**Outcome Evaluation**

**Policy Advisory and Support Units**

**In Lebanon.**

**Scrutiny of a Modality**

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**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

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| **SOME FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS** | **Suggested Actors** |
| **Findings**   1. UNDP/Lebanon was correct and well advised to take advantage of public questioning of the way PASU[[1]](#footnote-1) units were being used to revisit the modality[[2]](#footnote-2) six years after the last evaluation. 2. As before the modality continues to be seen by its clients and stakeholders in government, many of them very senior, to be useful and successful; at least as useful and successful as it was when last reviewed in 2005. 3. The modality has been used to respond an array of goals. It has apparently been successful in supporting continuity of administration as well as the institutional memory of key state actors during the several political evolutions of the last 18 years. It has permitted successive governments to create productive policy analysis support units and to staff them with high quality, highly motivated Lebanese staff, who enjoy better conditions than the regular civil service. 4. But the short run contribution of the relevant projects to fiscal and economic policy formulation and coordination was much greater than to the modality’s stated purpose: - public sector reform and strengthening of long term governmental capacity. As such the modality has been less successful in building sustainable capacity/promoting reform of the civil service in the Government departments where the modality has been used. This is attributed by many interlocutors to the political dynamics of the country**;** by some others to the perceived attitudes of some “UNDP” project staff. 5. There comes a time when any modality has run its course and ceased to be a productive and helpful instrument of progress. That may be the case here. This implies a need for UNDP to consider a rethink and for the government to review their approach both to the modality and to the issues it seeks to address. Hence the recommendations laid out in the section below. 6. Building the capacity of a society and that of a government are not necessarily the same and the modality may have been more successful in Lebanon and, thus be more easily defended and justified, for the former than for the latter. 7. Some at least of the projects appear to have made excellent and laudable use of, and provided valuable opportunities to, many articulate, qualified women. This may hold some lessons and a potential for making fullest use of national talent in any future modernisation of the civil service. 8. The 5% overhead on almost 100% national financing of the modality has allowed the UNDP office to offer a wider array of facilities and services to the society than would have otherwise been the case. 9. UNDP currently administers the High Cost Sharing Policy Advisory and Support Units but does not appear to manage them as one service function. It could. Please see Recommendations. 10. Total UNDP programme expenditure during the period of 2005-2010 was $168 million. Since 2005 expenditure on this modality has been $ 36,474,891.38. or approximately 22%. 11. In 2011 $6,291.610.90 was budgeted for the 5 PASU projects of which the UNDP contribution was $235,000. Thus almost all the resources, especially recently, have been/will be provided by Government. 12. Currently there are 104 Lebanese nationals employed in the five ministries via this modality.  Of these, 80 are classified as technical/professional and 24 as support staff.   **Recommendations for future policy and practice**   1. It is time for an evolution in UNDP’s support to civil service reform and responsive governance. 2. There is a concomitant need for an absorption strategy by Lebanese government and society, which should encompass any UNDP “exit strategy” from its current involvements. 3. Future Capacity Building efforts in which UNDP is involved programmatically should be focussed on, & managed for, a small number of clearly articulated goals; with a few, clear, meaningful progress /achievement indicators against which performance of all stakeholders should be monitored. They should be measurable, where possible, and cost effective, but at least observable by wise observers. 4. UNDP should i. Manage support to Capacity Building as a programme with clear programme goals not a series of projects, ii. contribute some of the budget, iii. manage for integration in relevant national systems. iv. use nationally staffed M&E to assess progress annually & provide quality control. 5. Where the government considers it absolutely essential, keep on supporting those policy advisory support functions as 100% nationally funded entities, managed as a service function by UNDP, retaining all of the advantages for Government currently attributed to the modality. 6. This could be spun off as an entirely nationally managed and financed facility but still using UNDP procedures and the salary differentials, if they are seen to be helpful overall. 7. In either case it may be useful to set up an advisory board, on which three or four senior and wise national representatives would sit alongside major donor representatives including the UNRC, overseeing the modality and offering a place for reflection and suggestion on the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of civil service reform, improved governance and policy making. The desired outcome is a changed climate of opinion and a different dynamic for strengthened governance and civil service. 8. If the scenario suggested in para 4 above is chosen, UNDP should manage the modality ultra-rigorously and transparently. Any non-essential support services and personnel that can be provided as well by the Government should be so provided. 9. The case for maintaining the policy analysis and support units currently collaborating with the PMO, MOF & MOET under such a scenario is plausible if those ministries desire it. The case for such collaboration with IDAL is less evident as such, but it is an evident capacity development project. 10. The leadership of OMSAR has indicated to the mission a preference for the approach outlined in para 3 above and this should be respected after the implementation of the necessary absorption of support and core function staff. Collaboration with IDAL could be maintained on a similar basis to OMSAR; both as targeted components in a capacity building programme. 11. Explore whether a systematic twinning between the regular civil service parts of the ministries and the PASUs might have some mutually beneficial effects. 12. UNDP may wish to manage High Cost Sharing Project Advisory and Support Units as one service function; using the 5% overhead on the 100% nationally financed activities to allow the office to continue to offer a wide and evolving array of facilities and services to the society but including programme and modality management. | UNDP/  GOL  UNDP/  GOL  UNDP/  GOL  UNDP  UNDP/  CDR  PMO/  MOF/ MOET/  OMSAR/  UNDP  UNDP/  GOL  UNDP/  GOL  UNDP/  OMSAR/ IDAL  PMO/  MOF/ MOET/  UNDP/  OMSAR  UNDP |

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**Introduction**

This report conveys conclusions of an external outcome evaluation of a modality covering five policy analysis and support units working with the Government of Lebanon. The focus is on the effectiveness of this modality as a means to bring about the modernization of the public administration and improvement of the performance of public institutions. The exercise was carried out in August 2011 in Beirut by an independent consultant from Solumanuk, Roger Maconick.

The evaluation was carried out in close consultation with the staff of the Governance programme of UNDP/Lebanon and the many very co-operative staff of the various units in the five ministries/ departments concerned.

Appreciation and thanks are due to certain key staff of the UNDP office all under the leadership of the UNRC Robert Watkins. Dr Hassan Krayem, Ms Gaelle Kibranian, Ms Amal Deek and Mr Alexan Djeredjian, all furnished very helpful administrative and substantive support before, during and after the mission, as did the managers of the five PASUs [[3]](#footnote-3) and their staff. The Terms of reference are attached as Annex 1 and the mission’s programme expertly arranged and amended by Ms Kibranian is appended as Annex 2. Annex 3 is a table from the previous (2005) assessment of these projects. Annex 4 is pour memoire. It refers to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators: - the Country Data Report for LEBANON, 1996-2009 accessible at <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/c124.pdf>. The information and analysis it contains is better viewed on line. Annex 5 is a list of abbreviations used in the report.

Any shortcomings, errors or omissions are entirely the responsibility of the author.

**Background**

This external outcome evaluation has beencommissioned by UNDP/Lebanon. It focuses on the modality of Policy Advisory and Support Units and in particular those supported by five related projects supporting the office of the Prime Minister (PMO), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of Economy and Trade (MOET), the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR)and the Investment Development Authority of Lebanon (IDAL) that seek to bring about the enhancement of the performance of public institutions and modernization of the public administration.

The modality was last examined by an evaluation on 2005. That exercise came to generally positive conclusions as to the seven interventions which it covered. Its findings and follow up to them will be explored below**.**

While it was timely to re-examine the modality after a period of 6 years, few UN offices have taken the initiative to use evaluation as a strategic tool as is the case here so the UNDP team and in particular the Governance programme are to be lauded for having taken the initiative in this instance.

The impulse was in this instance reinforced because there had been some adverse comment on the modality in some political circles in Lebanon and in the media. In addition some donors appear to have had marked views on the modality. So it was opportune to revisit the modality now and as an adviser in the US White House is alleged to have said, ‘a crisis is a terrible thing to waste’.

This evaluation seeks to determine the cumulative, synergetic and reinforcing effects of these five projects delivered outside the confines of a specific project or programme and of the modality itself in the interests of the enhancement of the performance of public institutions and modernization of the public administration.

It is concerned with the identification and solution of limitations, challenges and problems. It also seeks lessons learned

Specific topics that were required to be addressed include.

*Relevance: the degree to which the purpose of the programme remains valid and pertinent.*

*Efficiency: the productivity of the implementation process - how good and how cost effective the process of transforming inputs into outputs was.*

*Effectiveness: a measure of the extent to which a project or programme achieves its objectives through an effective use of its results.*

*Capacity development: a complex, long-term phenomenon requiring the development of human resources, the establishment of well-functioning organizations within a suitable work environment and a supportive socio-political environment.*

*Impact: an expression of the change actually produced in human development, environment, institutions, etc. as a result of the programme.*

*Sustainability: an assessment of the likelihood that the programme results will endure after the active involvement of UNDP has ended.*

**Measurement and Observation**

All of these 'characteristics”:- Relevance: Efficiency: Effectiveness: Capacity Development: .Impact: Sustainability, are complex, nuanced and mostly qualitative in the differences that can be seen, as well as the judgements that can be made about them, as far as their contributions to the enhancement of the performance of public institutions and modernization of the public administration are concerned.

So for measurement to occur and be recorded either the axes along which these characteristics are to be measured or observed exist and are generally accepted and the relevant data have been collected and recorded or they will have to be invented or inferred. In fact it appears that they do not exist and so there has been no systematic effort to collect data or record observations demonstrating progress or lack of it along any of these axes.

So while there have been plenty of project level evaluations over the years, this is the first real look at the modality as a modality and as a means of improving the performance of the public institutions and the modernization of the public administration. In the absence of measures, precise or even fuzzy, of improved performance and modernisation we are obliged to fall back on the judgment of the wise and even to encourage the creation of the wise, who would be it should be stressed be Lebanese.

The mission was unable to obtain any measures generally accepted by wise observers of Lebanese public institutions and the public administration of either the current level of performance of such institutions or the most acute needs for modernisation in the country.[[4]](#footnote-4) Similarly there do not appear to be generally articulated and accepted standards of governance for the sub region. It would be better if they did exist.

It would be helpful for the UNCT, which has governance as one outcome of the UNDAF for UNDP’s governance programme and it would be good for Lebanon, if work were to be initiated to create even provisional tentative estimates of such standards of governance. Both the process and the product would be useful. The question could be ‘given Lebanon’s history and current circumstances, what is it reasonable to expect of the governmental system and what is it reasonable to expect from the UN system in support of those expectations.’?

However there is some information generated externally to the country and to the sub- region, which for lack of anything better may have some relevance to deriving measures of the current level of performance of public institutions and therefore by extension some the most acute needs for modernisation in Lebanon. The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 published by the 2010 World Economic Forum lists: - inadequate supply of infrastructure, inefficient government bureaucracy, government instability/coups, corruption and policy instability, as the five most problematic factors for doing business. It ranks Lebanon 92 out of 139 on its Global Competitiveness Index. Another external source Transparency International examines a long series of factors (see Table 1).

Neither of these may be the best, most relevant measures of the performance of public institutions and or guides to the best path of modernization of the public administration but, in the absence of indicators created and maintained in Lebanon by Lebanese, which would be much more satisfactory, they do offer a starting point for a discussion, (hopefully an enlightened public discussion) of what the enhancement of the performance of public institutions and modernization of the public administration means in Lebanon now.

Table 1 Transparency International ratings for Lebanon (out of 139) [[5]](#footnote-5)

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| --- |
| *Property rights 57 /139 , Intellectual property protection 110/139, Diversion of public funds 116 /139 , Public trust of politicians 136 /139, Irregular payments and bribes 118 /139, Intellectual property protection 110/139, Public trust of politicians 136/139, Irregular payments and bribes 118 /139, Judicial independence 113/139, Favoritism in decisions of government officials 136/139, Wastefulness of government spending 130/139, Burden of government regulation 82/139, Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes 107 /139, .Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations 133/139, Transparency of government policymaking 104/139, Business costs of terrorism 136/139* |

The World Bank produces a set of Worldwide Governance indicators. The report on Lebanon for 1996-2009 is attached as Annex 4.[[6]](#footnote-6) That report suggests that Regulatory Quality has improved from 1996-2009 but that the Rule of Law and the Control of Corruption have not.

Given the above three observations emerge.

1. There are few independent and objective measures on which to base hard judgements by anyone on the modality’s contribution to the performance of public institutions and modernization of the public administration.
2. None of them are ‘produced/owned’ locally in Lebanon.
3. So it should be clear that any statements below about Governance, the performance of public institutions and modernization of the public administration are inferential and subjective for lack of a better and local alternative.

Also any such judgments have to be put forward in circumstances where virtually all local interlocutors encountered indicated their view that the performance of public institutions is inadequate and modernization of the public administration is greatly needed, but that consensus on exactly what to do and how to achieve it was even less common.

In various meetings the limiting factor was described by very well informed observers and practitioners as political will, a variable to which the UNCT and UNDP can contribute little directly, even if they are obliged to try.

Hence the central thrust of the few recommendations made below regarding this modality; regarding the desirability of the UNDP and UNCT contributing to changing the climate of informed opinion in Lebanon, recognising it is a society with challenges but also a wide and varied array of talented individuals, who collectively, given the ‘wisdom of crowds’, in this case very smart crowds should be capable or elaborating solid and sustainable solutions.

**THE CONCEPT AND THE SURROUNDING REALITY**

UNDP’s involvement in, and support to, governance is part of a larger and complex UN system engagement with the country and the region. So the big question is what role can the UNCT and UNDP play, given the serious resource constraint they face but also recognising the niche the UNCT and in particular UNDP appear to have carved out for themselves over the years, in particular in the area of governance.

In that sector the portion of collaboration between the government and UNDP currently under review is of long standing. It was initiated in two spurts, one in the early 1990s and the other early in the last decade. The stated intent has been to support the reform of the civil service with a view to offering to the diverse citizenry of Lebanon a variety of better services and greater transparency. But access to, and interaction with, privileged observers suggest there was/is an unstated objective namely to maintain/ restore the fabric of governance and government following the various shocks to the Lebanese polity and to promote continuity/ insure against instability in the event of future shocks. Thus circumstances and the confidence of the society endowed UNDP with the chance to play a catalytic role and there is evidence it did.

The policy analysis and support units (PASUs) (and the modality via which their services have been supported) covered in this outcome evaluation all display certain common features:- national implementation by Lebanese nationals; very high levels of government cost sharing; sensitive key governmental locations relevant to basic fiscal, economic and social policy and their implementation. ...

All of the ministries concerned it is asserted suffer from the less than optimal conditions of public service, which affect all parts of the civil service. Some of the ministries appear to be affected by/are in a position to influence the rent seeking behaviour, which some observers assert is a significant issue[[7]](#footnote-7) and which will affect the future common political economy of Lebanese society and which may be the most important long run underlying issue of governance; one where Lebanon’s needs and some of the UN system competences interface in the future. So there are strategic reasons for UNDP to maintain a relationship with them if it seeks to promote more transparent and inclusive governance and to stimulate public consideration and discussion of what to do and how to do it.

As noted, the modality was reviewed once before in 2005.That review found [[8]](#footnote-8)

*“that GOL's rationale for making such wide use of PAUs has largely to do with the fact that the UNDP PAU structure enables competitive salaries to be paid to project staff, which means that it is possible to attract highly skilled, well-motivated, and energetic staff who are capable of carrying out tasks that otherwise could not be performed at all by the government and other agencies in question or could not be performed to the same standard or with the same expedition. Critical also to the selection by GOL of this modality is UNDP’s strong reputation for: neutrality and impartiality; for cost-effective project management; and for its substantive capabilities in supporting governance and social reform. The PAU modality therefore enables the GOL to acquire much needed high quality assistance at arm’s length and at reasonable cost. As a whole, through a wide variety of support activities (of which 'policy advice' per se is only a relatively minor one of many), the portfolio of PAUs has made a substantial contribution to policy development and implementation at all levels in Lebanon, and hence to GOL and UNDP goals.”*

It further concluded that:

*The evidence presented in this report constitutes more than sufficient grounds for maintaining and strengthening the existing portfolio of projects. This evidence shows how the projects have supported significant institutionalised reform, provided the informational bases for policy making, and acted as incubators of exceptional leaders and technical experts. The latter is clearly revealed by the career trajectories of staff that leave projects and not least by the two cases where former PAU project managers have been appointed to Cabinet Minister in the GOL. Moreover, the strategic dispersion and embeddedness of existing PAUs in GOL institutions afford unparalleled opportunities for UNDP to support the comprehensive development of the Lebanese state at all levels of policy making and development. Prudent expansion of the modality into other GOL agencies that takes into account the success and organisational design factors discussed in the report is therefore highly recommended. This would give UNDP an unusually strategic support role in the development of Lebanon.[[9]](#footnote-9)*

So six years ago the modality received a positive endorsement at least as far as the portfolio of projects was concerned[[10]](#footnote-10). What was not apparently a matter of concern at that time was the overall performance of the modality as a means to advance an overarching goal: - better governance in Lebanon.

There is no indication that there was a programme approach to 'governance' and a special focus on managing UNDP support for Governance issues facing the society, as a coherent set of linked and mutually supportive actions with or without an underlying theory of change. Nor at that time does there appear to have been an interest in looking at the political conflict prevention/ peace building role the UN was also playing Therefore it is appropriate now to revisit the whole portfolio and the circumstances in which it has evolved to see what has been achieved overall and where if necessary it may be wise to go in the future

**Outcome and impact of the modality: Stated intentions and evolving purposes.**

UNDP has in the last two decades been collaborating with Lebanon in the areas of crisis prevention and this is an area which UNDP as a global organization plans to continue and strengthen its involvement [[11]](#footnote-11) in the future. So the UNDP supported interventions are early and positive examples of a long standing trend. In overall terms UNDP and the five projects in this modality did help to mitigate a crisis situation and did help to rebuild the fabric of governance in Lebanon

The PASU modality has however come under a range of criticisms recently. (Firstly there is the question of whether they are creating sustainable capacity in some key ministries as part of a strategy of long run civil service reform or isolated islands containing policy advisers serving several key Ministers but with no lasting foundation in, and links to, the staff and the ‘fabric’ of the ministries concerned. As such they were seen by some observers as alien, even inimical, to creation of sustainable capacity in the permanent civil service. Some of the critics have included major international donors to Lebanon.

Seen now in the current 'conjuncture', a very plausible case can be made that these units have provided continuity of government and an institutional memory in the ministries concerned, when there have been changes of government. Certainly senior political figures including ministers indicated as much in no uncertain terms to the mission as well as the serious concerns they would have were the modality be terminated for their ministry, abruptly and without a period of transition during which responsibilities would be progressively transferred to staff recruited under direct contracting procedures.

Given the earlier remarks about an unstated objective namely to maintain/ restore the fabric of governance and government following the various shocks to the Lebanese polity and to promote continuity/ insure against instability in the event of future shocks it is necessary to explore/revisit the origins of this modality. This set of actions has its origin in the several difficult periods over the last twenty years when Lebanese government and society had been subjected to severe shocks and the prime directive was to put the society and the government back together and in particular to get Lebanon's government and civil service working again after interruption.

UNDP was apparently a ready and obvious candidate to help to do so, quite often helping to implement the programmes of other donors as well as those actions funded by UNDP. In this process it began as an agency facilitating the programmes of others as well as pursuing its own. Over time the other actors have transitioned out of these areas leaving the UNDP in a position vis a vis some key parts of the government, much appreciated by some and much envied by others.

More importantly in terms of impact it does appear that the interventions enabled via this modality did help to maintain/restore the processes necessary to the working of the state and the fabric of governance and government, following the various shocks to the Lebanese polity. So they did promote continuity and that is a very real achievement. It is premature at this stage to make a judgement as to whether they have made a sufficiently sustainable contribution to strengthening the ministries concerned to help to insure against instability in the event of future shocks.

This being said programmes do sometimes acquire a logic and momentum of their own and to some extent that appears to have occurred here. It could be argued that part of the underlying premise of the modality has been made less relevant with the passage of time and that the situation has evolved without any of the institutions involved demonstrating an overt awareness of the change or indeed of being fully aware of it. This may alternatively have been an acceptance of the perceived limits of the situation. However in this instance paradise appears to be a moving target so the modality, the goals it seeks to advance and the actions it enables may need to move with the target.

More formally there is no recorded outcome for the programme cluster or for the modality, so there has been no monitoring system or monitoring at the level of the modality to follow either progress towards the substantive outcome, nor has there been apparent recorded attention to the efficiency and effectiveness of the modality as the mechanism for delivery of service beyond the evaluation that took place in 2005.

If there is no explicit outcome either for the mechanism as a mechanism or for the modality as a modality, it is difficult to make judgment about progress towards them. The best technique in such a circumstance is to see from the behaviour of those senior managers supervising the modality and the programme cluster how they interpreted/ acted on their imprecise mandate. The closest one can do that in the present circumstances is to look at the written record and to talk to those concerned.

Based on what the evaluation had been told it is possible (and necessary) to infer an Outcome and to the extent possible to disaggregate it into its different components. In this

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Box 2: 2010-2014 UNDAF content on Governance

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| Under **Outcome 1.2: Effective and accountable governance of state institutions and public administrations is improved**, the UNDAF (page 17) states that  “PCM and key line ministries and public institutions will continue to benefit from policy advice and support and capacity development for formulation, coordination and implementation of reform initiatives. At PCM, capacity development will focus on policy review and coordination and coordination of the government reform programme.  The Ministry of Finance will benefit from policy briefs and initiatives, macro-fiscal analysis to inform decision-making and legal advice, in addition to capacity development for donor coordination and for the preparation, coordination and management of public finance reforms. The Ministry of Economy and Trade will benefit from increased capacity to formulating trade and economic policies, small and medium-sized enterprises' (SMEs) policies and quality assurance policies and procedures. The capacity of the directorates of the Investment Development Authority of Lebanon (IDAL) to promote investment will be developed and accountability of services provision will be increased.  At the public administration-wide level, the increased priority to shift from administrative rehabilitation and modernization of the past years to administrative reform and development has become a matter of urgency in order to be aligned with the new requirements resulting from on-going financial, economic and social reforms. Improved governance will result from developing the effectiveness of various line ministries and public institutions, at both the central and local levels, through modernization of legislative mandates, management capacity development, and strengthening of technical capacity.  At the central level, UNCT will continue support for the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR) for further preparation of legislation for a citizen - and client-oriented administration, automation, and development of the management capacity in line ministries and public institutions. |

instance the best source for an overall view is the UNDAF[[12]](#footnote-12). The UNDAF, which covers the period 2010-2014, has five outcomes which the document identifies as being critical. The first outcome in the UNDAF is Democratic Governance and Institutional Development[[13]](#footnote-13). Under this outcome the actions laid out in Box 2 are foreseen.

Referring to and drawing on that part of the UNDAF the outcome for the Governance component of the programme could be inferred as follows:- **Public sector institution-building and capacity development.**

**Public sector institution-building and capacity development**

Overall as far as the development objective of Public sector institution-building and capacity development is concerned, notwithstanding the overt questioning in some political and journalistic circles, (part of the normal processes to be expected in a functioning democracy), some excellent work has been, and continues to be done, via most of the interventions. All government departments benefiting from this modality recognise its value and applaud its substance even if in one or two instances they raise questions about its process.

Part of the need for nuance in any judgements lies in the fact that the period of institutional and organisational stress has been going on for twenty years. The “received doctrine” is that the current “conjuncture” is inimical to civil service reform. If that is correct then the current strategy apparently successful at a ‘tactical’ level but not so clearly successful at the ‘strategic’ level of enabling and facilitating via “temporary & transitional” means, maintenance of an institutional memory and continuity of function in key parts of the administration may be said to be successful capacity maintenance at a time of institutional and organisational stress.

One of the critiques that has been made of the modality is that has gone on too long. But this extended involvement of UNDP in what was originally seen as a short to medium term phenomenon especially one a complex as governance in Lebanon does not necessarily invalidate it.

The first (very good) evaluation done in 2002 by the new Independent Evaluation office of the IMF was of prolonged use of IMF resources[[14]](#footnote-14) asking why an organisation mandated to deal with temporary balance of payments disequilibria should have continuous programmes for over 20 years in some 50 countries. This was an example (all too rare) of a senior multilateral organisation asking a strategic question about its performance.

So by the same token UNDP’s twenty year involvement in this area should not be seen as excessive per se. Governance is a difficult area rarely susceptible to having the approaches to its problems reduced to straightforward ‘projectisable’ solutions that can be completed in a tidy way and according to a tight schedule. The criteria for assessing the modality and the interventions it supports should be whether it has made the most of the opportunity to work in a key sensitive area and whether the resources could have been put to better use in other areas or in different approaches to the same problematique.

The modality’s contribution to Public sector institution-building and Capacity development may be seen at very least as having facilitated a holding operation whereby reform minded elements in Lebanon have been enables to bide their time and to await and try to create an opportunity to contribute more constructively to the dynamics of the situation.

In that context the creation of units such as the one that handled the introduction of the Value Added Tax or the one dealing with debt management can be seen as “project level” successes or limited scope of public administration reform, but the larger question whether UNDP was helping those reform minded elements in the society in the most creative way possible to modernise the public administration and improve of the performance of public institutions at large doesn’t appear to have been asked. This is something that might be expected to have come up in the preparation of the UNDP CPD or the UNDAF.

In terms of impact the picture is less distinct and more nuanced. Substantial success does appear to have been attained in terms of the unstated objective namely to maintain/ restore the fabric of governance and government following the various shocks to the Lebanese polity.

Also if the intent was to create long term capacity in the Civil service, that appears to have been successful in some areas notably in the Ministry of Finance notably in the Cadastral service, Customs, Fiscal transparency, debt recording and reporting as well as the VAT Unit.

So any claim that no capacity has been built appears to be less than entirely substantiated. However if reference is made to the previous evaluation of the modality in particular table 7.1 it appears that much of the capacity had indeed been initiated some years ago.[[15]](#footnote-15) The exceptions appear to be the unit managing the introduction of the Value Added tax and some of the work on Debt Management in the Ministry of Finance and the on-going work on WTO accession in the Ministry of Economy and Trade.

However in parallel with the building/strengthening of that capacity, it appears that certain practices may have arisen which were counterproductive. Setting up separate units clearly identified as UNDP projects with staff who were better paid[[16]](#footnote-16) and may have presented themselves as somehow better than regular ministry staff or could have been seen so by their colleagues in the ministries, may not have been the path most conducive to institutional happiness.

Such units may have met the needs of successive ministers for high quality professional solutions to problems they encountered. That gave the members of those policy analysis and support units status and power. Some units have accordingly been at pains to stress by small and large means their difference and distance from the regular civil service with which they were intended to collaborate and to help bring up to higher standards. In a telling aside one senior official suggested the project staff had created a ‘ridge’ between themselves and the rest of the ministry.

This has understandably created tensions with some Directors General and not been conducive to development of capable national civil service in the long run. The Directors General struggle with what is seen to be an inadequate civil service salary scale and a consequent very high level of vacancies. It would be quite natural even predictable if they were to resent independent or quasi-independent units. They may reasonably be expected to see such units as being beyond their control or even influence. In addition such units have apparently stressed that they are dealing with important challenging issues facing the Ministers from which the some Directors General were at sometimes excluded or neutralised for political reasons. Yet these topics were of interest for anyone with serious professional standards and abilities, and in which therefore the normal services of the ministry should have at least some supporting role.

Perhaps it may be possible going forward to choose for each Ministry one policy area where the regular ministry unit can be twinned with the PASU and they can work together with the dual objective of providing sound policy as well as political and technical advice to the Ministry concerned. But the real and explicit purpose would be to strengthen the regular department in the Ministry via learning by doing. Such twinning could be helpful in reducing the ‘ridges’ within the Ministries.

To summarise in terms of relevance: the modality and the actions it has permitted were valid and very pertinent at the outset; tactically they remain so but perhaps are no longer so strategically.

1. The modality and the actions it has permitted appear have been reasonably efficient even if it would have been more efficient if some of the categories of personnel had not been covered.[[17]](#footnote-17)
2. The modality and the actions it has permitted were effective sometimes exceedingly effective.
3. The modality and the actions it has permitted did create capacity. It is too early to tell whether that capacity will remain relevant and effective in well-functioning organizations within a suitable work environment and a supportive socio-political environment. Such circumstances do not yet exist in Lebanon and that is a large part of the problematique the modality addresses.
4. In terms of impact and of sustainability it is not yet clear whether any of the processes set in motion by the modality will ultimately prove fruitful. The modality has shown that it is possible to have quite satisfactory immediate results with reasonable effects without resolving the fundamental problem.
5. The question of what business the UNDP/UNCT is in and in particular the Governance programme needs to be asked again and answered as a joint process with key actors in Lebanon. That lesson is in the process of being drawn by those concerned. Hopefully it will be applied to future actions in the near future

**Gender equality,**

There are some a priori indications that a perhaps unexpected side benefit of the modality has been its success in the employment of technically able and qualified women. This has increased its impact and the utility of the services that it provides the society. There is some evidence that such employment has led to more flexible working conditions in some units permitting very talented and capable women with a variety of family needs and obligations to still provide vital services and play important roles.

In terms of potential for the future of Lebanese society there is now a cadre of women who have acquired a variety of skills in dealing with tricky and demanding social and economic/political issues. This is policy making at its hardest and most demanding and this means that going forward in any further modernisation of the Lebanese civil service and the improvement of the performance of public institutions, there is a pool of experienced and able women created via this modality, which can be drawn upon in filling senior positions in future. The modality is to be lauded for having facilitated this unexpected and unanticipated outcome.

Looking ahead this evaluation suggests two mechanisms to provide policy analysis and support functions and another to pursue administrative reform and capacity building. Future implementation of either the proposed mechanisms might choose to build on past achievements in the area of gender and make more active use of this aspect of the modalities workings.

**Value added of the programme cluster**.

In terms of value, since 2005 expenditure on this modality has been $ 36,474,891.38 or approximately 22% of the total UNDP programme expenditure of $168 million during the period of 2005-2010 In 2011 $6,291.610.90 was budgeted for the 5 PASU projects. The UNDP contribution is $235,000. Thus almost all the resources employed by this modality have been/will be provided by Government.

In terms of value added of it is of course difficult to make any judgment beyond the purely subjective. The products of technical collaboration capacity strengthening processes do not normally pass through a market or any equivalent mechanism for determining ‘value’.

In terms of the value of the outcomes the picture is mixed. Overall some excellent work has been, and continues to be done, via most of the interventions. All government departments benefiting from this facility recognise its value, applaud it and wish to continue to enjoy its benefits. This includes the ministers and senior advisers concerned. So at the level of perception there has been and continues to be considerable value added to Lebanon via this modality

In terms of impact on the modernization of the public administration and improvement of the performance of public institutions the picture is less distinct and more nuanced. To the extent that the intent was to create long term capacity in the Civil service, there have been successes in that units have been set up via the project notably in the Ministry of Finance.

However the “project teams” by creating a distance even separation from the regular civil service staff of the ministries have been less successful in terms of creating sustainable capacity, perhaps even counterproductive in that they are seen by colleagues in the regular civil service as over privileged and over paid. So the subjective judgment has to be that the modality has added significant value in the past but appears to be less so for the five individual ministries concerned as time goes on.

Mention needs to be made of the involvement with OMSAR which is of long standing. There is an articulate and apparently hardworking team in the office, which has produced significant out puts recognised by a series of reviews but the modernisation and reform of government has not been achieved. All of that is evidence militating in support of a rethink of the UNCT’s approach to the modernization of the public administration and improvement of the performance of public institutions.

While overall reform may not have been achieved, if the question is whether capacity has been created in Lebanese society then the answer is much more positive. There are quite senior individuals, who are now active in the private sector who gained experience and qualifications via working in this modality. This bolsters the argument that creating capacity in a society and in a government/ministry are not the same process and that the criteria for success or at least satisfaction are necessarily different. Future UNDP/UNCT involvement should be devoted to strengthening the capacity of the society, not just the government to modernize the public administration and to improve the performance of public institutions.

The “received doctrine” is that the current conjuncture is inimical to civil service reform. If that is correct then the current strategy, apparently successful, at least at the tactical level, of enabling via “temporary & transitional” means maintenance of an institutional memory and continuity of function in key parts of the administration may be said to be very successful capacity maintenance at a time of institutional and organisational stress, but it is less clear that that is strategically helpful in improving governance.

It is also less than clear that UNDP and the UNCT have a long run well-defined strategy for governmental reform and modernisation or that that links in a coherent way with the political, conflict prevention/ peace building responsibilities of the UN.

This could be taken to imply or rather confirm the hint made earlier that UNDP’s approach is not part of a long run strategy for modernization of the way Lebanon governs and manages itself both politically and administratively. Such an approach normally should be captured in the UNDAF and it could be monitored by the UN system and the UNCT using its own M&E responsibilities as a strategic occasion (if timely) to nudge the process forward in dialogue with relevant players in the Lebanese system

**WHAT IS TO BE DONE**

It is time for UNDP to rethink its support to civil service reform and responsive governance and this evaluation recommends that it evolves beyond the original approach combining direct support to key ministries with a simultaneous link to support to the Administrative Reform Strategy and Ministry.

There is a need to separate between policy advice and support functions on the one hand and the capacity building functions on the other hand. There have been as noted some signal achievements in what has been initiated. The task now is for Lebanese government agencies on their own to take them in hand and build on the foundation they have prepared together with UNDP.

This means there should be a strategy for Lebanese government and society, to absorb whatever has been created/set up with UNDP involvement via the PASU units in the PMO, MOF, and MOET. This process should encompass any UNDP “exit strategy” referred to in the TOR of this evaluation should situate itself within this absorption process.

It should be recalled that just as capacities evolve so do the needs for capacities change over time. So the absorption strategy should include a filter to examine whether all the capacities initiated or already up and running are still relevant to Lebanon’s current and future needs and whether the services they provide are best provided from within government or from Civil Society organisations or from private sector sources as the needs from its current involvements.

Alternatively the capacities may be obsolescent and should be terminated or amalgamated with more relevant departments. This is a task which falls within the remit of OMSAR but the work of OMSAR has been stymied so far by the lack of political consensus.

So maybe one of the most useful features of the absorption period should be for the Government and UNDP to examine jointly which capacities created over the last 20 years can be dispensed with and those which still need strengthening; filtering out unneeded capacity Another instance of a crisis being a terrible thing to waste.

In the present conjuncture UNDP PASUs are fulfilling “line” functions to 3 key ministries (PMO, MOF, and MOET). They are being carried out by Lebanese and almost all the resources come from the Government. As those functions are seen to be vital, stopping the delivery of those services would be unhelpful. But the logic of the situation suggests it would be in Lebanon’s interest for the government to fully fund these activities.

If they wish UNDP to manage the delivery of such services paying the standard overhead and using the UNDP procedures, which it is claimed are less cumbersome than the government’s, that is a choice for the national decision makers to take. There are ample examples of similar arrangements in the Latin America region and there is clearly scope for some South-South collaboration and for UNDP Beirut to consult with the concerned offices in Santiago, Quito, Buenos Aires and Brasilia.

The status of the projects in the MOF, PM and MOET needs to be revised forthwith to integrate any support staff currently on the UNDP budget within the public administration. The support staff would be integrated progressively but as part of a managed process of absorption as and at a rate which the Ministry concerned finds it to its advantage to do so.

It was suggested to the mission that the situation would best be resolved if the government is willing to take actions to recruit the very qualified people in these PASUs into the civil service structure and that this is doable through the legal direct contracting procedures.

In the interim, if the Government wishes UNDP to do so and also if UNDP is willing, then it should manage this PASU facility as a single service in the UNDP office, standardising procedures across different ministries/agencies stressing flexibility and responsiveness; hopefully planning for and contributing to an eventual take over by government of what should be an elite element in the civil service well practised in serving/meeting the needs of senior Lebanese politicians/ decision makers.

If UNDP does manage it as a single service function there would be one programme document covering delivery of the facility’s services. This should lead to simplification and harmonisation of the documentation and periodic reporting required.

There could be an annual review of the performance of the facility. It would ostensibly be concentrating in the first instance on major delivery issues if there are any. However it could be used as a strategic occasion; an entry point for a collective consideration involving senior decision makers from key ministries with the UN RC and relevant international partners of Lebanon, so as to provide a forum to discuss major issues of policy and governance rather than questions of project detail. If it is managed so that really important issues are discussed and there is a real opportunity to make progress on them then decision makers of sufficient seniority will attend.

Future Capacity Building efforts in which UNDP is involved substantively should similarly also be delivered preferably as a single programme covered by a single programme document and not by a series of projects. This programme can begin by taking up the goals currently being pursued by the collaborations with OMSAR and IDAL. This could mean having a single document for administrative reform covering collaboration with OMSAR but also any other bits of the government egg IDAL on which work is needed. Part of the future work with the CDR and the PMO might be to decide for which bits of government such work would be timely.

If having just one single programme is not feasible then having any programmes follow the division of responsibilities laid out in the UNDAF[[18]](#footnote-18) may be helpful in organising UNDP’s efforts and those of the other parts of the UN system in support of a common set of UN goals.

Any such Capacity Building programme(s) should be rigorously focussed on, and managed for, a small (not more than 3) number of clearly articulated and preferably strategic goals[[19]](#footnote-19);

with a few clear, meaningful progress/achievement indicators[[20]](#footnote-20) against which performance of all stakeholders should be monitored.

They should be measurable, where possible, but if, as often will be the case, measurement is difficult or too costly to be cost effective, then they should be at least observable by wise observers. The wise observers should wherever possible be Lebanese (resident or international) with knowledge of and experience in running organisations that deal with policy making and putting policies into effect

Specific options that have been put forward include

i. UNDP playing the role of service provider as the Lebanese government (Council of Minister or a special law) establishes a recruiting and training agency for the specially qualified Lebanese personnel to work in the key institutions as per the requests and needs of these institutions and the approval of the Council of Ministers. UNDP can manage this entity and these processes of recruitment ensuring quality control and professionalism, for GMS and until the Lebanese government take over.[[21]](#footnote-21)

ii. Gradual absorption[[22]](#footnote-22) of UNDP staff into regular government contracted staff

in agreement with the government, which should create and implement a mechanism for direct contracting of UNDP Projects’ staff according to the following timeline:

1. Absorb the Support staff first and within reasonable short period of time i.e. six months

2. Absorb the core function staff next (for example by establishing IT units, or Debt Management Units, etc…) over the next eighteen months

3. Restructure and strengthen the policy support and policy advisers with external short-term advisors as needed over thirty months

iii. A more likely practical synthesis combining options i and ii as the creation of this Lebanese Operational Unit for Development Services (LOUDS) would facilitate the processes of absorption of project staff as well as facilitate provision of services to other ministries and provide necessary capacity to deal with International Development Assistance and donors.

The idea of the Advisory Board would be relevant to and be applied for all options.

It also appears that some of the above could be combined

UNDP should also manage the programme and its monitoring very transparently in support of the programmes goals including integration of any emerging capacities in relevant national systems using its transparency, its management and its monitoring to support public consideration of, and involvement in, transparency.

**Creating and maintaining an enabling environment.**

If Government concurs with the arrangement outlined above and given the UNDP’s historical involvement in governance and administrative reform then it may be opportune for an advisory board to be set up composed of three or four senior recognised national experts on governance and building capacity as well as representatives of important international partners of Lebanon such as the Representative of the World bank, the EU delegate and the UN Resident Co-ordinator.

This would be an informal mechanism linked in its focus to the governance facility but which could choose to use those occasions as an opportunity to comment on any aspect of governance, the modernization of the public administration and improvement of the performance of public institutions. One Lebanese authority suggested a Governance Outcome Board and that sounds like a good idea

As indicated earlier a number of donors to Lebanon have had critiques of UNDP’s role in this area. Whatever their reasoning and motivation, the Advisory Board does provide the Government and UNDP to convene all concerned around a coherent agenda, to reframe the problematique in terms most helpful to better performing institutions and governance in Lebanon and to promote synergy of intent and action by all concerned to those ends.

UNDP and the UNCT as part of their monitoring of the UNDAF would normally look at major outcomes annually and this would provide an opportunity for them to involve relevant experts, Lebanese and external ones to look every year at whether these has been progress. On such occasions[[23]](#footnote-23) they could invite other major international partners of Lebanon including those represented in the advisory board to participate in a joint examination of whether there has been any collective progress in resolving this very difficult and challenging set of issues.

Another initiative that those interested in good governance might consider as part of an enabling environment for inclusive participation, greater government effectiveness and accountability might be a greater involvement with the media. This evaluation was partly prompted by media attention. Informal and very brief contacts with some journalists in Beirut indicated normal curiosity and some normal journalistic scepticism but no deeply irrational critiques as is sometimes the case elsewhere.

In the early experimental days (mid 1980s) of the UNDP Evaluation Office, serious consideration was given to using some thoughtful and respected journalists to carry out evaluations in some countries. Nothing came of it for complicated reasons of organisational dynamics but given the availability in the country of active writers articulate and knowledgeable about the challenges facing Lebanon then this would be a non-traditional but transparency promoting approach to evaluation, which might illuminate the subject and provoke an enlightened and eventually productive public discussion of the issues in governance, accountability and governmental effectiveness.

The impression of a short visit to Beirut is that there is a need for a paradigm shift when dealing with how to approach better governance. The current approach has considerable achievements to its credit but it has not yet achieved the essential and on-going change that is desired and there is general concurrence that it cannot overcome the current inertia in the system. Hence comes the need for a new approach. The most serious problem with past approaches is not that they were wrong or poorly executed. They just have not worked yet.

It may be that the shift needed is to move beyond considering the politics of the desires and the expectations of the multiple minorities in Lebanon, a task which is essentially backward looking and so reflects the political history of the polity so far. It may be timely for the UNCT, as presaged in the UNDAF[[24]](#footnote-24) to initiate a discussion of the institutions, organisations and capacities needed for equal citizens to lead capable lives in a secular and fair state. Depending on the dynamics of that discussion it could then be reflected in the institutional development that is undertaken as well as in a different approach to the issues of meritocracy and results based management and performance.

This is an area that has been dealt with in the 4th NHDR on State and Citizenship and will be so again in the next one which addresses Transcending Confessionalism. It may be important therefore in the transformation of the ‘administrative reform’ paradigm to link the recommendations included in the next NHDR with the discussions suggested above and a series of specific actions emerging from that process.

**Plan of action for the PASUs in the key Lebanese Public Institutions**

1. The most important finding is that the modality of the PAUs has served its purpose in providing for missing capacity and policy support, but it has not been conducive to administrative reform.
2. The central objective then is to link UNDP support to administrative reform and transfer of skills to the Lebanese Administration as much as possible in the shortest time possible.
3. In order to do that, there is a need to separate between Capacity filling and development and Policy advice and Support. IDAL and OMSAR are projects that have been filling missing capacity for the Lebanese government. There is a need to limit the timeframe to a maximum of three years with well planned activities to successfully transfer capacity to the government by that time. IDAL by end of 2013, and OMSAR by end of 2014. At the same time, the capacity development activities at the other projects at MoF. MoET and PMO are to be better focused and integrated with the Lebanese Administration and re-defined in a short timeframe to transfer skills to the Lebanese Administration at the end of this time. (End of 2014 by the latest)
4. The Projects at MoF, MoET and PMO are mainly Policy Advice and Support projects and thus the following list of options are drafted to be discussed with the Lebanese National Counterparts:
5. UNDP playing the role of service provider as the Lebanese government (Council of Minister or a special law) establishes a recruiting and training agency for the specially qualified Lebanese personnel to work in the key institutions as per the requests and needs of these institutions and the approval of the Council of Ministers. UNDP can manage this entity and these processes of recruitment ensuring quality control and professionalism, for GMS and until the Lebanese government take over.
6. Gradual absorption of UNDP staff into regular government contracted staff

In agreement with the government, which should create and implement a mechanism for direct contracting of UNDP Projects’ staff according to the following timeline:

1. Absorb the Support staff first and within reasonable short period of time i.e. six months

2. Absorb the core function staff next (for example by establishing IT units, or Debt Management Units, etc…) over the next eighteen months

3. Continue providing policy support after Restructuring and strengthening the policy support component and policy advisers with external short-term advisors as needed.

1. A synthesis combining options i and ii would be ideal if possible. The creation of this Lebanese Operational Unit for Development Services (LOUDS) would facilitate the processes of absorption of project staff as well as facilitate provision of services to other ministries and provide necessary capacity to deal with International Development Assistance and donors.
2. If Government concurs with the arrangement outlined above then it may be opportune for a technical committee to be formed from the proposed representatives (PCM, CSB, OMSAR, and UNDP) to facilitate both the LOUDS and the absorption plan. Also, an advisory board to be set up composed of three or four senior recognized national experts on governance and building capacity as well as representatives of important international partners of Lebanon such as the Representative of the World bank, the EU delegate and the UN Resident

Coordinator. This would be an informal mechanism linked in its focus to the governance facility but which could choose to use those occasions as an opportunity to comment on any aspect of governance, the modernization of the public administration and improvement of the performance of public institutions

**ANNEX 1**

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|  | **TERMS OF REFERENCE**  **Individual Consultant**  Outcome Evaluation – Policy Advisory and Support Units in Lebanon |

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| **I. Position Information** | | |
| Title of the contractor: International Consultant  Duty Station: Beirut  Section/Unit: UNDP Lebanon/Governance Programme | Source of Funding: UNDP  Duration of Employment: One (1) month Reports to: UNDP Resident Representative and Governance Programme Manager. | |
| II. Scope/Objective | |
| As part of its efforts to enhance strategic partnership with the Lebanese government, institutional capacity development of the Lebanese administration and effective implementation of reforms, UNDP is commissioning an external outcome evaluation**,** which sets out tocover a range of related projects that serve to bring about the enhancement of the performance of public institutions and modernization of the public administration.  Thus, this outcome evaluation seeks to determine the cumulative synergetic and reinforcing effects of related projects delivered outside the confines of a specific project or programme.  In concrete manner, it seeks to evaluate the common modality of the Policy Advisory and support units applied to these projects and their relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, capacity development, impact and sustainability. Thus, this outcome evaluation is also concerned with the identification and solution of limitations, challenges and problems.  Relevance: the degree to which the purpose of the programme remains valid and pertinent.  Efficiency: the productivity of the implementation process - how good and how cost effective the process of transforming inputs into outputs was.  Effectiveness: a measure of the extent to which a project or programme achieves its objectives through an effective use of its results.  Capacity development: a complex, long-term phenomenon requiring the development of human resources, the establishment of well-functioning organizations within a suitable work environment and a supportive socio-political environment.  Impact: an expression of the change actually produced in human development, environment, institutions, etc. as a result of the programme.  Sustainability: an assessment of the likelihood that the programme results will endure after the active involvement of UNDP has ended.  The standard objective of an outcome evaluation is to extract lessons learned. It includes:   1. Assessing progress towards the outcome and factors contributing to the outcome 2. Assessing key UNDP contributions 3. Assessing capacity development and transfer of skills and knowledge 4. Assessing limitations and challenges 5. Assessing cost and benefits. 6. Proposing changes to enhance effectiveness 7. Propose a gradual plan for an exit strategy for UNDP projects.   **GUIDELINES**  **BASIC DEFINITIONS**  Policy Advisory/Support Units (PASUs) have operated for a number of years in Lebanese ministries and public institutions, including:   1. Ministry of Finance (MoF) (1993) 2. Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR) (1994) 3. Prime Minister’s Office(PMO) (2001) 4. Ministry of Economy and Trade (MOET) (2001) 5. Investment Development Authority of Lebanon (IDAL) (2002)   **The Policy Advisory and Support Unit:**  The PASUs were established initially in the aftermath of the 15-year civil war in Lebanon that ended in 1990. With a view to “jump-starting” the economy after the war and helping set the country on a sustained path towards accelerated recovery and growth, the first of the PASUs was established in the Ministry of Finance in 1993, and subsequently at OMSAR in 1994 and replicated at the PMO, MOET and IDAL in the 2001-2002 period.  The PASU consists, in essence, of a cadre of the highest calibre of Lebanese professionals (expatriate or resident) not readily available from within the civil service, whose expert advice and specializations are brought to bear on national and sectoral policy priorities established by the Government and such knowledge and skills are to be transferred to the local administration. This cadre of experts is recruited competitively in accordance with UNDP rules, regulations and procedures, with full transparency and accountability. The PASU can also make available a pool of international or regional subject-matter specialists for specific consultancy services, as and when required.  These projects came as a direct response to the post- war economic and fiscal challenges, but over a period of ranging from 1-2 decades, the projects continuously adjusted their deliverables to meet the emerging needs of the administration. They developed from being a post conflict administrative recovery arm in 1993-1994, to currently playing a greater role of formulating and implementing different cumulative administrative, fiscal trade and economic reforms. These projects have as global objectives to build a 21st century administration, improve service quality to citizens, and ensure long term structural reforms. The strategic significance of all the PASUs is that through their inter-relationships and synergies they help to establish and address inter-sectoral linkages and to strengthen inter-Ministerial coordination across sectors, thus reinforcing the coherence and effectiveness of the overall development process in Lebanon.  The projects vary in size, capacity, role and conditions. However, they all revolve around four main functions:  **I. Providing policy advice**   * Trusted advisor at the decision-making level * Developer of policy analysis tools * Coordinating and building consensus on national policies   **II. Preparing and implementing reform projects**   * Project formulation * Best practices and their replication (for instance, VAT and revenue reforms) * Institutionalization of reforms * Business analysis, business process re-engineering, and implementation of automation,   **III. Enhancing existing capacities**   * Donor coordination. * Legislative review and reform * Effective communication and negotiations with foreign parties. * Legal Support (International parties and agreements)   **IV. Providing for missing capacities and building new capacities**   * Support to essential functions of the public administration, which do not exist or cannot be fulfilled in the absence of deep administrative reform (institutional structure does not exist; specific functions/capacity does not exist…). For instance, policy analysis and coordination, process re-engineering and automation; debt management. * Consolidation and harmonization of data (Statistical Information). * Promoting UNDP developmental Agenda.   **V.** In addition to the above, the projects have the following value added:   * Resource mobilization and multi-year funding and planning guaranteed * Highly skilled professionals organized in high performance teams * High flexibility combined with high efficiency * Knowledge transfer and acquisition based on global experience and local adaptation   **The comparative advantage: Why UNDP was requested to implement the PASUs?**   * Continuous presence in the country and a credible development partner * Focuses on national priorities and objectives * Ensures flexible and transparent execution mechanisms, with full accountability. * Secures required technical capacities with focus on recruitment of highly qualified nationals. * Catalyzes reform and transformation towards equitable development, with human development at its core. * Governance expertise and focus on institutional and national capacity strengthening * Efficient implementation of government and donor funded projects * Produces relevant, effective, and sustainable projects outputs * Managerial efficiency and best practices * Promotes responsiveness of government to its citizenry and civil society participation in shaping public policy * Global Knowledge Network * Strategic Leadership of the UN Development Group at HQ and in the country   **OUTCOME Definition and Projects**  **Outcome 1** Performance of public institutions enhanced; public administration modernized  **Indicator:**  % of Paris III commitments implementation  **Baseline:**  Paris III reforms  **Target:**  Fiscal and economic policies developed and coordinated Projects  |  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | **Project Description** | **Project ID** | **Start Date** | **End Date** | | Capacity Development for Fiscal Reform and Management  Technical Assistance for Fiscal Management and Reform | 00013397  00077489 | 1993  1-Feb-11 | 31-Jan-11  31-Jan-14 | | Support to Decision Making at the PM Office | 00013393 | 1-Jan-03 | 31-Dec-11 | | Support to the Ministry of Economy and Trade  Institutional Assistance for Economic Policy and Trade - Phase II | 00013381  00077082 | 1-Jan-01  1-Jan-11 | 31-Dec-10  31-Dec-13 | | Sustaining and Enhancing the Institutional Capacity of IDAL | 00013389  00076879 | 1-Jan-02  1-Jan-11 | 31-Dec-10  31-Dec-13 | | Support to Civil Service Reform | 00013388 | 1994-2000  2000-2008  2009-2011 | 31-Dec-11 |  Brief description of the projects that have contributed to the outcome **Ministry of Finance (MoF)**  The UNDP PASU at the MoF was established in 1993 and has since then been providing technical assistance for capacity development for fiscal reform and management. In the last phase (2003-2010), salient achievements were made towards effective and efficient fiscal management in terms of policy initiatives responding to the economic agenda of the Paris III reform programme, on the one hand, and improved efficiency, transparency and accountability of the civil service and the establishment of new services that respond to the role of a service-oriented Ministry of Finance (MoF), on the other. The current and most recent project (2011-2013), which was developed following a project evaluation, aims at supporting the Ministry through policy advisory and technical support and through the subsequent phases of preparation, implementation and monitoring of the reform plan.  **Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR)**  Since its inception in 1994, the PASU at OMSAR focuses on enhancing the targeting and sustainability of its assistance to the national reform agenda, through a thorough results framework. UNDP supports OMSAR in functions that reinforce national efforts to achieve its objectives of developing management capacities of key administrations, reducing the size and cost of the Public Administration, modernizing legislations, and implementing a citizens’ oriented administration.  **Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)**  The PASU at the PMO was established in 2001 and focuses on securing economic, legal and technical assistance in order to support more effective coordination with government institutions, hence making policy and programme implementation more efficient.  **Ministry of Economy and Trade (MoET)**  Since 2001, UNDP’s PASU is present at the MoET and substantive revisions were carried out in 2004 and 2005. An external evaluation was carried out for the period between 2001-2010 assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of the Project in terms of achieved outputs and results. The evaluation proposed improvements through adjustments and implementation approach strategies. Accordingly an improved project design has been undertaken. The overall objective of phase II of this project will remain the same: to build-up and strengthen the institutional capacities of the Ministry of Economy and Trade with respect to economic policy formulation, public sector management and control, private sector development and other related matters falling within the competences of the Ministry.  **Investment Development Authority of Lebanon (IDAL)**  The UNDP Project at IDAL was set-up in 2003 in the form of a PASU to provide IDAL with strategic and advisory support in performing its functions. Over the years, the role of the UNDP Project has taken a more operational focus to fill the shortage in IDAL staff and technical capacity.  Based on an assessment conducted in August-September 2010, the new UNDP Project at IDAL will aim at providing IDAL with the required capacity to developed and implement its 3-year strategic plan. The project is providing the institutional set-up needed for IDAL to improve the delivery of its key functions and develop the capacity for a long-term sustainable structure. The institutional mechanism of this project is leveraged by increasing the number of staff and strengthening technical capacity. Today, some of IDAL’s key functions including investment facilitation, marketing and promotion and investor targeting are undertaken by UNDP staff, despite occasional mismatch between skills required and skills available. This was the result of a gradual reduction in IDAL staff and inability to hire new staff from the Civil Service Directorate. | |

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| III. Functions / Key Expected Outputs\* |
| Rationale for UNDP's outcome evaluation and why it is now being evaluated? The subject of PASUs was reviewed and assessed a few times in the past years, including an external outcome evaluation in 2005. Given the longevity of some of these projects and their high cost sharing by government, these projects were part of the debate recently between government and opposition. This proposed evaluation by UNDP in collaboration with all concerned Ministries aims to:   1. Assess the activities, outcome and impact of the above projects. 2. Assess the value added of these projects and some of their limitations. 3. Assess their contribution to public sector reform, fiscal and economic policy formulation and coordination. 4. Assess the modality of the PASUs, including its sustainability, transfer of skills and knowledge, rate of success of the institutional capacity development and cost-benefit analysis. 5. Assess the limitations and challenges these projects have faced. 6. Propose changes and recommendations that would increase their added value and sharpen their focus on institutionalization of reforms and sustainability, including a gradual exit strategy for UNDP for a successful transfer of knowledge and skills to the relevant public administration.  The scope and Methodology of the outcome evaluations:  1. The methodology of this outcomes evaluation should be based on quantitative and qualitative criteria; it should also be based on a participatory approach with the major stakeholders. The study may be based on the following:    * Documentation review of projects, previous reviews, relevant progress reports, etc.. (desk study);    * Interviews with relevant stakeholders in the ministries and UNDP Project managers and staff;    * Field visits to the ministries;    * Questionnaires disseminated to staff and local administration;    * Focus groups and working meetings to discuss the draft report with stakeholders. 2. Composition: The mission will be composed of one international expert and one national support staff, who would be made available for the duration of the mission.      1. Duration: The mission will conduct a thorough review of all relevant documents made available prior to starting the mission by e-mail or on paper by UNDP Lebanon. 2. The total duration of the mission will be 4 weeks. This includes 2 weeks of field visits in Lebanon and 2 weeks for report drafting. The consultant is expected to present the draft report to a wider audience including national stakeholders to finalize the evaluation report. 3. The consultant, while in Lebanon will work five days a week (Monday to Friday). Total working days will be 10 (excluding travel and weekends). This will be in addition to the two weeks abroad for desk review and final report.      1. Support in the field: UNDP will be responsible for preparing the full agenda of the mission, in consultation with the relevant national stakeholders, and to organize local transportation and logistics in support of the mission. It is anticipated that the mission will meet the key partners including:    * H.E. the Prime Minister and Ministers;    * Senior management of Ministries and IDAL;    * UNDP management and staff.    * Other relevant stakeholders  Deliverables Based on the above the Consultant will be required to produce the following deliverables   * Conducting a comprehensive evaluation of the policy framework, outcome, projects and the relevance of the PASUs to them; * Developing success/failure criteria for the modality of the PASUs * Recommendations for changes and modifications if applicable. * Detail outlining of a gradual plan for UNDP exit strategy from these projects. * A draft report for review by UNDP and the concerned stakeholders in a focus group meeting with the consultant; * The Final Report with final proposed recommendations. |
| IV. Competencies |
| * Demonstrated academic and professional background, including work experience with governmental institutions; * Extensive experience with and knowledge of governance, fiscal and economic policies, and public administration reform programmes; * Excellent interpersonal, communication (oral and written) , and report writing skills; * Excellent planning, organizational, conceptualization, and analytical capacity; * Dedication to the principles of UNDP, especially of its mission, vision, values, and working in a culture of neutrality; * Demonstrated leadership and self-management; and, * Ability to work with a diversity of counterparts and stakeholders, including national and international actors and academic experts. |

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| **V. Recruitment Qualifications** | |
| Education | At least a postgraduate Degree in Economics, Finance, Public Administration, Business Administration or related field. |
| Experience | At least ten (10) years of professional experience in public sector reform, fiscal and economic policies, and related research, and in Monitoring and Evaluation |
| Language Requirements | Proficiency in English; knowledge of Arabic and French is an asset but not required. |

**ANNEX 2**

**Tentative Schedule for Evaluation Mission for PAUs**

**August 8, 2011 – August 26, 2011**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Monday** | **Tuesday** | **Wednesday** | **Thursday** | **Friday** | **Saturday** |
| **08/08/2011**  **PM**  2:30 Meeting at UNDP with Management (RR, CD and DRR)  4:00 Meeting with Project Managers | **09/08/2011**  **PM**  3:00 Meeting with UNDP PCM  **TBC (either 2:00 or 4:00 PM) Meeting with**  **PM Advisors** | **10/8/2011**  **PM**  1:30 Meeting with UNDP MoF at 3rd Floor Conference Room at MoF  3:00 Meeting with  Ms. Nada Al Nashif  Former DRR /Regional director of ILO– at ILO  4:30 Meeting with Ministry of Finance  (Minister, Advisers and DG) | **11/08/2011**  **AM**  11:00 Meeting with UNDP MoET at MoET, Block 2 6th Floor  12:00 Meeting with IDAL  (Chairman)  **PM** | **12/08/2011**  **AM**  10:00 Meeting with UNDP IDAL  12:00 Meeting with H.E. Min Jean Oghassabian at the Parliament (Office 512) 03-339635.  **PM**  3:00 Meeting With Former UNDP RR  Yves de San at UNDP |  |
| **15/08/2011**  *Meeting with UNDP*  11:00 Meeting with Rima Khalaf, ESCWA | **16/08/2011**  **AM**  11:30 Meeting with OMSAR  (Minister and Advisers)  **PM**  1:30 Meeting with UNDP OMSAR at UNDP project premises at OMSAR. | **17/08/2011**  **AM**  **PM** | **18/08/2011**  **AM**  11:00 Meeting with H.E. Min. Raya Haffar and Mr. Mazen Hanna (former PM Advisor) Speers near Future TV 01-373680  **PM**  3:00 Dr. Wafa Sharafeddine, CDR  5:00 PM Meeting with H.E. Min. Jihad Azour at Booze & Co – Park Avenue II, 5th Floor. 03-679777 | **19/08/2011**  **AM**  10:30-12:30 Focus group meeting with National Experts (Adnan Iskandar, Kamal Hamdan, Randa Antoun, and Munir Rached) at UNP 4th Floor Conference Room  12:30-1:30 Meeting with Alain Biffani, DG at Ministry of Finance  **PM**  **2:00** Meeting with Ministry of Economy and Trade  (Minister, Advisers and DG)- at the Ministry 01-981940  3:30 Meeting with MP Ibrahim Kanaan/ committee | **20/08/2011**  **PM**  12:00 (Noon) Meeting with H.E. Dr. Khaled Kabbani, Civil Service Board |
| **22/08/2011**  **AM**  10: 30 – 12: 30 Meeting with media figures (Adnan Hajj –assafir, Violette Balaa –Annahar, mohamad Zbeib –Al-Akhbar) at UNDP  **PM**  1:00 Meeting with Lamia Mobayed Bsat, Institute of Finance  3:00 Meeting with UNDP head of programmes. | **23/08/2011**  **AM**  10:00 Meeting with Mr. Hadi Lardi, Head of World Bank  11:30 Meeting with Mr. Diego Escalona Paturel & Mr. Bozkurt Eralp- EU Saifi  **PM**  3:00 PM Dr. Jim Barnhart USAID Head of Mission, US Embassy- Awkar | **24/08/2011**  **AM**  10:00 Meeting with H.E. PM Fouad Sanioura – at his office (Sadat Tower)  **PM**  2:30 Meeting Sawsan Masri-Raghed Assi @ UNDP | **25/08/2011**  **AM**  11:00 Meeting with Project Mangers  **PM**  1:00 Meeting With Head of the Administration and Justice Parliamentary Committee Mr. Robert Ghanem at Parliament  *Meeting with Management at UNDP* | **26/08/2011**  **AM**  10:30 Final Wrap-up Workshop with national counterparts and Project Managers to present the draft report @PMO  **PM**  *Meeting with UNDP Senior management* |  |

**Annex 3**

| **MODIFIED TABLE 7.1:** FROM PETER BLUNTS 2005 REPORT  INSTITUTIONALISED REFORM & FORMS OF POLICY SUPPORT (BY PAU) | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Project’s**  **Institut**  **-ional**  **Affiliation** | **Levels of Reform** | | | **Forms of**  **Policy**  **Support** |
| **National or Systemic**  **Reform** (High level policy) | **Single Institutional**  **Reform**  (Middle level policy) | **Sub-Institutional**  **Reform**  (Lower level policy) |
| **1. IDAL** |  | - AGROMAP agreement  - IDB Export Financing Scheme (in progress) | - Reform of the accounting system at IDAL | - Data collection & dissemination  - Preparation & publication of reports  - Commissioning of research (e.g., agriculture & textiles)  - Investor perception study  - Evaluation studies for Export Plus programme & ‘one stop shop’  - Sectoral studies  - Legal advice on labour market structural issues |
| **3. MOET** | - Production of national accounts (1998-2002)  - Consumer protection law  - Competition law  - Food safety law  - International trade & licensing law  - EFTA agreement  - WTO accession  - Gulf Cooperation Council free trade agreement | - Significantly enhanced overall performance capability of the Ministry | - One stop shop  - Consumer protection hotline  - Redesign of consumer protection function  - Establishment of computerised MIS system  - Development of SME support unit | - Economic data collection & analysis  - Research studies  - Preparation, publication, & distribution of reports |
| **4. MOF** | -Tax reforms resulting in increased revenues including introduction of VAT  - Customs reforms resulting in increased revenues  - Expenditure & Treasury management resulting in a rationalisation of expenditures  - Improved debt management resulting in reduced cost and risk  - Land registry reform resulting in increased revenues  - Public pension system reform resulting in reduced liabilities  - Capital market development including listing of Eurobonds on Beirut Stock Exchange  - Reform of Treasury’s Financing Activities including annual issuance strategy of Eurobonds  - Agreements for the Promotion and Protection of Investments & Convention for the avoidance of double taxation (since project inception, a total of 31 investment agreements & 24 tax conventions)  - Representing regional positions & views at international forums  - Paris II fund raising from donor countries & institutions (more than $2.6 billion raise from 7 participating states)  - Modernisation of the government payment system | - Significantly enhanced overall performance capability of the Ministry  - Modernised tax administration & better services to taxpayers  - Modernised Customs Department  - Integrated Treasury and budget system & better support to other administrations  - Modernised pension management system & better services  - Automated land registry system  - Establishment of a Large Taxpayer Office & a Tax Roll Unit  - Customs process improvement including elimination of in-house data entry meaning that clients now interact with customs electronically from their own offices | - Capacity development programme for young civil servants  - Skills transfer to the Budget Directorate, Treasury Directorate, & Debt Department  - Training of auditors  - Performance improvement planning at the Built Property Tax Unit  - Capacity building in customs risk management  - One stop clearance at Port of Beirut  - NAJM software upgrades  - Automation of 3 major customs offices  - Training of customs staff on automated operations  - Automation of 9 title registers throughout the country | - Monitoring, analysis & forecasting of public finance statistics  - Evaluation of measures including privatisation, securitisation, debt management, expenditure, & tax reforms  - Management of relationships with IFIs, major donors, & Ratings Agencies  - Review of baseline assumptions of medium term macroeconomic framework in order to assess implications of different policy options  - Updating of revenue & expenditure forecasts  - Review of financing constraints of different policy options  - Studies of the legal & administrative feasibility of policy options  - Advice to the Minister & Ministry on the basis of the above  - Preparation & publication of a wide range of reports  - Monitoring of fiscal performance  - Tracking of developments in international trade  - Conduct of research studies (e.g., SOEs; corporate governance; EDL & hedging; National Social Security Fund; Public Institutions for Housing)  - Assistance with development of World Bank Country Assistance Strategy for 2005-2008  - Promotion of partnerships with other institutions such as the World Bank Institute  - Production of guides & handbooks  - Development of models such as the debt cash flow model for risk management |
| **6. OMSAR** | - Completion of job descriptions & job classifications for all civil servants  - Introduction of uniform standards for the purchase by government of ICT  - Modernisation of government procurement procedures & associated draft laws  - Ombudsman law, and law on citizens right to access information; & an anti-corruption law  - Production of citizens’ charters on heritage; public funds; & public safety  - Formulation & implementation of a national e-strategy for Lebanon | - Establishment of performance evaluation system for teachers  - Revision of the testing system at the Civil Service Board  - Provision of ICT equipment & infrastructure & software to the control agencies & Ecole Nationale d’Administration  - Implementation of PIP at the Ministries of: Finance; Environment; Economy & Trade; the Electricity Authority; & the Water Authorities of Beirut & Barouk  - Draft laws on the mandates & structures of a number of ministries such as Energy & Hydraulics; Social Affairs; Tourism; Transport & Public Works; & Public Health | - Provision of training in management & ICT to different parts of the civil service  - Various forms of support to decentralisation to municipal governments  - Enhancement of the information portal at the Central Office for Administrative Information  - Development of the Transactions & Work Flow System at the control agencies & the Ministry of Public Health  - Simplification of procedures at Ministries of: Public Health; Education & Higher Education; & Finance | - Conduct of studies  - Development of databases in several ministries & institutions  - Dissemination of a legal guide for municipal works  - Technical support in ICT & MIS |
| **7. PMO** | - Following-up on key legislation in such fields as: tourism, construction and insurance, public safety, standards and norms, and public property  - Liaise between the PMO and government and external agencies in areas of national significance  - Facilitation of major infrastructure project implementation | - Significantly enhanced overall performance capability of the PMO | - Possible catalyst for the development of a Cabinet Office  - Establishment of an ICT system that is compatible with CDR and Ministries  - Automation of the document management system | - Assistance with development of World Bank Country Assistance Strategy for 2005-2008  - Liaison with IFIs, major donors, & Ratings Agencies who wish to meet with the PM; & support to donor conferences  - Conduct of research, production of reports, drafting of speeches for the Prime Minister  - Coordinating relations with other Government agencies and Ministries  - Examination of different poverty alleviation strategies in collaboration with the World Bank  - Donor coordination in such areas as agriculture, industry, health, tourism, and inward investment  - Review of legislation  - Monitoring of major infrastructure projects  - Maintenance of databases on, for example, infrastructure projects, government expropriations, & non-Lebanese residents  - Feasibility studies for major investment projects |

Annex 4

World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators:- the Country Data Report for LEBANON, 1996-2009

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| This Data Report provides a summary of the six aggregate governance indicators, together with all of the publicly-available disaggregated data on which the aggregate indicators are based. The underlying data as well as methodological issues are described more fully in "The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology, and Analytical Issues" (September 2010). |
| The Report displays the country's performance for all available years between 1996 and 2009 in six governance dimensions: i) Voice & Accountability, ii) Political Stability and Lack of Violence/Terrorism, iii) Government Effectiveness, iv) Regulatory Quality, v) Rule of Law, and vi) Control of Corruption. Each page shows the country's percentile rank on one of the six governance indicators. Percentile ranks indicate the percentage of countries worldwide that rate below the selected country. Higher values thus indicate better governance ratings. The graph also reports the margins of error displayed in the line charts by dashed lines, and corresponding to a 90% confidence interval. This means that there is a 90 percent probability that governance is within the indicated range. |
| Underneath the line charts, the Report also displays data from all the underlying sources used for that indicator. Individual ratings have been rescaled to run from 0 (low) to 1 (high). These scores are comparable over time and across countries since most individual measures are based on similar methodologies over time. Scores from different individual indicators are not however directly comparable with each other since the different data sources use different units and cover different sets of countries. The data from the individual indicators are in fact further rescaled to make them comparable across data sources before constructing the aggregate governance indicators. Note that for some variables we present an "NP", where "NP" stands for "Not Public", because the data is confidential and cannot be publicly disclosed at the request of the organizations producing the data. To find out more about each source/organization click on the provided links. More information about each of the underlying organization/source can also be found in the website. |

To access data, charts and background documentation, visit:

http://www.govindicators.org

Annex 5

### List of Abbreviations

**COM** Council of Ministers

**CPD** Country programme Document

**CSO** Civil Society Organisation

**EU**  European Union

**IDAL**  Investment Development Authority of Lebanon

**IFI** International Financial Institution

**IMF** International Monetary Fund

**MOET** Ministry of Economy and Trade

**MOF** Ministry of Finance

**NGO** Non-Governmental Organisation

**NIM** National Implementation

**OMSAR** Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reforms

**PMO** Prime Minister Office

**PASU** Policy Advisory and Support Unit

**SME** Small & Medium Enterprises

**UN** United Nations

**UNCT** United Nations Country Team

**UNCTAD** United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

**UNDAF**  United Nations Development Assistance Framework

**UNDP** United Nations Development Programme

**WB** World Bank

**WTO** World Trade Organisation

**VAT** Value Added Tax

1. . A first Policy Advisory & Support Unit (PASU) was established in the Ministry of Finance in 1993, another at OMSAR in 1994. Others were added at the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) (2001), Ministry of Economy and Trade (MOET) (2001) & lastly in the Investment Development Authority of Lebanon (IDAL) (2002). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. . There is no recorded outcome for the programme cluster. Drawing on the UNDAF the outcome for the Governance component of the programme and for the modality could be summarised as follows. Public sector institution-building and capacity development as the overall development objective/intention: & i. Responsive governance and participation leading to the consensual formulation of broad-based national policies, ii. Enhancing the role of civil society in the shaping of public policy, iii Enhance access to justice, IV Gender equality, as immediate objectives. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Mr. Samir Nahas, Project Manager for “Support to Decision Making at the PM Office

   Ms. Lama Oueijan, Project Manager/Advisor to the Minister for “Institutional Assistance for Economic Policy and Trade, Phase II

   Dr. Toufic Gaspard, Project Manager/Economic Advisor to MoF for “Technical Assistance for Fiscal Management and Reform –

   Ms. Leila Sawaya, Project Manager for “Sustaining and Enhancing the Institutional Capacity of IDAL

   Mr. Nasser Israoui, Project Manager/TCU Director for “Support to Civil Service Reform [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. That in itself is a significant indicator of the current state of art and of thinking about governance. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Transparency International CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. accessible at <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf_country.asp> [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. See the WB Governance Indicators for Lebanon,

   <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf_country.asp> [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Support to Policy Development and Implementation in the Government of Lebanon: A Review of UNDP Modalities. Peter Blunt Independent Consultant, [peterblunt@yahoo.com](mailto:peterblunt@yahoo.com) December 2005. page 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Op cit page 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. . That evaluation looked at 7 PAUs located in: (1) the Investment Development Authority of Lebanon (IDAL); (2) the Lebanese National Assembly (LNA); (3) Ministry of Economy and Trade (MOET); (4) Ministry of Finance (MOF); (5) Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA); (6) Office of the Minister for Administrative Reform (OMSAR); and (7) the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). This exercise looks at only 5 and excludes MOSA & LNA [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. ‘Crisis prevention and recovery programmes will be closely integrated with regional bureaux for more effective country support and mainstreaming with a jointly agreed focus on priority countries. There will be strengthened policy alignment between the Bureau for Development Policy (BDP) and Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR). There will be more effective and efficient country and regional crisis prevention and recovery programme management, through stronger links with regional bureaux country programme advisers and improved management of support and technical services to country offices through a single entry point for accessing services.’ UNDP Agenda for Organisational change May 2011, Page 8 [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. ‘An evaluation is an assessment, as systematic and impartial as possible, of an activity, project, programme, strategy, policy, topic, theme, sector, operational area, institutional performance etc. It focuses on expected and achieved accomplishments, examining the results chain, processes, contextual factors an causality, in order to understand achievements or the lack thereof. It aims at determining the relevance, impact, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the interventions and contributions of the organizations of the UN system. An evaluation should provide evidence-based information that is credible, reliable and useful, enabling the timely incorporation of findings, recommendations and lesions into the decision-making processes of the organizations of the UN system and its members’. Norms for Evaluation in the UN system 2005. p. 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. The CCA highlighted the extreme political polarization and its disastrous consequences, which are a constant reminder of the need for open dialogue and national reconciliation, at the political and popular levels, to ease the political situation. The major finding that emerged from the analysis of the CCA “… is the manifest failure of governance at all levels and across the range of sectors to confront Lebanon's many and deep-seated problems, there is a need to transform governance into good governance that is inclusive and respectful of human rights, and accountable.” A fundamental challenge for Lebanon lies in establishing a strong state to govern in an inclusive and accountable manner and to be instrumental in driving reform and progress’. UNDAF 2010-14 page 9 [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. [http://www.ieoimf.org/ieo/pages/IEOPreview.aspx?img=i6nZpr3iSlU%3D&mappingid=RH%2Fby5q88sY%3D](http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/pages/IEOPreview.aspx?img=i6nZpr3iSlU%3D&mappingid=RH%2Fby5q88sY%3D) [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Table 7.1 page 23 Peter Blunt report 2005 [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. The role of modalities such as the PASUs in providing niches where a portion of the educated elite of countries like Lebanon can find an opportunity to express their talents and gain valuable experience through learning by doing thus contributing to an increase in the capacity of the society should be neither ignored nor spurned. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. support personnel [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. UNDAF Outcome 1 is “ By 2014 good governance reforms and practices, with special focus on national dialogue and inclusive participation and government effectiveness and accountability are institutionalised at different levels” [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. In the instance of OMSAR and IDAL there could for example be one common goal. “successful services provided via Functioning departments in (OMSAR , IDAL etc)” with specific objectives for the specific department or capacity targeted [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. The first step is to measure whatever can be easily measured. This is okay as far as it goes.

    The second step is to disregard that which can't be measured or give it an arbitrary quantitative value.

    This is artificial and misleading.

    The third step is to presume that what can't be measured easily really isn't very important. This is blindness.

    The fourth step is to say that what can't be easily measured really doesn't exist. This is suicide.

    Daniel Yankelovich as quoted by Adam Smith (pseudonym for G.J.W. Goodman), Supermoney (New York: Random House, 1972), p.286. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. The mission was informed that a similar arrangement exists in Egypt; the OUDA of Egypt (Operational Unit for Development Aid). Its experience could be drawn upon. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. The following time frames are indicative and may need to be modified; speeded up or slowed down by hands on managers in UNDP and the Ministries concerned. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. See remarks about an annual review of the service delivery facility on the previous page [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. The UNDAF’s governance outcome seeks “to contribute to reinforcing national capacity to enable and implement wide-ranging reforms in the medium term grounded in peace building, inclusive participation and reinforced accountability. Sustained results will be gauged against the wider goal of reforming the political system of confessional representation, the main obstacle to reform and development progress. The national reconciliation (or Taef) agreement recognized the necessity and urgency of reform of the system - prerequisite to ensuring the sustainability of institutional reforms and development, and increasing accountability and democratic governance. Implementation of reforms”, UNDAF page14 [↑](#footnote-ref-24)