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Resilient nations.*

# EVALUATION

OF THE UNDP CONTRIBUTION TO  
**MINE ACTION**

**COUNTRY CASE STUDY:**  
Tajikistan

Independent Evaluation Office

United Nations Development Programme





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The overall evaluation team was led by Alan Fox and included Charles Downs as Principal Consultant. Jo Durham contributed to the development of a Theory of Change for UNDP mine action. Dilnoor Panjwani developed the global portfolio analysis and provided research support. Sonam Choetsho, Concepcion Cole, Flora Jimenez, Antana Locs and Michelle Sy provided logistical and administrative support. Sasha Jahic managed the production of the report.

Each country case study included a team of international and national consultants. The Tajikistan case study was led by Rebecca Roberts with Anna Roughley, assisted by Daler Khakimov and Shahnozakhon Mukhamadieva.

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## RESEARCH OVERVIEW

This Tajikistan country case study forms part of a global study by the Independent Evaluation Office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to assess the impact of UNDP contribution to mine action. The research for this study was guided by the theory of change, the framework of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the following key questions:

- Does UNDP support to mine action contribute to the impact of mine action on mine-affected communities and people?
- Has UNDP supported the development of national capacity?
- Has mine action resulted in impacts on mine-affected communities?
- Has mine action capacity development contributed to the impact?

Research was conducted through document review and a field visit to Tajikistan for three weeks in July and August 2015 by a team of two international consultants (Rebecca Roberts and Anna Roughley) and two national facilitators/interpreters (Shahnozakhon Mukhamadieva and Daler Khakimov). Consultations throughout the study and field visit took place with key national and international stakeholders, in addition to people living in mine/ERW-affected villages.

This report assesses the impact of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) on rural populations and considers the contribution of UNDP's role to mine action in Tajikistan, including:

- Support for institutional development.
- Technical and operational support.

- Support for victim assistance.
- Support for policies and procedures to enhance the socioeconomic impact of mine action.

## TAJIKISTAN CONTEXT

Tajikistan is the poorest country in Central Asia, with over 70 percent of its 8.3 million people living in rural areas. The mountainous country relies heavily on agriculture despite the fact that it has only 7 percent arable land. Therefore, although the total contaminated area was identified in the 2003–2005 survey at only around 50 km<sup>2</sup>, the contamination has a significant impact on people who want to access the land to farm or obtain natural resources. In the summer months, shepherds migrate with cattle to find grazing land, so it is not just those living close to the contamination who are affected.

Contamination from landmines and ERW is found in several regions and areas of Tajikistan:

- The Central Region as a result of the civil conflict from 1992 to 1997.
- The Tajik-Afghan Border mined by the Russian Army between 1991 and 1998.
- The Tajik-Uzbek Border, which was mined by Uzbekistan in 1999 and 2000 (in 2015 it was confirmed that the contamination is on the Uzbek side of the border).
- The Central and Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous regions, where armed clashes in 2010 and again in 2012 resulted in further ERW contamination.
- The training areas used by Russian troops stationed in Tajikistan, which have created localized contamination.

## MINE ACTION IN TAJIKISTAN

In 2003, with UNDP support, the Government of Tajikistan created the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC), which reported to the Office of the President and the Commission for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (CIIHL), the national mine action authority. TMAC was supported by the UNDP project, 'Support to the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme' (STMAP). TMAC coordinated, planned and monitored all aspects of mine action. It was headed by a National Director appointed by the President. STMAP funded national staff and an international chief technical adviser (this position was not always filled). The Government provided in-kind support, including staff for mine action operations from the Ministry of Defence. Other donors (both past and present) include Canada, Germany, Japan, Norway, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Until 2014, the status of TMAC was ambiguous, as it was not completely funded/implemented by the Government or by other actors in mine action. In January 2014, The Government and UNDP agreed to nationalize the TMAC, so it became part of the government structure and was included in the national budget. TMAC then became TNMAC, Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre. It still has a Director appointed by the President and reports to the Office of the President. The CIIHL continues to act as the national mine action authority.

The transition phase is being supported by STMAP staff who are providing capacity-building to the newly appointed TNMAC staff. There is a transition plan and STMAP staff are gradually being phased out as TNMAC capacity is being developed. STMAP is scheduled to be phased out by the end of 2017.

## UNDP ROLE

Through STMAP, UNDP has provided:

Support for institutional development

- Funding for a chief technical adviser position.
- Training and capacity-building for STMAP and TNMAC staff in the country and abroad.
- Opportunities for South-South cooperation.
- Promotion of gender awareness and gender mainstreaming.
- Advocacy for the Government to join the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
- Practical and financial support for the nationalization process.
- The UNDP Country Office has provided funds and coordinated funding from other international sources; TNMAC has a strategy for resource mobilization and is developing a strategy for the Ottawa Convention's Article 5 Completion Plan.

Technical and operational support

- From 2003 until the end of 2014, more than 14.5 km<sup>2</sup> of land was released and a further 1.8 km<sup>2</sup> of contaminated land is expected to be released by the end of 2015.
- Capacity-building and support have been provided to TMAC/TNMAC so that the Mine Action Centre (MAC) was the recognized national body for coordination, monitoring and reporting on all aspects of mine action.
- STMAP, in collaboration with other mine action actors, has supported the development of national mine action standards and standard operating procedures.
- MAC is responsible for information management. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining has provided ongoing support and is partnering with Tajikistan to pilot new software.
- Non-technical survey/technical survey and land release methodologies have been

improved over the lifetime of the MAC by working closely with implementing partners: the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), Union of Sappers of Tajikistan and the Humanitarian Demining Groups of the Ministry of Defence.

- STMAP employed Victim Assistance (VA) and mine/ERW risk education officers who have coordinated the work of implementing partners; TNMAC newly appointed staff are receiving capacity-building from the STMAP staff to coordinate VA and mine/ERW risk education.

#### Support for victim assistance

- MAC has maintained a database on victims as part of the Information Management System for Mine Action.
- Through MAC, STMAP coordinates and monitors implementing partner activities in four key areas of victim assistance to include: medical and rehabilitation support, psychosocial support, income-generation/financial support and advocacy.
- In 2006, STMAP established the Inter-Agency Technical Working Group on Victim Assistance comprising key stakeholders. In 2012, the VA programme expanded its scope to include support to all persons with disabilities and, in 2013, the VA pillar was renamed the Disability Support Unit through which its role and involvement were better defined in the mine action strategy. Since 2014 the

unit has been mainstreamed into UNDP's disability programme, and VA activities have been mainstreamed through various national and international institutions. There is a strong network of organizations involved in a number of types of assistance to persons with disabilities.

#### Support for policies and procedures to enhance the socioeconomic impact of mine action

- A system of prioritization was developed in 2006 but, for a variety of reasons, has not been followed.
- Apart from the initial impact survey (2003–2005), there has been no comprehensive or systematic pre- or post-clearance impact assessment.
- UNDP has mainstreamed mine action into its plans and strategies but, apart from providing assistance to mine survivors and the families of victims through its Communities Programme, there is no evidence that intentions were translated into reality.
- The Government's mine action strategies reference development goals, and its current and forthcoming country development plans include mine action.

### MINE ACTION STAKEHOLDERS

There is a strong and extensive network of stakeholders supporting mine action in Tajikistan.

Summary of key stakeholders	
<b>Land release</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Humanitarian Demining Groups of the Ministry of Defence (funded by the United States through OSCE)</li> <li>• NPA funded by Norway</li> <li>• FSD facing funding shortages</li> <li>• Union of Sappers of Tajikistan established in 2009 with funding from OSCE, supported by the FSD from 2012 and facing funding shortages, could potentially provide explosive ordnance disposal capacity post-2020</li> </ul>

(continued)

<b>Summary of key stakeholders</b>	
<b>Mine/ERW risk education</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Network of Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan volunteers, supported by the International Committee of the Red Cross</li> <li>• School teachers at the local level</li> <li>• Other trained volunteers including from women councils and community-based organizations</li> </ul>
<b>Victim assistance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Handicap International</li> <li>• International Committee of the Red Cross</li> <li>• Society of Persons with Disabilities</li> <li>• Disabled Women's League</li> <li>• Ministry of Health and Social Protection of the Population</li> <li>• National Union of Persons with Disabilities</li> <li>• Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan</li> <li>• Research Institute for Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities</li> <li>• Orthopaedic Centre</li> <li>• Public Organization of Landmine/ERW Survivors (<i>Taqdir</i>)</li> <li>• Tajikistan Campaign to Ban Landmines &amp; Cluster Munitions</li> <li>• United Nations Children's Fund</li> <li>• UNDP</li> </ul>
<b>Key Government partners</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CIIHL: acts as the national mine action authority; CIIHL secretariat is managed by the President</li> <li>• Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence: had explosive ordnance disposal capacity, which has lapsed</li> <li>• Ministry of Justice: supported the nationalization process and currently overseeing the drafting of the mine action law</li> <li>• Ministry of Defence: important partner for seconding staff to the mine action demining operators. Operates the Humanitarian Demining Groups supported by OSCE. Could potentially provide explosive ordnance disposal capacity post-2020</li> <li>• Ministry of Health and Social Protection of the Population: active in VA, promotion of rights and support for persons with disabilities, working with STMAP, TNMAC, UNDP and other organizations supporting mine victims/persons with disabilities</li> <li>• Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence: delivers mine/ERW risk education and could potentially provide explosive ordnance disposal capacity post-2020</li> <li>• Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Mission in Geneva: relevant for accession and reporting for various conventions</li> </ul>
<b>Key donors, past and present</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The UNDP Country Office has funded TMAC directly from its own funds since 2003 and continues to fund STMAP as well as TNMAC directly</li> <li>• The Government has provided in-kind support since 2003, including staff from the Ministry of Defence; since nationalization, it has continued to provide in-kind funding</li> <li>• Canada, Germany Switzerland and the United Kingdom: ceased funding</li> <li>• Japan: likely to stop funding within a couple of years</li> <li>• Norway: funds through NPA, and UNDP through the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support</li> <li>• OSCE: currently committed to funding mine action</li> <li>• United States: key donor, both through the Department of State and direct military support, and currently committed to funding mine action</li> </ul>

## **IMPACT OF LAND RELEASE**

- Rural populations reported that the contamination caused fear, restricted freedom of movement and prevented access to natural resources. This has had a significant impact on their daily lives and ability to engage in livelihood activities. Following land release, all the problems caused by the contamination disappeared.
- Land is allocated by the Land Committee, and there is little evidence of conflict over land that has been released.
- People had access to the same land following release as they did before the land was contaminated.

## **IMPACT OF VICTIM ASSISTANCE**

- Through mine action and increased awareness among the population of contaminated areas, the number of mine and ERW victims has declined.
- There was not enough evidence gathered through the research to determine the success of victim assistance. Those questioned who had received income-generating support said that they had benefited significantly from the assistance.
- Stakeholders believe that landmine survivors and the families of victims have benefited from all aspects of VA.

## **SUSTAINABILITY OF UNDP EFFORTS IN MINE ACTION: MIXED**

- It has taken 11 years to create a nationalized mine action centre and, although its official status is secure and the transition strategy is in place, it is dependent on funding from the Government and external sources and on ongoing commitment of the Government and stakeholders, and the ability to develop and retain the necessary national capacity to complete the clearance. It is also dependent on national and regional stability.
- The impact of land release to date is sustainable.
- Most VA will need ongoing support. The mainstreaming of VA into other initiatives protects these activities to some extent.
- The integration of mine action in the UNDP and national development strategies also help to sustain mine action activities.

## **CONCLUSION**

- Without support from UNDP, it is unlikely that the MAC would have been established. With UNDP support TMAP has been reincarnated as TNMAC, the nationalized mine action centre.
- Through STMAP, UNDP has supported the MAC to develop national capacity, which has enabled mine action to be implemented.
- Mine action has had a positive impact on the livelihoods of mine-affected populations.



## Section 1

# INTRODUCTION

### RESEARCH OVERVIEW

The Independent Evaluation Office of UNDP conducted a global study to assess the impact of UNDP support to mine action on people affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). Tajikistan was identified as a country case study. This report presents the findings of a document review and three-week field visit designed to answer the following questions:

- Does UNDP support to mine action contribute to the impact of mine action on mine-affected communities and people?
- Has UNDP supported the development of national capacity?

- Has mine action resulted in impacts on mine-affected communities?
- Has mine action capacity development contributed to the impact?

The study was guided by a theory of change (see Annex 2) and questions based on the evaluation framework of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (see Annex 3). Free-flowing semi-structured interviews were used to elicit information from key national and international stakeholders at the national and district levels. Separate focus group discussions (FGDs) using a participatory approach were



*Tajikistan  
Ministry of Defence  
clearance operation  
in the Vanj district  
near the border  
with Afghanistan  
and the village of  
Yazghulom. Photo:  
UNDP/Rebecca  
Roberts*

held with men and women from mine-affected villages in the Panj district, in Khatlon Province near the border with Afghanistan, in the Darvoz district and the Rasht Valley in the Central Region, and the Vanj district in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region.

It was a successful field visit. The Tajik authorities, international and national organizations and individuals were supportive. Nevertheless, certain constraints limited the scope of the research:

- The study was limited to areas that could be accessed in the time available. Access was limited because areas were remote and accessible only by poor mountain roads. Recent flooding and mudslides had led to a state of emergency and prevented access to some areas completely or at the time originally planned.
- Ongoing security concerns restricted a visit in the Panj district to four hours and prevented other visits to that region. Therefore, despite the Khatlon Province being a significantly contaminated area, only one village in the region was visited.
- Community meetings had to be completed within two hours to limit the disruption caused to the busy summer farming season. Therefore, the methodology was designed to focus on the most important information for the study: not all issues could be explored in depth.
- Introductions to villages were facilitated by key mine-action stakeholders, and this might have biased the decisions on which villages were included in the study and may have influenced what villagers were willing to discuss, as they knew which organizations had arranged the meeting.
- Rural inhabitants were unwilling to describe the socioeconomic profile of their community; the national facilitators explained that,

culturally, such discussions were uncommon and made people feel uncomfortable.

- Because of time constraints, FGDs could be held in only four rural communities; it was not possible to find people who had received types of support apart from the income-generation support provided to mine victims and their families.<sup>1</sup>
- The composition of the FGDs changed as individuals arrived and left during the exercise; some of the groups were too large — comprising as many as 20 people — which made it more difficult to have the kind of in-depth discussion one would have with a smaller group.
- There was no time to visit the Tajik-Uzbek border; although the area is mined only on the Uzbek side of the border, extensive victim assistance (VA) and mine/ERW risk education (MRE) activities have taken place there.
- Local government officials and staff from local and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were unavailable to meet with those gathering information because they were involved in the visit of the President to the Central Region.
- This latter constraint also prevented exploration of the use of larger-scale infrastructure projects that had followed land release.

## **SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE OF TAJIKISTAN**

Tajikistan, a landlocked country in Central Asia, has a population of 8.3 million. In 2013, 35.6 percent of the population was living below the poverty line. Seventy-three percent live in rural areas, the location of the majority of the country's poor people.<sup>2</sup>

Tajikistan is a mountainous country with only about 7 percent of its territory usable land.

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1 Information about a fifth village was gathered from key informants.

2 National Human Development Report, *Tajikistan: Access to Resources for Human Development* (Dushanbe, 2015).

Despite this, the population depends on agriculture for its livelihood and main exports of cotton and agricultural produce. Poor farming techniques have led to soil erosion and wasteful water management; there is chronic food insecurity and high levels of malnutrition. Economic opportunities in Tajikistan are limited, especially for young adults. Many seek work abroad, particularly in the Russian Federation, and the population is heavily reliant on remittances, which the World Bank estimated to equal 42.7 percent of gross domestic product in 2014.<sup>3</sup> Remittances have decreased with the Russian economic downturn and recent large-scale expulsion of migrant workers, including those from Tajikistan. Taxes are high, with income tax alone reaching 39 percent. Public services are limited, particularly in rural areas, which rarely have power, heating, sanitation or water in the home. Making matters more difficult is the fact that the people have to supplement education costs and cover their own medical expenses.

Tajikistan borders Afghanistan, China, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Relationships with China and Kyrgyzstan are good, with China supporting infrastructure development in Tajikistan. Uzbekistan fears that planned hydroelectric power development in Tajikistan would give that country the ability to limit the water flow into Uzbekistan, so relationships between the countries are tense. Currently only two of the 11 Tajik-Uzbek border crossings are open, and cargo trains heading to Tajikistan have commonly been stopped by the Uzbek authorities. The relationship with Afghanistan is complicated. While there are positive border management agreements between the two countries, some of which involve mine action, the Tajik Government fears that the conflict in Afghanistan will spill over into Tajikistan. International observers argue that the threat of this occurring is exaggerated. They complain that border security measures are inconsistently implemented and that government

decisions to close the border or restrict access to the border areas at short notice and without proper explanation impede development and mine action activities.

## CONTAMINATION

Contamination from landmines and ERW in Tajikistan is found in the Central Region, as well as along the Tajik-Uzbek Border (although in 2015, it was confirmed that all the contamination is on the Uzbek side).

Between 1992 and 1998 Russian forces laid landmines in the border area with Afghanistan, and the Uzbeks laid mines along their side of border with Tajikistan between 1999 and 2001, ostensibly to deter Islamic extremists from entering the country.<sup>4</sup> The civil conflict (1992–1997), which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, left landmine and ERW contamination in the Central Region, and armed clashes in 2010 and again in 2012 in both the Central and Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous regions resulted in further ERW contamination. The training areas used by Russian troops stationed in Tajikistan, known as ‘polygons’, have created localized contamination.

From 2003 until the end of 2014, more than 14.5 km<sup>2</sup> of land was released, and a further 1.8 km<sup>2</sup> of contaminated land was expected to be released by the end of 2015.

As of December 2015, 70 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) with an approximate total size of 5.72 km<sup>2</sup> and 101 records of unsurveyed minefield records remain to be addressed. These include areas along the Tajik-Afghan border containing 60 CHAs with an approximate total size of 3.98 km<sup>2</sup> and the 101 records of unsurveyed minefield records. In the Central Region, there are 10 CHAs, with an approximate total

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3 United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Tajikistan 2016–2020 (draft).

4 The Tajik-Uzbek border has not been well defined, and only in 2015 was it determined that all the contamination is on the Uzbek side of the border.

size of 1.74 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>5</sup> Although the area of contaminated land is relatively small, there is a significant impact on livelihoods. This is because of the limited amount of usable land and the fact that much of the border with Uzbekistan is not clearly marked and people cross into Uzbekistan illegally — either by accident or on purpose. However, to date there has been no comprehensive or systematic impact assessment pre- or post-mine action or any detailed study of the socioeconomic impact on the population of the landmine and ERW contamination.

### **MINE ACTION IN TAJIKISTAN**

In 1999 Tajikistan ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, also known as the Ottawa Convention. The first mine action activities started in 2000 when the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan (RCST) began delivering mine risk education (MRE). In 2003, with UNDP support, the Government created the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC). Until 2014 TMAC was supported by the UNDP project, Support to the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme (STMAP), and was staffed by nationals on UNDP contracts. UNDP has funded the positions of international chief technical advisers (CTAs) to support the national Director of TMAC and the Centre, a Presidential appointee. The Commission for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (CIIHL) acts as the national mine action authority.<sup>6</sup>

Tajikistan complied with Article 4 of the Ottawa Convention by destroying its stockpile of anti-personnel mines by 1 April 2004. Since 2004 it has fulfilled Article 7 of the Convention by reporting annually to the Disarmament Affairs Department of the United Nations Office

in Geneva. Following a request for an extension made at the 2009 review conference in Cartagena, Colombia, Tajikistan is due to complete clearance and fulfil Article 5 of the Convention by 1 April 2020.


In 2003, the Swiss Federation for Mine Action (FSD) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) began engaging in mine action in Tajikistan in coordination with TMAC. FSD conducted the first surveys, which were followed by clearance. OSCE provided funding to local and international operators, which increased in 2009 as the organization funded the newly established Humanitarian Demining Groups of the Ministry of Defence and the Tajik NGO for humanitarian demining, Union of Sappers of Tajikistan (UST). In 2012, following a series of management problems, it was agreed among TMAC and other operators that FSD would assume the supporting role for UST, as it was thought that an NGO would be better equipped to fulfil this role than OSCE. Unfortunately, lack of funding has seriously impeded FSD operations and its support to UST. In 2010, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) began operating in Tajikistan.

According to TMAC/TNMAC records, from 1992 until July 2015, there were 854 landmine and ERW victims, 484 of whom survived and 370 of whom died (these figures include incidents occurring in and around the polygons). In cooperation with government entities, ICRC, RCST, and international and local NGOs, TMAC has actively promoted victim assistance (VA) since 2006, although it was included in STMAP and national mine action strategies from 2003. STMAP has integrated VA into UNDP and Government support for persons with disabilities. In 2013 Victim Assistance changed its name to the Disability Support Unit (DSU) and in 2014 integrated activities into the UNDP Disabilities

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5 Republic of Tajikistan, Article 5 Completion Plan 2016–2020, 21 January 2016 (final draft) — updated after submission of the report.

6 CIIHL existed before mine action began in Tajikistan.



*All-female NPA demining team working near Sagbirdasht village, GBAO, which was visited to conduct community-level research. Photo: UNDP/Rebecca Roberts*

Programme and increasingly into UNDP Access to Justice and Rule of Law projects. This was done in coordination with the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women). The aim is to promote a community-based rehabilitation approach to persons with disabilities while at the same time creating a strong network of United Nations, Government and NGO stakeholders working to support and promote the rights of these persons.

The ICRC supports a network of volunteers through the RCST, which operates at the community level. The volunteers liaise with all relevant organizations, and work closely with TMAC to connect mine victims and their families to sup-

port services, and to deliver MRE either directly or through local school teachers. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) supported MRE delivery in schools from 2006 to 2007 but then handed the responsibility back to UNDP and its partners.

UNDP and TMAC have engaged in advocacy to promote the rights of persons with disabilities and encourage the Government to sign the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Stakeholders expect the Convention to be signed soon. UNDP and TMAC have also lobbied the Government to sign the Convention on Cluster Munitions but to date have been unsuccessful. UNDP is currently providing support to the Government to finalize national legislation

that would incorporate State obligations under the Ottawa Convention.

The UNDP Country Office in Tajikistan has supported TMAC directly from its own funds since 2003 and has as successfully secured funding from the UNDP headquarters' Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. Other major donors include Canada, Germany, Japan, Norway, OSCE, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. In recent years, the amount of funding available for mine action in general has decreased: Switzerland and the United Kingdom stopped funding mine action in Tajikistan in 2011, and Canada and Germany in 2013.

In January 2014 TMAC was discontinued and TNMAC was created. With its creation the process of nationalizing mine-action capacity began. Currently UNDP is committed to supporting TNMAC through STMAP until the end of 2017, although the situation will be reviewed every six months and plans revised accordingly. A local NGO, Academy Dialogue, and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) have worked with the Government, UNDP and STMAP staff to develop and implement the strategy of helping the mine action centre transition from being a UNDP project to being a national entity.

Since 2003 to date, staff at TMAC and TNMAC have attended various training courses in Tajikistan and abroad on management and operational issues and have received on-the-job training and mentoring. South-South cooperation has been strong, with UNDP and Tajikistan showing regional leadership in mine action. TMAC and TNMAC have not only participated in exchange programmes but have also received direct support from national mine action centres of other countries. TMAC staff have conducted or supported training in mine action in other countries. Requests have been made to UNDP Tajikistan for advice on the mainstreaming of victim assistance. Efforts have been made to mainstream gender through all aspects of mine action.

From its inception in 2003, and its national reincarnation in 2014, TMAC/TNMAC has been the main coordination and reporting body for mine action, providing monitoring and quality assurance for all implementing partners in all mine action pillars. It is agreed by all stakeholders that UNDP support has been central to mine action in Tajikistan. This report examines UNDP's role in mine action in Tajikistan, the socioeconomic impact of the mine contamination, and the impact of mine action activities on the population as a whole and on individuals.

## REPORT STRUCTURE

This report is structured according to the theory of change (Annex 2), which was developed before the start of the field work, to be tested as part of the country case studies. The framework questions of DAC (Annex 3) have guided the content of the report, which is organized into five sections:

1. Section 1: Introduction — provides an overview of the Tajikistan context and a brief description of the mine action activities.
2. Section 2: UNDP support to mine action in Tajikistan — analyses the role of UNDP according to the theory of change (lower half of the diagram) and the DAC questions on relevance and effectiveness.
3. Section 3: Impact — uses information gathered during the visits to villages to analyse the impact and outcomes of mine action according to the theory of change and to respond the DAC impact questions.
4. Section 4: Sustainability — responds to the relevant questions in the DAC framework.
5. Section 5: Conclusion — summarizes UNDP's role in mine action in Tajikistan and the impact of mine action. It also discusses how and where mine action in Tajikistan corresponds with the theory of change and comments on the methodological approach to the study.

## Section 2

# UNDP SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION IN TAJIKISTAN

Through STMAP, UNDP has supported institutional development, technical operations and victim assistance in mine action in Tajikistan. UNDP has also supported the development of procedures and policies that aim to enhance the socioeconomic benefits of mine action. This section examines the various roles of UNDP in mine action in Tajikistan, describes mine action activities, summarizes the work of partner organizations and analyses some of the outcomes and impacts of these activities.

### INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT

Tajikistan acceded to the Ottawa Convention by governmental decree in October 1999 and became a State Party on 1 April 2000. UNDP began providing technical and financial support to the development of mine action institutions and policies in 2003 when, with the Government, it agreed to create TMAC. It was established to coordinate, plan and monitor all mine action activities in the country. The CIIHL, an inter-ministerial committee managed by the Executive Office of the President, acts as the national mine action authority. It oversees the implementation of over 60 international treaties signed by Tajikistan. The First Deputy Prime Minister chairs the committee and the Minister of Justice is the Deputy Chair. Serving as Secretary is the Deputy Head of the Department of the Constitutional Guarantees of the Citizens' Rights of the Executive Office of the President. Members of the Executive Office of the President and

the first deputies of key ministries and departments are members of CIIHL. On various aspects of mine action TMAC/TNMAC works closely with numerous government entities, including the following: Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Defence, the Border Guards, Committee of Emergency Situations, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health and Social Protection of the Population.<sup>7</sup>

The mine action centre has maintained an ambiguous status since its inception: it has been neither a directly implemented UNDP project nor the nationally implemented project envisioned by the Government and UNDP since 2003. This ambiguity is reflected in a number of documents. For example, the 2006 TMAC report referred to the mine action programme as being national but at the same time expressed the need to nationalize capacity to deliver the programme. The same report recorded achievements in mine action as being joint UNDP and TMAC. A 2007 funding application made by the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery and the 2008 TMAC report both referred to TMAC as being a nationally executed project; yet independent evaluations conducted in 2009 and 2012 both concluded that TMAC was a hybrid Government/UNDP project. Both evaluations had been commissioned by UNDP to identify ways to increase government ownership and develop an exit strategy for UNDP.<sup>8</sup>

Moreover, the national staff have found it difficult to articulate their positions and the sta-

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7 Previously, the lead ministry for disability was the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of the Population. Social protection was merged with the Ministry of Health in 2014.

8 Keeley, Robert (2009), *Outcome Evaluation for Mine Action — UNDP Tajikistan, November–December 2008*; Roberts, Rebecca (2012), *Evaluation of United Nations Development Programme Support to the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme* (January 2012).

tus of MAC. TMAC was headed by a national Director appointed by the President who was simultaneously accountable to the Government and UNDP. Therefore, UNDP was not fully in control of the project it funded, nor was TMAC independent of UNDP. Yet, within the MAC itself, STMAP and TMAC were indistinguishable from one another.

The ambiguity has occurred despite the fact that staff at the mine action centre have been Tajik, and most of them for most of the time have been on United Nations salaries. The exception was one staff member, an international Chief Technical Adviser (CTA), who was not always in post. External consultants and a 2014 capacity assessment reported that staff capacity was reasonably good.<sup>9</sup>

TMAC developed mine action strategies on a five-year basis approved by the CIIHL. According to references made to the strategies in various documents, the first strategy ran from 2004 to 2006 and was extended with little change for 2006 to 2008. However, no record of it is available. GICHD states that the first national mine action strategy was not developed until 2006.<sup>10</sup> To complement these strategies, UNDP has maintained STMAP to deliver financial and technical support, including through funding staff and other resources. UNDP has provided technical support through funding CTAs, providing on-the-job training or financing external courses. The national mine action and STMAP strategies have been comprehensive and covered all pillars of mine action. They have been linked to national development strategies and the UNDP strategies designed to support them (see the description of socioeconomic support, below).

There have been only two national Directors for MAC and six international CTAs (see Annex 6).

Jonmahmad Rajabov, the first national Director (2003–2012), is credited as being effective at resource mobilization, and the second national Director (2012–present), Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, is credited with making the nationalization process possible. Of the CTAs, the first, who was in post for three years (2003–2005), focused on establishing TMAC and developing appropriate strategies for the centre. The second (2005–2007) concentrated on resource mobilization while encouraging the national Director to take the lead in managing operations.<sup>11</sup> There was reportedly a clash of personalities between the third CTA (2007–2008) and the national Director, which made the Director reluctant to accept the appointment of further CTAs.

As a result, there was a gap between 2010 and 2012, when no CTA was in post. Since then, CTAs have been given short-term or part-time contracts, a practice some key informants argue has been a mistake. One of the first CTAs said that progress was lost when UNDP stopped providing full-time CTAs and in this way UNDP jeopardized its earlier investment in TMAC. At the end of 2011, the UNDP Country Office thought it would be difficult to reintroduce an international CTA, as it would seem like a backwards step that would be hard to justify to UNDP headquarters and the national Director, who would oppose the idea. In response to recommendations following an evaluation and requests from the United States, which has been a key donor for mine action in Tajikistan, the Country Office appointed a CTA in 2012. Since then, there have been two CTAs: the first was in post for just six months, and the current one is on a half-time contract in line with the agreed transition plan to move from a UNDP to a nationalized mine action centre.

Turnover of STMAP staff has been low, particularly at the senior level. Since 2003, staff have

9 For example, Robert Keeley in 2009, Rebecca Roberts in 2012 and David Hewitson in 2015. In 2014 Sebastian Kasack conducted a formal in-depth capacity assessment.

10 GICHD, 2013:6.

11 After completing his contract as CTA, William Lawrence continued to provide support to TMAC when the CTA post was vacant in early 2012.

received a lot of training and capacity-building, much of which has been funded by UNDP and OSCE. STMAP staff possess many of the skills necessary to fulfil their roles well but sometimes lack confidence or are unwilling to show initiative for fear of repercussions if something goes wrong.<sup>12</sup> The newly appointed TNMAC staff are now also attending external courses funded by UNDP and OSCE. In addition, they as receive on-the-job training and mentoring from STMAP staff.

Despite criticism, the UNDP Country Office has been committed to pursuing mine action in Tajikistan, although it appears that the office's efforts have not always been supported by New York headquarters. For example, in 2011 the office received particularly strong pressure from headquarters to withdraw its support for TMAC, primarily because of the ongoing failure to nationalize the mine action centre. Headquarters has provided little or no practical support or guidelines for the current nationalization process. Expertise is being provided by GICHD and a national NGO as well as by the Government and mine action partners. The Country Office has been strong on advocacy in Tajikistan for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, but again says that it receives little support or guidance from New York. UNDP does not have clear policies on its support for mine action, there is little interaction among CTAs and there is not an obvious place to include mine action in core UNDP activities. Consequently, Country Office support for mine action fluctuates depending on the understanding of senior management. Although it has faced many challenges and has received little support or advice from New York, the UNDP Country Office is proud of its support to the mine action programme.

## ADVOCACY

Since 2003, UNDP has been supporting TMAC and now TNMAC to ensure that the Government fulfils its obligations under the Ottawa Convention. It has advocated for provisions of the Convention to be incorporated into Tajik law. From mid-2014 to the present, UNDP has been working with TNMAC to develop national mine action legislation. As of September 2015, the time this report was written, the Ministry of Justice has been considering a draft law. The Government has joined the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its Protocols. UNDP, with national and international stakeholders, has advocated for the Government to join the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Significant progress has been made, as the Ministry of Justice is considering how the latter convention can be integrated into Tajik law.

## GENDER

It is estimated that 70 percent of the 450,000 people living in mine-affected areas are women and children.<sup>13</sup> UNDP has promoted a gendered approach to mine action, which is important in a country where patriarchy is deeply entrenched, gender gaps are significant and gender-based issues remain a challenge. Despite numerous government initiatives to promote gender equality in public and private life, which include improving access to public education and health care, and increasing political participation,<sup>14</sup> women and other vulnerable groups are often restricted from owning property and land and accessing finance.<sup>15</sup>

STMAP documentation has mainstreamed gender into all mine action pillars. Nevertheless, TMAC never had an official gender policy,

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12 Observations from external consultants.

13 STMAP (2015) Annual Progress Report 2014. Tajikistan has a very young population and many female-headed households, as many men have migrated to the Russian Federation in search of work.

14 Republic of Tajikistan (2012), Living Standards Improvement Strategy for Tajikistan, 2013–2015.

15 United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2016–2020, May 2015; United Nations (2009), Country Programme Action Plan 2010–2015.

nor does TNMAC have one now (at the time of writing). The national mine action strategy (2010–2015) commits the Government to mainstreaming gender throughout all VA activities and programmes.<sup>16</sup> For the period 2013–2015, according to the UNDP Country Office Local Project/Programme Appraisal Committee internal review, the status of the STMAP was rated as “1: Some contribution to gender equality”.<sup>17</sup>

During implementation, efforts have been made to adopt a gendered approach. For example, in 2007, only two of the RCST MRE volunteers were female, so gender training was conducted and ICRC and RCST were asked to involve both men and women as volunteers. The United Nations Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes (2008 and 2010 editions), were translated into Tajik for use by MRE volunteers and community-based women’s councils located in mine/ERW-contaminated areas.<sup>18</sup> From 2008–2011 Gender Awareness training for MRE and VA was held for community members living and working in contaminated areas. Information for all mine action activities is disaggregated according to sex and age for analysis in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).<sup>19</sup>

Gender equity is difficult to achieve in the workplace for operational and administrative positions. In 2011, women were appointed as part of the medical staff for demining teams. Two women have held senior positions in TMAC — as the VA and MRE officers. Both have

remained in post following nationalization, albeit on reduced hours, as STMAP Advisers. The MRE Adviser acts as the gender focal point. Only the secretary on the TNMAC staff and the OSCE project coordinator are female. A female national United Nations Volunteer was hired to assist the VA programme for a period of 12 months in 2014.<sup>20</sup>

Although the current STMAP CTA notes that a gendered approach is least applied and understood in land release,<sup>21</sup> one of the most notable achievements for gender equity has been the creation in 2014 of the first female demining team in Tajikistan.<sup>22</sup> Although an NPA initiative, it received strong support from TNMAC, including from the Director, who was involved in the initial stages to promote the employment of women in humanitarian demining at both the local and district government levels. The process of recruiting the eight national women was difficult because of preconceived gender roles. TNMAC has continued to support and promote the female demining team publicly. As one example, the female deminers participated in National Mother’s Day, which celebrates women who work in various careers.

## RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

UNDP has been important for resource mobilization, while the Government has provided in-kind support since 2003. The Country Office has been a key donor to TMAC, which has been implemented as a UNDP project drawing on funding streams from TRAC (UNDP core funds

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16 Republic of Tajikistan (2013), *Tajikistan Mine Action Strategic Plan 2010–2015 (revised 2013)*, p.12.

17 <http://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/MA-Guidelines-WEB.pdf>. (accessed 27 August 2015).

18 <http://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/MA-Guidelines-WEB.pdf>. (accessed 27 August 2015).

19 STMAP/TNMAC (2015) Annual Report 2014.

20 Sebastian Kasack (2014), TNMAC Capacity Needs Assessment and Formulation of a Capacity Development Response Plan, July 2015–Dec 2016. The United Nations Volunteer position was subsequently extended for a further six months, until June 2015.

21 Sebastian Kasack (2014), TNMAC Capacity Needs Assessment and Formulation of a Capacity Development Response Plan, July 2015–Dec 2016.

22 It was not only the first female demining team in Tajikistan but also in Central Asia. <http://beijing20.unwomen.org/en/news-and-events/stories/2015/5/woa-tajikistan-nazokat-begmatova>. (accessed 27 August 2015).

allocated to programme countries) and from the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery.<sup>23</sup> Funding from New York headquarters is declining in general, as is funding from all donors for mine action. For this reason, it is increasingly difficult to mobilize the necessary funds. The Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery has undergone restructuring to become the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support. If funding is made available through this entity, the Country Office thinks it will not be available before mid-2016.

Other key donors for mine action include Canada, Germany, Japan, Norway, OSCE, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The United Kingdom and Switzerland stopped funding mine action in Tajikistan in 2011, and Canada and Germany in 2013. The United States is planning to fund mine action until the Article 5 target is achieved in 2020 and currently channels funds through UNDP and various implementing partners. Norway provides funding through NPA. OSCE has funded the national NGO, UST, and currently funds the Humanitarian Demining Groups of the Ministry of Defence

in addition to funding training courses and other mine action activities. New potential donors have been approached, including Qatar, which has not provided funding to date.

Recognizing the difficulty in securing funding, TNMAC developed a comprehensive resource mobilization strategy in 2015. There is also a specific resource mobilization strategy being developed to fund the Article 5 completion plan.<sup>25</sup>

TMAC's ambiguous status made some donors reluctant to fund it directly because it was a UNDP project and not a national entity. At the same time, donors have also stated that they were more confident to commit funds to the MAC because UNDP was present.<sup>26</sup> As noted, the United States threatened to withdraw funding if UNDP did not appoint an international CTA to support the MAC and currently states that, although supportive of nationalization, it is willing to fund mine action because of UNDP's active involvement in the programme. OSCE said that it could have coordinated its funding more effectively with UNDP but did not give details on how this might have been done.

<b>Key donors 2003–2014<sup>24</sup></b>	
<b>Donor</b>	<b>Amount in US dollars</b>
Germany	9 023 371
Norway	8 180 528
Canada	6 013 053
United States	3 760 690
Japan	2 314 411
United Kingdom	1 415 202
Switzerland	1 079 624
OSCE	5 131 624
UNDP	3 283 768
<b>Total</b>	<b>40 202 271</b>

## **NATIONALIZATION**

The intent of the initial agreement between the Government and UNDP to create TMAC was to nationalize the mine action centre. Some key informants maintain that the Country Office was not focused enough in its efforts to push through the nationalization process, or that early CTAs had good technical expertise but concentrated on operational activities rather than strategy. Simultaneously, the Government showed some resistance to nationalization partly because of lack of funding and partly because it did not fit easily into the government structure. As far as the Gov-

23 Target resource assignment from the core (TRAC) are UNDP Country Office internal funds, which it can allocate according to its own priorities.

24 TNMAC (2015), Resource Mobilization Strategy.

25 TNMAC (2015), Resource Mobilization Strategy: Republic of Tajikistan, Article 5 Completion Plan 2016–2020, 3 September 2015 (draft).

26 Assertions made by donors during the team's field visit to Tajikistan 20 July–8 August 2015.

ernment was concerned, TMAC was fulfilling its role and had international funding so there was no need to intervene or commit already-overstretched resources when external support was available. The future of TMAC was made uncertain following the death in 2011 of the first Deputy Prime Minister, a supporter of nationalization. Not only was TMAC's status still ambiguous, it had lost a champion. Moreover, the future of CIIHL was uncertain. In Tajikistan, personalities are often central to the functioning of government departments. An event such as a death in post or a reshuffle of personnel can lead to restructuring and major disruption. In this instance, despite the uncertainty, TMAC and CIIHL continued as before.

In line with long-held UNDP intentions, from mid-2012 onwards it opened serious discussions with the Government about making TMAC a fully nationalized entity. For nationalization to take place, stakeholders needed to accept the fact that it would be a long and difficult process. It would demand commitment from UNDP to provide the relevant expertise and resources, and from the Government to support it. In September 2012, UNDP hired a CTA, Sebastian Kasack, to lead the nationalization process and committed funds for the venture despite having doubts about its success. Mr. Kasack approached a national NGO, Academy Dialogue, specializing in conflict resolution, and GICHD to support and advise on the nationalization process. After 12 months of discussion and examination of the various options for the structure of TMAC and where it should be located in the government, it was agreed to nationalize MAC.

Suggestions for where MAC should sit in the government structure included the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Defence and Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence (CoES).<sup>27</sup> The current national Director claims

that choosing to put MAC in one of the ministries would have made it difficult for several ministries to contribute simultaneously to its work, as they currently do. If the Ministry of Defence had taken the lead, it would have been difficult for donors to fund it. MAC has changed its name but it remains in the Office of the President and reports to the CIIHL.

On 3 January 2014, TNMAC was created by governmental decree. Although the Government has provided in-kind support to mine action since 2003, since the start of the transition process in January 2014, it has allocated funds from the national budget. For 2014, the Government allocated 186,000 somoni, or \$35,769. Even though it was only a small percentage of the approximately \$4.7 million needed to fund TNMAC and mine action operations in 2014, it was an important symbolic commitment.<sup>28</sup> In addition to funding, the Government has provided offices for TNMAC and an area for technical training on the outskirts of Dushanbe.

The NGO Academy Dialogue criticized the initial nationalization process because it was top down. Later, the development of the transition strategy, led by the UNDP CTA, Academy Dialogue and GICHD, adopted a participatory approach involving key stakeholders. A three-year transition strategy from 2015 to the end of 2017 has been agreed. Indicators have been identified to measure progress and a timetable created for phasing out the STMAP staff and developing the capacity of TNMAC staff to assume overall responsibility of MAC once in place. The transition plan will be reviewed every six months and revised accordingly. In 2015, UNDP began channelling some funds to mine action directly through TNMAC. If this modality proves to function well, UNDP will do this again with a larger sum.

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27 The Committee of Emergency Situations had been supported by UNDP to develop a mine action capacity with the intention that it would provide national sustainable mine action capacity, whether as part of TMAC or in place of it.

28 Republic of Tajikistan, Article 5 Completion Plan 2016–2020, 3 September 2015 (draft).

Since the nationalization process began, only three of the original TMAC staff have accepted the opportunity to become TNMAC staff. This is largely because the relatively high-paying UNDP salaries will become government salaries, with some staff receiving 10 percent of what they have earned from the United Nations. The original TMAC staff are now being referred to as STMAP staff, which they have, in fact, always been, but due to the ambiguous status of the MAC, this was often overlooked. As part of the Support to the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme, the UNDP salaried staff are learning to take a step back and become advisers to the newly appointed TNMAC staff, who will eventually assume full responsibility for mine action activities.

It has been a difficult process for the STMAP staff, as most have been in post since the creation of TMAC or for at least seven years. It has taken time to persuade them to support the nationalization process and to develop their skills as advisers. As of August 2015, it is apparent that they have come to terms with the situation and are fully committed to the nationalization process, although they naturally have concerns about their own future financial security. It is a great pity that much of the national capacity, which has been developed with the support of UNDP and other external actors over the last decade, will be lost to TNMAC in the long term.

Along with the national Director, several key staff have been recruited, and are undergoing capacity-building and on-the-job training to develop the skills to be able to work independently of STMAP. The aim is to keep the number of key operational staff to around seven to ensure that the Government is not left with a large MAC that it cannot support and that is bigger than necessary for the scale of the challenge.

Despite the challenges, nationalization has already had some notable benefits. Numerous international actors have commented that, now that TNMAC is a national entity with a national Director, a clear structure and clear reporting lines to senior Government officials, obtaining the

necessary permission to operate in Tajikistan has become much easier. TNMAC, and the Director in particular, are credited with facilitating these processes, which international organizations report as enabling them to work more effectively.

Although the nationalization process is still in transition, it is notable that the STMAP and TNMAC staff are fully supportive of the process. There are some doubts about the long-term success of TNMAC but all key stakeholders have actively participated in the process and are committed to supporting it. The OSCE and mine action operators are well aware that many efforts to nationalize MACs elsewhere have failed and regard what has been achieved in Tajikistan to date as a success.

## **CAPACITY-BUILDING AND SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION**

Since 2003, staff working at MAC have had the opportunity to attend externally run courses, such as those at the James Madison University, and have received on-the-job training and mentoring. There has been ongoing collaborating with GICHD, particularly for information management. More recently, TNMAC has begun working with the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) of the Ottawa Convention.

South-South cooperation has been strong for all mine action pillars and has included exchange visits to share knowledge, workshops, research and training programmes. As well as seeking to build their own capacity, staff in mine action and UNDP staff working in Tajikistan have been consulted for advice or delivered training. Staff from MAC who participated in this study were positive about what they had learned through South-South cooperation. Examples include:

### **Operations and management**

- In 2013, the STMAP Information Management Adviser trained Armenian and Azerbaijani mine action staff.
- In 2013, 2014 and 2015, GICHD organized meetings of countries where Persian is

widely spoken (Persian Language Outreach Programme), first in Dushanbe, the second in Tehran and a third planned to take place in Kabul.

- In 2014, Tajikistan hosted the James Madison University International Centre for Stabilization and Recovery, which conducted its first regional Senior Management Course in ERW and Mine Action (prior to this all global courses were held on the University campus). It was attended by 24 participants from Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Nepal, Tajikistan and Yemen and was deemed successful.
- TNMAC management staff participated in OSCE-funded exchange experience programmes in Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Slovenia and Ukraine.<sup>29</sup>
- There is a similar ongoing bilateral exchange with the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan.

Victim assistance and assistance to persons with disabilities

- In 2012, STMAP/TMAC, in cooperation with relevant ministries and other actors, facilitated rehabilitation training for medical and rehabilitation support specialists from the National Research Institute for Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities, Tajikistan, and at the Senior Training Institute of Public Health, Kazakhstan (2012).
- Joint conferences with Afghanistan representatives have taken place in Kabul (2010) and Dushanbe (2011) on psychosocial assistance for landmine survivors and persons with disabilities.

- In 2014, STMAP/TNMAC supported a research project aimed at building capacities of the National Research Institute for Rehabilitation to elaborate strategic policy guidance to improve services available for all persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors.<sup>30</sup>
- In September 2014, STMAP/TNMAC organized a one-week study tour to the National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation in Jordan. The focus of this was to upgrade the knowledge of Tajik experts on micro-loans for landmine survivors, according to Islamic finance principles, strengthening the advocacy for the rights of persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors and for the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.<sup>31</sup>

## TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

### COORDINATION AND INTEGRATION

The role of a national mine action centre is to coordinate and supervise all aspects of mine action in the country and all implementing partners. The core mine action management capacities that are necessary for a MAC to fulfil its role successfully include information management, quality management, strategic planning, prioritization and coordination.

Stakeholders reported that MAC is effective at most aspects of coordination, is supportive and shares information openly. They also agree that MAC has increased its effectiveness and technical capacity and that improvement has continued, particularly for land release, since nationalization in 2014. There was some concern in 2011 that MAC was failing to show leadership and assert

29 United Nations (2015), Assistance in Mine Action — Report of the Secretary-General, 2013-2015 (Draft Outline).

30 Ottawa Convention Implementation Support Unit (2014), Five Key Examples of the Role of Mine Action in Integrating Victim Assistance into Broader Frameworks.

31 United Nations (2015), Assistance in Mine Action — Report of the Secretary-General, 2013-2015 (Draft Outline).

its authority over mine action activities. But the situation has been rectified and, as of 2015, MAC is recognized as the body for overall responsibility of mine action in Tajikistan.<sup>32</sup> TMAC, and now TNMAC, with the support of STMAP, coordinates and monitors land release, information management, MRE and victim assistance, and reports on all activities at the national and international level.

With the exception of a brief period in 2006 and 2007, when UNICEF assumed responsibility for MRE, MAC led MRE. In the last five years there has been a focus on coordination of MRE and it has been mainstreamed through national implementing partners, including RCST and the Ministry of Education. MRE is delivered through a network of RCST volunteers and school teachers who have been trained using a guide developed by TMAC. STMAP and ICRC trained volunteers in recording MRE data, which is now considered to be more accurate and can be analysed using the newly installed Mine Action Intelligence Tool (MINT) software. The network of volunteers participated in the field visits and were well informed and communicated regularly with STMAP and TNMAC staff as well as the RCST and ICRC. Similarly, VA has been integrated into UNDP and Government support for persons with disabilities. In 2013, TMAC VA was renamed the Disability Support Unit and in 2014 its activities were integrated into the UNDP Disabilities Programme and increasingly into the UNDP Access to Justice and Rule of Law project. Work in this area is coordinated with WHO and UN-Women. The DSU has remained in MAC following nationalization and is headed by the same STMAP staff member appointed in 2006.

Allocation of clearance tasks could be improved to limit the impact on operational efficiency

made by the harsh winters and government security restrictions. However, implementing partners report that since MAC became a national entity, it has been able to facilitate various bureaucratic processes including those necessary to obtain security clearance. Currently there is no systematic or well-documented prioritization system for clearance. The reasons for this are discussed. Agreed mine action standards and standard operating procedures (SOPs) are in place to regulate activities and are monitored by MAC.

The National Mine Action Standards, also referred to as the Tajikistan Mine Action Standards, were initially developed in 2006 to comply with International Mine Action Standards and have been updated as those international standards have evolved, with revisions made most recently in 2013. The Tajikistan Mine Action Standards have been translated into Tajik and, in accordance, with the 2010-2015 Programme Document, UNDP contracted an international consultant to develop SOPs for TNMAC. Workshops involving all stakeholders were held between March and May 2015. A rollout plan has been developed to ensure that each procedure is implemented, monitored and improved over time.<sup>33</sup>

MAC accredits, coordinates and monitors all implementing partners involved in land release activities to ensure that the procedures, processes and deliverables are quality assured and controlled.<sup>34</sup> Quality management processes exist but it is unclear whether they are effective. MAC currently does not have the correct detectors to conduct quality assurance and control after implementing partners have completed clearance. As a result, the effectiveness of quality assurance and control processes has been impeded and MAC has had to rely on implementing partners to provide the equipment.

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32 Roberts, Rebecca (2012), *Evaluation of United Nations Development Programme Support to the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme* (January 2012).

33 Fenix Insight Ltd. (2015), *Development of TNMAC SOPs Report*.

34 Republic of Tajikistan, *Article 5 Completion Plan 2016-2020*, 3 September 2015 (draft).

## DEMINEING METHODS AND ASSETS

As of September 2015 there were four demining organizations in Tajikistan. The international NGOs include FSD, which began in 2003, and NPA, which started operations in 2010. The Ministry of Defence began clearance before the Ottawa Convention was signed. In 2009, with the support of OSCE, the Ministry established the Humanitarian Demining Groups, working according to international standards. In 2009, OSCE also supported the establishment of a national mine action NGO, UST, which since 2012 has been supported by FSD and is waiting for funding to restart operations.

During the first three years, mine action operations relied on manual clearance and a small number of demining teams. Consequently, from 2004 until December 2006 only 372,597 m<sup>2</sup> of land was cleared. After FSD introduced Mine Detection Dogs (MDDs) in 2006, progress advanced. From September 2006 until June 2009, 2,191,124 m<sup>2</sup> of land was cleared. Mechanical assets (Mechanical Demining Machines) were introduced to the Humanitarian Demining Groups/Ministry of Defence manual teams by OSCE in 2009 (in the form of a Mini MineWolf). In the following year (2010), FSD deployed two mechanical demining assets (MV4s) in addition to its manual and MDD capacities. Use of such mechanical assets increased the speed of clearance operations.<sup>35</sup>

NPA introduced additional MDDs in 2012, but these were withdrawn by the end of the year because they were not a cost-effective solution, as they were unsuited to some of the terrain and could not be deployed everywhere. In early 2015, the MDDs programme ended, and 18 dogs were handed over to the Ministry of the Interior and the Border Forces. Similarly, at the end of 2014, mechanical assets were temporarily withdrawn

because they could not operate in alpine areas or areas with thick vegetation and were prevented from operating in some areas on security grounds. TNMAC has since recommended that a cost-benefit assessment be conducted by the implementing partners to see whether it is worthwhile maintaining costly mechanical assets and related staff when their potential use is limited.<sup>36</sup> These partners are responsible for procuring their equipment with their own funding and MAC supports customs clearance. Still, there are delays in receiving new equipment.

As of August 2015, the operational capacity of the implementing partners comprised the non-technical survey, the technical survey and manual clearance.<sup>37</sup> The operational staff included civilians and military personnel, provided by the Ministry of Defence and National Guards. The secondment of staff from national entities is part of the in-kind support from the Government to the mine action sector. As of mid-2015, the implementing partners' operating assets comprised 12 manual demining teams (including one female demining team and a mechanical team working manually) and two Non-Technical Survey teams to be deployed in August 2015, depending on funding.<sup>38</sup>

Currently there is no capacity for explosive ordnance disposal for post-2020 residual clearance. Staff from the CoES received explosive ordnance disposal training and equipment for six teams in 2010 but they have never been tasked with being part of the mine action programme and their qualifications have lapsed. A joint internal evaluation involving TNMAC, the Committee and FSD undertaken in 2013 found that the Committee was never included in the tasking mechanism from the outset, and explosive ordnance disposal tasks were instead handled by FSD. Strategic plans are included in the current Programme Document

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35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 TNMAC/STMAP (2015) Land Release Fact Sheet.

38 Republic of Tajikistan, Article 5 Completion Plan 2016-2020, 3 September 2015 (draft).

and Annual Work Plan to ensure that Tajikistan has the capacity to respond to residual contamination once the Article 5 target is achieved, but they are yet to be implemented.<sup>39</sup>

## LAND RELEASE

In Tajikistan, land release processes have accelerated and efficiency has improved as a result of introducing new methodologies.<sup>40</sup> In 2014 STMAP, TNMAC, FSD and NPA conducted a joint land release field assessment in the Central Region using the non-technical survey with light technical survey interventions (detectors). Stakeholders report that this approach has led to improved cooperation and analysis of results. Consequently, two areas with a total size of 585,000 m<sup>2</sup> were cancelled. In addition, one hazardous area was reduced from 160,000 m<sup>2</sup> to 60,000 m<sup>2</sup>. A total of 685,000 m<sup>2</sup> of the suspected hazardous area was released from the database.<sup>41</sup> While most of the land release efforts have focused on the Tajik-Afghan border and Central Region, joint non-technical survey field assessments have also been conducted by TMAC and FSD along the border. This confirmed that all hazardous areas were on the Uzbekistan side of the border, as anticipated. As a result, land release projects for previously suspected hazardous areas on the Tajik side were cancelled.

From 2003 until the end of 2014, more than 14.5 km<sup>2</sup> of land has been released through joint non-technical survey/technical survey interventions, mine clearance and technical survey activities. The following were found and destroyed during operations: 55,795 anti-personnel mines, 22 anti-tank mines, 8,454 ERW, 501 cluster sub-munitions, 37 kg explosive charges and 65,319 small arms cartridges. A total of 174 hazardous areas have been released and handed over to the local authorities for safe use.

Following the completion of clearance activities by implementing partners and quality assurance processes conducted by MAC, the demined land is released, and a handover certificate (signed by MAC, the demining organization and the local authority) is given to the district authority. Depending on the request from local leaders, an informal or formal ceremony is organized by MAC. The local population can then use the released land in confidence for their daily livelihood activities.

As of December 2015, 70 CHAs with an approximate total size of 5.72 km<sup>2</sup> and 101 unsurveyed minefield records remain to be addressed, including:

- Along the Tajik-Afghan border: 60 CHAs, with an approximate total size of 3.98 km<sup>2</sup> and 101 unsurveyed minefield records.
- In the Central Region: 10 CHAs remain, with an approximate total size of 1.74 km<sup>2</sup>.

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Information on the contamination problem relies on surveys and minefield records. The initial landmine impact survey identified around 50 km<sup>2</sup> of contaminated land, which the re-survey in 2007–2009 reduced by about 10 percent. However, neither survey is regarded as being particularly accurate. Early surveys were often poor by comparison with those used today. Staff lacked the necessary experience and expertise, there was no other competition in the country and, as with any other sector, techniques and methodologies have significantly improved over the years. Furthermore, the reliance on minefield records does not always obtain accurate results, and the information is not always shared in a timely manner.

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39 STMAP/TNMAC (2015) Annual Report 2014.

40 Ibid.

41 Republic of Tajikistan, Article 5 Completion Plan 2016–2020, 3 September 2015 (draft).

For example, records from the Russian military along the Tajik-Afghan border were not shared until 2009 but are considered to be reasonably (80–90 percent) accurate. Tajik military records are composed mainly of rough sketch maps and there are no records of early clearance the military conducted. In addition, a further 123 unsurveyed minefield records have recently come to light, out of which 22 have been surveyed. The remaining ones still need to be surveyed, and if confirmed as contaminated land, will be added to IMSMA. It is unclear why information about these 123 unsurveyed minefields was not shared earlier.

STMAP provides IMSMA support to MAC and is in the process of building the capacity of national staff to take over in the future from the STMAP Information Management Adviser. Information management capacity at MAC is considered to be good. However, the retention of TNMAC staff working in information management has proved difficult, as once the necessary competencies have been attained, staff have tended to move on elsewhere. This may be attributed to the fact that in the past there had been heavy reliance on one individual, the STMAP Information Management Adviser, and one STMAP staff in information management partly responsible for IMSMA data entry. However, there are now more information management staff on board to share this workload, including a TNMAC Geographic Information Systems Officer. A national Geographic Information Systems specialist is being hired at the time of writing as a UNDP consultant (September 2015) to assist with non-technical surveys and task folder preparations.

Although information management procedures exist, they have been under review to improve efficiency and information-sharing. An information management assessment conducted by GICHD in 2014 concluded that there is a lack of communication between the information management and quality management departments in MAC.<sup>42</sup> Information management activities

should essentially draw on different stakeholders and MAC department activities. However, the assessment found that the information management and operations department often seemed to be working parallel to each other, using different systems (for example IMSMA V6.0 versus Excel files). This has caused delays and inefficient management of information.

Following its assessment, GICHD drafted a two-year plan to provide information management support. TNMAC with STMAP are in the process of piloting the MINT software, which will support information management processes and enable more sophisticated analysis. STMAP and GICHD are also promoting the importance of information management to TNMAC to ensure that it is seen as a priority and given the time and resources needed to operate effectively. Measures to improve the efficiency of implementing partners are being introduced to reduce delays in submitting completion reports, which have resulted in misplaced reports and bottlenecks in the information management systems.

To address this problem, implementing partners will be provided with a lightweight version of IMSMA so that they can enter data remotely for full integration with IMSMA at a later date. Having access to IMSMA's information, which is considered credible, will also facilitate direct interaction between the TNMAC and various stakeholders. IMSMA is recognized as the main source of information for all cleared areas or remaining contaminated areas in the country. Requests for reliable information to ensure that areas are safe for development have already been received from commercial companies.

While land release processes, methodologies and inter-agency cooperation have improved since 2003, there are still challenges to meeting the obligations under the Ottawa Convention. These include building the capacity of the TNMAC

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42 GICHD (2014), Information Management Capacity Assessment Baseline Report, Tajikistan.

technical and operational staff, surveying the 101 remaining newly discovered minefield records, accessing insecure areas and dealing with difficult terrain. There is also a need to guarantee that capacity exists to deal with residual contamination, although there is time to ensure that this is in place post-2020.

## VICTIM ASSISTANCE SUPPORT

Victim assistance is central to the Ottawa Convention, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Protocol V (ERW), and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Tajikistan is one of the 28 States Parties to the Ottawa Convention (VA28) declaring a 'significant' number of mine victims/survivors. According to the national victim database, from 1992 to August 2015, a total of 854 landmine/ERW victims (484 survivors, 370 fatalities) have been recorded. Approximately 30 percent of mine survivors were children at the time of their accidents.<sup>43</sup>

Tajikistan's first Five Year Strategic National Mine Action Plan 2004–2008 shows a commitment to improving access to treatment, physical rehabilitation, psychosocial support and training for income-generation for mine survivors. It also demonstrates a commitment to support equal access to employment and educational opportunities through government and non-governmental national and international organizations. In 2006, STMAP and TMAC established the Inter-Agency Technical Working Group on Victim Assistance, comprising key stakeholders. These included representatives from the Ministry of Health and Social Protection of the Population,<sup>44</sup> the National Orthopaedic Centre, the National Research Institute for Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities, the National University of Tajikistan, an association of

survivors, the Society of Persons with Disabilities, the ICRC, and national and international non-governmental organizations working with and for survivors.

This inter-agency technical working group was key to ensuring that all strategic and annual work plans for mine action were developed to include the needs of landmine victims and survivors. In the same year, STMAP employed a medical doctor with expertise in neurology, psychiatry, psychology and social work as TMAC's Victim Assistance Officer. The following year a survivor joined TMAC's Victim Assistance team.

From 2005 to 2009, the TMAC VA programme provided direct support to more than 60 percent of the then-registered landmine/ERW survivors and victims' families. This included access to income-generating opportunities, vocational training, psychosocial support, rehabilitation and physiotherapy.<sup>45</sup> Effective monitoring, however, was impeded by geographical distances and limited access to remote villages. There were also concerns among stakeholders and the UNDP Country Office that TMAC was straying into implementation, which prevented it from being an objective coordinator and monitor of mine action activities.<sup>46</sup> These activities were absorbed into other implementing partner activities, for example the UNDP Communities Programme, so that the STMAP could concentrate on working with implementing partners to provide VA.

The various implementing partners in victim assistance are involved in four key areas: medical and rehabilitation support, psychosocial support, income generation/financial support, and advocacy. All these activities are coordinated and monitored by STMAP. Through various networks, STMAP has gathered information and

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43 STMAP/TNMAC (2015) VA/DSU Fact Sheet.

44 Previously the lead ministry for disability was the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of the Population — social protection was merged with the Ministry of Health in 2014.

45 STMAP/TMAC (2015) Annual Progress Report 2014.

46 Interviews conducted in Tajikistan in November and December 2011 by Rebecca Roberts.

maintained a victim database using IMSMA. The accuracy of data about mine/ERW victims/survivors is being verified in a joint initiative by ICRC/RCST, STMAP and TNMAC, which began in 2013 (involving a full needs assessment, village by village, and access to ICRC's micro-economic initiatives).

Various stakeholders from government departments, the United Nations, and national and international entities involved in assisting persons with disabilities who attended the VA workshop, held during the field visit in July, identified the following achievements in VA since 2003:<sup>47</sup>

#### **MEDICAL AND REHABILITATION SUPPORT**

- Improving the accessibility, quality and sustainability of services.
- Providing 60 beds for patients at the Research Institute for Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities.
- Providing orthopaedic assistance.
- Conducting research and holding workshops to improve services.
- Holding conferences and roundtable discussions on the implications of joining the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

#### **PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT**

Provision of psychosocial support had been poor, particularly in the rural mine-affected areas. VA projects to assist landmine/ERW survivors and families of victims have been coordinated, designed and implemented using the following strategies and methods:

- Raising awareness on psychosocial issues through mass media and organizing mass media events.
- Establishing an inter-ministerial group, which meets quarterly to discuss all issues

related to the provision of psychosocial support.

- Building the capacity of medical practitioners and social workers in mine-affected areas to provide psychosocial support to landmine/ERW survivors and families of victims (a total of 210 medical personnel had received training by August 2015).
- Implementing a peer-to-peer landmine survivor support programme by the Tajikistan Campaign to Ban Landmines & Cluster Munitions (2011–2013).
- ICRC's establishing a psychosocial support programme in 2015.
- Providing summer camps for persons with disabilities for recreational and educational activities; the opportunity is also used to raise awareness about the rights of persons with disabilities.

#### **INCOME-GENERATION/FINANCIAL SUPPORT**

Facilitating mine victims' opportunities to generate an income is intended to promote psychological well-being by enabling mine victims to be more independent. Activities in this area include the following:

- Investing in livestock and equipment that promote income-generating activities.
- Providing basic food items to increase nutritional standards and providing food for the most vulnerable during Eid;
- Engaging landmine/ERW survivors in permanent employment, to improve their economic status and promote psychological well-being.

A review by the Implementation Support Unit in 2010 concluded that income-generation and financial support had not enabled all mine victims and survivors to achieve financial inde-

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47 TNMAC/STMAP (2015) Victim Assistance in Tajikistan Workshop Report.

pendence, possibly because the remote rural locations of some provide a limited range of livelihood options.<sup>48</sup> Livelihood support is ongoing and, in August 2015, the ICRC was halfway through a three-year income-generation initiative. Responses to the project from the families of victims and inhabitants who were living in villages that participated in research were positive but further research is necessary to access the success of the project.

Organizations supporting persons with disabilities report that the status and living conditions of landmine survivors (and their families) are said to have improved as a result of the progress made in improving the accessibility and quality of services for medical, psychosocial and rehabilitation support.<sup>49</sup>

In 2014 alone, the following was achieved:

- 130 health care and social workers received training in psychosocial rehabilitation for persons with disabilities organized by the Public Organization Psychology Support Centre in cooperation with the Ministry of Health and Social Protection of the Population and TNMAC. As a result of this training, more than 300 persons with disabilities who suffered from psychological trauma received urgent psychological assistance.
- 26 local architects and designers were trained on the 'State standards and regulations of the Republic of Tajikistan on accessibility of buildings for people with limited mobility'. Three buildings in Dushanbe will be adapted for persons with disabilities by the newly trained architects and designers.
- 160 families of mine victims participated in the ICRC Micro-Economic Initiative Project.
- 72 families of mine victims received micro-credits through two UNDP/STMAP-supported micro-credit funds *Rushdi Sugd* and *Fayzi Surkhob*.
- 560 persons with disabilities and 442 visually impaired people were given access to education and psychosocial support.

In 2012, the VA programme broadened its remit to include support to all persons with disabilities and the inter-agency technical working group was renamed the Inter-Agency Technical Working Group on Disability Support. In 2013, the VA pillar was renamed the Disability Support Unit and its role and involvement were better defined in the mine action strategy.<sup>50</sup> The STMAP Victim Assistance Officer has become the Disability Support Officer for three United Nations/UNDP projects and spends about 25 percent of her time working for STMAP. The plan is to end STMAP support for VA by the end of 2016, assuming that the transition process to a national mine action centre is successful. Meanwhile, the Disability Support Unit has been mainstreamed into UNDP's disability programme from 2014. By 2015, VA activities had been mainstreamed through national and international institutions, including the following:

- Government: Ministry of Health and Social Protection of the Population.
- National: National University, Russian-Tajik Slavonic University, RCST, Tajikistan Campaign to Ban Landmines & Cluster Munitions Peer-to-Peer support, the local NGOs for persons with disabilities, *Imkoniyat* and *Taqdir*, Psychology Support Centre, Orthopaedic Factory.
- International: UNDP Communities Programme, UNICEF, Handicap International,

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48 Ottawa Convention Implementation Support Unit (2010), Review of VA in Tajikistan.

49 TNMAC/STMAP (2015), Victim Assistance in Tajikistan Workshop Report.

50 TMAC/STMAP (2014) Annual Progress Report 2013.

WHO, Japan International Cooperation Agency, ICRC Micro-Economic Initiatives, FSD accessibility and capacity-building project.<sup>51</sup>

## ADVOCACY

The first organizations in Tajikistan to advocate for the rights of mine victims were the ICRC and RCST. Since its inception, STMAP has made a valuable contribution to advocacy for victims and the disability sector in general, through capacity-building and awareness-raising initiatives, the translation of existing regional and international documents and guidelines into Tajik and Russian, and the publication of guidelines, methodologies and education materials on disabilities in Tajik.<sup>52</sup> From 2006, UNDP has been advocating for the rights of persons with disabilities to be included in the national development strategy. In line with this, TMAC, and now TNMAC, have promoted the rights of survivors and assistance for them to be mainstreamed into assistance for persons with disabilities and broader development frameworks.<sup>53</sup>

Efforts have been made to raise awareness within the Tajik Government about obligations under international humanitarian law to landmine/ERW victims and survivors and persons with disabilities. Advice and capacity-building have been provided to relevant Government entities. For example, in 2013 UNDP recruited an international and national consultant to support the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection to develop the country's first State Programme for Social Protection of Persons with Disabilities.<sup>54</sup> Joint workshops for national and international organizations about the importance of victim assistance have been held and invitations

extended to ministries and government officials.

National and international organizations, including UNDP, STMAP and TMAC/TNMAC, have formed a Joint Partnership Programme to promote the signing of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The President has established a working group to examine issues surrounding the Convention. Findings from the VA workshop conducted during the country visit suggest that this is likely to occur by the end of 2015 or early 2016. The Ministry of Justice is considering two options that will affect how soon the Convention is signed. The first is that the Government signs the Convention now and then conducts an in-depth review of legislation and a cost-benefit analysis before ratifying the Convention. The second is that the Government completes its review of legislation and cost-benefit analysis before signing and ratifying the Convention. To bridge the gap until, and if, the Government joins the Convention, a two-year State Programme on Social Protection of Persons with Disabilities was agreed in 2014. This provides "an age and gender-sensitive and rights-based foundation to promote the long-term physical, psychological, social and economic well-being of persons with disabilities".<sup>55</sup>

Despite the progress in victim assistance and promoting the rights of persons with disabilities, numerous challenges remain. The participants in the VA workshop identified the following:

- A lack of specialists, including physiotherapists and orthopaedic surgeons.
- Limited ability in the country to manufacture prosthetic devices.

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51 UNDP (2015), Draft Outline of Report of the Secretary-General on Assistance in Mine Action 2013–2015.

52 Ottawa Convention Implementation Support Unit (2014), Five Key Examples of the Role of Mine Action in Integrating Victim Assistance into Broader Frameworks.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 UNDP (2015), Draft Outline of Report of the Secretary-General on Assistance in Mine Action 2013–2015. The programme has never been officially approved because of changes in ministerial structures in early 2014.

- Limited and fluctuating funding.
- Turnover of trained staff.
- Lack of awareness among the public of the importance of psychological issues.
- Lack of premises with reliable electricity supplies for meetings/summer camps that can be accessed by persons with disabilities.
- Little awareness of VA at the local level.
- Many landmine survivors reside in remote mountainous areas with little access to information about what assistance is available.
- Promoting the rights of persons with disabilities is difficult, so that many of them, including landmine survivors, are unaware of their rights.
- The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has not been signed or ratified, despite efforts to raise awareness among Government officials.<sup>56</sup>

## SUPPORT TO SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

From the beginning of mine action in Tajikistan the positive link between mine action and recovery and development has been made by TMAP, the Government and UNDP, although there has never been any systematic or detailed impact assessment before or after clearance. The 2006 national mine action strategy developed by TMAP stated that demining was “a pre-condition for continuing development and modernization of the country ... [and that natural resources could not be] repaired, accessed or used because of contamination by landmines”.<sup>57</sup> The strategy aimed to “restore access to land and infrastructure to ensure that economic activity and development projects...[were] unimpeded by landmines”.<sup>58</sup>

## PRIORITY SETTING

In the 2006 strategy, TMAP stated that clearance capacity would be deployed to “have the greatest positive impact on the community” and would focus on:

- Settled land with high, or potentially high, civilian casualty rates.
- Land used for agriculture.
- Land required for community development purposes (local high-use areas critical to re-establishing the basic existence of *local* infrastructure, e.g., water sources, access ways, fuel supplies, etc.).
- Land required for reconstruction and infrastructure development purposes.

The table on the following page shows the rating system that was developed to prioritize tasks for clearance.

The system of prioritization has not been followed for a variety of reasons:

- Some donors imposed conditions — for example, Japan gave funding for clearing the Tajik-Afghan border.
- Certain government departments and local government leaders requested clearance of specific areas.
- Government security concerns restricted clearance in the Tajik-Afghan border.
- Early clearance operations took place in the Central Region near populated areas but were suspended when fighting erupted in 2010.

Undoubtedly there are logistical challenges to conducting mine action operations in some areas. Operators in 2015 noted that the more accessible areas had been tackled first, with the

56 STMAP/TNMAC (2015), Victim Assistance in Tajikistan Workshop Report.

57 TMAP (2006) *Report on the Implementation of the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme 2006*, p. 7.

58 Ibid, p. 5.

Land value		
	Mine/UXO rating	Socioeconomic rating
A	Mines or UXO confirmed a. Casualties in the area b. Mines confirmed by survey c. Minefield records held	1 High socioeconomic value a. Densely populated b. Good agricultural land c. Health and education facilities d. Important road blocked e. Water access obstructed f. Miscellaneous
B	Mines or UXO likely a. Potential for casualties b. Anecdotal casualties	2 Medium socioeconomic value a. Marginal land b. Poor rainfall c. Transportation infrastructure d. Electrical power infrastructure e. Miscellaneous
C	Mines or UXO unlikely a. No casualties in the area b. No minefield records	3 Low socioeconomic value a. No local population b. Poor land c. Commercial development d. Difficult access e. Miscellaneous

most difficult tasks remaining. Operators also admitted that with the various challenges and their own practical concerns, for the last few years, clearance had essentially been conducted district by district. All mine action stakeholders recognize that logistical considerations can drive the final stages of clearance, assuming that the contamination does not have significantly more impact in one area than another. However, in Tajikistan, in 2015, it is widely assumed that some areas are more badly affected than others and that these should be addressed first. Late in 2014, NPA introduced impact assessment tools for their operations. TNMAC, the UNDP Country Office and other stakeholders are discussing how such tools can be integrated more broadly into mine action in Tajikistan. For example, as part of the joint non-technical survey/technical survey initiated in 2015, impact assessment was included in the process by all stakeholders involved.

Land release has been conducted for large infrastructure projects, although it is unclear how the priority for such projects has been assessed or what the impact has been. Infrastructure projects include road rehabilitation along the border, bridges for border crossings and cross-border markets with Afghanistan, and coal and gold mining.

Clearance of the border area has provoked controversy and divided opinion. There is no consensus among international and national stakeholders and local communities about the socioeconomic impact of clearing the Tajik-Afghan border. Most of the cleared area in Khatlon Province lies behind a fence in no-man's land that apparently forbids ordinary citizens from entering. However, some local people and international observers state that civilians are accessing the area for grazing, farming and natural resources. Those fleeing the conflict in Tajikistan reported mine accidents on the border as they tried to enter Afghanistan and,<sup>59</sup> with the

59 Focus Discussion Groups held for this report, July and August 2015.

ongoing fighting in Afghanistan, it is possible that Afghans will try to cross the border to Tajikistan in search of safety.

After a visit to the western part of the border, Germany withdrew funding for clearance, arguing that there is no socioeconomic benefit for civilians. Other donors such as Japan and the United States argue that it is important for security reasons to clear the border. Local officials have stated that security and feelings of security are important for local citizens, and this in itself justifies clearance.<sup>60</sup> The United Nations and other mine action stakeholders argue that the border guards patrolling the area are at risk. These stakeholders have committed support in the 2016–2020 United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) to clear the border area. These discussions overlook the fact that the Ottawa Convention requires all contamination to be cleared regardless of the threat posed.

#### **INTEGRATED MINE ACTION AND DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES**

The TMAC/TNMAC, Government and UNDP have worked together to integrate mine action into a variety of national and international strategies, although it has not been possible to determine what this has meant in reality.<sup>61</sup> The 2013 revised version of the Tajikistan National Mine Action Strategy for 2010–2015 states that the response to the landmine contamination should be within the broader context of poverty reduction and socioeconomic development. The 2006, 2010 and revised 2013 national mine action strategies are aligned with several agendas, strategies and initiatives: the Millennium Development Goals, in particular, those on poverty reduction, environment sustainability, and global partnerships for devel-

opment; the National Development Strategy 2007–2015; the 2010–2015 Poverty Reduction Strategy; and the aid effectiveness principles of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action.

When the poverty reduction strategy was reviewed, it was renamed the Living Standards Improvement Strategy (2013–2015). The Strategy explicitly included mine action for the first time and states that anti-personnel mines and ERW should be cleared to improve safe access to land for agriculture, grazing, and gathering wood and other natural resources.<sup>62</sup> Mine action is also part of the draft national development strategy for 2016–2030.<sup>63</sup>

The UNDP Country Office supports the Government's poverty reduction initiatives through its Communities Programme, launched in 2004. The programme is conducted at the rural, cross-border and regional levels to promote development and trade, and mitigate the possibilities of conflict. There is information-sharing among the Communities Programme and TMAC/TNMAC and organizations assisting persons with disabilities. There has also been a practical integration of responses. For example, 101 victims and their families received assistance through a range of different Communities Programme initiatives.<sup>64</sup> UNDP has tried to involve its environmental team for Disaster Risk Reduction to discuss clearance operations scheduled for protected areas, but to date this has not been very successful.

#### **REPORTING**

Mine action is part of the 2010–2015 and 2016–2020 UNDAF under environment and disaster risk reduction. Mine action is not mentioned

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60 Government official at the Panj District Centre, 27 July 2015.

61 Relevant local officials and staff from German Agro Action and Aga Khan Development Network were unavailable during the field visits because they were involved in the Presidential visit to the Central Region.

62 Republic of Tajikistan (2013), Tajikistan Mine Action Strategic Plan 2010–2015 (revised 2013), pp. 9 and 15.

63 Email communication, Sebastian Kasack, 17 September 2015.

64 United Nations Country Office Team (2015), UNDAF for Tajikistan: 2016–2020, page 20.

in the Government–United Nations country programme document for 2016–2020 because there is no specific area in which to incorporate mine action, and length restrictions and format requirements led to its exclusion. The Country Office reports on mine action activities through various channels, including the online system,

Results-Oriented Annual Reporting. This is linked to the indicators for sustainable development, good governance and building resilience in the UNDP Strategic Plan 2014–2017.<sup>65</sup> The Country Office also provides information for other reports compiled at headquarters, such as reports of the Secretary-General.

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<sup>65</sup> Support to Tajikistan Mine Action Programme–Submission to UNDP/Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, June 2014; Linkage to UNDP Strategic Plan 2014–2017.

## Section 3

# IMPACT

Although only a relatively small area of Tajikistan is contaminated with landmines and ERW, the socioeconomic impact on the population is significant. This is because there is so little usable land and the majority of people live in rural areas and depend on agriculture for their livelihood. All villages visited engaged in some kind of farming, including livestock farming, but some areas relied more heavily on one type of farming than another, depending on the available natural resources.

Rural life is hard. In many parts of the country the summer is short. People must use the three or four months of good weather to farm and to graze their animals and also prepare for winter by making hay, collecting fuel and preserving food. A third of the population of Tajikistan lives below the poverty line and most of the country's poorest live in rural areas. Village inhabitants were unwilling to discuss the socioeconomic differences among their people, as this is considered inappropriate. Although it was evident from the clothes worn and possessions held that some households were better off than others, all were poor.

Women in Novobad village explained that, in their view, three factors affect household wealth:

1. **Sickness** — if a member of the household is ill, the cost of medical treatment is a drain on household resources, although if the household had a regular income from a salaried position, the impact of illness on the household wealth would be reduced.
2. **Children** — many young children are a drain on household resources, but many adult children who can contribute towards the household income create a wealthier family.
3. **Remittances** — if one or more family members is working in the Russian Federation and

is able to send money home, then the family remaining in Tajikistan will be better off.

Thousands of Tajiks find work in the Russian Federation. In some of the villages visited it seemed that looking for work in that country is a first choice, as it offers the most immediate and effective means of generating an income; for others it seems to be the last option when all other means of making money have failed.

Through focus groups discussions conducted separately with men and women, village inhabitants explained how their lives were affected by the contamination and what changed following land release. The main problems caused by the contamination were heightened levels of fear and psychological problems, reduced freedom of movement, and restricted access to natural resources. All these problems had significant repercussions, with long-term impact. They increased people's vulnerability and had the potential to lead them into cycles of poverty from which it might be impossible to escape (see Annex 11).

## **PROBLEMS CAUSED BY MINE CONTAMINATION**

### **FEAR**

Understandably, the proximity of land contaminated with mines and ERW causes fear. People worried about themselves, their friends and their families, particularly children. There have been few accidents in recent years as a result of clearance and increased awareness, but the memory of accidents even a couple of decades ago still caused fear. Some inhabitants had witnessed horrific accidents and were unable to help the victims for fear of endangering themselves. Others

had spent many hours and travelled many kilometres to rescue the injured and take them to a hospital, only for the victims to die en route.

The group of men recounting this experience many years later obviously still felt guilty that they had been unable to save their friends. One father explained how his son had bled to death in his house after being found dying in a field. Another father lost his three children in a single explosion. More research is needed about the psychological impact of witnessing such violent events, but villagers recalled how a mother who had just lost her son had a stroke and was paralysed down her left side, and another mother miscarried.<sup>66</sup> Children who had lost one of their parents in a mine accident were said to have behavioural problems and to lack role models. The remaining parent, who was usually the mother, struggled to be both the caregiver and the provider. Parents reported that they found it stressful worrying about their children's safety, and mothers said that it could be difficult to concentrate on their chores when the children were outside the home.

### **FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT**

The contamination prevented freedom of movement. During the war, anti-tank mines were laid on the roads. Following the war, vehicles could not use these roads, although people would walk on them to travel between villages and access markets. Obviously this was time-consuming and limited the amount of goods that could be bought and sold. The time it took to travel and to make multiple journeys to transport goods prevented people from engaging fully in income-generating activities. The mined roads affected the delivery of assistance. In the community of Saghirdasht, the inhabitants recalled how one of the tractors going to collect food supplies from the Aga Khan Development Network was blown up enroute. The driver was badly injured but survived and still lives in the village. Many of the roads were

among the first contaminated areas to be cleared. Inhabitants said that it made a huge difference to their daily lives when they could start to use the roads again safely, and travel in vehicles and transport goods easily.

Contamination also prevented some children from going to school, since they either had to be accompanied to school by a caregiver or miss it. Parents were also reluctant to allow children to help with household chores that were generally reserved for children. Consequently, adults spent more time than usual on such chores, including the task of minding the younger children. This reduced the time available for activities that contribute to household income.

Leisure activities were also affected, as children could not be allowed to play outside unsupervised. Both men and women explained that they could not go out in the open air to relax and that this affected their health. Some men said that they were prevented from fishing, which was something they did for pleasure but nonetheless could have contributed to household food stores.<sup>67</sup>

### **ACCESS TO NATURAL RESOURCES**

The biggest economic impact on rural populations caused by the contamination was the inability to access natural resources, including land for grazing and farming, firewood that they collected, mushrooms, herbs for medicine, grass to make hay for the animals in the winter, and water for drinking and irrigation.

The problems caused by the contamination became more apparent as respondents explained their way of life. For example, cows are very important because they provide milk — for butter, cheese and yoghurt — meat, and fuel for fires, which comes from dried cowpats. The better off a household, the more cows it owns. Yet even the poorest households are likely to have a cow

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66 The Head of the DSU says that further research is needed to understand the psychological impact of mine accidents on people directly involved and witnesses, 23 July 2015.

67 TMAC and ICRC established 'safe play' areas for children living in contaminated areas.

because it provides so much in the way of food and fuel. If a cow is killed, no one can afford to replace it with a full-grown cow. Because of the limited availability of grazing land in some parts of the country, livestock are moved to different pastures in various other areas during the summer months.

As a result, it is not only the local population that depends on specific pieces of land but people from other parts of the country as well. A few shepherds take these cattle in large numbers to pasture for grazing. Every year a few young people (usually men) are chosen to herd the cattle and every cattle owner pays so much per head of cattle for the animals to be herded. Economically, herding cattle is very lucrative so the responsibilities are allocated to different people in turn. The contamination reduced the areas available for grazing and meant that the shepherds could lose money if any one of the cattle was killed or injured by a landmine/ERW. The shepherds are considered responsible for the animals' welfare and must compensate the owner for any loss. It is never the full cost and might be paid in kind with a replacement calf rather than money. However, the shepherd's income, on which the household will depend, is reduced, and the owner has lost an animal that was providing milk, fuel and possibly meat. The money is not enough to replace the cow, and a replacement calf takes several years before it is as economically useful as an adult animal.

Horses and sheep are also important to the rural population and cannot be replaced if killed by a mine/ERW. Horses are mainly used for transport and are very useful, given the large distances that must be covered and the difficult terrain. The sheep are used for their wool and meat. If any animal is killed, the respondents explained, there is a gap in the generations of offspring. Not only is that particular animal lost and cannot be replaced, but it takes several years for another animal to become old enough to be as economically valuable as the one that was killed. In the meantime, households have to buy the products that they can no longer produce for themselves, which is expensive and may mean that they have

to sell assets to cover costs. Economically, it is very difficult for households to recover from the loss of an animal.

Sometimes animals would wander into contaminated areas where their owners could not protect them from wild animals. Several respondents reported losing cattle to bears. At other times, owners were forced to allow their animals to enter contaminated areas because there was no grass elsewhere for them to eat, and some animals were lost in this way. However, it came down to a choice between animals definitely starving to death or possibly being killed by in an explosion.

The clearance process itself can have an economic impact. In Saidon village, the summer months are short and this is when the clearance had to be conducted. The villagers had to find alternative grazing land for their livestock, which was over 40 kilometres away. Using alternative grazing land was expensive and inconvenient, and meant that villagers did not have access to milk or meat from their livestock during this time.

Because of the shortage of available farmland, some land was over-cultivated and became increasingly less productive. Sometimes the available land was less fertile than the contaminated land, so was less productive anyway. Unable to produce enough food for themselves and their families, villagers had to buy food and lose out on any income that would have been generated from surplus production. Purchasing food is expensive for villagers and means that households have to make sacrifices to be able to feed themselves, they eat a less healthy and varied diet, and sometimes go hungry.

In all the villages visited, inhabitants mentioned the importance of collecting herbs to make medicines for themselves and to sell to pharmacies in Dushanbe and other urban centres. Without access to herbs, inhabitants explained that their own health suffered and that they lost an important source of income. This meant that they had to rely more heavily on other sources of income and possibly sell some of their assets to make up the shortfall.

In Saidon, respondents explained how the contamination had led to conflict with neighbouring villages over their water supply. On a hill near the village a natural spring provided drinking water and fed an irrigation system, which was used by the population in the surrounding area. During the civil war, mines were laid around the spring, and the irrigation system was damaged. Because of the contamination, the irrigation system could not be repaired and the inhabitants from Saidon had to use water from neighbouring villages for drinking and irrigating their crops. This led to conflict, which was eventually resolved by village leaders who negotiated access to the remaining safe water supplies for the different villages on different days.

However, access to other water sources did not mitigate the loss of their local water supply. Inhabitants of Saidon could not irrigate their land properly, so they grew less and had less food to eat. This resulted in lower household incomes because there was no surplus to sell. In Dashti Sher village, contamination led to people becoming ill from drinking dirty water and developing acute and chronic health problems. This led to some households selling important assets such as cars and livestock to cover the cost of medical treatment. Once recovered, the earning capacity of these households was reduced because of the loss of assets they had been forced to sell. Since clearance, both these villages have had access to adequate water for farming and personal use, so the problems caused by the contamination have disappeared.

## LAND CONFLICTS

Land is allocated by the Land Committee at the district level based on the size of the household and its capacity to use the land effectively. The land user is registered legally with the authorities. All land users must pay tax on their land regardless of whether they are able to generate an income from it. Therefore, if land is mined and not in use, taxes must still be paid. Some communities dispute this and say that land users can ask the Land Committee for different land for a variety of reasons including contamination with landmines and ERW. Other reasons include

poor soil fertility or land size that is inappropriate for the size of the household. Because of the tax imposed on land, some households chose to return it to the Land Committee although it was unclear whether this is a common occurrence.

Most respondents stated that there had not been conflicts over released land because the Land Committee undertakes allocation and everybody is entitled to some land. Use of land and access to it had not changed significantly from pre-contamination to land release, and all members of previously mine-affected communities had benefited equally from released land. The use of shared land for grazing is regulated by community leaders, and access is based on long-agreed prioritization of households. Apparently, order of access can be negotiated and respondents claimed that the system works well and that there are no conflicts. However, with livelihoods so heavily dependent on access to good grazing land, those households without priority access must be concerned that resources will be depleted by the time they are able to use it.

One woman, who had cleared her own land of the Russian PFM-1, or butterfly mines, claimed that now that the land was cleared, other people wanted it. She claimed to have registered her use with the authorities and felt confident that it meant that others could not take it from her, although she feared that there would be conflict over the land. She and her family had been forced to move onto the land to survive after they had been living in a car for several months. She cleared the land herself to protect her children. With her family, she has built a house and is generating some income from farming the land. However, she is two years in arrears in paying tax on the land and was visibly poorer than other households visited for the study. The fact that she and her family felt they had no choice but to move to known contaminated land indicates that they were among the most vulnerable of the population. They have clearly benefited from clearing the land, building a house and establishing a smallholding but are not making enough to cover all their expenses. Her land was checked by professional demining organizations following

her unofficial clearance, and all items found were reported and destroyed.

### IMPACT OF LAND RELEASE

All respondents stated that once the land was cleared, all the problems caused by the contamination were resolved. Respondents were grateful to the organizations that had cleared the land and were confident that it was safe. They could discuss in equal detail the impact on their lives of the contamination cleared almost 20 years ago as well as the impact caused by contamination cleared just a few months ago.

Nearly all the benefits from the land released in the villages visited for this study seem to come from the people themselves, who were able to resume their normal livelihood activities unimpeded. There was no evidence of development initiatives being designed to complement the clearance, with the exception of repairs made to the irrigation system in Saidon by the Aga Khan Foundation. In addition to the Aga Kahn Foundation, the German NGO *Welthungerhilfe* is also active in the areas visited but it was not possible to determine whether their activities are directly linked to clearance.

In addition to community-level development projects, there have been some large-scale infrastructure projects that have been made possible because of clearance. A stretch of road along the border with Afghanistan was cleared so that it could be upgraded. Cross-border projects designed to improve trade between Afghanistan and Tajikistan have been possible because land was cleared so that bridges over the River Panj could be constructed to link the two countries. In Vanj district, every Saturday a market is held for traders and inhabitants from both sides of the border. A Presidential visit occupied the time of local government officials and NGO staff during the research team's visit, so it was not possible to determine what impact they felt these markets and the road improvements had had on the local population. When questioned, village inhabitants were vague about the road and bridge construction and none said that they went to the cross-border market on a regular basis.

### VICTIM ASSISTANCE

Despite the wide range of support reported to be available for mine victims, their families and people with disabilities, respondents were aware only of the income-generating assistance for mine victims and their families funded by the ICRC and distributed through the RCST. As this project is ongoing, many people were aware of it and thought that this was the first time such assistance had been made available. People who had been injured or lost an income earner 15 to 20 years ago confirmed that this was the first assistance that they had received. An elderly couple whose son had been killed chose to receive a cow and a calf. They said that this assistance had made a huge difference to their livelihood and would allow them to retire and use the milk. However, the beehive that the couple had also requested failed to make money for them, so they sold it.

Another man who had lost five children during the civil war chose a cow. A man who had been injured shortly after the end of the civil war asked for his tractor to be repaired. He now has a good income because he and his tractor are hired by other people who want their land cultivated. It is clear that most respondents who had received income-generating assistance had benefited from it, but it was not possible to collect information from enough people to ascertain how successful this programme is.

From the villages visited it is evident that, despite the relatively small area that is contaminated by landmines and ERW in Tajikistan, the dearth of usable land means that all land is valuable. The contamination had a dramatic impact on the lives of those living near the contamination but also of those travelling from elsewhere to access natural resources. Once the land had been cleared, the rural population benefitted significantly. Yet this was due more to their own hard work and resumption of livelihood activities, which led to socioeconomic improvements, rather than to external development assistance.



## Section 4

# SUSTAINABILITY

This section examines whether UNDP support to mine action has achieved sustainability. It considers sustainability of impact, sustainability of mine action activities, and the indirect sustainable benefits.

First, there is sustainability of impact. Once land has been released and people can use it they derive socioeconomic benefits, which are likely to continue. Some of the larger infrastructure projects that have been made possible because of land release are also likely to have long-term benefits for the population, although research is necessary to understand what the economic impacts are and how they manifest themselves. For example, are individuals benefiting because they are able to engage in cross-border trade or is there more public money because government customs revenue has increased?

With the instability in the region, ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and a tense relationship with neighbouring Uzbekistan, there is the potential that landmines could be laid again or that conflict could result in further ERW. The Russian military are increasing the number of personnel based in Tajikistan, so unless agreements can be reached to keep the land in the vicinity of their training grounds free from UXO, the contamination will remain a problem. The Government's security concerns in the Tajik-Afghan border region may mean that clearance will not be completed there. Both the impact of this contamination and the potential impact of clearance on the civilian population are disputed. Logistically, many of the areas that remain to be cleared are difficult to access and technically difficult to clear. Mudslides, avalanches and flooding that Tajikistan frequently experiences can lead to mines and other ERW migrating from unknown hazardous areas or marked areas to re-contaminate previ-

ously cleared areas. The potential residual contamination has to be considered as part of the long-term planning to ensure that the Government can respond to this scenario.

Sustainability of impact in victim assistance is more difficult to achieve than in land release because it tends to be an ongoing rather than a finite activity. Assistance for income-generating activities is intended to be sustainable, and reports from target groups suggest that sustainability is being achieved. However, provision of assistive devices, medical care, physiotherapy and psychosocial support is ongoing and expensive. In a country like Tajikistan, where government resources are stretched and so many members of the population are in need in some way, it is difficult to ensure sustainability.

However, UNDP has shown leadership in the area of victim assistance and support to persons with disabilities. The impact of support given to mine victims has potentially been made more sustainable to some extent by the following measures and initiatives: the creation of the Disability Support Unit within TMAC/TNMAC, the mainstreaming of support to persons with disabilities through United Nations entities, the strong network of government and non-government entities engaged in victim assistance and support to persons with disabilities, the mainstreaming of victim assistance into support for persons with disabilities, the promotion of community-based rehabilitation for these persons, and the lobbying of the Government to become a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

Despite the nationalization of MAC, the future of mine action is uncertain for a number of reasons:

- MAC is in a transition phase. Legally, for the first time in its history, it has the status of a national entity but it is still heavily dependent on UNDP and OSCE funding. It is still staffed by STMAP-funded staff, and TNMAC staff are on Government salaries topped up by OSCE and UNDP.<sup>68</sup>
- The newly appointed TNMAC staff are receiving training so that they can assume full responsibility for MAC; STMAP staff are still acting as advisers.
- There is concern, particularly among international stakeholders that the relatively low salaries will result in high staff turnover, corruption or appointment of individuals lacking the necessary abilities for the positions. National stakeholders have slightly different concerns. These stakeholders focus more on working conditions, arguing that the salaries are national salaries and, although low, are accepted as the norm. Rather than salaries, working conditions are an issue because staff are expected to fulfil multiple roles that may straddle operations and administrative purviews. This situation is not good for morale or concentration. Moreover, staff are unlikely to be equally good at such varied roles.
- A change in the TNMAC Director or a senior position related to mine action could happen if there is a reshuffle within the Government. Any changes can result in a complete staff turnover, as senior appointees often like to bring in their own teams and are reluctant to assume control of a team that may have allegiances to a political rival.
- Government funding for MAC is provided through the national budget. Although there continue to be concerns about whether the Government will be able to disburse the full amount of funding committed, to date it has fulfilled its financial commitments and has increased its funding for 2016 to around \$50,000.
- The UNDP Country Office has fewer financial resources available to support mine action, and many donors are withdrawing or reducing funding because of a change in priorities or a belief that the contamination and land release do not have a strong enough socioeconomic impact on the civilian population.
- The mine action law is still to be finalized and incorporated into Tajik law, although key informants expect this to happen.
- Currently, the target of Article 5 is due to be met by April 2020, and UNDP STMAP support to TNMAC is due to be withdrawn at the end of 2017, so capacity and resources need to be in place before STMAP support ends to ensure that TNMAC can fulfil its obligations under the Ottawa Convention.
- The lack of a comprehensive impact study pre- and post-clearance means that there is no hard evidence to persuade sceptics, including donors, of the importance of mine action for the socioeconomic recovery and development of the population.

There are undoubtedly challenges to the future of mine action in Tajikistan and TNMAC, but many measures are in place to limit the risks:

- There is a transition strategy for moving from a UNDP-supported mine action programme to an independent national programme that includes capacity-building.
- The integration of mine action into key UNDP and national strategies and the explicit link made between mine action, recovery and long-term development, raises its profile and helps to keep it on the agenda.
- The structure, position in Government, and reporting lines for TNMAC have been confirmed by governmental decree. They do not differ significantly from what has been in place since 2003, so it means that they

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68 The national Director's salary is not topped up. His salary is covered by the Government.

are accepted, understood and work reasonably well.

- The Government has shown commitment to mine action since 1999 by signing the Ottawa Convention, agreeing to establish MAC with the support of UNDP, providing in-kind support for mine action since 2003, and from the creation of TNMAC receiving direct financial support from the national budget, drafting a mine action law and agreeing to mine action activities in Afghanistan being conducted from the Tajik side of the border.
- Among mine action stakeholders there is a lot of goodwill and mutual support, which has been developed through good networking and communication and the adoption of participatory approaches on key issues such as the transitional plan, the completion plan and development of the new TNMAC SOPs.
- Although difficult, there could be options to top up national salaries such as running activities on a project basis and allowing staff to apply for funding for mine action and adding an overhead for their time. This is how an NGO would budget for mine action activities and donors may agree to it. However, it would have to be approved by the Government and requires TNMAC staff to be capable of writing proposals, which is currently not the case. Salaries could also be topped up by donors in the long term but would recreate the situation under TMAC, which was staffed by individuals on international salaries. Currently, salaries are being topped up by UNDP and OSCE.
- TNMAC has a detailed Resource Mobilization Strategy (2015) and there is a resource mobilization strategy in place to pursue funding for the completion plan. It will take effort, determination and dynamism to secure sufficient funding.
- The Government should develop a plan post-2020 and completion of clearance, and these activities will need guidance from UNDP and other stakeholders so that

appropriate options are considered. Limited capacity could be retained for information management and land release to ensure that residual problems are dealt with. Some MRE capacity will be needed for work done in the Tajik-Uzbekistan border area because it is unlikely that the Uzbek side of the border will be cleared and that the local population will have stopped entering the area. It will also be necessary to be able to deliver victim assistance but, as discussed above, measures have been taken to ensure the sustainability of this assistance. Alternatively, the Government could consider more high-profile plans for TNMAC by creating a regional centre for excellence for mine action in Central Asia or by providing expertise in mine action for international peacekeeping operations.

There are other more far-reaching impacts of mine action in Tajikistan that are sustainable. These include:

- The capacity-building of the STMAP team has helped individuals to develop expertise that can be used elsewhere. For example, the VA STMAP staff member already had a medical degree and was highly qualified before joining STMAP. But with expansion of the VA pillar into the DSU and increased collaboration with UNDP and other organizations to support persons with disabilities the potential impact is much greater. The DSU has expanded the VA available and improved support to persons with disabilities through a network of national and international organizations and promoting the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to the Government. Therefore, there is the potential for STMAP to have an impact on the population and individuals that is greater and wider than that originally foreseen.
- Through South-South cooperation, the STMAP and TNMAC staff have been able to share their skills and experience internationally. STMAP staff have pro-

vided training to others, and the UNDP Country Office has been contacted to share their experience of nationalizing MAC and mainstreaming VA.

- GICHD is partnering with TNMAC and STMAP staff to pilot its new software, MINT.
- TMAC/STMAP staff have progressed and assumed more senior and responsible positions in other mine action organizations in Tajikistan. It is expected that some of them will secure international positions in mine action.

The sustainability of UNDP efforts in mine action is mixed. It has taken 11 years to create a nationalized mine action centre. Although its official status is secure and the transition strategy is in place, it is dependent on funding from the Government and external sources and ongoing commitment from the Government and stakeholders, as well as on the ability to develop and

retain the necessary national capacity to complete the clearance. It also depends on national and regional stability. The impact of land release to date is sustainable but most of VA will need ongoing support. The mainstreaming of VA into other initiatives protects these activities to some extent, as does the integration of mine action into the UNDP and national development strategies. With so little land left to clear and a commitment from UNDP to support MAC until the end of 2017 (with possible extension if necessary) it seems likely that most of Tajikistan will be cleared of landmines and ERW before UNDP withdraws support. Therefore, the impact of the contamination will be removed. Beyond 2020, capacity to clear residual contamination will be the responsibility of the Government. Although the expertise will exist, the resources and organizational structure to manage it may not. The STMAP and TNMAC staff have received training and capacity-building, and these skills can be used outside MAC to benefit others and secure livelihoods for individuals and their families.

## Section 5

# CONCLUSIONS

This section summarizes UNDP's role in mine action in Tajikistan. It assesses the socioeconomic impact of mine action and the extent to which UNDP can be said to contribute to that impact.

Through STMAP, UNDP has supported TMAC and TNMAC — its nationalized form. STMAP has fulfilled an institution-building role, a technical role, a role in VA and, to a lesser extent, a role in promoting socioeconomic goals through mine action. Without UNDP it is unlikely that the TMAC would have been established independently by the Government in 2003. From 2003 until the beginning of 2014, TMAC was the national mine action centre responsible for coordinating and overseeing mine action, developing guidelines in accordance with International Mine Action Standards, recording progress and relevant mine action data, and reporting on all aspects of mine action. UNDP contracted CTAs to TMAC for most of the time since 2003, covered salaries of national STMAP staff, provided capacity-building, and funded the running of the centre. UNDP has played an important role as donor and resource mobilizer, with donors commenting that the presence of UNDP has given them confidence to fund mine action.

The VA programme leads current best-practice thinking, and UNDP has shown leadership in this area. The DSU collaboration of TNMAC (formerly TMAC) with the Ministry of Health and Social Protection of the Population in developing the government State Programme on Social Protection of Persons with Disabilities has the potential to assure realization of the rights of survivors long after the end of mine clearance activities. Long-term sustainability has also been enhanced through the promotion of disability-inclusive development.

Although UNDP has made a significant contribution to all aspects of mine action in Tajikistan, there are areas where it could have achieved more. For over a decade, TMAC had an ambiguous status, as it was neither a directly implemented UNDP project nor a Government project. This meant that the future of TMAC was uncertain, access to some funding streams was restricted, and obtaining government security clearance and permission for operations was more difficult. Creating a national mine action centre shows the Government's commitment to the Ottawa Convention. Moreover, promoting national ownership is in line with UNDP's mandate. After protracted discussions, the Government and UNDP agreed on the creation of the Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre, which was established by governmental decree in January 2014. This is widely recognized as an achievement; yet it is still in the transition phase. Although the Government has committed some funding and resources, TNMAC is heavily reliant on external funding and STMAP staff. International observers argue that the creation of a national MAC could have been achieved earlier if the UNDP Country Office had adopted a stronger stance with the Government and if CTAs had possessed diplomatic skills in addition to technical mine action skills.

At the same time, other international observers argue that the CTAs could have provided stronger technical leadership. TMAC has sometimes relied on the technical expertise of the key international implementing partners. International stakeholders also believe that clearance in Tajikistan could have been completed in a shorter timeframe if TMAC had promoted greater efficiency. For a combination of challenges, perhaps more than one international appointee is needed to fulfil the role effectively.

Findings from the field visits show that the impact of contamination on communities has been significant and that livelihoods have improved following land release. Although government and UNDP strategies link mine action and development, there was little evidence that development projects have been implemented to complement clearance activities. Land release has been conducted for infrastructure projects but there have been no studies to assess their socioeconomic impact. Rural populations seemed largely unaware of such infrastructure projects, and so had no opinion about their impact. It was not possible during the field visits to determine the impact of VA programmes, although those participating in the current ICRC/RCST income-generation programme reported positive outcomes. Stakeholders providing support to mine victims and persons with disabilities believe that their work is having a positive impact.

Assuming that there is no further contamination and that the VA programme continues to be mainstreamed into broader programmes for persons with disabilities and other development programmes, the socioeconomic impact of mine

action can be sustained. The individuals whose capacity has developed through STMAP will continue working and using their skills, even if no longer based in TNMAC. In this way their expertise will not be lost. The future of TNMAC is less certain but, in the medium term, with the strong focus on implanting the transition strategy and fulfilling obligations under Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention, it seems likely that TNMAC will continue to fulfil its role effectively until 2020.

Through MAC, a strong network of donors, implementing partners and Government entities has been created and has been able to undertake mine action activities effectively and provide the appropriate support to the Government to enable it to meet its obligations under the Ottawa Convention. UNDP has been central to the achievements of mine action in Tajikistan. Through its support to TMAC and TNMAC, it has built national capacity and contributed to the impact of mine action on mine/ERW-affected populations and individuals.

The table below shows how the theory of change is relevant to Tajikistan.

	<b>Theory of change</b>	<b>Relevance to Tajikistan</b>
<b>Impact</b>	Improved livelihoods (towards poverty eradication) and reduced marginalization (towards reduction of inequalities and exclusion)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The livelihoods of rural villages improved significantly following land release because villagers were able to resume livelihood activities, move around safely and without fear for themselves or their children.</li> <li>• Livelihood improvements were dramatic but they came about as a result of rural inhabitants' own hard work. There was little evidence found during the field work to suggest that there had been external assistance provided to complement land release.</li> <li>• Village populations, traditional leaders and local officials gave the impression that landownership and access to land is determined fairly based on need and on capacity to use the land. However, as usable land is a scarce resource, it is likely that there is discontent. Cleared land was allocated according to long-established systems. Landownership is registered at the district level; access to common land is negotiated at the village level among village leaders. There was little evidence of conflict occurring over land as a result of land release.</li> <li>• Everyone benefited equally from the demined land in that the status quo before contamination was reinstated.</li> <li>• The majority of the poor in Tajikistan live in rural areas and land release has not changed this or reduced inequalities. There is still a low level of development, limited government investment and high levels of taxation. However, the impact of land release on the lives and livelihoods of rural populations should not be underestimated.</li> </ul>

(continued)

	<b>Theory of change</b>	<b>Relevance to Tajikistan</b>
<b>Outcomes</b>	Safety and reduced threat from landmines and ERW	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Villagers reported feeling safer after land was cleared of landmines/ERW. Those who had witnessed accidents were affected by that experience many years later.</li> <li>• Released land is used soon after its clearance.</li> <li>• According to the victims database, the number of accidents per year has declined since the end of the war as a result of land release, MRE and greater awareness among the population of the location of contaminated areas.</li> </ul>
	Productive use of previously contaminated land	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Villagers have resumed their normal livelihood activities on previously contaminated land.</li> </ul>
	National landmine ban law and legal protection for mine victims in place	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There is a draft mine action law, which needs to be presented to Parliament for approval.</li> <li>• The Government is planning to join the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and is currently considering how to do this. Informed observers expect the Government to sign the Convention before the end of 2016.</li> <li>• To bridge the gap until, and if, the Government joins the Convention, a two-year State Programme on Social Protection of Persons with Disabilities was developed in 2014.</li> </ul>
	Rehabilitation and improved living conditions of mine victims	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• According to stakeholders that provide assistance to mine victims, their families and persons with disabilities, people have benefited from this assistance. It was not possible to verify this independently with a large enough sample, although respondents who had received income-generation support reported a significant improvement in their livelihood.</li> <li>• It has been difficult for mine victims to achieve financial independence because of the lack of livelihood options in rural areas.</li> <li>• Stakeholders acknowledge that there is still a shortage of funding and expertise to support mine victims and persons with disabilities, although there is a strong network of organizations working to improve the situation.</li> </ul>
	Demined land released	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demined land is released according to procedures agreed with implementing partners. Land release records are kept by MAC using IMSMA, the implementing partners who completed the task and the local authorities. There is an official handover of the land to local leaders.</li> </ul>
	National ownership of mine action and mainstreaming into relevant national body	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Government has shown ownership of mine action by signing the Ottawa Convention — Tajikistan is the only Central Asian country to have done so besides Turkmenistan — and by providing ongoing support to the national MAC.</li> <li>• MAC is in transition from being a UNDP-supported entity through STMAP to a nationalized entity. TNMAC has an official and recognized place in the government structure, accepted policies and procedures and is included in the national budget.</li> <li>• The CIHL has acted as the national mine action authority since the Government first officially engaged in humanitarian mine action in 2003.</li> <li>• The Government has provided in-kind support, supported the transition process, and drafted relevant legislation.</li> <li>• The Government has permitted mine action in Afghanistan to be conducted from the Tajik side of the border.</li> <li>• TMAC, now TNMAC, with the exception of the CTA, has been staffed by nationals. The capacity of the TMAC staff is good. TNMAC staff need to be trained, so at the time of writing (September 2015) TNMAC does not have the relevant capacity to manage mine action in Tajikistan. It may have the capacity at the end of 2017 when TNMAC is scheduled to assume full control of mine action.</li> <li>• Other government entities have been active in mine action including the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health and Social Protection of the Population, Ministry of Defence, Border Guards and CoES.</li> </ul>

(continued)

	<b>Theory of change</b>	<b>Relevance to Tajikistan</b>
<b>Outcomes</b>	Mine victims identified and recognized	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IMSMA contains a record of all known victims.</li> <li>• All victim data are currently being verified.</li> <li>• Information on victims is shared with RCST to help distribute assistance from ICRC.</li> <li>• There is information-sharing among the UNDP Communities Programme and TMAC/TNMAC and organizations assisting persons with disabilities. There has also been practical integration of responses; for example, 101 victims and their families received assistance through a range of various UNDP Communities Programme initiatives.</li> </ul>
	Mine victims able to access basic and specialized services and vocational schemes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Based on information from stakeholders providing assistance to mine victims, they are able to access services and vocational training programmes that have been designed to meet their needs. However, stakeholders admit that assistance is limited by resources and expertise. It was not possible to verify independently with mine victims how easily they can access services or how effective they find the services.</li> </ul>
<b>Immediate results</b>	Contaminated land identified and demined in line with IMAS standards and communities aware of risks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 101 unsurveyed minefields need to be assessed and entered into IMSMA if deemed CHAs.</li> <li>• Quality assurance/control processes exist and are implemented to ensure that land release is conducted in accordance with IMSMA.</li> <li>• Standard operating procedures and NMAS have been developed for Tajikistan in line with International Mine Action Standards.</li> <li>• The people living in contaminated areas are aware of the risk and they inform visitors to the area.</li> <li>• MRE programmes are delivered through RCST, local volunteers and teachers.</li> </ul>
	Institutional structures developed and/or enhanced (e.g., mine action centres/authorities)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Government and UNDP agreed to establish TMAC in 2003 to coordinate all aspects of mine action.</li> <li>• Through STMAP, UNDP provided support to TMAC and the Government provided in-kind resources and staff for land release through the Ministry of Defence.</li> <li>• Since 2003, there is a consensus among mine action stakeholders that TMAC/TNMAC capacity and effectiveness have improved over time.</li> <li>• TMAC, now TNMAC, is recognized as the leading authority for all mine action pillars and all aspects of coordination, monitoring, Quality assurance/control, information management and reporting of mine action.</li> <li>• There has been effective capacity-building for STMAP staff but most will leave when UNDP support for TNMAC ends. TNMAC staff are being trained and recruited, but it remains to be seen whether sustainable capacity for the MAC can be built.</li> <li>• The sustainability and effectiveness of TNMAC and government resources for mine action will not be tested until the beginning of 2018.</li> </ul>

(continued)

	<b>Theory of change</b>	<b>Relevance to Tajikistan</b>
<b>Immediate results</b>	Policies, structures and services for mine victims developed, strengthened and/or provided	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In 2006, STMAP and TMAC established the Inter-Agency Technical Working Group on Victim Assistance (VA TWG) comprising key stakeholders. By 2015 there was an extensive network of governmental and national and international organizations providing support to mine victims and persons with disabilities.</li> <li>• National and international organizations, including UNDP, STMAP and TMAC/TNMAC have formed a Joint Partnership Programme to promote the signing of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The President has established a working group to examine issues surrounding the Convention.</li> <li>• While the Government is considering how and when to join the Convention, a two-year State Programme on Social Protection of Persons with Disabilities was agreed in 2014.</li> </ul>
<b>UNDP role</b>	Demining, technical and operational support, awareness and training, quality management, provision of demining equipment, methods, etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Through STMAP, UNDP supported TMAC/TNMAC to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Develop the technical capacity to coordinate all land release activities, allocate tasks and conduct quality assurance/control;</li> <li>– Hold regular coordination meetings and manage information reported by implementing partners;</li> <li>– Coordinate non-technical surveys/technical surveys and, in collaboration with implementing partners, develop a new combined non-technical survey/technical survey approach, which includes light clearance capacity. So far this has proved an effective and efficient methodology;</li> <li>– Develop SOPs and NMAS and ensure implementing partners adhere to them.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Through STMAP, UNDP has provided: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– CTA support and on-the-job-training;</li> <li>– Capacity-building opportunities for all staff in-country and abroad;</li> <li>– Strong South-South cooperation. STMAP staff have been involved in delivering training as well as participating in training;</li> <li>– STMAP staff are building the capacity of the newly appointed TNMAC staff so that they can assume full responsibility for all mine action activities from early 2018.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• STMAP with TMAC/TNMAC has coordinated MRE delivered by partners. (MRE began before 2003 and the creation of TMAC.)</li> <li>• STMAP and TMAC/TNMAC have strong collaboration with GICHD to improve information management for all mine action activities in Tajikistan. STMAP staff provide IMSMA support to TNMAC and are currently building capacity of national staff.</li> <li>• There is an established network of delivering MRE through volunteers (mostly from RCST) in communities and schools.</li> <li>• UNDP funding of demining equipment has been limited.</li> <li>• All demining activities are conducted by a range of governmental, international and national organizations, which are coordinated by TMAC/TNMAC.</li> <li>• UNDP has provided funding for operations.</li> </ul>

(continued)

	<b>Theory of change</b>	<b>Relevance to Tajikistan</b>
<b>UNDP role</b>	Institutional support and development: governance, policy, legal and regulatory frameworks, coordination, resource mobilization, fund management, relationship-building, national surveys, etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In 2003, the Government and UNDP agreed to establish TMAC. UNDP created STMAP to support TMAC.</li> <li>• In collaboration with the Government, the management structure and policy and procedures for mine action in Tajikistan have been developed.</li> <li>• UNDP and the Government agreed to the creation of a national mine action centre at the beginning of 2014. The discussions about how this should be done was funded and facilitated by UNDP and STMAP.</li> <li>• STMAP is supporting the capacity-building of TNMAC.</li> <li>• TMAC/TNMAC is the lead organization for coordinating all mine action activities of all partners in Tajikistan.</li> <li>• STMAP has supported the Government on drafting the mine action law.</li> <li>• STMAP has been involved in resource mobilization and has managed funds for TMAC. Gradually, TNMAC is assuming financial control.</li> <li>• Few resources, support for resource mobilization or guidance for mine action in general has come from UNDP in New York headquarters.</li> <li>• STMAP has supported capacity-building and South-South cooperation.</li> <li>• UNDP and STMAP, in collaboration with mine action stakeholders and other actors promoting development and providing assistance to persons with disabilities, have advocated for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– National mine action legislation;</li> <li>– Tajikistan to join the Convention on Cluster Munitions;</li> <li>– Tajikistan to join the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities;</li> <li>– Realization of the rights of mine victims and persons with disabilities;</li> <li>– Improved gender equality.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• UNDP/STMAP works closely with a range of governmental and international and national organizations to provide an institution and procedures to regulate mine action.</li> <li>• UNDP has provided funding for institutional support.</li> <li>• STMAP has coordinated funding.</li> <li>• TNMAC and STMAP have developed resource mobilization strategies for the Article 5 Completion Plan and mine action activities in general.</li> </ul>

(continued)

	<b>Theory of change</b>	<b>Relevance to Tajikistan</b>
<b>UNDP role</b>	Victim assistance (including rehabilitation, advocacy, and reintegration support): physical rehab, medical exams, psychosocial care, vocational training, relevant policies, laws, and institutional structures, etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• STMAP/TMAC coordinated all aspects of VA implemented by governmental, national and international actors.</li> <li>• VA was central to STMAP and government plans. In 2006, STMAP and TNMAC established a VA Technical Working Group.</li> <li>• In 2012, the STMAP/TMAC VA programme broadened its remit to support to all persons with disabilities.</li> <li>• In 2013, STMAP/TMAC (now TNMAC) VA programme renamed the DSU. The STMAP VA officer is the Disability Support Officer for three United Nations/ UNDP projects.</li> <li>• Assistance to landmine survivors is mainstreamed into assistance to persons with disabilities and this assistance is mainstreamed into government and UNDP development plans.</li> <li>• UNDP, STMAP and TMAC/TNMAC have shown leadership in VA and created a strong network of governmental, national and international organizations. UNDP has been approached by Iraq asking for advice about how to mainstream VA and support for persons with disabilities into other programmes.</li> <li>• UNDP with STMAP and TMAC/TNMAC advocates for the rights of mine victims and persons with disabilities, including the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and interim measures to support persons with disabilities until/if Tajikistan joins the Convention.</li> <li>• Through the network for VA and support to persons with disabilities there has been capacity-building, South-South cooperation and research into improving assistance to mine victims and persons with disabilities.</li> <li>• UNDP has provided funding for VA.</li> <li>• Despite the achievements, funding and resources are inadequate to meet needs.</li> </ul>
	Socioeconomic development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDP has not played a strong role in promoting socioeconomic development through mine action, although mine action is mainstreamed into broader development strategies and efforts are ongoing to increase integration of mine action activities into UNDP programming.</li> <li>• UNDP has had limited success in mainstreaming mine action into development but has provided assistance to mine victims through its Communities Programme and uses data from mine action for that programme. Efforts are ongoing to increase integration of mine action activities into UNDP programming.</li> <li>• The Government mine action strategies refer to national development strategies, and the current and forthcoming national development strategies include mine action.</li> <li>• There has been no systematic pre- or post-impact assessment for mine action.</li> <li>• The system for prioritizing tasks has not been implemented.</li> <li>• Land has been cleared for infrastructure projects but there have been no studies to assess the socioeconomic impact.</li> <li>• Rural populations have benefited from the clearance significantly because they have been able to resume normal livelihood activities. However, there is little evidence of externally supported development projects being implemented to complement land release.</li> </ul>
	<b>Assumptions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The security situation remains stable so that land can be accessed for land release activities.</li> <li>• The Government and UNDP maintain positive working relationships for mine action.</li> <li>• There is adequate funding for mine action.</li> </ul>



## Annex 1


# ACRONYMS

APMBC	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty
BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (now under BPPS)
BPPS	Bureau for Policy and Programme Support
CCM	Convention on Cluster Munitions
CCW	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CHA	Confirmed hazardous area
CIHL	Commission for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law
CR	Central Region
CTA	Chief Technical Adviser
CoES	Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence
CO	Country Office
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
CWFA	Committee of Women and Family Affairs
DIM	Direct implementation modality
DSU	Disability Support Unit
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
EU	European Union
FGD	Focus group discussion
FSD	Foundation Suisse de Déminage (Swiss Foundation for Mine Action)
GBAO	Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
GoT	Government of Tajikistan
HDG	Humanitarian Demining Group
HI	Handicap International
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IEO	Independent Evaluation Office
IG	Income generation
IM	Information management
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
INGO	International non-governmental organization
IP	Implementing partner
ISU	Implementation Support Unit
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
JMU	James Madison University
KAP	Knowledge, attitudes, practices
KII	Key informant interview
LMS	Landmine survivor (and family)
LIS	Landmine Impact Survey
LR	Land release

LSIS	Living Standard Improvement Strategy
MA	Mine action
MAC	Mine Action Centre
MDD	Mine detection dogs
MDM	Mechanical demining machine
MF	Minefield
MEI	Micro-Economic Initiative
MINT	Mine Action Intelligence Tool
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoHSPP	Ministry of Health and Social Protection of the Population
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
MoL	Ministry of Labour
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRE	Mine Risk Education
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NIM	National implementation modality
NMAS	National Mine Action Standards
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NTS	Non-Technical Survey
PO	Public Organization (Tajik term)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PwD	Persons with Disabilities
QA	Quality Assurance
QC	Quality Control
QM	Quality Management
RCST	Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan
SOPs	Standard operating procedures
STMAP	Support to Tajikistan Mine Action Programme
TAB	Tajik-Afghan Border
TCBL & CM	Tajikistan Campaign to Ban Landmines & Cluster Munitions
TMAC	Tajikistan Mine Action Centre
TNMAC	Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNOG	United Nations Office in Geneva
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNV	United Nations Volunteer
UN-Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UST	Union of Sappers of Tajikistan
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VA	Victim Assistance
VA28	Ottawa Convention 28 States Parties on VA
WHO	World Health Organization

## Annex 2

# THEORY OF CHANGE





## Annex 3

# DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE FRAMEWORK KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS

Key evaluation question	Potential indicators — info	Sources	Tools and analysis
<b>KEQ1. Relevance: To what extent was UNDP support to mine action relevant to needs of countries supported? Did support vary among countries and over time to reflect various national contexts? Have programmes been implemented on a scale that allowed for the expected impact? Are the scope and extent of UNDP global engagement in mine action consistent with its mandate and linked to other support efforts?</b>			
1	National: Was UNDP support in mine action relevant to country needs and consistent with UNDP's poverty reduction mandate? Did UNDP respond to changing needs for support as national contexts changed?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDAF</li> <li>• National MA Strategy</li> <li>• Project documents</li> <li>• UNDP/CO, Nat'l Director, CTA, NGOs, Donors, GICHD/ISU</li> <li>• Ministries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Synthesis of stakeholder perspectives</li> <li>• Mapping of projects</li> <li>• Stakeholder analysis</li> <li>• Desktop studies</li> </ul>
2	To what extent did UNDP partner with other actors to provide this support? Did UNDP link mine action support to other country support mechanisms (e.g., anti-poverty, post-crisis recovery, DDR, cash for work, community development, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Country programme</li> <li>• UNDP/CO</li> <li>• Stakeholders</li> <li>• Mine action partners</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Synthesis of stakeholder perspectives</li> <li>• Mapping of projects</li> <li>• Stakeholder analysis</li> <li>• Desktop studies</li> </ul>
3	National: Did UNDP promote gender equity and South-South cooperation in its mine action support?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDP provision of mine action gender guidelines to staff</li> <li>• UNDP provision of specialized gender expertise to mine action</li> <li>• Gender marker of UNDP projects</li> <li>• UNDP support of South-South cooperation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Project records, staffing, budget, activities</li> <li>• UNDP/CO, Nat'l Director, CTA</li> <li>• Advisor/Manager Survey</li> </ul>
4	Global: Is UNDP mine action support consistent with the previous and new strategic plans of the organization? Does that provide appropriate support for the UNDP role in the UN Mine Action Strategy?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDP Strategic Framework</li> <li>• UN MA Strategy</li> <li>• UNDP/CO</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• [Note: not part of country case studies]</li> </ul>

(continued)

Key evaluation question	Potential indicators — info	Sources	Tools and analysis	
5	National: What steps have been taken by country offices to ensure that mine action programming results can be reported through the UNDP Strategic Plan 2014–2017? What changes in mine action programming approach and content is required by UNDP to ensure that mine action programming is inextricably linked to the organization's mission/vision?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CO-identified link between national mine action support and UNDP Strategic Plan</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDAF</li> <li>• UNDP/CO (CTA and Programme Officer)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• [Likely one paragraph in report]</li> </ul>
<b>KEQ2. Effectiveness: Has UNDP been able to address the national and local capacity development agenda in designing and implementing mine action programmes? Were the targeted government capacities, policies, services and laws developed? To what extent did UNDP assistance contribute?</b>				
6	National: Has the Government institutionalized the programmes, policies, services and laws developed to conduct mine action? Does this include specific attention to reduction in socioeconomic inequality?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is the Government a State Party to conventions on APMBC, CCW, CCM, CRPD — status of affiliation</li> <li>• National legislation approved to implement APMBC, CCW, CCM, CRPD</li> <li>• Appropriate org. structure approved</li> <li>• Is information management well established?</li> <li>• Quality management well established</li> <li>• Strategic planning and coordination</li> <li>• National Mine Action Standards</li> <li>• Land release policy</li> <li>• Credibility of national database as reflection of contamination and clearance situation in the country</li> <li>• Mine action included in national budget [% share national authority — 5 year periods]</li> <li>• Mine action identified as important factor in National Development Plan</li> <li>• Does priority-setting consider socioeconomic issues</li> <li>• Gender concerns incorporated in each National Mine Action Strategy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National MA Strategy</li> <li>• Operational priority setting guidelines</li> <li>• Nat'l Director, UNDP/CO</li> <li>• National Budget document</li> <li>• Donors</li> <li>• Operators</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Synthesis of stakeholder perspectives</li> <li>• Mapping of projects</li> <li>• Stakeholder analysis</li> <li>• Desktop studies</li> <li>• Analysis focused on UNDP role</li> </ul>

(continued)

Key evaluation question	Potential indicators — info	Sources	Tools and analysis	
7	National: Has UNDP mine action support contributed to development by the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labour (or other ministry) of policies or programmes to support mine survivors and their families?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ministry of Health policies and services for medical, physical and social-psych rehab after UNDP support</li> <li>• Ministry of Labour policies and services for job training and employment after UNDP support</li> <li>• Programmes recognize different needs/services based on gender</li> <li>• Gender concerns incorporated in National Mine Survivor Assistance and Disability Strategies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ministry of Health records of programmes for mine survivors and their families / PWD</li> <li>• Ministry of Labour records of programmes for mine survivors and their families / PWD</li> <li>• CTA, UNDP/CO, Nat'l Director</li> <li>• ICRC, HI</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Synthesis of stakeholder perspectives</li> <li>• Mapping of projects</li> <li>• Stakeholder analysis</li> <li>• Desktop studies</li> <li>• Timeline sequence of UNDP support and Ministry action</li> </ul>
8	National: To what extent is socioeconomic impact accepted as a major criterion for priority-setting and assessing the results of mine action? Is the landmine problem understood in terms of socioeconomic impact?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government documents describe landmine problem in socioeconomic terms</li> <li>• Does priority setting consider reduction in social-economic inequality? How is this translated into specific tasking?</li> <li>• What role do local communities play in prioritization process?</li> <li>• Gender aspect systematically reported</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National MA Strategy</li> <li>• Annual MA reports</li> <li>• Donors</li> <li>• Nat'l Director, UNDP/CO, INGOs</li> <li>• National landmine database</li> <li>• Community case studies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Synthesis of stakeholder perspectives</li> <li>• Mapping of projects</li> <li>• Stakeholder analysis</li> <li>• Desktop studies</li> <li>• Analysis should consider socioeconomic groups, with particular consideration to the poor</li> <li>• Analysis focused on UNDP role</li> </ul>
9	National: Has UNDP been an effective trust fund manager for mine action programmes? To what extent are donor contributions to mine action more likely due to the presence of UNDP as fund manager?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What is the role of the funding pool managed by UNDP (thematic; other)</li> <li>• Donor satisfaction with trust fund management</li> <li>• UNDP and other stakeholder satisfaction with the fund</li> <li>• Are there operational concerns about the trust fund?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Donors (in-country, others possible Skype)</li> <li>• UNDP/CO, Nat'l Director</li> <li>• Recipients of funds</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Synthesis of stakeholder perspectives</li> <li>• Mapping of projects</li> <li>• Stakeholder analysis</li> </ul>

(continued)

Key evaluation question	Potential indicators — info	Sources	Tools and analysis	
<b>KEQ3. Impact: Have the lives and livelihoods of impacted communities and citizens (women and men, girls and boys) improved as a result of demining and land release? What were the supporting or impeding factors in this regard? How did UNDP support contribute?</b>				
10	<p>Community: Did land release benefit the poorest mine-affected members of the community? Were there unintended impacts (positive or negative) on local communities? Has post-clearance land use led to change (positive or negative) in livelihoods or living conditions of marginalized populations?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What is the importance of the released land for the community? Why? Who benefits?</li> <li>• How has behaviour changed?</li> <li>• What development projects have there been? [Also KII]</li> <li>• Level of community concern about mines</li> <li>• Level of confidence to use released land</li> <li>• Community development projects in mine affected communities (UNDP, government, NGO)</li> <li>• Were those living on suspect land displaced following its release?</li> <li>• Were there any mine accidents in the community? What support was provided?</li> <li>• Site release by clearance or survey?</li> <li>• Use of land (options: agriculture, grazing, government services, infrastructure, cultural and religious sites, other?) [Also KII]</li> <li>• User of land (Owner/tenant? Male/female? Wealth categorization). Has their situation improved since land was demined? How/why?</li> <li>• Have there been conflicts over use of demined land? Conflicts over other land?</li> <li>• Was access opened to other resources (water, markets, schools, clinics, additional land, etc.)?</li> <li>• Have there been investments in national infrastructure or community development projects? By whom?</li> <li>• Safety: Have there been additional mine accidents since demining?</li> <li>• Do community members feel safer since demining was concluded?</li> <li>• Have changes in perceptions in safety enhanced or changed individual and community preparedness to invest and develop their land, community resources and infrastructure?</li> <li>• How has the community changed in recent years? Has this been affected by the availability of demined land?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Existing evaluations</li> <li>• Maps of areas released</li> <li>• Aerial photos of use of land post release</li> <li>• Photographs</li> <li>• Ministry of Education (Pub Works) schools project</li> <li>• Ministry of Health (Pub Works) rehab projects</li> <li>• Operator task records</li> <li>• Peace and Conflict impact assessment, if exists</li> <li>• National database</li> <li>• Local ministry officials</li> <li>• Local land records</li> <li>• UNDP/CO</li> <li>• Existing studies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Synthesis of stakeholder perspectives</li> <li>• Mapping of projects</li> <li>• Stakeholder analysis</li> <li>• Desktop studies</li> <li>• Timeline sequence of UNDP support and Ministry action</li> <li>• Community resource mapping</li> <li>• Focus Groups (disaggregated by sex)</li> <li>• Visit to and photographs of released sites</li> <li>• Timeline of use and users</li> <li>• Assess UNDP contribution</li> <li>• <b>Possible variants:</b> changes in use, users, and land conflicts over sites that were not mine-affected; mine-affected sites that have not been released; sites without UNDP involvement.</li> </ul>

(continued)

Key evaluation question	Potential indicators — info	Sources	Tools and analysis	
<b>KEQ4. Impact: Have the living conditions of mine survivors and their families (women and men, girls and boys) changed significantly? Does support for mine survivors and their families extend to all persons with disabilities?</b>				
11	National/Community: How, and to what extent, have the lives of mine survivors and their families improved as a result of mine action? Would the same results have been likely if UNDP had not been involved?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mine survivor income-generation opportunities (before incident and now)</li> <li>• Changes in conditions</li> <li>• What support/services are mine survivors and their families entitled to receive? What do they actually receive?</li> <li>• Where do community mine survivors and their families go to receive the support? Is transportation free?</li> <li>• Is the support for mine survivors and their families the same as for other persons with disabilities?</li> <li>• Satisfaction with prosthetic device (fit, comfort, maintenance, frequency of use)</li> <li>• Satisfaction with support and services received</li> <li>• For KIs of Health, Labour, etc.: What are the support and services to which mine survivors are entitled? Are they available and accessible in this region? (Remember: medical, psychosocial, socioeconomic); check on gender policy and appropriateness of services</li> <li>• Are other people with physical disabilities entitled to the same services and support?</li> <li>• How have support services changed in recent years?</li> <li>• Feeling of safety from mines in the community?</li> <li>• Marital status and prospects</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Local officials, Ministries of Health and Labour</li> <li>• ICRC, HI</li> <li>• Facility records</li> <li>• Mine Survivor survey</li> <li>• Mine survivors and their families</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Synthesis of stakeholder perspectives</li> <li>• Mapping of projects</li> <li>• Stakeholder analysis</li> <li>• Desktop studies</li> <li>• Community mapping</li> <li>• Narrative interview (semi-structured)</li> <li>• Analysis of UNDP role</li> <li>• Analysis of Survivor services:</li> <li>• Medical support</li> <li>• Prosthetics</li> <li>• Physical rehabilitation</li> <li>• Economic support</li> <li>• Counselling</li> <li>• Job training</li> <li>• Transportation</li> <li>• Lodging during treatment/support visits</li> <li>• Other services needed?</li> <li>• Possible variants: people with other physical disabilities</li> <li>• Consult with local sources regarding ethical issues of Mine Survivor interview</li> </ul>
12	Community: In situations where UNDP has provided direct support to mine survivors and their families, are mine survivors and their families better off than in situations where UNDP was not involved? Has the direct service supported by UNDP been replicated and expanded by others?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Comparative analysis of above data in communities with varied providers and demining conditions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Local officials, Ministries of Health and Labour</li> <li>• ICRC, HI</li> <li>• Facility records</li> <li>• Mine survivors and their families</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Synthesis of stakeholder perspectives</li> <li>• Mapping of projects</li> <li>• Stakeholder analysis</li> <li>• Analysis should consider socio-economic groups, with particular consideration to the poor</li> <li>• <b>Possible variants:</b> areas without contamination, areas without UNDP involvement</li> </ul>

(continued)

Key evaluation question	Potential indicators — info	Sources	Tools and analysis
<b>KEQ5. Sustainability: Were exit strategies appropriately defined and implemented, and what steps have been taken to ensure sustainability of results? Are the capacities, policies, services, and laws developed with UNDP support likely to continue without further UNDP involvement?</b>			
13	National: To what extent have capacities, policies, programmes, services and laws been developed to manage mine action and reduce inequality been institutionalized and are they likely to continue beyond support by UNDP (e.g., community impact priority-setting)?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Refer to measures of effectiveness KEQ2 above</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Operational strategy</li> <li>• Nat'l Dev Programme</li> <li>• UNDP/CO, Nat'l Director</li> <li>• Operators</li> <li>• Donors</li> </ul>
14	Global/National: To what extent has UNDP planned and implemented successful transitions to national ownership of mine action activities? Is there a transition strategy? What are the key challenges?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DIM and NIM status over time</li> <li>• UNDP interaction with post DIM/NIM over time</li> <li>• International advisors after UNDP</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Project documents</li> <li>• UNDP/CO, Nat'l Director, CTA, Donors</li> <li>• Handover protocol</li> </ul>
15	National/Community: Are the results of the national mine action programme, developed with UNDP support, likely to extend to additional beneficiaries even after UNDP support has concluded?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assessment of institutionalization (#5 above)</li> <li>• Donors expectations regarding continued funding</li> <li>• Expectation regarding continued national funding</li> <li>• Development cooperation frameworks include mine action</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Information above</li> <li>• Nat'l Director, UNDP/CO, Donors, NGOs, Ministry of National Development</li> </ul>

## Annex 4

# STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTED

<b>Stakeholder Meetings</b>			
<b>Date</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Organisation</b>
24 June	Elisabeth Vinek	Advisor, IMSMA systems Development	GICHD, Geneva
26 June	Helen Gray	Land Release and Operational Efficiency Advisor	GICHD, Geneva
20 July	Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda	Director	TNMAC, Dushanbe
22 July	Parviz Mavlonkulov	Land Release Advisor	STMAP, UNDP, Dushanbe
	Abdulmain Karimov	IM Advisor	STMAP, UNDP, Dushanbe
	Sebastian Kasack	Consultant in Mine Action and in Conflict Transformation	STMAP, UNDP, Dushanbe
	Firoz Verjee	Coordinator, Disaster Risk Management Initiative	Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) , Dushanbe
	Norimasa Shimomura	Country Director	UNDP, Dushanbe
23 July	Alisho Shomahmadov	VA focal point	TNMAC, Dushanbe
	Davlat Siddiqov	QA Officer	TNMAC, Dushanbe
	Dr. Din Mohammad and Aziz Makhmadov	Acting Programme/Country Director and Demining Specialist	FSD, Dushanbe
	Mihail Semionov, Luka Buhin, Azamjon Salokhov	Programme Officers; National De-mining Programme Officers	OSCE Demining Unit, Dushanbe
24 July	Faredun Hodizoda	Director	Academy Dialogue, Dushanbe
25 July	Azambek Bakiev	Executive Director	UST, Dushanbe
27 July	Mrs. Sharipova	Deputy Head of District	Panj District Centre
28 July	Mr. Safarkhon Zaripov	Executive Secretary	Red Crescent Society, Shurobad
	Limeda Sherali	Secretary	Women's Committee, Shurobad
29 July	Ballajon Dodarjonov	Executive Secretary and MRE Volunteer	Red Crescent Society, Kalai Khum, Darvoz District
30 July	Alokhon Sodikov Ramiz Hadzaj	Field Operations Assistant Technical Field Manager	NPA
	Haknazar Makhsudov	Volunteer	RCST, Saghirdasht, GBAO
	Father who lost his son	Mine victim	Saghirdasht, GBAO
	Couple who lost their son	Mine victim	Saghirdasht, GBAO
	A farmer injured when his tractor set off an anti-tank mine	Mine victim	Saghirdasht, GBAO

(continued)

<b>Stakeholder Meetings</b>			
<b>Date</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Organisation</b>
1 Aug.	Sayed Nuradin	Deputy of Humanitarian Demining Group	Ministry of Defence, Vanj District
	Niyozova Ganjina	Woman farmer who cleared landmines from her own land	Dashti Yazgalom, Vanj District
	Rahimov Alimahmad	RCST Volunteer, District Education Department	Dashti Yazgaulom, Vanj District
	Willie Venter	Programme Manager, Afghanistan	FSD, KalaiKhum, Darvoz District
4 Aug.	Officer in Charge	UNDP Regional Office	Garm
	Sharbatkhujja Said Khojaey	Volunteer and teacher	RCST Society, Garm
5 Aug.	Yoshihiro Horie	Japanese Deputy Ambassador	Japanese Embassy
6 Aug.	Holger Green	German Ambassador	German Embassy
	Leslie M Hayden and John Cooney	Deputy Chief of Mission and Political Economy Officer	United States Embassy
	Rahmon Dilshod Safarbek	Secretary	CIIHL
	Lieutenant Colonel Rasulov A.	Deputy Head of Engineering Forces Department of Military Headquarters	Ministry of Defence
	Kholikzoda Sarvar Khotami	Deputy Head of Main Department, the First Class Advisor of Justice	Ministry of Justice
	Captain Valiev Daler	Senior Officer of Engineering Department	Border Guards
	Soima Mukhabbatova	Head of Department of Social Protection	Ministry of Health and Social Protection of the Population
	Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai	Country Director	Norwegian People's Aid
7 Aug.	William Lawrence	Project Manager (and former TMAC CTA)	EU Border Management Northern Afghanistan (EU-Border Management Northern Afghanistan)
	Nargizakhon Usmanova	Programme Analyst	UNDP
14 Aug.	Daler Mirzoaliev	Operations Manager	Norwegian People's Aid
20 Aug.	David Hewitson	Independent Consultant	Fenix Insight, Ltd

<b>TNMAC-STMAP Workshop Participants (Dushanbe)</b>			
21 July	Zainiddin Rasulov	Project Assistant	STMAP, UNDP, Dushanbe
	Naim Mirzoev	QA Officer	TNMAC, Dushanbe
	Parviz Oimatov	HR and MRE Officer	TNMAC, Dushanbe
	Saidamir Kosimov	Accountant	TNMAC, Dushanbe
	Alisho Shomahmadov	VA Focal Point	TNMAC, Dushanbe
	Davlat Siddiqov	QA Officer	TNMAC, Dushanbe
	Shahrinisso Davlyatova	MRE Advisor, Gender and Media Focal point	STMAP, UNDP, Dushanbe
	Lutfullo Sattorov	QA Officer	TNMAC, Dushanbe

(continued)

<b>Tnmac-Stmap Workshop Participants (Dushanbe) (continued)</b>			
<b>Date</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Organisation</b>
21 July	Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda	Director	TNMAC, Dushanbe
	Sebastian Kasack	CTA: Consultant in Mine Action and Conflict Transformation	STMAP, UNDP, Dushanbe
	Nargizakhon Usmanova	Programme Analyst	UNDP, Dushanbe
	Murtazo Gurezov	QA Officer	TNMAC, Dushanbe
	Parviz Mavlonkulov	Land Release Advisor	STMAP, UNDP, Dushanbe

<b>Victim Assistance Workshop Participants (Dushanbe)</b>			
23 July	Zamira Makhmudova	Researcher	Research Institute for Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities, Dushanbe
	Alisho Shomahmadov	VA Focal Point	TNMAC, Dushanbe
	Shohei Kawabata	Child Protection Officer	Child Protection Section, UNICEF, Dushanbe
	Navid Dadbin	Physiotherapist	ICRC/SFD, Dushanbe
	Askar Jalilov	Deputy Director	SEOP (Orthopaedic Centre)
	Asadullo Zikrihudoyev	Director	Imkoniyat Society of Persons with Disabilities
	Sh. Holmadov	Director	Taqdir Public Organization
	Ulmasjon Davlatov	Coordinator	RCST, Dushanbe
	Ilhom Rahimov	Head of Health Department	RCST, Dushanbe
	Zanjirbek Karamov	Programme Manager	Handicap International, Dushanbe
	Dr Alexey Chudikov	Senior doctor	Research Institute for Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities, Dushanbe
	Esamboi Vohidov	Director	National Union of Persons with Disabilities, Dushanbe
	Reykhan Muminova	Disability Support Unit Advisor	UNDP, Dushanbe
	Saida Inoyatova	Chair	Ishtirok Disabled Women's League, Dushanbe
	Soima Mukhabbatova	Head of Department of Social Protection	Ministry of Health and Social Protection of the Population, Dushanbe

(continued)

<b>Community Meetings</b>		
<b>Date</b>	<b>Meetings</b>	<b>Village</b>
27 July	Women's FGD	Novobad village
	Men's FGD	
29 July	Meetings with key informants	Motravn, KheKick villages
31 July	Women's FGD	Saghirdasht village
	Men's FGD	
2 August	Women's FGD	Dashti Sher village
	Men's FGD	
3 August	Women's FGD	Saidon village
	Men's FGD	

## Annex 5

# TIMELINE OF EVENTS FOR MINE ACTION IN TAJIKISTAN

Timeline of key events for mine action in Tajikistan		
Year	Event	Actor(s)
1991	Independence from USSR	
1994	UNDP established in Tajikistan	UNDP
1992–1997	Civil war	
1996–1999	Clearance using combined arms methods (no international assistance)	MoD Sappers
1997	Signed APMBC	GoT
1999	Ratification of APMBC (12 October)	GoT
2000	States Party to APMBC (1 April)	GoT
	MRE commenced	ICRC and RCST
2003	TMAC established	STMAP, GoT
	Comprehensive mine action began	FSD, TMAC
	OSCE commenced engagement in mine action	OSCE
	VA inclusion in MA strategies	STMAP
2003–2005	Initial LIS conducted	STMAP, TMAC, FSD
2003–2006	NTS manual clearance capacity	FSD
2004	APMBC Art. 4 by destroying all anti-personnel mines stockpiles (by April) complies with APMBC Art. 7 and reports annually to UNOG	GoT
	FSD established	GoT, FSD
2004–2008	Five Year Strategic Mine Action Plan inclusion of VA	STMAP, TMAC
2005	Ratification of CCW	GoT
2005–2009	Livelihood and IGA support to MV and Survivors	STMAP, TNMAC
2006	National MA Strategy aligned with MDGs 1, 7 and 8	GoT, UNDP, STMAP, TNMAC
	Inter-Agency Technical Working Group on VA established	STMAP, TMAC, MoL, MoHSPP, national rehabilitation centres and institutes, ICRC, LMS/PWD stakeholders
	MDD clearance asset introduced to national MA programme	STMAP, TMAC, FSD
	National MA Standards/Tajikistan MA Standards developed	STMAP, TMAC, IPAs
2006–2007	National VA Officer employed (2006); LMS employed (2007)	STMAP, TMAC
	MRE supported in schools	UNICEF
2007	Coordination of MRE activities	STMAP, TMAC
2007–2009	LIS re-survey	STMAP, TMAC, FSD
2008	VA plan presented to MSP (November)	GoT, STMAP, TMAC

(continued)

<b>Timeline of key events for mine action in Tajikistan</b>		
<b>Year</b>	<b>Event</b>	<b>Actor(s)</b>
2009	Extension request for APMBC Art. 5 compliance at 2nd Review Conference held in Cartagena, Colombia (December)	GoT, TNMAC
	Weapons and Ammunition Disposal (WAD) Project began	FSD
	UST established (November)	OSCE
	HDGs established	OSCE
	MDM for national MA programme	OSCE
2010	Joint conference on psychosocial assistance for LMS and PwD, Kabul	Tajikistan and Afghanistan representatives
	NPA commenced LR operations on first two tasks along TAB (November)	NPA
	MDM assets increased	FSD
2010–2015	Peer-to-peer LMS support programme implementation	TCBL and CM
2012	VA programme recommended to include PwD	VA TWG
	Rehabilitation training for medical and rehabilitation support specialists, Kazakhstan	National Research Institute for the Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities, Tajikistan/Senior Training Institute of Public Health, Kazakhstan
	Discussion on TMAC become an a national entity recommenced	STMAP, TMAC, MoJ, Academy Dialogue, GoT, CIIHL
2012–2013	VA activities	FSD
	MDD introduced then withdrawn within a year, as not cost-effective	NPA
2013	IM Training for MA staff from Azerbaijan and Armenia	STMAP
	NMAS/TMAS updated	STMAP, TNMAC, IPs
	VA pillar renamed DSU; VA mainstreamed through national and international institutions	STMAP, TMAC, GoT, MoHSPP, MoL, RCST, UNDP, UN, ICRC
2013–2015	Living Standards Improvement Strategy included MA	GoT
2014	Establishment of TNMAC (3 January)	GoT
	Land allocated for training centre (December)	
	MoU with Government of Afghanistan for MA (September)	
	Building allocation to TNMAC (July)	
	Direct fiscal support for TNMAC from national budget for first time	
	MoU signed TNMAC and UNDP (June)	STMAP, TNMAC
	Two-year State Programme on Social Protection of PwD implemented	GoT, UNDP
	JMU CISR SMT Course, Dushanbe	TNMAC, JMU,
	Completion plan presented at 3rd Review conference in Maputo, Mozambique (June)	GoT, TNMAC
Joint NTS/TS field assessment in CR	STMAP, TNMAC, FSD, NPA	

(continued)

<b>Timeline of key events for mine action in Tajikistan</b>		
<b>Year</b>	<b>Event</b>	<b>Actor(s)</b>
2014 (continued)	MINT introduced (November)	STMAP, TNMAC, GICHD
	Research project to build capacities for strategy policy guidance on LMS/PwD	STMAP, TNMAC, National Research Institute for Rehabilitation
	Transition strategy developed for 2015–17	GICHD led process with STMAP, TNMAC
	One week study tour for Tajik experts on microloans for LMS in Jordan	STMAP, TNMAC, NCDR Jordan
	VA mainstreamed into UNDP Disability programme and MoHSPP activities in favour of persons with disabilities (PwD)	STMAP, TNMAC, UNDP, MoHSPP
	Mechanical assets withdrawn from MA programme	STMAP, TNMAC, OSCE, FSD
	First female demining team in the country and region established	NPA, TNMAC
	VA integrated into UNDP CO 'Disability' and 'Access to Justice and Rule of Law' programmes	UNDP, WHO, UN-Women, GoT
2014–2015	State Programme for Social Protection of PwD	STMAP, TMAC, GoT, MoHSPP, MoL
2015	MDD programme ended and handover to national entities	STMAP, TNMAC, MoI, Border Guards
	Drafting of a National MA Law	MoJ, STMAP, TNMAC
	Psychosocial support programme developed	ICRC
	Channelling of funds to TNMAC	UNDP, TNMAC
	TNMAC SOP development	STMAP, TNMAC, Fenix Insight Ltd, IPs
	UN Partnership to Promote the Rights of PwD (January to date)	UNDP, UNICEF, WHO
	Psychological support programme established	ICRC
2020	Tajikistan must be Mine Free (1 April)	GoT, UNDP, STMAP



## Annex 6

# NATIONAL DIRECTORS AND CTAS FOR TMAC/TNMAC

<b>Dates</b>	<b>National Directors</b>	<b>International CTAs</b>	<b>Dates</b>
July 2003– January 2012	Jonmahmad Rajabov	Peter Izaak	2003–2005
		William Lawrence	2005–2007
		Andy Smith	July 2007–Sep. 2007
		Lutful Kabir	April 2008–Sep. 2008
		Pascal Simon	Nov 2009–Feb. 2010
Jan 2012–to date (August 2015)	Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda		July 2012–October 2012
		Sebastian Kasack	Sep. 2012–Dec. 2013 Nov. 2014–to date (Sept 15)



## Annex 7

# TNMAC ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

According to the TNMAC Charter, the centre is responsible for:

- management of information data system on mine action activity
- development of a control system of action plan on mine action activity in Tajikistan
- analysis and approval of projects on mine action activity, submitted by state institutions, non-governmental and international organizations, before their implementation
- control of lands cleared from mines
- control the use of funds allocated to TNMAC for carrying out its activity according to conditions of project documentation
- representation of the Government at international events on mine action activity
- creation of efficient system of coordination for implementation of programmes on mine action activity in Tajikistan
- setting up a planning system for activity of the programme on mine action activity
- attraction of funds, coordination of external aid and mobilization of technical and financial means for implementation of the programme on mine action activity
- development of projects, their agreement with partners, as well as their submission to donors
- identification of primary hazardous areas for their demining
- identification of regions contaminated with landmines for implementation of programmes on warning of population of border territories about mine danger
- collection of data on victims of landmines and explosive devices, and coordination of assistance provided to them, by relevant governmental agencies and other institutions of Tajikistan
- close cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies and local executive authorities, State institutions, donor countries, non-governmental and international organizations
- submission of a report on progress of implementation of commitments of Tajikistan as a State Party to the Ottawa Convention.



## Annex 8

# VICTIM ASSISTANCE WORKSHOP REPORT

## VICTIM ASSISTANCE IN TAJIKISTAN WORKSHOP

Thursday 23 July 10.00–13.00 2015

### INTRODUCTION

The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of UNDP is conducting a three-country study in Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mozambique, and Tajikistan to understand the socioeconomic impact of mine action at the community level. The focus of the study is on the impact of clearance/land release and victim assistance. The research in Tajikistan is being conducted by Dr. Rebecca Roberts and Ms. Anna Roughley.

### VICTIM ASSISTANCE IN TAJIKISTAN

As part of the IEO study, on Thursday 23 July 2015, a three-hour workshop was held in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, with key stakeholders engaged in victim assistance (VA) and working with people with disabilities (PwD). Participants divided into four groups to discuss the different aspects of VA. They prepared presentations which they shared in plenary at the end of the workshop.

Participants examined four areas of assistance to victims and PwD:

- Medical and rehabilitation support
- Psychosocial support
- Income-generation
- Advocacy

They focused in the following issues:

- The main achievements in victim assistance
- The organizations that have driven victim assistance initiatives
- The main challenges in providing victim assistance
- The main sources of funding for victim assistance
- The future of victim assistance in Tajikistan
- UNDP's role in victim assistance

This document summarizes the discussion from the workshop.

### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Rebecca Roberts and Anna Roughley would like to thank the following people and organizations: Dr. Reykhan Muminova, the UNDP focal point for persons with disabilities and the DSU advisor for the Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre, for organizing the workshop; the Society of Persons with Disabilities *Imkoniyat* for hosting the workshop; all the participants who contributed their time and without whom Rebecca and Anna would have been unable to complete their research on VA in Tajikistan; and Daler Hakimov and Shakhnozakhon Mukhamadieva for translating.

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<b>List of participants</b>		
<b>Name</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Organization</b>
Zamira Makhmudova	Researcher	Research Institute for Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities
Alisho Shomahmadov	VA Focal Point	TNMAC
Shohei Kawabata	Child Protection Officer (UNV)	Child Protection Section, UNICEF
Navid Dadbin	Physiotherapist	ICRC/SFD
Askar Jalilov	Deputy Director	SEOP (Orthopaedic Centre)
Asadullo Zikrihudoyev	Chairman	PO [NGO] 'Imkoniyat' Society of persons with disabilities
Sh. Holmadov	Director	PO 'Taqdir' (for LM/ERW Survivors and other PwD)
Ulmasjon Davlatov	Coordinator	RCST
Ilhom Rahimov	Head of Health Department	RCST
Zanjirbek Karamov	Programme Manager	Handicap International
Dr Alexey Chudikov	Senior Doctor	Research Institute for Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities
Esamboi Vohidov	Director	National Union of Persons with Disabilities
Reykhan Muminova	Disability Support Unit Advisor	UNDP
Saida Inoyatova	Chair	PO 'Ishtirok' Disabled Women's League
Soima Mukhabbatova	Head of Department of Social Protection	Ministry of Health and Social Protection of Population of RT

## **ACRONYMS AND TRANSLATIONS**

CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
DPO	Organization of Persons with Disabilities
FSD	Swiss Foundation for Mine Action
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
Imkoniyat	Society of persons with disabilities
Ishtirok	Disabled Women's League
MEI	Micro-economic Initiatives
MV	Mine Victim
PwD	Persons with disabilities
PO	Public Organization (Tajik term for NGO)
RCST	Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan
SEOP	Orthopaedic Centre
Taqdir	Public Organization
TCBL & CM	Tajikistan Centre to Ban Landmines & Cluster Munitions
TNMAC	Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre
VA	Victim Assistance

## Group 1. Medical and rehabilitation support

Questions	Responses
1. What have been the main achievements in VA and why?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Providing 60 beds for medical assistance in the Research Institute for Rehabilitation of PwD</li> <li>• Providing orthopaedic assistance</li> <li>• Conducting research and workshops</li> <li>• Improving accessibility, quality of services and sustainability</li> <li>• Regional cooperation: Specialists from Tajikistan have attended training in Kazakhstan</li> <li>• Holding a conference on psychosocial support with Afghan colleagues</li> <li>• Holding a conference and roundtable discussion on CRPD</li> </ul>
2. Who/which organization promoted and/or implemented these VA activities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The following organizations have been involved in implementation and providing funding: WHO, JICA, AAR, Dilshod NGO, TNMAC, Handicap International, Orthopaedic Factory, ICRC/SFD, UNICEF, UNDP, RCST, POs (Imkoniyat)</li> <li>• The EU and USAID have also provided funding for VA</li> </ul>
3. What have been the key challenges?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There is a lack of specialists including physiotherapists and orthopaedic surgeons</li> <li>• The ability to manufacture prosthetics is limited</li> <li>• There is a not enough funding and the availability of funding fluctuates</li> <li>• There is a lack of funding for publications. For example, a dictionary of terminology for the rehabilitation cannot be published</li> <li>• Turnover of staff who have been trained and received capacity-building.</li> <li>• Accessibility, quality of services and sustainability have been challenges and continue to be so, but progress has been made and there have been achievements in these areas</li> </ul>
4. What have been/are the main sources of funding?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The GoT, ICRC, UNDP</li> </ul>
5. How do you see the future of VA in Tajikistan?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hope for better cooperation among the different actors</li> <li>• Continued improvement in VA and sustained efforts to overcome challenges</li> <li>• Improve State provision of assistance through capacity-building and increased resources</li> <li>• State medical institutions would like more international assistance to improve VA</li> <li>• ICRC would like to see the capacity of state institutions improve so that services can be handed over to the Government</li> </ul>
6. What role has UNDP played in Victim Assistance?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Financial support</li> <li>• Technical Assistance</li> <li>• Coordination</li> <li>• Research</li> </ul>

## Group 2. Psychosocial support

Questions	Responses
<p>1. What have been the main achievements in VA and why?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Psychosocial support received little attention in the past, especially in the rural mine-affected areas therefore TMAC VA component designed and implemented several projects to assist landmine survivors and families of victims</li> <li>• Research suggested that MVs and their families need psychosocial support immediately after the accident because beginning psychological rehabilitation early brings better results than starting it later</li> <li>• Raising awareness through mass media engagement and organization of mass media events</li> <li>• Coordination through UNDP VA programme</li> <li>• Inter-ministerial group was established and meets quarterly to discuss all issues related to and provision of psychosocial support. UN agencies always participate in these meetings</li> <li>• Roundtables organized in cooperation with the ministry of health to promote regional cooperation (with Afghanistan, plan of action, through various roundtable discussions, experience-exchange fieldtrips to regions)</li> <li>• TCBL &amp; CM has implemented a peer support programme</li> <li>• Previously ICRC has focused on physical support and less so on psychosocial support. From 2015, developing its psychosocial support programme</li> <li>• Capacity-building:               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Doctors, nurses, social workers in mine-affected areas; 210 medical personnel received training on psychosocial assistance to victims</li> <li>2. Peer-to-peer support project implemented in 2011-2013, assistance to victims given from the victims who have gone through the rehabilitation process. This has been very successful and MVs are best placed to empathize with other MVs</li> <li>3. Publications (guides, methodology material, and education material) published in 2007–2011 Publications have been produced in Tajik; 'Peer-to-peer support' guidelines were translated and adapted from Afghan documents</li> <li>4. Organization of trainings for FSD Staff—for paramedics and team leaders, 2007–2010. Stress management</li> <li>5. Conducting of a joint conference with Afghan representatives in Kabul (2010) and Dushanbe (2011) on psychosocial assistance for mine victims and persons with disabilities</li> <li>6. Conducting of summer camps for mine victims (2005–2013). During the camp, MVs were involved in art therapy, sport activities, psychological individual and group sessions, and trained in giving MRE</li> </ol> </li> </ul>
<p>2. Who/which organization promoted and/or implemented these VA activities?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ministry of Labour and Social Protection</li> <li>• Ministry of Health</li> <li>• UNDP STMAP</li> <li>• National University</li> <li>• Russian-Tajik Slavonic University</li> <li>• Public Organizations: TCBL &amp; CM, Imkoniyat, Taqdir and the 'Psychology Support Centre'</li> <li>• RCST</li> <li>• ICRC, 2015</li> <li>• UNDP coordinates psychosocial support</li> </ul>

(continued)

<b>Group 2. Psychosocial support</b>	
<b>Questions</b>	<b>Responses</b>
3. What have been the key challenges?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of sustainable long-term financing</li> <li>• Lack of awareness among the public of the importance of this issue</li> <li>• Lack of suitable premises for meetings/summer camps that can be accessed by PwD and have reliable electricity supplies</li> </ul>
4. What have been/are the main sources of funding?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDP</li> <li>• US Department of State</li> <li>• Canada</li> <li>• in-kind support by Ministry of Health and Social Protection</li> <li>• ICBL provided support to TCBL</li> </ul>
5. How do you see the future of VA in Tajikistan?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• continue capacity-building of psychosocial rehabilitation specialists</li> <li>• more training of trainers to create a pool of experts</li> <li>• continue publishing (mass media) booklets, methodical recommendations and guidelines</li> <li>• continue regional cooperation on psychosocial assistance (Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of Iran)</li> <li>• could be useful to liaise with relevant Russian organizations</li> <li>• use community-based rehabilitation capacities (psychosocial component)</li> <li>• Community-based rehabilitation could be expanded and should include working with children and their parents UNDP and UNICEF are working together on these issues</li> <li>• To mobilize resources for psychosocial assistance (Government and donors)</li> <li>• continue to involve disabled in psychosocial assistance (peer-to-peer methodology effective and cost-effective)</li> </ul>
6. What role has UNDP played in Victim Assistance?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Financing</li> <li>• Fundraising: mobilizing resources, not just from donors but also encourage Government to provide more support</li> <li>• Coordination</li> <li>• Capacity-building</li> <li>• Awareness-raising</li> <li>• Regional cooperation</li> </ul>

### Group 3. Income generation/financial support

Questions	Responses
1. What have been the main achievements in VA and why?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Registering MVs</li> <li>• Providing financial support to promote financial sustainability</li> <li>• Providing basic food stuffs to increase nutritional standards</li> <li>• Engaging MVs in permanent employment</li> <li>• The status of MVs has improved although not all have achieved financial independence.</li> <li>• When PwD are employed they are seen by others as people with capacities who have a contribution to make to their own life and that of their family</li> <li>• Being able to generate an income has a positive impact on the psychological well-being of PwD</li> </ul>
2. Who/which organization promoted and/or implemented these VA activities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RCST</li> <li>• Imkoniyat Public Organization</li> <li>• 'TCBL&amp;CM' Public Organization</li> <li>• RCST implemented a 'Income-generation programme' by giving MV families couple of sheep and foodstuff. After three years, each family returned per one sheep to ICRC, which could be given to other vulnerable families</li> <li>• UNDP provided additional support for Income-generation projects through funding of 'Bee-keeping project', distribution of milk cows, sewing machines and individual income-generation projects</li> <li>• ICRC's needs assessment survey is followed up by the development of Individual Rehabilitation Plans for survivors and victims through ICRC's small grants and Micro-economic Initiatives project (MEI).</li> </ul>
3. What have been the key challenges?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Many MV s are in remote mountainous regions with little access to information, contacting them to explain what assistance is available is difficult. Specialists have travelled from Dushanbe to rural areas to hold awareness raising meetings</li> </ul>
4. What have been/are the main sources of funding?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The main funders have been donors supporting income-generating projects. The aim is to make these programmes self-supporting</li> </ul>
5. How do you see the future of VA in Tajikistan?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Diversifying and expanding VA income-generating programmes to improve sustainability</li> <li>• Developing sectors such as accountancy, tailoring, repairing mobile telephones</li> <li>• Increase of income generating projects for sustainability and development</li> <li>• Provide training to increase the level of knowledge of MV for entrepreneurship and development</li> </ul>
6. What role has UNDP played in Victim Assistance?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDP and TMAC/TNMAC have played an important role. At the local level ICRC and TNMAC have provided training to volunteers to work in support of the programmes</li> </ul>

<b>Group 4. Advocacy</b>	
<b>Questions</b>	<b>Responses</b>
1. What have been the main achievements in VA and why?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establishment of TNMAC and ongoing VA work</li> <li>• The Government has been convinced of the importance of VA through workshops organized by national and international organizations to promote VA</li> <li>• The signing of the Ottawa Convention in 1997, which includes VA</li> <li>• Tajikistan adopted a National Plan for Implementation of the UPR recommendations in 2013, including consideration to join the Convention</li> <li>• in line with the National Plan for Implementation of the UPR recommendations, Tajikistan established a Governmental Working Group for CRPD</li> </ul>
2. Who/which organization promoted and/or implemented these VA activities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ICRC and RCST were the first organizations in Tajikistan to engage in VA</li> <li>• Other organizations include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDP began to be active in advocacy in 2007. UNDP advocating for the rights of PwD to be including in the national development strategy</li> <li>• ICRC</li> <li>• RCST</li> <li>• UNICEF</li> <li>• DPOs</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Working Group established by the President to work towards signing the CRPD</li> <li>• Key actors have formed a Joint Partnership Programme to promote the signing of the CRPD</li> </ul>
3. What have been the key challenges?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The CRPD has not been signed or ratified—this is a challenge for all people with disabilities. Efforts have been made to raise awareness among Government officials but as yet nothing has happened. Aim to sign CRPD by end 2015</li> <li>• Ministry of Justice is considering two options: Sign the CRPD now. Upon signature proceed with in-depth legislation review and cost analysis and ratify at a later date; or continue working on in-depth legislation review and thorough cost analysis and sign and ratify when this work is finished offering clear social and financial impact</li> <li>• There is little awareness of VA at the local level</li> <li>• Data collection and information exchange used to be the greatest challenged, now things have improved. ICRC is in the process of verifying Victim Data collection and conducting a needs assessment survey</li> <li>• Promoting the rights of PwD is a challenge and many PwD/VAs do not know their own rights</li> <li>• Only two POs are led by mine victims</li> </ul>
4. What have been/are the main sources of funding?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDP</li> <li>• US Department of State</li> <li>• ICRC</li> <li>• RCST</li> <li>• ICBL</li> <li>• Government (in particular contributing to advocacy)</li> </ul>

<b>Group 4. Advocacy</b>	
<b>Questions</b>	<b>Responses</b>
1. How do you see the future of VA in Tajikistan?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CRPD ratification — this would have a significant impact on the rights and assistance available to PwD and MV Tajikistan would be able to access more international funding and support</li> <li>• Would like the Government to increase its role in promoting assistance and rights of PwD and VA</li> <li>• Rights and assistance of MV would be included in rights and assistance for PwD</li> <li>• Promotion of community-based rehabilitation</li> <li>• Assistance implemented in partnership with WHO, UNDP, UNICEF, HI, Mission East, Caritas, OPERATION MERCY</li> </ul>
2. What role has UNDP played in Victim Assistance?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Undertaking advocacy: organizing events and activities</li> <li>• Providing funding and fundraising</li> </ul>

## Annex 9

# ROUTE OF FIELD VISIT

Date	Route	Travelling time (hrs)	Details
27 July	Dushanbe - Panj Panj - Kulob	3 3	Visited Navobad village, Panj district Overnight stay in Kulob
28 July	Kulob — Shurobod Shurobod — KalaiKhum	1 5	Meeting with RCST and Women's Committee Representatives Overnight stay in KalaiKhum
29 July	KalaiKhum - Dashti Yazgalom Dashti Yazgalom - KalaiKhum	4 4	Visited Motravn, KheKick villages Overnight stay in KalaiKhum
30 July	KalaiKhum - Saghirdasht Saghirdasht - KalaiKhum	1.5 1.5	Visited ongoing NPA task - Saghirdasht village (RCST volunteer and 3 LMS) Meeting with RCST Volunteer in KalaiKhum Overnight stay in KalaiKhum
31 July	KalaiKhum - Saghirdasht Saghirdasht - KalaiKhum	1.5 1.5	Visited Saghirdasht village (no other NGOs) Overnight stay in KalaiKhum
1 Aug.	KalaiKhum	–	Overnight stay in KalaiKhum
2 Aug.	KalaiKhum — Dashtisher Dashtisher — (Obi) Garm	2 6	Visited Dashtisher village Overnight stay in (Obi) Garm
3 Aug.	(Obi) Garm — Saidon Saidon — (Obi) Garm	1 1	Visited Saidon village (Chorcharog task) Overnight stay in (Obi) Garm
4 Aug.	(Obi) Garm- Dushanbe	3-4	UNDP Regional Office, RCST Volunteer Meetings Returned to Dushanbe



## Annex 10

# METHODOLOGY

For this study, a document review was complemented by interviews with key informants and field visits to meet with populations affected by landmine and ERW contamination and living in areas where mine action had taken place.

Semi-structured open-ended questions based on the theory of change and DAC framework questions were used to guide discussions with key informants. These interviews were mainly conducted in the TNMAC office or the office of the respondent in Dushanbe and Panj and Garm district centres.

Mine/ERW-affected populations were identified by STMAP, TNMAC and NPA staff, and visits to these populations were facilitated by TNMAC with the support of the RCST volunteer network and NPA staff. To ensure that the views of men and women were recorded, separate FGDs with men and women were conducted in four villages affected by landmines and ERW contamination. Individual interviews were conducted with a male and female key informant from a fifth village and an operator demining in the area. Meetings with women and men were facilitated by women and men, respectively.<sup>69</sup>

Individual interviews and FGDs were, as far as possible, conducted as a conversation using open-ended questions and giving respondents the opportunity to focus on the issues important to them. Such an approach reduced the risk that the research was based on preconceived ideas or restricted or influenced the information collected.

Various constraints limited what could be achieved during the visit to Tajikistan and

should be taken into account when drawing conclusions:

- The study was limited to areas that could be accessed in the time available. Access was limited because areas were remote and accessible only by poor mountain roads. Recent flooding and mudslides had led to a state of emergency and prevented access to some areas completely or at the time originally planned.
- Ongoing security concerns restricted a visit in the Panj district to four hours and prevented other visits to the Khatlon Province. Therefore, despite Khatlon being a significantly contaminated Province along the TAB, only one village in the region was visited.
- Community meetings had to be completed within two hours to limit the disruption caused to the busy summer farming season. Therefore, the methodology was designed to focus on the most important information for the study: not all issues could be explored in depth.
- Introductions to villages were facilitated by key mine action stakeholders, an approach that biased the choice of villages included in the study and may have influenced what villagers were willing to discuss, as they knew which organizations had arranged the meeting.
- Rural inhabitants were unwilling to describe the socioeconomic profile of their community; the national facilitators explained that culturally, such discussion were uncommon and made people feel uncomfortable.

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<sup>69</sup> FGDs comprising men were facilitated by both a male (national) and female (international) team member to allow for interpretation, as the team was not fully gender balanced.

- Lack of time meant that FGDs could be held in only four rural communities and, apart from income-generation support provided to mine victims and their families, it was not possible to find people who had received other types of support.
- The composition of the FGDs changed as individuals arrived and left during the exercise. Some of the groups were as large as 20 and this made it more difficult to have an in- depth discussion than with a smaller group.
- Local government officials and staff from local and national NGOs were unavailable to meet because they were involved in the visit of the President to the Central Region. This prevented exploration of larger-scale infrastructure projects that had followed land release.
- There was no time to visit TUB. Although the area is thought to be mined only on the Uzbek side of the border, there have been extensive VA and MRE activities.
- Ministry officials identified by their own line managers to participate in the study, were not always best placed to answer questions about landmine and ERW contamination and mine action. Appointed officials rarely deviated from the official line and had to report back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the content of the discussion.
- The translators were excellent, but information is always lost during the translation process and discussions can lack spontaneity.
- However experienced and good the researchers, they bring their own preconceptions to a study, and the presence of outsiders influences the discussion.

To minimize the influence of these constraints on research findings, multiple sources and individuals and groups were consulted so that information could be verified and triangulated. The professions of individual respondents were considered along with the factors that are likely to

influence their views. Effort was made to become familiar with the specific cultural and socio-economic context of the villages to understand better the impact the contamination and mine action has had on daily life.

The following impact assessment was used to illicit information from FGDs.

## **CONTAMINATION IMPACT ASSESSMENT**

Purpose of this tool:

- To identify and discuss the impacts of landmine contamination on the village
- To identify what changed after clearance

Facilitators introduce the activity and explain that, as outsiders to the area, the research team need to learn from the village inhabitants about their daily lives and how they are affected by the contamination and land release. Facilitators ask:

1. Do you know if there is contamination in the area? If yes:
2. Write down/draw the main problems that the contamination caused in your village (write/draw each problem on a separate piece of paper)
3. Arrange these in a row
4. For each problem, write down/draw how each of these problems impacted the village
5. Discuss each of these impacts
6. Arrange the problems in order of how serious a threat they pose
7. Arrange the impacts under each problem in the order of how serious a threat they pose
8. Ask which of these problems/impacts still exists now that clearance has been completed/or which problems/impacts would still exist if clearance were to be conducted

While the group is doing the impact assessment, facilitators note whether:

- The group agreed on the problems the contamination caused
- There was any disagreement about how the problems impacted on the community
- There were any problems discussed that were not included in the final assessment

Following the impact assessment, ask:

9. If everyone has benefited equally from the released land
10. If there has been any conflict over land and if the same people are using it post-clearance and pre-contamination (and during contamination)
11. If people know whether there have been any mine victims and, if so, whether they or their families received any assistance
12. Finally, if there is any other important information that the focus group wants to share.



## Annex 11

# COMMUNITY PROFILES

The information in this Annex has been extracted from NPA Community-Level Impact Assessment forms, TMAC/TNMAC IMSMA completion reports and case study material. These have been supplemented with information from the FGDs and individual meetings

conducted during the field study. Two national facilitators, Shahnozakhon Mukhamadieva and Daler Khakimov, acted as interpreters for the meetings.

**Key NK = Not Known**

General village information										
Village	District	Region/ province	Research tool	Meeting location	Facilitated by	Total population	No. of adults (18>)	No. of children (<18)	No. HHs	Avg. HH size
<b>Novobad</b>	Panj	Khatlon	FGDs with men and women	Private home	RCST & TNMAC	NK	NK	NK	NK	NK
<b>Saghirdasht</b>	Darvoz	GBAO	FGDs with men and women Individual semi-structured interviews	FGDs in Mosque. Individual meetings in private homes	NPA	5,420	M: 1,284 F: 1,348	B: 1,227 G: 1,174	728	7
<b>Yazgalom Area (Dashti Yazgalom, KheeKhick and Motravn villages)</b>	Vanj	GBAO	Individual semi-structured interviews	Ongoing task site; Individual meetings in private homes	OSCE & TNMAC	NK	NK	NK	NK	NK
<b>Dashti Sher</b>	Tavildara	DRS	FGDs with men and women	Village leader's house	NPA	400	NK	NK	32	12
<b>Saidon</b>	Rasht	DRS	FGDs with men and women	Village leader's house	NPA	211	M: 72 F: 72	B: 34 G: 32	26	8

### Village clearance, accident, MRE and VA information

Village	Previous clearance/ By whom?	Risk area entered/ Why?	Main income activity	Total accidents	No. people	Most recent accident	MRE / by whom	VA / by whom	Main non-mine problems
<b>Novobad</b>	NK	Yes/ grazing, agriculture	Agri- culture (cotton, corn)	NK	NK	NK	Yes / MRE volun- teers	ICRC/ RCST	NK
<b>Saghirdasht</b>	Yes/ FSD NPA Jul – Aug 2015	Daily/ grazing	Farming	45	Injured: 11 Killed: 34	2002	Yes/ ICRC	Yes / MAC	Risk from natural disasters
<b>Yazgalom area (Dashti Yazgalom, KheeKhick and Motravv villages)</b>	Yes/ FSD	No	Grazing, col- lecting wood	3	Injured: 3 Killed: NK	2005	Yes/ ICRC	Yes/ ICRC	NK
<b>Dashti Sher</b>	Yes/ MoD	Very rarely/ Graze cattle	Grazing	1	Injured: NK Killed: 3	NK	Yes/ MRE volun- teers	NK	Food security, Poor roads, lack of access to health facilities
<b>Saidon</b>	Yes/ FSD	Daily/ grazing cattle	Grazing	5	Injured: 1 Killed: 4	NK	NK	NK	Poor roads

## NOVOBAD, PANJ DISTRICT

Visited 27 July 2015

### 1. CONTAMINATION/CLEARANCE:

- The TAB is approx. 200–300 metres from Novobad village.
- Clearance activities commenced in 2010 and are still ongoing.
- Land is an important resource in a country that is 93 percent mountainous. Important to be able to use the land, as fear of crossing into contaminated areas decreases the effectiveness of land to be used.
- Local people do not enter the border area because a fence, erected after the Russian

forces left in 2006, closes it off. Those that do have access to use the land are mainly the soldiers to grow vegetables but it was not sure if they only consume them or also sell surplus.

- During the civil war in Tajikistan, people fled to Afghanistan for safety, and many were killed or injured trying to cross the minefield.

### 2. SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS OF CONTAMINATION:

Only the men in Novobad used the impact assessment tool. The women preferred to identify the problems and impacts caused by the contamination through a less structured discussion. Information from this discussion is summarized in point No. 1 above.

Men's FGD						
Problem	Impact 1	Impact 2	Impact 3	Impact 4	Impact 5	Impact 6
<b>No human value</b>	Importance of income-generation	Ignorance of contamination issue	Those who laid mines do not respect human life			
<b>Mental problems</b>	Abandonment issues	Fear of losing children	Burden of being sole parent	Parents worry about children's safety	Nervous about leaving children alone	Time consumed worrying over household duties
<b>Poverty (no access to social support)</b>	Health affected	Lack of food	School dropout	Lack of money	Nothing to sell at market	Increased pressure on land
<b>Lack of land use</b>	Health affected by build-up of minerals in soil due to lack of cultivation	Malaria breeding ground in stagnant water	Infertile land due to lack of use			
<b>Lack of access for pasture</b>	Less food for livestock	Decrease in number of livestock	Increase pressure on land	Affects livelihoods		
<b>Land conflicts</b>	Not enough land for housing	Increase in pressure on land	Low agricultural output	Decrease in pasture land	Fertile land scarce because of mountains	

## SAGHIRDASHT

Visited 31 July 2015

### 1. CONTAMINATION/CLEARANCE:

- Clearance of agricultural land took place around seven to eight years ago but villagers felt clearance was inefficient because the deminers lacked correct equipment and worked in areas where there was no contamination, despite being told that by the villagers.
- Further land release activities were conducted by NPA in July–August 2015 on 3 MF tasks nearby Saghirdasht community.
- MF #8: located on mountain top. The original task order indicated the MF was 48,000 m<sup>2</sup> in size. TS and manual clearance was conducted on 6,586 m<sup>2</sup> of land and 41,414 m<sup>2</sup> was recommended for cancellation, as no evidence was found. MF #12: original task order indicated MF was 3,000 m<sup>2</sup> in size. Clearance was conducted on 2,885 m<sup>2</sup> and 115 m<sup>2</sup> was cancelled as no evidence was found while conducting TS. MF #MJ3: was a Cluster Munitions

strike, so battle area clearance was conducted. Original task order indicated MF was 400,000 m<sup>2</sup> in size. A total of 340,000 m<sup>2</sup> was cleared and 60,000 m<sup>2</sup> was recommended for cancellation, as no evidence was found out after fadeout.

- Immediately after the civil war the road was cleared; this had a positive impact on people's lives.
- Records of LM victims and survivors have been kept, although this might not be the total numbers. The numbers of victims have decreased because land has been cleared and people are more aware of the contamination. The majority of accidents involved men who were grazing animals. Fewer women do this, although some girls have been injured this way. Shepherds from other parts of the country use the land, unaware of the risk. The locals informed them and marked the dangerous areas with stones.

### 2. MAIN PROBLEMS CAUSED BY CONTAMINATION AND ASSOCIATED IMPACTS IDENTIFIED IN BOTH THE MEN'S AND WOMEN'S FGDS:

Women's FGD					
Problem	Impact 1	Impact 2	Impact 3	Impact 4	Impact 5
Poor health	Lack of access to herbs	Lack of nutrition			
Lack of education	Financial constraints	Low income-generation due to loss of livestock	Lack of road access and delivery of school materials	Aid affected	Parents worry about children's future
Relocation	Don't own house/land	Health affected	Expensive medical services	Limited access for LMS	
Lack of pasture land	Unable to feed livestock	Unable to grow wheat, potatoes, etc.	Must purchase food and grass for winter	Starvation of the family	
Fear	Death/injury of family member	Unable to graze animals	Stressful for parents	Lack of alternative livelihood activities	Loss of livestock
Additional expenses (LMS and families)	Lack of money to cover nutrition, clothing and medicine	Harder living conditions	Cost of relocation		

Men's FGD								
Problem	Impact 1	Impact 2	Impact 3	Impact 4	Impact 5	Impact 6	Impact 7	Impact 8
<b>Income earners killed</b>	Loss of main income earner	Loss of human resources	Children have behavioural problems	Difficult to earn money legally	Sell livestock for medical expenses	Stressful time	Medical treatment expensive	
<b>Fear</b>	Cannot access the land	Psychological impact	Everyone wants to help					
<b>Grazing land</b>	Need access for summer grazing and collecting grass for six months' winter	Less food	Less money	Living standards drop	Still pay taxes on unusable land			
<b>Child cannot walk freely</b>	Limits adult time for other activities	Parents have fear for their children	Worry about children while working	Cannot collect firewood, herbs, grass				
<b>Cannot collect herbs</b>	Rely more heavily on remittances	Cannot exchange herbs for goods	Don't have their own medicine	Have to sell cows for money	Don't have own food/tea	Can't give gifts		
<b>Cows killed</b>	No meat	No milk/milk products	No food	No new calves	Difficult to replace cow	Difficult to save remaining livestock	No fuel	No money for anything
<b>Horses killed</b>	No transport	Difficult to replace	No meat	No foal				
<b>Sheep killed</b>	No meat	No lambs	Difficult to replace	No wool				
<b>Limited agriculture</b>	Rely more heavily on remittances	Must sell livestock for income	Must buy flour which is expensive (200 somoni/bag)	Expensive, must buy potatoes	Can't plant wheat			
<b>Limits leisure activities</b>	Prevents fishing	Limits tourism						

## YAZGALOM

Visited 3 August 2015

### 1. CONTAMINATION/CLEARANCE:

- Yazgalom is an area in the Vanj District that was contaminated with landmines and ERW from the civil war (1992–1997).
- Land release activities in the Yazgalom area, to include Dashti Yazgalom, KheeKheek and Motravn villages, were conducted by FSD between 2008 and 2010, whereby more than 800,000 m<sup>2</sup> of land was cleared.
- Village demining in this area has also been conducted by a local woman, Niyozova Ganjina, who cleared more than 12 butterfly landmines (PFM-1) from land around her house, as she could not wait for clearance to take place.

### 2. MAIN PROBLEMS CAUSED BY CONTAMINATION AND ASSOCIATED IMPACTS IDENTIFIED IN INDIVIDUAL MEETINGS:

- The local population was unable to use the land for more than 10 years following the conflict, due to unsafe access to roads, paths, agricultural land, and mountainous areas for collecting wood and construction materials.
- Released land in the Yazgalom area since 2010 has been used for irrigation, cultivation,

grazing of livestock, gardening and building houses, safe and free movement of people, and as a result the standard of living of the local population has improved.

- The construction of a bridge in the Yazgalom area has since been built and a cross-border market has been established between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Local people sell crops and buy products from the market once a week on a Saturday.
- Niyozova Ganjina, a mother of six, moved to the area more than eight years ago. She was forced by poor living conditions to go to the mountain areas to collect dung, firewood and grass. One trip would take 10–15 hours. She was scared for her children while she was away, and kept finding the mines near the road and her house. She did not use the land initially but was unable to support her family sufficiently, so she decided to clear the land herself, as she could not wait for the deminers to come. The mines she found were reported to deminers working in the area, who helped destroy the items in situ. Niyozova was provided with MRE by a local RCST volunteer and also worked with the UN to collect information on the landmine situation in the area. As a result of clearance, her family has a better life. They can graze cows, grow crops, and collect firewood, and her children can play safely.

## DASHTI SHER

Visited 2 August 2015

### 1. CONTAMINATION/CLEARANCE:

- Manual clearance of MF was conducted by NPA in May 2015.
- MF is 2,000 metres above sea level, with Dashti Sher being the nearest community to MF.

- Original task order size indicated MF was 250,000 m<sup>2</sup>. Clearance was conducted on 7,633 m<sup>2</sup> and the remaining 242,367 m<sup>2</sup> was recommended to be cancelled, as no evidence was found while conducting a technical survey.

### 2. MAIN PROBLEMS BY CONTAMINATION AND ASSOCIATED IMPACTS IDENTIFIED IN FGDS:

Women's FGD					
Problem	Impact 1	Impact 2	Impact 3	Impact 4	Impact 5
<b>Health issues</b>	Debt due to low/no medical assistance available	Increased expenses — lack of money	Low living standards		
<b>Lack of support to LMS</b>	Poverty, as no pension or little employment	Low/no income due to unavailability of jobs	Unable to work LMS injured and lack of alternative income-generation activities		
<b>Cows die</b>	Lack of food, dairy products, meat	Too expensive to replace cows	Poverty, as cow is main source of income-generation		
<b>Increased purchases (firewood, grass, food)</b>	Lack of money to purchase staple items	Poverty as a result of the increase in expenses with little or no income			
<b>Lack of access to land</b>	Unable to grow crops (potatoes, wheat and herbs)	Need to purchase food	Poverty due to lack of access to land and no IG from farming/ grazing	Low standards of living	Increased travel time to use alternative land
<b>Fear</b>	Increased purchase of food and grass from fear of using land	Stressful and health risks for parents	Children's safety	Increased expenses	Increased workload for parents and elders

<b>Men's FGD</b>						
<b>Problem</b>	<b>Impact 1</b>	<b>Impact 2</b>	<b>Impact 3</b>	<b>Impact 4</b>	<b>Impact 5</b>	<b>Impact 6</b>
<b>Fear</b>	Fear was identified as an overarching problem central to all other problems and impacts detailed here.					
<b>Grazing</b>	People cannot follow animals onto contaminated areas	Animals killed or lost, no milk or meat to sell	No money for clothes, school, medicine, etc.	Pay to use other safe land, it is expensive and may be far away	Sell belongings to cover costs (car, livestock, fruit)	People forced to emigrate to Russian Federation
<b>Can't collect grass</b>	No milk from cows	No meat from cows	Livestock dies because there is no food	No fertilizer	No fuel	
<b>No access to clean drinking water</b>	Forced to drink dirty water	Health problems	Medical treatment expensive	Sell livestock to cover costs	People forced to emigrate to Russian Federation	
<b>No agriculture</b>	Over use of safe land, exhaust soil	Forced to use less fertile land	Can't grow wheat, which provides food and income	Must buy flour — expensive	Cannot cultivate good grass for livestock	
<b>Can't shepherd livestock</b>	Can't protect livestock, some killed by bears	Milk production reduced				
<b>Can't collect herbs and mushrooms</b>	No herbs to sell	Loss of income	Less food			
<b>Leisure</b>	Affects health	Parents worry	Nowhere for children to play			

## SAIDON

Visited 3 August 2015

### 1. CONTAMINATION/CLEARANCE

- Clearance was initially conducted in the village eight or nine years ago and then again by NPA in 2014.

- Manual clearance in 2014 was conducted on 22,033 m<sup>2</sup>, a total of 27,420 m<sup>2</sup> was reduced, and 52,000 m<sup>2</sup> was released. A total of 2,547 m<sup>2</sup> was cancelled, as no evidence was found while conducting TS.

### 2. MAIN PROBLEMS BY CONTAMINATION AND ASSOCIATED IMPACTS IDENTIFIED IN FGDS:

Women's FGD						
Problem	Impact 1	Impact 2	Impact 3	Impact 4	Impact 5	Impact 6
<b>Problem</b>	Environmental changes following explosions (dust in air, health affected)	No access to herbs				
<b>Poor health</b>	Dirty water — clean spring water in contaminated areas	Health affected	Life at risk			
<b>Lack of education</b>	No income-generation	Health affected	Life at risk	Unable to collect grass for cows	Lack of access to herbs	Increased medical expenses as buying medicine instead of using herbs
<b>Relocation</b>	Health problems	Hunger	Mental health problems			
<b>Lack of pasture land</b>	Hunger	No income-generation	No replacement of livestock due to high expense			
<b>Fear</b>	Schooling affected	Access to alternative land, school, water sources				

Men's FGD					
Problem	Impact 1	Impact 2	Impact 3	Impact 4	Impact 5
<b>People killed</b>	Main income earner lost	Children orphaned	Could not rescue people quickly		
<b>Irrigation stopped</b>	Conflict over water	No mill for flour — no bread	Investment in the land with no return	Lost money – no produce	No potatoes
<b>Fear</b>	Afraid for children	No life improvements	Stopped people working		
<b>Livestock killed</b>	Shepherds lose money	No milk			
<b>Time consuming</b>	Less time for studying	Less time for agriculture	Not collecting grass	Not collecting herbs	
<b>Horses killed</b>	No transport	Loss of income	Not possible to replace	Loss of meat	



## Annex 12

# DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

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