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|  **UNDP/GOVERNMENT OF ERITREA** |
| **Evaluation of the Joint Program Supporting the Return/Resettlement of IDPs/Expellees to Communities of Origin/new Resettlement Areas in Eritrea (2004-2009)** |
| **Final Report** |
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| **July 2010** |

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As an independent evaluation, the findings and conclusions made are the responsibility of the team. However, we also hope the report truly reflects the opinions and views expressed by all those partners we met, and that it provides a comprehensive account of what has been achieved by the Joint Program, including the challenges, lessons learnt and future perspectives.

**Executive Summary**

This report presents the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the final evaluation of the Joint Program “*Supporting the Return/Resettlement of IDPs/Expellees to the Communities of Origin/new resettlement areas in Eritrea (2004-2009)*”. The evaluation was undertaken in 26 May-22 June 2010.

The team met with many stakeholders: government officials, donors who supported the program, participating UN agencies, as well as the JP coordinators and zoba staff from Gash Barka, Debub and Southern Red Sea regions. The team also drew upon the proceedings of the midterm review of the program conducted 3-4 December 2009 which involved all stakeholders, the reports of the midterm review of the UNDP 2007-2011 Country Program Action Plan (CPAP) and the UNDAF 2007-20111(United Nations Development Assistance Framework) , as well as the substantial documentation in the form of annual reports of the JP, minutes of the various committees of the JP (Steering Committee, TWG, Annual review meetings with the regions) and monitoring reports. Unfortunately field visits during the actual evaluation was not possible, but the team benefited from the field assessment visits to the intervention sites of the Joint Program made by two members of the evaluation team (Dr Zemenfes Tsighe and Dr. Senait Bahta) during the midterm review of the UNDP CPAP, a few weeks prior to this assignment.

At the end of a 30-year protracted war of independence, followed by a border conflict with Ethiopia (1998-2000), Eritrea was faced with massive population displacement (an estimated 1.1 million people were uprooted from their homes and had lost their means of livelihoods) and widespread destruction of the socio-economic infrastructure. Following the cessation of hostilities approximately 700,000 returned to their villages spontaneously. About 300,000 were assisted to return to their villages and provided with transport and other basic necessities. However, several thousand faced obstacles to return and remained in camps under harsh conditions, receiving assistance from government and the international community.

During the past eight years, substantial rehabilitation and reconstructions of war-damaged infrastructure has taken place under government programs supported by the UN and key donors and the World Bank. Other key players included donors (Italy, Netherlands, USAID, European Commission, and Norway) and several UN agencies (UNICEF, UNHCR, UNOCHA WFP, UNFPA, etc).

Ensuring that IDPs, expellees, returnees and other war-affected and drought-affected are reintegrated and have secure livelihoods and access to basic social services, is one of the national priorities of the Government of Eritrea. In accordance with this, the UN System and the GSE agreed that Emergency/Recovery to be one of the focus areas of the UNDAF (2007-2011). The goal of UNDAF is in this regard was “*By 2009, assist the Government through an integrated multi-sector approach, to ensure that IDPs, expellees, returnees and other war and drought-affected are reintegrated and have secure livelihoods and access to basic services*”.

In late 2004, there were 12,976 HHs (50,853 persons) internally displaced persons (IDPs) in camps/host communities in Gash Barka. In the same period there were also 4,714 HHs (20,354 persons) in camps in Debub. Moreover, there were 1,995 HHs (10,900 persons) in host communities in and around Tessenei and Goluj Sub Zoba in Gash Barka. In November 2004 a joint program between GoE and participating UN agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR and WFP) was signed Joint Programme (JP) addressing the return/resettlement needs of 30,000 IDPs and expellees from Adi keshi, Kotobia and Mai Wurai emergency camps. In March 2006, the GoSE decided to return/resettle all IDPs/expellees and close all emergency camps and for this reason the First Phase JP needed revision and expansion in content and resources. This resulted in a revised and expanded joint program which was signed by the GoE and UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR and UNFPA for the recovery-related activities of some 12,633 HHs (52,544 persons) who were in camps/host communities. These IDPs/Expellees consist of 11,000 persons from *Mai Wurai* and *Kotobia* camps, as well as IDPs and Expellees from the emergency camps in Metera, Shambuqo and those in the surroundings of *Tsorona* and *Senaf*e towns. The IDPs/Expellees are to return to some 14 villages of origin or new re-settlement areas over the period of 2006 and 2009. It was then agreed that the IDPs/expellees will be assisted to return/resettle in areas that have been cleared of landmines and unexploded ordnances.

The overall objective of the JP was to support the Government in the return and resettlement of IDPs/expellees to the communities of origin or new settlement areas and to have secure livelihoods and access to basic social services. The program was implemented in Gash Barka, Debub, and Southern Red Sea Regional Administrations. The activities envisaged under the Joint Program consisted of the following components: (i) the safe and dignified transportation of the IDPs; (ii) provision of potable water supply and sanitation facilities; (iii) provision of shelter (temporary and permanent); (iv) provision of agricultural inputs and services (seeds, tractor ploughing, farm hand tools, restocking of livestock) and environmental rehabilitation/protection through soil and water conservation interventions, community PV solar systems, fuel saving stoves, and income generating activities(beekeeping development and cash for work safety net program); (v) building the capacity of regional administration. In all interventions priority was given to some of the most vulnerable households specially, by women headed households.

Most activities were implemented through a pool fund managed by UNDP as lead agency. Other activities were funded under the parallel programs of other UN agencies (UNICEF, UNHCR, UNFPA) such as food aid rations, school feeding, supplementary feeding, school rehabilitation and temporary school construction and supplies, health facilities rehabilitation including health post construction and supplies and promotion of health services at their respective return/resettlement sites, and provision of education equipment/materials.

The overall conclusion of the evaluation team is that the JP was a highly successful program, all the more remarkable given the complex socio-political context within which it was implemented. All IDPs and expellees that were still in camps (17,690 households or 71,207 persons) have been successfully and safely transported with their belongings from camps to their villages of origin or new settlements in the designated areas from 2005 to 2008. Hence, all IDP/expellees camps were closed by March 2008. The functional movement areas of villages of origin and resettlement areas were cleared of land mines and/or marked with signs, and Mine Risk Education given to communities. Additional surveys are being conducted, and continuous road and farmland verification is being conducted. Mine action has been very effective, and there are no reports of causalities in villages of origin or resettled areas so far. Massive rehabilitation, reconstruction and reintegration works have been going on between 2005 and 2009. IDPs/expellees and returnees are being provided with shelter, basic social services, improved stoves, home solar systems, farm tools, oxen, land clearance and traction, seeds (12 kg/ha), and land (1-2 ha/household) to ensure livelihood security. Consequently, IDPs and expellees have started a dignified and purposeful life, free from the uncertainties of camp life. In the focus group discussion, beneficiaries reported: “*In the camps, yes we had enough to eat, but now we have our own land, our own houses, and we are now in full control of our lives*”.

Contributions to support the JP came from a variety of sources: UNDP and GoSE, financial support by the Norwegian Government, Italian Government, USAID, UNOCHA and European Union. Out of a total program budget of USD 60 million, some USD 46 million has been mobilized of which over 90% has been delivered, making it a highly efficient operation.

The evaluation team assessed the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the program. The Joint Program was judged to be highly relevant by the team. It was a top priority of GOSE and an important plank in the government’s post-war reconstruction effort which was to expeditiously repair damaged socio-economic infrastructure and help uprooted populations quickly return to normalcy. The JP contributed to this effort and built upon earlier efforts of government and the international community. The JP reflected the development and humanitarian concerns of the UN in Eritrea as expressed in the UNDAF (2002-2006; 2007-2011), as well as assistance frameworks of donors (both bilateral and multilateral). The target regions (Gash Barka and Debub) suffered the most damage and were at the epicenter of displacement and return – these regions were also critical to the socio-economic recovery of the whole country because of their economic potential. The target beneficiaries were those IDPs/Expellees whose return to areas of origin was for various reasons proving difficult to achieve, hence heightening the risk of trapping them in protracted displacement situation - the majority of the beneficiaries were female headed households, resource-poor, as well as those that lost all assets and personal possessions – those segments of the population of key concern to government. However, a few weaknesses: assistance tended to be somewhat fragmented in some instances, driven by the legitimate concern and need to reach the largest number of beneficiaries – it is important to stress though that this also very much dictated by the type of intervention. For example water supply schemes, micro dams, agricultural inputs and services and social safety nets cover almost all beneficiaries while others such as shelter and beehives have been provided to the most vulnerable families due to shortage of resources. The lack of baseline information meant that impact assessments were difficult but not impossible to undertake.

In terms of efficiency, the decentralized approach to program implementation for the pool-funded activities proved to be very efficient. Funds were directly transferred to the Zobas in accordance with agreed AWP which are prepared by the implementing Zobas and approved by UNDP. Assistance was given to beneficiaries as soon as it is available – beneficiaries received assistance by signing forms which stated the terms under which support is provided. The public/community participation mechanisms created employment, increased sense of ownership, reduced costs and speeded up implementation. For example, in CFW activities, the use of local/community team leaders to mobilize the community, keep records of attendances, measure work done (norms) significantly improved the timeliness of operations and payments, thus resulting in improved efficiency and greater cost-effectiveness. The high delivery rates of the program reflect the efficiency of operations both at the level of UNDP, Zoba and at lower levels. Pooled resources were well managed as evidenced from the audit reports of 2007, 2008 and 2009. The funds were managed in compliance with both donor agreements and UNDP corporate requirements. The full integration of program into existing structures of both UNDP and regional administrations reduced overheads significantly, while at the same time enhancing sustainability.

The JP was highly effective as it was a government-driven initiative and the structures established were appropriate and accountable to authorities/stakeholders at different levels (Central government, donors, UNDP, Regional/local Administrations, communities). The main lesson to be derived from this experience was that it is possible to handle emergency/humanitarian operations within existing structures in an effective and efficient manner without recourse to costly and unsustainable parallel structures. Eritrea appears to set a good example in this regard. The planned outputs were delivered well and the outcomes largely achieved, except when budget constraints stood in the way (e.g. shelter for Gash Barka). Factors that contributed to such effectiveness were the relevance and appropriateness of the support provided, as well as the fact that the regions were in the driving seat and the planning process was flexible and adaptive.

In terms of impact, there are significant indications of positive impact – the statement by a beneficiary: “*In the camps, yes we had enough to eat, but now we have our own land, our own houses, and we are now in full control of our lives*”, perhaps best sums up the measure of overall impact. Much socio-economic infrastructure has been built where previously there was none, and this has definitely improved access to social services. Previously women trekked long distances on daily basis to fetch water but this is now much reduced in many communities. Conservation works are rebuilding the natural resource base that will contribute in the long-term not only to enhancing productivity but also conserving biodiversity and reducing soil/land degradation and ensuring long-term sustainability. Moreover, SWC structures are often built on farmers’ own land which means that their maintenance over the long run is taken care of.

The team noted that the program has in place upward and downward accountability mechanisms. The management and oversight mechanisms internally within UNDP, as well as nationally and regionally, appear to work well. There was however a weakness with respect to closer monitoring of parallel funded activities due to staff changes within the relevant UN agencies. Fund management was transparent and effective as shown by audit reports, financial reports and high delivery and disbursement rates. Throughout the life of the program the relevant technical reports (annual reports), independent monitoring reports (e.g. ROM) were produced, and these were comprehensive and useful. Payments for work done, for example, for SWC works are transparent and fully recorded, verified and signed by the various parties involved (sub-zoba officials, team leaders and beneficiaries). There are many ways in which the JP sought to strengthen downward accountability: zoba administrations know the resource envelop available for each activity and for each planning period and sign the AWP with UNDP; communities are in turn gathered by the zoba/sub-zoba officers and informed on the resources available and the number of beneficiary households; communities with their local administrations (kebabi) and committees are responsible for selecting beneficiaries; development committee meetings are held on a monthly basis, and elections to the various committees are also regularly held; and communities and beneficiaries obtain redress through established channels and can hold zoba/sub-zoba and project officials accountable.

Interventions under the JP have promoted gender equality and women’s empowerment in many ways. Overall, more than 60% of the total target populations of the program are female-headed households. Environmental interventions which addressed reduction of fuel wood consumption through provision of fuel-saving stoves in households and provision of community solar-based household energy exclusively targeted women and female-headed households. In all livelihood security interventions, female-headed and resource-poor households were priority targets. In this case, female-headed households constitute 60% in provision of shelter, 64% in provision of seeds and tractor ploughing, 100% small ruminants for income generation and child nutrition and 67% participants in cash for work are women.. In the target communities, women and girls are responsible for fetching water. Provision of access to potable water implies reduction in women’s workload and having more time for income-generating activities as well as time for schooling for girls. Hence, the intervention enhanced women empowerment and gender equity. Women are well-represented (40%) in local development committees. Women’s increased representation and participation in the program has influenced resource allocations and policies by making them to address women needs and prioritized concerns.

The evaluation team made ten recommendations on the way forward as follows:

1. Maintain Transition and Recovery as the overarching framework for the program, at least for the next two years, but with increased emphasis on the longer-term perspective.
2. Adopt an inclusive and integrated area-based approach within the localities of operation for the joint program.
3. The program focus should shift more towards providing livelihood support, but continue to provide basic social services where these are in critical shortage.
4. More holistic efforts are made to strengthen capacities at zoba and lower levels, including community structures and households.
5. The recommended strategy of an area-based inclusive approach, and expansion of the program both within and outside the current regions dictate that resource mobilization efforts should be intensified.
6. Further efforts made to strengthen gender dimensions in program, building upon the very positive start made.
7. While maintaining the current structures established to oversee program implementation, strengthen institutional framework for the JP, particularly in revitalizing the national steering committee.
8. The NEX modality, pooled funding and decentralized implementation have proved highly successful and should be maintained.
9. To strengthen program monitoring and improve chances for significant resource mobilization, the team recommends better and unrestricted access (taking into account security considerations) to program sites.
10. Efforts be made to streamline procurement to make it predictable, rapid, efficient and in accordance with international standards.

The evaluation team concluded that the JP has been an effective and successful program and has undoubtedly helped and provided an opportunity for large segments of the war – affected population to begin to restore their lives and livelihoods. It has been effective in addressing the needs of the vulnerable such as, female-headed households, children and poor families, and contributed to closing the chapter on war and displacement in Eritrea, and by helping to rebuild critical socio-economic infrastructure, restore livelihoods is also contributing to laying the foundation to medium and long-term socio-economic development, to poverty reduction and attainment of the MDGs for the country. The JP has succeeded to consistently respond and provide support to very deserving communities in a very complex and politically sensitive context in a commendable way. Furthermore, there are several obvious indicators of positive impact on the ground and on the lives and livelihoods of individuals, households and communities.

The program was characterized by sound and affective partnerships (donors, UN agencies, government, regional administrations, and affected populations). By privileging links with regional administrations, the program has not only ensured rapid and effective implementation but has strengthened program ownership by the regional administrations and contributed critical capacity building support. The lean and efficient program management structures and integration within existing regional structures have ensured that most of the program resources are directed at the beneficiaries rather than the traditional heavy and costly program implementation structures. However, while maintaining the strong decentralized operational links with regional administrations, there are benefits to establishing stronger links with central government/line ministries in order to better anchor the future program to evolving national policy but importantly also to feed the very significant lessons learnt from the JP into national policy making process as Eritrea shifts to longer-term development- indeed the evaluation team of the view that the lessons learnt need to be documented both for national as well as regional and international use.

The UN agencies have generally worked well together and the leadership and management role played by UNDP has been commendable. Steps however need to be taken to strengthen the collaboration and coordination among UN agencies involved in the JP to make it a truly joint program. Greater efforts should also be made to allocate more core resources from the agencies concerned to the program. There is overwhelming preference for the pooled funding modality by donors and regional administrations – both Debub and Gash Barka - and this should be the modality for the future program.

**List of Acronyms**

ALDP: Anseba Local Development Project

AWP: Annual Work Plan

BCPR: Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP)

CERF: Central Emergency Response Fund

CFW: Cash for Work

CO: Country Office

CPAP: Country Programme Action Plan

DEX: Direct Execution

DHS: Demographic and Health Survey

DRR: Deputy Resident representative (UNDO)

EC: European Commission

EDA: Eritrean Demining Authority

FACE: Funding Authorization and Certificate of Expenditure )

FAO: Food and Agricultural Organization

FHH: Female Headed Household

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GHG: Greenhouse Gases

GSE/GoSE: Government of the State of Eritrea

HH: Household

HQ: Head Quarters

ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross

IDP**:** Internally Displaced Persons

IFAD: International Fund for Agricultural Development

ITN: Insecticide Treated Net

JP: Joint Program on IDPS/Expellees

M&E: Monitoring and Evaluation

MDGs: Millennium Development Goals

MoA: Ministry of Agriculture

MoF: Ministry of Finance

MoLG: Ministry of Local Government

MoND: Ministry of National Development

MRE: Mine Risk Education

NEX: National Execution

NUEW: National Union of Eritrean Women

OE2: Output-Outcome Evaluation

PC: Program Coordinator

PERA: Proclamation Establishing Regional Administrations

PHAST: Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Training

PIU: Project Implementation Unit

PMU: Program Management Unit

PoWER: Post War Recovery of Eritrea

PV: Photo Voltaic

QTR: Quarter

ROM: Result Oriented Monitoring

RU: Recovery Unit (UNDP)

SC: Steering Committee

SoC: Social Overhead Capital

SRH: Sexual and Reproductive Health

SRS: Southern Red Sea (region)

STI: Sexually Transmitted Infections

SWC: Soil and Water Conservation

TWG: Technical Working Group

UN/OCHA: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

UN: United Nations

UNCDF: United Nations Capital Development Fund

UNDAF: United Nations Development Assistance Framework

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNFPA: United Nations Fund for Population Activities

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF: United Nations Children’s Fund

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

USD: United States Dollar

UXO: Unexploded Ordinances

WASH: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

WFP: World Food Programme

**Table of Contents**

**Acknowledgements 2**

**Executive Summary 3**

**Acronyms 10**

**I: Background, Objectives and Methodology of Evaluation 14**

* 1. **Introduction 14**
	2. **Background 14**
		1. **Overview of Transition and Recovery in Eritrea 14**

**1.2.2 The Joint Program Supporting Return/Resettlement of IDPs/Expellees 15**

* 1. **The Evaluation 16**
		1. **Aims and Objectives of the Evaluation 16**
		2. **Methodology 17**

**1.3.3 Challenges 19**

**II: Overall Assessment of the Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, 19**

 **Impact & Sustainability and Accountability of the Joint Program**

**2.1 Program Design 19**

**2.2 Relevance 20**

**2.3 Efficiency 21**

**2.4 Effectiveness 22**

**2.5 Impact & Sustainability 24**

**2.6 Accountability 26**

**2.7 Key factors of Success & Lessons 27**

**2.8 Main Constraints 28**

**III: Assessment of Accomplishments of the Various Components 29**

 **of the Joint Program – Achievements, Constraints & Challenges,**

**3.1 Smooth Transportation and Return 30**

**3.2 Social Services, Shelter and Livelihoods 33**

**3.3 Mine Awareness and Mine Risk Education 38**

**3.4 Monitoring of Vulnerable Groups 38**

**3.5 Institutional Capacity Building of Zoba Administrations 39**

**IV: Integration of Gender 39**

**V: Program Funding, Management, Monitoring and Partnerships 45**

**5.1 Program Funding 45**

**5.2 Program Management 56**

**5.3 Monitoring and Evaluation 59**

**5.4 Partnerships & Coordination 60**

**VI: Recommendations on Way Forward 61**

**Conclusion 67**

**Annexes 69**

 **Annex 1: Terms of Reference 69**

**Annex 2: List of Persons Met 78**

**Annex 3: List of Documents Consulted 80**

**Chapter 1: Background, Objectives and Methodology of the Evaluation**

* 1. **Introduction**

##### This report presents the results of the Outcome - Output Evaluation (O2E) of the Joint Program (JP) Supporting the Return/Resettlement of IDPs/Expellees to the communities of origin/new resettlement areas in Eritrea (2004-2009). It is based on the findings of an independent evaluation undertaken in the period 27 May – 23 June 2010.

The report consists of six chapters: Chapter 1 presents the background, objectives and methodology of the evaluation. Chapter 2 deals with the overall assessment of the JP in terms of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact & sustainability and accountability. The chapter also outlines what are considered success factors, as well as the main constraints encountered Chapter 3 examines the main achievements in four results areas of the Joint Program, including constraints & challenges, lessons learnt. Chapter 4 reviews how gender considerations have been taken into account in the JP. Chapter 5 examines program funding, management and partnerships; and finally Chapter 6 makes recommendations on the way forward and conclusions.

* 1. **Background**
		1. **Overview of Transition and Recovery in Eritrea**

Eritrea was liberated in 1991 after a protracted 30-year war and became formally an independent nation two years later following an internationally supervised referendum. The new nation was to start, however, under less than propitious socio-economic conditions. Thirty Years of war coupled with recurrent droughts and the neglect of the previous Ethiopian administration left a severely underdeveloped economy.

Massive population displacements were the tragic consequence of both the war of liberation and the border war with Ethiopia. Some 500,000 people fled the country during the war of liberation. Most went to Sudan. At the height of the border war, as many as 1.1 million people, or a third of the population, were driven from their homes into internal displacement. In addition, over 75,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin were dispossessed of all property and forcibly deported from Ethiopia.

During the past eight years, substantial rehabilitation and reconstructions of war-damaged infrastructure has taken place under government programs supported by the UN and key donors and the World Bank. During the period 1996 to 2007, UNDP actively collaborated in recovery efforts in Eritrea, and played a leading role and was fully involved in the return/resettlement of internally displaced persons and expellees and has successfully implemented projects worth more than US$ 90 million with the successful settlement of expellees and the return/resettlement of internally displaced persons under its recovery programs. Other key players included donors (Italy, Netherlands, USAID, European Commission, Norway, UK, and Canada) and several UN agencies (UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, UNFPA, etc).

* + 1. **The Joint Program Supporting Return/Resettlement of IDPs/Expellees**

The Eritrean-Ethiopian border war (1998 – 2000) and the on-going border demarcation stalemate have reversed positive post-independence achievements in Eritrea. Since the end of the border war, the average growth in Gross Domestic Production (GDP), a key factor of poverty reduction, has been low. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) and expellees by and from Ethiopia and returnees, as well as the urban poor, the disabled, pastoralists, female-headed households, orphan and high-risk HIV/AIDS groups have been particularly hard hit. In spite of this reality, the GSE put “IDPs, expellees, returnees and other war-affected and drought-affected are reintegrated and have secure livelihoods and access to basic social services.” as one of its national priorities. In accordance with this national priority, the UN System and the GSE agreed that Emergency/Recovery to be one of the focus areas of the UNDAF. In the UNDAF it has been recognized that recovery needs are largely a result of displacement and thus apply to returnees and refugees, expellees, IDPs, and other war-and drought-affected populations.

The Emergency and Recovery program components (the JP on IDPs/expellees programme is under this category) address UNDAF goals and aim to support national development goals including the Millennium Development Goals. In order to attain the goal of UNDAF, “*By 2009, assist the Government through an integrated multi-sector approach, to ensure that IDPs, expellees, returnees and other war and drought-affected are reintegrated and have secure livelihoods and access to basic services*”, the UN System and the GSE work towards achieving a number of CP outcomes, namely:

1. “IDPs, expellees, returnees and host/war affected communities have basic rights fulfilled (shelter, water, sanitation, health, education) as the foundation for human development, with a special focus on HIV/AIDS and gender issues; and
2. IDPs, expellees, returnees and host/war affected communities have increased and diversified livelihood opportunities, and economic reintegration is enabled”.

In late 2004, there were 12,976 HHs (50,853 persons) internally displaced persons (IDPs) in camps/host communities in Gash Barka. In the same period there were also 4,714 HHs (20,354 persons) in camps in Debub. Moreover, there were 1,995 HHs (10,900 persons) in host communities in and around Tessenei and Goluj Sub Zoba in Gash Barka.

In November 2004 a joint program between GoE and participating UN agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR and WFP) was signed addressing the return/resettlement needs of 30,000 IDPs and expellees from Adi keshi, Kotobia and Mai Wurai emergency camps. Among the 30,000 IDPs, about 5,054 HHs (18,663 persons) of them were returned to their villages of origin in 2005. In March 2006, the GoE decided to return/resettle all the remaining IDPs/expellees sheltered in camps/host communities in Gash Barka and Debub to their villages of origin or to new resettlements and close all emergency camps in the two regions.

Hence, the First Phase JP needed revision and expansion in content and resources. This resulted in a revised and expanded joint program which was signed by the GoE and UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR and UNFPA for the recovery-related activities of some 12,633 HHs (52,544 persons) who were in camps/host communities. These IDPs/Expellees consist of 11,000 persons from *Mai Wurai* and *Kotobia* camps, as well as IDPs and Expellees from the emergency camps in Metera, Shambuqo and those in the surroundings of *Tsorona* and *Senaf*e towns. The IDPs/Expellees are to return to some 14 villages of origin or new re-settlement areas over the period of 2006 and 2009. It was then agreed that the IDPs/expellees will be assisted to return/resettle in areas that have been cleared of landmines and unexploded ordnances.

The activities envisaged under this Expanded Joint Program are the safe and dignified transportation of the IDPs, provision of potable water supply and sanitation facilities, provision of shelter (temporary and permanent), and provision of agricultural inputs and services (seeds, tractor ploughing, farm hand tools, restocking of livestock) and environmental rehabilitation/protection through soil and water conservation interventions, community PV solar systems, fuel saving stoves, and income generating activities(beekeeping development and cash for work safety net program).. In all interventions priority was given to some of the most vulnerable households specially by women headed households. Moreover, under the parallel programs were activities related to food aid rations, school feeding, supplementary feeding, school rehabilitation and temporary school construction and supplies, health facilities rehabilitation including health post construction and supplies and promotion of health services at their respective return/resettlement sites, and provision of education equipment/materials.

The JP on return/resettlement IDPs/expellees have been supported by a number of donors including Norway, Netherlands, USAID, UNDP, Italy, EC and UNOCHA and have mobilized USD 46,027,540 and registered an expenditure of USD 45,191,706.62 from 2004 - 2009.

* 1. **The Evaluation**

The evaluation was conducted by a team composed of three (3) members including an international consultant as team leader and two national consultants. The evaluation was participatory involving key stakeholders.

* + 1. **Aims and Objectives of the Evaluation**

The objective of the evaluation is “*to provide decision makers in the Government of Eritrea and the donors including the European Union, Norway and UNDP with sufficient information to make an informed judgment about the past performance of the JP on IDPs/Expellees return/resettlement (its efficiency, effectiveness and impact), to document lessons learned and to provide practical recommendations for follow-up action*.” The detailed Terms of Reference can be found in Annex 1.

Specifically, the evaluation sought to:

* Assess the relevance, efficiency, and effectiveness of the Joint Program on IDPs/Expellees return/resettlement, as well as the sustainability of the program from the design and implementation vantage point.
* Assess the program/project management capacity and structure of the relevant regional administrations.

The evaluation included the original Joint Program on IDPs/expellees return/resettlement signed in November 2004 and its expanded version which was signed in May 2006. Hence, the evaluation addresses interventions conducted in six consecutive years, i.e., from 2004 to 2009.

In addition to the above, the evaluation of the JP also undertook to:

* 1. Assess the accomplishments of the various components of the program by reference to the stated program objectives and targets;
	2. Review progress and mid - term review and assessment(participated by all stakeholders) reports that have been prepared by the Recovery Unit– what are the main constraints, challenges identified and proposed actions;
	3. Review the work planning processes: adequacy of annual work plans to guide program implementation; whether such work plan were discussed and agreed among the key partners in implementation (Regional Administrations of Gash Barka, Debub and SRS, UNDP);
	4. Assess and review independently prepared project appraisal and result oriented mission (RoM) reports by independent consultants employed by Norway and EC respectively.
	5. Review and assess the program implementation arrangement, donor coordination, and monitoring and evaluation modalities of the program.
	6. Compare and assess the pro and cons of the UNDP Direct Execution (DEX) verses National Execution (NEX) implementation modality, in the context of Eritrea.
	7. Identify the staff recruited for the program, their expertise, and roles pertaining to capacity building of the implementing partners/ institutions;
	8. Identify major institutional, financial and operational issues that have assisted and/ or constrained effective implementation of the Joint Program.

The evaluation team sought to identify strengths and weaknesses of the Emergency and Recovery program in the light of relevant International Standards and best practice in the sector, as well as the particular circumstances of the country. Finally, the evaluation team makes recommendations for improvement, future transition and early recovery program support, co-ordination, implementation and policies in Eritrea.

* + 1. **Methodology**

The JP on IDPs and expellees has been an important instrument for providing diversified support to enable former IDPs and Expellees resume normal lives disrupted by conflict and displacement.

The term “reintegration” is used to describe a process whereby persons displaced by conflict (refugees, IDPs and in the case of Eritrea, Expellees) on being assisted to return, experience “*the progressive establishment of conditions which enable [them] and their communities to exercise their social, economic, civil, political and cultural rights, and on that basis to enjoy peaceful, productive and dignified lives*”. Reintegration has also been described as “*an individual’s capacity for socio-economic self-sufficiency and ability to exercise citizenship rights consistent with neighbours and people of other communities”.*

Reintegration is complex long-term process which is difficult to measure, but can be assessed through a set of proxy indicators such as:

* Extent to which returnees feel contented to be in their communities, including social cohesion with host communities.
* Extent to which they feel safe and secure and protected by the authorities – including access to documentation, etc.
* Extent to which they are able to establish livelihoods, attain food security and generate cash income. Here the main factors include: ability to feed themselves or access food; level of malnutrition (general, vulnerable groups such as pregnant and lactating mothers, under fives, Female- headed households Vs Male-headed households etc); access to productive resources (e.g. tools, credit, inputs, land), training/skills building; markets, local economic prospects, non-farm incomes; etc
* Extent to which they have access to goods, services and information which they consider essential to their wellbeing. Here one is interested in not just physical construction of facilities but their effects: are facilities still functional (staffing of facilities, physical state, etc); effects on school enrollment; effects on access to health and consequently on indicators such as infant and maternal mortality rates; etc
* Extent to which there are differences in degree of reintegration as affected by: age; gender (e.g. Female HH Vs Male HH); IDPs Vs Expellees; Urban Vs rural; geographic/regional difference – Gash Barka Vs Debub; the existence of differences or otherwise between returnees and host communities, as well as IDP who spontaneously returned, and consequently the degree of social cohesion.

Simply put, sustainable reintegration is a function of two key inter-related factors: (i) household capacity for achieving viable livelihoods through subsistence or commercial farming, non-farm income generation, employment and small businesses; (ii) ability of returnees to exercise their rights as citizens consistent with individuals in nearby communities, and the community at large (access to basic services, national identity papers).

In order to achieve a thorough understanding of the Joint Program and the context, the evaluation review team employed such participatory techniques such as:

* Comprehensive **document review** **and analysis** of all emergency and recovery related documents;
* **Interviews** and participatory meetings with Government (Regional Administrations, UN Agencies and donor officials; and the UNDP RU staff.
* **Field Visits:** Unfortunately no permits were granted to enable the three-person evaluation team to visit the regions during the period of the evaluation of the Joint Program. However, and fortuitously, visits to project sites and participatory meetings with direct beneficiaries of the joint program had been undertaken by two members of the team a few weeks prior to the start of the evaluation in the context of the midterm review of the recovery program under the UNDP CPAP. The team members concerned visited project sites in both Gash Barka and Debub regions and held extensive consultations with beneficiaries, host communities, regional and local administrations. The evaluation team drew upon these findings and observations.
	+ 1. **Challenges**

The main challenge encountered and cited above was the difficulty in securing permits to enable the whole team to visit program intervention sites. Additionally also no systematic baseline data had been collected at the onset to enable impact monitoring, although the evaluation team took note of the fact that the beneficiaries of the program has lost most of their assets and were in fact starting the task of rebuilding their lives and livelihoods from scratch. Nonetheless as recommended later, this data gap needs to be addressed in subsequent phases. Finally, the team faced a challenge of comprehensively documenting funding from and activities supported through parallel funded activities.

**Chapter 2: Overall Assessment of Program Design, Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Impact & Sustainability and Accountability of the Joint Program, Main Factors of Success and Constraints**

* 1. **Program Design**

**2.1.1 Overall Program Design**

Overall the program was well designed. The objectives, outputs, implementation arrangements and other critical elements have largely been well elaborated. As a recovery and transition program, the design demonstrated a clear understanding of the needs and addressed a critical niche in a timely manner[[1]](#footnote-1).

However, the project document did not spell out the risks and assumptions of the program. Given the fluid and rapidly changing context within which the program was designed, this should have been done[[2]](#footnote-2). Nonetheless, in its implementation, sufficient flexibility in adapting to new circumstances was demonstrated. Another gap was the lack of a log frame for the program; although it was stated that this would be developed during implementation, this did not happen. It should be pointed out though that all the subsequent project documents related to the EC have clearly spelt out risks and assumptions and log frames.

**2.1.2 Gender aspects in the program design**

Gender is a cross cutting issue. Review of the various documents shows that the JP gives special emphasis to disadvantaged women and children and ensures equitable access to social services and shelter and sustainable livelihood. This is in line with UNDP guideline on mainstreaming gender, which is defined as ‘*a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation or policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. Its ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality*.’

In addition to design issues, the JP at the regional level in annual planning and annual reviews ensured that staff from the NUEW zoba and sub-zoba office are represented. Women and the elderly are represented in work teams formed for the daily work and equality of participation is ensured and participants assist one another and get equal payment.

**2.2 Relevance**

The Joint Program was judged to be highly relevant by the evaluation team. The program was a top priority and an important plank in the Government of Eritrea post-war reconstruction effort which was to expeditiously repair damaged socio-economic infrastructure and help uprooted populations quickly return to normalcy - a program that tries to ensure the smooth and successful reintegration of over 70,000 persons who had stayed in emergency camps for close to 10 years is a relevant and timely one. The program contributed to this effort by building upon earlier efforts of government and the international community. At the same time, from a longer-term perspective, the program contributed not only to Eritrea’s transition and recovery efforts but also to poverty reduction and the efforts to attain the MDGs which are also key national priorities.

The program reflected the development and humanitarian concerns of the UN in Eritrea as expressed in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework- UNDAF (2004-2007; 2008-2011), as well cooperation strategies of donors (both bilateral and multilateral). The target regions (Gash Barka and Debub) suffered the most damage and were at the epicenter of displacement and return – at the same time these regions are critical to the socio-economic recovery of the whole country because of their economic potential. The program beneficiaries were those IDPs/Expellees whose return to areas of origin was for various reasons proving difficult to achieve, hence heightening the risk of trapping them in protracted displacement situation. The majority of the beneficiaries were female headed households, resource-poor, as well as those households that had lost all assets and personal possessions – segments of the population of key concern to government and development partners.

Program relevance was further strengthened through diagnostic assessments that laid the basis for identifying needs, priorities and beneficiaries. The assessments carried out were not one-off, but needs and beneficiaries were reviewed constantly through the annual work planning processes, therefore making it possible to respond to changing needs and maintaining relevance.

Overall, the approaches and methods employed by the program were judged by the evaluation team to be sound and appropriate. The design and conception of the program was good, as were the implementation arrangements: UNDP availed staff, offices and brought on board many other stakeholders – UN agencies, donors, regional administrations, communities and others. Moreover, the program had relatively better coordination mechanisms at grassroots than many similar operations

A weakness observed was the lack of systematically documented baseline information which made quantifiable impact assessments difficult but not impossible. However, the evaluation team took note of the fact that most households had lost all their assets, including land, housing, livestock, farm implements and other resources which is indicative of the fact that for many households, the joint program afforded them the first opportunity to begin rebuilding their assets from scratch. The team also noted that inter-agency assessments were also conducted at inception of the program which guided program design. However, the evaluation strongly recommends that subsequent phases of the program should address data needs to ensure adequate and effective monitoring and documenting impact. This is especially important in the context of moving the program towards longer term development-type interventions. Possible options to address the data gaps could include: (i) collecting data as part of small research projects that can be conducted in collaboration with academic institutions in Eritrea; (ii) integrate data needs into current Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) being conducted by negotiating with the National Statistical Office targeting of project villages; (iii) targeting data collection linked to specific project implementation.

The evaluation concluded that the overall relevance in the present and future context could be further strengthened if more systematic linkages are developed and/or strengthened with zoba development plans (where these exist).

**2.3 Efficiency**

The decentralized approach to program implementation for the pool-funded activities proved to be very efficient. Funds were directly transferred to the Zobas in accordance with agreed AWP which are prepared by the implementing Zobas and approved by UNDP. Assistance is given to beneficiaries as soon as it is available – beneficiaries received assistance by signing forms which stated the terms under which support is provided. The public/community participation mechanisms used by the program created employment, increased the sense of ownership, reduced costs and speeded up implementation. For example, in CFW activities, team leaders were responsible for mobilizing the community, keeping records of attendances, measuring the work done (norms) and ensuring the necessary verification by the sub-zoba administration. This system has significantly improved the timeliness of operations and payments, thus resulting in improved efficiency and greater cost-effectiveness than if such tasks were conducted by program officers.

Initial steps and contributions to building the capacity of the regions have been taken – this extends to sub-zoba and community levels (e.g. training in new farming methods, income diversification, maintenance of new technologies, etc), resulting in improved capacities for program implementation by the communities and local administrations.

The high delivery rates of the program reflect the efficiency of operations at all levels - UNDP, at Zoba and lower levels. Pooled resources were well managed as evidenced from the audit reports of 2007, 2008 and 2009, and funds were managed in compliance with both donor agreements and UNDP corporate requirements.

Another efficiency indicator was the full integration of program implementation into existing structures of both UNDP and regional administrations which reduced overheads significantly, while at the same time enhancing sustainability. The fact that the program did not utilize traditional project implementation units (PIU) can be characterized as a best practice, regionally and internationally. Monitoring of the program was efficiently and regularly conducted at all levels, including donors. However, restricted access due to fuel shortage, need for travel permits have had some adverse effects.

The constant review of methods, approaches and support has improved overall efficiency of the program - for example, in the face of rising diesel fuel costs, UNDP did a cost-benefit analysis on the basis of which solar power-driven water pumps were introduced in the place of diesel pumps.

Most activities and inputs proceeded according to plan, but in some few instances delays have been caused by mismatch between planting time and the time tractors arrived to plough in some program villages like Shilalo.

**2.4 Effectiveness**

The program was highly effective as it was a government-driven initiative and the structures established (National Steering Committee, Technical Working Group, UNDP Recovery Unit, Program Coordination Units in the regions, etc) were appropriate and accountable to authorities/stakeholders at different levels (Central government, donors, UNDP, Regional Administrations). The main lesson to be derived from this experience was that it is possible to handle emergency/humanitarian operations within existing structures in an effective and efficient manner without recourse to costly and unsustainable parallel structures. This makes the need for PIUs in regular development programs even less justified. Eritrea appears to set a good example in this regard.

Overall the planned outputs were delivered well and the planned outcomes achieved, except when resources were inadequate (e.g. shelter for Gash Barka). Factors that contributed to this were the relevance and appropriateness of the support provided (mostly framers – so inputs were appropriate to build assets of beneficiaries), as well as the fact that the regions were in the driving seat and the planning process was flexible and adaptive.

However, it is important to stress that the process of reintegration and re-building livelihoods is a long-term one. Furthermore, setbacks experienced due to the twin problems of recurrent droughts and economic factors (price escalations of commodities, materials, fuel shortages, etc) have slowed down or eroded gains made. Thus the need for drought proofing/contingency planning, income diversification and safety nets to support the most vulnerable (building upon existing mechanism in place). In this regard, cash-for-work programs should in the short-term, be expanded/continued.

According to most stakeholders, the program effectively responded to the humanitarian challenge/situation that prevailed. However, it is important to stress that the program was designed to address the needs of a specific group among the displaced who could not spontaneously return and/or were not assisted to return from earlier efforts and were still living in camps (IDPs who could not return easily for a variety of reasons – villages awarded to Ethiopia by boundary commission, villages still occupied by Ethiopian army, lands contaminated by land mines or expellees from Ethiopia) and the relevant communities where they returned to. Large numbers of spontaneously resettled IDPS, returnees from Sudan, host communities and others were not the prime target, although some benefited from the social infrastructure provided, as well as from some of the agricultural inputs. Overall, needs far outstripped available resources even among the target group. For example in Debub it is estimated that 4,000 IDP Households benefited from the program while there were 40,000 in the Zoba.

In general, the facilities built or rehabilitated (schools, health facilities, dams, water facilities) appear to be fully functional and effective – they were staffed and maintained (even the make shift ones) but admittedly there are gaps in terms of staffing and supplies. However, in the case of SWC structures, the strategy to place them in farmers’ own fields has resulted in better maintenance and functionality than would otherwise have been the case. On the whole, the team considers the program as been timely and appropriate, and represented a sound option.

Under the current program, beneficiaries are provided with cash (23,000 Nakfa per household) for shelter construction. The money is paid in three installments based on progress made. This has improved implementation and is also expected to reduce the sale of building materials by beneficiaries in the earlier recovery program. The beneficiaries use local materials for the construction of their shelter mainly from the local materials such as stones, thatched roof etc. The main challenge was the lack adequate resources. Construction of the Senafe hospital was delayed due to lack of construction materials locally and has to be imported from abroad. For Shelter UNDP have imported Corrugated Iron sheets and purlins cheaper than the local market on the behalf of Zoba. Under current drought situations, beneficiaries may be tempted or forced to sell some of the assets or inputs provided like livestock, putting future production at risk. Sales seem to be an important asset management strategy of the IDPs/returnees but this is not always advisable. The sales proceeds are often spent on consumables and the result would be increased asset attrition. Sales of oxen and building material are partly due to lack of regular field supervision resulting from transportation problems.

**2.5 Impact & Sustainability**

The shift from utter dependence on external aid for their needs to prospects of self-reliance has opened windows of opportunities and hope for the IDPs/expellees. Unlike camp tents, the new houses provide better protection from the elements of nature, and some of them reported significant improvements in their health.

For the evaluation team, perhaps the most telling evidence of the impact of the program is a quote by one beneficiary as follows: “*In the camps, yes we had enough to eat, but now we have our own land, our own houses, and we are now in full control of our lives*”. The program has helped build significant socio-economic infrastructure where previously there was none, and this has definitely improved access to social services. Previously women (e.g. in Debub) trekked long distances on daily basis to fetch water but this is now much reduced in many communities. The evaluation team has noted that the joint program is contributing to the MDGs: education, health, gender, food security, poverty reduction, and water and sanitation goals. However, this needs to be closely monitored to ensure that beneficiary communities are not falling behind as compared to the rest of the country.

Conservation works are rebuilding the natural resource base that will contribute in the long-term not only in enhancing productivity but also conserving biodiversity and reducing soil/land degradation and ensuring long-term sustainability. Moreover, SWC structures are often built on farmers’ own land which means that their maintenance over the long run is taken care of. Significant soil and water conservation works have been undertaken on farm and non-farm lands on cash-for-work basis. These activities created employment (although short-term) for the local population, most of whom were women, improved the resource base for sustainable livelihoods and imparted skills to participants. Soil and water conservation structures like hill terrace have longer gestation periods and their full impacts can only be felt after five or more years. Some of the terraced areas in Gash Barka have been planted with *Acacia senegal* and *Acacia seyal*, which are sources of gum Arabic, and they constitute a source of income to the communities. There are also positive impacts on ground water supplies from some of the conservation structures built.

The evaluation team noted substantial ownership of objectives and achievements of the program due to the participatory nature of the project - once infrastructure is built it is handed over to communities who not only set up management committees but also have established system of user-fees to meet cost of routine minor maintenance. If their capacity is enhanced this will further strengthen sustainability. The fact that the regions are in driving seat and project implementation is embedded within regional administration structures is a positive contribution to sustainability.

Financial sustainability of the interventions could not be fully assessed, but the fact that community contributions were encouraged to maintain the socio-economic infrastructures built through cost-sharing modalities, user-fees, etc, is encouraging - - both humanitarian and development projects are notorious for meeting capital but not recurrent costs, or putting in place mutually agreed mechanisms to address recurrent costs. Community contributions are common for most of the interventions and this serves to strengthen ownership. For example, community-based interventions (e.g. public fountains, SWC works, dam construction, rangelands, etc) are all undertaken with the community who contribute in the planning, site selection and execution of works. In the case of soil and water conservation works, community members who work on these are, for example, paid three days work but contribute an additional two days work on their own.

The various construction works have created employment opportunities for the IDPs/expellees. Many individuals earned additional income on contractual or daily basis. Income obtained is used to buy building materials, livestock, household assets, or invested in income generating activities, making significant contribution to community viability. However, it is important to realize that even at household level the program is only meeting a small portion of needs and that households themselves are investing substantial own resources to ensure that they have secure livelihoods and adequate shelter.

There is evidence of the introduction of new technologies with sustainability concerns – solar pumps instead of diesel, the improved stoves (“Adhanet Mogogo” – has won international awards for efficiency and reducing in-door pollution). Appropriateness of technologies is judged by team to be generally sound. Overall, there are indications that due to the program interventions, access to education, health and clean water is fast improving. The distribution of PV systems and Adhanet mogogo has created healthier and better living conditions for most of the beneficiary populations. The PV solar homes provide superior, clean and reliable electric lighting. The smoke free, energy efficient stove completely eliminates indoor pollution, saves wood fuel consumption and time spent on wood fuel collection. Both energy interventions contribute to environmental sustainability (MDG7) at national and global levels.

The water supply systems constructed have immensely improved access to clean water, reduced travel distance/time for livestock watering, and reduced women’s drudgery associated with water fetching. However, in those cases where water supply systems have not been finished like in Adi Ma’elel, people share the same water sources with livestock. This exposes the population, particularly children, to water born diseases. Dams also create suitable habitat for mosquito breeding. Hence, malaria poses a threat and necessary safety and preventive measures must be in place.

Despite the interventions and their positive impacts, IDPs/expellees still remain vulnerable and they will continue to need assistance. They have not yet created adequate capital stock to absorb shocks like the last drought, which has significantly reduced harvest in some targeted areas. It will be a while until IDPs/expellees attain the level of prosperity and wellbeing that unaffected communities have attained. Increases in price of materials and consumables, and drought and other natural or man-made disasters may slow down progress towards normalcy. The challenges are therefore how to balance emergency assistance with investments in productivity enhancing technologies and practice for long-term viability. Full reintegration and return to normalcy will require more comprehensive and sustained interventions in the economic, social, environmental, etc. sectors. This is in line with the desire of the Zoba Administrations. However, since many of the activities under the emergency/recovery mode are not yet completed, the program is likely to continue under this mode until 2011. It is true that the program combines humanitarian and recovery assistance with development and many of the interventions bridge the gap between emergency, recovery and development. However, to ensure the survival of the benefits achieved so far, a strategy that smoothly phases recovery supports into development interventions must be prepared.

Sustainability requires human and financial resources. Building the capacity of the Zobas, Sub-zobas, and Kebabi administrations must be continued. Although the involvement of beneficiary communities has enabled them to develop vital skills in performing certain activities, and the management of resources and services, further awareness and sensitization trainings at grass root level in improved farming methods, nutrition, hygiene and sanitation, and technical skills in operation and maintenance of equipment is critical for enhancing the viability of communities, and sustainability of systems like water systems, PV solar home systems, etc. The involvement of communities has also created a strong sense of ownership and responsibility. Moreover, the establishment of various committees at Kebabi level has built community capacity and improved local governance, laying the necessary foundations for sustainability.

The evaluation team observed that the manner in which some of the interventions is designed (one-off assistance and need for rapid response to address urgent needs) all contribute to making assessment of impact and sustainability difficult. The design of future interventions should address this.

In concluding, the team notes that sustainability will largely depend on what people themselves do and not only assistance received. This fits within the culture and tradition of Eritrea, and the critical factor will be how people will use the assistance provided to rebuild their lives and therefore the need to continue to build their capacity.

**2.6 Accountability**

From the assessment of the evaluation team, the program has in place sound upward and downward accountability mechanisms. The management and oversight mechanisms internally within UNDP, as well as nationally (steering committee, TWG) and regionally appeared to work well. There was a noted gap in terms of the need for closer monitoring of parallel funded activities due to staff changes within the relevant UN agencies.

Fund management was transparent and effective as shown by audit reports, financial reports and high delivery and disbursement rates. Throughout the life of the program the relevant technical reports (annual reports), independent monitoring reports (e.g. ROM) were produced, and these were comprehensive and useful. Payments for work done for example for SWC works are very transparent and fully recorded, verified and signed by the various parties involved (sub-zoba officials, team leaders and beneficiaries). The forms examined by the team were written in the national language and demonstrate the meticulousness of the system in place. Donors have appreciated the way activities are implemented, managed and documented at the project sites and the level of transparency maintained at the village/area level where the JP is under implementation.

One area of particular interest to the team was an assessment of the program’s downward accountability towards communities. At international level there is increased emphasis on the need to strengthen downward accountability mechanisms in humanitarian/transitional situations (e.g. Humanitarian Accountability Partnership), particularly since beneficiary communities in such situations are often weak. In the case of the program there are many ways in which the project sought to strengthen downward accountability: zoba administrations know the resource envelop available for each activity and for each planning period and sign the AWP with the JP; communities are in turn gathered together by the zoba/sub-zoba officers and the resources available and the number of target beneficiary households to be covered; the communities together with their existing local administrations (kebabi) and committees are responsible for selecting beneficiaries; development committee meetings are held on a monthly basis, and elections to the various committees are also regularly held; the communities and beneficiaries are able to obtain redress on any perceived grievances or dissatisfaction through established channels and can hold zoba/sub-zoba and project officials accountable. Thus overall it appears both upward and downward accountability mechanisms exist.

**2.7 Key Factors of Success and Lessons**

The Joint Program has consistently responded and provided support in a very complex operational environment. The JP conceived as humanitarian effort has been flexible to address changing needs and laying foundation for long-term development. Some of the main factors for success identified by the evaluation team included the following:

* Commitment of all partners – government, zoba, donors, UN agencies - but importantly also due to leadership, pragmatism and problem-solving attitude that has prevailed Zoba - the governors of Gash Barka and Debub have been fully involved on a continuing basis over a long period of time, and demonstrated strong personal commitment
* By and large the structures set up (SC, TWG, etc) have functioned effectively – however there is a need to revitalize them in view of recent institutional changes (at national level authority for the JP has been transferred to the Ministry of Finance).
* UNDP leadership: senior management strong backers of the program despite changes; systematic efforts to meet regularly to review progress and take decisions to solve emerging bottlenecks; high level of trust developed; use of UNDP resources have been flexible and timely.
* Close involvement of communities, local and zoba administration in planning, monitoring and decision-making – planning was bottom-up – framers identified their needs e.g. types of seeds; process was demand-driven; participatory approach.
* The modality of program implementation – devolution to regions, integration within UNDP, zobas, reliance on national structures, pooled funding, etc was excellent. There was: a good framework at beginning from village level to zoba; good coordination with line ministries at zoba level; good relationship between UNDP, zoba administration and communities; well- staffed Recovery Unit team - spook with one voice, work processes streamlined, collective inputs, well functioning and well oiled team.
* Met real needs of populations and creative combination of emergency and longer term development needs – e.g. introduction of dairy goats helped address the immediate nutritional needs of children sustainably.
* Front-loading and system of advances allowed elements of program to continue even when funds were delayed - continuous flow of resources and no disruption in funding.

**2.8 Main constraints**

The main constraints identified through documents review and discussions with stakeholders included the following main ones:

* Resources were limited but needs are vast. Thus not only were some sections of the needy communities were left out, but in an effort to reach as many as possible, some interventions were spread thinly, and made prioritization very challenging.
* Communication, transport of materials to sites and monitoring difficulties due to fuel shortages. On the issue of fuel shortages, this did not only affect the JP but all UN operations, thus the need for a joint articulated approach to Government.
* Difficulty in assessing the contributions from parallel funded activities – channeling through central line ministries was both slow to reach regions but also often difficult to track. Furthermore, there were no resources from agencies especially for 2008 and 2009. Coordinated work planning proved to be difficult – including complementarity in targeting HH, villages and sequencing action. Thus the significant benefits of synergies were lost. If for reasons of policy or operational traditions, parallel funding has to continue then those agencies that opt for it must allocate credible resources,
* Shrinking donor base – initially many donors, now reduced to the following critical ones: UNDP, Norway, EC, UN/OCHA. Need for strategies to tap new sources of funding and for UN agencies to allocate core resources
* The question of how to handle new internal displacements that are non-conflict induced and related mainly to effects of drought and deliberate relocation from high density areas to high potential areas. The team detected a certain lack of consensus on their inclusion in the program and recommend greater and more open dialogue on this.
* Access to project sites for routine monitoring has been expressed as a source of concern in consultation with donors and other stakeholders, although this challenge appears to have been mainly faced in 2010.
* Price escalations of building and other materials caused delays in implementation and adversely impacted on program effectiveness by constraining beneficiaries’ abilities to construct shelter with the amount of money allocated per household. The current price of livestock, beehives and bee colonies are much higher than the budgeted price which was addressed by allocating additional funds.
* Procurement of imported materials which requires international bidding was time consuming, and affected implementation.
* Recurrent drought adversely affected the production of food and fodder. Many of the villages in Gash Barka received little rain last summer, adversely affecting the production of food and fodder.

**Chapter 3: Assessment of Accomplishments of the Various Components of the Joint Program**

As stated in the program document, the goal of the JP was *“resettlement and self-reliance in livelihoods for 40,000 individual IDPs and Expellees in Gash Barka and Debub administration regions through rehabilitation of economic activities, re-established social services, and socio-economic infrastructure and ultimately food security achieved*”. [[3]](#footnote-3)

The JP had four (4) overall objectives and results to achieve this goal were:

1. Ensure smooth and successful reintegration of IDP/Expellee families within the villages of return. The movement and integration of IDP/Expellee families will be conducted in a smooth and safe manner, creating the least amount of trauma or interruption of social services to families, access to shelter, food and water and other basic needs during their move;
2. Support vulnerable families, women and children especially in ensuring adequate social services (water, education, and food/nutrition, health) and ability to be sheltered in the immediate and long-term, as well as to have access to livelihood opportunities. After movement, there will be a reduction of interruption of “normal life” through access to permanent shelter, food and nutrition support, water systems, health facility (including maternal and child health), adequate schools, materials (school feeding, school water) and support to sustainable livelihoods to jump-start farming activities – thereby safeguarding their health, safety and ability to successfully integrate and benefit host communities; their sustainable livelihoods will be established;
3. Reduction of land mine accidents through mine risk education. Risk from land mine accidents will be minimized through mine risk awareness and education.
4. Monitoring the integration capacities of host villages and viability of sustainable settlement and eventual self-sufficiency of returnees. A monitoring system will be installed and consolidated to ensure that vulnerable women, adolescents and children in particular are given adequate support to reduce risks and enhance their sustainable integration.

An additional result area was the building of institutional capacities of regional (Zoba) administrations.

*The overall conclusion of the team is that the JP has effectively implemented nearly all the activities and related outputs of the program have been largely achieved, and that the JP is having a positive impact at all levels. Although monitoring activities have been undertaken regularly by the program, the evaluation team found no evidence of a monitoring system as outlined under result area 4 above.*

**3.1 Smooth Transition and Return**

***The movement and integration of IDP/Expellee families will be conducted in a smooth and safe manner, creating the least amount of trauma or interruption of social services to families, access to shelter, food and water and other basic needs during their move***

At the end of the border war with Ethiopia (2000), there were an estimated 1.1 million IDPs, of whom 700,000 spontaneously returned upon the signing of the cessation of hostilities. Through the UNDP PoWER (Post War Emergency and Recovery) program and other support, some 300,000 were assisted to return between 2000 and 2004.

At the start of the joint program in April/May 2004, there were an estimated 17,690 HH (4,714 in Debub and 12,976 in Gash Barka) or 71,207 individuals (20,354 in Debub and 50,853 in Gash Barka) in camps, of which approximately. 11,000 were Expellees from Ethiopia and 60,000 were IDPs.

**Achievements**

As Tables 1 and 2 below show, by 2008 all the remaining IDPS/Expellees had been successfully transferred from the camps to villages of return of resettlements. Thus all IDP camps in Eritrea were officially closed by Feb/March 2008.

During this phase and in the transition period immediately after transportation, the JP provided the following support designed to help families short-term needs:

* Several agencies (UNDP, ICRC, UNHCR) donors and ERREC contributed to the transportation of the IDPs/Expellees, their personal belongings and farm animals to designated resettlement areas;
* As part of the task of returning the IDPs/Expellees several hectares of land (3556 ha);
* The Gash Barka and Debub administrations ensured availability of water supply, and consequently constructed water delivery systems in all designated villages;
* Food commodities were distributed prior to the agricultural season as well as household items (mosquito nets, metal oven, blankets, soap, sickles, plough, axes, spades, hoe and kitchen sets) ;
* The program used mobile garages to support transportation and made provision for food for children and other innovative approaches such that no incidents were reported during the entire process.

**Efficiency and Effectiveness**

The whole operation was conducted efficiently and effectively without any significant hardships experienced by the beneficiaries. Although the process was conducted in stages, the actual physical relocation exercise was done in the shortest possible time.

**Impact & Sustainability**

The IDPS/Expellees were living in harsh conditions in various dilapidated camps and awaiting settlement and reintegration since the cessation of hostilities was signed. Their transportation and resettlement into the villages of origin or new areas had a major impact in terms of enabling them to begin to reestablish their lives and livelihoods in dignity.

Moving the IDPs/Expellees from the camps to villages of return or new settlement areas where they could begin to stand on their own two feet was by far a more sustainable proposition than continuing to live in camps on handouts provided by the Government and the international community.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **TABLE 1. IDPs/EXPELLEES IN CAMPS/HOST COMMUNITIES IN DEBUB and GASH BARKA , (2004-2008)** |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Region** |  **November 2004** |  **February 2005** |  **June 2006** |  **June 2007** | **Jun-08** | **Total still in Camps/HC** |  |  |  |
| **HHs** | **Persons** | **HHs** | **Persons** | **HHs** | **Persons** | **HHs** | **Persons** | **HH** | **Persons** | **HH** | **Persons** |  |  |  |
|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |
| 1. Debub | 4,714 | 20,354 | 4,714 | 20,354 | 2,526 | 11,010 | 2,526 | 11,010 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |
|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |
| 2. Gash Barka | 12,976 | 50,853 | 7,922 | 32,190 | 5,031 | 20,892 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |
|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |
| **Total**  |  a) 17,690 | 71,207 | 12,636 | 52,544 | 7,557 | 31,902 | 2,526 | 11,010 |   |   | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |
| **TABLE 2. NUMBER OF IDPs/EXPELLEES RETURNED/RESETTLED IN DEBUB AND GASH BARKA** |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Region** |  **November 2004** |  **February 2005** |  **June 2006** |  **June 2007** | **Jun-08** | **Total Returned/Resett** |  |  |  |
|  | **HHs** | **Persons** | **HHs** | **Persons** | **HHs** | **Persons** | **HHs** | **Persons** | **HH** | **Persons** | **HH** | **Persons** |  |  |  |
|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |
| 1. Debub | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  c) 2,188 | 9,344 | 0 | 0 | 2,526 | 11,010 | 4,714 | 20,354 |  |  |  |
|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |
| 2. Gash Barka | 0 | 0 |  b) 5,054 | 18,663 |  d) 2,891 | 11,298 |  e) 5,031 | 20,892 | 0 | 0 | 12,976 | 50,853 |  |  |  |
|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |  |  |
| **Total**  | 0 | 0 | 5,054 | 18,663 | 5,079 | 20,642 | 5,031 | 20,892 | 2,526 | 11,010 | 17,690 | 71,207 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Footnotes** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| a) IDPs/Expellees who were still in camps/host communities in Debub and Gash Barka in November 2004 |  |  |
| b) IDPs/Expellees from Adi Keshi camp who were returned/resettled in Shilalo, Sheshebit, Adi Tsetser, Adi Hakim, Mai Kokah, Mukuti, Dembe Dima (February 2005) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| c) IDPs/Expellees from camps in Mai wurai, Metera, Afoma and Hahaile were returned to Hadish Adi, Lahiyo, Meshal and Telihanarie (May 2006) |
| d) IDPs/Expellees from camps in Bimbina, Adi Baare, Shambuqo, Korekaen and Dembe Doran were returned to Girme, Ellala, Shehate and Folina villages (May/June 2006 |
| e) IDPs/Expellees from Camps in Koitobia and Adi Ba'are were returned to ten existing communities, namely: Tebeldia, Gergef, Sabunait, Guluj, Deriesa, Aklalat,in sub zoba Guluj, and Binbina, Tologomja, Anagulu, Tselim Kelay and Adi Maelel in sub zoba Shambeko. More over IDPs from Host communities who were mainly from subzoba Guluj were returned to Omhajer (April/May 2007) |  |
| f) IDPs/Expellees have been resettled from Mai Wurai Camp to Feghi Merih and from Metera Camp returned to Anbesete Geleba in February 2008 |  |  |  |
| g) IDPs/Expellees from Mihrad Chele, Dibie, Egrimekel, Kurbelly, Endasherif, Gemae, Debasit, Kolomia and Hamat have been resettled in Mihrad Chele in June 2008 |  |  |

**3.2 Social Services, Shelter and Livelihoods**

***After movement, there will be a reduction of interruption of “normal life” through access to permanent shelter, food and nutrition support, water supply systems, health facility (including maternal and child health), adequate schools, materials (school feeding, school water) and support to sustainable livelihoods to jump-start farming activities – thereby safeguarding their health, safety and ability to successfully integrate and benefit host communities; their sustainable livelihoods will be established.***

For the sake of assuring greater coherence in the analysis of the activities and impacts under this result area, the evaluation team clustered the interventions into two key areas: sustainable livelihoods and shelter.

**3.2.1 Sustainable Livelihoods**

The sustainable livelihood interventions sought to enable IDPs and Expellees break the impoverishment that the war caused by destroying their livelihood assets, and the long cycles of dependency that camp life created. The activities supported were aimed at: (i) kick-starting the resumption of agricultural activities; and (ii) re-building/restoring livelihood assets (human capital, physical assets/social services, natural capital, financial assets and social capital).

In reviewing the assistance provided, the evaluation team noted that the program:

* Understood the complexity of building sustainable livelihoods and followed multi-faceted approach to address livelihood concerns and tackle challenges.
* Provided assistance anchored on improving household food security: The JP recognized the importance of ensuring the IDPs’/expellees’ access to food, and care was taken to ensure that the assistance provided improve agricultural productivity.
* Realized the importance of building upon the strengths of IDPs/expellees and support them realize their potential, while at the same time acknowledging the effects of external factors – both natural and human.
* Understood that sustainable livelihood can only be achieved when assistance are congruent with the livelihood strategies and management competence of the target beneficiaries.
* Ensured that the type of assistance did put any new or additional management pressures on the IDPs/expellees.
1. **Resumption of agricultural production**

The main approaches used and the related achievements were the following:

1. *Rehabilitation of rain-fed farming by providing arable lands, farm tools and inputs, land clearance, preparation and planting*.
* All returnees have at least one hectare of arable land in Debub and two hectares in Gash Barka.

Various agricultural inputs and support provided to enable IDPs/expellees make productive use of the land provided: 9424 farm hand tools and 730 hand sprayers provided to 10 communities in Gash Barka; 10,939 hectares were cleared and 28,805 hectares ploughed in Zoba Debub and Gash Barka; and 16,577.15 quintals of selected/improved seeds distributed .

* Restocking: one ox per household and small ruminants to vulnerable households, (FHH) - about 12,750 households have been assisted with restocking
1. *Rehabilitation of irrigated horticulture productions for returnees with irrigable land*- Supply of horticultural seeds.
2. *Conservation and management of natural resources* – soil and water conservation works, etc – see below for details.
3. *Various allied supports*: Basic start-up non food items distributed almost to each household, and Supplementary food to children and lactating women (340 tons)
4. **Building/Resorting Livelihood Assets**

Building sustainable livelihoods fundamentally requires improving access to physical, human, financial, natural and social assetsand their ability to put these to productive use.

**A. Human Capital:**

The focus was empowerment through community capacity building through various capacity-building/ training including:

* Farming methods: apiculture, basic animal husbandry, natural resource management;
* construction of improved stove (over 400 women trained) ;
* management of water systems ;
* Health: SRH education and counseling provided: educational and information materials on SRH, nutrition, care and handling of complications during pregnancy distributed; child nutritional status screening (73 community volunteers and health worker);
* basic psychosocial care to over 150 teachers to complement life skill training;
* water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) provided through Participatory Hygiene and Sanitations Training (PHAST); and
* Mine risk education (MRE) provided to 57,843 persons.

**B. Physical Assets and related supports**

* Water infrastructure: Water wells, springs, ponds and micro dams for clean water supply and livestock watering; 40 ponds constructed in Gash Barka for livestock watering; Six micro dams have also been constructed (3 in Gash bark and 3 in Debub); four underground water cisterns for human and livestock constructed in Debubawi Keih Bahri; solar pumps installed.
* Social Overhead Capita (SOC): More than 50 semi permanent classrooms and residence for teachers constructed; teaching and learning materials, recreational school kits and other school furniture like desks and benches supplied; 12 static health services and 4 outreach health facilities established; Hospital in Senafe under construction to serve 100,000 people (80% of construction completed); essential drugs (25 health post), solar fridges (20 health post); insecticide treated bed net (over 20,000 ITN) distributed; anthropometric screening tools provided to 16 resettled communities in Gash Barka; Health outreach activities being conducted; SRH related equipment and essential drugs distributed to all health facilities and posts serving returnees.
* Transport: 36 km of access road constructed.

**C. Natural Capital**

Sustainable livelihoods for the IDPs/expellees can only be achieved if natural resources are themselves used in sustainable ways. Ensuring sustainable use of resources in the condition of IDPs/Expellees where meeting immediate needs are overpowering, post-war local economy is weak, resources other than increased use of natural resources are limited, and alternative livelihood options limited poses huge challenges.

The key activities and achievements undertaken by the program included:

* rehabilitation of degraded lands and prevention of further deterioration of the natural resource base through**: s**oil and water conservation (structural); construction of 4040.18 km of hillside terraces and 6310.6 km of soil and stone bunds, including on farm lands; construction of diversion canals on 35 hectares of land; construction of 368,161 M3 of check dams;
* Improving local biodiversity: planting of 158,425 tree seedlings and preparation of 380,410 planning pits; and
* Introducing environment-friendly technologies introduced: e.g. solar home systems (251), solar water pumps, energy-efficient stoves (6,200), solar refrigerators for health facilities.

**D. Financial Assets**

* Cash for work involving close to 7 million Nakfa**;**
* Attempts to diversify local economies are underway to ensure smooth transition from rehabilitation and recovery to full reintegration and resilient livelihoods: e.g. 1,231 person in Zoba Debub trained in apiculture; 731 modern bee hives and bee colonies and 2395 peripheral equipment distributed. (About 40% of the beneficiaries are women);
* Animal products from restocking: sales from male goats, milk, butter;
* Tree planting: sales from tree products like gum Arabic, fruit, timber, etc.

**E. Social Capital**

To build social capital, the program helped established numerous local level institutional mechanisms: 24 water committees; 39 village development committees; and committees for identification and prioritization of community needs and vulnerable households.

The figure below sketches out the links between assets and sustainable livelihoods.



**Impacts of the interventions to rebuild/restore livelihoods**

The main impacts of the interventions and achievements so far can be summarized as follows:

* Enabling conditions for IDPs and expellees to be economically independent and be free from dependency on external aid.
* Improving food security through resumption of agricultural production and resource conservation: in normal years, over one metric ton of sorghum per hectare can be harvested in Gash Barka from farms treated with soil/water conservation compared to 0.4-0.6 metric ton per hectare from untreated ones.
* Rehabilitation of degrade lands, improved biodiversity, and improved biomass productivity of land.
* Potential to generate additional income from planted economic trees created (gum Arabic, timber, etc).
* Improved water for livestock from ponds: no death of livestock reported in the last drought compared to previous drought events.
* The energy interventions: significant impacts at household and environmental levels: reduced deforestation pressure, reduction of GHG emissions (e.g. by 0.6 tons of CO2 per household/year from the stove); substantial reduction of indoor pollution; and saving in fuel collection time, and income generation for women trained in the construction of the improved stove.
* Improved health due to access to clean and year round water supply: e.g. no reports of outbreaks of water borne diseases like diarrhea
* Greatly reduced the burden of water hauling over long distances by women and children
* Children were able to continue their education (over 3000 students enrolled)
* Monitoring of malnutrition among children provide early warning information for timely interventions
* Cold chains improved storage and safety of drugs and vaccines.
* The high coverage of immunization (63% to 89%) protected children from crippling diseases like polio.
* With the education and awareness activities, communities have acquired better knowledge of health care and capacity to identify common symptoms, including those of STI.
* No landmine/UXO causality recorded so far.
* Stronger community cohesions and spirit of cooperation.

*Through these achievements and impacts the JP is also contributed to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).*

**Main Constraints**

However, several constraints were experienced as well:

* Inadequacy of resources compared to needs: beehives, seeds, restocking, CFW, classrooms, examination rooms in health facilities, furniture, medical supplies, are still inadequate; schools and health facilities also serve the host communities;
* Need to link distribution of inputs with Zoba extension services and a more integrated approach, including identification of locally suitable drought resistant and/or short maturing varieties;
* Environmental fragility of programme sites: hilly and semiarid which makes them vulnerable to natural hazards like drought; compounded by absence of drought risk reduction and preparedness; community-based adaptation/coping mechanisms;
* Isolation of some sites, particularly in Zoba Debub;
* Price escalations;
* Limited access to micro-financing and income diversification opportunities: IdPs/expellees still heavily depend on rain-fed farming;
* Need to upscale training in income diversification (handicraft, small rural-based business, etc.);
* Lack of clear indicators (lack of logical frame) and quantitative evidences to monitor progress.

**3.2.2 Shelter**

The objective of the shelter component was to provide temporary shelter immediately after return to be replaced by permanent shelter.

*Approaches used:*

* Provision of shelter kits (construction materials) and cash assistance for skilled labour: 2,200 HHs in Gash Barka region constructed their permanent shelters;
* Provision of cash assistance (23,000 Nakfa/HH) in three instalments: 7031 HHs (4328 in Gash Barka & 2703 HHs in Debub region) constructed their permanent shelters; 1625 HHs in Debub constructing their permanent shelter of which 1000 are expected to be finished before the onset of 2010 rains.

**Impact**

Some of the impacts of the shelter assistance provided included the following:

* The JP in effect became the biggest housing construction project in the country: towns like Tsorona had no single house with its roof intact excepting the Orthodox Church, but now every house has been repaired and numerous new houses constructed in programme areas providing comfortable habit for IDPs/expellees;
* The first tangible step towards restoring normal lives and livelihoods for the IDPs/Expellees;
* Improved health due to better protection from elements, privacy, and secure storage for assets;
* Feeling of better security and stable life; and
* Ability to lead normal social and spiritual life;
* Led to community empowerment because communities were consulted on type of shelter they need, it led to injection of cash into the community and strengthened bonds within the community.

**Main Constraints**

 Some of the main constraints included the following:

* Resource gaps: 8400 households still have to construct their permanent shelter, and resource allocated to each household is also inadequate;
* Due to limitations in available budget, selection and prioritization of HHs to benefit has become extremely difficult and difficult choices sometimes required between FHH Vs resource-poor HHs;
* Unavailability of construction materials in the domestic market and coupled with price escalations;
* Transport of materials due to inaccessibility of some villages.

***3.3 Mine awareness and Mine Risk education***

***Risk from land mine accidents will be minimized through mine risk awareness and education***

The support provided for Mine action made it possible to verify that all return/re-settlement villages were free from land mines and UXOs before the IDPS/Expellees were moved to their original villages or re-settled in new areas, and localities. In 2007, 2008 and 2009, there were no reports of land mine or UXO accidents in return/re-settlement villages of IDPS/Expellees. Moreover, support to persons with disabilities have been provided as well as access to rehabilitation and referral services on self care, communication, mobility, medical support and literacy training.

Specifically, the following achievements have been registered:

* Some 550,364 m2 area have been cleared of land mines/UXOs in the following areas: water points, farm and grazing lands and other functional areas;
* Some 309 different types of landmines and 950 UXOs were destroyed in different localities;
* About 1.5 million m2 of battle areas have been cleared of landmines and UXOs;
* About 750 km of continuous road verification was conducted in different returnee IDP/Expellee villages;
* Some 305,580 persons, out of which 209,645 are children have received Mine Risk education among the IDPs/Expellees. In addition, 5,743 persons with disabilities have accessed rehabilitation and referral services on self-care, communication, mobility, medical support and literacy training. Furthermore, 587 persons with disabilities have been referred to physiotherapy and orthopedic services.

No reported accidents in areas of IDP/Expellees return/resettlement villages. One of the pre-requisites for IDPs/Expellees to move was that their areas of return/resettlement should be cleared of landmines and certified by the EDA (Eritrean Demining Authority) and danger areas marked. Moreover, mine risk awareness education has been conducted and was continuous after return/resettlement.

***3.4 A monitoring system installed and consolidated to ensure that vulnerable women, adolescents and children in particular are given adequate support to reduce risks and enhance their sustainable integration.***

Under this component of the JP, responsibilities among the participating UN agencies were as follows:

* UNDP to take lead in ensuring adequate on the ground monitoring of the re-settlement of affected populations, impact on environment, host communities and infrastructure and assessment of ongoing outstanding needs;
* UNICEF/UNHCR/UNFPA to undertake specific studies involving vulnerable groups, articulating ways to reduce their risks and difficulties and improve social and economic adjustment.

From the discussions the evaluation team had with the various partners, few activities related to this result area have not been fully implemented. There has been some monitoring of vulnerable groups: partly integrated into activities in general program, but no system has been set up.

***3.5 Institutional Capacity Building of Regional Administrations***

Through the JP, support was provided various capacity building support such as:

* Material support to zoba administrations: setting up coordination offices; material support;
* Training support on program and project management for all line ministries at zoba and sub-zoba levels. Kebabi administrations were also targeted by the program. Training was also provided to local committees established by communities (e.g. water committees, leaders in SWC projects, etc), as well as communities themselves (e.g. training on Beekeeping, how to draft reports and requests, as well as at sub-zoba level basic knowledge of computers, financial management).

Capacity building in regions for zoba and sub-zoba is thought to be sustainable as the zobas will absorb the staff at end of project.

However, as interventions shift to longer-term approaches it becomes essential that regional administration capacities are strengthened holistically. Strengthening capacity of regional administrations is a long-term process and depends on government policy, and various efforts have been deployed in the past such as: the Proclamation on the Establishment of Regional Administrations (PERA) was promulgated in 1996, and the six regional administrations were established based on the PERA; the World Bank funded Eritrea Community Development Fund (ECDF) has made some progress in terms of rehabilitating social infrastructure (schools, health facilities, roads, clinics, market places, capacity building; some useful lessons could perhaps be drawn from the UNDP supported Anseba Local Development Project (ALDP) .

Since the JP is an important flagship for UNDP, it is proposed that consideration be given to the idea of complementing the JP by designing and implementing a decentralization and capacity building project targeting the two regions of concern-Gash Barka and Debub. Resources should also be drawn from the MoND institutional capacity building program that covers all Zobas and sector Ministries, providing support in planning, data for development and training. Capacity building should however not be just at zoba level but critically also at sub-zoba which is the frontline for implementation. The nature of capacity building at the two levels will also be different: at zoba emphasis should be on planning, M&E, etc; while in sub-zoba, implementation capacity and participatory planning, etc.

**Chapter 4: Integration of Gender**

The evaluation team concluded that the JP ‘provides special attention to women-headed households in the emergency and recovery programs**.’** The UNDP staff in charge of the JP in Asmara is connected to the zobas project coordinators, who work with government line ministries in the zoba office and with the NUEW representatives at the zoba and sub zobas. Women’s increased representation and participation in the program has influenced resource allocations and policies by making them to address women’s needs and prioritized concerns.

The approach is also participatory at the community level. There are local committees at the village level who know all members of the target communities in their villages and advice the local administrators who to prioritize for certain type of aid. The female headed households are given priority.

The aid given to the female- headed households is preceded or accompanied by tailor made training of the beneficiaries. For example, for women who receive beehives they are selected beneficiaries who reside in honeybee production potential areas and are trained on how to work with bee keeping first. For women who get dairy goat, they are women residing in areas suitable for goat production and are oriented on how to manage their benefit. For adhanet mogogo (smoke less oven), they are trained on how to build and use the smoke - free oven enabling them to develop expertise on the task and to sell their skills to work for others for cash. The program has therefore, enhanced women empowerment and gender equity by following a practical approach for assisting women to start to building sustainable livelihood.

In all the program components, women headed households are the main beneficiaries. As the various figures show, the activities enhanced women’s economic capacity in various ways. For instance in beekeeping 2,396 were trained and 2,396 HHs received modern beehives boxes, 40% women and 2,396 peripheral equipments of beehive were procured for distribution following training to selected beneficiaries who reside in honeybee production potential areas. Out of 251 households who received solar panels 237 are female headed households. All dairy goat provisions are given to women because they can handle them, get milk for their children and sell when need arises. In sub-Zobas Tesenei and Guluj alone 672 dairy goats are all given to female head of households and have good results in changing their life.

Provision of oxen also shows the same success, in sub zobas Lailai Gash, Sahmbko and Molki 1244 oxen are given to 778 female households as compared to 466 male led households in 2009 alone. In Debub, 65% of the oxen restocking activity were women headed households. Out of 1497 oxen given 531 were to male head of households (35.5%) and 966 oxen to female head of household (64.5%). The implementation process, therefore, applies a participatory and systemic approach where women head of households gain the most of the interventions.

In the soil and water conservation work most of the participants are women. Reports also confirm that most of the cash for work benefits women; 13,708 women as compared to 8125 men in Gash Barka and 21, 859 females and 9127 males in Debub. Thus it is clear in the implementation process that the JP is giving focus to gender and women’s needs. Cash for work is fruitful also when the money goes to the households led by women for it directly goes to the needs of the households’ members improving their quality of life rather than for other uses.

The JP has indeed supported women to improve their equality in decision making as the interventions confirm. There are instances where the men decided against the households benefit when it does not benefit them directly, but the women stood strong and changed the situation. Here is one case:

*Ham is a village in zoba Debub, which is built on a stiff rocky mountain, and the women have been living a hard life fetching water from a dangerous location. A bride had fallen down the cliff when getting water and the place is called mtsdaf mer’at. Under the UNDP intervention a micro dam has been built for the people and during its construction the people were asked to work for 40 NKF per day. The men refused, for the money was too little. The project implementers said the equipment that was ready for the construction will be moved to another village. That did not anger the men who said they can go and work for better money elsewhere but the women said ‘water is our main problem; we will work for no pay for we will suffer if we do not have water, not the men’. This made the men change their mind and the work resumed and accomplished.*

Women participate equally in the water committees and other village activities. The intervention thus has more impact on women’s lives and has helped change the low participation of women into one of active participation. Women have thus become contributors to the change but also beneficiaries at equal level.

The team noted that a revolving system of assistance is created where women benefit in building a sustainable life. 2175 dairy goats were given to 435 women headed household, each getting 5 dairy goats, in a revolving system of assistance when the dairy goats reproduce the new offspring will be handed over to other needy women headed households and so it will continue, thus multiply the number of beneficiaries every year. The 2175 dairy goats are expected to double in one year time and tripled in two years.

 **Achievements**

Interventions under the JP have promoted gender equality and women’s empowerment in many ways. Overall, more than 60% of the total target populations of the program are women-headed households. Environmental interventions which addressed reduction of fuel wood consumption through provision of fuel-saving stoves in households and provision of community solar-based household energy exclusively targeted women and women-headed households. In all livelihood security interventions, women-headed and resource-poor households were priority targets. In this case, women-headed households constitute 60% in provision of shelters, 64% in provision of seeds and tractor ploughing, 100% small ruminants for income generation and child nutrition and 67% participants in cash for work are women.

In the target communities, women and girls are responsible for fetching water. Provision of access to potable water implies reduction in women’s workload and having more time for income-generating activities as well as time for schooling for girls. Hence, the intervention enhanced women empowerment and gender equity. Women are well-represented (40%) in local development committees. Women’s increased representation and participation in the program has influenced resource allocations and policies by making them to address women needs and prioritized concerns.

Borehole based water supply in Ambesete Geleba village is one case among many that will impact women’s lives once accomplished. The design of brick elevated water tank with a capacity of 25M3 and two public fountains for water distribution, construction works of power house and public fountains are nearly completed in Ambesete Geleba. Procurement of solar pumps, accessories and fittings has been completed and delivered. Once the water supply is completed, 796 households will have year round access to adequate potable water supply.

**Shelter:** 60% of the beneficiaries in the recovery intervention are women because women headed households were majority in the camps. Second, the programme favours female heads of household and follows a pro-poor approach. .

**Sustainable Livelihood:** this component consists of several activities including; agricultural assistance - seed, draught animals, tools, land clearing; restocking whereby provision of oxen and dairy goat are given to female households; soil and water management,- increase in productivity for the HH and cash for food; water supply, bore holes, micro-dams, provision of Bee keeping etc.

Construction of a borehole based water supply scheme with submersible pump and 12 public fountains in Serha (Tsa’eda Korso), fitting a submersible pump in a borehole to pump water in Che’alo Hadadim; Water supply scheme in Folina village and in Ellala villages in Gash Barka as well as 4 borehole based water supply schemes, 4 ponds and 2 micro-dams, in Gash Barka and 13 water supply schemes in Debub have been constructed in villages of returnees and IDPs are but a few of the changes in the provision of water but in women’s burden.

Main achievements are not only in meeting short-term needs but help build their livelihood. This is related to the type of activities providing sustainable livelihood, e.g. instead of food aid, goats for milk providing the HH nutrition and cash. 6200 women in Gash Barka received fuel saving (smokeless stoves) and training on how to install and use them. Provision of Dairy Goats to support drought-affected Women-headed households in IDPs/Expellees return/resettlement villages in Gash Barka responds to the needs of these vulnerable IDPs/expellees focusing on the women headed households with children under 5 years of age by providing diary goats to supplement the daily diet of the children and enhance their nutrition deficiency.

It is also a major achievement when women trained in building Adhanet mogogo can impact at nation level. Many are now asked to build the new smokeless fuel saving mogogo type, it reduces wood consumption and is confirmed about 50% of the expenditure has been cut. This prevents destruction of the environment. Women’s role in this is significant

**Education**: The make shift schools build in Anagulu and Tolegamja villages are productive in helping children who cannot walk for 2 hours every day. Girls face a particular problem at higher grades when they have to rent a house in the city to resume their studies, which most cannot afford. A boarding school is suggested as a solution. Construction of school latrines in Folina and Ellala villages are also some of the necessary changes.

**Health**: A district hospital with a capacity for 100,000 persons and with a maternity ward is about to be completed in Senafe, Debub; 21 health facilities have been constructed. 400 ventilated pit latrines; Smokeless stoves for 6200 HH; Solar power systems - all contribute towards the health of women and members of their family. Renovation of the already existing health facility is almost completed in Hadish Adi village in Debub region.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Intervention | Type | Male | % | Female | % | Total |
| Transport | ---------------- | 2650 | 39 | 4166 | 61 | 6816 |
| Shelter | House | 1224 | 34 | 2392 | 66 | 3616 |
| Agricultural inputs and services supply | Tractor | 2061 | 34.4 | 3930 | 65.6 | 5991 |
| Seed | 4349 | 40 | 6589 | 60 | 10,938 |
| Restocking | Oxen | 1439 | 40 | 2173 | 60 | 3612 |
| Shoats | 1127 | 45 | 1378 | 55 | 2505 |
| Apiculture | Beekeeping | 83 | 17.3 | 399 | 82.7 | 482 |
| Cash for work | Soil & water conservation | 27,750 |  | 59,530 |  | 87,280 |
| Water supply | --------------- | ---------- | -------- | ---------- | -------- | 2770 villages |

 Debub Zoba: A Summary of the achievements in one zoba.

**Impact and Sustainability**:

The impact and sustainability of the JP may be too early to be visible, however, several points can be understood from the visit to the resettled IDPs/returnees’ villages. Children ask their parents to show them where exactly their house was, and parents take them and show them the ruins indicating this was where the bed was and this where your mom cooked etc. The basic human need is to have a home. The JP has fulfilled this need for the beneficiaries and has major impact on their life and their continuity. They feel they are back to life now, out of the camps, even though they are appreciative for the food supplies provided to them in the camps. It is obvious that ‘man does not live by bread alone’, but what makes one human is, a sense of belonging.

The material they need for living is equally important but that takes longer time to restore fully and once they have set foot on a secured shelter where they can sustain their living, it is certain that it can be achieved. It should, however, be clear that the JP can also only assist the beneficiaries to start a sustainable life which they themselves have to sustain by organizing their life by using what they have gained from the JP in terms of shelter, capacity, basic agricultural assistance, cash money, livestock/dairy goats and institutions for education and health services as well as clean water.

The beneficiaries meet the assistance given to them happily and many try to do much work on their own. For instance, women start poultry in their compound as they always have been doing to support themselves by selling eggs, chicken. They have shelter with a roof above their head, though many could not complete it due to price increases for building material. As the JP continues, the female headed household are gaining more cash from their participation in soil and water programmes, dairy goat, and so on. So the impact on their life is immense and without the JP many could have been living a life of misery. Considering the inclusiveness of the JP, sustainability of the stable life of the beneficiaries can be predicted given that peace prevails on their vicinity.

The introduction of alternative energy sources has a major impact on women’s lives. One example is Adhanet Mogogo or oven where wood consumption is minimal compared to the traditional usage. This has shown many sided benefits for women’s health, knowledge, financial status, but to the society at large. First, it is confirmed that Adhanet mogogo saves 50% wood consumption at the household and national level. Second women, after acquiring the skill on how to build the mogogo, can use their skill to earn from 700 to 1000 NKF per mogogo so it increases their financial earning. More important is the energy they save to fetch wood every morning. Their health status is also impacted through the introduction of this change. Women trained in this skill of building Adhanet mogogo can impact at nation level. Many are now asked to build the new mogogo type for the defense forces, who are also eager to reduce wood consumption and has been confirmed that about 50% of the expenditure has been cut. This has to continue in order to protect the destruction of the environment. Women’s role in this major task is significant

Capacity enhancing programmes, psychosocial support to make their position/confidence stronger, and services for their and their children’s health and well being as they participate in manual work outside the house to earn some cash, should be considered.

**Constraints and Challenges**

Presently, women are facing severe difficulties by being the sole supporters of their households. Single handedly they carry out both the household chore and work outside the family to earn a living. This in turn causes psychological pressure affecting the health of the mothers and their children as well and may limit their potential to perform the best they could to earn a good living.

**Lessons Learnt**

TheJP is a success as theprogress reports show and has the right design and implementing process that is focused on the most disadvantaged groups, which mainly consist of female headed households. What should be noted here is food is very important for human life and particularly for children who cannot tolerate hardship. The female headed households fall into difficulty to build a sustainable livelihood if the children do not get food and so any assistance that will come in the absence of food cannot hold. In this situation, the interventions that give them financial support including provision of dairy goats, cash for work, etc should be extended to female headed households while the other interventions such as agricultural interventions improves those women who are single-handedly carrying double responsibility.

**Recommendations**

* Micro-credit for female households can earn the best result in helping them build a sustainable life.
* Training centres for women where tailor - made training and other skills enhancing programs can benefit women is very crucial.
* Some support on advice and guidance would be fruitful. War has left its psychological impact in many of the female households who have lost their loved ones. Some female head of households find life very difficult to carry on with a heavy burden and no husband to share the responsibility.
* At all levels of the JP, staffing program should be gender sensitive.

**Chapter 5: Program Funding, Management and Partnerships**

This chapter presents the findings of the evaluation team on program funding, management and partnerships.

*The overall conclusion of the team is that the program has mobilized substantial funding (although needs still far outweigh resources), has been well managed and has forged diversified and effective partnerships. While routine program monitoring has been undertaken (both general monitoring and those tied to donor agreements – e.g. ROM of the EC), and that efforts have been made to integrate and act upon recommendations, impact monitoring should be strengthened. The coordination among UN agencies also has room for improvement*.

**5.1 Program Funding & Management**

**5.1.1 Resources Mobilized**

The graphs and tables on the following pages show respectively the resources mobilized and used by the JP from within UNDP, the overall JP donors and allocation among the various components of the JP.

Review of this data shows the following main observations and conclusions:

* Allocation of core resources from UNDP to the joint program shows that: out of a total UNDP CO core resources of USD 30.7 million between 2005-2009, the agency committed some USD12 million or 39% of its core resources to recovery activities, the majority of which went to support the JP. Up to 95% or USD 11 million of the committed were fully utilized; overall resources allocated to recovery activities were delivered at a much higher rate when compared to the rest of the UNDP core resources for other UNDP programs - the recovery activities was responsible for 37.5% of delivery of the CO resources between 2005-2009 – see Table 3 and Figures 1 and 2.
* In terms of total resources mobilized for the JP, the following observations: a total of USD 46 million (i.e. USD 34 million and 8 million Euros) were mobilized out of a total program budget of USD 60 million (i.e. 76% of the total resources were mobilized); consequently, there was a shortfall of some USD 15 million or 23% of the program resources; the biggest contributors were Norway, EC and UNDP which together accounted for USD 36 million or 78% of program resources – another important contributor was Netherlands. CERF funding is of growing important. See Tables 4 and 5, and Figure 3.
* Analysis of the allocation of program resources between the different components showed the following: overall shelter and water supply were allocated the most resources. However, resources allocation pattern has changed with allocations to sustainable livelihoods now higher than for shelter and water which have peaked and are declining – this is understandable given the need to address livelihood needs now that rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure has addressed the most acute needs in the early years. See Table 6 and figures 4 and 5.
* Resources allocated to regions amounted to $43million out of the USD 46 million mobilized showing that the vast majority of resources was spent where it was needed. Resource transfer to regions also showed a constant increase over time. Among the regions, Gash Barka had the most, followed by Debub and SRS. See Tables 7-10 and Figures 6-10.
* Significant resources have been provided by government of Eritrea, both in-kind and financial resources to support the Joint Program, but the evaluation team was unable to adequately document such a contribution. Similarly also, regional administrations, the host and beneficiary communities themselves.

*The evaluation team noted a shrinking of the donor base overtime to only four (4) principal donors – EC, Norway, UNDP, CERF. There is thus a need to expand donor base from the “big three”. Potential sources include the following: Netherlands, Italy – new spirit of re-engagement; Japan Human security Trust Fund; UNCDF – funding for local development activities given the area-based approach and building upon prior experience in Anseba could possibly have a modest start to support regional capacity building; UNDP/BCPR: more serious resource commitment*

**5.1.2 Fund Management**

Program resources were channeled in three different mechanisms: (i) Pooled funding: with UNDP as Lead/Managing agency. This mechanism was responsible for the lion’s share of the resources and largest number of donors; (ii) Parallel funding: agency funded directly the beneficiaries using their own procedures and mechanisms; and (iii) Pass-through: funds were channeled through central government ministries which then made them available to the corresponding zoba structures/institutions.

From consultations, there was overwhelming support for the pooled funding mechanism by stakeholders and partners of the JP. It is particularly noteworthy that the Governors of both Gash Barka and Debub, as well as the MoND supported this mechanism. For the zoba administration, the need to respond quickly and flexibly to emerging needs of the target populations dictated their preference for pooled funding that was channeled directly to them. An added factor was the capacity building component inherent in such an approach. Agency procedures and limitations appear to be the main cause why some agencies opted for parallel or pass-through mechanisms. In the short-term it is difficult to see how this can change.

The UNDP FACE (Funding authorization and Certificate of Expenditures) format is used to channel resources to the implementing partners and for QTR reporting. Under this system, funds are released only when a partner accounts for 80% of the funds allocated under the previous QTR. Fund disbursement has been judged largely successful. For example, cash-for-work has never been delayed because payments are front-loaded at sub-zoba level.

UNICEF parallel funded activities in the JP have been slow to implement as the funds pass through central government ministries and take long to get down to regional and lower levels and are often late. Furthermore, in some cases even when the funds eventually get there, they can be mixed up with other funds, making it difficult to track. UNICEF has taken steps to create special accounts at zoba level, but this does not solve the problem of delays. It was stressed that for the particular program of the JP on IDPs/Expellees, links should be directly to the Zobas and not central Government. This was a decision made by government. Central Ministries are to regulate standards and control quality.

*There was a continuous flow of funds to support the program by donors over the years and this has been part of the reasons for the success of the program.*

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| **Table 3: UNDP Core Resources Allocated to JP, and Delivery.** |
| **Year** | **Approved Budget (USD)** | **Approved Budget Recovery (USD)** | **Deliver Rate (%)** |  |
| **County Office** | **Budget** | **Utilized** | **Country Office** | **Recovery** |  |
| 2005 | 3,708,205 | 944,000 | 912,337 | 24.60 | 96.65 |  |
| 2006 | 5,211,660 | 1,419,854 | 1,144,781 | 21.97 | 80.63 |  |
| 2007 | 6,610,138 | 3,096,845 | 3,032,272 | 45.87 | 97.91 |  |
| 2008 | 5,668,594 | 2,698,581 | 2,421,407 | 42.72 | 89.73 |  |
| 2009 | 9,494,221 | 3,955,737 | 3,993,371 | 42.06 | 100.95 |  |
| **Total** | **30,692,818** | **12,115,017** | **11,504,168** | **37.48** | **94.96** |  |
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| **Figures 1: Comparison of Approved and utilized budgets of UNDP core resources devoted to JP**  |  | **Figure 2: Comparison of delivery rate between UNDP CO and Recovery Unit** |
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| **Table 4: Total resources mobilized by JP by donor** |
| **No** | **Donors** | **Currency** | **Resources Mobilized Based on the Agreement** | **Resources Mobilized 2004-2009 (Received)** |
| **2004** | **2005** | **2006** | **2007** | **2008** | **2009** | **Total** |
| 1 | Norway | USD |   | 1,130,856 | 930,233 | 3,793,327 |  4,664,562  |  1,309,599 | 1,594,567 |  12,113,545  |
| 2 | Netherlands | USD |   | 1,111,000 |   | 904,000 |   |   |   | 2,015,000 |
| 3 | USAID | USD |   |   |   | 3,875,171 | 988,076 |   |   | 4,863,247 |
| 4 | Italy | USD |   |   | 829,384 |   |   |   |   | 829,384 |
| 5 | UNDP | USD |   |   | 1,000,000 | 2,519,230 | 2,961,476 |  2,366,270 | 3,679,444 | 10,160,150 |
| 6 | UNICEF | USD |   |   | 105,000 | 135,000 |   |   |   | 240,000 |
| 7 | CERF | USD |   |   |   |   |  239,985.00  |  996,245  | 859,019 |  2,095,249  |
|   | **Total** |   |   |  **2,241,856**  |  **2,864,617**  |  **11,226,728**  |  **8,854,099**  |  **996,245**  |  **6,133,030**  |  **32,316,575**  |
| 8 | EC Food Security  | EURO | 3,795,000 |   |   |   |   |  1,984,613  | 1,725,091 | 3,709,704 |
| 9 | EC Health | EURO | 1,605,000 |   |   |   |   |  1,016,500  | 561,750 | 1,578,250 |
| 10 | EC CFW | EURO | 4,860,000 |   |   |   |   |   | 2,733,684 | 2,733,684 |
|   | **Total** |   |   |   |   |   |   |  **3,001,113**  |  **5,020,525**  |  **8,021,638**  |
|   | **TRANSFERS** |  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| 11 | Norway Mine Action - IDPs | USD |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  1,074,903  |
| 12 | EC refund from MA | USD |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | 915,981 |
|   | **Total** |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | **1,990,884** |
|   | **Grand Total - USD** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | **34,307,459** |
|   | **Grand Total - Euro**  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | **8,021,638** |

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| **No** | **Donors** | **Resources Mobilized 2004-2009 (USD)** |  |
| **2004** | **2005** | **2006** | **2007** | **2008** | **2009** | **Total (USD)** |
| 1 | Norway | 1,130,856 | 930,233 | 3,793,327 |  4,664,562  |  1,309,599 | 1,594,567 |  12,113,545.00  |
| 2 | Netherlands | 1,111,000 |   | 904,000 |   |   |   | 2,015,000 |
| 3 | USAID |   |   | 3,875,171 | 988,076 |   |   | 4,863,247 |
| 4 | Italy |   | 829,384 |   |   |   |   | 829,384 |
| 5 | UNDP |   | 1,000,000 | 2,519,230 | 2,961,476 |  2,366,270 | 3,679,444 | 10,160,150 |
| 6 | UNICEF |   | 105,000 | 135,000 |   |   |   | 240,000 |
| 7 | CERF |   |   |   |  239,985.00  |  996,245.00  | 859,019 |  2,095,249.00  |
| 8 | EC  |   |   |   |   |  4,465,941.00  | 7,254,140 | 11,720,081 |
|   | **TRANSFERS** |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|   | Norway Mine Action to IDPs |   |   |   |   |   |   |  1,074,903.00  |
|   | EC refund from Mine Action |   |   |   |   |   |   | 915,981.00 |
|   | **Total** | **2,241,856** | **2,864,617** | **11,226,728** | **8,854,099** | **5,462,186** | **13,387,170** | **46,027,540** |
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|  | **Table 5: Resource Mobilization JP on IDPs Pooled Funding2004 - 2009**

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|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | **Figure 3: Contributions by donor** |  |
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| **Table 6: Budget and Expenditures JP on IDPs 2005-2009 by Activity** |
| **Activities** | **2005** | **2006** | **2007** | **2008** | **2009** | **Total** |
| **Budget** | **Expend.** | **Budget** | **Expend.** | **Budget** | **Expend.** | **Budget** | **Expend.** | **Budget** | **Expend.** | **Budget** | **Expend.** |
| Transportation | 776,575 | 743,623 | 600,000 | 1,126,435 | 1,377,926 | 1,375,436 | 229,623 | 265,156 |   |   |   |   |
| Sustainable Livelihoods | 934,000 | 716,644 | 3,102,427 | 3,063,215 | 1,716,885 | 1,488,671 | 3,173,943 | 3,076,250 | 12,217,331 | 11,744,406 | 2,984,124 | 3,510,650 |
| Support to Shelter | 641,777 | 430,180 | 3,008,284 | 2,582,870 | 3,511,584 | 3,847,369 | 4,723,943 | 4,658,892 | 2,025,900 | 2,103,016 | 21,144,586 | 20,089,186 |
| Water Supply | 800,000 | 382,441 | 703,412 | 461,418 | 2,297,690 | 2,261,225 | 1,651,976 | 1,232,405 | 899,069 | 755,234 | 13,911,488 | 13,622,327 |
| Strengethening Reg. Administations |   |   |   |   | 106,800 | 66,964 | 128,520 | 88,165 | 133,736 | 95,543 | 6,352,147 | 5,092,723 |
| Health facility (Senafe Hospital) |   |   |   |   |   |   | 707,805 | 642,593 | 1,000,379 | 929,313 | 369,056 | 250,672 |
| Programme M & E | 200,000 | 40,226 | 89,259 | 23,288 | 122,000 | 40,845 | 204,200 | 192,982 | 196,000 | 215,340 | 1,708,184 | 1,571,906 |
| **Total** | **3,352,352** | **2,313,114** | **7,503,382** | **7,257,227** | **9,132,885** | **9,080,510** | **10,820,009** | **10,156,443** | **16,472,415** | **15,842,851** | **46,469,584** | **44,137,464** |
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| **Figure 4: Resource allocation by activity** |  | **Figure 5: Resource allocation by activity over time** |  |
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**Table 7: Allocated Resources by Sector - Gash Barka**

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| --- | --- | --- |
| **S.No** | **Activity** | **Allocated Annual Budgets** |
| **2005** | **2006** | **2007** | **2008** | **2009** | **Total** |
| 1 | Transport |   | 330,000 | 563,976 | 36,964 | 0 |  930,940.00  |
| 2 | Shelter | 354,567 | 2,546,061 | 2,465,798 | 1,887,201 | 1,713,200 |  8,966,827.00  |
| 3 | Water Supply | 735,000 | 275,000 | 500,000 | 557,000 | 320,000 |  2,387,000.00  |
| 4 | Sustainable Livelihoods | 500,000 | 2,590,562 | 1,707,998 | 1,564,601 | 6,225,687 |  12,588,848.00  |
| 5 | Strengthen Reg. Admins |   |   | 61,658 | 88,520 | 58,040 |  208,218.00  |
|   | **Total** |  **1,589,567.00**  |  **5,741,623.00**  |  **5,299,430.00**  |  **4,134,286.00**  |  **8,316,927.00**  |  **25,081,833.00**  |
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**Figure 6** **Allocated Resources by Sector - Gash Barka**

**Table 8: Allocated Resources by Sector - Debub**

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| --- | --- | --- |
| **S.No** | **Activity** | **Allocated Annual Budgets** |
| **2005** | **2006** | **2007** | **2008** | **2009** | **Total** |
| 1 | Transport |   | 108,568 | 89,767 | 102,530 |   |  300,865.00  |
| 2 | Shelter |   | 1,534,645 | 1,398,206 | 2,636,000 | 295,000 |  5,863,851.00  |
| 3 | Water Supply |   |   | 1,712,642 | 697,723 | 281,814 |  2,692,179.00  |
| 4 | Sustainable Livelihoods |   | 1,108,995 | 667,389 | 1,433,228 | 3,785,090 |  6,994,702.00  |
| 5 | Strengthen Reg. Admins |   |   | 60,800 | 80,810 | 64,658 |  206,268.00  |
| 6 | Health Facility |   |   |   | 851,610 | 934,934 |  1,786,544.00  |
|   | **Total** |  **-**  |  **2,752,208.00**  |  **3,928,804.00**  |  **5,801,901.00**  |  **5,361,496.00**  |  **17,844,409.00**  |
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| **Figure 7 Allocated Resources by Sector Debub** |  |  |  |
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**Table 9: Allocated Resources by Sector - Southern Red Sea**

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| **S.No** | **Activity** | **Allocated Annual Budgets** |
| **2005** | **2006** | **2007** | **2008** | **2009** | **Total** |
| 1 | Sustainable Livelihoods |   |   |   | 113,867 | 70,617 |  184,484.00  |
| 2 | Strengthen Reg. Admins |   |   |   | 500 | 1,000 |  1,500.00  |
|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  -  |
|   | **Total** |  **-**  |  **-**  |  **-**  |  **114,367.00**  |  **71,617.00**  |  **185,984.00**  |
|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
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**Figure 8 Resources Allocated by Sector Southern Red Sea**

**Table 10: Total Allocated Budget by Region 2005-2009**

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **S.No** | **Regions** | **Year** |  |  |
| **2005** | **2006** | **2007** | **2008** | **2009** | **Total** |  |  |
| 1 | Gash Barka |  1,589,567.00  |  5,741,623.00  |  5,299,430.00  |  4,134,286.00  |  8,316,927.00  |  **25,081,833.00**  |  |  |
| 2 | Debub |  -  |  2,752,208.00  |  3,928,804.00  |  5,801,901.00  |  5,361,496.00  |  **17,844,409.00**  |  |  |
| 3 | Southern Red Sea |  -  |  -  |  -  |  114,367.00  |  71,617.00  |  **185,984.00**  |  |  |
|   | **Total** |  **1,589,567.00**  |  **8,493,831.00**  |  **9,228,234.00**  |  **10,050,554.00**  |  **13,750,040.00**  |  **43,112,226.00**  |  |  |
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**Figure 9 Comparative Resource Allocation by Region** **Figure 10 Total Resources Allocated and by Region 2005-2009**

**5.2 Program Management**

This section examines the program management structures, the program management modality and planning processes.

**5.2.1 Program Management Structures**

The program follows a National Execution Modality (NEX) and has a multi-tier management structure as follows[[4]](#footnote-4):

*At National Level*

At national level, the JP has two overall structures:

* National Steering Committee (SC): The committee is chaired by the Ministry of Finance (until last year by the Ministry of National Development and Planning) draws together UN agencies involved in the JP (UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNHCR) and the regional administrations (Gash Barka, Debub and SRS) where the program is being implemented. Donors contributing to the program though not officially members are invited to attend. The committee meets once a year, or as often as necessary. The committee reviews progress reports, approves work plans and takes any decisions in the interest of the program. According to all accounts the committee has met regularly and has been judged effective. However, there may be a need to revitalize the SC in view of the changes in authority from the Ministry of National Development to Ministry of Finance;
* Technical Working Group: This TWG is composed of staff of the UN agencies supporting the JP. It meets quarterly and has been a mechanism for coordination. The objective of harmonizing agency contributions has not been that effective simply because the expected contributions from other agencies besides UNDP have not been forthcoming.

*At Regional Level*

At regional level, the Governor is responsible for all aspects of the program. Under the Governor, is a Program Coordinator (assisted by a Finance assistant/Accountant – not in Debub) who is responsible for day to day management of the program at zoba level. Direct implementation is the responsibility of Branch Offices (e.g. Agriculture – Branch Office of MOA; Shelter – Social Services; Water – Land, Water and Environment; etc), who report directly to the Governor. Actual implementation is at the sub-zoba level.

In preparation for the annual meetings of the SC, a review and assessment meeting is held in the respective regions. These meetings are chaired by the Governor and were well attended by the sub-zoba administration, implementing partners, and UNDP senior management (RR and DRR-Programs) as well as the UNDP Transition and Recovery Unit, and by UN agencies. They serve as forum for assessing progress and agreeing on annual plans, as well as discussing outstanding issues affecting program implementation. New and emerging issues were also discussed.

*UNDP Transition and Recovery Unit*

To manage the pooled funds and to spearhead UNDP’s transition and recovery activities in the CPAP, the Transition and recovery Unit has been set up which is also responsible for resource mobilization, technical support and monitoring and reporting.

The Unit is staffed by experienced and competent technical personnel that are complementary in terms of their skills/profiles and the needs of the program:

* Senior Technical advisor: has a seasoned and well round experience having successively led UNDP’s PoWER I and II program, well versed in policy development in general, and in particular recovery issues at regional and international level, donor relations and provides overall role of leadership, coordination and management. He reports directly to the UNDP RR;
* Program Specialist: a background in agriculture and gender (BSC and MSC) and sustainable livelihoods and worked on farming systems research diagnostic surveys, impact assessment, strategy/policy development, facilitating farmer advisory services and in design of M&E. and reports directly to the DRR-Programs;
* Program Analyst: reports to the Program Specialist: a civil engineer with experience in design, construction and supervision of engineering works (social infrastructure – health, education, water facilities, as well micro dams, soil and water management structures and ponds), as well as skills and training in project and program management. He provides both quality control of the works designs and supervision. Given the many activities of the JP in building social infrastructure this is a very much required profile.

With regards to staff number, this appears to be adequate as the staff are able to handle the required work load. The unit manages a large program which is roughly 70% of the business portfolio of the whole of UNDP-Eritrea, and is tasked with multi-donor reporting, specific reports to individual donors (EC, Norway, CERF, etc). A gap is that of a specially dedicated M&E staff – this can be a position for the whole UNDP office, but providing support

Staff of the Unit are funded from UNDP extra-budgetary resources and not directly from JP program resources which makes it sustainable. It is important to note that TR Unit makes a substantial contribution to UNDP Eritrea’s extra-budgetary resources accounting to 5-7% of the mobilized non-core resources. Despite the complex reporting and contractual arrangements, staff operate effectively as a team, and to their credit have designed and implemented a first class recovery program in a very complex political context.

**5.2.2 Program Management modality**

The evaluation judges that the program has been well and effectively managed. Furthermore, it was noted that the JP was fully integrated into national and regional structures and did not have the character of a parallel program of many such similar programs elsewhere. Within UNDP itself, significant efforts have been made to phase out the previous stand-alone project management unit and fully integrate it into the structure of UNDP both from a funding perspective and institutionally.

The decentralized approach used in implementing program has worked well as evidenced by the following example: in the case of the hospital in Senafe, the EC had tried for several years to implement it through the ministry of health without success. However, the involvement of UNDP and the regions has led to the project now being implemented and expected to be completed August/September 2010.

The program has used both DEX and NEX modalities over the past six years and valuable lessons have been learnt which points to the superiority of the NEX modality

The NEX modality has contributed to building government capacity, strengthened government ownership/leadership, and improved chances for sustainability by working through existing government structures. Overall, reporting and accountability has not been an issue. The NEX modality also conforms to overall government policy which discourages the setting up of PMU – a practice widely deplored but which continues to persist in most developing countries. The main challenges faced with the NEX modality have been:

* The issue of incentives for staff because of the low salaries for the staff of most of the implementing partners (8-900 nkf/month);
* Shortage of fuel and the consequent decision of government to pool all vehicles has limited mobility, access to sites and project monitoring.

The DEX modality was conceived as an instrument to respond to emergency/humanitarian and post-conflict situation to enable rapidity of response. This was the modality employed during the first phase of the program[[5]](#footnote-5). It proved to be an efficient tool, particularly in terms of procurement (both local and external) and enabled the program to quickly mobilize and respond to the unfolding humanitarian situation in the immediate aftermath of the border war and the consequent massive displacement, destruction of socio-economic infrastructure and disrupted lives and livelihoods. In the current situation though a DEX modality has considerable downsides as it does not contribute to building government capacity and runs counter to government policy.

As the program moves to an area-based and more development oriented interventions in its new phase, the NEX program is the obvious preferred option.

**5.2.3 Program Planning & Implementation Processes**

The planning process is a meticulous and fully participatory process – all levels participated: kebabi level, communities, regions, UN agencies as well as donors to some extent. Furthermore, the program drew upon comparative strengths of the different agencies – UNDP in international procurement; zoba does local procurement for materials available locally; local communities bring sand and water for construction for which they were paid full market rates, also provided skilled labour as masons and carpenters.

At regional level, the program relied on zoba existing structures: Social services: health and education; Economic development: agriculture, livelihoods, mining, etc; Infrastructure: shelter, feeder roads, dams, water points; and Administration and Finance departments.

There were however, some constraints to the planning and implementation process:

* The planning and integration of activities under the JP could be improved. Firstly to address the scattered and geographic dispersion of assistance (i.e. over 200 villages) which not only spreads resources thin but also makes M&E and documenting of impact difficult. Secondly, planning process of parallel funded activities could be improved by organization of tripartite meetings between the concerned Line Ministry, the Zoba and the UN agency involved. Thirdly, although five-year zoba development plan is in place, the JP is not integrated into the zoba plan as it is regarded as emergency project. In the same vein, linkages with other donors activities at zoba level could also be improved – however this is done at zoba level with the governor ensuring synergies are maximized. There are certain duplications (e.g. water supply provision) but the zoba administrations try to minimize them by assigning different sites to different organizations/actors.
* Linkages of recovery activities with other UNDP program areas (e.g. environment, poverty and food security) should be strengthened – the team was informed that there is agreement in principle but practical steps are yet to be taken. As the recovery program accounts for 80% of CO delivery opportunities for linkages, including jointly exploiting new areas – “climate proofing” – should be more fully explored;
* Program Coordinators at regional level do not have vehicles, but project allocates funds for M&E that they use to hire from government. Government policy is to rationalize vehicle and fuel use due to shortages.

**5.3 Monitoring and Evaluation**

Regular monitoring of the program has been fully and effectively undertaken. This has been accomplished in various ways. The M&E processes of the JP involved the following:

* Actual field visits to implementation sites by the UNDP Recovery Unit – on average once every three weeks: Field monitoring visits take place regularly – once a month or so (see example of reports; monitoring plans; how recommendations of M&E were implemented). The main problem has been shortages of fuel and the need for permits for the cars.
* Governors informally visit UNDP when they are in Asmara to discuss progress and issues;
* There are Program Coordination offices in the two regions that undertake regular monitoring visits;
* The TWG of the UN agencies meet every quarter, while the SC meets once a year. In addition there are annual review and assessment meetings in each region during which progress is reported;
* UNDP uses the Fund Authorization and Certificate of Expenditure (FACE) as a financial tracking and monitoring tool, and request for expenditure.

The UNDP Recovery Unit has developed a variety of monitoring tools: (i) Program Implementation Reports (PIR) which are used by regional administrations to compile QTR reports; (ii) Monitoring templates – e.g. for distribution of inputs, cash-for-work, etc. These templates (in English and Tigrinia) are signed by beneficiaries, kebabi administrators, sub-zoba administrators, extension workers, also provide the gender and identity number of the beneficiary; (iii) Ad Hoc templates are also designed as needed – e.g. questionnaires for distribution of dairy goats for monitoring purposes, as well as reporting on impacts (CERF requirement). A key issue to consider is the lack of a fulltime staff dedicated to M&E and this function is currently carried out by existing staff of the UNDP Recovery Unit.

Monitoring related to contribution agreements with individual donors. For example, yearly monitoring is done with Norway – Norway also conducted a program appraisal of the JP at the onset. Joint field monitoring is also done with donors and the UNDP Recovery unit provides donors with QTR reports (Technical and Financial). By taking part in review meetings and monitoring visits, donors have the opportunity to further monitor activities. A main complaint by donors is the restrictions on movement outside of Asmara. The EC undertakes its own monitoring missions (ROM) as per the agreements and the reports are detailed and provide many useful insights. Such independent assessments serve a useful purpose and should be continued. Most of the recommendations of the ROM missions have been acted upon according to the EC but not all, and have been taken into account in design of new projects (e.g. EC Food Facility).

Studies/assessments/diagnostic surveys are a critical input in planning and design of program, as well as in tracking/monitoring impact. Data gathering is currently constrained in Eritrea. Without undertaking large scale formal data collection and assessment exercises, the program can be strengthened by:

Field monitoring by donors were very instrumental in verifying that proper resource utilization, availability of capacity and transparency in managing funds, and contributed to facilitating action at HQ

**5.4 Partnerships & Coordination**

Overall partnership and coordination of the program has been good with the structures set up at national and regional levels (see section.) working well and acting as forum for joint planning, decision-making and follow up. At the field level though coordination has been even more effective and is simplified because of the fact that regions are in the driving seat and also staff of agencies make greater efforts to complement each others activities at village level.

However, the evaluation team judges that partnership and coordination could be further improved if the following issues are addressed:

* Cohesion between agencies a source of concern – seems to be a general problem of UN agencies involved in JPs. Program has not been as joint as it should have been. UNDP has been carrying the larger burden of the JP. This can be improved through more predictable allocation of core resources to support activities.
* Activities funded by the pooled and parallel-funded activities appear to be not well coordinated and there is need for common resource mobilization strategy. The existence of pooled and parallel funding makes integrated and coordinated work planning difficult. This also includes complementarity in targeting of households, villages and in the sequencing of actions. Thus significant benefited of synergy is lost. There is the reduction of coherence in the program.

The UNDP unit cannot/has not enforced reporting on activities of other agencies – its largely set up to managed the pooled funding under UNDP management rather than managing the JP. Consolidated reports that include pooled and parallel funding modalities were produced until 2008. However, since 2009 the JP report contained only activities done under pooled funding. This was due to the fact that the other agencies could not provide their inputs to the report. However, Standard Progress Report (SPR) under the “emergency and recovery” theme annually. The SPR is established by the UNDG (United Nations Development Group), and the SPR includes other programs that fall under emergency and recovery theme..

* At national level, coordination has been hampered by use of different modalities of fund disbursement, and the fact that contributions from other agencies apart from UNDP have dried up since 2008.

**Chapter 6: Recommendations on Way Forward**

The evaluation team’s recommendations draw upon the commonly agreed points during the midterm review of the Joint Program held 3-4 December 2009 attended by all stakeholders – see box below- and additional findings and observations of the team during the evaluation.

**Main points agreed at Stakeholders midterm review workshop on the Joint Program: 3-4 December 2009**

* Next phase be designed to include 12 sub-zobas in Debub region and IDP/Expellees included as part of the population that lives within selected sub-zobas;
* Need for increased resources to address the plight of war and drought-affected populations based on a wider region and an all inclusive framework;
* Start implementation of new phase with resources already at hand;
* Backlog of activities remain despite remarkable progress, especially for shelter in Gash Barka and this needs to be addressed on an urgent basis;
* Operate new phase in Gash Barka in an all-inclusive manner covering five sub-zobas;
* Parallel funding has been ineffective and to do emergency interventions in pooled funding mode for efficiency and effectiveness – pooled funding is the best modality for speedy implementation;
* Funds for emergency and recovery should be directly channeled to the regional administrations who have already demonstrated their capacity for managing and implementing interventions effectively and efficiently;
* For equity reasons, the JP should not be limited to the two highly war-affected regions (due to limited resources and risk of spreading them too thinly) but that needs of other equally suffering regions should also be addressed. Moreover, communities residing in other sub-regions (other than returnee/re-settlement areas) in Debub and Gash Barka should also receive emergency assistance;
* While pleased with the rapid progress made and with the rate of delivery as manifested in resources disbursed annually, donors strongly expressed the need for unhampered access to project sites for monitoring purposes, as this is an essential pre-requisite for their HQ to continue support. Moreover, they proposed visits on a monthly basis, rather securing permits on per-trip basis;
* Donors urged governors to open a dialogue with the government at the central level to update current procurement procedures to make it more efficient – lack of imported building materials in the local market have greatly affected the timely completion of projects;
* The mode of operation adopted by UNDP and the respective administrative regions should be replicated;
* Donors pledged to continue to support the recovery program and urged next that the framework program be a JP and that UN participating agencies, especially should support the pooled funding modality;
* Participating UN agencies were urged to earmark to the JP from their core resources – a meaningful JP is effective only if all participating UN agencies make a significant resource allocation;
* The UNDP Recovery Unit to develop a three-year framework for the next phase with inputs from the regions, donors and participating UN agencies for the period 2010-2012;
* Agreed on the use of the term “Transition and Early Recovery” for the next phase of the JP;
* Stressed the importance of access to data.

The team’s recommendations are clustered in two categories:

* those relating to the overall approach and future direction of the program; and
* those relating to operational aspects of the program - implementation.

**3.1 Overall Approach and Future Direction of the JP**

In terms of the overall approach and future direction of the Joint Program, the team makes six key recommendations.

1. **Move the JP on IDPs/Expellees towards Transition and Early Recovery as the overarching framework for the program, at least for the next two years, but with increased emphasis on the longer-term perspective**.

The team’s recommendation took into account the following two key considerations/observations:

* on the one hand, there is no fresh outbreak of conflict and displacement, and all IDPs/Expellees have been resettled and all camps closed; continuing to provide assistance to a specific target group who have since found homes (and in certain cases have better access to social services) could generate resentment from other communities and undermine equity considerations; most of the IDPs/Expellees are getting their livelihoods restored although there is still a long way to go – most have yet to rebuild their assets to pre-war levels; the JP has helped build significant social assets – schools. Health and sanitation facilities, water facilities, etc, which now more than before is ensuring improved access to basic social services in many communities, although many needs are yet to be completely addressed.
* But on the other hand, the focus on Transition and Early Recovery in Eritrea is still justified on the following grounds: large scale humanitarian needs still persist despite several commendable efforts – by GOE, donors, UN agencies, Regional and Local Administrations and the Communities themselves - both within the regions that have been the focus of the JP, as well as other regions in the country; the reintegration process is still far from being complete – HH are yet to regain their former asset base; Eritrea is subject to natural calamities, particularly drought, which render large segments of its population vulnerable, and which is also making livelihood recovery of former IDPs/Expellees very challenging. Moreover, the current economic climate is making it difficult for households to sustain the gains made; there is a “state of no war no peace” and the situation is still in a state of limbo, this creates a climate of uncertainty which makes a complete move to full development mode risky; from a financing point of view the only realistic option given the fact that other funding options through development are more difficult to access.

However, within this transition early recovery framework, the team strongly recommends that interventions must be designed with the perspective towards longer-term development. Government pointed to the need to move from emergency relief to development by addressing critical issues to fully integrate IDPs/Expellees into their communities. The new Early Recovery and Transition framework document appears to still place emphasis on emergency-type interventions. The beneficiaries themselves want to move from transition to long-term development through self-help. Key questions are what the government and regions can do to facilitate this through creating the enabling conditions.

1. **Adopt an inclusive and integrated area-based approach within the localities of operation for the joint program**

The move to an area-based assistance approach is recommended as this will ensure an integrated and holistic approach to local development. Such an integrated approach should be closely aligned with zoba development plans and its implementation be fully integrated into the zoba institutional framework which must be appropriately strengthened. The area-based approach must however, be combined with targeted assistance to reach the most vulnerable. Targeting should also look at high potential areas which have the prospect of creating the “socio-economic lift” for the regions concerned.

The adoption of an area-based approach should signal a shift to normal development processes from the purely emergency/humanitarian approach. Furthermore, this opens the opportunity/possibility of integrating humanitarian/emergency assistance into normal development planning. Up to now in Eritrea, there have been two parallel tracks for development assistance – emergency and medium-term development. These can now be integrated into one development approach.

Many of the donors are supportive of the idea of greater focus on longer-term development perspectives. This has implications on how the program should be implemented. Thus provision of inputs to farmers need to be coupled with better connection to extension services, farmer training, markets, etc.

In terms of inclusiveness, it is important to ensure that assistance is provided without distinction to former IDPs/Expellees, host communities, drought – affected populations, other returnees. However, this community-based and inclusive approach must not preclude some degree of targeting for vulnerable groups and other destitute categories, including former IDPs/Expellees, in this regard build upon the safety net mechanisms in place.

In terms of integration, this should be seen at two levels: (i) all interventions should be aligned with existing zoba development plans, where these exist; (ii) assistance should be in the form of integrated services – i.e. distribution of inputs should be complemented by linkage to agricultural extension services, training, credit, markets, etc. The provision of goats to households in SRS zoba should be done in tandem with rangeland development and provision of livestock watering facilities.

An area-based approach implies stronger coordination with non-JP development actors on the ground and this should be strengthened through common/joint planning forums or other mechanisms. Close coordination of interventions by other programs/agencies with the Transition and Early Recovery program for maximum impact and to avoid unnecessary duplications. It is also important to have a shared conceptual framework for reintegration and sustainable recovery so that partners have a common understanding and more holistic and mutually supportive engagements.

1. **The program focus should shift more towards providing livelihood support, but continue to provide basic social services**

Key aspects to take into account include the following:

* Strengthen the food security interventions building upon current support being provided by JP;
* There is still a need for the distribution of agricultural inputs, particularly seeds and pesticides, tractor ploughing, and drought proofing infrastructure to increase agricultural productivity and ensure full livelihood recovery. However, recovery interventions must be combined with development activities to ensure the survival of achievements and long-term viability of communities. Apart from agriculture-based interventions, efforts to assist households diversify incomes must be intensified – credit, training, business development, etc;
* Introduce initiatives to strengthen drought preparedness and contingency planning at zoba and lower level to deal with recurrent drought;
* Develop insurance mechanisms to protect assets and livelihoods;
* Services and infrastructure may have been expanded/improved, but they are still inadequate and too fragile to lay a foundation for recovery compatible with the Millennium Development Goals. Thus intensive efforts will have to be made to improve the quality and coverage of services, particularly education and health services;
* Baseline data and impact monitoring and assessment should be given top priority within such a context. Need to strengthen monitoring of the effects impacts of the program, particularly in relation to how program is contributing to poverty reduction and attainment of the MDGs. For example in school enrolments, health, etc. For the case of maternal mortality, Eritrea has made tremendous strides in cutting down maternal mortality from 998/100,000 in 2002 to 450/100,000 in 2010, against the MDG target of 246/100,000[[6]](#footnote-6). An important question of interest is how well the beneficiaries are doing with respect to the MDGs as a result of the interventions of the JP. In this regard it would be important to capacitate the zoba administrations to produce the data needed and their ability to undertake rapid and well defined assessments.
1. **More holistic efforts are made to strengthen capacities at zoba and lower levels, including community structures and households.**

The area-based and integrated approach will require strong capacities and zoba and lower levels. Therefore the current approach to zoba capacity building focused on recovery-related activities should be replaced by a more holistic approach based on structured capacity needs assessments and outline of clear goals, strategies and means, at the zoba, sub-zoba and kebabi levels, without having to wait for such capacity building at the national level. Lessons learnt from the UNDP-sponsored Anseba Local Development Program (ALDP) could be useful.

Special efforts are also needed to build capacities of the various village committees and user groups created (e.g. water, SWC, etc). Continuous community and local leadership capacity building over wide ranges such as skills in articulation of interest and negotiation, planning and programming, mobilization, management and efficient utilization resources, to ensure that communities remain engaged in all aspects and processes.

Reintegration should encompass establishing relationships and trust among IDPs and host communities, finding ways for all groups to be represented in local governance and leadership structures so as to ensure that no group feels marginalized. Full reintegration requires that the dichotomy between IDPs and host communities is ultimately shattered.

1. **The recommended strategy of an area-based inclusive approach, and expansion of the program both within and outside the current regions dictate that resource mobilization efforts should be intensified**

At present the JP relies on few core donors (Norway, EC, UN/OCHA and UNDP) with the CERF of growing importance. New sources need to be tapped – e.g. HSTF (Japan), UNCDF (local development), Climate adaptation, UNDP/BCPR. Efforts should also be made to bring back former partners who played a key role in the earlier phases –Netherlands, Italy, USAID, etc. finally, UN agencies should commit more resources from their core funds to the Transition and Early Recovery Program

1. **Further efforts made to strengthen gender dimensions in program, building upon the very positive start made**

Although the JP has many positive aspects with regards to gender, and female headed households are key beneficiaries of the support provided, gender could be further strengthened by the following measures:

* Enhancement of skills and competencies in decision-making and managing their businesses – preferably establish women training centre;
* In implementation, special needs of women (such as the burden of child care) participating in projects activities should be adequately catered for.
* Gender aspects in design and implementation of the JP can be better served by systematic involvement of NUEW in the planning stages.
* Continuation of micro-credit as this is critical to women’s economic empowerment

**3.2 Operational Aspects**

The Joint Program according to the findings of the evaluation team is operationally well run and efficient and effective. However, a number of constraints have been identified which inhibit the operational effectiveness. The four recommendations below are meant to address these.

1. **While maintaining the current structures established to oversee program implementation, strengthen institutional framework for the JP**
* Given the shift in responsibility from the Ministry of National Development to the Ministry of Finance, there is a need to revitalize the National Steering Committee. Consideration should be given to whether a selected number of key additional line ministries should be co-opted to the national steering committee, such as MoA and MoLG.
* The UN agencies must strengthen their joint planning, monitoring and implementation in a credible way – the “jointedness” of the program should be improved, while taking into account agency specificity. An important step would be to improve the volume and predictability of resources committed to the JP so that planning can be more effectively carried out.
* Feedback mechanism needs to be created to ensure that lessons learnt at the regions are channeled to relevant central government ministries – avoid a complete disconnect between the JP implementation process at regional level from line ministries. In fact, given the many valuable lessons learnt, an effort should be made to more systematically document these for dissemination at local, national, regional and international levels.
1. **The NEX modality, pooled funding and decentralized implementation have proved highly successful and should be maintained.**

The JP has opted to decentralize and work directly with regional and lower level structures to deliver. This strategic choice and the strong informal networks built have been effective and needs to be maintained as an operational modality. However, there is a need to strengthen linkages with central government structures/line ministries/institutions to both anchor the programs with evolving national policy frameworks but most importantly also to help shape policy from lessons learnt from program.

If for operational reasons, some UN agencies opt for parallel funding, it must be ensured that credible amount of program resources are ear-marked by the agencies concerned, and measures are taken to ensure their rapid channeling directly to the respective zobas, and that the activities thus funded are traceable for reporting and accountability purposes, within the overall Framework for Transition and Early Recovery.

1. **To strengthen program monitoring and improve chances for significant resource mobilization, the team recommends better and unrestricted access (taking into account security considerations) to program/project sites**
2. **Efforts be made to streamline procurement to make it predictable, rapid, efficient and in accordance with international standards.**

**Conclusion**

By all accounts (beneficiaries, government officials, regional administration, donors, agencies) the JP has been an effective and successful program and has undoubtedly helped and provided an opportunity for large segments of the war – affected population to begin to restore their lives and livelihoods. It has particularly been effective in addressing the needs of the vulnerable such as, women-headed households, children and poor families. It has contributed to progressively closing the chapter on war, displace in Eritrea, and by helping to rebuild critical socio-economic infrastructure, restore livelihoods is also contributing to laying the foundation to medium and long-term socio-economic development, to poverty reduction and attainment of the MDGs for the country.

To the credit of the JP it has succeeded to consistently respond and provide support to very deserving communities in a complex and politically sensitive context, and this is very commendable indeed. Given the complex reality in Eritrea, the JP has done well in terms of delivery and impact and must be commended. The policy environment is both fluid and unpredictable. Many of the complex issues are of a political/economic and beyond the scope of the JP to address. Furthermore, there are several obvious indicators of positive impact on the ground and on the lives and livelihoods of individuals, households and communities.

Apart from focusing on what was clearly a critical niche and priority for Eritrea, the program was characterized by sound and affective partnerships (donors, UN agencies, government, regional administrations, and affected populations). By privileging links with regional administration, the program has not only ensured rapid and effective implementation but has strengthened program ownership by the regional administrations and contributed critical capacity building support. The lean and efficient program management structures and integration within existing regional structures have ensured that most of the program resources are directed at the beneficiaries rather than the traditional heavy and costly program implementation structures.

However, while maintaining the strong decentralized operational links with the regional administration, there are benefits to establishing stronger links with central government/line ministries in order to better anchor the future program to evolving national policy but importantly also to feed the very significant lessons learnt from the JP into national policy making process as Eritrea shifts into longer-term development.

The UN agencies have generally worked well together and the leadership and management role played by UNDP has been commendable. Steps however need to be made to strengthen the collaboration and coordination among UN agencies involved in the JP to make it a truly joint program. Greater efforts should also be made to allocate more core resources from the agencies concerned to the program. There is overwhelming preference for the pooled funding modality by donors and regional administrations – both Debub and Gash Barka, and should be the modality for the future program.

The evaluation team judges that the decision to shift to an-area-based approach and an inclusive framework to address residual emergency needs and the effects of recurrent natural calamities (e.g. drought) within the framework of normal development processes is the right one. The scale and the enormity of the needs also dictates that the program be significantly expanded in scope - both within Gash Barka and Debub, but also to other deserving regions. However, a progressive and pragmatic approach should be adopted due to resource scarcity – currently it appears that only donors are Norway, EC and the CERF – and the need to consolidate. Considerable efforts of consolidation must be made, particularly in establishing baselines and putting in place an effective data collection and monitoring system to make it possible measure impact.

Eritrea being a small country there is much to be gained by streamlining how the UN delivers its assistance to reduce transaction costs and improve efficiency of its operations. While not a pilot country, serious consideration should be given to kick-starting discussions on how elements of the DAO initiative could be initiated within the context of the upcoming UNDAF.

**Annex 1: Terms of Reference of Evaluation**

##### A. Preface

In order to have clarity in the periods under Evaluation, it is important to point out that the JP on IDPs/Expellees falls in two UNDAF Programme Cycles. The First Phase of the JP covers the period October/November 2004 – May 2006. The Expanded and revised JP on IDPs/expellees signed between the parties on April/May 2006 covers activities undertaken till the present time. Moreover, the JP is also neatly divided into two categories of financing, namely: pooled funding managed by the UNDP as a lead agency to the JP, parallel funding implemented by other participating UN agencies such as UNICEF, UNFPA and UNHCR respectively.

Moreover, there is also a further complexity to the Evaluation. While the overall evaluation will focus on all issues related to all activities financed by Norway, UNDP, UNICEF, Italy, The Netherlands, USAID, we are obliged to single out the evaluation of the EC contribution under the Food Security Project separately (excluding the health facility component). Under the JP we have also treated Food security components financed by UNDP, Norway, EC, UNOCHA under one umbrella, but with separate accountability. It would be full hardy to separate them in the evaluation exercise, to accommodate contractual obligations for bureaucratic reasons, especially when we address the issue of impact and sustainability for the same beneficiaries and living in the same localities. A separate International consultant will be recruited who will be part of the Evaluation Team financed by the EC and selected by UNDP from a list of three short-listed candidates to be provided by EC. This consultant shall conduct an independent evaluation of the EC/UNDP Food Security Project and produce a report, which will be incorporated as a chapter of the overall evaluation report of the Joint Program or annexed to the Main Evaluation Report of the Joint Programme. As indicated earlier, the EC financed international consultant shall be a member of the evaluation team composed of an international consultant who will be a team leader and two other national consultants that will be financed by the UNDP.

We have also tried to resolve the problem of the JP falling under two distinct UNDAF Programme Cycles; namely: UNDAF-2002-2006 and UNDAF 2007-2011. If we are to make Outcome Evaluation, we need to combine the two for this specific JP rather than artificially separate them. It would be futile and unnecessary to have two outcome evaluations for the same JP which has identical objectives and components but overlapping time lines. Since there has been recently a Mid Term Review (MTR) for the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) 2007-2011 and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2007-2011, covering the period 2007-2009, it may be prudent to wait for a full Evaluation of the Emergency & Recovery Theme after the cycle is completed in 2011. The present CPAP and UNDAF MTRs would serve as an important input to the proposed Evaluation.

Moreover, although Mine Action falls under the thematic area Emergency and Recovery, it is not part of the JP on IDPs/Expellees return resettlement. However, a separate independent evaluation of the Mine Action by an international consultant has been conducted in 2008 and it will serve as an input to the current evaluation.

Last year (03-04 December 2009) a |Mid Term Review and Assessment was conducted for the JP on IDPs/expellees with the participation of all stakeholders including Government counter parts and donors. One of the findings and consensus agreements of the midterm review and assessment was to phase out the JP on IDPs/expellees and replace it by new joint programme focusing on area based development interventions. Based on this agreement UNDP has formulated a Framework for a “Transition and Early Recovery Programme”. The UNDP is in the process of soliciting the views of other UN Agencies if they would be interested and willing to subscribe to the three year Framework (2010-2012) with pooled funding. So far the UNHCR has indicated to be a co-signee and has earmarked funds to that effect. Hence, the O2E is final evaluation of the JP on IDPs/Expellees rather than a Mid Term Evaluation as originally anticipated.

##### Background

The Eritrean-Ethiopian border war (1998 – 2000) and the on going border demarcation stalemate have reversed positive post-independence achievements in Eritrea. Since the end of the border war, the average growth in Gross Domestic Production (GDP), a key factor of poverty reduction, has been low. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) and expellees by and from Ethiopia and returnees, as well as the urban poor, the disabled, pastoralists, female-headed households, orphan and high-risk HIV/AIDS groups have been particularly hard hit. In spite of this reality, the GSE put “IDPs, expellees, returnees and other war-affected and drought-affected are reintegrated and have secure livelihoods and access to basic social services.” as one of its national priorities. In accordance with this national priority, the UN System and the GSE agreed that Emergency/Recovery to be one of the focus areas of the UNDAF. In the UNDAF it has been recognized that recovery needs are largely a result of displacement and thus apply to returnees and refugees, expellees, IDPs, and other war-and drought-affected populations.

The Emergency and Recovery program components (where the JP on IDPs/expellees programme is under this category) address UNDAF goals and aim to support national development goals including the Millennium Development Goals. In order to attain the goal of UNDAF, “By 2009, assist the Government through an integrated multi-sector approach, to ensure that IDPs, expellees, returnees and other war and drought-affected are reintegrated and have secure livelihoods and access to basic services”, the UN System and the GSE work towards achieving a number of CP outcomes, namely:

1. “IDPs, expellees, returnees and host/war affected communities have basic rights fulfilled (shelter, water, sanitation, health, education) as the foundation for human development, with a special focus on HIV/AIDS and gender issues; and
2. IDPs, expellees, returnees and host/war affected communities have increased and diversified livelihood opportunities, and economic reintegration is enabled”.

**Geographic, Social and Economic Context**

Located in the Horn of Africa, Eritrea has an area of approximately 124 thousand square kilometers with an estimated resident population of 3.55 million people. It borders to the east on the red sea, to the west with Ethiopia, to the South with Djibouti and Ethiopia, and with Sudan to the North and North East. It is divided into six administrative regions, and has an arid to semi-arid climate prone to recurrent and severe droughts. Eritrea was liberated in 1991 after a protracted 30-year war and became formally an independent nation two years later following an internationally supervised referendum. The new nation was to start, however, under less than propitious socio-economic conditions. Thirty Years of war coupled with recurrent droughts and the neglect of the previous Ethiopian administration left a severely underdeveloped economy

Massive population displacements were the tragic consequence of both the war of liberation and the border war with Ethiopia. Some 500,000 people fled the country during the war of liberation. Most went to Sudan. At the height of the border war, as many as 1.1 million people, or a third of the population, were driven from their homes into internal displacement. In addition, over 75,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin were dispossessed of all property and forcibly deported from Ethiopia..

During the past eight years, substantial rehabilitation and reconstructions of war-damaged infrastructure has taken place throughout the sub regions under government programmes supported by the UNDP and key donors and the World Bank.

With regard to the collaboration with other recovery efforts in the country, during the period 1996 to 2007, UNDP played a leading role and was fully involved in the return/resettlement of internally displaced persons and expellees and have successfully implemented projects worth more than US$ 90 million with the successful settlement of expellees and the return/resettlement of internally displaced persons under its recovery programmes.

Through the UNDP led Recovery Programmes over 20,000 houses were rehabilitated/reconstructed/constructed in war-affected regions of Eritrea. An additional 39 schools were rehabilitated/reconstructed and furnished with teaching materials and 21 health facilities were reconstructed and stocked with medical supplies. Bakeries were opened, markets rebuilt and twenty villages in desperate need of clean water benefited from the construction of 26 boreholes, wells and water pipelines.

The previous Recovery programmes also supplied over 4,729 women with chicks for backyard poultry farming and another 400 women with the materials and training for beekeeping activities. Courses in home economics, weaving, traditional handcraft and construction were offered. Over 6,000 farmers were provided with livestock, seed and fertilizer and in the chaos of the immediate post-war situation, cash-for-work projects aided 125,000 persons.

Moreover the recovery Programme also assisted in the resettlement of over 12,000 rural deportees from Ethiopia through the provision of 3,000 hectares of cleared, ploughed and planted land as well as provided shelter kits, potable water systems, constructed a health facility and constructed make-shift temporary schools.

In late 2004, there were 12,976 HHs (50,853 persons) internally displaced persons (IDPs) in camps/host communities in Gash Barka. In the same period there were also 4,714 HHs (20,354 persons) in camps in Debub. Moreover, there were 1,995 HHs (10,900 persons) in host communities in and around Tessenei and Goluj Sub Zoba in Gash Barka.

In November 2004 a joint programme between GoE and participating UN agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR and WFP) was signed addressing the return/resettlement needs of 30,000 IDPs and expellees from Adi keshi, Kotobia and Mai Wurai emergency camps. Among the 30,000 IDPs, about 5,054 HHs (18,663 persons) of them were returned to their villages of origin in 2005. In March 2006, the GoE decided to return/resettle all the remaining IDPs/expellees sheltered in camps/host communities in Gash Barka and Debub to their villages of origin or to new resettlements and close all emergency camps in the two regions.

Hence, the First Phase JP needed revision and expansion in content and resources. This resulted in a revised and expanded joint programme which was signed by the GoE and UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR and UNFPA for the recovery-related activities of some 12,633 HHs (52,544 persons) who were in camps/host communities. These IDPs/Expellees consist of 11,000 persons from *Mai Wurai* and *Kotobia* camps, as well as IDPs and Expellees from the emergency camps in Metera, Shambuqo and those in the surroundings of *Tsorona* and *Senaf*e towns. The IDPs/Expellees are to return to some 14 villages of origin or new re-settlement areas over the period of 2006 and 2009. It was then agreed that the IDPs/expellees will be assisted to return/resettle in areas that have been cleared of landmines and unexploded ordnances.

The activities envisaged under this Expanded Joint Programme are the safe and dignified transportation of the IDPs, provision of potable water supply and sanitation facilities, provision of shelter (temporary and permanent), and provision of agricultural inputs and services (seeds, tractor ploughing, farm hand tools, restocking of livestock) and environmental rehabilitation/protection through soil and water conservation interventions, community PV solar systems, fuel saving stoves, and income generating activities(beekeeping development and cash for work safety net programme).. In all interventions priority was given to some of the most vulnerable households specially by women headed households. Moreover, under the parallel programmes were activities related to food aid rations, school feeding, supplementary feeding, school rehabilitation and temporary school construction and supplies, health facilities rehabilitation including health post construction and supplies and promotion of health services at their respective return/resettlement sites, and provision of education equipment/materials.

From 2005-2008 all IDPs/Expellees have been returned/resettled to their communities of origin or new designated resettlement areas successfully and as a result all emergency IDPs/expellees camps have been closed. In accordance with the agreed schedule of activities, 5,079 HHs (2,891 in Gash Barka and 2,188 in Debub) were returned to their communities of origin or resettled in new areas in May/June 2006. Moreover, in June 2007, 5,031 HHs were returned or resettled in Gash Barka and all the remaining 2,526 HHs IDPs/Expellees in camps in Debub have also returned to their original homes or were resettled elsewhere.

This particular evaluation will include the original Joint Program on IDPs/expellees return/resettlement signed in November 2004 and its expanded version which was signed in May 2006. Hence, the evaluation will address interventions conducted in six consecutive years, i.e., from 2004 to 2009.

The JP on return/resettlement IDPs/expellees have been supported by a number of donors including Norway, Netherlands, USAID, UNDP, Italy, EC and UNOCHA and have mobilized USD 46,027,540 and registered an expenditure of USD 45,191,706.62\_from 2004 - 2009.

##### OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION

To provide decision makers in the Government of Eritrea and the Donors including the European Union, Norway and UNDP with sufficient information to make an informed judgment about the past performance of the JP on IDPs/Expellees return/resettlement (its efficiency, effectiveness and impact), to document lessons learned and to provide practical recommendations for follow-up action.

1. The Outcome and Outputs Evaluation (O2E) will assess the relevance, efficiency, and effectiveness of the Joint Programme on IDPs/Expellees return/resettlement. It will also address sustainability of the programme from the design and implementation vantage point.
2. The 02E shall include an assessment of the programme/project management capacity and structure of the relevant regional administrations.

# OTHER MATTERS TO CONSIDER DURING THE O2E

1. Not limiting the above, the evaluation of the JP will also:
	1. Assess the accomplishments of the various components of the programme by reference to the stated programme objectives and targets;
	2. Review progress and mid term review and assessment(participated by all stakeholders) reports that have been prepared by the Recovery Unit– what are the main constraints, challenges identified and proposed actions;
	3. Review the work planning processes: adequacy of annual work plans to guide programme implementation; whether such work plan was being discussed and agreed among the key partners in implementation (Regional Administrations of GB, Debub and SRS, UNDP);
	4. Assess and review independently prepared project appraisal and result oriented mission(RoM) reports by independent consultants employed by Norway and EC respectively.
	5. Review and assess the programme implementation arrangement, donor coordination, and monitoring and evaluation modalities of the programme.
	6. Compare and assess the pro and cons of the UNDP Direct Execution (DEX) verses National Execution (NEX) implementation modality, in the context of Eritrea.
	7. Identify the staff recruited for the programme, their expertise, and roles pertaining to capacity building of the implementing partners/ institutions;
	8. Identify major institutional, financial and operational issues that have assisted and/ or constrained effective implementation of the Joint Programme.
2. The evaluation team shall identify strengths and weaknesses of the Emergency and Recovery programmes in the light of relevant International Standards and best practice in the sector, as well as the particular circumstances of the country. The evaluation team will make recommendations for improvement, future transition and early recovery programme support, co-ordination, implementation and policies in Eritrea.

# OUTPUTS

1. The output of the evaluation will be a report (to be provided in hard copy as well as electronic format) that provides findings, identifies lessons learned in the JP supporting the Return/resettlement of IDPs/Expellees ( emergency and recovery programme )on the basis of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability, and presents recommendations.

# SCOPE OF WORK

# Relevance

1. Are the stated outcomes and outputs of the JP supporting the Return/resettlement of IDPs/Expellees( Emergency and Recovery programme) as developed, revised and implemented during the period 2004-2009:
	* Appropriate considering the particular needs and priorities of Eritrea;
	* Design of the joint program; including diagnostic assessment of conditions on the ground, identification & understanding of target populations’ needs and prioritized concerns, problem identification and analysis as well as identification of stakeholders/actors;
	* Approaches and methodologies employed by the joint program;
	* In keeping with international standards, trends, and guidelines including relevant UN and Government policies?
2. Considering the country context what needs to be done and/or changed to ensure continued relevance of supports addressing the Emergency and Recovery needs within the country?
3. **Efficiency**
4. Given the circumstances in which the Programme was developed and implemented, were there better options for achieving the stated outcomes and outputs? To what degree have the stated outcomes and outputs of the Joint Programme been realized?
5. To what extent have the UNDP Recovery Unit been able to develop the capacity of their counterparts in accordance with the agreed Annual Work Plans? Where capacity was not developed what were the reasons? What actions should be taken by all parties to ensure that regional capacity is developed?
6. Have the resources of the JP pooled funding been managed in accordance with UNDP financial regulations, rules, policies and procedures that apply to such programmes including such things as ensuring that appropriate processes are in place for such matters as: procurement processes, logistical management of equipment and other assets?
7. Have the resources of the JP been managed in compliance with UNDP and donor agreements? And have relevant reports been presented to donors and national partners consistently?
8. What structures have been put in place within the executing agency (UNDP), implementing partners (Regional Administrations) to support the national execution modality (NEX) of the JP pooled-funding? What are the lessons learnt for future national execution programmes?
9. Have the resources of the JP Pooled-Funding been managed in such a way as to meet the requirements of the implementing partners/ institutions?
10. **Effectiveness**
11. To what extent was the JP programme on IDPs/Expellees and Host communities considered to be part of the Eritrean Government response to recovery, reconstruction and development needs in the country? Were the structures established by the Government appropriate, in the circumstances, to support the programme? Include lessons learned.
12. To what extents have the planned outputs of the JP been delivered? What contributed to/ inhibited delivery?
13. How are interventions and the outputs of the various components of the joint program and their contributions in the efforts to respond to humanitarian crisis in the country perceived by key stakeholders?
14. To what extent was capacity building for implementing partners considered part of the UNDP CO response to recovery, reconstruction, and development in the country? Where appropriate structures put in place by UNDP CO to support the recovery programmes in Eritrea?
15. In considering the above two questions, consider whether the structures were:
	* Appropriate;
	* Adequate - sufficiently supported (i.e. resourced and staffed) by the Government to implement their mandates;
	* Effective.
16. What major policy changes and discussions, relating to recovery programmes, have been taken at the National level and how have these affected the JP; how has the UNDP RU responded?
17. Have the responses of the JP PF to the events, in the emergency and recovery sector in Eritrea, been timely, appropriate? What could have been done differently?
18. **Impact and Sustainability**
19. Identify and assess effects and immediate impacts of the joint program on the target communities
20. Has the JP been designed in such a way as to facilitate sustainability? Has implementation been attentive to sustainability considerations?
21. Do the implementing partners/ institutions have the required skills to continue with emergency and recovery activities in accordance with accepted international norms and standards?
22. Is there a National strategy in place to ensure long-term sustainability of recovery programmes in Eritrea including budget support out of national resources? What steps should be taken by all partners to ensure management and financial sustainability?
23. **Accountability**
24. Have JP PF resources been managed by concerned parties in accordance with relevant agreements and procedures?

###### METHODOLOGY

1. The O2E should be participatory involving key stakeholders. In order to achieve a thorough understanding of the Joint Programme and the context, the evaluation review team is expected to employ such participatory techniques as they deem necessary not excluding:
* Comprehensive **document review** **and analysis** of all emergency and recovery related documents;
* **Interviews** and participatory meetings with Government (Regional Administrations, UN Agencies and donor officials; and the UNDP RU staff.
* Visit to project sites and conduct participatory meetings with direct beneficiaries of the joint program.
	1. **COMPOSITION OF EVALUATION TEAM**
1. The evaluation team will be composed of three (3) members including an international consultant as team leader and two national consultants.
2. The evaluation team will have expertise in the evaluation of operational and structural management arrangements for emergency and recovery programmes.
3. The evaluation team will have expertise in the following areas:
	* Evaluation of humanitarian and development activities particularly emergency and recovery;
	* Various types of support within recovery (shelter, input to agriculture, water, soil and water conservation, strengthening of capacity of implementing agencies, enhancement of the environment – Fuel Saving Mogogo (stoves), and transportation of IDPs/Expellees);
	* Planning and implementation of Projects/programmes within the emergency, recovery, rehabilitation, reintegration context;
	* Strategic planning, institutional development and management as well as familiarity with both relevant Government and UNDP policies and guidelines.
4. The evaluation team will be composed of the following :
	* Evaluation team leader with extensive professional experience in the areas of humanitarian and development particularly skilled in holistic analyses of contexts and evaluation of post war emergency, recovery, rehabilitation & reintegration;
	* An international consultant who will be part of the evaluation team to be financed by the EC and selected by UNDP from a list of three candidates to be provided by the EC. This consultant shall have a professional background in livelihoods security in general and food security in particular in a context of post war rehabilitation and reintegration;
	* A national consultant with a professional background in gender and socio-economic studies
	* A national consultant with a professional background in livelihoods and natural resource management
5. Familiarity with current situation in Eritrea would be an asset.

# H. WORK PLAN

1. The evaluation will take place over a period of 4 (four) weeks (20 working days for each consultant). The EC financed International Consultant may have a different schedule as the need arises.

**40. Proposed Schedule**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **No** | **Activity** | **Timing** |
| **May/June 2010** | **June 2010** |
| **Week 1** | **Week 2** | **Week 3** | **Week 4** |
| **31** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **7** | **8** | **9** | **10** | **11** | **14** | **15** | **16** | **17** | **18** | **21** | **22** | **23** | **24** | **25** |
| **1** | **Review & analyze relevant documents**  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **2** | **Field Visits (Debub and Gash Barka);****Consult Govt., UNDP, Donors, UNDP RU Staff** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **3** | **Prepare first draft report** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **4** | **Presentation of findings & synthesis to Govt., donors & UNDP** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **5** | **Incorporate Govt., donor, UNDP views after the presentation & produce final report** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **6** | **Submit final report** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Annex 2: List of Persons met

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Name** | **Title** |
| **Donors** |  |  |
| **Norway Embassy** | Elin EikelandMs. Ellen Borchgrevink | First Secretary, Head , Tech CooperationProgramme Officer |
| **European Commission** | Mr. Jean-Paul HeerschapMr. Eulogio Montijano  | Head, Food Security & Rural DevelopmentProgrammeManager, Food Security & Rural development |
| **Netherlands Embassy** | Ms. Marisia JA Pechaczek | Deputy Head of Delegation |
| **US Embassy** | Mr. Mehreteab AraiaDr. Ian Rozdilsky | Programme OfficerPolitical Advisor |
| **GOVERNMENT COUNTERPARTS** |  |   |
| **Ministry of National Development** | Mr. Kidane Tsegai | Director General |
| **Ministry of Labour & Human Welfare** | Mr. Mehreteab Fesehaie | Director General |
| **Debub Region** | Eng. Bashir Mohammed Abdussamad | IDPs Project Coordinator, Debub |
| **Debub Region** | Mr. Teklu Beraki | Head, MoA branch office Debub |
| **Gash Barka Region** | Mr. Tsegai Tewoldemedhin | IDPs Project Coordinator, Gash Barka |
| **Gash Barka Region** | Mr. Meseret G.Michael | Head, MoA branch office Gas Barka |
| **Southern Red Sea Region** | Dr. Yonas Woldu | Head, MoA branch office Southern Red Sea |
| **Other Nationals** |  |  |
| **National Union of Eritrean Women** | Ms. Luul GhebreabMs. Saliha AdemMs. Mesouda Humed | PresidentNUEW – Gash BarkaNUEW – Southern Red Sea |
| **UN Agencies** |  |   |
| **OCHA** | Mr. Steven LukuduMs. Jemila M/Berhan | Head of OfficeData base/GIS Officer |
| **UNDP** | Dr. Mamadou P. DialloMs. Verity NyagahProfessor Techeste AdheromMr. Eyob GhezaiEng. Berhane Gebremichael | UN Resident Coordinator/UNDP Resident RepresentativeDeputy Resident RepresentativeSenior Technical Advisor, RecoveryProgramme SpecialistProgramme Analyst |
| **UNHCR** | Mr. Michael Woldeab | Assistant Project Officer |
| **UNFPA** | Ms. Yordanos Mehari | Programme Associate |
| **UNICEF** | Ms. Kutloano LeshomoMs. Roselyn JosephMr. Samuel IsaacMr. David ProudFootMs. Abrehet Tesfamaria | Communication SpecialistM&E specialistChild Protection OfficerChief WASHSupply Officer |

**Annex 3: List of Documents Consulted**

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| --- |
| JP on IDPs/Expellees on supporting the Return/Resettlement of IDPs/Expellees to the communities of Origin or New resettlement |
| Revised and expanded JP on IDPs/Expellees on supporting the Return/Resettlement of IDPs/Expellees to the communities of Origin or New resettlement |
| Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) 2007-2011 |
| United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2002-2006 |
| United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2007-2011 |
| EC Food security Support to IDPs/Expellees Return/resettlement In Eritrea |
| Ec Support to Former IDPs/Expellees and host Communities to Enhance Urban and Peri-Urban Productive safety Net Through cash for work |
| Emergency Agricultural Assistance to IDPs/Expellees in Eritrea |
| Joint Programme on IDPs in return/resettlement areas/Agriculture |
| Provision of Dairy Goats to support drought-affected Women-headed households in IDPs/Expellees return/resettlement villages in Gash Barka region. |
| Provision of Dairy Goats to support drought-affected Women-headed households in IDPs/Expellees return/resettlement villages in Southern Red Sea and Gash Barka regions |
| **2- Reports** |
| Standard Progress Report on JP on supporting the return/resettlement of IDPs/Expellees to the communities of origin or Resettlement |
| Standard Progress Report on JP on supporting the return/resettlement of IDPs/Expellees to the communities of origin or Resettlement |
| Standard Progress Report on JP on supporting the return/resettlement of IDPs/Expellees to the communities of origin or Resettlement |
| Standard Progress Report on JP on supporting the return/resettlement of IDPs/Expellees to the communities of origin or Resettlement |
| Standard Progress Report on JP on supporting the return/resettlement of IDPs/Expellees to the communities of origin or Resettlement |
| EC Independent Result Oriented Monitoring Report on Food security |
| EC Independent Result Oriented Monitoring Report on Cash For work |
| Indeenedent Programme Apprsaisal JP On supporting the Return/Resettlement of IDPs and Expellees by Norwegian Goverment |
| Annual Report JP Focusing the Return/Resettlement of IDPs/Expellees to their places oF origin or new resettlement areas |
| Annual Report on Support to IDPs/Expellees Return/Resettlement & Host Communities to Enhance PERI-URBAN Productive Safety Net Through Cash For Work Programme |
| UNDAF Outcome Review 2007-2009 |
| CPAP Mid Term Evalaution 2007-2009 |
| UNDAF Midterm Evalauation 2007-2009 |
| Final Progress Report on Emergency Agricultural Assistance to IDPs/Expellees in Eritrea |
| Final Progress Report on Joint Programme on IDPs in return/resettlement areas/Agriculture |
| Progress Report on Provision of Dairy Goats to support drought-affected Women-headed households in IDPs/Expellees return/resettlement villages in Gash Barka region. |
| Progress Report on Provision of Dairy Goats to support drought-affected Women-headed households in IDPs/Expellees return/resettlement villages in Southern Red Sea and Gash Barka regions |
| Audi Reports of the JP on Supporting the Return/Resettlement of IDPs/Expellees 2007 |
| Audi Reports of the JP on Supporting the Return/Resettlement of IDPs/Expellees 2008 |
| Audi Reports of the JP on Supporting the Return/Resettlement of IDPs/Expellees 2009 |
| **3- Minutes** |
| Steering Committee meetings |
| Field trip Reports |
| Technical working Group Meetings |
|  |

1. See Draft Program Appraisal of UNDP-UNICEF-UNHCR-UNFPA Joint Programme “Supporting Return of IDPs and Expellees to Communities of Origin or Resettlement” A Framework Programme for Recovery in Eritrea. A Consultancy Report for the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Eritrea. By: Tesfay Haile, Consultant, August 2006, Asmara, Eritrea. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The explanation given was that at the time of preparation of the JP document there was not enough time because Government decided to return/resettle all IDPs/Expellees and close the camps. UN agencies were requested in this regard for support on 16 March and government decided to start implementation on 1 April 2006. The project document was prepared within 20 days. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. In the Expanded and revised JP document it is 40,000 IDPs, however there are 20,000 IDPs in the first JP signed in November 2004. Therefore total no. of IDPs is 60,000. There are also additional 11,000 Expellees [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The first phase was executed through a DEX (Direct Execution by UNDP) modality. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. In actual fact the program was implemented through a mix of DEX and NEX as funds were transferred to IPs, as documented by the 2007 audit report. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Progress is attributed to community mobilization/awareness, training of health professionals, putting in place EMOC (Emergency obstetrics care), improves access/facilities and supplies. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)