

UNDP Kosovo¹ Programme Outcome Evaluation 2005-2010

FINAL REPORT

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¹ Hereafter referred to in the context of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

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We wish everyone associated with UNDP Kosovo a Happy New Year!

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADR	Assessment of Development Results
BRC	Bratislava Regional Centre
CARDS	Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation
CEFTA	Central Europe Free Trade Area
DEX	Direct Execution
EAR	European Agency for Reconstruction
ECA	Eastern Europe and Central Asia
EO	Evaluation Office of UNDP
EPAP	European Partnership Action Plan
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EUSR	EU Special Representative
ET	Evaluation Team
EU	European Union
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
ICR	International Civilian Representative
IPD	Internally Displaced Person
IPA	Instrument for Preaccession Assistance
GDI	Gender Development Index
HDI	Human Development Index
KPC	Kosovo Protection Corps
KFOR	Kosovo Force (NATO)
ICO	International Civilian Office
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MIFF	Multi-annual Indicative Financial Framework
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PI	Phone Interviews
PISG	Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
POE	Programme Outcome Evaluation
RBEC	Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS
RRF	Results and Resources Framework
SAP	Statistical Office of Kosovo
SOE	State-owned enterprises
SOK	Stabilisation and Association Process
TL	Evaluation Team Leader
TSP	Thematic Sub-Programme
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNKT	United Nations Kosovo Team
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
WSSI	Women Security Safety Initiative

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The present report provides a summary of the findings of the evaluation of the UNDP Kosovo programme and covers the period from 2005 through 2010. The evaluation was carried out between June and December 2010.

The key evaluation questions were:

- What factors have contributed to achieving or not achieving intended outcomes?
- To what extent has UNDP assistance at the output level contributed to outcomes?
- Has the UNDP partnership strategy been appropriate and effective?
- What factors contributed to effectiveness or ineffectiveness?
- What are the lessons learned and recommendations related to the UNDP programme formulation and implementation in the 2010 – 2014 RRF?

This evaluation was conducted to provide input into the programmatic and operational baseline for UNDP's 2011 – 2015 RRF.

This evaluation was guided by UNDP Evaluation Policy and the UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) Standards and Norms².

The Evaluation Team consisted of a Senior Evaluation Expert/Team Leader (international), an International Evaluation Expert, and a Local Evaluation Expert.

FINDINGS

Programme Results. Long-term effects of UNDP interventions can be found in, but are not limited to development of new legislation; establishment of new institutions, units and organizations; capacity development at an institutional level; capacity development at an individual level; assistance to families that returned to their places of origin in Kosovo; implementation of construction projects; and assistance to young job seekers.

Evolution of Project Portfolio. UNDP effectively identifies “growth nodes”—issues that should be addressed—and then begins to “cultivate” them. Some “growth nodes” produce long strands of projects in which later projects build on the development of the previous ones. This kind of growth from a node can be stopped when funding dries up.

UNDP Partners' Capacity development. The UNDP has contributed greatly to the capacity development of UNDP partners in Kosovo. However, this positive process has natural and inevitable consequences. In the next few years the question “Why can't we implement this project ourselves?” will be asked explicitly by the increasing number of UNDP partners in Kosovo who are already considering their long-term prospects.

Programme design. The initial programme orientation and selection of areas of focus for UNDP in Kosovo were relevant to the UNDP corporate strategy, MYFF goals and EPAP priorities in Kosovo. The gender component of the UNDP Kosovo programme was underdeveloped but now UNDP Kosovo has greater capacity and accountability related to the integration of gender mainstreaming. While UNDP Kosovo priorities and strategic intents are very clear from the RRF and outcomes, there are flaws in the chains of results (outputs-outcomes-impact). One of the key problems is that in many cases outcomes are identical to impact. Sometimes outcome statements include both impacts and outcomes. This conflating of levels creates gaps in the programme

² http://www.uneval.org/papersandpubs/documentdetail.jsp?doc_id=22
http://www.uneval.org/papersandpubs/documentdetail.jsp?doc_id=21

logic where there are no causal links between the output and impact levels. To a great extent, problems with outcomes result from this unclear distinction between outcome and impact. Projects developed within the framework of the UNDP Kosovo Programme often use a programme outcome as a project outcome, whereas a programme outcome should be viewed as a project impact. Project impacts are not described at all in many cases. This creates a gap between project outputs and project outcomes and does not allow for the logical harmonization of projects and programme.

Programme Monitoring System. UNDP senior management, programme staff and UNDP partners alike mention an insufficient monitoring system as one of the major weaknesses of the UNDP programme in Kosovo. Indicators are often not well defined and are sometimes related to the country's situation rather than to the programme's results. It is a common mistake to misinterpret baselines and targets that are presented as narrative descriptions of an initial situation and its desired state rather than as the initial and target values of indicators. In many cases no system is in place for monitoring data collection and verification. UNDP Kosovo is forced to rely on the individual competencies of Programme Analysts and Project Managers rather than on a properly established and maintained monitoring and evaluation system.

UNDP Kosovo organizational structure. Evaluation revealed some limitations of the existing organizational structure:

- It does not take into account the distribution of responsibilities and skills between those who develop projects and those who implement them.
- Monitoring of project implementation is not effective enough.
- UNDP senior managers must spend an inordinate amount of time on project supervision and problem solving.
- There do not seem to be any incentives for collaboration and thematic 'clusters' do not collaborate effectively.

CONCLUSIONS

- UNDP activities in Kosovo have resulted in numerous positive changes at many levels and the long-term effects of UNDP interventions can be found in many areas of Kosovo society. Though these changes cannot be considered results of a well-orchestrated effort—a coherent country *programme*—there are nevertheless synergies among results in a number of areas affected by UNDP projects or groups of projects.
- Project design and implementation are at the heart of UNDP activities in Kosovo and UNDP has a diverse project portfolio that has been evolving along with the needs of Kosovo, UNDP partners and funding opportunities. UNDP project 'niches' are well cultivated and UNDP tends to build on successes and implements series of projects when needed and possible.
- While UNDP is undoubtedly the major player among the UN agencies in Kosovo, its 'niche' is not defined with sufficient clarity. Pressure to identify UNDP's area(s) of specialization is growing internally and externally.
- A Direct Execution modality has been relevant in the past and remains relevant under the present circumstances for UNDP in Kosovo. But this situation is changing in view of the substantially growing capacity of UNDP partners. A National Execution modality will become more relevant in this emergent capacity environment in the next few years.

- While UNDP Kosovo priorities and strategic intents are quite clear from the programme documents and relevant to the UNDP corporate strategy, MYFF goals, EPAP priorities in Kosovo, and Kosovo’s development needs, there are flaws in the overarching programme logic. Programme components are not properly harmonized within the programme’s conceptual framework.
- Programme monitoring is insufficient and is based on the capacities of individuals rather than on the capacity of the organization and organizational systems.
- The UNDP Kosovo organizational structure evolved during the period under review in order to adapt to the requirements of the programme and its priorities. But there are now clear indications of problems resulting from inconsistencies between the current organizational structure and the nature of UNDP’s current activities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1. Clarify UNDP Kosovo’s ‘niche’ and build on UNDP’s unique strengths. “What we do” and “how well we do it” should become higher priorities than “how much we mobilize.”

UNDP is already moving along this path. By making this recommendation we wish to support the idea of identifying UNDP’s unique ‘niche’ in light of its multidisciplinary expertise in the area of human development, its connections with the best HD experts in the region and around the world, its experience implementing numerous development projects in Kosovo, and its organizational capacity.

Recommendation 2. Develop and begin implementation of a transition strategy from DEX to NEX.

Part of the UNDP strategy should be the transition from DEX to NEX and delegation of responsibility for project implementation to its national partners. The UNDP should explicitly state this intent and clearly communicate the requirements its partners must meet in order to shift to a NEX modality. Internally, UNDP will have to build new organizational systems and develop its own capacity to get ready for NEX. One of the possible approaches for doing so would be implementation of pilot projects in a NEX modality with government partners that seem to be ready and willing to take over.

Recommendation 3. Redesign UNDP Kosovo’s organizational structure.

The new structure should be flexible and able to adapt easily to new tasks. It should remove barriers between ‘clusters’ (subject areas) and encourage creation of multidisciplinary project design teams. It should consider the different nature of project design and project implementation activities. It should facilitate effective monitoring at both programme and project levels and should open opportunities for communication and collaboration among projects. It should also make it easier for senior managers to manage the UNDP office effectively.

Recommendation 4. Develop UNDP Kosovo’s own capacity in the areas of programming, project management, monitoring and evaluation.

In its own capacity development work UNDP Kosovo needs to keep in mind key lessons learned by others: capacity development must include training but cannot be limited to training. Capacity development should also include self-education, learning by doing, information sharing, and

mentoring. Establishing proper organizational systems is also an important component of creating and sustaining organizational capacity.

Recommendation 5. In its future programming efforts UNDP Kosovo should make sure that there are no gaps in the chains of results and that the logic between adjoining levels of the programme is harmonized.

UNDP should be thoughtful and consistent in developing chains of results. Causal links between various levels of expected results should be explained and assessed.

Because a programme is no more than a logical framework for a set of related projects, activities—by definition—can only take place within projects. Projects contribute to programme outcomes, but programme outcomes can be achieved only if all the contributing projects are implemented successfully and their respective contributions made as planned. In this logical framework, programme outcomes should be viewed as the impact of the projects that constitute the programme, and project outcomes, in turn, should be viewed as programme outputs.

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Scope and Objectives

This evaluation was conducted in the context of the following developments:

- 1) In compliance with the Secretary-General's policy decision on integrated mission planning process³ (IMPP), in 2010 UNMIK and the UNKT are working to develop a joint UN Strategic Framework for Kosovo (UNSF).
- 2) In the context of development of the UNSF, the UN Kosovo Team (UNKT) will be developing a programming framework for the period 2011–2015 in accordance with the UNDAF methodology.
- 3) In the context of UN-wide programme planning activities, UNDP Kosovo will undertake development of a new RRF for the period 2011–2015.

As UNDP sets out to reposition its programme and operationalize the 2011–2015 RRF, the overriding purposes of the evaluation were to:

1. Undertake a historical overview of programming areas to identify specific trends in the type and/or level of engagement within programming initiatives (e.g. policy, advocacy, capacity development).
2. Identify programming initiatives which were scaled-up and/or replicated in the current programme cycle, including their success factors and sustainability.
3. Identify areas of convergence of the existing programme with EPAP priorities, including EC progress reports.
4. Identify partners' perceptions and views (including recommendations) of UNDP's contribution to Kosovo's development and alignment with donor priorities.

The Programme Outcome Evaluation (POE) was to draw up a set of lessons and actionable recommendations based on an assessment of the performance of UNDP's programme over the last programming period (2005–2010). The programme's achievements in the areas of institution and capacity building and contributions towards policy formulation were to be examined. The POE in particular was to review the sustainability of the programme results, their impact, the way they were achieved, and their alignment with Kosovo's development priorities, including those stated in the EPAP. Taking into account overall resource limitations, the evolving staffing situation and the extent of local involvement, the POE was to help articulate new perspectives and outlooks for operationalizing the 2011–2015 RRF.

The POE also was to serve as an input into the UNKT assessment exercise and subsequent development of the UNKT programming framework.

Evaluation conclusions and recommendations were to be discussed at the end of the evaluation mission, including reflections on the lessons learned and recommendations made with regard to operationalizing the 2011–2015 RRF.

1.2 Evaluation Methodology

This evaluation was guided by the UNDP Evaluation Policy and the UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) Standards and Norms⁴.

³ Decision of the Secretary-General on Integration of 25 June 2008, Decision No. 2008/24.

The overall approach adopted in this evaluation was to:

- Identify and pose a series of *evaluation questions* reflecting the programme issues about which we wished to make judgements and from which we wished to develop lessons learned.
- Develop an evaluation framework that would examine how each question could be answered, considering the existing sources of data and the appropriate methods of data collection available to us.
- Analyze factual findings in the collected data in order to draw conclusions and make recommendations.

Specific *evaluation questions* were “grouped” by programme dimensions: programme design, programme implementation, programme outcomes, relations with partners and the public, resource mobilization, and management. These *evaluation questions* were not the ones to be directly asked to stakeholders. Rather they were the questions that the evaluation team had to answer through the evaluation process. In the course of getting answers to *evaluation questions* the team was also to examine the factors explaining these answers. Although no specific questions referred to recommendations, the evaluation process was forward looking and resulted in recommendations.

This evaluation was to use both data source and methodological triangulation to ensure the validity and reliability of evaluation results. Data source triangulation means that data is collected from a variety of sources, while the methodological triangulation means that we use different methods of data collection and analysis.

There were two main sources of data: documentation and stakeholders.

- **Documentation:** The evaluation team studied numerous documents, including all project documents, reports and fact sheets available on the UNDP Kosovo intranet. Annex 4 lists the major documents studied in the course of this evaluation.
- **Stakeholders:** For the purpose of data collection, stakeholders were divided into the following six groups:
 - UNDP Kosovo Team
 - Other UN entities, development agencies (such as SDC, USAID, and SIDA) and donor organizations (such as EC and WB) in Kosovo
 - Government entities at the central and municipal levels in Kosovo
 - Kosovo NGOs
 - Kosovo businesses involved with UNDP activities
 - Beneficiaries of UNDP supported activities in Kosovo: citizens, vulnerable groups, etc.

To collect data from stakeholders, evaluation team used semi-structured, individual or group interviews. The choice of interview technique depended on the specific stakeholder and context. In most cases interviews were conducted without translation to make them most effective and informative. International consultants interviewed English-speaking informants and local evaluation expert interviewed stakeholders who were not comfortable working in English. The evaluation team paid special attention to the interviews as a very important way of collecting data.

⁴ http://www.uneval.org/papersandpubs/documentdetail.jsp?doc_id=22
http://www.uneval.org/papersandpubs/documentdetail.jsp?doc_id=21

Prior to data collection, the team prepared interview protocols to guide the interview process and to ensure that the dimension of gender mainstreaming and women's empowerment were well captured in the data collection.

Answers to the evaluation questions were to include an overview of the data collected (evidence) and interpretations of the data, as well as conclusions and recommendations. The report had to be completed with general conclusions presenting the key messages from the evaluation. General recommendations had to be anchored in general conclusions but did not have to be aligned in a simple one-to-one manner.

Preparing a report is the distinct, final stage of the evaluation process with the all-important goal of ensuring both credibility and approachability. The analysis of collected data/findings must be offered in a logical, readable format because the reader's confidence depends on both seeing solid evidence and on being able to grasp its significance.

The Evaluation Team consisted of:

- Senior Evaluation Expert and Team Leader (international) with overall responsibility for providing guidance and leadership; data collection and analysis; coordinating the draft and final report
- Evaluation Expert (international) provided expertise in the core subject areas of the evaluation; data collection and analysis; drafting key parts of the report
- Evaluation Expert (local) provided expertise in the local context and the core subject areas of the evaluation; data collection and analysis; drafting key parts of the report. The local Evaluation Expert was also responsible for preparations to the field mission (contacting interviewees, scheduling meetings, making travel arrangements inside Kosovo)

The Evaluation Focal Point of the UNDP Kosovo office supported the evaluation team in designing the evaluation and provided ongoing feedback for quality assurance during the preparation of the evaluation reports⁵. A local Program Assistant in Kosovo also supported the team.

1.3 Limitations

The main challenge the evaluation team faced—grasping the complexity of UNDP Kosovo interventions and internal functioning in 2005–2010—was made more difficult because of insufficient programme monitoring data. A purposeful sampling strategy helped us identify the most informed individuals and to interview them within two weeks with the assistance from UNDP staff. To cope with the challenge of missing data we conducted a thorough study of several dozen project documents available online. The participation of a local consultant on the evaluation team helped us to better understand the Kosovo context and to network and find relevant sources of information.

The evaluation team would have preferred to interview more UNDP donors and partners, but many of them were unavailable for various reasons⁶ when we conducted our field study. Another group that we could not involve in evaluation as actively as we wanted were the beneficiaries of UNDP projects. This group is very large, extremely diverse, widely spread geographically and in many cases does not speak English. We did whatever was possible in a two-week period.

⁵ We mean draft and final inception reports and draft and final evaluation reports

⁶ For instance, USAID management and staff were not available due to the visit of Hillary Clinton

1.4 Outline of the Report

Chapter 1, “Introduction,” provides an overall picture of the evaluation. It explains why the evaluation was done, how it will be used and what decisions will be taken after the evaluation is complete. Based on the nature of the evaluation questions and the existing restrictions, this chapter explains the rationale for choosing a sampling strategy, data sources, and data collection methods. The Introduction also contains a brief overview of methods used to process and analyze data and a description of ethical considerations.

Chapter 2, “Local Context,” is essential to understanding the environment in which UNDP activities in Kosovo were implemented and in which this evaluation was conducted. It provides a brief overview of the overall situation related to human development and the priority areas of UNDP work in Kosovo.

Chapter 3, “UNDP in Kosovo,” describes the UNDP corporate context in which its activities in Kosovo were implemented during 2005–2010.

Chapter 4, “Programme Design,” discusses the essence of the UNDP-Kosovo programmatic framework and examines its design, with special attention to the chains of results, outcome statements, and indicators.

Chapter 5, “Programme Implementation,” describes how the UNDP-Kosovo program evolved, explores patterns of project portfolio development and discusses the project lifecycle as the ‘core business process’ for UNDP-Kosovo.

Chapter 6, “Programme Results,” explores programme results by outcomes and describes the landscape of UNDP interventions in the past five years.

Chapter 7, “Programme Relationships,” explores relationships between UNDP and the other key development players: UN agencies, government entities, businesses, NGOs, and donors. Chapter 7 also discusses UNDP communications and visibility.

Chapter 8, “Programme Management,” provides an overview of four key management functions: planning, organizing, leading, and controlling. The chapter analyzes the organizational structure of the UNDP office. DEX vs NEX implementation modalities are discussed for the Kosovo context.

Chapter 9, “Main Conclusions and Recommendations,” summarises the conclusions and recommendations made by the evaluation team. To emphasize most important evaluation results and make this report more user-friendly we included some more specific conclusions and recommendations into several sections.

CHAPTER 2: LOCAL CONTEXT

2.1. General information

The total population of Kosovo is estimated at 2.5 million and the number of permanent residents is estimated to be 1.9–2.1 million inhabitants. The natural population growth was increasing in Kosovo until 2008, when it began to show the first signs of decreasing. Although birth rates appear to be declining, Kosovo's population continues to grow faster than those of neighbouring countries. According to the report of the Statistical Office of Kosovo (SOK), ethnic Albanians comprise 92% of the population, ethnic Serbs 5.3%, Turks 0.4%, Roma 1.1% and other ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Ashkali and Egyptians) 1.2%. Kosovo is considered to be a lower middle income country, with a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.734.⁷⁸ More people live in the rural areas than in the urban areas, in a proportion 63:37.⁹ The population is young: the 0–14 age group represents 33% of the population, the 15–64 age group 61%, and those 65 and older 5%.¹⁰ It is estimated that 50% of the population is under the age of 25 and 40% under the age of 18,¹¹ In 2002, approximately 37% of the population lived in poverty on €1.42 per day and 15.2% of the population lived in extreme poverty on €0.93 per day.¹² The recently published “Kosovo: MDG Factsheet 2010” depicts a bleak picture of Kosovo. It shows that unemployment in Kosovo is 43% (more than 50% of women are unemployed), relative poverty is 45%, maternal and child mortality is the highest in the region, and women's participation in decision making remains low (women quota in parliament is only 30%, women owning property is only 4%, women in business 4-6%). Kosovo scores 0.76 on the Gender Development Index (GDI), the lowest in the Balkans Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), scoring 0.465 due to the requirements of the law which guarantee a quota for women in all public institutions.¹³

Box 1 . Political developments in Kosovo in 2005–2007¹⁴

2005 In April the Contact Group excluded the partition of Kosovo or its union with any other country (i.e. Albania) in its status resolution. UN envoy Kai Eide reported in October that the rule of law was insufficiently entrenched, foundations for a multi-ethnic society had not been created, and Serbia had undermined Standards implementation by marshalling a partial Serb boycott of the provisional institutions. In October the UN Secretary General appointed former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari to lead the status resolution process. In November the Security Council endorsed the Contact Group's “Guiding Principles” for the settlement: “Once the process has started, it cannot be blocked and must be brought to a conclusion”, and the final decision “should be endorsed by the UN Security Council”. In November the European Commission in effect separated its annual progress reports on Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo, signaling their separate accession tracks. In December it decided to absorb the UN Standards into a European Partnership with Kosovo. In December UNMIK created the shells of future provisional government interior and justice ministries.

2006 In January Contact Group ministers further elaborated their joint position, specifying that “all possible efforts should be made to achieve a negotiated settlement in the course of 2006” and that it must “be acceptable to the people of Kosovo”. The ministers emphasised that the specificity of the Kosovo problem “shaped by the disintegration of Yugoslavia and consequent conflicts, ethnic cleansing and the events of 1999, and the extended period of international administration under UNSCR 1244, must be taken into account in settling Kosovo's status”. The EU Council advanced its plans for post-status mission presences,

⁷ HDI, according to UNDP Kosovo, *Kosovo Human Development Report* (Pristina, 2006).

⁸ This figure is as per old calculation where education index was calculated by literacy rates and enrolment in education instead from this year change in methodology was done and mean years of education and expected years of education are figures for calculation of education index. Overall the total figure for most countries has decreased

⁹ UNDP Kosovo, *Human Development Report 2004* (Pristina, 2004).

¹⁰ Kosovo Statistical Office

¹¹ UNDP Kosovo, *Kosovo Human Development Report* (Pristina, 2006).

¹² Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare (MLSW), *A Vocational Education and Training Strategy for Kosovo, Enhancing Employability (2005–2008)* (Pristina, December 2005).

¹³ UNDP Kosovo, *Kosovo MDG Factsheet 2010*

¹⁴ Source: International Crisis Group, *Kosovo Conflict History*, at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-issues/research-resources/conflict-histories/kosovo.aspx>

establishing planning teams in Kosovo for a rule of law (ESDP) mission, and an International Civilian Office (ICO)/EU Special Representative (EUSR) office. NATO concluded in favour of allowing and overseeing the establishment of a small, lightly equipped Kosovo Security Force and fed this into the emerging Ahtisaari Proposal. From February through September Ahtisaari's office (UNOSEK) engaged the negotiating teams of Kosovo and Serbia in several rounds of direct talks in Vienna and mounted a number of expert missions to both capitals.

2007 Ahtisaari unveiled his 63-page Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement to both Serbia's and Kosovo's leaders on 2 February. He forwarded the Proposal to the UN Secretariat, together with a four-page report defining Kosovo's political status. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon forwarded these to the Security Council on 26 March, expressing his full support for both documents. The Security Council heard Ahtisaari's presentation on 3 April and dispatched a fact-finding mission to Serbia and Kosovo on 25-28 April. After the UN Security Council was unable to agree on a resolution backing supervised independence, the six-nation Contact Group's 'Troika' – the EU, U.S. and Russia – started a new round of negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade. Talks ended on 10 December without a compromise status settlement; at a 14 December summit, EU leaders discussed preparations to proceed towards supervised independence based on the Ahtisaari plan and the deployment of a 1,800-strong EU security and rule of law mission.

2.2. Kosovo after February 2008

On February 17, 2008, the Kosovo Assembly adopted a resolution which declared Kosovo to be independent. At its meeting on February 18, 2008, the European Council acknowledged that through this resolution Kosovo had committed itself to the principles of democracy and equality of all its citizens; to the protection of the Serbs, other minorities, and their cultural and religious heritage; and to international supervision. Kosovo's independence, so far, has been recognized by a number of countries, including some within the European Union. The new coalition government includes ministers from the Serbian and Turkish communities and has made commitments concerning the wellbeing of minorities, in particular Kosovo Serbs. It has pledged to implement the plan for conditional independence devised by the UN Secretary-General's special representative, Martti Ahtisaari, and invited the International Civilian Representative (ICR), the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) and NATO (KFOR) to assume major responsibilities for implementing that plan.

The Kosovar parliament adopted the first Constitution of Independent Kosovo on April 9, 2008. This Constitution became effective on June 15, 2008. Based on the approved Constitution, the Kosovar institutions will take over responsibilities presently managed by the UN mission that has been administering Kosovo since 1999. The Constitution defines Kosovo as a parliamentary republic and a "State for all citizens" that guarantees the respect of minority rights. The official languages are Albanian and Serbian.

Kosovo is engaged in regular dialogue with the European Commission on reforms and progress is regularly monitored. The EU will support Kosovo's future development through an international civilian mission, headed by EU Special Representative, European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) Rule of Law Mission, and substantial support to economic and political development.¹⁵ The indicative EU assistance to Kosovo for the period 2007–2009 amounts to €199.1 million for the transition assistance and institution-building component and the cross-border cooperation component. The IPA allocation for Kosovo 2007–2009 is agreed in the Multi-annual Indicative Financial Framework (MIFF).¹⁶

¹⁵ European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Western Balkans: Enhancing the European perspective* (Brussels, 5 March 2008).

¹⁶ Kita, L. (2009). *HRD country analysis Kosovo*. Unpublished manuscript, European Training Foundation.

2.3. Governance

The political governance of Kosovo takes place within the framework of a democratic republic based on multi-party parliamentary representation. The Prime Minister of Kosovo is the head of government and the President of Kosovo is the head of state. Executive power is exercised by the government of Kosovo. Legislative power is vested in both the Executive and the Assembly of Kosovo. The Judiciary is independent of the executive and the legislature.¹⁷ The Executive of Kosovo is the collection of Kosovo institutions that exercises executive authority in Kosovo. It is headed by the Prime Minister of Kosovo, and includes the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Ministers, and various other ministers. The main political parties in Kosovo are the Democratic Party of Kosovo, Democratic League of Kosovo and Alliance for the Future of Kosova.¹⁸ The Assembly of Kosovo (legislative branch) has 120 members (the number formally specified by the Constitution), each elected for a four-year term. The Assembly includes twenty seats reserved for representatives of non-majority population. The Assembly passes all laws in Kosovo, ratifies international treaties, appoints the President, Prime Minister, ministers, and justices of all courts, adopts the budget and performs other duties as established by the Constitution.¹⁹

The assembly has made some progress in a number of areas, notably in streamlining its working procedures. Its capacity to scrutinize draft legislation and monitor its implementation after adoption needs further improvement. Parliamentary oversight of government needs to be enhanced.²⁰ Recently established government structures are functioning and have been able to maintain political stability.

There has been certain progress in local government reform. Effective implementation of decentralisation to the benefit of all communities remains a major challenge. Inter-ministerial coordination needs further strengthening. Political interference in high level appointments is an issue of concern.²¹ There has been some progress in public administration reform with the completion and the continuing implementation of regular functional review. Key legal acts need to be adopted. Ensuring the delivery of public services to all people in Kosovo and establishing a professional, accountable, accessible, representative public administration free from political interference is a key European Partnership priority. This has not been fully guaranteed. The capacity of Kosovo's public administration remains weak. Substantial efforts are needed to ensure the transparency of public appointments.

2.4. Judiciary

Kosovo is at an early stage in addressing priorities in the arena of justice. The justice system remains weak, vulnerable to political interference, and inefficient. There is a considerable backlog of cases (there are more than 200,000 cases waiting in courts). Structural problems of Kosovo's prosecution service need to be addressed. Kosovo's Judicial Council does not function effectively. Kosovo's judiciary is still in need of a major reform and the government needs to ensure the participation of the Kosovo Serb community in the process. The Kosovo Serbs also need to take proactive and constructive steps in this regard. Ensuring full respect for the rule of law is a key European partnership priority.²²

¹⁷ Wikipedia, Politics of Kosovo, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Kosovo

¹⁸ Ibidem

¹⁹ Ibidem

²⁰ European Commission Kosovo Progress Report 2009

²¹ Ibidem

²² Ibidem

The police, public prosecutors and courts are erratic performers, prone to political interference and abuse of office. Organized crime and corruption are widespread and growing. Realizing that prosperity, relations with the European Union (EU) and affirmation as an independent state depend on the rule of law, the government has taken important steps to replace key officials and pass long-delayed reforms. But critical weaknesses remain, notably in the courts, and the government, supported by the international community, must act swiftly to remedy them.²³

The judiciary is considered one of the weakest links in Kosovo's rule of law. This was recognized in the Ahtisaari CSP with the plan to establish EULEX. As a legacy of the previous nine years, Kosovo's body of applicable laws comprises UNMIK regulations, laws adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo in accordance with the new Constitution, certain former Yugoslav laws, and the laws of Serbia through Belgrade's parallel Kosovo structures in Kosovo Serb areas, especially in northern Kosovo. This has continued to hamper the delivery of justice, as judges are not always certain of the legal basis for their decisions. No system is in place to promote judges and hire new ones.²⁴

2.5. Economy

With a GDP per capita of €1,760, Kosovo is one of the poorest countries in Europe. With a 47% unemployment rate and a very low 29% employment rate, Kosovo has the weakest employment track record in Europe. Kosovo's 53% labor participation rate among the working age population is substantially below the ECA average of 65%.²⁵ In addition, there is poor and almost non-existing gender sensitive economic framework (articulating economical, legal and educational empowerment of women) to produce gender sensitive policies and practices to be adopted by relevant institutions: Finance, Trade, and Economy.²⁶

Even before the conflict of 1999, Kosovo suffered from isolation and a lack of investment. The conflict itself resulted in infrastructure damage, a drop in agricultural and industrial production, and a frozen financial sector unable to make even the most basic payments such as wages. Since 1999, large-scale financial and technical assistance from the EU (€2.4 billion in total) and other donors has helped to promote substantial progress in economic reconstruction and institution building. Much of this effort is being channelled through the European Agency for Reconstruction, which managed aid projects worth over €1 billion from the EU CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation) programme. In 2007, the Commission launched its successor, the Instrument for Preaccession Assistance (IPA). A key element in EU efforts to rebuild Kosovo is the country's inclusion in the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for the Western Balkans, and in particular a European Partnership adopted in 2006. Under the SAP, the EU works together with Kosovar authorities to identify priorities and reforms, which then form the framework for EU support. Promoting economic development and establishing a functioning market economy is a key element of the SAP.²⁷

The government of Kosovo has adopted its fourth Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), covering the years 2010–2012. This document has not, however, been used as a medium-term policy planning tool. The path documented in the MTEF for Kosovo's fiscal and

²³ International Crisis Group, The rule of law in independent Kosovo, at

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/kosovo/204-the-rule-of-law-in-independent-kosovo.aspx>

²⁴ Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009, at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/nit/2009/Kosovo-final.pdf>

²⁵ World Bank, Kosovo, Country Brief 2010, at

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/KOSOVOEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20629286~menuPK:297777~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:297770,00.html>

²⁶ Only 4-8% of property legally owned and registered to women, Only 3% of personal loans given to women by banks, Only 4-6% of all SMEs are registered to women's name Individual businesses: 42% or micro enterprises 58%, Decision-making in the business at least 25% by male members of the family

²⁷ Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, *European Economy News*, Issue 8, October 2007.

external balances appears difficult to sustain and the White Paper on social policies is not included, despite commitments made by the authorities at the 2008 International Donor Conference.²⁸ In March 2009, the first meeting in the framework of the fiscal surveillance mechanism with the European Commission took place in Pristina. On 29 June 2009, Kosovo became a member of the International Monetary Fund and of the World Bank.²⁹

Overall, political consensus on the fundamentals of market-oriented economic policies has been maintained, however, the legal framework and practices of modern public financial management are still lacking.³⁰

Over the past few years Kosovo's economy has shown significant progress in transitioning to a market-based system and maintaining macroeconomic stability, but it is still highly dependent on the international community and a Kosovar diaspora for financial and technical assistance. Remittances from this diaspora—Kosovars located mainly in Germany and Switzerland—are estimated to account for about 14% of GDP and donor-financed activities and aid for another 7.5%.

The official currency of Kosovo is the Euro. Kosovo's tie to the Euro has helped keep core inflation low. Kosovo has kept the government budget in balance as a result of efficient value added tax (VAT) collection at the borders and inefficient budget execution. In order to help integrate Kosovo into regional economic structures, UNMIK signed (on behalf of Kosovo) its accession to the Central Europe Free Trade Area (CEFTA) in 2006. However, Serbia and Bosnia have refused to recognize Kosovo's customs stamp or extend reduced tariff privileges for Kosovo products under CEFTA.

2.6. Poverty

Poverty remains persistent and widespread: 45% of the population is living below the national poverty line and an estimated 17% are extremely poor, i.e., unable to meet basic nutritional needs. Extreme poverty is disproportionately high among children, the elderly, households with disabled members and female-headed households. Almost two in three are poor people, while half of them are women of all ages.

A World Bank study finds that living standards have remained unchanged, mainly because real economic growth in the last four years has been slow and labor market conditions have been poor as a result.³¹ The study defines poverty as having an income of less than €45 per person (in adult units as defined by the OECD) per month in 2008. The report finds that about 45% of the population had consumption levels below this line. About 15% of the population is estimated to be extremely poor, defined as individuals who have difficulty meeting their basic nutritional needs. Meanwhile, inequality, though low, shows signs of increasing, especially in rural areas. Poverty is largely a rural problem. Almost two in three of all poor people live in rural areas. Rural poverty has increased slightly, while urban poverty has declined, over time. Poverty levels also vary widely across regions. Geographically, three out of five poor people live in just three regions: Mitrovica, Prishtina, and Prizren.

The groups most at risk of poverty appear to be larger households (especially with six or more members); dependent households; female-headed households; the unemployed (albeit with a

²⁸ European Commission Kosovo Progress Report 2009

²⁹ Ibidem

³⁰ Ibidem

³¹ World Bank, Kosovo Poverty Assessment Report 2008, at

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/EXTECAREGTOPHEANUT/0..contentMDK:21761678~menuPK:511551~pagePK:64215727~piPK:64215696~theSitePK:511545,00.html>

significant working poor, including the self-employed and those in the mining sector); and persons who did not complete a primary education. Children appear to account for over one third of all the extremely poor in Kosovo, a very worrying finding on which more research and policy advocacy is needed. Gender, ethnicity, and disability are all closely correlated with exclusion, often on the basis of discriminatory practices.³²

2.7. Labour Market and Youth Employment

Kosovo has an active workforce of 920,000 (0.92 million) people. Given Kosovo's population of 2 million, that corresponds to a labour participation rate of 46.2%. This rate is not only low by EU standards, but also in comparison with other countries in the Balkans region, where such rates normally do not fall below 60%. There are at least three reasons for Kosovo's relatively low labour participation rate: (i) Kosovo's comparatively young population, (ii) an increase in cases when people leave the labour market prior to retirement age, and (iii) women's participation is comparably low. The labour market participation of young man and young women aged 15 to 24, who represent 21% of Kosovo's total population, differs by age. More than half (60%) of young people aged 19 and younger are more interested in continuing their education and therefore are not seeking to enter the labour market. Starting at age of 20, however, most young people (69%) are considered active participants in the labour market.³³

In 2009, unemployment continued to plague 45.4% of Kosovo's population. Youth have been among the most affected. The young, working population aged 15 to 24 comprised 20% of Kosovo's labour force (48.1%) and 73% of them were unemployed. Such high unemployment rates are unsustainable. Not only is high youth unemployment positively related to social instability and higher crime rates, but also means that youth lack reasons for remaining in Kosovo.³⁴

2.8. Civil Society and media

During 2009, civil society groups presented agendas organized around thematic issues, which is seen as a direct impact of Kosovo's declaration of independence. This specialization and opens a space for a stronger and more credible role of NGOs. However, civil society and nongovernmental organizations still need to develop their own strategic vision. Civil society organizations (CSOs) are involved in policy analysis and recommendation, review and oversight of corruption in government and implementation of laws (especially the Law on Access to Official Documents), and government compliance with human rights statutes.³⁵ CSOs face challenges related to internal tensions arising from competition for foreign funding, unresolved ethnic divisions, public mistrust, and a lack of focus that has left many organizations willing to reshape themselves to fit donor priorities.³⁶

The first coalitions in Kosovo started operating in 1997 and included the Kosovo Women's Network. This network was officially registered in 2000.³⁷ Representing the interests of 85 women's organizations from all ethnic groups in Kosovo, KWN is a leader among civil society organizations in Kosovo and the region. In 2006, it became the first NGO network in Kosovo to adopt a code of conduct, setting an example of transparency and accountability. KWN also

³² European Commission, Social protection and social inclusion in Kosovo 2008, at <http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=4443&langId=en>

³³ UNDP, Human Development Report, Youth – a new generation for a new Kosovo, 2006, at http://www.ks.undp.org/repository/docs/hdr_eng.pdf

³⁴ Kosovar Stability Initiative, Unleashing change – Voices of Kosovo's youth 2010, at http://www.iksweb.org/repository/docs/iks_unleashing_change_eng.pdf

³⁵ Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009, at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/nit/2009/Kosovo-final.pdf>

³⁶ UNDP, Kosovo Human Development Report 2008 "Civil Society and Development"

³⁷ UNDP, Kosovo Human Development Report 2008 "Civil Society and Development", p102

produces research reports and policy papers, including *Monitoring the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Kosovo, The Extent of Gender-Based Violence and the Impact on Women's Reproductive Health in Kosovo, and Domestic Violence in Kosovo*.³⁸

Freedom of the media in Kosovo is well protected by the legislative framework, but legal and institutional mechanisms do not prevent political pressure on the media. The OSCE accused Kosovo politicians and political parties of regarding the media as a “mouthpiece” and criticized the Assembly of Kosovo for increasingly misusing its authority to exercise oversight of independent institutions, particularly the broadcast regulator and the public broadcaster. Regular and disproportionate paid advertising by the government and its agencies in newspapers close to selected political parties was a common practice, while independent newspapers were often threatened with exclusion from such advertising if they published critical reports.³⁹

In its 2010 Press Freedom Index, *Reporters Without Borders* ranked Kosovo 92nd, down from its rank of 75th in 2009. There are eight privately owned national dailies, but some of them are linked to political parties or financial groups that have developed in their sphere of influence. Editorial independence is compromised by the financial dependence of the press. In addition, the self-censorship is aggravated by the absence of any real social status for journalists.⁴⁰

2.9. Gender

In spite of eight difficult years as an international protectorate, Kosovo was able to create a solid legal infrastructure and institutional mechanisms for achieving gender equality. The most significant accomplishment in this regard was the development of the National Action Plan for Achieving Gender Equality in Kosovo. Kosovo has had a law on gender equality since 2004 and the Agency for Gender Equality (PM office) that monitors its implementation. A Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women is integrated in Kosovo constitution. All Kosovo municipalities have a gender officer. Beginning in 2009, UNDP, AGE and other stakeholders were preparing the law against domestic violence that was approved in July 2010.

Since 2002, following a decision by the Central Elections Commission, all political parties in Kosovo must ensure that at least one third of the candidates they put forward in any given election must be women. As a result, 30% of the members of parliament in the Assembly of Kosovo are women. This fact alone ranks Kosovo high internationally regarding participation of women in politics. Participation of women in other important institutions is also increasing. For example, 13.8 % of Kosovo Police Service employees are women.⁴¹

While there are a number of positive gender-related developments in legislative and institutional areas in Kosovo, there are still problems with implementation and budget allocation.

The political development of Kosovar women has been impeded by numerous, immensely difficult challenges. During the decades after World War II, the main obstacles to women's political involvement were illiteracy and a patriarchal mindset, whereas during the 1990s, women were excluded from political activities. For these reasons, intense and concerted institutional effort is required to remove the deficiencies and gaps created in the past. Excluding guarantees of gender equity in the new Kosovo Constitution would be a radical change of direction and a setback affecting the entire society.⁴²

³⁸ UNDP, Kosovo Human Development Report 2008 “Civil Society and Development”, p103

³⁹ Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009, at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/nit/2009/Kosovo-final.pdf>

⁴⁰ Reporters without Borders, Press Freedom Index 2010, at <http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2010.1034.html>

⁴¹ Luljeta Vuniqi, Women's role in independent Kosovo, 3. April 2008 Hochschule Luzern, at www.hslu.ch/s-luljeta_vuniqi_fjalimi_per_zvicerr.pdf

⁴² Ibidem

2.10. Environment

Although Kosovo lacks systematic monitoring of air, water, and soil, the limited amount of information available paints a very grim picture. The Kosovo Electric Company (KEK) produces 98% of Kosovo's electricity from lignite coal. The estimated 25 tons of dust and ash emitted into the atmosphere every hour is 74 times the excise allowed by European standards. Industrial development is seen as a sign of progress while care for the environment is still considered an unaffordable luxury concern. To date, the focus of environmental policy in Kosovo seems to be on fulfilling standards toward EU accession, rather than reflecting a true governmental commitment to environmental protection. Candidate countries must align their national legal systems with EU legislation and environmental protection is among the most complicated policy areas in this process.⁴³

In compliance with the EU Directive for Large Combustion Plants, the government is closing the highly polluting, coal-fired "Kosova A" power plant. The World Bank is helping address the resulting electricity supply gap by joining with the EU to sponsor the "New Kosovo" power plant that will reduce ash yield by 50%. The government of Kosovo is also making plans to remove 10,000 tons of hazardous chemical waste and efforts to reduce carbon emissions also include plans for wind and hydroelectric power.⁴⁴

Other European states and EU members-to-be are following an integrated approach that considers both the human environment (waste, wastewater, air, and food) and the natural environment (protection of nature and species, zoning, and production of alternative energy). An awareness of this interrelationship between the natural and human environments does not seem to exist in Kosovo at the political, social, or even international level and there is little environmental protection in Kosovo. International environmental organizations like Greenpeace, the Nature Conservancy, and the World Wildlife Fund do not have branch offices in Kosovo. Kosovar society is still dealing with the results of haphazard industrialization, urbanization, and the unpalatable changes associated with the transition to a market-based economy.⁴⁵ Kosovo does not have any water treatment facility for waste water and that solid waste collection is organized only for 40 % of households.

⁴³ Kosovar Stability Initiative, Thinking Green, June 2009, at <http://www.iksweb.org/repository/docs/Thinking%20Green.pdf>

⁴⁴ David L. Philips, Realizing Kosovo's Independence, May 2010

⁴⁵ Ibidem

CHAPTER 3: UNDP IN KOSOVO

UNDP began its operations in Kosovo in 1999, in the immediate post-conflict situation, and since then has delivered more than USD 150 million in assistance. Programme activities have evolved progressively from crisis response and recovery to longer term capacity development.

The primary and overarching objective of United Nations Development Programme in Kosovo is the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals, and promotion of United Nations fundamental principles. The core dimension of the UNDP approach is investing in human development, wealth creation (with emphasis on issues such as entrepreneurship and job creation), institutional reform, and capacity development⁴⁶.

The 2005–2010 Results and Resources Framework (RRF) for UNDP activities comprises three main components: Democratic Governance, Poverty Alleviation and Crisis Recovery. In the course of implementation, these components were further defined and subdivided into the four thematic areas below:

- Democratic Governance (including Environment)
- Economic Development and Employment
- Social Inclusion
- Justice and Security / Rule of Law⁴⁷

In 2008, prior to the EU- and WB-led donor conference on Kosovo (July 2008), the UN Kosovo Team (UNKT) produced a programming document for Kosovo covering the period 2009–2011 that was developed based on Kosovo’s 2009–2011 Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). This document remained a draft and is already outdated.

The primary implementation modality of UNDP activities in Kosovo has been direct implementation (DEX), allowing UNDP to exhibit its strength in delivery, resource mobilization, and flexibility in responding to the emerging needs on the ground. UNDP has also been mindful of the need to utilize available institutional capacities in Kosovo when possible.

For the period of 2005 through 2009 the annual financial value of the programme portfolio ranged between USD 12 and 23 million (see table 1). These funds were mostly mobilized as non-core funds. Core Resource (TRAC1 and 2) made up less than 5% of the total programme resources. BCPR funding (TRAC3 and other resources) of USD 3 million mainly supports Rule of Law/Justice and Security and a Regional IDP initiative.

Table 1. UNDP-Kosovo: programme delivery and resource mobilization

Indicators	Target 2010	Achieved 2009	Achieved 2008	Achieved 2007	Achieved 2006	Indicators
Programme Delivery	USD 18 m ⁴⁸	USD 23,1 m	USD 15.2 m	USD 16.2 m	USD 14.6 m	Programme Delivery
Total non-core resources mobilized	USD 15.5m	USD 12,1 m	USD 43 m	USD 18 m	USD 15.4 m	Total non-core resources mobilized

⁴⁶ <http://www.ks.undp.org/?cid=2,154>

⁴⁷ BCPR shaped that section of UNDP Kosovo and framed the approach and funding on SCR 1325 and the UNDP 8 point agenda in crisis and prevention context supporting as well gender mainstreaming and women empowerment for Peace and Security. Also BCPR has adopted a policy as mandatory 20 % of budget for women and gender mainstreaming (projects programs) and August 2009 fielded a Senior Gender Advisor CPR at Senior Management Level.


⁴⁸ Based on 100% delivery of on-going project budgets

CHAPTER 4: PROGRAMME DESIGN

4.1. Kosovo RRF and other important strategic frameworks

Due to the unique status of Kosovo, currently there is no (and can not be) a Country Programme until Kosovo is fully recognized as a country. Thus, the 2005–2010 Results and Resources Framework (RRF) for UNDP activities in Kosovo has been included as an amendment to the UNDP-Serbia Country Programme.

Figure 1. Results and Resources Framework Kosovo 2005-2009



In its strategic plan for 2008–2011⁴⁹ UNDP clearly identifies its focus:

...supporting national processes to accelerate the progress of human development with a view to eradicate poverty through development, equitable and sustained economic growth, and capacity development. This means that all UNDP policy advice, technical support, advocacy, and contributions to strengthening coherence in global development must be aimed at one end result: real improvements in people's lives and in the choices and opportunities open to them.

The UNDP strategy also describes two mutually reinforcing roles UNDP should play worldwide at the service of the international community, Member States and society at large. On the one hand, UNDP has to strengthen its role in “supporting the promotion of coordination, efficiency and effectiveness of the United Nations system as a whole at the country level.” On the other, UNDP will continue to provide “policy and technical support by working on and advocating for the multisectoral challenges of poverty reduction, democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, and environment and sustainable development.”

⁴⁹ UNDP strategic plan, 2008–2011 Accelerating global progress on human development. Geneva, 2008

The Kosovo action plan for the implementation of the European Partnership in 2006 was focused on the following priorities:

- Improvement of ethnic relations
- Fight against corruption
- Increase the awareness of political staff and civil servants to understand and respect their specific roles
- Local government reform

In 2006, UNDP-Kosovo turned to six outcomes shown in the figure below that were consistently used for planning and reporting purposes (in the ROARs in particular). The fourth thematic area (Justice and Security / Rule of Law⁵⁰) has been added to the initial three areas.

Figure 2. From RRF to 6 outcomes




Figure 2 shows that the new outcomes were successive and inclusive as compared to the RRF priorities and outcomes.

UNDP Kosovo always assigned a gender focal point within the cluster of Justice and Security. The gender focal point attended key related events and prepared reports when asked. Initiatives were taken that resulted in producing a Kosovo profile on gender with one training session at UNDP office (2007) followed by implementation of two key initiatives with funding from the 2008 UNDP Gender Thematic Trust Fund Initiative:

- working with women politicians and women voters on gender issues, monitoring the performance of elected candidates and engaging in dialogue
- communication between Serb and Albanian women in Kosovo toward peace and security

These initiatives lead to a gender strategy for UNDP Kosovo (Jan 2009). Initiatives involving partnerships with five NGOs were not supported to become full-fledged programmes. BCPR supported the first stand-alone, three-year project on women and empowerment.

⁵⁰ BCPR shaped that section of UNDP Kosovo and framed the approach and funding on SCR 1325 and the UNDP 8 point agenda in crisis and prevention context supporting as well gender mainstreaming and women empowerment for Peace and Security. Also BCPR has adopted a policy as mandatory 20 % of budget for women and gender mainstreaming (projects programs)

However from mid-2009 on, the Gender Equality Strategy and the UNDP 8-Point Agenda from SCR 1325 were indeed considered by UNDP Kosovo. A gender audit in September 2009 on implementation of the Global Gender Strategy for the year 2009, conducted by the Senior Gender Advisor, showed a need for a comprehensive program in mainstreaming gender and women's empowerment in all departments of UNDP Kosovo (operations, finances, budget, and cluster programmes and projects). The audit demonstrated the need to accurately report on activities throughout the program cycle from a gender perspective with gender disaggregated data and gender dimensions.

Early in 2010, the mandatory gender marker resulted in qualifying all projects inscribed in Atlas from a gender perspective. It was apparent that:

- gender equality was a “principal” objective of the output/project in only one out of 31 projects being implemented
- Two more projects had gender equality as a “significant” objective
- About 55% of the projects (17 out of 31) had outputs that contributed in some way, though not significantly, to gender equality
- 35.5% of the projects (11) were not expected to contribute noticeably to gender equality

Tailored services on gender mainstreaming and women's empowerment were deployed and resulted in a significant change.

It is important to mention here that after the Senior Gender Advisor joined the UNDP Kosovo team in 2009, the gender component of UNDP activities strengthened significantly.

Conclusions

- *The initial programme orientation and selection of areas of focus for UNDP in Kosovo were relevant to the UNDP corporate strategy, MYFF goals and EPAP priorities in Kosovo.*
- *The gender component of the UNDP Kosovo programme was underdeveloped but now UNDP Kosovo has greater capacity and accountability on the integration of gender mainstreaming.*

4.2. UNDP Kosovo Programme Model

4.2.1. Programme model: key definitions and framework for analysis


A programme model describes a programme (and project) as an intervention with connections between inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes and impact. Programme models are often presented as chains of results (see Fig. 3).

Outputs are tangible, time-bound products resulting from a completion of activities and largely under the control of a development intervention. *Outcomes*, by contrast, are changes in the real world, triggered by a set of outputs and to a great extent not under the control of a project or programme. *Impact* is the overall and long-term effect of an intervention. Outcomes of a particular programme only contribute to its impact but do not guarantee that the impact will take place as it depends on many other factors.

Projects are “unique, transient endeavours undertaken to achieve a desired outcome.”⁵¹
Programme is often defined as a set of related projects that “together achieve a beneficial change of a strategic nature for an organization.”⁵²

⁵¹ Association for Project Management. (2005). *APM Body of Knowledge. Definitions*. Retrieved 20 October 2010, from <https://www.apm.org.uk/download.asp?fileID=362>.

Figure 3. Chain of Results⁵³



Because projects are designed and implemented in a programmatic context, before we analyse the UNDP Kosovo Programme model it is essential to (a) clarify the difference between ‘programme’ and ‘project’ and, (b) explain how projects should be harmonized with their programme framework. To do so we shall use an approach⁵⁴ developed outside the UN system that is complementary to the UNDP manuals and regulations in the area of programming.

Figure 4 shows how the logic of projects that constitute a programme should be harmonized with the logic of the programme. The chains of results (outputs-outcomes-impact) should be well defined for both the programme and its component projects. Because a programme is no more than a logical framework for a set of related projects, activities, by definition, can only take place within projects. Projects *contribute* to programme outcomes, but programme outcomes can be *achieved* only if all the contributing projects are implemented successfully and their respective contributions made as planned. Thus, programme outcomes should be treated as the impact of the projects that constitute the programme. In the same logic, project outcomes become, it turn, programme outputs.

Figure 4. Harmonization of projects and programme

Project	Programme
	Programme Impact
Project Impact	↔
	Programme Outcome
Project Outcome	↔
	Programme Outputs
Project Outputs	
Project Activities	

⁵² Association for Project Management. (2005). *APM Body of Knowledge. Definitions*. Retrieved 20 October 2010, from <https://www.apm.org.uk/download.asp?fileID=362>.

⁵³ UNDP. *Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results.*, NY, 2009, p.55

⁵⁴ Kuzmin, A. (2010). *From 'monitoring and evaluation' towards 'planning, monitoring and evaluation'*. Paper presented at the International Evaluation School.

Planning, therefore, should start within the broader strategic framework of the *programme*: identifying its expected *impact*, the expected *outcome* that will contribute to the programme's impact, and a set of *outputs* that will trigger the expected outcome. Once this foundation is laid, the default impact of any project developed within a programme must be the programme outcome, otherwise the project will not contribute to achieving the programme outcome. Project outcome can be taken from the programme outputs but may be somewhat new. In the latter case, any such project outcome included in programme outputs would enrich those outputs.

The UNDP Handbook correctly notes “an outcome should not describe how it will be achieved and should avoid phrases such as ‘improved through’ or ‘supported by means of.’”⁵⁵ This is important to separate outcomes from outputs and activities and make the programme logic clear.

The UNDP Handbook also points out “an outcome should be measurable using indicators. It is important that the formulation of the outcome statement takes into account the need to measure progress in relation to the outcome and to verify when it has been achieved.”⁵⁶

To analyze UNDP Kosovo Programme Model we need to:

- 1) Assess the chains of results in the programme
- 2) Assess how the current programme outcomes are formulated⁵⁷
- 3) Find out if the outcomes are measurable with indicators
- 4) Assess how projects are harmonized with the programme

4.2.2. Chains of results and formulation of outcomes

While developing chains of results for a programme or project one has to pay attention to both ‘boxes’ (expected results at various levels) and ‘arrows’ (explanations of how the results are inter-related). The latter is the key to presenting the programme logic.

UNDP Kosovo RRF for 2005–2009 includes three chains of results.

The first chain:

- a) If competencies are clarified and codified (output), then the civil service will become more effective and responsive (outcome).
- b) If the civil service becomes effective and responsive (outcome), then democratic structures in Kosovo will consolidate and the transparency and efficiency of the administration will increase (provincial priority = impact)

In this chain, output is described in the terms of *activities* to be implemented rather than *results* to be achieved. This explains what UNDP is going to do (help the government clarify and codify competencies) rather than what the immediate results of that activity will be.

Outcome is described in the terms of results, but there is a logical gap between activities and outcome because the output is not properly formulated. We also think that the outcome statement is far too ambitious. UNDP indeed can make a contribution to the achievement of this result but can not take responsibility for achieving it as it depends on many other factors that are beyond UNDP control. Thus, this looks more like an expected impact (the overall, long-term effect of an intervention) rather than an outcome (changes in the real world, triggered by a set of outputs).

The impact statement includes three different results (consolidation, transparency, and efficiency), only one of which (efficiency) has a direct logical connection with the outcome.

⁵⁵ UNDP. Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results., NY, 2009, p.57

⁵⁶ UNDP. Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results., NY, 2009, p.58

⁵⁷ We put a special emphasis on the programme outcomes since this is the primary focus of our evaluation.

The second chain:

- a) If pro-poor policies are devised and implemented at central and municipal levels (output), then extreme poverty will be reduced (outcome).
- b) If extreme poverty is reduced (outcome), then economic development will be promoted and employment opportunities will increase (impact).

This output is described in result terms, but is beyond the control of UNDP in Kosovo, which means that it looks more like an outcome. In this case, the *level* of output needs to be clarified.

The outcome in this chain is identical to MDG #1⁵⁸ and should be considered an impact rather than an outcome.

This chain's impact includes two different statements: "economic development" describes a priority arena rather than a result and "increased employment opportunities" is more like a programme outcome than an impact.

The third chain:

- a) If the civil society is "more engaged" (output), then relations among social groups and between citizens and institutions will be normalized (outcome);
- b) if the relations among social groups and between citizens and institutions are normalized (outcome), then all ethnic communities into Kosovan society will be integrated (impact).

In this chain, the output is stated more like an outcome and the outcome is more likely at the level of impact. The impact statement is appropriately stated.

We can conclude that the major problem with outcomes in the UNDP Kosovo RRF is that they are formulated as impacts—long-term effects, beyond the control of the UNDP in Kosovo—rather than as results for which UNDP can take responsibility.

The current UNDP Kosovo outcomes are shown in Box 2 .

Box 2. Current UNDP Kosovo Outcomes

- Sustainable development plans/policies effectively respond to the need of stakeholders (central & local government), as well as promote employment and environmental protection (KOS_OUTCOME3)
- Increased employment opportunities through piloting active labour market policies and socio-economic assistance (KOS_OUTCOME4)
- An effective and responsive civil service established at central and municipal levels (KOS_OUTCOME9)
- Effective judicial and policing institutions established and contribute to increased personal security (KOS_OUTCOME11)
- Improved accountability and transparency in the public sector (KOS_OUTCOME14)
- Living conditions and relation (Inter-ethnic, government & public) improved in communities through increased local ownership of reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts (KOS_OUTCOME23)

⁵⁸ Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger


There is room for improvement in the programme logic descriptions. Some outcomes include more than one result (e.g. 3, 9, 23), some include an explanation of how the result will be achieved (e.g. 4, 23), and some include results that should be referenced as impacts rather than as outcomes (e.g. 11, 23).

In some cases programme impact can easily be ‘unpacked’ from the existing statements:

- UNDP will contribute to increased personal security (*impact level*) through establishment of effective judicial and policing institutions (*outcome level*),⁵⁹
- UNDP will contribute to increased employment opportunities (*impact level*) through piloting active labour market policies (*outcome level*).⁶⁰

It is apparent that the current programme framework and UNDP Kosovo RRF share a common problem: outcomes are more like impact statements, which creates a gap in the programme logic (Fig. 5).

Figure 5. Gap in the programme logic



This problem is largely a result of the way UNDP defines outcomes and impact—with no clear distinction between them—in UNDP manuals and handbooks:

- “Impacts are actual or intended changes in human development as measured by people’s well-being. Impacts generally capture changes in people’s lives.”⁶¹
- Outcomes are actual or intended changes in development conditions that interventions are seeking to support. An outcome statement should ideally communicate a change in ... the quality of life for people.”⁶²

The project outcome statement, “Conduct a comprehensive stock-taking exercise of the civil society movement and creation of an on-line resource facility, including data on NGOs” illustrates problems in describing chains of results at the project level as well.⁶³

The problem with project outcomes in contrast to programme outcomes is embedded in the ROAR and Atlas formats requiring the use of programme outcomes as project outcomes. Though this is not a Kosovo-specific issue, we believe that the solution could be Kosovo specific.

⁵⁹ KOS_OUTCOME11

⁶⁰ KOS_OUTCOME4

⁶¹ UNDP. Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results., NY, 2009, p.56

⁶² UNDP. Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results., NY, 2009, p.56

⁶³ We carefully studied ALL THE PROJECT DOCUMENTS available online and concluded that most of them do not have clearly defined chain of results.

Kosovo projects can be properly harmonized with the CP and for reporting purposes, the existing formats can be used until the issue is resolved at the UNDP headquarters level.

Conclusions:

- While UNDP Kosovo priorities and strategic intents are very clear from the RRF and outcomes, there are flaws in the chains of results.
- In many cases outcomes are identical to impact, which creates gaps in the programme logic.
- Problems with outcomes result to a great extent from the unclear distinction between outcome and impact.

Recommendations

- Assess both results (the boxes) and causal linkages (the arrows) in the programme results chains at the planning stage.
- Make sure that the outcomes are not identical with the impact.
- Conduct an internal UNDP-Kosovo workshop on programming, discuss and develop a common approach to describing programme and project models.

4.2.3. Indicators

UNDP templates for programming and reporting require indicators and UNDP provides clear guidelines on how to develop good indicators. In particular, the UNDP handbook provides examples of outcome indicators that clearly show that indicators help answer the question “What can we see to know if change is happening?” Indicators are about viewing change objectively. A baseline is what we start with, a target is what we aim at, and numbers—percentages, ratios, counts, and proportions—objectively indicate what’s happening (or not) between the two.

UNDP Kosovo RRF includes the following indicators:

Table 2. Indicators from UNDP-Kosovo RRF for 2005-2009

Outcome indicators	Output indicators
1. Public satisfaction of government services	1. Number of institutions completing codification of competencies
2. Level of extreme poverty	2. Unemployment rate in disadvantaged areas
3. Fluctuation of trust in institutions	3. Level of volunteerism
4. Fluctuation of perception of personal security	

All seven of these indicators from the UNDP-Kosovo RRF are defined as numbers and baselines and targets are established properly for six out of seven of the indicators⁶⁴. Because they provide important information on the situation in Kosovo, they help us understand if change is happening. But most of these indicators share a common problem: they do not allow us to

⁶⁴ It is important to note that there is a major problem with statistics in Kosovo. The last population census was conducted in 1981 and because the Kosovo Statistical Office does not generate statistics that are appropriate for measuring progress in economic and social issues, there is an unavoidable problem with baselines.

conclude if change is happening due to UNDP’s contribution or what and how UNDP is contributing to the change that is happening.

Thus, this approach does not permit causal attribution of changes in outcomes to changes in inputs. UNDP monitors the situation in Kosovo by using the seven indicators mentioned above, but does not monitor its own programme. These indicators could be used to monitor UNDP contribution only if we can guarantee that the UNDP contribution is the only factor that substantially affects the overall situation in Kosovo. This would be true of competency codification only. In all the other cases, such as perception of personal security or level of extreme poverty, there will be quite a few other major factors besides UNDP interventions that affect the situation in Kosovo and the selected indicators.

Another common problem with indicators in UNDP documents (including ROARs and project documents) is a misinterpretation of what an indicator should be and what baseline and target are about. To illustrate this we may start with Output Indicator #1 (the number of institutions completing codification of competencies). While the indicator itself is defined as a ‘number’, the baseline and target for it are narratives and present descriptions of the initial situation and the desired change:

- competencies not defined (“baseline”)
- division of responsibilities between central and municipal level defined and codified (“target”)

A more extreme example of such misinterpretation is presented in Fig. 5. While the indicator is defined as a “level of satisfaction” with certain services (this could indeed be a number), both baseline and target are purely narrative. Interestingly, in this case the “baseline” describes the initial situation while the “target” describes activities implemented. The box “achieved” is checked in the ROAR-2009 for this outcome. The questions are: What is achieved and how do we know that?

Figure 6. Misinterpretation of baseline and target in the UNDP Kosovo ROAR for 2009

<p>What do we want to achieve (outcome): Effective judicial and policing institutions established and contribute to increased personal security</p>	<p>Baseline: - Uncertainty and complexity in legal and political life of people - Lack of actual legislation which address areas of concern (weapons control, private security, domestic violence, etc) - No institutional solution for resettlement of former KPC troops</p>	<p>Target: - map the main areas of insecurity - strengthening synergies between thematic areas (women security and access to justice, etc.) - increase the public trust and satisfaction with security providers and institutions by the means of embedding the staff within them - foster the drafting and adoption of security related legislation, - gender sensitive security sector legislation improved - decreased number of armed related violence - at least 1800 KPC troops supported in resettlement and reintegration process</p>
<p>What can we see to know if change is happening (indicator): Level of satisfaction with policing and security services to enhance community safety.</p>		

...and the ROAR says: “achieved”

This case also provides a good example of how the way an outcome is formulated affects the possibility of measuring it. The outcome in figure 5 actually describes two results: “new institutions established” and “personal security increased.” In order to develop indicators we have to answer the question, How do we know that we achieved the desired outcome? And we immediately face the problem of choosing which of the results should be measured. In this case, personal security has been chosen (impact level) and creation of institutions (outcome level) has naturally dropped out.

Unfortunately, many other indicators in projects implemented by UNDP Kosovo are improperly designed. For instance, one can find phrases incorrectly used as indicators such as “long-term training programme implemented,” “training centre set up,” or “programme developed.” Correctly formed indicators should answer the questions, How do we know that the long-term training programme is implemented? How do we know that the training centre is set up? and, How do we know that the programme is developed?

Conclusions

- *There is room for improving the quality of UNDP Kosovo Programme indicators.*

Recommendations


- *UNDP should pay special attention to defining indicators and to the way baselines and targets are defined and described.*
- *UNDP-Kosovo may greatly benefit from training on how to develop indicators. This might become part of the training on programming recommended earlier in this report.*

4.2.4. Logical harmonization of UNDP Projects and Programme in Kosovo

For the purposes of our analysis it is important to note that both projects *and* programmes are implemented under the umbrella of the UNDP Kosovo Programme. For example, the 3-year Rule of Law Programme for Kosovo included a number of projects that contributed to the programme’s outcome. Another example would be UNDP Kosovo Democratic Governance & Environment Programme for 2009–2011 that includes four main components. To distinguish between the country programme and programmes that are implemented as a part of it, we shall call the latter “thematic sub-programmes” (TSP). Some projects implemented under the umbrella of thematic sub-programmes included smaller projects such as providing grants to community-based groups.

Because the Kosovo program has multiple layers, harmonization should take place “between” neighboring layers (see Fig. 7).

Figure 7. Logical harmonization of Kosovo Programme components: multiple layers



All UNDP thematic sub-programmes and projects were developed in compliance with the existing rules. Each of the TSPs, for instance, included a country programme outcome the TSP should contribute to. In that respect harmonization was implemented.

But country programme outcomes had to be considered TSP outcomes as well. We believe that this created gaps in programme logic and in fact damaged harmonization of the programme in general. Interestingly, the three levels of results (outputs, outcomes, impact) are replaced by two levels (outputs and outcomes) in UNDP manuals. Loosing the sense of the impact level in a strategic programme framework has harmful consequences in the present context and in contexts far beyond UNDP-Kosovo.

Conclusions

- *UNDP Programme in Kosovo includes not only projects, but thematic sub-programs as well. Some projects, in turn, include sub-projects.*
- *Projects of the UNDP Kosovo Programme considered project outcomes synonymous with Kosovo programme outcomes. This allowed only limited harmonization because project-level outcomes were not formulated, removing the critical link in the chain of results between project outputs and programme outcomes.*

Recommendations

- *Include impact level results in the programme design at all levels.*
- *Harmonize the logic between programme levels.*

CHAPTER 5: PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION

5.1. How the country program unfolded


Table 3 shows the number of projects in UNDP Kosovo project portfolio by years. The total number of projects per year increased from 30 in 2006 to 51 in 2009. Most projects were implemented in the three key thematic areas: Democratic Governance and Environment (43 projects since 2006), Social Inclusion (39) and Justice and Security (35).

Table 3. UNDP Kosovo Project Portfolio: number of projects

Thematic areas	Years				Total per thematic area
	2006	2007	2008	2009	
Social Inclusion	5	9	11	14	39
Justice and Security	4	8	11	12	35
Economic Development	2	2	3	3	10
Democratic Governance and Environment	12	10	10	11	43
Policy and research	5	6	5	5	21
UN Development Office	2	4	5	5	16
Communications	0	0	1	1	2
Total per year	30	39	46	51	

The actual total amounts of delivery in 2006-2009 (Diagram 1) are also in line with priority areas mentioned above: Social Inclusion (over 28 mln USD), Justice and Security (over 21 mln USD) and Democratic Governance and Environment (over 10 mln USD)

Diagram 1. UNDP Kosovo Project portfolio: delivery by thematic areas, mln. \$ (2006-2009)



Diagrams 2 and 3 show actual delivery by thematic areas in 2005 – 2009. The total amount of delivery per year doubled since 2005. Distribution of delivery by thematic areas demonstrates increasing share of projects in the areas of Justice and Security (since 2008) and Democratic Governance (since 2007). Although the share of Social Inclusion decreased, the total amounts per year in this area were around 10 mln USD since 2005.

Diagram 2. Delivery in USD million by thematic areas (2005-2009)






Diagram 3. Delivery in percentage by thematic areas (2005-2009)



The following five figures show cluster by cluster how the UNDP country program unfolded. These figures resulted from our study of all of the project documents available online. Each figure includes projects implemented under that particular cluster, the duration of those projects and their amounts of actual delivery (blue numbers = thousand USD).

Figure 8. Democratic Governance Cluster Projects⁶⁵



⁶⁵ For the purposes of our analysis we separated environmental projects from the democratic governance cluster and described them as “environmental cluster”, that formally does not exist.

Figure 9. Security and Justice Cluster Projects




Figure 10. Social Inclusion Cluster Projects




Figure 11. Environmental Cluster Projects





Figure 12. Economic Development Cluster Projects



Analysis of the projects constituting the UNDP Kosovo Country Program⁶⁶ (CP) from 2005 through 2010 and the context of their implementation has revealed patterns of emergence and organic growth that the evaluation team has called “growth nodes” and “project strands.”

1) Growth nodes

⁶⁶ Our analysis also considered the Joint Global Program to support high-risk regions launched in 2009 by the UNDP BDP Gender Unit and the BCPR Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. The program was implemented in Kosovo under the supervision of the Senior Gender Advisor since 2009.

UNDP identifies and begins to “cultivate” growth nodes—issues that should be addressed. Some growth nodes produce long strands of projects in which later projects build on the experience of previous ones. The growth from a node can be stopped any time funding dries up.

Growth nodes can emerge as a result of:

- Publication of UNDP Kosovo research products. For example, publication of the MDG Report in 2004 served as the growth node for what became a “tree” of MDG-related projects, an array of interrelated project strands in the Social Inclusion cluster.
- Policy decisions at the country level. For example, adoption of the Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan in March 2004 served as a growth node for a tree of decentralization projects and a strand of anti-corruption projects. The recommendation of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Security Sector Development Advisory Team (SSDAT) to do an Internal Security Sector Review that was implemented in 2005 served as a node for a strand of projects supporting the development of the security sector.
- Developments in other parts of the world. In some cases UNDP tries to “fertilize” the situation on the ground in Kosovo with ideas developed elsewhere. A good example of this is the “Global Compact and Corporate Social Responsibility in Kosovo” project.

2) Projects strands

A strand of projects is a pattern of projects forming a multifaceted unity within a thematic area (cluster). Several examples below illustrate this pattern.

E-Governance strand⁶⁷ This strand most likely began in 2002 with a survey of hardware, software, and existing IT infrastructure in local government structures in all 30 municipalities in Kosovo. Growth in this thematic niche led to the adoption of a Kosovo E-Government Strategy for the period of 2009–2015 and then stopped. The possible reason for this is that the E-Governance niche attracted other development actors. In 2010, with the financial support of the World Bank, NL EVD International launched the ‘Kosovo: Public Sector Modernization’ Project.⁶⁸ Component 3 of this project—Increasing the security and efficiency of government information systems (with a budget of US\$ 2.3 million)—builds on the Kosovo E-Government Strategy for the period of 2009–2015. This component will support the strategy’s aims to increase the automation of government work processes and gradually develop selected electronic applications for the improvement of service delivery to citizens and businesses.

Support to agricultural organizations strand⁶⁹ The beginning of this strand was prompted by the adoption of the Law on Agricultural Cooperatives in 2003. The strand began with the successful pilot project “Support to the Agricultural Organizations” (SAO) that established five agricultural cooperatives in two municipalities. The following full-scale SAO project had a plan to start at least another twenty agricultural cooperatives as well as five Unions of Cooperatives in up to ten municipalities. UNDP planned to finance this project, in part with its own money and in part with funds from a donor that it sought to cover the larger part of the budget. A donor was not forthcoming and the SAO project was downscaled. It supported one existing agricultural cooperative and launched four new cooperatives. After the completion of the SAO project, growth in this thematic area stopped.

Industrial waste site Environment as a theme has emerged in UNDP project portfolio relatively

⁶⁷ Democratic Governance Cluster

⁶⁸ www.evd.nl

⁶⁹ Economic Development Cluster

remediation strand⁷⁰ recently – in 2006. UNDP projects in the area of environment “grow” from two strategic documents adopted by Kosovo government: Kosovo Environmental Strategy 2005-2015 and Kosovo Environmental Action Plan 2006-2010. These documents were developed by Regional Environmental Center with financial support from SIDA. UNDP has already implemented two projects addressing industrial waste at Trepca sites. According to respondents who we interviews in the course of this evaluation, UNDP plans to continue working in the field of industrial waste so this strand of projects will most likely continue to grow.

Different projects strands are not completely separate. Several different project strands may provide support to the same entity or institution. For example, the Kosovo Anti-Corruption Agency has been supported by the anti-corruption strand and by the capacity building/development strand. The Ministry of Local Governance has been supported by both the Decentralization and the CDF Capacity building/development strands.

The terms “growth nodes” and “project strands” can be a useful handle for UNDP’s evolving programme development strategy. These approaches are not an explicit part of UNDP programming but are clearly a creative result of intentional effort by UNDP management and staff. UNDP Kosovo is good at ‘cultivating’ project ‘niches’ and may want to articulate this process as one of its strategic approaches for the future.

Conclusions

- *UNDP has a diverse project portfolio that has been evolving along with the needs of Kosovo, UNDP partners and funding opportunities.*
- *UNDP project portfolio has always been aligned with UNDP priority areas in Kosovo.*
- *UNDP effectively identifies “growth nodes”—issues that should be addressed—and then begins to “cultivate” them. UNDP tends to build on successes and implements series of projects when needed and possible.*

5.2. Potential for cross-cluster collaboration

Lack of collaboration—and lack of incentives for collaboration—between thematic areas (cross-cluster collaboration) were mentioned as a problem by UNDP Kosovo senior management and staff. By their nature, “cross-cutting” thematic areas such as gender may offer ready opportunities for collaboration. Support for gender equity, for example, can and should be incorporated in all project activities⁷¹.

Our analysis shows that all of the existing thematic areas in UNDP Kosovo can potentially contribute to any of the expected outcomes (see table 4). Cross-theme efforts are already a reality. For instance, the Social Inclusion portfolio has activities aimed at the development of small businesses, which are a part of the Economic Development portfolio. Similarly, the project strand Reintegration of people leaving Kosovo Police Corps includes job placements and SME development. A strand formally belonging to the Justice and Security portfolio is contributing to economic development and employment.

Analysis of project portfolios without reference to the existing cluster structure reveals several thematic areas to which all UNDP Kosovo clusters contribute. One of such thematic areas could be defined as “Increasing the degree of social coherence and integration of Kosovo society.” UNDP contributes to this area through numerous project strands that belong to different clusters:

- Reintegration of returnees (Social Inclusion cluster)
- Reintegration of divided multi-ethnic communities (Social Inclusion cluster)

⁷⁰ Environmental Cluster

⁷¹ Situation in this area is already changing as we mentioned earlier.

- Employment generation with a focus on youth (Economic Development cluster)
- Reintegration of people leaving Kosovo Protection Corps (Security and Justice cluster)
- Decentralization (Democratic Governance/Environment cluster)

Our conversations with UNDP staff and management also confirmed that all the existing thematic areas are, in principle, ‘cross-cutting’ as table 4 shows.

Table 4. Thematic areas (clusters) and Kosovo outcomes

Thematic areas	Social inclusion	Justice and Security	Democratic Governance	Environment	Economic Development and Employment	Gender
Kosovo Outcomes						
Sustainable development plans/policies effectively respond to the need of stakeholders (central & local government), as well as promote employment and environmental protection (KOS_OUTCOME3)	+	+	+	+	+	+
Increased employment opportunities through piloting active labour market policies and socio-economic assistance (KOS_OUTCOME4)	+	+	+	+	+	+
An effective and responsive civil service established at central and municipal levels (KOS_OUTCOME9)	+	+	+	+	+	+
Effective judicial and policing institutions established and contribute to increased personal security (KOS_OUTCOME11)	+	+	+	+	+	+
Improved accountability and transparency in the public sector (KOS_OUTCOME14)	+	+	+	+	+	+
Living conditions and relation (Inter-ethnic, government & public) improved in communities through increased local ownership of reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts (KOS_OUTCOME23)	+	+	+	+	+	+

This picture suggests that collaboration among clusters could be very natural, that existing barriers between clusters are not “fatally” rooted in the programme’s nature and that these barriers can therefore be removed.

Conclusions

- *Currently collaboration between clusters is not overly intense*
- *Clusters don’t seem to have incentives to collaborate more actively*
- *There is a great potential for collaboration among clusters as all the thematic areas could be considered ‘cross-cutting’*

Recommendations

- *Invite all clusters for discussion and potential contributions when developing new project concepts*
- *Look for new inclusive⁷² areas for collaboration to allow all or several clusters to contribute and to use UNDP’s competitive advantages*

⁷² For instance, “Increasing the degree of social coherence and integration of Kosovo society”


5.3. 'Project cycle' as a set of 'core business processes' for UNDP Kosovo.

Organizations must have a common set of core business processes to function properly. There is a general consensus on an essential set of these core business processes that any organization should maintain and strive to improve. The *design and implementation of projects* that improve people's lives in Kosovo is the heart of the UNDP-Kosovo Programme. UNDP-Kosovo's 'core business processes'—processes that define the proper functioning and effectiveness of its programme—must therefore be related to the *project cycle*.

A project cycle in UNDP (fig.13) starts with a situational analysis and identification of needs (in the traditional business process paradigm—*marketing*). Then a project proposal is designed⁷³—*product development*. In the next stage UNDP mobilizes resources—*sales*, 'selling' a project to donors. Then project is implemented – product/service delivery. Finally projects are evaluated to learn lessons and improve UNDP performance—*process and quality improvement; change management*.

Situational analysis and needs assessments are conducted in several ways depending on time, expertise, and resources available. Sometimes UNDP staff can simply rely on their own opinions (internal assessment). Another option is to interview key outsiders such as government partners (external assessment). Analysis and assessment could evolve into a full-scale research effort. UNDP knowledge products are used for these purposes and donors and their needs are necessarily an important part of this initial analysis and assessment.

Figure 13. The project cycle as a set of 'core business processes' for UNDP Kosovo



Projects are chiefly designed by UNDP specialists working in related thematic areas, although design sometimes involves external subject experts as well. This stage of the project cycle includes two steps:

- 1) development of a concept paper, and,
- 2) after consultations with donors, development of a full-scale project document.

⁷³ Since January 2010, a gender marker has been mandatory and has been used for projects and concepts to ensure a gender-sensitive program cycle.

In our study of project documents from 2005 through 2010, we identified the following types of project activities used by UNDP Kosovo:

- training
- conferences
- study tours
- advisory missions
- information campaigns
- facilitation of group discussions (within thematic, inter-ministerial working groups, project boards, local action groups, on-line forums, etc.)
- research (public opinion surveys, needs assessments, HDR)
- development of “guidelines” (manuals, strategies, regulations, laws)
- development of knowledge depositories (e.g. on-line databases of municipal documents or NGOs)
- providing equipment
- providing infrastructure (houses, electric lines, roads, etc.)
- grants
- micro-credit facilities

Resource mobilization is the responsibility of UNDP Kosovo senior management primarily when the project budgets are large. Such work involves direct contact with the senior management of donor organizations. When project budgets are smaller, resource mobilization is often conducted effectively by UNDP program analysts.

When funds become available, UNDP hires a project manager and staff who take full responsibility for project implementation.

Authority to manage a UNDP project can be delegated to:

- A Programme Analyst (e.g. KPAC, ‘Support MESP for Environment and Climate Change’ project)
- A Project Manager hired by UNDP and working under a fixed-term service contract (e.g. SDK, ABD, RRK)
- An implementing partner (e.g. Capacity Development Facility Project is implemented by the Kosovo Open Society Foundation (KFOS) and the Project Manager works under a contract with KFOS)

Most of the actual work implementing UNDP projects is done by local and international subcontractors and local grantees. In most cases projects establish advisory boards (Project Boards, thematic working groups, local action groups) that provide strategic guidance on project implementation.

Project evaluations are conducted on a regular basis by external experts. Project monitoring is a primary responsibility of project teams and their project managers in particular.

Our analysis has revealed several principles that govern project cycles in UNDP Kosovo:

- Engagement of local stakeholders in the determination of needs and strategies
- Focus on local ownership
- Flexibility and an evolutionary approach to design
- Use of local intellectual and technical capacities

These principles are rooted in the UNDP’s global organizational culture and values.

In spite of the fact that the project cycle is the core of UNDP Kosovo activities, the quality of implementing the various stages of the cycle is determined primarily by the qualifications of the people responsible and varies depending on their individual capacities. UNDP Kosovo’s core

business processes are not well defined or described, and there is no system in place for maintaining their quality.

As a professional project design and implementation entity UNDP should pay special attention to formalizing its core business processes, providing proper training to staff involved, and establishing a system for quality assurance. This work has already been started, but not in a systematic way. For instance, a decision was made to develop internal templates for narrative project reports. We suggest that UNDP Kosovo consider the experience of UNDP Indonesia in jointly developing and publishing a comprehensive manual on project management with a government partner.⁷⁴

Conclusions

- *UNDP Kosovo's specialty is the design and implementation of projects that improve people's lives in Kosovo*
- *As UNDP is an agency specialised in project design and implementation, its 'core business processes' are related to the project cycle*
- *The quality of implementing the various stages of the project cycle in UNDP Kosovo is determined primarily by the qualifications of the people responsible and varies depending on their individual capacities*

Recommendations

- *Formalize core business processes (project cycle)*
- *Develop a comprehensive manual on project management*
- *Establish a system for quality assurance*

⁷⁴ BAPPENAS, & UNDP Indonesia. (2009). *Project Management Implementation Guideline*: Directorate for Multilateral Foreign Funding Bappenas.

CHAPTER 6: PROGRAMME RESULTS

6.1. Results of UNDP Kosovo Activities


Since 2005, UNDP-Kosovo projects have produced numerous tangible and measurable results in various spheres. UNDP assisted the Kosovo government, municipalities, NGOs, businesses and ordinary citizens (vulnerable groups in particular). Below are some of these results grouped by the outcomes to which they were intended to contribute.

KOS_OUTCOME3: Sustainable development plans/policies effectively respond to the need of stakeholders (central & local government), as well as promote employment and environmental protection

- The advocacy work on mainstreaming MDGs in the daily work of the Kosovo Assembly resulted in the adoption of a Resolution on the MDGs by the Kosovo Assembly, which requests the respective institutions to monitor the MDGs and the Government of Kosovo to report annually to the Kosovo Assembly on the progress made in achieving these goals for Kosovo. The Kosovo Assembly adopted the Millenium Declaration with specific targets for Kosovo and in follow up work produced a Social Inclusion White Paper incorporating MDGs.
- The Statistical Office of Kosovo was supported by a UNKT project.
- The project on youth contributed to a Law on Youth Empowerment and Participation. The volunteer Section of the law was revised and submitted for approval. Later on support was provided to the Department of Youth while redrafting the Kosovo Youth Action Plan.
- Five Regional Volunteer Coalitions were established to initiate and draft the Law on Volunteerism.
- The Municipal Development Strategy of the Gjakove/a Municipality was developed and is firmly based on MDG targets and indicators specifically identified for the municipality.
- Kosovo MDG Reports were prepared
- Development and Transition e-newsletters were published
- Quarterly EWS “packages of activities” were implemented: reports, workshops, press releases, and press conferences
- Kosovo Human Development Reports (HDRs) were prepared

Kosovo HDRs and other knowledge products deserve special comment. These flagship UNDP products are unique and highly demanded sources of reliable information about Kosovo. Donors, government, researchers, politicians, UN agencies and many others regularly refer to UNDP knowledge products. Kosovo HDRs are much more visible on the Internet than HDRs produced by other UNDP offices in the region. The presence of Kosovo HDRs on the World Wide Web can be compared to the most popular HDRs: Iraq HDRs with over 24,000 results and Afghanistan HDRs with about 8,000 results.

Diagram 4. HDRs on the WWW (# of Google search results)



It is important to mention that since 2002, UNDP has been among the first organizations in Kosovo to conduct household surveys and opinion polls. UNDP's use of these surveys and polls has contributed to the practice of using scientific methods to research problems and develop strategies, plans, and policies on different sectoral issues.

KOS_OUTCOME4: Increased employment opportunities through piloting active labour market policies and socio-economic assistance.

- Kosovo Government adopted a Youth Employment Action Plan.
- The programme initiated a so-called "institutional and enterprise-based training" scheme that combines providing core employability skill training in work readiness and teamwork, information and communication technologies, and health and safety in the workplace with enterprise-based training to acquire job-specific skills for unskilled young job seekers.
- 6,166 young job seekers benefited from the programme in 2006–2009.
- In order to increase social responsibility in Kosovo's private sector, the Global Compact network was established in 2008 with 15 members.
- UNDP was the first organization to develop a project on Active Labour Market Measures and to introduce the concept to Kosovo authorities. After its successful implementation, there have been numerous replications of project by other donors. The Kosovo Employment Strategy was based on these measures upon which the WB provided the Kosovo Government with a 70 mil. grant for implementation of the strategy.

KOS_OUTCOME9: An effective and responsive civil service established at central and municipal levels.

- Macro- and micro-level assessments on key challenges and opportunities related to decentralization and local governance reform in Kosovo were completed.
- Projects on local development planning and Inter-Municipal Cooperation were implemented.
- Decentralisation road map implementation programme resulted in identifying core activities that have been agreed with the government and stakeholders to undertake in 2008–2012.
- Household surveys were conducted and reports on trends in perceptions of local government and public services in Kosovo were published.
- Over 120 expert missions were organized to provide technical assistance and to develop the capacity of civil servants.

KOS_OUTCOME11: Effective judicial and policing institutions established and contribute to increased personal security

- Office of Public Safety was established with UNDP assistance that includes a preparation of a package on certain policy issues and recruitment of core staff.
- Four Legal Aid offices and six regional Chamber of Advocates offices were opened.
- Kosovo Strategy and Action Plan on Trafficking in Human Beings was developed and approved
- Communications strategy for Ministry of Internal Affairs was implemented
- Internal Security Sector Review final report completed, publication pending in 2007.
- Capacity assessment and needs assessment completed for Ministry of Justice.
- Law on domestic violence and national action plan drafted in 2009-2010
- The new programme was set up on Capacity Building for Justice Institutions, Support to Good Judicial Practices, Improved Knowledge on Access to Justice, and Increased Knowledge of Practitioners [are these actually the names of four projects? {caps needed} or are these just the four components of a single project? {no caps needed}]

- Training centre for the Kosovo Chamber of Advocates was established and began operations.
- The first generation of the Initial Legal Education Program graduated successfully and 30 candidates were recommended to the Kosovo Judicial Council for appointment as judges and prosecutors.
- Trainings delivered for legal professionals, journalists, and gender officers on women's security
- Rules and procedures for Judicial/Bar Exam drafted and new manual published; trainings delivered for 180 exam candidates
- KPC Resettlement, over 1,500 ex-combatants were provided with job placement assistance, one-year salary support and vocational training, and help creating their own start-up business plans.

KOS_OUTCOME14: Improved accountability and transparency in the public sector

- Assessment mission for e-governance concept conducted in the Municipality of Pristina. Training of Municipal IT Managers and updating of intranet software in all 30 municipalities in Kosovo was completed. Start-up of e-service delivery.
- Anti-Corruption and Transparency Civil Society Coalition was established and the Transparency International Chapter for Kosovo was identified. Anti-Corruption campaign and policy analysis were undertaken through the KTI project, under which an anti-corruption perception survey, analysis of assembly integrity and number of public debates were also organised, which contributed to an increased awareness and reporting of corruption amongst the general public

KOS_OUTCOME23: Living conditions and relation (Inter-ethnic, government & public) improved in communities through increased local ownership of reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts

- About 650 Kosovo IDP families returned to their places of origin in Kosovo and received assistance from UNDP-managed Projects
- Establishment of the first joint PISG/UNDP Project Planning Cell in the Returns programme was successful and pioneering and resulted in an improved outreach and relationship with local partners.
- A multi-sector, multi-donor Programme for supporting local sustainable development and community integration was developed for Mitrovica North/South and Zvecan municipalities
- A comprehensive UNKT programme on Roma issues involving eight UN agencies was formulated following the completion of an UNMIK-run first phase
- ABD Programme Local Action Group (LAGs) were established in each area. Polling and Needs assessment conducted and finalized, two international study tours organized, Business Advisory Centers strategy developed, 46 municipal improvement projects being implemented, 13 business development support projects being implemented, 32 inter-community relations/development support projects being implemented, LED Strategy finalized in three areas.

All of the results mentioned above were selected from a long list of all the results of the UNDP programme in Kosovo. If we focus at the UNDP project level, we see hundreds of results that have benefitted various groups of Kosovo people and institutions. We'll use one such project implemented in 2007–2009 to illustrate these benefits.

Box 3 shows the results of the Women's Safety and Security Initiative (WSSI), a two-year project that was implemented in close collaboration with the Office of Public Safety (OPS), the Trafficking in Human Beings Section (THBS) of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), the Kosovo

Women’s Network (KWN), the Agency for Gender Equality (AGE), and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. WSSI was funded by the governments of Finland and the United Kingdom, and the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund. To implement training activities, WSSI contracted with the Pristina-based Advocacy Training Resource Center, the Kosovo Judicial Institute, Management Development Associates, and an independent consultant.

Box 3. Results produced by Women’s Safety and Security Initiative (WSSI) (2007–2009)

Year 1 Results	Year 2 Results
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Trainings for municipal gender officers. The officers were trained on lobbying, advocacy, fundraising, and liaising with other actors on the municipal level to improve coordination with women’s NGOs and become their voice. - Trainings on gender equality for journalists. The aim of the training was to raise the awareness of journalists and their responsibility in promoting non-stereotyped images of women and men. - Competition for the best story on radio and television and in a newspaper or magazine. - Information campaign to increase community awareness on violence against women and trafficking in human beings. The campaign included a public broadcast announcement, posters, and one TV show. - TV show on the new Kosovo Strategy and national Action Plan on Anti-trafficking. - Two training events for judges and prosecutors. They were trained to effectively implement the existing legislation and informed about the kind of abuses suffered by victims of trafficking and how these abuses may affect their ability to testify in court. - WSSI provided security systems, computers, printers, and beds to five shelters in five municipalities. - Trainings to the staff of these five shelters on professional development, organizational and emotional management, and conflict resolution. - WSSI provided equipment: video cameras, binoculars (day and night vision), voice-recorders, communications equipment (earpieces), and a vehicle to the Trafficking in Human Beings Investigation Section (THBS) in six regions. - WSSI has established and equipped interviewing rooms for victims of trafficking and domestic violence in six regional police stations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - WSSI served as the advisory and technical assistance group to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) for the drafting of the National Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings 2008 – 2011 (approved by the government on July 31st 2008). - An advanced level training in undercover operations for the KPS-THBS. Curriculum for the training was based on results of a specially conducted research of the existing environment, security and judicial. The final report on the training also included strategic recommendations for the KPS-THBS and Ministry of Internal Affairs for the prosecution framework in regard to trafficking in human beings. - A joint three day workshop for members of the judiciary (judges, prosecutors, and lawyers) and KPS-THBS (investigators) as a follow up of the above mentioned police training. The workshop focused on the development of relations between the judiciary and police services, particularly in regard to undercover operations (procedures, legal requirements, evidence, witness protection). - A comprehensive qualitative research on forms of gender based violence in Kosovo, made in partnership with the Agency for Gender Equality, Prime Minister’s Office, and the Kosovo Women’s Network. The research report served as a key referring document for the future National Action Plan on Violence Against Women: Domestic Violence. - Support to drafting National Action Plan on Violence Against Women: Domestic Violence.

While the results of UNDP activities are very impressive and some results are complementary, the overall picture does not look like a well-orchestrated effort if we can not show how the results contributed to programme outcomes and assess those outcomes.

6.2. Were the programme outcomes achieved?

One simple way of answering this question is to look at the outcome indicators and compare the actual values of indicators with the targets. As we can see from Table 5 the actual values of three out of four outcome indicators differed considerably from the targets. In other words, 75% of the time the actual characteristics of the situation in Kosovo differed considerably from what UNDP expected. The fact that targets were achieved in one out of four cases does not, however, mean that UNDP did or did not achieve the expected outcomes. As we showed in Chapter 4, the indicators used to measure outcomes do not permit any causal attribution of changes in the

outcomes to interventions implemented and the related changes in inputs and outputs. In addition, there were gaps in the programme logic and flaws in the harmonization of programme components. (See chapter 4 for more details). Thus, the possibility of measuring programme outcomes, let alone programme impact, is questionable.

Table 5. Outcome indicators: what to they tell us about?

CP outcome	Indicator	Baseline value of indicator	Target value of indicator	Actual value of indicator
An effective and responsive civil service	Public satisfaction of govt. services	51%	61% (20% improvement)	36,72% (EWR, January 2010) 29,30% (EWR, April 2010)
Reduction of extreme poverty	Level of extreme poverty	12%	6%	13% (2010, US Department of State)
Normalized relations among social groups and between citizens and institutions	Fluctuation of trust in institutions	10% difference between yearly high and low	5% difference between yearly high and low	No data on trust in institutions. Fluctuation in satisfaction with Gov. Kosovo (EWR, June 2009 – April 2010) – 24%
	Fluctuation of perception of personal security	10% difference between yearly high and low	5% difference between yearly high and low	Fluctuation of feelings of insecurity 4% (EWR, June 2009 – April 2010)

6.3. Where long-term effects of UNDP Kosovo interventions can be found

Despite the problems just outlined, there definitely are certain areas where the long-term effects of UNDP interventions in Kosovo can be found. We describe several areas of this kind and provide a rationale for choosing them in the search for long-term effects.⁷⁵

Table 6. Where long-term effects could be found and why

Where to look for effects	Why
Development of new legislation	Legislation is an important condition for human development in Kosovo. New legislation developed with UNDP assistance makes a difference in how the socio-economic environment functions.
Establishment of new institutions, units and organizations	They are more ‘fragile’ than buildings but the chances are high that they will exist for at least several years and will contribute to Kosovo’s well-being.
Capacity development at institutional level	In some cases UNDP made significant contributions to developing the capacity of both newly established and the existing institutions. Institutional capacity will remain after the UNDP intervention is over.
Capacity development at individual level	Capacity development can take place as either an intended or an unintended ⁷⁶ result of UNDP activities. Growing capacity of individuals resulting from UNDP interventions is already making a difference in various sectors of Kosovo life. Even when individuals change their jobs, they retain their new capacities.
Families that returned to their place of origin in Kosovo	UNDP intervention in this case made a major difference in the lives of several hundred families involving several thousand individuals. We were able to talk to some of these people and gathered detailed information on what UNDP assistance meant to them. Without UNDP intervention many of these people would have faced numerous challenges.
Assistance to the young job seekers	UNDP assisted several thousand young people in finding a job, a life-changing event that often dramatically affects a young person’s personal and professional development and.
Construction and infrastructure projects	Simply because the products created will last for many years they have the potential for long term, sustained effects.

⁷⁵ Exploration of such effects could become a subject for the ADR that will take place shortly

⁷⁶ By unintended results we mean positive results that took place but were not planned or expected by UNDP.

Conclusions:

- *UNDP activities in Kosovo resulted in numerous positive changes at individual, organizational, regional and central levels. These changes were documented as outputs of UNDP projects in Kosovo.*
- *Long-term effects of UNDP interventions could be found in, but are not limited to, the following areas: development of new legislation; establishment of new institutions, units and organizations; capacity development at an institutional level; capacity development at an individual level; families that returned to their place of origin in Kosovo; construction projects; assistance to the young job seekers.*
- *Though the results achieved can hardly be considered products of a well-orchestrated effort (a country programme), there are nevertheless some clusters of results that indicate synergies in certain areas, affected by UNDP projects or groups of projects.*
- *Kosovo programme outcomes as they are could hardly be measured due to the way they were formulated, lack of harmonization between various components of the programme and lack of programme monitoring data.*

Recommendations

- *UNDP may want to go beyond the existing outcomes in order to assess the development results it affected.*
- *Thorough work on the programme logic and harmonization of all program components may help UNDP make future programme outcomes measurable.*
- *Monitoring systems should be incorporated into the programme at the design stage and should be maintained properly in the course of programme implementation.*

CHAPTER 7: PROGRAMME RELATIONSHIPS

7.1. UNDP and UNKT

The UN Kosovo Team (UNKT) is comprised of the following UN Agencies: UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNIFEM, WHO, UN HABITAT, OHCHR, ILO, FAO, IOM, UNHCR, UNOPS.

The UN Agencies in Kosovo are coordinated through the United Nations Kosovo Team (UNKT), chaired by the UNKT Development Coordinator / UNDP Resident Representative.

The UN Agencies in Kosovo together developed a common strategic results framework for their operation in Kosovo that identifies the following strategic outcomes of the agencies for the period of 2008–2010:

1. **Health:** By 2010 – Improve the provision of essential public health services to women, children and young population, based on best practices
2. **Education:** By 2010 – completion rate of children in compulsory education has increased and quality and inclusive education ensured at all levels of education (pre-school, primary and secondary education)
3. **Employment:** Employment opportunities increased, particularly in economically lagging areas and among vulnerable groups
4. **Social Inclusion:** The vulnerable groups of population including minorities are assisted in the realization of their rights
5. **Governance:** Improved governance characterized by strengthened justice and rule of law for everyone in Kosovo and improved management of public goods and delivery of public services

UNDP identifies its ‘niche’ within UNKT as follows:

“UNDP Kosovo contributes to reaching the UNKT goals with several projects, particularly in relation to employment, social inclusion and governance. In order to achieve these goals, UNDP has built a portfolio of projects, which are still ongoing and contribute to accomplishing the aims of this strategy. Employment projects are included in the poverty eradication focus area under the Economic Development and Employment cluster of UNDP Kosovo. Social Inclusion is tackled through projects within two focus areas poverty reduction: Roma Askali and Egyptian portfolio; and Conflict Prevention and Recovery: Returns and Reconciliation. Governance is tackled through the Democratic Governance focus area.”⁷⁷ In 2010 UNDP Kosovo lead the establishment of a UN Task Force on gender-based violence that subsequently lead to the development of a program proposal and will eventually lead to more cooperation.

Thus, UNDP contributes directly to three out of five UNKT strategic outcomes and indirectly to all of them. UNDP’s mandate is most inclusive.

UNDP delivery exceeds delivery of all the other UN agencies in Kosovo. UNICEF is second in the extent of its deliveries, which are in the range of one half to one third of UNDP’s.

UNDP is the most ‘visible’ UN agency on the World Wide Web. Google searches that combine the titles of UN agencies and the name Kosovo⁷⁸ show the overwhelming extent of UNDP’s Web presence (diagram 5). The UNDP Web presence is also high compared to other UNDP country offices in the region. Interestingly, UNDP Serbia is mentioned on the Web only one fourth as frequently as UNDP Kosovo (diagram 6).

⁷⁷ <http://www.ks.undp.org/?cid=2,109>

⁷⁸ For example, “UNDP Kosovo” or “UNICEF Kosovo”

Diagram 5. UNDP and other UN agencies in Kosovo: visibility on the WWW as indicated by Google search results





Diagram 6. UNDP Kosovo and other UNDP country offices: visibility on the WWW as indicated by Google search results




UNDP is the undisputed leader among the UN agencies in Kosovo. The UNDP mandate allows it to develop almost any project in Kosovo and its areas of programming substantially overlap those of other UN agencies. Such overwhelming leadership might cause tensions inside the UNKT, and UNDP needs to conscientiously avoid the image of a ‘big brother’ who does not care about others and chases money without regard to substance. UNDP leaders are fully aware of this challenge and collaborate with other UN agencies to build a UN community that will work effectively to assist Kosovo. UNDP priorities are, (a) to develop and implement joint projects with other UN agencies rather than compete with them, and, (b) to identify its own niche and area of specialization.

UN Kosovo Team member agencies report on a positive atmosphere in the UNKT and a constructive position of UNDP, which they attribute to the current UNKT Development Coordinator and UNDP Director.

7.2. UNDP and donors

UNDP is active in developing relationships with various donors including bilateral and multilateral development organizations. UNDP donors in the past five years included the governments of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, Italy, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. UNDP also received support from the EU and from the Kosovo Government. In 2008 NATO was also one of the major UNDP donors. Diagram 7 illustrates the diversity of UNDP's funding sources.⁷⁹

Diagram 7. UNDP sources of funding in 2008



UNDP is well connected with and respected by donors. In many cases UNDP's neutrality becomes a serious advantage for donors and maintaining advantageous partnership relationships with donors is one of the key areas of UNDP activity.

The UNDP is already experiencing a reduction in numbers of donors and levels of international assistance to Kosovo. The trend will continue in the near future and any new UNDP fundraising strategy should take this trend into account.

7.3. UNDP and Government

Kosovo government institutions are UNDP's key partners. Through its responsibilities to coordinate efforts to reach the Millennium Development Goals, the UNDP supports these institutions their effort to improve the lives of Kosovans through a participatory process of sensitizing, awareness raising, analysis, and implementation of initiatives that support national priorities.

In many cases UNDP has developed close relationships with government entities and the offices of several UNDP projects are even located in government buildings. In the early stages of project design, UNDP teams make every effort to consider Kosovo government needs. Donors' interests are not always fully aligned with government needs, however, and UNDP must work out compromises that may not fully satisfy the government partner.

⁷⁹ <http://www.ks.undp.org/?cid=2,106>

It's beneficiaries greatly appreciate the UNDP's contribution to the capacity development of the Kosovo Government. Government entities dealing with issues such as internal affairs, justice and security, environment, and local self-governance are long-term partners of UNDP in Kosovo. The UNDP has maintained a high level of rapport with these government institutions in spite of their high level of staff turnover.

Over the years the capacity of government institutions has increased markedly. This positive process has natural consequences that will affect UNDP relationships with partners who are inevitably becoming more competent, capable, and demanding.⁸⁰

7.4. UNDP and businesses

Through its programmes, UNDP engages the private sector in support of public-private partnerships. These interactions can be divided into three areas:

- Private sector development, in which the private sector is the beneficiary of UNDP interventions that support sectoral development through policy development and capacity and institution building interventions
- Private sector engagement, in which the private sector is a collaborator with UNDP in its development programmes and projects
- Procurement, in which the private sector provides goods and services to UNDP within a commercial contract

UNDP's recently launched Global Compact project is one of the first initiatives in Kosovo that promotes the idea of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)—the continuing commitment of businesses to ethical practices, contributing to economic development and improving the quality of life of the workforce, the local community, and society at large. The Global Compact seeks to advance responsible corporate citizenship so that businesses join in addressing the challenges of sustainable development.

Recently UNDP Kosovo supported an initiative to include a women's business association and other NGOs in its business-related activities. In 2010, the first international conference on women's entrepreneurship in Kosovo was supported by the Global Gender Program at UNDP Kosovo.

CSR in Kosovo represents one of the most progressive developments within the private sector, by urging private companies to re-define their boundaries of responsibility vis-a-vis society and the environment, thereby contributing to a new social contract. Private sector participation, in partnership with civil society and the UN, contributes to a more sustainable and inclusive economy, though the Global Compact initiative in Kosovo is very fragile due to the weakness of the business sector in Kosovo and the current value system of Kosovan business community that does not include CSR as one of the values.

Hence, UNDP 'niche' in collaboration with business is development of small and medium size enterprises, which is fully in line with UNDP strategy and capacity and meets Kosovo needs. ILO should be considered as a potential partner in this area since it has a proven record of conducting high quality trainings on small business development.

7.5. UNDP and NGOs

UNDP works with civil society, including NGOs, community-based organizations, members of academia, and representatives of the mass media. UNDP engages with Civil Society and CSOs across all the practice areas, with a particular focus on policy and governance, localization of MDGs, and conflict prevention and recovery. UNDP has identified indigenous peoples as a

⁸⁰ For more details see Chapter 8, subsection 8.4.

particularly relevant partner in poverty reduction efforts towards inclusive development policies at the local, national, and international levels⁸¹.

The roles and responsibilities of UNDP and CSOs depend on the cooperation modality. CSOs can be UNDP partners, implementing agencies, grantees or contractors.

The UNDP website⁸² describes these cooperation modalities as follows:

1. CSOs as partners: The Memorandum of Understanding usually contains a broad cooperation framework and provides for consultation and the mutual exchange of information.

2. NGO implementation: the Project Cooperation Agreement describes the role and responsibilities of UNDP and the NGO that acts as implementing partner. When NGOs are designated as an implementing partner for UNDP activities, management responsibility for the entire project, including achieving project outputs, lies with the NGO.

3. NGOs as recipients of grants: the Memorandum of Understanding or micro-capital grant agreement describes the roles and responsibilities of UNDP and the NGO. The recipient NGO is responsible for undertaking the activities described in its workplan and budget, providing quarterly reports to the Steering Committee, and providing annual audited statements.

4. NGOs as contractors: the procurement contract (typically a contract for professional services) describes the roles and responsibilities of UNDP and the NGO as contractor. While an NGO contractor can be tasked to take over a certain degree of project management, the overall responsibility, especially budget control and reporting, rests with the implementing partner (national institutions, UN agency, NGO or UNDP country office). Within the framework of a contract, the implementing partner and the NGO can freely agree on the scope and scale of service, timetable, reporting requirements and frequency, and payment schedule.

Some time ago UNDP supported a project to create a web-based database and platform with the activities, mission and contact details for all of the NGOs in Kosovo. The platform never became fully operational in spite of the fact that UNDP provided all financial support.

Conclusions

- *UNDP is the undisputed leader among the UN agencies in Kosovo. It makes important contributions to collaboration among UN agencies. At the same time it needs to conscientiously avoid the image of a 'big brother' who does not care about others and chases money without regard to substance.*
- *UNDP is active and effective in developing and maintaining relationships with various donors including bilateral and multilateral development organizations. The UNDP is already experiencing a reduction in numbers of donors and levels of international assistance to Kosovo.*
- *Kosovo government institutions are the key partners with whom UNDP has developed close relationships. Over the years the capacity of government institutions has increased markedly. This positive process has natural consequences that will affect UNDP relationships with government partners who are inevitably becoming more competent, capable, and demanding.*
- *The UNDP 'niche' is development of small- and medium-size enterprises in collaboration with businesses in Kosovo.*

⁸¹ <http://www.ks.undp.org/?cid=2,31>

⁸² Ibidem

- *The UNDP has contributed significantly to the development of the NGO sector in Kosovo by supporting the creation of new NGOs and by providing grants to existing NGOs. In general, however, the NGO sector in Kosovo is still weak. Though most local NGOs have a long way to go towards becoming effective, professional entities, competent and capable people and strong organizations are already active in the NGO sector. UNDP Kosovo is open for cooperation with them and involves them in various projects, including research and evaluation.*

CHAPTER 8: PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

A basic list of the main management functions might include:

- Planning — setting priorities and defining results (goals and objectives, etc.) and how the results will be achieved
- Organizing — allocating and configuring resources to accomplish the preferred goals and objectives established during planning
- Leading — establishing directions and influencing people to follow that direction
- Controlling — monitoring and adjusting resources and processes to achieve goals and objectives

In this section we focus primarily on organizing. Planning and controlling functions have been discussed in the previous chapters and leading is beyond our scope of work.

8.1. Evolution and current state of the UNDP Kosovo organizational structure.

To be most effective, an organizational structure needs to be aligned with the structure of the organization's activities. That is why, in 2005,⁸³ the UNDP Kosovo organizational structure was divided into two major parts: programme and operations (See Annex 5.) Our task is to focus on the programme management aspects of this organizational structure.

The programme of UNDP Kosovo had to respond to emerging needs and available funding and was structured in accordance with the key programme priority areas⁸⁴:

2005	Democratic Governance, Employment and Community Outreach, Communications and Advocacy
2006	Economic Development/Employment, Governance, Security and Rule of Law
2007	Returns and Reintegration, Security and Rule of Law, Policy, Governance
2008	Returns and Reintegration, Security and Rule of Law, Policy, Governance
2010	Social Inclusion, Justice and Security, Economic Development/Employment, Democratic Governance/Environment, Policy Gender Equality and Women Empowerment

Prior to 2007, UNDP had two senior management positions: the UN Development Coordinator / UNDP Resident Representative and a Deputy Resident Representative. Since 2007 management included two new senior positions instead of a single Deputy RR: a Director and a Deputy Director. A Senior Gender Advisor reporting to the Director joined UNDP Kosovo in 2009.

⁸³ Probably this happened much earlier, but that is beyond our analysis.

⁸⁴ We did not have the UNDP organizational structure of 2009 at our disposal.

Groups responsible for thematic areas have been referred to by various names: ‘teams’ in 2005, ‘units’ in 2006, and since 2007, ‘clusters.’ By 2010 the term cluster had at least two meanings: (a) a group of experts working in a particular subject area, and (b) a group of projects implemented in that subject area.

The UNDP organizational chart of 2010 included UNDP projects for the first time and is far more complicated than any previous chart. To rationalize the reporting lines and clarify who is reporting to whom, a special supplemental document was developed in 2010.⁸⁵ According to that document there are ten people in the office who supervise projects implemented by UNDP Kosovo. The situation with reporting lines is complicated by the fact that internal UNDP regulations prohibit international staff from being supervised by national staff, and prohibit staff with higher formal status in the UNDP hierarchy from being supervised by people with lower formal status. (P5s, for example, cannot be supervised by P4s.) Although a clarification of the existing reporting lines was badly needed and welcomed, several project managers and key UNDP staff still share the opinion that the existing organizational structure is not sufficiently clear or effective and needs to be modified, not merely clarified.

8.2. Does it really need to be modified?

There are several reasons for re-thinking the UNDP organizational structure in Kosovo:

- 1) The existing structure does not take into account the different skills and responsibilities required for project design and project implementation.

Project managers in many cases are supervised by Programme Analysts, the UNDP specialists who develop projects. These Programme Analysts work on project design in small teams under the supervision of senior management. After the project document is completed and funding is available, a project manager and staff are hired and in most cases take full responsibility for the project’s implementation. Subsequently, Programme Analysts may continue to develop new project ideas and to mobilize resources. It is essential to note that good analysts and good managers possess different skill sets and competencies, which are rarely balanced in one person.

- 2) Monitoring of project implementation is not effective enough.

Senior management and Programme Analysts (heads of clusters)—a total of ten people—are available to monitor projects. The fact that eight out of 31 projects implemented this year were on the personal ‘watch list’ of the UNDP Director suggests that monitoring of project implementation is ineffective.

- 3) The Director has to spend too much time on project supervision and problem solving

There are numerous strategic issues such as strategic planning, resource mobilization, and programme development to be addressed by the UNDP Director who instead is obliged to spend time supervising and troubleshooting projects.

- 4) ‘Clusters’ do not collaborate effectively and don’t seem to have incentives for collaboration.

During both the project design stage and the project implementation stage, cluster and/or project teams do not collaborate, even though there is ample opportunity to jointly develop cross-cluster projects that might become unique UNDP products.

⁸⁵ Reporting lines of UNDP Kosovo Project Managers, 2010

8.3. Re-thinking the UNDP Kosovo organizational structure

In this section we propose an approach to re-thinking the UNDP organizational structure. This is not a specific proposal with exact positions and names of people. Our intent is to propose a new way of thinking about the organization that may help solve challenging problems and increase the effectiveness of UNDP's work. The proposed approach might be implemented only partially, it might be implemented in the future, and it might contribute to developing a better idea for restructuring UNDP Kosovo.

Here is what we propose.

- 1) Move from the existing 'clusters' that actually create barriers between subject areas toward what could be called a 'task-based structure.' The Department of Programming and Development under the Deputy Director will include both Programme Analysts and Subject Experts from all of the existing 'clusters.' Their primary goal is to develop new projects and mobilize resources. They will work in temporary task groups formed to jointly develop complex, multidisciplinary projects. The internal structure of the Department of Programming and Development will necessarily be very flexible.
- 2) Separate project implementation from project design. The second Deputy Director will be responsible for supervising all projects and for developing and maintaining a high quality project management system. All project managers will report directly to him/her. The flow of information on the implementation of all projects will go to one place. This approach will create opportunities for a better information exchange and cooperation among projects.
- 3) Establish a separate Monitoring and Evaluation unit that will focus primarily on monitoring. The unit's two major tasks are to incorporate monitoring into project design and to establish and maintain an effective monitoring system that provides timely and reliable information on the progress of projects and programmes. The Head of the M&E unit should report to the UNDP Director. M&E capacity and function should be spread in the organization with the M&E unit as a hub.

We also have a simple but important technical suggestion. The UNDP organizational charts were developed in Word (2005) or in PowerPoint (2006–2010). Neither of these applications was designed for this purpose and their use is very inconvenient. Much better software is available to create great organizational charts, as well as visually effective business diagrams for variety of purposes related to project design, action planning, reporting, etc. We strongly recommend that UNDP Kosovo purchase and use Microsoft Visio software.⁸⁶

8.4. DEX vs NEX in Kosovo

NEX (National Execution) and DEX (Direct Execution) are UNDP implementation modalities.⁸⁷

The NEX modality means that a host Government has assumed overall responsibility and accountability for formulating and managing UNDP-supported programmes and projects.⁸⁸ "NEX for UNDP should be the norm, taking into account the needs and capacities of recipient countries."⁸⁹ NEX is used when there is adequate capacity in a government to undertake the

⁸⁶ Most figures in this report were created in Microsoft Visio.

⁸⁷ The new abbreviations that are used now instead of DEX and NEX are DIM and NIM respectively. They stand for Direct Implementation Modality and National Implementation Modality. We use DEX and NEX in this report in accordance with the Evaluation ToR.

⁸⁸ Governing Council decision 92/22 of 26 May 1992

⁸⁹ UN General Assembly, Resolution 47/199 of 22 December 1992

functions and activities of the project. The UNDP country office ascertains the national capacities during the formulation of the programme/project.

Key principles for National Execution⁹⁰:

- 1) Use of government rules and procedures, where they are consistent with internationally recognized practices, to ensure integration with and relevance to national programmes and structures
- 2) Government accountability for the effective use of UNDP resources through adequate financial reporting and the achievement of programme/project objectives
- 3) Adherence to UNDP rules and regulations when the Country Office provides support services

The DEX modality means that UNDP carries full responsibility for project implementation.

DEX is appropriate when⁹¹:

- Activities require unique technical sector experience, specific management capacity or access to international networks
- The government lacks the required management or substantive capacity
- The donors prefer “agency execution” for other reasons (such as neutrality)

These are the reasons why DEX was chosen as a primary modality for UNDP in Kosovo. Though the situation is changing, DEX to a great extent remains relevant⁹². But the capacity of UNDP partners in Kosovo is growing and some are already wondering why they can't implement projects themselves. In the next few years this quite reasonable question will be asked by an increasing number of UNDP partners in Kosovo.

This is a trend with implications for UNDP's management. On the one hand, UNDP will need to bring DEX implementation to perfection to demonstrate its current advantage. On the other hand, UNDP will need a transition strategy to move “from DEX to NEX” as the NEX modality becomes more relevant and appropriate in many areas in Kosovo in the next few years. This transition will be more challenging and may take more time in Kosovo than in the other countries due to Kosovo's status.

While developing this strategy UNDP will also need to consider potential NEX-related challenges⁹³ such as:

- Changes in the staff and structure of Kosovo government
- Insufficient capacity
- No substantive commitment from partners
- Delays with signing project documents
- Project implementation delays
- Corruption
- Lack of coordination

New management mechanisms for the NEX modality should be developed and implemented by UNDP, including a new monitoring and evaluation system. The restructuring proposed above will make the transition from DEX to NEX easier because the project design function is separated from the project implementation and oversight functions.

⁹⁰ Cox, R. (2007). UNDP Delivery Methods in Electoral Assistance DEX - NEX. Retrieved [from here](#) October 1, 2010

⁹¹ Ibidem

⁹² UNDP Kosovo already has elements of national execution under DEX modality.

⁹³ Takenov, Z. (2004). NEX and DEX: Theory and Reality. Retrieved October 20, 2010, [from here](#)

Conclusions

- *The UNDP Kosovo organizational structure evolved during the period under review in order to adapt to the requirements of the programme and its priorities. But there are now clear indications of problems resulting from inconsistencies between the current organizational structure and the nature of UNDP's current activities.*
- *DEX modality was and still is relevant in Kosovo. UNDP is feeling internal and external pressure to shift from a DEX to a NEX modality in Kosovo.*

CHAPTER 9: MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

9.1. Main conclusions

UNDP activities in Kosovo have resulted in numerous positive changes at many levels and the long-term effects of UNDP interventions can be found in many areas of Kosovo society. Though these changes cannot be considered results of a well-orchestrated effort—a coherent country *programme*—there are nevertheless synergies among results in a number of areas affected by UNDP projects or groups of projects.

Long-term effects of UNDP interventions can be found in, but are not limited to development of new legislation; establishment of new institutions, units and organizations; capacity development at an institutional level; capacity development at an individual level; assistance to families that returned to their places of origin in Kosovo; implementation of construction projects; and assistance to the young job seekers.

Project design and implementation are at the heart of UNDP activities in Kosovo and UNDP has a diverse project portfolio that has been evolving along with the needs of Kosovo, UNDP partners and funding opportunities. UNDP project ‘niches’ are well cultivated and UNDP tends to build on successes and implements series of projects when needed and possible.

UNDP identifies “growth nodes”—issues that should be addressed—and then begins to “cultivate” them. Some “growth nodes” produce long strands of projects in which later projects build on the development of the previous ones. This kind of growth from a node can be stopped when funding dries out.

While UNDP is undoubtedly the major player among the UN agencies in Kosovo, its ‘niche’ is not defined with sufficient clarity. Pressure to identify UNDP’s area(s) of specialization is growing internally and externally.

Members of the UNDP staff know where their expertise is and what to build on in the future. Their professional growth and specialization will be an important factor in the UNDP Kosovo self-identification process. The stronger UNDP partners in Kosovo become, the more they need the increased professional specialization of the UNDP projects that work with them and the more they are sceptical of entities that claim to be able to do anything. The UNDP does not want to be seen by other UN agencies as a ‘big brother’ who does not care about others and just runs after money without caring about substance.

A Direct Execution modality has been relevant in the past and remains relevant under the present circumstances for the UNDP in Kosovo. But this situation is changing in view of the substantially growing capacity of UNDP partners. A National Execution modality will become more relevant in this emergent capacity environment in the next few years.

The UNDP has contributed greatly to the capacity development of UNDP partners in Kosovo. But this positive process has natural and inevitable consequences. In the next few years the question “Why can’t we implement this project ourselves?” will be asked explicitly by the increasing number of UNDP partners in Kosovo who are already considering their long-term prospects.

While UNDP Kosovo priorities and strategic intents are quite clear from the programme documents and relevant to the UNDP corporate strategy, MYFF goals, EPAP priorities in

Kosovo, and Kosovo's development needs, there are flaws in the overarching programme logic. Programme components are not properly harmonized within the programme's conceptual framework.

The programme's chains of results (outputs-outcomes-impact) are not well defined. One of the key problems is that in many cases outcomes are identical to impact. Sometimes outcome statements include both impact and outcome. This conflating of levels creates gaps in the programme logic where there are no causal links between the output and impact levels. To a great extent problems with outcomes result from this unclear distinction between outcome and impact.

Projects developed within the framework of the UNDP Kosovo Programme often use a programme outcome as a project outcome, whereas a programme outcome should be viewed as a project impact. Project impacts are not described at all in many cases. This creates a gap between project outputs and project outcomes and does not allow for the logical harmonization of projects and programme.

Programme monitoring is insufficient and is based on the capacities of individuals rather than on the capacity of the organization and organizational systems.

UNDP senior management, programme staff and UNDP partners alike mention an insufficient monitoring system as one of the major weaknesses of the UNDP programme in Kosovo. Indicators are often not well defined and are sometimes related to the country's situation rather than to the programme's results. It is a common mistake to misinterpret baselines and targets that are presented as narrative descriptions of an initial situation and its desired state rather than as the initial and target values of indicators. In many cases no system is in place for monitoring data collection and verification. UNDP Kosovo is forced to rely on the individual competencies of Programme Analysts and Project Managers rather than on a properly established and maintained monitoring and evaluation system.

The UNDP Kosovo organizational structure evolved during the period under review in order to adapt to the requirements of the programme and its priorities. But there are now clear indications of problems resulting from inconsistencies between the current organizational structure and the nature of UNDP's current activities.

Below are some shortages of the existing organizational structure:

- It does not take into account the distribution of responsibilities and skills between those who develop projects and those who implement them
- Monitoring of project implementation is not effective enough
- UNDP senior managers must spend an inordinate amount of time on project supervision and problem solving.
- There do not seem to be any incentives for collaboration and thematic 'clusters' do not collaborate effectively.

9.2. Main recommendations

Recommendation 1. Clarify UNDP Kosovo's 'niche' and build on UNDP's unique strengths. "What we do" and "how well we do it" should become higher priorities than "how much we mobilize."

UNDP is already moving along this path. By making this recommendation we wish to support the idea of identifying UNDP's unique 'niche' in light of its multidisciplinary expertise in the

area of human development, its connections with the best HD experts in the region and around the world, its experience implementing numerous development projects in Kosovo, and its organizational capacity.

Recommendation 2. Develop and begin implementation of a transition strategy from DEX to NEX.

Part of the UNDP strategy should be the transition from DEX to NEX and delegation of responsibility for project implementation to its national partners. The UNDP should explicitly state this intent and clearly communicate the requirements its partners must meet in order to shift to a NEX modality. Internally UNDP has to build new organizational systems and develop its own capacity to get ready for NEX. One of the possible approaches would be implementation of pilot projects in NEX modality with government partners that seem to be ready and willing to take over.

Recommendation 3. Redesign UNDP Kosovo's organizational structure.

The new structure should be flexible and able to adapt easily to new tasks. It should remove barriers between 'clusters' (subject areas) and encourage creation of multidisciplinary project design teams. It should consider the different nature of project design and project implementation activities. It should facilitate effective monitoring at both programme and project levels and should open opportunities for communication and collaboration among projects. It should also make it easier for the senior management to manage the UNDP office effectively.

Recommendation 4. Develop UNDP Kosovo's own capacity in the areas of programming, project management, monitoring and evaluation.

In its own capacity development work UNDP Kosovo needs to keep in mind key lessons learned by others: capacity development must include training but cannot be limited to training. Capacity development should also include self-education, learning by doing, information sharing, and mentoring. Establishing proper organizational systems is also an important component of creating and sustaining organizational capacity.

Recommendation 5. In its future programming efforts UNDP Kosovo should make sure that there are no gaps in the chains of results and that the logic between adjoining levels of the programme is harmonized.

UNDP should be thoughtful and consistent in developing chains of results. Causal links between various levels of expected results should be explained and assessed.

Because a programme is no more than a logical framework for a set of related projects, activities—by definition—can only take place within the projects. Projects contribute to programme outcomes, but programme outcomes can be achieved only if all the contributing projects are implemented successfully and their respective contributions made as planned. In this logical framework, programme outcomes should be viewed as the impact of the projects that constitute the programme and project outcomes, in turn, should be viewed as programme outputs.

Annex 1. Terms of reference (International Expert)

1. Background

The process of European integration provides a clear framework for Kosovo's development priorities and trajectory, guided by the European Partnership Action Plan (EPAP) adopted in 2006 and Kosovo's Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 2008-2011. Kosovo faces a specific set of development challenges: The capacities of local governing structures are weak and present a particular constrains to development efforts in other areas. Furthermore, a number of competencies previously carried out by the UN Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) have been transferred to the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in June 2008. Among these, the primary responsibilities include the areas of justice, police and customs.

Kosovo ranks lowest on the HDI for the region at 0.745 in 2007. Its Gender Development Index (GDI) is also lowest for the region at 0.76. The greatest threat for long-term stability of Kosovo remains its fragile economy. The global financial crisis has translated into a decrease in remittances and foreign direct investment. Unemployment stands at 35% for men and 62% for women. Economic growth is hindered by lack of private sector development and

UNDP began its operations in Kosovo in 1999, in the immediate post-conflict situation and since then has delivered more than USD 150 million in assistance.

Programme activities have evolved, progressively from crisis response and recovery to longer term capacity development.

The 2005 – 2010 Results and Resources Framework (RRF) for UNDP activities comprises three main components: Democratic Governance, Poverty alleviation and Crisis Recovery. In the course of implementation, these components were further defined and subdivided into the four thematic areas below:

4. Democratic Governance (including Environment)
5. Economic Development and Employment
6. Social Inclusion, and
7. Justice and Security / Rule of Law.

In 2008, towards the EU and WB led donor conference on Kosovo (July 2008), the UN Kosovo Team (UNKT) produced a programming document for Kosovo covering the period 2009-2011 which was developed based on Kosovo's 2009-2011 Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). However, this document remained in draft form and is at this time outdated.

The primary implementation modality of UNDP activities in Kosovo has been direct implementation (DEX), allowing UNDP to exhibit its strength in delivery, resource mobilization, and flexibility in responding to the emerging needs on the ground. Nevertheless, UNDP has been mindful of the need to utilize available institutional capacities in Kosovo when possible.

The financial value of the programme portfolio ranged between USD 15 to 20 million for the period 2005 to 2009. The portion of Core Resource (TRAC1 and 2) is less than 5 percent of the total programme resources that were mostly mobilized as non-core funds. BCPR funding (TRAC3) mainly supports Rule of Law/Justice and Security and Regional IDP initiatives, totalling USD 3 million.

The evaluation is timely in context of the following developments:

- 1) In compliance with the Secretary-General's policy decision on integrated mission planning process⁹⁴ (IMPP), in 2010 UNMIK and the UNKT are working to develop a joint UN Strategic Framework for Kosovo (UNSF).
- 2) The UN Kosovo Team (UNKT) in context of development of the UNSF will be developing a programming framework in accordance with the UNDAF methodology for the period 2011-2015
- 3) In the context of UN-wide programme planning activities, UNDP Kosovo will undertake development of a new RRF for the period 2011 – 2015.

2. Purpose

As UNDP sets out to reposition its programme and operationalize the 2011– 2015 RRF, the overriding aim of the evaluation is to:

1. Undertake a historical overview of programming areas to identify specific trends in terms of the type and/or level engagement within the programming initiatives (e.g. policy, advocacy, capacity development).
2. Identify programming initiatives which were scaled-up and/or replicated in the current programme cycle, including their success factors and sustainability.
3. Identify areas of convergence of the existing programme with EPAP priorities, including the EC progress reports.
4. Identify partners' perceptions and views (including recommendations) of UNDP's contribution to Kosovo's development and alignment with donor priorities.
5. The POE will feed into the programmatic and operational baseline for UNDP's 2011 – 2015 RRF

3. Evaluation Scope and Objectives

The Programme Outcome Evaluation (POE) will draw up a set of lessons and actionable recommendations based on an assessment of the performance of UNDP's programme over the last programming period. The programme's achievements in the form of institution and capacity building and contributions towards policy formulation will be examined. The POE will in particular review the sustainability of the results, their impact and the way they were achieved, as well as their alignment with Kosovo's development priorities, including those stated in the EPAP. Taking into account the limited overall resources, the evolving staffing situation and the extent of local involvement, the POE will help articulate new perspectives and outlooks for operationalizing the 2011 – 2015 RRF.

The POE will also serve as an input into the UNKT assessment exercise and subsequent development of the UNKT programming framework.

The conclusions and recommendations of the mission will be discussed in the final days of the evaluation mission with a view to reflect on the lessons learned and recommendations made with regard to operationalizing the 2011–2015 RRF.

Specifically the mission will address the following issues:

⁹⁴ Decision of the Secretary-General on Integration of 25 June 2008, Decision No. 2008/24.

Programmatic

- How did a specific portfolio develop? Which initiatives were scaled up and/or replicated? What was the level of engagement of individual initiatives and of the portfolio as a whole (was it at policy level? Advocacy? Capacity development? Local or central level?) What were the outcome level impacts of the individual portfolios?
- If certain initiatives failed to be up-scaled and/or replicated – what were the reasons? What are the major lessons learned in that regard?
- Provide an analysis of factors that influenced performance, success and sustainability of the UNDP programme (including opportunities and constraints).
- Assess the degree to which the programme orientation and selection of areas of focus are appropriate in relation to Kosovo’s development priorities, and particularly with respect to the EPAP priorities. Did the UNDP find its proper “niche” considering the activities of other development partners?
- Review the quality of the relations between UNDP and its main stakeholders – the Kosovo authorities, EC, bilateral donors, civil society, private sector, and UN agencies. Did the relationship allow for effective contributions in programme development and implementation?
- Determine whether the programme development modalities applied were appropriate and conducive to well designed project based interventions?
- Review the strategy adopted for, and success of, the resource mobilisation effort. Have the prospects for resource mobilisation changed?
- Assess to what extent cross-cutting considerations, especially gender dimensions and issues, have been incorporated and mainstreamed into programme and project design.
- Review the degree to which UNDP Kosovo managed to promote the visibility and public knowledge of its activities through public relations activities.
- Based on the lessons learned, provide actionable recommendations for implementation of the 2011-2015 CPD (RRF).

Operational

- Assess the degree of success with the application of the DEX modality. The quality and extent of UNDP Kosovo support needed and the degree that management capabilities of Kosovo authorities were developed at the project level, i.e. the quality of work planning, management of available resources, reporting and accountability.
- Determine to what extent has the DEX approach appropriate and cost effective? Have there been trade-offs in terms of programme quality?
- Assess the adherence to and quality of the monitoring and evaluation activities, as well as reporting and audit requirements.

3. Methodology and Evaluation Questions

The manner in which the above issues will be addressed will consist of a flexible application of the following methods, with relative weights to be left to the evaluation team to apply:

- (a) Review of the relevant documentation (project documents, evaluation reports, annual project reviews, tripartite review reports, Strategic Notes);
- (b) Review of the Results and Resources Framework along with the Integrated Work Plan, ROAR, Strategic Notes and project tree.
- (c) Review of the papers related to on-going Kosovo policy initiatives, the EU Progress Reports, MTEF, action plans and policies on human rights prepared by Kosovo authorities and the World Bank/IMF Poverty Reduction Strategy.

- (d) Interviews with the Kosovo aid coordinating body, project managers, NGOs/CSOs, government officials, UN agencies, OSCE, ECLO, ICO, EULEX and other multilateral and bilateral aid officials;
- (e) Discussions with UNDP Kosovo staff and management;
- (f) Study of office records and publications (NHDRs, Early Warning, etc.);

The evaluation mission will apply both quantitative and qualitative criteria in its assessment of the country situation and the results achieved.

In providing actionable recommendations, the evaluators are expected to analyze the following key questions:

- What factors have contributed to achieving or not achieving intended outcomes?
- To what extent has UNDP assistance at output level contributed to outcomes?
- Has the UNDP partnership strategy been appropriate and effective?
- What factors contributed to effectiveness or ineffectiveness?
- What are the lessons learnt and recommendations related to UNDP programme formulation and implementation in the 2010 – 2014 RRF?

3. Time frame

Submission of draft Results Framework in connection with Serbian CPD	30 April 2010
Identification of Team	9 June 2010
Formation of the POE team	June 2010
Kosovo briefing meetings	July 2010
Fielding of the POE mission	July 2010
Review/discussion of the mission's findings and recommendations with UNDP staff, and Kosovo counterparts and partners, including UNKT and donors, as appropriate	July 2010
Results framework for UN KT	August 2010
Submission of final POE report to RBEC and HQ	August 2010

4. Evaluation Products (deliverables)

The POE team is expected to produce the following outputs:

- Inception report, to be prepared following initial briefing meetings, and review of documentation, providing details of proposed evaluation criteria, including key questions, and methods for data collection and analysis, summarised in an evaluation matrix;
- Presentation of preliminary findings of POE as well as lessons learned and recommendations on any adjustments and re-alignments of the current programme;
- Kosovo programme outcome evaluation report with a maximum length of 20 pages, excluding 4-5 pages of summary of conclusions and recommendations, and annexes;
- Records of the proceedings of the Kosovo Programme Evaluation meeting with the Government (maximum 3 pages);
- POE recommended action matrix;

5. Documents to be consulted

- Relevant National Strategy documents
- 2009-2011 Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF)

- European Partnership Action Plan, August 2009
- Corporate Strategic and other planning documents
- UNDP Kosovo Strategy Notes (2010 and prior years)
- 2009-2011 UNKT Strategy Paper
- 2005-2009 Serbia Country Programme document
- Previous evaluations and assessments
- Returns and reintegration outcome evaluation
- See Kosovo website for details of project evaluations to date
- UNDP Kosovo publications
- UNDP Evaluation policy
- Evaluation matrix

6. Duties and Responsibilities:

- Working under the guidance of the Senior Evaluation Expert (International) the Evaluation Expert is expected to assist the delivery the above evaluation products.
- Evaluation Expert (International) will have the responsibility is to conduct the parts of the evaluation exercise conduct the desktop research and interviews and other activities envisaged under the “Methodology and Evaluation Questions” section which are needed for the timely and qualitative delivery of the evaluation report.
- Evaluation expert will undertake all the tasks and activities delegated by Senior Evaluation Expert.

3. Required Qualifications:

- Minimum Masters degree in economics, business administration, regional development/planning or any other social sciences related to the pro-poor economic growth and poverty reduction
- At least seven years of experience in conducting evaluations, strong working knowledge of UNDP and its mandate, the civil society and working with government authorities
- Extensive knowledge of results-based management evaluation, as well as participatory M&E methodologies and approaches,
- Minimum 7-10 years of professional experience in the area of development, poverty reduction, regional development, gender equality and social policies,
- Excellent communication skills with various partners including donors
- Strong reporting and communication skills in English (Albanian or Serbian is an asset)
- Team work skills and experience

4. Terms and Conditions:

All information and analysis will remain the intellectual property of UNDP.

Annex 2. Evaluation Questions

1. Programme design

- 1.1 What was the program's expected model⁹⁵? How did it emerge and develop?
- 1.2 To what extent were the initial programme orientation and selection of areas of focus relevant to the UNDP corporate policy, UNDP gender equality strategy & 8 point agenda from SCR 1325 (rolling since 2007), UNDP priorities in Kosovo, Kosovo's development priorities, and particularly with respect to the EPAP priorities?
- 1.3 How did UNDP identify its "niche" considering the activities of other development partners?
- 1.4 To what extent were the projects designed and implemented under the UNDP Kosovo Programme in line with the UNDP priorities in Kosovo?
- 1.5 To what extent cross-cutting considerations, especially gender dimensions and issues, were incorporated and mainstreamed into programme and project design?

2. Programme implementation

- 2.1 How did the program unfold?
- 2.2 What's working as expected? What's not working as expected?
- 2.3 What challenges and barriers have emerged? How has program responded to those challenges and barriers?
- 2.4 How did UNDP project portfolio develop? Which initiatives were scaled up and/or replicated? What was the level of engagement of individual initiatives and of the portfolio as a whole (Was it at policy level? Advocacy? Capacity development? Local or central level?)

3. Programme outcomes

- 3.1 What are the actual program outcomes? How do they correlate with the expected outcomes?
- 3.2 How aligned are the outputs of UNDP's interventions with the outcomes to which it would like to contribute?
- 3.3 What are the indications (if any) of program impact?
- 3.4 To what extent did projects implemented by UNDP in Kosovo help develop capacity of Kosovo authorities, i.e. the quality of work planning, management of available resources, reporting and accountability?
- 3.5 What were the other UN agencies' major contributions to the expected outcomes established in UNDP RRF and UNKT priorities? How do they correspond with UNDP contributions and complement them? Are there any synergetic effects or – on the opposite - reduplication?

4. Relationships with stakeholders, partnerships and communications

- 4.1 What was the quality of relations between UNDP and its main stakeholders – the Kosovo authorities, EC, bilateral donors, civil society, media, private sector, and UN agencies? Did the relationships allow for effective contributions in programme development and implementation?
- 4.2 How has the UNDP Kosovo Program used partnerships to increase the effectiveness of its support?
- 4.3 To what extent did UNDP Kosovo manage to promote visibility and public knowledge of its activities through public relations?

⁹⁵ Model describes program as an intervention with connections between inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes and impact

- 4.4 What are the UNDP Kosovo Program's key characteristics as perceived by various stakeholders? How similar or different are those perceptions? What's the basis of differences?

5. Programme management and resource mobilization

- 5.1 How did the office structure evolve during the period under review to adapt to the requirements of the programme? How effective and relevant were and are the organizational structure and staffing of the UNDP-Kosovo office?
- 5.2 How effective was the introduction of Results-Based Management (RBM) methodology and approaches in the course of the programming period, e.g. MYFF targets, indicators and ROAR, Atlas project tree and so forth?
- 5.3 How effective was the application of project oversight and monitoring and evaluation guidelines laid out in the Users' Guide, POPP and other corporate manuals and tool boxes?
- 5.4 To what extent was the DEX approach in Kosovo relevant, appropriate and cost effective? Have there been trade-offs in terms of programme quality?
- 5.5 What was UNDP Kosovo strategy for resource mobilization and how successful it was? Have the prospects for resource mobilisation changed?
- 5.6 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the UNDP Kosovo Program's management structure, the Program's planning, communication, performance reporting, monitoring and evaluation, and decision-making mechanisms? What are potential causes of the weaknesses (if any) and ways to address them?

Annex 3. List of people consulted

UNDP Kosovo

Mr. Abedin Azizi, Program Analyst, Capacity Development for MESP Project Coordinator
Mr. Alex Standish, Programme Manager, Return and Reintegration in Kosovo
Mr. Ardit Gashi, civic engineer, SPARK and RRK projects
Mr. Armend Muja, Head of Communication Department
Mr. Atdhe Hetemi, Project Manager, Early Warning Reports Project
Mr. Boban Simic, Local Project Manager, UNDP/ABD
Mr. D. Christopher Decker, Program Coordinator for Justice and Security Cluster
Mr. Dejan Antic, UNDP Local Programme Coordinator, Area Based Development Programme (ABD) – for Mitrovica-North and Zvečan
Mr. Dejan Radivojevic, Head of Social Inclusion Cluster
Mr. Denis Nushi, Project Manager, Human Development Reports
Mr. Hasan Kelmendi, UNDP Local Programme Coordinator, Area Based Development Programme (ABD) – for Mitrovica-South
Mr. John Durance, Project Coordinator, Kosova Protection Corps Resettlement Programme
Mr. Levent Koro, Former Head of Economic Development Cluster
Mr. Mytaher Haskuka, Head of Research and Policy Unit
Mr. Parviz Fartash, UNDP Kosovo Director
Mr. Petrit Skenderi, Project Coordinator, Rule of Law Institutional Capacity Building
Mr. Rreze Duli, Project Manager, Support to Decentralization in Kosovo project
Mr. Tetsuo Kondo, former Deputy Director, UNDP Kosovo
Mr. Valdet Osmani, Project Coordinator, Growing Inclusive Markets
Ms. Albulena Metaj, Gender Advisor, KPC Resettlement Programme
Ms. Arbnesha Shala Miftari, Head of Finance
Ms. Berenika Gashi, Knowledge Management Expert
Ms. Brikena Sylejmani, Gender Programme Associate
Ms. Jocelyne Talbot, Senior Gender Adviser
Ms. Kazuki Matsuura, Environment Program Manager
Ms. Lindita Daija, Project Coordinator, Private Sector Initiatives & Global Compact
Ms. Maria Elena Zuniga Barrientos, Project Manager, Development based on integrated biodiversity and sustainable land use management in Dragash
Ms. Marta K. Gazideda, Capacity Development for Kosovo Project Manager
Ms. Mithulina Chatterjee, Project Coordinator, Access to Justice
Ms. Nazlie Bala, Project Manager Women Safety and Security Initiative / WSSI
Ms. Osnat Lubrani, UN Development Coordinator / UNDP RR
Ms. Virgjina Dumnica, Program Analyst, Justice and Security Cluster
Ms. Yllka Gerdovci, Project Coordinator, Active Labor Market Project

Government and Municipal

Mr. Habit Hajredini, Coordination of Office for Good Governance, Kosova Government, OPM
Mr. Haki Rugova, Mayor, Istog municipality
Mr. Muhamet Malsiu, Director, Environment Department, Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning (MESP)
Mr. Sadri Ferati, Minister, Ministry of Local Government Administration (MLGA)
Mr. Salim Jenuzi, Mayor of Dragash Municipality

UNKT

Mr. Jo Hegenauer, Jr., Chief of Mission, UNHCR
Mr. Paul Miller, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
Mr. Skender Sylja, Head of Office, WHO Office, Pristina

Ms. Kaoru Yamagiwa, Project Manager, UMIFEM Office in Kosovo

Donors

Mr. Guido Bettrani, Deputy Director, Swiss Cooperation Office

Business

Mr. Boris Drobach, Manager of Business Center Zvečan

NGOs and CBOs

Mr. Agron Demi, acting Executive Director, GAP Institute

Mr. Aleksandar Gvozdic, Executive Director, NGO “Mission of People of Good Will”, Zvečan

Mr. Arber Gorani, Research Director, Kosovar Stability Initiative

Mr. Ramadan Ilazi, Executive Director, Speak Up Movement

Mr. Sadik Beciraj, leader of Serbobran RAE community

Mr. Taulant Hoxha, Head of Civil Society Programme, Kosovar Civil Society Foundation

Mr. Valdete Idrizi, Director, NGO “Community Building Mitrovica”, Mitrovica-South

Partners

Mr. Pekka Salminen, Project Manager, Finish Environmental Institute

Annex 4. List of Documents studied

Action plans

Annual workplan for Roma Regional Project

EPAP 2009 (Excel)

European partnership action plan EPAP for Kosovo 2009 (Narrative)

Development and Transition

2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 issues

Evaluation and Review Reports

CAPACITY BUILDING FACILITY Evaluation Report 2005

CAPACITY BUILDING FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROJECT Mid Term Review Report 2007

Evaluation of Active Labour Market Programme for Youth in Kosovo 2008

Evaluation of Kosovo Early Warning System III Project 2006

Evaluation of Support to Implementation of Kosovo Youth Action Plan 2010

Evaluation of Early Warning System End Users

Independent Evaluation Mission Report Returns and Reintegration 2009

Medium Term Expenditure Framework 2010-2012

PROJECT EVALUATION OF PUBLIC WORKS COMPONENT EMPLOYMENT GENERATION PROJECT 2007

PROJECT EVALUATION PLAN (UNDP Kosovo Project Management in ATLAS)

HD Reports

KHDR for 2004, 2006, 2007 and 2008

Multi-year funding frameworks

Multi-year Funding Framework Annual targets for 2006

Multi-year Funding Framework Targets for 2007

Multi-year Funding Framework 2004-2007

Organograms

UNDP Kosovo Democratic Governance cluster Sept2009

UNDP Kosovo organogramme of 2008

Program and project reports

Kosovo Annual Report 2005

Kosovo Annual Report 2006

Kosovo Gender Tracker (Atlas Kosovo June 2010)

Poverty reduction results 2007

Returns and reconciliation project results

“Women Participation in Shaping the New Kosovo” - Narrative final progress report

Project portfolios and project documents

PROJECT portfolio 2009

Project budgets and delivery in 2006-2009 (from Atlas)

Project Proposal “Women Participation in Shaping the New Kosovo”

ROARs

ROARs for 2005 through 2009

Strategies and program documents

Country programme document for Serbia and Montenegro 2005-2009

Final UNKT Strategic Plan narrative 2009-2011


Kosovo strategic notes 2003-2009

ROMA Project document

UNDAF Results Matrix for Serbia and Montenegro
UNDP Gender Equality Strategy for 2008-2011
UNDP Kosovo Democratic Governance and Environment Strategy of August 2009
UNDP Resolution 1325 (Women Gender Equality - 8 Point Agenda)


Annex 5. UNDP Kosovo Organizational Structures

UNDP KOSOVO






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