



EVALUATION OF JOINT PROGRAMME 5

Capacity Building Support to Zanzibar

Final Evaluation Report

Prepared by:

**Mr. Stuart Black
and
Ms. Aimtonga Amani Makawia**

December 2011

List of Acronyms

AA	Administrative Agent
AC	Asbestos Cement
ADB	Africa Development Bank
AG	Attorney General
ALC	Alternative Learning Classes
AMP	Aid Management Platform
ANC	Ante Natal Care
ANGOZA	Association of Non Governmental Organizations of Zanzibar
AU	African Union
AWP	Annual Work Plan
BCtA	Business Call to Action
BDS	Business Development Services
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi – Tanzania ruling party
CFS	Child Friendly Schools
COICOP	Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose
CPI	Consumer Price Index
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CUF	Civil United Front
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DaO	Delivering as One
DBS	Direct Budget Support
DEF	Department of External Finance
DH	District Hospital
DHMTs	District Health Management Teams
DHS	Demographic Health Survey
DMT	District Management Team
DNA	Deoxyribonucleic Acid
DP	Development Partners
DPP	Director of Public Prosecution
ECD	Early Child Development
ECOSAN	Ecological Sanitation Latrines
EmOC	Emergency Obstetric Care
Ex Comms	UN Executive Committee Agencies (e.g., UNDP)
EMIS	Education Management Information System
FANC	Focused Antenatal Care
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FBS	National Food Balance Sheet
FFS	Farmers Field School
FP	Family Planning
FRGs	Farmer Research Groups
FSN	Food Security and Nutrition
GBS	General Budget Support
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GoT	Government of Tanzania
HBS	Household Budget Survey
HF	Health Facility
HACT	Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfer
HIV/AIDS	Human Immune Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiencies Syndrome
HMIS	Health Management Information System

HQ	Head Quarters
HRTF	Human Right and Right to Food
ICT	Information And Communication Technologies
IFAD	International Fund For Agricultural Development
ILO	International Labor Organization
IMCI	Integrated Management of Childhood Illness
IMFS	Integrated Financial Management Systems
IMIT	Institute of Management and Information Technology
IPs	Implementing Partners
ISSC	Inter-Sectoral Steering Committee
IT	Information Technology
JAST	Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania
JSC	Joint Government/UN Steering Committee for the One UN Process
JP	Joint Programme
JP5	Joint United Nations Programme 5
JPO	Junior Professional Officer
JWG	Joint Working Group
LAN	Local Area Network
LGA	Local Government Authority
LMI	Labor Market Information
LMIS	Labor Management Information System
LSS	Life Saving Skills
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MA	Managing Agency
MALE	Ministry Of Agriculture, Livestock And Environment
MDA	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEoVT	Ministry of Education and Vocational Training
MFI	Micro Finance Institution
MKUKUTA	The United Republic of Tanzania National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
MKUZA	Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
MLEC	Ministry of Labour and Economic Empowerment and Cooperatives
MLYWCD	Ministry of Labor Youth women and Child Development
MNCH	Maternal Newborn Child Health
MoCAGG	Ministry Of Constitutional Affairs And Good Governance
MOFEA	Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
MOHSW	Ministry of Health and Social welfare
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSME	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise
MTEF	Mid Term Expenditure Framework
MTF	Multi Trust Fund
MTTI	Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industries
NFSND	National Food Security and Nutrition Department
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NSAs	Non State Actors
OCGS	Office of Chief Government Statistician
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSH-Act	Occupational Safety and Health Act
PER	Public Expenditure Review
PETS	Public Expenditure Tracking System
PF3	Police Form No 3

PHAST	Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Transformation
PHCU	Primary Health Care Unit
PLHA	People Living with HIV/AIDS
PMP	Performance Management Plan or Performance Measurement Plan
POFEDP	President's Office Finance, Economy and Development Planning
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PUNs	Participating United Nations Agencies
RBM	Result Based Management
RCH	Reproductive Child Health
RCO	Resident Coordinator Office
RGoZ	Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar
RRF	Results and Resources Framework
SACCOS	Savings and Credit Societies
SMEDP	Small and Medium Enterprise Development Policy
SMES	Small and Medium Entrepreneurs
SPs	Service Provider(s)
STC	Stakeholders Technical Committee
SUA	Supply Utilization Account
TA	Technical Assistance
TDHS	Tanzania Demographic Health Survey
ToR	Terms of Reference
TWG	Technical Working Group
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNCMT	United Nations Country Management Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDAP	United Nations Development Assistance Plan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Education Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Agency for Population Funds
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNV	United Nations Volunteer
WHO	World Health Organization
ZAMP	Zanzibar Agricultural Marketing Policy
ZAWA	Zanzibar Water Authority
ZBIC	Zanzibar Business Information Centre
ZRB	Zanzibar Revenue Board
ZEP	Zanzibar Employment Policy
ZHDR	Zanzibar Human Development Report
ZINDUKA	Journal of Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Plan
ZMC	Zanzibar Municipal Council
ZNCCIA	Zanzibar National Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture
ZNZ	Zanzibar
ZPMC	Zanzibar Programme Management Committee
ZSSF	Zanzibar Social Security Fund

Preface

The report conforms to the terms of reference developed by UNDP Tanzania for the evaluation assignment, and was based on a review of project documents and reference materials coupled with interviews and an in-country mission carried out during August and September 2010. The views presented in this report are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Revolutionary government of Zanzibar, the government of Tanzania or the United Nations Development Programme. The conclusions and recommendations provided are solely those of the authors and are not binding on the government, programme management or other stakeholders.

Team Composition

The team comprised the following consultants:

- Mr Stuart Black, Evaluation Team Leader & primary author of the sections on design, Pillar I, Pillar III and Management and Implementation
- Ms Aimtonga Amani Makawia, National Evaluation Specialist & primary author of Pillar II and the Micheweni Intervention

Acknowledgements

The consulting team would like to thank the many people who kindly gave their time during interviews with government and development partner institutions in Zanzibar and Tanzania Mainland, as well as those people who provided useful inputs to the assessment and comments on earlier versions of this report¹. The report, as well as the related preparatory work could not have been completed without the support of Ms Edna Gathigia, UNV posted to UNDP Zanzibar, who helped to arrange meetings with a wide range of stakeholders. The consultancy that led to this report was funded by UNDP Tanzania and implemented in cooperation with a number of UN agencies in Zanzibar and Tanzania Mainland

¹ Please refer to Annex 1 for a complete list of interviewees.

Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
List of Acronyms	ii
Preface and Acknowledgements	v
Executive Summary	viii
1.0 INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Programme Context - UN Delivering as One Initiative	1
1.2 Background to Joint Programme 5	1
1.3 Expected Results of JP5	1
1.4 Mandate of the Evaluation	2
1.5 Structure of the Report	3
2.0 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY	5
2.1 Methodology	5
2.2 Evaluation Framework	6
2.3 Evaluation Rating System	6
2.4 Limitations of the Evaluation Methodology	6
3.0 ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE	7
3.1 Introduction	7
3.2 Assessment of Programme Design	7
3.3 Assessment of Programme Results	12
3.3.1 Pillar 1: Wealth Creation, Employment & Economic Empowerment	12
<u>Outcome 1</u> : National capacity to manage and monitor FSN strengthened	13
<u>Outcomes 2, 3 and 4</u> : UNIDO Support to Job Creation	17
<u>Outcomes 5, 6 and 7</u> : ILO assistance to Employment Policy & Job Creation	22
3.3.2 Pillar II: Reduction of MNCN & Improved Social Services	31
<u>Outcomes 8 & 9</u> : Increased to comprehensive MNCH	32
<u>Outcome 10</u> : Improved water and sanitation	36
<u>Outcome 11</u> : Capacity to promote gender equality enhanced	39
<u>Outcome 12</u> : Improved educational programmes	41
3.3.3 Pillar III: National Capacity for Development Management	44
<u>Outcome 15</u> : Capacity to plan and implement development results improved	44
<u>Outcome 16</u> : Good Governance principles promoted	46
<u>Outcome 17</u> : Improved respect for the rule of law and justice	47
3.3.4 Micheweni Interventions	49
<u>Outcome 18</u> : Increased support to Micheweni and other vulnerable areas	49
3.3.5 Programme Management & Implementation	59
Adaptive Management	59
Programme Financing and Efficiency	63
Stakeholder Involvement and Relevance	66
Contribution of IPs and PUNs and Synergies among UN Agencies	67
Progress Toward the Overall Objectives	68
Achievement of Higher Level Goals	69
4.0 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS	73

<u>Annexes</u>	
1. List of People Interviewed	81
2. Bibliography and References	83
3. Financial Tables	84
4. Outputs, Targets & Outcomes	86
5. Rating of Performance by Outcome	91
6. Evaluation Framework	103
7. Evaluation Terms of Reference	106
8. Evaluation Schedule	116

List of Tables, Boxes and Photos

	<u>Page</u>
Table 1: JP5 Objectives and Results (2008 and after the re-planning in May 2009)	3 & 4
Table 2: Evaluation Rating System	6
Table 3: Rating of Programme Design	11
Table 4: Configuration of Outputs after first re-planning (February 2009)	12
Table 5: Configuration of Outputs after second re-planning (May 2009)	12
Table 6: Performance of Mnazi-mmoja Hospital GBV One Stop Centre	35
Table 7: Summary of Programme Results (Outcomes 1 to 18)	58
Table 8: JP5 Staff and Responsibilities	62
Table 9: Delivery Rates for JP5	65
Table 10: Delivery Rates of PUNs involved in JP5	65
Table 11: Summary of Programme Management and Implementation	68
Table 12: Summary of Higher Level Government and UN Goals	72
Box 1: Transformational Result: FAO Support to Downstream Interventions	15
Box 2: Possible Unintended Result: Restructuring of MLYWCD	25
Box 3: Transformational Result: Empowerment of Women	25
Box 4: Creation of Ownership through Synergies and Joint Planning	27
Box 5: Transformational Result – Empowering Women	28
Box 6: Transformational Result: A GBV “One Stop Centre”	35
Box 7: Unplanned achievement: Use of appropriate technology for safe water	37
Box 8: Transformational Result: Contribution to the Development of MKUZA II	46
Box 9: Transformational Result & Unplanned Achievement: Legal Sector Reform	48
Box 10: Transformational Result: Micheweni Community Radio	54
Box 11: Transformational Result: Model JP for UNDAF	69
Photo 1: Beneficiaries from Farmer Field School Training	15
Photo 2: Beneficiaries of Value-added Processing (Spices and Seaweed Products)	28
Photo 3: Water stand post established through JP5 support in Micheweni District	50
Photo 4: Maziwa Ng'ombe water tank project	51
Photo 5: The staff house and medical equipment; Maziwa Ng'ombe HF Micheweni	52
Photo 6: Former President and UNESCO Representative at Community Radio launch	53
Photo 7: New Government Constructed Premises for Micheweni Community Radio	54
Photo 8: Saininga Irrigation Scheme & Dairy Goat in Household Compound	56

Executive Summary

This report is on the Final Evaluation of the UN's Joint Programme 5, *Capacity Building Support to Zanzibar* (JP5). The evaluation was conducted by a two-person team of independent consultants contracted by UNDP during August and September 2011. The draft report was validated by the ZPMC at a multistakeholder meeting held on December 8th, and the Final Evaluation Report was submitted in January, 2012.

JP5 was one of 11 joint programmes being piloted in Tanzania (Mainland and Zanzibar) as part of the UN's new "Delivering as One" (DaO) approach. JP5 was the only UN joint programme providing a framework for development assistance specifically for Zanzibar.

JP5 began in January 2008 and ended in June 2011, with an extension granted until October 30, 2011. The programme was implemented by national implementing partners (IPs) with assistance provided by participating UN agencies (PUNs) under the overall leadership of a joint government-UN Programme Steering Committee (PSC) and coordinated by a joint Zanzibar Programme Management Committee (ZPMC). UNDP was the assigned Managing Agent (MA) with ultimate responsibility and accountability for achieving results, management of funds and reporting on progress.

The overall (planned) budget for JP5 was US\$ 19.0 million, but because of delays in implementation and lack of financial commitments, total expenditures were US\$ 11.3 million (approximately 60% of the planned allocation).

The principal programme objective was to support government institutions in Zanzibar to improve their capacity and service delivery for the purpose of contributing to the realization of pro-poor growth. There was also an underlying management objective to improve the UN system's fragmented and inefficient modalities for delivering development assistance. The programme was precisely aligned to the outcomes of the 3 clusters of the government's "MKUZA" development strategy (2010-2015)².

Assessment of Performance

In assessing **programme design**, JP5 was found to be very relevant when considered against the background of national priorities and policies. The design and implementation were very flexible and very participatory, following an incremental approach with the outputs and activities being revised through joint planning sessions several times during 2008 and 2009. These **joint work planning** activities became part of the process of turning the MKUZA strategy into an implementation plan. The designers correctly focused UN support on the UN system's comparative advantage of addressing the needs of the most vulnerable groups. But the programme lacked adequate intervention logic, an M&E framework and secure financing, which affected implementation and delivery rates. Also, the capacity-building needs of IPs was not adequately taken into account.

More than a joint programme, JP5 was designed like a mini-UNDAF and mini-MKUZA – a geographically based, multisectoral framework involving a range of interventions across a variety of sectors and clusters. It was a complex programme of technical support divided into 3 pillars of activity. As one interviewee put it: *"JP5 was not easy. It was difficult to visualize the whole plan in different clusters. The annual workplans had everything; it was like 'window shopping'. The 3*

² MKUZA is the Swahili acronym for "Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty"

pillars were too broad. They expected too much. They had to narrow down. It was too ambitious. But with the revisions it became better, a bit more manageable.”

Pillar I was focused on supporting wealth creation, employment and economic empowerment. Its interventions were aligned with the broad outcomes and goals of MKUZA Cluster 1: Growth and Reduction of Income Poverty. There were 7 outcomes, where programme delivery was done by sector with the requisite UN agencies supporting the relevant sectors: FAO in agriculture, ILO in labour, and UNIDO in trade and industry. Under the pillar/cluster approach, the ministries were able to treat the job creation/economic empowerment mandate as a cross-cutting, multisectoral issue that involved a range of institutions (Labour, Trade, Agriculture, etc.). Each ministry benefited a great deal from JP5 because it contributed to the achievement of MKUZA outcomes. These **synergies created ownership and collaboration**, where previously ministries and PUNs developed and supported their initiatives independently. However, there was a lack of synergy within the UN system, where planning was done by pillar but delivery was done by sector, with PUNs assisting the relevant sectors. As one person indicated, *“the UN agencies planned together but didn’t deliver together”*.

As a pilot programme, JP5 performed very well by working through initial strategies and plans and identifying future areas of need. The achievements in the area of policy support were quite significant, involving food security and nutrition, agricultural marketing, SME policy, employment policy, labour laws and social protection. Capacity building included support to the establishment of new departments in FSN and employment, and improvement in the collection and analysis of labour market information, economic studies, statistics and surveys for poverty monitoring. In the area of downstream interventions, JP5 support helped to empower farmers and SME groups to adopt new production techniques, marketing, packaging, etc. Some groups were able to benefit from complementary support from trade, labour and agriculture, such as organizing into groups (seaweed, FFSs, fish smoking, spices, etc.).

JP5’s interventions included some truly **transformational results**, such as the **empowerment of women** through their ability to earn income, participate in cooperative practices and make improvements to their nascent business ventures, which is an important first step in moving participants from subsistence level activities toward making a link to the market.

Looking to the future, the issue of “economic empowerment” has moved to the top of the national agenda. This is one area where development partner resources can be allocated to align with government priorities. There is also a need to continue the nascent entrepreneurship and market development efforts by strengthening value chains and market linkages between tourism and agriculture. Some outcomes performed better than others, but overall Pillar I achieved a **“satisfactory” (B)** rating.

Pillar II focused on reduction of maternal newborn and child mortality and improved social services. Interventions in Pillar II were implemented by government ministries with technical support provided by participating UN agencies (PUNs) as follows: MOHSW, under the technical support WHO, UNFPA; ZAWA under the technical support of UNICEF and UNDP; MoEVT under technical support of UNESCO and the Ministry of Social Welfare, Youth, Women, and Children Development; under the technical support of UNFPA and UNICEF.

Evaluation findings show that tangible upstream achievements were recorded mostly through the development of key policy documents such as the Road Map to accelerate reduction of maternal and newborn mortality, and the multisectoral strategy to prevent and respond to GBV. The findings also demonstrate that JP5 activities contributed to increased capacities in MDAs to

promote MNCH services, access to MNCH, ANC services and institutionalization of GBV responses, as well increased quality of HIV/AIDS services through integration of FP services into care & treatment services. Through JP5 support, there has been increased use of safe and appropriate technology by moving from hand pump wells to more capable deep boreholes with better capacity to supply water to communities and families. JP5 support moved from using Asbestos Cement pipelines to modern technologies (PVC, DCI and PE) that last up to 30 years with minimal maintenance requirements. The use of advanced and appropriate technology is a laudable approach in solving local community development problems. Establishment of a **GBV “One Stop Centre”** was recorded as one of the **transformational results** achieved under JP5. However, the achievements recorded from JP5 support to the education sector are limited, primarily due to limited funding allocated to education activities. Interventions in Pillar II were affected by funding delays, planning and capacity issues, particularly in such key interventions as EMOC assessments, and in establishing the skills, equipment and knowledge gap to guide JP5 and future MNCH interventions that were not undertaken. The evaluation findings rated the performance under Pillar II as **“satisfactory” (B)**.

Pillar III was focused on 3 broad result areas: 1) strengthening the capacity of government to plan, implement, monitor and report on development results, and implementation of reforms in the civil service and economic and public finance management; 2) promotion of good governance and improved participation in decision making by women and vulnerable groups; and 3) improved law enforcement and access to justice. The results of these activities included improved capacities in RBM and M&E among MDAs; improved aid management and reporting with the integration of aid management systems among MDAs and input from NGOs and NSAs; production of a new version of MKUZA and a new communications strategy for MKUZA which included a Swahili language version; identification of pro-poor elements in development projects; the production of valuable surveys to feed into the HBS and economic reports which informed policy, etc. These activities supported key public management policies and strengthened the ability of the Core Reform Unit to fulfill its mandate. Although, the Local Government Reform component of the Public Service Reform was delayed due to the change in government

Key results for Pillar III involved the roll out of the aid coordination mechanism, building capacity in aid management, completion of MKUZA II, and data collection involved for the HBS, which were given an overall rating of **“satisfactory” (B)**.

The **Micheweni intervention** contributed to increased and improved access to social services, water and sanitation, education, health and economic empowerment in selected communities. Several participating UN agencies and ministries were involved including UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO, UNESCO, MOHSW, MORASD, MoEVT, Ministry of Information and Communication Services and MLYWCD, with the Ministry of Finance controlling the funds. The evaluation findings show that the community radio was a transformational result that resulted in improved information and empowerment of groups and communities. However, the evaluation findings show that more evidenced-based planning and improved coordination could have increased the rates of delivery in Micheweni. As such, the overall performance of the Micheweni interventions was rated **“satisfactory” (B)**.

Under **Programme Management and Implementation**, the JP5 team was pursuing two sets of goals: 1) the short term programme goal of building capacity and improving service delivery, and 2) the longer term management goal, which involved providing a framework for UN agencies to work more closely together, along with government and other development partners. The ultimate goal of the management framework was to improve development results by achieving more than just joint results – a more unified programme, with joint work planning and reduced transaction

costs. The joint planning processes helped MDAs to implement the MKUZA and improved the delivery of aid. Thus, the programme outcomes were largely entwined within and to some extent dependent upon the management goal.

The implementation modality for JP5 was quite complex, where UNDP did not *manage* the programme so much as *administer* it. This arrangement was consistent with the design, where programme delivery was done by the IPs with assistance from PUNs in the attainment of outcomes arranged in three multisectoral ‘pillars’. As Managing Agent, UNDP had ultimate responsibility and accountability for achieving results and managing the funds. UNDP also had an important coordination role to play in ensuring effective collaboration between the partners, which involved instituting participatory planning, management and implementation processes through joint coordination mechanisms and oversight bodies such as Joint Working Groups (established in all 3 pillars), the Zanzibar Program Management Committee (comprising High-level government officials and representatives of PUNs) and the Joint Steering Committee (the overall oversight body for JP5).

JP5’s flexible and iterative approach to implementation was much appreciated by PUNs and IPs alike. The flexible and participatory decision-making approach was suited the changing programme and management objectives, but it created a high degree of uncertainty, particularly when it came to mobilizing the resources needed to implement the programme. Only 60% of the planned funding was raised – the majority through the One UN Fund (77%) and 23% through parallel funding, but no funds were raised through the preferred “pooled” mechanism.

In the rush to implement, proper needs and capacity assessments were not undertaken to determine the needs and capacities of the relevant institutions in government, the private sector, SMEs and CSOs that would be responsible for implementing and sustaining the interventions. As a result, there were delays in implementation, which affected programme delivery. Yet, of all JPs, JP5 had the highest delivery rate (89%)³. However, more could have been achieved if the management and implementation arrangements had been tighter, particularly in relation to securing of financial resources, building the capacity of IPs and coordination of PUNs. Also, roles and responsibilities for monitoring were not clearly identified, and the M&E system and reporting tools and templates were not adequately developed at the outset. So, it was difficult for the JP5 team to track the progress of outputs and outcomes.

Shortcomings at the output and outcome levels were made up in the attainment of higher-level goals, where JP5 provided support to government priorities and strengthened national ownership while building capacity and improving service delivery. It also provided a framework for the UN agencies and government to work in a more harmonized, coordinated and cost-effective manner, thus improving aid effectiveness. However, JP5 was not able to make many gains in mainstreaming various cross-cutting issues such as gender, the environment and the rights based approach, primarily due to a lack of support and capacity within IPs.

During its 4 years of operation, JP5 management and implementation arrangements can be summarized as follows:

2008 – Planning, consolidation, awareness building

2009 – Re-planning, bureaucratic delays and funding disbursements and implementation

2010 – Limited funding was approved (or available), so some interventions were not completed

2011 – Hope that UNDP will consolidate JP5’s gains & allow more impact or long term results

³ The delivery rate is calculated on funding received; the rate of delivery based on planned funding is 59%

Conclusion

JP5's flexible implementation modality and its multisectoral interventions were the right choice for Zanzibar. The programme contributed to national priorities and addressed both policy and downstream needs of the government and local communities. Despite several challenges under JP5, many short-term and long-term results were recorded in Zanzibar. Also, the timeframe was too short to be very effective. But it has to be remembered that JP5 was a pilot programme, where it pointed the way for future areas of need. In this respect, it performed very well. Moreover, by providing a model framework for delivering the One UN agenda, it established a platform for implementation of UNDAP in Tanzania, through which continuity of JP5 gains and lessons will be carried forward.

Key Lessons

1. Strong support and focus on programme management issues such as intervention logic, M&E and capacity building are critical to the successes of a capacity building programme like JP5
2. Participatory mechanisms involving joint planning and implementation are the key to creating ownership and sustainability on government-led initiatives
3. More effort has to be devoted to the design of complex, multisectoral "joint" programmes involving specialized UN agencies
4. The UN system should look more strategically at a particular ministry's or sector's total needs, upstream and downstream. Interventions involving policy level assistance and capacity building have to be followed up with assistance at the implementation and downstream levels to ensure the policies are implemented and capacity is strengthened
5. Study tours can have an impact on improving programme performance, generating new ideas and scaling up best practices if they are well planned and coordinated and visits conducted to locations with similar characteristic to those of project areas. The GBV and community radio study tours under JP5 are good examples for other programmes to learn from
6. In Micheweni, the readiness of community members to participate in development projects ensured the success of selected interventions. This approach is important as it gives a sense of community ownership and thus ensuring sustainability of project as JP5 comes to an end
7. To be effective, support to improved RBM and M&E systems at the central level of government has to be followed up with support in line ministries, MDAs and district levels
8. Flexible and adaptive management approaches are key in supporting government to meet its objectives, but more effort is needed in securing predictable financing beforehand

Recommendations

Design

1. It is important to invest in strategic thinking and planning during the design phase of programmes; this investment will help to increase efficiency during implementation.
2. Follow up support under UNDAP should make a point of undertaking capacity assessments to determine the capacity-building activities and implementation structures needed to implement complex, multisectoral interventions

Pillar I

3. Follow up support under UNDAP should follow through with JP5's 'capacity building' mandate and provide strategic technical assistance to the new departments and policies that JP5 supported to ensure the policies are implemented. For example, MALE needs assistance in agricultural marketing, the Ministry of Labour needs assistance with implementation of

labour laws, employment policy and social protection, and MTIM needs an SME support strategy

4. UNDAP should build on the downstream productivity gains of JP5 and provide longer-term assistance in market development, particularly in agriculture and tourism sectors.
5. To continue Pillar I's sectoral approach toward economic empowerment, UNDAP should look at supporting the government's existing committee formed to spearhead economic empowerment. This may involve putting together key actors and strengthening the capacity of the committee, but it will ensure ownership and create synergies among government ministries.

Pillar II

6. The UN should continue supporting women, youth, children, economic development & population issues in Zanzibar; it is one of areas with soaring needs & good results can be achieved.
7. EMOC assessment is still a critical activity to establish gaps in skills, equipment and knowledge so as to guide future MNCH interventions. EmoC assessment needs to be undertaken.
8. The campaign and construction of latrines needs to be sustained through joint efforts

Pillar III

9. Assistance should be provided to continue improving the M&E systems, particularly with support to line ministries

Micheweni Intervention

10. In order to create local ownership, it is important to involve government and the communities in all stages of the project cycle
11. To sustain provision of planting materials, farmer field schools need to be strengthened in Micheweni district, including training of agricultural officers on new production techniques.

Management and Implementation

12. Within UNDAP's monitoring framework there is a need for two things: 1) clearly defined roles for M&E, and 2) a full time M&E person to be involved in the design, planning, implementation and reporting of programme support.
13. The UN system should try to secure the necessary financial and technical resources prior to implementation

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Programme Context – UN Delivering as One Initiative

Tanzania was one of 8 countries piloting the One UN Reform initiative, which involved pooling operational and financial resources for UN agencies in a particular country. In November 2007, the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence conceived the "Delivering as One" (DaO) concept and established a series of pilot country initiatives to test the 'One UN' approach. The DaO approach was initially conceptualized as the 'Four Ones' – One Programme, One Leader, One Budgetary Framework, and One Office where appropriate. The UN Country Team in Tanzania added 'One Voice' in 2008 – making it 'Five Ones'. The ultimate goal is to reduce transaction costs and improve results by achieving a greater impact on the ground, along with oriented planning and management. Essentially, the One UN format provides a framework for UN agencies to work more closely together along with government and other partners to achieve more than joint results – a unified programme.

The One Programme was implemented through a number of Joint Programmes (JPs), which sought to respond to national priorities and represent sectors in which the UN has expertise to deal with the development gaps. In Tanzania, the UNCT developed a strategic framework (UNDAF 2007-2010) for the UN family to support the government's National Strategies for Growth and Poverty Reduction (MKUKUTA and MKUZA). Thus, the JPs are aligned to the MKUKUTA/MKUZA by involving the various UN agencies and partners in collaborating on joint workplans, joint budgets and defining common results. There were 11 Joint Programmes being piloted in Tanzania (Tanzania Mainland and Zanzibar). The Joint Programme on Capacity Building Support to Zanzibar (JP5) was the only UN joint programme providing a framework for development assistance specifically for Zanzibar (Unguja and Pemba isles).

1.2 Background to Joint Programme 5

Joint Programme 5 followed from the UN's 2005 Joint Strategic Review and was programmed between 2006 and 2007 for implementation over the period 2007-2010. JP5 fit neatly into the government's MKUZA development strategy, as the UN system tried to design a joint programme that would support the government's new cluster-based approach. The programme aimed to support Government institutions in Zanzibar to improve capacity and service delivery for the purpose of contributing to the realization of pro-poor growth and enhancement of democratic governance in Zanzibar. Furthermore, JP5 was designed as a pilot initiative to provide the opportunity for the UN to work in a harmonized, coordinated and more cost-effective manner to impact on Zanzibar's development efforts.

The programme commenced in January 2008 and ended in June 2011, and was implemented under the leadership of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (RGoZ). The overall budget for JP5 was USD 8,779,543.60.

1.3 Expected Results of JP5

The principal programme objective of JP5 was to support government institutions in Zanzibar to improve their capacity and service delivery for the purpose of contributing to the realization of pro-poor growth. There was also an underlying management objective which involved improving the UN system's fragmented and inefficient modalities for delivering development assistance. The programme was multisectoral in nature and was designed to contribute to the outcomes of the 3 clusters of MKUZA as well as the UNDAF, as outlined below:

MKUZA outcomes:

- 1) Cluster 1: Growth and Reduction of Income Poverty
- 2) Cluster 2: Social Services and Well-being
- 3) Cluster 3: Good Governance and National Unity

UNDAF outcomes:

- 1) Increased access to sustainable income opportunities, productive employment and food security in rural and urban areas
- 2) Increased access to quality basic social services for all by focusing on the poor and most vulnerable
- 3) Democratic structures and systems of good governance as well as the rule of law and the application of human rights, with a particular focus on the poor and vulnerable groups, are strengthened

Expected JP outcomes (and corresponding MKUZA clusters):

- 1) Pillar I: Wealth Creation, Employment and Economic Empowerment (responding to MKUZA cluster 1)
- 2) Pillar II: Reduction of Maternal, Newborn and Child Mortality and Improved Social Services (responding to MKUZA cluster 2)
- 3) Pillar III: National Capacity Development Management (responding to MKUZA cluster 3)

Table 1 below provides a detailed breakdown of JP5's outputs and outcomes when it was originally designed in 2008, as well as the changes in the results framework following the programme revision in May 2009.

In parallel to JP5's efforts to build capacity, the RGoZ has taken initiatives over the last several years to implement core reforms necessary for creating an enabling environment and promoting pro-poor growth and development. With the capacity-building support provided through JP5, the intention of the government was to deepen the reforms in public financial management and economic management, good governance and human resource management.

1.4 Mandate of the Evaluation

There is provision for a terminal evaluation in the One UN Programme Document for Capacity Building Support to Zanzibar, which stipulates that the evaluation will be undertaken by independent consultants and managed by UNDP. The final evaluation was conducted during August and September 2011, by a team composed of an international consultant and a national consultant.

The main purpose of the evaluation is to provide an independent in-depth assessment of the achievement of results and implementation arrangements of JP5, assessing the programme's relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and potential sustainability, with a particular focus on effectiveness. As such, the evaluation is intended to identify potential design problems, assess progress towards achievement of objectives, identify and document lessons learned, and to make recommendations on specific actions that might be taken to improve the design and implementation of future programmes.

The specific objectives of the evaluation as outlined in the ToRs are as follows:

- Evaluate the results based on planned deliverables contained in the Project Document (Result and Resource Framework – RRF), with special emphasis on measuring the achievement (or non-achievement) of the expected results under all components of the programme
- Assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of results/activities
- Explore to what extent synergies among UN agencies in particular and among IPs were explored and effected in implementation
- Assess to what extent the UN was able to provide upstream support as intended
- Assess whether the capacity development results were relevant and assess the likely impact of these;
- Evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the JP modality
- Draw experience and lessons learned from the UN Joint Programme 5 for Capacity Building Support to Zanzibar, its structure, management and implementation arrangements as a strategy for poverty reduction and its relevance for both the One UN pilot project and the RGoZ

- Consolidate lessons learned with a view to contribute to improving the future UNDAF implementation strategies and make recommendations to guide future programming for the Delivering As One (DaO)

1.5 Structure of the Report

Section 1 presents the background and context for the programme and the scope of the assignment. Section 2 contains the framework and methodology for undertaking the assignment. Section 3 presents an assessment of performance and Section 4 contains a summary of the evaluation findings.

Table 1: JP5 Objectives and Results (as conceived in 2008 and after the revision in 2009)

Programme Objective	Support government institutions in Zanzibar to improve capacity and service delivery, with a special focus on the needs of the poor
Management Objective	Improve the UN system's fragmented and inefficient modalities for delivering development assistance
Initial Results Framework (2008 Workplan) Output-Level Results	
Pillar 1: Wealth Creation, Employment & Economic Empowerment	1. Strengthened capacity of government institutions, private sector and CSOs for SME policy & labour laws (gender)
	2. Strengthened entrepreneurship capacity and access to micro-finance services focusing on groups of youth, women, PLHA and the disabled
	3. Comprehensive diagnostic of Zanzibar needs for social protection undertaken
	4. Enhanced capacity for sector ministries, workers and employers organizations, private sector and civil society groups to implement employment policy, job creation and Youth Action Plan
	5. Strengthen capacity of government to monitor and manage food security and nutrition and food safety
Pillar II: Reduction of Maternal, Newborn and Child Mortality and Improved Social Services	6. Roadmap strategic plan to accelerate the reduction of maternal and newborn mortality finalized and costed
	7. Strengthened capacity of primary and referral health facilities to provide quality maternal, newborn and child health care
	8. Strengthened capacity of District Health Management Teams to prioritize and monitor maternal, newborn and child health interventions
	9. Enhanced capacity of multi-sectoral stakeholder to prevent and respond to GBV and child rights abuse
	10. Improved coverage of social services (health, education, water and sanitation) in Micheweni and other vulnerable selected areas
Pillar III: National Capacity for Development Management	11. Strengthened MKUZA monitoring system
	12. Strengthened capacity for implementation of core reforms and aid coordination
	13. Effective participation of MDAs and NSAs in policy dialogue and public expenditure review (PER) process

Revised Results Framework (Following the May 2009 Programme Revision) Outcome-Level Results	
Pillar 1: Wealth Creation, Employment & Economic Empowerment	1. National capacity to monitor and manage food security and nutrition strengthened
	2. Support the RGoZ on Implementation of a Job Creation Programme
	3. Support pilot interventions for enhanced productivity and value chain in seaweed and agro processing
	4. The capacity of OCGS to carry out job creation projection arising from manufacturing industry enhanced
	5. Implementation of employment policy, job creation programmes and youth employment action plans enhanced
	6. Safety and health issues at the workplace addressed
	7. Institutional support and mechanisms for enhancing employment creation in place
Pillar II: Reduction of Maternal, Newborn and Child Mortality and Improved Social Services	8. Roadmap strategic plan to accelerate the reduction of maternal and newborn mortality finalized and costed
	9. Increased & equitable access to comprehensive Maternal Newborn Child Health (MNCH)
	10. Improved water and sanitation to selected areas with poor clean and safe water in Zanzibar
	11. Capacity within MLYWCD to promote gender equality and women's empowerment is enhanced
	12. Improved implementation of educational programmes including teaching & learning environments at primary & secondary schools in Zanzibar
Pillar III: National Capacity for Development Management	15. Zanzibar government capacity to plan, implement, monitor and report on development results improved
	16. Good governance principles of MDAs and participation of NSAs in decision making (including those representing women and other vulnerable groups) promoted
	17. Improved respect and observance of rule of law and justice and stronger oversight institutions of the RGoZ
Micheweni Interventions	18. Increased support to integrated development interventions in Micheweni and other vulnerable areas

2.0 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

2.1 Methodology

The evaluation methodology was based on a participatory approach which used consultative methods to engage a range of stakeholders so that they may contribute to and learn from the evaluation process. The evaluation was undertaken using a mix of tools and methods in data collection in order to ensure validity and reliability of the data collected and the overall findings as described below:

- (a) Document review
- (b) Data collection
- (c) Interviews using open ended questions
- (d) Field visits
- (e) Assessment and analysis
- (f) Analytical report writing

1. Review of Documents:

- a. Undertook a review of programme documents and reports available to identify key issues as a means of focusing the evaluation tasks.
- b. Applied *Evaluation Criteria* (see below) to assist in data collection and forming evidence-based findings.
- c. Assessed the status of *Baseline Conditions* using information and data from available reports and information provided by key participants.
- d. Used an *Evaluation Framework* (see above) with lead questions covering the key evaluation components.

2. Data collection:

- a. Gathered data from primary and secondary sources, such as government publications (Household surveys, MKUZA I and II), programme reports, interviews with IPs, beneficiaries, PUNs, other development partners.

3. Interviewed various stakeholders and beneficiaries:

- a. Individual and group discussions with a wide and representative set of stakeholders (see the list in Annex 2) to compile data in relation to the Evaluation Criteria.
- b. Maximize input from the programme team and key stakeholders
- c. Use of semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions to ascertain evidence-based evaluation responses.
- d. Consultation with various experts to examine the quality of current methods being used by the programme

4. Field visits to activity sites:

- a. Site visits and discussions with representative stakeholder institutions and organizations
- b. Field observations of selection of implemented projects

5. Assessment and analysis:

- a. Examined the weight of evidence compiled from reports, interviews and site visits
- b. Compared current conditions and results in relation to baseline information/data
- c. Rated programme performance and achievements using the UNDP rating scale

6. Analytical report writing:

- a. Prepared and reviewed a draft report inviting feedback for revisions to the final report

2.2 Evaluation Framework

An evaluation framework was used to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the programme's achievements in relation to the main outcomes and outputs (See Annex 6 for details). The questions were used as a general guide for the interviews. In addition, the findings were used to generate recommendations, alternative options that can be pursued, and identification of lessons learned that could be used for programming of future support.

2.3 Evaluation Rating System

The evaluation team used UNDP's standardized rating system to rate the achievement of each output, the pillars and the programme as a whole:

Table 2: Evaluation Rating System

Rating	Outcome and Impact
Highly Satisfactory (A)	Programme (outcome and output levels) is expected to achieve or exceed all its major objectives, and yield substantial national and district benefits, without major shortcomings. The programme can be presented as "good practice".
Satisfactory (B)	Programme is expected to achieve most of its major national and district objectives, and yield satisfactory benefits, with only minor shortcomings.
Marginally Satisfactory (C)	Programme is expected to achieve most of its major relevant objectives but with either significant shortcomings or modest overall relevance. Programme is not expected to achieve some of its major national and district objectives or yield some of the expected benefits.
Marginally Unsatisfactory (D)	Programme is expected to achieve some of its major national and district objectives with major shortcomings or is expected to achieve only some of its major objectives.
Unsatisfactory (E)	Programme is not expected to achieve most of its major national and district objectives or to yield any satisfactory benefits.
Highly Unsatisfactory (F)	The programme has failed to achieve, and is not expected to achieve, any of its major national and district objectives with no worthwhile benefits.

2.4 Limitations of the Evaluation Methodology

The following points summarize the limitations of the evaluation methodology and other factors that compromised the 'evaluability' of the programme.

The main difficulty that affected the evaluation of JP5 was inadequate M&E and documentation systems. Performance indicators and targets established in the annual workplans were changed to meet the achievements reported on in the each year's Annual Report. Also, many outputs appeared in the annual workplans but were never reported on. There was no final project report, and the evaluation consultants had to comb through annual reports and workplans from 2008, 2009 and 2010 to track activities, indicators, targets and tabulate accomplishments listed in the workplans against the achievements recorded in the annual reports. However, it was difficult to rate the achievements because the targets and achievements were drafted at the same time for the annual reports. This made the evaluation difficult. Moreover, because of inadequate reporting and monitoring systems, it was difficult to determine the number of people trained and the capacity strengthened, and because reports were based on activities, it was hard to determine the results of many activities.

This points to the need for a full-time M&E person at the MA level to be involved in the design, planning, implementation and reporting on joint programmes.

3.0 ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE

3.1 Introduction

This section presents an assessment of performance at a number of evaluation levels including programme design, pillars, outcomes and outputs. For recording results/achievements, emphasis was focused at the output level, which was then tabulated under each outcome to make a broad assessment of results. Outcomes were assessed in groups according to the relevant pillars. Based on the performance, an evaluative rating was given to each output, outcome and pillar, which is contained in a table at the end of each section (or in Annex 5). In some cases, for ease of reference and to avoid repetition, it was necessary to consolidate a number of outcomes and outputs that were supported by the same PUN. For example, in Pillar I, the original programme design combined a number of related outcomes (5, 6 and 7) that were supported by ILO.

The review of activities and analysis for each component is divided into a number of sections:

- Introduction
- Background information on what was intended (*what was supposed to happen*)
- Review of activities (*what actually happened*)
- Assessment of performance (*based on evidence, observations and interviews*)
- Findings and observations

3.2 Assessment of Programme Design

The relevance of the programme is evaluated against a) the background of national priorities and policies in 2007/2008, b) the continued importance of the programme objectives during implementation (2008-2011) and c) the intervention logic and M&E framework.

3.2.1 Context of addressing national priorities in programme design (2007/2008)

MKUZA I signaled the intention of the government of Zanzibar to adopt a cluster-based approach over the period 2007-10, which represented a major shift in the national development framework, focusing on strategic results and outcomes rather than priority sectors. Implementation of the MKUZA strategy would require coordination and collaboration among a range of MDAs, and NSAs working in each cluster. For example, Cluster 1 was designed to encourage collaboration among actors involved in Zanzibar's productive sectors (tourism, trade, agriculture), which was to be facilitated through stakeholder dialogue in planning, budgeting and implementation. Milestones were developed for completing various cluster-related interventions and cross-cutting themes of food security, HIV/AIDS and gender were mainstreamed in the strategy.

JP5 was designed to contribute to the achievement of the MKUZA outcomes. In supporting the government's cluster-based development strategy, JP5 was meant to perform two main functions: 1) improve capacity, and 2) support service delivery. The first function involved building the capacity of MDAs, while the second involved implementing a multisectoral programme of activities. The One UN programme document does not contain much information on the programme of activities – containing only a broad outline of the programme strategy, where the specific activities were to be detailed in a series of annual workplans and implemented by national institutions with UN agencies providing technical and advisory services. The design team was well aware of the severe capacity limitations within government institutions, as the document indicates that the objective of JP5 was to support government institutions which face significant capacity challenges, with the aim of “improving both capacity and service delivery”. Also, the document recognized that the government had “inadequate management, technical, as well as financial capacities” in all the sectors to be addressed, ranging from implementing core reforms, aid coordination, entrepreneurship, institutional capacity in the health sector, etc.

In addition to its capacity-building and service delivery functions, JP5 had a third role to play, which involved improving the fragmented and inefficient UN modalities for delivering development assistance. This was to be an equally great challenge as it would mean trying to corral the mandates and specializations of some 20 UN agencies under “One” programme, utilizing separate sources of funding (parallel, pooled, One UN Fund). The prodoc recognized that UN support was fragmented and uncoordinated, and that more coordination and harmonization among the varied UN agencies and development partners was needed to make aid more effective.

The designers were on the right track, especially in focusing UN support on the comparative advantage of addressing the needs of the most vulnerable groups. Thus, in the context of addressing national priorities, the design of JP5 has been given a “satisfactory” (B) rating.

3.2.2 Continued importance of the programme during implementation (2008-2011)

The design and implementation of JP5 followed an incremental approach, where the original outputs and activities were revised several times during 2008 and 2009. Interviews with PUNs revealed that during the initial planning stages, UN agencies took activities from their already planned pipeline of projects and simply slotted them into the joint workplans and budgets. Even though these individual projects were aligned with the priorities of government, the result was a patchwork of “parallelism and project approaches”, instead of a unified joint programme designed specifically for the government’s development strategy. This suggests that at the outset (in 2008) the joint programme lacked cohesion and “jointness” among UN agencies. The joint aspect of the programme improved after undertaking a situational analysis in 2009 involving joint planning and discussions.

During implementation the JP5 team seemed to pay more attention to the first function listed above (implementing the multisectoral programme) without paying enough attention to the capacity of MDAs to implement. This highlights an important design issue, where the programme team should have undertaken a series of capacity assessments before rushing to implement. The prodoc indicates that previous UN support had focused on strengthening institutional capacity by improving service delivery in the same areas as JP5 – economic and development management, good governance, health and social welfare, gender, youth, child development and education. One of the lessons learned during implementation of the previous programme was that there was limited capacity in government institutions to implement and absorb development assistance. In view of this previous knowledge, the first order of business should have been to determine the capacity and implementation structures needed to implement such a complex, multisectoral programme.

Because JP5 was designed in this iterative manner, stakeholders and IPs were encouraged to participate in the re-planning and revision exercises during programme implementation. The first revision of outputs and activities occurred in late 2008 and early 2009, where the JP5 team attempted to realign the programme with the government’s planning and reporting cycle. A second major readjustment was undertaken in May 2009, which had the objective of aligning the programme goals to the government’s national priorities as outlined in MKUZA, and formulating a new plan to focus on *results*. This was a major review that took place over a 5-day period involving key government departments and UN agencies working together to undertake problem analyses and using RBM tools to re-prioritize and establish better accountability for results.

The May 2009 review exercise was a crucial step in the design/implementation process that involved fine-tuning the areas of intervention. The document that followed the May 2009 session summarizes the achievements of the first year and a half of the programme, acting as a sort of mid-term review¹. The review process revealed that JP5 “lacked focus and results-based planning”, that the initial plan was “over-ambitious for the three-year time frame”, and that “few outputs were achieved against those planned”. Through this process, there was recognition of the need to undertake “realistic planning” and to concentrate efforts to achieve “tangible results”. In addition, it was realized that the government

¹ Joint UN Programme Planning Process: Lessons Learned in Zanzibar: Draft Paper, Abheet Solomon, 12 June 2009

lacked a proper implementation plan for MKUZA. The government had a strategy, but not a plan of how to achieve its strategy. So, JP5's iterative planning activities formed part of the process of turning the MKUZA strategy into an implementation plan.

The May 2009 re-prioritization process involved much collaboration, negotiation and consensus building among the 80 participants who attempted to clarify outcomes and outputs for better implementation. PUNs and government officials discussed, negotiated and reached a consensus, focusing on a combination of government priorities and UN comparative advantages. In some cases the process took months for partners to agree on the final outputs, targets and partitioning of funding. This planning process also increased awareness of the UN's role in Zanzibar among government partners, who began to recognize the UN's role as more of a technical partner supporting capacity development, rather than a traditional donor agency. It also provided an opportunity for UN agencies to share information among themselves on priorities, mandates and the challenges of funding collaborative programmes.

There were other design challenges that affected implementation. For example, the implementation period of JP5 was aligned with the government's development framework (2007-10), however, because of requirements by the major funding agencies, the reporting period was not aligned, which caused some difficulties in reporting and planning.

In view of the above, the continued importance of JP5 during implementation has been given a **“satisfactory” (B)** rating.

3.2.3 Intervention logic and M&E framework

Because of its iterative approach, JP5 did not use a standard programme design tool (eg., LogFrame) to ensure a rational approach in the planning of activities. The intervention logic that was used in the design of JP5 was inconsistent and incomplete. Some result areas do not follow a well-planned intervention strategy where the activities and outputs lead to the achievement of outcomes. Even after the May 2009 revisions, some result areas were grouped according to PUN inputs instead of being consolidated logically around programme outputs and outcomes. The planned targets and results listed in the various workplans are not consistent from year to year and are do not necessarily conform with those listed in the annual reports.

Similar to the other joint programmes, JP5 lacked an adequate M&E framework to track progress and monitor accomplishments. Neither the MOU signed by the UN agencies in January 2008 nor the One UN Pilot programme document provided a clear M&E plan or a delineation of responsibilities indicating which institution was responsible for the monitoring function. Also, reporting tools and templates were not adequately developed at the outset of the programme. This is especially important in an iterative capacity-building programme like JP5, where the M&E system is needed to track the capacity built, the number of jobs created, and various social indicators as these are rolled out.

Lacking a strategic document (LogFrame) to guide programme design and planning, the tendency was for partners to select activities as a 'shopping list'. Also, without an adequate M&E framework and plan and in the absence of standard reporting templates and tools, the programme did not have a complete and consistent benchmark for monitoring targets, indicators and activities and tracking results. In view of these shortcomings, the results and M&E framework has been given a **“marginally unsatisfactory” (D)** rating.

3.2.4 Assessment of performance (Programme Design)

JP5 was a very ambitious programme. In fact, JP5 was more than a joint programme; it was more like a mini-UNDAF and mini-MKUZA – a geographically based, multisectoral framework involving a range of interventions across a variety of sectors and clusters. When it came to implementation, part of the problem was that JP5 was not designed as a traditional programme (with secure/predictable financing) – it was designed to provide access to funding, through the creation of a new funding modality, the “One Fund”. Workplans and budgets were designed as 'shopping lists' that could be used by PUNs to raise

additional funding (which often did not happen as anticipated). As a result, workplans did not involve realistic activity planning – they were ambitious resource mobilization devices. Often, the plans were not formally adopted, which created challenges when it came to implementation and delivery, followed by delays, ineffectiveness, etc. Because of the iterative manner in which JP5 was designed, the programme was difficult to manage.

Also, JP5 was not managed through a standard implementation modality. Rather, it involved a complex mechanism where the IPs and PUNs managed part of the programme (e.g. the outcomes and outputs in pillars I, II or III), and the MA managed the overall programme. As a result, the Managing Agent did not manage the programme so much as administer it. Conflicts and issues were continuously arising between PUNs and IPs, and between PUNs and the MA. The UN specifically designed JP5 to encourage coherence among agencies (more so than other JPs because of its geographical location). To some extent, there has been some contribution to dialogue among the agencies, where a convergence of ideas and division of labour has taken place. But the programme had overlapping goals: a programme goal that was focused on improving capacity and supporting service delivery, and a UN/management goal that was focused on improving the fragmented UN modality for delivering development assistance. If the overall objective was to design an effective programme, the modality would have been different. But the design was part collaborative programming, part capacity building, part service delivery, part mini-UNDAF and part resource mobilization device.

One of the main problems with the design of JP5 was the lack of solid financial commitments on which to implement activities in a coordinated and structured manner. It is common in the UN system to design projects and programmes with open-ended budgets where one of the objectives is to mobilize resources from other development partners. But, from a project management perspective, this is a recipe for inefficiency and ineffectiveness, which results in long internal planning and re-prioritizing sessions to adjust and re-plan activities, outputs and budgets. In the case of JP5, this was exacerbated because the process involved not only UN agencies but underfunded and understaffed MDAs and NSAs. In this respect, because of its multisectoral focus and flexible approach, JP5 was more like a budget support mechanism for the government of Zanzibar, which focused on providing UN technical assistance.

As one interviewee put it: *“JP5 was not easy. It was difficult to visualize the whole plan in different clusters. The annual workplans had everything; it was like ‘window shopping’. The 3 pillars were too broad. They expected too much. They had to narrow down. It was too ambitious. But with the revisions it became better, a bit more manageable.”*

While the post-design process took a great deal of time, the alternative would have involved either rushing ahead to implement a programme that was poorly defined, or stalling the implementation process while the government and partners sat separately to design the programme. In the end, the collaborative planning processes became part of the capacity building exercise, where both government officials and PUNs benefited from being involved in joint planning and re-prioritization and the adoption of a more focused and coherent approach. As it turned out, JP5’s planning activities became part of the process of turning the MKUZA strategy into an implementation plan.

As a pilot programme, the collaborative joint planning and design process was perhaps the most appropriate approach to take, where recipients and donors planned together. The process also increased government ownership of the programme, because senior level officials were heavily involved not only in focusing the planning process but also in ensuring there was compliance in implementation. This led to a certain degree of quality assurance throughout the implementation process, and in some cases where MDAs had made commitments for certain programmes but when funding was not available (due to re-prioritizations), the MDAs had to fund the activities out of their own budget. Although JP5 received some criticism for this, it is an indication that JP5’s priorities were aligned with the needs of the government.

That said, JP5 should have paid more attention to the capacity of IPs (and PUNs), and it should have included more capacity-building activities, based on the findings of capacity assessments, which may have led to the inclusion of activities to beef up implementation structures.

The design of JP5 involved a very participatory process, where all major partners and stakeholders were consulted. This consultative process was continued during the follow up efforts involving the UNDP. However, stakeholders have felt somewhat left out of the UNDP since the initial round of consultations.

In view of the above, the performance of the design of JP5 has been given a “**satisfactory**” (B) rating.

Findings and Observations

1. JP5 was designed as an iterative programme, as part of the process to help the government implement its MKUZA development strategy, which involved attempting to consolidate a complex set of parallel UN agency projects and mandates into an unofficial budget support mechanism, without securing all the resources or technical assistance needed to implement the unified programme
2. JP5 outcomes and outputs lacked intervention logic; and the monitoring framework, reporting tools and templates were not adequately developed at the outset of the programme
3. The JP5 approach is perhaps the best articulation of the UN system’s DaO, as it wholeheartedly supported the government’s development goals and its cluster-based strategy – quite an ambitious undertaking for a series of government ministries and specialized UN agencies that are accustomed to working independently.

Table 3: Rating of Programme Design

Programme Component	Achievements	Comments/Rating
Design	The JP concept and strategy was effective and appropriate for the objectives of the programme. However, more effort should have been devoted to up front design and the capacity building needs of the target groups	Satisfactory (B)
Relevance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JP5 was aligned with national priorities and the needs of the target group when it was designed in 2007 • The objectives of the programme remained valid through implementation • Key stakeholders and partners were heavily involved in the development and implementation of JP5 • The results and M&E framework needed to track progress and monitor accomplishments were inconsistent and incomplete 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Satisfactory (B) • Satisfactory (B) • Satisfactory (B) • Marginally unsatisfactory (D)

Recommendations

- It is important to invest in strategic thinking and planning during the design phase of joint programmes; this investment will help to increase efficiency during implementation.
- Capacity building programmes should make a point of undertaking capacity assessments to determine the capacity-building activities and implementation structures needed to implement complex, multisectoral programmes
- In the design of joint programmes, the UN system should try to secure the necessary financial and technical resources prior to implementation

3.3 Assessment of Programme Results (Achievement of Outputs and Outcomes)

3.3.1 PILLAR I: WEALTH CREATION, EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT

Introduction

Pillar I was focused on supporting wealth creation, employment and economic empowerment. Its interventions were aligned with the broad outcomes and goals of MKUZA Cluster 1: Growth and Reduction of Income Poverty, and primarily Goal 3 (Reduce income poverty and attain food security). The original design of Pillar I interventions comprised 5 outputs, based broadly around issues (e.g., employment policy, social security, food security, job creation) that were observed to overlap in a number of categories. Also, an explicit intervention logic was missing. An attempt to rectify this was done during the first re-planning session in 2008/9, as can be seen from the configuration in Table 4:

Table 4: Configuration of Outputs after first re-planning (February 2009)

Output	IP	PUN	Issue
1 – Strengthened capacity of government institutions, private sector and CSOs for implementation of SME policy and labour laws from a gender perspective 1.2 Trade Information and negotiation capacity 1.3 Child Labour	MLYWCD (MLEC) MTTI MLYWCD	ILO UNIDO ILO	Development of SMEs, gender, entrepreneurship, employment policy, social protection
2 – Strengthened entrepreneurship capacity and access to micro-finance services focusing on groups of youth, women, PLHA and the disabled 2.3 Build capacity of FFS	MLYWCD (MLEC) MALE	ILO FAO	Job creation, entrepreneurship
3 – Comprehensive diagnostic of Zanzibar needs for social protection undertaken	MLYWCD (MLEC)	ILO	Social security
4 – Enhanced capacity for sector ministries, workers and employers organizations, private sector and civil society groups to implement employment policy, job creation and youth action plan	MLYWCD (MLEC)	ILO	Job creation, gender, youth, entrepreneurship
5 – Strengthen capacity of government to monitor and manage food security and nutrition and food safety	MALE	FAO	Food security

After the second re-planning session in May 2009, the programme involved a better clustering of activities based on underlying causal analysis within certain sectors. In the end, Pillar I comprised 7 outcomes, where programme delivery was done by sector (agriculture, labour, industry), with the requisite UN agencies (FAO, ILO, UNIDO) supporting the relevant sectors and issues. Realistically, these 7 outcomes could have been consolidated into fewer categories. Table 5 indicates the final configuration of outcomes under Pillar I, with the responsible IPs and PUNs:

Table 5: Configuration of Outputs after second re-planning (May 2009)

Outcome	IP	PUN	Sector (Issue)
1 – Food Security and Nutrition	MALE	FAO	Agriculture (FSN)
2 – Job Creation Programme	MTTI	UNIDO	Industry: SMEs in trade & tourism (Job creation)
3 – Pilot Value Chain Interventions	MTTI	UNIDO	Industry: agro-processing /tourism (Productivity)
4 – Support to OCGS Industrial Census	MTTI	UNIDO	Industry (Job creation)
5 – Job Creation and Social Protection	MLYWCD (MLEC)	ILO	Labour, Industry: value addition (Employment policy)
6 – Workplace Safety and Health	MLYWCD (MLEC)	ILO	Safety and health (Employment policy)
7 – Institutional support for employment creation	MLYWCD (MLEC)	ILO	Labour, PPP, apprenticeship (Job creation)

The assessment of outcomes under Pillar 1 was undertaken following the layout in Table 5, in which outcomes were consolidated by PUNs (see Annex 4 for detailed outputs for each):

- Outcome 1: FAO
- Outcomes 2, 3 and 4: UNIDO
- Outcomes 5, 6 and 7: ILO

Outcome 1: National capacity to manage and monitor FSN strengthened

Background: During the past decade, food insecurity and malnutrition had been a major problem effecting households in Zanzibar, and the Government had undertaken a number of initiatives to address the problems. For example, one of the aims of Vision 2020 was to eradicate absolute poverty; and MKUZA I put specific emphasis on tackling food security and nutrition from a cross-sectoral perspective by establishing a Food Security and Nutrition Policy and identifying vulnerable groups, which attempted to highlight the interrelations between poverty and food security. MKUZA II (2010-2015) went further by recognizing that growth in the agricultural sector was crucial for broad-based and pro-poor growth. However, there were a number of constraints in the agricultural sector that had to be addressed both at the policy and operational levels to boost production, such as shortage of inputs, lack of extension services, etc. Also, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MALE) needed support because of a chronic lack of capacity at the national and district levels to implement policies and programmes including inadequate technical expertise and management skills, low capacity for financial planning, insufficient financial resources and lack of adequate tools to manage the development process.

Under JP5, technical and financial support was requested from FAO to strengthen MALE's capacity to monitor and manage food security and nutrition programme by improving the Ministry's information collection and monitoring systems, develop an Agricultural Marketing Policy and Strategy, and strengthen household and community support structures and mechanisms to ensure household food security and nutrition for the most vulnerable sections of the population.

In addition, it was recognized that addressing issues of food insecurity among smallholder farmers involves increasing agricultural production at the farmer level. Thus, apart from assistance at the institutional level, MALE recognized the need for downstream interventions to improve marketing, increase productivity and reduce the cost of production to ensure that growth in the agriculture sector benefits a large section of the population. MALE sought to address these issues through expanding irrigation farming, securing investment for infrastructure, extension of credit and improvement in extension services.²

Review of activities: JP5 provided upstream and downstream support through FAO, which coordinated technical and financial assistance in collaboration with WFP to MALE and other national partners.

During the re-planning sessions, outputs for this component were revised and some activities were dropped. For example, following the first reprogramming (February 2009), Output 5 was turned into Outcome 1, and in the second re-planning (May 2009) the 3 activities were divided into 5 outputs and 17 activities (as shown in Table 5.1 in Annex 4). This fine-tuning was necessary for refining and refocusing assistance. However, for evaluation purposes it is difficult to pin down what was planned and what was achieved. For example, some activities were planned in 2008, with no indication of progress reported in 2009, while others were moved to other outcomes.

1.1 NFSND able to plan, implement and monitor FSN interventions: Upstream support included policy assistance in food security and nutrition, providing support in the drafting of the Food Security and Nutrition Act (signed by the President in August 2011), facilitating the establishment of a National Food Security and Nutrition Department (NFSND) in MALE, strengthening the capacity of NFSND to analyze FSN data and produce FSN monitoring outputs, including updated FSN situation analysis, policy briefs, etc.; and dissemination of NFSND monitoring outputs, through public campaigns and events.

² MKUZA II, pages 19-24

1.2 Monitoring system for FSN at MALE: The FSN information and early warning system was strengthened through improvements in collection of agricultural data and development of an M&E system for the FSN programme. This led to the establishment of a Supply Utilization Account (SUA) and National Food Balance Sheet (FBS) system, with the production of the first SUA/FBS report in October 2009. A policy brief on the food security and nutrition situation in Zanzibar was also prepared. As a result of these interventions, the government initiated a study on the establishment of a national food reserve as part of its safety net measures. Also, the Food Balance Sheet revealed the dire situation of food security in Zanzibar, including the huge trade imbalance of 49%, and a large amount of post-harvest wastage (20 to 50% on vegetables and fish). A study was done but due to the unavailability of funds, it was not printed or disseminated.

1.3 ZAMP policy & implementation plan formalized: JP5 supported the establishment of the Zanzibar Agricultural Marketing Policy (ZAMP) and strategy, with a Task Force Team formed to prepare an implementation plan. The policy is in the final stages of approval. The need for support to agricultural marketing became evident from the post harvest study, when it was recognized that the poor quality and handling of produce and the extent of post harvest losses was reducing income for farmers. Support for agricultural marketing will be continued under UNDAF.

1.4 DMTs & Shehia FSN committees able to plan: The process of building capacity involved generating FSN data and information at the sub-national level for decentralized decision making and stimulating local action and ownership. With support from a national training facilitation team, two districts were assisted in undertaking FSN planning and establishing DMTs and Shehia FSN committees, which formulated district-specific FSN action plans.

1.5 Support FFS to stimulate increased food production: Downstream activities included support to agricultural productivity through FFSs, and improvements in the handling of high value products such as seaweed. Working in conjunction with IFAD's Agricultural Services Support Programme (ASSP), 3 groups of 25 farmers were supported through the introduction of high yielding varieties of rice, which resulted in farmers producing 20% of their needs. With imports still comprising 80% of their needs, the program has a target to increase production to 50% of consumption needs. In total, 150 farmers benefited from participating in 7 FFS (4 in Pemba and 3 in Unguja with each group comprising approximately 20 farmers).

Assessment of performance: JP5 came at the right time, when the Ministry was struggling with capacity issues, and helped articulate policies on food security, agricultural marketing and the Food Balance Sheet. These interventions provided awareness and technical assistance at the policy level, and helped to strengthen the food security and nutrition situation. The Food Security and Nutrition Bill provides a "right to food" with legal status, which will help to improve the overall food security and nutrition situation in Zanzibar.

While JP5 was successful at the policy level, there were shortcomings at the implementation level. A lack of capacity meant that some policies and plans were not implemented. For example, the newly established FSN department lacked technical capacity and expertise, as the department needed technical backstopping to assist with monitoring, food balance sheets and early warning systems. The first phase of the M&E framework to monitor FSN was developed and the staff was trained on data collection. However, due to budget limitations a long-term advisor was not recruited under JP5 to provide support in the establishment of the database and strengthening of FSN monitoring and evaluation in early warning systems. There are possibilities for these FSN activities to be continued under UNDAF. At the downstream level, JP5 funds for this component were allocated for "community interventions" and FAO provided support to facilitate these interventions.

Box 1: Transformational Result: FAO Support to Downstream Interventions

The downstream areas involved some very successful interventions: Before JP5 only 2% of farmers used high-yielding varieties of rice seed, whereas usage increased to 20% after JP5 support. By introducing high-yielding varieties, MALE was able to address the tendency of subsistence farmers to fall back into a cycle of poverty following donor assistance by enabling farmers to increase productivity, seed quality and income. Also, this intervention reduced dependency on seed imports from the mainland and improved farmers' knowledge of seeds. In supporting FFS seed production, JP5 provided the right support at the right time. Moreover, the level of resources was very modest (about \$3,000), yet the impact was quite substantial – selling 500,000 Ts worth of produce. In addition, by introducing a system of contract farming in rice production (where the government buys the seeds and sells them back to farmer at a subsidized price), this intervention initiated the first steps out of subsistence level farming and into a market system. The guaranteed market appears to have provided farmers with an incentive to invest more time to produce higher quality seeds. The other downstream area that was successful under JP5 was seaweed harvesting, where 30 seaweed farmers in Pemba were helped to organize and increase the productivity of a high value product (whereas before, the harvesters were taken advantage of by the traders).

Photo 1: Beneficiaries from Farmer Field Schools**Findings and Observations**

1. The support JP5 provided to upstream policy assistance in FSN was highly valued by MALE
2. JP5 downstream support resulted in improving the livelihood of farmers, who now sell 500,000 Ts worth of produce
3. The introduction of contract farming helped improve agricultural methods and provided a link to the market (through a subsidized government seed buying/selling program). Because there is an absence of large agricultural companies in Zanzibar, this market link needs to be nurtured carefully. Assistance to this area can be continued through support to agricultural marketing and MALE's attempt to establish the farmers into associations.
4. The support to downstream interventions didn't come easily – MALE had to fight hard to get FAO to consider supporting downstream interventions. First, MALE was interested in programmes that would increase domestic production through the introduction of irrigation schemes for growing high yielding varieties of rice (90% of which was imported). The study on post harvest losses had identified large losses in vegetables, so MALE requested assistance from FAO to provide support to Farmer Field Schools (FFSs) to increase production and reduce losses. Secondly, MALE was interested in making improvements in the agriculture value chain and value-added interventions by

supporting high-value products such as seaweed harvesting, which was provided in conjunction with support from UNIDO (addressed in Outcome 3).

5. This example highlights the strengths of JP5 – it's flexibility to respond to government priorities. The benefits of this flexibility became apparent during the electricity crisis (of 2008/9 or 2009/10?), when a power outage made stakeholders realize the importance of producing rice seed locally. The farmers not only lost food for that year, but seeds for the following year as well. IFAD, which had been working with FFS, lacked the flexibility to respond to the emergency situation, whereas JP5 was able to top up IFAD's activities and provide emergency assistance to meet a particular need, by providing rice and maize seed fertilizer, etc. From this crisis, the need was identified to train Zanzibar's farmers to produce seeds.
6. In supporting the establishment of the FSN department, JP5 should have followed through with its 'capacity building' mandate and recruited a long-term policy advisor to provide technical backstopping to assist with monitoring, food balance sheets and early warning systems, as the department lacked technical capacity and expertise. However, funding was not available.
7. One weakness of JP5 was the limitations on funding. For example, MALE had planned activities based on their priorities, but when the JP5 budget kept being revised downwards, the Ministry had to finance these activities from its own resources. This highlights both an implementation and a design problem, where the capacity of the government was not taken into account, particularly in implementation of policies and strategies.
8. In terms of sustainability, the government is continuing the seed production program through the farmer contracting approach that was initiated and supported by JP5, which is an indication that this was a high priority area.

Future Programming

Globally, food security is becoming a major issue where various market and climate factors are converging to trigger unusual spikes in food prices. So, food security will remain a priority issue for some time in places like Zanzibar where food production is dominated by subsistence agriculture and 50% of food is imported, and where commercial agriculture is non-existent. MALE's priorities will remain with FSN, marketing policy, early warning system, food balance sheet, etc.

Another area of interest for MALE is creating greater linkages between tourism and agriculture. At the moment, smallholders are not benefiting from the tourism sector. A study on value chain analysis for the tourism sector revealed that the tourism industry spends US \$ 13.8 million annually on food in Zanzibar. But 80% of vegetables and 20% of fruits are imported from the mainland and overseas (eg, chicken from Brazil). Only fish is 100% supplied from Zanzibar. In spite of JP5's efforts to boost subsistence-level productivity, there is still a long way to go before Zanzibar farmers can enter the market or manage rural finances. Farmers do not have the capacity to meet the quality and reliability of supply demanded by the market. Farmers need support in developing value-chain linkages between the tourism and agriculture sectors, organizing into marketing groups, managing a savings account, etc. IFAD and the ADB have a rural finance project in the pipeline that will provide assistance to farmers to become more business-minded and independent, support marketing, and value added interventions, help them to organize, and strengthen rural finance and SACCOS using a credit guarantee scheme. There may be an opportunity for the UN system to support the development of value chains in agriculture and in developing linkages with the tourism sector. UNDP's BCtA has done studies on value chain interventions in agriculture and tourism and there are many good examples of UNDP supporting the establishment of multi stakeholder platforms in tourism.

Table 5.1 in Annex 5 attempts to outline the achievements of Outcome 1 against the planned targets in 2008 as well as the revised targets in 2009. Outcome 1 provided very good value for money, and demonstrated that targeted downstream assistance can produce high impact results. In view of the above achievements, Outcome 1 has been given a "satisfactory" (B) rating.

Outcomes 2, 3 and 4: UNIDO Support to Job Creation

Introduction

Originally, the intention of this component was to support micro level interventions that would empower and strengthen the capacity of youth, women, PLHA and the disabled to benefit from emerging opportunities in key economic sectors of agriculture, tourism, manufacturing and trade. The focus was on entrepreneurship development, BDS, access to microfinance and access to technology.

The activities and outputs of outcomes 2,3 and 4 feed into an overarching job creation component that combines UNIDO's support to all three result areas. However, the re-designed JP5 did not provide an overarching outcome combining these 3 related result areas, and so the focus of the programme tended to narrow to implementing particular activities. For management purposes and for ease of monitoring and reporting, outcomes 2,3 and 4 should have been combined into a single job creation outcome. Also, when activities were reported on (for example, "Trade negotiation training provided to 5 institutions"), it was difficult to determine the result of the particular activity: The following assessment will attempt to attribute achievements to each outcome. However, because of the inherent linkages between the three outcomes some have been grouped together for the purposes of the evaluation.

Outcome 2: Support the RgoZ on Implementation of a Job Creation Programme

Background: Zanzibar's manufacturing sector is characterized by a small trading market that is dominated by SMEs with a limited ability to produce a critical mass of goods to benefit from economies of scale. Most businesses are comprised of small traders who buy and sell goods, as opposed to entrepreneurs who add value to products. As such, SMEs remain stuck in a cycle of high-cost, low-volume production. Capacity is also lacking within the government and among CSOs. The government's MKUZA strategy recognized that this sector required interventions that would promote investment in productive capacity, empower SMEs, improve the quality of goods and packaging to meet export standards, and provide access to credit. However, despite MTTI's efforts, few investors have been attracted to Zanzibar, apart from the hotel sector.

Since the early 1990s, development partners have provided assistance in capacity building and improving service delivery and MTTI³ has undertaken studies and consultancies in value chain and entrepreneurship development. The studies identified priority areas for assistance including agro-processing, tourism and development of SMEs. Tourism was one of the sectors identified where local SMEs could potentially benefit from better linkages, products and pricing. Only a few SMEs were benefiting from the tourism sector, and support was needed in developing value-chain linkages between tourism and other sectors such as agriculture, food processing, etc. The government's strategy involved encouraging investment in high-end eco-tourism through improvements in infrastructure, attractions and linkages with the agriculture sector. However, studies had shown that economic growth in tourism was not translating into pro-poor growth that would benefit local SMEs and smallholder farmers. A study on value chain analysis for the tourism sector revealed that the tourism industry spends US \$ 13.8 million on food in Zanzibar. But 80% of vegetables and 20% of fruits were imported from the mainland. SMEs lacked information on products, standards, etc., and did not have the capacity to meet the needs of the market. Also, a study was done by MTTI identifying gaps in government institutions, private sector and civil society organizations, and capacity weaknesses in these institutions to negotiate trade, basic knowledge and low standards in weights and measures, consumer protection, etc.

Through JP5, the government planned to work with UNIDO and other development partners to implement MKUZA goals associated with the existing SME development policy, build capacity in the ministry and increase entrepreneurship among SMEs.

³ Now the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Marketing (MTIM)

Review of activities: The first workplan for this result area involved a wide variety of activities aimed at strengthening the capacity of government institutions, private sector and CSOs and promoting entrepreneurship, with ILO and UNIDO supporting a scattered array of activities involving implementation of SME policy, enforcement of labour laws and strengthening entrepreneurial capacity. Support was to be provided through a number of different outputs (1, 2 and 3) in several result areas with little evidence of intervention logic, a strategic plan or targets. These activities were significantly revised in the first re-planning session (February 2009), where the UNIDO component was revised into an activity (1.2: “TA to increase trade information availability and trade negotiation capacity”). After the second reprogramming exercise in May 2009, UNIDO’s involvement was separated from ILO’s and formulated into an outcome (#2), and the focus was narrowed to support implementation of a job creation programme through 5 outputs, as shown in Table 5.2 in Annex 5.

The revised plan was more focused, and was intended to build capacity in agro-processing through training in general entrepreneurship, and support the development of value-added products such as smoked fish, spices, seaweed soap, etc. However, the result was still a list of activities supporting various needs of MTTI, and not a well-planned intervention where the logic of the activities and outputs led to the achievement of the outcome. The outputs included an action plan assessing the needs of local communities, strengthening information collection in ZBIC, a compilation of business and product profiles, training and provision of computers and equipment, etc. For example, outcomes 3 and 4 could have been consolidated as separate outputs under an overarching job creation outcome.

2.1: Action plan to support communities engaging in tourism-related business: A capacity needs assessment was undertaken in 2008, which examined the capacity of government, private sector and CSOs, and identified the constraints among local communities and SMEs to engage in the tourism sector. An action plan was developed to support communities engaging in tourism-related business. However, after the gaps were identified, funds were not available for follow up activities. This is planned for in UNDAP. Also, some work was done on the supply side for the tourism sector (a survey), but very little was done on the demand side, partly because funding was not available but also because a strategic plan linking supply and demand was not undertaken. This is also planned under UNDAP.

Of the groups and institutions that were targeted to receive trade negotiation training, 5 institutions received training in 2009. Of the 50 SME groups that were to be engaged in tourism activities, 7 SMEs were supported in 2010, which represents a completion rate of 14%.

2.2: Trade information on marketing, price, packaging, credit facilities: The intention behind Output 2.2 was to establish an information centre to provide services to SMEs, with the provision of computer equipment and training. However, no needs assessment was undertaken beforehand, and it was realized afterwards that SME operators were not making use of information in the centre, primarily because the information and equipment was too sophisticated for their rudimentary level of business activity. Hence, apart from a few school children dropping in, there is little effective use of the centre. The Centre’s plan is to continue to mobilize information for SMEs on various markets under UNDAP.

2.3: Enterprise product development and marketing: A business directory was prepared, published and disseminated (and available on the web) containing information on 200 SME producers, importers and exporters. The intention was to undertake an inventory and a profile of SMEs, but the workplans and monitoring reports do not indicate the utility or impact of this directory, and the next steps are unclear (ie., “depends on the priorities of MTTI”). A survey was undertaken that revealed gaps in marketing, laws and procedures governing business, pricing and customer care, and 50 SMEs received training on the identified gaps.

2.4: Weights and measurement equipment: equipment was procured, resulting in improved institutional capacity within MTTI to ensure SMEs meet standards in legal metrology.

2.5: ZNCCIA has capacity for PPP dialogue promotion: This activity was recorded as having not being done, as there was a lack of funding. This will be put in UNDAP.

Assessment of performance: One of the major results of JP5 support to this area was SME policy assistance to MTTI by UNIDO. But, many of the other outputs were not completed or postponed, and stakeholders hope that support will be continued under UNDAF. There is general consensus among stakeholders interviewed that much more could and should have been done in the tourism sector. Assistance to the sector was marginal, with only 14% of targeted SMEs assisted. Also, the supply-side analysis on the constraints experienced by SMEs in the sector was useful, but it needs to be supported by demand-side analysis indicating target areas of investment for the tourism market and the potential areas for employment. More work is needed on developing tourism value chains and developing linkages between tourism and other sectors such as agriculture. Also, given the weak intervention logic, lack of results-based reporting and absence of a strategic plan to provide guidance on the selection of activities, it is difficult to see how these interventions will lead to the “job creation” outcome.

Future Programming

1. MTTI wants to establish a Bureau of Standards in Zanzibar, which they feel will increase the capacity of SMEs to enter the export market. SMEs in Zanzibar need to improve the quality of their products and packaging, and using the Bureau of Standards in Tanzania is too cumbersome because it involves sending products back and forth and requires too much travel.
2. MTTI has started to design an export development strategy, but it has to be ‘implementable’.
3. MTTI has started doing a diagnostic study in 5 areas: 1) Agro processing, 2) light processing industry, 3) trade hub, 4) port, 5) Duty free zone. However, none of these areas are conducive to the natural or human characteristics of Zanzibar or to the comparative advantage of the UN system
4. As indicated in Outcome 1, there is a lot of work to be done in the tourism sector, and there may be an opportunity for the UN system to support the development of value chain linkages between tourism and agriculture. Though the involvement of BCtA, UNDP could convene and facilitate the establishment and development of multistakeholder platforms and collaborative processes to move the cultural and sustainable tourism agenda forward in Zanzibar for greater poverty impact. UNDP could assist the government to establish, convene and coordinate a tourism platform at the country level (with sub committees at the district and community level facilitating linkages among other sectors and for policy advocacy and change).

Table 5.2 in Annex 5 attempts to outline the achievements of Outcome 2 against the planned targets in 2008 as well as the revised targets in 2009. Based on the above performance, outcome 2 has been given a rating of “marginally satisfactory” (C).

Outcome 3: Support pilot interventions for enhanced productivity and value chain in seaweed and agro processing

Background: MKUZA I identified a number of constraints affecting Zanzibar’s main economic sectors: agriculture, tourism and trade. These included access to microfinance, weak linkages promoting pro-poor growth, etc. In order to overcome these challenges, improvements were needed in agriculture production, tourism, infrastructure and access to microfinance. Relevant strategic interventions included promoting agro-processing and strengthening agricultural market information, promoting microfinance, facilitating the access of women and the disabled and improving the quality of export commodities. Although the problem of low benefits to the local population from the tourism sector was identified in MKUZA I, the initial workplans for JP5 did not include specific activities addressing this problem.

Review of activities: The original output for this component (output 2) involved strengthening entrepreneurship capacity and providing access to micro-finance services focusing on groups of youth, women, PLHA and the disabled. The intention was to provide a range of training and mentoring services in order to develop entrepreneurial and ICT skills in agriculture and tourism sectors. This range of 9 activities was reduced to 3 in the first re-planning exercise in February 2009. In the second planning

session (May 2009), these activities were completely revised and refocused under outcome 3, which was comprised of a mix of outputs and activities designed to support pilot interventions in seaweed, agro-processing, and renewable energy. These activities were jointly planned with the private sector but the private sector was not actively involved in implementation. Some stakeholders thought that the IP should have made more of an attempt to engage the private sector through the Chamber or PPP.

3.1 & 3.2: Local products of SMEs dealing with food processing: These activities resulted in the establishment of two food processing centres which provided enhanced value-added processes and new techniques to two groups involved in seaweed production and two in fish processing. Groups were able to make improvements in productivity, packaging, marketing and the shelf life of their products, which resulted in increased income, by as much as 50%. Some groups were able to showcase their spices, smoked fish and seaweed products (soap, desserts, shampoo, soft drinks) at an international trade fair held in Dar es Salaam in July 2010.

3.3 Pilot centres for demonstration of renewable energy: The original idea behind the demonstration renewable energy output was to establish 4 centres in remote areas where people did not have access to electricity, enabling communities to recharge their cell phones. However, the intervention was designed at a time when rural areas had to use generators or travel several kilometers to get access to electricity. Although the main idea behind the rural energy initiative was to supplement existing energy sources and to demonstrate the possibilities of utilizing indigenous renewable energy resources to generate power for local productive applications, by the time JP5 began most people were connected to the grid, which reduced the usefulness of the renewable energy centre concept. In the end, one demonstration centre was established at Kisakasaka, consisting of a mini biogas plant, a generator and a bank of solar panels. UNIDO is still intent on making good use of the capital, infrastructure and technology invested in the demonstration site, and is in the process of changing its objective to “making economic use” of the facility by building a community IT centre for training and raising awareness and exposure to rural renewable energy.

3.4 Capacity of MTTI to manage agro-food processing training, counseling and consultancy services to SMEs strengthened: Implementation was delayed.

Assessment of performance: UNIDO’s approach to building capacity in the SME sector involved a ‘scatter-shot’ approach to training, where 200-300 SMEs were given general training in entrepreneurship and various business development services. The Ministry’s preferred approach was to select a few promising SMEs and provide them with dedicated coaching and mentoring services. The two approaches are very different, and UNIDO felt that both were needed, even if the only result was to raise awareness about the benefits of training. But some stakeholders felt there was “*too much training*” in JP5, which was quite expensive and difficult to measure the impact.

3.1 & 3.2: Local products of SMEs dealing with food processing: There was some measurable impact on the skills and incomes of a number of entrepreneurs who benefited from training, attendance at trade fairs and new value-added techniques. However, it is difficult to ascertain the utility of the training provided to over 600 trainees and the strengths of the capacity building activities. Moreover, because of shifting targets and indicators, it is difficult to track the actual number of people trained and the type of training received. This is partly due to the broad targets established in the early workplans, and the overlap between some outputs and outcomes, as well as the tendency to report on the number of people trained instead of the results of the training. Nevertheless, interviews with beneficiaries confirmed that the training in business practices, value added techniques and packaging was applied to boost productivity, competitiveness, shelf life and income. Moreover, women in particular were empowered through the ability to earn income, participate in cooperative practices and make improvements to their nascent business ventures. This can be considered an important first step in moving participants from subsistence level activities toward making a link to the market.

3.3: Pilot centres for demonstration of renewable energy: The UNIDO demonstration renewable energy centre in Kisakasaka was an example of ‘*wrong planning*’, as described by one stakeholder. Although

the intervention was planned as a demonstration site with the participation of community and government stakeholders, the initial idea of generating power in remote communities was quickly overtaken by realities on the ground. The general consensus is that the technology piloted at Kisakasaka was too complex for small villages in Zanzibar. As things stand today, it will be difficult to get government and community buy-in to make the centre sustainable, as this particular model requires complicated technology. It may have been more appropriate to pilot a system that makes use of gas cylinders that can be filled and transported to people's homes, instead of having residents travel to a centralized facility to charge their phones, or if it had been located in a more remote site. Also, an exit strategy should have been factored into the intervention. As a result, the Ministry has inherited a 'headache' and has to live with it. Turning the centre into an IT demonstration site will need some careful thought, as it may be better to write off that investment and go back to the planning table.

Table 5.3 in Annex 5 attempts to outline the achievements of outcome 3 against the planned targets in 2008 as well as the revised targets in 2009. Based on the above performance, outcome 3 has been given a rating of "marginally satisfactory" (C).

Outcome 4: The capacity of OCGS to carry out job creation projections arising from manufacturing industry enhanced

Background: Persistent unemployment was one of the most critical concerns raised by stakeholders during the consultations for MKUZA I. The high level of unemployment, especially among youth, was linked to the low skills base and scarcity of vocational training centres. Moreover, because of the lack of livelihood options, unemployment tended to exacerbate problems with food insecurity and other areas such as low productivity and inappropriate farming and business practices. Also, a lack of capacity and weak statistical data collection, both at the level of the ministry (MTTI) and central government (OCGS), made it difficult to address the job creation problem, as well as having implications for policy formulation (the Ministry needs accurate data to formulate policies). In order to address this problem, MKUZA I identified the need to design and implement a labour market information system (LMIS). To this end, support from UNIDO was requested to strengthen the capacity of OCGS to undertake an industrial census.

Review of activities: The intervention in this area was not included in the 2008 workplan; it first appeared in the 2009 annual report (as Output 5), indicating that OCGS was to be assisted to undertake an industrial census. JP5 helped OCGS to undertake the industrial census, print it, and improve their capacity.

Assessment of performance: Interviews with OCGS revealed that their main problem was capacity, both in terms of human resources and equipment. Not only did JP5 support help OCGS to produce the industrial census, but it also helped to build its capacity to undertake similar types of data collection exercises in collaboration with other ministries (private capital flows, agriculture census, labour force, trade and employment, etc.). Although the industrial census was a small assignment, it helped to increase the collection of data. This assistance, in combination with other programmes (such as the HBS, which JP5 also assisted), helped to improve the quality of data within OCGS. The flexibility of JP5 support was appreciated by OCGS where one interviewee stated, "*JP5 was a very flexible partner, compared to the World Bank for example, and apart from delays in funding, they managed to complete the industrial census*".

Future programming

Data collection is a top priority for the government, which is focusing on improving M&E in line ministries as part of the President's "change process". But it will take time to build capacity, as each unit has to be equipped with the right people, and the right skills and knowledge. Also, OCGS needs a team to support and implement this change. One of the major drawbacks in this area is policy analysis, where one interviewee stated: "*The government needs sector level and policy analysis, but it is difficult to get good policy analysis in Zanzibar. OCGS used to hire consultants from the mainland, but found that the*

reports were ‘carbon copies’ of reports produced for the mainland. So now we use donor support to recruit external experts.”

Table 5.4 in Annex 5 attempts to outline the achievements of Outcome 4 against the planned targets in 2008 as well as the revised targets in 2009. Based on the above performance, Outcome 4 has been given a rating of “**satisfactory**” (B).

Findings and Observations: Outcomes 2, 3 and 4

MTTI identified a number of promising SMEs involved in fish-smoking, fruit-drying, salt-making, and seaweed harvesting, which were provided specialized support and coaching in packaging, quality control and marketing through attendance at trade fairs, etc., which enabled them to become more ‘market ready’. These SMEs are now producing for markets in the mainland, Uganda and Kenya. This assistance benefited approximately 80 people, who were able to improve their products, pricing, display, etc, and increase their income (some by as much as 50%).

This is a significant impact, but because these interventions were geared to improving the livelihoods of the self-employed, it is too early to assess whether they will have an impact on the government’s job creation targets. The reports indicate that approximately 300 people were trained, and equipment was purchased, resulting in additional full-time employment for about 30 people attached to these centers.

Although UNIDO was responding to the IP’s requests and priorities, stakeholders expressed the sentiment that UNIDO could have provided more expert advice in suggesting more “appropriate” activities that could be picked up by the Ministry afterwards. For example, the Business Information Centre intervention, which was a continuation of support that had been started by ITC in 2005, appeared poorly planned and poorly executed (even though it was planned in conjunction with the Ministry) primarily because a needs assessment was not undertaken to check that the type of support provided to the BIC was “appropriate” for the client base. As a result, support involved providing funding for new equipment, with little thought on the strategic use of the centre or the equipment. Also, the selection of the energy demonstration intervention (output 3.3) was poorly timed and badly placed.

Nevertheless, JP5 was a good learning experience for the IP and PUN. The Ministry was focused on the problem of helping SMEs to produce practical, market-ready products, while the PUN was looking ahead to the MDGs. Some people didn’t realize that MDG issues were mainstreamed in MKUZA I. The problem was that while MKUZA provided a good strategy, there was no implementation plan, which is what the joint planning processes in JP5 provided. It took some time for all parties to come up with a plan that targeted both MKUZA trade policy as well as the MDGs.

Outcomes 5, 6 and 7: ILO assistance to Employment Policy and Job Creation

Introduction

This section assesses Outcomes 5, 6 and 7, combining ILO support to employment policy and job creation. The original intention of this component was to ensure that policies related to employment creation and private sector development (e.g., SME policy, social protection, child labour) would be more inclusive in addressing the livelihoods of vulnerable groups.

Outcome 5: Implementation of employment policy, job creation programmes and youth employment action plans enhanced

Background: The government did not have an employment policy or sufficient labour laws in place. Also, apprenticeship programmes that cater to tailoring skills in youth to the job market were non-existent in Zanzibar. During the consultations for MKUZA I, the government recognized that the absence of an employment policy, decent work agenda and high unemployment among youth were major obstacles that had to be overcome to increase employment and meet Goal 2 “promote sustainable pro-poor and broad-based growth”. Some of the key interventions identified by MKUZA I included the need to develop and implement a gender sensitive employment policy, promote social justice and the

decent work agenda, and improve social protection at work. Under JP5, assistance from ILO was requested to enhance the capacity of key stakeholders including government ministries, private sector enterprises and civil society organizations to formulate an employment policy, implement labour laws and establish job creation programmes.

Review of activities: This outcome responded to the serious problem of unemployment in Zanzibar, particularly among youth. The Ministry of Labour, Youth, Women, Child Development (MLYWCD⁴) worked with ILO to implement the Zanzibar Employment Policy (ZEP), job creation programmes, and action plans for minimizing child labour and increasing youth employment – interventions that were designed to increase national productivity and improve gender responsive employment policies. ILO also provided support in the establishment of a labour market information system (LMIS) and a centre designed to provide information on labour market opportunities in the public and private sectors.

The original 2008 output (#1) was to “strengthen capacity of government institutions, private sector and CSOs in SME policy and labour laws from a gender perspective”. The activities under this component involved a ‘shopping list’ of actions ranging from an SME policy to MSME training, labour laws, etc., which were to be implemented by ILO in conjunction with UNIDO and FAO.

The first revised plan for this component (early 2009) involved undertaking a comprehensive diagnostic of Zanzibar’s needs for social protection (output 3) and enhancing the capacity of sector ministries, workers and employers’ organizations, the private sector and civil society groups to implement employment policy, job creation and a Youth Action Plan (output 4). In the second re-planning session (May 2009), these 2 outputs were consolidated into a single job creation/social protection/implementation outcome (#5) involving separate outputs for job creation, youth entrepreneurship, child labour and social protection all supported by ILO (see Table 5.5 in Annex 5).

ILO support for job creation was directed at two levels: 1) the policy/strategic level, and 2) direct action. At the policy level, the priority areas to be addressed involved assisting organizations to develop policies, strengthen governance structures and formulate business plans. The Ministry of Labour was assisted in the establishment of an employment department and the creation of employment committees at the national, district and regional levels. ILO also supported implementation of policies, which involved labour laws, regulations, legislation, training mediators and arbitrators, study visits, etc. Some policies and legislation are in the process of being approved and others have yet to be implemented (eg, social protection policy).

Direct action included support to labour organizations, employers and NGOs, which involved association building, and training of MSMEs in entrepreneurship, marketing, BDS, access to finance, etc. This was intended to increase productivity of MSMEs through technical training in processing and packaging of dairy products, livestock management, etc., and general business training in record keeping, business management, etc., with a sectoral focus on agriculture. ILO also organized a “challenge fund” competition to promote innovative ideas among women and youth enterprises.

The social protection output (executed in conjunction with Unicef) involved raising awareness about social protection and child labour by training officials from the Labour Commission, employers’ associations and schools, and strengthening the implementation structures for social protection policy by developing the capacity of key stakeholders from government institutions and social partners. Also, ILO provided technical assistance for a study on social expenditure review and social budget in collaboration with the Ministry of Labour, workers’ and employers’ organizations and ZSSF, which attempted to determine how the government spends social expenditure funding.

Table 5.5 in Annex 5 attempts to outline the achievements of Outcome 5 against the planned targets in 2008 as well as the revised targets in 2009. Based on the above performance, Outcome 5 has been given a rating of “**satisfactory**” (B).

⁴ Now the Ministry of Labour, Economic Empowerment and Cooperatives (MLEC)

Outcome 6: Safety and health issues at the workplace addressed

Review of Activities: The activities for this outcome appear to have been delayed or postponed, as there is no information reported in the annual reports.

Table 5.6 in Annex 5 attempts to outline the achievements of Outcome 6 against the planned targets in 2008 as well as the revised targets in 2009.

Outcome 7: Institutional support and mechanisms for enhancing employment

Review of Activities: The Ministry of Labour, the Labour Commission and employers' associations were supported in the formulation of 5-year strategic plans and mobilization of resources. ZMC was supported in the adoption of strategies and action plans to implement employment creation programmes in the delivery of municipal services involving a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) initiative. The idea was to outsource the provision of municipal services (street cleaning, solid waste removal) by using CBOs as a strategy for employment creation through PPPs. Awareness on outsourcing municipal services was raised among members through ILO sponsored workshops and a study tour to Dar. ZMC initiated a pilot programme involving cleaning the streets, drains and market areas in Stone Town by contracting 65 people who are paid a monthly rate of 100,000 Ts.

Assessment of performance: Key policy documents and strategic plans were formulated and are awaiting validation by stakeholders. In implementing the pilot street-cleaning programme, ZMC found that CBOs lacked the necessary capacity, equipment and financial resources to manage an outsourced service. In addition, there was a poor community response in terms of paying for municipal services. Nevertheless, the pilot programme revealed some important lessons regarding community willingness and capacity assessment. ZMC is very motivated and is looking into various possibilities involving raising revenue from hotels and other large businesses, and providing other services such as car parking.

Table 5.7 in Annex 5 attempts to outline the achievements of Outcome 7 against the planned targets in 2008 as well as the revised targets in 2009. Based on the above performance, Outcome 7 has been given a rating of “**satisfactory**” (B).

Assessment of performance: Outcomes 5, 6 and 7: JP5 came at the right time, when the government needed support with policy reforms and implementing labour laws, employment policy, youth action plan, etc. Most policy level outputs in this component were completed to some extent, with some activities still on-going in areas such as social protection policy and LMIS, involving the establishment of employment creation committees, which will require training and capacity building before being operational.

JP5 helped to build the capacity of the Ministry, empowering it to carry out its mandate, providing technical and financial support, tools and guidance in the Labour Sector Plan, procurement of equipment for the LMIS (and some construction), and promoting entrepreneurship and creativity at the downstream levels. Also, according to Ministry officials, economic empowerment, entrepreneurship and creativity were new to the Ministry of Labour. Through JP5 support, good practices were learned from other ministries and UN agencies. However, capacity is an ongoing problem where there still is a serious shortage of resources, both in terms of human resources and institutions not being in place to implement policy issues and laws, which hinders sustainability of results. For example, a Labour Department has been established, but there is no strategy on employment or on employment issues.

Training under this component was focused on policy level issues and developing operational capacity. However, training has not been applied to the implementation of labour laws. That is, there are few tools to assist with implementation of labour laws. Part of the problem was that during the first 2 years of JP5 there was no “employment department”. Because of the low capacity, there was a rationale for providing training; but training has to be planned properly, and to be sustainable, training has to be translated into action. This was lacking. This, in itself, was due partly to a lack of capacity and partly to a lack of follow

up on project activities. For example, a training workshop was supposed to be organized after the study tour to Mauritius, but this did not happen. So the operational results of the study tour may be lost. Study tours to appropriate locations are important, but it is equally important to link the study tour to operational realities. Although there was no concrete achievement from the study tour to Mauritius, apart from sharing experiences on labour laws, this was part of the capacity development process involving the development of labour regulations, which will be continued under UNDAF.

Another example of the importance of follow up is the need for a functioning LMIS and employment creation system, one that is focused on places where employment is created – at the district level, as opposed to the national level. JP5 provided a road map for the LMIS, involving the structure, tools, committees, data collection priorities and training of statistical officers. However, operationalizing the LMIS system will have to be left to UNDAF, where they plan to work with ILO to strengthen its capacity and develop a database on entrepreneurship, which will enable them to match supply and demand for labour, and collect information on the primary growth sectors: tourism and agriculture. For example, studies in tourism showed that the sector has not benefited Zanzibar residents as much as they would have liked, largely because of a lack of skilled personnel. So the Ministry's strategy will involve improving skills and capacities in tourism, mainly of the youth.

Box 2: Possible Unintended Result: Restructuring of MLYWCD

There are some possible unintended results from JP5 support. Following elections in 2010, the new government made changes in the structure and management of the Ministry of Labour Youth, Women and Children Development (MLYWCD), restructuring it into Labour and Economic Empowerment and Cooperatives (MLEC), and transferring responsibilities for Youth, Women and Children Development to the Social Welfare department in the Ministry of Social Welfare Women, Youth and Children Development. It created the missing employment department, which will make it easier to prioritize labour issues and employment creation. The new government established these reforms very quickly and it is difficult to attribute the changes to JP5. Nevertheless, the consensus is that the new Ministry of Labour and Economic Empowerment and Cooperatives (MLEC) has a more focused structure with good leadership, so issues that were stuck, should start to move ahead. As one interviewee stated, *"The Ministry is focused, and they know what they want, which is half the battle, as they can ask for assistance"*.

Regarding direct action, the MSME training included a vital link to local markets and hotels, resulting in beneficiaries being empowered through value added improvements in dairy processing and food vending. This component was very relevant as it targeted people's livelihoods at the community level, and increased their incomes. As a result of these interventions, there has been good progress in increasing employment, building capacity in entrepreneurship and skills, access to business development services and credit, and providing links to local and external markets in the mainland (attending trade fairs) and Kenya (dairy products, food vending, spices, etc.). The immediate impact can be measured in terms of numbers of women and youth participating (2,174), farmers in FFS (630), value added products (yogurt, cooking fat, butter, food processing, juice), marketing processes (labeling, packaging, etc.), and income (50-100% increase).

Box 3: Transformational Result: Empowerment of Women

There are significant achievements in self-employment, especially among women, where the support made a real difference in their lives by improving their social status, giving them confidence, increasing their income and sensitizing the men. Now the women have an economic role to play in the household and community, over and above their traditional social role.

However, not all components were successful – for example, the support to SACCOs in Pemba did not work, as there was a problem with credit. Also, sustainability is a significant problem, as many of these groups have received financial support from different ministries (Agriculture, Industry, Labour) and donors, yet they are still looking to be supported. So, while some groups have increased their

employment, and families are less dependent on the husband's income, many are still dependent on donor support.

There were some very good results in social protection, where the number of beneficiaries withdrawn from child labour was far above the target of 500 (1980, which represents a 400% fulfillment). However, regarding the social protection policy, Zanzibar still has some limitations, as social protection is still not coordinated properly; and the government still needs a policy framework. This was part of ILO support to Pillar II, which will continue to be supported under UNDAF, through the development of an action plan.

The apprenticeship policy was a new area for the Ministry of Labour, and it took some time to garner the required support. But with encouragement from ILO under JP5, the government is in the early stages of establishing an accreditation system, and the draft document is currently awaiting approval.

In summary, Outcomes 5, 6 and 7 were effectively implemented under the Ministry of Labour with ILO assistance, yielding significant results such as building the capacity of Ministry staff, strengthening labour and social welfare institutions in employment policy, and assistance with implementation of labour laws. The Ministry had a strong management team that knew what assistance they needed from JP5, and the staff learned many aspects of project management: procedures, procurement, monitoring, etc. These outcomes also resulted in increased employment (500), empowering women and youth, and improved entrepreneurship through practical training. By all accounts, the activities were well planned and were focused on the Ministry's priorities, and ILO provided very good technical assistance in employment policy, laws, social protection, labour compliance, gender (in collaboration with Unifem), and job creation. Based on the government's targets, 85% of the outcomes were achieved, and the 15% not accomplished was due to the short duration of the programme and the late disbursement of funds. While these results may not have been transformational, they are significant, and more importantly, as a pilot initiative, they indicate the direction for future support.

Future programming

1. As JP5 was a pilot programme, future support needs to be extended to areas that were not fully accomplished (social protection policy, child labour). Also, for job creation, support should be provided to strengthen associations of entrepreneurs (eg, handicrafts, cooperatives, etc.), where the Ministry of Labour's target for 2011 is assisting 3,500 and 200 SME groups.
2. As far as management of UNDAF, the Ministry would like to retain the system of planning and working together. The monthly pillar level meetings were ideal for problem solving, and the quarterly Principal Secretary meetings were useful for exchanging views among different MDAs and development partners.
3. Consideration should be given to the adoption of a cluster-based approach, where development partners look at a "joint" value chain approach, and where linkages to the market form part of the programme. For example, hotels, tour operators, etc. are all part of a supply chain in tourism, and the entire value chain needs to be developed, which can be done through mainstreaming the value chain approach in a number of ministries (Labour, MTTI, Agriculture, etc.). Seaweed, for example, has adopted a cluster/value chain approach, which could be tested on a pilot basis under UNDAF.
4. Credit is another area that has to be given serious consideration. For example, JP5 support to the SACCOs in Pemba did not work, as there was a problem with credit. This is partly because it was a "project-driven" approach, as opposed to a cluster or value chain approach.
5. Also, use of existing systems should be considered, such as the Ministry's credit management scheme (self reliant fund), instead of providing support to parallel projects. Such a joint, Ministry-led approach will encourage ownership, follow up, and sustainability.
6. Work needs to be done to improve the relationship between PUNs and IPs. The UN agencies had a tendency to exclude the ministries when designing technical assistance, recruiting experts, and selecting beneficiary groups. A more participatory approach is needed in the selection of

beneficiaries. The specialized agencies may have criteria for selection, but this should be done in collaboration with the Ministries, as the selection has to match the priorities and approaches of the ministries and it will ensure ownership. This could be done by instituting a “technical forum” to consult with the ministries prior to developing the ToRs and selecting the consultants, where UN agencies can establish guidelines, and help the ministry to prioritize the groups based on the criteria.

7. A special committee was formed to spearhead economic empowerment (credit fund); assistance is needed to reform and revive this committee; it needs wide participation involving government, NSAs, private sector, etc., and it needs tools and guidance.

Assessment of Pillar I

ILO was the lead UN agency for Pillar I, responsible for consolidating reports, workplans, etc. and submitting these to the MA (UNDP), and for delivering TA and providing advice to the Ministry of Labour and other IPs.

Box 4: Creation of Ownership through Synergies and Joint Planning

Synergies were created through the joint planning and implementation processes under Pillar I, which were very participatory, involving all the relevant IPs including high-level participation at meetings with the PSs of 3 ministries (Labour, Trade, Agriculture), plus senior personnel from FAO, ILO, UNIDO. This created ownership, where the group met every 6 months to plan and prioritize activities for Pillar I. This ownership was one of JP5’s real strengths, where previously each ministry handled development partners separately, and donor agencies were supporting their own initiatives independently. By bringing IPs and PUNs together under a participatory framework, the government was able to take the lead in the implementation process, with IPs convening meetings, directing actions, etc. JP5 had a positive impact on staff too – through training and exposing staff to planning and prioritization, and increasing their capability to plan activities, draft ToRs for consultants, etc.

While these synergies benefited the line ministries under Pillar I, there was a lack of collaboration within the UN system, where one person felt that “*the UN agencies planned together but didn’t deliver together*”. Planning was done by pillar but delivery was done by sector, with PUNs assisting the relevant sectors: FAO in agriculture, ILO in labour, and UNIDO in trade and industry. So, after planning together, there was a tendency for UN agencies involved in Pillar I to revert back to their specialized mandates and expert advice during implementation. For example, the early workplans tried to come up with a joint job creation programme. However, following the re-planning process, each agency designed its own job creation interventions, resulting in three separate job creation programmes: UNIDO through value added, ILO through entrepreneurship training, FAO through FFSs. This limited the “jointness” of the programme, as the specialized agencies, which are driven by their specialized mandates, tended to push their niche services and products – sometimes at the expense of government priorities (eg, social protection versus job creation). To some extent, this meant that the initial planning of activities was based too much on the mandate/leverage of the PUNs responding to the MDAs’ shopping list of requests, rather than on an overarching programme strategy. A typical example is a case where such shopping lists comprised of installation of equipment and infrastructure, the majority of which are categorized under budget support. Traditionally, specialized agencies, including FAO and ILO, do not have a mandate to address delivery of these requirements. This resulted in a sentiment expressed by the counterpart IPs that the PUNs within this pillar could have done more to add value through collaborating with other UN Agencies (such as UNDP) rather than simply delivering individually within the bounds of their normative mandates. In addition, other strategic sectors such as tourism, the environment and fisheries were left out of JP5 almost entirely – perhaps because these sectors were not well represented by the PUNs.

This lack of cooperation compromised the effectiveness of some activities, such as entrepreneurial training (which was done independently by different PUNs), and job creation (where 3 different PUNs were tackling this priority area separately). Part of the problem was that in the rush to implement the

programme, proper needs and capacity assessments were not undertaken to determine the needs and capacities of the relevant institutions in the private sector, SMEs, government agencies and CSOs that would be responsible for sustaining these activities. Also, some ministries did not have the confidence to guide the donors or stand up to them, but as one interviewee admitted, *“they will criticize them afterwards.”*

Each ministry benefited a great deal from JP5 because it contributed to the achievement of MKUZA outcomes (with which JP5 aligned its outcomes). Also, under the pillar/cluster approach, the Ministry of Labour and other ministries were able to treat the government’s new job creation/economic empowerment mandate as a cross-cutting, multisectoral issue that involved a range of institutions (Labour, Trade, Agriculture, etc.). As a pilot programme, JP5 was able to perform very well by working through initial strategies and plans and identifying future areas of need. The achievements in the area of policy support include food security and nutrition, agricultural marketing, SME policy, employment policy, labour laws and social protection. Capacity building included support to the establishment of new departments in FSN and employment, and improvement in the collection and analysis of labour market information, economic studies, statistics and surveys for poverty monitoring. In the area of downstream interventions, JP5 support helped to empower farmers and SME groups to adopt new production techniques, packaging, etc. Also, some groups were able to benefit from complementary support from trade, labour and agriculture, such as organizing into groups (seaweed, FFSs, fish smoking, spices, etc.).

Box 5: Transformational Result – Empowering Women

Training in business practices, value added techniques and packaging provided a much-needed boost to productivity, competitiveness, the shelf life of products and income. Women in particular were empowered through the ability to earn income, participate in cooperative practices and make improvements to their nascent business ventures. This can be considered an important first step in moving participants from subsistence level activities toward making a link to the market.

Photo 2: Beneficiaries of Training in Value-added Processing (Spices and Seaweed Products)



However, some areas need continued support, such as entrepreneurship and creativity. These are areas that need to be built on with future assistance programmes, in which it will be important to consolidate the gains from JP5 and build on the budding entrepreneurship skills. For example, there was an unintended result in the establishment of a guaranteed market, where the Ministry of Agriculture buys seeds from the farmers at a guaranteed price, which provided an incentive to the farmers to improve quality and investment. To follow this up and to ensure sustainability of results, subsistence farmers need to be taught entrepreneurial and business skills, and how to manage their money and savings, etc.

There were hurdles in effective planning under the sector approach pioneered in JP5, which will be continued under the UNDAF. For example, some challenges with coordination among Ministries remain, as the ministries are not well coordinated to implement a multisectoral programme, where each ministry tends to ‘do its own thing’. Coordination among trade, agriculture and labour is particularly important

for the multisectoral approach that is needed for employment creation and economic empowerment. Also, there is still a lack of data collection and analysis, and follow up, ownership and sustainability. But with the new government, this appears to be changing, where for example the Ministry of Labour has established a strategy and is inviting the UN agencies to provide support to that strategy.

Most people acknowledge that Zanzibar is a special case. The government and private sector are at a different level of development compared to the mainland, which is more advanced in terms of implementing labour laws, in the development of internal capacity, etc. For example, ILO's support for employment policy in the mainland is progressing well, but things are much slower in Zanzibar. Training and capacity development is being applied in patches, and there is a lack of capacity and/or political will among the responsible government ministries and stakeholder employer associations. Zanzibar is a separate island with a fully-fledged government, their own President, government ministries, separate programmes, and a different culture, etc. Some people think that resource allocation should be separate as well. There are historical and political reasons behind the separation of the Zanzibar programme.

Future programming for Pillar I

One area that has come out very strongly through the JP5 and MKUZA processes is the aspect of “economic empowerment”, which has moved to the top of the national agenda. However, the government doesn't have the funds to develop this area on its own, and will need donor support. So this is one area where resources can be allocated to align with government priorities. The Ministry of Labour is in the process of putting together an economic empowerment policy, and other Pillar I ministries are in the process of improving the data on the types of business groups, their skill level, their needs, potential opportunities, etc. Consideration should also be given to undertaking a series of “economic impact assessments” to determine the areas where investment and training would provide the greatest benefit for Zanzibar's pro-poor policies. Also, the work on value chain analysis pointed out that the private sector needs to step up to the plate and change its models to ensure the community benefits.

Another area for consideration is the aspect of human resource capacity, where strengthening capacity in MDAs is needed to enable the ministries to fulfill their mandate. This includes areas where government is deficient: systems, skills, etc., and has to draw from donors (this aspect is heavily donor dependent). But the government is showing commitment, and is intent on putting things in place that will a) increase revenues, b) decrease tax evasion and increase collection, and c) encourage investment to pay for social development and other activities. But it needs input from donors to bridge the gap.

In Agriculture, the majority of farmers are in the rural areas, and support is needed to increase their organization into groups (because subsistence level farmers are at the mercy of traders). The Ministry of Labour has over 5,000 registered societies, half of which are dormant. So they plan to revive them as a vehicle for economic empowerment. SACCOS will become financial intermediaries.

In summary, **Pillar 1** has been given a “**satisfactory**” (**B**) rating.

Observations, Lessons Learned and Recommendations

- In some result areas the design and selection of activities should have followed an overall strategic plan or intervention logic. For example, in UNIDO's support to MTTI, outcomes 2, 3 and 4 could have been consolidated under an overarching job creation outcome
- More work should have been done in the tourism sector, such as creating linkages with other sectors such as agriculture, developing tourism value chains and undertaking demand-side analysis to target areas where the tourism market can create areas for pro-poor employment.
- The approach to building capacity in the SME sector should be directed toward a few promising SMEs that can be provided with dedicated coaching and mentoring services. Providing a ‘scatter-shot’ of training to hundreds of unproven entrepreneurs wastes resources, creates the impression that training alone can make entrepreneurs and breeds dependency on donor-support to SMEs.

- Capacity building programmes that support the establishment of new departments or new policies should follow through with their ‘capacity building’ mandate and make sure there is enough capacity and technical expertise to implement the new policies. For example, the FSN department in MALE needed a long term policy advisor to monitor FSN data, and the Ministry of Labour needed tools to assist with implementation of labour laws. Tools are needed to assist with labour laws and employment policy
- JP5 was too short lived to make any impact on areas such as exports and market development. UNDAP should build on the gains of JP5 and provide longer-term assistance in market development, particularly in agriculture and tourism sectors.
- JP5 tried to meet the government’s change in priorities that was needed in the approach to pro-poor growth with a poverty-reduction focus
- Support both upstream and targeted downstream interventions. The JP5 process revealed that there is a tendency to provide policy level assistance and to do periodic situational analyses every few years, whereas ministries may need downstream support to implement its priorities. JP5 highlighted the advantages of providing support at the downstream level, which can inform policies and priorities in ministries. The UN system has the flexibility to make these downstream interventions, through strategically designed pilot projects that can add value, build capacity and inform policies. For example, JP5’s seed intervention led to the establishment of a home-grown seed policy in MALE. The UN system should also look more strategically at a particular ministry’s total needs, both at the upstream and downstream levels, to identify not only the immediate priorities, but to ensure the ministry has the capacity to implement the policies being supported
- The joint and sector planning approach pioneered in JP5 should be continued under UNDAP, as this will encourage the relevant ministries to coordinate the multisectoral approach that is needed for the new employment creation and economic empowerment mandate

3.3.2: PILLAR II: REDUCTION OF MATERNAL, NEWBORN & CHILD MORTALITY & IMPROVED SOCIAL SERVICES

Introduction

Pillar II focused on reduction of maternal new born and child mortality and improved social services, responding to social services and well-being. Expected outcomes under this pillar included:

1. Reduction of maternal newborn and child mortality and improved social services
2. Increased and equitable access to comprehensive Maternal Newborn Child Health (MNCH)
3. Improved water and sanitation to selected areas with poor clean and safe water in Zanzibar
4. Capacity within Ministry of Labor Youth Women and Child Development (MLYWCD) to promote gender equality and women's empowerment is enhanced
5. Improved implementation of educational programmes including teaching and learning environments at primary and secondary schools in Zanzibar

Like other pillars, interventions in pillar II were implemented by government ministries with technical support provided by participating UN agencies (PUNs) as follows:

1. Ministry of health and Social Welfare (MOHSW), under the technical support of World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).
2. Zanzibar Water Authority (ZAWA): Under the technical support of United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
3. Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MoEVT): under technical support of United Nations Education, scientific, and cultural Organization (UNESCO).
4. Ministry of Social Welfare, Youth, Women, and Children Development; under the technical support of United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF).

Background

The workplan, performance indicators and targets in JP5 were evolving. Major revisions were conducted in the second year of the programme. This review process was the result of a realization that the programme lacked focus and results based planning and limited participation of all stakeholders at the design stage, which contributed to difficulties in programme management and implementation of the multisectoral interventions. Through a participatory approach, major revisions were carried out to all three pillars. As a result some of the expected results from year one were dropped or merged with others. In pillar II, the reduction of maternal new born and child mortality and improved social services outcome remained year one's area of focus (May 2008 – June 2009) with 5 outputs, namely:

Outputs

1. Roadmap to accelerate the reduction of maternal and newborn mortality finalized, costed and distributed
2. Strengthened capacity of primary and referral health facilities to provide quality maternal, newborn and child health care
3. Strengthened capacity of District Health Management Teams (DHMTs) to prioritize and monitor maternal, newborn and child health interventions
4. Enhanced capacity of multi-sectoral stakeholder to prevent and respond to GBV and child rights abuse
5. Improved coverage of social services (health, education, water and sanitation) for the most vulnerable in selected areas.

Following the major revisions in May 2009, pillar II interventions were realigned to focus on reduction of Maternal New Born and Child Mortality Health (MNCH) with 5 outcome-level results:

Outcomes:

8. Increased and equitable access to comprehensive Maternal Newborn Child Health (MNCH)
9. Improved water and sanitation to selected areas with poor clean and safe water in Zanzibar
10. Capacity within MLYWCD to promote gender equality and women's empowerment is enhanced

11. Improved implementation of educational programmes including teaching and learning environments at primary and secondary schools in Zanzibar
12. Micheweni downstream interventions

Presentation of evaluation findings

The evaluation findings in this section are presented by output in each of the intended outcomes and in a chronological evidence-based manner: that is, what was planned, what happened and achievements and overall judgment of the achievements. At the end of each outcome a summary of findings and rating of the overall performance is provided.

Outcomes 8 & 9: Reduction of maternal newborn and child mortality and improved access to comprehensive Maternal Newborn Child Health (MNCH)

The outputs and activities under outcomes 8 and 9 were mixed in the JP5 workplans and annual reports because there were strong linkages between the two result areas. It was difficult to separate the achievements of Outcomes 8 and 9 individually, so for ease of understanding, the outcomes were evaluated jointly and reported as follows:

8.1 Roadmap to accelerate the reduction of maternal and newborn mortality finalized, costed and distributed

Though the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW) in Zanzibar, JP5 support aimed to finalize the roadmap to accelerate the reduction of maternal, newborn and child mortality plan, produce 400 copies of the final document and conduct a national and district level launch and dissemination event by end of June 2009. Additionally, there was plan to develop and operationalize a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework to monitor implementation of Child Mortality Health in Zanzibar.

The roadmap to accelerate the reduction of maternal and newborn mortality was finalized and launched, in December 2009, six months after the targeted date. 1000 copies were printed and disseminated. Additionally, user friendly guidelines on emergency obstetric care and essential newborn care for managing the major emergency obstetric complications was developed together with Emergency Obstetric Care Job Aid, to help maternal health care service providers to correctly identify obstetric complications and undertake timely appropriate decisions to either manage or refer the cases. At the end of JP5, the M&E framework to monitor MNCH services was not developed and operationalized.

Findings from the evaluation show that there is an increased number of maternal health service providers in Zanzibar that are able to manage most obstetric complications by themselves, with or without the presence of a medical doctor, by following guidelines in the Job Aid developed and distributed under JP5. This will go a long way to contributing to a reduction of maternal and newborn mortality causes of obstetric complications. This effort to reduce maternal and newborn mortality in the islands of Zanzibar represents a major achievement that can be attributed to JP5.

The development of the road map to accelerate the reduction of maternal, newborn and child mortality in Zanzibar (2008 – 2015) is in line with national and international agreements like the WHO Regional Committee of Ministers of Health Resolution of August 2004, and the endorsement by the Heads of States and Governments (AU), urging all countries in the region to develop strategies for reducing maternal and newborn mortality rates. The road map is already in use and stipulates various strategies to guide different stakeholders including the government, in the implementation of all maternal, newborn and child health interventions in Zanzibar.

8.2 Strengthened capacity of primary and referral health facilities to provide quality maternal, newborn and child health care.

The overall goal was to increase equitable access to comprehensive MNCH in Zanzibar, through strengthening capacities of the tertiary, district and primary health facilities to provide quality Emergency Obstetrics Care (EmOC), Newborn and Postnatal service. The target was to increase the

number of health facilities providing MNCH according to national guidelines to 40%; whereby each district will have at least two health facilities providing EmOC by March 2011. These were to be achieved through several interventions, including assessment of basic and comprehensive EmOC services to establish the necessary skills, knowledge and equipment gaps in MNCH services, and training of Service Providers (SPs) on Life Saving Skills (LSS) and link the services to HIV/AIDS care and treatment. Additionally, gender mainstreaming, development of user friendly guidelines on emergency obstetrics care essential newborn care, Focused Antenatal Care (FANC), Family Planning (FP) and Integrated Management of Childhood Illness (IMCI), scaling up quality improvement approach for MNCH in selected facilities as well as procurement of essential commodities, ambulance and communication equipments were considered.

Findings from the JP5 evaluation show that over 53% (18/34) of the health facilities in Zanzibar are providing emergency obstetric care. This was achieved through training of 30 service providers and supply of necessary equipment⁵, FP commodities and standard registers for reproductive and child health by MoHSW. Moreover, 20 SPs from the four regions of Unguja were trained on IMCI while a 15 member technical working group was formulated to support EmOC assessment. Additionally, the Tertiary hospital of Mnazi-Mmoja was capacitated through orientation of EmOC to SPs and procurement of equipment⁶.

Despite the above achievements, in the course of implementing JP5, delays in the disbursement of funds as well as reporting from implementing partners caused some activities to be re-planned and moved forward, which affected many planned activities including the EMOC assessment. The EMOC assessment was planned in 2008, 2009 and 2010 work plans, but could not be implemented. Instead the funds were diverted to support MOHSW during the national emergency power supply crisis and procurement of obstetric care equipment.

While the diverting of funds to respond to a genuine emergency shows flexibility of the program funding modality by responding to immediate government priorities, in the long run it affected the quality of JP5 achievements. Appropriate prioritization and alignment of key activities from the onset of JP5 support would have increased the quality and rate of delivery.

Main findings and observations

- One of the achievements recorded under this output is the increased number of health facilities providing MNCH according to national guidelines. However there was no baseline data on skills, equipment and knowledge gaps by facility. This limits the evaluation in objectively measuring the effectiveness and contribution of JP5 support.
- The EMOC assessment was a critical activity in establishing the skills, equipment and knowledge gap to guide JP5 and future MNCH interventions. The EmOC assessment was not undertaken, but follow up activities like training of SPs and procurement of EmOC equipment were done instead. Implementation of these activities lacked evidence-based programming rationally. While the spending contributed to increased financial delivery rate of JP5 and that of the PUN, in the long run it is not certain that it met the actual needs in strengthening MNCH services. For example, up to the time of this evaluation, some HFs were not yet able to use the EmOC equipment received. Therefore the need to conduct an EMOC assessment remains.
- Diverting of financial resources to address to a legitimate national emergency shows the flexibility of the funding modality and the overall aim to support government priorities.

8.3 Strengthened capacity of District Health Management Teams (DHMTs) to prioritize and monitor maternal, newborn and child health interventions

The overall aim under this output was to capacitate the District Health Management Teams (DHMTs) to operationalize the road map to accelerate the reduction of maternal, new born and child mortality in

⁵ Anaesthetic machines, oxygen concentrator, vacuum extractors and ambu bags,

⁶ 2 sets of laparotomy, 5 suction machines and 2 pieces of Autoclaves 120 litres

Zanzibar. This was to be achieved through capacitating all 10 DHMTs to adopt and incorporate gender sensitive planning and monitoring of MNCH interventions, and use of supervision guidelines through operationalization of the road map to accelerate the reduction of MNCH. The interventions were led by WHO and UNFPA and implemented by the MOHSW in Zanzibar.

Most of the above interventions and targets were planned in the 2008 workplan. But there were delays in implementation and disbursement of funds, thus no achievements were recorded. The same were moved to the 2009 workplan; and by end of 2009 all 10 DHMT were enabled to use the integrated supportive supervisions tools and trained on gender sensitive planning and monitoring of MNCH intervention. A follow up study to the trained DHMTs was moved into 2010 workplan and later pushed to the Jan – March 2011 workplan (the last three months before the close of the programme). The evaluation findings also show that the district plans include MNCH indicators signifying an increased capacity of the DHMTs to operationalize the road map to accelerate the reduction of maternal, new born and child mortality in Zanzibar.

Health sector policies and strategies prioritize MNCH issues: JP5 also aimed for prioritization of MNCH issues in the main national health sector policies and strategies. Some key activities implemented to achieve the outputs included capacity building of program managers on mainstreaming gender into RCH/MNCH services and review of MoHSW's strategic plan II. The evaluation findings established that MNCH issues were prioritized in the National Health Policy by the end of 2009, and in the Health Sector Strategic Plan II.

Existing monitoring system (HMIS, TDHS and MKUZA Monitoring) integrate MNCH indicators: MoHSW wanted to integrate MNCH indicators into existing national monitoring systems, like the Health Information Management System (HMIS), Tanzania Demographic Health survey (TDHS) and MKUZA, so as to ensure more comprehensive support to MNCH services. This output was to be achieved through development of an M&E framework for monitoring MNCH services, capacity building of SPs on MNCH data collection and reporting including printing of tools, technical support to undertake the TDHS 2009/2010, and regular supportive supervision of MNCH services. The MKUZA review process prioritized MNCH indicators in developing the MKUZA II. Under JP5 technical inputs and some support were provided to the National Bureau of Statistics to undertake the TDHS, and the final report of December 2010 includes MNCH and SRH key indicators. The evaluation findings also show that the revised HIMS include MNCH indicators.

8.4: Enhanced capacity of multi-sectoral stakeholder to prevent and respond to GBV and child rights abuse

The objective of this output in JP5 was to train 75% of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and other stakeholders on Gender Based Violence (GBV), women and children's rights and protection, development of a multisectoral strategic framework for addressing GBV by June 2009 and conduct a review of existing policies and laws to ensure that they respond and prevent GBV and protect the rights of women and children.

Sensitization and training on GBV were delivered to CSOs, community members, enforcement officials and members of the House of Representatives. A GBV committee was formed in Unguja North to increase efforts to prevent GBV. Furthermore, capacity gaps of health care providers and law enforcers in Unguja and Pemba to prevent and respond to GBV were established, and consequently a training manual to address gaps was developed. Review of existing laws on GBV was done which also guided the review of legislative measures to control GBV. A multisectoral Strategy Action Plan for preventing and responding to GBV in Zanzibar was developed by the MLYWCD but a system to monitor GBV was not completed.

Main findings and observations

Despite delays in implementation, the development of a multi-sectoral Strategy Action Plan for Preventing and Responding To Gender Based Violence (GBV) in Zanzibar was completed by

MLYWCD. Review of existing laws on GBV as well as the legislative measures to control GBV were important achievements in mainstreaming, control and responding to GBV in Zanzibar. For example, one of the goals of the GBV strategy action plan is to facilitate access to user-friendly pro-survivor/victim SGBV services including protection services, legal services and psychosocial services with a focus to introduce a holistic GBV services/package.

Box 6: Transformational Result: A GBV “One Stop Centre”

Through JP5 support a GBV **One Stop Centre was opened at Mnazi Mmoja Hospital in early 2011** and a committee was established to respond to GBV matters in Unguja North ‘A’ district. The performance of the one stop centre so far is excellent despite a few challenges such as inadequate legal support and enforcement system (low knowledge and experience of law enforcers on how to handle such cases, and community cultural and practices issues that are not favorable to GBV victims.

Table 1 provides details on the number of GBV cases handled/reported per month from February to July 2011. So far the GBV One Stop Centre has enhanced availability of evidence necessary for court rulings, whereas before this was a big challenge. Additionally, DNA testing of samples is now possible, although the hospital does not have a DNA machine as yet. The SPs are now able to fill in the required forms appropriately. By the time of this evaluation, only 4 cases had been called by the local court. Hindrance to the success of the centre includes inadequate knowledge by judges to handle and deliver GBV cases and provide justice in a timely manner, and factors associated with traditional culture and community histories. The GBV one stop centre in Mnazi Mmoja Hospital represents an unplanned achievement, but it needs to be embraced by the government and partners by ensuring continuity and smooth provision of trauma management, counseling, care and treatment including legal support services to the victims. Strengthening of the legal framework to ensure justice to the victims as well as provision of well-designed and appropriate education and sensitization campaigns on GBV and human rights and the negative effects of gender based violence including sexual abuse of women and children.

Table 6: Performance of Mnazi-mmoja Hospital GBV One Stop Centre: Feb-July 2011

Date	Male	Female	Age>18	Age<18	Total
Feb-11	3	87	79	11	90
Mar-11	3	61	51	13	64
Apr-11	3	66	53	16	69
May-11	2	116	24	94	118
Jun-11	9	98	76	31	107
Jul-11	7	108	58	57	115
Total	27	536	341	222	563

Evaluation summary and conclusions

Tangible upstream achievements were recorded mostly through the development of key policy documents such as the Road Map to accelerate reduction of maternal and newborn mortality, and the multisectoral strategy to prevent and respond to GBV. Establishment of the GBV One Stop Centre is one of the major transformational results recorded under pillar II interventions, as well as prioritization of MNCH issues and indicators in the main national documents: MKUZA, TDHS and the National Health Policy. Increased access to comprehensive MNCH was also a major finding.

Delayed disbursement of programme funds caused delays in implementation of the workplan. Consequently, this contributed to the low delivery rate on programme results and therefore reduced amounts of support and resources to the people and the government of Zanzibar, as well as delays in addressing priority issues. While most of the unimplemented activities are being considered in the

UNDAP support to Zanzibar, if adequate planning and consultation were undertaken at the onset of JP5, the UNDAP resources could have been used to scale up some of JP5's achievements and/or address other challenges that are still problematic in the EmOC and health sector at large.

Furthermore findings in this section also clearly show that there were inadequacies in using RBM in planning, inadequate clarity and focus on resource allocation and prioritization of the program activities, even after the major revisions. The role of the PUN was to provide technical and advisory services to ensure achievement of tangible results through leveraging their worldwide knowledge of best practices and experiences. But several factors such as little or lack of human resource capacities on the ground in the Zanzibar UN Sub Office contributed to inefficiency in performing such a role.

Lessons learned and recommendations

- Based on the above, in order to achieve concrete and tangible results, it is important for the PUNs and IPs to make sure that the planned interventions address all underlying causes as much as possible and the spectrum of activities are implemented logically and on time and try to avoid piecemeal interventions that are not helpful in alleviating and fully addressing MNCH problems.
- To achieve the designed programme results, PUNs and partners need to be clear on what they want to do and stay focused, align and prioritize the scarce resources to achieve the intended strategic results.
- Moving forward, the EmOC assessment has been included in the UNDAP to ensure actual needs for MNCH services are identified and addressed. Several ministries are not sure yet if UNDAP will carry forward activities initiated under JP5. Consultations between ministries and PUNs are still underway.

Rating of the overall performance under outcomes 8 and 9: Based on the above performance, outcome 8 & 9 has been given a rating of “marginally satisfactory (C)”. Table 5.8 in Annex 5 includes an outline of the achievements of outcome 8 & 9 against the planned targets in 2008 as well as the revised targets in 2009.

Outcome 10: Improved water and sanitation to selected areas with poor clean and safe water in Zanzibar

Under this outcome, the expected outputs were twofold: communities of Mkwajuni and Kivunje in North ‘A’ are supplied with stable, clean and safe water services and sanitation practices are improved in selected areas of West District of Unguja by June 2010. UNICEF and UNDP provided technical and management supports to MOHSW and ZAWA in planning, implementation and monitoring of the selected interventions to achieve the above targets. The table in Annex 4 outlines the outputs and targets for outcome 10.

10.1 Communities of Mkwajuni and Kivunje in North ‘A’ are supplied with stable service of clean and safe water by 2011

Review of activities

Construction of pump control house, electricity power line, pipelines, procurement and installation of a transformer to provide power to Mkwajuni and Kivunje were the main interventions planned to improve the supply of clean and safe water to Mkwajuni and Kivunje communities.

During JP5, procurement of polyethylene pipes and fitting materials to replace 300 meters of Asbestos Cement (AC) pipe was done. Boreholes at Mkwajuni in Northern region ‘A’ and Kiashangi areas were renovated and a total of 10 water simtanks were distributed to various schools during the 2009/2010 electricity crisis in Zanzibar. A generator for pumping water was also supplied through JP5 support. By the time of this evaluation processes were underway for procurement of the remaining items required for the water supply project in Mkwajuni and Kivunje communities. Therefore, in terms of improved supply of clean and safe water, the Mkwajuni and Kivunje communities have yet to benefit from JP5 investments because they are still using the old water supply system. However if the infrastructure will

be finalized by ZAWA as indicated, it will significantly contribute to the long term improvement of supplying clean and safe water to these communities.

Assessment of achievements

The overall achievement in this area was minimal because of delays in the disbursement of funds and delayed procurement processes and construction processes. The Zanzibar water sector reports show that by 2009 service coverage in urban and rural areas was approximately 80% and 60% respectively. Increasing water services and supply is one of the government's priorities in MKUZA I and II, which plans to improve access to clean and safe water from 60% in 2010 to 75% by 2015 in rural areas, and from 80% in 2010 to 95% by 2015 in urban areas. JP5's efforts were aimed at contributing to the government's efforts. According to Zanzibar Water policy, households are considered to have been covered by the service if they can at least fetch water within a distance of 250 meters from their premises in rural areas and 150 meters in urban areas.

Box 7: Unplanned achievement: use of advanced and appropriate technology for safe water

JP5 support moved away from small hand pump wells to deep boreholes with better capacity to supply water to a wide variety of communities and families with low maintenance costs. Moreover JP5 support moved from using Asbestos Cement pipelines to modern technologies (PVC, DCI and PE) that last up to 30 year with minimal maintenance requirements. The use of advanced and appropriate technology is a laudable approach in solving the local community development problems.

The sustainability of the intervention is ensured through ZAWA, as maintenance and the daily operational costs of all investments when completed are budgeted under ZAWA's own resources, including manpower. In addition, the new technology has low maintenance costs.

10.2 Improved sanitation practices in selected areas of West district of Unguja by June 2010

Under JP5 support, MOHSW's department of environmental health aimed to improve sanitation in west district, Unguja. The main interventions planned to improve sanitation in this district included training 60 shehias facilitators from 30 shehias on PHAST awareness and training 30 village artisans on construction of latrines, establishing a demonstration site for latrine and hand washing facilities as well as conducting a hand washing campaign and supporting a steering committee to monitor and supervise PHAST activities. Through JP5 a total of 72 people were trained, including local masons and community health committee members: 43 from North 'B' and 29 from North 'A'. A total of 7 demonstration latrines were constructed in North 'A' and North 'B'. These demonstration latrines were constructed at individual households which did not have latrines, as well as in public places like mosques.

Achievements

At the end of the project, community members in the project area had started appreciating the importance of sanitation by using latrines and adopting appropriate hand-washing behavior after using latrines. A total of 4 households in North 'B' were reported to have constructed similar family ECOSAN⁷ latrines using their own resources, while a total of 12 similar latrines had been constructed at Ushindoni and Kijini. These communities are characterized by a very high water table, high levels of poverty, high illiteracy levels and frequent cholera outbreaks caused by poor sanitation practices and facilities. Through JP5, more than 50 local self-employed masons are training others to construct similar ecological sanitation latrines.

The education campaign along with the construction of demonstration latrines and high involvement of local leaders in monitoring and supervising project activities, as well as training of local masons proved to be a very good combination of approaches in addressing the poor sanitation problem in North 'A' and 'B' community areas. This approach provides MOHSW with an opportunity to scale up sanitation activities, and an entry point for further advocacy on mobilizing the communities to adopt health and sanitation practices, as well as for more resource allocation.

⁷ Ecological Sanitation latrines supplied by UNICEF

The interventions and achievement are well aligned to the MKUZA II goal to improve access to water, environmental sanitation and hygiene. In Zanzibar about 73.4 percent of households still use pit latrine and 22.4 percent use flush toilets, while the remaining 4.2 percent do not have or use any toilets. JP5's interventions in this area contributed to the government efforts to implement Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Transformation (PHAST) projects to promote sound hygiene and sanitation practices to all its citizens, which aims to maintain and increase the attained results during MKUZA II, which plans to increase the proportion of households with access to basic sanitation from 83% in 2009 to 90% by 2015 through facilitation of construction and use of sanitary facilities in rural and urban areas, and improve good hygiene practices, and also by strengthening and safeguarding provision of sanitation services.

In terms of capacity building at the central level, visible changes and improvements in planning skills by the trained officers were highly rated by stakeholders. The 2010/2011 MTF plans contain clear analysis and causal linkage of issues, problems and solutions, which stakeholders rated much higher than the previous plans.

Shortcomings and challenges

During planning and implementation of JP5, challenges were experienced by all parties including the PUN and Ministries. The planning processes were new to everybody, and sometimes it was difficult for the PUN to meet the expectations of the partners. For example the PHAST trainings were dropped by the Ministry following revisions to the initial budget submitted by the PUN (UNICEF). Also, there were many revisions of workplans and planning sessions during JP5, which caused the partners to lose focus on JP5 and focus more on parallel funding. UNICEF is a good example where the PUN was more involved in implementing parallel interventions and less or at minimal levels in implementing JP5 initiatives.

Moving forward

The UNDAF is well informed of the lessons from JP5, particularly the planning and implementation processes. However, despite the joint planning initiatives in JP5, agencies still had bilateral discussions with ministries, which hampered the full transition to joint outcomes. But all in all, the planning process under JP5 enhanced ownership of the programme and the expected results. It was reported that, following implementation of JP5, there are some ministries proposing and or demanding all donors and partners to come up with a joint/common programme for all partners. Zanzibar does not have a basket fund yet, because the decentralization process is not well developed.

In terms of government priority areas, there is a feeling that UNDAF focuses on PHAST and capacity building. But the priorities of the ministry are the water project in schools and communities. One of ministry official put it this way:

“...The PHAST are good but are not our top priority at the moment. Our priorities are water projects in communities and in schools, not PHAST. We already send our concerns to UNICEF”.

Sustainability and recommendations

The campaign and construction of latrines needs to be sustained through joint efforts. Both the government and communities are happy with the latrines. Community members have started seeing the benefits while the government has started allocating some resources for similar activities: in 2011 the government allocated Tsh. 5,000,000 (equivalent to USD 3,000) to MoHSW's environmental health unit. There is a need to continue supporting community ownership, as they have picked up on the importance of hygiene practices and are now building their own toilets.

The evaluation findings point to several challenges in sustaining the capacity building achievement from JP5, including the difficulties associated with retaining trained and qualified staff. Government salaries are low and once staff are capacitated they tend to leave for better paying jobs. It was also reported that the economy of Zanzibar is not growing fast enough for government to pay better salaries to retain

skilled staff. Therefore, unless the government of Zanzibar comes up with an appropriate strategy, training of staff will not contribute to the intended capacity building.

Lessons learned

Working together in conjunction with various ministries; this component enhanced learning through sharing of experiences. This approach is the most preferred by ministries. One officer had the following to say: “...JP5 is the best approach for development work in Zanzibar”

Based on the above performance, Outcome 10 has been given a rating of “marginally satisfactory (C)”. Table 5.10 in Annex 5 includes details of the achievements of outcome 10.

Outcome 11: Capacity within MLYWCD to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment is enhanced

The main expected results were three-fold: a) revised gender policy in place, disseminated as well as approved by the house of representative by end of March 2011; b) MLYWCD is able to coordinate the development and implementation of GBV specific action plan and c) to increase awareness on GBV within MLYWCD and other key MDAs, media and CSOs.

11.1 The finalization of gender policy

Interventions to achieve the results of this output were planned for implementation during years two and three of JP5. The activities included formulation of GBV technical working group with members from various MDAs and hiring a national and international consultant, holding a one-day consultative meeting with members of the House of Representatives and translation of the gender policy into Swahili and submitting it to the House for approval. For two years (2009 and 2010) some preparatory work was done toward implementing and achieving the targeted results, including recruitment of a consultant and identification of gaps in the existing policy by the technical working group. Within the last six months of JP5, the gender policy and strategic action plan were finalized.

Finalization of the gender policy was one of the major achievements under pillar II and under JP5 overall support. The guidelines provided in the new gender policy and its strategic plan will make it easier for MDAs to mainstream gender issues in Zanzibar. A good example is the current UNDP framework, which is aligned to and contains some priorities from the new gender policy and strategic action plan. This also ensures the sustainability of the gains from JP5 under pillar II. For example, UNDP and other development partners in Zanzibar have drawn some of the main gender interventions from the 2007 study on gender gaps. Finalization of the gender policy also provides an opportunity for partners and MDAs to focus on prevention of GBV, as most of the previous interventions focused on GBV response.

11.2 MLYWCD is able to coordinate the development and implementation of GBV specific plan

Key interventions to strengthen the capacity of MLYWCD to coordinate development and implementation of GBV plans included capacity building training to staff, procurement of computers and consultant professional services to support development of a multisectoral GBV Action Plan, as well as finalization of the GBV training manual for health service providers and law enforcers.

Despite challenges to do with delayed disbursement of funds, the GBV Multisectoral Action Plan was developed during years two and three of JP5 through a participatory process which involved many stakeholders. Moreover, by the end of JP5 a GBV training manual for health service providers and law enforcers was also completed and in place.

The Multisectoral Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Responding to Gender Based Violence in Zanzibar is a notable milestone achieved in mainstreaming and institutionalizing preventive responses to GBV issues in Zanzibar’s overall development framework. The participatory processes contributed to capacity building of the stakeholders involved, but most importantly the processes enhanced greater ownership of the document and to its implementation. Similarly the GBV training manual presents a credible tool necessary for standardized training of health service providers and law enforcers in

Zanzibar. The manual is well informed by the study conducted in 2007 on assessing the capacity of law enforcers and health service providers to respond to GBV. Development of such a manual was a high priority for the government of Zanzibar, as previous studies also showed high rates of GBV in Zanzibar.

Moving forward, while the GBV training manual was among the high priorities of the government, there are no funds allocated to implement it. MLWYCD noted that, one of challenges ahead involves finding resources to support use of the GBV training manual to conduct GBV response training to target groups. The Ministry of MLWYCD does not have a budget for such training either from the government or the eagerly awaited UNDP (2011-2015) Zanzibar support framework. Like many other ministries, the UNDP design and planning processes were not well known to them to enable full participation and incorporation of their priorities and gaps from JP5 support. The only hope for this IP is that the ongoing discussions between MLWYCD and MOHSW on ways to collaborate in using the GBV training manual will bear fruit.

11.3 Increased awareness on GBV within MLYWCD, other MDAs, CSOs and Media

Key planned interventions to increase awareness on GBV within MLYWCD, other MDAs, CSOs and media included developing, printing and disseminating leaflets summarizing findings and recommendations from previous GBV studies conducted in Zanzibar. Another key intervention planned was GBV orientation training to health service providers and law enforcers using the developed GBV training manual.

Until the end of December 2010 none of the main interventions mentioned above had been implemented. The two main activities were included in both the 2009 and 2010 annual workplans. Delayed disbursements as well as shortage of funds affected implementation and timely achievement of the targets in this area. The evaluation findings could not establish evidence of implementation and achievement recorded.

Evaluation of the overall achievement

It is difficult to measure achievements at the outcome level. Implementation was delayed, and a good number of activities were completed a few months before end of the programme, leaving no room for the intervention to realize tangible outcome-level results. For example, the use and application of the gender policy, the GBV training manual as well as use of the Multisectoral Strategy and Action Plan for prevention and responding to GBV could not be completed during the timeframe of JP5 implementation.

Sustainability of the gains in this section is however reasonably assured: the structure and systems established through JP5 will remain in place and will support implementation and management of GBV interventions. For example, the GBV technical working group/committee will continue providing the needed support because it is made up of Zanzibar technical staff from various ministries. Gender issues and aspects are also within the government's priorities, and therefore stand a chance of being funded. A particularly new approach and a new focus is on prevention of GBV, whereas most previous efforts have focused on response to GBV.

Recommendation

The UN should continue supporting social issues (women, children, youth and population issues) in Zanzibar, it is one of the areas that a lot of results can be achieved and needs to be followed up on. However, there is still a lot to be done. For example, there are still a lot of outstanding issues to do with women, youth and children, economic development and population growth. For example, for many years Mnazi Mmoja Hospital continued to remain the only available referral and national hospital, despite the increased population and the health needs in Zanzibar.

Based on the above performance, Outcome 11 has been given a rating of “**satisfactory**” (B). Table 5.11 in Annex 5 includes an outline of Outcome 11 achievements.

Outcome 12: Improved implementation of educational programmes including teaching & learning environments at primary & secondary schools in Zanzibar

Implemented by the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MOEVT), under the technical support of UNESCO, two output level results were planned and targeted:

- i. Assisting in instituting child friendly schools (CFS) principles/elements in ZNZ schools
- ii. Teachers in all pre-primary and Primary schools have the capacity to promote performance and retention of girls in basic education

12.1 Assisting in instituting child friendly schools (CFS) principles/elements in Zanzibar schools

The main activities planned to realize instituting the principles of child friendly schools in Zanzibar included establishing a CFS unit in MOEVT Zanzibar, strengthening education management information system (EMIS) through training of district level education officers, and instituting a participatory teaching approach among grade 1 and 2 and pre primary teachers on transition from pre primary to primary to ensure that there is improved teaching and learning processes and increased teachers ability to apply participatory teaching methods. Other activities planned in order to improve the learning environment for teachers and students in targeted schools included strengthening a teacher resource centre for Early Childhood Development (ECD), procurement of classroom desks, and sensitization of education stakeholders in Pemba and Unguja on CFS approaches.

By the end of 2010, improved teaching and learning processes and the ability to apply participatory teaching methods were observed in some schools after training 150 teachers from Unguja and Pemba on participatory teaching approach. The trained teachers were from 5 selected schools. Improved teaching and learning environment was also reported after procurement and distribution of 135 classroom desks to Mwembeladu secondary school, wherein a total of 810 students now use the new desks in two shifts.

Although all the planned activities were implemented, there were serious delays caused by the different fund disbursement modalities. Funds for MOEVT activities were disbursed through the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, the lead IP for pillar II, which caused delays in transfer of funds, and also caused delays in implementation of the workplan. For example, the funds for 2008/2009 were received in December 2008, thus in 2008/2009 there was very little implementation. Only in 2010 were some notable milestones recorded in implementing the workplan. Thus, the CFS challenge remains, because MOEVT could not buy enough desks, which means, for example, form one students in Mwembeladu secondary schools are still sitting on the floor. This is only one school out of many that needed similar support in Zanzibar.

JP5 support to the education sector was in the government's priority areas. The key interventions were drawn from the Zanzibar education development plan, which is a road map of priority areas of intervention for the ministry, the government and development partners.

12.2 Teachers in all pre-primary and primary schools have the capacity to promote performance and retention of girls in basic education

In collaboration with UNICEF and UNESCO, MOEVT aimed to conduct training on gender responsive teaching and Alternative Learning Classes (ALC) to 600 pre-primary and primary school teachers in Unguja and Pemba including follow up visits to schools. Half (50%) of the trainees involved female teachers with knowledge on Alternative Learning Classes (ALC) as well as training of 150 teachers from 5 schools in Unguja and Pemba on participatory teaching approaches.

During the first two years of JP5, the main activities to achieve the target for alternative learning classes could not be implemented due to the capacity of MOEVT to spend the advanced funds, reporting and requests for disbursements on time, among other reasons. Therefore the planned activities were delayed and rescheduled for the last 6 months of JP5 support. Until the end of the JP5 support in June/July 2011, some of the key activities under this output were not implemented because planned funds were diverted by the MA to cover the costs of the national emergency power supply crisis, and these funds were not

replenished at a later stage. The most affected interventions included gender sensitization meetings, which planned to reach 600 teachers and the training of teachers on alternative learning classes. As such, there were no results recorded by the programme under this output.

The assessment of this section shows that the achievements recorded from JP5 support to the education sector are limited. They include opening of 2 alternative classes in Micheweni and Mkwajuni, addressing the child labor and school dropout challenges in Micheweni, as well training of teachers in improved teaching and learning processes and ability to apply participatory teaching methods.

Moving forward, the future priority interventions for MOEVT include quality improvement. Classes are too big, with limited space, and shortages of desks, teachers and school teaching and learning materials. The immediate interventions include: disseminating the 2006 education policy to lower levels, development of an early childhood development policy (underway), training science and mathematics teachers, recruiting teachers for 21 new government schools⁸, recruiting and preparing more lecturers for the State University of Zanzibar. In future the ministry would prefer a more consultative approach in identifying needs and gaps, and would not want their funds to go through another ministry. MOEVT is uncertain if UNDP will support these activities and build on JP5 support.

It should be noted that in Zanzibar there is no teacher college to prepare pre-primary school teachers, yet the education policy has made it mandatory for every child in Zanzibar to go through pre-primary classes. Moreover, due to lack of furniture/desks, most pupils and students in Zanzibar still sit on the floor. Despite these facts, MOEVT was reported as grossly underfunded by JP5, and brain drain and capacity issues are the most serious factors affecting the overall performance of the ministry.

Based on the above performance, Outcome 12 has been given a rating of **marginally satisfactory “C”**. Table 5.12 in Annex 5 includes a detailed outline outcome 12 achievements and rating of its performances.

Overall Rating of Achievement under Pillar II

The overall performance of Pillar II was good, despite challenges with capacity, delayed disbursements, reporting, program design and management. Key achievements recorded under JP5 include: development and finalizing upstream policy documents and frameworks like the gender policy, and the multisectoral strategy and action plan for preventing and responding to gender based violence (GBV) by the Ministry of Social Welfare, Youth, Women and Children's Development. There was also some downstream achievements, mainly involving the water and sanitation demonstration toilets in the Northern region of Unguja. Other achievements include capacity building of MOHSW and MOEVT staff in monitoring and evaluation as well as program and project planning and budgeting. A major transformational result achieved under Pillar II was the opening of a “One Stop Centre” for GBV.

Lessons learned

- If more time was spent on thinking through the design and management arrangements for JP5, more results could have been achieved. Experience from JP2 shows that spending more time designing the program enhanced the key deliverables and achieved more results.
- Through implementation of Pillar II and JP5 overall, the exchequer financial management system proved to be adequate but it should go hand in hand with capacity improvements in human resources, systems and infrastructure for it to work efficiently. Similarly, consideration of the local context and government structures and implementation modalities should always be taken into account before implementing externally imposed requirements.
- Achievements recorded under Pillar II were very much attributed to the commitment and roles of the partners: the IPs, PUNs and MA. UNFPA was the lead PUN for Pillar II interventions, despite the fact that many of the population issues were implemented in JP4. As such, in spite of the fact that Zanzibar is small geographically compared to the mainland, deliberate efforts

⁸ Funded by the World Bank

should be taken to ensure specificity and inclusiveness of the program design, and at the same time ensuring program design contributes to strengthening of the two states of the Union.

- The pillar leaders did not have specific TORs or guidelines, making it difficult to manage the IPs and PUNs, and all project components including organizing meetings, conducting joint visits and sharing experiences. This work could have done better if MOUs or TORs were developed and agreed upon, thus making the pillar leaders more accountable. Few UN agencies were present on the ground, thus making coordination of interventions very difficult. Nevertheless, Pillar II UN agencies were able to complement each other and ensure implementation of the programme components – thus fostering the DAO overall goal of working together.

In view of the above, Pillar II has been given a “**satisfactory**” (**B**) rating.

3.3.3: PILLAR III: NATIONAL CAPACITY FOR DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT

Introduction

Pillar III was focused on 3 broad result areas: 1) strengthening the capacity of government to plan, implement, monitor and report on development results (including gender equality), and implementation of reforms in the civil service and economic and public finance management; 2) promotion of good governance and improved participation in decision making by women, vulnerable groups, and at decentralized levels; and 3) improved law enforcement and access to justice. These interventions were aligned with MKUZA Cluster 3: “A society governed by the rule of law and government that is predictable, transparent and accountable” – and particularly Goal 5 (increase the capacity of government institutions and actors), and Goal 9 (provision of timely and reliable information and data for monitoring and evaluating government initiatives).

Background: Consultations with stakeholders during the preparation of MKUZA I revealed significant capacity constraints at all levels of government, including insufficient resources, lack of equipment and operational inefficiencies, which hampered the ability of MDAs to carry out routine operations, let alone implement much needed reforms. The original design of JP5’s Pillar III involved assisting with these constraints by channeling UN support through 3 outputs that were intended to improve the provision of timely and accurate information for monitoring, and support implementation of core reforms and development management, as shown in the table below.

Output	IP	PUN	Issue
1 – Strengthened MKUZA monitoring system	OCGS	UNDP	Information and data for M&E
2 – Strengthened capacity for implementation of core reforms and aid coordination	POFEDP, MOFEA	UNDP	Implementation of core reforms
3 – Effective participation of MDAs and NSAs in policy dialogue and public expenditure review (PER) process	MOFEA (POEDP) executed by ANGOZA	UNDP	Development management

During the re-planning session in May 2009, it was realized that Pillar III’s result statements were too broad, which invited a wide array of activities. The original 3 outputs were consolidated into a single outcome (15), and two additional outcomes were added for good governance (16) and the rule of law (17). This represented a significant reorganization of Pillar III that attempted to support two additional MKUZA Goals: Output 16 responded to Goal 10 (Inculcate good governance practices at all levels), and Output 17 supported Goal 11 (Promote and facilitate enjoyment of human rights). Further refinements in planning and prioritization continued as changes were made in various workplans, budgets and annual reports. The final configuration of Pillar III outcomes is shown in the table below.

Outcome	IP	PUN	Issue
15 – Zanzibar government capacity to plan, implement, monitor and report on development results improved	MOFEA, OCGS	UNDP	Data for M&E, core reforms, development management
16 – Good governance principles of MDAs and participation of NSAs in decision making (including those representing women and other vulnerable groups) promoted	MoCAGG	UNDP	Good governance
17 – Improved respect and observance of rule of law and justice and stronger oversight institutions of the RGoZ	DPP	UNDP	Rule of law

Outcome 15: Zanzibar Government capacity to plan, implement, monitor and report on development results improved

Review of activities: The original outputs for this component involved helping the government to develop a strategic framework, and build its capacity and ability to coordinate implementation and monitoring of its programmes. This involved strengthening the MKUZA monitoring system by building

on existing sector and community-based systems and promoting harmonization and linkages to the national monitoring system; and strengthening of OCGS through a series of capacity development activities involving improved data collection, analysis and dissemination for the Household Budget Survey (HBS) and economic surveys (output 15.1). It also involved strengthening the capacity of MDAs for implementation of core reforms and aid coordination (15.2).

As described above, the outputs continued to be revised to meet changing government priorities. For example, the output supporting ICT training for MDAs and NSAs in strengthening core reforms (12.3) was expanded to enhance national ICT capacity in schools, government institutions and non-state actors (15.3); and the output designed to improve participation of NSAs through policy dialogue and PER processes (12) was moved to the good governance section (16.2).

In general, these activities supported implementation of core reforms (economic and public financial management) including capacity development and provision of technical assistance, as well as supporting improved aid coordination. This involved supporting improvements in policy, planning aid coordination and budgeting.

Assessment of performance: The results emanating from these activities are quite significant and quite extensive, including improved capacities in RBM and M&E among MDAs; improved aid management and reporting, with the integration of aid management systems among MDAs and input from NGOs and NSAs; production of a new version of MKUZA and a new communications strategy for MKUZA which included a Swahili language version; identification of pro-poor elements in development projects; the production of valuable surveys to feed into the HBS and economic reports which informed policy, etc. These activities supported key public management policies and strengthened the ability of the Core Reform Unit to fulfill its mandate. Although, the Local Government Reform component of the Public Service Reform was delayed due to the change in government.

An Aid Management Platform (AMP) was rolled out at the President's Office of Finance, Economic and Development Planning and the capacity of staff in DEF was strengthened, which improved the processes of coordinating, monitoring, tracking and reporting on aid. Awareness of aid management and monitoring was increased among NGOs and MDAs. This has enabled the Zanzibar government to better manage and coordinate development assistance as well as strengthen the transparency of the aid management process, including a JAST sensitivity seminar for stakeholders using JP5 funding.

The completion of MKUZA II provided an overall strategy for poverty reduction as well as a useful tool for aligning the strategic plans of individual ministries. Many of the surveys and economic reports financed by JP5 helped policy makers make informed decisions in policy formulation.

One of the possible unintended results of JP5 was the promotion of officials involved in the MKUZA drafting team to senior levels in the new government. This accomplishment cannot be attributed directly to JP5 support, but the fact that 5 or 6 officials who were involved in the MKUZA process were subsequently promoted to directors, commissioners, and a PS and Deputy Minister in various ministries demonstrates that the work of JP5 was quite valuable for those individuals and for the government as a whole.

JP5 support to MKUZA and the core reforms was highly relevant to both the Paris Declaration principles and the government's strategy for increasing aid predictability, integrating external resources into the government's budget and Exchequer system, harmonizing government and development partner processes, and building capacity for aid coordination and external resource management. JP5 support in outcome 15 strengthened the capacity of government to be able to align development partner support to a single, government-led framework – the MKUZA.

There was some confusion regarding the UN agencies' role in monitoring, where the PUNs should have supported the IPs to undertake M&E, rather than doing the monitoring for them. More effort should have

been put toward supporting UNDP in building the capacity of the IPs. This is dealt with in more detail in Section IV, Management and Implementation.

Box 8: Transformational Result: Contribution to the Development of MKUZA II

One of the key successes of Pillar III was its contribution to the development of MKUZA II, which involved commissioning studies needed to review and verify the inputs for the strategy document, but it also involved establishing the monitoring system. As many IPs were involved in the preparation of the final MKUZA strategy, the consultation process took a long time. But the idea was to improve the monitoring system, which involved developing a monitoring master plan and undertaking a consultative process involving meetings in Unguja and Pemba to explain the plan, etc. This process is still underway, and a national consultation process remains to be held.

Moving Forward

The support provided under outcome 15 was substantial but it is by no means complete. Significant work still has to be done to improve the monitoring and information collection system, especially in transferring information from the ministries and grassroots level to the national level. General training was undertaken through JP5 but there was no practical application or guidance; and clear roles and responsibilities and job descriptions have yet to be established. Also, ministries still need to strengthen monitoring and to improve their coordination function. The first step will be the establishment of monitoring units in each ministry; secondly, staff will have to be trained; and third, the separate project and programme M&E units will have to be integrated into the ministry units. In addition, the monitoring system has to be synchronized with the work of the Planning Commission, which is still trying to find its way. There are three processes that have to be brought together:

- 1) The new quarterly review process being undertaken by the President (the “Bangokitita initiative”)
- 2) The completion of the MKUZA monitoring system
- 3) The work of the Planning Commission

This will take time, and the capacity still has to be developed. The work started under JP5 will have to be continued through UNDP in order to complete the results. UNDP needs to support a number of different levels: the Planning Commission, M&E units, support to the ministries and roles and responsibilities.

In view of the above, **Outcome 15** has been given a “satisfactory” (B) rating (see Table 5.15 in Annex 5 for more details).

Outcome 16: Good Governance principles at MDAs and participation of NSAs in decision-making (including those representing women & other vulnerable groups) promoted

Review of activities and assessment of performance: Activities under this component included strengthening institutions involved in oversight and accountability in support of good governance principles and improving the availability and use of information by MDAs and LGAs (especially MoCAGG). In spite of a late start, good progress was made with respect to the promotion of good governance principles among MDAs, and there were limited but important contributions provided by NSAs, whose participation still needs to be strengthened. Strategy and policy documents on good governance were developed involving a consultative process with relevant stakeholders, and the documents have been presented to Cabinet for approval. The Integrity Committee has started monitoring oversight institutions of governance, and efforts are underway to ensure improved availability and use of information at MDAs and LGAs. In addition, JP5’s activities in good governance have led to new work the Ministry is doing in anti corruption, where the Ministry is in the process of preparing a legal framework on corruption, which will be supported in UNDP.

This work has brought to light a general problem with corruption and public institutions, where 80% of corruption occurs through government procurement. This is exacerbated by the fact that there is no

procurement plan, and a lack of accountability – where, for example, there is no maintenance plan for computers or an inventory system for donor funded equipment, etc.

Apart from late disbursement of funds, there were challenges with the institutionalization of capacity, where trained focal persons kept being transferred so it was difficult to sustain the capacity of the departments. This challenge is not specific to Pillar III and was a factor inhibiting the capacity-building goal of JP5 in general.

JP5 coordinated a social or public expenditure tracking (PET) through an NGO (ANGOZA), which attempted to determine how the government spends social expenditure funding. The idea behind the PET was to monitor government spending, where ANGOZA conducted a review of health expenditure in 2 districts in collaboration with the Ministry of Health. This increased the capacity of NSAs to participate in policy development and implementation, as it strengthened ANGOZA's capacity to conduct PETs (whereas in the past they outsourced activities to a mainland based NGO). However, there were limitations in the decentralization of activities because there was a general reluctance on the part of government to decentralize, and the capacity at the district level was low. So, in principle, the idea of monitoring government spending is good, but in practice the results are not very effective, as there are few alternatives.

There were also limitations in the outreach of JP5, which was largely focused on building the capacity of government ministries, with very little funding devoted to NGOs. Apart from this, delays in allocation of funds in JP5 affected implementation of activities. For example, because of inadequate funding and delays, the PET component was only able to reach 60% of the target for agriculture and 80% for health, representing an average of 70% completion.

In view of the above performance, **Outcome 16** has been given a “marginally satisfactory” (C) rating (see Table 5.16 in Annex 5 for more details).

Outcome 17: Improved respect and observance of rule of law and justice, and stronger oversight institutions of the RGoZ

Review of activities and assessment of performance: Activities under this component involved strengthening the office of the DPP to oversee the rule of law and provide access to justice, and improve respect for human rights. This output was largely achieved as the capacity of the DPP office was strengthened through training in human rights aimed at improving the justice system, which promoted a better understanding of and respect for human rights among law enforcement institutions.

The DPP was a major beneficiary of JP5 support, which financed a major staffing exercise involving the placement and training of 8 state attorneys at the DPP office in the Mainland, which resulted in substantial improvements in the workings of the office. Prior to JP5's interventions, the DPP did not have proper procedures and rules, etc., while now the staff capacity has increased, as has its ability to analyze forensic information. In addition, the capacity of the resource centre was strengthened with equipment and the secondment of the librarian to Dar Es Salaam University library for 3 months. However, it is too early to measure the impact on those trained as they have not had an opportunity to apply the training.

As with other JP5 outputs, the priorities under this component were constantly being revised. For example, in 2010 the ‘peace’ output was changed to ‘leadership’, which changed the nature of the peace and conflict resolution training component. On the one hand, this demonstrates the flexibility of JP5, however, on the other it makes it difficult to assess the achievements, as the targets kept changing. Whereas this may be a good example of adaptive management, without proper monitoring, it is difficult to make the IPs realize the importance of accountability involving donor funded resources – and accountability goes part and parcel with the principles of good governance.

The training in human rights and law was targeted at police and other law enforcement institutions. However, this is a work in progress, as the issues are not resolved, and there are still delays in the rule of law. This will require follow up work on legal sector reform, which is scheduled under UNDAP.

Box 9: Transformational Result and Unplanned Achievement: Legal Sector Reform

There were some impressive achievements made in the DPP, largely through the leadership provided by a dynamic young lawyer who was responsible for writing the criminal reform program framework. Following JP5 assistance to the DPP, other needs have been identified in legal sector reform and other institutions are striving to be at the same level as the DPP in terms of capacity and standards. For example, the AG and High Court are now seeking UN support for various activities. And, seeing as the dynamic individual from DPP has recently been selected by the President to lead the reforms in the AG office, JP5 support might result in raising the standards in the rest of the sector, some of which will be included in UNDAP.

In view of the above, **Outcome 17** has been given a “satisfactory” (B) rating (see Table 5.17 in Annex 5 for more details).

Findings, Observations and Lessons learned from Pillar III

1. Key results for Pillar III involved the roll out of the aid coordination mechanism, building capacity in aid management, completion of MKUZA II, and data collection involved for the HBS.
2. Regarding implementation and monitoring of MKUZA I, JP5’s planning activities can be considered as part of the process of turning the strategy into an implementation plan. And the support provided in drafting MKUZA II and in M&E will likely lead to improvements in the implementation of the new strategy.
3. The Ministry of Finance was the leader for Pillar III, but UNDP is a relatively small player in the Ministry’s overall portfolio, so JP5 was not a high priority for the Ministry.
4. The system for financial management kept changing resulting in delays and confusion among IPs, which the Ministry had to coordinate. The Ministry would have preferred a more simplified and coordinated approach involving more capacity building and training in financial management, preparing accounts, etc.
5. Capacity building assessments have to be undertaken before implementation of project activities, particularly on a capacity building programme such as JP5, where capacity was lacking in basic areas of project management, financial management, procurement, reporting based on expenditure and activity, etc. Otherwise delays will result in poor utilization of funds and reduced achievement of results. The capacity issue has to be resolved if support under UNDAP is to be effective.
6. To be effective, support to improved RBM and M&E systems at the central level of government (DEF) has to be followed up with support in the line ministries and MDAs
7. Support for implementation of core public service reforms has to be followed up with support to local government reform, which in turn requires capacity strengthening at the district level
8. Support in the area of good governance and anti-corruption should be accompanied by the establishment of effective government procurement plans and accountability frameworks for donor-funded equipment.
9. Leadership is essential for creating change and sustaining ownership in legal reforms, which can raise standards in other branches of the legal sector.

Based on the above performance, the overall rating for Pillar III is “satisfactory” (B).

3.3.4: MICHEWENI INTERVENTIONS

Background

The Micheweni intervention dates back to the December 2006 request by the Government of Zanzibar to the UNDP Assistant Administrator and Director of the Regional Bureau for Africa to select Micheweni District as a model Millennium Village to be funded under Prof Jeffrey D.Sachs's Millennium Project. This request was in line with the objective of eradicating of abject poverty and attainment of sustainable human development by 2020 as the socio-economic development goal for Zanzibar, which was supported by Vision 2020, MDGs for Zanzibar and MKUZA. The 2004/05 Zanzibar HBS, the DHS and the UNICEF situation analysis of women and children in Zanzibar (2006) provided an indication of the grim situation in the Micheweni district, which recorded the highest incidence of basic needs poverty (74.1%), the highest level of food poverty (35.8%), the lowest gross and net primary school enrollment (95 and 51 respectively), the highest levels of infant and under five mortality (101 and 161) compared against the national average target of 89 for infant mortality and 141 for under five mortality, as well as gross lack of access to clean and safe drinking water and poor sanitation, where 81% community members had no access to toilet facilities. Instead of a model Millennium Village strategy, it was advised to establish a livelihood strategy, ensuring sustainability of income linked to markets. The idea is that any intervention in Micheweni has to start where community activity has already started, as well as drawing from MKUZA. The JP5 interventions in Micheweni therefore were designed to address findings from the Zanzibar HBS and DHS of 2004/2005.

Overview of Activities

The Micheweni intervention involved an investment of US \$500,000 to improve social services. The intention of JP5 support for downstream activities was to improve social services (health, education, water supply and sanitation) in Micheweni and other vulnerable selected areas through creating community awareness on the importance of education for girls, issues related to maternal, newborn, child care, family planning, promoting construction and use of latrine through Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Transformational (PHAST) and supporting construction of hand pump wells. Key targets included 50 percent of shehias in selected areas sensitized on girls education, MNCH, increased use of hand pump wells from 48 to 60 by December 2008, and the development of PHAST in 100 communities. Several participating UN agencies and ministries were involved including UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO, UNESCO, MOHSW, MORASD, MoEVT, Ministry of Information and Communication Services and MLYWCD, with the Ministry of Finance controlling the funds.

In the first year of operation (2008/2009) very little progress was made, apart from conducting a review of PHAST activities at the shehias level. The Micheweni Intervention was initially planned under Pillar II, but for various reasons it was shifted to a separate budget line. Following the major revisions to JP5 in May 2009 (year two), the Micheweni downstream interventions were re-aligned into one outcome and four output-level results covering health, water and sanitation, education and food and agriculture. The Micheweni downstream interventions were implemented by respective ministries with technical support provided by participating UN agencies and management support provided by UNDP and MOFEA. The evaluation findings of each of these results are provided in the sections below.

Outcome 18: - Increased support to integrated development interventions in Micheweni and other vulnerable areas

18.1 Selected shehias in Micheweni district access uninterrupted safe water and clean water supply and improved sanitation

The following activities were targeted to increase water supply and sanitation in selected communities of Maziwa Ng'ombe and Kiuyu Mbuyuni: The Maziwa Ng'ombe Water Project involved construction of a 250 cubic meters water tank to enable uninterrupted water supply to 1317 households in Maziwa Ng'ombe and Kiuyu communities, and construction of 4 pit latrines for boys and girls at the Kikuyu Mbuyuni nursery school.

The water project was to be completed with communities benefiting by end of 2011. By the time of this evaluation (September 2011), significant progress had been made in implementing the water project, including construction of the water source and laying of 3300 meters of a six-inch transmission pipeline from the water source to the Micheweni police station to join with the existing transmission pipeline (phase 1), construction of 3840 meters of transmission pipeline from the police station to Gongoni, improvement of the pipeline network in the village and installation of public water stand posts (phase 2), and part of phase 3 (construction of an elevated water tank with a capacity of 250,000 litres on a 10 meter tower).

Photo 3: Water stand post established through JP5 support in Micheweni District



Source: JP5 Evaluation Micheweni Sept 02 2011

The project was implemented by the Zanzibar Water Authority (ZAWA), which has responsibility for water supply and water resources management in the islands of Pemba and Unguja. The project involved construction of a water source, transmission pipelines, water storage tank, improvement of the water distribution network in the project area and installation of 22 water stand posts to supplement 48 existing ones, so as to meet the MKUZA target of 250m proximity in rural areas. Completion of phase 2 of the project enabled availability of water services in the villages without rationing by direct pumping without a water storage tank. The storage tank was completed at the end of October 2011. Completion of the tank will enable water storage for the communities in the event of electricity outages or any other emergency in the system.

Challenges

The water supply scheme to Maziwa ng'ombe and Kiuyu villages rely on one borehole as the source of water. Although the borehole has a capacity to serve the current population, it needs to be augmented by additional water sources for sustainability of water supply (and to sustain the JP5 and partners investment). Moreover, the main transmission pipeline is vulnerable to damage in some sections, as trench excavation for laying was not possible at the required depth (90cm) due to existence of hard rock in the pipeline corridor.

Evaluation of the main achievements

The water project has made a noticeable impact to the lives of the villagers in Kiuyu and Maziwa Ng'ombe: There is reliable water supply infrastructure that could serve these communities for many years; the water supply has improved hygiene and sanitation conditions in the communities; and The

reduction of work load to women and children has led to more time for communities to devote to working on economic development activities.

Photo 4: Maziwa Ng'ombe water tank project



Source: JP5 evaluation Sept 02, 2011

The improvements include a greater number of water sources, water reservoirs and piped networks for water supply, as well electricity for operating water pumps for a population of 11,137 in Kiuyu and Maziwa Ng'ombe Shehia. Before the project the communities of Kiuyu and Maziwa Ng'ombe relied on unclean and unsafe water from short wells, caves and unreliable piped water supply located very far from the households.

It is estimated that the water project infrastructure will benefit the communities for more than 20 years to come. The project cost about US \$ 344,393 whereby 90 percent of funds for construction of the tank came from JP5 support. The project was implemented according to ZAWA's operation and maintenance plans, and was successful despite the delay in the disbursement of funds.

To sustain the achievements from the project, there is a need to increase the number of water sources periodically to cope with the water demands resulting from population growth and changes in community lifestyle. Moreover, the sustainability of the water project requires mutual collaboration between ZAWA and the benefiting community members to protect the installed water supply infrastructure and efficient use of water services. The Micheweni community radio could be used to broadcast relevant messages on water conservation and hygiene to community members.

While JP5 support provided the two communities of Maziwa ng'ombe and Kiuyu with a better water supply system, more effort by government and development partners are still required to ensure a reliable supply of water to the entire Micheweni district, particularly the Mtemani, Mjananza and Mihogoni Shehias in Micheweni.

18.2 Strengthened maternal, child care and other health services at Maziwa Ng'ombe shehia

Under JP5 support, it was aimed to have a functional primary health care unit at Maziwa Ng'ombe, with a capacity of serving 80% of the Chimba population by March 2011. The main activities planned to achieve this goal included procurement of an automatic autoclave sterilizer, delivery beds, two

changeable laps, and outreach activities including training on nutrition, maternal and child care with emphasis on the importance of providing clinical services to communities, as well as construction of an onsite residential house for two health care service providers.

By the time of this evaluation, the Maziwa Ng'ombe health centre was fully functional, providing health care services to the community members including deliveries and ante natal care (ANC) services. Before JP5 this facility could not provide ANC services due to lack of equipment, shortage of trained Sps, and the providers were living too far from the centre to attend to patients who needed the services after regular working hours. Therefore community members including pregnant women had to walk long distances for such services or opt for a traditional birth attendant or home deliveries, which increased the risk of maternal and new born deaths. Following JP5 support, the Maziwa Ng'ombe health facility is providing ANC including up to 35 deliveries per month. Also, a lot more children with fevers, pneumonia and malaria are receiving health care at the facility instead of traveling long distances.

Photo 5: The staff house and medical equipment; Maziwa Ng'ombe HF Micheweni District



Source: JP5 evaluation Sept 02, 2011

Assessment of the main achievement

Construction of the staff house, supply of equipment and capacity building for the health workers at Maziwa Ng'ombe health centre positively contributed to strengthening maternal, child care and other services. More women and family members can access health care services within their community. Despite this positive achievement, the community members near the facility are not very happy with the increased capacity of the facility to attend more people including cholera patients, as there has been a spill-over of infections, which they feel is due to the proximity of the treatment facility to the living quarters. Thus, some community members decided to sabotage the facility by demolishing the fence and sometimes intentionally disturbing the provision of care to patients, especially births. During this evaluation, it was reported that construction of a new health facility at a new location is required. The district has already secured a land permit for the new building, though the district has yet to develop a plan and strategy to meet the new requirement.

The history of the Maziwa Ng'ombe health facility dates back to the 1990s, where the government ordered a village development house, located in the middle of households, to be transformed into a health facility so as to tackle an acute shortage of health care services in the area at that time. It appears that whoever decided on the location of the new health facility under JP5 did not learn from the lesson of the past. This decision to locate the new HF in the middle of the households has reduced the effectiveness of the JP5 investment, as another new HF will have to be constructed further from the community.

18.3 The community radio in Micheweni district has the capacity to mobilize participation of the community members in development activities

Under JP5 support, the Ministry of Information and Communication Services Zanzibar, with the technical support from UNESCO, aimed to provide at least 60% of Micheweni population with access to FM Radio programmes by March 2011, as well as providing at least 50% of all secondary schools in Micheweni with access to a multimedia resource centre by March 2011.

Key activities planned to achieve the above goals included in-house staff training and mentoring, on community radio mobilization, a study tour to the Sengerema community radio station in Tanzania mainland to learn how to manage a community radio station, furnishing and equipping the radio station, technical support, assisting in information gathering, strengthening organizational management and developing and producing a 40 minute documentary on JP5 activity in Micheweni district.

The Micheweni Community radio station has been on air since January 2010 and community members in Micheweni districts have been actively involved by listening to the broadcasts and phoning the radio station to offer their opinion on the different programmes being aired. The radio program operates from 6 am to 7.30 pm daily and broadcasts can be heard within a 30km radius. The radio station is manned with 6 government permanent staff and 6 volunteers. Under JP5 the support staff was recruited and trained, and a group of 7 staff members were sent on a week-long study tour to the Sengerema community radio station. Operation and communication policy was formulated as well as technical support and equipment and furniture were provided. The usual programmes aired by the radio include topics such as: education, peace, HIV/AIDS, fishing, agriculture, women and entrepreneurship, child labor, health and hygiene practices. During 2010, the radio broadcast a total of 247 radio programs including 70 voter education programs. By the time of this evaluation, the 40-minute documentary on the Micheweni intervention and the establishment of the multimedia centre were not yet undertaken. Therefore the target of 50% of schools in Micheweni having access to the multimedia resource centre by March 2011 was not achieved.

Photo 6: The Former President of Zanzibar talking to the Director and Representative of UNESCO after the launch of the broadcasting studio equipment



Source: UNESCO Jan 2010

Assessment of the key achievement

Despite the fact that some key activities under this project were not implemented; the community radio project for Micheweni is one of the main transformational results achieved under JP5.

Box 10: Transformational Result: Micheweni Community Radio

The Micheweni Community radio is the first community radio station in Zanzibar, despite the fact that there is no law developed to regulate community radio in the islands. Apart from broadcasting valuable information to the Micheweni community, the community radio component of JP5 has influenced policy change, enhanced communication between government leaders and community members in Micheweni district. For the first time members of parliament are able to use the radio to communicate with and respond to questions phoned in by community members. The same radio is being used by Sheikh to advocate formal education among boys and girls as per the Quran teaching. The radio is slowly changing the mindset of community members, stimulating development and reducing dependency, which many people feel is the underlying cause of many problems in the area. The Micheweni community radio intervention was repeatedly appreciated by the government and UN partners for significantly contributing to building peace and consensus between the two main political parties in Zanzibar, the ruling party (CCM) and the opposition party (Civil United Front, CUF) party, which gets strong support from Micheweni. It is also a model community radio that brings three partners together to achieve a common goal: The community (providing land and volunteer labour), the UN (providing funding, equipment and TA) and the government (providing funding for constructing the building).

Photo 7: New Government Constructed Premises for Micheweni Community Radio

Source: JP5 Evaluation, September 2011

Moving forward

Operation of the Micheweni radio station will be sustained by the government of Zanzibar. The government is already paying the staff salaries, with no interference in the operation and programmes aired. Nevertheless, efforts need to be taken to ensure effective leadership and management of the radio station, as well as developing a national law to govern operations of community radio in Zanzibar.

18.4 Gross enrolment rate and retention in selected areas of Micheweni district improved

The main objective was to increase the gross enrolment rate and retention of pupils in Micheweni. The strategy was to achieve this through construction and management of a nursery school in Kiuyu, with a capacity to enroll up to 150 pupils by March 2011.

Through JP5 support, a **Kiuyu nursery school** (2 classrooms, hall, kitchen and toilets) was constructed and enrolled with up to 80 pupils and 4 teachers. To improve sanitation, 4 latrines and a water reservoir tank with a capacity of 10,000 liters was constructed, and boys and girls have been benefiting from the improved sanitation initiatives. The initial running costs for the school were provided through JP5 support, following which the government of Zanzibar has taken over management and administration, as parents are unable to pay for these services. The government pays salaries for the teachers and other staff. To enhance pupil retention, a feeding programme was initiated through JP5 support.

Assessment of the achievements

To a large extent the objective of constructing a nursery school and enrolling pupils was achieved, despite the fact that the intervention was on such a small scale (80 pupils) and implemented in a short period. Therefore, the output contributed to improving the gross enrollment rate and retention. However, the output has only scratched the surface of the access problem in Micheweni, as there are over 1000 children still not enrolled in school, largely because schools are located far from households, making it difficult for children to walk to. Parents in Micheweni are trying to use their resources to build more schools, and they should be supported to continue with this positive attitude, including sensitization on the importance of girl's education as well as the need to allow all children to attend school on a full time basis.

18.5 Food security and income generation of selected communities in Micheweni improved

Through the Ministry of Agriculture, JP5 supported a number of income-generating activities to reduce food poverty from 33.35% of the population to 30.0% by March 2011, as well reduce the basic needs poverty line from 74.2% to 70% by March 2011. The strategies used to achieve these objectives included implementation of the following: support implementation of rice irrigation, beekeeping promotion, and provision of dairy goats for boosting income, food and nutrition, as well as research on planting materials/seeds.

18.5.1 The Saninga irrigation scheme

JP5 support included rehabilitation of a borehole at Saninga to provide supplementary water during dry periods for a 16 hector irrigation scheme that was supporting about 310 farmers (the majority of whom were women). The farmers belong to a water user association which is lead by a 12 member committee responsible for the operation and maintenance of the irrigation scheme.

At the time of this evaluation, the scheme was not fully completed, with the electrification and well-drilling in the final stages. Implementation of the irrigation scheme's activities were delayed due to two major reasons: first, delays in the disbursement of funds and second, capacity constraints of the manpower to implement the actual work, i.e. construction activities were done on voluntary basis by unskilled worker/farmers, and the skilled labourers were underpaid or paid small allowances as opposed to salaries. With women forming a major proportion of the farmers, the construction activities and overall implementation of the planned activities were also delayed. Thus, by the end of JP5, farmers and peoples of Micheweni were yet to reap the direct benefits of the irrigation scheme.

Increasing production is an important objective because each farmer has a small plot of land (0.1 hectare) for subsistence level agriculture, dividing their time between farming, fishing and seaweed harvesting (95% of the farmers and seaweed harvesters are women). JP5 funds were not enough to complete irrigation of the entire area. There are a number of options for the farmers to complete the scheme on their own, which would increase the sustainability of JP5 funding: Obtaining a loan the SACCOS, completing small sections at a time through raising funding among the group, etc. The 12 member committee suggested that they would need training to improve the capacity of the group in management, production, etc. This was not included in the JP5 project, but it will strengthen the farmer organization significantly and demonstrate their initiative.

18.5.2 Beekeeping promotion

JP5 supported the Department of Forestry and Non-Renewable Resources (DFNRR?) to implement a beekeeping promotion activity in Micheweni District with the objective of increasing incomes for community members through modern methods of beekeeping and harvesting honey and beeswax, involving sales to local and external markets.

Through JP5 support, 80 beekeepers were trained (60 men and 20 women) from 20 villages in Micheweni, 160 beehives were constructed and distributed to villages in Micheweni, with 95 improved beehives being used as models for the local beekeepers to learn from. Moreover, 20 sets of protective beekeeping gear were procured and distributed to 14 villages, two honey pressers were also procured,

and a demonstration plot was established at Kijijini village for practical training sessions. The honey pressers have helped the farmers to improve the processing of honey products in a more efficient manner, increasing quality, quantity and profit.

Photo 8: Saninga Irrigation Scheme & Diary Goat in Household Compound, Micheweni



Source: JP5 evaluation, Maziwa Ng'ombe, Sept 2011

18.5.3 Adaptive research sensitization project

This intervention aimed to establish Farmer Research Groups (FRGs) and farmer field schools (FFS) in 6 shehias of Micheweni with a target of improving production rice seeds and paddies, and millet and sorghum.

During JP5, a total of 60 farmers from different shehias were mobilized and formed 6 FRGs and FFS with approximately 20 farmers in each. The FRGs were engaged in field trials of drought resistant varieties of yams and pigeon peas. Planting materials (one ton of paddy seeds, half a ton of sorghum seeds and half a ton of millet) were procured to support farmers to acquire and use quality seeds so as to improve the quality and quantity of their harvests. At the end of JP5, 2,125 farmers benefited from the planting materials/seeds.

Assessment of achievements on adaptive research project

To sustain provision of planting materials, farmer field schools need to be strengthened in Micheweni district, as well as training of agricultural officers on new production techniques. The production and market demands of honey from beekeepers in Micheweni increased as a result of JP5 support, although statistics substantiating this claim could not be obtained by the evaluation team. The livestock intervention (goats and chicken) did not seem to have had much of an impact on the communities in Micheweni, due to diseases, lack of knowledge on improved breeding varieties and also the lack of food at the household levels -most of the goats and chickens distributed by the ministry to the farmers were consumed by the families.

Moving forward

In Zanzibar, decision-making and planning processes are mostly centralized in Unguja, through the main government ministries. As such, in Pemba and particularly in Micheweni, the stakeholders were not aware if their interventions and projects will be carried over by the UNDP support.

Overall assessment of the Micheweni intervention

Improvement of health and ANC services was recorded through construction of the health providers residential house near the Maziwa ng'ombe health facility, which contributed to an increase in the number of communities receiving health care at the Maziwa Ng'ombe health centre, between 5 and 25 people per day. Increased enrolment of pupils and particularly girls in nursery school was also realized

through construction of nursery school classrooms at Kiuyu Mbuyuni. Construction of water pipelines enhanced the access to clean water for people living in Kiuyu and Maziwa ng'ombe. Likewise, 5000 community members in 15 Shehias of Micheweni were provided with access to clean water through the construction of 17 hand pump wells. Again, collaboration between MOHSW and ZAWA enabled girls and boys to access improved sanitation facilities (3 pit latrines and 2 water washing facilities) at 3 schools in Micheweni. The Micheweni community radio station is a model intervention and one of the key transformational results in JP5.

However, the evaluation findings on the Micheweni intervention demonstrate that there is inadequate evidence of a results chain or strategic selection criteria used in the design and implementation of the interventions in Micheweni. There was no logframe or “smart” indicators, objectives, and performance measurement. The need to address some of these gaps was raised at a JP5 meeting held at the UN sub office on 28 April 2008 between MOFEA, MOEVT, UNESCO, UNDP and other partners implementing outcome 5 “improved coverage of social services in Micheweni”. However, these actions were not implemented. For example, the minutes of this meeting show that it was agreed to initiate participatory identification of the community development vision, needs and their proposed strategies of attaining their needs through participatory efforts and areas of external assistance to hasten their development. The logical framework approach was to be used to assess the community development needs and design appropriate responses. It was also agreed to have baseline data and harmonization of existing socioeconomic data for Micheweni, and extend the planning time for the Micheweni intervention to 2015 so as to coincide with the MDGs span or up to 2020 to coincide with the ZNZ development vision, establishing an M&E strategy for each cluster etc.

Also, as the DHS findings indicated that Micheweni was the poorest district in Zanzibar, the need to further assess the factors causing the situation by undertaking a needs assessment would have benefited significantly the design of appropriate, cost effective and sustainable interventions and solutions to the underdevelopment in Micheweni district.

On the other hand, the people and government of Micheweni, Pemba and many in Unguja expressed their satisfaction with the Micheweni interventions. However, the development partners, especially the participating UN agencies, were not as pleased, as they felt they were left out of the planning and implementation processes by the MA. More collaboration and involvement could have enabled more cost-effective, higher quality and sustainable results in the Micheweni intervention. It was also noted that the overall intervention was excellent but the partners rushed into implementation with a response-based, top-down approach, which was implemented in a short time-frame with not enough comprehensive planning to make a significant impact or to eliminate the underlying problems in the area.

There were other limitations in JP5 support. The Ministry of Finance was the lead government agency for the Micheweni interventions, which they found difficult to manage under JP5. For example, they found it difficult to meet the goals of decentralization, as there was so little capacity in Pemba. As a result, the Ministry of Finance office in Pemba controlled all payments for Micheweni interventions.

Rating of the Micheweni interventions: In view of the above performance, **Outcome 18** has been given a “satisfactory” (B) rating. Table 5.18 in Annex 5 provides more details.

Table 7: Summary of Programme Results (Outcomes 1 to 18)

Programme Component	Achievements	Comments/Rating
Programme Results	<i>Did the programme achieve its planned outputs, outcomes and objectives and how satisfactory was the achievement?</i>	Satisfactory (B)
Pillar I	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1. National capacity in FSN was strengthened through FAO support to policies and downstream interventions • 2, 3 & 4: UNIDO provided support to 300 SMEs/groups and empowered 80 women with increased income • 5, 6 & 7: Strengthened capacities in MLEC with ILO assistance in employment policy, labour and social welfare institutions, building the capacity of Ministry staff, and downstream assistance to SMEs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Satisfactory (B) • Marginally satisfactory (C) • Satisfactory (B)
Pillar II	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved access to MNCHS in Zanzibar • Improved capacities of the MOHSW and MDAs to promote MNCHS and respond to women and children issues including GBV in Zanzibar 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Satisfactory (B)
Pillar III	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishment of an aid coordination mechanism, building capacity in aid management, completion of MKUZA II, and data collection involved for the HBS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Satisfactory (B)
Micheweni intervention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved access to social services (water, health and education) and information in Micheweni district 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Satisfactory (B)

3.3.5: PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

Introduction

This section presents evaluation findings on the assessment of project management and implementation. The assessment involved a review of the management and implementation structures to ascertain whether they were suited to the effective implementation of programme activities and achievement of the overall objectives. It also involved a review of programme financing for delivering the programme results, and a review of expenditure by pillar and by year. There are 2 sub sections: A) Implementation and management, and B) Higher-level UN and government goals. Seven elements were considered under sub-section A:

- The role of adaptive management
- Review of UNDP's role as Managing Agent (MA)
- Project administration and reporting
- Programme financing
- Stakeholder participation and involvement: Joint planning, the role of oversight mechanisms: JSC, ZPMC and AA
- Contribution of IPs and PUNs and synergies among UN Agencies
- Progress toward the overall objectives

Sub section B presents findings on the achievement of higher-level UN and government goals and cross-cutting issues. Three elements are assessed:

- Contribution to National Priorities (MKUZA) and MDGs
- Delivering as One, UNDAP
- Cross-cutting issues

A) Programme Management and Implementation

a) The Role of Adaptive Management

Background: Adaptive management is an essential element of a joint programme that was being implemented as a pilot to test a new approach where workplans would be determined on an annual basis and where lessons learned would be used to develop future programmes. Under such uncertainty, it is important to have mechanisms that can maintain flexibility in programming, administration and resources. Because JP5 was based on a learning-by-doing process, it required an iterative process of decision-making and resource mobilization, where the aim is to reduce uncertainty through adaptive management and other feedback mechanisms such as monitoring. The challenge in an adaptive management system lies in finding the right balance between improving management in the long-term and achieving the best outcomes in the short-term.⁹

Review of Activities and Assessment of Performance: Within JP5 there were essentially two sets of goals being pursued: 1) the short term programme goals, JP5's multisectoral outcomes, and 2) the longer term management goal, which involved providing a framework for UN agencies to work more closely together, along with government and other development partners. The ultimate goal of the management framework was to improve development results by achieving more than just joint results, but a more unified programme, with joint planning, reduced transaction costs, etc. Thus, under JP5, the programme outcomes were largely entwined within and to some extent dependent upon the management goal.

Achievement of programme results required an open management system that included the full range of stakeholders to plan and implement the multisectoral programme. This was achieved formally through the ZPMC and JSC, where JP5 provided a multistakeholder management framework comprised of representatives of government ministries, UN agencies, NGOs and private sector organizations. More than this, the implementation arrangements included a more informal network of joint working groups

⁹ Catherine Allan and George H. Stankey (2009). *Adaptive Environmental Management: A Practitioner's Guide*.

(JWGs) and planning committees that were established on an ad hoc basis to plan, review, re-plan, and prioritize JP5's activities and resources. What was lacking, though, was an effective monitoring system to ensure achievement of both the management goal and the programme outcomes.

As far as the programme goals were concerned, in principle, JP5 had two options to support RGoZ in implementing the multisectoral programme of activities: (1) strengthen existing capacities or (2) establish/use parallel structures. In practice, JP5 chose the former, following the stipulations of the Paris Declaration. However, existing government institutions lacked capacity and would need capacity-building support – as acknowledged in the One UN Programme document, where the objective of JP5 was to “support government institutions in Zanzibar which face significant capacity challenges, with the aim of improving both capacity and service delivery on the isles”. Thus, as far as the government's programme objective was concerned, JP5 was meant to perform two main functions: 1) improve capacity, and 2) support service delivery. The first function involved building the capacity of MDAs, while the second involved implementing the multisectoral programme of activities.

As the evaluation has noted, there were delays in implementation and problems with capacity. So, in rushing to implement its activities, the JP5 programme team appeared to pay more attention to the second function (implementing the multisectoral programme) without paying enough attention to building the capacity of MDAs to implement. This orientation towards service delivery is evident in the planning and re-planning sessions and JSC meetings, where discussions were dominated by considerations of *what* to implement as opposed to *how* to implement it.

This highlights an important implementation/management issue, where the programme team should have paid more attention to existing capacities by undertaking capacity assessments as the first order of business. This may have led to the establishment of temporary parallel structures in the early stages while implementation capacity was beefed up in MDAs. Without this capacity-building element, sustainability becomes more difficult.

b) Review of UNDP's role as Managing Agent (MA)

Background: For many JPs, the task of Managing Agent was given to UNDP by default because other agencies either didn't have the capacity or didn't want to do it. There was a good rationale for using UNDP as MA for JP5, because UNDP maintained the largest presence in Zanzibar, and the capacity-building focus of the programme meant that UNDP was the most logical choice for MA, particularly in view of the multisectoral nature of the programme, which involved a complex mix of economic growth, social development and development management. No other UN agency had such a broad mandate.

Review of Activities and Assessment of Performance: As the Managing Agent, UNDP had ultimate responsibility and accountability for achieving the results and management of funds. Normally, the organization providing the funding will also be responsible for monitoring the results – as a way of ensuring accountability and achievement of results. However, the complex nature of JP5, coupled with the lack of clarity in the prodoc, meant that there was some confusion in roles and responsibilities regarding the programme objectives, management goals, achievement of results, monitoring and reporting.

The implementation modality for JP5 was quite complex where UNDP did not *manage* the programme so much as *administer* it. Programme delivery was done by the IPs which were assisted by PUNs in the attainment of outcomes arranged in three multisectoral ‘pillars’ (wealth creation, social services and development management). This administrative/management arrangement suited the overarching programme and management goals of JP5. While the PUNs were assisting the IPs to achieve the programme results (improve service delivery and build capacity), the MA had a coordination/management role to play, which involved improving the fragmented and inefficient methods that the UN system had for delivering development assistance. This coordination role involved an equally great challenge as it meant trying to corral the mandates, specializations and egos of a diverse

network of specialized UN agencies under “One” programme, while attempting to mobilize resources from a variety of funding sources (parallel, pooled, One UN Fund, external agencies).

As Managing Agent responsible for delivering both the programme and management results, UNDP’s role involved extensive partnership building, between government MDAs and PUNs, and among UN agencies, as well as raising funds from external partners. In order to manage (administer) the programme and ensure delivery of programme results, UNDP had to find ways to solve the many issues and conflicts that were continuously arising between PUNs and IPs, and among PUNs (specialized agencies and Ex Comms¹⁰). Formally, this coordination role was performed through the JSC and ZPMC, which comprised the coordination mechanism established to facilitate collaboration between government and UN agencies. But as UNDP’s underlying strategy was to build partnerships, there were many other informal and high-level channels that were used to achieve the desired management results. Using the full array of financial, political and personal tools at its disposal, the management team was able to do this quite effectively by, for example, leveraging the funding available from the One UN Fund (\$US 92 million), or cajoling through internal UN political channels to influence a particular outcome, and even using the personal charm of senior leaders to extract a compromise.

Because of its multisectoral/capacity building/programme delivery nature, JP5 had to convene the full range of stakeholders to plan together to produce annual workplans and budgets that supported the priorities of the ministries. While this process of coordination, planning and re-planning of activities and budgets helped focus the ambitious visions of the ministries and PUNs on the most needed priority areas, it made implementation very difficult because the funding for these activities was not always secure or predictable. Stakeholders would establish a budget and then realize there was not enough funding, so they had to revise it, re-orient, re-plan and rearrange. This uncertain process was exacerbated by capacity problems in the IPs, PUNs and the MA, which in turn resulted in increased difficulties and delays in implementation and disbursement of funds.

This system of management sparked a cycle of delays: including delays in funding, activities, and reporting – meaning that the subsequent payment was late, etc. Most parties agreed that the MA was not the only organization responsible for the delays in disbursement of funds. The blame can be equally shared among MA, IPs and the Ministry of Finance (Exchequer), as delays often involved a range of issues: decision problems, problems of disbursing to PUNs, late reporting from IPs, etc. In addition, delays that appeared to be associated with the MA, sometimes involved delays at the HQ level, the Administrative Agent (AA). However, if the funding had been secured beforehand, the programme would have been managed/administered more smoothly.

In spite of the bureaucracy and delays in implementation, the flexibility of JP5’s implementation approach was much appreciated by PUNs and IPs alike. Activities that had not been programmed into the PUNs’ Parallel funds (e.g., labour compliance) and emergency programs (electricity crisis) were included in JP5 for ‘ease of implementation’. JP5 was a very easy mechanism for implementation, which performed more like a budget support system for providing UN technical assistance and funding.

In summary, JP5 management and implementation arrangements can be characterized by the following periods in its 4 years of operation:

2008 – Planning, consolidation, awareness building

2009 – Re-planning, bureaucratic delays and funding disbursements and implementation

2010 – Limited funding was approved (or available), so some interventions were not done

2011 – Hope that UNDP would consolidate JP5’s gains to allow more impact or longer term results.

2008: *Constraints in the planning process*: It was difficult to get IPs to focus activities on results that were achievable. The MA had to keep reminding them that they had to be realistic in planning because achievement of results was an important determining factor in the amount allocated by the JSC for the

¹⁰ Typically, the specialized agencies provided technical assistance, while UNDP (an ExCom) simply passed funds through to government departments.

next tranche. IPs were encouraged to develop criteria for prioritization. Human capacity and institutional arrangements were constraints that had to be evaluated and worked around.

2009: *Management and administration of the programme*: the MA experienced challenges with disbursement of funds, budgeting and delays. The lack of funding was a major challenge, where funding to IPs and PUNs was not coordinated properly, which caused difficulties in coordination of funding for implementation activities through the IP and funding for technical assistance through the PUNs. So, for example, if the IP didn't spend its funds on time, this would cause delays in the availability of technical assistance. Also, the IP had to contend with ever-shrinking budgets that were re-planned and reduced. Reporting was also a problem, where there were different formats and requests for special reports.

2010: *Funding crunch*: limited funding was approved (or available), so some interventions were not done.

2011: *Delays in future programming*: UNDP was supposed to start in July but funding was delayed.

c) Project Administration and Reporting

In addition to its responsibility for achieving results and management of funds, UNDP had responsibility for overall coordination of the JP, which included 1) preparation of consolidated narrative and financial reports for review by the ZPMC and subsequent submission to the JSC, 2) progress reporting to oversight and governance structures (JSC, Country Office, and the government of Tanzania), and 3) financial reporting to the One UN Fund's Administrative Agency (UNDP HQ).

Coordination of JP5 was managed by UNDP out of the UN sub office in Zanzibar, which provided a central hub housing all UN agencies. The UNDP office was staffed with 5 programme staff (UN Team Leader and later UNRC Liaison Officer, a Programme Analyst, a JPO and 2 UNVs) and 3 operations staff (Finance Assistant and two Programme Assistants).

A review of the responsibilities surrounding project administration and reporting raises questions about staff continuity and clarity of roles, as well as formats for monitoring and reporting. The interviews revealed that JP5 staff was overloaded (both MA and PUNs), as they had to manage and coordinate JP5 activities as well as implement their regular programmes. For UNDP, JP5 was a heavy administrative burden, where staff had to report on the programme content as well as the administrative aspects, not only for their programme elements, but for other PUNs as well. On several occasions, UNDP shuffled JP5 responsibilities among staff members performing different functions involving monitoring of pillars I and II, UNDP as PUN (Pillar III) and monitoring and reporting (MA), as shown in Table 8. This division of duties provided better management, but it often happened on an ad hoc basis and did not span the duration of the project.

Table 8: JP5 Staff and Responsibilities

Function	2008	2009	2010	2011
JP5 Coordination (MA)	UN Team Leader/UNRC Liaison Officer	UN Team Leader/UNRC Liaison Officer	UN Team Leader/UNRC Liaison Officer	UN Team Leader/UNRC Liaison Officer
Pillar I (monitoring)	Programme Analyst	JPO (Ghana)	Programme Analyst	UNV (Kenya)
Pillar II monitoring	Programme Analyst	JPO (Ghana)	Programme Analyst	National UNV
Pillar III (PUN)	Programme Analyst	JPO (Ghana)	JPO (Kenya)	JPO (Kenya)
Monitoring & reporting (MA)	Programme Analyst	JPO (Ghana)	Programme Analyst	Programme Analyst
Finance	Finance Analyst	Finance Analyst	Finance Analyst	Finance Analyst

The turnover in staff and shuffling of responsibilities gave the impression to IPs and PUNs that the MA lacked staff and/or capacity at the sub office in Zanzibar. This was exacerbated by UNDP micro-managing the processes between planning and implementation, sometimes asking for minute

adjustments in budgets for stationary or fuel, which increased the administrative burden for PUNs and IPs but did not lead to an improvement in monitoring and reporting.

Coordinating the monitoring and reporting by IPs and PUNs turned into an administrative nightmare for UNDP. While the MOU signed by PUNs and UNDP in January 2008 specifies the reporting responsibilities between PUNs and MA, indicating that the PUNs will provide the MA with annual narrative and financial progress reports on their part of the activities, it did not provide a clear M&E plan – indicating only that a “Joint Monitoring and Evaluation System” would be developed under the direction of the RC, without specifying mechanisms or responsibility. Similarly, the One UN Pilot programme document did not include a clear monitoring plan or a delineation of responsibilities, rather it passively indicated that an M&E matrix will be used to monitor and evaluate results achieved, and that the matrix will form the basis of joint monitoring in relation to output targets. There was no indication of which institution was responsible for the monitoring function. The implication is that responsibility rested with the Managing Agent (UNDP), which was responsible for consolidating the annual progress reports. Without a clear M&E plan and in the absence of standard reporting templates and tools, the tendency was for partners to report in different formats and to report on activities instead of results.

The M&E system that evolved under JP5 included the development of a joint annual workplan with targets and indicators, monitoring on a quarterly basis through a Joint Working Group (JWG) and reporting in the Annual Progress Reports produced by the MA. Joint monitoring visits were supposed to be undertaken by all PUNs, participating MDAs and IPs at least once a year. However, the M&E system and reporting tools and templates that were needed to track progress in both the management goal and the programme outcomes were not adequately developed at the outset of the programme. The monitoring framework and monitoring plan were inadequate, and there was very little joint monitoring because agencies found it difficult to schedule joint monitoring visits. This led to activity-based reporting, with little record of achievement toward outputs and outcomes. Monitoring tasks could have been made much more efficient if there had been an M&E plan, and if joint monitoring was made a mandatory part of programme implementation.

Adaptive management requires a good monitoring system, as it is based on a learning process, which attempts to reduce uncertainty through constant monitoring. This is particularly true in a multisectoral capacity-building programme like JP5, where it is important for the M&E system to track the capacity built, the number of jobs created, social indicators, and the results of Pillar III.

Also, there was some confusion on the role of the MA and PUNs in monitoring and evaluation. Two different types of monitoring were required: 1) monitoring the programme objectives (JP5 monitoring) and 2) building the capacity of government ministries to undertake M&E (MKUZA monitoring). UNDP was responsible for the first, and the idea behind the second was for the ministries to undertake the M&E, not for the PUNs and MA to do it for them.

UNDP was playing many roles, which added to the complexity of the programme, and caused confusion among some IPs and agencies. For example, UNDP was the MA for JPs and the Administrative Agent for the One Fund (which experienced problems and delays as well).

This points to the need for two things: first, clearly defined roles for M&E in the prodoc, and secondly, a full time M&E person at the MA level to be involved in the design, planning, implementation and reporting of programme support.

d) Programme Financing and Efficiency

This section assessed the financial aspects of JP5, examining budget allocations, delivery rates and sources of funding. Like the other JPs, JP5 was funded through both pooled and parallel mechanisms, involving three sources of funding:

- a) One UN Fund: a separate pooled fund made up of contributions from different development partners (for example, as of 2010 Canada had provided \$11.3 million, the UK \$9.1 million, etc);

- b) Pooled funding involves the separate UN organizations pooling their funding in a pot to be managed by the Managing Agent (MA).
- c) Parallel funding refers to funds allocated by each participating UN organization, which are used to implement certain activities that have been commonly agreed in the JP workplan.

The One UN Programme document indicated that *pooled* funding was the preferred modality, where in addition to the funds allocated from the One Fund, PUNs were supposed to pool their regular and mobilized resources for the JP, and to put these resources under the management and administration of the MA (UNDP). However, the pooled funding modality was not used. Table X below shows that almost no funding was raised through the pooled mechanism: 24% was raised through parallel funds and the vast majority (82%) was allocated from the One UN Fund. The main reason for this was because the MA (UNDP) would receive 7 percent of the pooled funds as overhead for its part in managing and administering the programme, while the PUN that raised the funds would only get an allocation based on programme delivery. As a result, PUNs were reluctant to pool their funds into a pot which the MA would control, and collect the management fee. Recognizing this, the One UN document indicated that the pooled fund mechanism was a longer-term vision that would be introduced gradually over time. For implementation of the UNDAP, it remains to be seen if the PUNs are willing to contribute more of their own resources to the pool. The experience of JP5 is that PUNs saw JPs as a way of accessing greater resources – from the One UN Fund – as opposed to contributing their resources to the joint pool.

The September 2007 prodoc demonstrates the uncertain nature of funding for JP5, where out of a total estimated budget of \$ 9,657,000 only 20% (\$ 1,968,100) of the resources were secured (that is, allocated by PUNs), leaving 80% (\$ 7,688,900) unfunded. For project management and implementation purposes, it is not easy working with approximate budget figures. Efficient project management requires predictable and sufficient resources to determine whether or not an activity will be funded. The initial uncertainty was carried on throughout the implementation of JP5, year by year as indicated below (see the tables at Annex 3 for more detail).

The first 2008 workplan shows a budget of \$ 6.8 million, with only \$ 5.58 million allocated and only 16% funded. The second workplan for 2008 shows a total budget of \$ 6.1 million with 26.8% (\$ 1.6 million) funded by parallel funds and 73.2% (\$4.5 million) from the One Fund. In 2009, the workplan shows a total budget of \$ 5.8 million, with 12% from parallel and 87.5% from the One Fund, and with only 9% of total funds secure. The workplan for 2010 shows a total budget of \$ 3.4 million, with 25% from parallel and 75% from the One Fund, and with all funds secure. In 2011, the workplan shows a total budget of \$ 1.8 million, with 30% from parallel and 70% from the One Fund, and with all funds secure.

In such an uncertain implementation environment, a progressive amount of funding should have been secured as the programme progressed from design (2007) to implementation (2008-2011). However, after 2007, when only 20% of the funds were secured, the percentage of secured funds decreased in 2008 (16%) and 2009 (9%).

By the end of 2011, programme expenditure was \$11.3 million, out of a total budget (resources received) of \$12.7 million, yielding a delivery rate of 89%. However, total planned funding was \$19 million, which means that approximately 60% of funding was received (77% from the One Un Fund and 23% from Parallel funding). Each year the funds raised from parallel and the One UN Fund remained fairly constant, averaging between 25 - 30% and 70 - 75% respectively. But no funds were raised from “pooled” funding mechanism, which was the preferred funding modality.

In spite of the funding uncertainty, the annual delivery rates for JP5 were between 69 and 86% as shown in Table 9 below, averaging at 80%. Also, there was a gap in resource mobilization, where the UN agencies were only able to raise 70% of the funding, which further reduced the effectiveness of the programme, to 73.5% of capacity. Because of delays in implementation and the requirement to spend 80% of the previous allocation, the programme found itself in a difficult position in 2010, where the budgeted figure was only \$1 million, although the allocation was \$ 4.11 million because of a backlog of

expenditures from previous years. Red flags are raised when expenditures increase to 400% of the budgeted figure in the final years of a project, raising questions about whether the funds were well planned and well spent, or whether it represents a rush to spend for fear of losing the funds.

Table 9: Delivery Rates for JP5

<i>Budget & Expenditure</i>	Type of Funding Modality			Total
	One UN Fund	Parallel	Pooled	
2008 - Allocation	5.10	1.19	0	6.19
Budget	3.47	1.12	0	4.59
Expenditure	2.18	0.99	0	3.17
Delivery Rate	62.8%	83.1%	na	69.1%
2009 - Allocation	6.08	1.32	0	7.40
Budget	3.31	1.27	0	4.58
Expenditure	2.83	1.09	0	3.92
Delivery Rate	85.5%	85.8%	na	85.5%
2010 - Allocation	3.59	0.52	0	4.11
Budget	0.57	0.43	0	1.0
Expenditure	2.80	0.38	0	3.18
Delivery Rate*	77.9%	87%	na	77.4%
2011 - Allocation	1.01	0.15	0	1.16
Budget	1.01	0.13	0	1.14
Expenditure	0.88	0.10	0	0.98
Delivery Rate	87.1%	78.8%	na	86.2%
Total Expended	9.31	2.56		11.25
Percentages	83%	23%		

* The delivery rate for 2010 was based on the Allocation amount not the Budget figure

Table 10 provides the delivery rates of PUNs involved in JP5, indicating the level of resources allocated and received against expenditures as of the end of 2010. The table shows a delivery rate of 87.02%, which represented the highest delivery rate among all JPs.

Table 10: Delivery Rates of PUNs involved in JP5

PUN	Total Approved	Net Funded	Total Expenditure	Delivery Rate
FAO	562	562	520	92.65%
ILO	1,010	775	697	89.94%
UNESCO	49	49	17	34.22%
UNICEF	262	262	229	87.48%
UNIDO	647	497	349	70.22%
WFP	54	54	4	6.54%
UNDP	6,651	6,641	5,681	88.54%
Total	9,235	8,615	7,497	87.02%

A comparison of funding allocation between programme activities (Pillars 1, II, III and Micheweni) and management and administration will reveal the efficiency of programme administration. However, budgeted or expenditure figures for Management and Administration were not available. A look at the *budgeted* figures for programme activities (*expenditure* figures were not available) indicates the following distribution by pillar:

	% of total budget
Pillar I Growth:	32%
Pillar II Social Services:	38%
Pillar III Management for Development:	22%
Micheweni Intervention:	9%

The fee for Management & Administration was \$614,568, which represents approximately 5% of programme expenditures, which is below the budgeted figure of 7%.

Delays in financial disbursements had an impact not only on the timeliness of delivery of inputs, but also on achievement of outputs, because these delays led to delays in reporting, which affected the recruitment of TA, which in turn affected future payments, etc.

With JP5's total resources coming in at approximately \$12.7 million, this represents 1% of the total funding for the 4 year budget for the entire UN family (\$777 million) and 9% of UNDP's resources of \$140 million. This raises questions whether there was value for money, given the heavy administrative burden, and whether the money was well spent, given the delays.

In the final analysis, the assessment of programme financing receives a rating of "Marginally satisfactory" (C).

e) Stakeholder Involvement and Relevance

Joint Work Planning: A great deal of time was devoted to joint planning, re-planning and re-prioritizing, not only within the UN agencies, but involving government departments as well. While the role of UNDP as MA and partnership builder may have provided a buffer between the specialized agencies that were keen to implement their standard mandates and projects, its role also involved encouraging the IPs to be more "realistic" in planning during the first half of the programme. So, where JP5's joint planning sessions started out as a long shopping list of activities developed by IPs and PUNs, these activities were eventually pared down to match only those activities that could be budgeted. Challenges with implementation were discussed and resolved in Joint Working Group (JWG) meetings under the leadership of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MOFEA), represented by the Commissioner for External Finance. For example, after nine months of programme activity, the JWG met at the end of October 2008 to resolve several important implementation challenges:

- *Delays in disbursement of funds:* due to prolonged planning, transfer of funds through the Exchequer system, delays with IPs and procedural setbacks with PUNs, which contributed to delays in implementation and low delivery rates
- *Coordination between IPs, MDAs and MA:* which needed improvement in sorting out which agency and department was doing what in relation to coordination of JP5 activities
- *Reporting formats:* members were using a variety of formats for narrative and financial reporting which needed to be harmonized
- *Procurement procedures:* IPs were not clear about the procurement procedures and lacked the knowledge and capacity to carry out the tendering responsibilities
- *Shortage of human resources:* IPs were concerned about the increased burden JP5 was putting on their staff, who had to multitask. As a result, JP5 agreed to provide consultants and UNVs to assist with delivery of services

Coordination Mechanisms (JSC, ZPMC) and Oversight Bodies (Administrative Agent – AA): Stakeholder involvement was an integral part of the One UN Programme, and this was well-represented in the roles and membership of the three joint government/UN coordination mechanisms: the Joint Steering Committee (JSC), the Zanzibar Programme Management Committee (ZPMC) and the Joint Working Group (JWG). The JSC was comprised of representatives of government (both mainland and Zanzibar) and select UN agencies, which were responsible for providing strategic leadership and monitoring, and decisions on allocations of funding from the One UN Fund. The ZPMC was co-chaired by the Ministry of Finance and UNDP, with members being drawn from government ministries and UN agencies, who were responsible for reviewing the annual and quarterly workplans and budgets prepared by the IPs and PUNs.

The Administrative Agent (AA) (UNDP) was responsible for disbursing funds from the One UN Fund to the MA (also UNDP), with allocation of resources guided by the JSC based on approved workplans. The MA was required to provide the AA with annual narrative progress reports, annual financial progress reports, and final narrative and financial reports at the end of the programme. During programme implementation, decisions made at the sub-office level were often overturned at the MA level. And sometimes decisions made at the MA level were overturned at the AA level. Also, delays that appeared

to be associated with UNDP, sometimes involved delays at the AA level, as HQ would sometimes weigh in on an issue.

f) Contribution of IPs and PUNs and Synergies among UN Agencies

JP5 used national organizations as implementing partners (IPs) for programme execution, supported by technical expertise provided by PUNs. The role and contribution of IPs and PUNs has been documented in the sections on programme implementation under the outcomes and outputs. Administratively, the lead PUNs were responsible for consolidating quarterly workplans and requests for funds, in collaboration with other PUNs and IPs.

In terms of creating synergies among stakeholders, JP5 was unique in that it utilized collaborative planning and implementation of activities involving PUNs and IPs. Previously, IPs and PUNs worked separately and budgeted separately, whereas under JP5 they shared experiences, solved problems together, worked in teams, collaborated on reporting and provided checks and balances through shared budgeting, which promoted greater transparency. An internal division of labour provided for PUNs to coordinate sections of the Joint Programme in line with their mandate, areas of comparative advantage and technical expertise according to the following areas of JP5:

Pillar	PUNs	IPs
Pillar I: Wealth creation	ILO, FAO, UNIDO, WFP, Unicef	MLYWCD (MLEC), MALE, MTTI
Pillar II: Social services	UNFPA, WHO, Unicef, Unifem, UNESCO	MOHSW, MLYWCD, MoEVT
Pillar III: Development management	UNDP	MOFEA, OCGS, MoCAGG, DPP, ANGOZA
Micheweni	UNDP	MoF

There were many instances where the synergies did not gel among PUNs and between PUNs and IPs. UNICEF is an example, where the PUN was more involved in implementing parallel interventions and less or at minimal levels in implementing JP5 initiatives. Also, there were instances where the IPs had to finance activities that had been budgeted under JP5, but funding fell short after re-programming. One example involves the seed programme under the FFS component, where the Ministry of Agriculture had to fund the activities after JP5 funds were reduced.

From the UN side, JP5 was much more difficult to administer and manage than anticipated. As a separate geographically-based programme being implemented as a joint programme, JP5 experienced difficult lines of responsibility and reporting among the UN agencies. There were sensitivities surrounding the sub office involving local politics, reporting roles and responsibilities and inter-Agency turf battles. There were issues surrounding the RC's office and the liaison officer. In addition, the UN system was having a difficult enough time with JPs, where PUNs tended to treat JPs more like a "project" than a programme, and they also used JP5 as "parallel" programmes, competing amongst each other for funding.

As JP5 was a combination of all UN programmes in a particular geographic area, it performed more like a mini-UNDAF. This implementation modality suited the regional sensitivities of Zanzibar but the "jointness" of the separate UN agencies attempting to implement JP5 was disappointing. The specialized agencies liked JP5, because they were able to implement projects according to their mandate, and the government ministries liked the flexibility of the programme, because it was able to provide special arrangements for programming, and implementation and oversight for support to Zanzibar. But, to some extent, the specialized agencies tended to push their mandate, as opposed to meeting the needs of government and other beneficiaries (eg, social protection versus employment creation). And sometimes lacking in strong leadership or a strategic implementation plan, it was difficult for the ministries to stand up to the PUNs. But there were also capacity deficiencies among the PUNs, where there was a shortage of technical staff. FAO, for example, had only one technical staff person in Zanzibar.

g) Progress Toward the Overall Objectives

Assessment of management and implementation is particularly important for assessing the progress toward overall objectives because under JP5 the programme objectives were closely entwined with the management objectives. Considering the above constraints, JP5 performed as best it could in meeting the overarching programme and management objectives: 1) building capacity and improving service delivery, and 2) improving the fragmented UN delivery method. Regarding the management objectives, the UN designed JP5 to encourage coherence among agencies. And to a large extent, the programme resulted in a great deal of dialogue among the agencies, where a convergence of ideas and division of labour has taken place. Also, JP5 has highlighted the overlaps between workplans, etc. But as one of the goals was to improve programme efficiency under DaO, the implementation modality of having a Managing Agent administer while at the same time deliver may have caused some administrative and management problems. A bilateral donor would have contracted a consulting firm to manage the programme. This modality may not be suitable for the UN system, and it would have been far more expensive administratively. In the end, having UNDP as the Managing Agent kept the programme focused on the higher-level outcomes, as opposed to the agency-specific outputs. It would have been difficult to adapt a better implementation modality to the development context in Zanzibar. The main problem with JP5 was not with the management and implementation, it was that JP5 was not a “joint” programme – it was part collaborative programming, part mini-UNDAF and part resource mobilization device.

On the programme side, there were capacity limitations within government, and the ministries found it difficult to keep up with the implementation targets, delivery rate and monitoring responsibilities, in addition to the programme reviews needed to re-prioritize JP5 activities. Also, there was perhaps a lack of commitment to JP5 from some ministries, particularly the Office of Planning, which was a busy department with lots of other development partners to deal with. Regarding the service delivery objective, this was enhanced through several downstream interventions, particularly in the Micheweni interventions, but also in Pillar I with FFSs and entrepreneurship development and value added activities, and in Pillar II through increased number of health facilities providing MNCHs and more GBV victims having access to treatment and legal services.

In view of the above Programme Management and Implementation has been given a rating of “Satisfactory” (B).

Table 11: Summary of Programme Management and Implementation

Programme Component	Achievements	Comments/Rating
Programme Management & Implementation	The MA implemented the programme in a manner that was consistent with the design, particularly in view of the coordination that was required. However, management could have been more effective and efficient	Satisfactory (B)
Adaptive management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> JP5 provided an iterative mechanism for decision-making and resource mobilization, which suited the changing programme and management objectives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Satisfactory (B)
M & E and reporting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Roles and responsibilities were not clearly identified in the prodoc, and the M&E system and reporting tools and templates were not adequately developed at the outset 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unsatisfactory (D)
Programme efficiency and timeliness of Implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There were delays in disbursements which caused a cycle of delays and affected delivery, yet JP5 had the highest delivery rate of all JPs (77%) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Marginally satisfactory (C)
Project budget and duration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The 3 year timeframe was too short to be effective, but was adequate for a pilot programme 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Satisfactory (B)

Financial management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> JP5 raised 70% of funds through the One UN Fund and 30% through parallel funding but none through the intended pooled mechanism. Only 70% of funds needed were raised, and funding was not very predictable. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Marginally satisfactory (C)
Stakeholder involvement and relevance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> JP5 was highly participatory and its joint planning processes helped MDAs to implement the MKUZA. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Highly satisfactory (A)
Contribution of UN Agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PUNs tended to stick to their specialized mandates, and could have been more collaborative in joint implementation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Satisfactory (B)
Progress toward overall objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MA provided critical support for the overarching programme and management objectives: 1) Building capacity of government institutions and improving service delivery, and 2) Improving fragmented UN delivery 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Satisfactory (B)

B) Achievement of Higher Level Goals

a) Contribution to National Priorities (MKUZA) and MDGs

JP5 contributed to Zanzibar's priorities by aligning with the MKUZA and supporting the government's development goals and its cluster-based strategy. Also, MKUZA I attempted to mainstream MDG issues but some IPs did not realize this, which caused some tension during the planning and re-planning sessions. In addition to providing a forum for agreeing on programme activities that would meet both MKUZA and MDG priorities, the JP5 planning process helped to provide a framework for turning the MKUZA strategy into an implementation plan. Under MKUZA II, JP5 supported various economic studies and activities that improved the presentation of information and the monitoring framework.

In the context of sector programming and general budget support, JP5 provided a flexible mechanism that could support government priorities and national ownership while building capacity and improving service delivery. At the same time, it attempted to improve aid effectiveness by providing a forum for improving the UN system's fragmented delivery methods. Looking ahead, the government now needs an investment plan to mobilize resources from domestic, ODA, external and private sector sources.

b) Delivering as One (DaO) and UNDAF

During the May 2009 re-planning exercise, cracks started to become evident about the difficulty of converging UN agency mandates, partner mandates, competition for funding and the UN's tendency to "do what we are comfortable doing". An 'organizational inertia' was noticed, which conflicted with the objectives of the joint programme. That is, the "joint" part of JP5 was distilled out of the programme to such an extent that each UN agency ended up developing separate projects instead of trying to implement the pillar outcomes jointly. Outcomes were separated according to PUNs and IPs. As a result, the JP5 implementation process became more like an UNDAF, with the MA administering and coordinating. The 2009 'mid-term review exercise' indicated that the implementation process required empowered leadership and accountability frameworks. But the separate PUN implementation structure that emerged from the process may have trumped any gains that leadership and accountability might have provided.

Box 11: Transformational Result: Model JP for UNDAF

It is clear that JP5 helped to revise and improve the DaO process. The DAO was piloted around the Joint Programme approach. All agencies had JPs, as well as their regular programs. So programme implementation wasn't very efficient, and was rather disjointed. But JP5 was different than the other JPs, largely because it integrated the necessary elements for programme planning and implementation, and because it had strong commitment from the government and agencies. JP5 tapped into a number of elements that were right for Zanzibar: the strong will of the government for a Zanzibar-based programme, the commitment shown by the UN agencies to Zanzibar and the presence of a sub office in

Zanzibar providing a local coordinating role, and the fact that Zanzibar is a small island, where the culture of coordinating and organizing fit well with the integrated, multisectoral approach.

As such, JP5 provided the ideal model for the UNDAP, which to a large extent demonstrates the success of the programme. The UNDAP will attempt to pool all JPs together, and assistance will be allocated by sector, managed through working groups. Some lessons learned from JP5 have been streamlined into the UNDAP, for example issues of parallel work planning, joint workplans and the need to have a separate management committee for Zanzibar, as well as accountability for results at the agency level.

The consensus in Zanzibar is that most stakeholders would like to retain the JP5 aspect, where there is a separate but integrated Zanzibar program. Most people interviewed for the evaluation appreciated the joint planning, coordination and implementation functions of JP5, which involved high-level working group meetings, and they hope this will continue under UNDAP. Some participants think this approach is too ambitious, while others think it is manageable. Some PUNs fear that IPs might fall back to their old independent ways before JP5. However, it is obvious that capacity has been built, and IPs have participated in the planning, so it is quite likely that they will focus on what the government wants to achieve in MKUZA II.

It is fortunate that UNDAP will be able to take over the priority areas that JP5 was not able to complete. Most ministries hope that UNDAP will build on the strengths of JP5 and MKUZA, but they are uncertain about the means to implement UNDAP, through a single implementation plan. The problem remains of how to manage implementation of support to Zanzibar under a mainland-based framework. Zanzibar and the mainland have separate priorities and separate implementation structures, and national priorities and the policy framework are different than in the mainland. For Zanzibar, it is not so much a question of *ownership*, but *implementation*. This was one area of success in JP5: it followed Zanzibar's priorities. Under UNDAP, development partners will have to define the context for Zanzibar, in a similar manner to how the Zanzibar government defined the context for MKUZA and Vision 20-20, including policy areas, implementation structures, priorities, capacity to implement, etc. But there will have to be more consideration of government capacities and use of national systems. For example, from the government's standpoint, the UN system should work together to implement the DaO system, but this should be done through existing management committees, with the UN agencies fulfilling their mandates, and focusing on pro-poor priorities.

There has been a step back from direct budget support by donors, as there was a lack of accountability and transparency. However, JP5 was a modified version of the DBS approach, where PUNs provided support to a range of areas and helped the government to build capacity and monitor progress. This approach, which was pioneered by JP5 and is now being taken up by UNDAP, might combine the flexibility of the budget support modality along with the improved accountability and transparency that comes with a managed capacity building programme like JP5.

Consideration has to be given to the strengths of JP5 that led to the UNDAP, and what has been gained or lost. Of the underlying objectives of JP5 (the programme objective of multisectoral programme delivery and capacity building, and the management objective of improved delivery), the programme objectives seemed to have been retained and the management objective has perhaps been taken for granted, as there is no role for an MA in the UNDAP. The evaluation found that the role of the MA was perhaps the most important part of JP5. Certainly, there were tensions between the MA acting on behalf of UNDP and the PUNs represented by the specialized agencies, and in some cases these tensions raised above the objectives of the programme to reach the higher levels of the UN organizations, causing delays and interruptions in programme activities, as politics and persuasion trumped timeliness of delivery. This heavy coordination function underscored the need for the MA to be able to incorporate the roles of the Specialized Agencies (ILO, FAO, etc) to meet the objectives of the programme, as opposed to pursuing their particular outputs, while keeping an eye on the big picture, the country programme, MKUZA outcomes, etc.

In assessing the programme against the guiding principles for UN joint programmes, JP5 performed very well:

- ✓ **National ownership and leadership:** JP5 supported these through supporting national development strategies and using national processes for dialogue, planning and monitoring
- ✓ **Delivering as one:** JP5 focused on poverty reduction, capacity building and other areas where the UN had a comparative advantage
- ✗ **Jointness:** The UN agencies planned together but they had difficulty implementing and delivering together
- ✓ **Division of labour:** JP5 followed nationally defined priorities, filled a gap in poverty reduction and focused on UN comparative advantages
- ✓ **Coherence and minimizing transaction costs:** JP5's joint work planning sessions helped government ministries to plan and implement their programmes, and provided a forum for development partners
- ✓ **Ensure sustainability:** JP5 attempted to do this through long term capacity building

Assessing JP5 against the One UN process, the programme performed quite well, contributing significant support to the following One UN indicators (with some areas needing improvement):

One Plan

- ✓ Drawing on the services and expertise of 10 UN agencies
- ✓ Country-owned and signed off by government, with high-level Joint Steering Committee
- ✓ Builds on UNCT & UNDAF, reflecting the UN's added value in specific country context (% of government resources allocated to program areas needs to be calculated and followed up)
- ✗ Results-based, with clear outcomes and priorities (M&E framework needs improvement)
- ✓ Responsive to the national development framework, aligned with MKUZA
- ✓ Strategic, focused and with clear priorities, including UN comparative advantage, MDGs
- ✓ Effectively delivered a multisectoral approach to development using JSC, ZMPC & JWG

One Budget and One Fund

- ✓ Management and effective implementation of the programme through the One UN Fund
- ✗ Pooled funding mechanism needs to be linked to the strategic outcomes
- ✓ Budget was transparent, showing the overheads and transaction costs of the UN funds, programmes and specialized agencies

One Leader

- ✓ MOU provided RC with the authority to negotiate with the government on behalf of the UN system and UN Team Leader in Zanzibar facilitated consensus-building and substantive direction of JP5
- ✓ RC was able to shape the Programme, including the authority to allocate resources from pooled and central funding mechanisms
- ✓ Role of AA provided clear accountability framework for RC and effective oversight mechanism for the RC system
- ✗ Sub office in Zanzibar could have been staffed with more technical capacity (eg M&E)

One UN House

- ✓ Joint premises established at sub office in Zanzibar with at least 10 UN agencies resident

One Set of Management Practices

- ✓ JP5 used an integrated results-based management system, with integrated support services for narrative and financial reporting, procurement, etc.

c) Cross-cutting Issues (Gender, Human Rights Based Approach, etc.)

Several gender training and ‘rights and results’ sessions were held. However, the programme was not able to mainstream these cross-cutting issues, primarily because of a lack of support within government, and to some extent a lack of capacity among IPs.

In view of the above the achievement of higher-level goals has been given a rating of “**satisfactory**” (B).

Table 12: Summary of Higher Level Government and UN Goals

Programme Component	Achievements	Comments/Rating
Achievement of Higher Level Government and UN Goals	<i>Adherence to the principles and objectives of DaO and MDGs, including reference to the One UN Process indicators</i>	Successful (B)
Contribution to National Priorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In the context of sector programming, JP5 provided a flexible mechanism that supported government priorities and national ownership while building capacity and improving service delivery. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Highly successful (A)
Delivering as One, UNDAF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The programme was successful in improving aid effectiveness by providing a framework for working in a more harmonized and coordinated and cost-effective manner, thus improving the fragmentation of aid delivery. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Successful (B)
Cross-cutting Issues (Gender, Rights Based Approach)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unable to mainstream due to a lack of support and capacity within IPs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Marginally unsatisfactory (D)

4.0 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents a summary of the findings as well as lessons learned and insights on the successes and weaknesses of the programme, including the overall impact and the lead up to the UNDAF.

- Summary of achievements
- Special achievements
- Overall observations, conclusions and lessons learned
- Sustainability
- Recommendations for future programming

A) Summary of Achievements

JP5's achievements documented in the programme elements of the evaluation are summarized below by pillar. These achievements include both upstream and downstream support to capacity building and service delivery for MDAs, NGOs, CSOs and private sector entities. Also presented are the achievements in the management objective of providing a framework for the UN system to work in a more harmonized, coordinated and cost-effective manner:

Pillar I: Strengthened capacity of MDAs, CSOs, MSMEs and private sector organizations in the promotion of wealth creation, employment and economic empowerment

Pillar II: Increased capacity of MDAs to promote MNCH services, increased access to MNCH, ANC services and institutionalization of GBV responses as well increased quality of HIV/AIDS services through integration of FP services into care & treatment services
Improved access to quality water and Increased use of safe and appropriate technology' by moving from hand pump wells to more capable deep boreholes

Pillar III: Strengthened capacity of government to prepare national development strategies (MKUZA) and national studies and statistics (HBS) needed to monitor development targets and outcomes, core civil service reforms, good governance and the rule of law.
Supported an aid management platform needed to plan and manage aid flows

Micheweni Intervention: Improved delivery of social services (water, education, health and sanitation) in Micheweni, one of the most disadvantaged and vulnerable areas of Zanzibar

Management and Implementation: Provided a framework for UN agencies to work in a more harmonized, coordinated and cost-effective manner, thus improving the fragmentation in delivery of UN assistance

JP5 also provided general improvement in capacity at the central government level for budget formulation and development planning and within MDAs for preparation of sectoral strategies. For example, there has been some measure of impact of the programme on the government personnel where at least 5 government officials that worked with JP5 were promoted to senior levels of government. But how much of this success can be attributed to JP5 is a question that is open for debate.

In relation to other JPs, JP5 was rated highly as a successful programme in its ability to strengthen the capacity of national institutions to respond to national development in Zanzibar. This rating was based on a number of factors including its alignment with the government's national development strategy (MKUZA), the involvement of numerous stakeholders at national, district and community levels and the delivery rate (87% at the end of 2010).

B) Special Achievements and Insights on the Successes and Weaknesses of the Programme

Successes: JP5 provided many special achievements and insights to the UNCMT. The briefing note from the mission to Zanzibar in October 2010 reported that JP5 had 'revolutionized' the way the UN does business in Zanzibar: By pooling together the UN agencies and government partners, JP5 'transformed' the nature of the working relations, and helped to position the UN agencies as 'champions' of aid coordination and aid effectiveness. In addition, in a 2009 World Bank briefing note, JP5 was cited as a

best practice case for “collective processes at the country level”, where the programme provided “real opportunities to build cross-sectoral, multi-stakeholder capacity to address gaps in institutional capacity”. During the interviews for the evaluation, similar sentiments were expressed by government and UN officials from all levels including top management and regular staff. By developing a common workplan, standardized programming and joint implementation and monitoring mechanisms, JP5 provided the opportunity for UN agencies to work in a harmonized, coherent and coordinated manner. It contributed to aid transparency as government and UN agencies sat together to plan and report, in full view of each other. As such, JP5 has reinforced the role of the UN system as the “friend of the government” – a trusted and honest broker where UN agencies are the first development partner called for advice and in times of emergencies.

One person interviewed stated, “*Of all the JPs, JP5 was the most successful and the most difficult*”.

Transformational Results: The evaluation uncovered a number of “transformational results” which are categorized by pillar below:

Pillar I:

- JP5’s downstream interventions influenced policy change: By introducing high-yielding varieties of rice, FAO was able to address the tendency of subsistence farmers to fall back into a cycle of poverty following donor assistance by enabling farmers to increase productivity, seed quality and income. Also, by introducing a system of contract farming (where the government buys the seeds and sells them back to farmer at a subsidized price), this intervention initiated the first steps out of subsistence farming and into a market system
- ILO contributed to some significant achievements in self-employment, especially among women, where JP5 support made a real difference in their lives by improving their social status, giving them confidence, increasing their income and sensitizing the men. Now the women have an economic role to play in the household and community, over and above their traditional social role
- UNIDO’s training in business practices, value added techniques and packaging provided a much-needed boost to productivity, competitiveness and income, particularly among women who were empowered through the ability to earn income, participate in cooperative practices and make improvements to their nascent business ventures. This is an important first step in moving participants from subsistence level activities toward making a link to the market
- The joint planning and implementation processes under Pillar I created synergies among the relevant IPs (Labour, Trade, Agriculture), which created ownership in planning and prioritizing activities for Pillar I

Pillar II:

- Establishment of GBV ‘One Stop Centre’ at Mnazi Mmoja Hospital

Pillar III:

- One of the key successes of Pillar III was its contribution to the development of MKUZA II, which involved commissioning studies needed to review and verify the inputs for the strategy document, and establishing a monitoring system. IN addition, there is an improved capacity to plan within the MDAs

Micheweni intervention

- The community radio in Micheweni

Management and Implementation:

- JP5 helped to revise and improve the DaO process which was piloted around the joint programme approach. But JP5 was different than the other JPs because it integrated the necessary elements for programme planning and implementation, tapping into a number of factors that fit well with an integrated, multisectoral and geographic-based programme: the strong commitment by the government for a Zanzibar-based programme, willing participation by UN agencies and the presence of a sub office in Zanzibar providing a local coordinating role. As

such, JP5 provided the ideal model for the UNDAF, which to a large extent demonstrates the success of the pilot programme.

Challenges & Weaknesses: The challenges and weaknesses in each pillar have been documented in the relevant sections above. The following is a summary of challenges that apply to the programme as a whole:

- JP5 was a complex, multisectoral programme that attempted to cover a wide range of interventions with insufficient funding, staff and technical expertise
- Capacity weaknesses at the IP level (within MDAs) caused delays in planning and implementation, and lack of technical expertise and financing within PUNs contributed to low delivery rates
- Late disbursement of funds at all levels created a cycle of delays in reporting, recruiting and spending, which also contributed to low delivery rates
- Coordination of planning, implementation and financing of joint programme activities was difficult enough for the MA, in addition to attempting to coordinate the management objective (DaO), because some UN agencies tended to continue with parallel programming
- There were challenges with the institutionalization of capacity in IPs, where trained focal persons kept being transferred, making it difficult to sustain the capacity of the departments, which inhibited the capacity-building goal of JP5 in general
- The programme was not able to mainstream cross-cutting issues (such as gender and a rights approach) primarily because of a lack of support and capacity within government
- Establishing an effective monitoring system was a challenge because the systems were not in place and because the targets kept changing

C) Conclusions, Overall Observations and Lessons Learned

Any evaluation should involve a forward-looking process that will help in the design process of future programmes. This evaluation has attempted to highlight the key achievements and lessons learned from JP5, as well as future programming priorities for Zanzibar.

JP5 was a difficult programme to plan, implement and monitor. The original expectations were very ambitious, and were not realistic given the size and unpredictability of the budget. The architects underestimated the complexity of the task at hand, especially with the capacity weaknesses in both IPs and PUNs. An evidence-based evaluation does not do justice to the accomplishments, which went much further than achieving the targets set by the outputs and outcomes. Judged against these expectations, JP5 comes up short. Judged against the more realistic expectations that were hammered out in lengthy planning sessions between IPs and PUNs, the programme fared better. Shortcomings at the output and outcome levels were made up in the attainment of the higher-level goals, where JP5 provided support to government priorities and strengthened national ownership while building capacity and improving service delivery, and in the provision of a framework for the UN agencies and government to work in a more harmonized, coordinated and cost-effective manner, thus improving aid effectiveness. This support assisted the government with joint and cluster-based planning and implementation, supported the government's priorities outlined in MKUZA, and aligned with the main areas of need in a number of sectors: pro-poor growth (Pillar I), social development (Pillar II), capacity building (Pillar III), and reducing poverty in Micheweni.

Design

1. JP5 was a complex, multisectoral programme that could have been developed as five separate projects, one for each pillar, one for Micheweni and a separate one for management coordination
2. The design team should have taken more time to assess the capacity of implementing partners, otherwise this can lead to a misalignment of expectations during implementation
3. A number of interventions were not strategically designed, which led to the appearance of poorly planned outputs and outcomes

4. The absence of a full time M&E function in the CO, contributed to weaknesses in programme planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation; also the focus should have been on increasing capacity in the implementing partners through technical assistance
5. JP5 interventions were multisectoral, which was not a new approach for the PUNs. However, due to the extensive reach of the programme and the shortage of time allotted to plan the activities, most PUNs took activities from their already planned project pipeline and slotted them into the JP5 joint workplan and budget. This lessened the “joint” effort to develop a strategic programme where activities and results were not linked using a logical framework approach. As a result, JP5 needed two major revisions in and several re-planning sessions during implementation. Investing more time for strategic thinking and planning is therefore recommended to improve future programs. If more time was spent on thinking through the design and management arrangements for JP5, more results could have been achieved. Experience from JP2 shows that spending more time designing the program enhanced the key deliverables and achieved more results
6. Flexible programmes like JP5 can include incremental design, planning and implementation processes, but to be effective UN support should be well-planned and financing should be secure/predictable prior to implementation. The uncertain resource situation caused major problems with implementation, a situation which was aggravated by lack of capacity
7. On capacity building initiatives, capacity assessments should be undertaken as part of programme design so that support can be tailored to suit the implementation framework in case the capacity of target implementation systems and structures needs to be strengthened beforehand

Pillar I

8. In some result areas the design and selection of activities should have followed an overall strategic plan or intervention logic. For example, in UNIDO’s support to MTTI, outcomes 2, 3 and 4 could have been consolidated under an overarching job creation outcome
9. More work should have been done in the tourism sector, such as creating linkages with other sectors such as agriculture, developing tourism value chains and undertaking demand-side analysis to target areas where the tourism market can create areas for pro-poor employment.
10. The approach to building capacity in the SME sector should be directed toward a few promising SMEs that can be provided with dedicated coaching and mentoring services. Providing a ‘scatter-shot’ of training to hundreds of unproven entrepreneurs wastes resources, creates the impression that training alone can make entrepreneurs and breeds dependency on donor-support to SMEs.
11. While JP5 was successful at the policy level, there were shortcomings at the implementation level. A lack of capacity meant that some policies and plans were not implemented. Capacity building support has to be in place beforehand to ensure that policies can be implemented
12. JP5 tried to meet the government change in priorities that was needed in the approach to pro-poor growth with a poverty-reduction focus
13. Support both upstream and targeted downstream interventions. The JP5 process revealed that there is a tendency to provide policy level assistance and to do periodic situational analyses every few years, whereas ministries may need downstream support to implement its priorities. JP5 highlighted the advantages of providing support at the downstream level, which can inform policies and priorities in ministries. The UN system has the flexibility to make these downstream interventions, through strategically designed pilot projects that can add value, build capacity and inform policies. For example, JP5’s seed intervention led to the establishment of a home-grown seed policy in MALE. The UN system should also look more strategically at a particular ministry’s total needs, both at the upstream and downstream levels, to identify not only the immediate priorities, but to ensure the ministry has the capacity to implement the policies being supported
14. JP5 was too short lived to provide longer-term assistance (e.g., exports), but some immediate impact and results can be seen in terms of income and market development. These areas will have to be picked up by UNDAF

Pillar II

15. PHAST (main focus in UNDAF) is not ministry’s priority, they want water projects in schools and communities instead.

16. Overall M&E could be improved
17. Despite focusing on capacity building support to MDAs, the pillar II intervention had considerable reach to community levels
18. Review of existing laws on GBV as well as the legislative measures to control GBV were important JP5 accomplishments in mainstreaming, control and responding to GBV in Zanzibar
19. The education campaign along with the construction of demonstration latrines and high involvement of local leaders in monitoring and supervising project activities and training of local masons proved to be a good combination of approaches in addressing poor sanitation problems in rural poor communities

Pillar III

20. To be effective, support to improved RBM and M&E systems at the central level of government (DEF) has to be followed up with support in the line ministries and MDAs
21. Support for implementation of core public service reforms has to be followed up with support to local government reform, which in turn requires capacity strengthening at the district level
22. Support in the area of good governance and anti-corruption should be accompanied by the establishment of effective government procurement plans and accountability frameworks for donor-funded equipment, etc.
23. Leadership is essential for creating change and sustaining ownership in legal reforms, which can raise standards in other branches of the legal sector

Micheweni intervention

24. The community involvement and readiness of community members to participate in development projects increased the chance of success of selected interventions. This approach is important as it gives a sense of community ownership and thus ensuring sustainability of those projects as JP5 comes to an end.
25. The decision to locate the new HF in the middle of the households has reduced the effectiveness of the JP5 investment, as another new HF will have to be constructed further from the community.
26. Needs assessment could have enriched the results recorded on Micheweni interventions. For example, constructing a nursery school and enrolling 80 pupils only scratched the problem, more than 1000 pupils in same community are not enrolled in school

Management and Implementation

27. Flexibility and adaptive management is key in supporting government to meet its objectives.
28. Implementation of JP5 was difficult because many implementing partners lacked capacity in basic areas of procurement, monitoring and planning. This resulted in delays in financing, implementation, low delivery rates and achievement of results. There is a need to undertake detailed capacity assessments to ensure MDAs have the capacity to plan, implement, monitor and report
29. The UN system, and UNDP in particular, has a strong relationship with the government, drawn from history but also from the long established trust and support. Having a sub office presence in Zanzibar was useful for the UN family to work with and closely support the Zanzibar government.
30. The M&E system and reporting tools were not developed adequately at the outset, which resulted in shifting targets and poorly designed performance indicators, which affected reporting, as partners reported in different formats and on activities instead of results. M&E training should have been provided to staff in the central and line ministries. The JP5 M&E system could have been improved if strong field supervision and joint monitoring was adopted. As a capacity-building programme, a deliberate effort should have been made to track the capacity built along with ensuring appropriate capacity-building interventions/activities were prioritized in the workplans.
31. The MA should have focused more attention on predictable inputs (financial resources) and outcomes (monitoring results, building capacity, joint implementation, etc.) and paid less attention to planning of unfunded activities. The more a programme focuses on outcomes, the greater the accomplishments.
32. It is critical to build in participatory structures to planning and implementation as this creates ownership and sustainability

Sustainability

33. To ensure sustainability of results, it is important not to get caught up in implementing small projects or outcomes, particularly in complex, multisectoral programmes like JP5. Rather support should focus on entire systems, where a particular ministry may need policy assistance, capacity building and downstream support.
34. Many of JP5's interventions have been institutionalized:
- **Pillar I: Food security:** the government has taken over the seed program from JP5, and is in the process of introducing seed laws and quality control in Zanzibar – which is an indication that this was a high priority area
 - **Pillar II:** The structure and systems established will remain in place and will support implementation and management of similar interventions in future, for example, the One Stop Centre.
 - **Pillar III:** the economic studies for the MKUZA II strategy and the monitoring system will help to sustain the gains from JP5
 - **Implementation and Management:** UNDAF: The JP5 approach itself has been institutionalized in the UNDAF

Impact and Future Programming

As JP5 has only recently been completed, it is too early to assess its impact. However, because the programme was so wide-ranging, including upstream and downstream support, there has already been some impact from the interventions, such as strengthened capacity and increased incomes. Perhaps the most significant impact to date has followed from the management objective, through the creation of a new implementation modality, the UNDAF. As a geographically-based, multisectoral, technical assistance support framework, JP5 provided the inspiration for the UNDAF model. JP5 was a unified UN business plan for Zanzibar, and the UNDAF is essentially a larger JP with a unified business plan based on the JP5 model. Lessons learned from JP5 have already been streamlined into the UNDAF: for example issues of parallel workplans, the joint workplan and the need to have a separate management committee for Zanzibar, as well as accountability for results at the agency level. Lessons learned from JP5 can also guide future programming for the broader goals of Delivering as One (DaO).

As far as using JP5 to improve future UNDAF implementation strategies, UNDAF will need more than capacity-building support, as 44% of the population is below the poverty line. Also, UNDAF will need more than capital: Zanzibar needs jobs and income, which will require supporting the government's new economic empowerment mandate through both upstream and downstream measures. Priority areas are tourism (value chain analysis revealed that they need products, which means undertaking a market demand analysis), and agriculture (Zanzibar needs a strategy for investment in domestic and export crops and it needs ecological zone and soil analysis). Entrepreneurship also needs to be improved as the current labour market cannot absorb all the school graduates. A strategy is needed to transform Zanzibar's economy by examining areas of opportunity involving some of the areas beyond JP5's interventions, such as business incubators, agribusiness, trade, tourism, contract farming to supply hotels, microfinance, etc. This will require a larger multisectoral effort involving infrastructure, schools, hospitals, water, etc. Moreover, the private sector needs to be empowered, both domestic and in partnership with foreign investors. For example, the tourism value chain analysis pointed out that the private sector needs to change its business models to ensure the community benefits. But for this, skills training will be required. The government has to have mechanisms to coordinate and sequence support: develop projects, investment conferences, etc. The UN system can focus on building capacity.

UNDP has a clear comparative advantage in the environment, particularly with funding for climate change initiatives, through management of GEF funding. The fact that there was no environment component in JP5 provides an opportunity for future programming. Zanzibar has some unique aspects of biodiversity and threats to climate change that would fit well into a GEF community-based adaptation (CBA) or GEF small grants programme (SGP). GEF financing for Zanzibar should be explored as part of UNDAF's environment component.

Recommendations**Design**

1. It is important to invest in strategic thinking and planning during the design phase of programmes; this investment will help to increase efficiency during implementation.
2. Follow up support under UNDAP should make a point of undertaking capacity assessments to determine the capacity-building activities and implementation structures needed to implement complex, multisectoral interventions

Pillar I

3. Follow up support under UNDAP should follow through with JP5's 'capacity building' mandate and provide strategic technical assistance to the new departments and policies that JP5 supported to ensure the policies are implemented. For example, MALE needs assistance in agricultural marketing, the Ministry of Labour needs assistance with implementation of labour laws, employment policy and social protection, and MTIM needs an SME support strategy
4. UNDAP should build on the downstream productivity gains of JP5 and provide longer-term assistance in market development, particularly in agriculture and tourism sectors.
5. To continue Pillar I's sectoral approach toward economic empowerment, UNDAP should look at supporting the government's existing committee formed to spearhead economic empowerment. This may involve putting together key actors and strengthening the capacity of the committee, but it will ensure ownership and create synergies among government ministries.

Pillar II

6. The UN should continue supporting women, youth, children, economic development & population issues in Zanzibar; it is one of areas with soaring needs & good results can be achieved.
7. EMOC assessment is still a critical activity to establish gaps in skills, equipment and knowledge so as to guide future MNCH interventions. EmoC assessment needs to be undertaken.
8. The campaign and construction of latrines needs to be sustained through joint efforts

Pillar III

9. Assistance should be provided to continue improving the M&E systems, particularly with support to line ministries

Micheweni Intervention

10. In order to create local ownership, it is important to involve government & the community & to use mass media to provide information on what each is doing.
11. To sustain provision of planting materials, farmer field schools need to be strengthened in Micheweni district, including training of agricultural officers on new production techniques.

Management and Implementation

12. Within UNDAP's monitoring framework there is a need for two things: 1) clearly defined roles for M&E, and 2) a full time M&E person to be involved in the design, planning, implementation and reporting of programme support.
13. The UN system should try to secure the necessary financial and technical resources prior to implementation

ANNEXES 1-8

Annex 1 - List of People Interviewed and Organizations

Organization	Name	Designation / Division
Implementing Partners and Beneficiaries		
President's Office – Finance, Economic and Development Planning	Mr. Ahmed Makame Haji	Commissioner, Planning Commission
	Mr. Amina Kh Shaaban	Executive Secretary, Planning Commission
	Mr. Bakar H. Bakar	Officer in Charge, Pemba
	Mr. Addi Juma Faki	Coordinator, Pemba
	Ms Khamis Mussa Omar	Principal Secretary MoFFA
Ministry of Labor, Economic Empowerment and Cooperatives	Ms. Asha A Abdulla	Principal Secretary
	Mr. Radhiya Rashid Haroub	Director of Planning Policy and Research
	Mr. Hafidh Khamis	Senior Planning Officer, Leader for Pillar I
Ministry of Health	Dr. Mohamed Salel Jiddawi	Principal Secretary
	Dr. Azzah Nofli	RCH Department
	Dr. Fatma Ali Haji	Coordinator, GBV One Stop Center, Mnazi Mmoja Hospital
	Dr. Marijani	Medical Doctor; GBV One Stop Center
	Dr. Azzah Nofli	RCH Department
		Ministry of Health Pemba
	Mr. Salum Abubakar	Environmental Health Department
	Zuhura Abrahaman Sudi	Health Service Provider, Maziwangombe PHCU, Micheweni
Office of Chief Government Statistics (OCGS) Zanzibar	Mr. Mohamed H. Rajab	Chief Government Statistician
	Mr. Abdulla Majid Jecha	Vital Statistician
	Mr. Mohamed Kassim Ali	Project accountant
Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources	Mr Juma Ali Juma	Deputy Principal Secretary, Agriculture
	Ms. Mansura M. Kassim	Director, Food Security & Nutrition Dept.
	Issa Nassor Bakar and Afisa Mdhamini	Pemba
	Mr Ali Abdalla and/or Yusuf Khamis	Facilitator, Farmer Field Schools, Unguja
Farmers	Mrs. Mkasi Haji Makame, Mr. Simae Makame, Mrs. Masemo Makame, Mr. Hamza Hassan, Mr. Juma Ali Silima	Kibokwe Farmers Field School, Unguja
ANGOZA	Hassan Khamis	
Downstream Beneficiaries	Met Mr Ibrahim & Mr Saidi and 9 farmers	JWAPO Dairy Association
	Met 13 staff and volunteers	Community Radio
	Met 8 farmers	Saninga Irrigation scheme Pemba
	Met 3 MTTI reps & 5 members	Pemba Seafood Processors (Smoked Dagaa)
	2 women	Kidichi Spices, Zanzibar
	Site visit to power plant	Demonstration Power
	Met 15 women	Seaweed soap makers
Ministry of Public Service and Good Governance	Ms Rukia Mkali Fadhil	Civic Education Officer
	Ms Wahida Saleh Kondo	Good Governance Coordination Officer
Ministry of Social Welfare Youth Women and Children Development	Fatma G. Bilal	Principal Secretary
	Ms Mhaza Gharib Juma	Leader for Pillar II
	Ms. Wahida Maabad	
Ministry of Education and Vocational Training, Zanzibar	Mr. Abdulla M. Abdulla	Deputy Principal Secretary
	Ms. Madina M. Mwinyi	Director Policy and Planning
	Mr. Rijal A. Rijaal	Donor Aid Coordinator
Ministry of Trade, Industry & Marketing	Mr Rashid A. Salim	Deputy Principal Secretary
	Mr. Tahir	Zanzibar Business Information Centre
ZAWA	Mr. Omar Mshindo Bakar	Director, Pemba Branch

	Mr. Rashid Mohamed Yussuf	Planning & Design Engineer
	Mr Ahmad Musa	Chief Technician, Pemba
	Mr Juma Ali Othman	Pemba
	Mr. Bakari Juma	Pemba
Micheweni, Pemba	Ms Asha Yussufu Hassan	Sheha, Maziwang'ombe
	Khair J. Mjaja	Ministry of Information
	Ismail A. Juma	Ministry of Health
	Khamis S. Mohamed	MOVET
	H. M. Rashid	Zawa
	Mr. Addi Juma Faki	Coordinator, Pemba
	Mr Issa Nassor Bakar	Ministry of Agriculture, Pemba
	Ali Badru Ali	Ministry of Agriculture, Pemba
	Abdulla Khamis Hamad	Ministry of Agriculture, Pemba
	Ali Khamis Ali	Ministry of Livestock, Pemba
	Hasnou Kwait	Ministry of Livestock, Pemba
Zanzibar Municipal Council	Mr. Mzee Kh. Juma	Deputy Director
Participating UN Agencies and Other Development Partners		
United Nations Development Program (UNDP)	Mr. Philippe Poinot	Country Director
	Ms. Louise Chamberlain	Deputy Country Director (Programme)
	Dr. Karna Soro	UN Team Leader & UNRC Liaison Officer for Zanzibar
	Mr Chrispian Petro Kapainga	Programme Analyst, Development Management & Monitoring
	Mr. Ernest Salla	Assistant Resident Representative (PP/WC)
	Mr. George Otoo	Operations Advisor
	Mr. Ishmael Dodoo	Head, Management Support
	Mr. Ali Shaib	Finance & Administrative Officer, ZSO
	Ms. Njeri Kamau	Program Officer, Zanzibar
	Ms. Edna Gathigia	JP5 Coordinator, UNV Zanzibar
	Ms. Fortunata Chuwa	Program Officer, UNV Zanzibar
	Mr. Juma Bakar Alawi	UNV JP5 Chake Chake
ILO	Ms. Hopolag Phororo	Deputy Director,
	Ms. Flora Nyambo Minja	National Programme Coordinator
	Ms Fatma M. Rashid	Liaison Officer, Zanzibar
FAO	Mr. Ali Haji Rahadhan	National Coordinator, Zanzibar
	Aisja Frenken	Programme officer
UNFPA	Dr. Julitta Onabanjo	Representative
	Dr. Esther Muia	Deputy Representative
	Dr. Rita Noronha	Health Systems Specialist
	Ms. Christine Mwanukuzi –Kwayu	National Programme Officer
	Ms. Felister Mayala Bwana	National Program Officer, Reproductive Health
	Samweli Elisa Msokwa	Poverty & Population Analyst
WHO	Dr. Theopista John	National Professional Officer, FHP
UNESCO	Mr. Al Amin Yusuph	Program Officer Communication & Information
UNICEF	Mr. Abheet Solomon	Chief, Planning Monitoring and Evaluation
	Ms. Vicky Chuwa	
	Ms. Eliphase Kamugisha;	Child Specialist, Zanzibar
WFP	Mr. Juvenal Kisanga	Programme Officer (VAM)
UNIDO	Ms. Juliex Kabege	Programme Officer
	Mr. Emmanuel Michael	Energy Expert
	Medordi Byakugila	UNIDO Zanzibar
High Commission of Canada (CIDA)	Mr Christian DaSilva & Mr. Robert Orr	Councillor (Development) & Canadian High Commissioner

Annex 2: Bibliography and References

1. A multisectoral strategy and action plan for prevention and responding to gender based Violence (GBV) in Zanzibar; 2011
2. Capacity Building Support to Zanzibar: UN JP5 Project Brief on Pillar I: Wealth creation, economic empowerment and employment: Documentation on Good Practices and Lessons Learnt (FAO, ILO, UNIDO) UN Tanzania
3. Joint Programme 6.2; Strengthening National Disaster Preparedness and Response Capacity; end of programme evaluation Final report; July 2011
4. Joint Programme Mid Year standard progress report, delivery as one Tanzania, 2008, 2009, 2010
5. Joint UN Programme Planning Process, Lesson Learned in Zanzibar; Draft paper, Abheet Solomon, 12 June 2009
6. JP5 Annual reports; 2008; 2009; 2010
7. JP5 annual workplans and budget; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011
8. JP5 Field Monitoring visit reports
9. JP5 project document, September 2007
10. JP5; UNCMT Mission to Zanzibar Brief Note; October 2010
11. UN One programme 2009 annual report, delivering as one pilot programme in Tanzania
12. Road Map to Accelerate the Reduction of Maternal, Newborn and Child Mortality in Zanzibar, (2008 – 2015)
13. Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (ZSGRP) MKUZA I, January 2007
14. Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (ZSGRP) 2010-2015: MKUZA II, October 2010
15. Delivering as One in Tanzania: Annual Reports 2008, 2009, 2010, UNDP Tanzania
16. Stocking Report on UN reform in Tanzania, 2008, UN Tanzania
17. Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) 2007-2010, UNDP Tanzania
18. Report of Public Expenditure Tracking System (PETS), ANGOZA, October 2010
19. JP5 Joint Programme Workplans, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011
20. United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF, 2007-2010), UN Tanzania
21. United Nations Development Assistance Plan (UNDAP, July 2010- June 2015), UN Tanzania
22. JP5 Joint Programme Annual Reports 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011
23. UNCMT Mission to Zanzibar, Briefing Note, 30-1 October 2010, UN Tanzania
24. ZMPC Meeting Minutes and Decisions: 15 January 2008, June 20, 2008, 27 October 2008, 10 August 2010, Approval of 2009-2010 Workplan, UN Tanzania
25. National Action Plan for the Elimination of Child Labour, 2009-2015, MLYWCD, UN Tanzania
26. Field Monitoring Visit Report in Selected Areas for Pillar I, 27-30 April 2011
27. JP5 Memorandum of Understanding between Participating UN Organizations and UNDP, January 2008
28. One UN Pilot Programme Tanzania, Capacity Building Support to Zanzibar, September 2007 – December 2008, UNDP Tanzania, Sept 3, 2007
29. Delivering as One 2007-11: Guidelines for Joint Programme Evaluations: ToRs: Requisite Components
30. Brief Report on Prof. Jeffery Sachs Official Visit to Zanzibar, 8 January, 2007
31. Zanzibar Food Security and Nutrition Programme and Policy, April 2008
32. Zanzibar Food Balance Sheet Report for 2007, Zanzibar FSN Programme, MALE, October 2009
33. Zanzibar National Export Strategy 2009-2015, Commonwealth Secretariat
34. ZINDUKA, Quarterly Magazine, April-June 2010
35. Tanzania's cooperatives look to the future, Andrew Bibby, January 2006
36. Study identify limiting factors for engagement of local communities in the tourism sector in Zanzibar, August 2010
37. Project Brief: Kisakasaka Renewable Energy ICT centre in Zanzibar, November 2011, Emmanuel G. Michael

Annex 3 – Financial Tables

2008 (a) Pillar	Estimated budget	% of budget	Funded	% funded	Unfunded budget	% unfunded
Pillar I	2,397,000	43.0%	132,000	5.5%	2,265,000	94.5%
Pillar II	2,495,000	44.7%	556,450	22.3%	1,938,550	77.7%
Pillar III	684,000	12.3%	192,800	28.2%	491,200	71.8%
Total	5,576,000		881,250		4,694,750	
% Allocation	100%		15.8%		84.2%	

2008 (b) Pillar	Total budget	% of budget	Funded	% funded	One Fund 2008	One Fund Jan-Jun 2009	% One Fund
Pillar I	1,630,000	26.5%	130,000	8.0%	534,000	966,000	92.0%
Pillar II	2,806,450	45.6%	806,450	28.7%	1,310,550	689,450	71.3%
Pillar III	1,714,300	27.9%	714,300	41.7%	390,000	610,000	58.3%
Total	6,150,750		1,650,750		2,234,550	2,265,450	
% Allocation	100%		26.8%		73.2% (4,500,000)		

2009 Pillar (Nex)	Total budget	% of budget	Parallel		% Parallel (% secure)	Pooled		One Fund		% One Fund (% secure)
			Secure	Unsecure		Secure	Unsecure	Secure	Unsecure	
Pillar I (840,000)	1,965,660	31.8%	133,000	200,000	16.9% (6.8%)				1,632,660	81.4% (0.0%)
Pillar II (906,400)	1,521,500	33.6%	395,000		26.0%				1,126,500	74.0% (0.0%)
Pillar III (1.5 mil)	1,860,000	26.0%							1,860,000	100% (0.0%)
Pillar V (500,000)	500,000	8.5%							500,000	100% (0.0%)
Total (3.8 mil)	5,847,160		528,000	200,000					5,119,160	
% Allocation (64.3%)	100%		9.0%	3.4%					87.5%	

2010 Pillar (Nex PUN/IP)	Total budget	% of budget	Parallel		% Parallel	Pooled		One Fund		% One Fund
			Secure	Unsecure		Secure	Unsecure	Secure	Unsecure	
Pillar I (281,290/ 604,822)	923,517	27.0%	198,935		21.5%			724,582		78.5%
Pillar II (14,000/ 917,500)	1,061,500	31.4%	463,000		43.6%			598,500		56.4%
Pillar III (197,080/ 737,680)	934,760	27.0%	195,000		20.9%			739,760		79.1%
Pillar V (9,858/ 458,323)	458,323	13.5%						458,323		100%
Total (0.5 mil/ 2.7 mil)	3,378,100		856,935					2,521,165		
% Allocation (14.9%/ 80.5%)	100%		25.4%					74.6%		

2011 Pillar (Nex PUN/IP)	Total budget	% of budget	Parallel		% Parallel	Pooled		One Fund		% One Fund
			Secure	Unsecure		Secure	Unsecure	Secure	Unsecure	
Pillar I (415,000/ 206,468)	621,468	33.8%	30,000		4.8%			591,468		95.2%
Pillar II (0.0/ 711,599)	711,599	38.7%	333,000		46.8%			378,599		53.2%
Pillar III (199,640/ 176,637)	376,277	20.4%		179,640	(47.7%)			196,637		52.3%
Pillar V (0.0/ 127,168)	127,168	6.9%						127,168		100%
Total (614,640/ 1.2 mil)	1,836,512		363,000	179,640				1,293,872		
% Allocation (33.5%/ 65.3%)	100%		19.8%	9.8%				70.5%		

Annex 4: Outputs and Targets for JP5 Outcomes

Outcome	Outputs	Targets / Indicators
Outcome 1: National capacity to manage and monitor food security and nutrition strengthened IP: MALE PUN: FAO	1.2 National Food Security and Nutrition Division is able to plan, implement and monitor FSN interventions 1.3 Monitoring system for FSN and SUA/FBS established at MALE 1.4 Zanzibar Agricultural Marketing Policy (ZAMP) and implementation plan are formalized and implementation underway 1.5 District Management teams (DMT) and shehia FSN committees in 2 districts are able to plan for FSN interventions 1.6 Promote and support capacity building to FFS to stimulate increased food availability at the national and household level 1.7 National and sector policies are in line with the Zanzibar FSN policy and programme.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FSN training conducted • FSN Bill endorsed ... by March 2011 • STC institutionalized and members appointed • Needs assessment for FSN data completed • Monitoring needs assessment for 1st generation FSN M&E • Policy brief to inform stakeholders on FSN issues • Agricultural Marketing Policy approved • 2 districts formulated FSN action plans and applying FSN planning methods • 150 farmers trained in rice seed production and management of quality seed
Outcome 2: Support the RGoZ on Implementation of a Job Creation Programme	2.2 Action plan to support local communities in low participating regions to engage in tourism-related business developed 2.3 Trade information on marketing, price, packaging, credit facilities accessed by SME and business community strengthened 2.4 Enterprise product development and marketing promoted 2.5 MTTI assisted to ensure SMEs meet standard in legal metrology 2.6 ZNCCIA has capacity for PPP dialogue promotion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 50 SME groups engaging in tourism activities • Business directory comprising 200 different SMEs • 20 MTTI staff are imparted with necessary skills to administer legal metrology equipments • ?
Outcome 3: Support pilot interventions for enhanced productivity and value chain in seaweed and agro processing	3.1 Local products of SMEs dealing with food processing promoted 3.2 Pilot agro-food SMEs upgrade production output and promoted 3.3 Support MTTI to set up 4 pilot centres for demonstration of renewable energy use for productive use 3.4 Capacity of MTTI to manage agro-food processing training, counseling and consultancy services to SMEs strengthened	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 pilot agro food center in operation • Pilot centres for demonstration of renewable energy established to 4 different communities
Outcome 4: The capacity of OCGS to carry out job creation projection arising from manufacturing industry enhanced	4.1 OCGS assisted to undertake industrial census	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Industrial Census Report

Outcome	Outputs	Targets / Indicators
Outcome 5: Implementation of employment policy, job creation programmes and youth employment action plans enhanced IP: MLYWCD (MLEC) PUN: ILO/	5.1 Implementation of Job Creation Programme, Youth Employment Action Plan supported 5.2 Entrepreneurship centres for enhancing employment opportunities for young women and men supported 5.3 Implementation of the Action Plan for minimizing child labour in Zanzibar supported 5.4 Policy framework for supporting Social Protection in place and endorsed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MSME groups of young women and men trained and able to diversify, develop new products and improve quality and quantity of their products • Child labour unit is strengthened and its structure supported • X professionals trained (9 officials trained on extension of social protection ... by June 2009) • Social protection policy and action plan in place • ...Social protection expenditure review completed • Employment policy approved by the House of Representatives • Fully functional LMI ... by June 2009
Outcome 6: Safety and health issues at the workplace addressed	6.1 Regulations for Employment Act 2005 and OSH Act 2005 drafted and endorsed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •
Outcome 7: Institutional support and mechanisms for enhancing employment creation in place	7.1 Systems and procedures in place for supporting implementation of employment policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Draft legal framework for employment promotion in place • CEB toolkit on mainstreaming decent work piloted • Number of groups of women, young women and men engaged in municipal service delivery supported • Apprenticeship training programme developed • Minimum wage study in place

Outcome 8 : Reduction of maternal newborn and child mortality and improved social services and outcome		
no.	Outputs	Targets
8.1	Roadmap to accelerate the reduction of maternal and newborn mortality finalized, costed .and distributed	By June 2009, the Roadmap finalized, costed, printed and distributed
8.2	Strengthened capacity of primary and referral health facilities to provide quality maternal, newborn and child health care	By June 2009, the M&E framework for MNCH is in place and functional.
8.3	Strengthened capacity of District Health Management Teams (DHMTs) to prioritize and monitor maternal, newborn and child health interventions	By June 2009, 40% of health facilities provide MNCH according to National guidelines.

8.4	Enhanced capacity of multi-sectoral stakeholder to prevent and respond to GBV and child rights abuse	By June 2009, 75% of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and other stakeholders trained on GBV, women and children's rights and protection; & multi-sectoral strategic framework for addressing GBV in place
8.5	Improved coverage of social services (health, education, water and sanitation) for the most vulnerable in selected areas	Improved coverage of social services (health, education, water and sanitation) in selected areas
Outcome 9: Increased & equitable access to comprehensive Maternal Newborn Child Health (MNCH)		
9.1	Tertiary, District and Primary Health Care Centre facilities have capacity to provide quality EmOC, Newborn and Postnatal services by 2011.	At least 2 PHCU+ per district have the capacity to provide EmOC by March 2011.
9.2	Health sector Policies and strategies prioritize MNCH issues by 2010.	All 10 DHPs in Zanzibar incorporate full package gender sensitive MNCH care by March 2011
9.3	Existing monitoring systems (HMIS, DHS and MKUZA Monitoring) integrate MNCH indicators by 2011.	Health sector Policies and strategies prioritize MNCH issues by 2010
9.4	Enhanced capacity of DHMTs to operationalized the Roadmap to accelerate the reduction of Maternal, Newborn and Child Mortality.	All MNCH indicators stipulated in the roadmap are reflected in DHS and HIMS by March 2011

Outcome	Outputs	Targets
Outcome 10: Improved water and sanitation to selected areas with poor clean & safe water in Zanzibar	10.1 Communities of Mkwajuni and Kivunge in North "A" are supplied with stable service of clean and safe water by 2011	-By March 2011, the communities will experience stable water supply services -By March 2011 Sixty Shehia facilitators from 30 Shehias trained on PHAST.
	10.2 Improved sanitation practices in selected areas by June 2010	30 village Artisans trained on latrine construction.
	10.3 Communities in West District of Unguja have the capacity to improve sanitary conditions.	-Demonstration sites for latrines constructed. -Monitoring and supervision activities conducted by steering committee

Outcome 11: Capacity within MLYWCD to promote gender equality & women's empowerment is enhanced	Outputs	Targets
	11.1 Gender policy reviewed, finalized and disseminated 11.2 MLYWCD is able to coordinate the development and implementation of a GBV specific Action Plan. 11.3 Awareness on GBV within MLYWCD, other key MDAs and CSOs is raised.	By March 2011 the gender policy approved and 1000 copies printed Multisectoral action plan in place by Feb 2011 GBV manual for health service providers developed

	Outputs	targets
Outcome 12: Improved implementation of educational programmes including teaching & learning environments at primary & secondary schools in Zanzibar.	12.1: Assist in instituting child friendly schools (CFS) principles/elements in ZNZ schools	By December 2010, there is improved teaching, learning and ability to apply participatory teaching methods in selected schools
	12.2: Teachers in all pre-primary & primary schools have the capacity to promote performance and retention of girls in basic education.	Schools with classroom desks by March 2011
		Nine (9) secondary school classes in North 'A' District is equipped with new school desks.
	12.3 Enhanced capacity of pre-primary and primary schools in Zanzibar to implement Child Friendly principles and capacities to use EMIS are built.	505 teachers are trained in EMIS in all 10 districts in Zanzibar.
		60 pre primary teachers are trained in ECD. (In all trainings, at least 50% of participants are female). 170 teachers are upgraded from pre to primary.

Pillars/ Outcomes	Outputs	Targets / Indicators
PILLAR III: NATIONAL CAPACITY FOR DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT		
Outcome 15: Zanzibar government capacity to plan, implement, monitor and report on development results improved IP: PUN: UNDP	15.2 RGoZ capacity to coordinate and implement public finance and economic management reform and other selected reform programmes strengthened	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Key core reform-related documents produced • Aid Management Platform database • Staff in DEF trained to produce quality reports • Staff in DEF skilled in negotiation and financial agreements • Staff in MDAs and CSOs are aware of Aid effectiveness agenda • Capacity to formulate budget aligned with MKUZA • Staff guided on budget preparation • MKUZA II in place • TGWs conduct bi-monthly meetings • 1 Research management and secondary data analysis training • Policy briefs on ZHDR • 2000 copies of ZINDUKA newsletter produced each quarter • Training on births and deaths to local registers in Urban, West and Chake Chake districts • Judiciary PER completed • 4 IT manages trained on advanced web design • Harmonized COICOP codes for HBS and CPI • Better use of ICT for Government and NSAs
	15.3 The capacity of RGoZ to formulate, implement and monitor MKUZA strengthened	
	15.4 Enhance national capacity to provide, transfer and make use of ICT knowledge in schools, Government institutions and NSAs	
Outcome 16: Good governance principles of MDAs and participation of NSAs in decision making (including those representing women and other vulnerable groups) promoted	16.1 Strengthened selected institutions of oversight and accountability of the RgoZ in support of good governance principles and use of information at MDAs and LGAs (esp, MoCAGG)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Principles of good governance are well monitored in all MDAs and LGAs • Health Public Expenditure Tracking report
	16.2 NSAs have the capacity to participate in policy development and implementation	

Outcome 17: Improved respect and observance of rule of law and justice and stronger oversight institutions of the RGoZ	17.1 Strengthen the independent office of the DPP to provide and oversee the rule of law and access to justice including the police 17.2 Improved political tolerance, peace, harmony and better respect for human rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5 state attorneys have prosecutorial skills • 800 copies of the Shahidi Journal produced and disseminated • LAN connection in DPP Office • Improvements in human rights and rule of law for the police, special departments, magistrates, prosecutors from DPP office, etc.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

	Outputs	Targets
Outcome 18: Increased support to integrated development interventions in Micheweni and other vulnerable areas	18.1: Selected Shehias in Micheweni district access uninterrupted safe and clean water supply and improved sanitation	1327 HHs have access to clean & safe water supply by March 2011.
	18.2: Food security and income generation of selected communities in Micheweni district improved	Reduction of population below food poverty line from 33.35% to 30.0% by Mar 2011. Reduction of basic needs poverty line from 74.2% to 70.0% by March 2011.
	18.3: Gross enrolment rate and retention in selected areas of Micheweni district improved	A nursery school in place enrolling 150 pupils by March 2011.
	18.4: Strengthened maternal, child care and other health services at Maziwa Ng'ombe Shehia	PHCU in place serving 80% of Chimba population by March 2011.
	18.5: The community radio in Micheweni district has the capacity to mobilize participation of community members in development activities.	At least 60% of Micheweni population has access to FM Radio programmes through private or public media by March 2011. At least 50% of all secondary schools in Micheweni have access to the multimedia resource centre by March 2011.

Annex 5: Rating of JP5 Performance by Outcome

Table 5.1: Outcome 1: Food Security and Nutrition

Programme Result	Targets	Achievements	Comments/Rating
2008 Output 5: Strengthen capacity of government to monitor and manage food security and nutrition and food safety		<u>Reported in 2009</u>	• Satisfactory (B)
2.1 Strengthen entrepreneurship, etc.	• Number of FFS established	• 29 FFS with 480 farmers established	• Increase in poultry & rice production (30%)
5.1 Strengthen FSN information and early warning system, including improving agricultural routine data and the development of an M&E system for ZFSN programme	<u>Indicators/Targets:</u> • M&E framework to monitor FSN • Baseline studies and FSN Division established • # of stakeholders trained to use Rural Invest tool	<u>Reported in 2009</u> • First phase of FSN M&E framework in place with 20 staff (40% female) trained on FSN data collection • Baseline studies partly complete • No progress. Consultancy not arranged for RI	• Satisfactory (B) • Partially achieved, as the M&E team's ability to monitor and manage FSN and food safety was enhanced with training in collection and analysis of data as well as the completion of a draft M&E framework
5.2 Support reduction of post harvest losses and development of Agricultural Marketing Policy and Strategy	• ZAMP in place	• Draft ZAMP finalized and is expected to be approved by June 2010	• Satisfactory (B) • Targets were met, but there were delays
5.3 Strengthen household and community support mechanisms to ensure FSN for vulnerable groups by strengthening district level FSN planning	• DMTs and shehia FSN committees in two selected districts are able to plan for FSN interventions	• 12 facilitators trained to provide training to FFS (targeted 42 FFSs with 250 farmers capable of producing improved rice seed under irrigation systems)	• Highly satisfactory (A) • FFS program was very successful: stimulated increased production and established pre-market links, which will increase sustainability
2009 Outcome 1: Food Security and Nutrition		•	• Satisfactory (B)
Output 1.1: NFSND able to plan, implement and monitor FSN interventions	• <u>Planned in 2010</u> • FSN training for NFSND • ISSC trained in human rights and right to food (HRTF) • FSN Bill endorsed • STC institutionalized and members appointed	• <u>Reported in 2010</u> • 8 participants trained in FSN • 15 trained in right to food • FSN Bill ready for endorsement • No progress reported	• Satisfactory (B) • Partly achieved • The M&E team's ability to monitor and manage FSN and food safety enhanced through training in collection and analysis of data • Addressed national priorities
Output 1.2: Monitoring system for FSN established at MALE	• Needs assessment for FSN data completed • Monitoring needs assessment for 1st generation FSN M&E • Policy brief to inform stakeholders on FSN issues	• M&E framework for collecting FSN data in place • 1st generation FSN M&E framework operational • 1 st draft of 2009 SUA/FBS report disseminated	• Satisfactory (B) • Mostly achieved • This led to the government initiating a study on establishment of a national food reserve as part of their safety net measures

Output 1.3: ZAMP policy & implementation plan formalized	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agricultural Marketing Policy approved 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ZAMP document submitted to MALE for approval • Achieved 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Satisfactory (B) • A Task Force Team was formed to prepare implementation strategy for the policy
Output 1.4: DMTs & Shehia FSN committees able to plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 districts able to formulate FSN action plans and apply FSN planning methods 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DMTs & Shehia FSN committees established • Training needs assessment conducted & training in FSN analysis • FSN situational analysis • Achieved 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Satisfactory (B) • District-specific FSN action plans were formulated • Local capacity was built to generate FSN data at a sub-national level, enhancing decentralized decision making
Output 1.5: Support capacity building for FFS to stimulate increased food production	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 150 farmers trained in rice seed production and management of quality seed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 150 farmers from 7 FFS participated in on-farm training in rice seed production 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highly satisfactory (A) • Achieved • Resulted in increased food production, food security and income.

Table 5.2: Outcome 2: Job Creation

Programme Result	Targets/Indicators	Achievements	Comments/Rating
2008 Output 1/2: Strengthened capacity... changed to Key Result #3: Job Creation Prog		<u>Reported in 2009</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marginally satisfactory (C)
No activity identified in 2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Output 3.1 added in 2009: Action plan to support local communities in low participating regions to engage in tourism business developed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initial preparations: developed ToRs and selected consultant to carry out assessment survey 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marginally satisfactory (C)
Activity 1.2: TA in increasing trade information availability and trade negotiation capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Changed to Output 3.2 in 2009 report: Trade Information on marketing, price, packaging, credit facilities accessed by SME and business community strengthened 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Delayed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unsatisfactory (E)
2009 Outcome 2: Support RoGZ on Implementation of a Job Creation Programme		Supported Job Creation Programme under SMEDP. Improved entrepreneurship capacity of youth and women.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marginally satisfactory (C)
Output 2.1: Action plan to support communities engaging in tourism-related business	<u>Indicators/Targets:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Action plan for engaging communities • 50 SME groups engaging in tourism activities • 	<u>Reported in 2010</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Action plan in place • 7 SMEs trained 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marginally unsatisfactory (D) • Achieved, but no strategy or funds for follow up • 14% fulfilled • Income streams and economic activities have been diversified

Output 2.2: Trade information on marketing, price, packaging, credit facilities accessed by SME and business community	•	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Postponed Planned for next year 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unsatisfactory (E) Not achieved SMEs are not making use of information in the centre
Output 2.3: Enterprise product development and marketing promoted	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Business directory of 200 SMEs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Directory completed and distributed 50 SMEs trained on identified gaps 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Marginally satisfactory (C) Achieved but no indication of the utility or impact of training A survey revealed gaps in marketing, laws and procedures governing business, pricing and customer care
Output 2.4: MTTI assisted to ensure SMEs meet standard in legal metrology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 20 MTTI staff are imparted with necessary skills to administer legal metrology equipments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weights and measure equipment procured 20 staff trained 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Satisfactory (B) Achieved Institutional capacity & equipment strengthened in MTTI to improve business practices
Output 2.5: ZNCCIA has capacity for PPP dialogue promotion		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Postponed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unsatisfactory (E) Not achieved Not implemented because of lack of funds

Table 5.3: Outcome 3: Support pilot interventions for enhanced productivity and value chain in seaweed and agro processing

Programme Result	Targets/Indicators	Achievements	Comments/Rating
2008 Output 2: Strengthened entrepreneurship capacity and access to micro-finance services focusing on groups of youth, women, PLHA and the disabled		<u>Reported in 2009</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Marginally satisfactory (C)
<u>Activity 2.1:</u> Provide training & mentoring for market access through entrepreneurial and ICT skills to groups of youth, women, PLHAs and disabled <u>Activity 2.2:</u> Promote dialogue between MFIs and MSMEs on financial policies and funding sources for micro finance services targeting groups of youth, women, PLHA and the disabled	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Skills on product design and improvement done to 20% of youth, women, PLHA, disabled Support 10 groups/associations Curriculum developed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not achieved Achieved Achieved 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Marginally satisfactory (C)
2009 Outcome 3: Support pilot interventions for enhanced productivity and value chain in seaweed and agro processing		<u>Reported in 2010</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Marginally satisfactory (C)

Output 3.1: Local products of SMEs dealing with food processing promoted	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Study on food processing • Action plan to promote SME products 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No information on progress 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ?
Output 3.2: Pilot agro-food SMEs upgrade production output and promoted	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 pilot agro food centers in operation • Training for 50 SMEs in packaging and marketing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 pilot centres established (100%) • 30 community members trained in value added fish smoking • 50 youth trained on seaweed value addition 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Satisfactory (B) • SMEs showcased seaweed products (desserts, powder, shampoo, soft drinks) at the Dar Trade Fair, July 2010 • Empowered women, increased income by 50%
Output 3.3: Support MTTI to set up 4 pilot centres for demonstration of renewable energy use for productive use	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pilot centres for demonstration of renewable energy established in 4 different communities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One centre established in Kisakasaka (25%) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marginally unsatisfactory (D) • Now that most people are connected to the grid, the utility of the centre is reduced • The plan now is to turn the centre into a community IT centre
Output 3.4: Capacity of MTTI to manage agro-food processing training, counseling and consultancy services to SMEs strengthened	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 25 trainers from MTTI, MALE, etc., undertake ToT on food processing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Postponed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unsatisfactory (E)

Table 5.4: Outcome 4: Enhanced capacity of OCGS to carry out job creation projection arising from manufacturing industry

Programme Result	Targets/Indicators	Achievements	Comments/Rating
2008 Output: none		<u>Reported in 2009</u>	•
No intervention planned in 2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Output 5 added in 2009: OCGS assisted to undertake industrial census 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provision of a projector, and 2 laptop and 3 desktop computers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Satisfactory (B)
2009 Outcome 4: The capacity of OCGS to carry out job creation projection arising from manufacturing industry enhanced			• Satisfactory (B)
Output 4.1: OCGS assisted to undertake industrial census	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Industrial Census Report 	<u>Reported in 2010</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Industrial census undertaken and printed. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Achieved • Improved the capacity of OCGS to carry out an industrial census

Table 5.5: Outcome 5: Implementation of employment policy, job creation programmes and youth employment action plans enhanced

Programme Result	Targets/Indicators	Achievements	Comments/Rating
2008		<u>Reported in 2009</u>	Satisfactory (B)
2008 Output 1: Strengthened capacity of government institutions, private sector and CSOs in SME policy and labour laws from a gender perspective	<u>Targets:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 200 SME groups of men, women and people with special needs aware of the SME policy & labour laws (ILO/UNIDO) • 8 labour and SME institutions supported to implement labor laws and SME policy (ILO/UNIDO) • 50 key stakeholders trained on implementation of SME policy and labor laws (ILO/UNIDO) • 500 (50% girls) children to be withdrawn from child labor and re-integrated in primary school and vocational training (ILO) 	<u>Reported as 1.1</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 58% fulfilled (= 116 groups?) • 63% fulfilled (= 5 institutions?) • 106% fulfilled (= 53 trained?) • 246% fulfilled (= 1230 children reintegrated) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Satisfactory (B) • But it is unclear what was the result of the ILO training
2: Strengthen entrepreneurship capacity and access to micro finance services with a focus on groups of youth, women, PLHA and disabled	<u>Indicators/Targets:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 400 groups of youth, women, PLHA and disabled trained in entrepreneurship and ICT skills/access microfinance (ILO) • Skills on product design and improvement done to 20% of youth, women, PLHA, disabled (ILO) • Support 10 groups/associations (FAO) • Develop curriculum 	<u>Reported as 1.2</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 610 SMEs trained in association building, entrepreneurship, business & financial management, record keeping + 40 new SMEs established through umbrella associations • Report says 115% achievement, which would be 460 groups trained. (610 would be 153%?) • Not achieved (in discussion with MFIs) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Satisfactory (B) • It is difficult to ascertain the utility of the training and the strength of the capacity building activities beyond the numbers trained, which do not always match the indicators and targets • It is unclear what the training resulted in and what the targets vs indicators were (FFS, microfinance?)
3: Comprehensive diagnostic of Zanzibar needs for social protection undertaken	<u>Indicators/Targets:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No of officials trained in social protection • Action plan for social protection • No of people benefiting from SP • Social Protection Expenditure Review • Tripartite steering committee 	<u>Achievements: 1.3</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 8 officials trained on social protection • Action plan not complete • No measurement of beneficiaries • Social Protection Expenditure Review and Social Budget drafted • Steering committee and a working group established 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marginally Satisfactory (C) • Partially achieved • Good progress toward putting social protection policy and action plan in place with the establishment of a steering committee (9 members) and technical working group (15)

4: Enhanced capacity for ministries, workers and employers organizations, private sector and civil society groups to implement employment policy, job creation and Youth Action Plan	<u>Indicators:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Youth Entrepreneurship Centres in place Apprenticeship system in place No of MDAs adopting gender mainstreaming <u>Targets:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Employment policy in place Functional LMI 	<u>Progress: 1.4</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Construction of youth centre begun Draft apprenticeship policy validated by stakeholders <u>Achievements:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Employment policy launched April 2009 Fulfilled 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Satisfactory (C) Mostly achieved Increased awareness of employment creation among MDAs led to incorporation of employment targets in MTEFs ZMC has begun to outsource services to CBOs In 2011, 10 people from Labour, OCGS, ZSSF were trained in LMIS management
2009 Outcome 5: Implementation of employment policy, job creation programmes and youth employment action plans enhanced		<u>Reported in 2010</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 50% of outputs achieved 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Satisfactory (B)
Output 5.1: Implementation of Job Creation Programme, Youth Employment Action Plan supported	<u>Indicator/Target:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> MSME groups of young women and men trained and able to diversify, develop new products and improve quality and quantity of their products 	<u>Reported in 2010</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 5 enterprises/co-ops 408 (97% women) and 556 (94% women) trained in dairy processing, livestock mgt, business mgt, etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Satisfactory (B) Output 7.1 should have been included with 5.1 as the outputs are linked
Output 5.2: Entrepreneurship centres for enhancing employment opportunities for young women and men supported	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MSME groups of young women and men trained and able to diversify, develop new products and improve quality and quantity of their products 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implementation postponed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unsatisfactory (E)
Output 5.3: Implementation of the Action Plan for minimizing child labour in Zanzibar supported	<u>Indicator:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of district officials, teachers and other key actors trained; Number of young and older girls and boys identified, withdrawn, rehabilitated and reintegrated into basic education and vocational training <u>Target:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Child labour unit is strengthened and its structure supported 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 30 teachers trained on child labour issues & validated child labour educational materials More than 200 children (7-13) withdrawn from child labour and integrated into schools <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Target not achieved, planned for next phase 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Satisfactory (B) Increased awareness of children's rights among Labour Commission, employers associations and schools and children past school age provided an opportunity to learn vocational skills Unsatisfactory (E)
Output 5.4: Policy framework for supporting Social Protection in place and endorsed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No of professionals trained Social protection policy and action plan in place 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 8 officials trained on extension of social protection ToRs for implementation structure drawn up, and a consultant identified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Satisfactory (B) Largely achieved, as preparations for the implementation of social protection policy begun, and the capacity of key stakeholders from government institutions and social partners was developed

Table 5.6: Outcome 6: Safety and health issues at the workplace addressed

Programme Result	Targets/Indicators	Achievements	Comments/Rating
2008 Output: none		•	• Unsatisfactory (E)
2009 Outcome 6: Safety and health issues at the workplace addressed		<u>Reported in 2010</u> • Implementation delayed	• Not achieved
Output 6.1: Regulations for Workers Compensation Act 2005 and OSH Act 2005 drafted and endorsed	<u>Indicators/Targets:</u> • None	• None	• Not achieved

Table 5.7: Outcome 7: Institutional support and mechanisms for enhancing employment creation

Programme Result	Targets/Indicators	Achievements	Comments/Rating
2008 Output: Reported under Output 1.4: Enhanced capacity for job creation, etc.		<u>Reported in 2009</u> • ZMC realized the need to outsource to CBOs	•
2009 Outcome 7: Institutional support and mechanisms for enhancing employment creation in place		<u>Reported in 2010</u> • Ministry of Labour, Labour Commission and Employers Association developed a 5-year strategic plan with targets on enterprise development & employment creation	• Satisfactory (B) • Key policy documents formulated and awaiting validation by stakeholders
Output 7.1: Systems and procedures in place for supporting implementation of employment policy	<u>Indicators/Targets:</u> • Draft legal framework for employment promotion • CEB toolkit on mainstreaming decent work piloted • Number of groups of women, young women and men engaged in municipal service delivery supported • Apprenticeship training programme developed • Minimum wage study in place	<u>Achievements:</u> • Employment promotion bill drafted • Not achieved • Draft workplan developed by Zanzibar Municipal Council • Draft policy awaiting validation • Reports for minimum wage and working conditions completed	• Satisfactory (B) • Good progress • Output 7.1 should have been included with 5.1 as the outputs are linked

Table 5.8: Outcomes 8 and 9: Reduction of maternal newborn and child mortality and improved social services and Increased and equitable access to comprehensive MNCH

Output(s)/Outcome	Rating	Justification
Outcome 8: Reduction of MNCHM	Marginally Satisfactory (C)	Only about 60% of planned activities were implemented. Results were not achieved on time
8.1: Roadmap to accelerate the reduction of MNCHM finalized, costed and distributed	Marginally Satisfactory (C)	60% implementation. The M&E framework for MNCH was never developed.

8.2: Strengthened capacity of primary and referral health facilities to provide quality MNCH care	Marginally Unsatisfactory (D)	EmOC was one of key activity but was not implemented. Diverging funds to cover for power emergency affected the delivery rate.
8.3: Strengthened capacity of DHMTs to prioritize and monitor maternal, newborn and child health interventions	Marginally Satisfactory (C)	Only about 50% implementation of planned main interventions
8.4: Enhanced capacity of multi-sectoral stakeholder to prevent and respond to GBV and child rights abuse	Highly Satisfactory (A)	One Stop Centre for GBV in Mnazi Mmoja Hospital is one of transformation results under JP5. Several upstream achievements were also recorded under challenging working setting.

Table 5.10: Outcome 10: improved water and sanitation to selected areas with poor access to clean and safe water in Zanzibar

Output(s)/Outcome	Rating	Justification
Outcome 10: Improved water and sanitation to selected areas with poor access to clean and safe water in Zanzibar	Marginally Satisfactory (C)	JP5 support recorded achievements of its major objectives; improved sanitations but with significant shortcomings in improving supply of clear, stable and safe water to Mkwajuni and Kivunje communities.
10.1: Communities in Mkwajuni and Kivunje in North 'A' district supplied with stable service of clean and safe water by 2011	Unsatisfactory (E)	JP5 supported came to end in July 2011. By September 2011, major milestone on the project had not yield any satisfactory benefits [Aimtonga is to check with ZAWA, as they felt something was done
10.2 Improved sanitation practices in selected areas by June 2010	Satisfactory (B)	JP5 support achieved most of its major district objectives; awareness and construction of ECOSAN latrines and yield satisfactory benefits to targeted communities. Minor shortcoming was lack of conducting PHAST training due to budget revisions and planning processes.
10.3: Communities in West District of Unguja have the capacity to improve sanitary conditions		

Table 5.11: Outcome 11: capacity within MLYWCD to promote gender equality and women's empowerment is enhanced

Output(s)/Outcome	Rating	Justification
Outcome 3: Capacity within MLYWCD to promote gender equality and women's empowerment is enhanced	Satisfactory (B)	Major policy documents were developed under JP5 programme support despite lots of challenges on fund disbursements, and implementation.
Output 3.1: The finalization of gender policy	Satisfactory (B)	Despite the delay in implementation and achievement of results. The gender policy was finalized and in place. It is expected to benefit national and district objectives, and yield satisfactory benefits.
Output 3.2: MLYWCD is able to coordinate the development and implementation of GBV specific plan.	Satisfactory (B)	Two important GBV documents were developed despite the challenges on delayed disbursement and implementations; The GBV training manual and the Multisectoral Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Responding to Gender Based Violence in Zanzibar

Output 3.3: Increased awareness on GBV within MLYWCD Somebody thought this output did not exist, not in plan	Unsatisfactory (E)	JP5 support in this area is not expected to achieve most of its major national and district objectives or to yield any satisfactory benefits because of delayed implementation.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	--------------------	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table 5.12: Outcome 12: Improved implementation of educational programmes including teaching & learning environments at primary & secondary schools in Zanzibar

Output(s)/Outcome	Rating	Justification
Outcome 4: Improved implementation of educational programmes including teaching & learning environments at primary & secondary schools in Zanzibar	Marginally Satisfactory (C)	Delayed implementation. Some key activities were not implemented, while results were highly perched, that required long implementation time frame to be realized.
Output 4.1: Assisting in instituting child friendly schools (CFS) principles/elements in Zanzibar schools	Marginally Satisfactory (C)	Many of the planned activities were not implemented. There was delays in implementation and achieving results
Output 4.2: Teachers in all pre-primary and Primary schools have the capacity to promote performance and retention of girls in basic education	Unsatisfactory (E)	None implementation, funds were diverted to fund power supply.

Table 5.15: Outcome 15: Zanzibar Government capacity to plan, implement, monitor and report on development results improved

Programme Result	Targets	Achievements	Result/Comments
2008 Outputs		<u>Reported in 2008 & 2009</u>	• Satisfactory (B)
11. Strengthened MKUZA monitoring system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 major surveys reports with disaggregated data conducted • Research TWG members trained and 2 strategic policy reports produced • 50% of TWGs and MKUZA secretariat trained 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communication WG prepared a People's report • PERs completed for education and infrastructure and HBS ongoing • Survey assessing the contribution of 4 development projects on poverty reduction • Annual MKUZA report and ZINDUKA completed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partly achieved with improved RBM/M&E • The report was useful in designing a new communication strategy for MKUZA • The surveys helped to identify the pro-poor nature of these projects • MKUZA monitoring enhanced by 3 lead consultants to support 13 local consultants
12. Strengthened capacity for implementation of core reforms and aid coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 consultative meetings with DPs • Ministries integrated with IFMS • 4 exchange visits conducted • Funds to ministries channeled through the exchequer • ICT improved 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MOFEA facilitated AMP & consultative meetings with DPs, NGOs & NSAs • IFMS integrated into MDAs; all Ministries use IFMS to manage financial resources • One-day training for 25 people on ICT in aid coordination. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved aid reporting by MDAs and NGOs • Public Finance Implementation Strategy used by MDAs to implement public finance reforms • Aid management improved among MDAs and NSAs

<p>13. Effective participation of MDAs and NSAs in policy dialogue and public expenditure review (PER) process</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5 NSAs participate in PER process in 5 districts • 3 commentaries on PER produced by NSAs • Review report on PER process produced • Gender responsive budget guidelines developed • 1 training conducted to build dialogue capacity of NSAs • At least 2 trainings conducted 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Series of policy briefs “Sera Zetu” produced • ANGOZA conducted PETs in 2 sectors, education and water • Gender not yet mainstreamed in the PER process • Training not undertaken 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 40% fulfilled • Facilitate NSAs engaging in policy and gender analysis and dialogue • Strengthened PER process and increased ANGOZA’s capacity & knowledge in PET and advocacy •
<p>2009: Outcome15: Zanzibar Government capacity to plan, implement, monitor and report on development results improved</p>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highly satisfactory (A)
<p>15.1: RGoZ capacity to coordinate and implement public finance and economic management reform and other selected reform programmes strengthened</p>	<p><u>Indicators/Targets:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public Management Policy, Public Service Management Program and Public Service Act in place • AMP database on donor projects • 2 staff in DEF trained in report writing and negotiation of external financial agreements • 90 staff in MDAs and NSAs aware of Aid Effectiveness • Budget guideline is in place and all budget officers in MDAs are capable of applying the developed budget guideline • Workshop on budget preparation 	<p><u>Reported in 2010</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Key public management policies were approved, training was conducted, and 2 Economic Bulletins and 2 economic survey reports were published • AMP rolled out and tracking aid flows • 2 staff from DEF trained in report writing and aid management • Draft JAST improved through consultative meetings and submitted to MOFEA • 80 officials in MDAs trained on aid effectiveness • BCC in place and 2 training sessions given • Workshop given to 261 budget officers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Satisfactory (B) • 80% achievement • Activities strengthened the ability of the Core Reform Unit to fulfill its mandate • The Local Government Reform component of the Public Service Reform was delayed due to the change in government. • 90% of training in aid effectiveness complete • There was good MTEF and budget execution, as evidenced by the Accountant General’s mid-year (2010/11) budget execution report, which indicated there was swift alignment of MTEF with MKUZA II and sound allocation and use of resources allocated to many MDAs

<p>15.2: The capacity of RGoZ to formulate, implement and monitor MKUZA II strengthened</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MKUZA II in place • TGWs conduct bi-monthly meetings • Training in research management and secondary data analysis • Policy briefs on ZHDR • 2000 copies of ZINDUKA newsletter produced each quarter • Training on births and deaths to local registers in Urban, West and Chake Chake districts • Judiciary PER completed • 4 IT managers trained on advanced web design • Harmonized COICOP codes for HBS and CPI completed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MKUZA II was produced • 2 meetings for each of the 6 TWGs were held • Training improved data analysis skills of the Research TWG • Policy brief on ZHDR discussed by Research TWG • ZINDUKA quarterly newsletter produced • Training improved births and deaths register • A member of Census and Survey TWG attended an M&E course in Uganda • PER TWG disseminated Judiciary PER • 4 IT managers trained in Web designing skills at IMIT in Dar • Classification of COICOP codes of HBS were harmonized with those used for CPI by OCGS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highly satisfactory (A) • This output was largely achieved with the production of MKUZA, ZINDUKA newsletter, Policy briefs on ZHDR and POICODE Codes for HBS/CPI • Completion of MKUZA II provided a useful tool for aligning the strategic plans of ministries • TWG sessions provided platforms for critical reflections on implementation of MKUZA • Harmonization of codes updated the CPI basket and improved inflation estimates
<p>15.3: Enhance national capacity to provide, transfer and make use of ICT knowledge in schools, government institutions and non-state actors</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Better use of available ICT for government and Non State Actors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3 ICT training sessions conducted • 100 CDs of free Ubuntu-version of Open Office operating system distributed to each participant 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some institutions have started moving from satellite internet connection to fiber optic cable • Government is in the process of drafting a national ICT policy

Table 5.16: Outcome 16: Good Governance principles at MDAs and participation of NSAs in decision making promoted

Programme Result	Targets	Achievements	Result/Comments
2009 Outcome 16: Good Governance principles at MDAs and participation of NSAs in decision making (including those representing women & other vulnerable groups) promoted		<u>Reported in 2009</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No progress 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unsatisfactory (E) • No progress in 2008/9
16.1 Strengthened selected institutions of oversight and accountability of the RgoZ in support of good governance principles and use of information at MDAs and LGAs (esp, MoCAGG)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Principles of good governance are well monitored in all MDAs and LGAs 	<u>Reported in 2010</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MoCAGG facilitated the establishment of Integrity Committee 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marginally satisfactory (C) • Partly fulfilled • Committee monitors implementation of good governance principles in MDAs and LGAs
16.2 NSAs have the capacity to participate in policy development and implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Health Public Expenditure Tracking report 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ANGOZA conducted a Health PET in 2 districts in collaboration with the Ministry of Health 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Satisfactory (B) • Fulfilled (100%) • ANGOZA's capacity was strengthened to conduct PET

Table 5.17: Outcome 17: Improved respect and observance of rule of law and justice, and stronger oversight institutions of the RGoZ

Programme Result	Targets	Achievements	Result/Comments
2009 Outcome 17: Improved respect and observance of rule of law and justice, and stronger oversight institutions of the RGoZ		<u>Reported in 2009</u> • No progress	• Unsatisfactory (E) • No progress in 2008/9
17.1 Strengthen the independent office of the DPP to provide and oversee the rule of law and access to justice, including the polices and 17.2 Improved tolerance, peace and harmony and better respect for human rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5 state attorneys have prosecutorial skills • 800 copies of the Shahidi Journal produced and disseminated • LAN connection in DPP Office • Improvements in human rights and rule of law for the police, special departments, magistrates, prosecutors from DPP office, etc 	<u>Reported in 2010</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5 new state attorneys sent to DPP Office in Tanzania to improve their prosecutorial skills • 800 copies of the Shahidi Journal was disseminated to raise awareness on criminal and legal matters • DPP Library equipped and librarian attached to Dar University library for 3 months • 8 trainings on human rights conducted for the police, special departments, magistrates, DPPs and other agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Satisfactory (B) • Largely achieved • Capacity of the DPP office was improved through training in human rights aimed at improving the justice system in Zanzibar • Improved respect for human rights for and among law enforcement institutions

Table 5.18: Outcome 18: Micheweni interventions

Output(s)/Outcome	Rating	Justification
Outcome 18: Increased support to integrated development interventions in Micheweni and other vulnerable areas.	Satisfactory (B)	The Micheweni Interventions have benefited the community members. The benefits are expected to last as especially those from the Radio program, nursery school, water project and the irrigation scheme.
Output 18.1: Selected shehias in Micheweni district access uninterrupted safe water and clean water supply and improved sanitation	Satisfactory (B)	The water project is expected to achieve most of its major national and district objectives, and yield satisfactory benefits.
18.2: Strengthened maternal, child care and other health services at Maziwa Ng'ombe shehias	Marginally Satisfactory (C)	The HF is expected to achieve most of its major relevant objectives but the households around the facility are not happy with it. It seems the HF will be moved to another location, thus JP5 investments on construction could be irrelevant and might not be able to yield some of the expected benefits.
18.3: The community radio in Micheweni district has the capacity to mobilize participation of the community members in development activities	Highly Satisfactory (A)	The community radio is has exceed all its major objectives, and yield substantial national and district benefits, without major shortcomings. The project can be presented as "good practice".
18.4: Gross enrolment rate and retention in selected areas of Micheweni district improved	Satisfactory (B)	The nursery schools project achieve most of its major district objectives, and yield satisfactory benefits.
18.5: Food security and income generation of selected communities in Micheweni district improved	Marginally Unsatisfactory (D)	The beekeeping and research project achieved the district objectives. The irrigation schemes were not finalized on time. Major shortcomings were note on the livestock and eco tourism initiatives.

Annex 6: Evaluation Framework

Evaluation Component	Evaluation Criteria and Lead Questions
1.0 Programme Design	<i>Was the JP concept and strategy effective and appropriate for the objectives of the programme given the experience to date?</i>
1.1 Programme relevance/appropriateness	<p>The extent to which the JP pertained to national priorities and the requirements of the target group, particularly when it was designed in 2008:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ To what extent are the objectives of the programme still valid? ▪ To what extent were partners involved in the development and implementation of the JP? ▪ Were the activities and outputs of the programme consistent with the intended key results?
2.0 Programme Results	<i>Did the programme achieve its planned outputs, outcomes and objectives and how satisfactory was the achievement?</i>
2.1 Programme effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ To what extent did the JP achieve the key results?
2.2 Achievement of outputs:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Were the planned outputs implemented according to the workplan? ▪ Factors contributing to achieving or not achieving the desired results, including institutional, management and financial arrangements? ▪ Perceptions of stakeholders regarding output quality
2.3 Achievement of outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Indicators of outcomes as per the UNDAF and MKUZA
2.4 Progress toward overall objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Support government institutions in Zanzibar to improve capacity and service delivery, with a special focus on the needs of the poor
2.5 Insights on the successes and weaknesses of the programme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Identification of factors contributing to effectiveness or ineffectiveness ▪ Issues and constraints identified by stakeholders ▪ Alignment and compatibility with other government initiatives
3.0 Project Management & Implementation	<i>Was the programme implemented in an effective, efficient and sustainable manner, consistent with the design?</i>
3.1 Adaptive management	<p>Are the requisite systems, structures, staff and other capacities in place and adequate?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Extent to which well structured programme management and adaptive management practices led to strengthening capacity and disseminating lessons learned ▪ Observable management responses to issues and needs during implementation (adaptive management)
M & E systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Use of the logical framework in monitoring and reporting ▪ Modification of the logical framework in response to issues ▪ Implementation of an effective, operational monitoring system ▪ Presence and quality of an M&E plan ▪ Use of the M&E Plan in data collection and reporting
Work Planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Submission of workplans as per UN standards and timing ▪ The process for developing collective workplans through joint exercises ▪ Implementation of workplans as scheduled
Reporting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Quality, objectivity, frequency and relevance of programme reporting ▪ Usefulness of reporting to management & decision makers

Timeliness of Implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Completion of activities in relation to schedule Explanations for delays and effects on programme results
3.2 Contribution of Implementing Partners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Specific guidance and direction provided by UNDP staff and experts on key issues, including policy support Understanding of roles and responsibilities by Implementing Partners Activities completed by implementing partners in relation to workplans Fulfillment of roles and responsibilities in relation to UN policies and procedures
Preparation and readiness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Appropriateness of outputs and follow-up actions Timeliness of budgets, workplans and activity completion
Stakeholder participation, partnership strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number and range of participants in programme activities Mechanisms for stakeholder participation in the programme Effective working relationships between Implementing Partners involved in management and implementation Extent of cooperative relationships between programme partners
3.3 Programme efficiency	<p>The extent to which delivery was undertaken by the most cost-efficient means;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Were activities cost-efficient? Were outputs achieved on time? Was the programme implemented in the most efficient way compared to alternatives?
Project budget and duration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Extent to which disbursements occurred as planned Changes in the budget to accommodate unforeseen events
Financial management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Costs of Outputs and their general reasonableness Fulfillment of the planned co-financing commitments. Financial reporting in accordance with UN norms
3.4 Stakeholder involvement, affiliation and relevance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Extent to which national and local community participation are an integral part of the project concept Mechanisms for stakeholder input to project design and operations
3.5 Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The positive and negative changes produced by the JP (directly or indirectly, intended or unintended) What difference has the activity made to the beneficiaries? How many people have been affected? How did impact differ across key target groups, including vulnerability categories such as gender, age etc? What were the transformational results achieved by the JP
3.6 Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Presence of explicit sustainability strategies in the programme design and the feasibility of these strategies given experience to date Are policies and regulatory frameworks in place to support continuation of results The degree to which outputs and outcomes led to the development of institutional framework (policy, laws, organizations, procedures) Implementation of measures to ensure financial sustainability in government budgets or cost recovery mechanisms Observable changes in attitudes, beliefs and behaviours
4.0 Achievement of Higher Level Goals	<i>Adherence to the principles and objectives of DaO and MDGs, including reference to the One UN Process indicators:</i>

Higher Level Government and UN Goals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Progress towards higher-level government and UN goals: MDGs, DaO, human rights based approach, and cross-cutting considerations such as gender equality and environmental sustainability. ▪ To what extent were the principles of Joint Programming in terms of collaborative planning, implementation and monitoring across participating agencies adhered to? ▪ What factors facilitated or adversely impacted upon Delivering as One? ▪ Lessons learned, future programming and additional priorities that could have been included in the programme
Contribution to National Priorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Effective participation of MDAs and NSAs in Policy Dialogue ▪ Extent to which JP5 was aligned with government priorities, evidenced by government internal resource allocation to JP5 priority areas
Lessons Learned	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lessons to improve design and implementation of other programmes (for example, UNDAP)

Annex 7: Terms of Reference for the Evaluation

EVALUATION OF THE JOINT PROGRAMME 5 ON CAPACITY BUILDING SUPPORT TO ZANZIBAR

Background

Tanzania is among the eight countries piloting the Delivering As One concept in the world. The 'Delivering as One' (DaO) approach was conceived by the UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence in the areas of development, humanitarian assistance, and environment. The DaO approach was initially conceptualised as the 'Four Ones' – One Programme, One Leader, One Budgetary Framework, and One Office where appropriate. The UN Country Team in Tanzania added the 'One Voice' in 2008 – making it 'Five Ones'.

On 22 November 2007, the Secretary-General decided to establish a series of pilot country initiatives to test the 'One UN' approach. The governments of eight countries – including Tanzania – volunteered to pilot the DaO approach. It was agreed that the testing of the DaO approach and principles would be undertaken on a voluntary basis, and that the outcome and lessons learned, based on the experiences, would inform future intergovernmental consultations.

The One UN Programme was the first of the 'One's' to be fully developed in Tanzania. The One Programme is implemented through a number of Joint Programmes (JPs). The JPs seek to respond to national priorities and represent sectors in which the UN has expertise to deal with the development gaps. The JPs are thus aligned to the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty; MKUKUTA/MKUZA. The Joint Programme approach involves collaborations between various UN agencies and partners. This implies making joint work plans, joint budgets and defining common results.

Currently, there are 10 Joint Programmes being piloted in Tanzania (Tanzania Mainland and Zanzibar). Although some Joint Programmes extend their activities to Zanzibar, the Joint Programme on Capacity Building Support to Zanzibar (JP5) is the only UN joint programme framework for development assistance to Zanzibar (Unguja and Pemba isles) which is multi-sectoral and addresses all clusters of the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty in Zanzibar-MKUZA. The programme aims to support Government institutions in Zanzibar to improve capacity and service delivery for the purpose of contributing to the realization of pro-poor growth and enhancement of democratic governance in Zanzibar. The programme commenced in January 2008, and is implemented under the leadership of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (RGoZ). The overall budget for the JP5 programme is USD 8,779,543.60.

The Capacity Building Support to Zanzibar aims to contribute to the achievement of the goals and objectives of the MKUZA and the MDGs as they relate to Zanzibar. Results to be achieved through the programme includes: increased access to sustainable income opportunities, productive employment and food security in rural and urban areas by 2010; improve access to quality basic social services for all especially the poor and most vulnerable; strengthen democratic structures and systems of good governance, as well as the rule of law and the application of human rights.

Strategically, JP5 responds to national priorities and vision 2020 for Zanzibar and MDGs as delineated in the Zanzibar National Development Plans (i.e. the Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty and other sector or agency specific plans). In responding to Vision 2020 and MDGs, JP5 utilizes comparative advantage of the UNs in programming and contributes to the achievement of the MDGs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8; and UNDAF's outcomes.

With the three-pillar structure of the Joint Programme, JP5 combines efforts of the UN Agencies and its national counterparts to address the three main clusters of MKUZA, that is: 1) Wealth Creation, Employment and Economic Empowerment responding to Growth and Reduction of Poverty of MKUZA cluster I; 2) Reduction of Maternal, Newborn and Child Mortality and Improved Social Services responding to Social Services and Well-being of MKUZA cluster II; and 3) National Capacity Development Management responding to Good Governance and National Unity of MKUZA cluster III.

Each pillar is led by a national counterpart with a participating UN agency providing technical assistance and supplementary parallel financial support. The pillar leaders have the overall thematic responsibility to coordinate the pillar partners in planning, implementing, and reporting of pillar outputs and avail the opportunity for the UN and its national partners to work closely together to support capacity development efforts for a greater impact in Zanzibar.

The national implementing partners (IP) include: Association Of Non Governmental Organizations (ANGOZA), Ministry Of Agriculture Livestock And Environment, Ministry Of Labour Youth Women And Child Development, Ministry of Constitutional Affairs And Good Governance, Ministry Of Education And Vocational Training, Ministry Of Finance And Economic Affairs, Ministry Of Health And Social Welfare, Ministry Of Tourism Trade And Industries, Office Of Chief Government Statistician (OCGS), Zanzibar Employees Association (ZANEMA), Zanzibar Trade Union Cooperation (ZATUC), Zanzibar Water Authority (ZAWA), Zanzibar Food Security And Nutrition Policy And Programme and Zanzibar National Chamber Of Commerce Industry And Agriculture (ZNCCIA).

While the PUNs include Food And Agriculture Organization Of The United Nations, International Labour Organization, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Population Fund, United Nations Children's Fund, United Nations Industrial Development Organization and World Health Organization.

JP5 provides opportunity for the UN to work in a harmonized, coherent and coordinated manner and become more cost-effective while delivering greater development impact and minimize fragmentation and inefficiency. As a result, UN Agencies have developed a common work plan and budgetary framework and use of common business processes such as procurement, financial reporting system and procedures (HACT) to reduce transaction costs.

UNDP is the Managing Agent of the Joint Programme. As a Managing Agent (MA), UNDP has ultimate responsibility and accountability for both the achievement of results and management of funds since it is responsible for overall coordination of the programme. The MA is responsible for reporting matters including (1) preparation of consolidated narrative and financial documents and reports for review by the Joint Programme Committee (and subsequent submission to the

Joint Steering Committee); (2) progress reporting to governance structures; and (3) financial reporting to the One UN Fund's Administrative Agency (AA).

The planned terminal evaluation will be carried out to assist the UN and programme stakeholders to draw lessons learned in implementing the programme and improve the quality of future development interventions. As the UN in Tanzania moves towards the UNDAF, the first all-inclusive One UN business plan for Tanzania, the review of the JP5 will also provide opportunity to reflect on the challenges in the management and implementation of such multi-stakeholders programs and inform the formulation and implementation of similar programmes and partnerships which might derive from the UNDAF.

Summary of the key outputs of the JP5 is presented below:

MKUZA Cluster 1: Growth and reduction of income poverty;
Goal 3: reduce income poverty and attain overall food security

UNDAF Outcome: National productivity and competitiveness is improved through decent employment opportunities, equitable access to and effective use of productive resources, improved transport and communication networks and greater market access

JP Output: Wealth Creation, Employment and Economic Empowerment

- Strengthened capacity of relevant Government institutions, private sector, and CSOs for implementation of SME policy and enforcement of labour laws from a gender perspective
- Strengthened entrepreneurship capacity of poor groups of youth, women, PLHA and the people with disability.
- Gender sensitive employment policy, job creation programme and Youth Action Plan developed
- Comprehensive diagnostic of Zanzibar national needs for social protection undertaken
- Strengthen capacity of government to monitor and manage food security and manage nutrition and food safety

MKUZA Cluster 2: Social services and well being

Goals 2: improved health status including reproductive health, survival and well-being of children, women and vulnerable groups

Goal 7:strengthen and expand social security and safety nets for the disadvantaged and most vulnerable population groups

UNDAF Outcome:

- Increased and equitable access to comprehensive reproductive health interventions
- Effective mechanisms including social protection in place the address institutional barriers and socio-cultural dimensions to promote and protect the rights of the poor and most vulnerable
- JP Output: Reduction of Maternal, New Born and Child Deaths and Improved Social Services
- Roadmap to accelerate the reduction of maternal, newborn and child mortality finalized and costed
- Strengthened capacity for primary and referral and health facilities to

- provide quality maternal, newborn and child health care
- Strengthened capacity of District Health Management Teams to monitor maternal, newborn and child health interventions
- Enhanced capacity of multisectoral stakeholders to prevent and respond to GBV and child rights abuse
- Improved coverage of social services (health, education, water and sanitation) in Micheweni.

MKUZA Cluster 3: A society governed by the rule of law and government that is predictable, transparent and accountable

Goal 5: increase the capacity of government institutions and actors

Goal 9: provision of timely and reliable information and data for monitoring and evaluating government initiatives

UNDAF Outcome: Strengthened MKUKUTA/MKUZA monitoring budget and planning systems that foster participation and gender equality

JP Output: National Capacity for Development Management

- Strengthened MKUZA Monitoring System
- Strengthened capacity for implementation of core reforms and aid coordination
- Effective participation of MDAs and NSAs in Policy Dialogue and Public Expenditure Review (PER) process

Duties and Responsibilities

The main purpose of the evaluation is to provide an independent in-depth assessment of the achievements of results as well as the implementation arrangements of the Joint Programme on Capacity Building Support to Zanzibar (JP5). The evaluation will focus on the following criteria: effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, with a particular focus on effectiveness. Thus the evaluation specific objectives are:

- Based on planned deliverables of the Project Document (Result and Resource Framework (RRF) the consultants should evaluate the project results (that have/have not been achieved and a special emphasis should be placed on measuring the achievements or non-achievements of the expected results under all components of the project);
- Assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of results/activities;
- Explore to what extent synergies among UN agencies in particular and among IPs were explored and effected in implementation;
- What extent the UN was able to go upstream as intended;
- Whether capacity development results were relevant and assess the likely impact of these;
- Evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the JP modality;
- To draw experience and lessons learnt from the UN Joint Programme 5 for Capacity Building Support to Zanzibar, its structure, management and implementation arrangements as a strategy for poverty reduction and its relevance for both the One UN pilot project and the RGoZ.
- Consolidate lessons learned with a view to contribute to improving the future UNDP implementation strategies and make recommendations to guide future programming for the Delivering As One

Scope of the evaluation

The evaluation will review and assess the achievement of the programme. The

review should include an analysis of (a) an assessment of progress towards achieving the outputs/outcome of the programme, (b) assessment of the key factors that could have affected or could affect the achievement of the outputs/outcomes, (c) assessment of the JP5 strategy in general (d) To discuss additional priorities that could have been included in the programme. The evaluation team will review and assess the achievement of the programme outcomes focusing on:

Progress status: What were the basis of the outputs/outcome and its constituent interventions? Were past experiences and lessons as well as dialogue with stakeholders in design of the programme and outputs considered? Assess the adequacy of the background work carried out. Determine the degree to which outputs/outcome was achieved and, if not whether there was progress towards their achievement. Identify the balance effort that were needed and the suitability or otherwise of pursuing the achievement of the outcome/outputs.

Underlying factors: An analysis of the underlying factors that have influenced the outputs and achievements. What were the key internal and external assumptions made? Distinguish the substantive design issues from the key implementation and/or management capacities and issues including the timeliness of outputs, the degree of stakeholders and partner's involvement in pursuit of the outputs, and how processes and activities were managed/carried out.

JP5 strategy: Ascertain whether JP5 was appropriate and effective. Assess the initial design modalities and planning process as well as management mechanisms and identify the role of each party involved and how did it function and how has it been sustained? How did each party understand its role? How did the management arrangements contribute (or hinder) to the achievement of the outputs/outcome? What was the level of participation of the stakeholders and the perception of the beneficiaries?

Methodology

The evaluation should be based on a stakeholder approach, where all groups and individuals, who affect and/or are affected by the achievement of the project objectives, are involved in the analysis. Moreover, the evaluation will take into consideration the institutional, structural and economic context, which affects the overall performance of the project.

The approach of the evaluation shall be participatory, that is, be flexible in design and implementation, ensure stakeholder participation and ownership, and facilitate learning and feedback.

The Evaluations will utilize both qualitative and quantitative methodology. The consultant will make the best use of the existing documents and conduct individual interviews/group meetings with relevant stakeholders. Thus both primary and secondary data will be utilized. The following data collection methods should be included as minimum.

- Desk review of all relevant documents of the project e.g., those relating specifically to the project context, the project document, log-frame, implementation plans, monitoring reports, assessment and learning mission reports, progress reports, expenditure reports etc. This could be done prior to any field visit, focus group discussion, or individual interviews;

- Discussions with the ZPMC (Zanzibar Programme Management Committee), the JWG (Joint Working Group), PUN's (Participating UN Agencies), Senior Management at UNDP office; UNDP Zanzibar Sub office team, UN Zanzibar program staff, Senior Government officials, Implementing partners (Ministries, NGO's, Private sector institutions).
- Briefing and debriefing sessions with the UN-IAPC, the Government of Zanzibar, as well as other main stakeholders
- Interviews with partners and stakeholders (including gathering the information on what the partners have achieved with regard to the outcome and what strategies they have used); other donors
- Field visits to selected project sites and discussions with project teams, project beneficiaries
- The evaluation will be led by one national and one international consultant. The lead consultant (International) after brief orientation, s/he will develop plan of action stating the methodologies and required resources for the end of program evaluation. In the plan of action, areas of evaluation, indicators and data collection should be clearly spelled out. The consultants need to attach interview questionnaires and focus group guide.

Consultations will be held among users and other stakeholders to refine and approve evaluation questions. But at the minimum, the evaluation should respond to the following questions:

Relevance /Appropriateness – the extent to which the JP pertained to national priorities and the requirements of the target group. Indicative questions might include:

- To what extent were partners involved in the development and implementation of the JP?
- To what extent are the objectives of the programme still valid?
- Were the activities and outputs of the programme consistent with the intended key results?

Effectiveness - the extent to which the JP attained its key results. Indicative questions might include:

- To what extent were the key results achieved?
- What were the major factors influencing the (non)achievement of the desired results, including institutional, management and fiscal arrangements?

Efficiency – the extent to which delivery was undertaken by the most cost-efficient means. Indicative questions might include:

- Were activities cost-efficient?
- Were outputs achieved on time?
- Was the programme implemented in the most efficient way compared to alternatives?

Impact - the positive and negative changes produced by the JP (directly or indirectly, intended or unintended), Indicative questions might include:

- What difference has the activity made to the beneficiaries?
- How many people have been affected?
- How did impact differ across key target groups, including vulnerability categories such as gender, age etc?

Sustainability - measuring whether the benefits of the JP are likely to continue after the end of programme activities. Indicative questions might include:

- To what extent will the benefits of a programme continue after activities

- have ceased?
- What are the major factors which will influence the sustainability of the programme?

The evaluation should also respond to three additional assessment areas.

Delivering as One - adherence to the principles and objectives of Joint Programming (include reference to the One UN Process Indicators). Indicative questions might include:

- To what extent were the principles of Joint Programming in terms of collaborative planning, implementation and monitoring across participating agencies adhered to?
- What factors facilitated or adversely impacted upon Delivering as One?
- Cross Cutting Considerations – application of the programming principles of the UN, referencing Human Rights Based Approach, Gender Equality, Environmental Sustainability, Results Based Management and Capacity Development. Indicative questions might include:
 - Were cross-cutting considerations mainstreamed in the implementation of activities?
 - To what extent did the programme involve the host communities and other stakeholders in programme design and implementation?
 - Were capacity development activities informed by a capacity assessment at manifold levels?

Lessons and Recommendations for future programming. Indicative questions might include:

- What additional measures (if any) could have improved the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact or sustainability of the JP?
- What lessons can be applied in terms of collaborative programme planning, implementation and monitoring to the implementation of the UNDP 2011-2015?
- What key measures can the UN in Tanzania, regionally and at HQ, plus the Government of Tanzania and Development Partners (DPs) adopt to improve the implementation and performance of the One Programme under DaO?

The evaluator will be selected based on a proposed methodology for the evaluation. The evaluation shall be a result-oriented exercise which involves all key stakeholders. The evaluation shall provide evidence of achievement of expected outputs and outcomes using quantitative and qualitative data.

At every stage of the evaluation process, the following principles should be observed:

Independence - the evaluation team should be independent from the operational management and decision-making functions of the JP

Impartiality – the evaluation information should be free of political or other bias and deliberate distortions

Timeliness - evaluations must be designed and completed in a timely fashion

Purpose - the scope, design and plan of the evaluation should generate relevant products that meet the needs of intended users

Transparency - meaningful consultation with stakeholders should be undertaken to ensure the credibility and utility of the evaluation

Competencies - evaluations should be conducted by well-qualified teams. The teams should, wherever feasible, be gender balanced, geographically diverse and

include professionals from the countries or regions concerned.

Ethics - evaluators must have professional integrity and respect the rights of institutions and individuals to provide information in confidence and to verify statements attributed to them. Evaluations must be sensitive to the beliefs and customs of local social and cultural environments and must be conducted legally and with due regard to the welfare of those involved in the evaluation, as well as those affected by its findings.

Quality - All evaluations should meet the standards outlined in the Standards for Evaluation in the United Nations System. The key questions and areas for review should be clear, coherent and realistic. The evaluation plan should be practical and cost effective. To ensure that the information generated is accurate and reliable, evaluation design, data collection and analysis should reflect professional standards, with due regard for any special circumstances or limitations reflecting the context of the evaluation. Evaluation findings and recommendations should be presented in a manner that will be readily understood by target audiences and have regard for cost-effectiveness in implementing the recommendations proposed.

Key deliverables (Evaluation Products)

The consultant(s) will produce a comprehensive structured evaluation report that provide analysis and evidence, independent in-depth assessment of the achievements of results as well as the implementation arrangements of the Joint Programme on Capacity Building Support to Zanzibar (JP5) as well as lessons learnt.

Evaluation inception report—an inception report should be prepared by the evaluators before going into the fully fledged evaluation exercise. It should detail the evaluators' understanding of what is being evaluated and why, showing how each evaluation question will be answered by way of: proposed methods; proposed sources of data; and data collection procedures. The inception report should include a proposed schedule of tasks, activities and deliverables, designating a team member with the lead responsibility for each task or product. The inception report provides the programme unit and the evaluators with an opportunity to verify that they share the same understanding about the evaluation and clarify any misunderstanding at the outset.

Evaluation matrix – An evaluation matrix should be included in the inception report. The evaluation matrix is a tool that evaluators create as map and reference in planning and conducting an evaluation. It also serves as a useful tool for summarizing and visually presenting the evaluation design and methodology for discussions with stakeholders. It details evaluation questions that the evaluation will answer, data sources, data collection, analysis tools or methods appropriate for each data source, and the standard or measure by which each question will be evaluated.

Debrief the ZPMC members, ZJWG Members as well as the Managing Agent.

A Final evaluation report, the Report should be written fully in line with UNDP quality criteria and standards (UNDP standard evaluation format will be utilized). The structure of the Final Report should be including the following as a minimum (i.e. Hard copy, a soft copy in MS Word and Acrobat reader, Times New Roman, Size 12, Single Spacing) containing:

- Title and opening pages
- Table of contents
- List of acronyms and abbreviations
- Executive summary
- Introduction
- Description of the intervention
- Evaluation scope and objectives
- Evaluation approach and methods
- Data analysis
- Findings and conclusions
- Recommendations
- Lessons learned
- Report Annex (including interview list, data collection instruments, key documents consulted, ToR)

Provide a draft report 10 days before the end of the consultancy period and request for comments to identified stakeholders to allow enough time for incorporation of comments received.

The Final Evaluation Report should be presented in a solid, concise and readable form and be structured around the issues in the ToR, 3 days before the end of consultancy period.

The consultant should refer to annex 7 of the UNDP Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation handbook for details on reporting template.

Supervision, reporting and Management of the assignment

Under the overall guidance of the UNDP Deputy Country Director (Programme, the selected consultants shall report to the UNDP Pro-Poor Unit Team Leader. The Head of the UNDP Sub Office in Zanzibar will facilitate the work of the consultants and ensure smooth interaction with the joint UN/RGOZ Task Force as well as other key stakeholders.

Management and Implementation arrangements

The overall support of the evaluation team lies with the UNDP Pro-Poor Team Leader. In terms of practical management and implementation, the UN Sub-Office Team will coordinate the work of the Evaluation Team, while the UN/RGOZ Task Force will provide the Evaluation the following support:

- Provide the consultant with all the necessary support (not under the consultant's control) to ensure that the consultant(s) undertake the study with reasonable efficiency.
- Appoint a focal point in the programme section to support the consultant(s) during the evaluation process.
- Collect background documentation and inform partners and selected project counterparts.
- Meet all travel related costs to project sites as part of the JP5 evaluation cost.
- Support to identify key stakeholders to be interviewed as part of the evaluation.
- The programme staff members will be responsible for liaising with partners,

logistical backstopping and providing relevant documentation and feedback to the evaluation team

- Cover any costs related to stakeholder workshops during consultation and dissemination of results
- Organize inception meeting between the consultants, partners and stakeholders, including Government prior to the scheduled start of the evaluation assignment.

Evaluation Ethics

The evaluation will be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG 'Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation' and should describe critical issues evaluators must address in the design and implementation of the evaluation, including evaluation ethics and procedures to safeguard the rights and confidentiality of information providers.

Time Frame

The work should be carried out in a total of 30 working days from starting date.

Orientation with UN Zanzibar, finalize and agree on ToR , revision of Plan of action ; submission of inception report; avail documents, evaluation of methodologies, Desk review of relevant of documents , Presentation of inception report and briefing with UN-IAPC. (3 working days)

Data collection and Field visits

Submission of draft report, De-briefings through power point to UN-RgoZ JTF & ZPMC (20 working days)

Incorporation of comments and submission of final report with clear set of recommendations, dissemination of findings (7 working days)

Main Reference materials

The consultants should study the following documents among others:

- UNDP Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results;
- Ethical Code of Conduct for UNDP Evaluations;
- Guideline for Reviewing the Evaluation Report;
- UNDP Results-Based Management: Technical Project Documents and relevant reports
- Documents and materials related to the Joint Programmes Management in Tanzania
- National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUZA I & II)

Conditions of Work

Consultants will be expected to use their own laptop computers. UNDP will support and facilitate the consultants travel, provide administrative, logistics and facilitate security related issues of the consultancy. The UN Sub Office in Zanzibar will avail working space during the consultancy period. Consultants shall arrange by their own means of accommodation in Zanzibar during consultancy period.

<u>Annex 8: UN JOINT PROGRAM 5 EVALUATION VISIT SCHEDULE</u>				
<u>AUGUST - SEPTEMBER 2011</u>				
Date	Time	Organization	Contact Person	Venue
Friday	8.00am – 8.45am	UNFPA	Felista Bwana	UNFPA Office (4 th Floor)
19-Aug-11	9.00am – 9.45am	UNICEF	Dr. E. Kamugisha	UNICEF Office (3 rd Floor)
	10.00am – 11.00am	ILO	Fatma Rashid	ILO Office (3 rd Floor)
Monday	9.00am – 9.45am	FAO	Ali Haji (0777 435 058)	FAO Office (3rd Floor)
22-Aug-11	10.30am-11.30am	Ministry of Labour Economic Empowerment and Cooperatives	Hafidh Khamis (0777 410 260)	Mwanakwerekwe
			Radhia R. Haroub (0777 433 124)	
	2.00pm-3.00pm	Department of Food Security and Nutrition	Mansura M. Kassim	ZSTC Building, 2nd Floor
			0777 277 747	
Tuesday	9.00 am -10.00am	Zanzibar Water Authority	Mr. Rashid	Zanzibar Water Authority
23-Aug-11				Mkunazini
	10.30am-11.30am	Ministry of Trade	Mr. Rashid	Stone Town
			0777 428 892	
	12.00pm - 1.00pm	Ministry of Health - RCH Department	Dr. Azzah Nofli	RCH Department
	2.00pm-3.00pm	Ministry of Health - Environmental Health	Mr. Salum Abubakar	Ministry of Health - Environmental Health
		Department		Department
Wednesday	9.00am – 9.45am	Office of the Chief Government Statistician	Mrs. Mayasa	Office of the Chief Government Statistician
24-Aug-11		(OCGS)/ National Bureau of Statistics	Hafidh Mohamed	(OCGS)/ National Bureau of Statistics
	10.30am-11.30am	Ministry of Social Welfare, Youth, Women and Children Development	Ms. Mhaza Gharib Juma (0777 414 966)	Ministry of Social Welfare, Youth, Women
				and Children Development
	12.00pm - 1.00pm	Ministry of Social Welfare, Youth, Women	Ms. Wahida Maabad	
		and Children Development		
	2.00pm-3.00pm	Ministry of Education and Vocational Training	Mr. Rijal	MoEVT - Kiembe Samaki
Thursday	9.00am – 9.45am	PS- Ministry of Education and Vocational	Abdallah Mzee/Mwanaidi Saleh Abdallah	MoEVT- Kiembe Samaki
25-Aug-11		Training (PS)	0777 472 038	
	10.30am-11.30am	President's Office - Finance, Economics	Ahmed Makame (0777 433 361)	POFEDP - Stone Town

		& Development Planning		
			Mr. Khatib Mwadim (0777 872 021)	POFEDP - Stone Town
	12.00pm - 1.00pm	ANGOZA	Hassan Khamis	
			0773 306 684	
	2.00pm-3.00pm	President's Office - Public Service & Good Governance	Wahida and Rukia (0772 075 755/077478882)	PO- PSGG - Stone Town
Friday	9.00am -9.30am	Travel to JUWAPPO Association		
26-Aug-11	10.15am-11.15am	JUWAPPO Association	Ibrahim/ Mr Saidi (0766 449 605/0773 156640)	
Monday	08.00pm-09.00pm	Travel to Farmer Field School-Kibokwe	Evaluation team	Unguja
29-Aug-11	09.00pm-10.00pm	Farmer Field School Kibokwe	Yusuf Khamis (0777 868 625)	Kibokwe
	12.00am-01.00pm	PS- Ministry of Labour, Economic Empowerment and Cooperatives (PS)	Asha Ali Abdulla (0777 423 165)	MLEC- Mwanakwerekwe
	02.00 pm-03.00pm	Zanzibar Municipal Council	Mr. Mzee (0777413043)	Zanzibar Municipal Council Offices
Tuesday	09.30am-10.30am	Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (PS)	Mr. Juma Ali Juma	MANR-stone Town
Wednesday				
31-Aug-11		Eidilfitri		
Thursday		Eidilfitri		
1-Sep-11	10.30am-11.00am	Travel to Pemba	Evaluation Team	Unguja
	09.00am-11.00am	A Briefing Meeting with all IPs in Pemba	Evaluation Team	Chakechake: venue to be communicated
Friday	11.00am-12.00am	Travel from ChakeChake to Micheweni	Evaluation Team	Micheweni
2-Sep-11	12.15am-14.00am	Visit Saininga Irrigation Scheme	Mr. Alawi and Stuart	Micheweni
	12.15am-14.00am	Visit PHCU and Health Workers Twin House	Mr. Addi and Aimtonga	Micheweni
	14.00am-16.00pm	Visit Micheweni Community Radio	Mr. Alawi and Stuart	Micheweni
	16.00pm-16.30pm	Meeting with the UNVs	Evaluation Team	Chakechake
	16.30pm-18.30pm	Travel back to Chakechake	Evaluation Team (Stuart)	Chakechake
Saturday	09.00am-12.00am	Visit SME/BDS groups in Pemba	Hussein Khatib	MTIM
	14.00am-16.00pm	Visit the Water Tank at Gongoni	Mr. Addi and Aimtonga	Micheweni
	16.30pm-18.30pm	Travel Back to Unguja	Evaluation Team	
Monday	9.00am-10.00am	Meeting with Chrispin Kapinga	Chrispin	UNDP Sub Office
5-Sep-11	10.15am-11.15am	Meeting with UNRC Liaison Officer	Dr.Karna Soro	UN Sub Office