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**Evaluation of the project**

**“Support to Service Delivery Improvement System”**

**Draft Evaluation Report**

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# List of acronyms and abbreviations

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| AP | Action Plan  |
| CCA | Common Country Assessment |
| CSB | Civil Service Bureau |
| EC | European Commission |
| GoJ | Government of Jordan |
| GPA | Government Performance Assessment Unit  |
| HR | Human Resources  |
| KACE | King Abdullah Centre for Excellence  |
| MoPSD | Ministry of Public Service Development  |
| MoH | Ministry of Health |
| MDG | Millennium Development Goals |
| M&E  | Monitoring & Evaluation  |
| MDA  | All Ministries , Departments & All Government Agencies  |
| NA | National Agenda |
| PPP’s | Public Private Partnerships |
| PSRD | Public Sector Reform Directorate |
| SC | Steering Committee |
| SG | Secretary General  |
| SDI | Service Delivery Improvement Unit  |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Program  |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| WB | World Bank |

# Executive Summary

*Public Sector Reform Directorate (PRSD) to implement the Service Delivery Improvement System (SDIS) In Jordan”* (JOR/050003, hereinafter the Project) was designed in early 2005. The purpose of the evaluation is to provide the UNDP with key findings and lessons learnt from its co-operation in the framework of the Project, including the extent to which the UNDP support has contributed to progress made towards the Jordanian Public Sector Reform (PSR) objectives, and to provide a valuable aid for future programming.

## Project management

Management and reporting indications set out in the project documents were not appropriately implemented. Absence of key stakeholders in the Steering Committee (SC), lack of regularity in SC meetings, deficiencies in reporting, lack of adequate communication mechanisms with relevant and involved staff, absence of a shared and appropriate filing system brought about insufficient information about the Project among relevant stakeholders and did not allow for adequate implementation, revision and monitoring of its activities.

**Project design**

The focus of the Project on service delivery was probably an appropriate choice, although not supported by adequate justifications. A risk was the absence of a regulatory framework for service delivery at that time.

The level of analysis was in general poor. No stakeholders’ analysis was carried out. Also, the context as not examined through a cause effect relationship. This negatively impacted on the overall structure of the Project and on its implementation.

## Relevance and appropriateness

The project was appropriate at that moment and suitable to what were the GoJ in the field of public sector development. However, Government instability and continuous delays in the public sector reform process have partially hampered the achievement of results.

On the UNDP side, the project was highly relevant and responded appropriately to the development agenda set out in UNDP’s country strategies and in its overall priorities.

The obstacles described above might perhaps have been minimized if the project had taken into consideration the absence of a proper legislative framework and of properly endorsed and agreed upon national strategies.

## Effectiveness and efficiency

Effectiveness was mainly hindered by changes in strategic directions of the GoJ and MoPSD. Capacity building and training might have been more effective if logically structured, i.e. firstly implemented at MoPSD staff level and only subsequently carried out in other MDAs. The preparation of a service delivery strategy was not implemented directly through the Project, nor was a proper M&E mechanism put in place. Efficiency was medium, with delays in decision making, implementation of foreseen activities and to limited extent payments.

## Impact and sustainability

Impact was in general hindered by several factors. Activities were scattered and did not follow an internal logic. Moreover, the role of MoPSD in enhancing service delivery – implemented in the Project through dissemination of the Toolkit – must be further strengthened; the Ministry should receive a clear mandate from the Prime Ministry and this should be endorsed by the Cabinet. It is not clear whether the central level (PRSD, GPD) were involved in the Project preparation, shared its general concept and agreed on objectives and methodology.As for service delivery, it seems that not all relevant Ministries are fully aware of the role of the customer orientation concept in service delivery and its potential to improve citizens’ lives.. The level of involvement of them is still not an institutionalised process, following clear patterns and protocols, but it is rather left to the initiative and good will of the single agency.

Sustainability is made difficult by the scattered character of training, lack of institutional memory due to high staff turnover, lack of training material, scarce communication between the project management and the staff of MoPSD.

**Coherence**

Jordan approved the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, and the first Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration took place in 2008.

Mutual reinforcement implies in general a high degree of coordination, both among UNDP funded projects and with other donors. Donors’ coordination is in Jordan an issue to be addressed. MoPIC is in charge of ensuring coordination; however, there aren’t yet regular mechanisms to concretely address this issue. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness stressed the need for linking donors’ interventions to concrete, approved, shared and ongoing national plans and strategies.. In view of the recent developments of MoPSD and its ongoing negotiations with other donors on support to public sector reform, it is highly advised that coordination be strengthened to avoid overlapping and to ensure harmonisation of funding interventions.

**Cross-cutting issues**

Environmental sustainability is not addressed in the Project and environment issues were not scrutinised at all.

Gender issues might also have taken into consideration in the selection of sub-projects, especially as far as service delivery is concerned, but this issue was not dealt with at all.

A more specific approach to include these aspects into project implementation should have been carried out, and should have been carefully addressed by the Project Steering Committee.

# Introduction: background and context of the programme

## Context of the Project

The need for a review and rethinking of national public sector policies and strategies was firstly recognized and clearly expressed by His Majesty the King Abdullah II, who in this decade embraced a comprehensive vision of Good Governance as a key factor to enhance the capabilities of the Jordanian Government (GoJ) to deliver better services and improve citizens’ lives.

Addressing public sector issues is one of the key goals of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Through the Common Country Assessment exercise (CCA), it was decided that UNDP focus in the Governance sector should be on assisting the GoJ in its efforts to improve performances of the public sector.

In line with this priority, the Project *‘Support or Building the Capacity of the Public Sector Reform Directorate (PRSD) to implement the Service Delivery Improvement System (SDIS) In Jordan”* (JOR/050003, hereinafter the Project) was designed in early 2005.

On 3 July 2005, an agreement was signed between the Jordanian Government and UNDP for a total amount of 625, 550 USD, 425,550 USD of which were cost-sharing from the Jordanian Government. The main beneficiary was at that time the Public Sector Reform Directorate under the Prime Ministry.

In 2006 the Ministry of Public Sector Development (MoPSD) was established. Its role and functions are set in the *Regulation no. (54) for the year 2007 on Organization of Public Sector Development Administration*, issued pursuant to Article (120) of the Constitution. As a consequence, PRSD functions were transferred to the MoPSD, which consequently became the actual beneficiary of the Project.

## Jordan economic developments

Since the Project inception, a number of policies/initiatives by the GoJ have been undertaken as steps to achieve objective and goals stated in the National Agenda/Kulluna al-Urdun programmatic documents.

In particular, the challenges represented by the need for improving Jordan macro-economic framework to achieve a greater stability, for reforming the financial planning, for tackling poverty and social-related issues, as well as the process of decentralization, have been addressed in a number of policy formulations and actions implementation.

Since the Project inception, the macro-economic outlook has improved in Jordan, with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) registering a real annual growth rate between 5.6% and 8.6% in the period 2004-2008.

Notwithstanding an expected reduction in the economic activity for 2009 as a consequence of the global financial and economic crisis, the IMF World Economic Outlook of April 2010[[1]](#footnote-1) projections for 2010 and 2011 GDP show rising figures, combined to a slowing down in Consumer Prices.

*Table 1*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|    | 2010 | 2011 |
| Real GDP  | **4.1** | **4.5** |
| Consumer Prices  | **5.3** | **4.6** |

*Source: World Economic Outlook, Rebalancing growth, IMF 2010*

Jordan’s economic performance has in general improved, showing greater resilience against new external shocks such as the elimination of free oil delivery from Iraq. The surge in economic activity has been broad based, involving all sectors of economic activity. The following table and graph show the % GDP distribution among sectors.

 *Table 2*

|  |
| --- |
| GDP DISTRIBUTION BY SECTOR |
|  | 1988 | 1998 | 2007 | 2008 |
| Agriculture  |  6.9 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 2.9 |
| Industry  | 22.8 | 26.4 | 30.3 | 34.1 |
|  *of which, Manufacturing*  |  *10.1* |  *15.7* |  *19.5* |  *20.5* |
| Services  | 70.3  | 70.5 | 66.8 | 63.0 |

*Source: World Bank, Jordan at a glance*

 *Graph 1*

Although deficits in Current Accounts (and specifically in Trade Balance) and Balance of Payments persist, the Country has been, in general, positively rated by the IMF at the end of its Article IV review in May 2009[[2]](#footnote-2). Inflation remained low, with an average 5% as for years 2005-2007, and showed an exceptional rise in 2008 driven by international oil and food prices. Although the external deficit widened, this was balanced by a rise in FDI inflows, which – together with significant donor support, including bilateral support from the US and Gulf states – enabled a steady and sizable increase in international reserves.

This positive macroeconomic outlook was coupled with reforms (such as the reform of the state pension system, as well as recent tax reforms which include the improvement of tax administration and management), in an effort to create an enabling environment for private sector investment. Reforms have progressed well in the areas of education, privatization and expenditure/budget management. Indeed, Public Finance Management in recent years has advanced both in relation to budget planning and execution. MTEF was introduced at the central level, as well as on a pilot basis in 3 out of 93 Jordanian Municipalities, thanks to the support by the German-funded PAMD Programme. The Government is committed to extend the exercise to all of the 93 Municipalities by 2011. In addition, a Unified Financial Model for Municipalities is to be adopted by the GoJ.

In addition, with the support of the UNDP, the GoJ has reviewed the property tax, transferring the responsibility for its collection to Municipalities. It is, therefore, expected that this will have a double impact: an increase in income and on the other side a more accurate estimation of available resources (and, presumably, expenditures). However, this also reveals that Municipalities have some competencies in collecting taxes but they lack a proper full autonomy on the financial side.

Notwithstanding these positive results, “still the Jordanian economy maintains many attributes of a *rentier* economy, where significant public revenue accrues from natural resources, such as phosphates and potash, and from external financial assistance and where private household income is largely dependent on family members’ remittances from abroad”[[3]](#footnote-3).

Also, despite the economic growth the Country witnessed in recent years, unemployment rate (among nationals) did not fall as expected, but remained relatively steady at 13.1 % (12.7% in 2008), with a percentage of unemployed females of 25.6 (Jordan Department of Statistics, 2007). According to the World Bank Report *Jordan - Resolving Jordan's labour market paradox of concurrent economic growth and high unemployment*, “many newly created jobs (through FDIs and other investment) were not filled by Jordanians but by foreign workers”.

This coupled, with an uneven rate of poverty among its 12 Governorates, poses challenges to Jordan future development. In fact, notwithstanding an improved ranking in the UNDP Human Development Index of the Country as a whole (pls. refer to Table 3 below), Jordan has combined high growth rates with persisting high poverty levels and deterioration of social indicators in certain areas of the Country, combined with one of the highest population growth rate in the area.

With a rate of 14.2% in 2006 (World Bank) declining from a rate of 21.3% in 1997, poverty distribution by Governorate reveals an unevenly spread of poverty, with areas such as Mafraq reaching up to 23% and Zarqa, where poverty is not only significantly higher than in other Governorates but it has increased over the past few years. Large households, women and youth in rural areas with fewer opportunities are the most affected. Out of 73 districts in Jordan, 20 with a population of 403,000 people, (i.e. 7.6% of the country’s total population) had poverty levels of over 25%. Indeed, the first National MDG Report (2004) identified regional disparities as a key challenge. As a result, specific MDGs report on the areas of Mafraq and Zarqa have been elaborated as of 2008.

*Table 3 - HDI AND OTHER SOCIAL INDICATORS (2009)*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Population, total** | **HDI Rank** | **Life Expectancy** (Year) | **Literacy** | **Real GDP Capita** (USD) | **People living below national income poverty line** |
| 5,906\* | 96 (out of 182) | 72.4 | 91.1 |           4,901 | 14.2% |
| **Female literacy as percentage of total population** | **Male literacy as percentage of total population** | **Female estimated earning income**  | **Male estimated earning income**  | **Infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births**  | **Unemployment, total (%of total labour force** |
| 87% | 95.2% | 1,543 $ | 8,065 $ | 27 | 12.7% |

\*2008 *Source: Human Development Report 2009, UNDP (based on 2007 data) and World Bank*

The Government of Jordan (GoJ) has devoted a considerable amount of effort on social protection system reforms in recent years. Indeed, according to the World Bank, more than 25% of GDP is devoted to human development (education, health, pensions and social safety nets).

Between 1995 and 2005, around 20% of the Government Budget (around 6.5% of GDP) was represented by educational expenses (Jordan is one of the best performing Country in the MENA Region).

Women are almost equally represented in higher education, and nearly half of Jordan’s Universities enrolled students are represented by female. However, the percentage of women in the workforce remains low. In the 2007 parliamentary elections, a record number of seven women gained seats in the lower house. In addition, an unprecedented number of ministerial portfolios have been given to women.

## Public Sector Reform in Jordan

### Progress of the reform during this decade

The Jordanian public administration includes three types of organizations: Ministries, Central departments, other State agencies. In this report they will be named MDA (Ministries/Departments/Agencies). Jordan's governance system consists of three levels:

Central level: composed of 26 ministries and 23 central departments.

The centre is responsible for developing strategies and policies that govern service delivery to citizens. Despite reforms to enhance decentralization, it is said that most decisions are made by central authorities.

Regional Units are composed of 12 Governorates; each has sub-divisions called districts (Liwa)

and sub-districts (Qadha’).

Local Units consist of 309 municipalities and 157 village councils and 40 common service councils.

The total number of governmental employees (civilian side) is about 180.000 employees, with a ratio of 1:30 civil servants vis-à-vis the population[[4]](#footnote-4).

Public administration reform has been in the GoJ agenda since several years and was the object of strategies, programmes and plan since the 70s.

In particular in this decade, a comprehensive administrative reform effort was launched in 2001 as a part of the overall socio-economic reform efforts. It sought to modernise the country’s bureaucracy and raise qualitative standards for public services, through restructuring government departments and implementing an e-government plan. In particular, administrative reform in Jordan was intended to achieve efficiency, effectiveness and transparency in the public administration through a qualitative change process focusing on improving services provided to citizens, rationalising costs, improving organisation and control, and supporting competitiveness in the private sector.

The reform plan, as approved in the programme presented to King Abdullah II Ibn Hussein and the Economic Council in 2002, focused on 4 key goals: increasing productivity and efficiency; rationalising expenses and achieving optimal use of available resources; developing competitive departments and adapting the organisation of the administration to international development needs; improving the quality of services provided to the citizens. In order to reach these goals, 5 priority areas for intervention were identified: Government and its restructuring, Human resources development in the public sector, Service quality, Adoption of the responsibility principle in administrative action, Development of information technology (electronic government) and postal administration. These five objectives were reflected in five different programme groups.

In terms of developing accountability in administrative actions, Jordan began at that time defining procedures regarding the planning process in all Departments through training staff involved with planning and development, and through introducing a performance control and monitoring programme. Furthermore, Jordan planned to set parameters to measure performance in terms of the goals that needed to be reached.

In 2002, the King Abdullah II Award for Excellence in Government Performance and Transparency was launched by Royal Decree ‘*to enhance the role of the public sector in serving the Jordanian community with all its sectors and the investment community by promoting awareness of the concepts of comprehensive quality administration and distinguished performance, and to highlight the exceptional efforts of the public sector and present its accomplishments in the area of developing its systems and services. The King Abdullah II Award for Excellence in Government Performance and Transparency is considered the highest award of excellence for the public sector on the national level’’[[5]](#footnote-5).* One of the areas is the Award for Excellence in Government Performance and Transparency.

In 2005, a Steering Committee including representatives from the government, civil society, private sector, Parliament, and media completed the National Agenda, an ambitious development agenda to transform Jordan from a lower-middle income country into a modern knowledge-based economy with higher value added, increased productivity and employment, and improved quality of life for Jordanians. On Government & Policies side, the Agenda means*: involving reforms intended to contribute to the stimulation of economic development and the improvement of social welfare and security. These reforms revolve around creating a favourable investment environment, fiscal discipline, internal political stability, administrative development, justice, accountability, transparency, labour policies, vocational training, employment support, minimum wage, maximum working hours , education*[[6]](#footnote-6).

2006 was an important year for the progress of public sector reform. In January the King Abdullah Centre for Excellence (KACE) was established, with the objective to be the national reference for quality and excellence among public, private, business associations, educational service providers and non-governmental institutions. KACE also contracts non-biased parties to measure customer satisfaction (citizens, investors, or entities).

In mid 2006 the Ministry of Public Sector Development (MoPSD) was established as the legal and actual successor to the Public Sector Development Directorate, which was part of the Office of the Prime Minister. The new ministry also incorporated functions of the previous Ministry for Administrative Development, whose tasks and functions were therefore expanded.

In 2006, the GoJ ratified the UN Convention against corruption, defined an anticorruption strategy and a decentralization plan, strengthened its Audit Bureau, and submitted a draft financial disclosure law to Parliament.A start was made with public sector reform within various Ministries*,* but *–* as reported in the*.* 2006 EC progress report on Jordan: *a strategy for overall reform of the sector is not yet in place and does not seem to be high on the authorities’ agenda. Public sector reform is, however, essential as it is a precondition for other reforms’.[[7]](#footnote-7)*

The GoJ programme presented to Parliament in December 2007 ran along the same lines of the National Agenda; in particular, continuing education reform and fighting poverty and unemployment were the top development priorities of the GoJ.

In 2008, MoPSD, in collaboration with partners, developed a strategic plan for the public sector development (2008-2013), with a vision for efficient and effective government management in order to deliver better services. The mission of the strategy focused on empowering public sector ministries, especially in terms of their functions; developing policies and procedures based on national priorities; and enhancing principles of excellence, accountability and transparency.

In spite of these efforts, progress has been in general slow. Most areas, ranging from reforms in pay and grading to improving meritocracy and human resources management to strengthening policy coordination and streamlining government, have witnessed limited advancement. Some though limited evolution has been registered within several ministries and public institutions using different tools, such as the KACE and some twinning projects with EU institutions which proved effective in harmonizing Jordan’s institutional framework with the EU’s.

Slow pace of reform in the public sector is also highlighted in EC reports. The 2008 Progress Report states: *Limited progress was made on public sector reform. Some ministries, such as the Ministry of Environment, proceed with successful unilateral internal reforms, yet there is no clear effort ongoing across the public sector as a whole[[8]](#footnote-8).*

Another sign of slow progress in the public sector can be the limited, if non existing, amount of external aid GoJ received in this field. Donors concentrated to other priorities; the World Bank cancelled in 2006 a 15Million US$ support to PSR because of lack of appropriate commitment and proper framework, and only recently has reappeared to negotiate a new, revised possible intervention.

The last quarter of 2009 witnessed important changes on the political scene. King Abdullah dissolved the Parliament in November 2009 and called for pre-term elections. A new government was appointed in December 2009, tasked with an ambitious reform programme notably touching upon economic recovery and development of key sectors such as energy and transport, good governance, transparency and efficiency of the public service, decentralization and citizens' participation. Progress was made in the area of governance and transparency, with the start of work of the Ombudsman office and the adoption of a code of conduct streamlining the relationship between the Government and the media.

A major step was undertaken by the GoJ in 2010. The Government adopted seven strategic initiatives to help focus its efforts in 2010 and to better define and prioritize its activities going forward.

The seven strategic initiatives are as follows:

1. Strengthening Government Performance and Accountability

2. Encouraging Political and Civic Participation

3. Enhancing the Business and Investment Environment

4. Empowering Jordanian Citizens with the Skills to Succeed and Enter the Labor Market

5. Feeding and Fueling Growth and Security through Infrastructure Mega Projects

6. Expanding the Middle Class and Empowering the Underprivileged

7. Improving Citizen Services

To improve policy development, institutionalize decision making, and to better implement Cabinet decisions, the Government established a number of new oversight mechanisms, including the creation of Ministerial Committees to oversee the seven strategic initiatives. [[9]](#footnote-9). They are supplemented by three other specialized committees of the Council of Ministers to provide overall administrative, financial and strategic coordination support. A Delivery Unit has alsobeen established in the Prime Minister’s office, to support the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers with actual implementation of the priority projects outlined in the Government Plan 2010. The Unit collates information on implementation progress and provides progress reports to the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers.

### Service delivery

Service delivery is regulated in Jordan by Regulation No. 64 of 2006. The Bylaw only provides for some general indications, but does not include a proper definition of service delivery and of responsibilities to be attributed to entities.

A number of initiatives have been developed in the last 10 years to improve service delivery. A Municipal Capacity Assessment Study was prepared by RTI and approved by Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) in 2006; it provides an overview of municipal service delivery, with particular focus on municipal, service partnerships with the private sector.

It has been said that current efforts to improve service delivery in Jordan tend to focus on the supply side of service provision, through public sector reform, capacity building of government institutions and, to a lesser extent, the reform of policies and laws in order to promote poverty alleviation. As recent UNDP reports state, *more attention is required in relation to the demand side of service delivery. Civil society organizations that aim to represent the interests of the poor should take a more proactive role at the local level by informing citizens of their rights and entitlements and helping them claim them effectively.[[10]](#footnote-10)*

### Human resources

In terms of human resources, the Civil Service Bylaw that was approved by the Cabinet in June 2002 called for the application of transparent, merit-based systems for hiring and promoting civil servants. Training programmes for existing staff were also reportedly launched and carried out.

The bylaw was subsequently revised. The current Civil Service Bylaw 30 /2007 has made significant changes in the way of managing human resource in civil service. Some changes reflect good practices, especially in the areas of HR Planning, employees’ performance appraisal management, HR Development and Training, Complaints and Complaint Handling, conduct and discipline.

### Decentralization

Progress is to be observed with respect to decentralization, although at a slower pace than expected and despite declarations and statements by His Majesty the King[[11]](#footnote-11). Among the main achievements in this field, it is worth mentioning the Cabinet decision issued on 20 October 2008 approving the establishment of a specialized Technical Committee to revise the “Vision for Decentralization in Jordan”, drafted by the Government of Jordan (GoJ), with the support of the Danish LGDK (the National Association of Municipalities in Denmark).

There has been an extensive debate in Jordan over form and kind decentralization should assume in the Country. Recently, the concept moved from the idea of focusing on Regions to that of Governorates. A Law on decentralization (where focus is shifted towards Governorates) has however been drafted and is under scrutiny. However, a comprehensive framework is yet to be fully developed.

A new Municipalities Law was enacted in February 2007 (Law no. 14/2007), under which the mayors and councils of all municipalities are to be elected, except in Amman where half the members of the council will continue to be appointed by the government. Under the previous 2001 law, all mayors and half of the council members in all municipalities were appointed. The Law also includes a 20% quota for women in the council seats (at the elections of February 2007, twenty women candidates above those elected by quota won council seats and one woman won a mayorship), allows joint membership in the parliament and municipal councils, and reduces the age of eligible voters from 19 to 18 years. The Law delegates to Municipalities 28 specific functions (as per art. 40 of the Law, including town and street planning, building system, sewage system, etc.) and a general function which allows municipalities to “practice any developmental authority and establish developmental projects that generate public benefits to the municipal residents”.

The Directive issued by Prime Minister’s Office on 12 February 2008 transferring 92 specific functions from the central level Ministries to their representatives of line Ministries at the Governorate level. Tasks attributed to Governors have been widened to include development planning and Local Development Units (LDUs) have been established at the Governorate levels. The LDUs have elaborated Governorates’ development plans, merging and/or including proposed plans and projects by the Municipalities enclosed in their borders. Governorates fall under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior (Governors are not elected as Mayors in Municipalities but are appointed), which has established a specific Directorate responsible for development.

Government transfers to Municipalities are based on provisions by the Municipalities’ Law, and derive mainly from petroleum tax, therefore fluctuating according to oil prices, which makes good municipal planning and budgeting processes difficult. Recently, the% transfer to Municipalities from Central Government has been increased from 3 to 6%.

## The MoPSD

In 2006, the Regulation no. 64 for the year 2006 on Public service delivery improvement, issued pursuant to Article 120 of the Constitution, was enacted. It assigned to MoPSD the following tasks:

*Article 3 – The Ministry shall have the following responsibilities:*

1. *Provide technical advice to the Department to contribute to building its capacities in public service delivery improvement.*
2. *Spread public awareness in the area of service delivery improvement in cooperation with the concerned Department.*
3. *Assist the Department in utilizing the necessary mechanisms to develop Service Standards and identify Desired Levels.*
4. *Cooperate with the Department in the area of measuring level of Service provided and identify possible areas for improvement for this Service.*
5. *Prepare studies related to public services in cooperation with entities that provide them to improve its services and present recommendations in this regard to the cabinet.*

*Article 4 – For the purposes of this Regulation, the Department shall have the following responsibilities:*

1. *Coordinate and cooperate with the Ministry in terms of implementing necessary mechanisms and tools for improvement of Services provided.*
2. *Identify needs and expectations of the Client*
3. *Develop standards of services provided and identify Desired Level and circulate it to concerned entities.*
4. *Measure actual performance level for its services in comparison with the set standards for learning and improvement purposes.*
5. *Measure the level of satisfaction of Client.*

*Article 5 – for the purposes of indentifying needs of Service Recipient , the Department shall, at least once a year, measure the Client voice and identify their needs using more than one adequate methodology and tool including customer service office, suggestions and complaints system, opinion polls and structured interviews.*

*Article 6 – for the purposes of Service Standards development and publishing, the Department shall establish adequate foundations and mechanisms and ensure that the standards are comprehensive and adequate from all service delivery aspects, and identify Desired Level for each standard.*

*Article 7 – for the purposes of reviewing, measuring and improving actual performance for services provided, the Department shall utilize mechanisms and tools in order to identify areas for service improvement and establish necessary plans for implementation.*

*Article 8 – for the purposes of implementing the provisions of this Regulation, the Department shall:*

1. *Identify the services it provides*
2. *Identify the directorates that provide the service and identify other relevant entities*
3. *Prepare services manual*
4. *Undertake necessary measures to implement the provisions of this Regulation including naming a relevant entity in the Department to undertake the responsibility of implementing it and facilitating the mission of the Ministry team in the area of service improvement.*
5. *Spread awareness among staff and train them on mechanisms, tools, procedures and standards for services established to ensure efficient delivery of service.*
6. *Establish an action plan to improve its services within a specific timeline.*
7. *Ensure that the Client receives information relevant to services provided at the Department.*

*Article 9 –*

1. *The Department shall commit to explanation of reasons and justifications for not providing the required Service to the Client.*
2. *The Client is entitled for objecting to not providing the Service based on the set and disclosed standards.*
3. *The Department shall, in coordination with the Ministry, issue the instructions relevant to the procedures of presenting an objection and the mechanisms to decide on the matter[[12]](#footnote-12).*

Since its establishment, the Ministry undertook several changes in priorities and strategic directions due to the rapid succession of several ministers. A new boost was given by the appointment in December 2009 of the current Minister of MoPSD, Mr. Imad Fakhoury, who is also State Minister for Infrastructures and Mega Projects. Mr. Fakhoury initiated intensive work on MoPSD. An Operational Plan 2010-2013 was recently prepared; also, a revision of the country public sector reform strategy was elaborated (with USAID support) on behalf of the ministry and is now being revised by the World Bank. A Plan to link MoPSD activities and projects with the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) has also been prepared.

In addition, a consultant has been hired to prepare a plan for pilot projects on public services channelled through focal points, provisionally called reception stations. The initiative is reportedly highly supported by H.E. the Minister.

# Description of the program – its logic theory, results framework and external factors likely to affect success

## Logic Theory

At the time of the identification of the Project, the GoJ had reportedly a vivid interest in launching and implementing a national strategy for the improvement of the public sector. His Majesty King Abdullah II’s vision for Good Governance[[13]](#footnote-13) recognized the vital link between good governance and Jordan’s socio-economic goals and emphasized the dimension of performance improvement in the delivery of services, which should base on customers’ needs. Until then, Jordan’s public sector institutions had made some efforts in improving services, but results were limited: the capacities of institutions and citizens to embrace such new orientation and lack of institutionalisation of measures severely hampered achievements.

King Abdullah’s vision on Governance became the subject of a joint initiative on Good Governance for Development in the Arab Countries, launched at a regional conference held in Jordan on 6-7 February 2005, under the patronage of His Majesty King Abdullah II. The initiative was founded on three inter-related reform areas - administrative, financial, and judicial - and had six themes: Civil Service and Integrity, E-Government and Administrative Simplification, Governance of Public Finances, Public Service Delivery, Public-Private Partnership and Regulatory Reform, -Role of the Judiciary and Law Enforcement, Citizens, Civil Society and Public Sector Reform in the Arab Region.

It is in the spirit of a renovated commitment to good governance that the Project was conceived.

### Intervention logic and strategy

The project document highlights service delivery as main focus of the actions:

 *A key component of this programme is strengthening the government’s service delivery systems[[14]](#footnote-14).*

The original project document mentions four key results/expected outcomes:

1. *Strengthened Project Coordination Unit to coordinate all project activities and to ensure that timelines are met,*
2. *Capacities of PSRD strengthened to deliver the Service Delivery Improvement System,*
3. *Strategy and plan for a unified monitoring and evaluation system [linking the policy level and the operational level performance measurement systems] developed, and*
4. *National Strategy and plan for implementation of SDIS (service delivery improvement system) system government-wide developed and for institutional capacity building needs to support SDIS[[15]](#footnote-15).*

The choice of service delivery as the key component of the Project was probably appropriate. Empowering MDAs to implement SDI is meaningful not only because it is part of a step-by-step “responsibilisation” process but also because it provides the relevant Counterparts with the means to build their own “development”. It theoretically allows for better internal cohesion among different involved stakeholders and enhanced effectiveness, encourage initiative and innovation, and can generate lasting results. A major shortcoming could be represented by the absence of properly established strategic, operational, and legislative arrangements for service delivery at that time.

## Results Framework

The results framework of the Project presents numerous logical shortcomings. The description of objective as stated in the document - *to build the capacity of the Public Sector Reform Directorate (PSRD) and selected institutions to implement the Service Delivery Improvement System (SDIS) linked to the Public Sector Reform Programme* – does not fully coincides with the so called ‘outputs’ presented in the framework. There seems to be some confusion among outputs and results; what is called an output is actually a result, or an outcome. Output 1 (strengthened Coordination Unit) is not a result, but a means for achieving the expected results of the Project.

It is also to be noted that the framework lacks objectively verifiable indicator (OVIs). This is an important shortcoming, as they would have allowed for enhanced monitoring of the Project and for a proper evaluation.

## External factors

External potential risks of the Project are quite clearly stated in the project document:

*The SDIS tools and methodologies are new to Jordan and some are less understood than others.*

*Capacity building and change management processes for institutionalizing SDIS need to build into the system: (i) reinforcement for the change process, (ii) rewards for institutions that take the risks, (iii) linkages to required training, (iv) removal of competing priorities, (v) integrating SDIS into other PSRD systems and (vi) continuing assistance.*

The main risk, however – and it should have been mentioned in the document – was, and to some extent still is, the extent of the political will of GoJ to seriously and timely undertake such complex reform. In fact, this has been one of the major issues undermining an effective and efficient implementation of the Project. Reasons and details will be explored later in this report.

# Purpose of the evaluation

The purpose of the evaluation was to provide the UNDP with key findings and lessons learnt from its co-operation in the framework of the Project, including the extent to which the UNDP support has contributed to progress made towards the Jordanian Public Sector Reform (PSR) objectives, and to provide a valuable aid for future programming.

As the ToRs state, this evaluation findings and recommendations ‘*will therefore be utilized to develop a potential separate project document for the next phase, with a comprehensive and detailed results and resources framework*’.

# Key questions and scope of the evaluation - information on limitations and de-limitations

Limitations to this evaluation deal mainly with:

1. Lack of proper project design and absence of key evaluation indicators, such as Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVI)
2. Unavailability of key staff working at the Project in the first years of implementation. This relates to both UNDP, MoPSD and other stakeholders, and hampered the establishment of an institutional memory thus hindering the impact of the Project itself
3. Lack of documented justification for project directions’ changes and deviations from the original project documents
4. Unavailability or absence of project documentation, such as project reports and Steering Committee (SC) meetings minutes.

## Key Evaluation Questions

Taking into account the ToRs of the present mission, the implementation status of the programme and the resource disbursements made to date, the final evaluation has explored the following questions:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Project Management**  | * Are the Project Management arrangements appropriate at the team level and Steering Committee level?
 |
| **Project Design**  | * To what extent did the design of the project help in achieving its own goals?
* Were the context, problem, needs and priorities well analyzed while designing the project?
* Were there clear objectives and strategy?
* Were there clear baselines indicators and/or benchmarks for performance?
* Was the process of project design sufficiently participatory? Was there any impact of the process?
 |
| **Relevance** **and** **appropriateness**  | * Was the project relevant, appropriate and strategic to national goals and challenges?
* Was the project relevant, appropriate and strategic to the mandate, strategy, functions, roles, and responsibilities of MOPSD ?
* Was the project relevant, appropriate and strategic to UNDP mandate?
 |
| **Effectiveness and efficiency** | * Were the actions to achieve the outputs and outcomes effective and efficient?
* Were there any lessons learned, failures/lost opportunities? What might have been done better or differently?
* How did the project deal with issues and risks?
* Were the outputs achieved in a timely manner?
* Were the resources utilized in the best way possible?
 |
| **Impact and sustainability** | * Will the outputs/outcomes lead to benefits beyond the life of the existing project?
* Were the actions and results owned by the local partners and stakeholders?
* Was capacity (individuals, institution, systems) built through the actions of the project?
* What is the level of contribution of the project management arrangements to national ownership of the set objectives, results, and outputs?
* Were the modes of deliveries of the outputs appropriate to promote national ownership and sustainability of the results achieved?
 |
| **Coherence** | . Did activities under the project allow UNDP to achieve its development policy objectives without internal contradiction or without contradiction with other donors’ policies?  |

# Approach and methodology

In light of the next UNDP intervention in the governance sector, the present evaluation has a particular focus on impact, sustainability and lessons learnt, serving the main purpose of contributing to provide a baseline appraisal for its inception.

This is in agreement with the UNDP Office, as well as with the GoJ and in line with the overarching goal of the GoJ in addressing public sector issues.

## Approach, Structure and Reporting

The Consultant worked closely with UNDP and the MoPSD staff at all stages of this evaluation exercise, in order to ensure that the mission would be participatory and inclusive by engaging all the stakeholders through participatory evaluation approaches. The evaluation was carried out by an independent consultant. The consultant reported on all stages of the study to the appointed representatives from the MoPSD and the designated UNDP representatives.

## Methodology

The evaluation exercise was done following the five evaluation criteria of Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability and Impact, to which further criteria defined by the UNDP and the consultant were added. The consultant used participatory methodologies and appreciative inquiry in evaluating the Project. This included regular consultation with the Project staff and UNDP.

### Data Collection and Analysis

Initial data were collected by studying and examining reports and documents provided by the UNDP. Additional data were provided by GoJ designated officers (MoPSD) as well as other documents sourced from MoPSD and other MDAs. These were collected through various techniques, including key informant interviews and retrieving/recovering data from MoPSD and other stakeholders’ archives.

Data from desk review were analyzed and synthesized per theme. Appropriate analysis levels were employed to get the best interpretation from the data.

### Case Studies

Two success stories in the public sector were documented, with particular emphasis on lessons learnt.

### Analysis and Reporting Phase

This phase entailed interviews and additional meetings with relevant partners at the central level: UNDP Office, MoPSD, and other stakeholders relevant to the Project.

##  Basis of Judgement and Interpretation of Findings

In this study, the consultant has relied on plan documents, various progress and review reports, stakeholder interviews, questionnaires, discussions and meetings for its findings. Whereas candid conclusions have been drawn on issues where consistent data has been generated, there are several cases where respondents gave divergent information and opinions, leaving the consultants to make judgements based on statistical weighting and/or hindsight.

# Findings

The evaluation exercise was carried out following the five criteria of Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability. Additional criteria (project management, project design, cross-cutting issues) were added by the UNDP and the consultant, in order to evidence key elements to be taken into consideration in the design of next UNDP interventions.

1. Relevance of the Project was assessed in connection with the development policy of the Jordanian government and the needs of the beneficiaries (Jordanian citizens).

2. Effectiveness was assessed by analyzing the extent to which the Project objectives have been met.

3. Efficiency of Project implementation was analysed focusing on quality, quantity, timing of inputs, overall management of activities and the utilization of Project inputs.

4. Impact was identified focusing mainly on the positive and negative direct outcomes of the Project, and is related to the overall goal of the Project realized at the time of evaluation.

5. Sustainability was assessed by looking at the extent to which the country can continue to successfully carry on the Project activities considering financial, institutional and technical aspects.

6. Coherence was analysed by examining to what extent activities under the Project allowed UNDP to achieve its development policy objectives without internal contradiction, or without contradiction with other donors’ policies.

7. Finally, cross-cutting issues were dealt with by analysing whether there might have been an indirect or direct contribution of the Project to gender and environment matters.

## Project management

Are the Project Management arrangements appropriate at the team level and Steering Committee level?

Management arrangements are defined in the project document and have been taken as the basis for this chapter.

### Steering Committee

The project documents states that

*the project will be managed by the PSRD under the Prime Minister’s Office through the National Execution Modality (NEX).[ ... ] A Steering Committee will be established for the project with the following composition:*

1. *Executive Director of PSRD, Chairman of the Steering Committee*
2. *Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC)*
3. *United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)*
4. *Executive Director of GPD*
5. *Project Coordinator / PSRD*

*The Steering Committee will meet quarterly to review Project progress and to update work-plans as required.[[16]](#footnote-16)*

It is not clear what the role of the SC has been in the first years of the Project, due to unavailability of most minutes – if even prepared - and high turnover of relevant staff, including UNDP staff and Secretaries General. The project has been factually dormant in years 2006 and 2007 and no SC was held in that period. There were reportedly three - four SC meetings in 2009 and one in 2010. One of the current MoPSD Directors has been present at one of those meetings in 2009 and reported that the meeting was correctly carried out, assessing past developments, new orientations and recommendations on future actions. It seems that participants of SC changed all the time; this hindered a correct monitoring and assessment of Project implementation.

The consultant found minutes of what was probably the 1st SC meeting, held on 6th November 2005, and of a SC meeting held on 2nd January 2006 ‘in order to re-activate the project as soon as possible’. It seems that its recommendations were never implemented.

As to participants, one might wonder why representatives of main MDAs involved in service delivery were not foreseen in the project arrangements. This might have facilitated the work, by creating a shared consensus among key stakeholders.

Absence of strategic vision in the composition of the SC, lack of minutes and lack of regularity in SC meetings were serious shortcomings and did not favour an appropriate consolidation of lessons learnt, nor allowed for proper communication and information flows among relevant stakeholders’ staff.

### Reporting arrangements

The project document states:

*The Project Coordinator shall prepare, at least one month prior to each tripartite review meeting[[17]](#footnote-17), an Annual Project Report (APR) that: compares project performance with targets specified in the Project Document and work plans approved at previous tripartite reviews; presents revised work plans for the remaining duration of the Project; and which identifies key issues that need to be resolved during the review. Additional Project review reports may be requested, if necessary, by the UNDP, Government or executing agency.*

*A Terminal Project Report (TPR) will be prepared for consideration at the final tripartite review of the project at least 2 months prior to the final tripartite review to allow initial comments to be provided and incorporated in the report prior to the final tripartite review. PSRD will finalize the TPR and submit this to the Government and UNDP within one month of the final tripartite review.*

The consultant had not access to project progress reports, not it is clear whether were they prepared at all. The only available document is a three pages final report prepared in 2010 by the Project Manager at MoPSD for UNDP, which presents a very brief description of activities carried out throughout years 2006-2010.

As far as other reports prepared under the Project, the Consultant could find:

1. A pre-scoping assessment report prepared in 2009 in order to streamline UNDP support in policy making through an assessment of MoPSD activities and recommendations for moving forward. The report’s suggestions were however not implemented because MoPSD directors did not agree with contents and conclusions.
2. A report of a mission held in January 2010 to formulate suggestions on decentralisation issues and streamline service delivery systems in the MoPSD.

There are workplans for 2006 and 2007, which were reportedly not implemented.

No monitoring missions were foreseen under the project, although the Consultant found a self-assessment for the period January – October 2008 what was probably derived from a UNDP template.

All these documents were found in folders located in the UNDP Project manager’s office. No other staff could have access to them, nor are they available in electronic format. The introduction of an electronic folder might have made files available and easy to be consulted, provided that MoPSD was properly equipped[[18]](#footnote-18).

It seems that the above reports were not disseminated and provided to relevant staff of the MoPSD. This is in contrast with the principles of openness and transparency, as well with best practices in general and project management requirements.

### Conclusion

All in all, management and reporting indications set out in the project documents were not appropriately implemented. Absence of key stakeholders in the SC, lack of regularity in SC meetings, deficiencies in reporting, lack of adequate communication mechanisms with relevant and involved staff, absence of a shared and appropriate filing system brought about insufficient information about the Project among relevant stakeholders and did not allow for adequate implementation, revision and monitoring of its activities.

## Project design

### Design of the Project vis-à-vis its goals

To what extent did the design of the project help in achieving its own goals?

The Project was designed in a time where the public sector reform was becoming again one of the GoJ priorities. The main intended objective of the technical assistance outlined under the Project, according to the original project document, was *to build the capacity of the PSRD to support implementation of the SDIS in 14 institutions[[19]](#footnote-19).*

The original project document mentions four key results/expected outcomes, called outputs:

1. *Strengthened Project Coordination Unit to coordinate all project activities and to ensure that timelines are met,*
2. *Capacities of PSRD strengthened to deliver the Service Delivery Improvement System;*
3. *Strategy and plan for a unified monitoring and evaluation system [linking the policy level and the operational level performance measurement systems] developed, and*
4. *National Strategy and plan for implementation of SDIS (service delivery improvement system) system government-wide developed and for institutional capacity building needs to support SDIS[[20]](#footnote-20).*

It seems that there is a sort of discrepancy between the four results and the stated main objective, which focuses on the SD component. Moreover, there is no rationale for the choice of the service delivery component as main objective of the Project. At that time, there was an absence of a clear framework on PSR and of a clear definition of roles and responsibilities of both government levels (central bodies, governorates, municipalities?) and institutions (State/local bodies? private agencies?) as regard to nature and type of services to be delivered.

In fact, many Project activities were based on the Service Delivery Improvement Toolkit for Public Sector Reform 2004-2009, a tool developed in 2004 and adapted by PSRD with the support of Price Waterhouse/World Bank. It is to be asked whether such tool should have been developed at a later stage, and whether it would have been more appropriate to undertake at a first stage only some limited awareness measures to prepare and inform State bodies’ and other relevant stakeholders’ staff on potential and impact of customer oriented approach in delivering services to citizens. This might have represented a limitation and will be dealt with later in this report.

During the implementation the original four components were reduced to the SDI and capacity building components. This delimitation was never formalised, nor justified by a proper situation assessment.

In spite of changes in the scope of the project, this was never officially revised, nor was the project document updated: even the beneficiary – changed from PRSD to MoPSD – was not changed in the Project document. Such changes, revisions and consequent delimitations of Project scope should have been formally agreed upon, and a set of justification for deviations should have been prepared. The formalisation of changes is a necessary step in project implementation and management, providing clearer and shared guidelines on future priorities and allowing for proper monitoring of both expenditures and results.

As a conclusion, the original project design was probably too broad. Next developments in the pace of change and realisation of the public sector reform in Jordan led to the need of changes in the Project implementation and to the delimitation of its areas of intervention. This was however never formalised. Also, it is to be discussed whether focus on service delivery was appropriate, given the lack of a proper policy, legal and institutional framework at the time of the Project design.

### Analysis

Were the context, problem, needs and priorities well analyzed while designing the project?

### Problem Analysis and Project Intervention’s Logic

#### Baseline situation analysis/Stakeholders analysis

Given the considerable political dimension of the reform and its high sensitiveness, a thorough analysis of the context should have been a priority in the project preparation phase. Brief indications of the general policy framework at the national level was presented in the project document; however, it lacked a more articulated and in-depth analysis.

A proper stakeholders’ analysis should have been conducted, in order to have a well detailed baseline situation analysis against which measure progress. For instance, competencies attributed to MDAs in terms of service delivery, as well as capacities which should be strengthened, are not spelt out or commented on. From the Project Result Framework we understand that part of the capacities building efforts of the Project focused on strengthening Performance Improvement Units (PIUs, later called Policies and Institutional Development Units - PIDU) within selected institutions over time, linking their goals to their respective ministry’s or institution’s mission, goals and objectives. However, a specific capacity appraisal is missing and this does not allow for a full understanding of how and if objectives stated in the results. A baseline situation analysis (possibly with baseline indicators) would have been helpful in identifying and quantifying results and purposes to be achieved, as well for monitoring and measuring the Project. No background on current mechanisms of service delivery in Jordan has been elaborated; though, this was due to be one of the Project results.

#### Problem analysis

 In addition to what said above, problems addressed are not organized in a cause-effect relationship (utilizing “problem tree” techniques or others). The consultant could not ascertain if the time allotted to project formulation was sufficient to include all needed investigations.

### Strategy

Were there clear objectives and strategy?

The project document states:

*The main objective of the technical assistance outlined under this project document is to build the capacity of the PSRD to support implementation of the SDIS in 14 institutions. SDIS is at the core of efforts to improve the delivery and quality of services in Jordan. It is based on the concept of continuous improvement based on client needs and client satisfaction and is built on a five-stage process.[[21]](#footnote-21)*

 The process, illustrated in the following figure, was elaborated in 2003 by the GoJ with the support of Price Waterhouse and inserted in the Service Delivery Improvement Toolkit, Public Sector Reform 2004-2009, developed by PSRD.



The project document shows some awareness of difficulties the reform will encounter:

*Implementing a change of this nature requires not only a change in practices but a change in the way public servants think about their performance responsibilities, and is therefore a long term process. Based on this understanding, the scope of the project is to initiate the change process by building the capacities in 14 institutions to identify clients for their services, to use the SDIS toolkit in identifying client needs, and to develop and publish standards for a few of the institutions’ main services.*

There were no explanations or logical steps in the project documents evidencing the reasons why the particular aspect of service delivery was selected in the identification of the UNDP support, except that this was one of the main goals of UNDP support to governance.

As to the process itself, it poses some questions as to its feasibility.

There was absence in Jordan of a clear and endorsed framework for division of roles and responsibilities among levels and institutions on what services should be provided at which level by which service provider. As a consequence, the process described above could easily be subject to instability and changes.

Performance improvement measures can be effectively designed and carried out only under condition that appropriate M&E mechanisms are already in place In fact, Project Result 3 was not dealt with at all in the Project implementation.

There was no analysis of the situation on the ground and a lack of understanding of the deep lack of knowledge at that time among the population and relevant staff of both citizens and GoJ in general on the concept of customer orientation in service delivery.

All these aspects in fact hindered the project implementation. Service delivery is still an issue in the GoJ and has not been adequately addressed to date, for reasons linked to political will, inadequacy of staff, lack of awareness.

### Indicators

Were there clear baselines indicators and/or benchmarks for performance?

No indicators were provided in the project document. As said above, this set heavy constraints in the evaluation exercise and also resulted in lack of proper monitoring of project activities and results.

### Participation

Was the process of project design sufficiently participatory? Was there any impact of the process?

The Consultant could not verify modalities and features of the Project design process with staff involved at the time, due to personnel turnover. The desk review documents that several studies and pre-scoping assessment were carried out by UNDP in February 2005. However, no documentation stating the participation of the GoJ in the designing phase was made available to the Consultant.

### Conclusions

The focus of the Project on service delivery was probably an appropriate choice, although not supported by adequate justifications. A risk was the absence of a regulatory framework for service delivery at that time.

The level of analysis was in general poor. No stakeholders’ analysis was carried out. Also, the context as not examined through a cause effect relationship. This negatively impacted on the overall structure of the Project and on its implementation.

## Relevance and appropriateness

### Relevance to national goals and challenges

Was the project relevant, appropriate and strategic to national goals and challenges?

Designed in 2005, the Project answered a political need of the Government of Jordan to initiate a large public sector reform process to enhance transparency and efficiency of the GoJ institutions, provide citizens with more efficient and effective services, combat poverty in a more effective way.

As a matter of fact, this was systemically and clearly articulated with the establishment of the National Agenda Committee (700 members including Government and political representatives, private sector, civil society and media representatives) as a way of strengthening national dialogue and enhancing participation. The Committee debate over Jordan’s future development vision resulted in the National Agenda[[22]](#footnote-22) Initiative of November 2005, a long-term ambitious programmatic document that commits Jordan’s current and future governments to reform, and particularly focuses on, and gives high priority to, political and administrative reform. Jordan subsequently stressed these efforts with the *Kulluna al-Urdun* or “We are all Jordan” initiative to provide a comprehensive policy framework for Jordan’s future development[[23]](#footnote-23). However, notwithstanding that this document is slightly later than the Project signature, it is worth saying that the political commitment by the Jordanian Government was already strong at the time of the design.

The Project is fully aligned with the *National Social and Economic Programme (NSEP) 2004-2006*. The NSEP addressed the need for reforms in legislation, policies and regulatory framework in order to improve the quality of life for all.

And National Executive programme 2008-2010?

### Relevance to MOPSD

Was the project relevant, appropriate and strategic to the mandate, strategy, functions, roles, and responsibilities of MOPSD ?

Before the MoPSD establishment the overall responsibility of initiating and leading the reform was under the Prime Ministry’s Public Sector Reform Directorate (PSRD). Its roles are clearly explained in the project document:

*The PSRD is responsible for service delivery improvement at the operational level– SDIS [to ensure that government is working effectively and efficiently and continuously improving]. The role of the PSRD is to:*

1. *Set Service Standards (in coordination with GoJ institutions).*
2. *Monitor delivery against Service Standards by receiving performance reports, provide feedback to GoJ institutions on performance gaps, and jointly work on closing the gaps following the SDIS (intervene to investigate upon continued failure to meet set Service Standards).*
3. *Champion the SDIS and develop, promote, and continually improve relevant tools and knowledge.*
4. *Support the deployment of the SDIS via coordinating with GoJ institutions’ relevant performance units (help set up such units where they do not exist).*
5. *Develop and centrally manage the ‘client voice’ initiatives for GoJ institutions (satisfaction surveys (inc. mystery shopper), citizen panel, complaint system).*
6. *Coordinate with ‘Challenge Fund’ on improvement projects.*
7. *Identify collective issues and barriers to SDIS and develop policy recommendations to the Council of Ministers.*
8. *Coordinate with GPD by providing ‘client voice’ input to Key Performance Indicator (KPI) target setting and report on operational progress, effectiveness, and efficiency of service delivery*

Subsequently, the MoPSD was established. Its functions, as detailed in Regulation no. 54, are as follows:

* *Drawing the general policy for administrative development and laying the plans and programs needed to implement it.*
* *Developing the organizational structure of the public administration and organizing its departments.*
* *Setting the basis for the best methods to utilize human resources in public offices and drawing plans for their training and rehabilitation.*
* *Studying projects for administrative regulatory systems and department organizational structures and offering consultancy.*
* *Coordinating with the General Budget Department and other departments to study their needs for jobs; following up on the proper adoption of job descriptions and classifications and setting up employment tables based on these descriptions and classifications.*
* *Employing modern administration methods for better performance at the departments.*
* *Preparing databases on department personnel, and updating and developing them periodically by employing the proper means.*
* *Issuing a publication on administrative development issues.*
* *Offering consultancy on issues referred (to the Ministry) from other departments that fall under its authority.*

The MoPSD roles and mandate represent therefore a development and an enlargement of PSRD, which was focused mainly on service delivery. Such new mandate should perhaps have been better taken into consideration in the implementation of the Project.

Most resources of the ministry are spent on SDI and the main notable results of MoPSD are to be found in that area. Other MoPSD directorates having a broader scope and a mid- or long-term impact (Streamlining, M&E, HRM) are still at early stage of development, mainly due to political reasons and to the GoJ indecision on features and modalities of the public sector reform. This was also due to high turnover of key decision makers in the ministry: from 2006 to date MoPSD changed 6 Ministers and 3 Secretaries General. All this reflects heavy uncertainties by the GoJ side on pace, features and modalities of the reform, as well on its place in the National Agenda.

### Relevance to UNDP

Was the project relevant, appropriate and strategic to UNDP mandate?

The answer is yes. The project was in line with UNDP strategies and priorities. The project strategy and its activities were intended to achieve progress in Outcome Number 7 in the NHDR identified as “Improvement of Public Service…linked to Public Administration Reform.” Additionally, the *Intended Outcome* and *Strategy* are linked to: (i) MYFF Goal l -Achieving the MDGs, SL 1.5 Private Sector Development and SL 1.7 Civil Society Empowerment; (ii) Goal 2 - Policy Support for Democratic Governance, SL 2.1 Policy Support for Democratic Governance and SL 2.7:Public administration reform and anti-corruption; (ii) UNDAF - Enhanced quality of life for the population through improved health and education services; (iii) to MDGs - Building public services that are cost-efficient and results-oriented, transparent, responsive and accountable to the needs of citizens.

The 2004 Jordan Human Development Report for Jordan stressed that strong political dimension

is required in the public sector reform and particularly in service delivery: *A process of “deep democratic decentralisation” is needed, which addresses issues of empowerment, participation,-ownership, rights, entitlements and responsibilities. To a large extent, this will depend on civil society playing a more active role.[[24]](#footnote-24)*

### Conclusions

The project was appropriate at that moment and suitable to what were the GoJ in the field of public sector development. However, Government instability and continuous delays in the public sector reform process have partially hampered the achievement of results.

On the UNDP side, the project was highly relevant and responded appropriately to the development agenda set out in UNDP’s country strategies and in its overall priorities.

The obstacles described above might perhaps have been minimized if the project had taken into consideration the absence of a proper legislative framework and of properly endorsed and agreed upon national strategies.

## Effectiveness and efficiency

### Effectiveness

Were the actions to achieve the outputs and outcomes effective?

The project document mentions the following results:

1. *Strengthened Project Coordination Unit to coordinate all project activities and to ensure that timelines are met,*
2. *Capacities of PSRD strengthened to deliver the Service Delivery Improvement System;*
3. *Strategy and plan for a unified monitoring and evaluation system [linking the policy level and the operational level performance measurement systems] developed, and*
4. *National Strategy and plan for implementation of SDIS (service delivery improvement system) system government-wide developed and for institutional capacity building needs to support SDIS[[25]](#footnote-25).*

####  Strengthened Project Coordination Unit

This – as stated above – cannot be considered a result but rather one of the activities meant to achieve project results. In any case, a project manager position was assigned at the PRSD and subsequently moved to MoPSD. There have been several changes of staff in that position. The last project manager was appointed in July 2008 and remained until the Project’s end, in July 2010. Reportedly - and considering the quality and timing of project documentation made available to the Consultant - work performed by project managers was unsatisfactory. Poor document value and lack of communication and information to key staff have heavily hindered the Project performance, as well staff motivation and commitment.

#### Capacities of PSRD strengthened to deliver the Service Delivery Improvement System

On MoPSD side, continuous changes in its strategic directions due to government instability and high staff turnover have negatively impacted on the Project implementation and results. It is reported that at least two years of the project lifespan, 2006 and 2007, have been wasted in absence of proper inputs and absence of project managers in the Ministry.

In any case, the Project managed to carry out the following activities:

1. *Training of service delivery improvement teams*

This training exercise is also called Capacity Building (CB) I. It focused on strengthening Performance Improvement Units (PIUs, later called Policies and Institutional Development Units - PIDU) within selected institutions. Training consisted in awareness modules, delivered by peer teams of the MoPSD to 100 staff of the PIDUs in relevant Ministries.

The PIDUs were established at Ministries involved in service delivery. Their main task is to enhance service delivery mechanisms. The training objective was to build human capacity to improve services, institutionalize the SDI process and ensure sustainability.

Training was delivered by outsourced consultants paid under UNDP funds. It was focused on general awareness issues on the concept of service delivery and customer orientation. It also consisted of exercises on how to use the Toolkit developed in 2004 by GoJ/Price Waterhouse. The training material was uniquely the Toolkit.

Training was held in the National Training Institute (NTI), an organisation falling under responsibilities of MoPSD. NTI management reported to the Consultant that no track of courses is to be found there.

Training was reportedly received with a certain interest, and several MDAs are still cooperating with the MoPSD SDI Directorate to get support on implementation of the toolkit. However, SDI Directorate is aware that the present version of the Toolkit is heavy and difficult to be used, and has recruited consultants to work on its simplification, in order to make it practical and user friendly.

No further training has been carried out on the toolkit after the UNDP funded exercise. This is reportedly due to lack of demand from MDAs, insufficient staff in the SDI Directorate to deliver training, lack of State funds and the need for revision of the Toolkit before delivering training.

There was no evaluation of the training exercise.*b. Capacity building programme for Human Resources (HR) Directorate of MoPSD*

The purpose of that component was to develop two manuals on “Human resource assessment module for government entities” and “guidelines for the recruitment cycle for government entities that fall beyond the scope of the Civil Service Bureau”, in order to enable the of its Human Resources Unit staff capacities to fully implement their mandate.

In 2009 a new Director was appointed at the HR Directorate. Reportedly, she approached the Project to receive appropriate training for the staff. The needs of the Directorate focused on two main issues: methodologies for streamlining HR management, and methodologies for evaluating and assessing the capacities of HR units in MDAs. The training was conducted in March 2010 by a private company funded from the UNDP Project budget; it targeted 16 staff from the HR Departments of MoPSD and Civil Service Bureau (CSB). Two main topics were selected: recruitment process and procedures, including methodologies to prepare job descriptions; and methodologies on how to assess capacities of HR units[[26]](#footnote-26).

Two manuals were prepared on a) recruitment cycle in the public sector, b) HR assessment of recruitment procedures used by independent government institutions. They have been submitted to the cabinet’s public sector committee for approval and enforcement.

Results of this activity seem to be controversial. While some insist on the positive outcomes of the exercise, others remark its limited results. Training was carried out by junior consultants with no experience, and approaches were general and academic, with no practical suggestions on how to improve working procedures and mechanisms. Also, no evaluation of the exercise was reportedly requested to attendees. This would have constituted a useful tool to streamline further training.

The HR Director in MoPSD main aim is currently to develop an internal team of qualified staff who can serve as trainers for further delivering training activities on HR issues in relevant MDAs.

1. *Capacity building programme for SDI Directorate of MoPSD*

This training exercise– called CBII – is not delivered yet. It is to be delivered in October 2010, targeting 12 staff from the Directorate. The main topics will be ISO 9001, Training of Trainers, business process reengineering according to the SDI toolkit. A private company has been selected to conduct the training and will be funded from the UNDP Project budget.

#### National Strategy and plan for implementation of SDIS

The MoPSD has recently prepared an Implementation Plan which was approved and currently ongoing. However, it has not been prepared in the framework of the Project. This result was therefore not been achieved.

A support mission to the SDI Directorate of MoPSD was carried out in February 2010 in order to verify achievements of the project and suggest improvements. The mission provided valuable inputs which are currently being taken into consideration by MoPSD, notably on revision of its founding regulation and on improvement of the Toolkit. A summary of its conclusions is to be found in Annex 5.

Sub-projects

Two sub-projects were selected for UNDP funding under the Project. Their results are positive and can encourage replication in other MDAs.

1. *National electronic registry for renal failure patients* project

The sub-project – managed by the Ministry of Health (MoH) - had a total cost of 35,000 JOD. The project was completed and the project launch is planned for mid-July 2010. See details in Annex...

1. *Documentation management at the Public Passports Department*

This sub-project aimed at developing the Department’s documentation and filing systems and unifying the current database with the files and legal documents. See details in Annex....

#### Selection of sub-projects

The selection modalities are not very clear, nor were they defined in the project document. It is possible that they were brought to the attention of the SC before funding and initiating.

The Consultant understands from interviewees that

- For Public Passports sub-project, the Department received initially funds from the Innovation Fund (50,000 JOD). The amount was not sufficient to cover the costs, so an agreement was stipulated with the MoPSD to be additionally funded with UNDP funds. The agreement was agreed upon with MoPIC and UNDP for an initial budget of 20,000 US$. This amount was subsequently increased to.......US$.

- For the Ministry of Health, personal links of the Director of Incommunicable Diseases with the former MOPSD Minister made the sub-project feasible and easily approved.

#### Strategy and plan for a unified monitoring and evaluation system

This component has been in practice neglected. As said above, political instability and continuous changes in the implementation plans of the public sector reform have in practice interrupted the process, thus impacting on this component. The recent renovated interest of GoJ in setting up and implementing PSR might lead to positive developments in the next future.

### Efficiency

Were the actions to achieve the outputs and outcomes efficient?

In general terms, the Project implementation suffered from delays and from lack of adequate project management, both from UNDP and MoPSD sides.

Expenditures were as follows[[27]](#footnote-27):

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Per year:** |  |
| **Year** | **Annual Total Expenditure in USD** |
| 2006 | 106119.17 |
| 2007 | 444993.36 |
| 2008 | 68949.54 |
| 2009 | 62485.95 |
| 2010 | 69465.27 |
| **Grand total** | **752,013.29** |
|  |  |
| **Per output:** |  |
| **Output** | **Expenditure** |
| Output 1 | 153,878.23 |
| Output 2 | 548,376.30 |
| Output 3 | 49,758.76 |
|  |  |
|  |  |
| **Per fund source:** |  |
| **Fund source** | **Amount** |
| UNDP | 151826.43 |
| GOJ | 600,186.86 |

Activity?

According to the above data, UNDP contributed for an amount of 151,826 US$, of which most spent on salaries for the project managers, equipment for MoPSD and sub-projects, expert coming for the 2010 support mission, consultants for capacity building and training activities. Statistics?

The whole project was implemented in 2010. There were reportedly delays in payments of some sub-project components, such as MoH on printing material and data collection, which have been paid only in 2010.

### Lessons learned

Were there any lessons learned, failures/lost opportunities? What might have been done better or differently?

Lessons learned are to be taken from the above chapters. In general, any proper reform of the public sector is successful only under condition that an appropriate environment is in place. This comprises: clear and accepted strategies, plans and guidelines; readiness of institutions to take part in the process; awareness and commitment of staff to reforms. This did not happen in the Project lifespan.

As far as SDI in particular is concerned, the Project contributed to some limited achievements at central MDA level. Since no evaluation of training was conducted in MDAs, it is difficult to draw lessons on this aspect.

Training material was not developed at all, thus hindering a proper institutionalisation of Project’s outputs and outcomes.

The two sub-projects in the Passports Department and at the MoH have been successful due to their concrete and practical character and to a correct assessment of needs in those areas. However, selection criteria might have been more structured and formalised.

An appropriate revision of original project documents, to be undertaken one or two years after its starting up, would have been useful to justify and formalise changes and to better structure project activities.

Also, regular monitoring should have been carried out to better address issues of concern.

Finally, a proper project management structure – in line with the project document – would have greatly contributed to better implementation and utilisation of resources. Alternatively, the management of the project might have been assigned to Ministry directors. This would have been more in line with latest trends in development cooperation, which tend to eliminate PMUs in order to strengthen in-country ownership and responsibilities[[28]](#footnote-28). However, it is to be asked whether directors were/are ready to accept such arrangements in view of their workload and statutary obligations. These elements will be properly structured in Chapter 10 - Conclusions.

### Risk management

How did the project deal with issues and risks?

The project documents, although providing a brief enumeration of risks, did not propose any interventions or mechanisms to minimize and adequately manage them. Shortcomings and issues emerging during the Project implementation were targeted individually. Some issues were dealt with in SC meetings, but the irregular character of those meetings did not allow for proper supervision. As a consequence, the project was left mainly to the project managers and the MoPSD staff, with limited impact.

The Support mission undertaken in February 2010 is a sign of renovated commitment and will to address issues and shortcomings of the Project.

### Timeliness

Were the outputs achieved in a timely manner?

In terms of timeliness, there were delays in the design and implementation of the Capacity Building activities and training, of which the most important ones – training of internal staff – were and will be delivered only in 2010.

In terms of sequencing, it is worth to say that in general training and capacity building activities should have been more logically articulated and formulated. Training and capacity building of internal staff of the MoPSD should have been conducted prior to any other capacity building related activity, in order to consolidate internal resources and allow for a more proper formulation of activities and issues to be dealt with externally, at MDAs level.

### Resource utilisation

Were the resources utilized in the best way possible?

Given limited funds available from UNDP, it is to be concluded that financial resources were correctly utilised. The project manager position has been an issue, and numerous replacements had a negative effect on Project’s effectiveness and continuity. Also, more project information should have been disseminated to MoPSD relevant staff, so as to consolidate results and institutionalise the Project.

### Conclusions

Effectiveness was mainly hindered by changes in strategic directions of the GoJ and MoPSD. Capacity building and training might have been more effective if logically structured, i.e. firstly implemented at MoPSD staff level and only subsequently carried out in other MDAs. The preparation of a service delivery strategy was not implemented directly through the Project, nor was a proper M&E mechanism put in place. Efficiency was medium, with delays in decision making, implementation of foreseen activities and to limited extent payments.

## Impact and sustainability

The lack of impact indicators in the project is an important omission. There are neither mechanisms nor indicators for measuring the contribution of the project’s activities to the economic and social development of the country.

The role of MoPSD in enhancing service delivery – implemented in the Project through dissemination of the Toolkit – must be further strengthened. The Ministry should receive a clear mandate from the Prime Ministry and this should be endorsed by the Cabinet. Only under this condition MoPSD initiatives and indications will be taken into serious consideration by the MDAs in their agendas and action plans and will achieve tangible, institutionalized results.

#### Achievement of Objectives

With regard to the overall objective, the Project contribution was limited. Work on the Toolkit and its streamlining has represented an important step which was favoured by the Project. Coherent and coordinated implementation measures are now needed to take advantage of the momentum.

The impact of training on staff of MDAs is not easy to be measured, due to various reasons.

On the other side, sub-projects have positively impacted on GoJ performances, although in limited fields.

#### External factors

The GoJ initial commitment has facilitated the establishment of a favourable ground for the project’s activities. Subsequently, changes of priorities in the GoJ agenda, uncertainties and obstacles in the implementation of a coherent sector strategy and plan have hindered the success of the Project and have negatively impacted on its results, especially at central level. Other donors cooperating with Jordan on this issue have encountered the same difficulties and have withdrawn from funding initiatives. As far as sub-projects, their focused and practical approach led to important achievements, which will perhaps need to be taken into consideration in identifying the next UNDP intervention.

#### Management

The absorption and implementation capacity of stakeholders at central level remained uneven, with key staff turnover in MoPSD and at the UNDP office. It is hoped that the determination of the current Minister will boost the process in the next months, provided that elections will not bring about significant changes. At sub-project level, the knowledge and commitment of staff in the two selected institutions were very satisfactory and their inputs were decisive.

### Sustainability

Will the outputs/outcomes lead to benefits beyond the life of the existing project?

Sustainability was not mentioned in the project document and was never raised as an issue at management level.

The sustainability of the Project with regard to MoPSD is uneven for a variety of reasons. The implementation of the 2010 Support Mission results and recommendations on the Toolkit depend highly on personal skills and capacities of the Ministry’s staff, on the readiness of all MDAs to accept the tool as a useful instrument to improve SD, and finally on the political willingness of the Minister.

The Minister’s determination in boosting and initiating a proper public sector reform is high. In order to keep the momentum and pave the way for the next UNDP intervention, a close cooperation with the MoPSD and a proper strategy in place are crucial. At the moment, very limited actions in terms of capacity building/training are carried out in involved ministries, unless they are specifically requested. This of course entails sustainability, and is associated with the limited capacity of MDA staff to identify their needs in service delivery. The absence of developed training packages poses heavy limitations to Project sustainability and its capacity to disseminate results.

### Ownership

Were the actions and results owned by the local partners and stakeholders?

#### Ownership of Objectives

The establishment of MoPSD has demonstrated the GoJ commitment to carry out the reform. There is no information on the involvement of relevant State bodies in the Project preparation. Some perplexities were expressed by the 2010 Mission on the actual capabilities of the State institutions to advance in the service delivery process. It is not clear whether the issue was debated with the other institutional stakeholders, as well as with the UNDP. It seems however that there were difficulties in sharing goals and vision of the Project with the relevant stakeholders. Also, the role of the MoPSD in steering the service delivery improvement process – and in general in leading the public sector reform – is not strong and institutionalised enough to achieve significant objectives.

It is worth mentioning that the extent of involvement of different stakeholders depended also on the capacities of each Institution: the SDI staff states that while some MDAs are well staffed, have a good institutional culture and are committed to SDI process, others experience difficulties in service improvement and do not possess the adequate motivation and willingness to undertake such changes.

As said above, absence in the Steering Committee of relevant MDAs involved in service delivery represented a weakness: this would have provided for better involvement and commitment.

#### Ownership of achievements

Strategy. The preparation of a Strategy for Service delivery and of an Operational Plan, although not implemented though the Project, is a clear evidence of a ownership of service delivery issues. MoPSD is chairing the Interministerial Committee on Capacity Building for Service Delivery. At the moment, the PSR is undergoing a revision which should lead to a comprehensive strategy to be endorsed by the Cabinet. Timing for this will depend upon the Minister’s ability to negotiate the strategy with the Cabinet and upon the results of forthcoming elections, to be held in November 2010.

Service Delivery. This is quite a controversially-perceived achievement. Some of the MDAs are more aware of the role of the customer orientation concept in service delivery and their potential to improve work of institutions and citizens’ lives. Others, however, seem less aware and see the toolkit not as a needed and compulsory tool to be utilised and included in their working tools. Moreover, the role of MoPSD is not perceived as key. The low retention rate in the Ministry staff (as an example, several consultants working in MoPSD were fired by the previous Minister with the pretext of being too expensive) can also have affected – though to a limited extent – this feeling.

Training and capacity building. It seems clear that there is a need for continuous training. An institutionalised planned continuous learning process/mechanism (which could perhaps also help solving the issue of staff turnover) is not actually in place as such. This is a really key point to ensure sustainability and “bridge” the gaps that exist among different MDAs in service delivery.

The consultant could verify that no quality or impact evaluation report on training and capacity building conducted by MoPSD was done. Being capacity-building a long term continuous learning process, an “exposure” to development through practical training on-the-job and exchanges of experiences would have been definitely useful for better consolidation of concepts and ideas.

### Capacity building

Was capacity (individuals, institution, systems) built through the actions of the project?

Project activities on capacity building to date are limited to the training courses implemented for 100 staff from relevant institutions involved in service delivery.

At present, the SDI staff is cooperating with: Ministry of Health, Passport Department, Licensing Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) for authenticating papers, Housing and Urban Development Department (on reengineering services to get housing permits and land drawing), Civil Service Consumer Corporation (a sort of supermarket initially only for civil servants, then extended to the population at whole), Lands and Survey Department, Ministry of Municipal Affairs (MoMA) on reengineering services, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Labour, Residence and Border Department of General Security (Police), Ministry of Social Development. Acceptance and cooperation highly differ, with a very good cooperation from Licensing Department (it is a military organisation and performance level is very high), Procurement Directorate, Food and Drugs Administration, Standards and Metrology Directorate, Central Bank of Jordan.

 In general, results have been uneven. Central level institutions seem not to have qualified human resources and good equipment and their absorption level is still limited, due to lack of clear guidelines and to the fact that MoPSD mandate to steer service delivery improvement is not yet fully institutionalized.

The MoPSD SDI staff has not received training to date. It is hoped that it will benefit from additional training under CBII, to be conducted in the forthcoming weeks under UNDP funds. Training for MoPSD should have been conducted before going to MDAs, in order to strengthen their commitment, knowledge and capacities to effectively lead the process.

Further training is also much needed at, and will be beneficial to, MDAs. Their capacity to act as agents of change and to provide the array of services attributed to them by law varies greatly and seems in general to be still low.

Additional awareness initiatives are required, and training should not be confined to the utilization of the toolkit, especially if service delivery standards and modalities of implementation will be subject to change in the framework of the new public sector reform. Modules should be properly articulated. A thorough assessment of training needs should be conducted prior to training activities; this should include a proper delivery plan and should involve not only specific staff of SD departments, but also high ranking managers, to ensure institutional commitment.

Some training modules should be tailored to the institution and personnel involved, while other modules could be applied to all stakeholders, irrespective of different background and capacities.

Also, recommendations of the 2010 Mission should be taken into consideration to strengthen capabilities of involved units in the MDAs.

### National ownership

What is the level of contribution of the project management arrangements to national ownership of the set objectives, results, and outputs?

In general terms, the choice of institutions to coordinate and manage the project was good. MoPSD is entrusted by law with the tasks of drawing and implementation of the general policy for administrative development, improving utilization of human resources in public offices, projecting and planning administrative regulatory systems, employing modern management methods for better performance at the departments, and offering consulting and support services to other MDAs.

MoPIC is entrusted by law with the coordination and steering of developmental efforts through planning, execution, monitoring and evaluation of social and economic development plans, as well as with the coordination of international cooperation. In the framework of the Project, the Ministry was involved in overall coordination activities.

However, it is a matter of fact that commitment towards improved service delivery needs to come from the top. In the case of Jordan, top level means clear strategic directions from H.M. the King and a recognized acceptance and commitment from the Cabinet side. This has not happened to date. As above said, a clear mandate to MoPSD from the PM and the Cabinet is key for the success of any initiatives in the sector.

The announced public sector reform is still under debate and will have direct effect on the Project ownership and sustainability.

### Promotion of ownership and sustainability

Were the modes of deliveries of the outputs appropriate to promote national ownership and sustainability of the results achieved?

As said above, no real measures were taken to strengthen ownership. Regular contacts of the SDI Directorate in MoPSD with relevant units in MDAs occur but are not sufficient to achieve full consensus and commitment, if not properly followed by a clear mandate, recognised and accepted at high Government level. Steering Committees of future initiatives should include representatives of MDAs as well as of the Prime Minister Office. With regard to sustainability, it would be essential that a proper set of capacity building tools (training, toolkit etc.) be consolidated and disseminated to relevant staff of both MDAs and MoPSD, and that the successful examples of the two sub-projects be publicised and replicated in other entities.

### Conclusions

Impact was in general hindered by several factors. Activities were scattered and did not follow an internal logic. Moreover, the role of MoPSD in enhancing service delivery – implemented in the Project through dissemination of the Toolkit – must be further strengthened; the Ministry should receive a clear mandate from the Prime Ministry and this should be endorsed by the Cabinet. It is not clear whether the central level (PRSD, GPD) were involved in the Project preparation, shared its general concept and agreed on objectives and methodology.As for service delivery, it seems that not all relevant Ministries are fully aware of the role of the customer orientation concept in service delivery and its potential to improve citizens’ lives.. The level of involvement of them is still not an institutionalised process, following clear patterns and protocols, but it is rather left to the initiative and good will of the single agency.

Sustainability is made difficult by the scattered character of training, lack of institutional memory due to high staff turnover, lack of training material, scarce communication between the project management and the staff of MoPSD.

# Coherence

Did UNDP activities under the project allow UNDP to achieve its development policy objectives without internal contradiction or without contradiction with other donors’policies?

In terms of donor coordination, Jordan approved the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, and the first Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration took place in 2008.

Mutual reinforcement implies in general a high degree of coordination, both among UNDP funded projects and with other donors. Donors’ coordination is in Jordan an issue to be addressed. MoPIC is in charge of ensuring coordination; however, there aren’t yet regular mechanisms to concretely address this issue. MoPIC is part of the Interministerial committee’s technical subcommittee in charge of capacity building for decentralisation, and is reportedly working to coordinate donors’ efforts in this field.

A factor which perhaps needs to be taken into consideration is the donors’ attitude to fund projects which are surely in their priorities for external aid, but might prove to be unrealistic vis-à-vis the country’s positions or consolidated traditions, thus becoming unrealistic. The Paris declaration on Aid Effectiveness stressed the need for linking donors’ interventions to concrete, approved, shared and ongoing national plans and strategies. One might add that any donor intervention should previously consider the pace of implementation of reforms in the country. The main issue in PSR in Jordan is not linked to the absence of strategies, but rather to difficulties in their implementation.

In view of the recent developments of MoPSD and its ongoing negotiations with other donors on support to public sector reform, it is highly advised that coordination be strengthened to avoid overlapping and to ensure harmonisation of funding interventions.

# Cross-cutting issues

Environmental sustainability is not addressed in the Project and environment issues were not scrutinised at all.

Gender issues might also have taken into consideration in in the selection of sub-projects, especially as far as service delivery is concerned, but this issue was not dealt with at all.

A more specific approach to include these aspects into project implementation should have been carried out, and should have been carefully addressed by the Project Steering Committee.

Same comments as in summary. Yes, the summary just recapitulates conclusions taken from chapters.

# Conclusions

The table below summarizes the results of evaluation based on the pre-stated criteria. This matrix elucidates the performance based on each criteria of evaluation. The Consultant divided the evaluation of the Project as a whole from the evaluation of sub-projects to better evidence differences between projects with a focused approach and projects based on general topics.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Criteria of Evaluation  | Performance Rating |
|  | Whole Project | Sub-Projects |
| Project Management | 2.5  | 4 |
| Project Design | 2.5  | 4 |
| Relevance | 5  | 5 |
| Effectiveness | 3 | 4 |
| Efficiency | 3  | 3 |
| Impact | 2 | 4 |
| Sustainability | 3 | 4 |
| Coherence | 4  | 4 |

|  |
| --- |
| Performance Rating  |
| 5  | 4  | 3  | 2  | 1  |

5 signifies outstanding performance

4 signifies satisfactory performance

3 signifies moderate performance

2 signifies poor performance

1 signifies unsatisfactory performance

# Recommendations

The team has identified 6 main key areas for recommendations:

Key Area 1: Strengthen project design

Key Area 2: Streamline project management

Key Area 3: Streamline human resources

Key Area 4: Focus on long-term approaches (impact, sustainability)

Each recommendation is targeted at the following levels:

FA, Funding Agency (UNDP)

MG, Management (MoPSD)

MDAs, Ministries, Departments, Agencies

Recommendations are given for each key area. A degree of priority is assessed for each recommendation on a high (XXX) to low (X) scale. An indicative timeframe for implementation of recommendations is also provided.

**Recommendation 1 – Strengthen project design**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **1a**  | Priority: XXX | Timing: MT | FA | **Introduce stakeholders’ analysis** |
| **Operational application:** Project documents should contain an appropriate analysis from which a sets of results and adequate action should be derived. |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **1b**  | Priority: XXX | Timing: MT | FA | **Introduce outcome indicators in the project documents** |
| **Operational application:** outcome indicators should be included in the project documents. |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **1c**  | Priority: XXX | Timing: MT | FA | **Link interventions to shared, endorsed country strategies** |
| **Operational application:** ensure that the project objectives are shared and agreed among key Government stakeholders over reasonable time. |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **1d**  | Priority: XXX | Timing: MT | FA | **Focus interventions on realistic objectives** |
| **Operational application:** ensure that project objectives are realistic and achievable against the actual political, economic and social context of Jordan. Prefer areas which are not heavily subject to changing political environment. |

**Recommendation 2 – Streamline project management**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **2a**  | Priority: XXX | Timing: MT | FA | **Link payments to the project’s management and reporting arrangements**  |
| **Operational application:** payments should be executed against presentation of regular sets of reports (progress reports, minutes of SC meetings, quarterly reports...) |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **2b**  | Priority: XXX | Timing: MT | MG | **Increase communication within the MoPSD** |
| **Operational application**: project activities, report and other information should be communicated and disseminated among all ministry staff, in order to create awareness, consensus and in order to contribute to the creation of shared MoPSD objectives. |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **2c**  | Priority: XXX | Timing: MT | FA | **Pay attention to the composition of Steering Committees** |
| **Operational application:** Steering Committee should reflect/represent key stakeholders. In a Public Sector Reform project, as an example, the PM should be member. |

**Recommendation 3 - Streamline human resources**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **3a** | Priority: XXX | Timing: ST | FA/MG/MDAs | **Analyse training and capacity building needs at all levels** |
| **Operational application:** Training and capacity building measures should be based on the stakeholders’ analysis and should be specified in a detailed study prior to start up of activities. They should be extended to all stakeholders. Analysis of capacities and training needs are not periodically carried out on a standardised basis. In view of the re-launch of SDI initiatives, such analysis should be conducted. |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **3b** | Priority: XXX | Timing: MT | MG/ MDAs | **Institutionalise training activities**  |
| **Operational application:** - Appropriate training modules should be prepared and made easily available to staff of each MoPSD Directorate.- Priority should be given to Training of Trainers (ToT). A shift from theoretical traditional methods to more practical on-the-job training is strongly needed.-- An institutionalised mechanism aimed at creating a “continuous coaching” of MDAs is needed in order to provide adequate stimuli for skills upgrading and problem solving.- Training material should be carefully evaluated in order to ascertain that it is suitable for immediate and practical use and integration into existing training programmes of State institutions. |

**Recommendation 4: Focus on long-term approaches (impact, sustainability)**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **4a** | Priority: XXX | Timing: MT | FA/MG | **Strengthen coordination with other projects and donor community** |
| **Operational application:** Develop and encourage joint activities when appropriate and effective. Avoid potential overlapping. Specifically, take leadership/proactive role in dealing with the donor community, agreeing with donors on formats and methodology to be applied. Encourage transfer and sharing of best practices. |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **4b** | Priority: XXX | Timing: MT | MG/MDAs | **Strengthen capabilities to effectively plan** |
| **Operational application:** Continue regular training and capacity building of MDAs on management, strategic planning, and needs analysis. Strengthen projects’ selection criteria, focusing more on comparative advantages and local resources, as well as on sustainability elements. |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **3d** | Priority: XXX | Timing: MT | MG/MDAs | **Mainstream gender considerations into SD plans** |
| **Operational application:** some activities in service delivery might focus on gender aspects, i.e. service to families, women with children, unemployed women, etc. |

# Annexes

ToR for the evaluation

List of individuals or groups interviewed or consulted and sites visited

List of supporting documents reviewed

Project results framework

Short biographies of the evaluator

Code of conduct signed by evaluator

1. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/index.htm> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09159.pdf> *Underpinned by sound macroeconomic policies and strong trade links, Jordan’s economy witnessed remarkable economic performance over the prolonged period of time. Intensified implementation of wide-ranging structural reforms for over a decade has also enhanced the*

*investment climate and helped position Jordan as an attractive private capital destination. Sizeable inflows and vigorous domestic investment have steered the economy to unprecedented GDP growth averaging 6½ percent from 2001 to 2007. At the same time, inflation has been generally subdued, public debt is on a declining trend, and reserves are steadily accumulating. The economy’s robust performance and its resilience in weathering various external shocks and geopolitical tensions in recent years, has placed it in a strong position to face the ongoing global economic recession,* Statement by Shakour Sha’alan, Executive Director for Jordan May 4, 2009, IMF Country Report No. 09/159. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. See T. H. Kanaan and M. D. Hanania, *The Disconnect between Education, Job Growth, and Employment in Jordan*, 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Consultative meeting on priorities in innovating government and public administration in the Mediterranean region, Presentation by The National Institute for Training in Jordan, Naples, Italy, December 2007. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. http://www.kace.jo/government\_performance.shtm [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Jordan National Agenda, 2005. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. EC, Jordan progress Report 2006. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. EC, Jordan Progress Report 2008. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Committees Overseeing the Seven Strategic Initiatives:

**Public Sector Development Committee:** itis responsible for coordinating policies and programs to strengthen public sector performance. The Committee seeks to achieve this goal through the adoption of performance management frameworks and capacity and capability-building initiatives that aim to improve the quality of public services provided by the Government.

**Sovereignty, Political and Civic Participation Committee:** it focuses on issues affecting sovereignty and national interests, as well as procedures and policies related to domestic and foreign affairs. The Committee specializes in constitutional affairs, human rights, freedom of the press, and the development of policies and programs to encourage greater civic participation on the part of all citizens. In fulfilling its role, the Committee coordinates with stakeholders at the highest levels in order to communicate Jordan’s political agenda both domestically and abroad.

**Economic Development Committee:** it reviews and coordinates economic policies across sectoral development ministries and ensures that these policies are aligned with their respective sector goals and the Government’s overall economic and budgetary priorities. In addition, the Committee provides and serves the needs and objectives for expanding the middle class, as well as monitoring the competitiveness of the business environment in the Kingdom.

**Human Development Committee:** it is responsible for reviewing and coordinating government policies and programs in education and job training, in order to ensure that all Jordanians have the opportunity to obtain the skills necessary to succeed in an increasingly global marketplace. The Committee also works closely with the private sector to understand the needs of the labour market both in terms of the number of workers and the type of skills that are required.

**Infrastructure and Mega Projects Committee:** it coordinates the negotiation and implementation of infrastructure development projects. This includes responsibility for the development and regulation of public private partnerships (PPPs) throughout the Kingdom.

**Services Committee:** it is concerned with government policies and programs to enhance the quality, efficiency and accessibility of social services that promote citizens’ welfare. These programs include the provision of housing, healthcare, and recreational facilities, in addition to services provided to the underprivileged.

Specialized Committees

**Coordination and Procedures Committee:** chaired by the Prime Minister, it reviews the recommendations of the other committees and ensures their consistency with other government policies and programs. The Committee is also responsible for resolving issues and problems at the committee level and allocating budget resources for priority projects and programs.

**Economic Policies Committee:** it reviews macro-economic policy settings and policies linked to economic development and economic reform. The Committee is responsible for balancing available financial resources against the demand for government expenditure and for maintaining financial and monetary stability.

**Legal Committee**: it identifies legislative changes that are required to execute the policies and initiatives put forth by the Council of Ministers. It does so by supervising efforts to develop laws and bylaws and by seeking to promote transparency and accountability across Government.

**Private Sector Partnerships Committee:** it aims at enabling private sector participation in the decision-making process, which will in turn result in the formulation of well-informed policies that support both the public and private sectors. The Committee is chaired by the Prime Minister and includes members from ministries and private sector representatives.

Source: GoJ Implementation Plan 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. UNDP Human Development Report, 2004. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. In many occasions, His Majesty King Abdullah has stressed the relevance of “…*reactivating local government administration is the best means to expand the basis of public participation and to foster political, social and economic development*” (speech of 5th October 2008, on the occasion of the opening of the 15th Parliament’s second ordinary session) and reiterated on 8th June 2009, in an address to the nation on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the King’s accession to the Throne, that improving citizens’ standards of living, addressing problems of poverty and unemployment, and providing the best health and educational services to citizens remain priorities: "*We have based our vision for Jordan’s future on investing in Jordanians in terms of their education and training; on providing job opportunities for all youth; on institutionalising participation in decision making; on applying decentralised management and fostering the principles of transparency, accountability and responsibility and achieving justice and equality for all*". [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Regulation No. 64 of 2006, GoJ. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. *As for administrative reform, we call for profound reformist change in all aspects of administration and government institutions, one that is based on efficiency and accountability and re-habilitating human resources which are the basic component of the administrative process* .(HM Speech from the Throne, 2004). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. UNDP Project Document, 2005 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. IBIDEM. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. UNDP Project Document, 2005. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. To be carried out quarterly. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. The provision of PCs and printers was one of the Project outputs. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. IBIDEM. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. IBIDEM. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. IBIDEM. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. See National Agenda 2006-2015. The Jordan we strive for <http://www.nationalagenda.jo/Portals/0/EnglishBooklet.pdf> ). [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. The two documents were subsequently combined into a three-year National Executive Programme (NEP) for 2007-2009 with specific goals, policies, programmes, projects, and indicators. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. UNDP Jordan Human Development Report, 2004. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. IBIDEM. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Source of information: MoPSD. During the interview no mention of the manuals was made [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Source: UNDP. The expenditure plan is to be found in Annex…. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. See *European Commission - Reforming Technical Cooperation and Project Implementation Units for External Aid provided by the European Commission - A Backbone Strategy – Bruxelles, July 2008.* [↑](#footnote-ref-28)