**Strengthening the Capacity of the Ministry of Social Solidarity**

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Ahmed O. El-Kholei

President, Consultants for Development and Environment (CDE)

URL: [www.cdefirm.com](http://www.cdefirm.com/)

Cairo, Egypt

October 2011

**Acknowledgements**

I wish to thank UNDP-Egypt for giving me the opportunity to conduct this evaluation. Specifically, I would like to thank Ghada Waly, Noha Rifaat and Sara Sabry.

This work was impossible without the support and understanding of the officials at the Ministry of Social Solidarity and those experts who are still working and those who left the project. Specifically, I would like to thank Dr. Ali El-Moselhy, Noha Kaptan, Abdulhakeem Hammouda, Dahlia Kurtam, Anwar El-Nakeeb, Ayman Hossam, Sherif Radwan, Moheeb Adel-Sattar and Wafaa Lotfy for their time and help. I would like to thank those who accompanied me on the site visits, particularly A. Gad, M. Fathalla and S. Salem. I also would like to thank all interviewees whom I annexed their names to this report.

I have to acknowledge that mentioning a commercial company or product in this publication does not imply the endorsement of the UNDP-Egypt or cooperating agencies. Trademark, names, and symbols are used in an editorial fashion with no intention of infringement on trademark or copyright laws.

The contents and views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of UNDP-Egypt and the agencies cooperating in this study. I regret any errors or omissions that may have been unwittingly made.

Ahmed O. El-Kholei

Cairo, April 2012

**Executive Summary**

This project aims to develop and build the capacity of the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MOSS) to design and implement social policies, increase the relevance and efficiency of social protection schemes and social intervention including local development, and contribute to elaborate a new social contract, namely in the field of poverty reduction through better empowerment and participation of the poor and civil-society organizations.

The project was launched in 2006 with a timeframe of 2006-2009 with a total budget of US$ 2,201,025.00. The Project Board has agreed to increase the project’s funding by US $2,650 thousand to continue and expand its activities to have a total of US$ 4,851,025.00.

The project has the following six outputs:

1. An advisory group established;
2. MOSS new organizational Structure;
3. Capacity building of MOSS staff;
4. A system for accrediting of NGOs developed;
5. Effective policy for social protection; and
6. Nasser Social Bank assessed.

The evaluation covers activities since launching the project till October 2011. It seeks to identify key entry points for effective and efficient use of available resources. The main question this evaluation address is the “why has the project succeed, or not, in strengthening the capacities of MOSS?” and “how?” Thus, the overall purpose of the evaluation is to:

1. Assess the status of project results and how they are being achieved;
2. Assess UNDP’s role in providing expertise and exposure to international best practices to enable the Ministry of Social Solidarity to implement its planned outputs efficiently and effectively with maximum impact;
3. Identify factors that have facilitated and/or impeded the achievement of objectives;
4. Assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project;
5. Review of M&E framework and establish the appropriate indicators and quality criteria to measure future implementation with assigned roles and responsibilities;
6. Provide implementation recommendations for the remainder of the project; and
7. Provide recommendations for a second phase of the project

The primary audience and users of this report are the Minister of Social Solidarity and staff. Users of this report include project staff and staff of UNDP-Egypt responsible for the project.

The information collected from reviewed documents, such as UNDP project document, and interviews is the basis for this evaluation. The review of documents is a necessary step towards preparing for interviews and discussion for a holistic comprehension of where the project currently stands. The second source of information is interviewing project beneficiaries, i.e., those who received training and constituents whom MOSS serves through Centers for Social Services and NSB; and project personnel, such as Advisors to the Minister.

Since there is no complete baseline data or indicators in the project document to measure against them progress of outputs, then the consultant had to use qualitative measures to develop useful causal relationships. Qualitative analysis captures the contextual setting associated with information or situations affecting people’s lives, and so can assist in characterizing the relationships of one variable in the ”chain of causation” to the next.

Building capacities is a process, and thus the best research methodology to apply has to be qualitative. Intensive research, in this case, aims to collect information of the process of capacity development and building by examining in depth individuals’ behavior, and the reasons for such behavior. The inability to extend the findings of qualitative analyses to wider populations with the same degree of certainty that quantitative (extensive) analyses can is the main weaknesses of the approach. This weakness is not an issue since the findings of the assessment are not to be generalized.

Site visits provided an opportunity to meet the direct beneficiaries of capacity building, i.e., the employees of MOSS within their working environment; and the indirect target group, i.e., the constituents who receive services from MOSS. The consultant used “Organizational storytelling,” which is often used in conducting management, [strategy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategy) and organization studies. Organizational storytelling is one of many forms of collecting information when embarked on a qualitative analysis. The consultant held meetings with each group in a form of semi-focus group session where questions were made to the constituents, and then giving the employees of MOSS the opportunity to comment and respond.

A Likert scale was developed to rank the progress of project outputs. The Likert scale ranks the output into highly satisfactory, satisfactory, indifferent, marginally satisfactory, and unsatisfactory. The Likert scale was used as the project document lacked a log-frame with indicators and means for verification.

Through the various interventions, the project could create a dent, and induce a transformation in the culture of social solidarity. However, there is a need for commitment and determination to continue the processes of strengthening the capacities of MOSS. Restructuring MOSS, in reality, is restructuring the social affairs only, but had been little to do with other entities, such as the supply and NCSCR. Establishing TAU is a fact, yet some of the advisors left with the former Minister, and there do not seem any plans for sustaining this unit. The output concerning the capacity building and accreditation of NGOs did not take-off as other outputs. Many of the interventions, such as the use of ICT, are still in need of time and backing from within and outside MOSS.

UNDP has been instrumental in this project. During his interview, Dr. Ali El-Moselhy acknowledged the role of UNDP in this project, and expressed his sincere gratitude to Antonio Vigilante, the former UN Resident Representative in Egypt.

The project faced number of challenges, such as lack of reliable, valid and complete information; financial limitations, cooperation of other public bodies, resistance to change, etc. The major problem was the design of the project itself. For example Output 3 is for capacity development of the key staff institutionalized, but focuses only on training. Capacity development is not synonymous to training. Capacity development is the process by which individuals, groups and organizations, institutions and countries develop, enhance and organize their systems, resources and knowledge; all reflected in their abilities, individually and collectively, to perform functions, solve problems and achieve objectives; while training is [an organized](http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/organized.html) [activity](http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/activity.html) aimed at imparting [information](http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/information.html) and/or [instructions](http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/instructions.html) to [improve](http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/improve.html) the [recipient's](http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/recipient.html) [performance](http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/performance.html) or to help him or her attain a [required](http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/required.html) level of [knowledge](http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/knowledge.html) or [skill](http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/skill.html). Furthermore, there is little connection between the outputs of the project, such as the connection between Nasser Social Bank (output 6), a system for accreditation of NGOs (Output4) and a developed and effective system for social protection (Output 5).

However, the project succeeded despite the structural weaknesses of its design because of the support of the Minister. If the project was well-designed, the impact of both the exerted efforts and allocated resources could have reached its maximum.

The number one reason for the success of this project is the support and attention that the former Minister paid to the project. The advisors had authority, and worked with their counterparts in a subtle manner by coaching them to make presentations to the former Minister, involving them in the different processes, such as conducting a study or an assessment.

UNDP is the other reason for the success of the project. First, UNDP has clear, transparent controls for project implementation as prescribed in the NEX manual. Second, UNDP is capable of initiating and maintain South-South dialogue that brought other countries’ experience in social protection. Third, UNDP contributed to capacity building of MOSS staff and those working with MOSS at the local level. Fourth, UNDP was instrumental in introducing non-conventional modalities for poverty alleviation, such as Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) and targeting the poor.

The project is in line with national priorities. It is also in accord with UNDAF and the MYFF priorities. All project outputs are relevant and effective in strengthening the capacities of MOSS, but not all of them are sustainable. For example, Output 6, NSB evaluated is a sustainable output as the Bank administration has a plan to continue efforts for upgrading the bank and the services it provides. To the contrary, Output 4, a system for accrediting NGOs had very little progress, and does not seem to be sustainable, given the need for a new legal framework for NGOs.

Resources allocated to project activities, as indicated in the auditors’ annual report, seem to be efficiently used. However, the processes of strengthening the capacities of MOSS need, first, seeking support from the collaborators and constituents; and second, patience to deal with internal weaknesses. Strengthening the capacities of MOSS is one of the interventions to alleviate poverty, but without political commitment to that cause. Lacking social justice was one of the chief triggers for the revolution of January 25th, 2011. The former regime might have a will to achieve social justice, but definitely did not commit itself to achieving it. Without political commitment to attaining social justice, then strengthening the capacities of MOSS might not prove to be totally effective. This is a risk that had to be considered in the design of the project.

The project has six outputs. Based on the reviewed documents, interviews, site visits, and UNDP Human Development Reports and 2010 report on the Progress toward achieving the MDGs, the rank of the project is satisfactory.

Output 1 is accomplished, but not sustainable. Its rank on Likert scale is satisfactory. The analysis shows that the rank of the second output is satisfactory, as the organizational structure was developed and approved. However, it is not sustainable either as splitting MOSSS into its original two institutions was possible late December 2011.

The progress of the third output seems marginally satisfactory. There was training to individuals. Some of them did not have the chance to apply their newly acquired skills, thus requiring refreshing training. Some of them are trained on filling application forms (Tadamoun 1 and 6), which are not used, as several interviewees mentioned. Furthermore, the output included a communication strategy that was never developed.

The rank of the fourth output is unsatisfactory. There is an evaluation form with indicators and means of versification that was developed, but never applied. IT was only tested on 150 NGOs out of more than 20 thousand. The expert responsible for this output complained that her counterparts did not cooperate. The former Minister admitted that “the context was not ready for this output.” It seems that a security concern at that time is the reason for hampering the progress of this output.

The fifth output ranks as satisfactory. MOSS in collaboration with UNDP, MOSS held two international conferences in 2007 and 2009 to share ideas and shed the light on the experiences of other developing countries in their attempt to alleviate poverty, such as targeting the poor and CCT. MOSS paid attention to improving the Centers for Social Services (34 different service) and penal institutions. In the meantime, MOSS developed the productive families associations, link them to other institutions in Europe that provided them with designs and training, and then marketed their products abroad. MOSS investigated leakage in the subsidies system. The solution was to use ICT to monitor and follow-up on disbursed solidarity checks, subsidized food items, such as cooking oil, and distributing gas cylinders to the deserved population through the use of coupons. The efforts of the project, and MOSS at large, to achieve this output are remarkable, and thus the fifth output ranks as satisfactory.

The sixth output is highly satisfactory. The sixth output was to evaluate NSB. Project experts elaborated an assessment, and recommendations for an action plan for NSB. The development and upgrading NSB has taken steps in the right directions, yet there are more needed actions. NSB officials have a plan to continue in the same direction – build capacities of the staff, diversify services to clients, and upgrade and refurbish other branches.

Consequently, UNDP project to strengthen the capacities of MOSS is satisfactory. There are other practices to alleviate poverty, such as CCT, which was added as an output since 2005, and productive families. Assessment of NSB and its improvements are also a step towards enhancing the environment for both the workers and the clients. The output concerned with NGOs needs more attention. The project with the support of Microsoft, established a database for NGOs, as there were number of contradicting statistics within government agencies, such as CAPMAS, and Non-Government bodies, such as the General Union for NGOs. Having a database is not enough, more important is the reliability and validity of the data that the database includes. Moreover, having a database for its own sake is fine, but it would be more useful to enable search and query to check on which organizations are doing what, and serving whom? The project also invested time and effort to set a system for accreditation of NGOs to be qualified to mobilize resources and serve their constituents. Till the time of the evaluation, the system was tested on a sample, but was not put to test and made use of it. Aside of these issues, there is a need to revise the law, and other elements of the institutional framework that governs the work of NGOs, such as responsibilities, coordination bodies, etc. to avoid duplication, lack of coordination and overlapping of responsibilities to enhance the performance of NGOs as development partners.

There are lessons learned from this evaluation. First, ICT is not always the solution to all developmental/societal problems, particularly in a country, such as Egypt, that lacks reliable, valid and continuous data. ICT can help in development, but has limits, which constitute risks for the project, and its logframe had to acknowledge and investigate means to internalize these risks.

Second, often problems arise within an awkward institutional framework. MOSS consists of two ministries 1) Supplies that was established during WWII to ration food, and then continued to provide subsidized food, and 2) Social Security that provides safety net in the form of pensions to the poor. Putting these two institutions in one institution requires re-defining the mission and mandate. This did not happen under Output 2. Putting two institutions under one executive is not sufficient to assure efficient operations. Probably, this is the reason that late 2011 during a Cabinet shuffle, MOSS ceased to exist, and the two ministries were separated as it was the case in the past.

Third, strengthening the capacities of a public institution is extremely difficult as it requires transformations in dogma. Public institutions are not similar to private sector companies. Among the elements that make the difference between these institutions is the mission and mandate of the institution itself, and thus how decisions are made with the institution. Most of decisions made within public bodies are based on “political” rather than “technical” considerations. Among the reasons for this situation that future is often uncertain. Conditions within the public institution and outside it always changes, thus precise prediction, projection and forecasting are not always possible. These institutions do not consider long-term objectives, rather are often after a “quick” fix. Sustainable development is about avoiding temporal discontinuities, i.e., inter-generational discontinuities. Sustainable development by nature is a long term, while decision-makers atop the public agencies are often in pursuit of the “quick” fix, and thus will be reluctant to consider fundamental alternatives. Probably that is the reason for why public institutions prefer present than future effects and outcomes. When MOSS engaged with UNDP-Egypt to build the capacities of MOSS, the element of transformation was probably of special importance, where the Former Minister believed in it, but very few of personnel of MOSS were willing to change, and thus some of them considered resistance, which explains the marginal or unsatisfactory progress of some outputs.

Fourth, public institutions often do not advertise planned action in advance to avoid opposition. These institutions do not consider long-term objectives, rather are eventually after a “quick” fix. However, UNDP is after sustainable human development which by nature is a long term, while decision-makers atop the public agencies are eventually in pursuit of the “quick” fix, and thus will be reluctant to consider fundamental alternatives. Probably, that is the reason for why public institutions prefer present than future effects and outcomes. In other words, they heavily discount the future to maintain their status quo. Keeping the institution running might, in many occasions, be more important than fulfilling the mission and meeting the mandate. In many cases, the resultant of interventions turned to be a financial burden, an economic problem, and an output that the community does not accept or own.

The project is coming to an end, yet there are some unfinished businesses and loose ends to tie. There is a need to evaluate these experiences, then draw lessons learnt and best practices to scale-up the use of these tools to a national policy. The project will need to elaborate a log-frame with indicators, risks, external factors and other elements of designing an intervention, and propose means for integrating the various outputs. The project needs to lay-out a plan for phasing out, and a strategy of sustaining the achievements.

Obviously, there is a need for another phase, but with a design based on a different philosophy to meet the current aspirations following the January 25th revolution. The state will have to abandon the neo-liberal thinking that had catastrophic impacts on the global economy. The new phase has to seek linkages between the various entities of MOSS. It also needs to pay more attention to NGOs to be a complete partner and able to reach those who live in informal areas and rural settlements. The new phase has to experiment with tools for enabling and empowering the people who live in misery to be in-charge of their resources and future.

Table of Contents

[List of Tables xii](#_Toc322341282)

[List of Figures xiii](#_Toc322341283)

[List of Photos xiv](#_Toc322341284)

[List of Boxes xv](#_Toc322341285)

[List of Acronyms and Abbreviations xvi](#_Toc322341286)

[1 Introduction 1](#_Toc322341287)

[2 The Project 3](#_Toc322341288)

[2.1 The Objective 4](#_Toc322341289)

[2.2 Outputs 4](#_Toc322341290)

[2.2.1 Output 1: An Advisory Unit established. 4](#_Toc322341291)

[2.2.2 Output 2: MOSS new proposed structure submitted for decision making. 4](#_Toc322341292)

[2.2.3 Output 3: Capacity Development of key staff institutionalized. 4](#_Toc322341293)

[2.2.4 Output 4: A system for accrediting NGOs developed. 5](#_Toc322341294)

[2.2.5 Output 5: A more developed and effective system for social protection 5](#_Toc322341295)

[2.2.6 Output 6: Nasser Social Bank evaluated. 6](#_Toc322341296)

[2.3 Assumptions, Risks and External Factors 6](#_Toc322341297)

[2.3.1 National priorities 6](#_Toc322341298)

[2.3.2 UNDAF Priorities 7](#_Toc322341299)

[2.3.3 MYFF Priorities 8](#_Toc322341300)

[2.4 Strategy and Implementation Arrangements 9](#_Toc322341301)

[2.5 Inputs 9](#_Toc322341302)

[2.6 Institutional Framework 9](#_Toc322341303)

[2.7 Limitations of the Project Design 10](#_Toc322341304)

[3 Methodology 12](#_Toc322341305)

[3.1 Evaluation scope and objective 12](#_Toc322341306)

[3.2 Evaluation criteria 12](#_Toc322341307)

[3.3 Evaluation questions 13](#_Toc322341308)

[3.4 Evaluation approach and methods 13](#_Toc322341309)

[3.4.1 Data sources, collection procedures and instruments 13](#_Toc322341310)

[3.4.2 Stakeholder participation 14](#_Toc322341311)

[3.4.3 Major limitations of the methodology 14](#_Toc322341312)

[4 Analysis: Progress and Outcomes 15](#_Toc322341313)

[4.1 Output 1: An Advisory Unit established 15](#_Toc322341314)

[4.2 Output 2: MOSS new proposed structure submitted for decision making. 17](#_Toc322341315)

[4.3 Output 3: Capacity Development of key staff institutionalized 29](#_Toc322341316)

[4.4 Output 4: A system for accrediting NGOs developed 31](#_Toc322341317)

[Output 5: A more developed and effective system for social protection 32](#_Toc322341318)

[4.4.1 Social policy 32](#_Toc322341319)

[4.4.2 The use of ICT as a tool for an effective system for social protection 33](#_Toc322341320)

[4.4.3 Productive families 37](#_Toc322341321)

[4.4.4 Supplies 39](#_Toc322341322)

[4.4.5 Other 43](#_Toc322341323)

[4.5 Output 6: Nasser Social Bank evaluated 44](#_Toc322341324)

[5 Findings 53](#_Toc322341325)

[5.1 Status of the Project 53](#_Toc322341326)

[5.2 Role of UNDP 55](#_Toc322341327)

[5.3 Elements of success 56](#_Toc322341328)

[5.4 Relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability 57](#_Toc322341329)

[5.5 M&E Framework 59](#_Toc322341330)

[6 Conclusions 60](#_Toc322341331)

[7 Recommendations 63](#_Toc322341332)

[8 Lessons learnt 63](#_Toc322341333)

[References 65](#_Toc322341334)

[Annex 1: Terms of Reference 66](#_Toc322341335)

[Annex 2: List of interviewed individuals 77](#_Toc322341336)

[Annex 3: List of sites visited 79](#_Toc322341337)

[Annex 4: List of reviewed documents reviewed 80](#_Toc322341338)

[Annex 5: Short biography of the evaluator 82](#_Toc322341339)

[Annex 6: Questionnaire 83](#_Toc322341340)

[Annex 7:Code of conduct signed by evaluators 89](#_Toc322341341)

[Annex 8: Conditional Cash Transfer 90](#_Toc322341342)

# List of Tables

[Table 1 General Information of Baladi bread Subsidy System in Egypt 39](#_Toc322341025)

[Table 2 Expected situation once a system for rationing the distribution of gas cylinders 42](#_Toc322341026)

# List of Figures

[Figure 1 Economic growth and poverty incidences, 1982-2010 6](#_Toc322341011)

[Figure 2 Proportion of Children Under 5 Who Suffer from Underweight by Regions, 2008 7](#_Toc322341012)

[Figure 3 A new proposed organizational structure for MOSS 20](#_Toc322341013)

[Figure 4 Organization structure of the Social Services Center 22](#_Toc322341014)

[Figure 5 Nasser Social Bank: Revenue, Deposits, Capital, Investment, Deposits and Income, million EGP, 2006-2011 45](#_Toc322341015)

# List of Photos

[Photo 1 Entrance to the Division of Social Solidarity, Shebin El-Km, Menofia 21](#_Toc322341036)

[Photo 2 An office at the Directorate of MOSS, Shebin El-Kom, Menofia 21](#_Toc322341037)

[Photo 3 Supplies office, Shebin El-Kom, Menofia 21](#_Toc322341038)

[Photo 4 Productive families, Shebin El-Kom, Menofia 22](#_Toc322341039)

[Photo 5 The Vision of the Center, and the Mission of the Directorate 24](#_Toc322341040)

[Photo 6 Office of a social worker, Faisal, Suez 24](#_Toc322341041)

[Photo 7 Mobile Center for Social Services 25](#_Toc322341042)

[Photo 8 Upgraded Center of Social Services, 6th of October 25](#_Toc322341043)

[Photo 9 Entrance hall, Center for Social Services, 6th of October City 26](#_Toc322341044)

[Photo 10 Court, Center for Social Services, 6th of October 26](#_Toc322341045)

[Photo 11 Two social workers at the Center for Social Services, 7th District, 6ht of October 27](#_Toc322341046)

[Photo 12 Center of Social Services, 7th District,, 6th of October 27](#_Toc322341047)

[Photo 13 Haram City 28](#_Toc322341048)

[Photo 14 Center for Social Services, Harm City 28](#_Toc322341049)

[Photo 15Employee at the Center for Social Services, Haram City 28](#_Toc322341050)

[Photo 16: Smart Card 37](#_Toc322341051)

[Photo 17 NSB, main computing facility during the processes of upgrading 45](#_Toc322341052)

[Photo 18 NSB, main computing facility after the processes of upgrading 46](#_Toc322341053)

[Photo 19 NSB 6th of October Branch, hall of transaction before retrofitting 47](#_Toc322341054)

[Photo 20 NSB 6th of October branch, hall of transaction after refurbishment 47](#_Toc322341055)

[Photo 21 NSB Madinet Nasr Branch under construction 48](#_Toc322341056)

[Photo 22 NSG Madinet Nasr after inauguration 48](#_Toc322341057)

[Photo 23 NSB Suez Branch, the hall for transactions 49](#_Toc322341058)

[Photo 24 NSG Suez Branch, office of an employee 49](#_Toc322341059)

[Photo 25 NSB Training Center 50](#_Toc322341060)

[Photo 26 NSB Classroom training 51](#_Toc322341061)

# List of Boxes

[Box 1 Key points on targeting 34](file:///D:\Documents\UNDP-MOSS%20Evaluation\Evalaution%20Report-UNDP-MOSS.docx#_Toc322341062)

# List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

NCSCR National Center for Social and Criminological Research

CCT Conditional Cash Transfer

CO Country Office

GoE Government of Egypt

MDGs Millennium Development Goals

MOSS Ministry of Social Solidarity

MYFF Multi-Year Funding Framework

MTE Mid-Term Evaluation

NSB Nasser Social Bank

NSB Nasser Social Bank

PL Poverty Lines

SMEs Small and Micro Enterprises

TAU Technical Advisory Unit

UNDAF United Nations Development Framework

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

# Introduction

In 2005, the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MOSS) was established by merging two institutions: Ministry of Supply and Domestic Trade,[[1]](#footnote-1) and Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs.[[2]](#footnote-2) The NDP Government established the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MOSS) by merging the Ministry of Supply, without the responsibility of domestic trade and the State-run supermarkets; with the Ministry of Social Affairs, where the Authority for Social Insurance was amended to the Ministry of Finance. The argument was at that time to support the efforts of transforming the Egyptian economy into a market economy, and extend social safety to marginalized sub-population groups. Today, MOSS does not exist. It is divided into its two original ministries under two ministers.

The United Nations Development Framework (UNDAF) for the 2002-2006 cycle states that the UN system supports reforms in civil service, public enterprise and decentralization, while promoting civil-society empowerment and local governance.[[3]](#footnote-3) Under current cycle 2007-2011 the Goal of the UN is to support Egypt to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and reduce human poverty. It is, therefore, of utmost importance to focus on improving national capacities to design, apply and monitor pro-poor policies, while addressing regional disparities (UNDP Country Programme Outcome 2007-2011). Furthermore, UNDP seeks to promote poverty reduction strategies and programmes rooted in human rights based approach. The primary objective of UNDP-Egypt is enhancing both the State and human capabilities to achieve MDGs, promote human development, and reach a new social contract based on tripartite partnership.[[4]](#footnote-4)

This project aims to develop and build the capacity of the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MOSS) to design and implement social policies, increase the relevance and efficiency of social protection schemes and social intervention, including local development, and contribute to elaborate a new social contract, namely in the field of poverty reduction through better empowerment and participation of the poor and civil-society organizations. Establishing an advisory support unit for policy advice and capacity building in MOSS is a key output from this project and an entry point to other outputs and activities.

The project was launched in 2006 with a timeframe of 2006-2009 with a total budget of US $2,201,025.00 with MOSS contribution at US 1,851.025.00 and UNDP contribution amounting to US $350,000.00. The Project Board has agreed to increase the project’s funding by US $2,650 thousand to continue and expand its activities.

This report covers the activities since the launch of the project until 31st of December 2010. Since January 2011, Egypt has been undergoing serious transformations, where the former National Democratic Party (NDP) ceases to exist. A Parliament with the People’s Council and Shura (Consultative) Council are elected with a majority of Islamic parties, which was outlawed before the 25th of January 2011 revolution. A new constitution will be written and approved, and a new elected president will be sworn in by 30th of June 2012. This means that the scene is changing.

This report is the output of an external midterm evaluation of the project. This midterm project evaluation was included and planned for in the original project document and the UNDP evaluation plan of 2007-2011. By definition, a midterm evaluation is an external evaluation performed at the middle of the period of implementation of the project. This evaluation assignment is to analyze the achievements of the project against its original objectives while providing project partners with an independent review of project outputs. The principal goal of a midterm evaluation is to draw conclusions on the status of the project, and whether there is a need for adjustments to the design and implementation to achieve desired outcomes. This midterm evaluation is instrumental in aligning project activities, outputs and outcome, with defined targets and goals. The evaluation seeks to identify key entry points for effective and efficient use of available resources. The objectives of this midterm evaluation are to:

The scope and objective of the midterm evaluation are to:

* Assess the status of project results and how they are being achieved.
* Assess UNDP’s role in providing expertise and exposure to international best practices to enable the Ministry of Social Solidarity to implement its planned outputs efficiently and effectively with maximum impact.
* Identify factors that have facilitated and/or impeded the achievement of objectives.
* Assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project
* Review of M&E framework and establish the appropriate indicators and quality criteria to measure future implementation with assigned roles and responsibilities.
* Provide implementation recommendations for the remainder of the project.
* Provide recommendations for a second phase of the project

This evaluation addresses four sets of questions. Atop the list of issues that mid-term evaluation addresses is the efficiency of project management. To what extent has project management been efficient in using available resources to accomplish the mandates of the project? Has project management been innovative and resourceful? If yes, then how? The answers for these questions might enable project management to efficiently achieve the targets and objectives that the project was set to achieve.

The second key issue is the project bound to fulfill its mission? Will the project be able to achieve its goals? If no then what are the problems? What interventions are needed?

The third key issue is to assess the appropriateness of project design. If the project is not bound to achieve its mission, maybe there is a need for reviewing the project design. This revision could extend to project strategy and implementation arrangements; outputs and activities; role of project partners, and so forth.

Finally, the evaluation seeks to document best practices and lessons learned, which in itself might help in improving the delivery of inputs, for example, revisiting the management structure, and so forth. This last issue will raise questions pertaining to the sustainability of project outcomes, and whether there are plans for phasing out. If not, then what need to be done?

The primary audience and users of this report are the Ministers of Supplies and Social Affairs and their staff; Project staff and staff of UNDP-Egypt responsible for the project. Partners might be able to set priorities in response to transformations resulting from the 25th of January revolution, which requires adopting and applying principles of good governance. The Government of Egypt will seek more equitable and efficient mechanism for distributing wealth. This evaluation is an opportunity to show project partners where it stood at the time of the evaluation to decide the new direction for future actions.

The second group of audiences is the project staff. They might need to know what has been working, and what did not work; and why. The qualifications of project staff, duties and responsibilities might need revision for the time left to the end of the project, and in case of recommending another phase.

The third group of audience is the staff of UNDP-CO. They want to know whether the project has been in line with mission and mandate of UNDP-Egypt. They want to know whether this project has helped the Government of Egypt (GoE). They also need to be sure that if there is a need to revise the project as a response to the results of the evaluation, and whether the project can be extended?

# The Project

As mentioned earlier, the project is to build the capacities of MOSS. The intervention has six outputs interrelated outputs. The first output is defining an organizational structure for MOSS to merge the Ministry of Supply with Ministry of Social Affairs. The second output is to define the mission, mandate, vision, and the internal and external environs of MOSS. The third output is to identify and fulfill training needs. The fourth output is building the capacities of partners, i.e., NGOs. The fifth output is to design a more effective system for social protection for efficient distribution of subsidies, particularly bread and gas cylinders. The last output is to evaluate NSB. Section 2.3 presents a full discussion on these six outputs.

The report consists of a number of sections. This section introduces the reader to project as designed and portrayed in the project document, including, but not limited to, objectives, outputs, inputs, etc. The next section presents the methodology applied in this evaluation exercise, then followed by two sections on analysis and findings. The report ends with sections portraying conclusions, recommendations and lessons learnt.

## The Objective

“The project aims to enhance the capacity of MOSS to design and implement clearly defined and targeted social policies, increase the relevance and efficiency of social protection schemes and social intervention including local development, and contribute to the elaboration of the new social contract, namely in the field of poverty reduction through better empowerment and participation of the poor.”[[5]](#footnote-5)

## Outputs

### Output 1: An Advisory Unit established.

To achieve the aforementioned objective, the project has to produce six outputs. The first output is a Technical Advisory Unit (TAU) at MOSS. This unit will be responsible for:

1. Strategic policy advice, including key options, research and coordination, and situation and prospective analyses;
2. Restructuring MOSS including organizational structure, internal governance, human resources and mainstreaming the use of Information Technology (IT); and
3. Program implementation support, such as training, communication, etc.

To fulfill its mandate, the unit was staffed with a team leader and seven to nine experts specialized in economics, sociology, management, IT, training and capacity building, communication, finance, etc.

### Output 2: MOSS new proposed structure submitted for decision making.

Proposing an organisational structure for MOSS is central to fulfilling its mandate and mission. The “merger” of two institutions, i.e., the Ministry of Supply and Ministry of Social Affairs requires a new organizational structure to assure smooth cooperation and synergies within the newly established institution. This requires clear mission and mandate statements, a vision, and an assessment of the internal and external environments of the newly formed institution. Next is to analyze strategic issues, will lead to the need to assess the competencies of the staff of MOSS. The assessment has to identify needs at the organizational, occupation and individual levels.

### Output 3: Capacity Development of key staff institutionalized.

This output integrates and complements that above-mentioned Output. The project avails training to key staff at MOSS, such as social workers, and their partners, particularly NGOs. In addition to delivering training, the project will contribute to elaborate an efficient and dynamic communication strategy to convey relevant messages to the population, properly reflect the image of MOSS. Hence, based upon the activities implemented so far in training and preparing and implementing a communication strategy, then MOSS will be ready for elaborating and implementing an internal mobilization strategy, i.e., incentives and understanding the mission of MOSS, common comprehension of the mission of MOSS, its strategy and interventions.

### Output 4: A system for accrediting NGOs developed.

MOSS is the official regulatory body for NGOs active in Egypt. NGOs are instrumental in achieving the mission of MOSS, and thus are among the most significant partners of MOSS. They are able to reach those marginalized and unprivileged sub-population groups, such as female-headed households. NGOs receive financial and technical support. For this reason, it is of utmost importance that MOSS has a system for monitoring NGOs to eradicate poverty effectively poverty effectively .Thus, a database of the 20 thousand NGOs registered with MOSS is essential to achieve the mission and mandate of MOSS. Equally important is to set up a system of accrediting and eligibility for NGOs. These two steps are central to producing a periodic report on NGOs, to monitor their activities, and provide them with necessary support.

### Output 5: A more developed and effective system for social protection

Today, capability poverty substitutes the notion of monetary measure of poverty. Several studies[[6]](#footnote-6) indicated that fallacy of using Poverty Lines (PL) to target the poor. Capability approach[[7]](#footnote-7) for assessing poverty provides means for targeting the poor, who are they? Where they live? What exactly they need to move to an improved standard of living.

Designing an adequate social protection system requires an effective mechanism for targeting the poor. This mechanism serves as a vehicle to setting priorities, thus deciding on efficient and productive interventions to alleviate poverty.

### Output 6: Nasser Social Bank evaluated.


The project funded the assessment of Nasser Social Bank (NSB). The assessment highlights the strengths and weaknesses of NSB, as well as the available opportunities for improving its role in poverty alleviation in areas such as sponsoring Small and Micro Enterprises (SMEs) and threats, i.e., risks, in the external environment of NSB that might limit its effectiveness. UNDP helped in recruiting a team of national and international experts to conduct the assessment and layout a business plan for NSB emulating successful experiences in Asia and Latin America.

## Assumptions, Risks and External Factors

### National priorities

The project serves the national priorities. Poverty is a major impediment to sustainable human development, and alleviation of poverty is among the national priorities. According to the 2010 report on the progress towards achieving the MDGs, Egypt has a program for targeting the poor using poverty indicators that are updated annually. In 2005, independent researchers proposed a poverty-reduction strategy “A New Social Contract" that is anchored to the National Economic and Social Development Plan (2007-2012).[[8]](#footnote-8) Sayed et al. (2010) argued that the result of these efforts of GoE and assistance of donors was a sharp decrease in proportion of population living in extreme poverty from almost 8.2 to 3.4 percent during 1990 and 2008/2009, respectively, Figure 1. “However, based on the national poverty line, the poverty indices declined from 24.2 percent in 1990/1992 to 21.6 percent in 2008/09, which is higher than the previously observed level in early 2008. This is mainly due to, the prevailing global crises series including food, fuel, financial, economic crisis, and climate change.”[[9]](#footnote-9)


Figure Economic growth and poverty incidences, 1982-2010



Source: Sayed, Hussein Abdel-Aziz et al (2010) Egypt’s Progress towards Achieving the Millennium Development Goals, Ministry of Economic Development and UNDP, Cairo, Egypt.

Egypt is a country that suffers from regional disparities. Poverty is evident in rural areas, and urban informal settlements. Inequity affects the elasticity of poverty reduction. Despite claims for improved equality in the distribution of income using Gini coefficients, yet these measures are illusive as these coefficients assess equality not equity. The proportion of underweight children (five years or less) is one of the manifestations of regional disparities and poverty, Figure 2.

Figure 2 Proportion of Children Under 5 Who Suffer from Underweight by Regions, 2008



Source: Sayed, Hussein Abdel-Aziz et al Egypt’s Progress towards Achieving the Millennium Development Goals, 2010, Ministry of Economic Development and UNDP, Cairo, Egypt.

Unemployment in Egypt is among the reasons for poverty. In 2009, the rates of unemployment reached about 9.4 per cent. Among the age cohort of 15-24 years old, unemployment rates reached nearly 23 percent. More than 60 per cent of females who belong to this age cohort are unemployed. In 2006, the private sector availed job opportunities for 80 per cent of the labor force. However, statistics suggest that many job opportunities, almost 60 per cent, are within the informal sector.

Within the aforementioned, the report on the progress towards achieving the MDGs clearly indicates that Egypt has to continue the struggle to alleviate poverty to achieve Goal 1 of the MDGs. Egypt continues to need the project as one of the initiatives to alleviate poverty through project outputs, such as proper targeting of the poor and improved NSB services.

### UNDAF Priorities

UNDP Egypt supports activities in four practice areas: Poverty reduction, Energy and Environment, Democratic Governance, and Crisis Prevention and Recovery. UNDAF (2007-2011) is the framework within the project was designed. This project serves two of the four practice areas, i.e., poverty reduction and democratic governance.

UNDAF (2007-2011) aims to enhance governance through a participatory development dialogue, institutional capacity development and empowering civil-society organizations. This goal is in line with national priorities. The project is designed to achieve this aim by offering training to the staff of MOSS, support to NGOs, investigating means for efficient use of subsidies, and assessing NSB to better serve its constituents.

The mission of MOSS is to provide food subsidies to marginalized population, where Outputs 5 and 6 are means to reach this aim; and Outputs 1, 2, 3 and 4 are essential elements towards institutional development conducive for democratic governance. Specifically, this project contributes to accomplishing Outcome 1: by 2011, state's performance and accountability in programming, implementing and coordinating actions, especially those that reduce exclusion, vulnerabilities and gender disparities, are improved.

### MYFF Priorities

This project fits well with UNDAF Priority Area (I): Reinforcing State Capacities. Under this priority area the UNDAF intends to improve the performance and accountability of the State in programming, implementing and coordinating actions that reduce exclusion, vulnerabilities and gender disparities. This outcome responds to national priorities to improve the standard of living for citizens and upgrading services, and achieving a major boost to the national economy as articulated in the government's programme (2006).

One of the MYFF goals is achieving the MDGs and reducing human poverty. In this respect, UNDP assist the GoE to improve national capacity to design, apply and monitor pro-poor policies with addressing geographical disparities. The annual national development plans, particularly the five-year fiscal plans, include detailed budgets for human development. The third MDG Country report adequately reflects progress against targets (national and sub-national).

UNDP outputs to achieve this goal included, but not limited to, 1) National capacity to monitor poverty and status of vulnerable groups improved (including from a gender perspective) and an integrated monitoring and mapping system for MDGs developed and institutionalized; 2) Poor and marginalized groups' access to finance and assets facilitated to enable them to start up income-generating activities; 3) Poverty reduction strategies and programming implemented and targeting and distribution of social services improved and new financial products developed; and 4) Technical capacity of government in delivering social contract enhanced. NGOs development programmes/projects are aligned with MDGs is one of UNDP Output indicators. The budget allocated to achieve this goal is US$34,431 thousand.

Juxtaposing the above mentioned information from CPAP and MYFF against the project subject to evaluation, it is clear that the project and its outputs serve the national priorities and those of UNDP-Egypt. The project is about building the capacities of MOSS to assist the marginalized sub-population groups (Outputs 1, 2, 3 and 6). It also aims to build the capacities of MOSS partners, i.e., NGOs through accreditation (Output 4). Finally, Output 5 intends to assure that the poor gets State subsides, thus contributing to the overall social justice.

## Strategy and Implementation Arrangements

The project builds on UNDP MDG related initiatives. UNDP aims to ensure incorporating MDGs within the strategic plans of Egypt, thus integrating the concept of sustainable human development in the processes of plan formulation and implementation including, but not limited to, problem definition, goal articulation, evaluating alternatives, evaluation and monitoring, etc. Enhancing the skills, knowledge and access to best practices in the functions of public bodies is a step towards effective, efficient delivery of services to the constituents, particularly the poor.

The project is nationally executed (NEX), where MOSS is the executing body. There is a National Project Director (NPD), who is responsible for all project execution including, but not limited to, coordinating the implementation of all activities, developing action plans, and reporting progress. In addition to the NPD, there is a Project Executive Group that consists of representatives from MOSS, UNDP and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). This group is responsible for executive management decisions, provides guidance to the NPD, approves work plans and budget revisions, etc. The group is also responsible for project assurance reviews to support the project.

## Inputs

The project was launched in 2006 with a timeframe of 2006-2009 with a total budget of US $2,201,025.00 with MOSS contribution at US 1,851.025.00 and UNDP contribution amounting to US $350 thousand. The Project Board has agreed to increase the project’s funding by USD 2,650 thousand to continue/expand its activities.

## Institutional Framework

In 2005, Egypt had its first direct election of a President. The former President, who headed the National Democratic Party that cease to exist after the January 25th revolution, had a program to modernize Egypt via a market economy, where the role of the State was to be a regulator of markets to assure competitiveness, and intervene to avoid market failures.

In the meantime, the Ministry of Planning and Local Development and UNDP-Egypt released Egypt 2005 Human Development Report, which advocated the need for a new social contract based on three important notions of change: 1) A new 'social contract' whereby the state encourages further political, social and economic participation from civil society: by extending and integrating institutions that promote democratic practices and are accountable; 2) improving the quality and levels of delivery of public goods; and 3) by developing policies that encourage private sector participation in development without adverse distributional effects in between-group share of overall wealth and a cultural and behavioral change such that the values of participation, entrepreneurship, innovation and transparency can prevail. This will require establishing and public dissemination of codes of conduct and accountability for public services, well-designed policies and programs for those basic public institutions that help shape values - schools and the media - the systematic public rewarding of independent thought, tolerance and social responsibility, and the promotion of gender equity.[[10]](#footnote-10)

Since its inception in 2005, by the Presidential Decree No. 421, MOSS set a clear vision to direct and serve as a catalyst elaborating a new social contract that governs the relationship between the citizen and the State, and stimulates both civil society organizations and private sector companies to participate effectively in the processes of social development by providing, executing and evaluating ideas for social development and justice. The mandate of MOSS, therefore, is to develop an environment that is conducive to providing services to targeted households, and enhance the capabilities to participate as productive member of society in the overall schemes of development.[[11]](#footnote-11)

The goals of MOSS[[12]](#footnote-12) are to:

* Establish social safety nets for the Egyptian citizens.
* Develop a new framework to assure that State subsidies are to the needy
* Focus on overall human development.
* Providing basic services to disadvantaged areas.
* Establish partnerships between the State and private sector companies
* Make use of the beneficiaries’ view point to improve services provided to them

Thus, MOSS, in collaboration with other stakeholders, aims[[13]](#footnote-13) to:

* Reduce percentage of poor people by 50 percent by 2015
* Increase the rate of satisfying the needs of families to 85 percent
* Increase the participation of NGOs and private sector companies to 80 percent of the programs of MOSS that serve the poor.

To properly fulfill the mission and mandate of MOSS, there was a need to strengthen its capacities. The State had the political will to support MOSS and the project at large by allocating the needed fund for the cost sharing.

## Limitations of the Project Design

The project document does not include a clear log-frame with baseline and indicators to enable proper tracking of progress. The progress reports, however, include baseline, indicators and targets that do not included in the project document. Nevertheless, the project has evidences of pre- and post-intervention, such as the case of NSB, which can assist the process of elaborating the Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) report.

Some project outputs are spelled out as a component, such as Output 5: A more developed and effective system for social protection. In reality, all activities exerted under this output were to ration the subsidies of Baladi Bread and Gas Cylinders. The concept of social protection is more than just subsidizing food and fuel. According to United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), social protection is preventing, managing, and overcoming situations that adversely affect people’s well-being. It is a package of policies and programs designed to reduce poverty and vulnerability by 1) promoting efficient labor markets, 2) diminishing people's exposure to risks, and 3) enhancing capacity of the poor to manage economic and social risks, such as unemployment, exclusion, sickness, disability and old age.[[14]](#footnote-14) According to this definition, project outputs are means towards achieving social protection, not just Output 5.

Available resources are often limited. To maximize the returns of these resources, project design has to establish linkages between outputs. Unfortunately, the connection between some outputs is not clear.

The project document has no clear assumptions, risks and external factors that are central to the log-frame. However, based on the progress reports, it seems these elements existed, but not in the project document.

The project document could have a more detailed situation analysis. For example, alleviating poverty requires both political will and commitment. At that time, the Government expressed the will, but did not express the commitment, which is a serious risk. There is no real effort in the document to show how GoE is committed to alleviating poverty, which entails, among others, access to resources, such as land for example. Securing land tenure is not within the mandate of MOSS, but still is the mandate of GoE.

The project document does not present a detailed project strategy and implementation arrangements p.5 – another manifestation of lacking a log-frame. The Technical Advisory Unit seems to be the Project Management Unit (PMU). There is no clear description of partners and stakeholders; direct and indirect target groups. However, Section IV-Management Arrangement of the project document lists the various bodies responsible for project management. The Project Executive Group, as described on p. 10, “may be established to take executive management decisions.” The word “may” is an auxiliary verb that entails possibility or permission. Fortunately, this group was formulated and functioning.

The project document makes the case that establishing TAU as an output and an entry point to other outputs,[[15]](#footnote-15) but does not show how? A PMU has a different role, authorities and obligations than that of a TAU – there is difference between implementing a project document, detailing working plans, keeping project records, drafting ToRs for short-term experts, managing subcontracts, etc. and advising the Minister on means for targeting the poor, accrediting NGOs, proposing means for better social services and so forth. Furthermore, there is no clear vision of how the TAU will work with the respective partner within MOSS, and thus how the project will phase out, i.e., an exit strategy? And how the outcomes of the project are sustainable? The answer of these two questions might be on the agenda during the time left following this evaluation.

The project document does not show clearly inputs, and how they are related to outputs. There is limited breakdown of the output into activities and their related inputs.

# Methodology

UNDP initiated this MTE to analyze the achievements of the project against its original objectives while providing project partners with an independent review of project outputs, Annex 1. This MTE reviews technical and managerial aspects and consider issues of effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, impact and sustainability. Also it attempts to identify factors that have facilitated and/or impeded the achievement of objectives and should result in recommendations and lessons learned that will help project managers in re-orienting and re-prioritizing project activities and managerial arrangements as needed for the remainder of the project. This MTE is a forward looking, giving future directions and recommendations for donors, government and project partners for the second phase of the project. The evaluation timeframe is that of the entire project duration from 2006 to date.

## Evaluation scope and objective

The scope and objective of the midterm evaluation is to:

* Assess the status of project results and how they are being achieved
* Assess UNDP’s role in providing expertise and exposure to international best practices to enable the Ministry of Social Solidarity to implement its planned outputs efficiently and effectively with maximum impact.
* Identify factors that have facilitated and/or impeded the achievement of objectives
* Assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project
* Review of M&E framework and establish the appropriate indicators and quality criteria to measure future implementation with assigned roles and responsibilities.
* Provide implementation recommendations for the remainder of the project.
* Provide recommendations for a second phase of the project

## Evaluation criteria

There are number of measures for the performance standard of the success of the project. First is a Likert measure, i.e., a rating scale, which is a unidimenstional scaling, divided into segments of highly satisfactory, satisfactory, marginally satisfactory, and unsatisfactory. An output rated “highly satisfactory” means excellent achievements; a “satisfactory” grade means good accomplishments; an output regarded “marginally satisfactory” means acceptable achievement; and an output rated “unsatisfactory” means very limited achievements. This ordinal scale helps establish a rank-order when evaluating the outputs of the project.

Another set of performance standards are the national indicators. There are number of national documents, such as Human Development Reports, the Progress towards achieving the MDGs, etc. that report the status of Egyptians, and whether the effort of MOSS, and the Government at large, have been effective in socio-economic development.

## Evaluation questions

Evaluation questions used in conducting this MTE include, but not limited to:

* Were stated outputs achieved?
* What progress toward the outputs has been made?
* What factors have contributed to achieving or not achieving intended results? In specific, has the project improved the capacity of MOSS to deliver on planned outputs? And how?
* Were the actions to achieve the outputs and outcomes effective and efficient?
* Has the project partnership strategy been appropriate and effective?
* What factors contributed to effectiveness or ineffectiveness?
* Are the results sustainable?
* How can the project be improved in its next phase?

The consultant gathered information from interviewing available project staff, Annex 2 lists interviewees; visiting sites where the project had interventions, Annex 3 lists visited sites; and the reports and documents that the project and UNDP availed, Annex 4 lists reviewed documents and reports. The consultant developed a questionnaire to collect information from the field. He shared the questionnaire with UNDP before conducting the interviews, Annex 6 presents the questionnaire.

## Evaluation approach and methods

### Data sources, collection procedures and instruments

This MTE depends on number of sources of information. This evaluation stems from the information collected from reviewed documents and interviews. Reviewed documents include, but not limited to, UNDP project documents, project work plans, project progress reports, etc. Annex 4 is an inventory of reviewed documents. The review of documents is a necessary step towards preparing for interviews and discussion for a holistic comprehension of where the project currently stands.

The second source of information is interviewing project beneficiaries, i.e., those who received training and constituents that MOSS serves through Centers for Social Services and NSB; and project personnel, such as Advisors to the Minister. Annex 2 is a list of interviewees.

Since the project document does not include a baseline or indicators to measure against them progress, and the only source for this information is the progress reports, then it is not possible to conduct the evaluation using a quantitative methodology. The consultant had to use qualitative measures to develop useful causal relationships that reflect the status of project outputs and outcomes if possible. Qualitative analysis captures the contextual setting associated with information or situations affecting people’s lives, and so can assist in characterizing the relationships of one variable in the ”chain of causation” to the next. Hence, the evaluator used a “snow ball” interviewing technique, where the first interview leads to a second, more focused interview with another individual.

Branches of NSB and Centers for Social Services that are not upgraded and modernized serve as the control group to make up for lacking a baseline. A comparison between the two groups is a means to assess the impact of the project. Another technique that the evaluator used is questions on the working conditions before and after the upgrading process. A final technique to assess the progress is to compare NSB earmarked funds for capacity building before and after the project, which indicates that officials have come to pay more attention to capacity building for effective and efficient modality to serve the constituents of MOSS. As for other outputs, the qualitative approach is applicable.

### Stakeholder participation

The project addresses two groups of beneficiaries. The first group is the staff of MOSS who received training to improve their capacities, and had a working environment conducive to enhancing levels of service delivery to the second group of beneficiaries, i.e., Partners of MOSS, such as NGOs, and the constituents of marginalized population. The consultant visited Centers for Social Services that were subject to upgrading and those that did not receive support to make comparisons possible.

Site visits was an opportunity to meet the direct beneficiaries of capacity building, i.e., the employees of MOSS within their working environment; and the indirect target group, i.e., the constituents who receive services from MOSS. The consultant held meetings with each group in a form of semi-focus group session where questions were made to the constituents, and then giving the employees of MOSS the opportunity to comment and respond.

### Major limitations of the methodology

Building capacities is a process, and thus the best research methodology to apply has to be qualitative. Intensive research, in this case, aims to collect information of the process of capacity development and building by examining in depth individuals’ behavior, and the reasons for such behavior. The principle questions the evaluation addresses are: why has the project succeed, or not, in strengthening the capacities of MOSS? How? For this reason, the evaluator uses smaller, focused groups, not large samples as in the case of quantitative analyses.

Two other limitations faced the consultant. The first is many of the project staff left after the ex-Minister left office. The other limitation was the timing of the evaluation that was held during Ramadan and August of 2011. The consultant had to ask questions to those who worked closely with the experts who left, or interview them outside the working environment. For example, the consultant interviewed one of the experts on phone, and met with the ex-Minister at his private office. To assure validity, the consultant checked the validity of the statements they made during the interviews held with project staff and MOSS staff. Some interviews were held after Eid.

The inability to extend the findings of qualitative analyses to wider populations with the same degree of certainty that quantitative (extensive) analyses can is the main weaknesses. The findings of this assessment are not tested to discover whether they are statistically significant or due, in part, to chance. This weakness is not an issue, for one simple reason, the findings of the assessment is not to be generalized.

# Analysis: Progress and Outcomes

The consultant used “Organizational storytelling,” which is often used in conducting management, [strategy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategy) and organization studies. Organizational storytelling is one of many forms of collecting information when embarked on a qualitative analysis. The consultant prepared summaries of the documents reviewed, and field notes. The consultant acted as an observant, asked the interviewees open-ended questions, and in some cases had to play the role of a “devil advocate” to get the complete picture. Whenever possible, the consultant conducted a “focus group”[[16]](#footnote-16) meeting to get the responses from the interviewees for deeper comprehension. The next step was to categorize gathered information into patterns as the primary basis for organizing and reporting results. The most common analysis of qualitative data is the observer's impression. To minimize the consultant’s bias, and ensure validity of the analysis, the evaluator used interviewer corroboration, and peer debriefing.

Having outlined the method of analysis, the report within this subsection will attempt to render the progress and results of the six outputs from the project. Section five of the report then is a synthesis of the findings from the analysis, where the Lickert scale will be used to rank each output, and the project at large.

## Output 1: An Advisory Unit established

The project has a Project Management Unit (PMU) staffed with competent professionals, in addition to short-term experts. Long-term experts are the core of the Technical Advisory Unit (TAU). Most of them had a previous working experience with the former Minister, Dr. Ali El- Moselhy. The former Project Manager, Mr. Nehro Rashad Khalil was the Chief Advisor to the Minister. He left Egypt during January 2011, and was not available for an interview. Furthermore, Dr. Alaa Serry was the international consultant who was responsible for NSB. He left Egypt back to Canada before the project evaluation process started.

Gen. Abdulhakeem Hammouda worked on the restructuring of MOSS. Gen. Sherif Radwan, who is responsible for training and advisor to the Minister, and Ms. Noha Koptan, IT expert and advisor to the Minister; and Mr. Ayman Hossam, advisor to the Minister and responsible for Productive Family projects, were available in an interview. All of them had a former working experience with the Minister. This means that Dr. El-Moselhy selected his advisors based upon his confidence and their work experience, which had several of positive aspects. First, there was no time wasted to establish connections with the Minister; he already knew them, knew their competences and were given authorities to embark on implementing the various activities as described in the project document. Second, having close relationship with the Minister meant that attempts of the employees of MOSS to resist change were minimized. All interviewed experts shared one view of how to work with their counterparts within MOSS, including NSB. Each expert worked with his or her counterparts by 1) understanding what they are doing; 2) suggest means to improve their work and listen to view point of the MOSS employee; and then 3) seek an agreement on the best way to do business. This subtle approach paid off in a number of ways. The employees of MOSS, particularly senior officials, did not see the advisors as a threat, or that the advisors were out to replace them. At first, it took the advisors time and effort to do things by themselves, to show the officials of MOSS that doing business in a different way result better outcomes. Therefore, they gained the confidence among the employees, who were encouraged to carry-on the job by themselves, and the advisors were there for backstopping. In some cases, the advisors directed their efforts to the number of the junior staff, who showed enthusiasm to learn and participate in trying another way of doing business. Once they started to see the benefits of building their capacities, such as an opportunity to travel abroad to market the products of productive families and participate in international conventions, the other reluctant employees started to show interest to learn from the expert.[[17]](#footnote-17)

The advisors provided the Minister, the officials and employees of MOSS strategic options, research, coordination, and analyses to support the processes of decision making. These advisors played an important role in:

1) The restructuring of MOSS, and strengthening its capacities, through support to projects to retrofit and refurbish branch offices of NSB;

2) Merging the Office of Supply with the Unit for Social Services into a Center for Social Services; and

3) Using

3) Using information and communication technologies to improve service delivery to marginalized population, and support on food supply cards, gas cylinders and improved production and distribution of Baladi bread. T

The advisors also supported the processes of formulating a strategy for comprehensive social policies plus issuing Law 137/2010 for social solidarity and its Executive Regulations, piloting Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program, and two conferences on a social policy.

Based on the reviewed documents, interviews, site visits and UNDP Human Development Reports and 2010 report on the Progress toward achieving the MDGs, it seems this component was instrumental to the success of other outputs, as the report will render. The output is relevant to the project and its overall objective. However, it does not seem to be sustainable. There is no plan for sustaining this unit, such as moving it into the overall organizational structure of MOSS, which is the second output of the project. The Minister selected members to serve in the unit based on their qualifications, and former working relations. For all these reasons, on a Likert scale, the rank of Output 1 is satisfactory.

## Output 2: MOSS new proposed structure submitted for decision making.

Originally, there was the Ministry for Insurance and Social Affairs and the Ministry of Supply and Domestic Trade. The Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs included among other institutions the Authority for Insurance. The Ministry of Supply and Domestic Trade included all functions and institutions responsible for domestic trade, such as the outlets for marketing the products of State-owned food industries, meat imported from Ethiopia and Sudan, etc. In 2005; the Authority for Insurance was amended to the Ministry of Finance, and simultaneously. The responsibility of Domestic Trade was then amended to the Ministry of Industry and Foreign Trade to be the Ministry of Industry and Trade. The Government entrusted the responsibility of importing food for the poor through private-sector companies. Discussions at the People’s Council that various media channels covered revealed several criminal investigations of cases of introducing substandard quality of imported food supplies that do not meet minimum standards of food safety.

As mentioned earlier, in 2005, MOSS was the merger of the Ministry of Social Affairs with the Ministry of Supply. After the January 25threvolution, a new Cabinet was sworn-in, and the Domestic Trade returned to be part of the MOSS, and the Ministry of Industry and Trade, returned once more to be Ministry of Industry and Foreign Trade. This was an attempt to have more government control on the markets. Early December 2011, a national salvation government head was formulated to manage the transitional phase until June 2012, when a constitution is approved, and a President is in office. The Prime Minister decided to split MOSS into the Ministry of Supply and Domestic Trade, and the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs as it used to be in the past.

One of the steps to actualize the goals of MOSS, as outlined in Section 2.7 Institutional Framework earlier, was to put in place an organisational structure for MOSS. The project contributed to a new proposed organisational structure for MOSS (Figure 3). According to Figure 3, MOSS consists of three major blocks: 1) Office of the Minister, 2) Social Care and Development, and 3) Finance, Administration, Human Resources and Directorates.

According to A. Hammouda,[[18]](#footnote-18) designing the organizational structure of MOSS focused on the Sector of Social Affairs, and the Sector of the Office of the Minister. He worked in close collaboration with the Central Agency for Organization and Administration[[19]](#footnote-19) (CAOA). On April 1st, 2010, CAOA approved the organization structure of MOSS.

The proposed organization structure does not seem complete, as it does not show exactly other entities affiliated to MOSS, such as NSB, National Centre for Social and Criminological Research (NCSCR),[[20]](#footnote-20) and the General Committee for Foreign Assistance. Furthermore, the proposed organizational structure does not seem to be in accord with the services of MOSS in the sphere of Supplies, such as licensing a new bakery, inspecting a produce refrigeration facility, etc.

There were number of activities and outputs that the project sponsored under Output 2 up to June 30th, 2010,[[21]](#footnote-21) the project:

1. It upgraded and developed 179 units within the sectors of social affairs (150 social units and 11 social administration), and supplies (11 supplies office, six supplies administrations, and one supplies Directorates).[[22]](#footnote-22)
2. Constructing 34 new buildings, including the headquarter for Social Affairs in Agouza, Giza, where the estimated cost for this building is about EGP 48 million; four divisions in Minya, Alexandria, Menofia and Suhaj; three social departments at the Markaz level at the Governorates of Behera and Minya; and 16 centers for social services at the village level at the Governorates of Minya, Asyut, Gharbia, Sharqia, Behera, Luxor, Menofia, Matrouh, Aswan and Qena.
3. Constructing 10 supplies offices at the Governorates of Behera, Sharqia, Daqahlia and North Sinai.
4. Developing 58 Centers for Social Services, six Social Units and three kindergartens in the ultra-poor villages. MOSS also concluded an agreement with the Social Fund for Development (SFD) to finance jointly building six social units at the Governorates of Suhaj, Sharqia and Asyut for the amount of EGP 1.5 million during 2010/2011.

At all levels, most of the offices of MOSS are not properly maintained. These offices cannot be a working environment conducive to an effective and efficient provision of social services to the needy. The Directorate of MOSS of the Governorate of Menofia, for example, is in a rented building, and cannot serve as headquarter for MOSS at the level of the Governorate. Photo 1 shows the entrance, and the office of security. Photos 2 and 3 show the miserable conditions of the offices of supplies and productive families, Shebin El-Kom. According to M. Fatthalla, many social units in Cairo, such as that of Gammaliya, lack Water Closets Closets (WCs),” just a bucket and a faucet,” he said.

Figure A new proposed organizational structure for MOSS



Source: Hammouda, A. Report on achievements of the Strengthening the Capacity of MOSS, 2011

Photo Entrance to the Division of Social Solidarity, Shebin El-Km, Menofia

Source: A. El-Torky, CDE

Photo An office at the Directorate of MOSS, Shebin El-Kom, Menofia

Source: A. El-Torky, CDE

Photo Supplies office, Shebin El-Kom, Menofia

Source: A. El-Torky, CDE

Photo Productive families, Shebin El-Kom, Menofia

Source: A. El-Torky, CDE

Many of the developed centers for Social Services provide both social and supply services.[[23]](#footnote-23) The project contributed to the organizational development of these centers (Figure 4). The project also provided training for the staff of these centers, as will be discussed later the coming subsection under Output 3: Capacity development of key staff institutionalized.

Figure Organization structure of the Social Services Center

Source: Hammouda, A. Report on achievements of the Strengthening the Capacity of MOSS, 2011

The Governorate of Suez has a Directorate for Social Solidarity. In each of the five districts (qism), i.e., Etaqqah, Suez, Faisal, al Gannayen and al Arbien, there is a Center for Social Services. The consultant visited the Directorate, and met with the Deputy of the Chairperson of the Directorate, Ms. Madeha A. Hassanein, who holds a positive view on the processes of upgrading of the centers, and training the staff of the divisions, and the staff at the centers for social services in each district. The consultant met with the staff of the Social Service Division at Faisal, Suez, who received training on data entry, reviewing the forms and applications requesting State assistance known as (*Tadamoun* 1, and *Tadamoun* 6, the Family File)[[24]](#footnote-24) and building their skills as social workers. They hold a positive impression, but had some complaints. Eng. A. Gad, from the Information Center at MOSS, discussed their views and directed them to the solution at the Directorate.

The Center for Social Services has a clear vision (Photo 5). The Centre has a database of all beneficiaries it serves in both digital and paper media. During the visit, the consultant observed that the staff members of the Centre have a close relationship with many of the beneficiaries. The working place of a social worker is clean, and with partitions to provide the social worker and the investigated case a sense of privacy (Photo 6). The Center for Social Services in Faisal, Suez, used to host the office of supply. Now the office moved to a nearby location; no clear reason was given during the interview.

The consultant met the following four beneficiaries:

1. M. Hassan receives a monthly payment to support him. He likes using his smart card to get the various services that MOSS offer. When asked how many services he had on his smart card, he was not able to count except two to three of the services that the smart card provides. Using his smart card, each month he gets his pension from the Post Office, which is next to the bakery, where he gets his subsided Baladi bread every day. According to him, both outlets, i.e., the Post Office and the Bakery, are not crowded. He is satisfied.
2. S. Moustafa sees that in the past, he could get his payment in 10 minutes from the Centre. It takes him time at the Post Office in Suez (a different district (qism); it is the main postal office at the city, probably that is the reason for being crowded). It was not clear to the consultant why someone who lives in Faisal goes down to Suez to get his payment each month? But he claims that the Post Office of Suez is near his residence, which raises the question, then why is he getting his services from this office not from the office of Suez *qism*? He is satisfied with the services that the office of supplies provides him.
3. H. Zouir is an old man who has health problems. The smart card used to provide him health services of the hospital that the Health Insurance Agency manages. The State partially covers his medical treatment, and he has to pay for the remaining costs. MOSS used to pay his share through the smart card, but since January 25th, 2011; MOSS is not paying the Health Insurance Agency, and thus the hospital is not admitting him or offering him services without paying his share. Following the 1967 was, he and his family moved to Beni Suef. He needed a surgery, and filed a request where he was treated at al Qasr el Eini, Cairo and paid nothing. He remembers those old days of the benevolent, egalitarian State under President Nasser. “Those days, no one worried for paying their share to get treatment,” he said. Zouir wants his payment to be delivered to his residence. In the past, the social workers of the Center used to take the records and visit him to sign in the file, and get his payment. The Post Office refuses to give the payment except to the beneficiary him/herself by showing a valid identification card along with the smart card.

Photo The Vision of the Center, and the Mission of the Directorate

Source: A. El-Kholei, CDE

In remote areas, such as the Governorates of Red Sea, New Valley, Matrouh and North and South Sinai, MOSS prepared mobile centers for Social Services to research cases, and delivered the checks to the beneficiaries.

Photo Office of a social worker, Faisal, Suez

Source: A. El-KholeiPhoto Mobile Center for Social Services

Source: Arab Authority for Industrialization

The consultant then visited three centers for Social Services on the 6th of October City, The first center was among the early generation of centers for Social Services to be upgraded (Photos 8, 9 and 10). Hanna Ezzat is a social worker who has been working for the office for the past 3.5 years. She received training to enhance her skills as a social worker, the family file, and *Tadamoun* 6 forms. She did not get the chance to apply the skills she acquired from training to prepare the family file, which was applied in the Governorates of Suez, Luxor and Sharqia because the centre is not connected to the MOSS network. Soon the centre will be connected to the MOSS network as the consultant saw the switch installed but not functioning yet. The Directorate has computers, but the local area network is not completed; however, someone from the office goes to the Directorate to enter the data on a terminal to process the payments to the beneficiaries (they do not use smart cards yet). Abeer Abdul-Lateef, the Head of the Center, thinks that disbursing the payments through the Post Office have distanced the beneficiaries from the Centre. In the past, the beneficiaries used to walk in the office to pick up their check, and have a chat with the social worker who administers their file. This was a chance for follow-up on the status of the beneficiaries.

Photo Upgraded Center of Social Services, 6th of October



Source: A. El-Kholei, CDE

Photo Entrance hall, Center for Social Services, 6th of October City

Source: A. El-Kholei, CDE

Photo Court, Center for Social Services, 6th of October

Source: SA. El-Kholei, CDE

The next Centre for Social Services that the consultant visited was located in the seventh district, 6th of October City. It is one room (Photos 11 and 12). No privacy is available during the process of investigating the case, and no room to keep the files. Initially, the building was developed as a Social Service Unit, as other centres and units when the City was developed. Today this building hosts a Community-based Organization for developing the community that provides the residents with services, such as a nursery and kindergarten, tutoring classes, a women’s club, etc. For this reason; the social workers have no space for their operations. Furthermore, the social workers of this centre received training as their colleagues of Suez, but did not apply the newly acquired skills because of lacking PCs and network.

Photo Two social workers at the Center for Social Services, 7th District, 6ht of October

Source: A. El-Kholei, CDE

Photo Center of Social Services, 7th District,, 6th of October

Source: A. El-Kholei, CDE

The third Center for Social Services that the consultant visited was that of Haram City, 15 kms away from 6th of October nearby the Cairo-Faiyum Desert Road. Orascom Company developed this community within a national program for housing the youth where units range from one to three rooms. When the rockslide disaster took place in Muqqattam hill during 2008, some inflicted families were re-located in this new development; MOSS had to provide them with services, such as blankets, furniture, money, etc. MOSS needed an outlet to provide the services. The company gave MOSS two dwelling units (back to back), ground floor for a nominal fee (Photos 13, 14 and 15). All social workers and other employees working for this center are in the hall, and the head of the center and the treasurer occupy the other room. The treasurer does not have a safe to keep the petty cash and his files; the other apartment is a store for goods to be disbursed. The Office was subjected to theft, but the residents of the community defended it. There is no iron grills to protect the windows. All the interviewed employees expressed their dissatisfaction with the working conditions. All of them have put requests to transfer to another office. One of the workers requested benches and a shade outside the apartment to provide the beneficiaries with a humane waiting area.

Photo Haram City



Source: A. El-Kholei, CDE

Photo Center for Social Services, Harm City



Source: A. El-Kholei, CDE

Photo Employee at the Center for Social Services, Haram City



Source: A. El-Kholei, CDE

Output 2: MOSS new proposed structure submitted for decision-making was not achieved as spelled out in the project document. The organizational structure is not complete, and lacked horizontal linkages between the functions of subsidizing food supply for the poor and availing them with safety nets essential during times of economic restructuring. If the approved organizational structure was solid and functional, the split of MOSS into the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs, and the Ministry of Supply and Domestic Trade, would not have been possible and easy. It seems that merger of these two institutions was not natural, rather a forced merger.

In Egypt merging ministries and splitting a ministry is a usual practice when there is a new Cabinet. The merger and split of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education and State for Scientific Research is an example of this practice. Sometimes ministries are established for a purpose and then cease to exist, such as the Ministry for Rural Development, and the Ministry of High Dam. This is a serious risk that the project document had to consider as it might affect the sustainability of the output and the project at large.

The fact that MOSS was split into Ministry of Supplies and Domestic Trade, and Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs late 2011, as it used to be before 2005, indicates that the output is not sustainable. Fortunately, availing a humane space for the social workers and the beneficiaries is essential to provide the poor families assistance with dignity. MOSS has taken the first step on the one thousand-mile road. Comparing the conditions of the units and offices of Menofia, the 7th District of the 6th of October to that of Suez, this output is relevant to the project. For these reasons, on a Likert scale, the output ranks as satisfactory.

## Output 3: Capacity Development of key staff institutionalized

This output integrates and complements Output 2. The project avails training to key staff at MOSS, such as social workers, and their partners, particularly NGOs. Some social workers need their capacities to be built to effectively perform their duties. However, the Centers for Social Services were staffed with employees; some of them can receive training to be assistants to the social workers. This step can enhance the capabilities of the Center for Social Services to reach more constituents in shorter periods of time. [[25]](#footnote-25)

The training that the project provided included also training to senior officials within MOSS. Training was in various forms. Some training was delivered through a number of channels and forms, such as workshops, in-class training, and study tours. Some MOSS employees and cadres received on-job training.[[26]](#footnote-26) The list of courses that the project provided included training on acquiring skills for social research, practicing social solidarity; administering productive families; working with NGOs; fighting addiction; strategic planning; women in development; family and childhood; newly recruited, financial auditors, acquiring skills for public service; organization and administration; skills to use computers, etc. If the project is extended to another phase, it might provide training on human resources development, time management, dealing with the public; follow-up; management; leadership, etc.

Based on the available information, in 2007/08, the project trained 1,330 trainees; most of them are from executing divisions, on marketing, communication skills, strategic planning, family and childhood, monitoring and follow-up, feasibility study, etc. Some received training on the use of personal computers. During 2008/09, the project delivered training to 1,141 individuals. Most of the training took place within the premises of MOSS or at NCSCR. In 2010, the project trained 638 individuals out of 3,595 eligible individuals. These individuals were not social workers, but served as secretary within the centers, units and divisions. They received training to enable them to act as assistants to social workers. Moreover, up to the 13th of January 2011, 1,576 out of 6,614 social workers within MOSS and the Centers for Social Services, including heads of the centers, social workers within the centers, and directors of social directorates received training on targeting, communication skills, social interaction, role of the social worker and so forth. [[27]](#footnote-27)

It seems there was no training delivered to NGOs as stated in the project document. The reason, probably, is because the limited progress on Output 4, as will be rendered later.

The average cost per trainee was around EGP 900-1000 including transportation, lodging (if necessary), breaks, venue, etc. The project has a system to follow on the impact of training by following up on those working for the centers and units. [[28]](#footnote-28)

Delivering training and maintaining the impacts of training faced number of challenges. The first is to select the trainees to be at the same level to attend the same class. This was to ensure harmony within the training sessions. Second, number of those trained once returned to their offices at the local administration were transferred to another duty station. For this reason, transferring the trainee needed the approval of MOSS to avoid losing the trained cadre. The third obstacle was communication with local administrations. Building the capacities of the senior official was in parallel to training of the junior staff. It was important to build the capacities of cadres (seniors and juniors) to ensure common understanding and proper communication between and within the groups of cadres, i.e., seniors and juniors. Finally, there is always a need for workshops to refresh the trainees on topics on which they received training. As indicated from the site visits many received training but had little chance to apply the newly acquired skills, and thus required sessions to refresh their memory.[[29]](#footnote-29)

According to the project document, the project will contribute to elaborate an efficient and dynamic communication strategy to convey relevant messages to the population. The former regime planned to abolish subsidizing food and fuel. Market mechanisms will settle the prices and availability of goods. The money allocated through the State budget for that purpose would then be transferred to the poor.[[30]](#footnote-30) The communication strategy was to send MOSS messages to the public to accept the new setup. The plan was to search of means to ration food subsidies, and use alternatives. This plan required a political decision. Leaders of NDP decided to postpone the execution of this plan, for further discussion after the 2011 Presidential election. The January 25th revolution took place ousting the President, and the NDP cease to exist; thus, the communication strategy was never elaborated.

The output is relevant to the project and its general objective. The implementation of the activities does not seem efficient. The project trained social workers who had no chance to apply their new skills to work. Delivering training without an opportunity to apply the new competencies seems a waste of resources, time and effort. Due, in part, to factors beyond the control of the PMU and MOSS at large, there was no communication strategy. Comparing the accomplished to the targeted, the output seems to be marginally satisfactory.

## Output 4: A system for accrediting NGOs developed

NGOs are instrumental in achieving the mission of MOSS, and thus are among the most significant partners of MOSS. Information on NGOs is scattered. MOSS has information on NGOs, the General Union of NGOs has another database of NGOs, and CAPMAS has a third database. The first step was to have one consolidated database for NGOs, which the project successfully supported; MOSS is the official source information. Establishing this database containing the information concerning the 20 thousand NGOs is an output that the project document clearly mentioned.

The second step was to build the capacities of NGOs for accreditation to be a complete partner to MOSS, and better serve their constituents. The solution was to develop criteria for accreditation that was developed and approved.

Ms. Qurtam designed this evaluation form for accreditation based on criteria of five aspects: 1) legal, 2) administrative, 3) financial, 4) networking and 5) partnerships. The form included nine elements, 60 indicators and four levels of evaluation. The evaluation form starts with information on the NGO, such as name, nationality, type (local, central, foundation, etc. number of members, areas of activities, web site, email, and so forth. For each of the five aspects there are several indicators, such as a system installed for managing financial and administrational aspects. For each indicator the evaluation form included means of verification, such as minutes of board meetings, files and records of finance, etc.

The evaluation form was then tested using 150 Central (Markaziya) NGOs. The form was approved and posted on the MOSS web site. There was a plan for a series of orientation workshops to introduce the evaluation form to the directorates at the local levels and the NGOs to be followed by training on the use of the evaluation form and assessing the needs of NGOs. Ten employees from the Central Administration for NGOs received training on the evaluation form. The cooperation between Ms. Qurtam and her counterparts was limited as indicated by her memos to the Minister.[[31]](#footnote-31) It is apparent that a system for accrediting NGOs is not complete. She complained about several issues as reasons for this modest level of accomplishment. Atop of these reasons is the need to revise the law that governs the work of NGOs. The former Minister in his interview confirmed this reason. “I had no control over the budget allocated to the output; and the central administration for NGOs often ignored me” said Ms. Qurtam.[[32]](#footnote-32) “It seems that the environment was not conducive for this output to succeed as the case of other outputs” said Dr. Ali El-Moselhy, former Minister of Social Solidarity, in his interview.

Within the 1000 poorest villages program, MOSS was not able to find partner NGOs at the village level to act as an agent of change because most of the NGOs in these villages had no capacity in terms of administration, premises, accounting and filing system, etc. For this reason, MOSS depended on umbrella NGOs that can work with smaller NGOs at the village level. Therefore, the output is needed.

The output is relevant to the project and its goal. Funds allocated for this output were not used towards implementing activities for realizing the output as Ms. Qurtam said. There is very little done under this output. There is limited cooperation between the project staff responsible for this output, i.e., Ms. Qurtam, and her counterpart within MOSS. Since there is little accomplished, the output cannot be considered sustainable. The rank of this output on Likert scale is unsatisfactory.

## Output 5: A more developed and effective system for social protection

### Social policy

Within the overall attempts to establish a system for social protection, MOSS with the support of the project could organize two international conferences in 2007 and 2009 to explore other countries’ attempts for an effective system for social protection. In 2007, the experiences of Canada, Tunisia, Malaysia and Ireland were presented. The UN ESCWA, UNDP and MOSS sponsored that conference. In 2009, the project assisted in organizing another international conference. MOSS, with the support of UNDP-Egypt invited 12 renowned scholars. They shared their views and reviewed experiences of Asian and Latin American countries, such as Brazil, India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The conference emphasized that it is not enough to have political will to alleviate poverty, but equally important is to have determination.[[33]](#footnote-33)

Two committees evolved from these conferences. The first was a social policy committee, and the second was a committee for services. Both committees addressed social policies as a framework for social protection. They dealt with poverty issues and needed interventions to support the Ministerial Group for social development that was responsible for the development of the 1,000 Poorest Villages. The committees were responsible for a policy paper that the National Democratic Party (NDP) adopted as a working paper for the Government.[[34]](#footnote-34)

MOSS embarked on formulating an integrated social policy that did not fully materialize. The policy aimed to alleviate poverty as a framework of social protection. Dr. El‑-Moselhy issued ministerial decrees to: 1) relief poor students from tuition fees; 2) formulating a working group to elaborate a Law for Health Insurance[[35]](#footnote-35) where MOSS will pay their subscription to the medical care program; 3) the executive regulations of the law for protecting the physically-disabled included an article that they are the responsibility of MOSS; and lastly, 4) Law 137/2010 and its executive regulations signed January 2011 availed more financial resources for social solidarity. In addition to adding 35-40 percent of unregistered households to benefit from the food supply cards as MOSS established a database of the poor.[[36]](#footnote-36)

MOSS decided to test alternatives for food subsidies,[[37]](#footnote-37) such as Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) that other countries, such as Brazil, India and Mexico, applied to alleviate poverty and induce social development. The American University in Cairo (AUC) piloted a CCT scheme in Ein El-Seera with the support of the International Poverty Center in Brazil.[[38]](#footnote-38)

It seems that NDP and the State, which included advocates of neo-liberal economic policies, such as Dr. Y. Boutros Ghali, former Minister of Finance, and M. Rashid, former Minister of Industry and Trade, determined that the most efficient and effective means for social protection is to disburse the funds allocated for food subsidies in the State budget.

### The use of ICT as a tool for an effective system for social protection

Targeting the poor is then the answer. MOSS, with the support of the project and using the expertise of the NCSCR, attempted to target the poor using the 2006 census data. Targeting the poor is one of the main foundations for decision-making in the sphere of social solidarity and supplies; in addition to building the capacities of the social workers, and improving their working conditions.[[39]](#footnote-39)

There are several of ways that targeting design is concerned with who, in principle, is to be reached and why; and includes approaches that rely on poverty assessment and social categorization. Targeting implementation is concerned with questions of how the eligible are identified and reached in practice. The distinction between targeting design and implementation is critical; enabling policy-makers to identify, which targeting approach will have the greatest impact on poverty. However, poverty impact is not the only consideration for policy-makers – they also have to consider the political acceptability, the practicality of execution and cost issues associated with different targeting methods. There are four main mechanisms for identifying eligible beneficiaries. Means-testing uses household poverty indicators, based on the collection and verification of information on a household’s income and/or wealth. Means testing is the most expensive. Proxies are reliable only when they correlate well with poverty. Elected or imposed committees implement community-based targeting, although it is rare for communities or committees to identify targeting criteria themselves. There are two views on the desirability of targeting. Some promote poverty targeting, based on actual or proxy poverty indicators and believe that it is possible to identify and reach the poorest. Others argue that all citizens within a defined category should receive the same benefits. There are various types of costs associated with the targeting of cash transfers. Analyzing the costs of targeting introduces a number of trade-offs that present major challenges. First, the more program implementers spend on improving targeting to ensure that cash transfer to reach only eligible households, the less cash they have been available to transfer to beneficiaries. The second trade-off is that, to the contrary, self-targeting approaches are cheap and easy to administer but opportunities for self-targeting are limited in the case of cash transfers and, when poverty levels are high, rarely effective. Approaches relying on means-testing or the uses of a poverty threshold are expensive because they need frequent updating of detailed data sets and pose complex problems of interpretation for program administrators. Identifying the poor based on geographical criteria or according to social or demographic category, such as the elderly, orphans and vulnerable children, women-headed households, etc. might be the solution. For demographic or geo­graphical approaches to be effective there must be robust empirical evidence they correlate well (or at least better than other indicators) with poverty. There are more examples of stigma where social categories or social proxies are used for targeting. However, the use of such approaches to reduce targeting costs introduces a third major trade-off between maximizing the number of poor people that are included in programs, and minimizing the number of non-poor people that are included. This is a challenge for both design and implementation.[[40]](#footnote-40)

1. The targeting of cash transfers can increase their impact on poverty, but can be limited by the lack of resources and capacity in low-income countries
2. Targeting vulnerable groups is often simpler, more politically acceptable and less socially divisive than means testing
3. Good targeting requires an assessment of the distribution of poverty, targeting costs and political acceptability

Slater, Rachel and Farrington, John, “Cash transfers: targeting” ODI Project Briefings, No 27 November 2009

Box Key points on targeting

Based on the interviews,[[41]](#footnote-41) MOSS decided on the use of proxy technique for targeting the poor. None of the interviewers explained why the proxy method was chosen and applied. It is less expensive than other methods, as it depends on monetary definitions of poverty, such as poverty lines. If the NDP and the State were really committed, then the definition of poverty should have been more holistic using capability approach of identifying the poor. “People's lives are not measured by income alone. That idea is at the heart of all the Human Development Reports since the first one was produced for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1990. We cannot rely on growth trickling down automatically. It takes government policy and action to ensure that income helps citizens to expand their choices and to gain adequate health, education and resources for themselves and for their children - in other words, to achieve human development.”[[42]](#footnote-42) The fact that Egyptians revolted on January 25th, and were on the streets chanting “Bread, Liberty and Social Justice” is an indicator that NDP neo-liberal policies might have had positive impacts on the macro level, but definitely had limited impact at the micro level – an indicator of idle trickle-down mechanisms in the Egyptian economy that had serious social and environmental implications.

Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is a tool that MOSS used to improve delivery of services. The system had to be established from scratch. The first is establishing a database that included, for example, information on 12,000 nurseries and kindergartens, social services, infrastructures, residence conditions and information pertaining to poor families collected from the forms (Tadamoun 1 and 6). The system then was used to target the ultra-poor. Today there are 10 Governorates that use the system. In 2006, the Directorates and their Social Divisions and units (2,500 units) had new PCs, and are connected on line with the Information Center of MOSS. The Governorate of Suez, which the consultant visited as mentioned earlier under Output 2, was among these 10 Governorates. The project contributed to building an information system conducive to decision-making using GIS.

The starting point for the beneficiary is to fill the forms of Tadamoun at the Center for Social Service. Next the social worker, who received training as described in Output 3, visits the beneficiary at his or her residence to complete the assessment. Once the beneficiary is eligible for the social security pension, and food subsidy, she, or he receives his or her smart card (Photo 16), which is similar to credit cards, and can be used to provide up to seven different services, including food supplies, social security pensions,[[43]](#footnote-43) health care services, as in the case of Suez.

Up until now, the Smart Card is used to cash the social security pensions and receiving subsidized food items, i.e.; the smart card serves as a the poor with card for subsidized food items. In Suez, there was an attempt to provide health insurance, but this service was stopped because of lacking funds, [[44]](#footnote-44) as previously mentioned under Output 2. At the time of the evaluation, the use of Smart Card was not generalized to all of the Governorates of Egypt. Today, there are 12 million households that use these smart cards to get their share of subsidized food items.

MOSS database includes information on suppliers of food subsidies. Each supplier has an electronic machine that reads the smart card of the beneficiary. The merchant also has her or his smart card that includes her or his data, including address, and an inventory of subsidized food items in his or her store. Every month the merchant visits the office of supply where a machine, which is connected to the MOSS system, reads her or his smart card, and then deducts the amount of food items, she, or he disbursed. Once the supplier gets his or her inventory of food supplies, such as rice, sugar, cooking oil, etc. from the outlets that MOSS manages, her or his inventory list is updated in the system.

The disbursing of the solidarity payments, i.e., pension, was also automated, and the beneficiaries get their money from post offices, as mentioned earlier under Output 2. Each month, in collaboration with the Social Insurance at Ministry of Finance, lists of beneficiaries are compiled to be sent to the postal services to print and issue the payments that are available for the beneficiaries starting the first day of the month and for two weeks; on the 19th of each month the cycle starts once more for the next month. The project started in Suez and Luxor, and then completed the 10 governorates in November 2011. It is planned to be extended to other Governorates.[[45]](#footnote-45)

Photo : Smart Card



Source: A. El-Kholei, CDE

ICT is conducive to improving the distribution of subsidized food items, such as cooking oil, rice, sugar and tea to the poor. The use of smart cards availed the opportunity to add new births, and poor families. It seems that ICT application enabled monitoring the supplies of subsidized food, and contributed to minimizing leakage in the system. [[46]](#footnote-46)

The project used the capacities of ICT to install a call center (outsourced) to assist the poor families. The call center provides answers to the inquiries of the poor on available services, eligibility for assistance, etc.

The project developed a database for NGOs, as mentioned earlier, Output 4. [[47]](#footnote-47) There were hurdles that faced this process. Lacking complete, reliable and valid information was the major obstacle. MOSS had to work closely with number of public bodies, such as the Ministry of Interior to make sure that the beneficiaries’ information is that on their national identification card. MOSS had to work closely with the Ministry of Finance to update the databases. For this reason, it is the responsibility of those at the local levels, such as the social services' units and divisions to revise the database in the digital and paper format. [[48]](#footnote-48)

### Productive families

Since its establishment in 1968, the productive families’ project has been an opportunity for employment in micro-enterprises. Starting 2006, and within five years, MOSS, with the support of the project, could reach 2.6 million beneficiaries. Corrective measures included the restructuring of 300 training centers, 73 training centers for artisans, and 103 exhibition halls. The project trained 27 associations on the management of the association, marketing and serving the beneficiaries. Interventions included loans from the Social Fund for Development (SFD) that reached EGP 25 million and another EGP 10 million from the fund for supporting the manufacturing establishments at MOSS, which serves also as an exporting outlet.[[49]](#footnote-49)

The project focused on micro-enterprises of labor-intensive production techniques, such as sewing, hand-made rugs, production of garments, and so forth. The project extended technical assistance to productive families and helped them to conclude agreements with other establishments abroad, such as the case of Jazzerit Shandawell, Suhaj, which concluded an agreement with a Businesswomen Association in Frankfurt to provide the Egyptians with research and development to improve the produced garments, and market their products in Europe. Another association for productive families, the Governorate of Behera, specialized in making jewelry concluded an agreement with an Italian establishment to give them the designs, and market their products in Europe. The project helped MOSS in organizing an annual exhibition known as Diyarna (Our Home) that is on the international agenda for artisans’ exhibitions. MOSS could market the production of these associations in international exhibitions held in Germany and India. All efforts were to network and connect the productive families in Egypt with new markets abroad. The project also encouraged transforming senior artisans into trainers for junior artisans to expand operations.[[50]](#footnote-50)

The outcome of these interventions is approximately one million productive families associations that are operational, and active in exporting their products. These associations provided job opportunities to the youth, particularly women.[[51]](#footnote-51) Productive families program has been operational and active before the project. There were no clear baseline to assess how much of this development is the result of the project.

There were several hurdles. Atop the list of obstacles is availability of finance. Financial support from SFD is not enough; probably NSB can play a role in supporting these associations to expand their operations. The other difficulty is the institutional setup. There is a need for a body that coordinates the fund for supporting manufacturing and the NGOs that are enrolled in the Productive Families system. The third difficulty is to convince an individual to start a business. [[52]](#footnote-52)

Mr. Ayman Hossam, advisor to the Minister and responsible for Productive Family projects contracted through the UNDP project, thinks his job is complete. There are several individuals within MOSS who worked closely with him. He showed them the way, and then delegated to them some of his responsibilities. They proved trust worthy. They received financial bonuses, and had the chance to travel abroad. Others who did not work with him at the outset of the project, started to be envious, and approached their colleagues for assistance and advice.

### Supplies

#### Baladi Bread

Food subsidies represent five per cent of the State budget.[[53]](#footnote-53) There is always a need to ration food subsidies, and ensure that only those who deserve these subsidies receive it. Smart cards were used to make sure that only those who deserve food subsidies will get it,[[54]](#footnote-54) as indicated in sub-section 4.5.2 that dealt with the use of ICT for an effective system for social protection.

Bread is a food item that gets significant attention. Bread, known by Egyptians as Aish not the Arabic term Khubiz, is the synonymous with the word “living,” is a common element for the Egyptian diet. Baladi bread[[55]](#footnote-55) (Egyptian Bread) is widely consumed. Table 1 summarizes information of the Baladi bread subsidy system in Egypt.

MOSS with other public bodies, including local administrations, police, Ministry of Health, etc. is responsible for the system. The private sector plays a role in transporting, milling and baking the wheat. This institutional setup is not conducive to an effective, efficient, equitable system that avails subsidized Baladi bread to the poor. For several reasons that include scattered responsibility among the various bodies; and the present Key Performance Indicators (KPI) are not properly monitored and followed-up.[[56]](#footnote-56)

Table General Information of Baladi bread Subsidy System in Egypt

| **Data** | **Item** |
| --- | --- |
| EGP 13,000 million | Annual Cost |
| 13 million (MT/year) (40 % from local resources and 60 % imported | Total amount of required Wheat |
| 349 bunkers and 80 silos | Numbers of bunkers & silos |
| 18,000 (92% are privately owned); (5,549 cities/towns used to locate bakeries based on the proportion of population) | Number of bakeries |
| 145 mills (70% are state owned enterprises while the rest are privately owned). | Number of mills |
| Alexandria (17%), Dekheila (37%), Damietta (20%), Port Said (14%), Safaga (11%) | Ports |
| 82% | Average extraction rate |
| 220 Million | Number of Loaves /day |
| +70 Million | Coverage |
| Per capita consumption (rural) = 1.9 Loaves  Per capita consumption (urban) = 3.11 Loaves) | Per-capita consumption/day |
| 130 grams | Weight of loaf |

Source: El Nakeeb, Anwar M. Strategy of Food subsidy system Reform in Egypt (Balady Bread as an example) ECES workshop, “Price Subsidies in Egypt: Alternatives for Reform” Cairo, October 5, 2010

The structure of Baladi Bread production and distribution consists of: [[57]](#footnote-57)

* ***The procurement phase*** The General Authority for Supply Commodities (GASC) buys the wheat at free market price;
* ***Milling phase:*** *mills receive the wheat from* GASC at LE 455/MT;
* ***Baking phase*:** Bakeries pay LE 160/ton for subsidised flour. (less than 15 percent of the free market price**);**
* ***Distribution phase:*** *(five piasters per loaf) Outlet includes Bakeries, Home Delivery.*

Each of the above phases has more than a problem, as the studies that the project sponsored. The result is a leakage. The project examined the supply side to find there were studies that showed leakage. During 2004/05, the World Bank assessed this leakage at 41 per cent. In collaboration with the advisors that the project availed, the World Bank in 2008/09 then found that leakage is 31 per cent. In 2009, the World Food Programme, using the expertise of TNT Corporation in logistics, assessed the leakage at 29 per cent. [[58]](#footnote-58)

The quality of the Baladi bread is another aspect of the supply side. Approximately, 67 and 63 per cent of urban and rural residents respectively complained about the poor quality of the Baladi bread. [[59]](#footnote-59)

The demand side has problems manifested in availability. Baladi bread is available only at specific times. Accessibility to Baladi breead is the second issue, as the average time spent waiting to purchase bread reaches 33 minutes. The third issue isgeneral targeting as subsidized Baladi bread is available all consumers living in Egypt; targeting by Governorate and region is not equitable, where the Governorates of Upper Egypt, whose share of the total poor is more than 61 percent, receives only about 35 percent of the total wheat flour distributed across the country. Targetingby households' income and expenditure brackets is not possible. [[60]](#footnote-60)

#### Gas Cylinders

The State Budget of 2011-12 included subsidies for gas cylinders that reach to about EGP 140,000 million. The fact that matters is that commercial and manufacturing establishments uses up to 25-30 per cent of this subsidy, which is allocated to families.[[61]](#footnote-61) The annual year plan indicates that the annual consumption of gas cylinders is approximately 40 million ton. Governmental data suggest that the domestic production of gas cylinders is not enough, and thus the Government imports gas that cost the State budget about USD 1,100 per ton,[[62]](#footnote-62) which means that the cost per cylinder is EGYP 83 plus the cost of filling and marketing. The data also show that about 15 million families use gas cylinders, the present annual rate is about 18-20 gas cylinder per family of five persons; meanwhile, the current rate of connection of Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) is of 800 dwelling units per annum.

There is a need for reforming the mechanism of distributing gas cylinders for the following reasons:

* There is a black market for distributing gas cylinders;
* There is a need for rationing the subsidy, and assuring that only those who deserve this subsidy receives it;
* Often there are shortages, particularly during the winter season, and there is need to satisfy the needs of the people;
* There is a spatial disequilibrium, where the supply of cylinders, i.e., location of filling the cylinders, and the demand for these cylinders represented in the families;
* Many establishments, such as poultry farms and brick factories, use gas cylinders.[[63]](#footnote-63)

The solution seems to continue using gas cylinders via a reformed mechanism, while expanding the network CNG to dwelling units. The first step that MOSS considered for instituting a reformed mechanism was to conduct a questionnaire to estimate the needs, supply and other aspects of the market. The results of the questionnaire indicated that 67 per cent of the interviewed families prefer the use of “coupons” as a means of distributing subsidized gas cylinders to the deserved families.[[64]](#footnote-64) The recommended intervention then is to avail each family monthly coupons relative to its size. These coupons will be disbursed through the food supply card, or using the smart card if available. Any additional need for a gas cylinder, the family then has to obtain it at the free market price.[[65]](#footnote-65)

The obstacle to apply this mechanism is lacking a good, fair system of targeting the poor, who deserve the subsidy. The way out is to disburse these coupons using the Supplies Card, where the family can pay for the coupons at the store where the family gets the monthly subsidized food, such as rice, cooking oil, etc. Those who do not hold a Supply Card will visit the nearest Supplies Office to fill a form to get his/her fair share of coupons.

According to Dr. El-Nakeeb, some citizens complained that some cylinders do not weight exactly kg 12.5. For this reasons MOSS mandated each filling establishment to place its decal on the cylinder to be held accountable for the weight of the gas cylinder.

An estimated 23 per cent of the Egyptians use CNG in their dwellings, and 20 per cent of them do not hold a Supply Card, then the expected situation will be as Table 2 presents.

Table Expected situation once a system for rationing the distribution of gas cylinders

| Number of persons per household | Number of households | Number of gas cylinder per family | Total number of cylinders a year |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1-2 | 2,423,133 | 12 | 29,077,596 |
| 3-4 | 3,897,786 | 18 | 70,160,148 |
| 5 or more | 6,564,118 | 24 | 157,538,832 |
| Total | 12,885,037 |  | 256,776576 |
| Current Status |  |  | 351,000,000 |
| Expected savings |  |  | 95,000,000 |

Source: El Nakeeb, Anwar M. Strategy of Food subsidy system Reform in Egypt ECES workshop, “Price Subsidies in Egypt: Alternatives for Reform” Cairo, October 5, 2010

To check of the validity and applicability of this system, MOSS will implement it on a pilot basis during the fall of 2011 in both the Governorates of Red Sea and New Valley.[[66]](#footnote-66) Smart Cards can be used to purchase the cylinder. Families will pay for a cylinder by coupons to the outlet or street vendors. According to newspaper reporters, the public in these two governorates refused the proposed system for disbursing gas cylinders in the two governorates.

In his interview, Dr. El-Nakeeb[[67]](#footnote-67) indicated that he is pleased to have had the opportunity to work on the issue of subsidies for food, including Baladi bread, and gas cylinders. He and staff of MOSS, who worked with him, had the chance to work closely with prestigious institutions, such as the World Bank and WFP. This interaction with these organizations is similar to on-job training. He also thinks that the cadres of MOSS made use of this project as they shared in the processes of elaborating these studies. They provided ideas, and ground, factual information, despite having problems in discussing conceptual, strategic issues, thus they are not able to analyze the problem and make necessary recommendations for a solution.[[68]](#footnote-68)

The problem with subsidized gas cylinders, food and Baladi bread is the distortions in the market. A good that has two different prices is bound not to reach the poor at the lower price, and will be used for a different purpose, such as the case of using the gas cylinders in poultry farms. The Government needs to police these subsidies using stern measures, and severe penalties; and use economic instruments and financial incentives to avail these goods to the poor without distorting the market mechanisms.

### Other

The former Minster mentioned in his interview other activities executed under the project that can be within the overall aim of developing an effective system for social protection. MOSS, through the project contracted the services of Prof. Dina Shehayeb. In her interview, she said “I was hired to prepare design guidelines to contract architects to design and retrofit 34 difference social services including, but not limited to, kindergartens, centers of social services, shelters for the street child, centers for motherhood and childhood.” In collaboration with the General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP), she prepared physical planning guidelines of these 34 services, such as location, orientation, walking distance, the threshold of the service, i.e., how many persons the facility serves, etc. The guidelines were then used to train 10 MOSS to license the development and operation of a facility, as some facilities are run by NGOs.

The most significant activity based on these guidelines was upgrading the penal institution[[69]](#footnote-69)for juvenile delinquent located in El-Marg. The former Minister mentioned the improvements that took place in the penal institution. During Sept. 2009, the former Minister inaugurated the first phase of upgrading the correction institution. The process of developing this correction facility is based on the results of studies that NCSCR conducted. The results included an action plan and programs to accomplish number of goals including adopting the principles of human rights in education. The institution will offer programs for qualifying its graduates to participate productive activities. The action plan included a database that includes the names of the graduates and their relatives, and monitoring and following-up on their problems. The other aspect of improving the facility is to hire 400 trainers of social workers and psychologists, and another 160 trainers for the workshop, plus seconding 350 teachers from al-Azhar and the Ministry of Education to deliver lessons to the inmates. Furthermore, the supplies of raw materials for the workshops have doubled, with a mechanism to market the products.

Output five is central to the role of MOSS. The responsibility of social protection is shared between MOSS and other public institutes at both local and central levels, and the society at large. The pre-January 25th Government followed prescriptions based on neo-liberal economic thought. In almost each developing country in the region, such Yemen and Tunisia, that applied these policies, the middle-income social stratum was eroded, processes of impoverishment accelerated despite signs of economic revival at the macroeconomic level.

The efforts of the project, and MOSS at large, to achieve this output are steps toward an effective social protection. However, the efforts did not address the root cause of impoverishment indicating limitations in the project design. The implemented activities dealt only with the symptoms, as the 2010 MDGs Progress report notices: “Egypt might not be able to achieve all targets under MDG 1.”[[70]](#footnote-70) There might be a need to stop and look back on this output, and then derive lessons for the future stage and phases to come, given the request of the youth during the revolution downtown Cairo for social justice.


The output is relevant to the project and its objective. Activities exerted under this output seem to be implemented efficiently. However, the sustainability of the output is questioned. For example, the health authorities discontinued providing services to smart card holders in Suez as there were no funds availed from MOSS. The proposal for using coupons to disburse Baladi bread and gas cylinders at nominal prices need to be evaluated for effectiveness ad efficiency. The rank of this output on a Likert scale is satisfactory as the project made steps towards a more developed and effective system for social protection.

## Output 6: Nasser Social Bank evaluated

The Government established Nasser Social Bank (NSB) in 1971, and its operations started in 1972. Its capital at that time was about EGP 1.2 million, and one branch in Cairo. Today the capital of NSB is about EGP 1,300 million, and 90 branches all over Egypt. NSB has a social mandate to service marginalized populations. NSB thrives to expand social solidarity base and achieve both economic growth and social justice through a banking and investment components that generate revenues to fund its socially-oriented services.

Since its inception, NSB has always generated profits. Lately, the performance of NSB has significantly been improving by all indicators (Figure 5).[[71]](#footnote-71) According to the report that Dr. Serry prepared, and the interviewees of NSB, the interventions through this project to build the capacities of MOSS, which included evaluating NSB, are directly responsible for these improvements. The main computing facility was upgraded to a state-of-art efficient and secured network connecting all divisions and departments of NSB and 40 out of 90 branches (Photos 17 and 18).

Figure Nasser Social Bank: Revenue, Deposits, Capital, Investment, Deposits and Income, million EGP, 2006-2011



Note: 2011 is only seven months

Source: Serry, Alaa, 2010 Year-End Report, inclusive activities up to March 15th, 2011

Photo NSB, main computing facility during the processes of upgrading

Source: M. Youssef, NSB

Photo NSB, main computing facility after the processes of upgrading

Source: M. Youssef, NSB

Through the project, NSB could upgrade and refurbish the branches of 6th of October (Photos 19 and 20), Zagazig, Mohandiseen, Qous, New Valley, Aswan; then developing Madinet Nasr (Photos 21 and 22), and four other branches will be finished at Asyut, Suhaj, Qena and Luxor. Furthermore, within 2011, NSB has a plan to upgrade and refurbish 19 other branches. Other branches are in serious need for upgrading, refurbishing and retrofitting, such as the branch of Suez (Photos 23 and 24). NSB has a plan to continue upgrading other branches by the year 2014 through consulting engineering firms and certified contractors. [[72]](#footnote-72)

Photo NSB 6th of October Branch, hall of transaction before retrofitting

Source: M. Youssef, NSB

Photo NSB 6th of October branch, hall of transaction after refurbishment

Source: M. Youssef, NSB

Photo NSB Madinet Nasr Branch under construction

Source: M. Youssef, NSB

Photo NSG Madinet Nasr after inauguration

Note: Notice the ramp at the entrance of the branch to serve the physically disabled.

Source: M. Youssef, NSB

Photo NSB Suez Branch, the hall for transactions

Source: M. Youssef, NSB

Photo NSG Suez Branch, office of an employee

Source: M. Youssef, NSB

The upgrading, refurbishing and retrofitting of the branches were based on a criterion of feasibility by responding to the following questions: 1) is upgrading the branch doable and feasible? If yes, then necessary measures are taken to prepare blueprints, bill of quantities, specifications, etc. 2) if the branch has serious structural issues to the extent that the building can be unsafe, then the decision was to move to another location, or establish a new branch. [[73]](#footnote-73)

Upgrading the branch entailed upgrading its infrastructures. These include installing and upgrading the computer network; repairing the structural elements, such as columns, beams and slap; and various technical installments, particularly plumbing, air conditioning, and lightening. The upgrading of the branches led to a pleasant working environment, and attracted more clients. [[74]](#footnote-74)

In the past, every employee has a specific job to do, such as being responsible for current accounts, loans, etc. The project contributed to develop and deliver training programs to employees to transform them into “comprehensive” employee, who is capable of providing different services, and assist his or her colleagues. According to the interviewees, this step led to improve the delivery of services to the clients and constituents of NSB. The project contributed to establish a specialized training center atop the NSB 6th of October branch (Photos 25 and 26). The success of the training programs and center meant allocating more funds for training and capacity building.[[75]](#footnote-75) It seems that training served three major needs: 1) Organizational 2) Occupational; and 3) Individual. Every trainee received training to fulfill missing competence that enables him / her to feel good about themselves; s/he received training on fulfill his or her duties and responsibilities thus extending their capabilities to serve as a “comprehensive” employee, which in turn serves the purpose of NSB. Finally, every employee received training for the development of NSB itself, i.e., to serve the organization. According to the current plan, within four to five years most of the employees will have the capacities to serve as a “comprehensive” employee.

Photo NSB Training Center

Source: M. Youssef, NSB

Photo NSB Classroom training

Source: M. Youssef, NSB

The process of capacity development of NSB was not easy. First, there was resistance. Many employees did not welcome the idea of training. Furthermore, many employees were not pleased during the processes of retrofitting and refurbishing the branch, which in some cases had to be in phases while the branch had to operate and serve the clients. Others were not merry to have a dress code for a professional imager. NSB had problems with local administrations and utility companies to process papers for granting a license to implement repair of the building(s).

The advisor to the Minister, A. Serry hired through UNDP sponsored project, could gain the trust and respect of the employees of NSB. He used to be at the Bank at 7:30 am and leaves at 5:00 pm; and works with the heads of divisions and departments, as well as the employees. Constantly, he was in the Hall of Transactions for to provide backstopping, and not waiting for written reports. In short, he was sincere. He was not a threat to any of them; to the contrary, he coached and encouraged them to take lead in the process of developing NSB. All interviewees regret that he left the bank. Furthermore, he was not paid by the Bank, and none of the interviewees viewed him or the processes of upgrading the branches and training the staff as a financial burden. They are so proud with their achievements, and are willing to continue the efforts to develop NSB. As a matter of fact, there are requests from other branches to be included in the process of development. According to one of the interviewees, the staff of El-Bagour Branch held a vigil (*waqfa ehtigagiya*) demanding to include their branch in the plan for 2011. “It was a sad day when he left the Bank," said Mohamed Omar, Deputy Chairperson of NSB.

NSB still has challenges to face. There is a need for a strategic orientation, particularly after the January 25th, 2011 revolution, where the youth bluntly require “social justice.” According to the assessment that Ashmawy and others[[76]](#footnote-76) prepared, there is a list of strategic issues that challenges NSB. These issues include, but not limited to, number of financial institutions, such as the Social Fund for Development (SFD), that provide social and solidarity services, which serve as competitors to NSB. Moreover, the State lacks a comprehensive and an integrated scheme for social services. Lacking bases for measures and criteria that defines the beneficiaries of NSB who deserve solidarity schemes is another strategic issue.

NSB has to be a bank for the poor, and if possible owned by the poor. It should not be transformed into another commercial bank, given that almost 99 percent of customers pay back their loans.[[77]](#footnote-77) NSB also needs to continue the endeavor of building the capacities of human resources, which has to go hand in hand with enriching a motivated organization culture, and a clear plan for succession. Of course, the process of refurbishing and retrofitting NSB branches is an important step, but it might be the easiest. Training and improving the working environment needs to transform the behavior of NSB employees is not enough, there is also need to pay attention to their culture and working ethics, the processes of doing businesses, and the context within which operations take place, in addition to the use of technical advances, such as installing Automatic Teller Machines (ATM).

The development and upgrading NSB has taken steps in the right directions. However, there are more to be done besides improving the physical environment as mentioned earlier. Atop of these steps is the need for a strategic orientation, particularly after the January 25th, revolution, where the youth bluntly required “social justice, which entails in addition to pursuing a diversified portfolio and expanding operations, serving the poor by expanding the ownership of the bank to the poor as in the case of the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh. The output as spelled in the project document is about assessing NSB. The consultant found that NSB has been assessed, and has a plan for improving its operations.

The output is relevant to the project and the objectives of MOSS. The implementation of the output is efficient, as the amounts of moneys NSB spent on upgrading its branches and training its staff is more than the returns and dividends, as indicated in the report that Dr. Serry prepared. NSB has plans to continue upgrading other branches, and offering training to their employees, which indicates the sustainability of the output. The rank of this output and its result on a Likert scale is highly satisfactory.

# Findings

## Status of the Project

The project is scheduled to close the coming year. Restructuring MOSS is, in reality, restructuring the social affairs only, but had been little to do with other entities, such as the supply and NCSCR. Establishing TAU is a reality, yet some of the advisors left when the former Minister left, and there do not seem any plans for sustaining this unit. Some members of this unit served also as members of the PMU, which can be confusing and might be counterproductive.

The project design lacked a clear log-frame that makes the connections and relationships between the various outputs (components) of the project. For this reason very few interviewees could relate to other outputs. For example, the project was instrumental in targeting the poor using ICT. However, delivering subsidies to those who deserve it is still a problem as indicated in availing subsidized gas cylinders and Baladi bread to the poor. Another example is the financial constraints that challenge productive families, while NSB assessment and upgrading had little to support initiatives for sustaining the livelihoods of the poor, such as projects of the productive families.

The project has six outputs. The first output is to establish an advisory unit, which took place. However, once the Minister left office, many of the experts within this unit left. There is no plan for sustaining the unit once the project phases out. Furthermore, there is no clear idea on how this unit would move into the organizational structure of MOSS.

Output 2 is concerned with having a new proposed organizational structure of MOSS that focused on the social affairs only. It even did not consider how the established advisory unit will be part of the Office of the Minister.

The third output is about capacity building of key staff of MOSS. Capacity building is a conceptual approach to development that focuses on understanding the obstacles that inhibit institutions, such as MOSS, from realizing their developmental goals while enhancing the abilities that will allow them to achieve measurable and sustainable results. The activities exerted to achieve this output were mere training courses delivered to enhance the skills of MOSS staff. In addition, the project was instrumental in upgrading the working conditions of these social workers, such as in Suez. However, some of those who received training, such as the workers of the 6th of October, did not have the chance to apply their new skills. It seems that the magnitude of the problem is more than realized, as indicated by the opinions of the interviewees and as observed during the site visits. Furthermore, the project did not start the process of developing a communication strategy, as listed under this output in the project document.

The fourth output, i.e., a system for accrediting NGOs is developed and tested, but not operational. The former Minister acknowledged that the context was not ready. Ms. Qurtam complained of lack of cooperation with the Central Administration for NGOs.

The external context, which is beyond the mandate of the project, was another obstacle in completing Output 4. The current law that governs the work of NGOs does not allow them the autonomy to operate. According to the law, the State monitors and approves activities of NGOs, particularly their efforts for fund raising to implement their initiatives. EHDR 2008 drew attention to fact that it is no simple matter for government to allow civil society to ‘take off’ after a decades of freeze, particularly given its national security concerns. For this reason, the report notes that progress is slow on the legislative and security fronts. Handoussa and others (2008) disprove some claims that foreign donors use NGOs — through funding and otherwise — to promote their own agendas. Indeed, EHDR 2008 dispels this notion. The report clearly indicates these donations are a fraction of the monies collected locally, and that other sources of foreign assistance are overwhelmingly of a technological nature. To claim otherwise is to undermine the local and genuine efforts of NGOs to contribute to the development efforts of Egypt. [[78]](#footnote-78) The external environment is a risk that the project design had to address.

EHDR 2008 acknowledges that Egypt’s social policy has not kept pace with the liberalizing measures introduced to stimulate an ‘open’ economy. For this reason, Output 5 is of utmost importance. There were several sub-outputs under Output 5: a more developed and effective system for social protection. The first sub-output is attempts to formulate a social policy that reflects the dogma of the regime at the time, where two international conferences held to review other countries’ experience. Accordingly, MOSS, through the support of the project applied on an experimental basis Conditional Cash Transfer, which seems as a means to substitute direct cash subsides instead of in-kind subsidy. It also requires proper targeting of the poor.

Policing subsides and ensuring they reach only those who deserve it is another sub-output. This required the use of ICT to automate all the paper work, where the smart card substitutes for the card of subsidized food items. This intervention still needs time and backing from within and outside MOSS. For example, the Family file is not used any more, as one of the interviewees expressed since, Dr. Ali left office, despite Law 137/2010 for social solidarity and its executive regulations mentioned clearly that the social worker will use information included in the family file to assess the needs of the household.

Support for productive families is another sub-output that was not mentioned under Output 5 in the project document. Productive families program has been operational before the launching the project. However, the use of the expertise of Mr. A. Hossam to build the capacities of those working in this division within MOSS and the capacities of the NGOs engaged in productive activities was an added value to MOSS and its partners. The success of partnering the NGOs with others abroad, enabled marketing Egyptian hand-made products, and probably contributed to preserve traditional handy crafts, such as jewelry and garments.

Reforming the system for disbursing subsidies, which is dedicated for food items and gas cylinders, is a must, given the financial deficit in the State budget. This sub-output is another element in a developed, effective system for social protection. The project assisted MOSS to identify the leakages in the system for disbursing subsidies; however, replacing monetary cash transfer instead of in-kind subsides might not seem socially and politically acceptable after the January 25th revolution.

The last sub-output is the development of architectural and planning design guidelines for social services. This sub-output was not listed in the project document. However, this is seriously needed for physical planning purposes to assure adequate levels of provision of social services to the public. Equally important is to embark on improving the conditions in penal institutions.

The last output, i.e., NSB evaluated, has materialized. The project contributed, through Dr. Serry and other experts, such as Ashmawy, to provide an in-depth analysis and an action for upgrading the Bank. Comparing the branches of NSB that were upgraded, such as that of Nasr City and the 6th of October, to those still waiting their turn for upgrading, such as that of Suez, clearly indicates the success of this output through several indicators, such as the increase in revenues and the growing number of clients. However, the bank has to pay more attention to its real constituents, i.e., the poor. There is a need to use the bank as a tool for alleviating poverty as the case of the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh.

In sum, the project was able to create a dent, and induce transformations to the culture of social solidarity. However, there is a need for commitment and determination from the State to continue the processes of strengthening the capacities of MOSS.

## Role of UNDP

Often UNDP contribution is towards an efficient and effective implementation of outputs for a maximum impact and results. During his interview, Dr. Ali El-Moselhy acknowledged the role of UNDP in this project. He expressed his sincere gratitude to Antonio Vigilante, the former UN Resident Representative in Egypt.

UNDP has been instrumental in this project. UNDP has contributed to successful delivery of project outputs. Limitations and weaknesses that hampered complete delivery of an output are the result of internal problems within MOSS that the project design did not identify as risks, and prescribe solutions to overcome and internalize them.

UNDP has serious administrative and financial controls. UNDP served as an operator to this project applying these controls, thus ensuring legitimacy, accountability and transparency.in project operations.

UNDP has a comparative advantage in supporting south-south cooperation. Several countries in Latin America and Asia succeeded in extending social protection to the disadvantaged sub-population groups. Driving lessons from these countries, and attempting to localize best practices might prove feasible in the attempts of MOSS to extend social protection to marginalized households.

UNDP mobilized resources and provided logistic support essential to hold two international conferences on social policy. These international conferences brought experiences from other developing countries, such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, and others, to the attention of Egyptian leaders. The idea was to study these experiences and deduce the lessons for social protection. CCT is a modality that Egypt transferred from other developing countries as a means for alleviating poverty. UNDP also assisted in organizing study tour to the Minister to witness how other countries succeeded in formulating and implementing policies for effective social protection.

UNDP assisted in introducing techniques for targeting the poor, which is a means for effective poverty alleviation. UNDP helped MOSS to get exposed to other experiences, and mobilize resources for targeting the poor.

UNDP helped in recruiting a team of national and international experts to conduct the assessment and layout a business plan for NSB emulating successful experiences in Asia and Latin America.

## Elements of success

There are several reasons for the success that the project achieved so far. The number one reason is the support and attention that the former Minister paid to the project. He selected the members of the TAU for their competencies. Almost all of them had a previous working experience with him. Some of them worked with him at the Postal Services; others he knew from his former service at the Military Technical College as his students. For this reason, they had his confidence, and were given the authority to embark on planning and implementing the various interventions. With this power, the advisors had little resistance from the senior cadres of MOSS. Many of the advisors worked with the cadres of MOSS in a subtle manner by coaching them to make presentations to the former Minister, involving them in the different processes, such as conducting a study or an assessment.

The reason for the success of the project might turn to be a threat that the project might not be able to complete its mission. The processes depended on the former Minister, who left office, and number of the advisors followed him. The process of strengthening the capacities of MOSS did not get the chance to be institutionalized into the day-to-day working routine because many trained individuals did not have the chance to apply their new skills. The exception is probably the case of NSB where they already felt the difference by improving the working conditions and training. However, NSB still have a long way to modernize the bank, and get it to serve the real constituents, i.e., the poor.

The project faced number of challenges, such as lack of reliable, valid and complete information; financial limitations, cooperation of other public bodies, resistance to change, etc. These are risks that the project design had to address. In addition, the project faced unexpected challenges, i.e., the January revolution and the aftermath including change in priorities of the government, change in leadership at the central and local public bodies, and abandoning the neo-liberal approach for developing Egypt. The change in the context within which the project operates has led to resignation of the several experts from the TAU.

The major problem was the design of the project itself. However, the project succeeded despite the structural weaknesses of its design because of the support of the Minister. If the project was well-designed, i.e., to have a clear logframe with risks properly addressed with proposed actions to limit their threats, the impact of both the exerted efforts and resources allocated could have reached its maximum.

## Relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability

Poverty in Egypt is a serious issue. It is the outcome of an array of factors, including slow economic growth with idle mechanisms for trickle down; improper management of development plans based on new liberal school of thought; lack of social justice as the State neglected its role of supporting the disadvantaged and marginalized sub-populations; the inability to access both the processes of decision-making and natural resources, such as land.

Strengthening the capacities of MOSS is one of the interventions to alleviate poverty, but without political commitment to that cause, then the strengthening the capacities of MOSS might not prove to be totally effective. This is a risk that had to be considered in the design of the project, and thus the project strategy and its implementation arrangements had to consider this risk, and seek means to internalize it.

The project is in line with national priorities. It is also in accord with UNDAF and the UNDP Country Programme priorities. All project outputs are relevant and effective in strengthening the capacities of MOSS, but not all of them are sustainable. Resources allocated to project activities, as indicated in the auditors’ annual report, seem to be efficiently used. However, the processes of strengthening the capacities of MOSS need, first, seeking support from the collaborators and constituents; and second, patience to deal with internal weaknesses.

In response to the evaluation questions listed under Section 3.3 the evaluation suggest that, first, not all stated outputs were achieved. Output 4, i.e., a system for accrediting NGOs is elaborated but not operational. The achievement of other objectives is either satisfactory or marginally satisfactory. The achievement of Output 6 NSB evaluated is highly satisfactory.

Output 1 made progress towards establishing the TAU, but proved not sustainable. The experts who worked in TAU left it following the Minister once another Minster was in office. Output 2, which is to have a new organizational structure for MOSS, was accomplished, but not sustainable, as in late 2011, MOSS was split into Ministry for Supplies and Domestic Trade, and Ministry of Insurance and Social Services. Output 3 that is to develop capacities of MOSS staff has made some progress, but its effect might not prove to be complete. Not all trained cadres had the chance to apply their newly developed skills. A system for accrediting NGOs, i.e., Output 4, did not take-off. Output 5, which is to have a more developed and effective system for social protection, has made progress on activities mentioned within the project document, and extended to activities that were not defined in the project document, such as CCT and retrofitting the penal institution. The last output, to evaluate NSB, has been completed. The Bank was assessed, and has an action plan to upgrade it branches, and train its staff.

The project has contributed to improving the capacities of MOSS. Improving the working conditions, such as the case of social service center in Suez, and upgrading the branches of NSB are steps in the right direction. The project contributed to training MOSS cadres and those of NSB, which have positive impact on their performance.

The Minister is among the factors for success. He selected members of the TAU based on their qualifications and his previous working experience with them. There was a complete understanding between the Minister and the experts. When sitting with their counterparts at MOSS, the experts had the Minister’s support. Also they worked in close collaboration with their counterparts by seeing how they do business, and then proposing modalities to improve the operations. In addition to the direct training to the MOSS cadres, the TAU experts provided on-job training to their counterparts, such as the case of Dr. A. Serry and the officials of NSB. In cases where the expert was not able to collaborate with his/her counterpart, the output had little progress, such as the case of Output 4.

UNDP is another factor of success. UNDP has helped in poverty alleviation through sharing experiences of other developing countries. It helped in targeting the poor and introducing other modalities to support them, such as CCT. UNDP help the project through its administrative and financial controls that the NEX manual includes. These controls have given the project the legitimate, accountable and transparent image it enjoyed.

Most of the activities the project implemented to achieve the outputs and results seem to be exerted in an efficient and effective manner. Output 6 is an example of the efficient and effective use of resources. To the contrary, some activities, such as training cadres, without availing the chance to apply their newly acquired competencies seem a waste of time and effort. For this reason, there were refreshing training modules as one of the interviewees mentioned.

The project partnerships strategy worked in certain areas, such as the use of ICT to monitor and police the subsidized food items and deliver pension payments to the poor. MOSS collaborated with private sector companies and public bodies for the use of ICT in social protection are possible. The project succeeded in partnerships of the Productive Families Programme and NGOs. However, the partnerships for Output 4 to materialize did not work because of the people of MOSS were not ready, as the former Minister expressed.

 What factors contributed to effectiveness or ineffectiveness?

 Are the results sustainable?

Except for Output 6, other outputs of the project do not seem sustainable. The officials of NSB have understood the importance of have a nice working environment, up-to-date computer technology, and trained individuals to perform more than an operation. They witnessed the increase in revenues, and the growing size of clients. Now the officials of NSB believe in capacity development, and have earmarked a sizable fund in their budget to maintain the exerted effort, and start working on other branches. Other outputs cannot be sustainable on their own. The TAU fell apart once the Minister left office. Output 2, which was about elaborating a new organizational chart for MOSS did not include plans for merging TAU into the structure of MOSS. This output proved unsustainable late 2011, when the Prime Minster decided to split MOSS into Ministry of Supplies and Domestic Trade and Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs. Output three can be sustainable if there is a plan with enough resources to ensure continuity. Output 4 did not take-off, and does not have a plan for sustainability. Output 5 can be sustainable if there are funds and planned activities to continue paying attention to CCT, upgrading the centers for social services, and so forth.

Given the split of MOSS into its two original entities, extending the project might not be possible. However, Egypt needs this project. The solution is to have a joint programme that both Ministries share responsibility of its implementation and execution, as they share their cost-sharing. This joint programme can have two components: 1) Supply and 2) Social justice. Under the first component, the programme will address issues concerning subsidized food items, gas cylinders and domestic trade; while the other component will address strengthening the capacities of NGOs, social workers, development of centers for social services, attention to penal institutions and so forth. The design of the programme will have to consider that the two components are not mutually exclusive. In other words, the work plan of the activities needs to be synchronized for utmost returns of the limited available resources.

## M&E Framework

UNDP employs a system for M&E to track progress of projects the organization sponsors in Egypt. UNDP M&E framework is geared towards results through:

1. Aligning the monitoring and evaluation system with results-based management;
2. Promoting evaluative knowledge and learning around results; and
3. Simplifying policies and procedures.

Thus, the central objective of the M&E framework for this project is to demonstrate how and where the MOSS is making a measurable contribution to effective social protection.[[79]](#footnote-79)

Monitoring and evaluation improve the effectiveness of MOSS. Establishing links between past, present and future interventions and results is the recommended mechanism for M&E to judge whether the project is going into the right direction, and achieving the desired results.[[80]](#footnote-80)

M&E help enhance performance and achieve results. It is measuring and assessing of performance, i.e., progress towards outcomes, to effectively manage development impacts and results. The focus of M&E is on assessing the contributions of various factors to a given development outcome, with such factors including outputs, partnerships, policy advice and dialogue, advocacy and brokering/coordination. [[81]](#footnote-81)

In principle, the project has an M&E system that track changes from baseline conditions to desired outcomes. The aim is to validate what results were achieved, and how and why they were or were not achieved. This is evident from the progress reports, Project Board meetings and Annual Project Reports (APRs) that serve as means of verification. However, the baseline against which the project achievements are measured is not complete, and for this reason the consultant used a qualitative methodology for evaluation, as indicated earlier in Section 3.4.

The project document does not include a clear system for rating for all results that the project reports. This rating system has to measure progress in outcomes and outputs. The project document also does not include bold indicators to serve as scale that measures performance, as it lacks a complete baseline data and targets with milestones. The consultant used reports, such as EHDR and Progress towards MDGs, as proxy source of data to assess the performance of some outputs. The participation of project staff, MOSS staff, and beneficiaries was another way to collect data to measure progress.

The project needs indicators that:

1. Assess outputs by reviewing the implementation of activities by measuring effort exerted;
2. Assess outcomes by using outputs and sustained production of benefits results in terms of access, usage and stakeholder satisfaction; and
3. Assess impact using outcomes and sustained positive development change by looking into results in terms of the combined effect of a combination of outcome activities that improve development conditions at the national level.

# Conclusions

Atop the list of issues that a mid-term evaluation addresses is the efficiency of project management. The status of accomplishment of most of the outputs is satisfactory. The project seems to be approaching accomplishment of most of its goals, and achieving its mandates. The fact there are some activities that were part of the project outside what has been described in the project document can indicate innovation in project management. Unfortunately this finding cannot be extended to Output 4.

Strengthening the capacities of MOSS is within the national priorities, UNDAF and MYFF. To achieve its development objective, strengthening the capacities of MOSS is a step that needs other elements. The necessary condition for alleviating poverty is to be committed to social justice and equity. The benevolent, egalitarian state is the answer, which is not the scope of the project, but the GoE has to understand this fact, and be determined to address issues of equity for sustainable future. This might be a condition for another phase.

The project has six outputs. The first output was to establish an advisory unit. Based on the reviewed documents, interviews, site visits and UNDP Human Development Reports and 2010 report on the Progress toward achieving the MDGs, it seems this component was instrumental in the success of other outputs, and thus ***the rank of Output 1 is satisfactory***.

The second output was to have a new organizational structure for MOSS. Based on the site visits to Suez, Menofia, and the 6th of October, the activities conducted under this output aimed to avail a humane space for the workers and the beneficiaries. It helped to work process to be more efficient. A clean working space, with ICT facilities, is essential to provide the poor assistance with dignity. However, there are other centers that need attention. ***The rank of this output is satisfactory.***

The third output was to develop capacities of key staff and elaborate and implement a communication strategy. The project delivered training to upper-, middle-level management, and to juniors at the implementation level. The project delivered training social workers, and to transform secretaries to serve as assistants to social workers. The range of training topics was wide, and included, strategic planning, application of the family file, etc. The project also delivered training on PCs. Comparing the accomplished with the targeted; the output seems to be marginally satisfactory. Delivering training without an opportunity to apply the new skills seems a waste of time and effort. Due, in part, to factors beyond the control of the PMU and MOSS at large, there was no communication strategy. ***The progress of this output and its expected outcome seem marginally satisfactory.***

The fourth output was to develop a system for accrediting NGOs. MOSS in collaboration with CAPMAS and the Union for NGOs, established a database of NGOs, and set a system for accreditation of NGOs, which is not functional yet. MOSS could induce some improvements to the corrective facility for delinquent youth. There is a very little impact of this output. In fact, the output is not complete. There is limited cooperation between the project staff responsible for this output and their counterpart within MOSS. The context for this output was not ready. ***The rank of this output and its expected outcome are unsatisfactory.***

The fifth output was to develop an effective system for social protection. MOSS in collaboration with UNDP held two international conferences in 2007 and 2009. These two events were an opportunity to share ideas and shed the light on the experiences of other developing countries in their attempt to alleviate poverty, such as targeting the poor and CCT. In the meantime, MOSS formulated and passed Law 135/2010 for social solidarity and its executive regulations. Furthermore, MOSS, through project experts, could develop the productive families association, link them to other institutions in Europe that provided them with designs and training, and then marketed their products abroad. The products of these associations were well received in various exhibitions in Germany and India. Using the experts of the project, MOSS investigated leakage in the subsidies system in food cards, Baladi bread and gas cylinders. The solution was to use ICT to monitor and follow-up on disbursed solidarity checks, subsidized food items, such as cooking oil, and distributing gas cylinders to the deserved population through the use of coupons.

The efforts of the project, and MOSS at large, to achieve this output and its outcome are remarkable. However, the efforts did not address the root cause of impoverishment; they only dealt with the symptoms, as the 2010 MDGs Progress report notices – Egypt might not be able to achieve all targets under MDG 1. There might be a need to stop and look back on this output, and then derive lessons for the future stage and phases to come, given the request of the youth downtown Cairo for social justice. ***The rank of this output is satisfactory.***

The sixth output was to evaluate NSB. An evaluation was elaborated in terms of an assessment, and recommendations for an action plan for NSB. One of the items of developing the bank was to improve its physical environment by retrofitting 15 branches, and to continue the plan to reach 40 branches the coming year. The other step was to install a system for IT to connect the branches together and the headquarters. The third step was to train the cadres of the bank. The development and upgrading NSB has taken steps in the right directions. However, there are more to be done besides improving the physical environment. ***The rank of this output and its outcome is highly satisfactory***.

The project is coming to end. It is not likely that it will completely fulfill its mission. The project might have some resources left from the current phase, and thus there is a possibility to extend it into the future at no cost. This is not recommended. Instead, the remaining fund can be used towards preparing an outlook of future needs, given that Egypt will have a new constitution, a new President will be in office, and the State will experience serious institutional transformations. Following the investigation of the future outlook, then it is possible to identify the common needs and interventions, and thus determine the course of action.

Finally, the evaluation seeks to document best practices and lessons learned, which in itself might help in improving the delivery of inputs, for example, revisiting the management structure, and so forth. This last issue will raise questions pertaining to the sustainability of project outcomes, and whether there are plans for phasing out. If not, then what need to be done?

***Consequently, UNDP project to strengthen the capacities of MOSS is satisfactory.*** The project used number of tools to ration subsidies, such as targeting the poor and the use of smart cards. There are other practices to alleviate poverty, such as CCT and productive families. Assessment of NSB and its improvements are also a step towards enhancing the environment for both the workers and the clients. The output concerned with NGOs needs more attention. Having a database is not enough. There is a need to revise the law, and other elements of the institutional framework that governs the work of NGOs to stimulate them.

# Recommendations

The project is coming to an end, yet there are some unfinished businesses and loose ends to tie. There is a need to evaluate these experiences, then draw lessons learnt and best practices to scale-up the use of these tools to a national policy. The project will need to elaborate a log-frame with indicators, risks, external factors and other elements of designing an intervention, and propose means for integrating the various outputs. The project needs to lay-out a plan for phasing out, and a strategy of sustaining the achievements.

Obviously, there is a need for another phase, but with a design based on a different philosophy to meet the current aspirations following the January 25th revolution. The state will have to abandon the neo-liberal thinking that had catastrophic impacts on the global economy. The new phase has to seek linkages between the various entities of MOSS. It also needs to pay more attention to NGOs to be a complete partner and able to reach those who live in informal areas and rural settlements. The new phase has to experiment with tools for enabling and empowering the people who live in misery to be in-charge of their resources and future.

# Lessons learnt

The following are the lessons learnt from this evaluation:

1. ICT is not always the solution, particularly in a country that lacks reliable, valid and continuous data. ICT can help in development, but has limits.
2. Strengthening the capacities of a public institution is extremely difficult as it requires transformations in beliefs. Change is possible, but often is resisted from within the public institution.
3. Often problems arise within an awkward institutional framework. Public institutions, whether central or local, are different compared to private-sector companies and non-profit organizations, such as syndicates, NGOs, CBOs etc. Among the elements that make the difference between these institutions is the mission and mandate of the institution itself, and thus how decisions are made with the institution. For this reason, if MOSS wants to succeed in fulfilling its mandate and mission, then there is a need to engage private-sector companies and NGOs in the processes of decision-making to assure their ownership and responsibility for implementation.
4. MOSS is a classic icon of a public body. Planning is about setting ends and means to reach them. For a public body often ends are vague, broad and implicit, and fragment. Most of the decisions made within public bodies are based on “political'” rather than “technical" considerations. Among the reasons for this situation, that future is sometimes uncertain. Conditions within the public institution and outside it always changes, thus precise prediction, projection and forecasting are not often possible.
5. When a public institution engages with another institution, whether public, private or non-profit, then the element of change is probably of special importance. The other institution tries to impose change on the public institution, thus forcing the institution to consider serious counter-measures. Examples of this situation include the system of health insurance in Suez.
6. Public institutions often do not advertise planned action in advance to avoid opposition. These institutions do not consider long-term objectives, rather are eventually after a “quick” fix. However, UNDP is after sustainable human development which by nature is a long term, while decision-makers atop the public agencies are eventually in pursuit of the “quick” fix, and thus will be reluctant to consider fundamental alternatives. Probably, that is the reason for why public institutions prefer present than future effects and outcomes. In other words, they heavily discount the future to maintain their status quo. Keeping the institution running might, in many occasions, be more important than fulfilling the mission and meeting the mandate. In many cases, the resultant of interventions turned to be a financial burden, an economic problem, and an output that the community does not accept or own.
7. To the contrary, private-sector companies are radically different. Decisions are made to maximize profit and minimize costs. For this reason decisions are based on technical considerations as well as political and social acceptances. Private-sector companies always have the shareholders, clients, competitors and collaborators, such as financing institutions, in perspective. Thus advertising is important, and the image is crucial to test ideas, target specific groups and so forth.
8. Non-profit organizations are flexible to reach those unfortunate. For this reason, they go beyond the Prince (the State) and the Market (the private-sector companies). In addition to considering the views of their constituents, they have to consider the interests of their sponsors.

# References

de Janvry, Alain and Sadoulet, Elisabeth, “Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: Are They Really Magic Bullets?” June 2004 <http://are.berkeley.edu/~sadoulet/papers/ARE-CCTPrograms.pdf>

Evaluation Office (2009), Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for Results, UNDP, New York, NY.

Sabry, S. (2009) “Poverty lines in Greater Cairo: Underestimating and misrepresenting poverty,” Poverty Reduction in Urban Areas Series, Working Paper 21, International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), London, UK.

Sabry, S. (2010) “How Poverty is Under Estimated in Greater Cairo, Egypt,” Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 22 No. 2, pp. 523-541.

Sayed, Hussein Abdel-Aziz et al Egypt’s Progress towards Achieving the Millennium Development Goals, 2010, Ministry of Economic Development and UNDP, Cairo, Egypt

Sen, Amartya (1999) Commodities and Capabilities, Oxford: Oxford University Press

# Annex 1: Terms of Reference

**PROJECT EVALUATION TOR**

**’’Strengthening the Capacity of the Ministry of Social Solidarity’**

1. **Background and context**

The United Nations Development Framework (UNDAF) for the 2002-2006 cycle states under goal 1 objective 3 that the UN system supports reforms in civil service, public enterprise and decentralization, while promoting civil society empowerment and local governance. Under current cycle 2007-2011 it is clearly stated that the UN Goal us to support Egypt achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and reduce Human Poverty. To achieve this outcome it is necessary to focus on improving national capacity to design, apply and monitor pr-poor policies while addressing geographical disparities. Furthermore, one of the fundamental objectives of UNDP is to promote poverty reduction strategies and programmes from a human rights based approach.

Therefore, UNDP in its work with the Egyptian government has as a primary objective the enhancement of both State and Human capabilities to achieve MDGs, promote human development, and reach a new social contract based on tripartite partnership. To this end, the ’Strengthening the Capacity of the Ministry of Social Solidarity’ Project aims to enhance the capacity of the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MOSS) to design and implement social policies, increase the relevance and efficiency of social protection schemes and social intervention including local development, and contribute to the elaboration of the new social contract, namely in the field of poverty reduction through better empowerment and participation of the poor and civil society organizations. The establishment of an advisory support unit for policy advice and capacity building in MOSS is a key output of this project and an entry point to other outputs and activities.

The project was launched in 2006 with a timeframe of 2006-2009 with a total budget of US $2,201,025.00 with MOSS contribution at US 1,851.025.00 and UNDP contribution amounting to US $350,000.00. The Project Board has agreed to increasing the project’s funding by USD 2,650,000.00 to continue/expand its activities.

This midterm project evaluation was included and planned for in the original project document and the UNDP evaluation plan of 2007-2011.

1. **Evaluation purpose**

As an integral part of the project implementation cycle, UNDP has initiated a project evaluation that will analyze the achievements of the project against its original objectives while providing project partners with an independent review of project outputs. The evaluation will review technical and managerial aspects and consider issues of effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, impact and sustainability. The evaluation will identify factors that have facilitated and/or impeded the achievement of objectives and should result in recommendations and lessons learned that will help project managers in re-orienting and re-prioritizing project activities and managerial arrangements as needed for the remainder of the project. The evaluation will also be forward looking, giving future directions and recommendations for donors, government and project partners for the second phase of the project.

1. **3. Evaluation scope and objectives**

The objective of the midterm evaluation is to:

* Assess the status of project results and how they are being achieved
* Assess UNDP’s role in providing expertise and exposure to international best practices to enable the Ministry of Social Solidarity to implement its planned outputs efficiently and effectively with maximum impact.
* Identify factors that have facilitated and/or impeded the achievement of objectives
* Assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project
* Review of M&E framework and establish the appropriate indicators and quality criteria to measure future implementation with assigned roles and responsibilities.
* Provide implementation recommendations for the remainder of the project.
* Provide recommendations for a second phase of the project

The evaluation timeframe is that of the entire project duration from 2006 to date.

1. **4. Evaluation questions**

Evaluation questions define the information that the evaluation will generate. The evaluator(s) will include in the Inception Report a list of evaluation questions that, when answered, will give users of the evaluation the information they seek in order to make decisions, take action or add to knowledge. For example, evaluation questions might include:

* Were stated outputs achieved?
* What progress toward the outputs has been made?
* What factors have contributed to achieving or not achieving intended results? In specific, has the project improved the capacity of MOSS to deliver on planned outputs? And how?
* Were the actions to achieve the outputs and outcomes effective and efficient?
* Has the project partnership strategy been appropriate and effective?
* What factors contributed to effectiveness or ineffectiveness?
* Are the results sustainable?
* How can the project be improved in its next phase?

Evaluation questions must be agreed upon between UNDP and MOSS and other stakeholders and accepted or refined in consultation with the evaluator(s).

1. **5. Methodology**

The evaluator(s) is expected to use all relevant methods to obtain data and information for their analysis and drawing up of findings, conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations.

The suggested methodology for the evaluation includes:

* Documentation review: Begin with the description of the project, its intended outcome and outputs, the baseline for the outcome/outputs and the indicators and benchmarks used. Review documents such as the project document, project brief, quarterly progress reports, Annual Project Reports (APR), Project Implementation Reports (PIR), minutes from Tripartite Review, Project Technical Reports, and minutes from relevant meetings,
* Field visits to relevant project sites. A list of the suggested field visits should be included in the inception brief (a social service unit- one bank Nasser Branch).
* Interviews with Project Manager, Project staff, project partners, UNDP, etc.
* Focus Groups/questionnaires with MOSS staff could be organized to validate perceptions regarding training curriculums, possible improvements in job efficiency, perceptions regarding restructuring of offices, etc.
* Probing the project outcome/output indicators, going beyond these to explore other possible indicators, and determining whether the indicators have been continuously tracked.

The methodology that will be used by the evaluator(s) should be presented in the inception brief and the final report in detail. The methodology must be agreed upon between UNDP, the evaluator(s) and SFD prior to the start of the evaluation.

1. **6. Evaluation products (deliverables)**

Key evaluation products the evaluator(s) will be accountable for producing:

* Inception Brief – the evaluator will prepare a brief outlining the main evaluation issues that will be addressed, relevant evaluation questions and the proposed and final methodology that has been agreed upon before the evaluation is set to begin.
* Draft evaluation report—The Programme Unit and key stakeholders in the evaluation should review the draft evaluation report to ensure that the evaluation meets the required UNDP quality criteria
* Final evaluation report (See Evaluation Report Template in Annex 3)
* Brief Executive Summary
* PowerPoint presentation on findings and recommendations

1. **7. Evaluation team composition and required competencies**

The final evaluation will be carried out by an independent national consultant that has not participated in the project preparation and/or implementation and does not have any conflict of interest with project related activities.

The appropriate evaluator for this assignment will have the following qualities:

* Advanced university degree preferably in Microfinance, Economics and Sociology with 10-15 years of national and international experience in the field.
* Familiarity with Social solidarity schemes and with laws and regulations pertaining to them in Egypt.
* Recognized experience in Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) and result-based management evaluation methodologies.
* Recent knowledge of the UNDP Monitoring and Evaluation Policy. Previous involvement and understanding of UNDP procedures is an advantage
* Experience with multilateral or bilateral supported projects.
* Extensive experience in the fields of project formulation, execution, and evaluation is required; experience in science to policy linkages would be welcome.
* Fluency in Arabic and English and possession of strong technical writing and analytical skills
* Evaluation ethics

All UNDP Programme and project evaluations are to be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG ‘Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation’ and the UNEG Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System. Both documents can be found at the following link: <http://www.uneval.org/search/index.jsp?q=ethical+guidelines>

Evaluations of UNDP-supported activities need to be independent, impartial and rigorous. Each evaluation should clearly contribute to learning and accountability. Hence evaluators must have personal and professional integrity and be guided by propriety in the conduct of their business

Evaluators:

* Must present information that is complete and fair in its assessment of strengths and weaknesses so that decisions or actions taken are well founded
* Must disclose the full set of evaluation findings along with information on their limitations and have this accessible to all affected by the evaluation with expressed legal rights to receive results.
* Should protect the anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants. They should provide maximum notice, minimize demands on time, and: respect people’s right not to engage. Evaluators must respect people’s right to provide information in confidence, and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. Evaluators are not expected to evaluate individuals, and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this general principle.
* Evaluations sometimes uncover evidence of wrongdoing. Such cases must be reported discreetly to the appropriate investigative body. Evaluators should consult with other relevant oversight entities when there is any doubt about if and how issues should be reported.
* Should be sensitive to beliefs, manners and customs and act with integrity and honesty in their relations with all stakeholders. In line with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, evaluators must be sensitive to and address issues of discrimination and gender equality. They should avoid offending the dignity and self-respect of those persons with whom they come in contact in the course of the evaluation. Knowing that evaluation might negatively affect the interests of some stakeholders, evaluators should conduct the evaluation and communicate its purpose and results in a way that clearly respects the stakeholders’ dignity and self-worth.
* Are responsible for their performance and their product(s). They are responsible for the clear, accurate and fair written and/or oral presentation of study limitations, findings and recommendations.
* Should reflect sound accounting procedures and be prudent in using the resources of the evaluation.
* All staff engaged full or part time in evaluation must sign an Evaluation Staff Agreement Form at the start of their contract (see Annex 2).

**Implementation Arrangements**

The principal responsibility for managing this evaluation lies with UNDP-Egypt and the project manager. The UNDP Egypt Country Office is the main operational point for the evaluation and will be responsible for liaising with the project team to set up the stakeholder interviews, arrange the field visits and co-ordinate with MOSS and other counterparts.

The report will be cleared by UNDP and the Ministry of Social Solidarity.

1. **Resources and Logistical Support Required:**

It is expected that at least one senior member of the project will accompany the evaluator during the visits in order to facilitate and provide clarifications where necessary.

During the evaluation period, the team will require office accommodation that will be provided by the Project Management offices (in Cairo) or UNDP-Egypt as necessary.

**ToR Annexes**

**ANNEX 1**

Documents to be consulted— This is a list of important documents and WebPages that the evaluator(s) should read at the outset of the evaluation and before finalizing the evaluation design and the inception report.

* Project Document and any revisions
* Websites:
* [www.undp.org.eg](http://www.undp.org.eg)
* [www.mss.gov.eg/mss/ar-EG](http://www.mss.gov.eg/mss/ar-EG)
* [www.mpcpegypt.com/index.html](http://www.mpcpegypt.com/index.html)
* UNDP M&E Yellow Handbook
* Project operational guidelines, manuals and systems
* Quarterly Progress Report and detailed activity progress reports
* Project Annual reports
* Minutes of Board meetings and other project management meetings.
* Presentations and other inputs to Board Meetings and project management meetings
* Combined Delivery Report
* Atlas Reports (such as the AWP and Project Budget Balance report)
* Project Implementation Reviews
* UNDP User Guide (relevant sections

**ANNEX 2**

United Nations Evaluation Group – Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System

Evaluation Consultants Agreement Form

To be signed by all consultants as individuals (not by or on behalf of a consultancy company) before a contract can be issued.

Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System

Name of Consultant: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Name of Consultancy Organization (where relevant): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.

Signed at ( ) on ( )

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

**ANNEX 3**

**EVALUATION REPORT TEMPLATE AND QUALITY STANDARDS**

This evaluation report template is intended to serve as a guide for preparing meaningful, useful and credible evaluation reports that meet quality standards. It does not prescribe a definitive section-by-section format that all evaluation reports should follow. Rather, it suggests the content that should be included in a quality evaluation report. The descriptions that follow are derived from the UNEG ‘Standards for Evaluation in the UN System’ and ‘Ethical Standards for Evaluations’.66

The evaluation report should be complete and logically organized. It should be written clearly and understandable to the intended audience. In a country context, the report should be translated into local languages whenever possible (see Chapter 8 for more information). The report should also include the following:

Title and opening pages—Should provide the following basic information:

Name of the evaluation intervention

Time-frame of the evaluation and date of the report

Countries of the evaluation intervention

Names and organizations of evaluators

Name of the organization commissioning the evaluation

Acknowledgements

Table of contents—Should always include boxes, figures, tables and annexes with page references.

List of acronyms and abbreviations

Executive summary—A stand-alone section of two to three pages that should:

Briefly describe the intervention of the evaluation (the project(s), programme(s), policies or other intervention) that was evaluated.

Explain the purpose and objectives of the evaluation, including the audience for the evaluation and the intended uses.

Describe key aspect of the evaluation approach and methods.

Summarize principle findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

Introduction—Should:

Explain why the evaluation was conducted (the purpose), why the intervention is being evaluated at this point in time, and why it addressed the questions it did.

Identify the primary audience or users of the evaluation, what they wanted to learn from the evaluation and why, and how they are expected to use the evaluation results.

Identify the intervention of the evaluation (the project(s) programme(s) policies, or other intervention—see upcoming section on intervention.)

Acquaint the reader with the structure and contents of the report and how the information contained in the report will meet the purposes of the evaluation and satisfy the information needs of the report’s intended users.

Description of the intervention—Provides the basis for report users to understand the logic and asses the merits of the evaluation methodology and understand the applicability of the evaluation results. The description needs to provide sufficient detail for the report user to derive meaning from the evaluation. The description should:

Describe what is being evaluated, who seeks to benefit, and the problem or issue it seeks to address.

Explain the expected results map or results framework, implementation strategies, and the key assumptions underlying the strategy.

Link the intervention to national priorities, UNDAF priorities, corporate multi-year funding frameworks or strategic plan goals, or other programme or country specific plans and goals.

Identify the phase in the implementation of the intervention and any significant changes (e.g., plans, strategies, logical frameworks) that have occurred over time, and explain the implications of those changes for the evaluation.

Identify and describe the key partners involved in the implementation and their roles.

Describe the scale of the intervention, such as the number of components (e.g., phases of a project) and the size of the target population for each component.

Indicate the total resources, including human resources and budgets.

Describe the context of the social, political, economic and institutional factors, and the geographical landscape within which the intervention operates and explain the effects (challenges and opportunities) those factors present for its implementation and outcomes.

Point out design weaknesses (e.g., intervention logic) or other implementation constraints (e.g., resource limitations).

Evaluation scope and objectives—The report should provide a clear explanation of the evaluation’s scope, primary objectives and main questions.

Evaluation scope—The report should define the parameters of the evaluation, for example, the time period, the segments of the target population included, the geographic area included, and which components, outputs or outcomes were and were not assessed.

Evaluation objectives—The report should spell out the types of decisions evaluation users will make, the issues they will need to consider in making those decisions, and what the evaluation will need to achieve to contribute to those decisions.

Evaluation criteria—The report should define the evaluation criteria or performance standards used. The report should explain the rationale for selecting the particular criteria used in the evaluation.

Evaluation questions—Evaluation questions define the information that the evaluation will generate. The report should detail the main evaluation questions addressed by the evaluation and explain how the answers to these questions address the information needs of users.

Evaluation approach and methods—The evaluation report should describe in detail the selected methodological approaches, methods and analysis; the rationale for their selection; and how, within the constraints of time and money, the approaches and methods employed yielded data that helped answer the evaluation questions and achieved the evaluation purposes. The description should help the report users judge the merits of the methods used in the evaluation and the credibility of the findings, conclusions and recommendations. The description on methodology should include discussion of each of the following:

Data sources—The sources of information (documents reviewed and stakeholders), the rationale for their selection and how the information obtained addressed the evaluation questions.

Sample and sampling frame—If a sample was used: the sample size and characteristics; the sample selection criteria (e.g., single women, under 45); the process for selecting the sample (e.g., random, purposive); if applicable, how comparison and treatment groups were assigned; and the extent to which the sample is representative of the entire target population, including discussion of the limitations of sample for generalizing results.

Data collection procedures and instruments—Methods or procedures used to collect data, including discussion of data collection instruments (e.g., interview protocols), their appropriateness for the data source, and evidence of their reliability and validity.

Performance standards—The standard or measure that will be used to evaluate performance relative to the evaluation questions (e.g., national or regional indicators, rating scales).

Stakeholder participation—Stakeholders’ participation in the evaluation and how the level of involvement contributed to the credibility of the evaluation and the results.

Ethical considerations—The measures taken to protect the rights and confidentiality of informants (see UNEG ‘Ethical Guidelines for Evaluators’ for more information).70

Background information on evaluators—The composition of the evaluation team, the background and skills of team members, and the appropriateness of the technical skill mix, gender balance and geographical representation for the evaluation.

Major limitations of the methodology—Major limitations of the methodology should be identified and openly discussed as to their implications for evaluation, as well as steps taken to mitigate those limitations.

Data analysis—The report should describe the procedures used to analyse the data collected to answer the evaluation questions. It should detail the various steps and stages of analysis that were carried out, including the steps to confirm the accuracy of data and the results. The report also should discuss the appropriateness of the analyses to the evaluation questions. Potential weaknesses in the data analysis and gaps or limitations of the data should be discussed, including their possible influence on the way findings may be interpreted and conclusions drawn.

Findings and conclusions—The report should present the evaluation findings based on the analysis and conclusions drawn from the findings.

Findings—Should be presented as statements of fact that are based on analysis of the data. They should be structured around the evaluation questions so that report users can readily make the connection between what was asked and what was found. Variances between planned and actual results should be explained, as well as factors affecting the achievement of intended results. Assumptions or risks in the project or programme design that subsequently affected implementation should be discussed.

Conclusions—Should be comprehensive and balanced, and highlight the strengths, weaknesses and outcomes of the intervention. They should be well substantiated by the evidence and logically connected to evaluation findings. They should respond to key evaluation questions and provide insights into the identification of and/or solutions to important problems or issues pertinent to the decision-making of intended users.

Recommendations—The report should provide practical, feasible recommendations directed to the intended users of the report about what actions to take or decisions to make. The recommendations should be specifically supported by the evidence and linked to the findings and conclusions around key questions addressed by the evaluation. They should address sustainability of the initiative and comment on the adequacy of the project exit strategy, if applicable. Recommendations should also provide specific advice for future or similar projects or programming.

Lessons learnt—As appropriate, the report should include discussion of lessons learnt from the evaluation, that is, new knowledge gained from the particular circumstance (intervention, context outcomes, even about evaluation methods) that are applicable to a similar context. Lessons should be concise and based on specific evidence presented in the report.

Report annexes—Suggested annexes should include the following to provide the report user with supplemental background and methodological details that enhance the credibility of the report:

ToR for the evaluation

Additional methodology-related documentation, such as the evaluation matrix and data collection instruments (questionnaires, interview guides, observation protocols, etc.) as appropriate

List of individuals or groups interviewed or consulted and sites visited

List of supporting documents reviewed

Project or programme results map or results framework

Summary tables of findings, such as tables displaying progress towards outputs, targets, and goals relative to established indicators

Short biographies of the evaluators and justification of team composition

Code of conduct signed by evaluators

# Annex 2: List of interviewed individuals

Abdulhakeem Hammouda Advisor to the Minister for Institutional Development

Abdulhamid Mohamed Beneficiary, Faisal, the Governorate of Suez

Abdulsalaam M. Sayed Director, NSB Nast City Branch

Abdulsattar Gad MOSS Information Center

Abeer M. Abdul-lateef Head, Center for Social Services, 6th of October

Adel Nasr El-Din Director, Social Solidarity, Faisal, the Governorate of Suez

Adell A. Ibrahim Head, Haram City Social Services Unit, 6th of October

Ali El Moselhy Former Minister of Social Solidarity

Anwar El-Naqeeb Economist, Advisor to the Minister on Subsidies

Ayman Hossam Former Advisor to the Minister for Research, Strategic Planning and Media

Azza M. Hafez Social Worker, 7th District Social Services Unit, 6th of October

Dahlia Qurtam Advisor to the Minister on NGOs

El-Hossani Zoier Beneficiary, Faisal, the Governorate of Suez

El-Sayed Mostafa Beneficiary, Faisal, the Governorate of Suez

Fagr M. Ali Beneficiary, 7th District, 6th of October

Ghada Waly Assistant to UN Resident Representative

Hanan Ezzat Social Worker, Center for Social Services, 6th of October

Hanan Omar Secretary, 7th District Social Services Unit, 6th of October

Iman El-Rubi Social Worker, 7th District Social Services Unit, 6th of October

Lamia I. Farag Head, Solidarity division, Faisal, the Governorate of Suez

Madeyha A. Hassanien Deputy, Directorate for Social Solidarity, the Governorate of Suez

Magdi Fathalla General Director, Directorate of Greater Cairo Region

Magdi M. Ghounami Director, Planning and Follow-up, NSB

Magdi Sadeq Former, Director of Social Solidarity, Faisal, the Governorate of Suez

Mohamed Abdulmoniem Treasurer, Haram City Social Services Unit, 6th of October

Mohamed Hassan Beneficiary, Faisal, the Governorate of Suez

Mohamed Omar Deputy to the Chairperson of the Board, NSB

Mohamed Saeed Head of Financial Sector, NSB

Mohamed Youssef NSB

Mona F. El-Sayed Secretary, Haram City Social Services Unit, 6th of October

Mona M. Ramzi Social Worker, Haram City Social Services Unit, 6th of October

Nabila A. Awad Social Worker, Haram City Social Services Unit, 6th of October

Naglaa Khayrat Secretary, 7th District Social Services Unit, 6th of October

Nagwa Abdulaziz Social Worker, 7th District Social Services Unit, 6th of October

Nawal Hassan Social Worker, 7th District Social Services Unit, 6th of October

Noha Kaptan Project Manager, a.i.

Noha Rifaat Results-Based Management Officer, UNDP Egypt

Ola M. Sultan Social Worker, Haram City Social Services Unit, 6th of October

Omayma Abdulatti Social Worker, 7th District Social Services Unit, 6th of October

Rasha O. Mohammed Social Worker, Haram City Social Services Unit, 6th of October

Saber Salem Deputy to A. Hammouda

Sahar Abdlumoneim Auditor, Solidarity division, Faisal, the Governorate of Suez

Saleh Saber Guard, Haram City Social Services Unit, 6th of October

Sana A. Mohamed Auditor, Solidarity division, Faisal, the Governorate of Suez

Sara Sabri Program Assistant, UNDP, Egypt

Sherif Radwan Advisor to the Minister for Training

# Annex 3: List of sites visited

Center for Social Services, 6th of October, the Governorate of Giza

Center for Social Services, 7th District, 6th of October, the Governorate of Giza

Center for Social Services, Faisal, the Governorate of Suez

Center for Social Services, Haram City, 6th of October, the Governorate of Giza

Directorate of Social Solidarity, Suez, the Governorate of Suez

Directorate of Social Solidarity, the Governorate of Menofia

Division of Social Services, Faisal, the Governorate of Suez

Ministry of Social Solidarity, Downtown, Cairo

Nasser Social Bank, Headquarters, Downtown, Cairo

Nasser Social Bank, Nasr City Branch, Nasr City, Cairo

National Association for Family and Childhood, Agouza, Giza

Office of Productive Families, Shebin El-Kom, the Governorate of Menofia

Office of Supplies, Shebin El-Kom, the Governorate of Menofia

# Annex 4: List of reviewed documents reviewed

El Mahdi, Alia, Micro & small finance and employment Creation in Egypt 2009, Second Conference on Integrated Social Policies in Egypt July 2009

El Nakeeb, Anwar M. Egyptian Food Subsidy System Structure, performance and future perspective, World Bank Conference, June 2009

El Nakeeb, Anwar M. Impact Assessment of shifting food subsidy from in kind to cash transfer programs Concept Note September 2010

El Nakeeb, Anwar M. Strategy of Food subsidy system Reform in Egypt (Balady Bread as an example) ECES workshop, “Price Subsidies in Egypt: Alternatives for Reform” Cairo, October 5, 2010

Executive Summary Analysis of Consumer Profiles and Behavior Patterns of Food Subsidy Recipients: An Approach to Targeting

Hammouda, A. Report on achievements of the Strengthening the Capacity of MOSS, 2011

Handoussa, Heba, Making Basic Services Reach the Poor, Second Conference on Integrated Social Policies in Egypt Saturday 4 July 2009

McCleery, Robert K. Basic Service Provision for Poverty Reduction, Second Conference on Integrated Social Policies in Egypt July 2009

Ministry of Social Solidarity web site, <http://www.mss.gov.eg/MSS/ar-EG/>

Rawlings, Laura B., and Rubio, [Gloria M.](http://wbro.oxfordjournals.org/search?author1=Gloria+M.+Rubio&sortspec=date&submit=Submit)  “Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs,” World Bank Research Observer, Spring 2005, Volume 20, Issue 1, pp. 29-55

Serry, Alaa, 2010 Year-End Report, Inclusive of activities up to March 15th, 2011, Nasser Social Bank (NSB) Reforms Project, Cairo, Egypt, March 2011

Serry, Alaa, Consulting Assignment Report, Nasser Social Bank (NSB) Reforms Project, Cairo, Egypt, February 2011

Serry, Alaa, Mission Report, Nasser Social Bank (NSB) Reforms Project, Cairo, Egypt, January 2010

Serry, Alaa, Mission Report, Nasser Social Bank (NSB) Reforms Project, Cairo, Egypt, February 2010

Serry, Alaa, Mission Report, Nasser Social Bank (NSB) Reforms Project, Cairo, Egypt, March2010

Serry, Alaa, Mission Report, Nasser Social Bank (NSB) Reforms Project, Cairo, Egypt, April 2010

Serry, Alaa, Mission Report, Nasser Social Bank (NSB) Reforms Project, Cairo, Egypt, May 2010

Serry, Alaa, Mission Report, Nasser Social Bank (NSB) Reforms Project, Cairo, Egypt, June 2010

Serry, Alaa, Mission Report, Nasser Social Bank (NSB) Reforms Project, Cairo, Egypt, July 2010

Serry, Alaa, Mission Report, Nasser Social Bank (NSB) Reforms Project, Cairo, Egypt, August 2010

Serry, Alaa, Mission Report, Nasser Social Bank (NSB) Reforms Project, Cairo, Egypt, October 2010

Serry, Alaa, Mission Report, Nasser Social Bank (NSB) Reforms Project, Cairo, Egypt, November 2010

Serry, Alaa, Mission Report, Nasser Social Bank (NSB) Reforms Project, Cairo, Egypt, December 2010

Sholkamy, Hania, Introducing Conditional Cash Transfers for Poor Families in Egypt, Cairo, July 2009

Slater, Rachel and Farrington, John, “Cash transfers: targeting” ODI Project Briefings, No 27 • November 2009

Soares, Fabio Veras, Cash Transfer programmes in Latin America: an overview, International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG/UNDP/IPEA), Cairo 4th July 2009

Standing, Guy, From Conditional to Unconditional Cash Transfers: A New Model of Social Protection, Cairo 4th July 2009

TNT, Baladi bread project, 13 December 2009

TNT, WFP and others, Submission of Base Case and agreed deliverables to H.E. Dr Ali El- Moselhy, Supply chain management review of Baladi bread, Dec 2009 - Feb 2010 Study

TNT, WFP and others, Submission of modelling scenario’s and study/pilot plans to H.E. Dr Ali El-Moselhy, Supply chain management review for Baladi bread, March - May 2010 Study

UNDP-Egypt, Egypt 2005 Human Development Report, Cairo, Egypt, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/national/arabstates/egypt/name,3335,en.html>UNDP, Egypt Human Development Report 2010, Cairo, Egypt

Upendranadh, C. The National Rural Employment Guarantee (NREG) in India: Feature, Experiences and Lessons, Second Conference on Integrated Social Policies in Egypt July 2009

WFP-CO Egypt, Vulnerability Analysis and Review of Safety Nets in Egypt, Cairo, July 2009

**Documents in Arabic**

النقيب، أنور محمود عبدالعال (دكتور) الخطوات التنفيذية للتعامل مع مشكلة انبوبة البوتاجاز في المرحلة القادمة11 يوليو 2011

عشماوى إبراهيم (دكتور) وأخرون، بنك ناصر، مشروع خطة العمل، المرحلة الاولى: الدراسة التشخيصية ؛2007

عشماوى، إبراهيم (دكتور) وأخرون، بنك ناصر، مشروع خطة العمل، المرحلة الثانية: خطة العمل - اهم الاولويات والاصلاح والتطوير

النقيب، أنور محمود عبدالعال (دكتور) إصلاح منظومة الخبز المدعم في مصر ورقة سياسات؛ وزارة التضامن والعدالة الاجتماعية فبراير 2011

**(need to complete the list of the reviewed documents)**

# Annex 5: Short biography of the evaluator

El-Kholei has an extensive experience in planning, development and environmental management acquired through formal training, consultancies and research projects. Conducted several studies on issues related to regional planning and environmental management. Provided technical assistance in participatory strategic and action planning for urban and regional planning, and national environmental management programmes. He participated in designing several national and regional development projects. He led the evaluation of several development and environmental projects. K. Anan, the UN Secretary-General appointed him as member of the Advisory Group for Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF) of Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) for his outstanding expertise in the fields of environment management and urban planning, 2006-2008 Coordinated the activities to update Egypt’s National Environmental Action Plan. He has shown managerial capabilities and leadership that are contributing to the successful and timely delivering of outputs and achieving aimed outcomes. Understands and familiar with UN system and procedures. He possesses excellent communication skills with Government officials, donors’ representatives and leaders of civil society organizations, including but not limited to, labor union, NGOs and private sector. These skills were instrumental in building consensus on issues and setting directions for future actions when he was responsible for the National Environmental Action Plan of Egypt. Acquires outstanding computer skills in data management, and competent in advanced multivariate statistical analyses. He published more than twenty scientific papers in urban and regional planning, environmental management and sustainable development, and planning theories, methods and models.

# Annex 6: Questionnaire

**’Strengthening the Capacity of the Ministry of Social Solidarity’**

**The information collected using this questionnaire is secret and will be used for evaluation purpose only**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Code of Questionnaire** |  |  |  |

1. **Information:**
2. Date and Place of Interview: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
3. Name of Interviewee: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
4. Affiliation/Agency/Institution: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
5. Position: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
6. Relation to the Project: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
7. When did you join the project? \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
8. **Status/Progress of the Component:**
9. What is the status of the activities of your component?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

1. Taking into consideration the speed, at which the project is proceeding, what is the possibility of achieving all the Outputs/Outcomes within the current timeframe?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

1. So far, in your opinion, how effective has the implementation of component activities?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

1. To what extent, have component objectives been achieved?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

1. .In your opinion, have the scope, quality and usefulness of the project outputs produced so far contribute to achieving the expected results?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

1. In your own words, assess the feasibility and effectiveness of implementation arrangements, work plans, budget and internal M&E mecahnisms in implementing the component?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

1. To what extent will your component be able to achieve its immediate objective? And overall development objective? Why? What are your recommendations?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

1. Based on the above, what is your opinion concerning status of the project

Highly Satisfactory ⎕ Satisfactory ⎕ Marginally Satisfactory ⎕ Unsatisfactory ⎕

1. Why?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

1. **Component Management:**
2. How were you responsive and/or adaptive to the implementation mechanisms that constraints and opportunities shape?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

1. What are the actions you considered/implemented to overcome the obstacles and address challenges identified during the implementation of your component activities?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

1. What are the current monitoring procedures and methodologies applied to assure that your component is on the correct path?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

1. In case of need to re-align component in response to specific challenge and/or opportunity, what was your response?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

1. How? Why?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

1. How would you assess management of your component?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

1. How would you strengthen the adaptive management and monitoring functions of your component?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

1. How would you ensure accountability for the achievement of the UNDP objective?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

1. How would you enhance organizational and development learning?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

1. How would you enable informed decision-making?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

1. How did you implementing the activities of your component?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

1. How did you involve the staff of the Ministry?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

1. How sustainable are the results?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_What specific results were achieved?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

1. What was the impact of the intervention/activities of the component on the services to the population and beneficiaries?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

1. How was the capacity of the staff of the Ministry built to follow up and sustain services?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

1. Based on the above, what is your opinion concerning your component?

Highly Satisfactory ⎕ Satisfactory ⎕ Marginally Satisfactory ⎕ Unsatisfactory ⎕

1. Why?

**D) Evaluating Project Outcomes/Outputs (Questions to the Former Minister):**

**Output 1: An Advisory Unit established at the MOSS**

1. What is your opinion concerning achieving Output 1?

Highly Satisfactory ⎕ Satisfactory ⎕ Marginally Satisfactory ⎕ Unsatisfactory ⎕

1. Why?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

**Output 2: MOSS new proposed structure submitted for decision-making**

1. Based on the above, what is your opinion concerning achieving Outcome 2?

Highly Satisfactory ⎕ Satisfactory ⎕ Marginally Satisfactory ⎕ Unsatisfactory ⎕

1. Why?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

**Output 3: Capacity development of key Ministry staff is institutionalized**

1. Based on the above, what is your opinion concerning achieving Outcome 3?

Highly Satisfactory ⎕ Satisfactory ⎕ Marginally Satisfactory ⎕ Unsatisfactory ⎕

1. Why?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

**Output 4: National accreditation and eligibility system for NGOs is in place**

1. Based on the above, what is your opinion concerning achieving Outcome 3?

Highly Satisfactory ⎕ Satisfactory ⎕ Marginally Satisfactory ⎕ Unsatisfactory ⎕

1. Why?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

**Output 5: More effective social protection system**

1. Based on the above, what is your opinion concerning achieving Outcome 3?

Highly Satisfactory ⎕ Satisfactory ⎕ Marginally Satisfactory ⎕ Unsatisfactory ⎕

1. Why?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

**Output 6: Bank Nasr evaluated**

1. Based on the above, what is your opinion concerning achieving Outcome 3?

Highly Satisfactory ⎕ Satisfactory ⎕ Marginally Satisfactory ⎕ Unsatisfactory ⎕

1. Why?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

**Overall assessment of the project:**

1. Based on the above, what is your overall all assessment of the project so far?

Highly Satisfactory ⎕ Satisfactory ⎕ Marginally Satisfactory ⎕ Unsatisfactory ⎕

1. Why?

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Questions to the Former Minister and Interviewees

**What are your main recommendations to?**

UNDP\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

MOSS\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Component Management

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

**How are these recommendations implemented?**

UNDP\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

MOSS\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Component Management

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Thank you foryour time and effort.

# Annex 7:Code of conduct signed by evaluators

United Nations Evaluation Group – Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System

Evaluation Consultants Agreement Form

To be signed by all consultants as individuals (not by or on behalf of a consultancy company) before a contract can be issued.

Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System

Name of Consultant: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Name of Consultancy Organization (where relevant): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.

Signed at ( ) on ( )

# Annex 8: Conditional Cash Transfer

Conditional cash transfer programs pay recipients in exchange for an action that brings private behavior closer to the social optimum. Rawlings and Rubio (2005) analyzed one such program in Mexico: Progresa that pays four million poor mothers to send their children to school and health visits. They concluded these programs can be made more efficient by selecting beneficiaries and calibrating transfers for maximum response per unit of transfer.[[82]](#footnote-82)

Several developing economies have recently introduced conditional cash transfer programs, which provide money to poor families contingent on certain behavior, usually investments in human capital, such as sending children to school or bringing them to health centers. The approach is both an alternative to more traditional social assistance programs and a demand-side complement to the supply of health and education services. Unlike most development initiatives, conditional cash transfer programs have been subject to rigorous evaluations of their effectiveness using experimental or quasi-experimental methods. Evaluation results for programs launched in Colombia, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Turkey reveal successes in addressing many of the failures in delivering social assistance, such as weak poverty targeting, disincentive effects, and limited welfare impacts. There is clear evidence of success from the first generation of programs in Colombia, Mexico, and Nicaragua in increasing enrollment rates, improving preventive health care, and raising household consumption. Many questions remain unanswered, however, including the potential of conditional cash transfer programs to function well under different conditions, to address a broader range of challenges among poor and vulnerable populations, and to prevent the intergenerational transmission of poverty.”[[83]](#footnote-83)

1. The Ministry of Supply existed since World War II to provide families with subsidized flour, rice, tea, sugar, cooking oil, and so forth. Later, domestic trade responsible for policing prices, and controlling State-run supermarkets, was an added responsibility to the Ministry of Supply. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs consists of the Authority for Social Insurance, which is responsible for pensions to the retired people; and Social Affairs to provide assistance to the needy. Nasser Social Bank (NSB) was part of the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. under Goal 1 Objective 3 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Egypt HDR 2005 discussed the means to this pro-poor social contract. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. UNDP and GoE (2006) Strengthening the Capacity of the Ministry of Social Solidarity, The Project Document, p. 5, Cairo, Egypt [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Using official data of the Greater Cairo Region (GDR) that the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) publishes, Sabry (2009, 2010) concluded that calculated poverty lines for GCR often under estimate and misrepresent poverty in the region. She reviewed the accuracy of Egypt’s various poverty lines, and data used to calculate these poverty lines; then questioned the validity of these poverty lines associated with the real costs of basic food and non-food needs in eight informal areas within GCR in 2008. She concluded that the incidence of poverty is considerably underestimated in GCR. According to Sabry, calculated poverty lines for GCR are set too low in relation to the costs of even the most basic of needs. She argued that the data collected using household survey that are used to compute poverty lines often under-represent people living in informal settlements -- and under-count the populations of informal settlements. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. According to Sen (1999) the core focus of the capability approach is on what individuals are able to do. The following are five interrelated parameters to decide whether an individual counts as poor: the importance of real freedoms to assess an individual’s advantage; his/her ability to transform resources into valuable activities; the multi-variate nature of activities giving rise to happiness; a balance of materialistic and non-materialistic factors in evaluating human welfare; and finally, the concern for distributing opportunities within a society. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Handoussa, Heba et al. (2005), Egypt Human Development Report 2005, UNDP and INP, Cairo, Egypt [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Sayed, Hussein Abdel-Aziz et al. (2010) Egypt’s Progress towards Achieving the Millennium Development Goals, 2010, p. 20, Ministry of Economic Development and UNDP, Cairo, Egypt. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. UNDP-Egypt, Egypt 2005 Human Development Report, Cairo, Egypt, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/national/arabstates/egypt/name,3335,en.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Ministry of Social Solidarity web site, <http://www.mss.gov.eg/MSS/ar-EG/> [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. MOSS website [www.moss.gov.eg](http://www.moss.gov.eg) [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. MOSS website [www.moss.gov.eg](http://www.moss.gov.eg) [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Barrientos, Armando (2010) “Social Protection and Poverty,” Social Policy and Development,. Special Events, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), <http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpPublications)/973B0F57CA78D834C12576DB003BE255?OpenDocument> [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Project document, sub-section II. Strategy, p.5 [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. This is qualitative research technique where the consultant grouped the interviewees, then asked them about their perceptions, opinions, beliefs and attitudes towards the services, the training, the refurbishing and retrofitting, and other interventions implemented within the overall framework of strengthening the capacities of MOSS. The consultant asked questions in an interactive group setting where participants were free to talk with other group members. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Interview with Ayman Hossam and the end report of Dr. A. Serry. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Interview with General Engineer A. Hammouda, who handed the consultant a report on efforts to structure MOSS [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. *al Jihaz al Markazi le al Tanzeem wa al Edara* [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. <http://www.ncscr.org.eg/Main.aspx?Module=Content&CategoryId=40> [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. End of the Egyptian fiscal year. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. *Mudiriya* [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Centers for Social Services provide social services, such as pensions, and supply services, such as issuing a food subsidy card to enable the poor to access subsidized food, such as rice and cooking oil. It is not clear how these centers now are functioning after the split of MOSS into the Ministry of Supply and Domestic Trade and the Ministry of Insurance and Social Services. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. *Tadamoun* 1 and 6 are applications that a poor household fill to request a food supply card, pension for the widow, pension for child support, etc. The Family File is a form that includes information on the household that is applying for services. It includes data on the residence, such as location, connection to piped water and sewerage networks, etc. and information concerning family members, such as number, age, sex, education and so forth. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Interview with Gen. Sherif Radwan [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Interview with Gen. Sherif Radwan [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Interview with Gen. Sherif Radwan [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Interview with Gen. Sherif Radwan [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Interview with Gen. Sherif Radwan [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. El Nakeeb, Anwar M. Impact Assessment of shifting food subsidy from in-kind to cash transfer programs Concept Note September 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Interview with Dahlia Qurtam; and her email sent on Nov. 13th, 2011 in response to the first draft of the evaluation report. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. an interview April 5th, 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Interview with Ms. Ghada Waly [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Not approved yet as a result of the January 25th Revolution [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Interview with Dr. Ali El-Moselhy [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. El Nakeeb, Anwar M. Impact Assessment of shifting food subsidy from in kind to cash transfer programs Concept Note September 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Interview with Ghada Waly [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Interview with Dr. Ali El-Moselhy [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Slater, Rachel and Farrington, John, “Cash Transfers: Targeting” ODI Project Briefings, No 27 November 2009 [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Interview with Dr. Ali El-Moselhy and Noha Kaptan [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Women Aid, “Capability Poverty Measure (CPM),” <http://www.womenaid.org/press/info/poverty/cpm.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. There is a wide range of pensions including, educational support, money for the elderly, money for the physically disabled, child support, etc. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Interview with Ayman Hossam [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Approximately 60 percent of the beneficiaries were females. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Approximately 60 percent of the beneficiaries were females. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Interview of Dr. Anwar El-Nakeeb [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Interview with, and presentations of Dr. Anwar El Nakeeb [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. This bread is round, 15-20 cms in diameter and 1-2 cms thick, and is backed with whole wheat. This bread is enriched with a thin layer of bran sprinkled on the lower layer. The loaves are sold individually, and come in different textures: soft, dry, and very dry. Egyptians scoop up various kinds of food using this bread. Very dry bread can be softened by wetting it under running water then passing it over a naked flame. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. El Nakeeb, Anwar M. Strategy of Food subsidy system Reform in Egypt (Balady Bread as an example) ECES workshop, “Price Subsidies in Egypt: Alternatives for Reform” Cairo, October 5, 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. An estimate of four million households use gas cylinders [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. One ton is about 80 gas cylinders, the weight per cylinder is about kg 12.5 [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. The Government provides many large-scale, capital intensive industries, such as fertilizers, cement and ceramics, subsidized energy. In many case, such as fertilizers, the factories get the natural gas as an input to the production process at a subsidized price. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. There is no information on how the questionnaire was prepared, and how samples were drawn. These two issues can affect the reported results. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. El Nakeeb, Anwar M. Strategy of Food subsidy system Reform in Egypt (Balady Bread as an example) ECES workshop, “Price Subsidies in Egypt: Alternatives for Reform” Cairo, October 5, 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. The results of this pilot might be misleading for number of reasons. First, the population of these two desert Governorates might not experience severe winter, such as that of the Governorates of the Nile Delta, and thus their use of gas cylinders for heating water is not representative to that of ht remaining areas of the country. Second, the population densities in these two Governorates are the lowest, and might not represent the patterns of demand and need as in The Nile Valley and Delta. Third, most of the populations of these Governorates live either in the city or in remote areas as nomads, which, once more, do not resemble the consumption patterns of the majority of Egyptians. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. He is an associate Professor of Economics, Sadat Academy, and economic advisor to the Minister. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. This is not the case of MOSS, but rather most of the cadres in public bodies, probably as a result of the education system that emphasizes rehearsing rather than reasoning and thinking critically. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. An institution, which The Ministry of Interior administers under the supervision of MOSS, where persons are confined for punishment and to protect the public. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Sayed, Hussein Abdel-Aziz et al Egypt’s Progress towards Achieving the Millennium Development Goals, 2010, Ministry of Economic Development and UNDP, Cairo, Egypt [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Interviews with Abdulsalam M. Sayed (NSB Madinet Nasr); Mohamed Omar (Deputy, Chairperson of the Board of NSB); Magdi M. Ghounami (Director, Planning and Follow-up, NSB);, Mohamed Saeed (Head, Financial Sector, NSB). [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Interviews with Abdulsalam M. Sayed (NSB Madinet Nasr); Mohamed Omar (Deputy, Chairperson of the Board of NSB); Magdi M. Ghounami (Director, Planning and Follow-up, NSB);, Mohamed Saeed (Head, Financial Sector, NSB). [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Interviews with Abdulsalam M. Sayed (NSB Madinet Nasr); Mohamed Omar (Deputy, Chairperson of the Board of NSB); Magdi M. Ghounami (Director, Planning and Follow-up, NSB);, Mohamed Saeed (Head, Financial Sector, NSB). [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Interviews with Abdulsalam M. Sayed (NSB Madinet Nasr); Mohamed Omar (Deputy, Chairperson of the Board of NSB); Magdi M. Ghounami (Director, Planning and Follow-up, NSB);, Mohamed Saeed (Head, Financial Sector, NSB). [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. According to M. Omar, Deputy to the Chairperson of NSB, this year there are two million Egyptian Pounds for training. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. عشماوى إبراهيم (دكتور) وأخرون، بنك ناصر، مشروع خطة العمل، المرحلة الاولى: الدراسة التشخيصية ؛2007

    عشماوى، إبراهيم (دكتور) وأخرون، بنك ناصر، مشروع خطة العمل، المرحلة الثانية: خطة العمل - اهم الاولويات والاصلاح والتطوير [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Interviews Mohamed Omar (Deputy, Chairperson of the Board of NSB); and, Mohamed Saeed (Head, Financial Sector, NSB). [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Handoussa, Heba et al. (2008), Egypt Human Development Report 2008, Institute for National Planning and UNDP-Egypt, Cairo, Egypt. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Evaluation Office (2009), Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for Results, UNDP, New York, NY. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Rawlings, Laura B., and Rubio, [Gloria M.](http://wbro.oxfordjournals.org/search?author1=Gloria+M.+Rubio&sortspec=date&submit=Submit)  “Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs,” World Bank Research Observer, Spring 2005, Volume 20, Issue 1, pp. 29-55 [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. de Janvry, Alain and Sadoulet, Elisabeth, “Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: Are They Really Magic Bullets?” June 2004 <http://are.berkeley.edu/~sadoulet/papers/ARE-CCTPrograms.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-83)