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# Evaluation of United Nations Electoral Support Team

# (UNEST) Project during the Electoral Cycle 2008 to 2012

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# ACRONYMS

AEC Australian Election Commission

BRIDGE Building Resources in Democracy Governance & Elections

CNE Commissão Nacional de Eleições

CTA Chief Technical Advisor

ECT Electoral Certification Team

EMB Electoral Management Body

EUEOM European Union Electoral Observation Mission

GoTL Government of Timor-Leste

NAM Needs Assessment Mission

PNTL Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste

PRO-PALOP Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa

STAE Technical Secretariat for the Electoral Administration TAM Technical Assessment Mission

UNAMET UN Assistance Mission to East Timor

UNEG United Nations Evaluation Group

UNEST United Nations Electoral Support Team

UNMIT United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste

UNTAET UN Transitional Administration in East Timor

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Both UNMIT and UNDP, through UNEST, played an important role in providing technical and operational support to the Timorese electoral authorities in managing, coordinating and ensuring peaceful community elections in 2009 and presidential and parliamentary elections in 2012.

All observer groups stated that the three electoral processes in 2012 were conducted efficiently and credibly in a peaceful atmosphere, with a minimum number of complaints and with the results widely accepted by all political parties. In addition there was a high voter turnout and a low percentage of invalid ballots. Observers also noted that the Timorese authorities and the UN took into account many recommendations from 2007.

UNEST also ensured systematic coordination of all UN inputs to the electoral programmes (UNMIT, UNDP, UN Women, UNICEF). The establishment of an integrated support team was in line with the UN policy “*Delivering as One*” whichemphasizes the importance of the continued support of the United Nations for long-term assistance in the electoral area.

With the support of UNEST, the electoral legal framework for the 2012 national elections was prepared, discussed and approved by the National Parliament and promulgated including the Law on the Electoral Administration Bodies, the Law on the election of the President of the Republic, and the Law on the election of the National Parliament, as well as all the relevant procedures, rules and regulations and codes of conduct. Further legal reform and assistance will be needed if municipal elections are to be held.

UN support (UNMIT, UNDP, UN Women) contributed greatly to supporting the Women’s Network in getting the women’s quota of one in three candidates must be a woman passed. With this quota, Timor-Leste’s National Parliament ranked among the countries with the highest women parliamentarian participation in Asia.

The National Commission on Elections (CNE) and the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE) were more generally more effective in 2012 than in previous elections. The coordination between the two institutions was improved and consolidated. Overall, the EMBs participated more actively in the preparations, planning and operations taking a leading role in the working groups and coordination mechanisms. The voter registration exercise produced an up to date complete voters’ list maintained in a centralised database that can be updated for future elections.

Voter education was highly visible and effective according to the high voter turnout and surveys. The voter education campaign also targeted women and youth in particular. Further civic education needs to conducted at community level especially before municipal elections and should remain a priority for the government and electoral management bodies in the future with less donor funding. In 2012, STAE organized awareness-raising activities for people with disabilities, youth and prisoners, which is an indicator of the progress of their professionalism and service-mindedness and should continue in future elections.

As part of a broader conflict prevention strategy initiated by CNE, key political parties signed a national pact for peaceful elections. At sub-national level, more than 500 male and female political party representatives benefitted from training provided by UNEST on legal framework, electoral disputes, code of conduct though the resource centres in five districts. Such initiatives and support contributed greatly to peaceful elections and should be continued in the lead up to the series of electoral events that will take place in the next electoral cycle.

UN electoral assistance should continue in the electoral cycle 2013 to 2017, although at a much reduced scale, through the UNDP Country Office, in collaboration or coordination with UN Women, UNICEF and non-UN electoral assistance providers to avoid duplication of efforts. All future electoral assistance should focus on consolidating the gains made from the previous cycle, supporting the electoral management bodies to take into account recommendations from holding a post-election review, modify their strategic plans and lobby for funding in between elections to continue capacity development with benchmarks built in, on sustainability and cost-effectiveness, and increasing public awareness through civic education.

# METHODOLOGY

The independent evaluator was in country, Timor-Leste, for 12 days, October 11 to 23, and conducted most interviews in Dili, with two field trips to districts Liquica (west) and Baucau (east).

The evaluator used a mixed method approach based on qualitative and quantitative data. This included a comprehensive desk review and design of open-ended interviews. Interviews were held with all key stakeholders including UNEST staff, CNE and STAE, civil society organisations, media, political parties, parliament, and donors. If persons were not physically accessible at the time of the evaluation, the evaluator attempted to contact relevant key interlocutors (e.g. the former Chief Technical Advisor).

Evaluations, post-election reviews, certification and observation reports from the 2007 elections served as a baseline to measure progress and improvements to-date since the last set of national elections.

The evaluator recognizes and protects the rights and confidentiality of informants for ethical reasons, according to the rules of the Code of Conduct adopted by UNEG (United Nations Evaluation Group).

The evaluation encompassed these main areas of assessment:

***Relevance*:** To what extent was the project design and implementation of activities able to respond to the Needs Assessment Mission (NAM), the mandate of UN electoral assistance and UNDP goals in Democratic Governance, as well as the recommendations from the 2007 elections observer reports, and related project evaluations from UN’s assistance? This section also looks at whether gender and other disadvantaged groups ́ needs were factored into the development of the ProDoc.

***Efficiency:*** To what extent did the project economically use resources at its disposal, including the efficacy of planned activities within the timeframe and budget for implementation? To what extent were resources used appropriately to produce the intended outputs? And to what extent were project funds, expertise and time used judiciously to achieve desired project outputs?

***Effectiveness:*** To what extent did the project activities yield expected outputs at the component level and contribute to expected outcomes?

***Impact:*** What was the project’s contribution to the preparations for and accomplishment of the community elections in 2008 and presidential and parliamentary elections in 2012, considering the project design and execution, and the UNEST cycle project activities in the four components? To what extent were gender, capacity development, and other crosscutting issues effectively mainstreamed and addressed in project design and development?

***Sustainability*:** To what extent are the improved systems, processes and capacities resulting from this project likely to benefit the EMBs particularly with a view to application for the next community elections, the possibility of municipal elections yet to be scheduled, and the next presidential and parliamentary elections in 2017?

In addition, the consultant assessed the adherence to core aid effectiveness principles such as national ownership and leadership, and outlined key lessons learned and best practices, as well as specific recommendations for participating partners and project stakeholders.

# POLITICAL CONTEXT

Unlike the 2001 Constituent Assembly election, which was organized to meet a UNTAET deadline and was the first nationwide ballot since the violence, and the 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary elections, which the first to run by Timorese electoral bodies but with significant UN support, the Timorese electoral bodies took the lead in organising and supervising the 2012 elections. The peaceful conduct of these elections without violence, followed by the successful formation of the Fifth Constitutional Government, seemed to have given a significant boost to Timor-Leste’s national confidence and sense of sovereignty.[[1]](#footnote-1)

The Constitution of Timor-Leste guarantees fundamental freedoms in conformity with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and other key international instruments. All Timorese, who are 17 years and above, have the right to vote.

The laws pertaining to the parliamentary and presidential elections were revised since the 2007 elections, in line with recommendations made by observer groups then, including the strengthening of CNE’s autonomy and the increase in women’s quota on the candidate lists (from one in every four slots to one in every three slots). The National Parliament has a five-year term, and the Constitution provides that the Parliament should have between 52 to 65 members. According to the Law on National Parliament Elections, the 65 members of Parliament are elected in one single national constituency, through a closed and blocked-list proportional representation system. All parties need to win at least 3 per cent of valid votes to gain representation in Parliament. The d’Hondt highest average formula is utilized for the allocation of seats.

The President has a five-year term that is renewable only once. An absolute majority elects the President in one single constituency. If no candidate gains over 50 per cent of the vote in the first round, a second round of voting takes place with two candidates who earned the highest number of votes in the first round.

# PROJECT DESCRIPTION

In the previous electoral cycle, from 2002 to 2007, the UN Mission and UNDP worked together but due to different structures this resulted in some degree of confusion for STAE, CNE and the rest of the UN family.[[2]](#footnote-2) By 2008, following some examples from other missions such as Afghanistan and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where the electoral team integrated staff from UN agencies and UNDP, and with agreement from national stakeholders, the UNMIT and UNDP created an integrated electoral component, United Nations Electoral Support Team (UNEST) under the DSRSG/RC, which would still remain under the overall guidance of UNEAD. A Memorandum of Understanding between UNMIT and UNDP was signed in May 2010, which clearly delineated contributions of staff, office space and equipment and what needed to be returned to its respective UN agency.

By all accounts from the UN and partners the activities were conducted during this electoral cycle:

Table 1: Activities in the Electoral Calendar for the period 2008 - 2012

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 2008 | * Update of the voters’ database and voters registration.
* Voters Registration Exhibition and Challenges Process.
* Revision of the existing electoral laws, procedures, rules and regulations at suco level (village & hamlet elections).
* Draft electoral laws and procedures for processes where they do not exist (for example Municipal elections and referendum and procedures for political parties funding).
 |
| 2009 | * Update for the voters database and voters registration, voters registration abroad.
* Continuation of the revision of the electoral laws, rules, regulations and procedures, focused on the Suco and Municipal elections.
* Preparation and organization of Suco elections.
 |
| 2010 | * Update for the voters data base and voters registration,
* Support STAE with the proposal for voters’ registration abroad.
* Continuation of the revision of the electoral laws, rules, regulations and procedures, focused on national elections parliamentarian and presidential referendum.
* Preparation and organization of the first phase of the Municipal elections
* Preparation and organization of the second phase of the Municipal elections
 |
| 2011 | * Update for the voters database and voters registration, voters registration abroad.
* Continuation of the revision of the electoral laws, rules, regulations and procedures, focused on national elections parliamentarian and presidential, referendum.
* Preparation and planning of the national elections (Presidential & Parliamentarian)
 |
| 2012 | * Update for the voters database and voters registration, voters registration abroad.
* Continuation of the revision of the electoral laws, rules, regulations and procedures, focused on national elections parliamentarian and presidential, referendum.
* Plan, preparation and organization, of the national elections (Presidential &Parliamentarian)
 |

# RELEVANCE

After the 2007 elections the expectations of the EMBs of heavy assistance by UN needed to be managed. This focus shifted in 2008, underlining the need to move past the provision of ‘hard’ assistance in the post-election period onto ‘softer’ support to institutional development and support to the electoral processes and laws.[[3]](#footnote-3) The project design was framed as ‘Electoral Cycle Support’ to reflect this institution building and institutionalising processes aiming for a more sustainable approach reducing dependency on international assistance. A UN Needs Assessment Mission conducted in February 2011 in response to a request for support to 2012 elections. The three main project components (a fourth coordinating international assistance) were relevant in strengthening CNE and STAE, supporting the legal reform process including gender equality and supporting political parties and their representatives in the districts in the lead up to the campaign.

Recommendations from various international observer reports, the UN certification team and post-election reviews from 2007 elections were factored into the project support.

# EFFICIENCY

Following the UN policy “Delivering as One” *[[4]](#footnote-4)*, UNEST was designed with the express purpose to emphasize the importance of the continued support of the United Nations for long-term assistance in the electoral area to help build the democratic system of Timor-Leste, strengthen the capacity of the national electoral institutions. The UNEST plan was designed to present a united front to the national stakeholders as well as donors and to enhance the effectiveness of UN assistance.[[5]](#footnote-5)

Figure 1: Coordination and Reporting Lines

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | UNMIT - DSRSGUNDP - Resident Representative |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| UNMITDirector, Democratic Governance Support Unit |  |  | UNDPHead of Governance Unit |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Chief Technical AdviserUN Integrated Electoral Support Team |  |  |

Figure 2: Project Management Unit

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | UNDPChief Technical Adviser |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| UNDP Project Manager |  |  | UNMIT Coordinator ofElectoral Advisory Team |

According to the project document, all advisers working on the project should be physically co-located in the current UNDP Electoral project office in Dili. This office provides the necessary space for the integrated team. The UNMIT advisers would have to move from UN HQ to join them. This will greatly enhance coordination, communication, common planning and team morale.[[6]](#footnote-6) The gender balance and diversity in UNEST has been exemplary.

According to most interlocutors, especially UN, this worked very well. The solidarity among UNEST staff was clear. In fact it was difficult to tell who was under an UNMIT or UNDP contract, a clear indicator of a well-integrated unit. Although the balance of time spent in each institution depended upon the respective adviser and his or her work plan, the starting point was to spend 70% in the EMB and 30% in Management Unit. While this makes sense in UN terms that staff report back and have internal meetings and necessary administrative functions to perform. Both CNE and STAE said that they would have preferred that the UN Advisors would have spent more time mentoring and transferring of skills. This was particularly the case in the district as the conditions of these CNE/STAE offices lacked internet and made it difficult for UN Advisors to access information and updates and so they needed to spend some time at UN District offices becoming a *de facto* communication conduit. The lesson learned is that if CNE and STAE had better facilities in transport and communication then this would have meant less dependency on UN in these areas and UN advisors could have focused more on capacity development.

# EFFECTIVENESS

The **original outcomes** of the project were as follows:

* Improved institutional capacity of STAE and CNE to ensure elections are carried out in a free, fair, well-administered and credible manner;
* Increased capacity of civil society and political parties in the democratic process;
* High-level voter turnout especially women and young people.

Given the shift to the inter-election period, these outcomes were updated through this project document revision to focus on the longer-term capacities and processes.

The **proposed revised outcomes** of the project are as follows:

* Enhanced capacity of the STAE and CNE to fulfil their administrative and supervisory mandates
* Laws and processes that enhance participation and free, fair and credible elections
* Improved political party institutional capacity, tolerance and communication[[7]](#footnote-7)

This was a clear shift from an event-driven to process-driven electoral cycle approach.[[8]](#footnote-8)

##  OUTCOME 1: ENHANCED CAPACITY OF ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS—CNE AND STAE

**Outputs:** Strategic planning and implementation, capacity development, professional exchange and study tours

**Indicators:** Assessment from other stakeholders and observation reports, evaluation of BRIDGE trainings; study tour reports; quality of the organization of the election

**Baseline:** Certification and observation reports from 2007 elections

**Target:**

### Overall Effectiveness

The National Electoral Commission (CNE in Portuguese) and the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE), have been considerably strengthened since the 2007 elections, which were the first to be conducted by the Timorese authorities. STAE was given technical, administrative and financial autonomy under a 2011 amendment to the 2006 law on EMBs, and both institutions were given more funds allowing them to recruit more national staff and to train them better. Although the UN has been progressively taking a back seat, it still provided substantial technical and logistical support to the Timorese EMBs, especially through the United Nations Electoral Support Team (UNEST), an *ad hoc* UN entity created to coordinate the electoral sections of UNDP and the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) in the country.[[9]](#footnote-9)

Relations between the CNE, an independent, collegial body, tasked with supervisory and regulatory duties, adjudicating election-‐related complaints, and national tabulation, and the STAE, an administrative structure within the Ministry of State Administration in charge of the administration of elections, have often been difficult, presidential election CNE had, in two instances, to seek legal remedy in the Court of Appeal because it felt that STAE was preventing it from performing its supervisory role. These tensions re-emerged during the final stage of the parliamentary election as a result of ballot recounts from two polling centres.[[10]](#footnote-10)

International observers concluded that both STAE and CNE managed to perform their complementary duties well. STAE organised all steps of the election in an efficient and generally timely manner, despite the logistical challenges posed by Timor such as communications and transport infrastructure. For its part, CNE actively supervised STAE ́s election preparations, adjudicated complaints in the prescribed manner and ensured that the national tabulation process was fully transparent. CNE, therefore, fulfilled its constitutionally‐mandated task of independently supervising the activities of STAE. More importantly, the neutrality of neither institution was seriously challenged by the candidates running in the parliamentary election.[[11]](#footnote-11)

The following table shows a specific recommendations made by the UN Certification Team in 2007 and the evaluation of those efforts by UNEST to address them by 2012.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **2007** | **2012** |
| STAE be removed from the jurisdiction of the Minister and Ministry for State Administration, and made directly answerable to CNE, with directions from CNE only channelled through its President to the Director of STAE. | In 2012 the Chief of STAE was appointed Secretary of State Administration after the election, which raised suspicion of a perceived lack of impartiality. |
| STAE and CNE are guaranteed staffing and budgetary independence, for example by positioning their budget items in the parliamentary budget. | STAE’s budget continues to come from State Administration |
| The considerable store of existing capacity in the country needs to be recognised. CNE and STAE have just successfully conducted three electoral operations in challenging circumstances, due in no small measure to the skills of their staff. The challenge for them is to consolidate the skills of their senior staff and to provide the opportunity for those staff to transfer those skills to more recent recruits.  | STAE has clearly proved its competence and credibility, yet still with significant UN support. In future projects, UN support should be minimized to allow both CNE and STAE to grow in self-sufficiency further. Both organizations need funding to develop capacity (i.e. of new staff in between elections and not just have a budget for electoral events.) |
| The conduct of elections is a sovereign responsibility of Timor-Leste, and the substantial willingness of the government and Parliament to meet those responsibilities, in particular by meeting core election costs from the State Budget, is to be commended.  | While Timorese government has continued its responsibility to fund the organization of electoral events, some ‘soft’ areas such as training and civic education or in between election activities remain somewhat donor-dependent. |
| Future electoral developments need to be local-led and focused. It is essential that electoral functions be taken on by Timorese officers, rather than being *de facto* outsourced. This is especially the case in relation to the legal framework for elections: the policy prescriptions set down in laws and regulations must come from, and be fully understood by, Timorese policymakers. The role of foreign advisers should be specifically that of providing advice to illuminate the policy-making process: they should always work through their Timorese counterparts.  | While national ownership was tangible the challenge remains to find qualified and competent national lawyers who could advise CNE, STAE and Court of Appeals. Either there are not enough qualified lawyers or they are working in other areas of government, private sector or abroad. Many UNEST advisors lamented the fact that there were few legal counterparts to work with. |
| No element of the recent electoral processes is so defective that it needs to be recreated from scratch. Change should be incremental, building on what already exists.  | UNEST supported existing institutions and legal framework. |
| Large scale support for transient electoral events should be avoided: in its place, smaller scale but consistent support should be provided for the consolidation of permanent electoral institutions, thereby reducing the need for unsustainable and costly interventions, and avoiding the risk that local initiative will be overwhelmed. Support should also be carefully targeted to priority areas. Every effort should be made to move away from “stop-start funding”. To enhance national capacity, efforts should be made to support STAE and CNE through the deployment of competent national staff, as is being done in some other areas of government, rather than relying only on international advisers.  | The electoral cycle approach helped continuity of funding and clearly CNE/STAE had national ownership of the electoral process. The number of advisors at national and district level was relatively high mostly in response to a request from STAE for support and as CNE was relatively new. In comparison to other integrated UN electoral support such as Liberia the number of staff per capita was quite high and probably not needed to that extent. |
| STAE and CNE should be supported in maintaining long-term cooperative relationships with election management bodies in other countries. | This was done through extensive study tours to eight countries and through the PRO-PALOP project |
| (2008) Finally, the period following an election should not be considered as “down time”, but as the ideal time for CNE, STAE and their staff members to document lessons learnt, and develop long-term strategic plans.  | The electoral cycle approach allowed post-election review after 2007 and 2009 but not 2012. The down time was a period used with support for UNEST also with *suco* elections as further consolidation of experience. Further post-election reviews after 2012 elections would be valuable to modify strategic plans. |

### Commission of National Elections (CNE)

In 2007 there were new commissioners appointed whose role was to monitor the electoral process and in particular the complaints and also provide civic education. The secretariat was built up over a period of four years from 2007 to 2011 with support from advisors on legal, IT, management and administration, electoral monitoring and civic education. The State provided the budget but UNEST provided international advisors and national focal points for each district. CNE as an institution was strengthened through a capacity development programme to bring it up to the same level as STAE, which had been established much longer since 2002.

The needs identified for CNE included general management putting in place systems and processes, office administration and financial management, internal communications with IT, Portuguese language lessons especially as the laws are in Portuguese, and also support in monitoring complaints and conducting civic education.

CNE supervised the community elections in 2009 and national elections in 2012. The commissioners gained valuable experience and the secretariat was strengthened in this period. CNE’s increase in credibility as perceived by all interlocutors is an indication that the institution has grown professionally and acts with integrity. With the possibility that that a number of new commissioners will be appointed in 2013, it will important to capture lessons learned for institutional memory or facilitate a handover workshop especially as the UN advisors have left at the end of the current project.

In terms of office management, the systems and process were put in place and CNE will have to maintain these to ensure continued and effective running of the institution. In other areas, CNE has grown in confidence in designing their own civic education programmes and material but would still need some support in graphic design. The UN legal and complaints advisors had built a considerable amount of capacity within CNE over the period but said that further support would be needed especially in legal matters due to the lack of legal expertise in Portuguese within CNE.

According to observer reports, CNE actively supervised STAE’s election preparations, adjudicated complaints in the prescribed manner and ensured that the national tabulation process was fully transparent. CNE, therefore, fulfilled its mandate of independently supervising the activities of STAE.[[12]](#footnote-12)

### Technical Secretariat of Electoral Administration (STAE)

STAE developed a strategic plan for the electoral cycle 2007–2012. UNEST supported this achievement. The elections operational plan was drafted in English then translated into Portuguese and Tetum and disseminated among staff. Next time STAE could follow the same format and process but draft their strategic plan directly into Portuguese.

STAE had proven that they could organise the community elections in 2009 successfully and that the national elections in 2012 became a real test for national ownership. They followed a tight schedule and the budget allocated was sufficient for running costs and events but still supported by UNEST and donor funding.

STAE was given technical, administrative and financial autonomy under a 2011 amendment to the 2006 law on EMBs, and given more funds allowing them to recruit more national staff and to train them better. UN still provided substantial technical and logistical support to STAE and took more of a lead than in 2007 elections. According to observer reports, STAE organised all steps of the election in an efficient and generally timely manner, despite the logistical challenges posed by Timor-Leste’s communications and transport infrastructure.[[13]](#footnote-13)

UNEST supported STAE’s debriefing with district coordinators in April 2012 after the first round of presidential elections that aimed a correcting any irregularities that had arisen. For example, STAE reviewed its policies on the orientation of voting compartments in the light of observer reports. The polling station layout changes flowing from that review have made it significantly more difficult for voters to make surreptitious attempts to photograph their marked ballot papers. This is an indication that STAE has the capacity and the credibility to review its own policies and address any shortcomings in the process in a transparent manner. One exception being when STAE refused to provide CNE with the original polling centre results forms that led to CNE lodging a complaint to the Court of Appeals and STAE was ordered to comply. In future if STAE allowed copies of signed results sheets to be given to party agents present this would enhance the transparency of the process and mitigate suspicion.

### Capacity Development

Capacity development for both CNE and STAE was a blend ranging from advisors mentoring staff as counterparts on a day-to-day basis also gaining hands-on experience from community and national elections, to structured courses in a series of workshops like BRIDGE conducted by PALOP and AEC, to study tours which have exposed a few senior staff of CNE and STAE to electoral processes and practice in other countries.

Mentoring and on-the-job learning was the main focus of UNEST capacity development strategy and selecting eh right UN advisors with language skills was essential for this approach to work. While UN advisors had the technical knowledge, electoral experience and spoke either Portuguese or Indonesian they did not have specific training on mentoring and how to transfer skills effectively to counterparts. One recommendation could be to train UN advisors with their counterparts on skills needed for mentoring and to get the best from your mentor.

With BRIDGE the evaluations were positive especially about the interactive methodology though some CNE and STAE staff mentioned that the workshops were not always customised, somewhat generic in nature enhancing comparative understanding of best practices in electoral processes but not as useful in applying knowledge or skills in their day-to-day work. Senior staff said they befitted from the study tours and it certainly exposed them to new ideas particularly to new technology.

Without reports of the tour or any follow up, it is difficult to evaluate whether these study tours have an impact or remain incentives for travel. Some district CNE and STAE staff complained that they never got the opportunity to go on study tours and it was always senior staff at HQ who went.

### Electoral Management Bodies at District Level

CNE at district level had good relations with UNEST advisors who were co-located in the CNE office and relied on them for communications and transportation to the sub-districts. UNVs helped conduct training of monitoring officers allocated to the polling centres. UNVs also helped explain Portuguese law that would have been difficult without such support. Without the UN vehicles CNE said they would find it more difficult to conduct their work on motorcycles.[[14]](#footnote-14)

STAE at district level also valued the support from UNEST but also stated that due to road conditions the UN advisors did not always want to go to the sub-districts. Some UN advisors also felt like they were drivers rather than advisors. The lack of internet in STAE offices meant that UN advisor spent more time in the UN district office to get information and respond to emails than with their counterparts. Communication and transportation are essential elements for both CNE and STAE to function effectively and conduct activities. While UN advisors played a key role in supporting CNE and STAE in the districts, a reliance on communication and transport can detract from the mentoring and capacity development. It is clear that further strengthening of both CNE and STAE is needed at district level in addition to resources in transport. Perhaps in a future project to increase national ownership further, national UNVs could support district offices with guidance from a couple of internationals based in Dili, who could be mobile in covering all districts for specific guidance or training covering all districts.

## OUTCOME 2: ELECTORAL LAWS AND PROCESSES THAT ENHANCE PARTICIPATION AND FREE, FAIR AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS

**Outputs:**

**Indicator:** Number of amendments made to improve the law in a timely manner; voter turnout statistics (including women and youth); number of voter/civic education spots/posters distributed, impact assessment

**Baseline:** Electoral law 2007, voter turnout 2007, community elections voter turnout 2009;

**Target:**

The Certification Team in 2007 recommended that all legal prescriptions relating to elections be consolidated into a single law or code. The consolidation process needs input from STAE and CNE, who have the best understanding in the country of the practical implications of the various legal prescriptions already in place. The Team recommended that a process be put in place for preventing last minute changes to the legal framework.[[15]](#footnote-15)

With the support of UNEST, the electoral legal framework for the 2012 national elections was prepared, discussed, amended and approved by the National Parliament and promulgated by the President in June 2011 in addition to updated regulations and procedures. Following recommendations the legal framework was amended in adequate time for preparations for 2012 elections.

In addition to the Constitution of Timor-Leste, the applicable legal framework related to elections in Timor-Leste is as follows:

* Law No. 6/2011 of 22 June 2011, the first amendment to Law No. 5/2006 of 28 December 2006 regulates the status and mandate of the electoral management bodies, the CNE and STAE, of Timor-Leste;
* Law No.1/2012 Law No. is the third amendment to Law No. 6/2006 of 28 December 2006, regulating the National Parliament election;
* Law 7/2006 regulating presidential elections has been amended by 3 laws (8/2011, 2/2012 and 7/2012).
* Regulation on the presentation of candidates for the election of deputies for the National Parliament (No.01/STAE/X/2011);
* Regulation on the presentation of candidates for the election of the President of the Republic (No. 02/STAE/X/2011);
* Regulation on the electoral campaign for the Presidential and Parliamentary elections (No. 03/STAE/X/2011); there is a fourth Regulation 04/STAE/X/2011 on the Voting, Counting and Tabulation Procedures for the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections;
* Various Codes of Conduct for political parties and party coalitions, candidates, national and international observers, party agents and the media.

The main amendments approved included:

* An increase in women’s quota for parliamentary elections that one in three candidates must be a woman which helped increased women’s representation which was already relatively high at 29 per cent to 38 per cent in parliament;
* the use of voters ID card, national ID card or passport provided that the voter is registered in the voter database;
* polling only at the place of registration which caused some problems for some voters; polling from 7am to 3pm; an increase in the number of polling staff from 5 to 10; counting of ballots at the polling centre;
* polling in prisons and hospitals which was successfully conducted through use of mobile polling stations;
* one Special Prosecutor appointed by the Public Prosecutor Office and three judges appointed by the Supreme Court to deal with electoral offences.

According to observer reports these amendments contributed to improving the electoral process.

Voter registration and polling abroad though now in the law were not implemented in 2012 and a feasibility study is recommended to assess the capacity, infrastructure and operational and financial costs to implement this provision.

### Gender Equality and Women’s Representation

The formal steps taken by successive governments of Timor-Leste to increase the representation of women in Parliament are commendable and fully in line with commitments contained in the Constitution and in the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which Timor-Leste has ratified. The prominent role played by women in Parliament and other spheres of public life since independence is evidence that this and similar policies have had a positive effect. However, an element of formality still attaches to the legal requirement that women fill every third place on party candidate lists. A more concerted and systematic effort by government and civil society to inform women of the opportunities that are open to them and how they can take advantage of them could give real momentum to this initiative.[[16]](#footnote-16)

UN support (UNMIT, UNDP, UN Women) contributed greatly to supporting the Women’s Network in getting the women’s quota passed. This policy maintained that one in every three candidates must be a woman as opposed to one in every four candidates as in earlier elections. With this quota, Timor-Leste’s National Parliament ranked among the countries with the highest women parliamentarian participation in Asia.[[17]](#footnote-17)

In the 2012 National Parliament election, women gained 38 per cent of the 65 seats in Parliament compared to 29 per cent in 2007. The number of women appointed to senior government positions has also increased significantly. From 2007 to 2012 there was a 100% increase of women in the government as Ministers, Vice-Ministers and Secretaries of State.

The lack of gender balance in STAE teams was a concern raised in the presidential elections, but this was addressed in the recruitment process for Parliamentary elections. During the process of the approval of the electoral regulations, UNEST advisors proposed alternative wording to establish a minimum percentage of female polling staff to STAE, but the proposal was not accepted.[[18]](#footnote-18)

A number of other initiatives by UNEST that targeted gender equality and women’s representation included two BRIDGE workshops on Gender and Elections were held in 2010 also a Booklet on Women’s Participation in the 2009 Community Elections was published to promote more women to participate in future elections as there are only 10 women village chiefs out of 442.

### Voter Registration

The Certification Team in 2007 recommended that the timetable for updating the register of voters be reviewed and clarified, so as to maximise the effectiveness of the updating process. Consideration should be given to the possibility of updating the register during a fixed period which is the same every year; in the long term this would enhance the voters’ understanding of the registration process, and of their rights and obligations, and would also make the process easier to plan and implement. The Certification Team recommended that such a timetable include provision for a truly effective exhibition and challenges process, and that that process be properly resourced. The Team also recommended that a well-publicised and comprehensive exhibition and challenges process take place before any further voter registration cards are issued.[[19]](#footnote-19)

As a result of UNDP IT support, operational and planning advice and help with a public information campaign, UNEST quite laudably produced a complete voters list by 2011.

The exhibition and challenges process of the voters’ list took place from June 1 to 12 2010. Voters had a chance to verify their information and make complaints to change any data if errors were found. Despite short notice a high number of voters would turn up for the exercise of checking their data indicating that the village chiefs were effective in conveying the information to the communities.

There were also concerns with the requirement faced by some voters to travel to their place of registration in order to vote. The government did provide extra transport in some cases, but in others it was clear that voters had few or no options for returning to their place of registration in order to vote. This was particularly noticeable for voters returning to Oecusse, some of who found themselves stuck at the border at Batugade with no available transport.[[20]](#footnote-20)

### Civic and Voter Education

The division of tasks between the two bodies charged with electoral administration is mirrored in the assignment of responsibility for civic education to CNE and for voter education to STAE. In the pre-election period, CNE stopped its on-going civic education programme and STAE resumed its voter education sessions at village level. Using PowerPoint presentations, instruction videos and sample ballots, STAE explained in Tetum and sometimes also in local languages the differences between the Presidential and the Parliamentary elections, and the procedures for marking and casting ballots.

EU observers reported that due to being familiar with voting procedures from voter education activities before the presidential election the Timorese were less interested for the parliamentary elections. Voter education sessions often had to be postponed or cancelled due to low attendance.

In addition, CNE adopted the innovative approach of informing voters through mobile phone SMS about such matters as their right to file complaints and the prohibition on further campaigning during the two days leading up to the election. Despite the apparent lack of interest in voter education programmes, on election day voters’ understanding of voting procedures was evaluated by EU observers as good or outstanding in 86% of the polling stations observed, a finding that was supported by a sizeable decrease in the share of invalid votes compared to the first round of the Presidential election whose complexity was similar to that of the Parliamentary election.[[21]](#footnote-21)

Several civil society organisations offered voter education programmes specifically targeted at women. Civic education needs to go deeper to sub-district and suco level through CNE via CSOs and volunteers.

In terms of sustainability, the archive of civic and voter education material is well organised and can be re-cycled with modifications. Through some training provided, STAE does have skills on developing the concept and the message for voter education, can use basic photoshop ‘cut and paste’ from existing images and materials (banners. posters, etc.) but would still need professional assistance on a needs basis for layout and effective design which could also be outsourced.

Vox Populi[[22]](#footnote-22), or Voice of the People survey, provided evidence that the Timorese population is very familiar and comfortable with the voting procedures but less so on right to complain. It would be important for CNE/STAE to continue Vox Populi to gauge how to pitch their civic/voter education material for upcoming suco and municipal elections.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *Survey question* | *Yes* | *No* |
| Did the geographic unit (suco) affect participation?  | 76.9% | 23.1% |
| Did you witness vote buying? | 12.2%  | 87.8% |
| Were voter education materials visible? | 81%  | 19.5 |
| Was there useful information in materials? | 84.9%  | 15.1%  |
| Did you see voter education on TV / radio / newspapers ? | 44.8% | 36.3% | 19% |  |
| Did you receive SMS from STAE/CNE? | 80.5%  | 19.5% |
| Were you aware of voting procedures? | 88.3% | 11.7% |
| Were disabled voters accommodated? | 89%  | 11% |
| Were you free to choose? | 95.3% |  |
| Was voting process transparent? | 92.5% |  |

Based on these survey results, the voter education materials and SMS campaign seem to have been widely seen and received contributing to the general understanding of voting procedures and confidence building.

### Voters with Disabilities

As part of the voter education campaign in 2012, STAE for the first time organized awareness raising activities for people with disabilities in collaboration with relevant organizations.[[23]](#footnote-23) Assisting blind voters compromises the secrecy of their vote and STAE has not yet found a solution such as Braille device so blind voters relies on someone they trust to assist them. A number of participants who attended the training also applied to become national observers. Such awareness raising of being service-minded to all voters equally is highly commendable and CNE and STAE should include this aspect in civic education and training activities for future elections. The *Vox Populi* survey found that 89 per cent of voters perceived that disabled voters were accommodated but in talking to representatives of civil society organizations dealing with disability, more needs to be done and CNE and STAE could look at this issue in a post-election review and consult with these groups to address their needs further.

### STAE also organised with support from UNEST mobile stations so that all Timorese citizens, such as prisoners and hospital patients could exercise their right to vote as per the amendment to the law.

STAE with joint support from UNEST and UNICEF also targeted young and first time voters through posters, civic education sessions at schools and youth centres, TV and radio spots and activities through youth parliament.

## OUTCOME 3: POLITICAL PARTIES’ INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY STRENGTHENED AND A MORE TOLERANT POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT PROMOTED

**Output:** Training on laws, dispute resolution, IT skills (email, drafting, etc.) and Portuguese language

**Indicator:** Timelines for establishing or re-opening resource centres;

**Baseline:** Capacity of existing political parties in 2007

**Target:** Increased capacity by 2012

### Political Parties

EU noted that oversight of voting and counting procedures was facilitated by a strong presence of party agents and domestic observers in the vast majority of polling stations observed. However, the mostly passive conduct of party agents indicates that there is considerable room for improvement in preparing them for their duties.[[24]](#footnote-24)

According to another international observer report[[25]](#footnote-25), at a number of polling stations, the clear distinction between the roles of political party representatives and staff of the election administration were sometimes blurred. Party agents were also reported to be otherwise active participants in the electoral process such as playing an especially overt role in guiding voters through the polling process; recording in a ledger book the names and identity card numbers of some voters; attempting to instruct polling station officials as to their role. Clearly further training on the role of party agents is needed and in future sanctions enforced to deter such irregularities.

Political party representatives interviewed stated that the District Resource Centres (DRC) in Baucau had positive benefits and that they received useful training especially in computer training, in English and Portuguese language ethics, and the electoral law. The shortcoming of the DRC was that it was too small. Only three representatives per party could attend and only a short time was allocated for training. They needed transport to conduct cascade training at suco level.

According to the *Vox Populi* survey, 60 per cent of citizens felt they were well informed about the programs and the governing plans of the political parties and candidates, while 40 per cent did not. Further, 54 per cent knew of their right to file a complaint, while 46 per cent did not.[[26]](#footnote-26)

Perhaps the 46 per cent of citizens who did not understand the governing plans of the political parties and candidates suggests that more assistance is needed in helping political parties to develop their platform, their campaign and how to communicate their message more effectively.

In general the political parties interviewed said that they thought technically CNE and STAE had conducted the elections well. One major party made a complaint about STAE to CNE, as there was no copy of district tabulation results and therefor lacked transparency.

Political parties interviewed considered the UNEST-supported training highly valuable and much needed but too short, only one day and only three representatives per political party could attend. Certificates were a good incentive for representatives to attend the training. In Baucau the training of party agents made a difference but not all districts received the same level training or access to a DRC. The party representatives also commented that many of them need further understanding of the laws and regulations, which are in Portuguese and translated unofficially into Tetum, in particular how to make a complaint and the role of a fiscal regarding what they can and cannot do. In terms of gender representation the party coordinator had to choose two men and one woman to attend such trainings. They also suggested that it would be better to train party representatives before the political campaign period starts and not during this busy time for political parties. The communication strategy needs multiple approaches from informal email to formal invitations as not everyone has IT access or skills.

They also suggested that candidates are given more notice to complete documents. UNDP with partners could organise more dialogue forums or roundtables to discuss issues and not just training. In future UNDP should coordinate with CNE on any training on civic education and electoral law for party agents before campaign; code of conduct, making complaints tabulation.

Many parties at district level lack the basic resources and facilities. While it is not the role of UNDP to support parties in this regard in the future and nor is it sustainable, but UNDP can contribute to enabling a fairer playing field by ensuring that through CNE/STAE and other relevant institutions the legal framework, regulation, procedures and forms are understood by political parties equally.

Observers recommend that CNE intensify its training and workshops for prospective party agents, with a special focus on counting and tabulation procedures and the filing of complaints at polling stations and tabulation centres.[[27]](#footnote-27)

### 6.3.2 Conflict Prevention

On February 28 2012, CNE launched a Peaceful Elections campaign as part of a broader conflict prevention strategy and was supported by UNMIT and UNDP. The main aims of the strategy were to promote open dialogue and democratic values, encourage tolerance and generate legitimacy by including all key stakeholders. The National Pact for Peaceful Elections signed by all relevant political actors on the day before the presidential campaign contributed a peaceful atmosphere, with a minimum number of complaints and with the results widely accepted by all political parties.

According to observers, there were no reports of other than the most minor political or other violence or intimidation leading up to or on the day of the ballot. The peaceful and positive conduct of the parliamentary pre-election campaign period set a new benchmark for the standard of political conduct in Timor-Leste, and augurs well for the further embedding of its democratic process.[[28]](#footnote-28) Without UNMIT’s presence the PNTL will have increased responsibility to ensure security during election time, so further training of the police on civil and political rights could contribute to understanding the roles and responsibilities of all the key stakeholders.

## 6.4 OUTCOME 4: ELECTORAL COORDINATION & MANAGEMENT OF DONOR SUPPORT

**Outputs:**

**Indicator:** Level of satisfaction of donors and assistance providers, regularity of meetings and reporting.

**Baseline:** Status andlevel of coordination and management of donor support in 2007

**Targets:** UN Delivering as One and effective coordination with other assistance providers to avoid duplication

UNEST also ensured systematic coordination of all UN inputs to the electoral programmes (UNMIT, UNDP, UN Women, UNICEF). The establishment of an integrated support team was in line with the UN policy “*Delivering as One*” whichemphasizes the importance of the continued support of the United Nations for long-term assistance in the electoral area.

CNE, STAE and UNEST conducted regular donor coordination meetings. Some of the key meetings were the donor coordination and project steering committee held in March 2010 with all donors and other international organizations involved in electoral assistance. The main objective was to evaluate electoral assistance provided so far and to explore future areas of support. In November 2010, this was followed up with a donors coordination meeting in the presidential palace with the president, all the donors and international organisations. The objective of this key meeting was to assess the status of preparation for 2012 elections including the needs and requirements of CNE and STAE and to identify the main challenges. A month later, at a steering committee meeting chaired by CNE, STAE and UNDP presented the annual work plan and the financial situation of the project.

All the donors and international organisations interviewed for this evaluation were satisfied with UN’s effective coordination of electoral assistance from 2008 to 2012.

The EU/UNDP joint project of PALOP (African Countries of Portuguese Official Language) has a main objective of contributing to the democratic processes of the PALOP countries and Timor-Leste, through specific support targeted to electoral processes, parliaments and the media. UNEST facilitated this joint activity that provided an opportunity of sharing experiences between PALOP countries and Timor-Leste and a series of workshops in Portuguese on registration, strategic planning, media and elections, observers and a training facilitators. Key members of CNE and STAE attended an EC/UNDP joint workshop in Brussels on formulating and implementing electoral assistance projects.

The Australian Election Commission also collaborated with CNE and STAE in conducting BRIDGE modules, such as Introduction of Electoral Administration, Civic Education and Gender and Elections.

IRI continued their partnership with UNEST and collaborated effectively on training of political parties in all districts from September to November 2011.

UN Women collaborated with UNEST to support Timorese stakeholders on gender workshops and the strategic plan for gender equality. Likewise, UNICEF partnered with UNEST to support STAE in a voter education campaign targeting youth and first time voters.

In general coordination was effective, but training activities and workshops could have been coordinated between UNEST, CNE, STAE, PALOP and AEC. UN Woman also noted that better coordination of gender workshops would be a lesson for next time. One of the difficulties of coordination is that different agencies and organisations have their own calendar of workshops and different funding that could lead to either duplication or workshop fatigue with the same institutions especially CNE and STAE. In the next project, it is recommended that UNDP could prepare a comprehensive and inclusive coordination plan of all training activities and electoral workshops by various agencies and organisations, allowing flexibility and maximising the resources provided.

# IMPACT

As was the case during the two rounds of the 2012 Presidential Elections, the 2012 parliamentary elections were conducted in a peaceful and orderly manner. There were no reports of other than the most minor political or other violence or intimidation leading up to or on the day of the ballot. The peaceful and positive conduct of the parliamentary pre-election campaign period set a new benchmark for the standard of political conduct in Timor-Leste, and augurs well for the further embedding of its democratic process.[[29]](#footnote-29)

While the 2012 elections were considered to be successful, the long-term impact of the support to the electoral process will be tested in the next cycle with reduced assistance.

# SUSTAINABILITY

The final section examines to what extent elements of the project are sustainable taking into account policy support measures, choice of technology, socio-cultural matters, institutional approach, environmental factors, economic and financial aspects and external factors. This section specifically addresses skills and expertise development, capacity for strategic planning and voter education, and the capacity of CNE and STAE.

Due to the support provided in this project, CNE now has a much stronger secretariat and an office management system, a strategic and operational plan, and has designed and conducted a number of civic education campaigns. When new commissioners will be appointed, the institutional memory of the secretariat and former commissioners will be invaluable to sustain the institution if they maintain the systems put in place.

STAE which has been established longer than CNE and is much stronger institutionally and operationally even with some staff turnover which is an indicator that it has become a sustainable institution which should no longer need to rely on international assistance except for specific needs and cases. The State budget for both institutions is adequate for basic running costs and events but they lack additional resources for in between election activities if they are to follow their strategic plans

UN had supported logistics in the past particularly air support, but STAE also developed more sustainable approaches by land used in the last elections during rainy season which is an indicator that STAE could manage without UN support though the enclave Oecusse will remain a challenge for last minute delivery of materials if needed.

Internet was being installed in CNE and STAE offices in the past few months that will help strengthen internal communications. However, transport remains an issue due to a lack of vehicles. Many district offices complained that motorbikes were not suitable nor enough to cover all sub districts. UN handed over vehicles to the Timorese government and will decide on the allocation of additional vehicles to each ministry and state institutions. CNE and STAE’s work relies heavily on adequate transport, and without Un support, they would need more vehicles for their work to be effective and sustainable.

Despite some major advances in institution strengthening of both CNE and STAE, some specific areas require further support in future projects. These areas include legal advice in making procedures from future amendments to the laws in Portuguese, maintaining the voter registration database with professional IT skills, professional level graphic design and conceptualising effective campaigns in print and other media, and finally effective strategic planning and budgeting and to monitor its implementation and manage resources to meet the objectives. In addition UNDP may provide if requested specific advice on issues such as out-of-country registration and polling, voter registration auditing, considerations for introducing any technology.

UNDP could still play a key role in linking CNE and STAE to regional and global networks and supporting them to broaden their expertise and share their experience with peer groups, which will help sustain credibility and professionalism while representing Timor-Leste abroad.

# CONCLUSIONS

The recent holding of the peaceful and orderly presidential and parliamentary elections in Timor-Leste demonstrated the value of UN electoral assistance so far, and all interlocutors observed that continued assistance was essential, particularly in terms of ensuring confidence in the electoral process and in technical support in certain areas such as legal advice and IT.

The National Commission on Elections (CNE) and the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE) were more generally more effective in 2012 than in previous elections. The coordination between the two institutions was improved and consolidated. Overall, the EMBs participated more actively in the preparations, planning and operations taking a leading role in the working groups and coordination mechanisms.

Due to long-term nature of the support, trust being built over time and with the electoral cycle approach, the working relationships between the UN and the national actors also improved.[[30]](#footnote-30)

# LESSONS LEARNED

* The CNE will require continued capacity building, particularly as it faces a potentially challenging period of transition, when the Commissioners’ mandate will terminate at the end of 2012.
* Fifteen CNE commissioners, while broadly representative, are relatively too many compared to other countries and the size of the electorate (645,624[[31]](#footnote-31)). A smaller number may be more manageable in terms of decision-making, support and being more cost-effective.
* Public perception of impartiality is crucial to both CNE and STAE’s credibility that would mean no interference from government ministries.
* The CNE secretariat still requires improvement in its technical and management skills and needs to maintain the office management system and processes put in place.
* Throughout government institutions, including STAE and CNE, there is little or no capacity in the legal and IT fields which if not resolved will lead to continued reliance on external expertise.
* The capacity of both CNE and STAE at the District level is weaker than national level, and will need to be built during the “in between elections” period with adequate funding and a plan of activities.
* Training activities provided by various agencies and organizations can lead to duplication or workshop fatigue if not carefully coordinated into a comprehensive capacity development matrix.
* Logistical challenges remain in transport to sub-district and suco levels.
* The CNE secretariat really benefitted from the basic office management and archiving systems implemented.
* All electoral staff whether UNMIT or UNDP located in the same office outside of the UN compound, helped facilitate the integration of the team. UNEST proved to be a good model of integration used in other subsequent missions but needed more co-locating of international and national staff and training of UN advisors on how to transfer skills to national counterparts in a more effective and sustainable way.
* Strong branding strategy with logos, banners, posters, newsletters helped create the common image of UNEST and the project was very well documented and archived, which could be a model for other projects.
* Strong relationships between them Management Team and UNEST staff contributed to the program’s success.
* Over the past decade, Timorese institutions have relied on international assistance providers to design and conduct civic/voter education activities and capacity development initiatives.  Such ‘soft assistance’ could be lost with a decrease in donor funding. CNE/STAE in particular should lobby for additional government funding to continue these initiatives that instill ownership would decrease donor dependency.
* Political party resources centres were useful for disseminating information, conducting training sessions and providing office facilities that some political parties lacked but they were not sustainable in the long term and political parties still need further development.
1. **RECOMMENDATIONS**
* A voter registration systems audit would help identify areas to ensure the accuracy of updating the voters’ list, the sustainability of managing the database and whether or not it should remain parallel or merged with the civil registry.
* Further develop IT and Legal capacities by first attracting staff with aptitude in these specific areas of work. In the long term invest, through the universities and exchange programmes, in developing a pool of Portuguese speaking lawyers not just for electoral authorities but also for all state institutions. External legal or IT consultants could be provided on a needs basis only.
* CNE and STAE should lobby for budget allocation from the state in between elections making a case for the importance of capacity development and civic education and reducing further dependency from international assistance.
* CNE and STAE should be encouraged to institutionalise systems and processes including office management and archiving thoroughly to ensure less dependence on assistance in the next electoral cycle.
* CNE and STAE could increase public awareness and enhance transparency of the process by publishing on their websites new regulations, decisions and initiatives and election results broken down to voting centre level.[[32]](#footnote-32)
* Consider outsourcing for highly technical skills such as graphic design or database management.
* CNE and STAE would strengthen their institutions and processes further by conducting post-election reviews, consulting stakeholders and taking into account observer reports after each event then by implementing recommendations through their strategic plans.
* Conduct thorough institutional assessments and develop strategies for optimising resources and retaining staff, including a long term capacity development plan, and introduce staff performance evaluation with clear incentives and career paths.
* As an alternative to study tours, conduct a regional or lusophone EMB conference in Timor-Leste with CNE and STAE as hosts to raise visibility and benefit from peer exchange.
* UNDP could help CNE/STAE and other organisations to plan and coordinate better the training activities and workshops provided by different organisations, keeping track of participants, topics and follow up in terms of assessing impact on participants in their workplace. Also to help assess further institutional and staff needs.
* Conduct a feasibility study on implementing voter registration and polling abroad for 2017 elections.
* Continue to organize and support training programmes for journalists, police and political parties on their roles and responsibilities, also building trust and managing conflict.
* Provide stronger support to political parties to build sustainable capacities in the lead up to the next electoral event, if not through the District Resource Centres, then through impartial, permanent premises such as CNE district training facilities.
* Review and reform political finance regulations, monitoring and enforcement; review CNE’s auditing practice and the outside capacity it relies on to examine political parties’ accounts.
* Develop further training programmes for police on civil and political rights, and for journalists on professional and ethical reporting. Such training could be part of a governance programme rather than an election project.
* Long term civic education is required but might fit better into a broader governance project than a specific election project and see synergies with compatible programmes for women and youth supported by UNICEF and UN Women.
* The Strategic Plan on gender equality produced jointly by the Women’s Network (RedeFeto) with support from UNDP and UN Women should continue to be implemented.
* Consider national staff (CNE focal points and trainers from the resource centres) as potential project staff in Dili and the districts. They have the contextual and linguistic advantage and would help outreach to suco and village level. It would also be more sustainable and help build local capacity.
* The CTA/project manager position could be merged in a future project with reduced resources.

# ANNEX 1: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Name | Organization | Department/Title |
| Finn Reske-Nielsen | UNMIT/UNDP | DSRSG, UN Resident Representative |
| Ken Inoue | UNMIT | DGSU |
| Fernanda Tavares | UNMIT |  |
| Preston Pentony | UNMIT | Political Affairs |
| Diana Baker | UNMIT | Political Affairs |
| Mikiko Tanaka | UNDP | Country Director |
| Noura Hamladji | UNDP | Deputy Country Director |
| Farhan Sabih | UNDP | Assistant Country Director |
| Joao Pereira | UNDP | Programme Officer |
| Andres del Castillo | UNEST | Chief Technical Advisor |
| Dan Radelescu | UNEST | Project Manager |
| Vera Monteira | UNEST | Coordinator of Electoral Advisors |
| Olga Rabade | UNEST | Legal Advisor for CNE |
| Felipe | UNEST | Advisor |
| Karen Kelleher | UNEST | Graphic Designer  |
| Jose | UNEST | CNE Advisor |
| Carla DuarteDiane Almeida | UNESTUNEST | STAE AdvisorSTAE Advisor |
| Janet Wong | UN Women | Country Representative |
| Hongwei Gao | UNICEF | Country Representative |
| Ximenes | Timorese Government | Court of Appeals |
| Vincent Guterres | Timorese Government | Speaker of Parliament |
| Tomas Cabral | Timorese Government | Secretary of State Admin |
| L. Monteiro | PNTL (National Police) | Chief |
| Faustino Cardoso | CNE | Chair |
| Dulce | CNE | Commissioner, Civic Education |
| Angelina | CNE | Commissioner, Voter Registration |
|  | CNE | Liquica |
| Jaoa da Silva | CNE | Baucau Chief |
| Liliana Borges | CNE |  |
| Manuel Branco | STAE | Chair |
| Elviro Moniz | STAE | Dep. Training & IT |
| Eduardo Casimiro | STAE |  |
|  | STAE | Liquica |
|  | Political Party Reps |  |
| Rede Feto | Women’s Network |  |
|  | CSO/Media |  |
|  | Domestic Observer |  |

1. European Union Electoral Observation Mission (EUEOM) Timor-Leste July 2012 Final Report [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. UN Integrated Electoral Assistance: Lessons Learned – Case Study: Timor Leste 2007 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. UNEST Concept Paper Integration [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Refer to Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel: “Delivering as One”, November 2006. In the Report is stated: “… the UN needs to overcome its fragmentation and deliver as one through a stronger commitment to working together in the implementation of one strategy, in the pursuit of one set of goals”. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. UNEST Concept Paper Integration [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. UNEST Concept Paper Integration [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Revised Project Document Support to the Timorese Electoral Cycle, February 2008 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. A policy adopted by UN/UNDP in 2007 which continues assistance in between electoral events [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. EUEOM Timor-Leste July 2012 Final Report [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. EUEOM Timor-Leste July 2012 Final Report [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. EUEOM Timor-Leste July 2012 Final Report [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. interview with CNE and STAE in Baucaua nd Liquica districts [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. UNEST Project Document 2008-2012 Annex 1. Issues Of Ongoing Significance For Elections In Timor-Leste Identified By The Certification Team [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. EUEOM Timor-Leste July 2012 Final Report [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. interview with Andres del Castillo, CTA, UNEST [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. UNMIT Lessons Learned Study on the United Nations Support for the 2012 Elections in Timor-Leste, p. 41. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. UNEST Project Document 2008-2012 Annex 1. Issues Of Ongoing Significance For Elections In Timor-Leste Identified By The Certification Team [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Australia Timor-Leste Friendship Network Report Parliamentary elections July 7 2012 Final Report [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. EUEOM Timor-Leste July 2012 Final Report [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. A “Vox Populi” (Voice of the People) survey was conducted August-September 2012 with 834 interviews answering 28 questions capturing experiences of citizens in the 2012 National Elections. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Handicap International, Leprosy Mission Association, AHISAUN (Light of Friendship) [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. EUEOM Timor-Leste July 2012 Final Report, XII, pg 23 [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Australia Timor-Leste Friendship Network Report Parliamentary elections July 7 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. A “Vox Populi” (Voice of the People) survey was conducted August-September 2012 with 834 interviews answering 28 questions capturing experiences of citizens in the 2012 National Elections. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Recommendation from EUEOM Timor-Leste July 2012 Final Report [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Australia Timor-Leste Friendship Network Report Parliamentary elections July 7 2012 Final Report [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Australia Timor-Leste Friendship Network Report Parliamentary elections July 7 2012 Final Report. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. from an Interview with former CTA, Andres del Castillo [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. source: STAE [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. recommendation from EUEOM 2012 Final Report [↑](#footnote-ref-32)