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Disclaimer

In normal practice, the programme country government reviews all Assessments of Development Results (ADRs) carried out by the Independent Evaluation Office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) prior to publication. This review is followed by a wider discussion of the report with stakeholders and development actors at an in-country workshop. However, because of political and security developments that have taken place in the country since June 2014, the Iraq ADR did not complete this otherwise mandatory process.

Carried out in the last quarter of 2013, the ADR took into consideration the developments in the country through to April 2014 when the draft report was completed (following review by UNDP Iraq and the Regional Bureau for Arab States). The Report provides an account of UNDP contributions until January 2014; the recommendations are based on this assessment and the Iraq country context at that point in time. The sudden changes in the country's political and security context significantly altered the environment of UNDP programmes and critically affected the programmes that were ongoing when the evaluation was carried out. Therefore, some (though not all) of the recommendations may not be fully applicable to the current programming context in Iraq.

Since the ADR was completed, UNDP Iraq carried out several programme activities, including support to IHEC in carrying out Governorate Council Elections, capacity development of new parliamentarians, preparation of public administration roadmap and the development of the Iraqi National Security Strategy. UNDP Iraq also contributed to the establishment of the Al Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies as a Government of Iraq think tank for security issues. UNDP subsequently supported the enhancement of the Centre's research and analytical capacities to inform policy development. UNDP Iraq launched the Iraq national Human Development Report 2014, which analysed Iraq's development progress with a focus on youth development. UNDP supported the government's crisis response efforts, focusing on internally displaced persons and refugee support. Jointly with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNDP contributed to the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (UNDP led the resilience component of the plan). Within this context and with UNDP's engagement, the government formally established the Joint Crisis Centre in Kurdistan and the Joint Crisis Management Centre in Baghdad. The evaluation team did not have the opportunity to verify the progress of these activities.

A report that takes into account the changed country context and its implications for UNDP programmes requires a separate assessment; the present security context does not allow for this exercise.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

FOREWORD

It gives me great pleasure to present the Assessment of Development Results (ADR) in the Republic of Iraq. Covering the period between 2008 and 2013, the evaluation includes the 2008 to 2010 period when UNDP had not yet developed its own country programme and instead had lead responsibility in the integrated UN assistance framework (the United Nations Iraq Assistance Strategy programme). The evaluation also includes the 2011–2014 UNDP country programme cycle. Data collection was completed in April 2014.

The evaluation found that UNDP contributed to strengthened policies, legislation and institutional capacity in priority areas for the government. UNDP's contributions were also important in restoring public services and infrastructure as Iraq emerged from the 2005–2007 crisis. The UNDP programme addressed complex issues that were relevant to the challenges faced by the country in the areas of participatory mechanisms, rule of law and accountable and transparent governance. The evaluation also found, however, that programme design could have been more sensitive to the difficult delivery environment and that UNDP programme models and approaches were not sufficiently customized to the local context and culture. The strategic value of UNDP programme areas notwithstanding, the challenges included responding to the evolving country context and supporting reforms in a country with intermittent conflict.

UNDP's efforts to deliver programmes in Iraq had to continuously overcome security constraints and the challenges of remotely operating from Amman, Jordan. The effects of UNDP's limited access to national partners and project sites cannot be underestimated. The security restrictions considerably limited UNDP's programme contributions, and the evaluation points out that it is remarkable that the programme has not suffered more than it has as a result.

The sudden changes in the country's political and security context in June 2014 significantly altered the environment of UNDP programmes and critically affected the programmes that were ongoing when the evaluation was carried out. As a result, not all of the recommendations are fully applicable to the current programming context in Iraq, although the lessons that the evaluation discusses have wider relevance for programming. The change in context also meant that we did not have an opportunity to discuss the evaluation with the government or other UNDP development partners in the country, which is a usual practice in conducting an ADR.

I hope that this evaluation will be found useful not only for UNDP and government partners, but also more broadly by the development actors in Iraq and in other post-conflict contexts.

Indran A. Naidoo
Director
Independent Evaluation Office

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ACRONYMS

ADR	Assessment of Development Results
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CSO	Civil society organization
DMA	Directorate for Mine Action
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IEO	Independent Evaluation Office of UNDP
IHEC	Iraq High Electoral Commission
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
LADP	Local Area Development Programme
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NDP	National Development Plan
NDS	National Development Strategy
NHDR	National Human Development Reports
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PSDP-I	Private-Sector Development Programme for Iraq
SCR	Security Council Resolution
UN	United Nations
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNDAF	United Nation Development Assistant Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WHO	World Health Organization

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

The Independent Evaluation Office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conducted this Assessment of Development Results (ADR) in Iraq in 2013. The ADR aims to capture and demonstrate evaluative evidence of UNDP contributions to development results in Iraq and to determine how effective UNDP strategies were in facilitating and leveraging national efforts to achieve development results.

ADRs are independent, country-level evaluations carried out in accordance with the UNDP Evaluation Policy. The Independent Evaluation Office of UNDP Director reports to the UNDP Executive Board through the UNDP Administrator. The responsibilities of the Independent Evaluation Office of UNDP include providing the Executive Board with valid and credible information for corporate accountability, decision-making and improvement; enhancing the independence, credibility and utility of the evaluation function; and furthering evaluation coherence, harmonization and alignment in support of United Nations (UN) reform and national ownership. Based on the principle of national ownership, the Independent Evaluation Office of UNDP conducts ADRs in collaboration with national governments. The purposes of an ADR are to: provide substantive support to the UNDP Administrator's accountability function in reporting to the Executive Board; support greater UNDP accountability to national stakeholders and partners in the programme country; serve as a means of quality assurance for UNDP interventions at the country level; and contribute to learning at the corporate, regional and country levels.

This is the first ADR for Iraq, conducted towards the end of the current 2011–2014 UNDP programme cycle. The ADR will contribute to the preparation of the new UNDP country programme as well as the forthcoming United National Development Assistance Framework.

The objectives of the ADR in Iraq are to:

- Assess UNDP's contributions to development results in Iraq since 2008, focusing on programme activities' relevance, effectiveness and efficiency in achieving intended programme outcomes and the potential sustainability of results;

- Analyse UNDP's strategic positioning in Iraq, focusing on synergies with national development strategies and priorities and alignment with the values espoused by the United Nations; and

- Draw general conclusions and make recommendations to improve the programme's future strategy and approaches.

The evaluation covered the period when the UN in general, and UNDP in particular, had access to vast reconstruction and development funds—the implementation of the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund. The ADR includes activities conducted under the ongoing 2011–2014 country programme and those undertaken between 2008 and 2010, when UNDP had not yet developed its own country programme and instead had lead responsibility in the integrated UN assistance framework (the United Nations Iraq Assistance Strategy programme).

The UNDP programmes provided support during multiple phases of the post-conflict period, operating in the context of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI). The evaluation's scope therefore includes the interface of the UNDP programme with UNAMI, which has

a Security Council mandate[i] to advise, support and assist the people and the Government of Iraq.

CONSULTATION PROCESS

In normal practice, the programme country government reviews all Assessments of Development Results (ADRs) carried out by the Independent Evaluation Office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) prior to publication. This review is followed by a wider discussion of the report with stakeholders and development actors at an in-country workshop. However, because of political and security developments that have taken place in the country since June 2014, the Iraq ADR did not complete this otherwise mandatory process.

Carried out in the last quarter of 2013, the ADR took into consideration the developments in the country through to April 2014 when the draft report was completed (following review by UNDP Iraq and the Regional Bureau for Arab States). The sudden changes in the country's political and security context significantly altered the environment of UNDP programmes and critically affected the programmes that were ongoing when the evaluation was carried out. Therefore, some (though not all) of the recommendations may not be fully applicable to the current programming context in Iraq.

A report that takes into account the changed country context and its implications for UNDP programmes requires a separate assessment; the present security context does not allow for this exercise.

KEY FINDINGS

STRENGTHENED PARTICIPATORY MECHANISMS

The UNDP flagship programme, Support to Elections, has achieved considerable results. In contrast, performance in other programme areas of the outcome has been constrained by a lack of synergy among programmes and the small scale and stand-alone character of programme activities.

Election support is a government priority, as it accords legitimacy to government-run electoral processes. Assistance to the electoral commission has established the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) as a self-sufficient, independently functioning, sustainable and successful participatory mechanism. Iraq is a middle-income country and IHEC has demonstrated that it is capable of running its own elections. While there may be aspects in which IHEC could use technical assistance, it could source such assistance without a full-fledged UNDP project. The relevance of UNDP's technical support has thus diminished. In addition, some of the issues in the functioning of the IHEC are beyond the scope of the support UNDP can provide.

The other programme areas of the outcome— supporting the functioning of the Council of Representatives, supporting CSOs and reconciling ethnic differences—had only modest interest for the government. Peace and reconciliation support involved small pilot projects premised on the expectation that lessons learned from the projects will greatly enhance UNDP and other agencies' capacities to undertake local community dialogue projects in Iraq. The scale and scope of the pilot projects were too small to demonstrate a viable model for replication or pursuing an approach.

ENHANCED RULE OF LAW

The sustainability of the rule of law programme in the federal system has been questionable. In Kurdistan, where the government welcomed the modernization of its judiciary and has embraced the programme, sustainability is more promising. The Rule of Law programme opened the doors for future reform, but concrete achievements were modest. The number of judges and the number of

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i   The original mandate of UNAMI is in S/RES/1483 (2003), which was most recently renewed in S/RES/2110 (2013).

cases in criminal courts have increased. However, there is little evidence of increased court efficiency, reduced case backlog or increased public confidence in the justice system.

The situation is somewhat different in the Access to Justice and Human Rights programme. Here, the Ministry of Interior has strongly supported the Family Protection Units that provide police and legal assistance to women, children and families to respond to domestic disputes. There is also strong support in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG); there is full collaboration in supporting judicial training, in providing legal aid, in setting up a Board of Human Rights, in supporting the Directorate for Eliminating Violence against Women and in supporting women's shelters.

Instead of responding to declining resources by consolidating the programme to increase synergies and effectiveness, UNDP has accepted contributions for project financing with little regard to whether the project added to the outcome's internal consistency. There are indications this may be changing—the Country Office is developing a strategy to enhance programme coherence and ensure greater coordination in implementation. National ownership of the support extended by UNDP has been fraught with limitations. Ownership was demonstrated in few areas.

ACCOUNTABLE AND TRANSPARENT GOVERNANCE

Under a challenging political environment, UNDP aimed to support the government in addressing complex issues. However, UNDP's programme approach was either too elaborate or too theoretical to yield tangible results. UNDP programme efforts are modest first steps in achieving outcome objectives. The programme strategies UNDP followed, however, did not fully meet the practical realities of Iraq. UNDP failed to gain critical national support for the programme to remain relevant. While the programmes in this area are in accord with the government's development plan, their relevance also depends on whether its

concept and design could realistically gain political support. UNDP found it challenging to obtain high-level government support for many of its initiatives in this area.

The Public Sector Modernization programme has been driven by an ambitious, whole-of-government approach that is more conceptually satisfying in design than pragmatic. The Office of Inspectors General constitutes a key element in the design of the Accountability, Transparency and Anti-corruption Programme. Adopted from a United States model, it gives little consideration to the Iraqi institutions that have functioned for decades—even under adverse conditions in previous regimes. While the approach is conceptually sound, in practice it is not in accord with the circumstances within which it is meant to function. Similarly, the donor coordination design was a model intervention that was undertaken globally and brought into Iraq with little modification.

Containing tuberculosis has been a priority health sector objective of the government and the international community. Therefore, the UNDP-Global Fund programmes were relevant to this national challenge. However, the UNDP-Global Fund programme does not have a strong substantive linkage to the focus of this programme outcome (and no programmatic linkages with other component programmes in this portfolio).

SUPPORT TO PRO-POOR STRATEGIES

UNDP programmes, while relevant, were focused on localized recovery activities and were not consistent with the country programme's policy- and institution-building orientation. Conflict Prevention and Recovery projects made tangible contributions to the recovery of public services and infrastructure, with some limited support to institutional capacity. The combined target population for the three projects was approximately four million persons living in the immediate urban area and surrounding communities.

Most projects were delivered during a transitional period, as Iraq emerged from the violence

of 2005 to 2007 and before conditions began to deteriorate again with the 2011 breakdown of the Erbil Agreement government. UNDP responded to the basic infrastructure needs of the post-2007 crisis. In most cases there was tangible evidence that the projects met their objectives (implementation delays notwithstanding). The various projects had the possibility of helping consolidate positive trends as conditions improved, including expanding the delivery of basic public goods and services, improving the lives of beneficiaries through their access to services, legitimizing the Iraqi State as the provider of these services and opening a compact between state and society.

Prior to 2008, all projects were affected by extreme security conditions that produced security-related restrictions (which are still in effect). Performance variables included poor quality of design, weak management oversight and implementation capacity, underestimation of risk and lack of mitigation. External factors also played an important role, such as beginning with uneven national ownership, limited capacities of national counterparts and the politicization within some ministry counterparts.

ENABLING POLICY FRAMEWORKS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY

Managing changes in the Iraqi context was an important programme challenge for UNDP. Difficulties left UNDP unable to sustain its engagements in key programme areas, including private-sector reform. Contributing factors included weaknesses in UNDP's transition strategy, absence of coherent demand from government, lack of government funding and the sharp reduction of international funding as donors scaled back their operations.

This programme area generally showed good output-level effectiveness. However, outputs were not always well used. Project design flaws and inefficiencies within the government were both contributing factors. Regardless, the portfolio contributed to only a limited number of outcomes, in large part resulting from the deteriorating

situation in Iraq after 2011. The ongoing country programme was prepared during a period of transition and optimism (2008–2010), with conditions deteriorating as soon as the plan became effective in 2011. UNDP was confronted with a series of parallel transitions in its programme and funding environment. These produced deteriorating security conditions and sharp reductions in resources and activities just as UNDP was attempting to shift into a development-oriented programme. At the same time, significant institutional effort by UNDP was used to bring the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund to an orderly closure. Importantly, the Government of Iraq has not emerged as a funder of UNDP activities (with the exception of some support from the Kurdistan Regional Government). UNDP had difficulty managing this combination of factors.

Sustainability was best when the government had strong ownership, projects were embedded into national strategies and institutions or when UNDP was able to sustain its engagement over an extended period of time. The PSDP-I, LADP, Private Sector Development and the Partnership Services for Fiduciary Monitoring Agent plans projects continue operations and show good possibility for output-level sustainability. These projects are integrated into government priorities and systems and have effective governance arrangements. Given that most of these projects were of good quality, sustainability will depend on the government's use of the outputs. Mine Action, however, shows poor possibility for sustainability, given government inefficiencies.

CONCLUSIONS

Conclusion 1: UNDP delivered a number of tangible benefits to the country through individual component programmes. These benefits are evident in strengthened policies, legislation and institutional capacity in priority areas for the government. UNDP's contributions were important in restoring public services and infrastructure as Iraq emerged from the 2005–2007 crisis. UNDP sustained its support

despite the challenges posed by the security situation in central and south Iraq.

UNDP programmes addressed issues that were relevant to the challenges faced by the country. UNDP aimed to address complex issues such as inefficient delivery of basic services, abuse of the public trust by civil servants and the need to ensure that capital investment expenditures addressed real needs. UNDP approached such complex issues with grand designs, some of which were too theoretical to yield tangible results.

The relevance or strategic value of UNDP programme areas notwithstanding, the challenge is to design a strategy that considers the evolving country context. There may be little UNDP can do to support reforms in a country where conflict is ongoing and where government cooperation is so difficult to secure.

Programme design, however, could be more sensitive to the difficult delivery environment by taking practical constraints into consideration. In areas such as Rule of Law programming in south and central Iraq, considerable presence, tact and strategic responsiveness are required. In some instances, UNDP programming may not have approached these sensitive matters with the required finesse. Security constraints and the limitations of remote delivery hindered UNDP's efforts to deliver these programmes efficiently and effectively in south and central Iraq. These factors also made UNDP's Iraq operations highly costly; the extent to which such costs were justified was unclear.

An important consequence of operating under security restrictions is that programme implementation focuses on support primarily to the central government and almost not at all to the governorate or other subnational entities. Several programme areas would have benefited by broadening their focus to the provincial and district levels. Local initiatives do figure under economic reform and diversification efforts, but not under efforts to strengthen governorate-level development planning institutions and systems or efforts

to integrate these into a unified approach to decentralization within Iraq's federal structure.

Trends in Iraq constrained UNDP contributions to development results. After a period of optimism and improvement (2008–2010), conditions in Iraq have again declined and it has become difficult to address core governance issues. In addition, economic trends have been towards further concentration of economic activity in the state, driven by a rapid increase in the oil sector. In this context, there was limited progress towards the government's priorities of economic diversification and private-sector development, which were key elements of successive national development plans.

Conclusion 2: Since 2008, UNDP has aimed to shift its programme focus from reconstruction and recovery to development, and, accordingly, from a project-based approach to a more coherent and strategic programming approach. However, UNDP has yet to achieve a coherent programmatic approach to address critical development challenges in Iraq.

The legacy of UNDP operations under the Iraq Trust Fund was its project-oriented approach with attention to delivery rather than long-term development results. UNDP has begun to steer itself towards a coherent and strategic programme approach, first with its Interim Country Strategy 2008–2010 and then with its first post-2003 country programme for 2011–2014. Despite this intent, UNDP's country programme is a composite of self-standing projects that lack significant synergies or coherence. The failure to transform the country programme into a coherent and strategic approach has been due to senior Country Office management's lack of strategic leadership during the crucial period of programme transition.

Under the current country programme, though individual component programmes and projects achieved results, the programmes were operating relatively independently and synergies among them were not pursued. There was no strategy

to use the combined forces of these component programmes to increase their effectiveness and efficiency in achieving their outcomes. A clear example is that the missed synergies among the Public Sector Modernization programme, the Anti-corruption programme and the Local Area Development programme have yet to be realized.

The present preoccupation with fund-raising led to some isolated projects that, while good in their intentions and hence marketable, were too small and *ad hoc* to create much discernible impact. Further, UNDP pursued programmes even when the political support critical to the particular approach was lacking (e.g. the Anti-corruption and Rule of Law programmes), when there were political and reputational risks (e.g. the Election Support programme), or when the lack of delivery resulted in a loss of credibility (e.g. the Parliament Support programme).

Conclusion 3: UNDP lacked strategic leadership at critical points in programme support in Iraq, undermining the potential of UNDP contributions. UNDP has addressed this issue recently with the change in leadership to provide a more strategic vision to UNDP support in Iraq.

The mid-level programme managers, each in charge of a component programme, are generally competent, having led their programmes to some successes. They were left to identify funding opportunities and pursue their programme objectives and project delivery. While senior management fully supported their individual efforts, little guidance was given to integrate these component programmes into a strategic approach aimed at achieving country programme outcomes. Under such circumstances, the support provided to individual programme managers by senior management unintentionally led to a country programme that was neither cohesive, strategic nor prioritized and where programme managers competed rather than collaborated.

The phasing out of the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund in 2009

and 2010 made UNDP increasingly dependent on bilateral donor contributions at a time when bilateral donors were withdrawing from Iraq. Donor development plans often play a significant role in shaping UNDP's engagement. A related issue is that in many areas of the programme, UNDP did not adequately plan for reductions in donor resources. Instead of reducing and sharpening the scope of its interventions, UNDP has diversified and fragmented its interventions.

It is essential to find ways of diminishing the inefficiencies caused by security restrictions, to do more to facilitate contact with national partners and to make sure that expert staff with Arabic language skills are readily available. In many programme areas, opportunities were missed and important expectations went unmet, which often diminished UNDP's credibility.

Conclusion 4: UNDP implemented programme models and approaches without sufficiently customizing them to the local context and culture. This contributed to poor national ownership and undermined the effectiveness and sustainability of UNDP support.

UNDP applied programme models that it used in other countries without first adapting them to the Iraqi context and culture. For example, the Peace and Reconciliation projects applied a western reconciliation method that would not work in the Iraqi cultural context and was rejected by local stakeholders. The Accountability, Transparency and Anti-corruption Programme used a United States model in developing the Office of the Inspectors General, and most national stakeholders were pessimistic about its sustainability. Poor design among some UNDP Iraq Trust Fund-funded projects resulted in outputs being delivered but never used, or to late delivery that undermined results.

UNDP showed improvement over time in developing and adapting programme models to respond to the Iraqi context, as seen, for example, in the evolution of the LADP programme model over its three iterations. Though this indicated

that UNDP was making sustained efforts, the lack of initial adaptation had significant impacts on the programme's contributions to development results.

Conclusion 5: UNDP's programmatic collaboration with UNAMI was weak and not beneficial for enhancing UNDP contributions.

Synergies between UNDP and UNAMI were less than positive, which undermined UNDP programmes' contributions in some areas. Potential areas of collaboration were not adequately utilized. This was despite the fact that UNDP's Resident Representative had been serving as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General for development and humanitarian affairs (which directly supports the head of UNAMI). The comparative strengths that UNDP usually exercises in the United Nations country team was overshadowed in Iraq, sometimes with justification and sometimes without. In critical matters, particularly those in which the common interests of development partners was at stake (e.g. on security constraints), UNDP was not sufficiently proactive in ensuring that its interests (or the interests of other important development partners) were adequately represented.

The lack of clear roles in areas where both UNDP and UNAMI had a mandate was a factor in UNDP's poor contributions to development. UNDP unsuccessfully established an identity that was distinct from either UNAMI or the United Nations country team. Establishing a clear distinctness from the Security Council-mandated activities of UNAMI will be essential for UNDP to convey its own positioning in key areas.

Conclusion 6: UNDP has not always succeeded in gaining the government's full confidence as a trusted, long-term development partner that strategically provides support through well-integrated programmes or that delivers what it has committed.

National partner ownership of programmes is critical to sustaining programme achievements and to informing national planning and policies. There are important examples of UNDP programmes that were embedded in government priorities and systems with robust national ownership. Notwithstanding such examples, it was challenging for UNDP to secure national ownership for its programmes.

With exceptions, the government did not consider UNDP to be a key development partner in providing strategic policy and programme support. UNDP's lack of clear programme focus was one factor, as the agency had some difficulty defining its possible roles to the government. The security situation in the country did not allow UNDP to have sufficient interactions with national partners, which led to another major factor—insufficient communications and interactions with the national counterparts, exacerbated by the remote programme management from Amman. Further, the complex political situation was not conducive for UNDP to engage with government partners and gain their ownership over programmes. While avoiding exposure of its staff to security risks is justifiable, UNDP was neither proactive nor innovative in addressing this challenge, unlike some other UN agencies. Although UNDP made the policy decision to move its Country Office back to Baghdad, the decision to do so was slow in coming.

UNDP's programme positioning was undermined by many government officials' and donors' perception of UNDP as a mere implementer of donor projects rather than as a driver of development that works closely with national counterparts. UNDP has not successfully conveyed the value addition of its programmes to national stakeholders.

UNDP's ability to provide strategic support to Iraq's development depends on well-integrated programmes and careful planning to ensure that commitments are met. This was compromised by UNDP's increasing need to raise funds, resulting in a focus on resources rather than programme coherence. Though UNDP has increasingly been counting on sharing the cost of programming with the government, it seems that government

officials are not fully convinced of the value of UNDP support such that they would share expenses. For its part, the government has often not clearly articulated the contributions it wants from UNDP.

Conclusion 7: While there is a rationale to provide more central-level support, opportunities were not adequately taken to strengthen subnational capacities (particularly in central and south Iraq).

UNDP did not effectively balance its programme support between the federal and governorate levels. Service delivery at the governorate level has been a priority area for Iraq. While some projects focused on governorate-level service delivery, UNDP did not adequately consolidate its strategy to respond to governorate-level needs and priorities. More recently, UNDP has been considering opening up field offices to support UN programmes. This is a much-needed step in preparing for a more substantive role in supporting development in Iraq.

Conclusion 8: UNDP did not give gender equality adequate priority in programme implementation, and was not persistent in its efforts to integrate gender in its programme support.

Despite achievements in a few projects, UNDP's programme response generally neglected gender. Where gender was addressed, the Iraq context presented significant challenges, particularly when it came to politically sensitive national policies. UNDP lacked a strategy to systematically approach gender issues in its programme areas or to collaborate with other agencies on this issue.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: UNDP Iraq should consolidate its programme support, ensuring that it has adequate scope and depth to address the key development challenges confronting Iraq. UNDP should move away from funding-driven, low-impact activities.

In order to strengthen its credibility, UNDP Iraq should develop programmes that build on its comparative strengths in areas such as governance. UNDP should avoid regrouping existing projects into new overarching programmes, particularly where projects are not aligned to intended outcomes. It should establish a strategy for each programme area and then appropriately develop activities that will substantively address Iraq's development challenges. The strategy should be realistic and flexible in adapting itself to changing political and security situations.

As donor funding for its programmes declines, UNDP needs to be specifically conscious of using limited resources for more sustained support in a few areas. The programme is presently constructed around broad reform areas, the scope of which is too large to impose any constructive limitations on what UNDP does. The result is that programme areas comprised dispersed and eclectic projects, without a judicious approach to reform initiatives.

UNDP should not proceed without a clearly structured and focused programme. A first step is to narrow the reform areas, replacing the broad mandates with specific problem-solving initiatives in which UNDP has substantial expertise and where it has government support.

Recommendation 2: UNDP's future relevance will depend on establishing strong development partnerships with the Government and people of Iraq. UNDP Iraq should make it a priority to develop and sustain partnerships with national counterparts.

A key challenge for UNDP is to restore close relationships with national partners in the government and civil society. Other UN agencies have tried various methods to overcome this challenge with varying degree of success. UNDP should learn from such experiences and strengthen its relations with the government.

Following through on recent management decisions (e.g. moving programme management from

Amman back to Baghdad and recruiting more programme managers who are Arabic speakers) will be critical for increasing the level of interaction between programme management and national partners. UNDP should also actively pursue a strategy to increase the number of national staff on the programme team.

Recommendation 3: UNDP Iraq should develop adaptive strategies that will continue to contribute to Iraq's development under different and evolving political and security scenarios, particularly the challenging security context of central and south Iraq.

To meet Iraq's immediate and long-term development needs, UNDP should adapt its programme strategies and operations to difficult security situations and an evolving institutional context. The volatility of the security situation should be factored into programme planning and design. UNDP should take adequate measures to devise innovative ways of adapting to—and overcoming—security limitations in working in central and southern Iraq. UNDP should also address issues arising out of working from the International Zone that severely restricts interaction with national counterparts. UNDP should place the risk of working with partners before the importance of UNDP's presence.

One of the problems in developing a four-year country programme in a post-conflict situation is the unrealistic requirement that the programme must have a tight results framework that assumes an orderly development process, one that is not affected by political and security factors. The current country programme, developed during a time of optimism, was unrealistic in terms of its expected achievements. Establishing solid overarching goals for the programmes does not preclude incorporating flexible and adaptive mechanisms and strategies to achieve these goals and, if necessary and justifiable, revisiting the country programme results expectations.

Recommendation 4: UNDP Iraq should ensure the appropriate balance of programme support

between the national and governorate levels and should strengthen the synergies between programmes at the two levels.

The lack of public-sector capacities at the governorate and local government levels is one of the most critical challenges in the country. Although UNDP addresses this issue through the Local Area Development programme, strengthening service delivery will require a more coherent approach to local-level capacity development.

UNDP is exploring the possibility of opening local programme support offices in south and central Iraq outside Baghdad, as well as having UNDP national staff embedded in government ministries and offices. Such measures should be followed through in order to support strengthening governorate capacities and to improve collaboration access with national partners.

Recommendation 5: UNDP programmes need to prioritize promoting gender equality. The lack of a conducive environment cannot justify inadequately pursuing programmes that promote gender equality and women's empowerment.

UNDP should take specific measures to systematically integrate gender into its programme response and should commit adequate resources to ensure its implementation. Gender analysis should inform programme design and implementation of the forthcoming programme. In order to maximize results in the area, UNDP should strengthen partnerships with UN agencies.

Recommendation 6: UNDP should strengthen its own technical and advisory capacities. UNDP should review programme management and should develop an appropriate strategy to respond effectively to Iraq's development needs.

UNDP's role and contribution in Iraq depends on the quality of the advisory, policy and programme support it provides. National counterparts in Iraq expect advisory services from senior-level experts

who bring cutting-edge ideas. UNDP should ensure that the programme and policy support it offers is of high quality and provided by senior experts who are familiar with the national context. UNDP should not use programme models that are ill-suited to the Iraqi context.

UNDP should strengthen its technical advisory capacity at a relatively senior level in key areas of programme support in order to effectively contribute to strengthening Iraq institutions. UNDP staff should have adequate skills to respond to different political and security scenarios in Iraq.

Recommendation 7: Recently, the importance of UNDP's mandate in integrated peacekeeping missions has been increasingly recognized. UNDP and UNAMI should draw lessons from countries where close coordination between UNDP and the integrated mission has been mutually beneficial and has enhanced their contributions to peacebuilding and development. UNDP and UNAMI should make concerted efforts to solve disagreements regarding their roles in the area of governance.

Greater clarity of programme roles and closer links are needed for an effective partnership between UNDP and UNAMI. This will require both partners to exhibit administrative flexibility. UNDP should recognize and respect the status that the Security Council has accorded the Mission in Iraq and support it in principle and in practice. UNAMI should recognize UNDP's expertise and capacity to take the lead on issues where UNAMI believes it has exclusive jurisdiction.

UNDP will have to recognize and respect the status that the Security Council has accorded the Mission in Iraq and support it in principle and in practice. At present, this recognition and respect do not exist. A small working group should be established to represent UNAMI and UNDP, resolve differences and chart new and collaborative directions.

UNDP and UNAMI should jointly address differences in the programme orientation of the peacekeeping and development mandates and how it should manifest in supporting Iraq. UNDP and UNAMI should revisit the Integrated Strategic Vision in order to work out a viable plan of action to strengthen their collaboration in areas where their mandates are complementary. Efforts should be made to build on the synergies of the peacekeeping and development mandates and to promote integrated approaches.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The Independent Evaluation Office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conducted this Assessment of Development Results (ADR) in Iraq in 2013. The ADR aims to capture and demonstrate evaluative evidence of UNDP contributions to development results in Iraq and to determine how effective UNDP strategies were in facilitating and leveraging national efforts to achieve development results.

ADRs are independent, country-level evaluations carried out in accordance with the UNDP Evaluation Policy.[1] The Independent Evaluation Office of UNDP Director reports to the UNDP Executive Board through the UNDP Administrator. The responsibilities of the Independent Evaluation Office of UNDP include providing the Executive Board with valid and credible information for corporate accountability, decision-making and improvement; enhancing the independence, credibility and utility of the evaluation function; and furthering evaluation coherence, harmonization and alignment in support of United Nations (UN) reform and national ownership. Based on the principle of national ownership, the Independent Evaluation Office of UNDP conducts ADRs in collaboration with national governments. The purposes of an ADR are to:

- Provide substantive support to the UNDP Administrator's accountability function in reporting to the Executive Board;

- Support greater UNDP accountability to national stakeholders and partners in the programme country;

- Serve as a means of quality assurance for UNDP interventions at the country level; and

- Contribute to learning at the corporate, regional and country levels.

This is the first ADR for Iraq, conducted towards the end of the current 2011–2014 UNDP programme cycle. The ADR will contribute to the preparation of the new UNDP country programme as well as the forthcoming United National Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF).

1.1 OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the ADR in Iraq are to:

- Assess UNDP's contributions to development results in Iraq since 2008, focusing on programme activities' relevance, effectiveness and efficiency in achieving intended programme outcomes and the potential sustainability of results;

- Analyse UNDP's strategic positioning in Iraq, focusing on synergies with national development strategies and priorities and alignment with the values espoused by the United Nations; and

- Draw general conclusions and make recommendations to improve the programme's future strategy and approaches.

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1   See UNDP Evaluation Policy, available at: www.undp.org/eo/documents/Evaluation-Policy.pdf. The ADR was also conducted in adherence to the Norms and Standards and the Ethical Code of Conduct established by the United Nations Evaluation Group; see www.uneval.org.

1.2 SCOPE

The evaluation covered the period when the UN in general, and UNDP in particular, had access to vast reconstruction and development funds—the implementation of the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund. The ADR includes activities conducted under the ongoing 2011–2014 country programme and those undertaken between 2008 and 2010, when UNDP had not yet developed its own country programme and instead had lead responsibility in the integrated UN assistance framework (the United Nations Iraq Assistance Strategy programme).[2] The ADR examined programme activities' contributions to development results in pursuit of outcomes outlined in the respective programme and framework documents. In examining activities that took place under the United Nations Iraq Assistance Strategy programme 2008–2010, the assessment considered two outcomes: governance and economic recovery and diversification. The continuity of many of these projects into the 2011–2014 country programme facilitated the assessment of contributions to results.

The UNDP programmes provided support during multiple phases of the post-conflict period, operating in the context of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI). The evaluation's scope therefore includes the interface of the UNDP programme with UNAMI, which has a Security Council mandate[3] to advise, support and assist the people and the Government of Iraq.

1.3 METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

This ADR follows the framework provided by the Independent Evaluation Office of UNDP's 'ADR Method Manual 2011'. The ADR uses multiple data collection methods and applies standard evaluation criteria to generate findings and make assessments. The evaluation criteria

the ADR used to assess contributions through programme activities include:

- **Programmatic relevance**: How relevant were UNDP's programme activities and outputs to achieving intended programme outcomes and to addressing the challenges the outcomes aimed to address?

- **Effectiveness**: How effective were UNDP's programme activities and outputs in achieving intended programme outcomes and in addressing the challenges the outcomes aimed to address?

- **Efficiency**: Were there any reasonable ways to achieve more results with the same resources or the same results with fewer resources?

- **Sustainability**: Are the results achieved by the programme sustainable or produced in such a way that they are likely to be sustainable?

Assessing UNDP's strategic positioning entailed analysing the strategies UNDP used to respond to Iraq's national context (including development assistance provided by other actors). For this, the following criteria were applied as per the standard ADR methodology:

- **Strategic relevance and responsiveness**: How relevant were UNDP's programmes and strategies to national development challenges and government priorities, and how responsive was UNDP in keeping its programmes relevant in light of emerging challenges and shifting priorities?

- **Use of UNDP's strengths and comparative advantages**: How did UNDP make use of its strengths and comparative advantages (e.g. its strategic position in the country or its development knowledge and expertise) to maximize its contributions to development results?

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2   Because the United Nations Iraq Assistance Strategy covered the programme areas of all UN agencies, it had other programme outcomes that were not directly relevant to UNDP's work.

3   The original mandate of UNAMI is in S/RES/1483 (2003), which was most recently renewed in S/RES/2110 (2013).

- **Promoting UN values from a human development perspective**: How did UNDP incorporate the promotion of UN values (e.g. equality and human rights) in its approach and programme activities?

EVALUATION CHALLENGES

Security restrictions during the conduct of the evaluation posed significant challenges. With the exception of Kurdistan, international team members found meetings with national stakeholders extremely difficult because of security restrictions for internationals. The national members of the team, however, faced fewer restrictions in travelling to meetings with national counterparts.

DATA COLLECTION AND PROCESS

The evaluation team based its conclusions on the triangulation of evidence from primary and secondary data sources, including a desk review of documentation and information and data collected during interviews with key informants.

The evaluation team outlined a theory of change for each programme outcome in order to assess UNDP contributions and to guide data collection. The projects, however, were not designed as integral parts to achieve programme outcomes, but rather each was independently designed with individual objectives. Therefore, while an assessment was made on each project's contributions, it was not possible to aggregate contributions to provide an assessment of the outcome.

The desk study included a wide variety of information sources, including programme and project documents, reports relating to project performance, audit reports, meeting minutes and presentations, successive national development plans, national statistics and studies and reports produced by other international agencies and research institutions. In particular, data and studies issued by the Joint Analysis Unit were used to analyse the country context. Additional documents and records were collected during the field research.

The ADR built on the outcome evaluations carried out by UNDP Iraq. Findings of the following outcome evaluation reports in particular were used to substantiate ADR findings:

- Outcome Evaluation of the 'UNDP Governance, Crisis Prevention and Recovery, and Poverty Reduction Initiatives in Iraq' (2009);

- Evaluation of 'Enabling Policy Framework for Rapid Economic Recovery, Inclusive and Diversified Growth and Private-sector Development', Outcome 5, UNDP Iraq Country Programme Action Plan 2011–2014 (2012); and

- Outcome Evaluation of Country Programme Action Plan Outcome 2, Rule of Law & Human Rights in Line with International Standards (2013).

The evaluation team interviewed programme managers, project implementers, project counterparts (which are mainly government officials), beneficiaries where relevant, funding partners and collaborating agencies or those in the same area of work. Field visits were organized to conduct data collection activities, which covered 10 out of 18 Governorates in Iraq (Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, Basrah, Erbil, Nineveh, Quadissiya, Salah al-Din, Sulaymaniyah and Thi-Qar).

CONSULTATION PROCESS

In normal practice, the programme country government reviews all Assessments of Development Results (ADRs) carried out by the Independent Evaluation Office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) prior to publication. This review is followed by a wider discussion of the report with stakeholders and development actors at an in-country workshop. However, because of political and security developments that have taken place in the country since June 2014, the Iraq ADR did not complete this otherwise mandatory process.

Carried out in the last quarter of 2013, the ADR took into consideration the developments

in the country through to April 2014 when the draft report was completed (following review by UNDP Iraq and the Regional Bureau for Arab States). The Report provides an account of UNDP contributions until January 2014; the recommendations are based on this assessment and the Iraq country context at that point in time. The sudden changes in the country's political and security context significantly altered the environment of UNDP programmes and critically affected the programmes that were ongoing when the evaluation was carried out. Therefore, some (though not all) of the recommendations may not be fully applicable to the current programming context in Iraq.

Since the ADR was completed, UNDP Iraq carried out several programme activities, including support to IHEC in carrying out Governorate Council Elections, capacity development of new parliamentarians, preparation of public administration roadmap and the development of the Iraqi National Security Strategy. UNDP Iraq also contributed to the establishment of the Al Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies as a Government of Iraq think tank for security issues. UNDP subsequently supported the enhancement of the Centre's research and analytical capacities to inform policy development. UNDP Iraq launched the Iraq national Human Development Report 2014, which analysed Iraq's development progress with a focus on youth development. UNDP supported the government's

crisis response efforts, focusing on internally displaced persons and refugee support. Jointly with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNDP contributed to the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan; UNDP led the resilience component of the plan. Within this context and with UNDP's engagement, the government formally established the Joint Crisis Centre in Kurdistan and the Joint Crisis Management Centre in Baghdad. The evaluation team did not have the opportunity to verify the progress of these activities. A report that takes into account the changed country context and its implications for UNDP programmes requires a separate assessment; the present security context does not allow for this exercise.

1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

The report is divided into six chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 provides the context within which UNDP has been working over the past decade and describes the challenges it faced. Chapter 3 outlines UNDP's programme response and financial portfolio. Chapter 4 provides an assessment of UNDP's contributions to development results through achievement of its intended programme outcomes. Findings are further analysed from the viewpoint of UNDP's strategic positioning in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 provides conclusions of the evaluation and recommendations for UNDP's forthcoming programme in Iraq.

Chapter 2

NATIONAL CONTEXT

Until two decades ago, Iraq was highly regarded in the Middle East for its public sector management capability, its effective growth strategy for an emerging economy and its social welfare programmes. Since the 1991 Gulf War, years of war and international isolation have led to deteriorating infrastructure and underinvestment in public services. The hierarchical bureaucracy and inefficiencies of the socialist system, as well as secrecy and the patronage system under centralized rule, led to inefficiencies in public service delivery and a lack of transparency in governance. The country still suffers from the remnants of this system.

After the 2003 military operations of the international coalition force, Iraq was administered by the Coalition Provisional Authority on the basis of the Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003). In early 2005, the transitional National Assembly was formed to write the new Constitution of Iraq (adopted in October 2005 in a national referendum). A general election was then held under the new Constitution in December 2005, and the Iraqi Council of Representatives was elected as the permanent parliament. After months of negotiations, a new coalition government was formed in May 2006. The first governorate council elections took place in 2009, generally without serious incident. The second federal elections were held in 2010, and after protracted negotiations the incumbent government was established.

Despite the consecutive elected governments, a critical challenge for Iraq has been the high levels of 'security incidents', beginning in 2007 and 2008, followed by a reduction up to 2012, and then an increase in security incidents in late 2012, which then rose dramatically in 2013.[4] This chapter discusses some of the development challenges faced by Iraq, which have implications for UNDP contributions to development.[5]

2.1 NATIONAL STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES

Iraq developed its fully nationally-owned National Development Plan (NDP) 2010–2014 with the aims of achieving Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 9.4 percent per annum; generating 3 to 4.5 million new jobs; diversifying the economy away from oil and into agriculture, industrial sectors, and tourism; and creating a stronger role for the private sector, both in terms of investment and job opportunities. Achieving these goals required mobilizing US$186 billion in investment, creating 3.5 million new jobs and cutting unemployment from 15 percent to 7.5 percent. The NDP focuses on environmentally sensitive economic and social development through the sustainable use of available natural resources. The NDP aims to reduce poverty rates by 30 percent from 2007 levels by focusing on comprehensive rural development and by providing basic services (e.g. education and health care), particularly to vulnerable groups such as youth and women. It also aims to strengthen the role of local governments to bring service delivery and economic development closer to the people.[6]

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4   Reports prepared by the Joint Advisory Policy Unit, UNAMI, Baghdad.

5   This ADR was conducted before the 2014 developments in the country.

6   Government of Iraq, 'National Development Plan 2010–2014', Ministry of Planning, 2010.

In September 2013, Iraq launched the National Development Plan 2013–2017, which replaced the NDP 2010–2014. The new plan is complementary to the earlier plan, with the additional aims of reducing the gaps between rural and urban areas, strengthening the role of local governments in NDP implementation and promoting the private sector. [7]

2.2 ECONOMY

The strong economic performance and development achievements of the 1960s and 1970s came to an end in the 1980s with the regional war with Iran (1980–1988), followed by international sanctions (1990–2003) and two military occupations (1991 and 2003). Iraq's economy contracted a further 30 percent in 2003 under the weight of sanctions, invasion and occupation. Cumulatively, these events severely damaged Iraq's economic institutions and infrastructure; much of Iraq's resources were redirected into war efforts. As a result, per capita GDP declined by one third between 1980 and 2008[8] and did not return to the adjusted 1980 level of $3,042[9] until 2009.[10] Economic growth between 2004 and 2007 was modest and constrained by the effective collapse of state institutions and the ongoing conflict.

After 2008, relative improvements to security and political stability combined with Iraq's rapidly expanding hydrocarbon sector to increase the pace of growth. GDP growth ranged between 5.8 percent in 2009 and 8.6 percent in 2012, with the growth rates for 2013 and 2014 projected to be between 8 and 9 percent. These rates were below the two NDP targets but robust enough to make Iraq one of world's best growth performers in recent years.[11]

Iraqi per capita GDP also increased, tracking growth in the economy. From an estimated $900 in 2004, per capita GDP increased to $4,278 in 2010 and $6,305 in 2013.[12] In 2004, Iraq was ranked with low-income countries; it achieved lower-middle-income status in 2008 and then upper-middle-income status in 2013.[13] These growth rates demonstrate both the depth of Iraq's economic decline between 1980 and 2003 and the progress it made since 2008.

The government estimates the hydrocarbon sector's contributions to annual GDP at almost 19 percent.[14] Iraq has the world's fifth largest oil reserves, estimated at 1.43 billion barrels.[15] Both the production and export of oil increased between 2009 and 2013, with production recovering to the peak 1979 level of 3.5 million barrels per day by 2012–2013. The government estimates that production increased by 9 percent annually between 2009 and 2011, less than the 11 percent target but large enough to drive

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7   Government of Iraq, 'National Development Plan 2013–2017', Ministry of Planning, 2013.

8   World Bank, 'Country Partnership Strategy for Iraq FY13-FY16', November 2012, para 5.

9   International Monetary Fund, 'Iraq Programme Note', 18 April 2013.

10 Data summarized from Government of Iraq, 'National Development Plan 2010-2013', 2010, pages 42 and 43.

11 International Monetary Fund, Iraq Article IV Consultation; IMF Country Report No. 13/217, June 2013. See Para 6, Iraq: Selected Economic Indicators, 2010–18.

12 Joint Analysis Unit, Synthesis Paper; Preparation for the UNDAF 2015-2019, 25 November 2013, page 3.

13 The World Bank classifies lower-middle-income countries as having an annual per capita GDP of $1,035 or less. Middle-income countries range from $1,036 to $4,085, while upper-middle-income countries range between $4,086 and $12,615 (see http://thecurrencynewshound.com/2013/07/13/world-bank-iraq-moves-to-the-category-of-upper-middle-income-countries).The International Monetary Fund estimates that per capita GDP could reach $8,601 by 2017, at the end of the current National Development Plan period (International Monetary Fund, Iraq Article IV Consultation; IMF Country Report No. 13/217, June 2013. See Table 1. Iraq: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2010–18).

14 Government of Iraq, 'National Development Plan 2013-2017', 2013, Table (3-7). Estimate is for 2014, calculated in 2012 fixed prices.

15 Government of Iraq, 'National Development Plan 2013-2017', 2013, page 73.

a significant growth in both GDP and State revenues.[16] By 2012, the hydrocarbon sector generated up to 60 percent of Iraq's GDP and accounted for most government revenues. The NDP 2013–2017 estimates that oil revenue generated 88 percent of the 2009 budget, decreasing to 86 percent in 2010, then up to 90 percent in 2011.[17] Other estimates range as high as 97 percent of state revenue in 2013 being derived from the oil sector, making Iraq one of the most oil-dependent countries in the world.[18] The government forecasts that production will increase to 9,500 million barrels per day by the end of 2017, although other estimates are lesser than this in the range of 6 million barrels per day.[19] All estimates are subject to vulnerabilities such as fluctuations in the international price of oil and to internal security and political stability.

Growth in non-oil sectors was less robust, limiting employment creation for Iraq's growing workforce. The government estimates that non-oil sources comprised 10 to 14 percent of its revenues during the evaluation period, of which tax revenue was 6.04 percent in 2009, declining to 1.78 percent in 2011.[20] The agriculture sector,

an important employer, grew at approximately 7 percent between 2009 and 2012; manufacturing grew at 6 percent over the same time period. The non-oil sectors that showed stronger growth (e.g. the construction, infrastructure and transportation sectors and mobile communications in the information and technology sector) depended heavily on federal government expenditures and public investment. The state played the dominant role in determining how these sectors are developing and which economic actors were involved.[21] With economic resources concentrated in the state, there has been limited progress diversifying Iraq's economy away from its dependence on oil or strengthening the role of the private sector as a strategic actor in Iraq's development. A robust private sector has yet to emerge either as a strategic actor in Iraq's development as a source of employment or as an alternative source of tax revenue. Rather, private-sector growth continues to be crowded out by the state-managed economic system.

Outside of the larger sectors that depend on government spending, Iraq's private sector is dominated by micro-, small-and medium-sized

Table 1. Oil and Non-oil GDP Growth 2010 to 2013[22]				
GDP (percentage change)	2010	2011	2012	2013
Real GDP Growth	5.9	8.6	8.4	9.0
Non-oil real GDP	9.7	5.7	6.3	6.0

16 Earlier growth was affected by the 2008 global economic crisis, with declining international prices resulting in an income loss of approximately 10 percent of GDP for that year (International Monetary Fund, Iraq: Staff Report for the 2009 Article IV Consultation and Request for Stand-By Arrangement, IMF Country Report No. 10/72, March 2010).

17 Government of Iraq, 'National Development Plan 2013-2017', 2013, page 86.

18 International Monetary Fund and World Bank data. OECD Development Assistance Committee estimated that Iraq was the second most oil revenue dependent country in the world in 2010, after Angola (OECD DAC, 'Fragile States 2013: Resource Flows and Trends in a Shifting World', 2013, Table 2).

19 The International Monetary Fund predicts production will increase to 5.7 million barrels per day by the end of 2017, noting constraints resulting from insecurity, political instability, complex contracting procedures and the ongoing need to improve production and export infrastructure (IMF, Iraq; 2013 Article IV Consultation, IMF Country Report No. 13/217, June 2013, para 6).

20 Government of Iraq, 'National Development Plan 2013-2017', 2013, page 6.

21 Government of Iraq, 'National Development Plan 2013-2017', 2013, Table 3-7. Also see pages 53 to 56 for agricul-ture data.

22 International Monetary Fund Iraq; 2013 Article IV Consultation, IMF Country Report No. 13/217, July 2013, Table 1, Iraq: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators.

enterprises. These operate mainly in the retail and trade sectors and in light industry. The majority of these enterprises are either owned by sole proprietors or by family partnerships. Using mainly low-technology methods, they account for most non-public sector employment.

The NDP 2013–2017 estimates that large enterprises increased from 412 in 2009 to 420 in 2010; medium-scale enterprises increased from 50 in 2009 to 55 in 2010. The number of small businesses increased from 10,289 in 2009 to 11,126 in 2010. Most private sector growth, therefore, remains in the micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprise sector. However, it is not a source of innovation with the capacity to provoke structural change. A 2012 study by the International Labour Organisation estimated that 85 percent of small and medium-sized enterprises were owned by a single individual, 93 percent did not have a bank account and 73 percent of which did not have Internet access. Few small and medium-sized enterprises had introduced new products or business techniques since 2003, citing the lack of financial support as an important constraint.[23]

On the basis of these trends, the NDP 2013-2017 concluded that the private sector "has not held a strategic role in overall economic development activities."[24] The private sector's contributions to fixed capital formation during the evaluation period did not exceed 6.4 percent. In contrast, the public sector was the biggest investor during 2009–2010, accounting for 96.3 percent of fixed capital formation in 2010.[25] Public and private sector contributions to GDP from 2009 to 2010 were characterized by relative stability, with the state making the dominant contributions. Public-sector expenditures accounted for 65.4 percent of GDP in 2010, while private-sector contributions to the GDP were 34.6 percent.[26]

2.3 GOVERNANCE

In the area of governance, institutional capacities are a key challenge. Weak legal mechanisms and widespread corruption constrain development. Iraq ranks 169 out of 176 countries on the 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index.[27] Institutional public finance management capacities are limited, which impedes effective administration of oil revenues. Iraq also faces challenges in delivering basic services, which limits popular confidence in the government and hampers peace consolidation efforts.

The devolution of powers to provinces is evolving in Iraq, although at a very slow pace. The Constitution of Iraq allows for governorates to form into regions, and it recognizes Kurdistan as a region, providing it a special status. A law establishing the process of regionalization was established in 2006. One of the challenges facing Iraq is the lack of a policy on implementing federalism. At present, only Kurdistan is given special status; powers have yet to be devolved to other provinces. Iraq has yet to make the choice whether it would like to pursue a fully federal model or one that devolves power to local bodies. While Iraq has supported a reform process for decentralized political and administrative government, challenges remain in the devolution of authority for the delivery of services and the transfer of revenues to local governments.

2.4 POVERTY REDUCTION

Iraq achieved middle-income country status in 2011, with moderate levels of income, multidimensional poverty, and low income inequality. Since 2008, rapid economic growth and improvements to public service delivery have contributed to significant reductions to income poverty and more modest reductions to non-income poverty. Progress notwithstanding, Iraq's development

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23   ILO, 'Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in Iraq; A Survey Analysis', 2012, Executive Summary.

24   Ibid.

25   Government of Iraq, 'National Development Plan 2013-2017', 2013, page 4.

26   Government of Iraq, 'National Development Plan 2013-2017', 2013.

27   Transparency International, 'Corruption Perceptions Index 2012', 2012.

CHAPTER 2. NATIONAL CONTEXT

profile in 2013 is characterized by significant spatial and demographic inequalities, many of which were outlined in the NDP 2010-2014.

Income poverty is the most important contributor to multidimensional poverty in Iraq, with marked spatial (e.g. urban-rural and governorate) and demographic (e.g. male, female and age) inequalities. Deprivation of education is the most important contributor to non-income poverty for both females and males. Other contributors to non-income poverty vary by location and are strongly influenced by access to public goods and services. Women fare poorly across all of the multidimensional poverty indicators, particularly those in rural areas or who have lower levels of education.[28]

In 2013, Iraq was ranked 131 out of 189 countries in the UNDP Human Development Index. Its relative position improved from 135 in 2006, with Iraq now among the countries in the

"medium human development" category. Iraq's actual Human Development Index improved from .57 in 2007 to .59 in 2012.[29] UN Iraq calculated a higher Human Development Index for the country, .683, based on the results of a 2011 UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey assessment on NDP 2013–2107 priorities.[30]

Notwithstanding the overall improvements to Iraq's ranking, there were marked inequalities among governorates' human development indices. The Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the Baghdad Governorate have the highest Human Development Index (between .7 and .76), while the Governorates of Muthanna, Ninewa and Missan were among the lowest (between .6 and .65) (see Figure 1).

According to the 2013 MDG report, Iraq has achieved two Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets: Goal 1 (eradicating extreme poverty and hunger),[31] and Goal 6 (combating

Figure 1. The Human Development Index across Iraqi Governorates

Source: UNAMI, Governorate Level Vulnerability Mapping, Joint Analysis Unit, DRAFT, Baghdad, December 2013.

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28 See Government of Iraq, 'National Development Plan 2010-2014', 2010.

29 UNDP, 'Iraq: Human Development Indicators', 2013, http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/IRQ.

30 UNAMI, 'Governorate Level Vulnerability Mapping', Joint Analysis Unit, DRAFT, Baghdad, December 2013, page 4.

31 Some concern remains for the prevalence of underweight children, which at 8.5 percent is above the target of 4.5 percent. UNDP and the CSO, '2015 Millennium Development Goals', UNDP Iraq Country Office, 2013, page 3.

HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases). Iraq was also on track to meet some specific MDG indicator targets in Goal 2 (achieving universal primary education enrolment and youth literacy), Goal 5 (improving maternal health, with a significant improvement in the number of attended births), and Goal 7 (ensuring access to improved sanitation). Good progress was also shown in meeting Goal 8 (developing global partnerships). Although Internet access remains low (6 percent), Iraq exceeded MDG targets on computer ownership and cellular subscriptions. It also benefited from external debt reduction, from $114 billion to $31 billion, under the Paris Agreement signed with the International Monetary Fund.[32]

Progress notwithstanding, the status of the remaining six MDGs is listed as "ongoing," with large gaps between progress and targets on some indicators. There was particular concern for some indicators of Goal 2 (low net enrolment in secondary education and adult literacy), Goal 3 (poor overall performance on all indicators related to gender inequality, with the exception of girl's primary school enrolment), and Goal 7 (ensuring access to potable water). Despite significant progress on Goal 4 (reducing the child mortality rate—50 per 1,000 in 2006 to 32 per 1,000 in 2011), it is still twice the 2015 target of 17 per 1,000 live births. Limited access and quality of public services in many rural areas was a key contributing factor to performance gaps.[33]

There was a modest decline in the number of economically active Iraqis as a percentage of the overall population (from 46 percent in 2009 to 42 percent 2011).[34] The government attributes the fall in activity rates to slow growth in job creation relative to demographic growth, among other factors. There were differences in labour force participation rates among governorates. The rates of participation are the highest in Anbar, Najaf, and Wassit (47 to 48 percent), while the rates are lowest are in the governorates of Dohuk (38 percent), Thi-Qar (41 percent), and Muthanna (41 percent).[35] There were also significant variations between the participation rates of males and females; 73 percent of males are economically active, compared to only 15 percent of females.[36] Male participation declined slightly (75 percent in 2007 to 73 percent in 2012), while female participation showed a modest increase of approximately 2 percent, up from the 13 percent reported in the 2007 Household Survey.[37] The government also reported a gradual decrease in the gap between male and female participation rates in urban areas; the gap is growing in rural areas.

The national unemployment rate for 2012 was 11 percent, declining from 15 percent in 2009. With the reduction, the government reported that Iraq was on track to meet its 2014 target of "reducing unemployment to acceptable levels."[38] However, concerns remain for the demographic and spatial profile of unemployment and the quality of private-sector jobs. These remain contributors to multidimensional poverty.

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32   UNDP and the CSO, '2015 Millennium Development Goals', UNDP Iraq Country Office, 2013, page 3.

33   Ibid.

34   Government of Iraq, 'National Development Plan 2013-2017', 2013, page 8. 'Economically active' refers to persons over 15 years of age that are either working or seeking employment. The United Nations reports 43.8 percent of Iraqis were economically active in 2011, slightly higher than the government estimate (UNAMI, 'Governorate Level Vulnerability Mapping', Joint Analysis Unit, DRAFT, Baghdad, December 2013, page 15). The 2008, 46 percent activity rate, was well below the Middle East and North Africa average rate of 67 percent, largely owing to the low participation of women.

35   UNAMI, 'Governorate Level Vulnerability Mapping', Joint Analysis Unit, DRAFT, Baghdad, December 2013, page 15.

36   Government of Iraq, 'National Development Plan 2013-2017', 2013, page 8. Iraq has the third lowest rate of female economic activity in the Middle East and North Africa region, after Yemen and Saudi Arabia (World Bank, 'Opening Doors: Gender Equality and Development in the Middle East and North Africa', 2013, Figure 0.3).

37   World Bank, 'Confronting Poverty in Iraq', Main Findings, 2011, page 39. From 2007 data, the report estimated that only 11 percent of women were active in the labour force, noting that a large number of these were unemployed. Accordingly, 87 percent of women were outside of the labour force in 2007, compared to 85 percent in 2012. These figures include women actually working and those unemployed but seeking jobs.

38   Government of Iraq, 'National Development Plan 2013-2017', 2013, page 8.

2.5 GENDER INEQUALITY

Iraq has a high level of gender inequality. The 2012 national Gender Inequality Index of .57 placed Iraq at position 117 out of 146 countries globally, and the third-to-last position in the Middle East and North Africa region.[39] The government reported that it does not expect to achieve gender equality in the near term due to cultural and social factors.[40] The Gender Inequality Index varies geographically, ranging from .7 in Al Muthana Governorate to .47 in Suleimanyah (see Figure 2). Overall, the three Kurdistan Governorates have the lowest levels of inequality. The governorates with the highest Human Development Index correlate as having the lowest inequality levels.[41] Nationally, inequality is driven by high maternal mortality, low representation in parliament, low participation in the labour market and the small number of females over 25 years of age with a secondary or greater education level.

2.6 INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

After the 2003 invasion, a substantial amount of official development assistance was provided to Iraq, mainly as a response to the humanitarian crisis and as support for the reconstruction of physical and social infrastructure (see Figure 3). When the new government was formed in 2005, total official development assistance had reached over $20 billion. Official development assistance has been an important source of revenue for the Government of Iraq. The aid-to-GDP ratio for 2003–2010 was 22 percent, making Iraq the world's 14th most aid-dependent country and one of the seven largest recipients of official development assistance during the period.

Approximately 50 percent of total assistance came from the United States. The allocation of official development assistance to fragile states tripled during the ten-year period ending 2012 as a percentage of total aid flows. Of 10 to 12 percent of

Figure 2. Iraq Gender Inequality Index

Governorate	Index
Muthana	0.070
Basrah	0.64
Salah al-Din	0.63
Ninewa	0.63
Kirkuk	0.63
Kerbala	0.62
Missan	0.62
Thi-Qar	0.61
Qadissiya	0.60
Diyala	0.58
Iraq	0.57
Anbar	0.57
Najaf	0.57
Baghdad	0.56
Babil	0.54
Wasit	0.53
Erbil	0.52
KRG	0.50
Dohuk	0.49
Sulaynaniyah	0.47

39   UNAMI, 'Governorate Level Vulnerability Mapping', Joint Analysis Unit, DRAFT, Baghdad, December 2013, page 5 The Gender Inequality Index is based on an assessment of three indicators: reproductive health, empowerment and labour market participation. A score of 1 shows absolute inequality between men and women, while a score of 0 shows equality.

40   Government of Iraq, 'National Development Plan 2013-2017', 2013, page 21.

41   UNAMI, 'Governorate Level Vulnerability Mapping', Joint Analysis Unit, DRAFT, Baghdad, December 2013, page 5.

42   Data on international assistance to Iraq taken from OECD DAC, 'Fragile States 2013; Resource Flows and Trends in a Shifting World', 2013, http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/FragileStates2013.pdf.

official development assistance in 2001, the 47 countries classified as "fragile" received 38 percent of total official development assistance in 2010 (approximately $50 billion). Over 50 percent of official development assistance allocations during this period went to seven countries, identified by donors as situations where their national security interests intersected with state fragility and conflict. Iraq was the largest recipient in 2005 and among the top seven recipients between 2003 and 2010. However, the aid-to-GDP ratio declined after 2005 as national GDP began to expand and with the sharp reduction of international assistance beginning after 2007. [42]At its peak in 2005, allocations to Iraq accounted for 40 percent of all aid flows into fragile states. Of equal importance to financing was the transfer of technology, modern equipment and access to international advances in all fields after 13 years of isolation.[43]

The turning point came in 2009, when almost all donors except the United States of America and multilateral agencies drastically cut their official development assistance to Iraq. The United States continued to provide sizeable official development assistance, but nevertheless reduced the amount year-by-year. This could be explained by the fact that after the first tenure of the government, significant oil revenue enabled the country to restore its self-financing capacity (as seen in Figure 3), thus 'graduating' from its post-conflict emergency status and achieving middle-income country status. The financial crisis of 2008 may also have played a factor in this precipitous drop. In this context, official development assistance fell to $1.9 billion in 2011 (1.7 percent of gross national income), down from $9.2 billion in 2007.[44]

Figure 3. Net Official Development Assistance Inflows and Government Expenditures 2003–2011

Legend:
- Net ODA received (current USD millions)
- Total general government expenditure (Iraqi Dibar billions)

Source: OECD DAC and UNDP Iraq

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43 In this context, Donors channelled almost $1.43 billion through the United Nations Development Group's Iraq Trust Fund, which closed new programme funding in 2010. See the UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund site for programme and financial information, http://mptf.undp.org.

44 OECD, Development Assistance Committee (DAC), http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/IRQ.gif Total official development assistance to Iraq for 2011 was estimated at $1,904 billion, of which 75 percent originated from the United States. Support to governance, social service delivery and infrastructure comprised almost 90 percent of the portfolio. Also see Table 25, Official Development Assistance Receipts and Selected Indicators for Developing Countries and Territories. http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/statisticsonresourceflowstodevelopingcountries.htm.

Chapter 3

UNDP'S RESPONSE

UNDP has partnered with the Government of Iraq for over 35 years (since the Standard Basic Assistance Agreement in 1976), supporting development, recovery and reconstruction efforts. Since 2003, UNDP has operated as part of the United Nations assistance strategy coordinated by UNAMI. UNDP support aligned with the successive NDPs, the United Nations Iraq Assistance Strategy 2008–2010 and the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq. Since the launching of this funding mechanism, UNDP participated alongside UN agencies and other international organizations in administering the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund.

The United Nations Security Council established UNAMI at the request of the Government of Iraq (via the 2003 Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1500; SCR 1770 greatly expanded UNAMI's role in 2007). UNAMI is mandated to: assist the government and people of Iraq advance inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation; assist in the electoral process and national census planning; facilitate regional dialogue between Iraq and its neighbours; and to promote the protection of human rights and judicial and legal reform.[45]

UNAMI is an integrated mission, covering not only peace and security issues but also humanitarian interventions and recovery. It is headed by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General to Iraq, who is assisted by two deputies, one in charge of political affairs and the other in charge of development and humanitarian affairs. The latter position is assumed by the UN Resident Coordinator, who provides linkages between UNAMI and the UN country team (which comprises sixteen UN and associated agencies engaged in development and humanitarian work).

In 2004, the United Nations and the World Bank launched the multilateral International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq in order to help donor nations channel their resources and coordinate their support for Iraq's reconstruction and recovery. This funding facility was made into two trust funds; the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund ($1.33 billion), and the World Bank trust fund ($496 million) to implement. Approximately $400 million (about $50 million per year) of the Iraq Trust Fund was disbursed to UNDP.

UNDP was mandated to act as the Administrative Agent of the trust fund and to actively coordinate the use of the fund by United Nations country team agencies. The United Nations country team was requested to focus on quick-impact and transition activities to be implemented in a rapid and flexible way. With a view to supporting the integrated mandate from SCR 1770, the United Nations country team developed the United Nations Iraq Assistance Strategy for 2005–2007 and 2008–2010 in order to provide a coordinated approach to humanitarian, reconstruction and longer-term development assistance.

This chapter discusses the UNDP programme strategy and programmes carried out by UNDP in coordination with UNAMI and the UN.

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45   S/RES/1500 (2003); S/RES/1770 (2007).

3.1 UNDP PROGRAMME 2008–2011

In order to introduce a coherent approach to programming, UNDP prepared the Interim Country Strategy 2008–2010, which replaced the earlier project-based approach. The Strategy comprised the outcome of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq, and introduced a coherent approach to programming for the first time since 1989 (see Table 2 for the United Nations Iraq Assistance Strategy outcomes that UNDP supported).[46] Aligned with priorities identified in the NDS 2007–2010, SCR 1700, and the International Compact with Iraq,[47] the UNDP programme focused on two areas 1) governance and 2) economic recovery and poverty alleviation (the Strategy also included programme areas of other UN agencies that are not directly relevant to UNDP's work). UNDP focused heavily on financing reconstruction efforts and generating employment, including the rehabilitation of multiple power generation plants and systems.

3.2 UNDP PROGRAMME 2011–2014

The UNDAF 2011–2014 provided for an integrated UN country strategy based on the NDP 2010–2014. Accordingly, UNDP transitioned to its current full country programme for 2011–2014 with four priority areas: (1) fostering inclusive participation; (2) strengthening accountable and responsive governing institutions; (3) promoting inclusive growth, gender equality, climate change mitigation and adaptation and MDG achievement; and (4) restoring the foundations for development.[48] UNDP also changed its programmatic focus from infrastructure rehabilitation to upstream initiatives including capacity development and policy support to key national institutions.[49] Annex 2 outlines the strategic linkages between national priorities represented in the NDP, the UNDAF and the UNDP country programme.

The UNDP country programme 2011–2014 for Iraq is structured around five programme

Table 2. United Nations Iraq Assistance Strategy Outcomes (2008–2010) Relevant to UNDP	
Governance	
Outcome 1	Strengthened electoral processes in Iraq
Outcome 2	Strengthened national dialogue and civil society for governance and reconciliation
Outcome 3	Enhanced rule of law and respect for human rights in line with international standards
Outcome 4	Strengthened regulatory frameworks, institutions and processes of national and local governance
Economic reform and diversification	
Outcome 1	Improved policies, strategies and related institutional developments that are sensitive to the MDGs, social inclusiveness, gender equality and pro-poor economic growth
Outcome 2	Enhanced key sectors of local economy in most deprived areas
Outcome 3	Strengthened electricity and transportation sector plans for rapid economic growth

Source: United Nations Iraq Assistance Strategy 2008–2010: United Nations Country Team, Mission Statement

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46   UNDP Iraq Interim Country Strategy 2008–2010.

47   International Compact with Iraq Resolution: http://www.uniraq.org/ici/ICI_Resolution_EN.pdf.

48   UNDP Country Programme Document for Iraq (2011–2014), 15 October 2010.

49   UNDP and Government of Iraq, Country Programme Action Plan, 2011–2014.

Table 3. Country Programme Outcomes (2011–2014)	
Country Programme Outcome	
Outcome 1	The Government of Iraq and civil society have strengthened participatory mechanisms in place for electoral processes, national dialogue and reconciliation
Outcome 2	Enhanced rule of law, protection and respect for human rights in line with international standards
Outcome 3	Strengthened regulatory frameworks, institutions and processes in place for accountable, transparent and participatory governance at national and local levels
Outcome 4	The Government of Iraq has the institutional framework to develop and implement MDG-based pro-poor, equitable and inclusive socio-economic and environmental policies and strategies
Outcome 5	Enabling policy and frameworks for rapid economic recovery, inclusive and diversified growth and private sector development

Source: UNDP Iraq country programme document

outcomes. Each outcome is intended to be achieved through several component programmes (see Table 3).

3.3 PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION

There are important aspects of the Iraq programme that distinguish it from UNDP programmes in other countries and that affect how the country programme is managed. After the 2003 bombing of the UN offices in Baghdad, the programme was largely implemented from a remote office in Amman, Jordan. Although a section of the programme staff returned to Iraq, a large portion of the country office operations remained based in Amman. In the last quarter of 2013, UNDP closed the Amman office and returned all operations to Iraq.

The remote operation from Amman affected programme performance, resulting in reduced interactions with national partners and, to some degree, among UNDP programme staff who were dispersed between three offices (Amman, Baghdad and Erbil). International programme staff's access to national partners and stakeholders has been severely curtailed by UNAMI security restrictions, which have been an issue particularly in Baghdad. UNDP Iraq management is exploring options to mitigate the negative impacts of security restrictions on programme performance, such as increasing national programme staff and locating national staff in the ministries and local offices where security rules do not allow free movement of the international staff.

UNDP supported the Kurdistan Regional Government and, given the region's special status, implemented parallel programmes. UNDP has run parallel projects in a number of programme areas (e.g. one with the Federal Government in Baghdad and another with the Kurdistan Regional Government). The Erbil sub-office, initially set up to support programmes within the Kurdistan Regional Government, has since consolidated as an independent sub-office.

At the time of the evaluation, the Country Office had plans to open a programme support office in Basrah, in addition to the main office in Baghdad and one in Erbil for to improve engagement with sub-national government actors.

3.4 RESOURCES

The Iraq Trust Fund was established in 2004. UNDP was allocated approximately $400 million to disburse, beginning in 2005. In 2005, there was approximately $160 million available for

programme implementation (about 70 percent of which was spent). UNDP's budget for the next two years ranged from $90 to $100 million, also with a 70 percent expenditure rate. UNDP had another increase in the budget in 2008 to approximately $135 million, presumably to expedite the spending of the remaining funds. The operation of the Iraq Trust Fund was to be officially closed in December 2013.

With the drop in foreign aid beginning in 2009, UNDP's programme budget has been on the decline (although not as precipitously because the programmes are budgeted over a number of years and there is a delayed effect). The trend in the budgets and expenditures is depicted in Figure 4. For 2013, the programming budget was about $60 million, less than half of what was budgeted in 2008. There are indications that there may be further reduction in the funds.

Budget performance and expenditure rates have generally remained around 70 percent, except

for 2009 to 2010, when the rate dropped to 50 to 60 percent. Figure 4 shows the distribution of resources among the programme areas for the period 2006–2011. The budget for each outcome is presented in Table 4.

The nature of projects supported by UNDP has varied from infrastructure rehabilitation to training and policy studies. Budget size does not necessarily reflect programme importance. The categorization of projects into different programme areas has been inconsistent and occasionally arbitrary.

The United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund created pressure to complete individual projects. As a result, UNDP could not effectively pursue coherent programming that is likely to achieve long-term development results. Nevertheless, with the large sum of funding available and a focus on reconstruction and recovery, the programme produced tangible benefits to the country.

Figure 4. UNDP Iraq Budget and Expenditure

Table 4. Country Programme Outcomes, Component Programmes and Budget (2011–2014)		
Country Programme Outcome		Budget (in US$)
Outcome 1	Support to elections Support to the Council of Representatives Empowering civil society organizations Peace and reconciliation	49,427,491
Outcome 2	Rule of law Human rights and access to justice Security sector reform and small arms and light weapons programme	60,432,393
Outcome 3	Public sector modernization Anti-corruption programme Donor coordination mechanism UNDP-Global Fund support to national anti-tuberculosis programme	75,303,877
Outcome 4	Achievement of MDGs Local Area Development Programme Environment and sustainable development	250,133,204
Outcome 5	Private sector development programme Reconstruction Loan management	208,084,988

Chapter 4

UNDP'S CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

This chapter analyses UNDP contributions by country programme outcomes, applying the criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. Each of the sections below is an analysis of the outcomes of the current programme and related projects from the previous programme through to April 2014. For each outcome overall findings are presented followed by an analysis of the projects in each programme area of the outcomes.

4.1 STRENGTHENED PARTICIPATORY MECHANISMS

Outcome 1 includes four programme components that respond to national needs and priorities: support to elections; support to the Council of Representatives; empower civil society organizations (CSOs); and promote peace and reconciliation.

Two of them, support to elections and support to the Council of Representatives, pertained to governance reforms (see Box 1 and Table 5).

OVERALL FINDINGS

The UNDP flagship programme, Support to Elections, has achieved considerable results. In contrast, performance in other programme areas of the outcome has been constrained by a lack of synergy among programmes and the small scale and stand-alone character of programme activities.

Election support is a government priority, as it accords legitimacy to government-run electoral processes. Assistance to the electoral commission has established the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) as a self-sufficient, independently functioning, sustainable and successful

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Box 1. Outcome 1 Statements and Indicators

Outcome Statements:

The Government of Iraq and civil society have strengthened participatory mechanisms in place for electoral processes, national dialogue and reconciliation.

Outcome 1 includes four areas of work: elections, Council of Representatives (parliament), support to civil society organizations and peace and reconciliation.

Outcome Indicators:

- The Iraq High Electoral Commission has a permanent voter registry with safeguards to prevent fraud and mechanisms for inclusion of all Iraqis in elections (2010: no; 2014: yes);
- Number of personnel, disaggregated by gender, and representatives of relevant Iraqi partner institutions engaged in capacity-building activities to enhance electoral management policies and processes (2010: 0; 2014: 450);
- The Government of Iraq and civil society have strengthened participatory mechanisms in place for electoral processes, national dialogue and reconciliation;
- The number of political parties participating in capacity development events (2009: 0; 2014: 10 political parties);
- Percent of legislators elected in 2010 trained on legislative and oversight functions (2009: 0; 2014: 50 percent); and
- Women candidates have the capacity to undertake effective electoral campaigning (2010: no; 2014 yes).

Table 5. Programme Activities under Outcome 1

Programme activities under Outcome 1

Programme	Project	Duration	Original Budget $000,000	Source	Location
Support to Elections	Institutional Development: Organizational and Capacity Development for Iraq High Electoral Commission	2005–2010	7.2	Iraq Trust Fund	National
	Technical Assistance to Iraq High Electoral Commission Phase II	2008–2012	5.5	United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund	National
	Institutional Development Support to the Iraq High Electoral Commission	2010–2013	10.1	United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund	National
Support to the Council of Representatives	Support to the Council of Representatives	2010–2013	1.4	UNDP core funds UNDP Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund; UNDP Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery	National
Support to Civil Society Organizations	Empowering Civil Society Organizations in Iraq	2012–2014	2.7	UNDAF fund	National
Peace and Reconciliation	Support to National Reconciliation	2010–2013	0.5	UNDAF Fund	Nineweh
	Support for Rights of Minorities	2010–2012	0.5	Government of the Netherlands	Nineweh and DIBs
	Nineweh Minorities – Inter-faith Dialogue Component	2011–2013	0.18	Government of the Netherlands	Nineweh and DIBs
	Peace and Development Analysis	2010–2013	0.52	UNDP core funds; Conflict Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund	National

participatory mechanism. The other participatory mechanisms supported under this outcome (the Council of Representatives, CSOs and reconciliation initiatives) each, for various reasons, made limited contributions to the outcome objectives. This is partly due to UNDP's responsiveness in implementation. It is also due to increasing sectarian conflict and the present government's unsuccessful efforts to impose order and centralize power. The government has become less inclusive and less participatory.

While performance against some indicators is positive (e.g. the percentage of women elected to national and governorate Councils of Representatives), others aiming for greater civil society involvement and progress in peace-building show negative trends. UNDP's financial predicament and the lack of coordination between UNDP and UNAMI are also contributing factors.

The Support to Elections programme has expressed concerns about voter registration and other matters to IHEC management. Previously, IHEC has responded openly to the concerns of international advisers, but this seems to be changing. There appears to be declining interest within IHEC management to consult the UN

elections support team, for example, in introducing a biometric approach to voter registration that the UN team opposed. While the electoral support programme has been relevant to IHEC needs throughout the programme period, its relevance has recently diminished as the challenges faced by IHEC are no longer technical, but largely political, for which UNDP does not have as large a role.

Although UNDP's involvement has been mostly well-regarded, and UNDP may wish to continue its support to elections, the question is whether further UNDP involvement would continue to be desirable from the point of the government. Iraq is a middle-income country and IHEC has demonstrated that it is capable of running its own elections. While there may be aspects in which IHEC could use technical assistance, it could source such assistance without a full-fledged project by UNDP. The relevance of UNDP's technical support has thus diminished. In addition, some of the issues in the functioning of the IHEC are beyond the scope of the support UNDP can provide.

If the UN is not invited to advise on key decisions (e.g. on those related to voter registration issues), it will risk its credibility by blindly associating itself with the election results. In order to avoid such a risk, there must first be serious political-level involvement and clarification of the conditions under which the UN can be associated, which is the mandate of UNAMI. UNAMI took political leadership on this issue in support of the UN electoral support team. UNDP did not show much interest beyond trying to carve out its niche within the UN team to focus on capacity development. Thus, although UNDP prepared a new project document for continued support for the institutional development of IHEC, it is important to ask how political and reputational risks can be avoided and

whether the continued focus on technical support is the right approach.

The other programme areas of the outcome—supporting the functioning of the Council of Representatives, supporting CSOs and reconciling ethnic differences—seem to hold only modest interest for the government. The Council of Representatives is a political body whose efficacy is suffering from the rise in political tensions, particularly since the last national elections. Though the NDP 2010–2014 mentions CSOs, it is to caution that "their identity must be verified" and to ask whether they "really exist or are they fictional?"[50] The NDP makes no mention of peace-building or reconciliation. The political situation is challenging, where the government is (understandably) increasingly sensitive to measures that might benefit political oppositions, making it difficult for programmes to remain relevant.

There may have been some results in the support to CSOs, but its small scale and the fact that it is a stand-alone project means it does not have the scope to achieve its objectives of holding the government accountable in service delivery, promoting human rights and reducing corruption. The support to the Council of Representatives has so far accomplished far less than expected, and the peace and reconciliation projects have been small, pilot initiatives that have generated little appreciation or interest.

Supporting the Council of Representatives has entailed significant challenges. There is a perception that the Council is presently not in a position to make key legislative decisions, effectively discharge its oversight role over the executive branch or combat corruption. Introducing reforms in the Council must contend with this complex environment.[51] For UNDP support to be relevant, it must carefully design its approach so as to overcome these challenges. The current

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50   Government of Iraq, 'National Development Plan 2011–2014', Ministry of Planning, 2010.

51   Milad Abdul-Jabbar, 'Iraq: the executive authority distributes the rights of citizens over the nation's COR!', Baghdad, 20 September 2013.

project does not seem to be successful in this regard, as it has garnered neither political nor financial support for its initiatives.

Peace and reconciliation support involved small pilot projects, premised on the expectation that lessons learned from the projects will greatly enhance UNDP and other agencies' capacities to undertake local community dialogue projects in Iraq.[52] There has been, however, no indication of significant support from within UNDP nor were there indications of support forthcoming from other agencies. There is no question that these reconciliation projects attempted to promote UNDP values of addressing the needs of vulnerable groups and protecting minority rights. However, the question in this case is whether the approach had the merit of addressing conflict on a wider scale that is applicable broadly in the country. Very few stakeholders considered that it did. Some regarded the projects as naively conceived. While the overall objective is relevant to the critical issues facing the country, these projects have not engendered wider interest; support was found to be minimal.

Outcome 1 is not a coherent entity, and this detracts from the overall effectiveness of its component parts. Support to elections is the exception, because it continues to achieve significant results.

The scale and scope of the pilot projects were too small to demonstrate a viable model for replication or pursuing an approach.

Pilot projects are justified by the expectation that they will attract donor investors and other agencies to build on their initial efforts. However, the small and stand-alone Support to the Council of Representatives, Support to Civil Society Organizations and the Peace and Reconciliation projects do not seem poised to bring in additional support. It appears that UNDP took them on in part because the funds, however modest, were made available and the remote possibility that they would evolve into something more substantial. In retrospect, the these projects' contributions to overall UNDP efforts have been modest and national partners—parliamentary committees, CSOs in Iraq and ethnicities in Nineweh— have seen little change.

ELECTIONS

Support to the IHEC has been a key area of UNDP work in Iraq since 2004. UNDP has been a part of a four-agency international electoral support team, led by UNAMI, together with the United Nations Office for Project Services and the International Foundation for Electoral Support. Within the team, UNDP focused on supporting IHEC's institutional capacities on dispute resolution mechanisms and public outreach and on developing staff capacities in the areas of electoral data collection and reporting, field coordination and management, complaints processing, and social media use. The approach was to have advisory staff working closely with IHEC to identify areas of improvements and lessons learned from previous elections and then address revealed gaps.

Two successive UNDP projects guided UNDP's contributions between 2004 and 2009 providing technical assistance, training and needs assessments. A third UNDP project, beginning in 2010 and continuing to 2013 (Institutional Development Support to the Independent High Electoral Commission), was the largest programme area under Outcome 1 oriented, in principle, towards institution building. The funds came from the now-terminated Iraq Trust Fund (see Table 5 for programme activities under Outcome 1).

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52 UNDP Iraq, Project Document – Support for the Rights of Minorities and Vulnerable Groups in Ninewa, February 2011, page 7.

Support to elections has achieved considerable results; IHEC is now regarded as an institution that can run well-organized elections. However, gaps remain in enabling voter participation.

Support to elections by the UN team has achieved tangible results. The proof has been in a succession of reputable national, governorate and Kurdistan elections. Two elections have taken place under the auspices of IHEC, the Governorate Council elections in south and central Iraq and the parliamentary elections in the Kurdistan region, both are viewed as well-managed.[53] This perceived legitimacy speaks for itself.

IHEC has become a self-sufficient, technically developed institution capable of running well-organized elections. While IHEC's work in recent elections has been seen as successful, there are nonetheless some important concerns. For example, despite support from UNDP and others for a full-fledged voter registration campaign, it did not generate the required momentum. Low voter turnout and popular indifference in south and central Iraq is another concern. Voter turnout in the south and central regions has been unusually low (36 percent). By comparison, the voter turnout in the recent Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) elections was reported to be 78 percent. The IHEC has been unclear in how it intends to address these concerns. While these may be seen as a result of ineffectiveness of the UN electoral team's advice on encouraging voter registration and turnout, it also suggests that voter registration may be a political issue beyond the remit of UNDP technical support.

The present voter registry is neither permanent nor fraud-free. Voter re-registration campaigns that precede each election have had little success. In spite of suggestions by the UNDP team and others for a full-fledged voter registration campaign, voter rolls continue to be made up of a patchwork of lists including those from old, often inaccurate food rations lists and military records that are vulnerable to manipulation. Though this voter registry has sufficed up to now, its many inaccuracies invite fraud in KRG and in south and central Iraq.

The four-agency international electoral support team are acutely aware of the apparent indifference of voters in south and central Iraq. Popular indifference and even suspicion about IHEC and its efforts to reach the population are common in south and central Iraq. A recent survey of 3,000 respondents across the country assessing the impact of IHEC's media campaigns found that a large proportion did not know about the campaign (see Table 6). The survey's summarizing report described these results as "frightening."[54]

UNDP has addressed its concerns about voter registration and other matters to IHEC management. In previous years, IHEC has responded openly to the international advisers' concerns, but this is now changing; in the last two years, IHEC management has become less interested in UNDP technical advice. Part of the reason is that the four agencies do not present a common front; UNDP and UNAMI have yet to agree about their respective prerogatives and responsibilities. IHEC management is embarking on a

Table 6. Influence of the Independent High Electoral Commission on the Population through Media Campaigns (percent)			
Positive Effect	No Effect	Negative Effect	Unaware of IHEC Campaigns
36	14	1	49

Source: IHEC, IHEC Media Impact – Sample Survey, 2011

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53 Shams Network for Monitoring Elections, Report Series on Electoral Process in Iraq 2013: the Parliamentary Elections in Kurdistan Region – Report on Special Voting 19/09/2013, Election Network in the Arab World, 2013.

54 Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), 'IHEC Media Impact Sample Survey', 2011 page 27.

biometric approach to voter registration, which UNDP and UNAMI had opposed.

Despite the diminishing ability to work productively within IHEC, UNDP may wish to continue its involvement and continue to provide advisory services. However, UNDP must recognize that its presence will be increasingly less welcome and UNDP's association with IHEC may assume an undesirable level of reputational risk.

COUNCIL OF REPRESENTATIVES

Support to the Council of Representatives included four projects. Three of them ended in 2009. The fourth project, scheduled to end in 2013, involves support to women parliamentarians, support to the administration (the Secretariat) of the Council and support to six parliamentary committees (covering programmes to which UNDP has provided funding under other programme areas). The current project was initiated in 2011 when the United Kingdom and the United States withdrew from this sector. UNDP stepped in with a 30-month project beginning in 2011 with a small amount of core funds and approximately $1.4 million from UNDP's Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund and the Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery.

The ongoing project proposes to engage with the Council of Representatives in a number of ways. The project initially engaged with the Office of the Secretary General (the administrative wing of the Council) to formulate a strategic plan for parliamentary management. The project then reviewed five standing committees in the Council

and conducted a needs assessment (there were plans to build on the needs assessment and create a training cell to establish rules of procedures and propose administrative changes). Next, the council signed a memorandum of understanding in a highly publicized ceremony in December 2012 with the UNDP Administrator present. The memorandum of understanding set out the terms of future collaborations, agreeing on a permanent UNDP presence in the parliamentary offices, on activities, on the provision of expertise and on potential cost sharing.[55]

Support to Council of Representatives has accomplished far less than expected. In a politically contentious situation, UNDP found it difficult to achieve intended objectives.

Some UNDP objectives have been realized (e.g. expanding women's participation). The percentage of women serving as parliamentarians reflects the quotas established by the constitution (see Table 7). Other objectives are far from realized. After holding two workshops and a training session to formulate a strategic plan, UNDP consultants discontinued their contact with the Secretariat and preparation of the strategic plan was put on hold. Very little happened in 2013 on this matter. On the review of five standing committees, the plan to build on the needs assessment conducted also seems to have been put on hold. On the permanent UNDP presence in the parliamentary offices, as well as other assistance promised in the memorandum of understanding, none are yet to be in place. Overall, national partners perceive UNDP as not carrying though with its commitments.

Table 7. Women Parliamentarians from the 2005 and 2010 Elections			
Year	Number of seats	Number of women parliamentarians	Percentage of women parliamentarians
2005	230	62	27%
2010	318	82	26%

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55 UNDP, 'Strengthening the Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR) – Progress Report', Governance Section, May 2011-November 2012, January 2013.

Because expectations from the project were high, UNDP's credibility has declined inside the Council. Consider, for example, the strategic plan for the Secretariat. The UNDP counterparts inside the Council are generally senior politicians or senior managers who expect to work with senior experts when working with the UNDP. They were disappointed to find that their counterparts were junior consultants lacking the requisite experience. A recent needs assessment observed that "there is limited capacity in UNDP for managing parliamentary support."[56] Further, despite the Council's commitment to provide office space, there is still no UNDP presence inside the parliament and no mechanism for coordinating international support. This is a role that UNDP is positioned to play and its failure to do so is a missed opportunity.

UNDP perceived budget shortfalls as a factor in the limited contribution. However, insufficient resources are as much a symptom as a root cause. Resources available for this outcome were widely dispersed among initiatives whose justification was that they bring in donor funding to a governance programme when resources are dwindling. UNDP's positioning as the appropriate conduit for funding to the Council of Representatives would be more credible if UNDP had undertaken more disciplined planning processes.

Notwithstanding these limitations, UNDP made some contributions to Iraq's legislative body. Although the Council of Representatives project has stalled, UNDP has impacted the Council of Representatives through other projects. UNDP's project to put a High Commission for Human Rights in place has relied on the Council's Human Rights Committee to oversee its formation and has ensured that this innovative High Commission has the protection of the legislative branch. The Public Sector Modernization project has made important contributions to the Regions and Governorate Committee; the project successfully helped amend the important Provincial Powers Act, Law 21. Advice on the amendment has been deeply appreciated. UNDP provided expertise to the Committee on Family, Women and Children to draft a law on women's parliamentary participation that has contributed to women's capacity to undertake effective campaigning.

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

This programme area includes one project, Empowering CSOs, which began in early 2012 (it was the first UNDP CSO project since 2008). The project aims to fund CSOs to undertake initiatives that will hold the government accountable. There is another project, listed under Outcome 3 (Participatory Governance for Enhanced Accountability and Human Rights), where CSOs figure in one of four somewhat unconnected activities. UNDP's involvement with CSOs is not part of a broader initiative to support the non-governmental sector, so the Empowering Civil Society Organizations project stands largely alone with only tenuous connections to other UNDP activities.

During the United States occupation, CSOs were encouraged to establish themselves and they sprang up in large numbers. UNDP supported their emergence in various ways. In 2004, UNDP supported a national inventory and training for new CSOs committed to humanitarian activities. In 2007, UNDP sought to engage CSOs in training communities how to protect themselves during the insurgency. A concurrent opinion survey conducted as part of a UNDP outcome evaluation raised suspicions when it showed that many of the CSOs were one-person organizations and that a larger number had close links to political parties.[57] Some suspected that there were as many as 4,000 CSOs formed during these years. UNDP ceased its support of CSOs after 2007.

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56   Kevin Devieux, 'Needs Assessment of Parliament in Iraq', UNDP, 2012.

57   Jim Freedman, Eduardo Quiroga, John Weeks and Amal Schlash, 'Outcome Evaluation of Crisis Prevention and Recovery, Governance and Poverty Reduction Initiatives, UNDP Iraq', June 2009.

Table 8. Civil Society Organization Registration 2011–2013		
Year	Total registered	Average per month
2011	403	34
2012	868	72
2013 (9 months)	584	65
Total	1855	

Source: Joint Analysis and Policy Unit, UNAMI, Baghdad

In 2011, the Government of Iraq began a formal registration process. See Table 8 shows for the number of CSOs that submitted formal registration papers to the CSO Directorate housed under General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers. The number of opportunistic CSOs may have diminished in the interim, but their total number remains large.

Empowering Civil Society Organizations selected and funded 31 organizations. The selected CSOs work in 15 consortia to "effectively monitor the Government of Iraq's compliance with due process and transparency and enhance CSO capacities for advocacy"[58] in one of three broad areas: promoting human and civil rights, reducing anti-corruption and promoting adequate service delivery. Each of these areas corresponds to a UNDAF priority. The project is proceeding step by step, providing the CSOs with needed skills and tracking progress as the consortia work in their respective areas.

While CSO support had some outputs, its small scale and the stand-alone nature of its activities meant that it did not have the scope for achieving its objectives of promoting human rights, reducing corruption and holding the government accountable in service delivery.

The UNDP implementation model was adopted by the Council of Representatives' Civil Society Organization Committee by drafting a law that would have empowered the Committee to fund CSOs on a regular basis; the draft law was eventually defeated. A Committee spokesperson regretted that UNDP's presence was sporadic at best and that UNDP had not done enough to support the draft law.

The small number of CSOs supported by the project means that greater attention can be given, which distinguishes it from the larger programmes supported by larger donors that stress quantity over quality. The smaller number also means that the scope of the project is inevitably modest and the likelihood of there being any significant impact on the reputation of CSOs is less. Though this might not have been an issue in previous years when funds were more widely available, it is an issue when UNDP needs to be especially conscious of using limited resources to demonstrate its comparative advantage in a few bankable areas. UNDP does not expect that this project will contribute to developing a comparative strength or even a minor practice area in working with civil society.

The CSO support project has not operated at a large enough scale to register a discernible impact. Being a pilot, it could have served as an example that will encourage others to follow suit. However, the project manager has rarely been asked to consult with other projects. Nonetheless, it is widely acknowledged that the United Nations Office for Project Services has developed expertise in working with CSOs in Iraq. This project may have value, and it may be well-managed, but it did not assist in contributing to UNDP's need to establish sufficient

58 UNDP, Empowering CSOs in Iraq, MPTF Generic Annual Programme Narrative Progress Report 1 January 31 December 2012, Iraq UNDAF Trust Fund, February 2013, page 3.

competence in building national and regional governance institutions such that its services are sought after.

PEACE AND RECONCILIATION

This project comprises five relatively minor projects that engage communities in peace-building in order to promote peaceful interactions among minorities, sects and faiths. For the most part, these projects took place in the Ninewah Governorate where Kurds and Sunni Arabs have been caught up in disputes. The projects include Support to National Reconciliation, to review reconciliation activities in Iraq; Rights of Minorities in Ninewah, to bring minorities together in disputed boundary areas to reconcile differences; Interfaith Dialogue, to do the bring together groups of different faiths for reconciliation; Conflict and Development Analysis, to bring a particular conflict analysis tool to bear upon the situation in these areas; and the Community Development, Safety and Social Cohesion project, to support income generation activities in tandem with initiatives for finding common ground among opposed groups. Funds have come primarily from the Government of the Netherlands and the UNDAF fund.

The Kurds' growing influence in the border governorates of Diyala, Erbil, Kirkuk, Ninewah and Salah al-Dinhas been met by aggression from a Sunni Arab bloc, escalating tensions in the area. Local minorities and religious groups have found themselves caught up in the conflict, pitted one against another. Long-nascent antagonisms have surfaced, increasing tensions in these disputed border areas. In response, two of the UNDP pilot projects proposed to train facilitators to bring these different ethnic and religious groups together. The projects applied a technique developed by transitional justice programmes, assembling adversaries to air grievances, to discuss their concerns about each other and then to find a common ground upon which to build peaceful interactions.

In another project, a conflict development analysis was conducted to ascertain the root causes of conflict in these areas. A plan to initiate a successor project (the Community Development, Safety and Social Cohesion project) has been approved with the aim of integrating local economic development initiatives with efforts to address the roots of violence and intolerance, again in Ninewah.[59]

The Peace and Reconciliation projects have achieved very little, not only because of their small scale but also because they failed to convince national partners that the reconciliation model they adopted was effective and worth replicating.

The two Peace and Reconciliation projects followed a similar scheme. UNDP selected members of minorities for one project and faiths for the other and then trained them in conducting peace-building exercises. Once trained, the facilitators then selected communities where they brought local ethnic and religious leaders together for workshops "to build intercommunity understanding and identify initiatives that communities can undertake themselves to improve intercommunity understandings."[60] Ninewah was chosen to pilot the exercise because it is home to a number of ethnicities and religious groups who have been living together in an uneasy truce (although this diversity and the tension makes it is a difficult environment to promote inter-ethnic and interfaith tolerance).

The project encountered a number of setbacks. In the Interfaith Dialogue project, an Interfaith Advisory Committee was created, but members were reluctant to participate and reluctant to publicize their involvement out of fear of

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59   UNDP Iraq, Project Initiation Plan – Community Development, Safety and Social Cohesion Project, October 2012, page 2.
60   UNDP Iraq, Project Document – Support for Rights of Minorities and Vulnerable Groups in Ninewah, February 20, 2011.

reprisals. Community workshops did not involve discussions on topics that ethnic representatives felt uncomfortable addressing. Some mutual understandings endured, while others were short-lived. Participants expressed the view that the overall approach was culturally insensitive; the project brought in Western conflict-resolution techniques without incorporating the cultural context of Iraq.[61] Reports from project organizers on the real achievements were lukewarm.[62]

These are pilot projects, premised on the expectation that "lessons learned from the project will greatly enhance the capacity of UNDP and other agencies to undertake local community dialogue projects in Iraq."[63] There are, however, no indications of significant support from within UNDP nor are there indications of support forthcoming from other agencies. These reconciliation projects promote UNDP values of addressing the needs of vulnerable groups and protecting the rights of minorities. It remains unclear whether this approach addresses conflict on a wider scale and there is little evidence that it is applicable to the communities of north-west Iraq or elsewhere.

Some regard the projects as naively conceived. Given these challenges, these projects are unlikely to engender wider interest and support.

This reconciliation model has nevertheless continued to receive support in UNDP. The final report for the Interfaith Dialogue project recommended that it be implemented on a larger scale to ensure greater impact, that trained facilitators should receive continued support and the Interfaith Dialogue Advisory Committee should continue to receive funding. It would be prudent to re-examine the approach and seek ways to address issues that surfaced in the pilot initiatives.

4.2 ENHANCED RULE OF LAW

Outcome 2 comprised three areas of support: the rule of law; human rights and access to justice and human rights; Security Sector Reform and Small Arms and Light Weapons. See Box 2 for outcome statements and indicators; see Table 9 for projects, their duration, location, funders and geographical coverage.

Box 2. Outcome 2 Statement and Indicators

Outcome Statement:

Enhanced rule of law, protection and respect for human rights in line with international standards.

Outcome Indicators:

- Percent of courts that have court administration harmonized to minimum international standards (2010: 0 percent; 2014: 15 percent);
- Percent reduction in backlog of civil and criminal cases (2009: baseline; 2014: 10 percent less);
- Percent of registered cases with the family response units with legal proceedings initiated (2009: 0; 2014: 50 percent);
- Percent of periodic reports submitted as required by international human rights treaties ratified by Iraq (2009: to be determined; 2014: 50 percent increase);
- Percent of cases referred by Human Rights Commission (2009: 0; 2013: 50 percent);
- Development of the National Security Sector Strategy presented to the Government of Iraq (2010: no; 2014: to be presented); and
- Database of small arms and light weapons created and managed (2010: no; 2014: yes).

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61 For example, one reconciliation technique asks adversaries to openly air grievances against each other, something considered inappropriate in the Iraqi cultural context; many participants refused to take part.

62 UNDP Iraq, Ninewah Inter-Faith Dialogue Initiative – Final Report, February 2013, pages 15–21.

63 UNDP Iraq, Project Document – Support for the Rights of Minorities and Vulnerable Groups in Ninewah, February 20111, page 7.

Table 9. Programme Activities under Outcome 2					
Programme	**Project**	**Duration**	**Original budget $000,000**	**Source**	**Location**
Rule of Law	Support to Rule of Law and Justice	2008–2013	20.4	European Commission; UNDP core funds	National
	Support to the Development of Justice and Rule of Law	2008–2012	9.2	Iraq Trust Fund	National
	Reforming the Judicial Development Institute	2010–2012	0.6	Government of Germany	National
	Strengthening the Administration of Justice and Rule of Law	2010–2014	3.2	United States International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Agency	National
	Justice Data Management Project	2011–2015	3.8	United States International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Agency; UNDP Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery	National
Access to Justice and Human Rights	Family Protection Support, Justice and Security for Survivors of Domestic and Gender Based Violence I	2010–2013	0.7	Government of Norway	National
	Family Protection Support, Justice and Security for Survivors of Domestic and Gender Based Violence II	2012–2015	2.5	Danish International Development Agency; UNDP core funds; UNDAF Fund	National
	Human Rights	2007–2009	1.4	Iraq Trust Fund	National
	UNAMI Human Rights	2008–2009	0.8	Iraq Trust Fund	National
	Participatory Governance and Human Rights Project	2012–2014	1.2	UNDAF Fund	National
Security Sector Reform and Small Arms and Light Weapons	Security Sector Reform	2012–2014	1.15	UK Conflict Pool (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence and UK Department for International Development) UNDP core funds	National
	Small Arms and Light Weapons	2012–2013	0.15	UNDP Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery	National

OVERALL FINDINGS

The rule of law programmes have achievements in some areas and close to none in others. The programme is relevant to the government development plan in principle, though has only recently been fully accepted in practice. An April 2014 agreement between the Higher Judicial Council and UNDP was a step in the direction of greater collaboration. In Kurdistan, the programme shows potential, though it is still in an early stage.

The government included rule of law and access to justice under good governance within the NDP 2011–2014. Areas of support such as courtroom efficiency, accessibility to clients, providing resource materials, training for judges and the creation of a commission for human rights relate to broader objectives of the national strategy; the government supports these initiatives in principle. However, rule of law and access to justice constitute a minimal component within the NDP 2011–2014 good governance chapter.[64] The chapter mentions court reform and access to justice only obliquely, and is primarily limited to the potential contributions of the legal system in overseeing the proper division of responsibilities between the provincial and central governments and among government departments. Government collaboration with UNDP appears to have increased over the last year. An indication of this is the strategic partnership framework between UNDP and the Higher Judicial Council, which was to be signed in Iraq on 10 April 2014.

Judicial practices, prison management, access to legal remedies and matters having to do with human rights and national security all involve institutions whose reform inevitably raises questions of national sovereignty. Changing how judges make decisions, how lawyers work and how courts and investigators carry out their business are delicate matters. There are contextual and political challenges in pursuing judicial reforms.

The Access to Justice and Human Rights programme has yielded considerable outcomes both in the federal system and in Kurdistan. The National Security Strategy and the Small Arms and Light Weapons programme have yet to produce results at this stage. The KRG has been more receptive to reforms of court proceedings, availability of legal aid and legal protection for women. Further, the KRG has directly solicited UNDP intervention and is considering cost-sharing for the programming. The programme is therefore relevant to both the needs of the region and the government plan in Kurdistan.

The sustainability of the rule of law programme in the federal system has been questionable. In Kurdistan, where the government welcomes the modernization of its judiciary and has embraced the programme, sustainability is more promising. The sustainability of the Access to Justice and Human Rights programme appears promising in both the federal system and in Kurdistan.

UNDP has implemented programmes to improve court efficiency, to provide techniques for criminal investigations and to train judges in order to make court management more efficient. Though these programmes may have stopped the further deterioration of the judicial system, they have not been able to meet their objectives. Members of the judiciary appeared hesitant to rely on external advisers to reform their long-standing institutions. They are also somewhat reluctant to act unilaterally on sensitive and systemic issues. These factors have diminished the impact of UNDP interventions in south and central Iraq, especially in training judges, investigating cases and managing court information. Two recent in-depth evaluations of the programme raised questions about the ongoing commitment of the government judicial institutions. There have been some distinct successes, however, in improving access to justice in the KRG, in providing effective legal representation for those who cannot do so for themselves

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64   Government of Iraq, 'National Development Plan 2011–2014', Ministry of Planning, Baghdad, 2010, page 179.

and in providing formal and informal assistance to women victims of gender-based violence.

For activities under the Rule of Law programme, (those involving key judiciary institutions in the federal system in particular), national counterparts' stances have ranged from mildly supportive to indifferent. The commitment of national partners may be increasing somewhat since its low point in 2011, particularly since the recent signing of a four-year partnership framework between UNDP and the Higher Judicial Council. There were no assurances that pilot court experiments would be expanded or that the legal aid experiments in Basrah would be duplicated. This raises questions about its sustainability and, given the limited results in this thematic area, about its future prospects.

In the Access to Justice and Human Rights programme, the situation is somewhat different. Here, the Ministry of Interior has strongly supported the Family Protection Units that provide police and legal assistance to women, children and families to respond to domestic disputes. There is also strong support in the KRG; there is full collaboration in supporting judicial training, in providing legal aid, in setting up a Board of Human Rights, in supporting the Directorate for Eliminating Violence against Women and in supporting women's shelters.

Instead of responding to declining resources by consolidating the programme to increase synergies and effectiveness, UNDP has accepted contributions for project financing with little regard to whether the project adds to the outcome's internal consistency. There are indications this may be changing—the Country Office is developing a strategy to enhance programme coherence and ensure greater coordination in implementation.

In Outcome 2, projects are linked in some way to the outcome statement, though the array of initiatives includes those that are too varied to make for a coherent outcome. An initial project included a number of initiatives to make the court system more attractive to Iraqi clients by increasing its efficiency and accessibility. Training judges may have had some impact. After protracted delays, the case management system has finally begun to function in two courts—one in Baghdad and the other in Basrah. Training judicial investigators has had very little impact, which could have been predicted given the tense relations between the Ministry of Interior and the High Judicial Council. Support for a database of small arms is tangential to the outcome statement. Discipline in planning is essential to build coherence in which investments represent a concerted set of initiatives.

The recent Outcome 2 evaluation observed that the outcome is made up of projects that are siloed, since they are implemented with minimal regard to one another or to how the projects fit into a larger strategy for rule of law, justice and human rights in Iraq.[65] Planning has inconsistently focused on well-targeted and well-defined outcomes that would ensure that all investments contribute to maximizing the outcome. Though the projects themselves may have merit, may have the support of contributors, may appeal to the government or may strike a sympathetic chord among some programme staff, they do not add up to a well thought out approach to achieving specific and achievable objectives.

National ownership of the support extended by UNDP has been fraught with limitations. Ownership was demonstrated in few areas.

UNDP made efforts to promote collaboration with national partners concerned with justice and human rights, including the federal and KRG judiciary, parliamentary committees, Ministry of Interior and the National Security Adviser's office. At stake is not only the national partners' practical acceptance, but also the prospect—increasingly on the minds of UNDP staff—of encouraging

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65 Richard Langan II, 'Outcome Evaluation of Country Programme Action Plan Outcome 2 Rule of Law & Human Rights in Line With International Standards', UNDP, August 2013.

national partners to share the cost of UNDP's presence and expertise.

For activities under the Rule of Law thematic area, those involving key judiciary institutions in south and central Iraq in particular, the attitude of the national counterparts has ranged from mildly supportive to indifferent. National partners' commitments may be slightly increasing since its low point a couple of years ago,[66] but the question remains—how seriously do the judiciary institutions take UNDP's contributions? This raises questions about programme sustainability and, given the limited results in this thematic area, about its future prospects.

For activities under the Access to Justice and Human Rights thematic area, the situation is somewhat different. Here the Ministry of Interior has strongly supported Family Protection Units, which respond to domestic disputes by providing police and legal assistance to women, children and families. There is also strong support in the KRG where there is full collaboration in supporting judicial training, providing legal aid, setting up a Board of Human Rights, supporting the Directorate for Eliminating Violence against Women and supporting women's shelters. The KRG is more than prepared to support these services to needy clients, certainly more than the judiciary institutions in south and central Iraq are.

RULE OF LAW

The springboard for the present Rule of Law thematic area has been the Support to Rule of Law and Justice Project that began in 2008 and continued with extensions to 2013. This initial project undertook activities in a number of areas, some of which are being followed up under the Rule of Law thematic area and some under the Access to Justice and Human Rights thematic area.

Four Rule of Law projects have received funding to: i) increase the efficiency of courts (case man-

agement system in pilot courts, developing curricula for training judges, and penitentiary reform); ii) support refresher courses for practising judges through the Reforming the Judicial Development Institute; iii) link the Iraqi and Dubai judiciaries in a twinning arrangement (through the Strengthening the Administration of Justice and Rule of Law project) and support the training of judicial investigators; and iv) facilitate the exchange of data on criminals and criminal activities among government departments (through the Justice Data Management Project, supported in part by the United States International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Agency). See Table 9 for more details about the projects.

A new project, Promoting the Rule of Law in the Kurdistan Region, has recently started with an agreement from KRG partners to contribute $6 million to co-finance the programme.

The Rule of Law programme opened the doors for future reform, but concrete achievements are modest. The number of judges and the number of cases in criminal courts have increased. However, there is little evidence of increased court efficiency, reduced case backlog or increased public confidence in the justice system.

The Rule of Law programme in the federal system has supported automation of case management, legal research, training for judges, training of judicial investigations and sharing of data on criminal activity among government departments. Meeting the outcome targets in south and central Iraq has required improving 15 percent of all courts' administration to international standards and achieving a 10 percent reduction of case backlogs. Meeting these targets would have required considerable progress in computerizing court records, capacity building of judges to bring them up to speed on key issues and improving pretrial investigation processes.

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66 Jim Freedman, 'Iraq – Support to the Rule of Law and Justice Project, Final Project Evaluation,' European Union, UNDP and United Nations Office for Project Services, March 2012.

On computerizing case records, although the software was first introduced to three pilot courts during UNDP's first Support to Rule of Law and Justice project, only recently have some court records been entered into the case management system (at the Commercial Court and Rusafa Court in Baghdad and the Basrah).[67] A level of computerization sufficient to have an impact will require a further and consistent effort by the court administration. There were similar difficulties in the initial implementation of the Justice Data Management project aiming to computerize criminal records kept by different ministries and departments. Country Office reports in 2014 note that the project has secured government support.

On capacity building of judges, the lack of adequate collaboration in reforming the curriculum at both the Judicial Development Institute (under the High Judicial Council) and the Judicial Training Institute (under the Ministry of Justice) has undermined the expertise of the judges.

There were efforts at continuing to update the curricula at the Judicial Development Training Institute, which would have replaced the *ad hoc* short courses under the first project. However, the High Judicial Council did not offer sufficient support and funds were shifted elsewhere. Nonetheless, UNDP forged ahead with a plan for institutional development, but once completed, neither the High Judicial Council nor its training wing, the Judicial Development Institute, endorsed the plan. This brought the reform of training institutes essentially to a standstill.

Improving investigation into criminal cases is a special issue. Iraq provides for special judicial investigators instead of police to conduct pretrial criminal investigations. Recently, the High Judicial

Council has sought help in training judicial investigators.[68] UNDP proposed to train two groups of Judicial Investigators as part of the Strengthening the Administration of Justice in Iraq project that ran between 2010 and 2013. Training judicial investigators (who work under the Higher Judicial Council) inevitably diminishes the role of police (who work under the authority of the Ministry of Interior) in criminal investigations. Support to judicial investigators has consequently generated friction between the Higher Judicial Council and the Ministry of Interior.

There are also a number of international actors (including the United States Department of State, the European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission and the Government of the United Kingdom) who work in this area and look to UNDP to coordinate their inputs. UNDP was did not build on the opportunities to contribute in this area.

UNDP was slow to begin project implementation, which delayed addressing this inter-ministry friction and coming to agreement on a common approach among international stakeholders. The recent Outcome Evaluation concludes "given the delays in UNDP's implementation … it is difficult for this evaluation to attribute improvements in the functioning of the Judicial Investigation Officers to UNDP."[69]

It is difficult to gauge the extent to which the country programme targets have been met. UNDP programmes have opened up areas of reform that would otherwise have remained closed, which is a positive. There is evidence that the overall number of judges has increased and that the number of cases in criminal courts has increased across Iraq.[70] However, it is doubtful

67 Website (Arabic only) of the High Judicial Council http://www.iraqja.iq/view.2077.

68 Richard Langan II, 'Outcome Evaluation of Country Programme Action Plan Outcome 2 Rule of Law & Human Rights in Line With International Standards', UNDP, August 2013, page 21.

69 Ibid, page 44.

70 Justice Raheem, Analytical Study on Performance of the Judicial System, Justice and Human Rights in Iraq 2007–2012, Appendix 1, produced for UNDP, Appendix 1.

that the backlog of cases has been reduced to any significant degree. It is even more doubtful that any portion of the courts—certainly not 15 percent—now operates at international standards. There are three main reasons:[71]

1. Judicial institutions have not been fully engaged. On a number of occasions, the institutions chose not to endorse the results of UNDP programmes. The High Judicial Council decided not to fully endorse the effort to introduce a computerized case management system. Desk books prepared for judges to use at the bench have not been adopted. Institutional reforms designed by UNDP for training centres have been rejected by judicial authorities.

2. The different institutions dealing with judicial matters (the High Judicial Council, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Interior) do not readily work with each other. This has been an impediment to reforms that require their collaboration. Training judicial investigators with, for example, the responsibility to investigate criminal cases, has lacked the cooperation of the Ministry of Interior whose police would, as a consequence, have their functions diminished. Improving the training of judges has involved two training institutes (the Judicial Training Institute and the Justice Development Institute), and the different departments managing these separate institutes have been reluctant to work together.

3. UNDP management has not effectively engaged with national partners. In some instances, UNDP has been slow in its implementation. In others, it has not sustained productive and ongoing interactions with national partners, particularly the High Judicial Council and the Ministry of Justice.

Since the Rule of Law programme in Kurdistan is in the early stages of implementation, its effectiveness remains to be seen. Regardless, the regional government's political and financial commitments are promising. KRG officials show eagerness to engage UNDP's expertise in rule of law matters, specifically in assembling a legal database and increasing judges' level of training.

ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The original Support to Rule of Law and Justice Project planned to introduce legal aid help desks in south and central Iraq and in Kurdistan. Very little was done in south and central Iraq. In contrast, in Kurdistan a legal help desk were functional in the Erbil Investigative Court, Sulaymaniyah and the Dohuk court.

Funding from the original Support to Rule of Law project concluded in 2013. In order to build on these achievements and to continue to support legal aid help desks in Kurdistan and south and central Iraq, UNDP is providing $300 thousand of core funds to two projects, Delivery of Justice and Citizens' Access to Justice. The Bar Association in Kurdistan now manages the legal aid services in Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Dahuk. The first legal aid help desk in south and central Iraq has opened in the Basrah Court; it is managed by a non-governmental organization (see Table 9 for more details about the projects).

The Family Protection Support project and the Justice and Security for Survivors of Domestic and Gender-based Violence project were originally planned to operate for 30 months. The projects have put in place Family Protection Units in both south and central Iraq and Kurdistan, staffed by female police officers to assist victims of domestic violence. The number of these Family Protection Units has increased steadily, as has the number of women clients seeking assistance. In Kurdistan, two additional social protection initiatives include support to establish the Directorate to Combat Violence against Women and a Women's Shelter assisting women exposed to domestic violence.

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71 Two recent evaluations of UNDP Rule of Law programming concur on these reasons: Jim Freedman, 'Iraq –Support to the Rule of Law and Justice Project, Final Project Evaluation', European Union, UNDP and United Nations Office for Project Services, March 2012; Richard Langan II, ibid.

The Human Rights and the UNAMI Human Rights projects have supported multiple initiatives between 2007 and 2009. These were completed and closed and, three years later, the Participatory Governance and Human Rights project has included four multifaceted components, two of which were to support the creation of a High Commission for Human Rights in south and central Iraq and the Board of Human Rights in Kurdistan.

The Access to Justice and Human Rights programme has had concrete achievements. The Ministry of Interior has collaborated in setting up Family Protection Units that provide tailored legal assistance to women and children. A High Commission for Human Rights has been established in the federal system against considerable odds.

Activities under the Access to Justice and Human Rights thematic area are performing well. The number of Family Protection Units has increased to 16 throughout the country. The number of cases in which they intervened has steadily increased in south and central Iraq. From 2012 to 2013, there was a 44 percent increase in cases per month, up from an average of 653 per month in 2012 to an average of 940 cases per month in 2013 (see Table 10). In Kurdistan, the number of Family Protection Units has risen to seven in the course of the project, and the number of cases has increased to nearly 400 per month in 2013 before tapering off.

In south and central Iraq, the number of clients whose cases have gone to court is 12 percent, a relatively low rate because it is deemed preferable to resolve disputes within offices rather than wait a year or two for a case to go to trial. In contrast, 99 percent of the cases in Kurdistan are sent to the courts for adjudication. Both approaches have their merits.

The legal aid help desks show similar achievements, mainly in Kurdistan where the help desks are operating in Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Dahuk. Two of these (Erbil and Sulaymaniyah) are operating inside provincial courts. After lengthy efforts, there is now a legal aid help desk in south Iraq operating out of the Court of First Instance in Basrah. Table 11 shows the trend in consultations and representations.

After an initial rise, the number of help desk clients dropped off in 2013. Originally, the help desks in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah were managed

Table 10. **Activity of Family Protection Units 2012 and 2013**				
Average cases per month				
	South and central Iraq		**Kurdistan**	
	2012	**2013**	**2012**	**2013**
Number of cases received	653	940	398	305
Number of cases resolved by Family Protection Units	517	462	0	0
Number of cases resolved by Court	80	85	397	0
Number of cases being processed	47	1	119	305

Source: UNDP, Access to Justice programme area project data

Table 11. **Legal Aid Help Desks—Consultations and Representations**			
	2012	**2013**	**2013 (6 months)**
Legal consultations	132	156	62
Legal representations	22	18	10

Source: UNDP, Access to Justice programme area project data

by non-governmental organizations who proactively promoted the service (particularly among women). For a subsequent project, and in an attempt to ensure greater sustainability, the management of the help desks was given to the Bar Association in Kurdistan. When this occurred, services were less readily available and women were less explicitly the target group they had been.

Support for the establishment of the High Commission of Human Rights in the federal system continues to have a complex evolution. UNDP has worked step by step with the parliamentary Committee on Human Rights to create the High Commission. A group of 11 commissioners has been brought on board, all eminent persons with deep commitments to protecting human rights. Following their selection, the chosen members received training on the operation of human rights commissions in other countries in the region. Considerable progress has been made despite two difficulties. Pressure has been placed on the selected commissioners from political blocs seeking to control the Commission. Further, the executive branch has been against the formation of the Commission on the basis that the existing Ministry of Human Rights is able to handle such affairs.

The commissioners have been unable to agree on key issues or make critical decisions. For example, they have been unable to agree on where to locate their offices; some fear working outside of the International Zone while others insist on being accessible to citizens in the city at large. Political considerations have prevented the commissioners from agreeing on a president. There appears to be a distinct possibility that the High Commission for Human Rights will at some point be dissolved and reconstituted with a membership less mired in political affiliations.

UNDP support has been thoughtfully provided, the commissioners are devoted and qualified individuals and the selection process has been above reproach. Although the odds against the High Commission's survival may be too great to overcome, the process has been well-coordinated. It is a testament to UNDP's intervention that the process has gone this far. It is also indicative of the commissioners' commitment that prior to having all facilities in place, individual members of the High Commission for Human Rights receive cases of human rights violations and attempt to deal with them. There is the concern that this may be premature; cases should not be dealt with on an *ad hoc* basis.[72] Commissioners argue, however, that something must be done to ensure their credibility.

The Human Rights Board in KRG is has replaced the KRG Ministry of Human Rights and does not need to contend with duplicating a Ministry's functions. The process took almost three years—the Ministry was abolished in 2009 and the Board of Human Rights was not fully operational until 2012. By then, trained members of the Ministry had found jobs elsewhere, leaving the Board of Human Rights with little capacity. Like the High Commission of Human Rights in the federal system, the Board receives complaints and attempts to address them, but only on an *ad hoc* basis. Neither the High Commission in the federal system nor the Board in KRG are prepared to submit periodic reports as required by international treaties. Neither has the machinery in place for formally receiving and adjudicating violations, though steps have been taken in this direction. In additions, UNDP is taking steps to increase Board staff members' level of competence. It has also been advising the Board to constitute itself similarly to the federal one (i.e. independent individuals instead of government officials).

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

Two small projects make up this thematic area (see Table 9). Support to Security Reform is a two-year project to lay the groundwork for drafting

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72 Richard Langan II, 'Outcome Evaluation of Country Programme Action Plan Outcome 2 Rule of Law & Human Rights in Line With International Standards', UNDP, August 2013 page 65.

an update of the National Security Strategy. The Small Arms and Light Weapons project aims to reinforce the government's efforts to stem the proliferation of small arms by undertaking, as a first step, a capacity assessment of available small arms and light weapons mechanisms.

In the Support to Security Reform project, UNDP provided a consultant to the Office of the National Security Adviser to lay the foundation for updating the National Security Strategy originally drafted in 2007 during the United States occupation. There have been consultations with an impressively diverse group of stakeholders including academics, CSOs, members of parliament, youth groups and others. The next step is to constitute a high-level steering committee to deepen the strategy and to address a number of specific areas recommended by the consultant's report.

UNDP supported the preparation of a draft national security strategy, which has yet to be formulated. Support to a strategy to reduce the proliferation of small arms and light weapons made limited progress.

Since March 2012, UNDP was expected to complete a capacity assessment of mechanisms and competencies among Iraqi authorities for controlling the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The project built upon UNDP's prior contributions to small arms and light weapons in Iraq, including technical advice and a previously attempted (but abandoned) effort in 2008 to establish a database and registration system in Basrah.[73] The ultimate objective was to lay the groundwork for a database and a set of policies founded on a greater understanding of the proliferation of weapons. However, the capacity development component was not completed. Interactions between the project consultant and national counterparts were infrequent and a report had not been produced until 2013.[74]

4.3 ACCOUNTABLE AND TRANSPARENT GOVERNANCE

Outcome 3 includes four programme areas: Public Sector Modernization; Anti-corruption, a Donor Coordination/Capital Investment Tracking Mechanism; and the UNDP-Global Fund Support (See Box 3 and Table 12).

Box 3. Outcome 3 Statement and Indicators

Outcome Statement:

Strengthened regulatory frameworks, institutions and processes in place for accountable, transparent and participatory governance at national and local levels.

Outcome Indicators:

- Civil Service Reform and Modernization Plan adopted, taking into account the national strategy for women and Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) (2009: no; 2012: yes);
- Percent of decentralized service delivery pilot projects implemented based on dialogue at the municipal, district and governorate levels (2010: 0; 2014: 9);
- Number of Ministries having the capacity for gender-responsive budgeting (2009: 0; 2014: 3);
- National anti-corruption law for adherence to United Nations Convention against Corruption in place (2009: no; 2014: yes); and
- Advocacy and training programmes conducted to support women's advancement in decision-making positions (2010: no; 2014: yes).

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73 An earlier (2006–2008) UNDP/JICA-funded pilot in Basrah 'Project BLUE' had attempted to establish a small arms and light weapons registration database and system, to construct two community police Stations and to conduct an awareness campaign in that governorate. These were placed on hold for strategic reasons after discussions with the Ministry of the Interior, Basrah Police and the donor.

74 Richard Langan II, ibid., page 87.

Table 12. Programme Activities under Outcome 3					
Programme	**Project**	**Duration**	**Original Budget $000,000**	**Source**	**Location**
Public Sector Modernization	Iraq Public Sector Modernization Phase I	2010–2012	55.0	Iraq Trust Fund	National
	Iraq Public Sector Modernization Phase II	2012–2014	17.0	UNDAF Fund	National
Anti-corruption	Anti-corruption Support in Iraq	2008–2013	9.8	United States International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Agency	National
	Supporting Iraqi compliance to the United Nations Convention against Corruption and combating corruption at the governorate level	2008–2013	3.0	United States of America	National
	Enhancing Transparent Participatory Governance and Human Rights	2012–2014	3.0	UNDAF Fund	National
	English Language Training for the Commission of Integrity	2011–2013	1.6	United States International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Agency; UNDP Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery	National
	Support for the Office of the Inspectors General	2011–2013	4.7	United States Department of State	National
	Institutional Development for the Anti-corruption Academy	2012–2014	1.2	UNDAF Fund	National
Donor Coordination/ Capital Investment Tracking Mechanism	Support to the Government of Iraq in Implementing the Paris Principles	2010–2012	2.6	Iraq Trust Fund; UNDP core funds	National
	Implementation of KRG Development Management System	2012–2013	0.5	Kurdistan Regional Government	KRG
Global Fund Project in Iraq	Support to National Tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS Programmes I	2008–2013	32.7	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria	National
	Support to National tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS Programmes II	2013–2015	14.1	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria	National

OVERALL FINDINGS

The Good Governance section in the NDP 2010–2014 begins with three issues that are central to two programme areas under this outcome: (i) public sector modernization, (ii) decentralization of public services and (iii) anti-corruption. The NDP 2010–2014 states: "Current government structures are characterized by excessive centralization; functional overlaps; weak inter-ministry coordination; lack of developed and efficient data systems and analyses; wide expansion in civil service; lack of adequate skills; weak human capital; inadequate financial management and monitoring capabilities; and the absence of proper mechanisms ensuring citizen participation in the decision-making process. Therefore, the reform process requires modernization of the functional structure of the country's institutions, organization of their relationships, and training of its staff to ensure efficient and professional participation by the entire population."[75] The Plan further reaffirms that financial and administration corruption is one of the more important challenges to good governance in Iraq. Overall, the emphases in the government's governance agenda mirror those of UNDP in this outcome.

UNDP programme efforts are modest first steps in achieving outcome objectives. The programme strategies UNDP followed, however, do not fully meet the practical realities of Iraq. UNDP failed to gain critical national support for the programme to remain relevant.

While the programmes in this area are in accord with the government's development plan, their relevance also depends on whether its concept and design could realistically gain political support. UNDP found it challenging to obtain the high-level government support for many of its initiatives in this area.

The Public Sector Modernization programme has been driven by an ambitious, whole-of-government approach that is more conceptually satisfying in design than pragmatic. Key government interlocutors and selected ministries remained suspicious of Public Sector Modernization reforms in Phase I. In Phase II, however, recent approvals and interest expressed at the highest levels indicate a greater commitment than before.

The Office of Inspectors General constitutes a key element in the design of the Accountability, Transparency and Anti-corruption Programme. Adopted from a United States model, it gives little consideration to the Iraqi institutions that had functioned for decades—even under adverse conditions in previous regimes. While the approach is conceptually sound, in practice it is not in accord with the circumstances within which it is meant to function. Further, there seems little possibility that key national actors (the Council of Representatives and the Council of Ministers) will alter their opposition to this principal pillar of the anti-corruption mechanism.

The donor coordination design was a model intervention that was undertaken globally and brought into Iraq with little modification. Similarly, though the model may be conceptually good, it does not quite apply in practice. Further, the Ministry of Planning has never fully committed itself to maintaining the donor database, perhaps because donor funds are a comparatively minor source of revenue. The Iraqi Development Management System now provides a far more critical service—tracking capital investments projects for all departments.

Containing tuberculosis has been a priority health-sector objective of the government and the international community. It was estimated that tuberculosis was causing more than 3,000 deaths annually in Iraq. The deterioration of health facilities from the military invasion and internal conflicts is likely to lead to a larger and expanding number of infected persons. Therefore, the UNDP-Global Fund programmes were

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75   Government of Iraq, 'National Development Plan 2010–2014', Ministry of Planning, 2010, page 178.

relevant to this national challenge. However, the UNDP-Global Fund programme does not have a strong substantive linkage to the focus of this programme outcome (and no programmatic linkages with other component programmes in this portfolio). It is, though, clearly relevant to the achievement of MDGs, specifically MDG 6 aiming to "combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases." Therefore, this programme is misplaced.

Under a challenging political environment, UNDP aimed to support the government in addressing complex issues. However, UNDP's programme approach was either too elaborate or too theoretical to yield tangible results.

The programmes under this outcome have yielded some results. For example, the cabinet has approved a public administration reform roadmap. However, significant progress has yet to be made in decentralizing public service delivery, reducing corruption or improving the management of development and capital investment resources.

In this outcome area, programme sustainability depends on national ownership and strong government support. This requires, at a minimum, regular contact and collaboration between UNDP and national partners. The Iraq Development Management System database has not had the full support of the Ministry of Planning in the central government. Contact and collaboration has taken place in the Public Sector Modernization programme and in the UNDP-Global Fund tuberculosis programme, but contact between UNDP and national partners in other programme areas is intermittent, casting doubt on their sustainability.

It is important to recognize that for reform initiatives that require government support, the forthcoming 2013 election and rising popular discontent make it unlikely that the government will take any politically sensitive actions. It is therefore a challenge for this portfolio's programmes to find an approach that would achieve their objectives while remaining politically acceptable for the government and key national partners.

PUBLIC SECTOR MODERNIZATION PROGRAMME

The initial phase of the Public Sector Modernization project was an ambitious programme of public administration reform. The project involved seven UN agencies collaborating in a multifaceted array of activities aimed at improving the service delivery performance of the public sector in three federal ministries under the overall direction of the Prime Minister's Advisory Committee. Phase I of the project ended with little achievement; it has been revived for Phase II. $33 million, unspent during Phase I, was available for Phase II. However, at the conclusion of the Iraq Trust Fund, the EU refused to transfer these funds, leaving Phase II with only half of its projected amount.

Phase II has greater focus, greater government backing and greater collaboration among agencies. Early indications are promising. A civil service reform programme developed for Phase I has been reworked as the roadmap for Phase II. The Public Administrative Reform Higher Committee (constituted under the Prime Minister Advisory Committee) adopted the roadmap as its strategic plan; it was recently approved at the Council of Ministers. It is a concise, well-crafted document with clear targets that has been approved at the highest level.

The Public Sector Management programme in KRG has commenced in 2013. It is based on an in-depth needs assessment[76] commissioned by the KRG Ministry of Planning, which detailed many of the shortcomings of the public administration under the executive branch. One of its particularly appropriate observations was the need for "clear ministerial mandates,

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76 Geopoliticity, 'Assessment of Kurdistan Regional Government's Public Administration Reform Efforts – Iraq Public Sector Modernization Programme (I-PSM)', UNDP and KRG Ministry of Planning, May 2012.

clarity of sub-entity roles and staff terms of references."[77] At present, the project is being largely managed under the authority of the Director General for Capital Investments.

A major achievement of the Public Sector Modernization Phase II programme was the cabinet's adoption of a roadmap for public administration reform, reflecting the fact that its concept and value have high-level government acceptance. Implementing the roadmap and mobilizing government officials to this end will be the next significant challenge for this programme.

Phase I of the Public Sector Modernization project did not succeed in attaining full backing from the government. Though the collaborating agencies did their work, there was minimal impact on reforming public administration and decentralizing services.[78] There were concerns that UNDP's leadership in the programme had compromised full collaboration among agencies. Agency formulations of sector plans with selected ministries were not well coordinated. UNDP was neither able nor prepared to exercise its authority to ensure that the participating agencies worked in close concert.

The Public Sector Modernization programme Phase II succeeded in obtaining critical support from key national partners in both the central government and KRG. For Phase II, the Council of Ministers developed and approved the roadmap for public administration reform. Although it is not yet clear to what extent the roadmap will be realized, high-ranking government officials, members of the Prime Minister Advisory Committee and the Council of Ministers do understand the concept and recognize its value. This was not the case with the Phase I design.

The question has been whether UNDP would be able to marshal enough commitment from government stakeholders to ensure implementation. Decentralizing the delivery of public services is an element that seems especially challenging. This was a prominent objective in Phase I, though less so now perhaps in recognition of the challenges Phase I faced. In the Phase II roadmap, decentralizing services appears fourth in a list of four objectives, following training on management, linking promotion to merit and training tailored to upper management. Though this may be a realistic approach that was necessary to garner government support, it relegates what was once a principal focus to an element that will receive far less attention. Phase II is more practical in this regard, though perhaps at a cost.

Nevertheless, the programme made some contributions to decentralization in three areas: transferring e-governance functions to governorates; assisting in reformulating the Provincial Powers Act (21), which was completed in 2013; and providing policy support for the devolution of responsibility over the administration of the ration card to nine governorates. During a regular meeting of the High Coordination Committee of Provinces, the Prime Minister indicated some support for these initiatives by suggesting that a number of federal ministries (the ministries of education, health, and municipalities) will be dissolved and their functions will be devolved to the provinces. Not coincidentally, these are the three ministries covered by the programme. It remains to be seen whether this suggestion becomes a reality.

Achievements in this programme cannot be measured exclusively in concrete deliverables. A great deal of effort is expected to go into mobilizing senior government staff to take initiatives, to change management styles at all levels

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77 Geopoliticity, 'Assessment of Kurdistan Regional Government's Public Administration Reform Efforts – Iraq Public Sector Modernization Programme (I-PSM)', UNDP and KRG Ministry of Planning, May 2012, page 30.

78 "The programme design was fuzzy in conception and in presentation. The intended outputs were poorly formulated, with the results framework providing few objectively verifiable indicators of achievement. The programme document gave little indication of how actual work was to proceed, while no inception report or useful work plan was produced." Alan Taylor, 'Iraq Public Sector Modernization Progamme, Phase I Evaluation Report', December 1 2011, page 7.

and to focus on delivering services at the governorate level. This poses considerable challenges in Iraq. Mobilizing senior public servants means increasing awareness and establishing the appropriate mechanism to guide these reforms. Increasing awareness and creating mechanisms do not themselves yield immediate tangible results and here is a concern. UNDP's credibility is being questioned in some quarters in part because some of its projects remain unattended or have little to show for results. Phase I of this project was occasionally cited as a contributor to this credibility gap. These credibility concerns are likely to continue, barring some concrete, reasonably achievable interim targets.

The KRG is a different environment, and the Public Sector Modernization programme has evolved differently there than with the central government. The entry point for UNDP to KRG was more straightforward, and its Ministry of Planning was open to engaging with UNDP for this programme. The programme, however, finds itself in the web of one Directorate's eagerness to exercise tight control over foreign-funded programming and to some extent alienate other ministries, departments and agencies. The participation of others, whose involvement is essential, was hence not ensured despite the 'whole of government' approach to government reform that the programme propagates.

ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY AND ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAMME

The Accountability, Transparency and Anti-corruption programme is the sum of six separate projects that all support a national oversight mechanism. An initial project supported the drafting of the National Anti-corruption Strategy[79] along with efforts to establish institutions and to nationally disseminate the Strategy's principles. Three subsequent projects provided English-language

training to investigators, supported the creation of an Anti-corruption Academy, provided support for an Asset Recovery and International Cooperation programme and put in place the Offices of Inspectors General (a new mechanism central to Iraq's emerging oversight structure). A final project devotes some assistance to the Board of Supreme Audit in KRG.

After acceding to the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2008, the Government of Iraq elaborated its own National Anti-corruption Strategy.[80] The Cabinet of Ministers and by Council of Representatives have adopted this strategy. UNDP and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime developed the strategy together; UNDP followed it through by supporting a public awareness campaign Commission of Integrity, and the Office of the Inspectors General.

In the KRG, the oversight mechanism is still in the conceptual stage. UNDP has provided support to the KRG's branch of the Board of Supreme Audit on some technical matters.

The Accountability, Transparency and Anti-corruption programme has yielded tangible results in the adoption of the National Anti-corruption Strategy and the establishment of anti-corruption institutions. The oversight mechanism, the Offices of Inspector General, is failing to gain the government support and its survival is in question. To achieve the long-term goal of reducing the corruption, the programme may need to consider a different approach.

The Accountability, Transparency and Anti-corruption programme's major achievement is the adoption of the National Anti-corruption Strategy[81] that the programme supported initially. The programme's support to the establishment of the Commission of Integrity, Offices of Inspector General and the Anti-corruption

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79 Government of Iraq, 'National Anti-corruption Strategy 2010–2014', Joint Anti-corruption Council, 2010.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

Academy has resulted in putting these institutions on a firm footing.

The system of the Offices of Inspectors General is central to the oversight mechanism in south and central Iraq. However, both the Council of Representatives and the Council of Ministers were not convinced about the usefulness of this mechanism. Because it places inspectors within ministries, it provoked considerable opposition from those that found it uncomfortable to be subject to continual oversight. Because of this, many inspectors have been replaced with temporary officers who fill the position but do not have their full authority, essentially rendering them unable to perform their functions. The estimated number of temporary or interim Inspectors General in ministries at the end of 2013 is 26 out of 33, leaving only 7 fulfilling their duties as expected.

Government representatives perceive that the resistance to the Inspectors General system reveals proof of its value. But the reality is that many of the inspectors have either been rendered incapable of doing their job or have ended up in a feud with senior officials. In either case, the oversight mechanism has been ineffective. The ADR found that, though individual inspectors had a relatively positive view of their role and performance, they were uniformly pessimistic about the survival of the programme.

A recent United Nations country team paper prepared in advance of UNDAF discussions observed that the "necessary integration and procedures for collaboration among the three main entities (of the oversight mechanism) is lacking," and noted "in practice, this theoretically comprehensive system is severely limited in its effectiveness and capability and susceptible to manipulation and abuse."[82] Its ineffectiveness, the lack of government support, the exclusion of the Board of Supreme Audit from the oversight mechanism and its near-exclusive reliance on the

United States for support suggest that a different approach should be considered.

The oversight mechanism in the KRG is still in the development stage. UNDP has provided support to the Kurdistan region branch of the Board of Supreme Audit. UNDP's support to the Board of Supreme Audit has achieved very little so far, and further support is unlikely to have a greater effect until more progress is made towards elaborating a viable oversight mechanism (an independent Commission of Integrity for the Kurdistan region is being formed in last quarter of 2013 for this purpose). The design has an opportunity to learn from the experience with the federal system; it must ensure a close link between the oversight mechanism and the KRG Council of Representatives and it must be part of the overall reform process of public administration in order to ensure that it fits and functions well within the ministries and departments whose interests it serves.

DONOR COORDINATION/CAPITAL INVESTMENT TRACKING MECHANISMS PROGRAMME

The initial donor coordination programme, the Donor Assistance Database, was launched as a project in 2006. It was succeeded in 2012 with a two-year follow-up project, Support to the Government of Iraq Implementing the Paris Principles. The Iraq Development Management System and the Kurdistan Development Management System have emerged out of efforts to implement the Paris Principles project.

The initial support for a donor coordination mechanism was rightly abandoned in favour of supporting databases to track capital investment and NDP indicators in both the central government and KRG. In the central government, the database still requires data entry before it can be used; it is ready to be used in

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82   UNAMI, 'UN Iraq Synthesis Paper – Preparation for UNDAF 2015–2019', Joint Analysis Unit, Baghdad, 25 November 2013 page 20.

Kurdistan. Achieving the long-term goal of having the government more effectively manage capital investments for development results will require government decisions and actions to fully utilize these databases.

The donor coordination projects, implemented in collaboration with the Ministry of Planning over the past seven years, now exist in name only. Donors rarely forward their information, and the International Cooperation Directorate in the Ministry of Planning has not diligently pursued them or used the mechanism for recording and coordinating donor contributions. Maintaining a donor database never had much promise in Iraq. In 2011, the project essentially ceased providing support for maintaining the database. Nonetheless, the database continues to exist despite few donors submitting data on annual contributions.

The Iraq Development Management System has the potential to track capital investment projects and NDP indicators. UNDP provided training to specially equipped locations in ministries and departments where data is to be entered. The United States Agency for International Development–Tarabot project has supplemented UNDP resources with funds and technical assistance of its own. Although the idea has significant promise, there have been tedious delays and the data entry staff have been losing interest waiting for software revisions. Its full use is still awaiting changes requested by the Minister of Planning. Data for 2011 has not yet been fully entered, and data for 2012 and 2013 has yet to be addressed. The Iraq Development Management System has potential and could make considerable contributions once the data is entered and the system is put in full use.

The Kurdistan Development Management System benefits from the close supervision and control exercised by the Director General for Capital Investment. The Director General brought the System's operation into a room near his office and intends to use it not only to manage development expenditures, but also to ensure that expenditures meet real needs as identified in

the system (which also tracks development progress across a number of sectors). The information will facilitate budgeting and ensure that expenditures respond to real needs.

NATIONAL TUBERCULOSIS AND HIV/AIDS PROGRAMMES

Iraq's national capacity to contain tuberculosis was severely damaged by the long period of war, sanctions and internal conflict. As the principle recipient of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund), UNDP was assigned to manage a large grant to restore national tuberculosis containment capacity. UNDP implemented the programme in partnership with the World Health Organization, which provides the technical framework for containment and plays a technical advisory role. The UNDP-Global Fund Project, Support to National Tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS Programme Phase I, provided testing and treatment for tuberculosis patients between 2008 and 2013. It has recently been renewed through 2016. Programme objectives include expanding and enhancing national and local-level containment strategies; supporting the procurement of medical and related supplies; addressing critical tuberculosis problems faced by vulnerable groups (e.g. inmates, refugees and those in remote areas); and securing partnerships for awareness-building and social mobilization.

UNDP supported the implementation of the national tuberculosis strategy, helping to restore basic health services for tuberculosis and to establish a monitoring mechanism. UNDP contributions have been important to the joint initiatives with the World Health Organization.

The UNDP-Global Fund programme supported the restoration of basic tuberculosis services. It financed renovation and equipment purchases for clinics throughout Iraq to screen clients and provide treatment. In the immediate years following invasion, there were only 18 laboratories capable of testing tuberculosis in the entire country; by the end of 2012, the number of laboratories had increased to 234.

The Ministry of Health, UNDP, the World Health Organization (WHO) and partnering non-governmental organizations participated in regular national- and governorate-level tuberculosis review meetings in order to monitor the progress of implementing the national tuberculosis strategy. Following the project, treatment success rate rose to 89 percent in 2010, higher than the WHO threshold of 80 percent. Significant challenges still remain in case detection due to a number of social and technical factors that need to be overcome.[83] Improvements have been observed in tuberculosis containment among prison inmates. A limitation was that programme has not provided capacity training for the beneficiary clinic or laboratory staff.

4.4 SUPPORT TO PRO-POOR STRATEGIES

Outcome 4 of the UNDP Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP 2011–2014) was comprised of 32 projects (see Table 13). Of these, 25 were 'legacy projects' that originated prior to 2010 and were largely funded by the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund. Only four projects commenced between 2011 and 2013, when the current CPAP came into effect. These included two environment and two local area development projects.

The scope of activity in the Outcome 4 portfolio, therefore, declined over the evaluation period. The evaluation team was aware of only two projects that were to continue into 2014, although several were under development. The portfolio is significantly smaller both in terms of the number of projects and donor contributions. The reduction tracks with the closure of the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund to new funding in 2010, and the overall decline of official development assistance to Iraq. The Government of Iraq did not emerge during this transition as a funder, including in priority areas such as Environment, Local Area Development and work related to National Human Development reporting.

Box 4. Outcome 4 Statement and Indicators[84]

Outcome Statement:

The Government of Iraq has the institutional framework to develop and implement MDG based pro-poor, equitable and inclusive socio-economic and environmental policies and strategies.

Outcome Indicators:

• Number of conflict-sensitive Provincial Development plans with localized MDG targets (2009: 0; 2014: 6);

• National policies and programmes informed by gender disaggregated data (2009: no; 2014: yes);

• Percentage of achievement of targets of localized MDGs indicators: (2010: 0; 2014: 50 percent);

• Increased proportion of women, and youth (age group 20-24) in the economic active labour force (2007: 43 percent for youth, 12 percent for women; 2014: 50 percent for youth, 25 percent for women);

• Inter-ministerial structure and technical secretariat on trans-boundary water resources established (2009: 0; 2014: yes);

• The Ministry of Water Resources Decision Support System governs water resource allocation (2009:no; 2014: yes); and

• A National Adaptation Strategy approved by the cabinet and initiated implementation at local levels (2009: no; 2013: yes).

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83   Khatri, G.R., et al., 'Evaluation Report for National TB Programme, Iraq, covering the period of 2008–2011', UNDP and WHO, 2012.

84   The complete UNDP CPAP 2010-2014 Outcome Four Results Matrix with Country Programme Outputs and Country Programme Output Indicators is included in Annex 2.

Table 13. Programme Activities under Outcome 4						
Programme	**Project**	**Start Date**	**End Date**	**Original Budget ($000,000)**	**Source**	**Location**
Conflict Prevention and Recovery	Support for Construction of Basrah Children's Hospital	2007	2012	40.9	Administrative Agent UNDP Iraq Trust Fund	South
	Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery preparatory Assistance fund	2008	2011	9.6	UNDP	National
Conflict Prevention and Recovery; Environment	Umbrella Project: Energy and Environment	2008	2012	2.3	UNDP	National
Conflict Prevention and Recovery; Electricity and Health	Rehabilitation of Ramadi General Hospital	2007	2012	25.8	Japan	Central
	Rehabilitation of Tikrit General Hospital	2007	2011	28.6	Japan	North
	Establishment of Maternity and Children's Hospital in Fallujah	2008	2012	36	Japan	North
	Support to Electricity and Health	2007	2010	6.2	Swedish International Development Cooperation	National
Conflict Prevention and Recovery; Service Delivery	Budget Execution Support Basra	2008	2011	2.3	United Kingdom	South
	Budget execution support: Recovery Programme in Kurd Region	2008	2014	6.4	United States, Iraq, UNDP	North
	Support to the Expanded Humanitarian Response Fund	2008	2013	22.7	Administrative Agent UNDP Iraq Trust Fund	National
	Muthanna Governorate Capacity	2009	2012	3	Japan	South
Conflict Prevention and Recovery; Water	Addressing Short and Long Term Water and Sanitation Needs for Umm Qasr	2006	2010	1.3	Administrative Agent UNDP Iraq Trust Fund	South
	Emergency Water Supply and Sanitation for Abu Al-Khaseeb	2007	2010	1.9	Administrative Agent UNDP Iraq Trust Fund	National
Environment	Preparatory Assistance for the development of Economic Reform and Diversification Initiatives	2008	2009	0.6	UNDP	National
	Preparatory Assistance for the Development of a Comprehensive Area-Based Recovery Programme in Al-Anbar Governorate	2008	2011	2.1	United States, UNDP	National
	Institutional Strengthening for the Ministry of State for the Marshlands	2009	2011	0.1	UNDP	National

(continued)

(continued)

Table 13. Programme Activities under Outcome 4						
Programme	**Project**	**Start Date**	**End Date**	**Original Budget ($000,000)**	**Source**	**Location**
Environment (comtinued)	Decision Support System for Water Resources Planning in Iraq	2009	2013	3.5	Italy, UNDP	National
	Water and Sanitation Master Planning and Capacity Building Programme	2010	2012	6.2	Administrative Agent UNDP Iraq Trust Fund	National
	Preparatory Assistance to the Government of Iraq on Climate change	2010	2012	1.3	UNDP	National
	Preparatory Assistance for Energy Strategy Formulation	2010	2012	0.5	UNDP	National
	Poverty Reduction and Environmental Sustainability	2010	2011	0.3	UNDP	National
	National Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change	2011	2013	0.5	GEF	National
	Development of National Framework for Integrated Drought Risk Management in Iraq	2011	2013	0.3	UNDP, Japan, UNDAF Fund	National
	Regional Water Initiative	2007	2011	0.5	UNDP, Stockholm International Water Institute	National
Governance; Health	Support to tuberculosis and HIV Programmes	2007	2013	38.5	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; UNDP	National
MDG; Service Delivery	Capacity Development on MDG Monitoring and Reporting	2008	2012	2.6	UNDP	National
	Iraq National Human Development Report III	2010	2013	1.1	UNDP	National
	Bridging for Local Area Development Programme Phase II	2010	2012	6.7	Swedish International Development Cooperation, UNDP, Administrative Agent UNDP Iraq Trust Fund	5 Governorates
	Area Based Development Programme	2012	2013	2.9	Swedish International Development Cooperation, UNDP, Iraq	National
	National Human Development Report	2006	2009	0.8	Japan, UNDP	National

OVERALL FINDINGS

UNDP programmes, while relevant, are focused on localized recovery activities and were not consistent with the country programme's policy- and institution-building orientation.

A large part of the Outcome 4 was designed as part of the strategic plans formulated by the government, donors and UNDP for the 2005–2007 and/or 2008–2010 periods. These plans focused largely on the emergency restoration of public service and the rehabilitation of related physical infrastructure. Reflecting contextual changes, the NDP 2010–2014, the NDP 2013–2017 and the UNDP programme response had a development orientation. As such, legacy projects had limited potential to directly contribute towards either the Outcome 4 objective (strengthening Iraq's institutional framework for policies and strategies) or the CPAP indicator (crisis prevention and recovery principles and approaches incorporated into national development frameworks and strategies). However, they remained relevant to the government's priorities related to MDG achievement. In addition, fragmentation within the portfolio resulting from the large legacy component undermined strategic focus.

Most projects were delivered during a transitional period as Iraq emerged from the violence of 2005 to 2007 and before conditions began to deteriorate again in with the 2011 breakdown of the Erbil Agreement government. The various projects had the possibility of helping consolidate positive trends as conditions improved, including expanding the delivery of basic public goods and services, improving the lives of beneficiaries through their access to services, legitimizing the Iraqi State as the provider of these services and opening a compact between state and society.

All projects were affected by extreme security conditions prior to 2008 that produced security-related restrictions that are still in effect.

Performance variables included poor quality of design, weak management oversight and implementation capacity, underestimation of risk and lack of mitigation. External factors also played an important role, such as beginning with uneven national ownership, limited capacities of national counterparts and politicization within some ministry counterparts.

CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RECOVERY

The Crisis Prevention and Recovery component of the CPAP assumed that given the significant investments required, the government would take the primary role in recovery and physical reconstruction projects. UNDP's objective was to transition upstream to building institutional capacity and policy support, moving from the direct implementation roles outline in the previous United Nations Country Strategy (2008).[85] UNDP would also support public-private partnerships in order to strengthen private-sector participation in the economy.

The Conflict Prevention and Recovery portfolio for Outcome Four included 14 projects. All projects focused on restoring essential public services in urgent need sectors (water, electricity and health) and geographic locations, building government capacity to plan service delivery and/or improving budget execution. Public service infrastructure projects usually involved some combination of assessing unmet needs and the condition of public service infrastructure, physical works to rehabilitate damaged infrastructure and the provision of new equipment and training for personnel. Several projects focused on building planning systems, particularly in the water sector. During the period 2008 to 2010, one project addressed urgent and unmet humanitarian needs for Internally Displaced Persons. Short-term employment creation appeared as a secondary objective, usually through construction activity.

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85 In addition to supporting public-private partnerships to fund recovery, the CPAP also cites work in the electricity and transport sector to develop national master plans and regulatory capacity.

UNDP responded to the basic infrastructure needs of the post-2007 crisis. In most cases there was tangible evidence that the projects met their objectives (implementation delays notwithstanding).

Conflict Prevention and Recovery projects made tangible contributions to the recovery of public services and infrastructure, with some limited support to institutional capacity. The combined target population for the three projects was approximately four million persons living in the immediate urban area and surrounding communities. Evaluation team field visits confirmed that after the rehabilitation was completed, the public use of the services at two of three hospitals assessed by the ADR doubled. The evaluation team found that civil works were generally completed to project specification and of good quality. Project training components were also delivered, and well-evaluated by participants. In a majority of cases, hospital officials acknowledged and appreciated UNDP's role as project manager, although oversight of the infrastructure was not always up to adequate standards.

While there is no data to illustrate the projects' impact on health care, officials perceived that the projects had an important and positive impact on health service capacity and access. At one of the health facilities, the community perceived improvements to child and maternal health in the community based on improved treatments; these perceptions could not be quantified.

MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORTING

There were four outputs as part of the support to MDG reporting—UNDP provided support to the National Human Development Report and three Millennium Development Reports, which includes technical support to statistical agencies in the federal Ministry of Planning and the Kurdistan Regional Statistics Office.

Two projects supported the drafting of consecutive National Human Development Reports (NHDR 2008 and NHDR 2013),[86] while a third project helped establish and maintain government systems in order to monitor development trends against MDG targets. The NHDR and the MDG projects were part of a larger effort to build up data, analysis and baselines as inputs into Iraq's development planning and policy.[87] The projects were done in collaboration with statistics offices at the national and regional levels (the Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology and the Kurdistan Region Statistics Office).

The NHDR and MDG-related reports contributed to Iraq's institutional capacity to develop policy, regulatory and planning frameworks.

The NHDR and MDG-related reports delivered results that contributed to strengthening Iraq's institutional capacity to develop policy, regulatory and planning frameworks. Concepts emerging from these reports have been integrated into national development planning processes, and data has been used to support both analysis and policy. Officials in the Ministry of Planning expressed strong satisfaction with the quality of the assistance provided by the UNDP and with the agency's sustained engagement over the six-year period. Officials believed "UNDP provided committed and high calibre staff," and appreciated access to global HDR and MDG personnel and standards. Officials also appreciated the training and orientation on post-2015 development goals.

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86 Government of Iraq, 'National Report on the Status of Human Development 2008', Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation and Baytal Hikma Iraq, Iraq, 2008. The Ministry of Planning advised the 2013 NHDR will be available in 2013. Supporting documentation is available at http://iraqnhdr3.wordpress.com.

87 Government of Iraq, 'National Development Strategy 2007-2010', 2007, and 'National Development Plan 2010–2014', 2010.

At their inception in 2007/2008, the MDG and NHDR projects conducted original research that contributed to knowledge on Iraq development conditions. Results became available as Iraq was making its transition from a recovery to a development orientation in the 2008 to 2010 period. They built on several earlier Ministry of Planning/Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology initiatives,[88] and contributed to the baselines against which progress is now being measured. Importantly, the projects introduced the development concepts, standards and methodologies that are being used as a framework for articulating national development priorities.

The NHDR and MDG projects contributed to Iraq's overall planning framework and helped to establish development priorities. The NHDR and MDG reports were used as primary inputs to NDP 2010–2014, NDP 2013–2017 and related sectoral plans and policies. Both NDPs were based on human development concepts and indicators. Analysis and data from the 2008 NHDR were used extensively as part of the 2010 planning.[89] In this regard, the NHDR and the government's interaction with UNDP contributed to framing Iraq's overall approach to development planning.[90] Officials also stated that using global standards helped strengthen the quality of national planning.

In addition, government officials made extensive use of MDG reporting data. The NDP 2010–2014 used specific MDG indicators and concepts as the basis for establishing national priorities and the strategies for achieving them. The indicators are less apparent in NDP 2013–2017, in large part because the MDG framework will expire halfway through its implementation. Related concepts and data were also integrated into the regional planning document, Building the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.[91]

The projects contributed to building statistical agencies' capacities in the federal Ministry of Planning and in the KRG. The government is now able to produce annual MDG reports with some ongoing technical assistance from UNDP. One final report is anticipated, with MDG tracking closing as the global MDG campaign itself concludes in 2015. UNDP provided some initial orientation as the global campaign transitions to the Sustainable Development Goals.[92]

The Ministry of Planning/Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology stated to the evaluation team that it will still require technical assistance to produce the National Human Development Report, without which it may not be able to produce the next report.[93] Reporting systems and procedures are being consolidated; the government now has the objective of producing the NHDR on a biannual basis. Importantly, for the 2013 report, the government was able to work within approved UNDP global standards for human development

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88   Officials cited the 2009 Iraq Household Socio-economic Survey and the basic needs mapping done by the Ministry of Planning in 2011.

89   The 2013 NHDR was not available on time to contribute to the National Development Plan 2013-2017. However, the current plan made extensive use of Human Development Index concepts and indicators.

90   For example, see Government of Iraq, 'National Development Plan 2013-2017', 2013, page 30.

91   Kurdistan Regional Government, 'Building the Kurdistan Region of Iraq', Government of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, and UNDP, December 2012.

92   United Nations Sustainable Development Goals http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org.

93   Ministry of Planning officials requested continuation of support for the 2015 NHDR, but UNDP has not yet indicated whether support will be available. Officials also noted that important gaps remain within the Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology's overall institutional capacity, particularly related to statistical analysis. These affect the Ministry of Planning/Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology's ability to produce the report without assistance. However, they are outside of the scope of the NHDR and require a larger and sustained intervention that is beyond current UNDP capacity.

reporting, after some initial difficulties with the 2008 report.[94]

LOCAL AREA DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

Beginning in 2008, the Local Area Development Programme (LADP) was implemented over three phases. The project was ongoing in 2014. Phase I was implemented under Outcome 5, reflecting its focus on economic recovery. A Bridging Phase and Phase II were situated under Outcome 4, as the project concept shifted to strengthening planning capacity and systems at the governorate level. In this ADR, all three phases are summarized under Outcome 4 for coherence of presentation.

All three iterations of the LADP were influenced by two contradictory trends; constitutional decentralization versus political centralization. Prior to 2003, Iraq had a highly centralized constitution and political system dating to the British Mandate period. The 2005 Constitutional reform established Iraq as a federal state, devolving some power, responsibilities and resources to sub-national governments (the governorates). The governorates' role in Iraq's development has become increasingly important, particularly as analysis shows the spatial dimensions of poverty.

The reform process left important elements of the constitution incomplete or vague. Issues such as the division of power within the federal system and authority over natural resources remain contentious. Also, the institutions and systems needed for cooperation between different government levels need to be strengthened. Political authority remains highly centralized at the federal level (with the possible exception of the KRG).

Within existing arrangements, the Federal Government began to scale-up resource transfers to the governorates and the KRG in 2006. Initial transfers covered reconstruction projects and service delivery.[95] By 2011, the total federal transfers to governorates under the Development and Reconstruction mechanism approached $3.7 billion. Governorates also receive transfers from other sources, for administration and through federal line ministries for sectoral programmes. Accompanying new responsibilities under the 2005 constitution and the growth in transfers, the Provincial Powers Act (2008) required that Provincial Development Plans be prepared by the Governor's Office and approved by the Provincial Councils. There was also a requirement for governorates to contribute to ministries' sectoral plans on projects of strategic national interest or local development. These transfers began at the same time as the spatial dimensions of Iraq's development challenges were being defined within national planning processes. The importance of local strategies for reducing income poverty and deprivation of access to public goods and services began to emerge.

In 2007, governorates were not positioned to use resource transfers effectively or to otherwise contribute to meeting recovery and development challenges. Governorates were not integrated into national planning processes and lacked the capacity to develop their own governorate-level plans. Systems were neither institutionalized within governorates nor standardized among the governorates, the KRG and the Iraqi Federal Government. A good indicator of this is low budget execution rates, which averaged 44 percent in 2011; at least seven governorates showed execution rates of less than 50 percent. Weak performance has a particular impact on Iraq's

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94   The 2008 NDHR was published by the Ministry of Planning, endorsed by the Government of Iraq and used extensively at the federal level and in the Kurdistan Region. However, the UNDP Human Development Report Office assessed the report as not meeting global standards due to some procedural and technical issues. Accordingly, the 2008 report was not approved by UNDP as a national report. The Human Development Report Office participated in the planning for the 2013 report; formal endorsement is pending.

95   General Federal Budget Law, 2006.

capacity to address the spatial dimension of its development priorities. In this context, LADP Phase I differed from earlier economic recovery activities; it emphasized building the capacity to plan, deliver and assess development priorities through local authorities and institutions.

Overall the LADP Phase I, joint programme contributed to establishing development district-level planning systems and a large body of economic recovery activities. However, gaps in project design meant that LADP-I had limited impact strengthening systems at the governorate level.

LADP Phase I was designed in 2006/7 as Iraq was defining its recovery priorities and governance arrangements within the new federal constitution. The first phase (2008 to 2010) was implemented in three governorates, with the objective of strengthening local authorities' capacities to prepare and implement local area development plans. The plans were intended to stimulate local economic development and to strengthen district-level planning capacity. Focus at the district level was intended to push resources out to the community level. UNDP's contribution to the Joint Programme framework focused on strengthening planning systems. UNDP also collaborated with the participating UN agencies on the delivery of 132 fast-track economic recovery projects.

The most important medium-term achievement of LADP Phase I was establishing initial systems and procedures for development planning. Though evaluation reporting does not identify outcome-level achievements resulting from the District Plans (including for the economic recovery projects), available evidence indicates that the plans were either partially implemented or not used. They generally lacked the necessary institutional framework and resources to be fully implemented and sustained. The design gap was limited coverage and lack of integration into overarching systems. The plans appeared as anomalies; they were implemented in less than 10 percent of Iraq's districts and used a model that

was not recognized or understood by governorate planning and resource allocation systems.

LADP Phase I was an early effort to establish and institutionalize sub-national planning systems. The programme was unique; poor security tended to preclude most other international organizations from working at the district level. Working within the federal structure, the programme offered a locally-focused model for planning, service delivery and economic diversification in a centralized political and institutional context. It also contributed to identifying the required linkages between district, governorate and federal planning and resource allocation systems. The good quality of work and relevance of the model from LADP Phase I produced the demand for an expanded second phase, which is planned to be implemented in all 18 governorates with the potential of establishing a national-level standardized planning model.

The LADP Bridging Phase contributed to strengthening planning systems at the governorate level and to the process of building vertical linkages between the governorates and the regional and federal planning frameworks. The contribution remains unique; ongoing insecurity and the declining international presence in Iraq mean that few if any international organizations are working on governance issues at the governorate level.

Building on the work done by Phase I, the LADP Bridging Phase made tangible contributions to development planning systems. It resolved LADP Phase I design gaps by focusing at the governorate level. Phase II scales up nationally and works with the vertical linkages among federal, regional and governorate planning institutions. Related work is still continuing under Phase II of the project.

The most important design change from Phase I was the shift in focus from individual districts to whole-of-governorate planning. The methodology involves all districts in the participating governorates as well as consultation across the

governorate-level institutions with development-oriented responsibilities. The project introduced a standardized planning model that focused on strengthening coherence between stakeholders. This occurred where processes were previously *ad hoc,* with limited transparency or coordination. Governorate ministries prepared their individual plans, often with different methodologies, and the vertical linkages to districts were weak.

UNDP generally met its output targets within the Bridging Phase Joint Programme framework (implementation delays notwithstanding).[96] The programme delivered five Integrated Provincial Development Plans, one in each of the participating governorates. All of the plans were approved by the appropriate governorate entities (Provincial Council and Ministry of Planning), integrated into overall planning and resource allocation and appear to have political and public support.[97] The plans piloted the revised LADP model, and prepared the basis for national scale-up in Phase II. Lessons learned were incorporated into Phase II design, which is under implementation in all 18 Iraqi governorates (with the participation of the federal Ministry of Planning).

Government counterparts interviewed considered the development plans to be of good quality and to include a sizeable number of development projects. For example, in Babel, counterparts advised that 385 projects were integrated into the plan (315 new and 70 ongoing). The evaluation team was not able to verify the extent to which the plans or the projects were being implemented, the development results achieved or the impact of planning on budget execution rates. Interviews with officials in three of the participating governorates indicated that at least a portion of the plans were under implementation.

LADP Bridging Phase achievements remain fragile. The revised programme model has only been through one implementation cycle. Delays with resource mobilization resulted in a one-year funding gap, undermining progress on institutionalizing LADP-supported systems (the funding gap interrupted progress towards implementation in at least one governorate). Counterparts in two governorates (Suleimanyah and Thi Qar) also noted that the 2013 elections disrupted planning processes. They also noted that ongoing technical support is still required. In this regard, planning remains vulnerable to political and institutional conditions and Bridging Phase achievements are pending institutionalization during Phase II.

These factors notwithstanding, the LADP Bridging Phase used a whole-of-government approach to make important contributions to strengthening governorate-level development planning institutions and systems. In three governorates, LADP activities were complemented with technical support to improve budget execution.[98] These are also technical inputs into the larger process of clarifying Iraq's federal arrangements and strengthening planning and resource allocation systems. The technical inputs position the LADP programme to strengthening the effectiveness of Iraq's federal system and the decentralization of some authority and resources to the governorate and regional levels.

Noting the unique arrangements within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the Bridging Phase established linkages to the governorate and regional planning systems. A linkage between planning and budget execution was also established, through coordination with the Budget Execution Support project. Efforts were ongoing and have not been evaluated. However, they

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96   The ADR field study was able to meet with LADP Bridging Phase stakeholders in three of the five participating governorates (Suleimanyah, Babel and Thi Qar), in addition to reviewing documents and interviews with UNDP and KRG officials and one donor. Outputs were confirmed in UNDP and Government of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, 'Final Narrative Report: Bridging for Local Area development Programme Phase II', May 2013.

97   The evaluation team was able to confirm support from Provincial Council representatives in three governorates.

98   There was no evidence that the support improved budget execution rates. However, insufficient time has passed for results to be demonstrated. Iraqi officials interviewed in two governorates showed strong support for the project linkage between planning and budget execution systems.

further reflect the shift towards taking a whole-of-governorate or whole-of-systems approach within the LADP programme model at the governorate level. Cooperation between the LADP and the Budget Execution Support projects strengthens the linkages between planning and budget processes and improves budget execution.

ENVIRONMENT

The 13 projects in the Environment portfolio were intended to strengthen Iraqi capacity to manage environmental challenges. The NDP 2010–2014 noted that Iraq lacks a comprehensive policy or system to manage key resources (e.g. water) or to address the deterioration of the country's environment. Increased and tangible pollution of all environmental elements—air, water and soil—was a major problem.

Most Outcome 4 projects focused on strengthening Iraq's institutional framework (including policy development) and on strengthening planning and operational capacities. The projects tended to be short-term interventions, focused on a specific policy or institutional deliverable. They were spread over key areas of environmental concern (water resource management, climate change, drought preparedness and mitigation and energy).

The projects made direct and indirect contributions to Iraq's 'National Environmental Strategy and Action Plan' (2013–2017). The Ministry of Environment published the Plan in 2013 with UNDP technical assistance. UNDP was expected to contribute to implementing the Plan through the project Support to Environment Sustainability and Energy Efficiency in Iraq, which was under development in 2013.

Partnering with UNICEF, UNHABITAT and the World Health Organization, UNDP contributed to the Joint Programme, Water and Sanitation Master Planning and Capacity Building. UNDP served as the lead agency, with responsibility for project outputs related to the formulation of water and sanitation master plans at each location. Key outputs specific to UNDP contributions included

the delivery of five long-term master plans for the Governorates of Thi Qar and Suleimanyah, for Tikrit City in Salah al-Din, Kut City in Wassit and the Makhmoor District in Erbil.

Most environment projects were focused on the federal level, though some work strengthened governorate-level systems. For example, the Water and Sanitation Master Plan Joint Programme was designed to strengthen planning capacity and service delivery in five participating governorates. Another project addressed environmental concerns in the marshlands governorates.

UNDP supported government efforts to strengthen environment policies and institutions.

UNDP support to the environment area in Iraq focused on policy and institutional development. UNDP contributed to policy discussions, research and institutional development related to: decision-making systems within the Ministry of Environment, water resource management and sharing across Iraq's internal boundaries, climate change, drought management and dust storms. UNDP contributed technical and other support the drafting of the 'National Environment Strategy 2013–2017'. The strategy, integrated into the NDP 2013–2017, outlines a plan of action to address further environmental degradation.

UNDP contributions to the 'National Environment Policy' (2013) were particularly important. Officials also noted that UNDP drought risk and water management contributions informed the Prime Minister's Higher Water Committee and the development of new legislation.

There were also several recovery-oriented initiatives funded by the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund and implemented in specific communities in southern Iraq. For example, UNDP delivered support to restoring potable water and solid waste management services in the city of Umm Qasr in southern Iraq, with a positive outcome for local health. UNDP also contributed to restoring potable water services

in the town of Abu Al-Khaseeb in the Basrah Governorate. Available information indicates that these projects met their output targets, and contributed towards local MDG achievement (MDG-7 in particular).

Most recent environment projects were short-term, of limited scope and focused on delivering a specific report or activity. UNDP has not been able to build a coherent country programme on the environments that allows it to sustain its engagement with issues and counterparts. Funding has been the major obstacle. UNDP Staff turnover disrupts programming and is not well communicated externally; several counterparts were unaware that some government officials had left and made reference to communications or commitments that were pending. Based on the available information, there were no projects in the pipeline and no new confirmed funding.

In this regard, UNDP has not been able to build on its success. Officials in the Ministry of Water Resources and the Ministry of Environment expressed an interest in continuing international cooperation, including with UNDP, and focused on technical assistance and access to global networks and competence. However, the Ministries are looking for long-term relationships, preferably with some expertise embedded in Iraqi institutions. Remotely managed relationships are of less interest.

UNDP was unsuccessful in providing viable water and sanitation plans. Poor monitoring and oversight of UNDP programmes undermined its contributions.

UNDP's objective of strengthening governorate-level planning systems in order to improve water and sanitation service delivery was only partially met. Contributing factors include weak local ownership and poor monitoring and oversight by UNDP. There were challenges in the implementation of the Water and Sanitation Master Plans. Officials in some governorates considered the Water and Sanitation Plans to be of poor quality and were not keen to implement the

plans. Performance concerns were not captured in UNDP monitoring and evaluation documentation, and it was unclear if similar issues were experienced in other locations.

Governorate officials expressed the concern that they were not consulted during project design and were not part of the outsourcing of the implementation of the UNDP-managed water and sanitation plans. The officials, therefore, were uncertain of the scope of work that had been outsourced and could not negotiate corrective action or have informed discussions with the implementing firm. UNDP oversight performance appeared weak, as did communication with the governorate. Monitoring and evaluation reports did not assess quality of the water and sanitation plans or capacity development, whether the outputs were in use or what (if any) outcomes resulted.

The contracted company delivered generic water and sanitation plans. These plans were based on earlier surveys commissioned by the governorate between 2006 and 2009 and interviews with some officials. The company did not undertake original survey work and added little value to the information already available. The Arabic translation of the plans was poor, making them difficult for local use. For example, the water plan finally presented was based on a system design that had not been used in Thi Qar since the 1950s, with a fundamental difference in approach that the governorate does not intend to adopt. Governorate officials have since contracted different water and sanitation works, based on a planning survey done in 2006. Further works are planned for 2014, based on technical work that is now underway without UNDP participation. UNDP, therefore, did not appear positioned to sustain a working relationship with water and sanitation officials in Thi Qar.

4.5 ENABLING POLICY FRAMEWORKS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY

Outcome 5 comprised 28 projects. All projects were developed under the Crisis Prevention and Recovery area and subdivided into six sectoral

areas: Civil Aviation; Economic Recovery and Inclusive Growth; Mine Action; Infrastructure; Private Sector Development; and Housing. Outcome indicators were assigned in each of these areas.

Of the 28 Outcome 5 projects, 24 were legacy projects with inception dates between 2006 and 2010. Of the legacy projects, 15 were funded by the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund. Five projects had inception dates in 2010 or later, with only one new project funded within the current CPAP 2011–2014 period. United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund projects comprised 60 percent of the total Outcome 5 projects by number, about 80 percent of the portfolio's total value.

Most legacy projects in the Outcome 5 portfolio had a recovery orientation and focused on public service delivery and infrastructure. There were some exceptions, the most visible of these was the Private Sector Development Programme (PSDP-I). Projects were written to the priorities of planning frameworks that expired prior to or during the evaluation period, and with limited relevance to the CPAP 2010–2014. In addition, the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund funding criteria had an important impact on project design, including favouring short-term recovery interventions rather than the medium-term policy and institutional impacts.

Portfolio composition meant that there were projects that had limited possibility of contributing to the intended outcomes. Only six Outcome 5 projects had direct potential to contribute towards effectiveness and were fully consistent with the objective of strengthening "enabling policy and frameworks" for economic recovery and private sector development. Disconnected projects and their lack of relevance to the portfolio was a factor in the closure of a large body of United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund projects from the 2007–2009 period, most of which were also affected by security-related implementation delays.

Taking relevance into account, the evaluation team focused on six projects/thematic areas: Private Sector Development Programme-Iraq and the Private Sector Development collaboration between UNDP, Shell Oil and the government; Local Area Development Programme (Phase 1); all projects in the Mine Action portfolio; the Partnership Services for Fiduciary Monitoring Agent; and the Civil Aviation Master Plan. While mostly legacy in origin, the designs of these projects were generally consistent with the objectives of the government, the United Nations and UNDP planning frameworks for 2010–2014. The projects reflect an upstream focus on working with the government to strengthen legislative, policy, regulatory and institutional frameworks. This is in contrast to recovery-oriented projects that were designed to strategic objectives that date back to 2005.

Box 5. Outcome 5 Statement and Indicators

Outcome Statement:

Enabling policy and frameworks for rapid economic recovery, inclusive and diversified growth and private-sector development.

Outcome Indicators:

- Iraqi airspace and air traffic regulated and managed in line with international standards (2010: no; 2014: yes);
- Volume (US$) of growth related and bankable projects developed across infrastructure sectors (2009: below $1 billion; 2014: $2 billion);
- Change in national level perception of improved electricity supply (2009: 40 percent; 2014: 70 percent);
- Number of state-owned enterprises restructured with adequate social mitigation measures (2010: 0; 2014: 2);
- Percent increase in employment in the private sector disaggregated by gender and age (2008: 22 percent, 2014: 35 percent); and
- Percent of female professional and technical workers (2008: 61.8 percent; 2014: 72 percent).

Table 14. Programme Activities under Outcome 5						
Programme	**Project**	**Start Date**	**End Date**	**Original Budget ($000,000)**	**Source**	**Location**
Conflict Prevention and Recovery	Civil Aviation Rehabilitation and Update	2006	2008	0.5	UNDP	National
	Support to Civil Aviation Master Plan	2008	2011	5.8	United States	National
Conflict Prevention and Recovery/ Economic recovery/ Inclusive Growth	Al-Muthanna Governorate Electricity Network Reinforcement Programme	2006	2009	9.9	Japan	South
	Iraq Reconstruction and Employment Programme	2006	2009	14.3	Japan	National
	Partnership Services for Fiduciary Monitoring Agent	2009	2013	4.6	Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA); United Nations Capital Development Fund	National
	Basrah Governance Support	2009	2011	2.5	UK Department for International Development	South
Conflict Prevention and Recovery/ Housing	Improving the Housing Delivery System in Erbil	2008	2013	3.7	UN-HABITAT; Administrative Agent UNDP Iraq Trust Fund	North
	Strengthening the Capacity of the Housing sector	2010	2012	0.5	UN-HABITAT; Administrative Agent UNDP Iraq Trust Fund	North
Conflict Prevention and Recovery/ Infrastructure	Rehabilitation of Mussayib Gas Power Station (Phase 2)	2006	2012	70.1	Administrative Agent UNDP Iraq Trust Fund	National
	Reconstruction Priority Community Public Services and Infrastructure in Samara	2006	2007	03	UNDP	South
	Restoration of Al Askari Shrine in Samarra City and Rehabilitation of Other Damaged Sites Throughout Iraq	2007	2011	4.7	Administrative Agent UNDP Iraq Trust Fund	South
	Electricity Sector Reconstruction	2007	2010	1.0	JICA; United Nations Capital Development Fund	North
	Sustainable System of Navigational Aids for Approach Channel (Umm Qasr and Az Zubayr)	2009	2013	5.6	Danish International Development Agency	South
	Electricity Sector Reconstruction Kurdistan	2009	2013	9.2	Iraq	North

(continued)

(continued)

Table 14. Programme Activities under Outcome 5						
Programme	**Project**	**Start Date**	**End Date**	**Original Budget ($000,000)**	**Source**	**Location**
Conflict Prevention and Recovery/ Mine Action	Mine Action Support-JPN	2007	2008	0.41	United Nations	National
	MA non-governmental organization 1 Development	2006	2008	3.6	Administrative Agent UNDP Iraq Trust Fund	National
	Conflict Victim Assistance	2007	2012	12.8	Japan	North
	Conflict Victims Assistance – North	2007	2012	4.3	Japan; Australian Agency for International Development	North
	WHO Conflict Victims Assistance – North	2007	2011	2.1	Japan	North
	Strengthening of National Mine Action Organization in Southern Iraq	2007	2011	5.8	Australia, UK Department for International Development	National
	Institutional Development Support -National Mine Action Authority	2007	2013	4.4	Italy; UNDP	National
	Mine Action in Southern Iraq	2008	2011	3.6	Administrative Agent UNDP Iraq Trust Fund	South
	Operational Capacity Development	2010	2013	5.0	Australian Agency for International Development	National
	Victim Assistance Capacity Development	2010	2013	1.1	Australian Agency for International Development; UNDP	North
	Private Sector Development Programme	2012	2013	1.2	Shell Iraq Petroleum Development; UNDP	National
Conflict Prevention and Recovery/ Private-Sector Development	Private Sector Development Programme for Iraq	2008	2013	10.8	Administrative Agent UNDP Iraq Trust Fund	National
MDG/ Economic recovery/ Inclusive Growth	Area-based Development Programme	2007	2010	16.1	Administrative Agent UNDP Iraq Trust Fund	5 gover-norates
	Local Area Development Plan	2007	2009	3.0	Swedish International Development Cooperation	5 gover-norates

In this regard, an important task accomplished during the evaluation period was to bring an orderly closure to United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund and recovery-oriented projects from previous programme periods. Significant institutional resources were needed to complete the work, while the UNDP was simultaneously looking forward and adapting to a rapidly changing and volatile country context.

OVERALL FINDINGS

Managing changes in the Iraqi context was an important programme challenge for UNDP. Difficulties left UNDP unable to sustain its engagements in key programme areas, including private-sector reform. Contributing factors included weakness in UNDP's transition strategy, absence of coherent demand from government, lack of government funding and the sharp reduction of international funding as donors scaled back their operations.

The ongoing country programme was prepared during a period of transition and optimism (2008–2010), with conditions deteriorating as soon as the plan became effective in 2011. UNDP was confronted a series of parallel transitions in its programme and funding environment. These produced deteriorating security conditions and sharp reductions in resources and activities just as UNDP was attempting to shift into a development-oriented programme. At the same time, significant institutional effort by UNDP was used to bring the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund to an orderly closure. Importantly, the Government of Iraq has not emerged as a funder of UNDP activities (with the exception of some support from the Kurdistan Regional Government).

UNDP had difficulty managing this combination of factors. It had developed a credible portfolio that addressed core government priorities for recovery, economic diversification, private-sector development and local area development. Many of the core projects began to show a

sustained engagement over time, with evolution and innovation in their design, and a strengthening of relations with Iraqi counterpart institutions. UNDP demonstrated an ability to learn and manage knowledge, although individuals rather than systems appear to have played the main role. However, relevance of the portfolio arguably declined over the duration of the CPAP 2011–2014 cycle.

UNDP was unable to sustain its involvement in most project areas, with the exception of ongoing work with the Local Area Development Programme and a smaller, less diversified programme in Private Sector Development. The successful Partnership Services for Fiduciary Monitoring Agent project also continues based on demand from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the government. Economic diversification and private sector development will remain core government priorities as outlined in the NDP 2013–2017. However, the government has not articulated a clear demand for UNDP services or attached national funding support to requests. In addition, UNDP has not been assertive in clarifying its own strategic direction on related priorities or in resource mobilization. This was particularly the case for private sector development where there was demand and opportunity to build on success.

UNDP's involvement in the Mine Action area showed strong relevance to the country context, UNDP's corporate and normative mandate, and to stated government priorities in 2010. UNDP had a corporate responsibility to advocate for effective mine action given the extent of landmine and explosive remnants of war contamination in Iraq. However, the relevance of mine action to government priorities declined as the government failed to take effective action to improve its own performance. UNDP's position was untenable by the end of 2013, given weak government performance after ten years of assistance. Mine action donors came to the same conclusion and withdrew from Iraq.

Outcome 5 generally showed good output-level effectiveness. However, outputs were not always well used. Project design flaws and inefficiencies within the government were both contributing factors. Regardless, the portfolio contributed to only a limited number of outcomes, in large part resulting from the deteriorating situation In Iraq after 2011.

Outputs generally met project targets (implementation delays notwithstanding). While the PSDP-I supported the drafting of the Economic Reform Act and its underlying policy and regulatory framework, the LADP is strengthening governorate development planning systems and Private Sector Development is building linkages and between the oil and non-oil economies. The Partnership Services for Fiduciary Monitoring Agent also demonstrated strong performance in improving the delivery of key public service infrastructure. In each of these cases, there was evidence of a contribution that has (or could have) strengthened national institutions. There is also evidence that most of the recovery-oriented projects delivered tangible outputs that strengthened public service delivery.

There were two primary exceptions. Important outputs from the Mine Action portfolio were not used, given the limited effectiveness of some government institutions. For the Civil Aviation Master Plan, poor project design and management and changing political conditions resulted in the project's regulatory outputs not being used (though its institution-building outputs were used).

There were limited linkages between portfolio outputs and desired national outcomes. National development trends often contradict the outcome objectives. In Iraq, the national development trend has been for further concentration of economic activity in the oil sector, and of economic resources and power in the State.

Political gridlock has slowed progress towards needed reforms, and government institutions' actions are not always consistent with the policy

of economic diversification. The overall political and security context remains volatile and the incentives for important stakeholders to devolve economic power from the State are unclear.

The State, therefore, has an important responsibility for broken linkages between project outputs and limited effectiveness in achieving the outcomes desired. In turn, the lack of diversification or private-sector development had consequences for the government's overall human development strategy. Successive national development plans were based on the assumption that private-sector growth would create new economic opportunity and reduce poverty, particularly for the large youth cohort entering the labour market. This has not occurred.

There were important differences in the efficiency of legacy projects with earlier start up dates compared to projects implemented later in the portfolio. These demonstrate UNDP progress in institutional learning on the Iraq context and on project design.

The delivery-focused approach under United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund contributed to a lack of programme coherence and synergy within the portfolio component. A transition to a more programmatic approach, intended since 2008, has not been fully realized, affecting programme efficiency in delivering results. In general, the efficiency of legacy projects and of most international interventions in Iraq from 2003 to 2010 was mixed and affected by a combination of the several factors, including: Pressure for rapid delivery of outputs under difficult conditions, often with institutional counterparts that had limited capacity; uneven national ownership of projects, often based in individuals rather than strategic position and agreement at the institutional level within the government (in part, this reflected Iraqi institutions' internal dynamics); deficiencies in project design, often resulting from limited contextual knowledge or working in areas outside of core UNDP institutional competences; limited direct access to government counterparts and projects sites,

contributing to difficulties with project governance, communications and with project management and oversight.

These conditions produced implementation delays and resulted in mixed quality of some outputs and changes in scope; the large majority of projects would eventually need to be revised and extended. Later projects in the Outcome 5 portfolio showed increases in efficiency, largely based on important design and management improvements. For example, in later projects, UNDP tended to develop more effective relationships with their Iraqi counterparts. This change resulted from a combination of strengthening of Iraqi institutions and better ability within these programmes to establish and sustain working relations over an extended period of time. The ability to sustain engagements and relations was a key performance variable that enabled UNDP to present itself as a credible partner in the process of institutional change, particularly as UNDP's presence within Iraq strengthened (including through the use of long-term agreements with trusted national implementers). UNDP demonstrated better context knowledge, with designs that embedded projects with counterpart institutions and processes and that embodied improved project governance. Working in areas of core institutional competence allowed UNDP to field programme teams with a combination of subject matter experience and good knowledge of UNDP. This includes fielding more expert staff with Arabic language skills.

Sustainability was best when the government had strong ownership, projects were embedded into national strategies and institutions or when UNDP was able to sustain its engagement over an extended period of time.

The PSDP-I, LADP, Private Sector Development and the Partnership Services for Fiduciary Monitoring Agent plans projects continue operations and show good possibility for output-level sustainability. These projects are integrated into government priorities and systems and have effective governance arrangements. Given that most of these projects were of good quality, sustainability will depend on the government's use of the outputs. Mine Action, however, shows poor possibility for sustainability, given government inefficiencies.

Legacy projects show mixed sustainability. Many legacy projects had sustainability measures built into their design; most outputs were designed for integration into public systems. Examples include projects in the electrical sector, which have high importance to the government and are fully integrated into the power grid. Other public service delivery projects showed design effectiveness. At the same time some projects showed poor ownership or strategic integration in their design (e.g. the Civil Aviation Master Plan project).

The most important sustainability concern is UNDP's inability to build on previous achievements or to sustain its engagement with the government. The proximate reason is a dramatic reduction in funding; LADP, Private Sector Development and Partnership Services for Fiduciary Monitoring Agent are the only Outcome 5 projects that are able to continue activity into the next programme cycle. UNDP showed limited success with resource mobilization or new project development. UNDP's overall institutional capacity, therefore, was significantly reduced; UNDP lacks a revised strategic orientation to focus its remaining capacity. Government counterparts are generally aware of the reduction, which influences their perception of UNDP as a counterpart.

For PSDP-I, UNDP did not have a strategy for sustaining its engagement after funding for the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund ended; UNDP has not generated new resources for the project. UNDP Senior management did not act effectively to develop a transition strategy or to articulate future possible contributions. The programme team has been disbanded and activity will close with the presentation of the Private-sector Development Strategy paper, which is currently in the Prime Minister's Advisory Commission. UNDP, therefore, does

not have the personnel or resources to systematically follow up, to advocate for the new private-sector law or to support its implementation. This means that UNDP completed part of the work, but will not be present during the equally difficult implementation phase, which is essential to outcome achievement.

CIVIL AVIATION AND TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE

The outcome indicator for the Civil Aviation project was not achieved. Only a portion of the Civil Aviation outputs were delivered to and/or used by the aviation authority. As a result, the project had limited possibility to contribute to achieving the outcome desired.

The Civil Aviation portfolio comprised two sequential projects (the 2006 Civil Aviation Rehabilitation and Update project and the 2008 Support to Civil Aviation Master Plan project). The Support to Civil Aviation Master Plan project was implemented over a three year period between 2008 and 2011. By bringing national civil aviation regulatory frameworks into compliance with international standards, the project would help "maximize accessibility of the country to trade flows through reliable and efficient air routes, airports, waterways and sea ports, ensuring the prompt delivery of goods needed for Iraq's recovery and development."[99] The 2008 project built on the earlier Civil Aviation Rehabilitation and Update project.

The Support to Civil Aviation Master Plan had eight supporting outputs. Two of the most important outputs were the ten-year 'Civil Aviation Master Plan', prepared and adopted by the Government of Iraq, and a comprehensive package of training and capacity-building initiatives for the Iraqi Civil Aviation Authority (within

the Ministry of Transport). The projects received funding from the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund, the Government of Japan and the United States Department of State. Technical support for the Master Plan was contracted through the International Civil Aviation Organization, while UNDP was able to embed a technical specialist in the Aviation Authority's office at the Baghdad International Airport.

There has been limited progress towards the outcome objective. At the end of project implementation, Iraqi airspace and air traffic are not regulated or managed in accordance with international standards. Slow progress towards reform and the modernization of Iraq's aviation infrastructure constrain the sector's expansion, Iraq's economic development and improved flows of persons, goods and services. The NDP 2013–2017 cites a "continued lack of strategic vision" as a factor contributing to the lack of progress.[100]

UNDP technical assistance strengthened the Iraqi Civil Aviation Authority's capacities. However, the Civil Aviation Master Plan was not implemented and there were no contributions to improving regulatory frameworks. Contributing factors were weak design and project ownership among Iraqi authorities (which changed frequently).

Support to the Civil Aviation Master Plan made an important contribution to strengthening Iraq's Civil Aviation Authority by providing training to 257 officials.[101] The training programme was assessed as being of high quality and relevance; Authority officials used the knowledge and skills acquired through the programme. Technical assistance provided by the UNDP's specialist at the Aviation Authority's Baghdad International Airport facility was also assessed as being of high quality, contributing to the effectiveness of

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99   UNDP, 'Master Planning and Capacity Building for Iraqi Civil Aviation Sector; Project Summary Information', undated, 2008.

100   Government of Iraq, 'National Development Plan 2013–2017', 2013, page 13.

101   Findings are summarized from UNDP, 'Outcome Evaluation of the UNDP Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) for Iraq 2011–2014', January 2012, Section 2.6. They were updated and confirmed for 2013 with two interviews.

ongoing operations and the training programme's implementation. Iraq officials noted the positive impact of embedding the UNDP specialist within the Authority's operational centre.

Other important outputs from the Civil Aviation project were either not delivered or not used by the government, including the centrepiece Civil Aviation Master Plan. As such, the project did not contribute to improved regulation of the sector and did not move it towards using international standards.

The Civil Aviation project delivered only four of its original eight outputs, with the donor and Iraq counterparts showing dissatisfaction with the overall quality of UNDP's contributions. A 'Civil Aviation Master Plan', written by specialists from the International Civil Aviation Organization, was presented to the Aviation Authority in March 2009. The authority never formally acknowledged that it received the Master Plan, and it was not implemented.[102] The plan appeared poorly suited to the context and too complex for use by the Authority. Informants noted that the International Civil Aviation Organization authors had limited or no previous experience working in conflict-affected and low capacity environments, which influenced the realism of the draft plan under Iraqi conditions.

As contributing factors, UNDP had insufficient management capacity and aviation sector credibility to oversee the process. In addition, UNDP did not have the capacity to engage the Aviation Authority on implementation of the plan. Institutional weakness within the Aviation Authority and the limited ownership of Iraqi counterparts during the early design stage were also factors. The Director General of the Authority changed four times over the life of the project, with frequent changes also in subordinate

officials. Successive Directors General had different priorities and loyalties and the Aviation Authority's commitment to the project eroded over time. At the same time, political gridlock meant limited progress was made on legislative and regulatory reform.

In contrast, UNDP successfully implemented an additional project in the transport sector, the Navigation Aid for Approach Channel-Umm Qasr and Az Zubayr Ports (NAVAID) project. NAVAID contributed to improved capacity at the Umm Qasr facility, Iraq's only deep water port. Navigation systems dated to the 1970s, did not comply with international standards and were in poor operating condition. The objective of the NAVAID project was to improve maritime traffic by updating the systems and strengthening the institutional capacity of the General Corporation for Ports Iraq. Improvements were seen as a prerequisite for expanding oil exports.

Navigation buoys were in place and operational by 2012. There was no data available to link the project with increased maritime traffic or safety. However, informants from the Port Authority credit the aids with improvement to overall safety, which was a reason some shippers had previously avoided the Umm Qasr facility. The introduction of Maritime Automatic Identification Systems/ Vessel Traffic Services navigation systems and training was also credited with improved traffic management. Iraqi counterparts and the donor (Denmark) credited UNDP with effective project management.

ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH

The Economic Recovery and Inclusive Growth portfolio was comprised of six projects, including one in the electricity sector and one focused on reconstruction and employment. The main

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102   The original 'Civil Aviation Master Plan' was 450 pages. The government and the United States Department of State requested UNDP prepare an 80-page executive summary that could be managed by the Iraqi Civil Aviation Authority. The revised report was delivered in Sept 2009. However, the Aviation Authority never officially acknowledged receipt of either the report or the executive summary. No action has been taken by the Aviation Authority or Ministry of Transportation to implement the report, in whole or in part.

components of the portfolio were projects related to the LADP, the Partnership Services for Fiduciary Monitoring Agent and UNDP's support to budget execution in two governorates. Two subsequent iterations of the LADP and budget support projects appeared in the Outcome 4 portfolio, reflecting a shift to focus on governance and strengthening governorate-level planning and budget systems.[103]

UNDP contributed to improving the performance of a $4.5 billion Japan International Cooperation Agency loan to the Government of Iraq, supporting the implementation of 17 public service infrastructure projects. UNDP's contributions also helped to improve economic governance in the public sector.

Through the 2009 Partnership Services for Fiduciary Monitoring Agent, UNDP provided ongoing technical and advisory services to the Monitoring Committee of a Japanese concessional loan to the Government of Iraq, valued at $4.5 billion. The Committee includes representatives of JICA and the Government of Iraq. The Committee oversees a portfolio of 17 large-scale infrastructure projects being implemented by various federal ministries.

UNDP is contracted through an agreement with JICA to work with the Government of Iraq implementing institutions to improve the performance of projects funded by the loan. To this end, UNDP provides assistance to the institutions to develop and monitor procurement planning, to support financial management and planning to identify capacity development needs and provide related services, and to regularly report to the Monitoring Committee. Implementation of the loan agreement was at its mid-point by the end of 2013; most projects are scheduled for completion between 2014 and 2017. JICA anticipates that UNDP will continue to provide support until closure of the loan.

Evidence from the early implementation phase is that UNDP contributions helped to improve economic governance in the public sector and the effectiveness of projects in the loan portfolio. In this regard, the project made positive contributions towards the outcome indicator of increasing the number of "bankable projects developed across infrastructure sectors," although the relative contribution is difficult to quantify.

Overall performance in the portfolio is satisfactory. Stakeholders from JICA and the government expressed a high level of confidence and satisfaction with UNDP contributions. Specifically, UNDP's technical support to the design and management of JICA loan requirements enabled an effective start-up of the portfolio. UNDP also contributed to strengthening procurement procedures and otherwise identifying implementation bottlenecks that would require Steering Committee action. UNDP supported planning and project management within the implementing ministries; stakeholders perceived that UNDP's contributions had generally strengthened capacity and project performance.

INFRASTRUCTURE

The Outcome 5 infrastructure portfolio included six projects that focused on restoring Iraqi's electrical and transportation infrastructure and rehabilitating damaged religious sites (the latter was intended to support reconciliation after attacks on religious sites). Four of the projects were developed prior to 2008, when UNDP gave priority to rehabilitating public infrastructure. As a result, projects do not always have clearly identified outcome or output indicators in the CPAP results matrix.

Outcome 5 included the last of 18 projects implemented by UNDP in the electricity sector between 2004 and 2013, valued at approximately $190 million and funded either by bilateral donors or the United Nations Development

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103 The LADP projects are addressed in the Outcome 4 section. The projects were implemented in sequence, with the design of subsequent iterations evolving based on lessons learned and changing requirements. For the purpose of coherence, therefore, the three LADP projects are assessed together.

Group Iraq Trust Fund. Because projects implemented by UNDP comprised only 2.5 percent of the total national and international investment between 2004 and 2009 (approximately $8 billion), their possibility to improve overall sector outcomes or public opinion was limited.[104]

The Electricity Sector Reconstruction Project was implemented over two phases with the Regional Ministry of Electricity in Kurdistan.[105] The projects aimed to improve the availability of electrical power by rehabilitating three transmission substations. The second phase delivered mobile substations and equipment. UNDP provided project management, technical assistance and advisory services to the Regional Ministry as part of a $6.4 million loan agreement between the ministry and JICA. UNDP did not play a direct implementation role.

The projects, Restoration of Al-Askari Shrine in Samarra City and Rehabilitation of Other Damaged Religious Sites throughout Iraq, aimed to rehabilitate the Al-Askari Shrine, damaged in 2006 during sectarian violence. The project was done jointly with UNESCO, with the UNDP component focused on rehabilitating other public infrastructure elements (two schools) in Samarra City and developing measures for reconciliation and restoration of stability.

Iraq made some progress reducing the gap between electricity capacity and demand and stabilizing the electrical grid. UNDP projects contributed to stabilizing the power grid and to preventing further deterioration of strategic production facilities. However, Iraq did not achieve the national outcome objective of improving public perceptions of service delivery.

UNDP contributions to the electricity sector were modest in relation to overall needs, accounting for about 2.5 percent of the total investment into Iraq's electrical sector between 2004 and 2008 (the peak years of UNDP activity in the sector). The Outcome 5 portfolio, therefore, had limited ability to influence the overall quality of service delivery or public perceptions. Nonetheless, UNDP projects did help to stabilize the electrical grid.

The increase in power supply from UNDP projects was credited with helping to avert an even greater crisis. While modest, UNDP projects effectively targeted strategic production sites. This contribution helped mitigate damage from the 2003 collapse of the power grid. However, long implementation delays undermined the effectiveness of outputs—projects were often delivered after the immediate crisis and with a reduced scope of work. Late delivery may have also undermined projects' ability to influence public perceptions of service quality.

The evaluation team assessed two projects for the ADR, the Mussayib Power Station and the Electricity Sector Reconstruction Project in Kurdistan. The Mussayib Power Station has been finalized. The project contributed to the stabilization of the station's power generation capacity and to improved reliability through reduced shutdowns. As a result, the overall stability of the Iraqi power grid was enhanced, particularly given the Mussayib station's strategic position in the central region of Iraq.

However, reductions in the project's scope and lengthy implementation delays diminished the effectiveness of its outputs. The project took eight years to complete instead of the two years originally planned. As such, the project did not meet its objective of helping to stabilize the grid during the immediate crisis period. Delays largely related to difficulties working in Mussayib,

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104 Estimate cited from UNDP, Evaluation of *"Enabling policy framework for rapid economic recovery, inclusive and diversified growth and private sector development"*; Outcome 5, UNDP Iraq Country Programme Action Plan 2011–2014, Baghdad, Iraq, 2012, page 36.

105 UNDP, Electricity Sector Reconstruction Project, Project Document, undated 2007; UNDP, Electricity Sector Reconstruction in Kurdistan, Project Document, undated 2009.

particularly during the peak years of violence. However, UNDP project planning and management were also cited as areas of deficiency.[106]

The Electricity Sector Reconstruction Project in Kurdistan was based on a cost-sharing agreement between the Regional Ministry of Electricity in Kurdistan and UNDP for the implementation of a $150 million JICA loan. UNDP provided technical assistance and project management support for the construction of electrical substations, which improved the overall effectiveness of the distribution grid in the Kurdistan Region. The project has been completed to the strong satisfaction of the Regional Ministry and evaluated in 2012 as being "satisfactory," the second highest rating on a five-point scale. Performance has been enhanced by the combination of strong government ownership and investment and by a project governance, oversight and quality assurance system.

Improvements to generation capacity and supply notwithstanding, electrical power supply is the worst rated public service in Iraq. Public opinion polls show a high and consistent level of public discontent with the quality of electricity services. In a 2011 opinion poll done by the UN and the government, 79 percent of the population stated that the quality of electrical power service was "bad" or "very bad."[107] The exception was in the Kurdistan region, where public approval was high.[108] A 2012 poll conducted by Oxford Research International found that 64 percent of Iraqis had a negative view of the electricity supply; a 2010 poll by the International Republican Institute found that 66 percent of Iraqis believed poor public service delivery, including electricity, was the most serious problem facing the country. Nationally, 60 percent of respondents stated the situation had become worse when compared to 2008.[109] These polls also showed a growing concern with economic issues, corruption, employment and the general delivery of public goods and services as security conditions improved after 2009. Electricity emerged as an issue of the highest concern and political sensitivity.

Through the Electricity Sector Reconstruction Project in Kurdistan, UNDP demonstrated its competence in a strategic role as a fiduciary agent. The role of fiduciary agent has often been allocated to multilateral financial institutions and represents an important future opportunity as cooperation with Iraq moves from grants to soft loans and technical assistance.

MINE ACTION

The Mine Action programme comprised eight projects. UNDP contributions to Mine Action dates back to 2004, beginning with support to the Coalition Provisional Authority's first efforts to establish a national mine action authority.[110] More recently, UNDP collaborated with the Directorate for Mine Action (DMA), located within the Ministry of Environment and with the Kurdistan Regional Government.[111] All active projects were to be completed by the end of 2013. UNDP, the Government of Iraq and donor officials all advised that no future Mine

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106 UNDP, Evaluation of *"Enabling policy framework for rapid economic recovery, inclusive and diversified growth and private sector development"*; Outcome 5, UNDP Iraq Country Programme Action Plan 2011–2014, Baghdad, Iraq, 2012, Section 2.5.

107 UNAMI, 'Synthesis Paper for Preparation of the UNDAF 2015–2019 (draft)' Joint Analysis Unit, Amman and Baghdad, 25 November 2013, page 11.

108 UNDP, 'Outcome 5 Evaluation', 2012, pages 36-38.

109 Ibid, pages 37-38.

110 There were 10 projects between 2004 and 2013; two projects concluded prior to 2008 and the scope of the evaluation. The total value of the portfolio was $35 million. During this period, UNDP worked with the Coalition Provisional Authority, the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, and with the Directorate for Mine Action (which was formed in 2010).

111 There are two entities under the KRG responsible for mine action; the Iraq Kurdistan Mine Action Agency in the Dahouk and Erbil Governorates and the General Directorate of Mine Action in the Suleimanyah.

Action projects are being considered and that the programme will be closed.

Mine Action projects were implemented with a broad set of institution-building and service delivery objectives. These included supporting Iraqi accession to the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention; establishing the national-level legal, policy, regulatory and institutional framework for the Mine Action programme; providing technical assistance in order to develop the Iraqi National Mine Action Standards to guide operations, the Information Management System for Mine Action and landmine impact technical and non-technical surveys; assisting victims with rehabilitation assistance and vocational training services; and building the capacities of the Ministry of Environment's Regional Mine Action Centres. UNDP also engaged in advocacy work with national authorities.

Despite its efforts, UNDP contributions to improving mine action institutions and systems were modest. Iraq has not established an effective legal or regulatory framework for Mine Action. There has also been limited progress in reducing contamination from landmines or Explosive Remnants of War, and Iraq is not on track to meet its 2018 target to complete clearance. The lack of progress cannot, however be attributed to UNDP alone.

The UNDP Mine Action portfolio was based on a coherent design concept; UNDP sustained its engagement over a ten-year period. UNDP was a minor actor in financial terms relative to other international Mine Action stakeholders. However, this was offset by the sustained engagement with Iraqi stakeholders, the good quality of UNDP's technical assistance and advice and UNDP's unique position relative to the inter-

national normative framework for mine action. UNDP also enjoyed donor confidence, and there was a broadly held perception that it was impartial in a context marked by tensions within and among some Iraqi institutions.

UNDP did not achieve the outcome objective of improving the regulatory and coordinating mechanisms for Mine Action in Iraq. There has, though, been some limited progress in recent years. Iraq adopted national mine action standards in 2012 that are consistent with international standards, and has submitted four Transparency Reports to the mine ban convention process since 2008.[112] In 2013, the Ministry of Defence formed four units of 500 personnel each for mine action. The units are budgeted and scheduled to deploy in 2014. Together with the growth in commercial demining in the oil sector, these have the capacity to increase the scope and quality of clearance activity. The KRG manages well-established Mine Action institutions and programmes that date back to the mid-1990s and that are now self-sufficient with KRG funding.[113]

Regardless, there was limited or no progress towards the CPAP outcome of strengthening Iraq's legislative, policy and institutional framework for Mine Action. Nor were there improvements in the performance of Iraq's overall Mine Action effort or its compliance with mine ban convention obligations. UNDP outputs also made limited contributions to the equitable economic recovery foreseen in the CPAP. Much of the clearance is now linked to oil production with limited benefits accruing to affected communities or non-oil economic sectors. Victim assistance programmes outside of the Kurdistan Region are almost non-existent.[114] As a result, the NDP 2013–2017 concludes that "landmine areas continue to remain untreated [with an impact on]

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112 Government and UNDP informants did not consider the Transparency Reports reliable, given the lack of functioning information systems and weak institutional capacity within the DMA.

113 UNDP, 'Outcome Evaluation of the UNDP Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) for Iraq 2011–2014', 2012.

114 UNDP and government informants noted that victim surveys were completed in two Southern Governorates during 2013. However, the informants expressed concerns regarding high costs, inconsistent methodology and the accuracy of data. They noted that there are no plans for a victim assistance programme based on the data.

human security, land exploitation and development projects in these areas."[115]

As specific concerns, Iraq still has no approved legislation or legal framework for Mine Action. Likewise, no national strategy for mine action or explosive remnant of war removal was approved during the evaluation period.[116] After ten years of support from UNDP and other international entities, the institutional framework for mine action remains ineffective.

The primary reasons for the lack of progress rests with the government—the absence of a legal framework or effective institutions. The DMA has overall operational responsibility for mine action in Iraq. However, the Directorate is undermined by important institutional shortcomings. It lacks qualified personnel, and its internal management, planning, oversight and reporting systems do not efficiently or transparently function. The DMA also lacks the technical ability to coordinate mine action activities, plan technical and non-technical surveys, gather reliable data on contamination or clearance activities or to quality assure that clearance is done to agreed standards. Importantly, the DMA does not maintain the mine action information system. Without this data, the government is unable to track and quality-assure clearance activities, regulate or plan mine action activities or accurately report to the Ottawa treaty. Although numerous reports have identified these and other concerns since the DMA's formation, no corrective action has taken place. As a result, Mine Action lacks credibility and institutional coherence and is not prominent in government planning. In particular, Mine Action does not appear in either NDP. Responding directly to the lack of progress, donors had effectively ended their funding to related activities by 2012.

Government informants note that the lack of progress is independent from the high quality of technical support provided by the UNDP. According to one official, "UNDP did all that it could reasonably do in this situation. The problems were with [the government] and not with UNDP… without DMA reform they could not do more."[117]

UNDP generally met its project-level output targets, which were assessed by the government as being of good quality. This includes technical assistance and capacity-building services to the DMA and UNDP support to mine action information systems. However, the government, in particular the DMA, did not make effective use of the outputs. Poor outcome level performance in the Mine Action portfolio, therefore, was the result of political and institutional constraints that were beyond the ability of the UNDP to resolve.

A 2012 evaluation also cited a lack of support for the Mine Action portfolio within UNDP at the senior management and corporate levels. As a result, UNDP's position has been described as "untenable" and UNDP's activity closed at the end of 2013.

In contrast, UNDP support to victim assistance in the Kurdistan Region showed tangible outcomes. These included two highly regarded projects that supported the expansion of victim assistance services and contributed to victims' physical rehabilitation, education and livelihood training. Project outputs have been absorbed into public service delivery systems, and are sustained with KRG funding. In this regard, the UNDP successfully completed its cooperation with the KRG; public systems have been established and are self-sufficient, programmes have national funding and no further UNDP assistance is required.

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115   Government of Iraq, 'National Development Plan 2013–2017', 2013, page 26.

116   A law was drafted in 2011 and is with the Parliament. However, the law remains pending and there is no indication when or if ratification might occur. A National Mine Action Strategy was approved in 2011, but has not been effectively implemented.

117   From an interview with a government official to the Higher Committee for Mine Action.

PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

Economic diversification and private sector development were core government development priorities in consecutive national development plans, starting from the first 'National Development Strategy 2005–2007'. There were two projects in UNDP's Private Sector Development portfolio. The Private Sector Development Programme for Iraq (PSDP-I) was a Joint Programme between the UNDP and six other UN agencies.[118] UNDP played the lead and/or support roles with programme objectives related to: strengthening national capacities and policies for private-sector development; developing a road-map for restructuring Iraqi's 192 state-owned enterprises (including social mitigation measures); and establishing a public micro-lending programme. UNDP also collaborated in activities to promote local economic strategies and to strengthen the operational, regulatory and legislative environment for development of small and medium enterprises.

PSDP-I formed the core of the CPAP Outcome 5 portfolio in several respects. The project accounted for almost a third of new financial allocations during the evaluation period. It was aligned with the post-2008 UNDP framework, positioned at the centre of the government's policy objectives for economic recovery and had strong national ownership through its full life cycle. PSDP-I was implemented with numerous ministries under the coordination of the Prime Minister's Advisory Commission and through seven thematic working groups that comprised the Task Force for Economic Reform.[119] Among its coordination and other roles, UNDP played the lead with outputs for strengthening national

capacities and policies for private sector development; improving the efficiency of the public micro-lending programme; and strengthening the operational, regulatory, and legislative environment for small and medium-sized enterprise development. UNDP was also involved with local economic development and the restructuring of state-owned enterprises.

UNDP is also collaborating in a public-private partnership with Shell Oil, the Ministry of Oil, the Southern Oil Company and local authorities in the Basrah Governorate in the Vocational Training and Micro-, Small- And Medium-sized Enterprise Capacity Development programme. The programme's objectives are to promote economic diversification, to strengthen the private sector's role in local area development by building the Vocational Training system's capacity to meet the growing demand for skilled labour and to strengthen local enterprise capacities to respond to opportunities in the oil sector and elsewhere. The project also contributes to several community development initiatives in the Majnoon district (near Shell operations).

Though UNDP made an important contribution to developing Iraq's legislative, policy and regulatory framework for economic reform and private-sector strategies, the desired outcome of economic diversification was not achieved during the evaluation period. However, the programme contributed to laying the foundations for future action, including pending ratification of the Economic Reform Act (which was one output of the PSDP-I process). Regardless, the programme in now closed and UNDP is not positioned to build on PSDP-I achievements.

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118   United Nations Development Group, Private-Sector Development Programme for Iraq, Programme Cover Sheet, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, International Labour Organization, UN Habitat, UNDP, UNIFEM (now part of UN Women), United Nations Industrial Development Organization, and the United Nations Office for Project Services.

119   UNDP, Evaluation of "Enabling policy framework for rapid economic recovery, inclusive and diversified growth and private-sector development"; Outcome 5, UNDP Iraq Country Programme Action Plan 2011–2014, Baghdad, Iraq, 2012. The seven Task Force for Economic Reform working groups included 1) State-owned Enterprise Restructuring; 2) Small and Medium-sized Enterprise and Access to Finance; 3) Land Policy; 4) Taxation and Financial Management; 5) Strategic Investment; 6) Legislative Reforms; and 7) Social Dialogue and Mitigation.

UNDP made limited progress towards achieving the outcome objective of economic diversification and job creation through enabling policies or regulation. The overall trend was for further concentration of economic resources and power within the state at the federal level, with no structural changes that would promote diversification or private-sector job creation. The trend contradicts the government's policy objectives and is driven by rapid expansion of the hydrocarbon sector. As a result, the economy was not well positioned to contribute towards poverty reduction or spatial development priorities. This is particularly the case with absorbing Iraq's rapidly growing youth population into the labour force and addressing deprivation in some areas of the country. Outcome achievement was constrained by structural trends and a lack of political consensus on the state's economic role.

The PSDP-I Joint Programme made a substantial and positive contribution to early design of the government's economic reform strategy. Activities were fully aligned with the government priorities outlined in both the National Development Strategy (2007–2010) and the NDP 2010–2014. The final outcome could not be determined within the evaluation period, as the main output—a legislative reform package—was still pending ratification as of November 2013. Regardless, there was a direct linkage between the PSDP-I presentation of the legislative package and the formation of a structure within the government to develop and implement the reforms.

The PSDP-I, through the Task Force on Economic Reforms and under management of the Prime Minister's Advisory Commission, was fully integrated into and strengthened the government's coordinating structure. UNDP was able to establish itself as a credible institutional partner by being physically present in Iraq, by sustaining its involvement over four years and by making highly qualified personnel available. The United Nations was able to play these roles as other international organizations were not in a position to work in Iraq's difficult security conditions. UNDP lost this advantage when the PSDP-I closed without any provisions for continued UNDP involvement or follow-up to the PSDP-I achievements.

UNDP supported legislative formulation of policy, regulatory and institutional reform to further economic diversification. In August 2013, the Council of Ministers approved the draft Economic Reform Act legislative package, a comprehensive framework for reform that brought together the work done by all seven Task Force for Economic Reform Working Groups. The bill was sent to the Iraqi Parliament and is pending ratification. Among other elements, the Act included legislation related to the restructuring of state-owned enterprises, changes to National Investment and Foreign Investment laws that allow the private purchase of state-owned enterprises, the injection of private capital into the companies and tax reforms to expand the government's revenue base.

The Economic Reform Act addresses key structural issues hindering private-sector development. If implemented, legislation has the possibility of a transformational effect in the economy, scaling down government dominance, building up the private sector and establishing a market orientation in the economy. It built on a body of policy and legislation that the government developed, with PSDP-I support over the life of the project. This included policy and legislation for micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises and on land and housing. The project was further credited with helping create a structure within the government to develop the reforms and carry them forward, and with promoting cultural change within state institutions.

UNDP was in the process of finalizing the Private-sector Development Strategy as a final output from the PSDP-I at the time of the evaluation. The strategy was developed by the government with the UN agencies that participated PSDP-I and in consultation with the private sector. The Strategy's purpose was to develop a consensus within the government and between the government and the private sector on policy

objectives. The strategy was described as a road-map for clarifying policy and priorities and for implementing supporting legislative, regulatory, financial and institutional reforms. In this regard, the Strategy was intended to build on and implement the reforms developed by Task Force for Economic Reform processes and elsewhere.

The first draft of the Private Sector Development Strategy was presented in January 2013, with revisions expected for the end of 2013. Finalization came after UNDP had closed out most of its PSDP-I activities; key staff had left and financial resources were depleted. UNDP, therefore, had limited capacity to sustain its involvement. The strategy document was being completed by a team of UNDP-retained consultants using Target for Resource Assignment from the Core (TRAC) funding and working with in the Prime Minister's Advisory Commission. UNDP, therefore, was not positioned to sustain the same level of engagement on economic issues or to contribute to the actual implementation of the private-sector or larger reform initiatives.

UNDP's support to public-private cooperation between the Ministry of Oil and Shell Oil shows good initial performance in building linkages between the oil and non-oil sectors.

The public-private cooperation between the Ministry of Oil and Shell Oil shows good initial performance. The project is on track to build linkages between the oil and non-oil sectors, to increase the availability of skilled workers in the labour market and to strengthen local business development. These achievements are consistent with the government's economic development priorities of diversifying the economy and strengthening the private sector. The Private-sector Development project also has good potential to be scaled up in Iraq and elsewhere.

The Private-sector Development project is early into its implementation phase; no outputs have been finalized for vocational training, small business development or community projects. The exception is two schools that were refurbished

in the Majnoon area (in close proximity to Shell Oil operations). Also, 10 companies completed the first round of business development training, although they advised the training has not yet resulted in the acquisition of new contracts.

Implementation delays have resulted from slow decision-making within Iraqi institutions, including the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. Recent governorate elections in Basrah created further uncertainty regarding governorate representation to the project's Steering Committee. Informants also noted that because a public-private collaboration of this nature has not been undertaken before, the design of operational arrangements among the three counterparts (Shell, the Government of Iraq and the UNDP) has taken both time and an investment of institutional energy.

Regardless, programme counterparts considered the early performance as positive. The project strategy was based on a consensus around the needs and development priorities shared between the three counterparts: promoting economic diversification, developing linkages between the oil and non-oil sectors, strengthening the availability of skilled workers and increasing the number of Iraqi businesses that can deliver services to international standards. The project model is considered innovative and there was discussion with the government to replicate it elsewhere in Iraq and in other countries. The project builds on existing field implementation capacities and experience using structures established for the Local Area Development Project. This allows UNDP to sustain its engagement with its field-level counterparts.

The government stressed the importance of building direct linkages between the oil and non-oil sectors and developing the national labour market and the private sector. The project concept of linking Shell Iraq operations to vocational training, business development and social service delivery in communities has good national support and is considered a pilot for scaling up elsewhere in Iraq.

A senior Shell Iraq official was of the view that UNDP has been an open and excellent partner to Shell Iraq, as regular interactions and common objectives have enhanced the sense of partnership and delivery on the ground. UNDP and Shell Iraq had compatible objectives in developing local businesses and training skilled trades-persons to work in the oil industry. Shell Iraq also considers UNDP to have generally met performance expectations, particularly in getting buy-in from public officials and with public institutions and providing operational management.

Chapter 5

UNDP'S STRATEGIC POSITIONING

This chapter examines how UNDP positioned itself to respond to the reconstruction and development needs in Iraq and interfaced with the integrated mission.

5.1 RESPONDING TO NATIONAL PRIORITIES

UNDP programmes aligned with the priorities of transition and development as set out in the National Plans. Some areas of the programme faced challenges in securing national ownership.

The NDP 2010–2014 provided the first medium-term planning framework for post-2003 Iraq. The NDP processes guided the preparation of the UNDAF 2011–2014 and hence aligned it with national development priorities. These national development priorities included, among other areas, infrastructure, transportation and communication; water and sanitation; health; women; children and youth; vulnerable groups; poverty; MDGs; sustainable environment; and good governance.[120] The 2011–2014 UNDP country programme was based on the UNDAF for the same period and has been generally consistent with the NDP objectives and priorities.

UNDP programmes addressed issues that were relevant to the challenges faced by the country. During the period when Iraq Trust Fund resources were available, the priority focus was on reconstructing and restoring basic public services. The government and UNDP generally agreed that the priority for UNDP was to address governance-related issues; the UNDP country programme heavily emphasized these issues. While the NDPs

did not have proactive development objectives for supporting CSOs (understandably in the political environment where suspicions existed about the identity of some CSOs), UNDP nevertheless kept its intention to support them.

A number of programmes were not accepted by the government or other national partners. The way in which some key government counterparts criticized UNDP initiatives indicates that UNDP did not succeed in achieving national ownership. UNDP was seen as an aid agency focused on technical support rather than as a partner that could assist in national development processes.

One reason for this lack of acceptance has been the lack of close collaboration and regular consultations with the government (largely due to UNDP operating remotely from Amman and the security restrictions in south and central Iraq). The relative successes of the Support to Elections programme and the recent success of the Public Sector Modernization programme in securing national counterparts' ownership was largely due to the fact that the national counterparts were located in the International Zone of Baghdad and the project manager was stationed in Baghdad, not in Amman. The government's participation was much more forthcoming in Kurdistan where the security situation has been quite stable.

The successes of the Access to Justice and Human Rights programmes are commendable given the security challenges in the country. While it is by no means justifiable to expose staff to unnecessary risks, UNDP has been particularly slow in devising ways for other programmes to overcome these challenges. The resulting lack of

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120   UNDAF 2011–2014, ibid.

interactions with national partners has not only affected UNDP's relationship with them, but has also hindered effective project implementation.

The lack of close collaboration was even graver outside Baghdad in south and central Iraq where local governments had significant capacity development needs. The progress made by the Local Area Development Programme has been very slow and the challenges faced by local partners have not always been promptly addressed. There was still a significant imbalance between the needs and challenges and the support provided to partners outside Baghdad and Kurdistan, despite UNDP having had offices located in Anbar, Basrah and Najaf from 2008 to 2010.

Similarly, the approach UNDP took with some projects did not always fit the local context. In some cases, for example, UNDP brought in relatively junior consultants with theoretical expertise rather than practical experience. In the Iraqi culture, seniority and experience were important factors in gaining respect; having such consultants playing an advisory role to parliamentarians, senior government officials and local leaders was often not acceptable.

COLLABORATION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN IRAQ AND THE UNITED NATIONS COUNTRY TEAM

There were some areas of long-term collaboration with UNAMI, which facilitated making contributions to strengthening national institutions. Overall, the relationship with UNAMI was less congenial for UNDP contributions in Iraq.

There is scope for improving UNDP's relationship with UNAMI. UNAMI is an integrated mission, and its work includes areas that are within the UNDP mandate (e.g. elections support, human rights and reconstruction). There have been collaborations in terms of information sharing (for example, the Joint Analysis and Policy Unit served the information needs of both UNAMI and the United Nations country team).

In terms of programmatic collaboration, for example, in the election support team, UNAMI and UNDP had specific areas to support. Among the four electoral support team agencies, UNDP had the responsibility to address capacity development while UNAMI addressed political and logistical aspects. Beyond carrying out their respective roles, however, the potential for deeper collaboration on substantive issues has not been realized.

The lack of clarity between UNAMI and UNDP regarding their respective roles has been a source of contention. UNAMI is critical of UNDP for programming in areas that it considers under its mandate and for programming without the level of consultation that UNAMI expects. UNDP is concerned that UNAMI assumed this prerogative of a greater role without acknowledging the roles that UNDP can and should play. This became difficult within the electoral team where several actors (the International Foundation for Electoral Support, UNAMI, UNDP and the United Nations Office for Project Services) all played a role, where their respective functions were not always well agreed, and where UNDP project managers found themselves required to follow UNAMI instructions even when there may not have been full justification.

There were also instances where UNDP was less consultative. For example, when UNDP undertook a peace and reconciliation programme in Nineweh, UNDP did not involve the UNAMI's team working on the disputed internal boundaries team. UNDP's Small Arms and Light Weapons reduction programme did not fully consult with UNAMI's disarmament resource persons.

Considering UNAMI's political role, UNDP had concerns about collaborating in some areas. Another area of concern is that development support to the United Nations country team should be based on a clear understanding with the government so as to avoid political and reputational risks. This entails clear communications with national counterparts about the distinctness

of the mandates of the United Nations country team, UNAMI and UNDP.

From the UNDP perspective, UNAMI was unsuccessful in providing the clarity needed between the political and development mandates of the UN and role sharing in overlapping areas, particularly in the governance area.

Efforts to address such concerns have been ineffective. In 2011, there were efforts to agree on an Integrated Strategic Vision. Four areas were noted where UNAMI and UNDP could be expected to work together: electoral team assistance; the public distribution system; reconciliation and arms reduction in the disputed internal boundaries in the north-west of the country; and water resources. However, the Integrated Strategic Vision arising from these meetings had little impact; collaboration between UNAMI and UNDP has seen little if any improvement.

Potential areas of collaboration on such issues as the rule of law have not been adequately explored. UNDP's approach has been to develop capacity, i.e. training of judges and building an academy. However, there has not been political acceptance of UNDP support or an understanding on the part of UNDP of how different government agencies would be involved. As such, many UNDP governance initiatives had a political dimension that could have benefited from UNAMI's help in gaining clearer political understanding on the direction of its support.

While it is too early to speculate on the roles and responsibilities of UNDP in a post-UNAMI context, UNDP has not positioned itself well in the areas of governance that fall within its mandate. The lack of field presence is an important issue for UNDP; UNDP is now considering opening up a few field offices to support UN programmes at the time of the evaluation, which is a much needed step in preparing for UNAMI's withdrawal (in addition to taking on a more substantive role in supporting local development in Iraq).

RESPONDING TO DIMINISHING FUNDING

UNDP's ability to provide a comprehensive programme response has been reduced due to diminishing funds; UNDP has not planned for its programme to respond to this decline.

Resources diminished precipitously at the conclusion of the Iraq Trust Fund. It is not clear the extent to which UNDP planned for this eventuality, but UNDP now faces a worrisome financial shortage. Though funding for one established thematic area, Support to Elections, may be adequate, funding for others is not (e.g. funding for maintaining a strong presence within the Council of Representatives). Further, funding is insufficient to meet general expectations under the existing country programme. When UNDP fails to meet expectations, doubts are raised about UNDP's capacity to deliver and UNDP becomes less attractive as an implementer of governance programming. As resource mobilization has become more difficult, UNDP has become less discriminating about the projects it undertakes and, for this outcome, this means projects are taken on as much for the revenue they generate as for their feasibility or their contribution to enhancing UNDP's reputation as a credible service provider on key governance issues.

Diminished funding has affected UNDP's programme choices and is likely to continue to do so in the future. UNDP's response to this resource decline has been to promote marketable projects to interested donors. Many donors, because of the dire security situation, were willing to use UNDP's services to implement their own programmes. The result was that the UNDP programme became a collection of isolated programmes and projects, each funded by a separate donor. This bred a culture in which each component programme was focused on implementing its own set of projects without any substantive linkage to other component programmes aiming to achieve the same country programme outcome. Typical examples were the anti-corruption programme, backed by a United States agency, and the Loan Management programme, implemented on behalf of JICA. Both of these programmes

were able to secure sizeable financial resources, but operated independently from other component programmes.

SECURITY RESTRICTIONS AND ACCESS TO NATIONAL PARTNERS

Security constraints and the challenges of remote delivery hindered UNDP's efforts to deliver programmes efficiently and effectively in south and central Iraq. These factors also made UNDP's Iraq operations highly costly (the extent to which such costs were justified was not evident).

UNDP's efforts to deliver programmes in south and central Iraq had to overcome security constraints and the challenges of remote operation from Amman. As a result, the frequency of contacts and consultations with national partners was much less than the norm in other countries. This greatly affected the programme delivery and efficacy. While staff security should rightfully be of paramount concern to senior management, some other UN agencies (such as UNICEF) have devised different ways to deliver programmes under these challenging conditions. UNDP could have learned more from these experiences in accommodating itself to the situation.

The effects of UNDP's limited access to national partners and project sites cannot be underestimated. This obstacle has been underscored repeatedly in the past. It is misguided to believe that the present application of security restrictions is doing anything other than crippling the programme; it is remarkable that the programme has not suffered more than it has. In no instance are development initiatives risk free, and in Iraq, development activities will not be risk free in the near term. Further, the risk of the UN being the deliberate target of aggression has passed and needs now to be replaced with a more reasoned perspective.

These security restrictions entail a high cost of operations in Iraq. For example, the United Nations country team agencies make payments to UNAMI for security services (e.g. armed escorts), and the infrastructure for their operations (e.g. electricity supply in the UN compound). These payments are extremely high, but no agency was able to clarify the basis on which UNAMI came up with the amounts. It remains unclear the extent to which these costs are justified.

Other agencies have approached security constraints differently, overcoming them to some extent to efficiently deliver programmes. UNDP has not been creative in adapting to the limitations of project implementation in south and central Iraq. There are, however, indications that this is changing. Amman-based programme managers are expected to move to Baghdad, and more programme positions are expected to be filled by Iraqi national staff. UNDP senior management is exploring the possibility of opening local programme support offices in south and central Iraq outside Baghdad, as well having UNDP national staff embedded within government ministries and offices. If these measures are implemented, access to national partners would be significantly improved and the costs incurred by security restrictions would be reduced.

5.2 USE OF UNDP'S COMPARATIVE STRENGTHS

Efforts to build national counterparts' confidence in UNDP support remained a challenge.

In many countries, UNDP is seen as a neutral and trustable development partner to the government and its citizens. In Iraq, however, the UN has been associated with sanctions, invasions and the subsequent occupation by the Coalition Provisional Authority and is perceived to have represented Western interests more than the interests of the country. Still, many Iraqi citizens seemed to welcome the UN presence as a neutral agent useful in this time of political turmoil in a divided country—if not as a mediator, then as an observer and a window to the international community. Unfortunately, most Iraqi citizens associate this role with UNAMI, not UNDP.

UNDP has not yet established itself as a trusted development partner, but is rather seen as a mere project implementer that is dispensable if project funding is depleted or as fungible if an alternative project implementer is found. Because of its restricted access to citizens, UNDP has not gained the trust and support from civil society and the general public that it could have otherwise.

Attaining the status of a trusted development partner through enhanced interactions with the citizens and Government of Iraq may be a priority in re-establishing UNDP's comparative strength as a leading UN development agency.

Full advantage has not been taken of potential synergies in UNDP's programme.

An area where synergies could have been created was at the local governance interface between the Local Area Development and the Public Sector Modernization programmes. The Local Area Development Programme promotes local needs-based planning of public service delivery. This planning assumes budget allocations to governorates and districts. At the same time, governorates' sectoral departments use sectoral ministries' budgets to implement ministerial plans for public service provision; the Public Sector Modernization Programme sought to improve the administration of these budgets for such purposes. Maintaining coherence between the planning and administration of public services from these two streams (one bottom up and one top down) is a particularly important issue to address. However, these programmes have been independently conceived and implemented without taking advantage of such an opportunity of interface.

The Support to the Council of Representatives programme could also have created greater impact by leveraging other programmes. Although general technical support to the parliamentary secretariat stalled, UNDP did achieve some results through parliament, such as at the Human Rights Committee or the Regions and Governance Committee. These achievements, however, did not benefit much from the general

Support to the Council of Representatives programme, which failed to establish a liaison function either within the secretariat or within the parliamentary committees. Similarly, as it has had only marginal impact, Support to Civil Society Organizations programme did not provide much leverage for other projects. This programme could have instead focused on supporting CSOs as a part of a broader strategy in other UNDP programmes so that it could directly contribute to achieving programme outcomes and development results.

5.3 PROMOTING A HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE

UNDP bases its programmes on its core values. Beneficiaries and national partners have generally appreciated the promotion of these values. However, the challenging political environment in Iraq has made it difficult for UNDP to pursue value-based initiatives. Limited field operations have prevented UNDP from bringing full benefits to those who need them.

UNDP designs its programmes to address human development challenges and to promote the values of equity and shared responsibility, inclusive development and justice for all. In the challenging political environment of Iraq, however, it was not always possible to push forward the initiatives to realize these values. For example, voter registration in the Election Support Programme touched on political sensitivity. Survival of the anti-corruption mechanism is in question. Given the cultural sensitivities in Iraq, gender equality had to be considerably toned down within the agenda of public-sector modernization. UNDP's rule of law programme did not have much traction with the national judicial authorities. At times, UNDP may have been too politically naive or culturally insensitive in making the case for its agenda. Nevertheless, UNDP programmes were true to its core values and their managers were committed to them.

Due to the remote operation from Amman and the limited access to the field, UNDP could not

bring its programme benefits fully to those who were most in need. Where it did, such as with the Access to Justice and Local Area Development programmes, or with the reconstruction support through the Loan Management programme, UNDP initiatives were generally appreciated by local beneficiaries. While some beneficiaries raised complaints, these were generally associated with implementation issues—a manifestation of challenges in remote operation—but not with the presence of UNDP to address the needs of local population.

Gender equity is built into all UNDP programmes to enhance women's participation in development, but ensuring its implementation had limitations.

Promotion of gender equality has not been without challenges, particularly when it came to politically sensitive national policies. For example, within the Public Sector Modernization programme, no federal ministries considered using gender-responsive budgeting. In Phase I, the programme did not give much attention to a national strategy for women nor did it accord much attention to gender mainstreaming.[121] In preparation for Phase II, UN Women submitted a gender analysis of the programme.[122] Preparing a roadmap for addressing gender-related issues turned out to be too political to give gender issues more than a minimal presence.

At this point, the expectation that gender-responsive budgeting will be introduced at the federal and governorate levels appears to be unrealistic; including it as a key indicator turned out to be unhelpful. There is room, however, to expand the treatment of gender issues within public sector reform as the broad roadmap becomes an action plan in the near future. What transpired from this experience is that as difficult an environment as Iraq is today in promoting gender equality politically and culturally, UNDP must be both persistent yet flexible, continually adapting its strategy to the political and social context.

There were some important outputs where UNDP projects made special efforts to address women-specific needs. For example, female police officer-staffed Family Protection Units in south and central Iraq and in Kurdistan assisted victims of domestic violence. The number of women clients seeking assistance has steadily increased, which shows the project filled important gender-based needs. In addition, the establishment of the Directorate to Combat Violence against Women and a Women's Shelter in Kurdistan was a major achievement supported by UNDP. The clients of the Legal Aid Centres were predominantly women, and the cases they bring relate mostly to domestic issues. This shows that the Centres have provided legal recourse for women, especially those in rural areas, who did not have easy access to the justice system for cultural, social or financial reasons.

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121   Alan Taylor, 'Iraq Public Sector Modernization Progamme, Phase I Evaluation Report', December 1 2011, observes: "The individual UN agencies were poorly equipped to mainstream gender into the sectoral work, while UN Women's role was limited to providing a consultant on gender responsive budgeting." page 7.

122   Royal Tropical Institute, 'Gender Analysis of the Public Sector Modernization Programme, Phase II', UN Women, 30 October 2012.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The analysis in the preceding sections covers UNDP support to the Government of Iraq's efforts towards reconstruction and transition to development. The UNDP programme has operated in the context of UNAMI as well as UNDP's own programme, and has provided support through multiple phases of the post-conflict period. This was also the period of implementation of the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund, when the UN in general and the UNDP in particular had access to vast reconstruction and development funds. Drawing from the analysis in the previous sections, this chapter presents key conclusions and recommendations.

6.1 CONCLUSIONS

Conclusion 1: UNDP delivered a number of tangible benefits to the country through individual component programmes. These benefits are evident in strengthened policies, legislation and institutional capacity in priority areas for the government. UNDP's contributions were important in restoring public services and infrastructure as Iraq emerged from the 2005–2007 crisis. UNDP sustained its support despite the challenges posed by the security situation in central and south Iraq.

UNDP programmes addressed issues that were relevant to the challenges faced by the country. UNDP aimed to address complex issues such as inefficient delivery of basic services, abuse of the public trust by civil servants and the need to ensure that capital investment expenditures addressed real needs. UNDP approached such complex issues with grand designs, some of which were too theoretical to yield tangible results.

The relevance or strategic value of UNDP programme areas notwithstanding, the challenge is

to design a strategy that considers the evolving country context. There may be little UNDP can do to support reforms in a country where conflict is ongoing and where government cooperation is so difficult to secure.

Programme design, however, could be more sensitive to the difficult delivery environment by taking practical constraints into consideration. In areas such as Rule of Law programming in south and central Iraq, considerable presence, tact and strategic responsiveness is required. In some instances, UNDP programming may not have approached these sensitive matters with the required finesse. Security constraints and the limitations of remote delivery hindered UNDP's efforts to deliver these programmes efficiently and effectively in south and central Iraq. These factors also made UNDP's Iraq operations highly costly; the extent to which such costs were justified was unclear.

An important consequence of operating under security restrictions is that programme implementation focuses on support primarily to the central government and almost not at all to the governorate or other subnational entities. Several programme areas would have benefited by broadening their focus to the provincial and district levels. Local initiatives do figure under economic reform and diversification efforts, but not under efforts to strengthen governorate-level development planning institutions and systems or efforts to integrate these into a unified approach to decentralization within Iraq's federal structure.

Trends in Iraq constrained UNDP contributions to development results. After a period of optimism and improvement (2008–2010), conditions in Iraq have again declined and it has become difficult to address core governance issues. In

addition, economic trends have been towards further concentration of economic activity in the state, driven by a rapid increase in the oil sector. In this context, there was limited progress towards the government's priorities of economic diversification and private-sector development, which were key elements of successive national development plans.

Conclusion 2: Since 2008, UNDP has aimed to shift its programme focus from reconstruction and recovery to development, and, accordingly, from a project-based approach to a more coherent and strategic programming approach. However, UNDP has yet to achieve a coherent programmatic approach to address critical development challenges in Iraq.

The legacy of UNDP operations under the Iraq Trust Fund was its project-oriented approach with attention to delivery rather than long-term development results. UNDP has begun to steer itself towards a coherent and strategic programme approach, first with its Interim Country Strategy 2008–2010 and then with its first post-2003 country programme for 2011–2014. Despite this intent, UNDP's country programme is a composite of self-standing projects that lack significant synergies or coherence. The failure to transform the country programme into a coherent and strategic approach has been due to senior Country Office management's lack of strategic leadership during the crucial period of programme transition.

Under the current country programme, though individual component programmes and projects achieved results, the programmes were operating relatively independently and synergies among them were not pursued. There was no strategy to use the combined forces of these component programmes to increase their effectiveness and efficiency in achieving their outcomes. A clear example is that the missed synergies among the Public Sector Modernization programme, the Anti-corruption programme and the Local Area Development programme have yet to be realized.

The present preoccupation with fund-raising led to some isolated projects that, while good in their intentions and hence marketable, were too small and *ad hoc* to create much discernible impact. Further, UNDP pursued programmes even when the political support critical to the particular approach was lacking (e.g. the Anti-corruption and Rule of Law programmes), when there were political and reputational risks (e.g. the Election Support programme), or when the lack of delivery resulted in a loss of credibility (e.g. the Parliament Support programme).

Conclusion 3: UNDP lacked strategic leadership at critical points in programme support in Iraq, undermining the potential of UNDP contributions. UNDP has addressed this issue recently with the change in leadership to provide a more strategic vision to UNDP support in Iraq.

The mid-level programme managers, each in charge of a component programme, are generally competent, having led their programmes to some successes. They were left to identify funding opportunities and pursue their programme objectives and project delivery. While senior management fully supported their individual efforts, little guidance was given to integrate these component programmes into a strategic approach aimed at achieving country programme outcomes. Under such circumstances, the support provided to individual programme managers by senior management unintentionally led to a country programme that was neither cohesive, strategic nor prioritized and where programme managers competed rather than collaborated.

The phasing out of the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund in 2009 and 2010 made UNDP increasingly dependent on bilateral donor contributions at a time when bilateral donors are withdrawing from Iraq. Donor development plans often play a significant role in shaping UNDP's engagement. A related issue is that in many areas of the programme, UNDP did not adequately plan for reductions in donor resources. Instead of reducing and

sharpening the scope of its interventions, UNDP has diversified and fragmented its interventions.

It is essential to find ways of diminishing the inefficiencies caused by security restrictions, to do more to facilitate contact with national partners and to make sure that expert staff with Arabic language skills are readily available. In many programme areas, opportunities were missed and important expectations went unmet, which often diminished UNDP's credibility.

Conclusion 4: UNDP implemented programme models and approaches without sufficiently customizing them to the local context and culture. This contributed to poor national ownership and undermined the effectiveness and sustainability of UNDP support.

UNDP applied programme models that it used in other countries without first adapting them to the Iraqi context and culture. For example, the Peace and Reconciliation projects applied a western reconciliation method that would not work in the Iraqi cultural context and was rejected by local stakeholders. The Accountability, Transparency and Anti-corruption Programme used a United States model in developing the Office of the Inspectors General, and most national stakeholders were pessimistic about its sustainability. Poor design among some UNDP Iraq Trust Fund-funded projects resulted in outputs being delivered but never used, or to late delivery that undermined results.

UNDP showed improvement over time in developing and adapting programme models to respond to the Iraqi context, as seen, for example, in the evolution of the LADP programme model over its three iterations. Though this indicated that UNDP was making sustained efforts, the lack of initial adaptation had significant impacts on the programme's contributions to development results.

Conclusion 5: UNDP's programmatic collaboration with UNAMI was weak and not beneficial for enhancing UNDP contributions.

Synergies between UNDP and UNAMI were less than positive, which undermined UNDP programmes' contributions in some areas. Potential areas of collaboration were not adequately utilized. This was despite the fact that UNDP's Resident Representative had been serving as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General for development and humanitarian affairs (which directly supports the head of UNAMI). The comparative strengths that UNDP usually exercises in the United Nations country team was overshadowed in Iraq, sometimes with justification and sometimes without. In critical matters, particularly those in which the common interests of development partners was at stake (e.g. on security constraints), UNDP was not sufficiently proactive in ensuring that its interests (or the interests of other important development partners) were adequately represented.

The lack of clear roles in areas where both UNDP and UNAMI had a mandate was a factor in UNDP's poor contributions to development. UNDP unsuccessfully established an identity that was distinct from either UNAMI or the United Nations country team. Establishing a clear distinctness from the Security Council-mandated activities of UNAMI will be essential for UNDP to convey its own positioning in key areas.

Conclusion 6: UNDP has not always succeeded in gaining the government's full confidence as a trusted, long-term development partner that strategically provides support through well-integrated programmes or that delivers what it has committed.

National partner ownership of programmes is critical to sustaining programme achievements and to informing national planning and policies. There are important examples of UNDP programmes that were embedded in government priorities and systems with robust national ownership. Notwithstanding such examples, it was challenging for UNDP to secure national ownership for its programmes.

With exceptions, the government did not consider UNDP to be a key development partner in providing strategic policy and programme support. UNDP's lack of clear programme focus was one factor, as the agency had some difficulty defining its possible roles to the government. The security situation in the country did not allow UNDP to have sufficient interactions with national partners, which led to another major factor—insufficient communications and interactions with the national counterparts, exacerbated by the remote programme management from Amman. Further, the complex political situation was not conducive for UNDP to engage with government partners and gain their ownership over programmes. While avoiding exposure of its staff to security risks is justifiable, UNDP was neither proactive nor innovative in addressing this challenge, unlike some other UN agencies. Although UNDP made the policy decision to move its Country Office back to Baghdad, the decision to do so was slow in coming.

UNDP's programme positioning was undermined by many government officials' and donors' perception of UNDP as a mere implementer of donor projects rather than as a driver of development that works closely with national counterparts. UNDP has not successfully conveyed the value addition of its programmes to national stakeholders.

UNDP's ability to provide strategic support to Iraq's development depends on well-integrated programmes and careful planning to ensure that commitments are met. This was compromised by UNDP's increasing need to raise funds, resulting in a focus on resources rather than programme coherence. Though UNDP has increasingly been counting on sharing the cost of programming with the government, it seems that government officials are not fully convinced of the value of UNDP support such that they would share expenses. For its part, the government has often not clearly articulated the contributions it wants from UNDP.

Conclusion 7: While there is a rationale to provide more central-level support, opportunities were not adequately taken to strengthen subnational capacities (particularly in central and south Iraq).

UNDP did not effectively balance its programme support between the federal and governorate levels. Service delivery at the governorate level has been a priority area for Iraq. While some projects focused on governorate-level service delivery, UNDP did not adequately consolidate its strategy to respond to governorate-level needs and priorities. More recently, UNDP has been considering opening up field offices to support UN programmes. This is a much-needed step in preparing for a more substantive role in supporting development in Iraq.

Conclusion 8: UNDP did not give gender equality adequate priority in programme implementation, and was not persistent in its efforts to integrate gender in its programme support.

Despite achievements in a few projects, UNDP's programme response generally neglected gender. Where gender was addressed, the Iraq context presented significant challenges, particularly when it came to politically sensitive national policies. UNDP lacked a strategy to systematically approach gender issues in its programme areas or to collaborate with other agencies on this issue.

6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: UNDP Iraq should consolidate its programme support, ensuring that it has adequate scope and depth to address the key development challenges confronting Iraq. UNDP should move away from funding-driven, low-impact activities.

In order to strengthen its credibility, UNDP Iraq should develop programmes that build on its comparative strengths in areas such as governance. UNDP should avoid regrouping existing projects into new overarching programmes, particularly where projects are not aligned to intended outcomes. It should establish a strategy for each programme area and then appropriately

develop activities that will substantively address Iraq's development challenges. The strategy should be realistic and flexible in adapting itself to changing political and security situations.

As donor funding for its programmes declines, UNDP needs to be specifically conscious of using limited resources for more sustained support in a few areas. The programme is presently constructed around broad reform areas, the scope of which is too large to impose any constructive limitations on what UNDP does. The result is that programme areas comprised dispersed and eclectic projects, without a judicious approach to reform initiatives.

UNDP should not proceed without a clearly structured and focused programme. A first step is to narrow the reform areas, replacing the broad mandates with specific problem-solving initiatives in which UNDP has substantial expertise and where it has government support.

Recommendation 2: UNDP's future relevance will depend on establishing strong development partnerships with the Government and people of Iraq. UNDP Iraq should make it a priority to develop and sustain partnerships with national counterparts.

A key challenge for UNDP is to restore close relationships with national partners in the government and civil society. Other UN agencies have tried various methods to overcome this challenge with varying degree of success. UNDP should learn from such experiences and strengthen its relations with the government.

Following through on recent management decisions (e.g. moving programme management from Amman back to Baghdad and recruiting more programme managers who are Arabic speakers) will be critical for increasing the level of interaction between programme management and national partners. UNDP should also actively pursue a strategy to increase the number of national staff on the programme team.

Recommendation 3: UNDP Iraq should develop adaptive strategies that will continue to contribute to Iraq's development under different and evolving political and security scenarios, particularly the challenging security context of central and south Iraq.

To meet Iraq's immediate and long-term development needs, UNDP should adapt its programme strategies and operations to difficult security situations and an evolving institutional context. The volatility of the security situation should be factored into programme planning and design. UNDP should take adequate measures to devise innovative ways of adapting to—and overcoming—security limitations in working in central and southern Iraq. UNDP should also address issues arising out of working from the International Zone that severely restricts interaction with national counterparts. UNDP should place the risk of working with partners before the importance of UNDP's presence.

One of the problems in developing a four-year country programme in a post-conflict situation is the unrealistic requirement that the programme must have a tight results framework that assumes an orderly development process, one that is not affected by political and security factors. The current country programme, developed during a time of optimism, was unrealistic in terms of its expected achievements. Establishing solid overarching goals for the programmes does not preclude incorporating flexible and adaptive mechanisms and strategies to achieve these goals and, if necessary and justifiable, revisiting the country programme results expectations.

Recommendation 4: UNDP Iraq should ensure the appropriate balance of programme support between the national and governorate levels and should strengthen the synergies between programmes at the two levels.

The lack of public-sector capacities at the governorate and local government levels is one of the most critical challenges in the country. Although UNDP addresses this issue through the Local

Area Development programme, strengthening service delivery will require a more coherent approach to local-level capacity development.

UNDP is exploring the possibility of opening local programme support offices in south and central Iraq outside Baghdad, as well as having UNDP national staff embedded in government ministries and offices. Such measures should be followed through in order to support strengthening governorate capacities and to improve collaboration access with national partners.

Recommendation 5: UNDP programmes need to prioritize promoting gender equality. The lack of a conducive environment cannot justify inadequately pursuing programmes that promote gender equality and women's empowerment.

UNDP should take specific measures to systematically integrate gender into its programme response and should commit adequate resources to ensure its implementation. Gender analysis should inform programme design and implementation of the forthcoming programme. In order to maximize results in the area, UNDP should strengthen partnerships with UN agencies.

Recommendation 6: UNDP should strengthen its own technical and advisory capacities. UNDP should review programme management and should develop an appropriate strategy to respond effectively to Iraq's development needs.

UNDP's role and contribution in Iraq depends on the quality of the advisory, policy and programme support it provides. National counterparts in Iraq expect advisory services from senior-level experts who bring cutting-edge ideas. UNDP should ensure that the programme and policy support it offers is of high quality and provided by senior experts who are familiar with the national context. UNDP should not use programme models that are ill-suited to the Iraqi context.

UNDP should strengthen its technical advisory capacity at a relatively senior level in key areas of programme support in order to effectively contribute to strengthening Iraq institutions. UNDP staff should have adequate skills to respond to different political and security scenarios in Iraq.

Recommendation 7: Recently, the importance of UNDP's mandate in integrated peacekeeping missions has been increasingly recognized. UNDP and UNAMI should draw lessons from countries where close coordination between UNDP and the integrated mission has been mutually beneficial and has enhanced their contributions to peacebuilding and development. UNDP and UNAMI should make concerted efforts to solve disagreements regarding their roles in the area of governance.

Greater clarity of programme roles and closer links are needed for an effective partnership between UNDP and UNAMI. This will require both partners to exhibit administrative flexibility. UNDP should recognize and respect the status that the Security Council has accorded the Mission in Iraq and support it in principle and in practice. UNAMI should recognize UNDP's expertise and capacity to take the lead on issues where UNAMI believes it has exclusive jurisdiction.

UNDP will have to recognize and respect the status that the Security Council has accorded the Mission in Iraq and support it in principle and in practice. At present, this recognition and respect do not exist. A small working group should be established to represent UNAMI and UNDP, resolve differences and chart new and collaborative directions.

UNDP and UNAMI should jointly address differences in the programme orientation of the peacekeeping and development mandates and how it should manifest in supporting Iraq. UNDP and UNAMI should revisit the Integrated Strategic Vision in order to work out a viable plan of action to strengthen their collaboration in areas where their mandates are complementary. Efforts should be made to build on the synergies of the peacekeeping and development mandates and to promote integrated approaches.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. INTRODUCTION

The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conducts country evaluations called Assessments of Development Results (ADRs) to capture and demonstrate evaluative evidence of UNDP's contributions to development results at the country level, as well as the effectiveness of UNDP's strategy in facilitating and leveraging national effort for achieving development results. The purposes of an ADR are to:

■ Provide substantive support to the Administrator's accountability function in reporting to the Executive Board;

■ Support greater UNDP accountability to national stakeholders and partners in the programme country;

■ Serve as a means of quality assurance for UNDP interventions at the country level; and

■ Contribute to learning at corporate, regional and country levels.

ADRs are independent evaluations carried out within the overall provisions contained in the UNDP Evaluation Policy.[123] The IEO is independent of UNDP management, headed by a Director who reports to the UNDP Executive Board through the UNDP Administrator. The responsibility of the IEO is two-fold: (a) provide the Executive Board with valid and credible information from evaluations for corporate accountability, decision-making and improvement; and (b) enhance the independence, credibility and utility of the evaluation function and its coherence, harmonization and alignment in support of United Nations reform and national ownership. Based on the principle of national ownership, IEO seeks to conduct ADRs in collaboration with national governments.

This is the first ADR for Iraq. It will be conducted in 2013 towards the end of the current UNDP programme cycle of 2011–2014 with a view to contributing to the preparation of the new UNDP country programme as well as the forthcoming United National Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). The evaluation will cover UNDP activities undertaken under the ongoing Country Programme 2011–2014 as well as those undertaken under the framework of the United Nations Iraq Assistance Strategy 2008–2010.

2. NATIONAL CONTEXT

During the review period of the UNDP programme, Iraq moved from a transitional national government to a permanent government that was elected through a newly established democratic process. Since 2005, two parliamentary and provincial elections have been held in Iraq. Successive governments initiated reforms to better perform core state functions. The government committed to reforming the public sector, addressing corruption, ensuring more inclusive institution-building and modernizing the state at the national and subnational levels. Iraq is in the process of addressing the fundamental causes of vulnerability to conflict and harnessing its human and natural resources in order to accelerate much-needed reconstruction and recovery efforts.

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123 See UNDP Evaluation Policy, available at: www.undp.org/eo/documents/Evaluation-Policy.pdf. The ADR will also be conducted in adherence to the Norms and the Standards and the ethical Code of Conduct established by the United Nations Evaluation Group; see www.uneval.org.

The National Development Strategy (NDS) for 2007–2010 and the National Development Plan (NDP) 2010–2014, are medium-term development strategies aimed at providing a framework for the country's sustainable development.[124] The Strategy aims to reduce poverty rates by 30 percent from 2007 levels by focusing on comprehensive rural development and by providing basic services such as education and health-care, particularly to vulnerable groups such as youth and women. It also aims to strengthen the role of local governments to bring service delivery and economic development closer to the people.

The NDP aims to achieve Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 9.4 percent per annum; to generate 3 to 4.5 million new jobs; to diversify the economy away from oil and into agriculture, industrial sectors, and tourism; and to create a stronger role for the private sector (both in terms of investment and job opportunities). Iraq must mobilize US$186 billion in investment, create 3.5 million new jobs, and cut unemployment by half from 15 percent. The NDP focused on environmentally sensitive economic and social development using available natural resources in a sustainable way.

The new NDP for 2013–2017 continues with the policies of the previous NDP and further emphasizes strengthening administrative processes and governance systems.[125] Since the peak of violence in 2006–2007, Iraq has made a significant progress in improving security and the violent incidents subsided towards the end of 2012.[126] However, there has been a worrisome resurgence of violent incidents in early 2013,[127] revealing the persistence of political challenges.

Continued lack of security, intermittent political instability at the national and subnational levels, and pluralistic politics have constrained addressing the drivers of conflict, pursuing reform processes or strengthening national institutions. The lack of security continues to be a major impediment in social and economic development.

Challenges remain in achieving state-building and development goals. The 2012 Human Development Index value was 0.590, positioning Iraq at 131 out of 187 countries and territories and in the medium human development category.[128] Regional and subgovernorate-level inequities and discrepancies in wealth, access to services and other development indicators persist. The 2010 Poverty Assessment showed that overall poverty is at 23 percent.[129] At the national level, there was a reduction of extreme poverty by more than half its level since 1990, but the poverty gap index continues to be low at 4.5 percent. The proportion of the population living on $2.50 per day has dropped from 28 percent in 1990 to 11 percent in 2011, below the 2015 target of 14 percent.[130] The low employment rate (38 percent) is a major issue in Iraq, in particular the high unemployment among youth. The representation of women in parliament increased from 13 percent in 1990 to 27 percent in 2011. The share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector, however, has dropped and the proportion of women in the public sector and government remains low.[131] Gender-based violence is emerging as an issue of concern. Inadequate security continues to disproportionately affect the most vulnerable groups, in particular women, children and persons with disabilities.

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124   Government of Iraq, 'National Development Plan 2010–2014', Ministry of Planning, 2010.

125   Government of Iraq, 'National Development Plan 2013–2017', Ministry of Planning, 2013.

126   Brookings Iraq Report, 2012.

127   See UNAMI, http://unami.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=5397&language=en-US.

128   UNDP, 'Human Development Report 2013: The Rise of the Global South'.

129   World Bank, 'Confronting Poverty in Iraq: Main Findings', Washington DC: World Bank.

130   United Nations Joint Analysis Policy Unit (JAPU), 'Progress in Iraq: The Millennium Development Goals', March 2013.

131   United Nations, Statistics Division, Millennium Development Goals Indicators: mdgs.un.org.

Iraq has fifth largest oil reserves worldwide (as much as 214 billion barrels). Despite its vast oil wealth, its GDP had fallen to about $900 in 2004 from $3,400 in 1980.[132] Institutional challenges continue to pose major constraints on economic reforms and significantly affect the country's efforts to diversify the economy and promote private-sector investment. Reconstruction and development of the infrastructure throughout the country is critical for non-oil sector growth.

Institutional capacity and governance weaknesses are central to Iraq's development challenges. Weak accountability and transparency systems and rule of law combine with widespread corruption to constrain development. Iraq ranks 169 of 176 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index for 2012.[133] Institutional capacity for public finance management has limitations, which has implications for effectively managing oil revenues. Iraq faces challenges in delivering basic services, which hinders building confidence in the government among the population and hence peace consolidation.

Federalism and devolution of powers to provinces is evolving in Iraq. The Constitution of Iraq allows for governorates to form into regions and recognizes the Kurdistan region, providing it a special status. A law establishing the process of regionalization was enacted in 2006. One of the challenges facing Iraq is the lack of policy on the implementation of federalism, resulting in one province being given special status, while powers are not devolved to other provinces. Iraq has yet to make the choice whether it would like to pursue a federal system or decentralized local governance. While Iraq furthered reform processes for decentralized political and administrative government, through devolution of power to 18 governorates, challenges remain in devolution of authority for

the delivery of services and transfer of revenues to local governments.

At the request of the Government of Iraq, the United Nations Assisted Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) was established by the 2003 UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1500. As a political mission, its role was greatly expanded in 2007 with SCR 1770. It is mandated to assist the Government and people of Iraq in advancing inclusive, political dialogue and national reconciliation; to assist in electoral processes and national census planning; to facilitate regional dialogue between Iraq and its neighbours; and to promote the protection of human rights and judicial and legal reform.[134]

3. UNDP PROGRAMME STRATEGY IN IRAQ

UNDP has partnered with the Government of Iraq for over 35 years (since the Standard basic Assistance Agreement in 1976), and has since supported development and recovery and reconstruction efforts. Since 2003, UNDP has operated as part of the United Nations Assistance Strategy coordinated by UNAMI. UNDP support has aligned with the successive National Development Plans, United Nations Iraq Assistance Strategy 2008–2010, and the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq. Since the launching of this funding mechanism, UNDP played a key role in administering of United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund.

UNDP's Interim Country Strategy 2008–2010 introduced a coherent approach to programming for the first time since 1989, replacing the approval for UNDP assistance to the country on a project-by-project basis.[135] Aligned with priorities identified in the NDS 2007–2010,

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132   International Monetary Fund, 'Program Note on Iraq', 18 April 2013.

133   Transparency International, 'Corruption Perceptions Index 2012', 2012.

134   S/RES/1500 (2003); S/RES/1770 (2007).

135   UNDP Iraq Interim Country Strategy 2008–2010.

SCR 1700, and the International Compact with Iraq,[136] the UNDP programme focused on the two main areas of (1) governance and (2) economic recovery and poverty alleviation. UNDP focused heavily on financing reconstruction efforts and generating employment, including the rehabilitation of multiple power generation plants and systems.

The UNDAF 2011–2014 provided for an integrated UN country strategy based on the NDP 2010–2014. Accordingly, UNDP transitioned to its current full Country Programme for 2011–2014 that outlined four priority areas: (1) fostering inclusive participation; (2) strengthening accountable and responsive governing institutions; (3) promoting inclusive growth, gender equality, climate change mitigation and adaptation and MDG achievement; and (4) restoring the foundations for development.[137] UNDP also changed its programmatic focus from infrastructure rehabilitation, to upstream initiatives including capacity development and policy support to key national institutions.[138]

There are two important features of the Iraq programme that distinguish it from UNDP's other country programmes and will affect the way the evaluation is organized. Since the 2003 bombing of the UN compound in Baghdad, the programme has been implemented in large part remotely from the Country Office located in Amman. Since then, a section of the programme staff has returned to Baghdad and some have moved to Erbil, although the majority still remained in Amman.

Furthermore, within the country, access to national partners and stakeholders by international programme staff has been restricted by the security rules of UNAMI, which has been an issue particularly in Baghdad. The second feature is that UNDP supported the Kurdistan Regional Government and has implemented

parallel programmes, given the special status of this region. UNDP has thus run parallel projects in a number of programme areas, one with the Federal Government in Baghdad and another with the Kurdistan Regional Government.

4.   SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

The evaluation coverage will include the ongoing Country Programme 2011–2014 and projects that UNDP has operated under the United Nations Iraq Assistance Strategy 2008–2010. It will also take into account the general evolution of UNDP assistance since 2003 to the extent relevant to the assessment and considerations for the future programme in Iraq. The evaluation should be both retrospective and prospective. Retrospectively, the evaluation will analyse UNDP development contributions in five outcome areas and provide conclusions on UNDP's overall performance for each of the outcomes. The evaluation will also look ahead to examine how UNDP can support Iraq in strengthening national institutions and processes.

The ADR will assess UNDP's contributions to national efforts in sustainable peace-and state-building and addressing development challenges. It will assess key results, specifically the five outcomes outlined in country programme—anticipated and unanticipated, positive and negative—and will cover UNDP assistance funded from both core and non-core resources.

The ADR will cover a particularly important time for Iraq in its efforts towards reconstruction and transition to development. The UNDP programme has operated in the context of UNAMI and has provided support through multiple phases of the post-conflict period. This was also a period of implementation of the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund, when the UN in general and UNDP in particular had access to vast reconstruction and

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136   International Compact with Iraq Resolution: http://www.uniraq.org/ici/ICI_Resolution_EN.pdf.

137   UNDP Country Programme Document for Iraq (2011–2014), 15 Oct 2010.

138   UNDP and Government of Iraq, Country Programme Action Plan, 2011–2014.

Table 1. Country Programme Outcomes and Budget (2011–2014)		Budget (in US$)
Country Programme Outcome		**Budget (in US$)**
Outcome 1	Government of Iraq and civil society have strengthened participatory mechanisms in place for electoral processes, national dialogue and reconciliation.	49,427,491
Outcome 2	Enhanced rule of law, protection and respect for human rights in line with international standards.	60,432,393
Outcome 3	Strengthened regulatory frameworks, institutions and processes in place for accountable, transparent and participatory governance at the national and local levels	75,303,877
Outcome 4	Government of Iraq has the institutional framework to develop and implement MDG-based pro-poor, equitable and inclusive socio-economic and environmental policies and strategies.	250,133,204
Outcome 5	Enabling policy and frameworks for rapid economic recovery, inclusive and diversified growth and private-sector development.	208,084,988

Table 2. United Nations Iraq Assistance Strategy Outcomes (2008–2010)	
Governance	
Outcome 1	Strengthened electoral processes in Iraq
Outcome 2	Strengthened national dialogue and civil society for governance and reconciliation
Outcome 3	Enhanced rule of law and respect for human rights in line with international standards
Outcome 4	Strengthened regulatory frameworks, institutions and processes of national and local governance
Economic Recovery and Diversification	
Outcome 1	Improved policies, strategies and related institutional developments that are sensitive to the MDGs, social inclusiveness, gender equality and pro-poor economic growth
Outcome 2	Enhance key sectors of local economy in most deprived areas
Outcome 3	Strengthened electricity and transportation sector plans for rapid economic growth

Source: United Nations Iraq Assistance Strategy 2008–2010: United Nations Country Team – Mission Statement

development funds. The scope of the evaluation will therefore include the interface of UNDP programme with UNAMI in complementary areas such as elections support. The evaluation will assess UNDP's role in administering the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund and engagement to further reconstruction and development results in Iraq.

UNDP contributions will be assessed against the outcomes outlined in the Country Programme Document 2011–2014 as well as the outcomes defined in the United Nations Iraq Assistance Strategy 2008–2010 for the two outcome areas that UNDP had the lead substantive responsibility (i.e. Governance and Economic Recovery and

Diversification) (see Tables 1 and 2). This will be done through assessing the collective contribution of projects towards achieving the outcomes. Between the two periods, there is a large degree of coherence in the programme structure and continuity in many projects. Therefore, the assessment will not be presented with the two programme frameworks as separate, but as a contiguous programme using the structure of the current country programme.

5. METHODOLOGY

The evaluation has two main components; (a) the analysis of the UNDP's contribution to development results through its programme outcomes,

and (b) the strategy UNDP adopted to enhance contribution to development results in Iraq. For each component, the ADR will present its findings and assessment according to the set criteria provided below. Further elaboration of the criteria will be found in the 'ADR Manual 2011'.

UNDP's contribution by thematic/programmatic areas. Analysis will be made on the contribution of UNDP to development results of Iraq through its programme activities. The analysis will be presented by thematic/programme areas and according to the following criteria:

- Relevance of UNDP's projects and outcomes;

- Effectiveness of UNDP interventions in terms of achieving intended programme outcomes;

- Efficiency of UNDP's interventions in terms of use of human and financial resources; and

- Sustainability of the results to which UNDP contributed.

UNDP's contribution through its positioning and strategies. The positioning and strategies of UNDP are analysed both from the perspective of the organization's mandate[139] and the development and humanitarian needs and priorities in the country as agreed and as they emerged. This would entail systematic analyses of UNDP's place and niche within the development and policy space in the country, as well as strategies used by UNDP to maximize its contribution through adopting relevant strategies and approaches. The following criteria will be applied:

- Relevance and responsiveness of the county programme as a whole to the challenges and needs of the country;

- Use of UNDP's comparative strength; and

- Promoting UN values from human development perspective.

The ADR will assess UNDP's performance in relation to its overall approaches, namely capacity development, gender equality, South-South cooperation, national ownership and UN partnerships. Specific attention will be paid to UNDP's support to furthering gender equality in Iraq. The evaluation will systematically assess how gender is mainstreamed in UNDP's programme support, and advocacy efforts to further gender equality.

The evaluation criteria form the basis of the ADR methodological process. In addition to judgements made using the criteria above, the ADR process will also identify how various factors (which focus on the means) have influenced UNDP's performance. The following lists the initial factors that will be addressed in this ADR:

- Comparative strengths that UNDP brought to supporting Iraq in recovery and reconstruction and development;

- National ownership of the programmes, as well as the implications of remote management of implementation;

- Political situation in the country and political interests of international partners as factors in the scope and direction of international support to Iraq;

- Programme direction provided by the senior management during the transition along the conflict-development nexus;

- Management including programme management, human resource management and financial management; and

- Security situation that affected the mobility of the programme staff.

The evaluation criteria form the basis of the ADR methodological process. Evaluators generate findings within the scope of the evaluation and use the criteria to make assessments. In turn, the factual findings and assessments are

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139   For UNDP's Strategic Plan, see www.undp.org/execbrd/pdf/dp07-43Rev1.pdf.

interpreted to identify the broad conclusions from the evaluation and to draw recommendations for future action.

An outcome paper will be developed for each outcome noted in Table 1 and will examine progress towards the outcome and UNDP's contribution to that change. A Theory of Change (ToC) approach will be used and developed by the evaluation team in consultation with UNDP and national stakeholders. Preparation of the ToC will focus on the assumptions made about a programme's desired change and causal linkages expected and these will form a basis for the data collection approach. The outcome papers will use the ToC approach to assess UNDP's contribution to the outcome using the evaluation criteria and identify the factors that have affected this contribution. Each outcome paper will be prepared according to a standard template which will facilitate synthesis and the identification of conclusions. The findings and conclusions from each outcome paper will then be synthesized into the overall ADR report.

5.1   DATA COLLECTION

Assessment of data collection constraints and existing data. An assessment was carried for each outcome to ascertain the available information, identify data constraints, to determine the data collection needs and method. The assessment outlined the level of evaluable data that is available. The assessment points that: a) outcomes evaluations are available for UNDP's contribution under United Nations Iraq Assistance Strategy 2008–2010, and a part of Outcome 5 of the Country Programme 2011–2014 (excluding the Local Area Development Programme); b) an outcome evaluation is expected to be available for Outcome 2 of the Country Programme 2011–2014 in the second half of 2013; c) systematic monitoring of outcomes is not available for the evaluation to build on; and d) linkages between projects and outcomes are not very strong reflecting the absence of programme approach prior to the current country programme. The data collection method and

tools aims to address the data gaps as well as the policy-level information that was not covered in outcome evaluations.

Data collection methods. The evaluation will use data from primary and secondary sources, including desk review of documentation and information and interviews with key informants. Based on the ToC, specific evaluation questions for each criteria and the data collection method will be outlined in the outcome papers. A multi-stakeholder approach will be followed and interviews will include government representatives, civil-society organizations, private-sector representatives, UN agencies, multilateral organizations, bilateral donors and beneficiaries of the programme.

The criteria for selecting places for field visits include coverage of all programme areas and outcomes as outlined in the UNDP country programmes (except those covered well in outcome evaluations) and areas where UNDP has programmes in more than one outcome area.

There are two major factors that need to be considered for data collection planning. First, the projects were run in parallel with the federal and the regional governments. Hence, data collection activities also need to be conducted in parallel, in the Kurdistan region and the rest of the country. The exceptions to this include the areas of work that comes under federal administration, for example, programmes in such areas as health and elections.

The second major factor is the security concern. A strict security regime is imposed in Iraq, particularly in Baghdad, which heavily constrains the mobility of international staff and consultants. While the evaluation team will include national consultants to overcome this constraint, some key policy-level interviews need to be conducted by the Evaluation Manager or an international consultant. Careful planning, while necessary, in reality needs to be applied flexibly and in an opportunistic manner.

The IEO identified an initial list of background and programme-related documents that is posted on an ADR Web portal. The following secondary data will be reviewed: background documents on the national context (including cross-cutting and sectoral plans and policies prepared by the government); documents prepared by international partners during the period under review and documents prepared by UN system agencies; programme plan and framework; and project evaluations conducted by the Country Office.

Validation: The evaluation will use triangulation of information from different sources to ensure that the data is valid. All findings must be supported by evidence and validated through consulting multiple sources of information. The evaluation team will develop an evaluation matrix to present findings from multiple sources and to validate each finding. The data collection process will utilize data codification methods to facilitate analysis.

Stakeholder involvement: At the start of the evaluation, a stakeholder analysis was conducted to identify all relevant UNDP partners as well as those who may not work with UNDP but play a key role in the outcomes of the practice areas. The evaluation will use a participatory approach to the design, implementation and reporting of the ADR. In order to facilitate the evaluation process, as well as to increase the ownership of the evaluation results, a national reference group for the ADR will be established, comprising a group of key national stakeholders, i.e. representatives from government, CSOs, UN agencies, donors and other development partners, as well as the UNDP Country Office.

5.2 MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

Independent Evaluation Office of UNDP: The IEO will conduct the ADR in collaboration with the Government of Iraq. The IEO Evaluation Managers will coordinate and lead the evaluation and provide overall management and technical backstopping to the evaluation. The Evaluation Managers will set the Terms of Reference for the evaluation, facilitate selection of the evaluation team, prepare the evaluation design, provide guidance to the conduct of evaluation, coordinate teamwork and analysis, organize feedback sessions and a stakeholder meeting, coordinate team inputs in the preparation of the draft report, lead the drafting of the main evaluation report and manage the review and follow-up processes. The Evaluation Managers will support other members of the evaluation team in understanding the scope, the process, the approach and the methodology of ADR, and will provide ongoing advice and feedback to the team for quality assurance. The IEO will meet all costs directly related to the conduct of the ADR.

Government of Iraq: The key government counterparts of UNDP in Iraq will facilitate the conduct of the ADR by the evaluation team by providing necessary access to information sources within the Government of Iraq; safeguarding the independence of the evaluation; and jointly organizing the stakeholder meeting with IEO. The counterparts will be responsible within the Government of Iraq for the use and dissemination of the final outputs of the ADR process.

UNDP Country Office in Iraq: The Country Office will support the evaluation team to liaise with key partners and other stakeholders, make available to the team all necessary information regarding UNDP's programmes, projects and activities in the country, and provide factual verifications of the draft report. The Country Office will provide the evaluation team support in kind (e.g. arranging meetings with project staff and beneficiaries or assistance for the project site visits).

During the entire evaluation process (and particularly during the main mission), the Country Office will cooperate with the ADR team and respect its independence and need to freely access data, information and people that are relevant to the exercise. To ensure the independence of the views expressed in interviews and meetings with stakeholders held for data collection purposes, the Country Office will not participate in them.

The Country Office will ensure timely dispatch of written comments on the draft evaluation

report. From its side, the ADR team will act in a transparent manner and will interact regularly with the UNDP Country Office and national government counterparts at critical junctures.

UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States (RBAS): UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States will support the evaluation through information sharing and will also participate in discussions on emerging conclusions and recommendations as well as in the in the Stakeholder Workshop.

Evaluation Team: The IEO will constitute an evaluation team to undertake the ADR. The team will include the following members:

- Evaluation Manager, IEO, has the overall responsibility for managing the ADR and will prepare and design the evaluation, select the evaluation team, provide methodological guidance to the team, lead in data analysis and synthesis, lead in addressing strategic issues in particular, prepare the draft and final reports, take measures to ensure quality of the report, conduct the stakeholder workshops and take follow up actions to facilitate the use and dissemination of the report.

- Associate Evaluation Manager, IEO, will support the Evaluation Manager in preparing and designing the evaluation, selecting the evaluation team, analysing and synthesizing data, preparing of the draft report and other aspects of the ADR process as may be required.

- Research Assistant, IEO, will provide background research and documentation.

- Two senior international development experts will have the responsibility of assessing the programme for specific outcomes and preparing the outcome papers.

- A senior national development expert will act as the national team leader and have the responsibility of coordinating the data collection of the national team, and synthesize the data collected to provide the core inputs to the reports.

- Two national development experts will support in data collection and analysis. One will be responsible for the Kurdistan region with the Kurdish language skills; the other for the rest of the country with the Arabic language.

5.3 EVALUATION PROCESS

The evaluation will be conducted according to the approved IEO process as outlined in the 'ADR Manual 2011'. The following represents a summary of key elements of the process. Four major phases provide a framework for conducting the evaluation:

Phase 1: Preparation. The IEO will prepare the terms of reference and the evaluation design, following a preparatory mission to UNDP Country Office for Iraq located in Amman by the Evaluation Managers. The preparatory mission to Amman and discussions with UNDP programme staff in Baghdad included the following objectives: i) ensure that key stakeholders understand the evaluation purpose, process and methodology; ii) obtain key stakeholder perspectives of any key

Table 3. Responsibilities of the Evaluation Team		
Outcome	**Outcome report**	**Data collection**
Outcome 1	International expert (1)	International and national experts
Outcome 2		No data collection at the technical level—outcome evaluation available
Outcome 3		International and national experts
Outcome 4	International expert (2)	International and national experts
Outcome 5		Outcome evaluation available—additional data collection by national experts focusing on Local Area Development Programme and by the international expert on policy level information

development issues to be covered in the evaluation; and iii) determine the scope of the evaluation, approaches, time-frame, and the parameters for the selection of the ADR evaluation team. The evaluation team comprising international and national development professionals will be recruited.

Phase 2: Data collection and analysis. The phase will commence in August 2013. The evaluation matrix will guide data collection. The evaluation team will use data collection templates for documenting interviews and other data collected.

■ Pre-mission activities: Evaluation team members conduct desk reviews of reference material, and prepare a summary of the context and other evaluative evidence, and identify the outcome-specific evaluation questions, gaps and issues that will require validation during the field-based phase of data collection.

■ Data collection mission: The evaluation team, including the Evaluation Managers will undertake a mission to the country to engage in data collection activities. The estimated duration of the mission is 3 weeks in September (2 weeks in Baghdad and 1 week in Erbil). This is preceded by one week participation in the stakeholder workshops (in Baghdad and in Erbil) organized by the Country Office to discuss the findings of the evaluation of rule of law outcome (Outcome 2) with national partners.

■ Field data collection: Due to the aforementioned security constraints, a large part of data collection will be conducted by the national team of consultants. This will start in parallel to the data collection mission above, and will continue for 6 weeks until the mid-October.

■ Outcome analysis: The outcome analysis will be conducted by international and national consultants with a view to producing outcome reports. This will be done in the second half of October.

■ Data analysis and synthesis workshop: Once the preliminary outcome analysis is completed, a one-week data analysis and

synthesis workshop will be organized in early November to bring together all members of the evaluation team to share their initial findings and cross-analyse them to produce findings on strategic positioning and preliminary conclusions.

■ End-of-mission debriefing: At the end of the data analysis and synthesis workshop, the evaluation team will share initial findings with the Country Office.

Phase 3: Synthesis, report writing and review. Following the data analysis and synthesis workshop, the evaluation team will prepare the outcome reports. The team will ensure that factual inaccuracies and misinterpretations are corrected in completing the outcome reports.

Based on the outcome papers and the discussions at the data analysis and synthesis workshop, the first draft of the report will be prepared and subjected to IEO quality control processes. Once cleared by the IEO, the first draft will be further circulated to relevant stakeholders to arrive at robust, evidence-based evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations.

The second draft, which takes into account the results of the stakeholder reviews, will be prepared for the stakeholder workshops to be organized in Baghdad and in Erbil. At the stakeholder workshops, the results of the evaluation will be presented to key national stakeholders and the ways forward will be discussed with a view to creating a greater buy-in by national stakeholders in taking forward the lessons and recommendations from the report, and to strengthening the national ownership of development process and the necessary accountability of UNDP interventions at country level. Taking into account the discussion at the stakeholder workshops, the final evaluation report will be prepared. This ADR will be presented to the UNDP Executive Board in June 2014.

Phase 4: Production, dissemination and follow-up. UNDP Iraq will prepare a management response to the ADR under the oversight

of RBAS. RBAS will be responsible for monitoring and overseeing the implementation of follow-up actions in the Evaluation Resource Centre.[140]

The ADR report and brief will be widely distributed in both hard and electronic versions. The evaluation report will be made available to the UNDP Executive Board by the time of approving a new Country Programme Document. It will be widely distributed by the IEO and at UNDP headquarters, to evaluation outfits of other international organizations, and to evaluation societies and research institutions in the region. The Iraq Country Office and Government of Iraq will disseminate to stakeholders in the country. The report and the management response will be published on the UNDP website[141] as well as in the Evaluation Resource Centre.

5.4   TIME-FRAME FOR THE ADR PROCESS

The time-frame and responsibilities for the evaluation process are tentatively as follows:

Table 4. Time-frame for the ADR Process		
Activity	**Responsible**	**Proposed time-frame**
Phase 1: Preparation		
ADR initiation and preparatory work	IEO	March 2013
Preparatory mission	IEO	June 2013
ToR approval by the IEO	IEO	July 2013
Selection of other evaluation team members	IEO	July 2013
Phase 2: Data collection and analysis		
Preliminary analysis of available data and context analysis	Evaluation team	August 2013
Data collection mission	IEO and Evaluation team	September 2013
Field data collection	IEO and Evaluation team	September/October 2013
Outcome analysis and draft outcome reports	IEO and Evaluation team	End October 2013
Data analysis and synthesis workshop	IEO and Evaluation team	First week November 2013
Submission of final drafts of outcome papers	IEO and Evaluation team	End second week November 2013
Phase 3: Synthesis and report writing		
First draft – clearance by IEO	IEO	December 2013
Second draft – stakeholder review	IEO	January 2014
Stakeholder Workshop in Baghdad	IEO, Country Office, Government	February 2014
Stakeholder Workshop in Erbil	IEO, Country Office, Government	February 2014
Submission of the final report	IEO	February 2014
Phase 4: Production and Follow-up		
Editing and formatting	IEO	March 2014
Issuance of the final report and Evaluation Brief	IEO	April 2014
Management response	Country Office	May 2014
Dissemination of the final report	IEO, Country Office, Government	May 2014

The time-frame above is indicative of the process and deadlines; it does not imply full-time engagement of the evaluation team during the period.

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140   http://erc.undp.org

141   www.undp.org/eo

Annex 2

UNDP PROGRAMME RESULTS MATRIX

UNDP 2010–2014*	UNDAF Priority (2011–2014)*	UNDAF Development Outcomes (2011–2014)*	UNDP Country Programme Document Outcomes (2011–2014)
• Good governance based on rule of law, participation, transparency, responsiveness, collective opinion, justice and comprehensiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, and accountability	Improved governance, including protection of human rights	The Iraqi state has a more inclusive and participatory political process reflecting improved national dialogue	• Government of Iraq and civil society have strengthened participatory mechanisms in place for electoral processes, national dialogue and reconciliation
		The Iraqi state has more efficient, accountable and participatory governance at national and sub-national levels	• Enhanced rule of law, protection and respect for human rights in line with international standards
		Iraq has an improved legal and operational Rule of Law framework for administration and access to justice	• Strengthened regulatory frameworks, institutions and processes in place for accountable, trans-parent and participatory governance at national and local levels
		Governmental and non-governmental institutions better protect and promote the human rights of all people in Iraq, with a focus on the most vulnerable	
• Increasing GDP by 9.38 per-cent annually • Economic diversification and increased productivity in all economic sectors • Sustainable jobs and income generation especially among youth and women • Reducing levels of poverty by 30 percent • Enhancing the role of the private sector in the national development process • Increasing the contribution of agriculture to the GDP	Inclusive, more equitable and sustainable economic growth	People in Iraq have improved access to job and income opportunities in a diversified and competitive market economy	Enabling policy and frameworks for rapid economic recovery, inclusive and diversified growth and private-sector development
		Vulnerable people in Iraq are benefiting from means-tested social transfers which stimulate economic growth and reduce dependency	
		Government of Iraq has institutionalized a universal social security system covering unemployment, health, old age, disability and other social risks	

*UNDP and UNDAF priorities and outcomes include only those that subsume UNDP outcomes

(continued)

(continued)

UNDP 2010–2014*	UNDAF Priority (2011–2014)*	UNDAF Development Outcomes (2011–2014)*	UNDP Country Programme Document Outcomes (2011–2014)
• Promotion of sustainable development • Control of environmental situation • Protection of air quality • Reduction in water pollution • Reduction in desertification • Environmental capacity development • Environmental awareness and regional and international cooperation	Environmental management and compliance with ratified international environmental treaties and obligations	The Iraqi state is responsive to climate change issues in line with its commitments to the ratified international agreements	Government of Iraq has the institutional framework to develop and implement MDG-based pro-poor, equitable and inclusive socio-economic and environmental policies and strategies
		Government of Iraq has improved programmes for the prevention and control of pollution	
		Government of Iraq has institutionalized improved mechanisms to prevent, mitigate and respond to natural and man-made disasters	

*UNDP and UNDAF priorities and outcomes include only those that subsume UNDP outcomes

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