EVALUATION
OF UNDP CONTRIBUTION TO
ANTI-CORRUPTION AND
ADDRESSING DRIVERS
OF CORRUPTION
EVALUATION
OF UNDP CONTRIBUTION TO
ANTI-CORRUPTION AND
ADDRESSING DRIVERS
OF CORRUPTION
EVALUATION OF UNDP CONTRIBUTION TO ANTI-CORRUPTION AND ADDRESSING DRIVERS OF CORRUPTION

Copyright © UNDP 2016, all rights reserved.
Manufactured in the United States of America.
Printed on recycled paper.

The analysis and recommendations of this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Development Programme, its Executive Board or the United Nations Member States. This is an independent publication by the Independent Evaluation Office of UNDP.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Independent Evaluation Office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) would like to thank all those who contributed to this evaluation. The evaluation team was led by Vijayalakshmi Vadivelu (Lead Evaluator), who also conducted regional and country studies. We wish to thank the following evaluation team members for their contributions to the evaluation. Jonas Lovkrona led the Africa country studies (Nigeria and Uganda), the Africa regional analysis and, along with Anish Pradhan, the Uzbekistan country study. Charlotte Ornemark carried out the Tunisia country study and the Arab States regional analysis along with Youri Bless. The Asia regional analysis was carried out by Frank Noij; Shabbir Cheema carried out the Pacific analysis and the Pacific Island States desk study. The Peru case study and the Latin America and the Caribbean regional analysis were conducted by Maximiliano Luft. Thaveeporn Vasavakul carried out country desk studies. Marina Busch, Anand Inbanathan, Anish Pradhan and Youri Bless contributed to the meta-synthesis of evaluations. Research support for the evaluation was provided by Youri Bless.

We wish to extend our sincere appreciation to the Independent Evaluation Office’s Evaluation Advisory Panel member Thomas Schwandt and to other Panel members. The evaluation benefited immensely from their advice and suggestions.

The Independent Evaluation Office could not have completed this report without the full support of UNDP colleagues from the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support (particularly the Governance and Peacebuilding unit), Regional Bureaux, Regional Hubs and the Country Offices. We wish to extend our thanks to Magdy Martinez-Soliman, Director, Bureau for Policy and Programme Support; Patrick Keuleers, Director and Chief of Profession the Governance and Peacebuilding Team; and Anga Timilsina, the Anti-corruption Programme Manager. We wish to thank Abdoulaye Mar Dieye, Director, and Ruby Sandhu-Rojon, Deputy Director, of the Regional Bureau for Africa; Sima Bahous, Director, and Sophie de Caen, Deputy Director, of the Regional Bureau for the Arab States; Haoliang Xu, Director, and Nicholas Rosellini, Deputy Director, of the Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific; Cihan Sultanoglu, Director, and Olivier Adam, Deputy Director, of the Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS; Jessica Faieta, Director, and Susan McDade, Deputy Director, of the Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean; and Simona Marinescu Director, and Serdar Bayriyev, Development Impact Group, of the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support. The collaboration and support of the colleagues in the Regional Bureaux was critical for the evaluation. A large number of Country Offices participated in the evaluation, and we are grateful for their engagement and support. The evaluation benefited from the views and insights of national and regional partners and we extend our sincere thanks to all of them.

Peer reviews and administrative support provided by our colleagues at the Independent Evaluation Office were critical to the completion of the evaluation. Alan Fox, Ana Rosa Monteiro Soares and Fumika Ouchi peer-reviewed the draft report. Diligent administrative support was provided by Sonam Choetsho. Sasha Jahic managed the production and outreach of the report.
Globally, corruption and lack of transparency and accountability in governance remain major challenges to achieving development objectives. The agreement on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly Goal 16, assumes significance given the detrimental impacts that corruption and poor governance have on reducing poverty and inequality. Significant losses in development resources reinforce the urgency for implementing global commitments and decisive action by governments.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) corporate programme frameworks recognize anti-corruption as key to accelerating sustainable development outcomes. While specific anti-corruption initiatives were supported, UNDP has focused more on addressing drivers of corruption, particularly demand-side accountability. UNDP has developed a unique niche in supporting efforts to address corruption drivers and to strengthen national anti-corruption capacities. Simultaneously pursuing anti-corruption and accountability initiatives has enabled UNDP to work at multiple levels.

While UNDP contributions have been important for enhancing anti-corruption policies and capacities, their actual outcomes have been dependent on broader governance capacities. Evolving governance systems and processes, in addition to inadequate judicial capacities reduced the impacts of anti-corruption initiatives. In the absence of core public administration accountability processes and capacities, even strong anti-corruption enforcement institutions could do little to address corruption. As is the case with many other agencies working in this area, while public administration drivers were addressed by UNDP, the thrust given to accountability and transparency issues was insufficient to generate the critical mass needed for transformations in overall governance for reducing corruption.

This evaluation reaffirms that addressing governance, corruption and development linkages is critical for achieving development outcomes. A challenge to an explicit focus on anti-corruption in governance, as well as other development interventions, is a lack of national policy instruments to integrate anti-corruption dimensions into development initiatives. A similar limitation was evident in international cooperation. While bilateral donors were more vocal about corruption issues, they exercised more caution in funding explicit anti-corruption initiatives as part of development support.

I sincerely hope this evaluation will inform UNDP anti-corruption programme support, and more broadly provide lessons for strengthening national anti-corruption efforts.

Indran A. Naidoo
Director
Independent Evaluation Office, UNDP
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Acronyms and Abbreviations**  xi

**Executive Summary**  xiii

**Chapter 1. Introduction**  1
  1.1 Rationale and Purpose  1
  1.2 Objectives and Scope  1
  1.3 Approach and Methodology  3
  1.4 Data Collection and Analysis  6
  1.5 Structure of the Report  10

**Chapter 2. Governance Contexts and UNDP Anti-Corruption Responses**  11
  2.1 Global and Regional Responses  11
  2.2 National Governance Trends  14
  2.3 UNDP Anti-Corruption Responses  19

**Chapter 3. Assessment of UNDP Contributions to Anti-Corruption and Addressing Drivers of Corruption**  23
  3.1 Scope and Scale of UNDP Responses Related to Anti-Corruption and Addressing Drivers of Corruption  23
  3.2 Contribution to Anti-Corruption and Addressing Drivers of Corruption  31
  3.3 Strengthening National Anti-Corruption Institutional Capacities  45
  3.4 Addressing Drivers of Corruption: Strengthening Accountability and Transparency Processes  52
  3.5 Facilitating Global and Regional Anti-Corruption Policy Debates and Advocacy  62

**Chapter 4. Conclusions and Recommendations**  67
  4.1 Conclusions  67
  4.2 Recommendations  71

**Annexes**
  Annex 1. Concept Note  73
  Annex 3. Evaluation Questions and Sub-Questions  81
  Annex 4. Conditions Used in Qualitative Comparative Analysis  83
  Annex 5. List of Persons Consulted  87
  Annex 7. Worldwide Governance Indicators  111
  Annex 8. UNDP Funding Trends  117
Tables

Table 1. Data collection methods and sources 9
Table 2. UNDP Strategic Plan outcomes and outputs pertaining to strengthening anti-corruption policies and institutions and addressing drivers of corruption 20
Table 3. Democratic Governance compared to overall programme expenditures, 2008-2015 (in US$ millions) 23
Table 4. Anti-corruption and addressing drivers of corruption-related expenditure as compared to other governance expenditures: 2008-2015 (US$ millions) 24
Table 5. Addressing drivers of corruption: number of countries and projects for 2008-2015 (total number of countries in the region in parenthesis) 27
Table 6. Level of engagement in addressing drivers of corruption (accountability and transparency areas) 27
Table 7. Strengthening anti-corruption policies and institutions: number of countries and projects for 2008-2015 (total number of countries in the region in parenthesis) 28
Table 8. Level of engagement of UNDP in strengthening anti-corruption policies and institutions 29
Table 9. Anti-corruption related regional projects expenditures (in US$ millions) 30
Table 10. Global anti-corruption projects - annual expenditures (in US$ millions) 30
Table 11. Performance rating of support to anti-corruption policies and institutional strengthening 33
Table 12. Performance across areas addressing drivers of corruption 37

Figures

Figure 1. Anti-corruption and addressing drivers of corruption programme streams 2
Figure 2. Theory of Change – contribution of UNDP anti-corruption and addressing drivers of corruption initiatives at the country level 4
Figure 3. Data collection, analysis and interpretation 7
Figure 4. Trends in governance progress over a decade 16
Figure 5. Human Development Index (HDI) and the control of corruption 17
Figure 6. Expenditures on support to strengthening anti-corruption policies and institutions: 2008-2015 (US$ millions) 25
Figure 7. Expenditure on support to addressing drivers of corruption (transparency and accountability measures): 2008-2015 (US$ millions) 25
Figure 8. Relevance of anti-corruption initiatives 34
Figure 9. Effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives 35
Figure 10. Effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives by region 35
Figure 11. Relevance of accountability and transparency initiatives for anti-corruption 39
Figure 12. Effectiveness of accountability and transparency initiatives for anti-corruption 39
Figure 13. Effectiveness of accountability and transparency initiatives for anti-corruption by region 40
Figure 14. Level of synergies with other UNDP programmes in country study and desk study programmes 41
Figure 15. Level of synergies between different UNDP programmes 42
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Box 1</td>
<td>Evaluation criteria and key questions</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 2</td>
<td>Five-point scale for rating UNDP performance</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 3</td>
<td>Regional anti-corruption conventions and initiatives</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 4</td>
<td>Contribution of anti-corruption initiatives: meta-synthesis of evaluation findings</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 5</td>
<td>Performance of accountability and transparency initiatives: meta-synthesis of evaluation findings</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 6</td>
<td>Synergies between different UNDP programmes: findings of the meta-synthesis of evaluations</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 7</td>
<td>The Kallxo in Kosovo</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 8</td>
<td>Access to information and digital Bangladesh reduced middlemen in service delivery</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 9</td>
<td>Support to local-level accountability and transparency initiatives</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 10</td>
<td>Corruption risk assessments initiative in Nigeria</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BPPS  Bureau for Policy and Programme Support
CARICOM  Caribbean Community
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States
GAIN  UNDP Global Anti-corruption Initiative
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GIZ  Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
  (German Agency for International Cooperation)
HDI  Human Development Index
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals
MGNREGA  Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guaranty Scheme (India)
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PACDE  UNDP Global Programme on Anti-corruption for Development Effectiveness
PAPI  Public Administration Performance Index
SDGs  Sustainable Development Goals
UNCAC  United Nations Convention against Corruption
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNODC  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I. INTRODUCTION

This evaluation was carried out by the Independent Evaluation Office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in order to assess national-level UNDP contributions to anti-corruption capacity development. The evaluation is part of the UNDP medium-term plan (DP/2014/5), approved by the UNDP Executive Board in January 2014. In approving the evaluation, the Executive Board recognized the importance of support to anti-corruption and accountability and transparency measures for equitable governance. Given the thrust to anti-corruption and public accountability and transparency in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the evaluation will contribute to strategizing the UNDP anti-corruption programme.

The main purposes of the evaluation include: a) strengthening UNDP accountability to global and national development partners, including the Executive Board; b) contributing to the development of the UNDP anti-corruption programme strategy; and c) facilitating organizational learning. The evaluation will be presented to the Executive Board at its first regular session in January 2017. Specifically, the objectives of the evaluation were to:

- Assess UNDP contributions to strengthening national capacities in anti-corruption and addressing drivers of corruption;
- Assess UNDP contributions to global and regional anti-corruption policy debates and advocacy; and
- Identify factors that explain UNDP contributions.

The evaluation assessed UNDP contributions to countries within development contexts and in transition for the 2008 to 2016 period, covering the last Strategic Plan 2008–2011 (extended to 2013), and the current Strategic Plan 2014–2017. Contributions of UNDP global, regional and country-level programmes pertaining to anti-corruption and those addressing drivers of corruption were assessed. The evaluation assessed the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of UNDP support at the country level as against the expectations in the Strategic Plans in terms of a) changes in macro policies and awareness; b) changes in capacities of state and non-state actors; and c) improved governance quality.

II. BACKGROUND

Progress in national anti-corruption is inextricably intertwined with other measures to strengthen governance and to improve government accountability and transparency. National authorities have made considerable efforts to improve governance through various reforms directly or indirectly related to anti-corruption. Corruption as a development issue has been the subject of deliberation at numerous high-level global and regional intergovernmental forums. The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) was a significant intergovernmental effort to address the various dimensions of corruption. Unlike the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), SDG Goal 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions) explicitly recognizes the extent to which corruption and

bribery can impact development and stability, in addition to recognizing the need for global efforts to combat corruption. In addressing governance capacities, the linkages between corruption and development have been long recognized as critical for achieving development outcomes. Despite such efforts, considerable challenges remain in making progress on this and addressing corruption.

Responding to corruption challenges, the current and previous UNDP Strategic Plans acknowledged the need to support targeted anti-corruption initiatives and multisectoral accountability mechanisms in public administration in order to address the institutional drivers of corruption. During the two strategic planning periods, the country programmes supported initiatives to address the quality, responsiveness and accountability of the public sector in order to improve the delivery of services. UNDP provided direct support to a range of activities seeking to strengthen anti-corruption policies and institutions and to facilitate UNCAC implementation.

During the 2008–2013 strategic planning period, UNDP assisted countries to formulate, implement and monitor national development and poverty reduction strategies, into which anti-corruption and accountability and transparency measures were integrated. Quality of governance was considered a key area of MDG achievement and governance support. Corruption was identified as one of the main impediments to pro-poor development. Strengthening public administration for accountable and efficient public services, with the overarching goal of achieving the MDGs, was given emphasis across UNDP country programmes.

In the 2014–2017 Strategic Plan, responding to post-2015 priority areas, UNDP further emphasized institutional and legal responses for increasing transparency, expanding access to information, maintaining adherence to the rule of law, building trust between the state and civil society and addressing corruption. Sector-specific access to information is an area that has been identified for anti-corruption support. In select sectors and development areas, UNDP supported efforts to identify and address integrity risks.

III. APPROACH

The evaluation recognizes that anti-corruption and addressing drivers of corruption initiatives involve complex sets of interactions among policy and institutional processes and actors, and that there are inherent logical and methodological limitations to isolating the effectiveness of anti-corruption, public accountability and transparency policies. In a majority of cases, these are embedded within programmes that address wider public administration and governance reform processes; causal linkages may not always be clearly discernible. The theory of change used for this evaluation took these limitations into consideration. Considering the complexity of anti-corruption outcomes and variations in the scale and scope of UNDP programmes, the evaluation distinguished between different levels of UNDP contributions (immediate outcomes, intermediary outcomes and long-term outcomes), recognizing that some of the components are iterative. Although not always distinct, such categorizations were useful to keep the UNDP programme expectations commensurate with the scope of its support.

For the purposes of this evaluation, UNDP programmes pertaining to anti-corruption were broadly classified into two areas: strengthening anti-corruption policies and institutions and addressing drivers of corruption (largely accountability- and transparency-related initiatives). The theory of change outlines the causal and reciprocal pathways of anti-corruption and addressing the drivers of corruption programme contributions. Sixty-five country programmes were analysed to ascertain the UNDP contribution to anti-corruption and addressing the drivers of corruption. The evaluation covered all five regions where UNDP implements programmes (Africa, Arab States, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States and Latin America and the Caribbean).
IV. CONCLUSIONS

Conclusion 1: UNDP anti-corruption programme support is carried out in a complex policy and implementation context with multiple public administration challenges. Many countries where UNDP provides support continue to face significant systemic challenges in their efforts to improve accountability and reduce corruption.

Partner governments acknowledged the detrimental effects of corruption on development and recognized the need to strengthen governance systems and processes. In each of the countries included in this evaluation, measures have been established to formulate anti-corruption policies, set up institutions, address accountability and transparency issues and to launch capacity development initiatives. Despite these efforts, many partner countries have not prioritized or entrenched these actions sufficiently to root out corruption. The evaluation found considerable inconsistency and often insufficient government commitment provided to accountability and anti-corruption enforcement processes and institutions that have been established. While governance reforms were ongoing in each of the countries included in this evaluation, the focus of such reforms is usually to enhance the economic growth of the countries. Preference for certain areas of governance reforms meant that UNDP has to be realistic about the expected outcomes from its anti-corruption support efforts.

UNDP support to strengthening anti-corruption and measures that enhance accountable and transparent governance continues to be relevant in most partner countries. Yet given the sensitive nature of the subject, UNDP and international development organizations in general typically face government resistance to comprehensive anti-corruption measures. UNDP programmes, therefore, tended to address the drivers of corruption as part of broader public administration support, and provided more direct anti-corruption support where governments had established their own national anti-corruption programmes and were open to technical advice. The UNDP emphasis on addressing drivers of corruption is well-considered, although uptake of these initiatives has been quite limited and has had marginal influence on corruption-related dimensions of governance reform processes. As has been the case with many organizations working in this area, although UNDP addressed public administration drivers, the thrust given to accountability and transparency was insufficient to generate the critical mass needed for the transformational changes necessary to significantly reduce corruption.

There was less resistance to initiatives aimed at enhancing accountability and transparency or addressing corruption at the local level as compared to the national level. There was greater ownership at subnational levels, especially initiatives linking accountability and transparency in governance to service delivery.

Conclusion 2: Anti-corruption and accountable governance were key areas of UNDP support during the current and previous Strategic Plans. Although the resources spent were not comparable to those spent by some international financial institutions, UNDP has developed a unique niche in supporting efforts to address corruption drivers and strengthen national anti-corruption capacities.

A significant aspect of UNDP work in this area has been its willingness to take on sensitive topics, such as anti-corruption. In several countries, UNDP was one of the first agencies to support anti-corruption initiatives. It is clear that long-term UNDP support has led to incremental reductions in corruption risk and has improved accountability and transparency.

Simultaneously pursuing anti-corruption and accountability initiatives enables UNDP to work at multiple levels. UNDP supported anti-corruption initiatives in 65 countries and efforts to address the drivers of corruption in public administration in 124 countries. Irrespective of the objectives of individual projects, these areas
of work are complementary, enhancing the overall UNDP contribution to anti-corruption. Support to anti-corruption policies and institutions across partner countries, as well as initiatives that address the drivers of corruption, were broadly defined and did not entail a predisposition towards a particular approach. This has increased UNDP flexibility in responding to national government priorities.

While UNDP contributions have been important in enhancing anti-corruption policies and capacities, their effectiveness and sustainability have been dependent on broader governance capacities, which had often not reached an adequate level. As with many organizations working in this area, while public administration drivers were addressed by UNDP, the thrust given to accountability and transparency issues was insufficient to generate the critical mass needed for transformations in overall governance for reducing corruption. This was a reflection of a wider challenge in the policy space: a limitation in linking public administration reforms to anti-corruption measures.

Although regional variations were evident in UNDP programme priorities, anti-corruption programmes were underrepresented in regions such as the Africa and the Asia and the Pacific regions. UNDP Country Offices are primarily responsible for mobilizing resources for these programmes. This builds considerable variation in the scale and scope of programming, as it is driven by country-level funding decisions by donors and partner governments. The lack of an organizational anti-corruption strategy contributed to the ad hoc nature of UNDP anti-corruption programming and the regional variability in UNDP engagement on this issue. In regions such as Africa, although the scope and scale of programmes were ahead of UNDP country programmes in other regions, they were not commensurate with the demand for anti-corruption programme support.

Partnerships with civil society organizations in advocacy and awareness-raising have complemented UNDP programme goals. UNDP has taken a balanced approach in its support to civil society organizations and citizen’s forums, including in countries with vibrant civil society-led advocacy efforts demanding accountability and action to reduce corruption. This work with civil society has been especially noteworthy in countries with limited space for civil society engagement. UNDP has supported regional platforms for civil society actors to engage with state actors and other anti-corruption stakeholders. Strengthening the capacities of civil society organizations at the local level has received only limited attention.

Conclusion 3: Contributions to global and regional debates and advocacy have been important, particularly to secure attention to the anti-corruption targets in SDG 16.

UNDP has facilitated the efforts of programme countries to engage on issues of anti-corruption and accountability within the establishment of the SDGs. The global anti-corruption community that UNDP supported includes a range of anti-corruption actors, such as governments, civil society organizations, think tanks and donors that have exchanged information on practices and have debated ways to address anti-corruption issues. UNDP leads the UNDP-UNODC International Anti-corruption Campaign, which serves as a flagship advocacy mechanism, providing avenues to influence global discourse on anti-corruption. UNDP global projects and regional programmes made important contributions by linking regional actors with global networks and by facilitating cooperation with international organizations. The global anti-corruption projects have facilitated UNDP engagement at the global level and have provided a channel for linking country-level work with global debates. The regional programmes, particularly in the Africa and Arab States regions, contributed to facilitating regional instruments and anti-corruption forums.

Conclusion 4: UNDP has contributed to strengthening national anti-corruption capacities.
UNDP has been persistent in its support to ensure that policies and institutions are sufficiently robust and help to motivate further reforms. Especially noteworthy has been the work of UNDP to help usher in anti-corruption and accountability efforts in countries with challenging political environments.

UNDP has demonstrated that it is well-positioned to support countries in implementing UNCAC and that it has enabled countries to fulfil their basic requirements for Convention compliance. In addition to the technical support, the global reach of UNDP, its ongoing close partnerships with government institutions and its knowledge of practical, on-the-ground opportunities are useful attributes. UNDP contributions to UNCAC implementation are notable, particularly in establishing the linkages between the enforcement and accountability and transparency dimensions of the convention.

Anti-corruption programme success is greatly enhanced by having well-structured governance systems, an independent and apolitical judiciary and anti-corruption institutions with unfettered powers to investigate illegal activity. Conventional mechanisms, such as anti-corruption commissions and legislative reviews, often fail to reduce corruption unless there is adequate thrust to strengthening the governance drivers of corruption. UNDP contributions have, therefore, been important as inputs to the processes of strengthening institutional capacities, rather than in actual corruption reduction actions, which are the pur-view of national governments.

Conclusion 5: UNDP has contributed to anti-corruption and accountability at local levels. Tangible outcomes were observed where UNDP addressed anti-corruption and accountability through local development and local governance initiatives. While the sustainability of some local outcomes remains in question, UNDP support has clearly contributed to increased demand for transparent and accountable local development and service delivery.

UNDP programming at the local level typically focused on the demand side of accountability in governance. Attempts were made to bridge the interests of supply- and demand-side actors to strengthen local-level accountability and transparency. UNDP worked on several themes, such as participatory local development, participatory local governance and e-governance, which have developed into key streams of support over time. There were several examples of UNDP-led initiatives at the local level that have been replicated by governments and other development agencies. UNDP support to citizen participation in local development had positive impacts on local-level service delivery. Access to information, citizen’s participation and consultation, citizen’s monitoring and oversight and social accountability initiatives were supported as measures to strengthen local governance and service delivery. A critical mass of demand was generated at the local level through demonstration projects, which in many cases has the potential for spiraling up and helping to reform national-level policies and practices.

Conclusion 6: Accountability initiatives were more effective when a sectoral approach was taken. UNDP is in an advantageous position to support governments in reducing corruption and increasing accountability and transparency, and has demonstrated that it can provide useful tools and techniques. Yet UNDP has not taken full advantage of its opportunities to better integrate this work into its other development programming.

With governance and public administration-related programmes in over 130 countries, the partnership capital that UNDP has generated over the years is significant; it gives UNDP the leveraging power of its governance portfolio and other development sectors to anchor anti-corruption work in broader governance processes and to promote linkages with sectoral development. While there were efforts to address larger governance and development linkages, such efforts were not systematically pursued or prioritized. The UNDP sectoral governance focus has not progressed ade-
quately. As a result, opportunities to integrate accountability and anti-corruption measures into the work of UNDP in its livelihoods, sustainable development, governance and resilience programming have been missed.

UNDP has not explored synergies between its anti-corruption and public administration accountability work and its other development support, particularly poverty reduction and Global Fund programmes. This represents lost opportunities to address corruption risks in these areas. The MDG Acceleration Framework, in a departure from this general trend, generated positive momentum through sector risk assessments. UNDP has yet to take this approach further.

Conclusion 7: While UNDP has supported governance risk assessments, it has not made these assessments a core aspect of its anti-corruption and accountability programming. In cases where assessments have been carried out, a lack of periodicity limited their utility as a tool for governments to track progress.

UNDP identified a range of development areas where it recommends that risk assessments should be carried out. UNDP-supported risk assessments mostly consisted of one-off activities that fell short of being context-specific risk assessments that could consistently inform sectoral policies. The assessments carried out have not been embedded within overall sector policies. UNDP did not utilize corruption risk mapping when establishing poverty, health, governance or environmental programming, and did not pursue government partners to carry out such mapping. This is a missed opportunity, since in a majority of countries context-specific corruption risk assessments are often non-existent.

Conclusion 8: Over the years, UNDP has developed a strong presence in the area of anti-corruption and public administration-related accountability and transparency support. UNDP has yet to use the reorganization of its programme portfolios to strengthen its anti-corruption programme capacities in order to respond to the demand for anti-corruption support. The underemphasized support of public administration at the organizational level has implications for anti-corruption programme support to countries in a development context.

Lack of alignment between headquarters-level programme prioritization and country-level programme demand is contributing to the decline of core public administration in regards to anti-corruption and accountability and transparency work. This affects the anti-corruption and accountability work of UNDP. The core public administration work in countries in a development context – an area in which UNDP has significantly invested for two decades and developed a strong niche – did not receive adequate organizational attention. Consolidation of governance programmes, earlier classified under crisis and development programming, has yet to include public administration work.

UNDP has a significant role to play in low- and middle-income countries in facilitating implementation of anti-corruption and accountability and transparency measures. The current organizational governance prioritization does not facilitate the UNDP role in countries within development contexts.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

UNDP made important contributions to anti-corruption in a number of areas. The recommendations provided here can enhance the support that UNDP provides to partner countries through its programming. While cognizant of the reduction in UNDP’s regular resources and the consequent challenges to programming, the recommendations provided are not necessarily restricted by this situation. While the recommendations provide focus on the work of UNDP and external donors, the evaluation recognizes the pre-eminent role of national governments to take responsibility for reducing corruption and improving accountability.

Recommendation 1: Prioritize support to addressing corruption risks to development.
Develop an anti-corruption programme strategy that more explicitly links the UNDP anti-corruption approach to other development programming.

The SDGs present opportunities for UNDP to reaffirm the value and significance of UNDP commitments to anti-corruption and accountable governance. To enhance UNDP contributions to addressing development–corruption linkages, UNDP should develop an anti-corruption strategy that explicitly links these efforts to UNDP governance and development programmes and its support to countries in attaining the SDGs.

UNDP support to the implementation of the UNCAC has been important in terms of enabling basic national frameworks. It is time to move beyond basic UNCAC compliance initiatives towards more concrete anti-corruption measures, including enforcement measures and those that address specific drivers of corruption.

UNDP should strategically address corruption risks to development in its country programming. Taking forward the MDG Acceleration Framework initiative, UNDP should develop a sectoral focus to its anti-corruption support. UNDP should identify key thematic areas where it will make development and corruption linkages more explicit, and should make explicit its willingness to support governments in their efforts to address corruption in service delivery. Greater efforts should be made to use development programme areas as entry points to further promote sectoral anti-corruption and accountability measures; such efforts should be initiated in the current programme.

There is a need for concerted anti-corruption initiatives in key development sectors, which require partnerships, for instance, in the provision of health, education, water and sanitation. Within the ambit of SDG processes, UNDP should develop global partnerships in sector-specific anti-corruption initiatives.

All anti-corruption support efforts at the global, regional and country levels should address gender-related aspects, as this continues to be a weak area of UNDP support.

Management response: UNDP management agrees that the organization should prioritize support to addressing corruption risks to development. UNDP management will ensure that this is taken into full consideration in developing the draft of the next strategic plan, 2018–2021. The UNDP programme on anti-corruption for development was the first to link anti-corruption with development. Learning from the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Acceleration Framework in many countries, UNDP is identifying governance and corruption-related bottlenecks in service delivery. UNDP global, regional and country-level governance and anti-corruption programmes are implementing projects that seek to identify corruption risk assessments in the health, education and water sectors in order to contribute to national development outcomes. With the Seoul Policy Centre, we have expanded these risk assessments to the construction sector; we plan to expand them to the justice and security sectors.

In supporting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), UNDP aims to apply the ‘mainstreaming, acceleration and policy support’ approach (known as ‘MAPS’), which is the common strategy approved by the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) to ensure effective, coherent implementation of the SDG agenda. This should ensure that various targets under Goal 16 are integrated into national plans, strategies and budgets, including through a sectoral approach, social accountability initiatives and the mainstreaming of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption into development processes. Acceleration will be supported by the use and further elaboration of tools and methodologies (including risk assessment tools) to identify critical constraints and governance or other bottlenecks (including in anti-corruption). UNDP will provide coordinated policy support to countries that will be involved in project implementation through UNDP global and regional advisers in coordination with UNODC and other partners, particularly in the implementation and mainstreaming of Goal 16 and its targets. UNDP is prioritiz-
‘clean construction’ and ‘e-procurement’ as an anti-corruption contribution to other goals, such as Goal 9 on infrastructure. UNDP has started developing and rolling out a support package to integrate anti-corruption in the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (in Ukraine and Nigeria, for example).

As Chair of the UNDG and coordinator of the United Nations resident coordinator system, UNDP is coordinating with nine other United Nations organizations to provide training to field staff on integrating anti-corruption into United Nations programming processes such as the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). UNDP, with other United Nations partners, aims to integrate anti-corruption into national plans and development processes, including those related to the SDGs through UNDAFs and other country-level United Nations programmes and projects.

Recommendation 2: Address regional variations in anti-corruption support and prioritize support to regions that are underrepresented.

Anti-corruption programme support is relevant across all regions, yet anti-corruption and accountability-related support are not adequately pursued in all regions. UNDP should review the global scope of its anti-corruption and accountability support and place increased emphasis on regions that have been underrepresented in this work. Considering the scale of the anti-corruption and accountability and transparency challenges facing many countries, UNDP support for improved access to information and modernized public administration systems and to sectoral anti-corruption efforts remains critical.

Management response: UNDP management agrees with the recommendation that UNDP should address regional variations in anti-corruption support in a development context. UNDP will analyse these variations and prepare recommendations for relevant actions to be taken to address them in its regional and country level anti-corruption programming. Full coverage of all regions will depend on the availability of sufficient financial resources.

Recommendation 3: Consider prioritizing support to anti-corruption and governance risk assessments and measurements.

UNDP should accelerate its efforts to support the measurement of anti-corruption progress as part of the SDG 16 monitoring initiative. It should support sector-specific anti-corruption initiatives to effectively diagnose governance and institutional risk and capacity issues. Robust tools for measuring and analysing governance risk are critical in setting priorities, understanding what works, raising awareness and furthering reforms. In sectors where there is overlapping support from multiple organizations, UNDP should initiate partnerships to carry out joint periodic sector integrity assessments.

UNDP should revisit its anti-corruption and accountability-related data gathering tools and techniques. UNDP should be more strategic in supporting anti-corruption and transparency-related advocacy and awareness-raising data generation. Rather than perception surveys, UNDP should facilitate developing and using practical and applicable corruption risk assessment and monitoring tools.

Management response: UNDP management agrees with the recommendation that UNDP should support anti-corruption and governance diagnostics and measurement. UNDP acknowledge that there have been many diagnostics, surveys, assessments and other measurements by various partners and academia. The challenge is to ensure coordination among partners, acceptance of such assessments and the data behind them by national policymakers, and their proper use for policy reform. UNDP experience has shown that most anti-corruption and governance diagnostics and measurement do not translate into policy, for reasons that include lack of political commitment, limited resources for follow-up and lack of sustainability plans. To strengthen anti-corruption measurement and provide guidance on the use of the right indicators for measuring and monitoring corruption, UNDP published a User’s Guide to Measuring Corruption and Anti-corruption in 2015.
To strengthen efforts to support anti-corruption and governance integrity diagnostics and measurement, UNDP will:

(a) Coordinate with other partners to standardize the corruption measurement methodologies to support the more effective use of anti-corruption and governance diagnostics and measurement;

(b) Ensure sustainability of projects from integrity assessment to policy reforms by securing buy-in from the governments and bringing together various stakeholders from the onset of the project implementation; and

(c) Maximize the use of information and communication technology (ICT) and social media to strengthen feedback mechanisms and solve the governance corruption-related bottlenecks in service delivery. UNDP will seek government cost-sharing to make sure that the ICT pilots are scaled up and sustained.

Recommendation 4: Increase support for local-level initiatives to strengthen demand-side accountability, particularly concerning access to information and social accountability initiatives.

Transparent and accountable service delivery at the local level continues to pose challenges. UNDP made a significant contribution to advancing national- and local-level demand-side accountability through its support to access to information and citizen participation mechanisms in local development. Moving forward, UNDP should focus on providing viable models to enhance accountability at the local level, foster improved local public administration processes and better service delivery, and increase the scope of its local-level anti-corruption initiatives.

Management response: UNDP management fully agrees with the recommendation. During the last eight years, UNDP contributed to anti-corruption and addressed drivers of corruption by strengthening its engagement with youth, women’s groups, communities and many local-level civil society actors and non-government organizations in order to raise the demand side of accountability. UNDP will continue its engagement with various civil society actors, such as Transparency International, Integrity Action and the Huairou Commission (the international organization of grassroots women’s networks) at the global level, while continuing its engagement with national and local-level civil society organizations (CSOs), youth and women’s group, communities and non-governmental organizations to strengthen service delivery, budgets and infrastructures, and the monitoring of corruption. UNDP will include government and non-governmental actors to make sure that there is a two-way dialogue contributing to an effective feedback mechanism that produces tangible results from the increase in demand-side accountability.

One of the main objectives of UNDP initiatives will be to strengthen social accountability in the health, education, water, infrastructure, justice and security and other relevant sectors to contribute to the attainment of the SDGs. Measures will include:

(a) Continue UNDP partnership with Transparency International and other global partners to raise the global demand for social accountability;

(b) At the national and local level, work with civil society actors and the private sector to promote and scale up successful initiatives on open data, access to information and procurement transparency in service delivery at the local level;

(c) Continue to support the monitoring of budgets, expenditure and services by civil society and the community, including through the adoption of new technologies to monitor services;

(d) Strengthen women’s networks to improve transparency and accountability in service delivery by scaling up successful local and national-level initiatives; and

(e) Provide support to youth networks for their innovative social accountability projects.

Recommendation 5: Further strengthen global and regional anti-corruption projects to support country programmes and enable UNDP to contribute to regional and global policy debates and
advocacy. Global and regional projects should be used to develop key streams of programme support at the country level.

Global and regional anti-corruption projects have added value beyond what UNDP accomplishes through its country programmes. UNDP should consider allocating additional resources to global and regional anti-corruption projects. While it is important to support Country Offices in national institutional capacity development, consider using global and regional projects to promote new approaches and sectoral anti-corruption initiatives. Global and regional projects should be leveraged to meet the programming needs of middle-income countries.

**Management response:** UNDP management fully agrees with the recommendation. UNDP will consider opportunities for strengthening anti-corruption components in existing global and regional governance programmes and initiatives. In line with this recommendation, UNDP has rolled out the ‘Anti-corruption for Peaceful and Inclusive Societies’ global project (known as ‘ACPIS’) to continue UNDP global policy and programme support on anti-corruption.

The new UNDP funding windows (such as the window on governance for peaceful and inclusive societies) will be used as an opportunity for UNDP to allocate funding to global, regional and country-level anti-corruption initiatives.

**Recommendation 6: Enhance fund mobilization for anti-corruption support, championing select areas of anti-corruption and accountability initiatives.**

As a way to open more funding avenues, the UNDP fund mobilization approach should consider taking into account opportunities to link anti-corruption and accountability and transparency to social services and development sectors.

**Management response:** UNDP management fully agrees with the recommendation, while noting the challenges resulting from the high degree of dependence on a handful of donors to its global anti-corruption programme. UNDP will intensify its partnership development efforts and diversify the donor base when mobilizing resources for supporting anti-corruption and governance interventions, focusing particularly on multilateral development banks, the private sector and donor agencies.

The roll-out of the Anti-Corruption for Peaceful and Inclusive Societies global project, 2016–2020, is an opportunity for donor partners to contribute specifically to UNDP anti-corruption work. The new UNDP funding windows (such as the window on governance for peaceful and inclusive societies) also provide an opportunity for interested donor partners to provide pooled, flexible funding through which they can support implementation of the UNDP strategic plan. The objective of the funding windows is to improve the quality of non-core funding to UNDP; promote more integrated programming, and respond to emerging issues. The windows are intended to help UNDP and its partners align around common goals to support country-focused efforts to achieve the SDGs.

UNDP will: (a) Work with UNODC and other United Nations partners to design joint programmes/projects on anti-corruption and governance integrity; (b) Continue to brief donor partners on UNDP plans to implement Goal 16 and mainstream it into other goals (this will help to mobilize additional resources in support of the SDGs); and (c) Brief donor partners on the UNDP approach, niche and priorities regarding anti-corruption and its global, regional and country-level projects and activities.

**Recommendation 7: Strengthen staff capacities at the global and regional levels to address the need for specialized policy and technical services for anti-corruption programming.**

A structural review of UNDP has consolidated institutional arrangements and streamlined staff positions at headquarters and regional hubs. Given UNDP commitments to SDG 16 and the global anti-corruption agenda, it is critical that UNDP have adequate staff capacities at the global and regional levels. Staff capacities at the
regional hubs are critical to supporting smaller Country Offices. Consider increasing staff with anti-corruption expertise at headquarters and regional hubs.

Management response: UNDP management fully agrees with the recommendation, while recognizing that an expansion of capacities is dependent on additional resources. UNDP will ensure that relevant capacities in support of development and implementation of anti-corruption programming are maintained and strengthened to the extent possible and pending the mobilization of additional resources.
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 RATIONALE AND PURPOSE

This evaluation was carried out by the Independent Evaluation Office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to assess national-level UNDP contributions to anti-corruption capacity development. The evaluation is part of the UNDP medium-term plan (DP/2014/5), approved by the UNDP Executive Board in January 2014. In approving the evaluation, the Executive Board recognized the importance of support to anti-corruption and accountability and transparency measures for equitable governance. Given the thrust to anti-corruption and public accountability and transparency in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the evaluation will contribute to strategizing the UNDP anti-corruption programme.

The evaluation will be presented to the Executive Board at its first regular session in January 2017. The evaluation’s main purposes include: a) strengthening UNDP accountability to global and national development partners, including the Executive Board; b) contributing to the development of the UNDP anti-corruption programme strategy; and c) facilitating organizational learning.

1.2 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

The evaluation assessed UNDP contributions to countries within development contexts and in transition for the 2008 to 2016 period, covering the last Strategic Plan 2008–2011 (extended to 2013), and the current Strategic Plan 2014–2017. Contributions of UNDP global, regional and country-level programmes pertaining to anti-corruption and those addressing drivers of corruption were assessed. In making the overall assessment of UNDP contributions, the evaluation assessed relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability at the global, regional and country levels as against the expectations in the Strategic Plans: a) changes in macro policies and awareness; b) changes in capacities of state and non-state actors; and c) improved governance quality.

The objectives of the evaluation were to:

- Assess UNDP contributions to strengthening national capacities in anti-corruption and addressing drivers of corruption;
- Assess UNDP contributions to global and regional anti-corruption policy debates and advocacy; and
- Identify factors that explain UNDP contributions.

For the purposes of this evaluation, UNDP programmes pertaining to anti-corruption are broadly classified into two areas: 1) strengthening anti-corruption policies and institutions and 2) addressing drivers of corruption. The activities that were assessed under these two areas are presented in Figure 1.

---


In this evaluation, ‘anti-corruption’ refers to eradicating, controlling and preventing corruption in public office and entails policies and institutional measures to take action against the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. ‘Addressing drivers of corruption’ refers to entailing measures taken to tackle substantial institutional weaknesses, not just the integrity flaws of some individuals. It entails minimizing the circumstances in which the opportunities and net benefits of corruption are particularly high, for example, by addressing issues related to the organization of state authority and public administration and by fostering accountable and transparent governance processes (accountability for public officials and transparency and predictability in government functioning). As presented in Figure 1, UNDP has supported anti-corruption policies and institutions and measures that would address drivers of corruption. The evaluation did not assess all UNDP-supported activities in the areas of public administration, decentralization or the rule of law. Instead, it focused on initiatives that had greater scope for addressing the drivers of corruption. The evaluation specifically assessed public administration and decentralization initiatives related to accountability and transparency in government processes and functioning.

The evaluation covered all five regions where UNDP implements programmes (Africa; Arab States; Asia and the Pacific; Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States; and Latin America and the Caribbean), comprising countries of all income categories.
1.3 APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

In assessing UNDP programme support at the country level, the evaluation recognizes that anti-corruption and accountability and transparency initiatives entail dynamic and systemic processes and complex sets of interactions among various institutions and actors, and that there would be limitations in measuring the effectiveness of anti-corruption, public accountability and transparency policies. The dependent variables (for example, accountability and transparency mechanisms, public administration modernization) associated with anti-corruption and governance programming are very similar. In addition, the relationships between independent variables (for example, anti-corruption and accountable and transparent governance) are more reciprocal than strictly causal. Further, the outcomes of anti-corruption programmes by themselves, in isolation from other governance measures, may not always be discernible. Anti-corruption and accountability initiatives in a majority of cases are embedded within programmes that address wider public administration and governance reform processes; causal linkages may not always be clearly discernible.

EVALUATING CONTRIBUTION TO ANTI-CORRUPTION AT THE COUNTRY LEVEL: THE THEORY OF CHANGE

The previous and current UNDP Strategic Plans consider anti-corruption and addressing drivers of corruption as elements in strengthening governance. This, in turn, is seen to contribute to sustainable development, thereby eradicating poverty and reducing inequalities and exclusion. Drawing on the approaches and outcomes of the two Strategic Plans, the theory of change developed for this evaluation underpins that targeted anti-corruption approaches need to be complemented by measures to improve overall accountability and transparency and thereby governance quality.

The theory of change outlines the causal and reciprocal pathways of anti-corruption and addressing drivers of corruption programme contributions in order to understand: the extent of UNDP programme support given a particular governance context (what did UNDP do?); the approach of contribution (were UNDP programmes appropriate for achieving national results?); the process of contribution (how did the contribution occur?); and the contribution of UNDP and the significance of contribution (what was the contribution? Did UNDP accomplish its intended objectives?). The theory of change is schematically presented in Figure 2.

Anti-corruption and accountability and transparency-related governance outcomes are long-term and nationally driven; political commitment and the extent and pace of addressing them significantly determine programme outcomes. Variations across countries exist in terms of governance quality, emphasis given to governance reforms and political commitment to pursue anti-corruption agendas, with implications for country performance across governance variables. Areas where performance has been better or worse are key to understanding the causal patterns in anti-corruption and governance outcomes. While the evaluation outlines a set of causal mechanisms (processes and pathways), determining the direction of causal pathways of UNDP contributions will be challenging.

UNDP support differs in the scale and continuity of its engagement across country programmes; in some areas, UNDP support is relatively small to overall governance outcomes in the country. As a result, there are limitations for aggregating UNDP contributions across countries. In assessing the contribution, what is critical is whether UNDP support was strategic for governance outcomes in the country, the nature of the contributions, whether UNDP support enabled partnerships at the country level and whether UNDP maximized its comparative advantage in the governance area in order to enhance results related to anti-corruption and accountability and transparency. In addition, a country’s governance context, the conditions that enable anti-corruption and accountability and transparency outcomes, and factors that determine the pace of such outcomes are fundamental to assessing the contribution of UNDP programmes.
The causal linkages outlined in the theory of change are intended to identify the level of contribution that is commensurate with the scope of a UNDP programme and the relevance and effectiveness of such a contribution. The theory of change, therefore, does not propose to link UNDP contributions directly to reductions in corruption, to increased accountability and transparency or to the lack of it. Determining specific causal linkages of contribution for anti-corruption and accountability and transparency programmes to governance outcomes has limitations, particularly when the scope of the programme is small in the face of the enormity of contextual issues associated with results in the area.

The theory of change distinguishes between immediate outcomes, intermediary outcomes and long-term outcomes, recognizing that some of the components are iterative (see Figure 2). The progression of outcomes may not always be clearly classifiable between the three levels of outcomes. Therefore, the levels are not meant to be seen as independent blocks. Such a categorization, however, was useful for the evaluation to keep the UNDP programme expectations commensurate with the scope of UNDP support. For example, improving the quality of procurement systems or strengthening the capacities of anti-corruption agencies can be considered as immediate or intermediary outcomes depending on the level of capacities enhanced. Establishing contribution (and attribution) will be more complex for long-term outcomes because of multiple actors and the numerous factors involved. The certainty of UNDP contribution, therefore, is greater at the immediate and intermediary outcome levels.

The level of visibility of UNDP programme outcomes or results achieved, in terms of contribution to anti-corruption and addressing drivers of corruption and related outcomes, depends largely on their relative importance for the countries as well as the positioning of UNDP support vis-à-vis other activities by state and non-state agencies, resources assigned by UNDP, length of engagement and other contextual factors. Some of the programme inputs and outputs of UNDP support may not be significant given the range of activities of different agencies. It will not be practical in all instances to separate UNDP programme inputs from others and look at their contribution in isolation, although the evaluation will follow the regular approach of looking at outputs, outcomes and UNDP contributions. Different levels of UNDP contribution at the country level are outlined in the theory of change.
UNDP support entails inputs in two areas of support: strengthening anti-corruption policies and institutions and addressing drivers of corruption. These areas are funded by UNDP or by bilateral donors or governments through UNDP. UNDP programme inputs complement ongoing efforts by governments and other agencies (including international cooperation).

The immediate outcomes are largely outputs. UNDP activities, combined with ongoing activities pursued by governments and other development actors, manifest in immediate outcomes. Immediate outcomes include changes that, when pursued, contribute to anti-corruption and accountability and transparency outcomes (such as formulating policy, establishing institutional systems and practices and technical backstopping). The key assumption underpinning the manifestation of immediate outcomes is that UNDP programme strategies and choices of activities are appropriate to the policy environment and respond to the capacity needs of governments and civil society.

Intermediary outcomes comprise enhanced capacities of government institutions and state and non-state actors to pursue an anti-corruption and accountability and transparency agenda. A key assumption underpinning the manifestation of intermediary outcomes is that a range of specific activities and actions are carried out, which establish some of the necessary conditions for developing the capacities of national institutions and actors. Another key assumption is that the scope and scale of UNDP programmes are reasonably sufficient to contribute to intermediary outcomes.

Long-term outcomes are the contributions to macro-level policy and institutional processes and changes pertaining to reductions in corruption or greater transparency and accountability in governance. Contributions to long-term outcomes largely depend on the level of intermediary outcomes. Considering that a number of factors determine the success of governance reforms and improved governance quality, the evidence linking UNDP contributions to long-term outcomes is likely to be weak. This does not rule out the possibility of UNDP contributions to national-level long-term outcomes.

The evaluation gives primary emphasis to immediate and intermediate outcomes, where UNDP programme contributions are likely to be evident and correspond to approximate levels of boundaries for the organization’s accountability in this area.

EVALUATION CRITERIA

In making the overall assessment of UNDP contributions, the evaluation assessed relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability at the country level as against the expectations in the Strategic Plans for enabling a) changes in macro policies and awareness; b) changes in capacities of state and non-state actors; and c) improvements in anti-corruption and accountability and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevance:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• To what extent was UNDP support to anti-corruption and accountability and transparency measures relevant to strengthening national anti-corruption capacities and addressing corruption drivers?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To what extent did UNDP programmes respond to the country’s anti-corruption and addressing drivers of corruption needs and priorities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How relevant were UNDP programmes to the country’s specific governance strengths and weaknesses?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To what extent did UNDP leverage its global presence to engage in global and regional debates and advocacy on anti-corruption and accountability and transparency?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued)
transparency. Box 1 presents evaluation criteria and key questions used in the evaluation.

1.4 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

A cumulative, multi-source evidence base was synthesized in order to arrive at UNDP contributions to anti-corruption and accountability and transparency. The evaluation used a mixed method approach, and protocols were developed for each of the methods (see Figure 3 for the process of data collection and analysis). The evaluation arrived at judgements through the use of document review, meta-synthesis of evaluations, country case studies, country desk studies and macro-level data analysis (governance and socio-economic data).

Document review

The evaluation reviewed the available literature on the subject (global and regional publications on the subject, publications and documents of national and international agencies); UNDP programme documents (global, regional and country programmes) and monitoring information; and relevant national development strategies.

Meta-synthesis

The evaluation carried out a meta-synthesis of country-level evaluations on anti-corruption and accountability and transparency-related support. The rationale for meta-synthesis was the use of a structured approach to analysing qualitative evidence produced by the large number of evaluations carried out by UNDP. The meta-synthesis covered evaluations conducted from 2008 to 2015, which included 110 evaluation reports pertaining to 65 country programmes. Of these, 34 were Assessments of Development Results (country programme evaluations) carried out by the Independent Evaluation Office of UNDP and the rest were evaluations carried out by UNDP programme units. The meta-synthesis used a set of parameters in drawing information related to UNDP support and contribution. The evaluation criteria and questions were used to set the boundaries for the scope and depth of the meta-synthesis. The meta-synthesis:

- Summarized the evidence on UNDP performance and contribution to anti-corruption and accountability and transparency and conditions that enabled or constrained such contributions;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 1. Evaluation criteria and key questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To what extent did UNDP contribute to strengthening national capacities in anti-corruption?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To what extent were programme objectives achieved given their relative importance to addressing drivers of corruption (enhancing accountability and transparency) and reducing corruption?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What were the contributions of UNDP accountability and transparency programmes to strengthening national anti-corruption?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What were the factors that enhanced the contributions of UNDP programmes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What were the contributions of UNDP to global and regional anti-corruption and accountability and transparency debates and advocacy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Efficiency:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To what degree did UNDP programmes and processes use resources in ways to achieve more results for least cost? How efficient were programme management arrangements at the global, regional and national levels?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainability:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To what extent are the results of UNDP contributions likely to be sustainable? Were UNDP programme contributions sustained beyond the programme period?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Assessed the extent to which the evidence available in the evaluations allows causality analysis based on the theory of change used by the evaluation; and

Tested hypotheses for why performance varied between country programmes.

The stand-alone programme unit evaluations were essentially meant to inform respective country programmes or projects. Therefore, attention was paid to extracting narrative evidence from the evaluation reports.

For the meta-synthesis countries, the evaluation documented broader governance issues as mentioned in the evaluation reports. In order to ensure uniformity, the indicators were also used.

Desk studies
Desk studies were carried out for 13 countries to broaden the evaluative evidence of UNDP contributions and related processes and to include different governance contexts (see Table 1 for the list of countries). The desk studies comprised an analysis of the national governance context, analysis of relevant literature and data, analysis of government strategies, analysis of UNDP programme and monitoring documents, and telephonic interviews with UNDP staff and programme partners to verify information.

Country case studies
Country case studies were carried out in 10 countries in order to provide in-depth insights on the contributions of UNDP support and factors facilitating or constraining UNDP contributions (see Table 1 for the list of countries). The country case studies involved visits to the countries to provide further insights into the processes, outcomes and other factors involved in UNDP contributions. Country case studies comprised a comprehensive analysis of the national governance context, analysis of relevant literature and data, analysis of government strategies, interviews with a range of development stakeholders and cross-checking of data collected from different sources. The country case studies covered the entire range of support to anti-corruption and integrity mechanisms.

For the country case studies and desk studies, the evaluation examined the governance context in more detail, specifically measures relating...
to public administration reforms, civil service reforms and decentralization reforms, paying specific attention to accountability and transparency measures. Some of the reform areas where UNDP was more engaged were examined in detail to better understand the trajectory of governance strategies pursued, institutional capacities at the country level and UNDP responses.

**Countries selected for data collection**

Identification of country case studies and in-depth desk studies was based on a preliminary analysis of 70 countries across regions and a classification of country programme governance profiles according to each of the two streams of UNDP support to anti-corruption and addressing drivers of corruption. The studies included a) those countries where UNDP has supported accountability and transparency measures and sector-specific initiatives, but where specific support to anti-corruption was not significant; b) countries with significant direct anti-corruption support; and c) those with a combination of the two programme streams. In addition, the selected country and desk studies represent different income categories, different levels of progress on governance and corruption control indices, and those with comparatively high levels of official development assistance. The countries represent all five regions in which UNDP has ongoing programmes. The countries included in the evaluation are presented in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Data collection methods and sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Method</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country case studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Arab States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Asia and the Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Europe and the CIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-depth desk country studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Arab States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Asia and the Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Europe and the CIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meta-synthesis of evaluations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Arab States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Asia and the Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Europe and the CIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews (including those carried out as part of case studies and desk studies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Government and intergovernmental actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Civil society organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• International organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Executive Board members and UN Missions Donor agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• United Nations agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• UNDP management and staff (headquarters, regional hubs, Country Offices)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: # Any references to Palestine throughout this report shall be understood as “occupied Palestinian territory.”

* Any references to Kosovo throughout this report shall be understood as “Kosovo under United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).”
The evaluation used a multi-stakeholder consultation process. Consultations were held with a range of development actors at the country level (e.g. government, civil society and NGO representatives, donors, multilateral and bilateral agencies and other national and international development organizations); representatives of Member States; donor representatives in their respective headquarters; UNDP management and staff in the programme units at headquarters, regional hubs and Country Offices; representatives of relevant UN agencies; and international civil society organizations.

DATA ANALYSIS

For analysis of the data and arriving at judgements, the evaluation used a rating to determine the strength of evidence collected by the evaluation, weighted scoring and Qualitative Comparative Analysis.

Strength of evidence

The evaluation used a three-point rating system (strong/high, medium/moderate, low/weak) to rate the confidence in evidence used for arriving at the judgement for the evaluation questions. When weighting the evidence, attention was paid to their demonstrative value and reliability; ascertaining the influential issues that emerged and reasons for ascribing more or less weight to particular evidence; acknowledging when there was concurrence among the evidence, even when there was less confidence in the evidence; and acknowledging when there were contradictions in the evidence when drawing from different data sources.

Weighted ratings

The evaluation used weighted ratings to assess UNDP contributions, for systematizing analysis and for consistency of assessment processes across countries and regions. It enabled the evaluation team to distinguish between context-related variations and UNDP programme approaches that can be attributed to the overall contribution of UNDP. It also enabled the evaluation team to map patterns in cross-country analysis. While the ‘relevance’ and ‘efficiency’ criteria were assigned a weight of 25, ‘effectiveness’ was assigned a weight of 30, and ‘sustainability’ a weight of 20.

A five-point scale was used for rating the four evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability; see Box 2). The ratings are not stand-alone assessments, but were used to substantiate qualitative judgements. Finer gradation is therefore deliberately avoided.

For each criterion, a set of evaluation questions and a series of judgement considerations were used to arrive at ratings on UNDP contributions to anti-corruption and addressing drivers of corruption. To factor consequences of the context in UNDP performance and contribution, a context judgement consideration was introduced for the effectiveness and sustainability criteria.

Box 2. Five-point scale for rating UNDP performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 = Very Good</td>
<td>A rating of this level meant that results exceeded expectations and that no significant unintended negative effects occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 = Good</td>
<td>This rating signified that although some issues related to the anti-corruption and accountability and transparency outputs prevented a rating of 5, there were no major shortfalls. Overall, the assessment was substantially positive, and problems were small relative to the positive findings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 = Average</td>
<td>Identified shortfalls were complemented by some positive findings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 = Poor</td>
<td>Although the evaluation identified some positive findings, there were also some significant shortfalls. Overall results were not those originally envisioned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = Very Poor</td>
<td>The evaluation concluded that anti-corruption and accountability and transparency outputs had clear problems and did not succeed in achieving the desired outcomes. Negative effects were apparent and outweighed any positive achievements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NE=Negligible evidence; NA=Scoring not applicable
Weights, aggregating to 100 percent, were assigned to the judgement considerations for each question. Multiplying the individual evaluation scores by the weight and aggregating the results yielded the overall scores for rating programme and activity relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability. Before applying scores, the evaluation established a degree of confidence in the evidence and findings in order to minimize errors in applying ratings and appropriately using evidence in arriving at UNDP contributions.

**Qualitative Comparative Analysis**

The evaluation used Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) for analysing the causal contribution of different aspects of a programme intervention and the wider context to strengthening anti-corruption capacities and enabling anti-corruption outcomes. The QCA was carried out for the country and desk studies as well as for the meta-synthesis of evaluations. The QCA enabled identification of set of conditions that account for UNDP programme outcomes, different pathways that enabled achieving anti-corruption outcomes, and understanding constraining conditions that impacted outcomes of the anti-corruption initiatives and those addressing drivers of corruption. The outcome conditions, mechanisms conditions and context conditions used for synthesizing evaluation reports are presented in Annex 4.

### 1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

This report is divided into four chapters. This introductory chapter is followed by Chapter 2, which discusses global and regional responses and the governance context in the countries included for analysis and a brief description of the UNDP programme. Chapter 3 presents the assessment of UNDP contributions to anti-corruption and addressing drivers of corruption. Chapter 4 presents conclusions and recommendations for future UNDP actions.

---

4 The evaluation used continuous fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis for analysing meta-synthesis data, assigning each case a score (0 to 1 scale) for the outcome (the dependent variable) and a number of causal conditions (the independent variables). The analysis identified the particular combinations of causal factors that are sufficient to bring about the outcome.
Chapter 2

GOVERNANCE CONTEXTS AND UNDP ANTI-CORRUPTION RESPONSES

This chapter discusses global, regional and country-level responses, key governance challenges and UNDP programme response. The discussion in this chapter is intended to provide a brief overview of the governance contexts to which UNDP programmes responded.

Globally, corruption and lack of transparency and accountability in governance remain major challenges to achieving development goals. Governments have espoused regional and international conventions and domestic legislations for addressing corruption. During the course of this evaluation (2015–2016), there were significant global events and intergovernmental agreements that aim to further the anti-corruption and governance agenda for better development. The agreement on the SDGs, particularly Goal 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions) and the Global Declaration against Corruption at the London Anti-corruption Summit assume significance given the backdrop of the detrimental impacts that corruption and poor governance have on reducing poverty and inequality. While significant losses in development resources reinforce the urgency for implementing global commitments, several high-profile corruption cases around the globe are reminders of the grand and systemic corruption and lack of transparency in governance. There is growing demand for decisive action by the governments who pledged commitment to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) almost a decade ago, and that have now made commitments to the SDGs, specifically Goal 16, which requires specific action on all forms of corruption.

Addressing governance, corruption and development linkages has been long recognized as critical for achieving development outcomes. Governance issues have been raised repeatedly as an impediment to development and achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Although not directly part of the MDGs, countries and international development agencies made efforts to improve governance through various reforms and to reduce the abuse of public positions and resources meant for development. Such efforts had varying levels of success in reducing corruption and enhancing accountability and transparency.

Given the magnitude of corruption and governance deficits globally, and variation in governance contexts, successful anti-corruption measures should take into consideration the governance challenges in a country. Context-specific governance reforms, particularly those that enhance accountability and transparency in public administration, and anti-corruption measures are necessary and mutually reinforcing. This reciprocity would mean that improving government accountability and transparency is key to anti-corruption and the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures.

2.1 GLOBAL AND REGIONAL RESPONSES

Corruption, long treated as a development issue in need of international engagement, has been a subject of deliberation at global and regional intergovernmental forums. Various international conventions on different areas that address corruption have encouraged governments to formulate legislation and ensure compliance. The UNCAC and SDG 16 are a collective acknowl-
edgment of the need for emphasis on governance and the extent to which corruption and bribery have impacted development and stability. Such efforts have played a crucial role in furthering the agenda of many governments. The UNCAC, which came into force in 2005, was the second comprehensive international legal instrument against corruption, the first being the 1997 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, with a narrower membership. With 178 countries today, UNCAC has contributed to governments establishing anti-corruption institutions and adopting national legal instruments against corruption, including anti-corruption laws and strategies.

Effective anti-corruption enforcement, however, requires systemic changes in public administration and the existence of robust judicial and prosecutorial systems, which are evolving in many countries. SDG 16, with its specific targets on corruption, illicit flows, and the development of effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels, has reinforced the discussion on the impacts of corruption, long-standing measurement issues and specific actions by governments. SDG 16 also highlights the significance of strengthening core government institutions and functions for sustainable development. Although there are legitimate concerns that an expanded list of targets could mean that governments will prioritize certain targets, it is too early to say whether governments will prioritize the anti-corruption and accountability and transparency objectives of SDG 16, despite the objectives’ widely acknowledge significance to achieving development goals.

REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS, INSTITUTIONS AND MECHANISMS

There are a number of regional anti-corruption conventions, largely adopted in the past decade (see Box 3). With the near universal ratification of the UNCAC, anti-corruption has been elevated on the development policy agenda in Africa. The African continent has a large number of regional organizations, economic communities, free trade areas, custom unions and treaties. Similarly, a range of instruments has emerged to address corruption. The anti-corruption instruments vary in their scope and binding nature, ranging from regional conventions and protocols to voluntary guidelines and standards (see Box 3). To date, the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2006) has been ratified by 37 of 54 member states. It is the most comprehensive regional anti-corruption convention, covering a wide range of punitive and preventive measures as well as provisions for international cooperation. In 2009, the African Union Advisory Board against Corruption was set up to promote the implementation of the African Union Convention. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development, the African Union’s vision and policy framework, and the African Peer Review Mechanism are also of relevance for the implementation of the African Union Convention. In 2011, the African Union Commission set up the African Governance Architecture, an overarching political and institutional framework to coordinate existing governance initiatives and to promote a more integrated approach.

The adoption of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption in 1996 under the auspices of the Organization of American States laid the foundation for intergovernmental coop-

---

6 OECD, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm
8 Apart from monitoring the measures adopted by member states, the Advisory Board is tasked with providing policy advice to governments, collecting and disseminating information on the nature and scope of corruption in Africa, promoting public awareness and facilitating dialogue between a wide range of stakeholders.
To date, the following 32 countries and jurisdictions from the Asia and the Pacific region have joined the Initiative: Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, People’s Republic of China, Cook Islands, Fiji Islands, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Macao, China, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Republic of Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vanuatu and Viet Nam.

The Arab Convention against Corruption was ratified by 12 out of 22 Arab countries. A significant initiative in 2013 by the Gulf Cooperation Council was the establishment of a Committee for the heads of agencies involved in the fight against cor-

The Asia-Pacific region is the only region that does not have a regional anti-corruption convention. There are, however, regional intergovernmental initiatives, such as the Anti-corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific (1999), a regional forum for supporting national and multilateral efforts to reduce corruption in Asia and the Pacific. Member governments formulate the Initiative’s strategies and implement programmes and activities with the help of its secretariat, which is jointly managed by the Asian Development Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In 2010, the Initiative adopted Strategic Principles that guide the Initiative’s future activities and strategic direction and made UNCAC implementation a priority for the Initiative.  

The Arab Convention against Corruption was ratified by 12 out of 22 Arab countries. A significant initiative in 2013 by the Gulf Cooperation Council was the establishment of a Committee for the heads of agencies involved in the fight against cor-

---


10 To date, the following 32 countries and jurisdictions from the Asia and the Pacific region have joined the Initiative: Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, People’s Republic of China, Cook Islands, Fiji Islands, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Macao, China, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Republic of Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vanuatu and Viet Nam.
ruption and the promotion of accountability and transparency in Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Such initiatives aimed to strengthen common action in the region for the protection of integrity and the fight against corruption.

Although the global and regional anti-corruption architecture made important progress, it is not working as planned in terms of assuring effective enforcement and concrete measures. Considering the voluntary nature of most of the conventions and the lack of proper monitoring mechanisms, compliance and enforcement are evolving at a slow pace. In some regions, too many conventions have meant an overload of reviews and dilution of the conventions’ purposes.

Country-level ownership of regional instruments and initiatives remains a challenge in all regions. For example, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance has so far only been ratified by 10 out of 54 member states and has, therefore, yet to enter into force. Little progress has been reported in terms of the implementation of the Southern Africa Development Community Protocol or the African Charter on the Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration. In the Asia and the Pacific region, under the Anti-corruption Initiative’s Action Plan, member countries have committed to reforming their legal and institutional frameworks, strengthening safeguards against corruption and implementing internationally recognized standards, but progress has been slow. Similarly, in the Arab States region, although a majority of countries have ratified both UNCAC and the regional Arab Anti-corruption Convention (2010), specific measures to control corruption and their implementation are not taking place at the required pace. Across regions, progress in terms of implementation continues to be slow.

For almost twenty years, the Council of Europe and the EU Conventions have sustained the momentum in member countries against corruption. The Istanbul Anti-corruption Action Plan, a subregional peer review programme in the framework of the OECD Anti-corruption Network, supports anti-corruption reforms through country reviews and continuous monitoring of implementation of recommendation and promotion of UNCAC and other international standards and best practices. Implementation issues are similar to other regions; there are countries in the region where there were reversals in corruption control.

2.2 NATIONAL GOVERNANCE TRENDS

Even going by conservative estimates, bribery alone is costing $1 trillion globally every year. Other estimates show that corruption costs comprise up to 25 percent of the cost of procurement contracts in a large number of countries, a reflection of weak governance and institutions. Public-sector corruption is a key barrier to effective service delivery, particularly in the health and education sectors, which disproportionately impacts on the poor. Public funds lost to corruption are estimated to be 10 times the amount of official development assistance. Hindering economic development, corruption negatively correlates with economic outcomes leading to poor and suboptimal management

---

11 AU Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, achpr.org/instruments/charter-democracy/
of public finances, with consequences for public expenditure decisions and investments. The impacts on women and girls have been found to be particularly severe, deepening social inequality.\textsuperscript{15} There is extensive empirical evidence that corruption negatively impacts on public expenditure decisions due to biases in the allocation of public funds. There is a greater possibility that development interventions with higher political returns may be selected at the expense of those with higher economic and social returns, resulting in inefficiencies and diminished and negative development outcomes.

An analysis of the governance context, as captured by the World Governance Indicators of 65 countries included in this evaluation over the span of 10 years (from 2004 to 2015), suggests that government effectiveness, voice and accountability, political stability, absence of violence and the rule of law are closely correlated with the control of corruption.\textsuperscript{16} The countries that showed improvements in governance effectiveness also showed similar improvements in corruption control (see Annex 7). Among the countries that experienced significant reversals, governance effectiveness and control of corruption were closely correlated, although the causal linkages are uncertain. Across indicators, about 25 countries showed different levels of reversals; among these, at least 10 countries showed significant reversals for governance effectiveness and control of corruption over a period of 10 years (see Figure 4).

There is the recognition that anti-corruption gains are likely to remain small if interventions aimed at taking action on corruption are not combined with a wider set of interventions aimed at improving the quality of governance institutions in general. Analysis based on World Bank governance data shows mixed, sometimes inconsistent results. For example, countries with better government effectiveness and corruption control scores had lower voice and accountability scores or political stability (see Annex 7). Similarly, better voice and accountability scores did not have a corresponding corruption control score. Such inconsistencies reaffirm the complexity of challenges in governance and corruption control linkages, the criticality of key reforms and the efforts needed to achieve the critical mass of transformation in areas that would contribute to overall governance effectiveness.

The transparency and access to information indicators have been relatively stagnant. The level of budget transparency is insufficient for the majority of the 65 countries.\textsuperscript{17} According to the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, the perception of corruption remains high in many of the countries included in this evaluation, especially so in resource-


\textsuperscript{16} World Bank Governance Indicators, info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home

\textsuperscript{17} According to the Open Budget Survey data for 2015, Chile, Peru, Uganda and Viet Nam have sufficient budget transparency, while Albania, Cambodia, Egypt, Guatemala, Jordan, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Tanzania, Tunisia and Turkey had insufficient transparency. International Budget Partnership, 2015, ‘Open Budget Survey 2015, Washington DC, internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBS2015-Report-English.pdf
Transparency International is a global civil society organization that has developed the Corruption Perceptions Index. The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries based on how corrupt their public sector (administrative and political) is perceived to be. It is a composite perception-based index drawing on corruption-related data collected by a variety of reputable institutions. The Corruption Perceptions Index reflects the views of observers from around the world, including experts living and working in the countries and territories evaluated. Transparency International publishes annual reports covering 177 countries with some 20 years of historic data.

High-income non-OECD countries performed better than upper- and lower-middle-income countries; upper-middle-income countries likewise performed better than lower-middle-income countries. There is a correlation between corruption control and Human Development; countries with higher levels of corruption are lower on the human development index (see Figure 5).

18 Transparency International is a global civil society organization that has developed the Corruption Perceptions Index. The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries based on how corrupt their public sector (administrative and political) is perceived to be. It is a composite perception-based index drawing on corruption-related data collected by a variety of reputable institutions. The Corruption Perceptions Index reflects the views of observers from around the world, including experts living and working in the countries and territories evaluated. Transparency International publishes annual reports covering 177 countries with some 20 years of historic data.
While half of the 65 countries included in this evaluation showed progress in governance effectiveness over a period of ten years, the level of progress has been not substantial enough for an overall improvement of the performance of the institutions. Most countries need significant improvements in governance effectiveness; over a period of 10 years, only 14 countries showed notable progress of 10 or more percentile points in improvement. It is important to note that in 27 countries there were governance effectiveness reversals, and in at least 11 countries the reversals were significant (see Annex 7).

Capacity challenges relate to the lack of financial and human capital or technical capabilities, which varied across institutions. Capacities, incentives and political commitments are inadequate to enable speedy governance reforms. Across regions, there was an uneven mix of capacities among different governance institutions and levels of government. Similarly, the quality of governance institutions varied considerably within individual countries; there was even greater variation in institutional effectiveness, which is not captured by the global governance indicators.

Challenges remain in the effective utilization of public-sector investment in infrastructure, health, education and other development activities that enhance the quality of people’s lives. Corruption correlates positively with high child and infant mortality rates, illiteracy and lack of access to sanitation. Better MDG outcomes on education, health and water are strongly and positively correlated with increased transparency, accountability and integrity. Policies in place to increase transparency and combat corruption in public

---

finance management have been shown to boost gross domestic product (GDP) by as much as 0.6 percent annually.20

The paradox of growth and high corruption in resource-rich countries has been a long-standing issue. Many countries that have significant natural resources lack important checks on government power. Extractive industries (e.g. mining and oil and gas production) are a major source of investment and revenue in many African countries as well as those in other regions. This sector is especially prone to corruption and illicit financial flows, particularly given the involvement of both political and commercial interests and traditionally low standards of accountability and transparency. Many countries have not been able to translate extractive industry revenues into sustainable economic development. In many cases, large extractive industry revenues even appear to have retarded economic and social development through a number of phenomena; there has been slow progress in reversing the ‘resource curse’.21

The resource-related governance challenges affecting many African countries have gained renewed prominence with recent oil and gas discoveries and extraction plans. As a share of GDP, sub-Saharan African resource rents are higher than those of any other region in the world.22 In Nigeria, for example, over-reliance on oil has led to the neglect of other sectors of the economy, such as agriculture and manufacturing, and has increased vulnerability to external shocks.23 In Uganda, there is a fear that political competition for the control of oil and gas discoveries in the western part of the country will intensify, which will in turn lead to corruption and embezzlement of funds. The consequences of insufficient financing, poor infrastructure, weak administration and significant capacity constraints have resulted in substandard social service delivery. There is an increasing acknowledgement that weak governance, high corruption and abundant natural resources are contributing to the incidence of armed violence. Several countries in which oil rents make up a significant percent of GDP have been afflicted by conflict.

While there has been a strong push for preventive efforts that address the drivers of corruption and related governance challenges, they are not sufficiently comprehensive to enable accountability and transparency in government functioning. Given the sensitivities associated with anti-corruption programming labelled as such, international donors and development organizations provided most of their support under the broader areas of public administration strengthening or good governance. Although this was a good strategy – and addressing public administration issues is important for anti-corruption – there are limits in establishing linkages between public administration strengthening and anti-corruption. Further, there is a dearth of information regarding which countries (or sectors, or activities) are weakly governed or particularly corrupt. A challenge in anti-corruption technical support provided through international cooperation is that political realities, power dynamics and social structures that perpetuate corruption are not adequately taken into consideration.

2.3 UNDP ANTI-CORRUPTION RESPONSES

In responding to global governance challenges, strengthening public administration and rule of law and supporting the development of democratic, transparent and accountable processes have been central to UNDP governance support for over two decades. In both Strategic Plans included in this evaluation, corruption was identified as one of the main impediments to pro-poverty development. Besides specific initiatives to strengthen anti-corruption policies and institutions, addressing drivers of corruption in public administration and local governance was considered as critical for accountable and efficient public services and for reducing corruption.

In the Strategic Plan 2008–2011 (originally for 2008–2013), UNDP prioritized three main areas of democratic governance: i) Expanding people’s opportunities to participate in decision-making processes, particularly women, marginalized groups and the poor; ii) making democratic institutions more accountable; and iii) promoting international principles of democratic governance. Anti-corruption initiatives pertaining to strengthening anti-corruption policies and institutions and to addressing drivers of corruption were implemented in all three areas of support (See Table 2 for outcomes and outputs related to strengthening anti-corruption policies and institutions and addressing drivers of corruption).24 The Strategic Plan 2008–2013 acknowledged the need for support to multisectoral accountability mechanisms (specifically public administration reform, public-sector ethics, decentralized governance and e-governance) as anti-corruption preventive measures. UNDP supported country-level implementation of the UNCAC.

The urgency of achieving the MDGs renewed interest in strengthening state delivery capacities. In particular, UNDP focused attention on improving the quality, responsiveness, accountability and transparency of the public sector to manage the delivery of goods and services. Recognizing the need to holistically address the policy, capacity-building and sector investment needs of local governments, UNDP supported the development of national programmes for decentralization and local development.

Continuing with governance programme priorities of the previous Strategic Plan, the 2014–2017 Strategic Plan defines UNDP democratic governance work as assistance to governance institutions to adapt to changing public expectations and to deliver clear benefit to citizens, such as better services, improved access to resources and greater security of persons and property. Similar to previous programme strategies, issues of corruption, poor public services and lack of equal rights for all are considered to be challenges to achieving sustainable development. Stronger systems of democratic governance are considered as key to responding to citizen expectations for voice, development, the rule of law and accountability.25

Responding to post-2015 priority areas, UNDP acknowledged that institutional and legal responses are required for increasing transparency, expanding access to information, maintaining adherence to the rule of law, building trust between the state and civil society and addressing corruption. UNDP took a broader approach to anti-corruption, considering that increased integrity in national and subnational public institutions is critical for improved governance, especially as countries mobilize a growing share of their development expenditures from domestic resources. Direct anti-corruption support is an output under the broader governance outcome.26

---

25 UNDP, 2013, ‘Background Note – Theory of Change for Outcome 2” (draft), New York, August.
26 Outcome 2 “Citizen expectations for voice, development, the rule of law and accountability are met by stronger systems of democratic governance.” See UNDP Executive Board, 2013, ‘UNDP strategic plan, 2014–2017 – Changing with the World’, (DP/2013/12), New York, June.
| Table 2. UNDP Strategic Plan outcomes and outputs pertaining to strengthening anti-corruption policies and institutions and addressing drivers of corruption |
|---|---|
| **Strategic Plan 2008-2013** |
| **Goal 1. Achieving the MDGs and reducing human poverty** |
| Outputs relevant to strengthening anti-corruption policies and institutions | Outputs relevant to addressing corruption drivers |
| 1.5. Strengthened capacities of local governments and other stakeholders to foster participatory local development and support achieving the MDGs |
| **Goal 2. Fostering democratic governance** |
| 2.9. Strengthened national-, regional- and local-level capacity to implement anti-corruption initiatives |
| 2.1. Civil society, including civil society organizations and voluntary associations, and the private sector contribute to the MDGs in support of national planning strategies and policies |
| 2.2. Electoral laws, processes and institutions strengthen inclusive participation and professional electoral administration |
| 2.3. Access to information policies support accountability and transparency |
| 2.4. National, regional and local levels of governance expand their capacities to reduce conflict and manage the equitable delivery of public services |
| 2.6. Effective, responsive, accessible and fair justice systems promote the rule of law, including both formal and informal processes, with due consideration on the rights of the poor, women and vulnerable groups |

| **Strategic Plan 2014-2017** |
| **Goal 2. Citizen expectations for voice, development, the rule of law and accountability are met by stronger systems of democratic governance** |
| 2.2. Institutions and systems enabled to address awareness, prevention and enforcement of anti-corruption measures across sectors and stakeholders |
| 2.1. Parliaments, constitution-making bodies and electoral institutions enabled to perform core functions for improved accountability, participation and representation, including for peaceful transitions |
| 2.4. Frameworks and dialogue processes engaged for effective and transparent engagement of civil society in national development |
| 2.6. Legal reform enabled to fight discrimination and address emerging issues (such as environmental and electoral justice) |

| **Goal 3. Countries have strengthened institutions to progressively deliver universal access to basic services** |
| 3.2. Functions, financing and capacity of subnational level institutions enabled to deliver improved basic services and respond to priorities voiced by the public |
| 3.3. National institutions, systems, laws and policies strengthened for equitable, accountable and effective delivery of HIV and related services |
| 3.4. Functions, financing and capacity of rule of law institutions enabled, including to improve access to justice and redress |

Sector-specific access to information is an area that has been identified as part of anti-corruption support. In select sectors and development areas, UNDP supported efforts to identify and address integrity risks.

UNDP country programmes supported a range of activities that provided direct support to strengthening anti-corruption measures and that targeted institutional drivers of corruption. Sixty-five country programmes have supported specific anti-corruption related interventions; 124 country programmes have supported governance programmes related to accountability and transparency and related governance practices which are analysed in Chapter 3.
This chapter analyses UNDP contributions to strengthening national capacities in anti-corruption and addressing drivers of corruption and UNDP contributions to global- and regional-level debates and advocacy. The analysis in this chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.1 presents the scope and scale of UNDP responses related to anti-corruption and addressing drivers of corruption. Section 3.2 analyses UNDP overall contributions to anti-corruption and addressing drivers of corruption; Section 3.3 analyses contribution to strengthening anti-corruption institutional capacities; Section 3.4 analyses how addressing drivers of corruption, specifically support to accountability and transparency processes, contributed to anti-corruption efforts; and Section 3.5 discusses the contribution of UNDP to global and regional anti-corruption policy debates and advocacy.

### 3.1 Scope and Scale of UNDP Responses Related to Anti-Corruption and Addressing Drivers of Corruption

Finding 1: Support to targeted anti-corruption initiatives is an emerging area of UNDP support. Overall, addressing drivers of corruption received more attention across country programmes.

Within the UNDP combined programme expenditure, governance programmes comprised the largest expenditure area in 2008 and 2009 (approximately 37 percent of UNDP expenditures in both years), and the second largest area from 2010 to 2013 (with an average of 25 percent of the total expenditure, whereas the poverty reduction and MDG portfolios represented an average of 29 percent for the same period). Since 2010, there was a gradual decrease in the relative share of gov-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total programme expenditure</th>
<th>Governance programmes expenditure</th>
<th>Percentage of governance expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4,278</td>
<td>1,566</td>
<td>37 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>4,262</td>
<td>1,514</td>
<td>36 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4,769</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>23 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>4,552</td>
<td>1,176</td>
<td>26 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>4,346</td>
<td>1,011</td>
<td>23 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>4,342</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>24 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014*</td>
<td>4,240</td>
<td>2,023</td>
<td>48 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015*</td>
<td>4,244</td>
<td>1,988</td>
<td>47 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>35,033</td>
<td>11,418</td>
<td>33 % (average)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Governance programme expenditure for 2014 and 2015 reflects new areas included in the governance outcomes subsequent to the Institutional Review in UNDP.

Source: UNDP Executive Snapshot Programme Overview (last accessed on 5/30/2016).
ernance programme expenditure. Following the UNDP structural reforms in 2014 under the current Strategic Plan, the peacebuilding and governance portfolios were combined into one portfolio. This resulted in a significant increase in the governance portfolio, to approximately 47 percent in 2014 and 48 percent in 2015. Table 3 presents the annual governance programme expenditures since 2008 compared to total programme expenditures.

In countries in development and transition contexts, the expenditure related to addressing drivers of corruption support was $1.48 billion for the period of 2008 to 2015, and $372 million for specific anti-corruption programmes for the same period. Table 4 presents anti-corruption and accountability and transparency-related expenditure as compared to overall governance expenditure for 2008 to 2015.

Although the Strategic Plans defined the broad parameters for UNDP country-level programming, activities pertaining to anti-corruption or public administration and local governance-related accountability and transparency initiatives (or any other governance themes) are not a component of a cross-country programming with shared objectives, designed and funded at the corporate level. Rather, the various initiatives represented country-level priorities and donor programme funding trends, with a significant variation in the scope and scale of the initiatives.27 The programme approaches also varied to suit the context and resource considerations. Funds received by UNDP country programmes are tied to specific interventions, and there is limited flexibility in terms of the areas they can focus and the time period of the initiatives. Similarly, in a number of countries in Latin America, programmes are funded by the government, which also sets the programme agenda. As UNDP regular resources declined, its leeway to engage and inform national anti-corruption and accountability and transparency programme efforts also decreased.

Finding 2: While support to anti-corruption and support to addressing drivers of corruption continues to be an important area of the UNDP governance programme, there was a decrease in the number of initiatives in these areas in a large majority of countries. Considering the enormity of corruption and accountability issues, annual average spending is low for all regions.

The Latin America and the Caribbean region had the highest expenditure for both areas of anti-corruption support (i.e. strengthening anti-corruption policies and institutions programmes and those that address drivers of corruption), followed by the Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and the Europe and the CIS regions. Similar expenditure patterns were seen for programmes related to addressing drivers of corruption (see Figure 7). In the case of expenditure related to targeted anti-corruption programmes, the Europe and the CIS region had the second largest expenditure, followed by the Asia

### Table 4. Anti-corruption and addressing drivers of corruption-related expenditure as compared to other governance expenditures: 2008–2015 (US$ millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addressing drivers of corruption</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>1,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-corruption</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other governance programmes</td>
<td>1,275</td>
<td>1,219</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>1,835</td>
<td>1,812</td>
<td>9,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,566</td>
<td>1,514</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>1,176</td>
<td>1,011</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>2,024</td>
<td>1,988</td>
<td>11,419</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ATLAS extraction and Independent Evaluation Office analysis

27 There were UNDP practice notes that defined what entails public administration work. However, the practice notes were essentially written to guide Country Offices; the notes cannot go beyond this to set any parameters for country-level support. Further, many of the programmes are decided based on country-level funding opportunities and needs.
and the Pacific and the Africa regions (see Figure 6). Overall, the Arab States region had the lowest expenditure compared to other regions. One of the reasons for comparatively higher expenditures in the Latin America and the Caribbean region is the consideration of the UNDP fiduciary role (broadly procurement and fund management related activities) in supporting governments as anti-corruption work (about 40 percent of the expenditures).

Figure 6. Expenditures on support to strengthening anti-corruption policies and institutions: 2008–2015 (US$ millions)

Source: UNDP Finance System (ATLAS) and Independent Evaluation Office analysis

Figure 7. Expenditure on support to addressing drivers of corruption (transparency and accountability measures): 2008–2015 (US$ millions)

Source: UNDP Finance System (ATLAS) and Independent Evaluation Office analysis
A large proportion (about 70 percent) of the anti-corruption projects were largely mobilized by Country Offices, with the UNDP global and regional programmes providing technical and programme management support and seed funding for initiating programmes. The share of regular resources was between 2 percent to 28 percent, mostly towards the lower end of the percentile. There has been a decrease in spending in targeted anti-corruption programming since 2012 and for addressing drivers of corruption since 2011 (see Figures 6 and 7). The decline was about 50 percent for anti-corruption programme expenditure and 35 percent for accountability and transparency-related programmes between 2008 and 2015, which corresponded with the reduction in UNDP corporate resources. Higher spending in 2008 for strengthening anti-corruption policies and institutions was due to the programmatic thrust that UNDP gave to this area since 2006 through global projects, which have since supported over 25 Country Offices, some of which initiated specific anti-corruption activities for the first time. The spending on global projects has subsequently declined, particularly since 2014.

The decline in resources was most significant in the Africa and the Latin America and the Caribbean regions. For example, in the Africa region, the annual average spending for 39 countries was approximately $52 million. Limited resources meant that the projects were not supported long enough to significantly contribute to higher-level outcomes. There was, however, an increase in the expenditure in the Arab States region by almost 70 percent for both addressing drivers of corruption and a similar increase in specific anti-corruption interventions (see Figures 6 and 7). This trend can be explained by the country-level resource mobilization challenges for anti-corruption programming in general. UNDP corporate investment in anti-corruption programming has been limited, and global and regional projects have been significantly downsized (see Tables 9 and 10). Prioritization of governance areas lacked consistency at the corporate level. The momentum generated by country-level anti-corruption efforts and by the global and regional projects was not adequately leveraged to develop a comprehensive anti-corruption portfolio.

The international funding for anti-corruption and accountability and transparency shows a downward trend. While this corresponded with low prioritization of the anti-corruption and accountability areas of public administration, it was also due to reduction in funding specifically for UNDP in some countries. Annex 7 presents donor-wise contributions to UNDP for the period 2008 to 2015. With exceptions, there has been a reduction in funding across donors for strengthening anti-corruption policies and institutions as well as for addressing drivers of corruption at the country level.

UNDP and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) compete for the same resources in the area of anti-corruption. Joint initiatives get easily undermined when pursuing the same resources, something that has not been addressed at either agency’s senior management level. As both agencies have experienced reductions in their resources, more joint efforts are required for stronger anti-corruption responses.

**Finding 3:** About 60 percent of UNDP country programmes supported local-level anti-corruption and transparency and accountability activities in addition to national-level initiatives.

Support to transparency and accountability measures is spread across UNDP public administration, local governance and rule of law programmes in 121 country programmes and 708 projects in countries within development contexts. Table 5 presents the regional distribution of the projects related to supporting accountability and transparency (some of the projects covered more than one area of initiatives related to accountability and transparency). In terms of country cover-

---

28 The number of projects can be also an understatement, as each project often addressed several areas but was counted for only one or two.
age, the Europe and the CIS and the Asia and the Pacific regions (with total coverage) were ahead of the Africa and the Latin America and the Caribbean regions.

Table 5 presents areas of support that were more prominent from the point of accountability and transparency support. The evaluation looked at the level of engagement based on a relative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Addressing drivers of corruption</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
<th>Number of projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>39 (46)</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab States</td>
<td>13 (18)</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>23 (24)</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and the CIS</td>
<td>23# (22)</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>23 (26)</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>121 (136)</strong></td>
<td><strong>708</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP Finance System (ATLAS) and Independent Evaluation Office analysis
Note: The projects are in different stages of implementation and are in the concluding stage in at least 34 percent of the projects.
# The number of countries during the last Strategic plan period was 23. The Slovakia country programme has since closed.

Table 6. Level of engagement in addressing drivers of corruption (accountability and transparency areas)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Of the 65 countries included in the evaluation</th>
<th>Case study and desk study countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of engagement</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access (right) to information policies and mechanisms (34 countries)</td>
<td>Bhutan, Cambodia, Tunisia, Pacific Island States, Guatemala, Turkey, Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oversight mechanisms (31 countries)</td>
<td>Jordan, Palestine, Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public finance management transparency (26 countries)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration and Civil service (38 countries)</td>
<td>Jordan, Nigeria Viet Nam, Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-governance (18 countries)</td>
<td>Bhutan, Burundi, Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local-level accountability and transparency mechanisms (39 countries)</td>
<td>Bhutan, Burundi, Chile, Guatemala, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Pacific Island States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to Justice and judiciary reforms (25 countries)</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Categorization of level of engagement is based on a relative comparison of UNDP governance programme and financial investment and should not be construed in terms of ongoing country-level efforts.

The total number of countries indicated in each area is based on the 65 country programmes included in this evaluation’s analysis.
comparison of UNDP governance programme and financial investment. A large number of countries had medium and high levels of engagement in at least three areas of support that addressed drivers of corruption. More recurrent areas of UNDP support included access to information; oversight mechanisms; public administration modernization and civil service; local governance accountability and transparency measures; and e-governance. The majority of country programmes assessed by this evaluation emphasized linking governance processes, public decision-making and citizens to the demand side of accountability interventions.

A strong area of UNDP engagement was local-level support to transparency and accountability. Since the previous Strategic Plan period, UNDP programming has shifted to the demand side of accountability. Underlining the functions and institutional processes of supply and demand side actors complemented UNDP anti-corruption support. UNDP supported several themes, such as participatory local development and governance. Over time, this developed into key streams of support, and governments and other agencies replicated the local development tools that UNDP promoted. About 60 percent of UNDP country programmes supported local-level anti-corruption and transparency and accountability activities in addition to national-level initiatives. UNDP supported access to information, citizen participation and consultation and citizen’s monitoring and oversight as important measures to strengthen local-level governance and service delivery. Sector-specific integrity measures were supported at the local level. Although anti-corruption was not overtly specified as a key objective, it underpinned various initiatives to reduce institutional inefficiencies in public management.

**Finding 4: UNDP corporate programme frameworks recognize anti-corruption as key to accelerating sustainable development outcomes.**

While targeted anti-corruption initiatives were supported, they were of limited scale and scope.

Sixty Country Offices have implemented 200 projects that support anti-corruption enforcement policies and institutions. In terms of the coverage of countries, the Europe and the CIS region, followed by the Arab States and the Asia and the Pacific regions, had more countries with projects on strengthening anti-corruption policies and institutions (see Table 7). Africa, although having had the highest share of projects throughout the period assessed, had the lowest country coverage. The number of projects in the Asia and the Pacific and the Europe and the CIS regions has declined since 2008. Although there was a high number of projects in the Latin America and the Caribbean region, 28 percent of them pertained to fiduciary and administration/procurement support to the government.

The level of engagement in anti-corruption programming varied across the country case and desk studies. Key areas of UNDP support pertaining to strengthening anti-corruption policies and institutions included support to anti-corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support to anti-corruption</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
<th>Number of projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>17 (46)</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab States</td>
<td>9 (18)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>11 (24)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and the CIS</td>
<td>13 (22)</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>10 (26)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>60 (136)</strong></td>
<td><strong>200</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP Finance System (ATLAS) and Independent Evaluation Office analysis
Table 8. Level of engagement of UNDP in strengthening anti-corruption policies and institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Of the 65 countries included in the evaluation</th>
<th>Case study and desk study countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of engagement</strong></td>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-corruption policies (36 countries)</td>
<td>Albania, Bhutan, Jordan, Papua New Guinea, Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-corruption agencies (23 countries total)</td>
<td>Pacific Island States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-corruption advocacy and awareness/support to civil society (35 countries total)</td>
<td>Bhutan, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, Tunisia, Turkey, Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCAC review/implementation (17 countries total)</td>
<td>Burundi, Chile, Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-corruption data management (23 countries)</td>
<td>Albania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectoral anti-corruption risk assessments (15 countries total)</td>
<td>Bhutan, Chile, Ethiopia, Jordan, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Categorization of level of engagement is based on a relative comparison of UNDP governance programmes and financial investments, and should not be construed as high contribution in terms of ongoing efforts at the country level.

Total number of countries indicated in each area is based on the analysis of programme portfolio in the 65 countries included in this evaluation.

policies, capacity development of anti-corruption agencies, advocacy and awareness raising. Table 8 presents UNDP anti-corruption activities and the level of engagement in the study countries. A large number of countries had medium and high levels of engagement in supporting anti-corruption policies, anti-corruption agencies and advocacy. A majority of the country/territory programmes supported key anti-corruption areas. For example, in Kosovo, Nigeria, occupied Palestinian territory, Tanzania, Tunisia and Uganda, UNDP supported programmes in at least four areas.

**Finding 5.** While global and regional anti-corruption initiatives received corporate attention, there has been a scaling down of expenditure for such initiatives during the current Strategic Plan period.

The expenditure on regional anti-corruption projects and governance projects addressing drivers of corruption is presented in Table 9. With the exception of the Arab region, expenditure across regions was very low given the number of countries in each region and the time period covered. Although the Africa region had relatively higher spending on regional projects compared to other regions, it was overall low considering that there are 46 countries in the region where UNDP provides assistance (see Table 9). There are fewer regional initiatives addressing public administration related issues, resulting in limited support to accountability and transparency-related initiatives.

Spending on regional anti-corruption projects has shown a significant decrease since 2014, with the exception of the Africa and the Arab States regions. Barring the Arab States region, where regional projects were fully funded by bilateral initiatives, regional projects in general were largely funded by corporate regular resources and bilateral funding for specific projects. Reductions
in corporate resources and changes in donor programme priorities affected the funding for regional projects.

From 2009 to 2013, total expenditure for global anti-corruption projects was $16.3 million – $10 million for the UNDP Global Programme on Anti-corruption for Development Effectiveness (PACDE) and $6 million for the UNDP Global Anti-corruption Initiative (GAIN) (see Table 10). Reductions in corporate resources significantly affected global projects. UNDP, with an extensive country presence, fairly strong areas of support in key governance areas and long-term global projects on key themes, provided a framework for country-level programmes and enabled Country Offices to mobilize resources. For example, the Programme for Accountability and Transparency, the Global Programme on Anti-corruption for Development Effectiveness and the Global Anti-corruption Initiative provided country-level direction to the anti-corruption programmes and facilitated anti-corruption initiatives. Reductions in regular funding meant that UNDP was not in a position to fund global projects on anti-corruption or core public administration issues. While the momentum generated by the SDGs (particularly SDG 16), with an emphasis on governance for sustainable development, provides opportunities for accountability, transparency and anti-corruption programming, prioritization of these areas was not evident at the time of the evaluation.

The 2014 institutional reorganization of UNDP (also called the Institutional Review) impacted the size of the governance team. The peacebuilding team, which was part of the Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery, merged with the governance team in the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support (BPPS). There was a consolidation of Regional Bureau programme advis-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>2009–2015</td>
<td>24.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab States</td>
<td>2004–2018</td>
<td>21.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>2008–2015</td>
<td>4.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and the CIS</td>
<td>2008–2014</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>2009–2015</td>
<td>10.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>64.93</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Bilateral funding sources: Africa (EU, Spain, Norway); Arab States (USA, Italy, France, Japan, UK, Germany (GIZ) Belgium, Siemens Integrity Initiative); Asia and the Pacific (Australia, UNDP, Cisco, IBM, Oracle, Intel, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization); Europe and the CIS (Netherlands, Sweden, Greece); Latin America and the Caribbean (Argentina, Colombia, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Luxemburg, Panama, Peru, Spain).

Source: UNDP Finance System (ATLAS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total PACDE: 10.18</strong></td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>16.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Funding sources – Australian Agency for International Development (AusAid), Norway, Belgium and Finland, and to a lesser extent from other bilateral donors such as Liechtenstein, Japan and the United States.

Source: UNDP Finance System (ATLAS)
ers and BPPS policy advisers in New York to the five regional hubs. There has also been an overall reduction of governance advisers at the headquarters and regional hubs. Compared to the previous Strategic Plan period, UNDP headquarters and regional hubs’ governance staff was reduced by approximately 40 percent. Staff positions were reduced across all regions, but some regions were more affected than others. The Latin America and the Caribbean regional hub in Panama had significant reductions in posts. The institutional reorganization did not have significant consequences for staff positions at the country level, as staffing patterns in the Country Offices largely corresponded to funding patterns.

Finding 6: Resource challenges were more intense in middle- and upper-middle-income countries, which received an even smaller share of regular resources or nothing at all.

Country programmes responded to national priorities in the governance area within the broad framework provided by the Strategic Plan. Given that Country Offices mobilize over 90 percent of programme resources in a majority of cases, governance issues that are pursued are those for which funding is available. Some areas, such as anti-corruption, the right to information and other transparency issues, required base funding for Country Offices to develop a programme and mobilize further resources. With the significant reduction of regular resource funding to Country Offices, the dependence on external funding increased, negatively impacting the programme choices of UNDP and its ability to pursue a medium- to long-term strategy. Most funds received by UNDP at the country level were tied to specific interventions, limiting substantive focus on a few areas.

Because donors reduced development support to middle-income countries or moved towards a bilateral/budget support modality, it was hard for UNDP to mobilize programme resources. The UNDP programme portfolios of middle-income countries sharply fell with concomitant decreases in programme scope and size. In the Asia and the Pacific and the Latin America and the Caribbean regions, the rise of middle-income countries resulted in reductions of overall financial resources to Country Offices. In Eastern Europe and the CIS, in addition to middle-income countries, the European Union accession or the candidature context meant that Country Offices had limited resources to carry out programmes. Lack of programme resources also tended to push Country Offices more towards fiduciary management-related support to the government; the overhead costs were then used to carry out development programmes. While some Country Offices were successful in working out government cost sharing, this primarily resulted in UNDP supporting governments in the areas they needed and prioritized.

External pressure was an important factor in the initiation of the accountability and transparency and anti-corruption measures, particularly in countries with budget support, those that were preparing for European Union candidature and accession and those with high external development assistance. In Eastern European countries, particularly those that are in the European Union accession process, governance reforms are central to European Union membership. The countries are primarily motivated by European Union candidature to pursue reforms, an impetus that would be hard for UNDP or other agency programmes to generate. However, this did not guarantee a bigger role for UNDP. With the European Union taking a lead in governance-related support and choosing to not work through other agencies, the UNDP role in addressing drivers of corruption and anti-corruption in European Union accession countries is shrinking. UNDP was seen as an alternative when the European Union did not consider it prudent to engage where it would be perceived as intervening in a country’s internal politics.

3.2 CONTRIBUTION TO ANTI-CORRUPTION AND ADDRESSING DRIVERS OF CORRUPTION

Finding 7: UNDP has taken a pragmatic approach towards facilitating an anti-corruption agenda. While specific anti-corruption initia-
tives were supported, UNDP has focused more on addressing drivers of corruption, particularly demand-side accountability.

UNDP took a two-pronged approach to anti-corruption. While anti-corruption is acknowledged as a separate programme theme in both Strategic Plans, UNDP programme strategies also emphasized that accountability and transparency in national and subnational public institutions is critical for improved governance and reducing corruption. UNDP has explicitly acknowledged in its programmes that reducing corruption is key to achieving development results, both in the MDG acceleration initiatives as well in subsequent sectoral efforts. In the countries included in this assessment, both external compulsions as well as internal pressures were factors in keeping up the pressure for anti-corruption reform processes. For example, post-UNCAC, a majority of the countries initiated measures to develop policies and institutional processes. Similarly, European Union accession and budget support spurred anti-corruption measures, particularly addressing drivers of corruption. There were several counties where citizen’s mobilization was a trigger point in pursing accountability and transparency measures. As the country case studies show, more concerted efforts were evident when anti-corruption was government-driven and had political ownership.

Predominant factors that facilitated UNDP contribution to anti-corruption include: the presence of ongoing governance reforms that specifically address accountability and transparency and governance issues; when sectoral approaches were pursued; when UNDP extended longer-term support; and when governance and development programmes were used for promoting anti-corruption efforts.

Direct measures to reduce corruption, such as the establishment of anti-corruption commissions, had limited anti-corruption outcomes. Several intervening factors, such as support from the political and the judicial establishment and effective functioning of public institutions, determined the effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions. Comparatively, support to addressing the drivers of corruption had more tangible outcomes in terms of strengthening accountability processes in targeted areas with higher potential for anti-corruption outcomes.

UNDP country programmes had a strong focus on strengthening core public administration institutions (such as civil service institutions), public financial management, judicial reform and decentralization. Strengthening accountability and transparency mechanisms and processes were integral to such support. The contribution of accountability and transparency measures to anti-corruption were more evident in local-level service delivery and local development. There were several instances where accountability and transparency efforts supported by UNDP had the potential to enhance anti-corruption processes. UNDP did not adequately use its governance and development programmes to further the anti-corruption agenda. UNDP programmes were trapped in silo project objectives that undermined its ability to respond to the complexities and longer time requirements that national institutional changes required.

A challenge in an explicit focus on anti-corruption in governance as well as other development interventions was that most governments had yet to adopt policy instruments to integrate anti-corruption dimensions into their development initiatives. A similar limitation was evident in international cooperation. While bilateral donors were more vocal about corruption issues, there was more caution exercised in funding explicit anti-corruption initiatives in development support.

Finding 8: UNDP contribution was more evident in strengthening anti-corruption institutional capacities and policies in three-fourths of the countries where support was provided, and to a lesser extent in enabling anti-corruption outcomes.

UNDP contributions were mainly through capacity development initiatives geared towards
an enabling policy and institutional environment and to strengthening national institutional capacities. UNDP supported formulating anti-corruption enforcement policies (e.g. anti-corruption policies, assets declaration policies, whistle blower policies) and setting up anti-corruption enforcement agencies and audit institutions. UNDP contributed to strengthening capacities for the anti-corruption enforcement agencies to function, investigate corruption cases, assess government agency risk, manage corruption information and to conduct corruption perception and integrity surveys. The establishment of information platforms in a number of countries enabled anti-corruption agencies to increase their outreach and public engagement.

UNDP was persistent in its support to ensure that policies and institutions were sufficiently robust and to motivate further reforms (for example, in Ethiopia, Jordan, Nigeria, Tunisia and Uganda). Implementation of the anti-corruption policies was often challenging, and sufficient actions by anti-corruption agencies were beyond the scope of UNDP programmes. Understandably, national governments exercised their prerogatives with regards to the extent of reforms, powers given to anti-corruption agencies and the manner in which policies were implemented.

The overall performance rating of UNDP anti-corruption initiatives was 3.55 on a five-point scale, which is a good score (see Table 11).

UNDP scored high on the relevance and effectiveness of the various initiatives undertaken, particularly for timeliness and responsiveness to developing legislations and building the capacities of anti-corruption institutions. The meta-synthesis of evaluations carried out in 65 countries shows similar results (see Box 4).

UNDP achieved the stated objectives of strengthening national institutional capacities, mostly functional and technical capacities that have the potential to enable anti-corruption processes. In terms of enhancing technical capacities and enabling policies, UNDP contributions to anti-corruption oversight and enforcement agencies were more tangible. Conventional mechanisms, such as anti-corruption commissions, did not always have the intended effect on reducing corruption when there were high levels of governance deficits. Evolving governance systems and processes and inadequate judicial capacities reduced the impacts of anti-corruption institutions. UNDP contributions were important as inputs to the processes of strengthening institutional capacities rather than to actual results in reducing corruption or ensuring that institutions will take action. While most initiatives were important to countries’ governance requirements, the duration of programmes minimized the relevance in a number of cases. There were instances where a more specific focus or a longer period of support would have enhanced institutional capacities to take forward anti-corruption measures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weight (%)</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Weighted score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Score: 1= Very poor; 2= Poor; 3=Fair; 4=Good; 5=Very Good
Note: The performance rating is for intermediary outcomes
Source: Independent Evaluation Office
UNDP contributions were significantly higher where specific anti-corruption efforts were supported alongside broader public administration accountability and transparency measures that addressed drivers of corruption. In several instances, the absence of core public administration accountability processes and capacities, even strong anti-corruption enforcement institutions, could do little to address corruption. UNDP did not adequately leverage on its governance portfolio in order to strengthen efforts to address drivers of corruption. Responding to the programme demands of the government or funding agencies meant that UNDP did not sufficiently address accountability and transparency issues.

Sustainability scores were moderate, as there were challenges in ensuring national ownership of outcomes and in building partnerships that would carry forward progress achieved. Further, there were countries where the capacities built were insufficient for institutions to function on their own after UNDP support ended. The anti-corruption projects were managed well in terms of meeting deadlines; where there were delays, contextual factors often slowed down UNDP programme implementation. A weak area of programme efficiency was the lack of synergies between governance programmes and other development programmes and anti-corruption initiatives with other governance initiatives.

Although there were several commonalities in regional performances, there were certain variations in UNDP contribution as well. For example, across the regions there were commonalities in

---

**Box 4. Contribution of anti-corruption initiatives: meta-synthesis of evaluation findings**

The meta-synthesis of 110 evaluations carried out in 65 countries shows that UNDP projects scored above the average cut-off score in terms of relevance of the initiatives (on a 0 to 1 scale, 0.50 being the average cut-off score), with high scores in several countries (see Figures 8 and 9). Over 500 projects covered in these evaluations showed that UNDP programmes were highly relevant. UNDP was moderate to highly effective in its contribution to anti-corruption policies and processes and institutional capacities.

**Figure 8. Relevance of anti-corruption initiatives**

(Continued)
Figure 9. Effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives

Source: Independent Evaluation Office

Figure 10. Effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives by region

Source: Independent Evaluation Office
the relevance of various initiatives UNDP supported; similarly, sustainability of the outcomes remains an issue. There was limited variation in the partnerships established, as performance across the regions was moderate. Partnerships, while strong in the implementation of the programmes, did not include other governance actors essential for carrying forward UNDP initiatives. In terms of the variations across the regions, the Europe and the CIS region had performed relatively better in ensuring synergies among different UNDP programmes compared to other regions. In term of overall effectiveness, the Africa region had relatively lower scores compared to other regions (see Figure 10). No specific set of factors explained regional variations, and combinations of factors (such as programme duration and resources assigned, engagement of the government, prioritization of anti-corruption issues by the government and other contextual factors) determined variations in regional performance.

Finding 9: The extent to which accountability and transparency initiatives contributed to anti-corruption efforts of the countries varied across initiatives. An explicit anti-corruption focus in accountability and transparency initiatives would have enhanced UNDP contribution.

UNDP anti-corruption work was underpinned by, and part of, a wider governance programme in which support to enhancing accountability in public administration and local governance was seen as critical to addressing a variety of corruption drivers. UNDP acknowledged the importance of supporting multisectoral accountability mechanisms and specifically supported oversight mechanisms, public administration reforms, public sector ethics, civil service reforms, decentralized governance and e-governance. Rule of law programmes were implemented in a number of countries, which complemented anti-corruption efforts. Although anti-corruption was not always central to accountability and transparency project objectives, UNDP support to such initiatives contributed to anti-corruption processes in public management.

UNDP support to accountability and transparency initiatives enabled setting up systems, strengthening national institutional capacities and providing viable models for enhancing local-level accountability and transparency. UNDP programmes were responsive to the needs of the government and national governance priorities. The change processes UNDP contributed to significantly varied across countries. UNDP contributions in a range of accountability areas had the potential to inform and influence public policy processes and practices to enhance government accountability. The contributions were, however, not sufficient in all cases for enabling transparent governance or public management accountability. Political impetus, government commitment to governance and institutional reforms, and the small scope of UNDP interventions undermined achieving accountability outcomes that would have had an impact on anti-corruption.

Table 12 presents the overall performance ratings of the projects pertaining to accountability and transparency-related initiatives in terms of their contribution to anti-corruption outcomes. This analysis acknowledges that although at least 40 percent of the projects did not explicitly mention anti-corruption as an objective of the programme, the initiatives nonetheless addressed drivers of corruption and hence were included in the analysis. The performance rating is based on evidence collected using the country and desk studies and meta-synthesis of evaluations. The overall performance rating of UNDP initiatives that addressed drivers of corruption in contributing to anti-corruption was 3.44 on a five-point scale. Cumulative impact was not at the desired level, as different accountability interventions were not grounded in a holistic strategy. Relevance and effectiveness of the initiatives scored high compared to the other two criteria. UNDP programmes scored high on responsiveness and choice of activities, although the scale of activities was not appropriate in a number of cases. Although the combination of scores in terms of contribution to anti-corruption is average, UNDP was highly effective in contributing to change processes in specific areas.
UNDP programmes and projects supported efforts to address accountability and transparency gaps in governance processes. There were indications of change in different segments of support regardless of whether the sum of all interventions contributed to larger change processes to enhance accountability in public administration or local administration. The capacity development approach taken in several countries has allowed the introduction of new approaches in public management (in terms of citizen participation, transparency measures and the integration of accountability dimensions into public administration).

In a majority of cases, public administration integrity-related project objectives were met in terms of improved processes and capacities. Similar to the anti-corruption projects, there were weaknesses in programme efficiency, and the governance portfolio lacked a coherent approach. In terms of sustainability, programme partnerships to ensure that progress achieved is sustained remain a challenge, particularly in the case of local-level initiatives.

At the central level, UNDP contributions to accountability processes were dispersed across key public administration areas, with contributions being more evident in areas of access to information, public administration modernization efforts and strengthening procurement policies and practices. At the local level, UNDP contributions were comparatively more significant in terms of enhancing accountability and transparency in local development as well as informing government practices for improved service delivery. The implications for anti-corruption efforts were comparatively significant at the local level in service delivery areas.

Key to the success of UNDP accountability and transparency measures was institutionalizing processes and practices and establishing linkages between key governance processes. While there were several instances in which UNDP strove to accomplish this, overall this was a problematic part of UNDP engagement. There was often disconnect among different areas of governance reform in most countries; activities in each area of reform were treated in isolation with an assumption that everything will contribute to coherent and efficient public management. UNDP governance programmes broadly reflected this fragmented approach; there was a lack of a combined effect of various UNDP accountability and transparency initiatives (although there were several examples of change and improvement in government functioning).

As part of its support to public administration, UNDP contributed to the modernization efforts of state institutions for transparent and effective government performance in about 38 of the 65 countries assessed. UNDP public administration efforts aimed to address one or more of the following issues: limitations in planning capacities, weak inter-ministerial or inter-institutional coordination and overlapping mandates, obsolete

### Table 12. Performance across areas addressing drivers of corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Weight (%)</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Weighted Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.44</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Score: 1= Very poor; 2= Poor; 3= Fair; 4= Good; 5= Very Good
Source: Independent Evaluation Office
regulations and policies, ineffective and less transparent procurement procedures, weak oversight mechanisms and ineffective civil service systems.

In regions such as Latin America and the Caribbean, the UNDP programme was fully funded by the government (or a major component thereof). The programme supported those areas of public administration prioritized by the government, and UNDP had limited leeway in the scope of the interventions it supported. UNDP efforts were more notable in low-income and lower middle-income countries, and in smaller subregions. In the Pacific Island States, for example, UNDP engagement included accountability initiatives, advisory services to the Marshall Islands, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands on compliance with UNCAC and support to promoting freedom of information. There was a greater demand for UNDP support in other Island States as well, for example from Nauru, Palau and Tonga.

Citizens’ lack of trust in governance was a key issue in a large number of countries. Addressing this required mechanisms to link citizens with public decision-making processes and balancing national-level accountability and transparency processes and local-level reforms. UNDP interventions in this area were largely at the local level in support of participatory mechanisms that would contribute to government transparency and accountability. UNDP used local-level work as entry points to further anti-corruption in service delivery, particularly in cases where there were too many national-level agencies supporting the government or when it was politically difficult to support reform.

UNDP created its own space in accountability and transparency support, barring some areas such as the management of petroleum funds. As noted in many government and donor interviews, UNDP has a comparative advantage in the cross-country experience it brings and its ability to closely work with governments, even under politically less favourable situations. It was also evident that the flexibility to support smaller components of the public administration spectrum helped UNDP position itself well within the accountability and transparency support area. This also provided the leveraging power to engage in broader governance reforms.

The findings of the meta-synthesis of evaluations largely correspond with the findings of the country studies and desk studies. The overall performance of accountability and transparency initiatives in contributing to anti-corruption has been moderate to good, averaging 0.65 on a 0 to 1-point scale (see Box 5).

**Box 5. Performance of accountability and transparency initiatives: meta-synthesis of evaluation findings**

The meta-synthesis of 124 evaluations carried out in 65 countries shows that UNDP projects score above the average cut-off score (on a 0 to 1 scale, 0.50 being average cut-off score), with high scores in several countries (see Figures 11 and 12). Over 500 projects covered in these evaluations show that about 60 percent explicitly mentioned anti-corruption as one of the objectives of these initiatives. Similar to the country studies and desk studies, UNDP programmes were highly relevant and moderate to high in effectiveness in their contribution to anti-corruption policies and processes. Compared to the direct anti-corruption initiatives, the contribution of the accountability and transparency initiatives was marginally lower. One of the reasons for the variations in the contribution level between the anti-corruption and addressing drivers of corruption streams was the range of activities in the latter, with a diversity of goals and objectives.

(Continued)
While there were negligible differences across income categories, there were regional variations in performance in some areas. The relevance of UNDP initiatives was higher in Latin American and the Caribbean and the Europe and the CIS compared to other regions. While effectiveness in addressing drivers of corruption was comparable across regions, the Arab States and the Europe and the CIS regions showed marginally better scores. The sustainability scores were similar for programmes in all regions, with the exception of Europe and the CIS, which had better scores. The Asia and the Pacific and the Africa regions had comparatively lower scores in establishing synergies among programmes to enhance anti-corruption (see Figure 13).
Finding 10: Leveraging synergies across governance projects and other programme areas would have provided UNDP with more entry points to support a country-level anti-corruption and accountability agenda.

Enabling governance and anti-corruption linkages was more challenging in several countries; UNDP did not adequately build on its programmes in governance or other areas to further promote an anti-corruption agenda. The evaluation also points that UNDP, similar to other agencies working on anti-corruption issues, had more challenges in enabling linkages between anti-corruption initiatives and governance processes. The evaluation looked at different dimensions of synergies between anti-corruption initiatives and other areas of UNDP support, viz., how anti-corruption programmes were integrated within development initiatives, in governance initiatives and in the procurement and infrastructure support UNDP provided, and the extent to which anti-corruption measures were included in UNDP programme implementation.

While in some cases the lack of synergies was due to the limited scope of UNDP programmes, UNDP did not pursue a more coherent approach to anti-corruption. Twenty-three country studies and desk studies and the meta-synthesis of 43 country programmes for which this data was available show that a lack of a coherent approach was
a factor that undermined UNDP contributions to anti-corruption efforts. The country programmes where performance was low showed a corresponding lack of synergies between different governance initiatives and other development programmes. An analysis of anti-corruption programmes in 23 country studies and desk studies showed that the level of synergies with other UNDP programmes in promoting anti-corruption was moderate to low (see Figure 14). The level of synergies was particularly low in the case of development initiatives and procurement and infrastructure support areas. This is discussed further in the coming sections.

UNDP programmes respond to national priorities; the choice and duration of programmes are often demand-driven. Such a programme model has its strengths (particularly in responding to context-specific needs), and promotes national ownership of development interventions, particularly where governments are not under obligation to supply-driven development support. UNDP has been realistic in doing what either the government or funding agencies approach it for. Demand-driven models are more efficient because they concentrate resources towards partnerships with governments that truly want UNDP technical support. However, such a model limited the possibilities of exploring programme synergies, as it was not always possible to get all stakeholders on board to integrate anti-corruption dimensions into other initiatives.

![Figure 14. Level of synergies with other UNDP programmes in country study and desk study programmes](image-url)

Source: Independent Evaluation Office
There was high-placed value on national ownership of projects and programmes, but there was no consideration of its implications for programme areas such as anti-corruption and accountability and transparency. A similar issue was raised by the evaluation of the UNDP strategy of 2008–2013, which observed that there was insufficient consideration of the trade-offs between national ownership and following corporate strategic directions. This is of particular concern in anti-corruption programming, in which the goals of the initiatives are not necessarily owned across government agencies.

Establishing partnerships was much harder in the anti-corruption and accountability areas. There was also considerable resistance to integrating anti-corruption measures into other support areas.

Although individual projects align with national priorities, the overall governance programme remains fragmented in most cases. UNDP had extensive justice sector programmes in several transition countries, but rarely incorporated issues related to corruption court systems. Similarly, UNDP did not use some of its support in the pov-

---

**Box 6 Synergies between different UNDP programmes: findings of the meta-synthesis of evaluations**

Figure 15 shows the level of synergies between different public administration programmes. The meta-synthesis of evaluations shows that there was considerable scope for improving programme synergies. Thirty-two out of 43 countries had a moderate to low score. Synergies between different governance projects and with other development projects were not maximized in a number of countries. The Qualitative Comparative Analysis shows that the level of synergies between anti-corruption and other programmes was a key factor in the contribution of UNDP to the anti-corruption agenda. UNDP contribution was greater when development programmes and governance programmes were used as entry points to further accountability and transparency.

**Figure 15. Level of synergies between different UNDP programmes**

![Graph showing level of synergies between different UNDP programmes](image)

Source: Independent Evaluation Office

property reduction, environment or health sectors to integrate anti-corruption issues. Box 6 presents the meta-synthesis of evaluation findings, which shows about half of the countries included in the assessment did not pay sufficient attention to this area. There were instances where Country Offices made specific efforts to explore synergies, and in such instances the overall contribution of UNDP was enhanced.

Finding 11: The UNDP governance strategy mentions a number of areas that UNDP will be working in (or intends to work in), but does not distinguish how it would pursue them at the global, regional or country levels.

UNDP has developed broad governance strategies that outline several governance areas for the organization to prioritize. Although UNDP considers Strategic Plans sufficient for corporate-level programme prioritization, in 2015, UNDP developed its internal strategy, Building Inclusive Societies and Sustaining Peace through Democratic Governance and Conflict Prevention. Anti-corruption is mentioned as a cross-cutting strategic priority. However, accountability and transparency areas pertaining to public administration are not adequately prioritized or lack clarity. The strategy does not adequately emphasize governance work in development contexts, and does not distinguish different governance contexts to which UNDP responds.

UNDP has outlined its funding priorities in order to ensure that it has the leeway to pursue areas that programme countries perceive as critical (as opposed to areas perceived as donor priorities). This provides some clarity on funding areas for donor support and for spending from regular resources. While the strategy should remain broad and provide enough possibility for UNDP to engage in a range of governance activities (particularly at the country level), some questions on clarity of direction remain in enabling this broad agenda, the pathways it would follow or the funds and staff resources it would invest. The global and regional projects have provided a framework for anti-corruption programming, although there remain challenges in their operationalization.

For almost a decade, the anti-corruption area followed a programmatic approach and was in a position to build a portfolio and mobilize resources for global projects and the Country Offices. Since 2015, however, donors have scaled down their support to anti-corruption, and given the many conflicting priorities, it was not feasible for UNDP to mobilize financial resources specifically for the anti-corruption area. Also, given the broad nature of the accountability and transparency area, there were no priority areas that were specifically earmarked for corporate attention.

UNDP is going through a challenging period due to reductions in core and non-core resources, and therefore has to rationalize its resource allocations at all levels. The prospect of additional funding for anti-corruption work will be an important condition for increasing (or merely retaining) staffing levels at the corporate and regional levels. In addition, the current staff support to the public administration area is not sufficient to meet Country Office needs or areas of specialization. For anti-corruption, UNDP is planning to retain its global team in Singapore to take the lead on policy support for the SDGs. While attention to the prevention of violent extremism and the UNDP focus on fighting corruption as one of the root causes of violent extremism will provide additional impetus for an anti-corruption focus, this is subject to the mobilization of funds for this area.

The efficiency of the global and regional programmes could be further improved. The global projects successfully enabled over 20 country programmes to initiate and develop anti-corruption programmes. The national projects that it supported allowed for the right entry points, although there are areas where UNDP could have further optimized global projects. For example, the seed funds, while responsive to country initiatives, could

---

30 UNDP, 2016, Funding Windows, undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/funding/funding-windows.html
have narrowed focus to a few areas. A mid-term review of the global anti-corruption initiative observed that the use of seed funding for pilot projects to test viable practices provided programme options that could be pursued, and recognized that the failure of some of the pilots was a natural outcome of such an approach. The mid-term review recommended continuing the programme and its approach of mainstreaming anti-corruption into development initiatives.31

Regional hubs lead the UNDP anti-corruption work in the region. The hubs are supported by the governance and anti-corruption advisers funded under different programme and funding streams. With three consecutive global projects, there were anti-corruption advisers and programme staff in all regional hubs during the last Strategic Plan period. The number of anti-corruption advisers has been considerably reduced since 2015, with the reduction of funding to the Global Anti-corruption Initiative. Only the Arab States and the Asia regional hubs currently have anti-corruption advisers. In the other regional hubs, the governance advisers provide anti-corruption support. Considering the specialized nature of governance areas, the anti-corruption advisers were instrumental in enabling Country Offices to build anti-corruption programme support. With the termination of the anti-corruption positions in three hubs, Country Offices in the Europe and the CIS and the Africa regions have indicated their dissatisfaction with the lack of specialist support being provided by the governance team.

Finding 12: UNDP brought out publications highlighting the disproportionate impact of corruption on women, but there was little evidence that gender perspectives were analysed and linked to anti-corruption and accountability and transparency support.

The country programme documents analysed (particularly those aligned with the current UNDP Strategic Plan) consider gender as an important cross-cutting issue. However, none of them elaborated on how it should be dealt with in respect to issues of governance and integrity. UNDP has largely ensured that there was a balanced participation of women and men in project activities. Efforts were more in ensuring women’s participation in the initiatives supported by UNDP, rather than pursuing programme approaches informed by gender-related governance concerns. There were examples that departed from the general trend and considered gender implications of the projects UNDP had supported, for example, the Strengthening Transparency and Accountability in the Utilization of Universal Primary Education Resources project in Uganda. The success of the project in engendering local planning was not immediately evident, and persistent efforts are needed to sustain the momentum such projects generated.32

Across country studies for this evaluation, the overall commitment to gender equality as expressed in country programme documents was not translated into gender-sensitive indicators, baselines or targets that would have enabled UNDP to measure the progress made in addressing gender equality through its governance programme. With exceptions, UNDP anti-corruption and public administration programmes lacked a gender analysis that would inform programme strategies. UNDP produced guidance documents on integrating the gender dimension in public administration, which is considered as useful material for wider use. However, Country Offices lacked capacities on how to integrate gender perspectives into the area of public administration reform, anti-corruption and accountability and transparency, particularly when compared to broader areas such as women’s political participation. A more holistic framework...
for gender equality as a transformative approach in anti-corruption and accountability initiatives was not adequately considered or applied in different areas of UNDP support.

3.3 STRENGTHENING NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITIES

ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS

Finding 13: UNDP support to anti-corruption policies and practices in many instances informed and shaped government programmes and priorities in setting up anti-corruption institutional measures. There were improvements in the anti-corruption policies in countries that UNDP supported.

According to the UNODC, over 70 countries have formulated a national anti-corruption strategy or a set of policies that constitute a comprehensive, coordinated anti-corruption framework. UNDP has supported anti-corruption legislations and policies in 36 countries, which are at different stages of implementation. Where UNDP provided technical inputs to the formulation of legislation or their amendment, stronger legislations were enabled; in a large majority of countries, UNDP-supported legislations were adopted.

Implementation efforts of anti-corruption policies have been more contentious, and were often fraught with resistance (for example, in Jordan, Nigeria, occupied Palestinian territory and Tunisia). Broader anti-corruption legislation was easier to adopt than policies and strategies, as the latter involved clarity of roles and responsibilities of various agencies, coverage of the policy and power and authority assigned to agencies. For smooth adoption of policies, it is critical to take into consideration national institutional power dynamics and timing of the initiatives. This was a limitation found in a few countries where UNDP did not adequately assess the context dynamics, the range of institutions that were likely to be involved or role sharing.

Notwithstanding their importance, the country studies and desk studies carried out for this evaluation show that anti-corruption legislation and institutions by themselves were not sufficient to control corruption unless there were measures to ensure government accountability and there was the presence of robust judicial and prosecution systems. What has been lacking is linking anti-corruption efforts with a number of governance measures, such as public procurement and management of public finances, judiciary and prosecution services, public sector management and public reporting. This evaluation reinforces that inadequate institutional and governance reforms constrained the performance of the anti-corruption institutions. Limited resources and institutional capacities of the anti-corruption institutions further undermined their effectiveness. While UNDP made important contributions to setting up anti-corruption processes and institutions, in a majority of countries the anti-corruption enforcement agencies lacked the requisite independence and authority to act.

Finding 14: UNDP had the distinction of being one of the first agencies supporting governments in strengthening governance and building national institutions and capacities.

UNDP played an important role in initiating anti-corruption measures in several countries. UNDP was responsive to evolving national governance issues in complex contexts; development actors in the country studies acknowledged this. For example, in the early 2000s, UNDP helped the newly established civilian government in Nigeria prepare an initial framework document for governance and anti-corruption efforts. Support to the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission and the Zero Corruption Coalition, a network of CSOs committed to the fight against corruption, was considered important. UNDP was one of the first international agencies (alongside UNODC) to support the Technical Unit on Governance and Anti-corruption Reforms soon after its 2007 establishment.
Similar support was provided in Jordan, Papua New Guinea and Tunisia. In Tunisia, UNDP was among the first agencies to support government efforts to respond to governance gaps in the post-Arab Spring period. UNDP supported the establishment of a National Integrity System, strengthened the legal framework and supported the development of a National Anti-corruption Strategy (which has been a politically problematic area). UNDP initiated discussions, often on sensitive issue such as on including illicit financial flows in the Asia and the Pacific region, safeguarding the autonomy of anti-corruption enforcement institutions in most regions, and supporting the role of civil society organizations in anti-corruption advocacy in the Arab States region.

Governments were ambivalent about international support to anti-corruption and accountability and transparency initiatives beyond a certain point. Ruling regimes did not necessarily share long-term programme objectives beyond policy formulation, setting up institutions or capacity development. This was one of the reasons for low sustainability of UNDP programme outcomes. Political reversals or slowdowns to commitments to pursue anti-corruption agendas were widely prevalent. Government decisions regarding how to combat corruption, and the extent thereof, were often changing. There was political hostility to pursuing concerted anti-corruption policies and institutional measures. UNDP provided continuous technical support and funding despite periods of political contestation, for example in Tunisia, which was acknowledged by the government and development actors.

The space available for anti-corruption programming determined the level of UNDP contributions. For example, despite Uzbekistan’s low ranking on cross-country indices, its government has for many years not made anti-corruption a priority issue. Consequently, anti-corruption measures have been confined to relatively minor changes to the legal framework, training of civil servants and surveys. In the absence of meaningful space for civil society, particularly for civil society organizations, to be able to play a watchdog role, public awareness and demand for anti-corruption action have been low. In addition, there is significant need for enhancing the independence of the judiciary and the legislature to create conditions for more meaningful anti-corruption activities. In this context, UNDP support has mainly aimed to promote initial steps on public finance reform, decentralization and e-governance. Nevertheless, Uzbekistan has recently adopted an action plan on anti-corruption that opened up opportunities for pursuing a more concerted anti-corruption agenda.

UNDP is generally recognized for its close proximity to governments, which has advantages and disadvantages. In many ways, proximity with governments facilitated partnerships in the areas of governance in general and anti-corruption in particular, and facilitated work on issues that are sensitive and less amenable to international cooperation. While UNDP donor partners acknowledged this advantage, there were perceptions that such proximity at times weakened UNDP, impeding its ability to take an objective stance with regard to government policy options. Although there were examples where UNDP explicitly shared its opinion on governance issues and the concrete actions needed by governments, international development actors were of the view that UNDP is too aligned with governments and is not raising issues that are critical for strengthening governance. There were instances where UNDP did not sufficiently balance its proximity to governments while demonstrating its objectivity by raising governance issues that may be less popular with governments but are nonetheless essential for achieving development results.

Finding 15: When support was provided to anti-corruption enforcement agencies in isolation, the outcomes were limited. Effective functioning of one anti-corruption agency depended on collaboration and cooperation with other enforcement agencies and institutions.

Coordination with other government agencies is essential for implementing the anti-corruption
strategy. However, the capacity of the newly formed anti-corruption enforcement agencies to command the cooperation of long-standing, resource rich and powerful oversight agencies and ministries remains a challenge. Several national agencies carried out functions related to anti-corruption (e.g. audit, economic and financial crimes units, income-tax agencies, ombudsmen and other oversight bodies). Most international agencies, including UNDP, did not rest their support on the assumption that a specific anti-corruption agency alone would reduce corruption, and considered such a support as one of several requirements.

UNDP supported government efforts to establish anti-corruption commissions in a majority of countries. In a third of these countries, UNDP supported more than one anti-corruption agency. When focused on one anti-corruption enforcement agency, UNDP initiatives had limited progress in advancing anti-corruption policies, as working relationship with tax agency, audit agency, finance ministry and other enforcement agencies was critical for overall effective functioning of anti-corruption agencies. Even in countries where UNDP supported more than one anti-corruption agency, for example, an anti-corruption enforcement agency and an audit agency (in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Timor-Leste and Uganda), support to the facilitation of information sharing, exchange of expertise and support and joint action remain a challenge. These are often not easy areas for external support.

Anti-corruption enforcement agencies were comparatively weaker in terms of power, authority and capacities than other oversight agencies, such as audit. Anti-corruption commissions, one of the main anti-corruption agencies with the responsibility of implementing anti-corruption policies in most countries, often lacked power or sufficient resources to fulfil their mandates. The powers vested with the anti-corruption commissions were often inadequate to ensure that other agencies played their role in providing necessary inputs. Conditions for enhanced capacities of the anti-corruption commissions in most cases included strong leadership and support by governments, clear legal bases and the authority to determine the terms and conditions of the enforcement agency.

A major challenge in the functioning of the anti-corruption commissions, despite good progress in some cases, was the lack of autonomy and politicization of their functioning. In several countries, there were delays in establishing the anti-corruption commissions and in giving them the due powers, authority and resources to independently function. Often, anti-corruption commissions were under the office of the prime minister or other executive institution, making them vulnerable to political pressures. There were also credibility issues due to the lines of reporting, even when the commissions took proper courses of action. There was limited political space for UNDP or any other external agency to take up such issues.

The country studies show that supreme audit agencies have a relative advantage of being discrete entities that operate with more clearly defined functions in a standardized manner. Irrespective of the anti-corruption institution, controlling corruption is a collaborative action of various enforcement institutions, a cumulative effect of several initiatives; this collaboration was found to be lacking in most country case studies and desk studies. Support to anti-corruption enforcement agencies was ultimately one of many inputs to larger processes to strengthen capacities to control corruption.

Governments made stronger commitments to audit and vigilance bodies that check bureaucratic functioning than to policies and processes that would make government functions more open and transparent. There was also comparatively less resistance to accountability and transparency and anti-corruption efforts at the local level than at the central and national levels. There was, however, greater resistance to establishing independent anti-corruption bodies with more powers and with a purview of the entire government function (executive, legislature and judiciary). Preferences for certain areas of reform meant
that there has to be realistic expectations from anti-corruption initiatives of UNDP.

Although the anti-corruption strategy was adopted, implementation remains an issue because the purview and powers of the Anti-corruption Commissions as outlined in the anti-corruption strategy in the case of several countries were not fully shared by other oversight and enforcement agencies. In a majority of countries, implementation responsibilities are not clearly delineated, and it appears that the entire responsibility of strategy implementation rests with a single anti-corruption enforcement agency. In practice, in most cases too much of a responsibility on poorly resourced anti-corruption agencies were fraught with controversies or practical implementation issues. Interviews often pointed to instances where anti-corruption agencies were seen as being politically pressured to follow up or drop certain cases. Anti-corruption Commissions, particularly recently formed first-generation agencies, need time to consolidate their roles and functions.

An issue that did not receive sufficient attention was the coordination between anti-corruption agencies in implementing national policies to reduce corruption. In most countries, cooperation and coordination among agencies with functions related to anti-corruption are still evolving. Often, there was a subtle hierarchy among agencies with oversight functions, and cooperation and coordination was not always at the desired level. For example, ministries tended to not cooperate with anti-corruption commissions similarly to how they cooperated with audit agencies. Common reasons for the lack of cooperation were overlapping mandates or a lack of clarity of roles and mandates. For example, while there were public office holders who had a reportedly high degree of compliance with legal requirements on asset declaration, the declarations were not publicly available. Several factors determined the lack of coordination between anti-corruption agencies and agencies that dealt with asset declaration, such as unclear institutional measures, lack of capacity and resources and political interference. In addition, the boundaries between the mandates of anti-corruption and regulatory agencies were sometimes blurred. UNDP programmes did not address these issues.

Multiple agencies with enforcement and oversight responsibilities and with overlapping mandates remain a challenge. Instead of strengthening existing agencies, governments have tended to create new ones under pressure to act against specific types of corruption. An issue that came up frequently was the limited role development agencies played, including UNDP, in minimizing the number of dysfunctional oversight institutions or those with identical or overlapping roles and responsibilities. There were instances where new agencies were created with overlapping mandates. In Tunisia, for example, UNDP supported the National Integrity System, which caused some confusion among national partners because the system was not clearly defined in terms of who would be in the lead and what roles different branches of the government and the independent Anti-corruption Commission would play.

UNDP contributed to different levels of capacities of anti-corruption agencies. There has been considerable progress in some cases, contrasted by the just-developing functional capacities in others. The level of functional capacities was insufficient to respond to corruption in a timely manner. Implementing anti-corruption policies requires concerted and long-term efforts to bring about lasting improvements in organizational capacities and to minimize the role of the state in the functioning of oversight agencies. Anti-corruption agencies suffered from a lack of infrastructure, including financial and human resources, thus limiting their ability to sustain activities and results. In most countries assessed, limited depth of institutional capacities meant that agencies lacked the requisite technical expertise to investigate financial crimes or new crimes (e.g. cybercrime). In addition, anti-corruption agencies continue to operate in an environment characterized by limited political will to address the root causes of corruption. In Uganda, for instance, the pace and quality of investigations and the number of successfully completed cases could, according to interviews, have been higher
if the Inspector General had access to better technology, expertise and transportation, particularly at the local level. Similar issues were evident in other countries.

Although anti-corruption policies, legal frameworks and institutional processes are important enabling factors to address corruption, none are individually sufficient to enable changes in governance practices unless complemented by adequate, available resources for investigations and prosecutions. A common issue was that measures to identify and address governance deficits were inadequately prioritized. The potential of anti-corruption enforcement agencies and other oversight mechanisms is weak when overall governance systems are weak and when there is no clear delineation of roles or authority. Progress towards transparency in public functioning did not always follow a linear path of improved progress. In a number of study countries, there were instances of government reversals to a more closed way of functioning and greater indifference to citizen and civil society demands for transparent and accountable governance.

In countries where UNDP supported anti-corruption institutions, often there were only a few high-profile cases that led to actual convictions – despite the agencies having won praise for pursuing governors and former ministers. Most cases were protracted and remain stalled in courts, leading to considerable pessimism regarding the effectiveness of anti-corruption bodies. Politicization of anti-corruption agencies remains a challenge, undermining the contributions of UNDP programme support.

Although the UNDP programme complemented the programmes of international financial institutions and bilateral donors, the level of coordination with agencies working on anti-corruption issues was not evident in all countries. In countries with budget support or larger bilateral support, coordination with other agencies was not accomplished. UNDP did not explore possibilities for engagement on any changes that may be required on its part for such an engagement.

### SUPPORT TO CORRUPTION DATA AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

**Finding 16:** A limitation of UNDP support to anti-corruption surveys and corruption risk assessments is that they were one-off efforts, often reducing their potential as policy tools.

An issue in most countries is the lack of time-series corruption and public performance data and measurement practices that are comparable over a period of time to monitor progress on actions taken and progress in corruption control. Similar to other development data, there is little coherence and coordination in the collection and analysis of corruption-related information.

UNDP supported surveys, corruption data management and risk diagnostics in several countries (Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, Uganda and 15 other countries). When surveys had a clear purpose and were well designed, they yielded a credible mapping of the extent, characteristics and causes of corruption, as the Nigeria and Uganda country studies show. In Uganda, the 2008 National Integrity Survey and the systems studies of select government institutions were considered highly relevant. Covering all 80 districts of Uganda, the survey comprised three sub-surveys (a household survey, a public institutions survey and a private enterprise survey), and explored the prevalence and incidence of corruption, determined trends in corruption and assessed the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures. However, the value of the survey was diminished by the absence of a repeat survey and systematic follow-up on the issues raised.

The engagement of national institutions was found to be key to the use of survey and studies data to inform policies, for example, as in Egypt, Nigeria, Palestine and Uganda. In Egypt, the government considered studies on the cost of corruption in patron-employee relations, witness and whistle-blower protection in Egyptian penal and administrative procedural laws, ombudsman systems and conflict of interest frameworks to be highly relevant to anti-corruption policymaking. Studies and surveys that were not linked to policy
processes were often limited in their use and had poor visibility.

Most of the available corruption data are perception-based and not based on diagnostics of the functioning of institutions and sectors. There are country-level measurements and surveys that aim to capture public finance management and service delivery in some areas. The indicators used in the governance and public finance management surveys are not meant to measure corruption, so are therefore insufficient to capture corruption levels. The perception measurements have limitations, as responses often refer to the likelihood of corruption rather than the experience of the respondents. Although UNDP supported surveys, broader challenges pertaining to corruption measurement were not addressed.

Finding 17: Corruption data portals were more effective where follow-up measures were in place.

UNDP supported corruption data portals in several countries in order to provide easy channels for citizens to report corruption and for authorities to track their responses to the complaints received. Corruption data portals generated citizens’ interest, and in most countries led to spikes in the reporting of corruption and other unethical practices (for example, in Albania, Bhutan, Jordan, Kosovo, Moldova, Serbia, Tanzania and Tunisia). The reporting methods and follow-up practices varied considerably across countries. The success of the data portals depended on the follow-up on the reported cases, which could not be ensured in most cases where UNDP support was provided. The more successful platforms, such as Kallxo in Kosovo, ensured follow-up by collecting information pertaining to the reported cases and sharing it with the respective government departments for action (see Box 7). In most other cases, however, the anti-corruption agency did not have adequate resources to carry out preliminary investigations of corruption cases. The reported cases were directed to respective ministries or departments for action, and there was no particular sense of urgency shown to respond to the complaints in a timely manner. There were often no systems in place to deal with the reported cases, leading to frustration among citizens and anti-corruption activists.

FACILITATING UNCAC COMPLIANCE

Finding 18: UNDP complemented the normative role of UNODC on UNCAC, facilitating initiatives to further UNCAC implementation.

UNDP support to UNCAC is closely aligned with its governance work and complemented the UNODC normative mandate on UNCAC through its support to public administration policies, capacity development and anti-corruption institutions and through engagement with state and non-state actors. UNDP positioning in relation to UNCAC implementation was also related to its representation in most countries, which enabled it to make linkages with development programming at the country level. UNODC representation was mostly limited to the subregional level, and therefore depended on UNDP.

Box 7. The Kallxo in Kosovo

In partnership with Internews Kosova and the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, UNDP developed kallxo.com, an Internet-based platform that allows Kosovo citizens to report corruption in real time through multiple channels, including social media, text messaging and the Internet. By visualizing and mapping reported corruption cases, the project aims to attract citizens’ participation and to raise awareness on the level and forms of corruption occurring in Kosovo. Four years after it launched, the platform reported over 5000 cases ranging from corruption in government, educational institutions, fraud at the local level and misconduct of public officials. Key to its success was follow-up of the reported cases and the use of the follow-up reports by government agencies. Because of this success, the platform is now increasingly being used to report inefficiencies in delivering public services at the local level. Most municipalities in Kosovo have a similar platform to enable municipalities to interact with citizens.
for engagement with country-level stakeholders. The UNDP country-level presence, its ongoing partnerships with government institutions, its governance programmes and its knowledge on practical opportunities on the ground enabled UNDP to support UNODC efforts in relation to UNCAC.

UNDP partnered with UNODC to facilitate self-assessment processes. In the Asia and the Pacific region, support to participatory self-assessment processes led to comprehensive UNCAC self-assessment reports and in some cases, to legislation revisions (e.g. Bhutan, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam). In the Pacific Island States, UNDP-UNODC produced a number of anti-corruption knowledge products to inform UNCAC implementation, in addition to advisory services on the implementation of UNCAC. Other initiatives included facilitating a global discussion on a set of Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies (the Jakarta Principles) to promote and strengthen anti-corruption agency independence and effectiveness.

Across regions, UNDP facilitated regional efforts to further UNCAC implementation. For example, in the Arab States, UNDP facilitated the formation of the Arab Governmental Expert Group and the Arab Anti-Corruption and Integrity Network. The Expert Group, a regional mechanism to enable UNCAC self-assessments, is comprised of governmental practitioners (officially nominated by their governments) from 17 countries. UNDP supported the Expert Group adopt a more evidence-based approach to the UNCAC self-assessment exercise. The Integrity Network deliberations identified common UNCAC priorities in the region that were identified and endorsed for action by Arab governments. Participating countries committed to responding to specific legal and capacity gaps stipulated in the UNCAC, particularly areas such as witness and whistle-blower protection, adapting criminal procedures to UNCAC requirements, asset declaration systems for public officials and establishing integrity in the private sector.

**SUPPORT TO ANTI-CORRUPTION ADVOCACY**

**Finding 19:** UNDP has supported the role of civil society and NGOs in creating demand for accountable and transparent governance and in raising awareness about corruption.

UNDP supported civil society organization efforts to take forward anti-corruption and transparency advocacy. In 35 out 65 countries assessed, UNDP supported awareness-raising and advocacy initiatives of civil society organizations and facilitated government strategies to engage with civil society organizations. It is noteworthy that UNDP supported civil society organizations, even in countries where the political space for civil society engagement was limited. There were positive examples of partnership with civil society organizations that promoted the anti-corruption agenda (e.g. Jordan, Kosovo, Tunisia, Uganda).

Country studies illustrate the constraints of civil society organizations in pursuing an anti-corruption agenda. Improved technology and media have increased the communication of perceptions and demand for government effectiveness, particularly in the delivery of public services and transparency in the use of public funds. Unless civil society organizations were working on probing corruption cases or facilitating citizens’ platforms for reporting cases or

---

33 Including a range of online anti-corruption resources to support the countries, such as the UNCAC Legal Library, the Pacific Integrity in Action Network (AP-INTACT) online network, the Pacific Accountability Network and a new Asia Pacific Accountability Portal (which is due to be launched jointly by the Regional Centre Bangkok and the Pacific Centre). Given the fewer actors in the Pacific Island States, UNDP and UNODC support has been more significant than in the Asia region.

34 The Arab Governmental Expert Group participating countries are: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, the occupied Palestinian territory, Sudan, Tunisia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
activities that attracted media attention, it was hard for them to sustain the interest of citizens and other constituencies.

Because the work of civil society organizations was often used for political purposes, governments in some countries expressed reservations about the UNDP approach to supporting civil society organizations in general. Civil society organizations were perceived as contributing to public distrust of government. Even in countries where the government had a less tenuous relationship with civil society organizations, raising corruption issues and demand for transparency in public fund management was not received well. Support to civil society organizations by international agencies was considered as not in the spirit of partnership with the government.

There were also countervailing concerns in some cases, where sections of civil society organizations working on governance issues were seen to be co-opted by the government through government initiatives to engage civil society (this was not typical of any one country). While working on anti-corruption and accountability and transparency issues, some of the organizations were perceived to be taking a more lenient view of government functions. Although there was no compelling evidence that co-opted organizations worked against other organization’s anti-corruption agenda, co-opting organizations as implementers of government programmes was perceived as undermining advocacy space.

Although there were civil society organizations with good capacities in each of the countries studied, financial and other capacity challenges determined the extent to which the organizations could consistently engage on complex governance issues in the midst of government resistance or hostility. UNDP programmes recognized such limitations and supported civil society organization activities. However, UNDP support to civil society organizations has declined over the years, although non-funding partnerships remain.

UNDP engagement was largely confined to civil society organizations based in capital cities, unless it was for project implementation. This general pattern was also seen among other international development agencies. Capacities of civil society organizations working at the subnational level were often weak. For example, civil society is relatively strong and vibrant in Nigeria. There is a plethora of anti-corruption activities carried out by international and national NGOs and some strong national-level NGO coalitions. However, the capacity of civil society to engage with subnational governments was limited. As with government actors, local civil society organizations suffer from a lack of resources and capacity and the absence of platforms for effective dialogue and oversight.

3.4 ADDRESSING DRIVERS OF CORRUPTION: STRENGTHENING ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY PROCESSES

STRENGTHENING CIVIL SERVICE PROCESSES

Finding 20: The contribution of UNDP civil service initiatives to enhancing integrity in the functioning of the public sector was not always pronounced.

A majority of countries UNDP supported have undertaken public administration and civil service capacity-building measures. UNDP contributed to such measures, and has supported cross-cutting efforts involving civil service (such


as formulation or revision of civil service policies), procedures on roles and responsibilities of bureaucrats, civil service system modernization (under broader public administration modernization), strengthening the capacities of civil servants through training, and actual implementation support to reforms. In several countries, UNDP provided training to civil servants in the areas of human resource management and implementation of procedures, modernization of administration for effective public management and accountability and transparency measures. In several instances, broader civil service strengthening support opened avenues to introduce anti-corruption measures in civil service-related work. There was more direct support to strengthening policies pertaining to the integrity of the government staff. In Egypt, UNDP contributed to policy formulation and provided advisory support to the newly established Transparency and Integrity Committee of the Ministry of Administrative Development in order to guide decision-making processes on the development and implementation of anti-corruption policies and standards. UNDP support enhanced the Committee’s capacity to formulate policies within the area of anti-corruption relating to public administration. Similar support was provided in Turkey to the Ombudsmen’s office to strengthen the administration of the civil service.

Measures that strengthened the interface of citizens and administrations had greater potential to enhance public accountability of civil servants (e.g. in Bangladesh, Egypt, Turkey and Uruguay). In Uruguay, public service delivery procedures and services were improved and streamlined to simplify citizen engagement with public administration. UNDP supported the Government of Uruguay’s development of the Network of Citizen Help Centres (22 centres were set up in 16 departments) to bring civil servants closer to the public they serve. In Bangladesh, UNDP support can be directly linked to the development of a Change Management structure within the government that resulted in the drafting of a new Civil Service Act (2012); the establishment of a Governance Innovation Unit within the Office of the Prime Minister and a Bangladesh Civil Service Women’s Network; enhancement of the concept of the Citizen Charter; and a robust increase in digital/e-service delivery for citizens at the local level.

Post-crisis state building and transition provided opportunities for addressing integrity issues in civil service. However, it was not evident that UNDP capitalized on such opportunities. UNDP played an extensive role in the civil service reform processes of some countries (e.g. Lebanon, Timor-Leste). In countries transitioning from crisis to development, UNDP also supported the management of government staff in some sectors, streamlining government staff positions, downsizing and strengthening merit-based recruitment processes. One of the issues in streamlining civil service, for example in Timor-Leste, was phasing out international staff. Addressing salary issues and job descriptions was extremely critical for streamlining government functioning and for accountability and transparency in government functioning. In such cases, it required measures to reduce practices that may undermine an accountable civil service system. Generally, this has been a long, drawn-out process. UNDP demonstrated limited ability to address systemic civil service issues.

Risks to initiatives to strengthen the capacities of government institutions arise when new layers of bureaucracy outside of the civil service are added. For example, in Lebanon, a majority of the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform personnel are UNDP staff, which support the development of plans for reform projects and follow up on their execution. The Office has been working in various areas to modernize the administration, entailing a host of measures to reinforce governance, accountability and transparency. The outcomes have yet to manifest in developing a self-sustained and transparent civil service in Lebanon. UNDP management of a parallel system of government staff that were policy advisers but not fully part of the civil service system was considered problematic. Such approaches were seen to undermine developing
a robust civil service system and inadvertently have the possibility of undermining government accountability.37

Implementation of civil service data systems posed challenges in many countries. UNDP supported measures to strengthen government staff databases on government staff positions and salaries. UNDP support contributed to building a role-based system and reducing public administration costs. However, experience shows that civil service data systems need to be thought through strategically and considered as more than a mere information and communications technology tool. In coordinating different government bodies, different data sets need to be streamlined for a more transparent civil service system.

Civil service and anti-corruption reforms generally take longer time and need more long-term support than UNDP governance initiatives provide. UNDP initiatives have therefore been important in complementing ongoing civil service efforts. This was also an area with several competing objectives, where the pace of reforms has been slow in many countries. One of the larger challenges beyond UNDP support has been establishing linkages among civil service processes and anti-corruption measures to increase the leverage of civil service initiatives.

IMPROVING ACCESS TO INFORMATION

Finding 21: UNDP contributions have been important in facilitating local-level access to public information, particularly initiatives that facilitated citizens’ utilization of information to engage in local planning and governance. Improvements in access to information have been more promising in increasing accountability and, to a certain extent, in reducing local-level corruption.

In the past two decades, the awareness of the right to information gained momentum as a necessary condition for civil society and media to demand effective governance, to expose corruption and to increase transparency in political processes, budgeting, expenditure reporting and procurement. According to the Global Right to Information rating, 103 countries have adopted right to information legislation, although the level of freedom of information significantly varies.38 Prior to 2011, less than 10 percent of African countries had adopted freedom of information legislation; the proportion has since increased to around 25 percent.39 In practice, however, progress towards increased transparency is not at expected levels. In addition, increased transparency has not always led to a commensurate increase in government accountability through enforcing standards or more evidence-based policymaking and planning.

UNDP supported initiatives that strengthened access to information in 34 of the 65 countries assessed, some of which entailed more substantive support. Key activities included supporting access to information policies at the national and local levels; developing information communication technologies for information sharing; integrating national databases through communication technologies, information portals and e-governance; and awareness-raising and advocacy.

Given the importance of citizens’ access to information and the dearth of concrete pre-existing information access initiatives, UNDP support helped governments become more responsive to the demand for transparency in public functioning. Such initiatives scaled up by governments (for example, Bangladesh) were critical to informing government policies (for example, Egypt, India), enhancing implementation of national legislations (for example, Cambodia), promoting efforts towards fiscal transparency in Ukraine and

38 Centre for Law and Democracy, Global Right to Information Rating, rti-rating.org/by-section
Kosovo, and yielding some incremental outcomes by contributing to transparent budget processes at the local level in several countries. UNDP promoted the use of information communication technologies in anti-corruption initiatives, for example, SMS-based corruption alerts to the anti-corruption authorities (for example, Kosovo, Papua New Guinea), which generated considerable public enthusiasm, although challenges in follow-up of the complaints remains.

There was some level of information and communication technologies use in all assessed countries. This corresponds with the trend in the past decade of increased use of technology to promote transparency and accountability and to identify and reduce corruption. UNDP used information and communication technologies to launch e-governance initiatives, information portals and other measures to improve the functioning of ministries. This has increased access to official information, improved interactions between the government and citizens and enabled reporting and campaigning on corruption. Information and communication technology support in the judicial sector helped to improve case management and access to justice (for example in Palestine, Rwanda, Timor-Leste and Uzbekistan).

Although certain factors that enable access to information and greater transparency stand out, contextual triggers are critical for generating momentum for implementing access to information policies and adopting legislation. In India and Peru, for example, the citizen movements for the right to information and mobilization against political corruption triggered increased action. UNDP was responsive to such situations and contributed to efforts to push for reform.

UNDP outcomes for information and communication technology use varied considerably across the areas for which they were used, with significant outcomes in enhancing access to information and improving public services in over a quarter of the countries assessed. The sustainability of the information portals was modest in many countries where it was not properly integrated within the functioning of government institutions or local governments. The same can be said about the use of information and communication technologies for streamlining government staff information. In most regions, there was an additional challenge in terms of providing Internet access, confidentiality and covering costs relating to the implementation of technological solutions.

Although a number of factors are responsible for low levels of progress in enhancing greater access to information, lessons from successful cases such as Bangladesh are important in understanding what factors work the best. Factors that contributed to the scaling up of activities in Bangladesh include government buy-in, a certain level of scale, anchorage in policy or institutional processes and addressing technical and logistics issues (see Box 8). Most UNDP initiatives, however, did not have the necessary scale or could not ensure that the processes were institutionalized and therefore were confined to project-level outcomes.

Public administration modernization efforts in key government institutions enhanced government effectiveness and contributed to transparency in government functioning. National and local-level e-governance is one such example; in 18 of the countries assessed, UNDP supported and made tangible improvements in areas that used e-governance. When used in the service sector, e-governance reduced the number of middlemen and corruption opportunities in service provision. UNDP supported the computerization of integrated financial and payroll management systems and the development and implementation of policies and procedures on human resource management (Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam).

Local information mechanisms in the context of active citizen mobilization has produced positive results (Bangladesh, India, Kosovo and Uganda), although it takes more time for its institutionalization. Local-level initiatives were of greater salience in politically complex contexts such as Uzbekistan. UNDP facilitated access to public information and services and related capacity
CHAPTER 3. ASSESSMENT OF UNDP CONTRIBUTIONS TO ANTI-CORRUPTION AND ADDRESSING DRIVERS OF CORRUPTION

Across the countries, there is a rising awareness among citizens of their rights to efficient and quality public service delivery and to transparency in government procurement. There is also an increasing preference for using information and communication technologies for public services. In the majority of cases, these demands have gone unmet or governments have only just started to respond. There are a number of examples in which UNDP was strategically well-placed to work in this area. UNDP support to national-level access to information and right to information legislations and policies occurred in contexts where salience was given to the issue.

development of local civil servants through several one-stop-shop initiatives, the establishment of public information centres and an electronic document management system for local governments. The increase in access to information on government services increased the demand for such services.

Across the countries, there is a rising awareness among citizens of their rights to efficient and quality public service delivery and to transparency in government procurement. There is also an increasing preference for using information and communication technologies for public services. In the majority of cases, these demands have gone unmet or governments have only just started to respond. There are a number of examples in which UNDP was strategically well-placed to work in this area. UNDP support to national-level access to information and right to information legislations and policies occurred in contexts where salience was given to the issue.

Key components of civil service and service delivery reform efforts in Bangladesh include access to information and the digitalization of public services and processes. As of 2015, 53 Government of Bangladesh public services are now available at the union digital centres nationwide. On average, the centres reduced wait times from seven days to one hour and average travel distances decreased from 35 km to 3 km. Digital centres in the field are active and there is a huge demand for services. UNDP data indicates that as of 2015, an estimated 4,500,000 persons per month (54,000,000 per year) now obtain enhanced services via the service centres at lower time-cost per visit rates. Citizens can access these services at 64 deputy commissioner’s offices, 4,547 union digital centres and urban access points in 407 wards, 11 City Corporations and 321 Paurashavas.

UNDP support proved instrumental to the creation of the union digital centres, and has resulted in a number of outcome-level gains. The process of identifying e-services was citizen-led, with UNDP pursuing a bottom-up approach with 56 services being suggested as candidates for transfer from central line ministries to the local level via the union digital centres. These were quick successes for UNDP, which supported the digitization and decentralization of previously over-the-counter services. UNDP also played an instrumental role in drafting and facilitating several policies and guidelines, such as the ‘Proactive Information Disclosure Guideline’ (2014) and the ‘Guidelines on Agent Banking for the Banks and National Information and Communication Technology Policy’ (2015). UNDP is in the process of crafting the country’s first ever e-service act. The goals of UNDP support to access to information are to get services to 20,000,000 persons and to reduce the time and costs associated with accessing services.

As a result of UNDP support, national and local government offices are available from one Internet address, a first for Bangladesh. This has reduced corruption (and collusion of corruption) by minimizing the number of people between service providers and recipients. The initiatives also have gender implications.

UNDP support also promoted a culture of local-level entrepreneurship. Links to local-level institutions were improved via public-private partnerships that empowered local entrepreneurs (e.g. digital banking services via mobile banking, health services and birth registrations).

In 2013, UNDP created a service innovation fund that awards small grants to local digital and other service providers (public and private). The fund aims to promote a culture of innovation within the public and private spheres and to encourage risk-taking behaviour among public officials so as to improve the quality and breadth of government services. For example, some union digital centres are using private-sector health care providers to register live births, deliver health services and to connect citizens with practitioners. Between 1976 and 2003, Bangladesh on average registered only 8 percent of live births. As of 2014, an estimated 80 percent of live births were being registered with the government. In addition, significant improvements were noted in terms of the time required to obtain a birth certificate (reduced to one day from an average of 8.8 days).

UNDP support was important to the overall national-level discourse on the right to information. For example, in Kazakhstan support to access to information legislation happened in a context where a high level of political focus was on the issue, with UNDP intervention ensuring that the legislation actually met most international standards.

Transparency in the implementation of large national development programmes has the potential to reduce opportunities to misuse allocated funds. In India, for example, UNDP provided technical support to the Ministry of Rural Development to improve transparency and accountability in the world’s largest employment guarantee scheme, MGNREGA (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guaranty Scheme). UNDP support provided much-needed flexibility to the central government and enabled quick independent audits of the early functioning of the programme in several states. This support informed public policy by allowing the government to revise implementation procedures and to institute other safeguards in the implementation of MGNREGA.

**ENHANCING THE ROLE OF CITIZENS**

**Finding 22:** UNDP contributed to enhancing the role of citizens and community-based organizations in local development planning. The success of such measures, however, depended on whether there were accountability systems in place at the local and other levels and whether local-level initiatives were linked to broader policy processes. In the absence of such linkages, local-level efforts had incremental outcomes and remained one-off or isolated initiatives without much impact on accountability and transparency policies and practices.

Local participatory mechanisms were supported in several countries with a fair degree of success in accomplishing the objective of raising citizen demand for accountability in public services. Local development space has many actors; there are countries where UNDP has fairly large programmes (e.g. Bangladesh, Georgia, Moldova, Uganda, and Viet Nam). UNDP support has contributed to providing viable models for citizen participation in enhancing local accountability and transparency and sector governance.

There were several positive examples of UNDP engaging civil society organizations and local communities (see Boxes 8 and 9). In Bangladesh, for example, UNDP contributed to improved service delivery, particularly in the education, health and clean water sectors. UNDP support to local governance was reinforced by its highly successful interventions in the area of Access to Information and Digital Bangladesh. While there was no country-level data upon which to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of such support in terms of better accountability and transparency in all cases, the space such activities provided had positive impacts on the functioning of local intuitions. Increased participation of local communities in financial management and budgetary oversight increased transparency and reduced the misuse of public funds.

The country studies show that the link between decentralization and accountability is not always causal and that outcomes are largely influenced by country specificities and the reform approach. Local governance may be particularly successful where there is local capacity and high levels of participation. Local governance strategies had the greatest success when combined with high levels of community participation and when pre-implementation included building the capacities of local government staff and infrastructure.

Considering the short duration and scope of the initiatives, there were challenges in ensuring replicability or influencing government policies and practices. Often, there were similar initiatives by different agencies working at the local level. Adequately leveraging government policies or
in institutionalizing the pilot initiatives was critical for broader application by governments and development agencies. Linkages between local initiatives and national-level policies were weak—and serious measures to establish such linkages were often lacking. The immediate challenge in a number of countries where the initiatives were

**Box 9. Support to local-level accountability and transparency initiatives**

UNDP efforts to strengthen local-level accountability and transparency provided models for wider implementation. An underlying assumption was that bringing in measures to support a more inclusive and participatory system of governance would not only be productive in terms of achieving development objectives, but would also ensure that a more efficient service delivery system would reduce wastage and corruption. In several instances, UNDP contributed to strengthening local government capacities for transparency in development planning and spending and accountability in service delivery (e.g. in Cambodia, Kosovo, Philippines, Tunisia, Uganda and Viet Nam). Similar to other local-level activities, partnerships with civil society organizations were crucial to the implementation of integrity mechanisms.

**Integrity forums in Uganda**

UNDP supported the establishment of integrity forums in 48 districts in Uganda. These forums serve as platforms for information sharing and coordination of initiatives that promote local government transparency and accountability. UNDP supported a similar initiative by the Inspector General’s office that established integrity clubs in more than 25 tertiary education institutions to enlist youth as anti-corruption ambassadors. According to interviews, the Inspector General has continued to support the integrity clubs after UNDP funding ended. The clubs have become an important means for the Inspector General’s public outreach, especially to youth. Similarly, the integrity forums established by the Directorate for Ethics and Integrity have been sustained with government funding.

In Uganda, UNDP support has led to notable changes in the government’s policy on decentralization. UNDP contributed to the ongoing process of local government restructuring and contributed to closing the gaps between national policy and actual implementation at the local level. The revised guidelines for local-level planning and budgeting further emphasized cross-cutting issues such as people’s participation, evidence-generation and gender mainstreaming, thus potentially contributing to enhanced accountability and transparency. Nevertheless, challenges remain with regard to the coverage, quality and responsiveness of local service delivery.

**The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index**

A collaborative effort among UNDP, the Viet Nam Fatherland Front and the Centre for Community Support and Development Studies (a Vietnamese non-governmental organization), the Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) assesses the experiences of a random selection of citizens with local governance and public administration. The PAPI initiative aims to strengthen the transparency, accountability and responsiveness of provincial governments to their citizens. Since 2011, it has been annually implemented in all 63 provinces and major cities of Viet Nam. PAPI includes six dimensions: local-level participation, transparency, vertical accountability, control of corruption, public administration procedures and public service delivery. Scores can be compared between provinces and over time. Overall, scores have remained stable, though aspects of bribery in health education and land use certificates have increased.

A mid-term review, conducted in 2014, concluded that the PAPI methodology, sampling and data analysis met international standards, that it made use of a thorough and sound survey methodology and that it has high reliability as a sociological index. The PAPI questionnaire is considered to have achieved neutrality and moved beyond perceptions and opinions to include citizens’ concrete experiences. The project is considered to form a model of good practice for engagement between government and non-governmental actors in pursuit of common goals. Based on the assessments, 13 provinces have issued official decisions or developed action plans to improve their performance.

The mid-term review recommended improving the presentation and communication of results in order to ensure that information reaches the intended users (primarily provincial leaders and officials as well as sociopolitical organizations, the media, central authorities, academic researchers and the public).

Source: Independent Evaluation Office country studies and desk studies
fairly successful was institutionalizing them in local government systems. Where UNDP also supported developing local governance processes, the opportunities for taking forward demand-side accountability measures were relatively better.

A lack of citizen willingness to demand accountability limited the outcomes of local-level initiatives. Although there is a rising awareness about citizens’ right to information, this did not always translate into demanding for public information. Whether due to their own preoccupation, systematic inequalities or other reasons, citizens tended to be less confrontational with local authorities. There were cases in which the facilitation provided by community-based organizations to demand information on public fund management and services was important. In Kenya, for example, UNDP supported civil society organizations’ basket-fund enhanced community engagement with policymakers. Such initiatives gave the necessary thrust for enhancing citizen demand for public information.

SECTOR INTEGRITY INITIATIVES

Finding 23: The UNDP MDG Acceleration Framework provided momentum to initiate efforts to reduce governance risks in key development areas. Such momentum was not sustained to address corruption issues in the social sector, which continues to be an underrepresented area of UNDP support.

UNDP prioritized the education, health, water and environment sectors and programme areas such as crisis and extractive industries for sectoral integrity assessments. Such assessments broadly identified governance vulnerabilities and have been comprehensive (where undertaken). Although the policymakers interviewed generally considered sector assessments to be important inputs in government strategizing (more so than the perception surveys), the actual use of these assessments appeared to be limited. One of the limitations of the UNDP sector governance assessments was the lack of periodicity. Further, UNDP was often not recognized as a provider of such assessments. When sector assessments were carried out, there were insufficient efforts to promote their use.

More evident at the municipal and local levels, UNDP programme contributions provided the possibility of replication across the country and informed macro-level policies. There were positive examples where UNDP support was important to improving sector initiatives at the local level (Kenya, Kosovo, Uganda). There were also efforts at the central level that were promising, for example, in Nigeria (see Box 10). In Kosovo, sectoral corruption risk assessments were supported at the country level, in addition to municipal integrity plans. The municipal integrity plans in the Pristina/Prishtine and the Gjakova/Djakovica municipalities were considered effective. It was the first time integrity planning was tried in Kosovo, and it is being replicated in other municipalities.

Although there is growing interest in governance risk assessments, sectoral risk management has not progressed adequately. The country studies show that social sectors have had limited risk assessments pertaining to corruption and procurement practices. A majority of UN Common Country Assessments identified governance issues and corruption as impediments to poverty reduction and service delivery; this was further confirmed by the country studies carried out for this evaluation. Institutional capacity weaknesses were among the most commonly mentioned constraints, although their underlying causes were often not adequately diagnosed. There are tools to assess fiduciary risks in public finance management and financial accountability, but were not by themselves sufficient for sector risk assessments.42 Opportunities were lost in addressing

---

42 Some of the indicators used include: credibility of the budget; comprehensiveness and transparency; policy-based budgeting; predictability and control in budget execution; accounting, recording and reporting; and external scrutiny and audit. See Public finance and Financial Accountability framework at pefa.org.
CHAPTER 3. ASSESSMENT OF UNDP CONTRIBUTIONS TO ANTI-CORRUPTION AND ADDRESSING DRIVERS OF CORRUPTION

Governance aspects are generally poorly integrated into UNDP development projects and programmes. For example, in any given year, UNDP managed funds for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (the Global Fund) in at least 25 countries, managing approximately $2 billion in grants annually. Global Fund management, to a certain extent, includes capacity development of government agencies in financial management and systems, (including risk management, procurement and supply management, monitoring and evaluation, and project governance). This provides an opportunity to include risk assessments in health sector procurement and to streamline procurement processes. About 50 percent of the countries have capacity development plans in place; 20 percent have advanced in the implementation of the Plan, which is an indication of improved governance, oversight, accountability, transparency and integrity of the health systems pertaining to Global Fund areas. UNDP has yet to leverage the Global Fund as an entry point to inform health sector anti-corruption and integrity measures.

There were countries where efforts were initiated to improve the capacity of the Ministry of Health to manage funds for the Global Fund. In Zimbabwe, for example, steps were being taken to safeguard Global Fund funding as programme management was being passed back to the government. Establishing systems to minimize the chances for corruption was central to such efforts.

Box 10. Corruption risk assessments initiative in Nigeria

The corruption risks assessments initiative in Nigeria is an example of an area where UNDP has been able to contribute to improving existing governance practices, potentially leading to increased accountability and transparency across several ministries, departments and agencies. The methodology for the corruption risks assessments was developed with the support of UNDP based on an already existing practice of the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission for conducting systems audits. UNDP support seems to have contributed to a qualitative improvement of this practice.

It is noteworthy that the recommendations of the corruption risks assessment focus on improving the governance systems, procedures and practices of the targeted institutions. The first corruption risks assessment of the Nigerian port sector has prompted the involved port agencies to develop anti-corruption policies and standard operating procedures. The procedures include guidelines aimed at reducing discretion in decision-making, clearly defining all the steps and procedures for actions such as detention of goods, seizure of goods and force majeure. In addition, the corruption risks assessment has reportedly spearheaded the Nigerian Shippers' Council to install a new e-service portal to enhance service efficiency and the resolution of complaints by port users.

UNDP successfully promoted cooperation and achieved synergies between government agencies as part of the corruption risks assessments. As such, a link has been established between the support to public procurement reform and the strengthening of anti-corruption agencies and mechanisms. The corruption risks assessments were carried out with the inputs of certified risk assessors from the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission, the Technical Unit on Governance and Anti-corruption Reforms and the Bureau of Public Procurement. According to interviews, the cooperation made it easier to mobilize the required technical expertise for the corruption risks assessments and strengthened the institutional linkages between the agencies. Since 2011, UNDP support has been based on annual work plans prepared jointly by the three agencies.

The corruption risk assessment provides a valuable tool and a first step in a process of ensuring that the structural causes of corruption and leakages in the management of public resources are systematically addressed. The assessments also enabled UNDP to move its anti-corruption engagement beyond dedicated anti-corruption agencies to Ministries Departments and Agencies at the federal and state level that are central to Nigeria’s achievement of the MDGs and now the SDGs. As such, UNDP will potentially contribute to establishing a closer link between the fight against corruption and the country’s development agenda.

Source: Independent Evaluation Office
The extent to which the Global Fund was used to further the integrity of the whole health system in Zimbabwe was limited. Part of the reason for this is that in Zimbabwe and other countries, the government was not interested in having UNDP pursue such measures. In addition, donors are not making their funding contingent on such assessments being carried out. This was a missed opportunity, particularly given the high prevalence of corruption in the health sector.

In the extractive industries sector, a priority area particularly in Africa, there has been limited work done so far. The UNDP Global Initiative on Extractive Industries for Sustainable Development Initiative, initiated in 2013, specifically emphasizes transparent and accountable management of extractive industries. This has yet to develop into a concrete initiative. There are other actors with domain expertise in extractive industries. Although the extractive industries sector is an area outlined in the Strategic Plan, a lack of resources and programmes undermined UNDP positioning in this area.

Finding 24: In many countries, UNDP provided procurement and fiduciary services to the government in the social and infrastructure sectors. Such opportunities were not effectively used to further integrity measures.

Procurement processes are perhaps the single most corruption-prone area of public administration. However, procurement processes also present the most promising area for which a set of concrete, quantifiable indicators can be developed, from the initial planning phase through to contract award and implementation. UNDP supported the formulation and strengthening of national procurement policies and development of e-procurement systems in 29 countries included in the assessment. In Uganda, for example, UNDP provided support to the development of a new legal framework, the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Authority. UNDP provided fiduciary and procurement-related support of different scales in about 25 of the countries included in the assessment. In the development context, procurement implementation and fiduciary support was comparatively higher in Latin America than in other regions.

Although UNDP is moving away from procurement-related support, many countries consider UNDP services to be efficient and cost effective. As such, UNDP procurement services are sought out in some countries where governments are in the process of reducing corruption in key social sectors. UNDP facilitated the payment of salaries to government employees in the health and education sectors. For example, in the Philippines, UNDP supported procurement in the education sector, where the scale of procurement is high and where corruption is also perceived to be high. While such support enhanced accountability and transparency and improved services, overall it proved challenging in terms of enabling more systemic changes in improving institutional processes and practices.

UNDP often sought to minimize corruption risks associated with its own projects by managing finances through direct implementation support, which may not in all cases lend itself to improving the capacities of the government institutions. UNDP aimed to ensure that there were no leakages in the funds it is managing and to be cautious in its fiduciary management role. Although this served to safeguard UNDP delivery and reputation and ensured procedural compliance, it did not necessarily contribute to national capacity development.

UNDP has guidelines on using national systems for project implementation. However, UNDP services were specifically used to overcome some of the systemic challenges. While there is a possibility of trickle-down capacity development, changes were slow to manifest. UNDP made minimal efforts to consolidate sector-specific procurement processes and indicators for wider application. The evaluation did not come across cases where UNDP facilitated risk assessments or institutionalized procurement processes that would have enhanced overall governmental accountability. Even in countries where UNDP handled larger construction-related projects, there were no risk
assessments carried out to establish public-sector procurement and management processes.

3.5 FACILITATING GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY DEBATES AND ADVOCACY

ENGAGEMENT IN GLOBAL DEBATES AND INITIATIVES

Finding 25: UNDP proactively engaged in global anti-corruption debates and advocacy. UNDP actively participated in the SDG debates and contributed to the SDG 16 agenda.

UNDP, in partnership with other international actors, facilitated global-level discussions on anti-corruption strategies. UNDP is part of joint initiatives such as Tax Inspectors without Borders, International Aid Transparency Initiative and the Open Government Partnership. The contributions of global and regional programmes to promoting anti-corruption debates have been important during the two Strategic Plan periods. Global anti-corruption projects, such as the Programme for Accountability and Transparency, the Global Programme on Anti-corruption for Development Effectiveness and the Global Anti-corruption Initiative have significantly facilitated UNDP engagement at the global level and have provided a channel for linking country-level work with global debates. Through these projects, UNDP engaged in various conferences, produced knowledge products and brought countries’ perspectives to the global discussion. These projects enabled UNDP representation in various global forums and enabled UNDP to build global partnerships to contribute to anti-corruption policy and advocacy.

Transparency in public management and access to information has been an issue of concern for a large majority of UNDP programme countries, although over 100 countries have legislation on access to information and asset declaration. As a member of the Open Government Partnership, a global-level government–civil society partnership initiative, UNDP supports the framing and implementation of Open Government Partnership commitments in a number of countries (e.g. in Chile, Mexico and Serbia). UNDP has also taken this agenda forward at the local levels.

Through Communities of Practice, UNDP provided global platforms to debate anti-corruption challenges and to collaborate on finding solutions. The global Community of Practice on anti-corruption hosts an annual debate on ways forward on strengthening the anti-corruption agenda. These well-attended debates facilitate the exchange of lessons and practices from various countries between governments, civil society actors and donors. Decisions in these forums, upon which there was more consensus, were often pursued for more concerted action. In the Asia and the Pacific region, for example, UNDP collaborated with the Government of Malaysia and UNODC to convene 70 high-level officials from 20 countries to develop common guidelines for national anti-corruption strategies, filling a long-standing gap in the region. Through its regional hubs, UNDP created similar networks at the regional level.

Finding 26: UNDP did not leverage its extensive country-level governance programme to address the linkages between anti-corruption and development, an area that continues to be underrepresented in global debates and efforts.

While there were UNDP initiatives that aimed to establish linkages between governance, pov-

---

43 Discussions were facilitated at the October 2013, UNDP, UNODC and Government of Malaysia conference (hosted by the Government of Malaysia) on anti-corruption strategies, at which representatives of 20 countries adopted the ‘Guidelines for Anti-corruption Strategies’ in the form of the Kuala Lumpur Statement on Anti-corruption Strategies, later endorsed in November 2013 in Panama at the international level in the Preventive Resolution adopted by the Conference of State Parties to the UN Convention against Corruption.

ERTY REDUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, UNDP DID NOT ADEQUATELY FOLLOW THROUGH ON THIS IMPORTANT WORK OR EXPAND IT TO INCLUDE WIDER PARTNERSHIPS. THERE WERE GOOD INITIATIVES, SUCH AS THE MDG ACCELERATION FRAMEWORK AND COLLABORATIONS WITH UNREDD TO INTEGRATE ANTI-CORRUPTION DIMENSIONS. UNDP WORKED WITH THE OTHER UN AGENCIES IN DEVELOPING A STRATEGY TO ACCELERATE MDG PROGRESS. SECTORAL GOVERNANCE RISK ASSESSMENTS WERE PRIORITIZED AS PART OF THE MDG ACCELERATION FRAMEWORK SUPPORT, AS GOVERNANCE WAS SEEN AS KEY TO ACHIEVING THE MDGS. UNDP DID NOT ADEQUATELY FOLLOW THIS THROUGH OR DEVELOP IT INTO A GLOBAL INITIATIVE BEYOND THE UNITED NATIONS. HAD IT BEEN WELL THOUGHT THROUGH, THIS PROGRAMME HAD THE POTENTIAL TO DEVELOP INTO A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE AND COULD HAVE MINIMIZED MULTIPLE SECTORAL GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENTS AT THE COUNTRY LEVEL. THE MAPS (MAINSTREAMING, ACCELERATION, AND POLICY SUPPORT) TO FACILITATE EFFECTIVE AND COHERENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW SDG AGENDA HAS YET TO TAKE SHAPE AND IT IS TOO EARLY TO SAY WHAT THE SCOPE OF SUCH AN ENGAGEMENT WOULD BE.

While UNDP engaged in broader anti-corruption and right to information advocacy and debates, there were limited efforts to champion specific areas where UNDP has country-level experience. The governance and anti-corruption areas are vast, with specialized areas and several ongoing global policy and advocacy efforts. Contribution to global policy and advocacy requires prioritization of areas for short-term and long-term focus. Such an organized approach has been missing.

Although UNDP joined policy coalitions related to governance, limited efforts were made to take the lead or to promote new coalitions on issues drawing from its cross-country programming experience. Global advocacy spaces are powerful for augmenting country-level outcomes, transferring knowledge, linking country-level actors to global governance debates and for fostering international cooperation. While UNDP continues to facilitate programme countries to place their needs on the global policy agenda, UNDP has yet to take concrete steps to fully leverage its comparative advantage.

**FACILITATING REGIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION DEBATES**

Finding 27: UNDP prioritized partnerships with regional intergovernmental bodies, which enabled a more structured approach to regional engagement in the Africa region.

The Regional Programme for Africa has had a clear regional orientation that focused on strengthening the capacities of regional intergovernmental institutions, building regional normative frameworks and fostering knowledge management. Anti-corruption is also explicitly considered in the context of support to strengthening regulatory frameworks and transparency in relation to natural resource extraction and financial flows. UNDP regional initiatives responded to processes such as the elaboration and ratification of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the Public Service Charter, the implementation of the African Peer Review Mechanism, the monitoring of the Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, UNECA’s annual Africa Governance Report and the Africa Development Forum series.

UNDP contributions to the finalization and adoption of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the Public Service Charter are significant from a regional anti-corruption perspective. Both charters have specific provisions on corruption and anti-corruption that require state parties to take comprehensive measures to enact anti-corruption laws, adopt corresponding strategies and to establish independent anti-corruption institutions. The Public Service Charter obliges states to institutionalize national accountability and integrity systems in order to promote value-based societal behaviour and attitudes as a means of preventing corruption. Following the adoption of the Public Service Charter, UNDP assisted the Secretariat of the Conference of African Ministers of Public Service and the African Management Development Network to design, administer and carry out the training of member state senior officials on how to adopt and implement the Charter. UNDP supported
the Conference Secretariat in developing an anti-corruption strategy, including a system of service champions and peer support. As a follow-up to the adoption of the Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance in 2012, UNDP facilitated the Pan-African Parliament’s efforts to advocate for its ratification by member states.

UNDP worked with the African Union to develop strategies with concrete measures for improving and monitoring accountability. The African Union Anti-corruption Board used UNDP technical expertise in hosting the first continental meeting on extractive industries, illicit financial flows, repatriation of stolen assets and regional enforcement of the Union’s Anti-corruption Convention. UNDP supported the development of a manual on forensic audits, which was endorsed by over 19 anti-corruption commissions in the region. Regional trainings on anti-corruption measurement tools and methods were carried out. Although some of these efforts may not have far-reaching outcomes, regional actors consider them significant to intensifying the anti-corruption momentum.

Africa has a number of regional instruments (see Box 3 in Chapter 2). Nevertheless, evidence suggests that the effectiveness of regional instruments, institutions and initiatives has been limited. While the various charters are significant in their own way, the progress has been slow in country-level ratification and implementation. The Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance has so far been signed and ratified by only 10 of 54 African Union member states. Twenty-eight countries have signed but not ratified it, and 16 countries have not yet signed. The Public Service Charter has been signed and ratified by 13 out of 54 member states (and signed by 23 more).

In general, there is a lack of coherence and harmonization between the various legal instruments. In addition, the capacities of the relevant oversight institutions are weak. The process of setting up the review mechanism under the African Union Advisory Board against Corruption has been slow and, as of June 2016, few self-assessment reports or country visit reports have been published. Similarly, the African Peer Review Mechanism has been faced with significant financial, technical and political challenges. While the African Governance Architecture is perceived as an important initiative, its impact remains to be seen.

**Finding 28: UNDP regional programmes made important contributions by linking regional actors with global networks and by facilitating cooperation with international organizations.**

UNDP regional engagement spanned a range of governance areas and has provided support to regional instruments and institutions, knowledge sharing events and training. At the regional level, UNDP brought to the fore anti-corruption issues, including issues pertaining to specific areas such as freedom of information (or the right to information), which were not sufficiently addressed in country-level debates. Starting some of those discussions from a regional level (rather than a country level) helped propel the policy dialogue, for example in Asia and the Pacific, as it meant that no country was singled out.

UNDP brought out several global and regional publications to facilitate debates and action on anti-corruption and accountability and transparency. Some of the studies and publications have made important contributions, particularly in regions where there were not many publications to guide policy debates and policymaking. In the Europe and the CIS region, for example, UNDP developed a survey methodology for addressing gender equality-related corruption risks and vulnerabilities in the civil service, which was used in five counties and adopted by GOPAC (the Global

---

45 See achpr.org/instruments/charter-democracy/ and au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-values-and-principles-public-service-and-administration
The first anti-corruption human development report in Asia recognized the importance of anti-corruption for development. A 2007 study on corruption in the Pacific region and a 2009 national study on anti-corruption frameworks and institutions in 10 Pacific Island States were used to prepare a baseline for the accountability and transparency work in the Pacific Island States. The Asia-Pacific Human Development Report on Corruption and other publications were used to facilitate anti-corruption debates in Pacific Island States as an advocacy tool with Pacific governments and to inform discussion on ratifying and implementing the UNCAC. The Anti-corruption Assessment Tool for Parliamentarians was used in several countries across regions.

Initiatives such as facilitating the establishment of the Arab Anti-Corruption and Integrity Network (which followed a series of regional and national consultations with 19 Arab countries in 2007 and 2008), were important. The Integrity Network has the reputation as the first inclusive Arab-owned regional anti-corruption platform for knowledge networking, capacity development and policy dialogue. UNDP facilitated regional anti-corruption debates in the Asia and the Pacific region. As part of the continuous effort to promote multi-stakeholder policy dialogue, the regional programme in Latin America and the Caribbean supported communities of practice and expert meetings across the region.

UNDP partnership approaches have enhanced its contribution to anti-corruption and accountability and transparency efforts in the Pacific Island States. UNDP leveraged its subregional presence in the Pacific Island States, and jointly with UNODC facilitated national and regional partnerships to promote subregional and national-level anti-corruption activities. Governments and civil society actors in the region acknowledged this aspect of UNDP support. The Pacific Centre and UNDP/UNODC regional anti-corruption project made significant contributions to the ratification and implementation of UNCAC in the Pacific.

There are many initiatives and robust collaborative efforts on anti-corruption in the Latin America region. However, UNDP has not been a major participant, as it has not prioritized this area for concerted regional engagement. Given the paucity of financial resources, it seems to be a justifiable decision that UNDP prioritized areas such as citizen security. The Caribbean region, however, needed more concerted support on governance issues in general and anti-corruption in particular. UNDP support to the secretariats of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and CARICOM has declined significantly over the years and has mostly been limited to financial and operational support.

---


49 The Arab Anti-Corruption and Integrity Network also provided a forum for non-governmental actors to dialogue with governmental anti-corruption authorities on reform needs and priorities.
Chapter 4

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter presents the main conclusions of the evaluation and provides recommendations for UNDP to consider as it carries out anti-corruption and accountability and transparency programming during the current Strategic Plan period, as well as to inform strategizing for the new Strategic Plan. The conclusions and recommendations presented here are based on the evaluation analysis and findings described earlier in this report. The conclusions focus on contextual issues and UNDP contributions to national capacity development in advancing anti-corruption.

4.1 CONCLUSIONS

Conclusion 1: UNDP anti-corruption programme support is carried out in a complex policy and implementation context with multiple public administration challenges. Many countries where UNDP provides support continue to face significant systemic challenges in their efforts to improve accountability and reduce corruption.

Partner governments acknowledged the detrimental effects of corruption on development and recognized the need to strengthen governance systems and processes. In each of the countries included in this evaluation, measures have been established to formulate anti-corruption policies, set up institutions, address accountability and transparency issues and to launch capacity development initiatives. Despite these efforts, many partner countries have not prioritized or entrenched these actions sufficiently to root out corruption. The evaluation found considerable inconsistency and often insufficient government commitment provided to accountability and anti-corruption enforcement processes and institutions that have been established. While governance reforms were ongoing in each of the countries included in this evaluation, the focus of such reforms is usually to enhance the economic growth of the countries. Preference for certain areas of governance reforms meant that UNDP has to be realistic about the expected outcomes from its anti-corruption support efforts.

UNDP support to strengthening anti-corruption and measures that enhance accountable and transparent governance continues to be relevant in most partner countries. Yet given the sensitive nature of the subject, UNDP and international development organizations in general typically face government resistance to comprehensive anti-corruption measures. UNDP programmes, therefore, tended to address the drivers of corruption as part of broader public administration support, and provided more direct anti-corruption support where governments had established their own national anti-corruption programmes and were open to technical advice. The UNDP emphasis on addressing drivers of corruption is well-considered, although uptake of these initiatives has been quite limited and has had marginal influence on corruption-related dimensions of governance reform processes. As has been the case with many organizations working in this area, although UNDP addressed public administration drivers, the thrust given to accountability and transparency was insufficient to generate the critical mass needed for the transformational changes necessary to significantly reduce corruption.

There was less resistance to initiatives aimed at enhancing accountability and transparency or addressing corruption at the local level as compared to the national level. There was greater government ownership at subnational levels, especially initiatives linking accountability and transparency in governance to service delivery.
Conclusion 2: Anti-corruption and accountable governance were key areas of UNDP support during the current and previous Strategic Plans. Although the resources spent were not comparable to those spent by some international financial institutions, UNDP has developed a unique niche in supporting efforts to address corruption drivers and strengthen national anti-corruption capacities.

A significant aspect of UNDP work in this area has been its willingness to take on sensitive topics, such as anti-corruption. In several countries, UNDP was one of the first agencies to support anti-corruption initiatives. It is clear that long-term UNDP support has led to incremental reductions in corruption risk and has improved accountability and transparency.

Simultaneously pursuing anti-corruption and accountability initiatives enables UNDP to work at multiple levels. UNDP supported anti-corruption initiatives in 65 countries and efforts to address the drivers of corruption in public administration in 124 countries. Irrespective of the objectives of individual projects, these areas of work are complementary, enhancing the overall UNDP contribution to anti-corruption. Support to anti-corruption policies and institutions across partner countries, as well as initiatives that address the drivers of corruption, were broadly defined and did not entail a predisposition towards a particular approach. This has increased UNDP flexibility in responding to national government priorities.

While UNDP contributions have been important in enhancing anti-corruption policies and capacities, their effectiveness and sustainability have been dependent on broader governance capacities, which had often not reached an adequate level. As with many organizations working in this area, while public administration drivers were addressed by UNDP, the thrust given to accountability and transparency issues was insufficient to generate the critical mass needed for transformations in overall governance for reducing corruption. This was a reflection of a wider challenge in the policy space: a limitation in linking public administration reforms to anti-corruption measures.

Although regional variations were evident in UNDP programme priorities, anti-corruption programmes were underrepresented in regions such as the Africa and the Asia and the Pacific regions. UNDP Country Offices are primarily responsible for mobilizing resources for these programmes. This builds considerable variation in the scale and scope of programming, as it is driven by country-level funding decisions by donors and partner governments. The lack of an organizational anti-corruption strategy contributed to the ad hoc nature of UNDP anti-corruption programming and the regional variability in UNDP engagement on this issue. In regions such as Africa, although the scope and scale of programmes were ahead of UNDP country programmes in other regions, they were not commensurate with the demand for anti-corruption programme support.

Partnerships with civil society organizations in advocacy and awareness-raising have complemented UNDP programme goals. UNDP has taken a balanced approach in its support to civil society organizations and citizen’s forums, including in countries with vibrant civil society-led advocacy efforts demanding accountability and action to reduce corruption. This work with civil society has been especially noteworthy in countries with limited space for civil society engagement. UNDP has supported regional platforms for civil society actors to engage with state actors and other anti-corruption stakeholders. Strengthening the capacities of civil society organizations at the local level has received only limited attention.

Conclusion 3: Contributions to global and regional debates and advocacy have been important, particularly to secure attention to the anti-corruption targets in SDG 16.

UNDP has facilitated the efforts of programme countries to engage on issues of anti-corruption and accountability within the establishment of
the SDGs. The global anti-corruption community that UNDP supported includes a range of anti-corruption actors, such as governments, civil society organizations, think tanks and donors that have exchanged information on practices and have debated ways to address anti-corruption issues.

UNDP leads the UNDP-UNODC International Anti-corruption Campaign, which serves as a flagship advocacy mechanism, providing avenues to influence global discourse on anti-corruption. UNDP global projects and regional programmes made important contributions by linking regional actors with global networks and by facilitating cooperation with international organizations. The global anti-corruption projects have facilitated UNDP engagement at the global level and have provided a channel for linking country-level work with global debates. The regional programmes, particularly in the Africa and Arab States regions, contributed to facilitating regional instruments and anti-corruption forums.

**Conclusion 4: UNDP has contributed to strengthening national anti-corruption capacities.**

UNDP has been persistent in its support to ensure that policies and institutions are sufficiently robust and help to motivate further reforms. Especially noteworthy has been the work of UNDP to help usher in anti-corruption and accountability efforts in countries with challenging political environments.

UNDP has demonstrated that it is well-positioned to support countries in implementing UNCAC and that it has enabled countries to fulfil their basic requirements for Convention compliance. In addition to the technical expertise, the global reach of UNDP, its ongoing close partnerships with government institutions and its knowledge of practical, on-the-ground opportunities are useful attributes. UNDP contributions to UNCAC implementation are notable, particularly in establishing the linkages between the enforcement and accountability and transparency dimensions of the convention.

Anti-corruption programme success is greatly enhanced by having well-structured governance systems, an independent and apolitical judiciary and anti-corruption institutions with unfettered powers to investigate illegal activity. Conventional mechanisms, such as anti-corruption commissions and legislative reviews, often fail to reduce corruption unless there is adequate thrust to strengthening the governance drivers of corruption. UNDP contributions have, therefore, been important as inputs to the processes of strengthening institutional capacities, rather than in actual corruption reduction actions, which are the purview of national governments.

**Conclusion 5: UNDP has contributed to anti-corruption and accountability at local levels.** Tangible outcomes were observed where UNDP addressed anti-corruption and accountability through local development and local governance initiatives. While the sustainability of some local outcomes remains in question, UNDP support has clearly contributed to increased demand for transparent and accountable local development and service delivery.

UNDP programming at the local level typically focused on the demand side of accountability in governance. Attempts were made to bridge the interests of supply- and demand-side actors to strengthen local-level accountability and transparency. UNDP worked on several themes, such as participatory local development, participatory local governance and e-governance, which have developed into key streams of support over time. There were several examples of UNDP-led initiatives at the local level that have been replicated by governments and other development agencies. UNDP support to citizen participation in local development had positive impacts on local-level service delivery. Access to information, citizen’s participation and consultation, citizen’s monitoring and oversight and social accountability initiatives were supported as measures to strengthen local governance and service delivery. A critical mass of demand was generated at the local level through demonstration initiatives.
projects, which in many cases had the potential for spiraling up and helping to reform national-level policies and practices.

Conclusion 6: Accountability initiatives were more effective when a sectoral approach was taken. UNDP is in an advantageous position to support governments in reducing corruption and increasing accountability and transparency, and has demonstrated that it can provide useful tools and techniques. Yet UNDP has not taken full advantage of its opportunities to better integrate this work into its other development programming.

With governance and public administration-related programmes in over 130 countries, the partnership capital that UNDP has generated over the years is significant; it gives UNDP the leveraging power of its governance portfolio and other development sectors to anchor anti-corruption work in broader governance processes and to promote linkages with sectoral development. While there were efforts to address larger governance and development linkages, such efforts were not systematically pursued or prioritized. The UNDP sectoral governance focus has not progressed adequately. As a result, opportunities to integrate accountability and anti-corruption measures into the work of UNDP in its livelihoods, sustainable development, governance and resilience programming have been missed.

UNDP has not explored the synergies between its anti-corruption and public administration accountably work and its other development support, particularly poverty reduction and Global Fund programmes. This represents lost opportunities to address corruption risks in these areas. The MDG Acceleration Framework, in a departure from this general trend, generated positive momentum through sector risk assessments. UNDP has yet to take this approach further.

Conclusion 7: While UNDP has supported governance risk assessments, it has not made these assessments a core aspect of its anti-corruption and accountability programming. In cases where assessments have been carried out, a lack of periodicity limited their utility as a tool for governments to track progress.

UNDP identified a range of development areas where it recommends that risk assessments should be carried out. UNDP-supported risk assessments mostly consisted of one-off activities that fell short of being context-specific risk assessments that could consistently inform sectoral policies. The assessments carried out have not been embedded within overall sector policies. UNDP did not utilize corruption risk mapping when establishing poverty, health, governance or environmental programming, and did not pursue government partners to carry out such mapping. This is a missed opportunity, since in a majority of countries context-specific corruption risk assessments are often non-existent.

Conclusion 8: Over the years, UNDP has developed a strong presence in the area of anti-corruption and public administration-related accountability and transparency support. UNDP has yet to use the reorganization of its programme portfolios to strengthen its anti-corruption programme capacities in order to respond to the demand for anti-corruption support. The underemphasized support of public administration at the organizational level has implications for anti-corruption programme support to countries in a development context.

Lack of alignment between headquarters-level programme prioritization and country-level programme demand is contributing to the decline of core public administration in regards to anti-corruption and accountability and transparency work. This affects the anti-corruption and accountability work of UNDP. The core public administration work in countries in a development context – an area in which UNDP has significantly invested for two decades and developed a strong niche – did not receive adequate organizational attention. Consolidation of governance programmes, earlier classified under crisis and development programming, has yet to include public administration work.
UNDP has a significant role to play in low- and middle-income countries in facilitating implementation of anti-corruption and accountability and transparency measures. The current organizational governance prioritization does not facilitate the UNDP role in countries within development contexts.

4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

UNDP made important contributions to anti-corruption in a number of areas. The recommendations provided here can enhance the support that UNDP provides to partner countries through its programming. While cognizant of the reduction in UNDP’s regular resources and the consequent challenges to programming, the recommendations provided are not necessarily restricted by this situation. While the recommendations provide focus on the work of UNDP and external donors, the evaluation recognizes the pre-eminent role of national governments to take responsibility for reducing corruption and improving accountability.

Recommendation 1: Prioritize support to addressing corruption risks to development. Develop an anti-corruption programme strategy that more explicitly links the UNDP anti-corruption approach to other development programming.

The SDGs present opportunities for UNDP to reaffirm the value and significance of UNDP commitments to anti-corruption and accountable governance. To enhance UNDP contributions to addressing development–corruption linkages, UNDP should develop an anti-corruption strategy that explicitly links these efforts to UNDP governance and development programmes and its support to countries in attaining the SDGs.

UNDP support to the implementation of the UNCAC has been important in terms of enabling basic national frameworks. It is time to move beyond basic UNCAC compliance initiatives towards more concrete anti-corruption measures, including enforcement measures and those that address specific drivers of corruption.

UNDP should strategically address corruption risks to development in its country programming. Taking forward the MDG Acceleration Framework initiative, UNDP should develop a sectoral focus to its anti-corruption support. UNDP should identify key thematic areas where it will make development and corruption linkages more explicit, and should make explicit its willingness to support governments in their efforts to address corruption in service delivery. Greater efforts should be made to use development programme areas as entry points to further promote sectoral anti-corruption and accountability measures; such efforts should be initiated in the current programme.

There is a need for concerted anti-corruption initiatives in key development sectors, which require partnerships, for instance, in the provision of health, education, water and sanitation. Within the ambit of SDG processes, UNDP should develop global partnerships in sector-specific anti-corruption initiatives.

All anti-corruption support efforts at the global, regional and country levels should address gender-related aspects, as this continues to be a weak area of UNDP support.

Recommendation 2: Address regional variations in anti-corruption support and prioritize support to regions that are underrepresented.

Anti-corruption programme support is relevant across all regions, yet anti-corruption and accountability-related support are not adequately pursued in all regions. UNDP should review the global scope of its anti-corruption and accountability support and place increased emphasis on regions that have been underrepresented in this work. Considering the scale of the anti-corruption and accountability and transparency challenges facing many countries, UNDP support for improved access to information and modernized public administration systems and to sectoral anti-corruption efforts remains critical.
Recommendation 3: Consider prioritizing support to anti-corruption and governance risk assessments and measurements.

UNDP should accelerate its efforts to support the measurement of anti-corruption progress as part of the SDG 16 monitoring initiative. It should support sector-specific anti-corruption initiatives to effectively diagnose governance and institutional risk and capacity issues. Robust tools for measuring and analysing governance risk are critical in setting priorities, understanding what works, raising awareness and furthering reforms. In sectors where there is overlapping support from multiple organizations, UNDP should initiate partnerships to carry out joint periodic sector integrity assessments.

UNDP should revisit its anti-corruption and accountability-related data gathering tools and techniques. UNDP should be more strategic in supporting anti-corruption and transparency-related advocacy and awareness-raising data generation. Rather than perception surveys, UNDP should facilitate developing and using practical and applicable corruption risk assessment and monitoring tools.

Recommendation 4: Increase support for local-level initiatives to strengthen demand-side accountability, particularly concerning access to information and social accountability initiatives.

Transparent and accountable service delivery at the local level continues to pose challenges. UNDP made a significant contribution to advancing national- and local-level demand-side accountability through its support to access to information and citizen participation mechanisms in local development. Moving forward, UNDP should focus on providing viable models to enhance accountability at the local level, foster improved local public administration processes and better service delivery, and increase the scope of its local-level anti-corruption initiatives.

Recommendation 5: Further strengthen global and regional anti-corruption projects to support country programmes and enable UNDP to contribute to regional and global policy debates and advocacy. Global and regional projects should be used to develop key streams of programme support at the country level.

Global and regional anti-corruption projects have added value beyond what UNDP accomplishes through its country programmes. UNDP should consider allocating additional resources to global and regional anti-corruption projects. While it is important to support Country Offices in national institutional capacity development, consider using global and regional projects to promote new approaches and sectoral anti-corruption initiatives. Global and regional projects should be leveraged to meet the programming needs of middle-income countries.

Recommendation 6: Enhance fund mobilization for anti-corruption support, championing select areas of anti-corruption and accountability initiatives.

As a way to open more funding avenues, the UNDP fund mobilization approach should consider taking into account opportunities to link anti-corruption and accountability and transparency to social services and development sectors.

Recommendation 7: Strengthen staff capacities at the global and regional levels to address the need for specialized policy and technical services for anti-corruption programming.

A structural review of UNDP has consolidated institutional arrangements and streamlined staff positions at headquarters and regional hubs. Given UNDP commitments to SDG 16 and the global anti-corruption agenda, it is critical that UNDP have adequate staff capacities at the global and regional levels. Staff capacities at the regional hubs are critical to supporting smaller Country Offices. Consider increasing staff with anti-corruption expertise at headquarters and regional hubs.
INTRODUCTION

The Independent Evaluation Office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is carrying out an evaluation of UNDP contributions to anti-corruption and governance integrity in a development context. This evaluation is part of the UNDP medium-term plan (DP/2014/5), approved by the UNDP Executive Board in January 2014. In approving the evaluation, the Executive Board recognized the importance of support to anti-corruption and transparency, accountability and integrity measures for equitable governance. The evaluation will include an assessment of UNDP contributions from 2008 to 2014, covering the period of the last Strategic Plan 2008–2011, extended to 2013, and the current Strategic Plan 2014–2017. Given the thrust to anti-corruption and governance in the Sustainable Development Goals, the evaluation will contribute to the UNDP anti-corruption and governance integrity programme strategy. The evaluation will be presented to the Executive Board at the second regular session in September 2016. The purpose of the evaluation is to:

- Strengthen UNDP accountability to global and national development partners, including the Executive Board; and
- Support the development of corporate programme strategies.

UNDP ANTI-CORRUPTION AND GOVERNANCE INTEGRITY SUPPORT

Corruption and lack of transparency and accountability in governance remain major challenges in achieving development goals. Hindering economic development, corruption negatively correlates with economic outcomes and has consequences for public expenditure decisions and investments. In addition to being dysfunctional, corruption undermines democratic values and institutions. In civil service and related institutional arrangements, corruption has serious implications for meritocracy. A number of governance variables affect levels of corruption. Anti-corruption gains are likely to remain small if interventions aimed at taking action on corruption are not combined with a wider set of interventions aimed at improving the quality of governance institutions in general.

For two decades, UNDP has extended support to strengthening accountability, transparency and integrity measures as part of its democratic governance interventions. UNDP support to Democratic Governance (Strategic Plan 2008–2013) and Inclusive and Effective Democratic Governance (Strategic Plan 2014–2017) entails a wide range of activities. Broadly, UNDP support in Strategic Plan 2008–2013 included programmes related to fostering inclusive participation, strengthening accountable and responsive governing institutions and grounding democratic governance in international principles. In the ongoing Strategic Plan 2014–2017, UNDP outlined support to increased integrity in public institutions, policies and capacities for more effective governance, rule of law and citizen security. During this period, UNDP supported programmes in the areas of conflict prevention and peacebuilding; responsible

---

and accountable institutions; inclusive political processes; rule of law; security and human rights; and HIV and health.\textsuperscript{51}

In both Strategic Plans, UNDP adopted a multidimensional and integrated approach to anti-corruption and governance integrity. Although specific support was extended to strengthening anti-corruption legislations, policies and institutions, support to anti-corruption was largely through strengthening governance integrity measures. In its ongoing and past Strategic Plans, key areas of governance support aimed to strengthen mechanisms of public accountability to better address concerns and interests of poor people, women and other vulnerable or excluded groups. UNDP recognized that in addition to support to anti-corruption policies and mechanisms, development programmes should systematically address accountability, transparency and integrity as preventive measures.

The 2008–2013 Strategic Plan acknowledged the importance of support to multisectoral accountability mechanisms, specifically oversight mechanisms, public administration reform, public sector ethics, civil service reforms, decentralized governance and e-governance in order to enhance accountability and transparency in governance. UNDP implemented programmes to strengthen the justice sector as part of its governance portfolio. In addition, UNDP supported anti-corruption policies and institutional mechanisms.\textsuperscript{52} While there was a sub-goal on anti-corruption, prevention-related support was spread across all governance programme areas. Both Strategic Plans broadly emphasized that UNDP should contribute to changes in macro-level policies, changes in capacities of state and non-state actors and improvements in governance quality.

In the ongoing Strategic Plan for 2014–2017, support to strengthening integrity measures in public institutions at the national and subnational levels is emphasized as critical to strengthening governance, especially as countries mobilize a growing share of their development expenditures from domestic resources. Similar to the previous Strategic Plan, larger preventive issues are addressed across inclusive governance support. As such, assistance to anti-corruption standards and systems are expected to supplement programmes that strengthen accountability and transparency mechanisms.\textsuperscript{53} Direct anti-corruption support is an output under the broader governance outcome.\textsuperscript{54} Sector-specific access to information is an area that is prioritized as part of anti-corruption support. In select sectors and development areas, UNDP aims to support identifying and assessing integrity risks.

Under the broad framework of these two Strategic Plans, UNDP country programmes support a range of activities that provide direct support to strengthening anti-corruption measures. UNDP country programmes also support strengthening accountability and transparency, thereby targeting institutional drivers of corruption. UNDP, in coordination with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, supports the implementation and review of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). About 30 country programmes have supported specific anti-corruption related interventions; over 81 country programmes have supported programmes focused on accountability and transparency and related governance practices. Although not all Country Offices consistently mainstream anti-corruption across poverty reduction, environment and crisis prevention programmes, most have addressed the drivers of corruption as part of their governance and poverty reduction support.

\textsuperscript{54} “Outcome 2: Citizen expectations for voice, development, the rule of law and accountability are met by stronger systems of democratic governance.” See Strategic Plan 2014.
In addition to country-level support to anti-corruption and integrity mechanisms as part of the country programme, UNDP also implemented global and regional anti-corruption programmes. All five Regional Programmes included anti-corruption and governance integrity support, although at different scales. Two anti-corruption global projects have been implemented since 2008: the Programme on Anti-corruption for Development Effectiveness 2008–2011, extended to 2013, and the Global Anti-corruption Initiative 2014–2017.  

**OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION**

The evaluation will assess UNDP contributions to strengthening national capacities in anti-corruption and governance integrity and to global- and regional-level debates and advocacy. In making the overall assessment of UNDP contributions, the evaluation will assess relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability at the country level as against the expectations of the Strategic Plans in terms of changes in macro-level policies and awareness, changes in the capacities of state and non-state actors and improvements in governance quality.

- **Relevance:** What is the extent to which UNDP support is appropriate for strengthening anti-corruption capacities and addressing corruption drivers?
- **Effectiveness:** To what extent did UNDP contributions to capacity development achieve the underlying objectives of establishing governance integrity and reducing corruption?
- **Efficiency:** What is the degree to which UNDP programmes and processes used resources in a way to achieve more results for least cost?
- **Sustainability:** To what extent are the results of UNDP contributions likely to be sustainable?

UNDP provides support to a range of countries, including those transitioning from and emerging out of conflict, countries within development context, and countries belonging to different income groups. Across this range of countries, strengthening governance is a key area of UNDP support. The evaluation will confine itself to UNDP contributions in the development and transition contexts.

The evaluation will include an assessment of the contributions of UNDP support from 2008 to 2015, covering the last Strategic Plan 2008–2011, extended to 2013, and the current Strategic Plan, 2014–2017, and an assessment of global-, regional- and country-level programmes pertaining to anti-corruption and governance integrity mechanisms.

The evaluation will assess UNDP contributions under the three streams of support, viz., strengthening anti-corruption policies and institutions, addressing drivers of corruption and bringing changes in governance practices. The evaluation will cover all five regions where UNDP implements programmes. In addition to assessing support to state actors, the evaluation will assess UNDP partnerships and support to strengthening the capacities of non-state actors such as civil society organizations, community forums and the media.

---

55 The Programme for Accountability and Transparency, a precursor to the Programme on Anti-corruption for Development Effectiveness, was an independent trust fund established with assistance from the governments of Denmark and the Netherlands, and later on from Germany. The Programme for Accountability and Transparency enabled UNDP to address the emerging concerns of addressing corruption as part of democratic governance. The Programme on Anti-corruption for Development Effectiveness supported countries to improve financial management and accountability through technical assistance and tools development. The Country Assessment in Accountability and Transparency programme was to assist governments in undertaking comprehensive self-assessments of their public financial management systems.
APPROACH

Anti-corruption and governance integrity issues are dynamic and systemic and entail a complex set of interactions among various institutions and actors. The evaluation recognizes the non-linear nature of anti-corruption and governance integrity programming results and the complexity associated with the contextual dynamics in play when reducing corruption or strengthening transparency and accountability in governance. Different compositions of institutions operating at the national and subnational level are often involved, and their differing and interdependent roles (for example, political, legislative and executive), can make the contribution of programmes at times intangible or less tangible.

It is widely recognized that there are limitations in accurately measuring the effectiveness of anti-corruption, public accountability and transparency policies. A fundamental issue is that the independent and dependent variables associated with anti-corruption and governance integrity are very similar and the relationship is more reciprocal than strictly causal. The variables of effective anti-corruption, for example, high governance and institutional capacities, or governance integrity, have a reciprocal causality with anti-corruption. Formulating a linear ‘input’ to ‘outcome’/‘result’ causal relationship therefore has inherent limitations. This evaluation consequently adopts a theory of change approach to understand the processes of UNDP contributions.

The theory of change outlines the causal and reciprocal pathways of the contribution of anti-corruption and governance integrity programmes in order to understand the extent of UNDP programme support given a particular governance context (what did UNDP do?), the approach of contributions (were UNDP programmes appropriate for achieving national results?), the process of contribution (how did the contribution occur?), and the significance of the contribution (what is the contribution and did UNDP accomplish its intended objectives?).

The evaluation will use a mixed method approach and a multi-stakeholder consultation process. The methods that will be used include document review, meta-synthesis of evaluations, country studies, desk studies and semi-structured interviews.

MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

The Independent Evaluation Office will manage the evaluation process, constitute a quality assurance system and provide administrative and substantive backstopping support. It will also coordinate and liaise with concerned agencies at headquarters, regional institutions and UNDP management and programme units. It will also ensure that evaluations are conducted in accordance with the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the United Nations System, as approved by the members of the United Nations Evaluation Group.

The Regional Bureaux, the Policy Bureau in New York and Regional Hubs in five regions will support the evaluation by providing the necessary information and documents requested by the Independent Evaluation Office and the evaluation team. In each bureau and regional centre, a substantive focal point will be identified. The focal point will provide the necessary information, and, in collaboration with the evaluation manager, will facilitate meetings with UNDP partners and programme stakeholders.

A technical reference group will be constituted comprising representatives of the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support (BPPS) Development Impact Group, Regional Bureaux, the BPPS governance unit and governance and anti-corruption advisers in the Regional Bureaux and Regional Hubs. During the course of the evaluation, two workshops with the technical reference group will be organized in order to share the evaluation design at the beginning of the evaluation and at a later stage coincident with the emerging findings.

The organizational performance group has the responsibility of reviewing drafts of the terms of reference and the draft evaluation report.
The BPPS Development Impact Group will coordinate comments from programme units on the terms of reference and the draft reports and will provide necessary programme information.

An Independent Evaluation Office Internal Review Group, comprising two evaluators from the Independent Evaluation Office and chaired by the Deputy Director of the Independent Evaluation Office will be constituted. The Internal Review Group will review key outputs of the evaluation, including evaluation tools.

An external advisory panel will be constituted and will consist of two experts in evaluation and development (Elliot Stern and Thomas Schwandt). The panel will play an important role in providing strategic, methodological and substantive advice to the evaluation process as well as reviewing key outputs, including the terms of reference and the draft evaluation report.

An external subject expert adviser will provide technical advice to the evaluation at critical junctures of the evaluation.

**EVALUATION PROCESS AND TIME-FRAME**

Consultations will be held with a range of country-level development actors, including: representatives from governments, civil society and non-governmental organizations; donors; multi-lateral and bilateral agencies and other national and international development organizations; representatives of Member States; donor representatives in their respective headquarters; UNDP management and staff in the programme units at headquarters, Regional Hubs and Country Offices; representatives of relevant UN agencies; development agencies; and international civil society organizations.

The evaluation will be presented at an informal Executive Board session in July 2016 and then to the second regular session in September 2016. To allow UNDP management time to prepare the management response, the final evaluation report will be completed and shared by mid-June 2016. A draft report will be shared with UNDP Management and programme units by mid-April 2016.
Annex 2

CONCEPTS USED IN THE EVALUATION

The definitions presented here are drawn from UNDP strategic documents and guidance and other literature.

**Governance** broadly refers to the role and performance of government in relation to a country’s economic, social and political institutions.

**Corruption** is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain in which a bureaucrat or an elected official breaks a rule for private gain. From an institutional perspective, corruption arises when public officials have wide authority, little accountability and perverse incentives, or when their accountability responds to informal rather than formal forms of regulation. Corruption is principally a governance issue—a failure of institutions and a lack of capacity to manage public affairs by means of a framework of social, judicial, political and economic checks and balances.

**Anti-corruption** is policies and institutional measures to take action against abuse of entrusted power for private gain when a bureaucrat or an elected official breaks a rule for private gain.

**Public integrity** is the appropriate use of public funds, resources and official powers as they were intended to be used. Integrity in public administration entails accountable, transparent, competent and responsive governance underpinned by the concept of public value.

**Governance integrity** refers to the application of values, principles and norms in the daily operations of governments and public sector institutions. Measures to enhance accountability and transparency in governance and the use of information, resources and authority for intended purposes underlie governance integrity.

**Accountability** is the answerability of public officials for their actions and institutionalized redress when duties and commitments are not met. Accountability entails established roles and responsibilities. Horizontal accountability consists of formal relationships within the state itself, whereby one state actor has the formal authority to demand explanations or impose penalties on another. Its focus is on internal checks and oversight processes. Vertical forms of accountability are those in which citizens and their associations play direct roles in holding the powerful to account.

**Transparency** is the increased flow of timely and reliable economic, social and political information, which is accessible to all relevant stakeholders.
Annex 3

EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND SUB-QUESTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation criteria</th>
<th>Key questions</th>
<th>What is judged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevance:</td>
<td>To what extent was UNDP support to anti-corruption and accountability and transparency mechanisms relevant to strengthening anti-corruption capacities and addressing corruption drivers?</td>
<td>The extent to which the level of governance and socio-political context were taken into consideration by UNDP in developing anti-corruption and accountability and transparency programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent did UNDP programmes respond to the country's anti-corruption and accountability and transparency needs and priorities?</td>
<td>The extent to which the programmes reflected the priorities set in national development plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How relevant were UNDP programmes to the country’s specific governance strengths and weaknesses?</td>
<td>Whether the choice and scope of UNDP programmes were appropriate to the country's level of needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent did UNDP leverage its global presence to engage in global and regional debates on anti-corruption and addressing drivers of corruption?</td>
<td>Whether UNDP engagement in global and regional debates was commensurate with the attention that anti-corruption and accountability and transparency issues demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How relevant was UNDP engagement?</td>
<td>Whether UNDP engagement in global and regional debates built on its comparative advantage in terms of extensive country presence globally and long-term engagement in the governance area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness:</td>
<td>What is the extent to which UNDP contributed to strengthening anti-corruption and accountability and transparency capacities? What is the extent to which the programmes' objectives were achieved given their relative importance in establishing accountability and transparency and reducing corruption?</td>
<td>Contribution of anti-corruption programmes to enhancing government capacities for monitoring and timely identification of corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did UNDP achieve its stated objectives?</td>
<td>Contribution of UNDP accountability and transparency programmes to strengthening government accountability and transparency in governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What was the contribution of UNDP to strengthening anti-corruption policies, institutions and mechanisms?</td>
<td>Contribution of UNDP in facilitating operationalizing global policies and conventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What was the contribution of UNDP accountability and transparency programmes to strengthening anti-corruption?</td>
<td>Contribution of UNDP in operationalizing cross-sectoral transparency and accountability measures at the national and local levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What was the contribution of UNDP to global and regional debates on anti-corruption and on addressing drivers of corruption?</td>
<td>Specific approaches used by UNDP in furthering anti-corruption and accountability and transparency (and their contribution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Extent to which UNDP programmes strengthened civil society capacities to play proactive roles in anti-corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What was the contribution of UNDP to sector policies to address governance integrity risks?</td>
<td>Contribution of sectoral governance integrity risk assessments/integrity plans in improving national sectoral policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Extent to which governance integrity measures are integrated into sectoral policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Extent to which governance integrity measures are integrated into key areas of development spending</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued)
### Evaluation criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key questions</th>
<th>What is judged?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness:</strong> (continued)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What were the factors that enhanced the contribution of UNDP programmes?</td>
<td>Contextual factors that facilitated or constrained UNDP contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What aspects of UNDP programmes contributed to anti-corruption and accountability and transparency outcomes?</td>
<td>Appropriateness of the scope and scale of the UNDP programmes to making meaningful contributions to anti-corruption and accountability and transparency outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was the programme approach used by UNDP appropriate?</td>
<td>Entry points that worked best for UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Synergies across programmes in the governance portfolio and other areas of UNDP programmes that were maximized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comparative advantages of UNDP programmes that were leveraged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The extent to which UNDP built on its comparative strength in the governance area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The extent to which UNDP leveraged its programmes to enable governments to integrate governance / anti-corruption measures into social sectors / key areas of development spending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The extent to which partnerships were sought and established in order to enhance UNDP contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The emphasis UNDP has given to national- and local-level institutional and capacity needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Efficiency:</strong></td>
<td>Extent to which programme management processes facilitated UNDP programme contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what degree did UNDP programmes and processes use resources in ways to achieve more results for least cost?</td>
<td>Appropriateness of management processes to maximize synergies across programmes in the governance portfolio and other areas of UNDP programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How efficient were programme management arrangements at the global, regional and national levels?</td>
<td>Complementarity of global, regional and country programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cost-effectiveness of UNDP programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainability:</strong></td>
<td>Extent to which issues of sustainability of results were reflected in the design of anti-corruption and accountability and transparency programmes, their implementation, in the delivery of outputs and the achievement of outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent are the results of UNDP contributions likely to be sustainable?</td>
<td>Extent to which partnerships were forged to sustain the UNDP programme contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were UNDP programme contributions sustained beyond the programme period?</td>
<td>Extent to which synergies were established between different programme areas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### OUTCOME CONDITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation criteria</th>
<th>Outcome conditions (O-conditions)</th>
<th>Level of outcome</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relevance</strong></td>
<td>UNDP programmes responded to the anti-corruption and accountability and transparency needs and priorities of the country UNDP programmes responded to specific governance strengths and weaknesses of the country UNDP programme choices facilitated the anti-corruption and accountability and transparency strategies / priorities of the country</td>
<td>Immediate outcome</td>
<td>a) The extent to which the level of governance and socio-political context were taken into consideration by UNDP in developing anti-corruption and accountability and transparency programmes b) The extent to which the programmes reflected the priorities set in national development plans c) Whether choice and scope of UNDP programmes were appropriate to the level of needs of the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness</strong></td>
<td>UNDP effectively achieved its stated objectives in enhancing anti-corruption and accountability and transparency</td>
<td>Immediate/intermediary outcome</td>
<td>a) Appropriateness of the scope and scale of the UNDP programme for meeting stated objectives b) Entry points that worked best for UNDP c) Whether synergies across programmes in the governance portfolio and other areas of UNDP programmes were maximized d) Whether the comparative advantages of UNDP programmes were leveraged e) Extent to which UNDP built on its comparative strength in the governance area f) Extent to which UNDP leveraged its programmes to enable government to integrate governance measures in social sectors / key areas of development spending g) Extent to which UNDP programmes strengthened civil society capacities to play a proactive role in anti-corruption h) Emphasis UNDP has given to national- and local-level institutional and capacity needs i) How were short-term requests for assistance by governments balanced against long-term development needs? j) The extent to which global and regional programmes enhanced UNDP programme strategies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ANNEX 4. CONDITIONS USED IN QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

#### Evaluation criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation criteria</th>
<th>Outcome conditions (O-conditions)</th>
<th>Level of outcome</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Effectiveness**   | UNDP contributions have been important in strengthening anti-corruption policies, institutions and mechanisms | Intermediate outcome | a) Contribution of UNDP anti-corruption programmes in enhancing government capacities for monitoring and timely identification of corruption  
  b) Contribution of UNDP governance integrity programmes to strengthening accountability of the government and transparency in governance  
  c) Contribution of UNDP in facilitating the operationalization of global policies and conventions  
  d) Extent to which UNDP programmes strengthened civil society capacities to play a proactive role in anti-corruption  
  e) Contribution of UNDP in operationalization of cross-sectoral transparency and accountability measures at the national and local levels  
  f) Specific approaches used by UNDP in furthering anti-corruption and governance integrity and their contribution  
  g) Extent to which UNDP programmes strengthened civil society capacities to play a proactive role in enhancing accountability and transparency  
  h) Contribution of sectoral governance integrity risk assessments /integrity plans in improving national sectoral policies (e.g. health, education, water, environment, REDD, judiciary)  
  i) Extent to which governance measures were integrated into sectoral policies  
  j) Extent to which governance measures were integrated into key areas of development spending  
  k) Extent of engagement with the private sector  
  l) Extent to which UNDP programmes addressed governance in services and sectors that affected the poor the most |
|                     | UNDP support to improving accountability of government and transparency in governance contributed to enhancing anti-corruption efforts | Intermediate outcome | |
| **Efficiency**      | Programme efficiency of anti-corruption and accountability and transparency programmes/projects was ensured by UNDP in order to maximize the outcomes | Immediate outcome | a) Extent to which programme management processes facilitated the contribution of the UNDP programme  
  b) Extent to which synergies across programmes in governance portfolio and other areas of UNDP programmes were established  
  c) Extent to which anti-corruption and accountability and transparency were integrated in other areas of UNDP programmes  
  d) Extent to which complementarity of global, regional and country programmes was established |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation criteria</th>
<th>Outcome conditions (O-conditions)</th>
<th>Level of outcome</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Efficiency (continued) | Management efficiency of the anti-corruption and accountability and transparency programmes/projects was ensured by UNDP | Intermediary outcome | a) Extent to which programmes were implemented in a timely manner  
  b) Appropriateness of management processes to maximize synergies across programmes in the governance portfolio and other areas of UNDP programmes in order to reduce costs while supporting results  
  c) Appropriateness of management processes to reduce costs while supporting results  
  d) Strategic mobilization of resources  
  e) Minimizing delays in programme implementation |
| Sustainability | Sustainability of outcomes are reflected in the design of UNDP anti-corruption and accountability and transparency projects | Immediate/intermediary outcome | a) Extent to which issues of sustainability of results were reflected in the design of anti-corruption and accountability and transparency programmes, their implementation and in the delivery of outputs and the achievement of outcomes  
  b) Extent to which partnerships were established to sustain the contribution of UNDP programmes  
  c) Extent to which synergies were established between different programmes areas  
  d) National capacity has been developed and an appropriate environment has been established so that UNDP may realistically plan progressive disengagement  
  e) Sectoral integrity mechanisms were established (e.g. health, education, water, environment, REDD, judiciary) |

(Continued)
### MECHANISM CONDITIONS AND CONTEXT CONDITIONS

#### Mechanism Conditions (M – Conditions)

- Anti-corruption and accountability and transparency programmes had a coherent programmatic approach
- UNDP programme approach is appropriate for anti-corruption and accountability and transparency capacity development
- UNDP followed an integrated approach to anti-corruption and accountability and transparency support
- UNDP programmes addressed issues related to gender in anti-corruption and accountability and transparency-related support
- UNDP supported advocacy and civil society capacity development
- UNDP programmes adopted a strong partnership approach (government, donors, civil society organizations, and other actors working on anti-corruption and accountability and transparency issues)
- Significant national ownership of UNDP programmes
- Scope and scale of UNDP programmes were appropriate for the stated programme objectives
- UNDP skills and expertise were adequate for substantive engagement
- Programme design enhanced synergies across programme areas in the governance portfolio
- UNDP development support was used as a mechanism to integrate anti-corruption and accountability and transparency measures in the development processes
- Management systems enhanced UNDP contributions

#### Context Conditions (C – Conditions)

- Anti-corruption legislation and implementation
- Transparency legislations and implementation
- Accountability legislations and implementation
- Income classification
- Corruption Perception Index 2015
- Human Development Index 2014
- Worldwide Governance Indicator 2014 – Control of Corruption: Percentile Rank
- Worldwide Governance Indicator 2014 – Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Percentile Rank
- Worldwide Governance Indicator 2014 – Rule of Law: Percentile Rank
- Worldwide Governance Indicator 2014 – Voice and Accountability: Percentile Rank
- Worldwide Governance Indicator 2014 – Regulatory Quality: Percentile Rank
Annex 5

LIST OF PERSONS CONSULTED

NEW YORK

PERMANENT MISSIONS

Abu Shawesh, Abdullah, Counsellor, Permanent Observer Mission of the State of Palestine to the UN
Clifford, Sinead, Development Adviser, Permanent Mission of Australia to the UN
Idrizi, Arben, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Albania to the UN
Vestrheim, Alf Håvard, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Norway to the UN

UNDP

Acuna-Alfaro, Jairo, Policy Adviser, Bureau for Policy and Programme Support (BPPS), UNDP
Armstrong Elia, Director, UN Ethics Office
Bahous, Sima, Director, Regional Bureau for Arab States, UNDP
Bayriyev, Serdar, Policy Specialist, Evaluations and Lessons Learned, BPPS/DIG, UNDP
Dam-Hansen, Susanna, Strategic Planning Adviser, Regional Bureau for Arab States, UNDP
Effendi, Faiza, Strategic Results Specialist, UNDP Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, UNDP
Kazana, Joanna, Country Liaison Adviser, Head of Country Office Oversight and Liaison Unit, Regional Bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, UNDP
Keuleers, Patrick, Director and Chief of Profession Governance and Peacebuilding Team, BPPS, UNDP

Mar Dieye, Abdoulaye, Director, Regional Bureau for Africa, UNDP
Marinescu, Simona, Director, Development Impact Group, BPPS, UNDP
Martinez-Soliman, Magdy, Assistant Secretary-General, Assistant Administrator and Director, BPPS, UNDP
Mc Dade, Susan, Deputy Director, Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean
Sultanoglu, Cihan, Director, Regional Bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, UNDP
Xu, Haolang, Director, Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, UNDP

UNDP REGIONAL HUBS AND GLOBAL POLICY CENTRES

Adam, Olivier, Deputy Director Regional Bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, UNDP
Alamarri, Nouf, Programme Analyst, Global Centre for Public Service Excellence, UNDP
Arutyunova, Aida, Anti-corruption Specialist, UNDP Global Centre for Public Service Excellence
Beth, Elodie, Regional Anti-corruption Adviser, Bangkok Regional Hub
Cereceda, Miguel, SIGOB Regional Coordinator, UNDP Regional Center in Panama
Chan, Leah, Knowledge Broker, Global Centre for Public Excellence, UNDP
Dejaegere, Samuel, former Regional Anti-corruption Adviser, Bangkok Regional Hub
Destrez, Marine, Anti-corruption Expert, Istanbul Regional Hub, UNDP
El-Seblani, Arkan, Manager Regional Project on Anti-corruption and Integrity in the Arab Countries, UNDP
Everest-Phillips, Max, Director, UNDP Global Centre for Public Service Excellence
Fashho, Nancy, Project Officer Regional Project on Anti-corruption and Integrity in the Arab Countries, UNDP
Gasparikova, Daniela, Team Leader Results Based Management Unit, Bangkok Regional Hub
Ibarra Angeles, Jose, AP Intact network facilitator, Bangkok Regional Hub
Inglis, Shelly, Team Leader Governance and Peacebuilding, Istanbul Regional Hub, UNDP
Lee, Ahjung, Programme and Policy Officer, UNDP Seoul Policy Centre
Marañón De Pablo, Israel, Anti-corruption Analyst, UNDP Global Centre for Public Service Excellence
Matsheza, Phil, Regional Team Leader Governance, Bangkok Regional Hub
Neto, Marcos Athias, Director, Istanbul International Center for Private Sector Development, UNDP
Noto, Gerardo, Democratic Governance Coordinator, UNDP Regional Center in Panama
Panova, Elena, Senior Programme Coordinator, Istanbul Regional Hub, UNDP
PauliNE, Tamesis, former global advisor governance, Bangkok Regional Hub
RosellNI, Nicholas, Deputy Regional Director for Asia and the Pacific and Director Bangkok Regional Hub
Sadiku, Lejla, Open Data Expert, Istanbul Regional Hub, UNDP
Tikum, Njova, Regional Anti-corruption Adviser, UNDP regional Service Center for Africa, UNDP
Timilsina, Anga, Programme Manager Global Anti-corruption Initiative, UNDP Global Centre for Public Service Excellence
VrbensKY, Ratislav, Manager, Istanbul Regional Hub, UNDP

AUSTRIA

Dummar-Frahi, Mirella, Civil Society Team Leader, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
Giudie Saget, Anna, Drug Control and Crime Prevention Officer, Justice Section of Division for Operations, UNODC
Norman, Gemma, Corruption and Economic Crime Branch/Division for Treaty Affairs, UNODC
Palicarsky, Constantine, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Officer, UNODC
Ruiz Villalba, Adan, Evaluation Officer, Independent Evaluation Unit of the Office of the Executive Director, UNODC
Sayago, Claudia, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Officer/Corruption and Economic Crime Branch/Division for Treaty Affairs, UNODC
Stolpe, Oliver, Chief, Conference Support Section/Corruption and Economic Crime Branch/Division of Treaty Affairs, UNODC
Vlassis, Dimitri, Chief, Corruption and Economic Crime Branch, UNODC
Von Söhnen, Constanze, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Officer, Corruption and Economic Crime Branch/Division for Treaty Affairs, UNODC
Welsh, Candice, Chief, Implementation Support Section/Corruption and Economic Crime Branch/Division for Treaty Affairs, UNODC
KOSOVO

Agani, Edis, Rule of Law Task Manager/Cooperation Section, European Union Office in Kosovo

Ahmeti, Shpend, Mayor, Prishtina Municipality

Avdiu Albert, General Director, Kosovo Judicial Council

Bogujevic, Valbona, Head of Programmes, UNDP

Demi, Agron, Executive Director, GAP Institute for Advanced Studies

Dobranja, Burbuque, Communications Associate, Policy Research, Gender and Communications Team, UNDP

Dumnica, Virgjina, Manager, Rule of Law and Justice Portfolio, UNDP

Gazideda Marta, Deputy Head of Programmes/Manager of Governance Portfolio, UNDP

Hajredini, Habit, Director, Office for Good Governance (Office of the Prime Minister)

Hoxha, Vigan, Officer on Innovation and E-governance, UNDP

Ispahiu, Faik, TV Director and Producer, Internews Kosova

Kodra, Besim, Director, Association of Patients

Kryeziu, Ismet, Director, Transparency International Kosovo

Kusari Lila, Mimoza, Mayor, Gjakova/Djakovica Municipality

Latifaj, Ardian, Project Officer, UNDP

Loshi, Krenar, Chief of Local Governance Section, OSCE Mission in Kosovo

Maliqi, Shkëlzen, General Director, Office of the State Prosecutor

Meierhans Alexandra, Programme Officer, UNDP

Miftari, Fadil Miftari, Communications Officer/UNDP

Mueller, Clemens, Anti-corruption Adviser, EULEX Kosovo

Musliu, Gresa, Governance Programme Associate, UNDP

Mustafa Salihi, Edita, Program Coordinator, Kosova Democratic Institute

Neziri, Shqipe, Project Manager SAEK, UNDP

Peci, Enver, Chair, Kosovo Judicial Council

Popovic, Viktor, National Programme Officer, Swiss Cooperation Agency

Prendrecaj, Zef, Director, Office of the Disciplinary Prosecutor

Preteni, Hasan, Director, Republic of Kosovo Anti-corruption Agency

Pula, Laura, National Coordination on Anti-corruption, Kosovo Prosecutorial Council

Ramberg, Kathrina, Deputy Head of Mission, Royal Norwegian Embassy

Reka, Rrezarta, Rule of Law Adviser/UNODC Coordinator for Kosovo

Roccasalvo, Alessandra, Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP

Russel, Andrew, Resident Representative/UN Development Coordinator, UNDP

Sadiku, Fitim, Secretary General, Ministry of Public Administration

Sahatciu, Nora, UN Coordination Specialist, Office of the UN Development Coordinator, United Nations Kosovo Team

Selimi, Shpend, Head of Operations, UNDP

Selitaj, Anton, Senior Programme Associate, UNDP

Skenderi, Petrit, Anti-corruption Adviser SAEK, UNDP

Vokshi, Armend, Director of Administration, Gjakova/Djakovica Municipality

Xharra, Jeta, Executive Director, Balkan Investigative Reporting Network
ANNEX 5. LIST OF PERSONS CONSULTED

NIGERIA

Adedokun, Adebowale, Procurement Officer, BPP
Aja, Kalu, Project Officer, EFCC
Bassey, Ekanem, Governance Adviser, Department for International Development (DFID)
Beyai, Pa Lamin, Country Director, UNDP
Bolaji, Kehind, Team Leader, Governance, and Peace Building, UNDP
Dan-Azumi, Jake, Research Fellow, NILS
Ekeanyanwu, Lilian, Head, TUGAR
Gabriel, Toyin, MandE Officer, DGD project
Hammantukur, Modibbo, Head, External Cooperation, EFCC
Igoche, Adamu, Deputy Office Director, Peace and Democratic Governance, United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
Mokuolu, Isaac, Procurement, Anti-corruption and Training Practitioner, BPP
Ogbewe, Pat, ODA Director, Delta State
Ogugua, Azuka, Chief Superintendent, Education Department, ICPC
Olawumi, Laolu, Programme Manager, EU Delegation to Nigeria
Olusola, Segun, Programme Associate, Governance and Peace Building, UNDP
Osotimehin, Kehind, National Project Officer, UNODC
Ouoha, Emeka, Barrister, Anambra State
Ree, Rolf, Ambassador, Royal Norwegian Embassy
Suraj, Olanrewaju, Civil Society Network Against Corruption (CSNAC)
Tafesse, Mintwab, Project Director a.i, DGD project
Wachanga, Jesse, Deputy Project Coordinator, UNODC

PALESTINE

ABASI, Heidar, Security Assistant, UNDP
Abdallah, Emaddedin, Senior Adviser, Representative Office of Norway, West Bank
Abu Arefeh, Ismail, Operations Manager, British Council, Jerusalem
Abu Atwan, Helmi, PYALARA
Abu Middain Barghothi, Rima, Team Leader Natural Capital, UNDP
Abusamra, Maha, Programme Manager – Governance and Social Development Unit, UNDP
Alamad Sakher, Project Manager, UNDP
Al-Assouli, Omar, Project Manager, UNDP
Al-Faqih, Nasser, Team Leader for Poverty Reduction and Productive Capital, UNDP
Ali, Marisa Consolata, Chief Technical Specialist, Rule of Law team, UNDP
Al-Khawaja, Hamdi, General Director Planning and Studies, Palestinian Anti-corruption Commission
Al-Kilani, Ahmad, Director of Follow up Department, General Personnel Council
Alnatshesh, Rafiq Sh., Commissioner, Palestinian Anti-corruption Commission
Atta, Nader, Programme Analyst, UNDP
Attili, Mamoun, Civil Society Coordinator, Strengthening the Rule of Law in the occupied Palestinian territories: Justice and Security for the Palestinian People, UNDP
Barqhuuki, Ibrahim, MUSAWA
Da’na, Fatima, Gender and Juvenile Justice Expert, Access to Justice Program, UNDP
Dawood, Othman, Mayor, Qualquilia Municipality
El Yessa Soueid Ahmed, Abderrahmane, Team Leader, Governance and Social Development Unit, UNDP
ANNEX 5. LIST OF PERSONS CONSULTED

PERU

Atarama Cordero, Mario, Adviser, High-Level Anti-corruption Commission (CAN)

Ausín Cantero, Francisco, Programme Officer for State Modernization and Decentralization, AECID

Ávila Herrera, José, Head of National Bureau for Dialogue and Sustainability (ONDS), Presidency of the Council of Ministers (PCM)

Baldomero, Elías, Member of the board, National Jury of Elections

Barreneche Cárdenas, Porfirio, Commissioner of the Ombudsman of Peru

Bustamante, Julián, Public Security Programme Adviser, UNLIREC

Cárcamo, Zilda, Programme Officer for Humanitarian Response and Gender Equity, UNFPA

Castañeda Portocarrero, Fernando Rafael, Deputy Ombudsman for constitutional affairs, Ombudsman of Peru

Cedamanos, Marcelo, General Manager, SERVIR

Cornejo Valdivia, Rosmary Marcela, Executive Secretary, High-Level Anti-corruption Commission

De La Puente, Juan, Political Analyst

Del Pozo Goicochea, Claudia, Deputy Ombudsman, Ombudsman of Peru

Gallard, Patrick, Civil Attaché for Development and Cooperation, EU Delegation in Peru

Hoflich Cueto, Walter, Coordinator of the Crime Prevention Unit, UNODC Peru y Ecuador

Hólge, Kristian, Representative for Peru and Ecuador, UNODC

Iguíñiz Echeverría, Javier, Executive Secretary, Acuerdo Nacional

Haj Hussein, Isam, Programs and Projects Director, Transparency Palestine

Halaykah, Ala‘, Employability Center Manager, Palestinian youth association for leadership and rights activation

Hancock, Louise, Governance Adviser, DFID, Jerusalem

Hasna Walid, Team Leader, Infrastructure, UNDP

Olesen, Asta, Senior Adviser, Royal Danish Representative Office, Ramallah

Qassem, Mazen, Head of Transportation, UNDP

Saba’neh, Adel, Projects and Activities Coordinator, Sharek Youth Forum

Saidane, Narjess, Deputy Special Representative of the Administrator, UNDP

Shaer, Badra, PCS

Shehadeh, Said A., G.D of Commissioner Bureau, Palestinian Anti-corruption Commission

Shurafa, Ahmad, Project Manager / Capacity Development and Economic development, Anti-corruption Coordinator, UNDP

Valent, Roberto, Special Representative of the Administrator, UNDP

Van Lelyveld, Willemijn, Knowledge Management and Reporting Specialist, UNDP

Weld-Blundell, Stacy, Technical Specialist – Rule of Law, Justice and Security, UNDP

Yasin, Omar, Financial and Administration Manager, Sharek Youth Forum

Zaid, Muath, Public Relations and Media Department, Qalqilia Municipality

Zamareh, Bader, Executive Director, Sharek Youth Forum

Zeidat, Shadi, Project Coordinator, Miftah
Jave, Iris, Coordinator/Researcher for the Institute for Democracy and Human Rights, Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru
León Amézaga, Kela, Executive Director, CPP
López Triveño, Rosa María, General Director of Cooperation and International Relations, National Jury of Elections
Montoya, Yván, Academic Adviser for the Institute for Democracy and Human Rights, Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru
Mujica, María Eugenia, Programme Specialist, UNDP
Oliva-Monti Hayden, Caterina, Programme Associate, UNDP
Pastor De Moscoso, Cecilia, Administrator, CPP
Riva Patrón, Aurora, Head of the Office for Strategic Development, International cooperation and investments, Ombudsman of Peru
Ruiz Olaya, Gustavo, Commissioner of the Ombudsman of Peru
SACASA, María Del Carmen, Resident Coordinator and Resident Representative, UNDP Peru
Sánchez Ruiz, Liliana, General Management Adviser, SERVIR
Solari Zerpa, Mario, former Programme Officer for Democratic Governance, UNDP
Stork, Edo, Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP
Suárez Oñio, Leonor, Programme Officer for Democratic Governance and Human Rights, UNDP
Távara Castillo, Gerardo, Secretary General, Transparency Civil Association
Tong, Federico, Coordinator of the Crime Prevention Unit, UNODC Peru y Ecuador
Valiente Izquierdo, Jorge, Programme Officer for Democratic Governance, AECID
Vélez, Lizbeth, Adviser on Human Rights, Democratic Governance, UNDP

TUNISIA
Annabi, Samir, Chairman, Instance Nationale de Lutte Contre la corruption
Bahri, Tarek, Directeur Général des services de la gouvernance à la présidence du gouvernement
Ben Mansour, Khaoula, Vice-Présidente, Association Tunisienne de Lutte contre la Corruption
Ben Smail, Anis, Expert National chargé de l’appui institutionnel de l’INLUCC, UNDP
Di Carpegna, Filippo, Conseiller Technique Principal, Projet “Justice Transitionelle,” UNDP
El Batti, Mehdi, Financial Management Specialist, World Bank
El Mounir, Mohammed, Conseiller technique Principal – Appui à la Société Civile, UNDP
El Yessa, Abderrahmane, former Governance Adviser, UNDP
Ennaifer, Oumama, Chargée De Programme OMD, Développement Humain et Gouvernance, UNDP
Fiegle, Thomas, Académie Franco-Tunisienne pour la Bonne Gouvernance, GIZ
Foronda, Shirley, Financial Management Specialist, World Bank
Giuliani, Jean-Raphael, Adviser, Constitutional Support and Parliamentary Development, UNDP
Jarmouni, Abdelhamid, Executive Director, the Tunisian E-governance Society
Kharrat, Abdellatif, Premier Président de la Cour des Comptes
Kuehn, Susanne, Conseillère Technique Principale, Anti-corruption and Renforcement du Système National d’Intégrité
Ladgham, Abderrahmane– Ancien Ministre de la Gouvernance et de la Lutte contre la Corruption
Mathari, Hela, Expert, Constitutional Support and Parliamentary Development, UNDP
Rahouï, Mongi, Parlementaire et Membre de la Commission de Lutte Contre la Corruption
Revol, Lorand, Chef De Projet, TOUENSA
Rostan, Thierry, Chef de Bureau Tunisie, UNODC
Sedki, Ali, Transparency International Morocco
Sellami, Khaled, Directeur General des Réformes Administratives et de l’Unité de l’Administration Electronique
Tabet, Mounir, Resident Coordinator UNDP
Trabelsi, Salwa, Economist, Ingénieurs Sans Frontières (ISF)

UGANDA

Abola, Nicholas, Deputy Director, Directorate for Ethics and Integrity (DEI)
Akangasire, Gideon, Principal Planning Officer, Parliament of Uganda
Andima, Alfred, Principal Assistant Secretary, Office of the President
Anena, Lucy, Programme Manager, Voice and Accountability, Democratic Governance Facility (DGF)
Byamugisha, Albert, Commissioner, Monitoring and Evaluation, Office of the Prime Minister
Dhizaala, Moses, Head, Monitoring and Evaluation, National Planning Authority
Kagaba, Cissi, Executive Director, Anti-corruption Coalition Uganda
Kaleebu, Nasiib, Programme Associate, UNDP
Kange, Sophie, Coordinator, Capacity Development, Uganda National NGO Forum
Kiiza, Adrian, Inspectorate of the Government
Kisindi, Chris, Programme Officer, Ministry of Local Government

UZBEKISTAN

Abdurakhmanov, Abduvakkos, Head of Environment Unit, UNDP
Akbarov, Sherzod, Head Of Economic Governance Unit, UNDP
Akhadov, Abbos, Nrm Specialist, UNDP
Ashrafkhanov, Bakhrom, Head of Treasury, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Finance
Bakhadirov, Azizkhon, Rule of Law and Governance Analyst, UNDP
Daniyar, Atadjanov, Head of E-government Department, Ministry of ITC
Farkhdov, Ibragimov, Head of Division, Public Sector Division, Ministry of ITC
Garakhanov, Farid, Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP
Ibragimova, Kamola, National Project Officer, UNODC
Ikramov, Anvar, Deputy Chairman, Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Islamov, Ulugbek, Project Manager, Water Resource Management, UNDP
Isroilov, Dilshod, Project Manager, UNDP
Karabaev, Farrukh, Project Manager, UNDP
Khamiolov, Ravsian, Chief Consultant, Ministry of Justice
Khusanov, Murod, National Project Officer, OSCE
Kolenko, Evgeniy, Deputy Head of Department, Prosecutor General’s Office
Liikanen, Vilja, MandE Officer, RMU, UNDP
Meliboev, Anvar, Partnership Specialist, UNDP
Mic, Ovidiu, Head of Cooperation Section, EU Delegation to Uzbekistan
Mollaoglu, Yusuf, Regional Law Enforcement Adviser, UNODC
Musaev, Akbar, Deputy Head of Department, Ministry of Justice
Nigmadjanov, Uygun, Head of International and Legal Department, Prosecutor General’s Office
Nodir, Jumanyozov, Head of International and Legal Department, Ministry of Justice
Omonov, Farrukh, Head, Business Development, Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Ozodzoda, Sherzod, Chief Consultant, Ministry of Justice
Perepada, Liya, Head of RMU, UNDP Uzbekistan
Petroni, Sandrine, Project Manager, Cooperation Section, EU Delegation to Uzbekistan
Preisner, Stefan, Resident Representative, UNDP
Raith, Andrea, Head of Finance, Contracts and Audit Section, EU Delegation to Uzbekistan
Rakhimov, Fasliddin, Procurement Specialist, the World Bank
Rustam, Zakirov, Senior Officer, Public Sector Division, Ministry of ICT
Rustamov, Hurshid, Head of UN Resident Coordinator’s Office
Tursunov, Laziz, Programme Associate, Governance Unit, UNDP
Umarova, Aziza, Head of Governance, UNDP
Umida, Musaeva, Senior Specialist, International Relations Department, Ministry of ICT

OTHER

Albert, Jose Ramon G., Senior Research Fellow, Philippine Institute for Development Studies, Philippines
Checchi, Francesco, Anti-corruption Adviser, UNODC Bangkok
Edes, Bart W, Director, Social Development, Governance, and Gender Division, Asian Development Bank
Ferreira Rubio, Delia, External Consultant
Haussman, Karen, External Consultant
Jaraquemada, María, Advocacy Director, Espacio Público, Chile
Kedowide, Francois-Corneille, Director, Franconsult, Benin
Kos, Drago, Committee Member, Independent Joint Anti-corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, Afghanistan
Lau, Aaron, Managing Partner, AITLAU Management Services, Australia
Loo, William, Deputy Head of Division and Senior Legal Analyst, Anti-corruption Division, OECD
Lord Fusitu’a, Member of Parliament, Chair of Parliamentary Committee on AC and Transparency, Tonga
Maharaj, Akaash, Chief Executive Officer, GOPAC, Canada
Majlessi, Shervin, Senior Legal Adviser, UNODC Bangkok
Mason, Phil, Senior Anti-corruption Adviser, Financial Accountability and Anti-corruption Team, DFID, United Kingdom
Peñailillo, Miguel, External Consultant
Reyes, Patricia, External consultant, UNDP Chile
Valenzuela, Paula, General Manager, Fundación Generación Empresarial, Chile
Whytes, Annika, Regional Anti-corruption Adviser, UNODC, Fiji
Woods, Daniel, Director Law and Justice, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Australia
Zinnbauer, Dieter, Senior Programme Manager – Emerging Policy Issues, Transparency International, Germany

UNDP – OTHER COUNTRIES

Abdel Azim, Nazly, Programme Analyst / Democratic Governance Team, UNDP Egypt
Chacko, James George, Assistant Resident Representative, UNDP Malaysia
Curry, Dennis, Assistant Country Director and Head of Governance Unit, UNDP Viet Nam
Dix, Sarah, Policy Adviser PAR and Anti-corruption, UNDP Viet Nam
Elfadel, Diya N., Programme Associate, Governance Portfolio and Disaster Risk Reduction Portfolio, UNDP Jordan
Gyles-McDonough, Michelle, Resident Representative for Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam, UNDP
Hart-Hansen, Martin, Deputy Resident Representative UNDP Thailand
Lodi, Alessandro, Advocacy and Citizen Participation Director, Fundación Casa de la Paz, Chile
Noriega, Rocío, Governance, Ethics and Transparency Adviser, UNDP Chile
Popovic, Velibor, Governance Programme Specialist, UNDP Cambodia
Risal, Bandana, Senior Programme Specialist, Governance and Rule of Law Unit, UNDP Nepal
Senibulu, Luisa, Programme Associate for the regional Anti-corruption project, UNDP Fiji
Valermei, Isikeli, Acting Programme Analyst, Strengthening Citizen Engagement in Fiji Initiative, UNDP Fiji
Annex 6

LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED


Aragon, Jorge and Martin Vegas, 2009, Governance Evidence in Peru: Production and Use in the Education Sector.


Consejo Asesor Presidencial Contra los Conflictos de Interés, el Tráfico de Influencias y la Corrupción, 2015, ‘Consejo Asesor Presidencial Contra los Conflictos de Interés, el Tráfico de Influencias y la Corrupción – Informe final’, Chile.


Council on Europe Conventions on Corruption, business-anti-corruption.com/about/about-corruption/european-anti-corruption-conventions.aspx


Disch, Arne, Endre Vigeland and Geir Sundet, 2009, *Anti-Corruption Approaches: A Literature Review*, sida.se/content/assets/3f5c8afd51a6414d9f6c8f8425fb935b/anti-corrupcion-approaches-a-literature-review_3153.pdf


Hanna et al., 2011, *The Effectiveness of Anti-corruption Policy: What has Worked, what Hasn’t, and What We Don’t Know*, r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Outputs/SystematicReviews/Anti corruption_2011Hanna.pdf


Inter-American Development Bank, 2013, ‘Evaluación Intermedia de los Compromisos del IDB-9, Combate contra el Fraude y la Corrupción’.

Hanna et al., 2011, *The Effectiveness of Anti-corruption Policy: What has Worked, what Hasn’t, and What We Don’t Know*, r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Outputs/SystematicReviews/Anti corruption_2011Hanna.pdf
Inter-American Development Bank, 2016, *Extractives in Latin America and the Caribbean: the Basics*.


Klein, Fabian, Edgar Von Knebel, Claudia Zilla, and Martin Thunert (Coordinator), 2014, ‘Sustainable Governance Indicators, 2014 Chile Report’.


Kosova Democratic Institute and Transparency International Kosovo, 2015, ‘National Integrity System Assessment’.


Latinobarometro, 2015, ‘Datos Análisis Online’.


Luna, Juan Pablo and Rosenblatt, Fernando, 2011, ‘¿Notas para una Autopsia? Los Partidos Políticos en el Chile Actual’.


Márquez, Rodrigo, 2015, ‘La Distancia Entre la Ciudadanía y las Élites, Una Mirada Desde el Informe Desarrollo Humano en Chile’.

Mehmet, Ugur and Dasgupta Nandini, 2011, *Corruption and Economic Growth: A Meta-analysis of the Evidence on Low-income Countries and Beyond*, University of Greenwich, MPRA Paper No. 31226. mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31226


OCDE, 2013, ‘Activos con América Latina y el Caribe, Mejores Políticas para una Vida Major’ OCDE.


Olken, Benjamin A. and Rohini Pande, 2012, ‘Corruption in Developing Countries’, Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab’s Governance Initiative, MIT.


Orellana Vargas, Patricio, 2007, ‘Chile, un caso de corrupción oculta’.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and Comptroller General of Chile, 2015, ‘Entidad Fiscalizadora Superior de Chile, Avance de las Reformas, Alcance e Impacto’.


Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015, ‘¿Cómo va la Vida en Chile?’.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015, ‘¿En qué Situación está Chile Comparativamente?’.


Sáez, Raúl E., 2010, ‘La OCDE y el ingreso de Chile’.


Tanaka, Martín, 2013, ‘Peru Case Study Background Paper, Governance in Peru’.


Transparency International, 2016, Online Country Overview – Chile. transparency.org/country/#CHL


Transparency International/Chile Transparente, 2015, ‘Índice de Percepción de la Corrupción 2015’.


UNDP 2011, ‘Reporte Final del Proyecto Fortalecimiento del Sistema Jurídico y Apoyo a la Administración de Justicia’.


UNDP Chile and Faúndez, Alejandra, 2013, ‘Informe Final de Evaluación del Marco de Asistencia para el Desarrollo (MANUD Chile 2011–2014)’. 


UNDP Chile, 2008, ‘Contraloría General de la República: Fortaleciendo la Transparencia y Probidad en la gestión pública en Chile a Través de la Cooperación Internacional y Seguimiento de UNCAC’.

UNDP Chile, 2009, ‘Juventud, Equidad e Inclusión Social en Chile: Hacia la Consecución de los ODM’.

UNDP Chile, 2009, ‘Políticas de Igualdad de Género en Chile y Buenas Prácticas para la Gobernabilidad Democrática’.


UNDP Chile, 2014, ‘Auditoría a la democracia, Más y mejor Democracia para un Chile Inclusivo’.

UNDP Chile, 2014, ‘Autoevaluación Participativa y Representativa de la Convención de Naciones Unidas Contra la Corrupción en Chile, Revisión de los Capítulos II y V’.


UNDP Chile, 2014, ‘Informe de Seguimiento Anual de Proyecto, Fortalecimiento del Ejercicio del Derecho de Acceso a la Información Pública en Chile’.


UNDP Chile, 2015, ‘Desarrollo Humano en Chile, Los Tiempos de la Politización’.


UNDP Chile/VVAA, 2015, ‘Orientaciones y Lineamientos Generales para la Elaboración de Códigos de Ética en el sector Público’ UNDP/VVAA.


UNDP Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2011, ‘Annual Progress Report Transparency and Accountability in Local Governments (TRAALOG)’.
UNDP Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2013, ‘An initial reflection on Anti-corruption policies: selected inputs for the implementation of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption from the Latin American experience’.

ANNEX 6. LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED
UNDP Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2013, ‘Socio-economic Exclusion in Latin America and the Caribbean Potentialities for Programmatic Engagement on Legal Empowerment at Regional and Country Levels’.

UNDP Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2013, Evaluación de Efecto Final Proyecto Regional ‘Seguridad en Centroamérica Sica-PNUD-AECID’.


UNDP Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2014, ‘Gender and Corruption in Latin America: Is there a Link?’


UNDP, 2012, ‘Plan de Acción del Programa País Entre el Gobierno de la República del Perú y el PNUD 2012–2016 (CPAP)’.


UNDP, 2013, ‘Background Note – Theory of Change for Outcome 2’ (draft), New York.

UNDP, 2013, ‘Highlights of the Key Achievements in 2013, Global Thematic Programme on Anti-corruption for Development Effectiveness’.


ANNEX 6. LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED


UNDP/CGR, 2015, ‘Memorándum de Entendimiento entre el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo y la Contraloría General de la República’.


UNDP/Republic of Perú, 2006, ‘Plan de Acción del Programa de País entre el Gobierno de la República del Perú y el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (2006–2010)’.


Uslaner, Eric M., 2007, Corruption, Inequality and Trust, Department of Government and Politics University of Maryland–College Park College Park.


Valenzuela, Arturo, 2011, ‘Crisis de Representación y Reforma Política en Chile’.


World Bank Institute, 2015, Online Country Overview – Chile, worldbank.org/en/country/chile

World Bank Institute, 2015, Online Country Overview – Peru, worldbank.org/en/country/peru/overview
World Bank Group, 2015, World Governance Indicators – various countries, info. worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports

World Bank Institute, 2015, Online Indicators - Peru.


Zakari, Z et al., 2014, ‘Mapping and Capacity Assessment of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) involved in Anti-corruption Programming at National and Sub-national Levels in Nigeria’.
## Annex 7
### WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS

### 2004 AND 2015 PERCENTILE RANK VALUES FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voice and accountability</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>22.12</td>
<td>54.68</td>
<td>32.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>21.63</td>
<td>46.31</td>
<td>24.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>16.35</td>
<td>33.50</td>
<td>17.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>30.77</td>
<td>47.29</td>
<td>16.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>33.17</td>
<td>48.28</td>
<td>15.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>36.54</td>
<td>49.26</td>
<td>12.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>44.23</td>
<td>56.16</td>
<td>11.93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>40.38</td>
<td>52.22</td>
<td>11.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>44.71</td>
<td>55.17</td>
<td>10.46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>15.27</td>
<td>9.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>45.67</td>
<td>54.19</td>
<td>8.51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>25.48</td>
<td>33.00</td>
<td>7.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>10.58</td>
<td>17.24</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>76.92</td>
<td>83.25</td>
<td>6.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>16.83</td>
<td>23.15</td>
<td>6.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>35.10</td>
<td>41.38</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>34.13</td>
<td>40.39</td>
<td>6.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>51.92</td>
<td>58.13</td>
<td>6.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>46.63</td>
<td>52.71</td>
<td>6.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>61.54</td>
<td>66.50</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>9.62</td>
<td>13.79</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>87.50</td>
<td>91.63</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>53.69</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>26.92</td>
<td>30.54</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>80.77</td>
<td>84.24</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet-Nam</td>
<td>8.65</td>
<td>10.84</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>23.56</td>
<td>25.62</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>19.71</td>
<td>21.67</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>27.40</td>
<td>29.06</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tomé and Principe</td>
<td>56.25</td>
<td>57.64</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>50.48</td>
<td>51.72</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political stability</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>26.09</td>
<td>60.48</td>
<td>34.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>14.49</td>
<td>44.29</td>
<td>29.79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>16.91</td>
<td>46.67</td>
<td>29.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>29.47</td>
<td>58.57</td>
<td>29.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>27.05</td>
<td>55.71</td>
<td>28.66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>8.21</td>
<td>32.38</td>
<td>24.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>24.76</td>
<td>20.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>33.82</td>
<td>53.33</td>
<td>19.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>51.90</td>
<td>18.57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>64.73</td>
<td>82.86</td>
<td>18.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>20.95</td>
<td>15.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>19.81</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>13.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>30.43</td>
<td>43.81</td>
<td>13.37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>16.19</td>
<td>12.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>13.04</td>
<td>25.71</td>
<td>12.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>27.54</td>
<td>39.05</td>
<td>11.51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>18.84</td>
<td>29.05</td>
<td>10.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>76.81</td>
<td>86.67</td>
<td>9.86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>11.59</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>8.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>12.08</td>
<td>19.52</td>
<td>7.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>89.86</td>
<td>96.67</td>
<td>6.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azeraijan</td>
<td>15.94</td>
<td>22.38</td>
<td>6.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>24.64</td>
<td>30.48</td>
<td>5.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>5.70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>13.53</td>
<td>16.67</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>20.77</td>
<td>23.81</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>43.00</td>
<td>45.71</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>4.83</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>10.14</td>
<td>10.95</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>31.88</td>
<td>31.90</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Voice and accountability</th>
<th>Political stability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>54.81</td>
<td>55.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>50.96</td>
<td>51.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>60.10</td>
<td>60.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>56.73</td>
<td>56.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>61.06</td>
<td>60.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>53.85</td>
<td>53.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>51.44</td>
<td>50.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>2.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>24.04</td>
<td>22.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>31.25</td>
<td>29.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>43.75</td>
<td>41.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>6.73</td>
<td>4.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>22.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt, Arab Rep.</td>
<td>21.15</td>
<td>18.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>17.31</td>
<td>14.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>42.79</td>
<td>39.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>22.60</td>
<td>18.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>73.08</td>
<td>68.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>32.21</td>
<td>28.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>35.58</td>
<td>31.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>41.35</td>
<td>36.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>38.94</td>
<td>33.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>37.50</td>
<td>32.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>32.69</td>
<td>26.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>42.31</td>
<td>35.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>52.88</td>
<td>44.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>15.87</td>
<td>6.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>47.12</td>
<td>37.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>72.60</td>
<td>62.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>18.75</td>
<td>7.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>87.98</td>
<td>76.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>47.60</td>
<td>35.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>58.17</td>
<td>43.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>53.37</td>
<td>23.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ANNEX 7. WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS

### Regulatory quality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>35.78</td>
<td>78.85</td>
<td>43.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>26.47</td>
<td>60.58</td>
<td>34.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>27.45</td>
<td>56.25</td>
<td>28.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>47.12</td>
<td>22.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>37.25</td>
<td>56.73</td>
<td>19.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>28.43</td>
<td>45.67</td>
<td>17.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>10.78</td>
<td>27.40</td>
<td>16.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>8.82</td>
<td>23.56</td>
<td>14.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>36.76</td>
<td>51.44</td>
<td>14.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>38.73</td>
<td>52.40</td>
<td>13.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>21.63</td>
<td>13.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>49.02</td>
<td>59.13</td>
<td>10.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>22.06</td>
<td>31.25</td>
<td>9.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>51.94</td>
<td>60.10</td>
<td>8.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>67.16</td>
<td>74.52</td>
<td>7.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>20.59</td>
<td>27.88</td>
<td>7.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>57.35</td>
<td>64.42</td>
<td>7.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>46.08</td>
<td>52.88</td>
<td>6.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>62.75</td>
<td>69.23</td>
<td>6.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tomé and Principe</td>
<td>19.12</td>
<td>25.48</td>
<td>6.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>36.27</td>
<td>41.35</td>
<td>5.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>13.24</td>
<td>17.31</td>
<td>4.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>63.73</td>
<td>67.79</td>
<td>4.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>12.25</td>
<td>15.87</td>
<td>3.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet-Nam</td>
<td>30.39</td>
<td>33.65</td>
<td>3.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>32.35</td>
<td>35.10</td>
<td>2.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>58.33</td>
<td>61.06</td>
<td>2.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>46.57</td>
<td>49.04</td>
<td>2.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>2.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>57.84</td>
<td>59.62</td>
<td>1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>40.69</td>
<td>42.31</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>67.65</td>
<td>68.75</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>47.06</td>
<td>48.08</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>39.22</td>
<td>39.90</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>65.69</td>
<td>66.35</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>63.24</td>
<td>63.46</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>34.31</td>
<td>34.13</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>89.71</td>
<td>89.42</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Rule of law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>23.44</td>
<td>60.10</td>
<td>36.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>31.10</td>
<td>65.38</td>
<td>34.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>28.23</td>
<td>54.33</td>
<td>26.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>18.66</td>
<td>37.02</td>
<td>18.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>19.62</td>
<td>36.54</td>
<td>16.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>22.49</td>
<td>38.46</td>
<td>15.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>26.32</td>
<td>41.83</td>
<td>15.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>43.06</td>
<td>57.69</td>
<td>14.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>25.36</td>
<td>39.90</td>
<td>14.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>20.10</td>
<td>31.25</td>
<td>11.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>14.35</td>
<td>25.48</td>
<td>11.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>63.64</td>
<td>74.52</td>
<td>10.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>33.01</td>
<td>43.27</td>
<td>10.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>17.22</td>
<td>27.40</td>
<td>10.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>40.19</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>9.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>60.77</td>
<td>70.19</td>
<td>9.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>39.23</td>
<td>48.08</td>
<td>8.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet-Nam</td>
<td>37.80</td>
<td>46.15</td>
<td>8.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>37.32</td>
<td>45.67</td>
<td>8.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>9.09</td>
<td>17.31</td>
<td>8.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>34.45</td>
<td>42.31</td>
<td>7.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>11.54</td>
<td>7.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>61.72</td>
<td>68.27</td>
<td>6.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>12.98</td>
<td>6.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>32.54</td>
<td>37.98</td>
<td>5.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>15.87</td>
<td>4.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>4.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>38.28</td>
<td>42.79</td>
<td>4.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>31.58</td>
<td>36.06</td>
<td>4.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>4.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>69.86</td>
<td>73.08</td>
<td>3.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>68.42</td>
<td>71.63</td>
<td>3.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>66.03</td>
<td>69.23</td>
<td>3.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>56.46</td>
<td>59.13</td>
<td>2.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>28.71</td>
<td>30.77</td>
<td>2.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>54.07</td>
<td>55.77</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>53.59</td>
<td>54.81</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>25.84</td>
<td>26.92</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Regulatory quality</th>
<th>Rule of law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>48.04</td>
<td>47.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>28.92</td>
<td>28.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>3.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>33.82</td>
<td>33.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>63.24</td>
<td>62.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>45.59</td>
<td>42.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>53.43</td>
<td>50.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>42.65</td>
<td>38.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>31.37</td>
<td>27.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>50.98</td>
<td>46.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>39.22</td>
<td>34.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>20.59</td>
<td>15.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>24.02</td>
<td>18.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>62.25</td>
<td>56.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>13.73</td>
<td>8.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>53.88</td>
<td>48.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>56.37</td>
<td>50.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>71.57</td>
<td>63.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt, Arab Rep.</td>
<td>32.84</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>40.20</td>
<td>31.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>34.80</td>
<td>25.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>64.71</td>
<td>54.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>30.88</td>
<td>20.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>51.47</td>
<td>40.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>79.41</td>
<td>63.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>51.96</td>
<td>26.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Government Effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>36.59</td>
<td>67.31</td>
<td>30.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>21.95</td>
<td>45.67</td>
<td>23.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>13.17</td>
<td>36.54</td>
<td>23.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>32.68</td>
<td>51.44</td>
<td>18.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>19.51</td>
<td>35.58</td>
<td>16.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>53.17</td>
<td>67.79</td>
<td>14.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>40.49</td>
<td>54.81</td>
<td>14.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet-Nam</td>
<td>40.98</td>
<td>55.29</td>
<td>14.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>12.68</td>
<td>25.96</td>
<td>13.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>16.10</td>
<td>29.33</td>
<td>13.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>28.78</td>
<td>41.83</td>
<td>13.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>42.93</td>
<td>53.37</td>
<td>10.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>34.15</td>
<td>43.75</td>
<td>9.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>48.78</td>
<td>57.69</td>
<td>8.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>17.56</td>
<td>25.48</td>
<td>7.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>50.73</td>
<td>58.17</td>
<td>7.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>22.93</td>
<td>28.85</td>
<td>5.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>24.88</td>
<td>30.77</td>
<td>5.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>66.83</td>
<td>72.60</td>
<td>5.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>54.37</td>
<td>60.10</td>
<td>5.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>38.54</td>
<td>44.23</td>
<td>5.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>6.34</td>
<td>12.02</td>
<td>5.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>14.15</td>
<td>19.71</td>
<td>5.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>20.49</td>
<td>23.56</td>
<td>3.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>20.98</td>
<td>24.04</td>
<td>3.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>23.41</td>
<td>26.44</td>
<td>3.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>59.51</td>
<td>62.50</td>
<td>2.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>14.63</td>
<td>16.83</td>
<td>2.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>31.71</td>
<td>33.65</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>44.39</td>
<td>46.15</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>28.29</td>
<td>29.81</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>39.02</td>
<td>40.38</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>55.12</td>
<td>56.25</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>65.85</td>
<td>66.83</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>4.88</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>73.17</td>
<td>72.12</td>
<td>-1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>64.88</td>
<td>63.46</td>
<td>-1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>67.80</td>
<td>65.87</td>
<td>-1.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Control of Corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>28.78</td>
<td>72.60</td>
<td>43.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>39.02</td>
<td>75.00</td>
<td>35.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>33.17</td>
<td>56.25</td>
<td>23.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tomé and Principe</td>
<td>30.73</td>
<td>52.40</td>
<td>21.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>17.07</td>
<td>38.46</td>
<td>21.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>25.85</td>
<td>42.79</td>
<td>16.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>18.27</td>
<td>15.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet-Nam</td>
<td>24.39</td>
<td>39.42</td>
<td>15.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>19.02</td>
<td>33.17</td>
<td>14.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>21.95</td>
<td>35.58</td>
<td>13.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>21.46</td>
<td>34.62</td>
<td>13.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>27.32</td>
<td>40.38</td>
<td>13.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>30.24</td>
<td>41.83</td>
<td>11.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>39.51</td>
<td>50.96</td>
<td>11.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>77.56</td>
<td>88.94</td>
<td>11.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>8.78</td>
<td>19.71</td>
<td>10.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>64.88</td>
<td>75.48</td>
<td>10.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>29.27</td>
<td>38.94</td>
<td>9.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>10.73</td>
<td>20.19</td>
<td>9.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>85.85</td>
<td>92.79</td>
<td>6.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>75.12</td>
<td>80.77</td>
<td>5.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>41.95</td>
<td>47.60</td>
<td>5.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>23.41</td>
<td>28.85</td>
<td>5.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>6.34</td>
<td>11.06</td>
<td>4.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>9.76</td>
<td>13.94</td>
<td>4.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>50.73</td>
<td>54.81</td>
<td>4.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>33.66</td>
<td>36.54</td>
<td>2.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>15.12</td>
<td>17.31</td>
<td>2.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>5.85</td>
<td>7.21</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>11.71</td>
<td>12.98</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>43.41</td>
<td>44.23</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>13.66</td>
<td>14.42</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt, Arab Rep.</td>
<td>35.12</td>
<td>35.10</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>23.90</td>
<td>23.08</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>12.20</td>
<td>10.58</td>
<td>-1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>14.15</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>-1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>66.83</td>
<td>64.42</td>
<td>-2.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>80.80</td>
<td>77.40</td>
<td>-3.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued)
### Government effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>13.66</td>
<td>11.54</td>
<td>-2.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>26.83</td>
<td>24.52</td>
<td>-2.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>63.90</td>
<td>61.54</td>
<td>-2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>47.80</td>
<td>45.19</td>
<td>-2.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>24.39</td>
<td>21.63</td>
<td>-2.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>82.93</td>
<td>79.81</td>
<td>-3.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>52.20</td>
<td>48.56</td>
<td>-3.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>63.41</td>
<td>59.13</td>
<td>-4.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>87.80</td>
<td>82.69</td>
<td>-5.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>56.10</td>
<td>50.48</td>
<td>-5.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>49.76</td>
<td>42.31</td>
<td>-7.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>30.24</td>
<td>22.60</td>
<td>-7.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>84.88</td>
<td>76.92</td>
<td>-7.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>21.46</td>
<td>13.46</td>
<td>-8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>47.57</td>
<td>39.42</td>
<td>-8.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>47.32</td>
<td>37.98</td>
<td>-9.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>74.63</td>
<td>64.90</td>
<td>-9.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>46.83</td>
<td>37.02</td>
<td>-9.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>42.44</td>
<td>31.25</td>
<td>-11.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>32.20</td>
<td>20.19</td>
<td>-12.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>25.37</td>
<td>12.98</td>
<td>-12.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>35.61</td>
<td>23.08</td>
<td>-12.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>60.49</td>
<td>47.60</td>
<td>-12.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>45.85</td>
<td>30.29</td>
<td>-15.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>70.24</td>
<td>49.04</td>
<td>-21.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>38.05</td>
<td>13.94</td>
<td>-24.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt, Arab Rep.</td>
<td>48.29</td>
<td>22.12</td>
<td>-26.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Control of corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>47.32</td>
<td>44.71</td>
<td>-2.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>90.73</td>
<td>87.50</td>
<td>-3.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>44.39</td>
<td>40.87</td>
<td>-3.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>70.24</td>
<td>65.87</td>
<td>-4.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>55.12</td>
<td>50.48</td>
<td>-4.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>15.61</td>
<td>10.10</td>
<td>-5.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>61.95</td>
<td>55.29</td>
<td>-6.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>32.20</td>
<td>25.48</td>
<td>-6.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>10.24</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>-6.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>44.88</td>
<td>37.98</td>
<td>-6.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>38.54</td>
<td>30.77</td>
<td>-7.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>51.71</td>
<td>43.75</td>
<td>-7.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>53.17</td>
<td>45.19</td>
<td>-7.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>36.10</td>
<td>27.40</td>
<td>-8.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>22.44</td>
<td>13.46</td>
<td>-8.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>35.61</td>
<td>26.44</td>
<td>-9.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>31.22</td>
<td>20.67</td>
<td>-10.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>29.76</td>
<td>17.79</td>
<td>-11.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>70.73</td>
<td>58.17</td>
<td>-12.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>24.88</td>
<td>12.02</td>
<td>-12.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>46.83</td>
<td>32.21</td>
<td>-14.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>42.44</td>
<td>26.92</td>
<td>-15.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>57.07</td>
<td>41.35</td>
<td>-15.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>40.98</td>
<td>22.60</td>
<td>-18.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>41.46</td>
<td>22.12</td>
<td>-19.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>47.80</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>-22.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>45.37</td>
<td>16.35</td>
<td>-29.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Annex 8

#### UNDP FUNDING TRENDS

For anti-corruption and addressing drivers of corruption.

**Table A1. Expenditures in direct anti-corruption support and addressing drivers of corruption. Total amounts by donor, 2008-2015.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Total 2008-2015 (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>369,341,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>245,201,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>135,363,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>90,438,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>83,146,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDTF (various multi-donor trust funds)</td>
<td>78,718,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>53,736,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>46,169,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>39,934,174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>25,514,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>24,473,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>16,603,979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation</td>
<td>13,110,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
<td>8,880,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>8,668,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>8,155,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>6,925,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6,654,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>4,920,787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Environment Fund</td>
<td>4,317,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3,360,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)</td>
<td>3,232,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF)</td>
<td>3,136,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>2,495,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA)</td>
<td>1,909,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding Fund</td>
<td>1,893,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>1,807,317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
<td>1,690,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>1,582,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
<td>1,329,697</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Total 2008-2015 (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector (various)</td>
<td>1,317,547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1,293,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>1,259,684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,229,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1,172,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>982,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>833,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Volunteers (UNV)</td>
<td>817,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam Novib</td>
<td>755,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Fund for Agriculture and Development (IFAD)</td>
<td>741,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockefeller Foundation</td>
<td>668,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Development Bank</td>
<td>584,622</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP Finance System (ATLAS) and Independent Evaluation Office analysis. Based on selected projects and donors. Note: Amounts for specific countries can include contributions from various national sources.
Figure A1. Contribution from key donors, 2008-2015 (in US$ millions)
Recommendation 1. Prioritize support to addressing corruption risks to development. Develop an anti-corruption programme strategy that more explicitly links the UNDP anti-corruption approach to other development programming.

Management response: UNDP management agrees that the organization should prioritize support to addressing corruption risks to development. UNDP management will ensure that this is taken into full consideration in developing the draft of the next strategic plan, 2018–2021. The UNDP programme on anti-corruption for development was the first to link anti-corruption with development. Learning from the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Acceleration Framework in many countries, UNDP is identifying governance and corruption-related bottlenecks in service delivery. UNDP global, regional and country-level governance and anti-corruption programmes are implementing projects that seek to identify corruption risk assessments in the health, education and water sectors in order to contribute to national development outcomes. With the Seoul Policy Centre, we have expanded these risk assessments to the construction sector; we plan to expand them to the justice and security sectors.

In supporting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), UNDP aims to apply the ‘mainstreaming, acceleration and policy support’ approach (known as ‘MAPS’), which is the common strategy approved by the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) to ensure effective, coherent implementation of the SDG agenda. This should ensure that various targets under Goal 16 are integrated into national plans, strategies and budgets, including through a sectoral approach, social accountability initiatives and the mainstreaming of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption into development processes. Acceleration will be supported by the use and further elaboration of tools and methodologies (including risk assessment tools) to identify critical constraints and governance or other bottlenecks (including in anti-corruption). UNDP will provide coordinated policy support to countries that will be involved in project implementation through UNDP global and regional advisers in coordination with UNODC and other partners, particularly in the implementation and mainstreaming of Goal 16 and its targets. UNDP is prioritizing ‘clean construction’ and ‘e-procurement’ as an anti-corruption contribution to other goals, such as Goal 9 on infrastructure. UNDP has started developing and rolling out a support package to integrate anti-corruption in the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (in Ukraine and Nigeria, for example).

As Chair of the UNDG and coordinator of the United Nations resident coordinator system, UNDP is coordinating with nine other United Nations organizations to provide training to field staff on integrating anti-corruption into United Nations programming processes such as the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). UNDP, with other United Nations partners, aims to integrate anti-corruption into national plans and development processes, including those related to the SDGs through UNDAFs and other country-level United Nations programmes and projects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key action(s)</th>
<th>Time frame</th>
<th>Responsible unit(s)</th>
<th>Tracking56</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ensure that prioritization of support to addressing corruption risks to development is taken into full consideration in the process of developing the draft of the UNDP strategic plan 2018–2021.</td>
<td>By end December 2017</td>
<td>Bureau for Policy and Programme Support (BPPS), Executive Office</td>
<td>Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make sure anti-corruption is a part of the MAPS approach and other support packages developed to support the SDG agenda.</td>
<td>By March 2017</td>
<td>BPPS</td>
<td>Status</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

56 Implementation status is tracked in the Evaluation Resource Centre
## Recommendation 2. Address regional variations in anti-corruption support and prioritize support to regions that are currently underrepresented.

**Management response:** UNDP management agrees with the recommendation that UNDP should address regional variations in anti-corruption support in a development context. UNDP will analyse these variations and prepare recommendations for relevant actions to be taken to address them in its regional and country level anti-corruption programming. Full coverage of all regions will depend on the availability of sufficient financial resources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key action(s)</th>
<th>Time frame</th>
<th>Responsible unit(s)</th>
<th>Tracking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1. In collaboration with the regional bureaux and hubs, prepare an analysis of the regional variations in anti-corruption support in a development context, and make recommendations to address those variations.</td>
<td>By December 2017</td>
<td>BPPS, in cooperation with regional hubs and regional bureaux</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. Provide capacity-building and advisory support to Country Offices in regions that are underrepresented in the area of anti-corruption support.</td>
<td>Continuous (by end 2018)</td>
<td>BPPS, in cooperation with respective regional hubs and regional bureaux</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3. Mobilize resources from development partners to secure additional policy and programme support for those regions where there is high demand for anti-corruption programming but limited resources.</td>
<td>By December 2017</td>
<td>BPPS, in cooperation with respective regional hubs and regional bureaux</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Recommendation 3. Consider prioritizing support to anti-corruption and governance risk assessments and measurement.

**Management response:** UNDP management agrees with the recommendation that UNDP should support anti-corruption and governance diagnostics and measurement. UNDP acknowledges that there have been many diagnostics, surveys, assessments and other measurements by various partners and academia. The challenge is to ensure coordination among partners, acceptance of such assessments and the data behind them by national policymakers, and their proper use for policy reform. UNDP experience has shown that most anti-corruption and governance diagnostics and measurement do not translate into policy, for reasons that include lack of political commitment, limited resources for follow-up and lack of sustainability plans. To strengthen anti-corruption measurement and provide guidance on the use of the right indicators for measuring and monitoring corruption, UNDP published a User’s Guide to Measuring Corruption and Anti-corruption in 2015.

To strengthen efforts to support anti-corruption and governance integrity diagnostics and measurement, UNDP will:

(a) Coordinate with other partners to standardize the corruption measurement methodologies to support the more effective use of anti-corruption and governance diagnostics and measurement;

(b) Ensure sustainability of projects from integrity assessment to policy reforms by securing buy in from the governments and bringing together various stakeholders from the onset of the project implementation; and

(c) Maximize the use of information and communication technology (ICT) and social media to strengthen feedback mechanisms and solve the governance corruption-related bottlenecks in service delivery. UNDP will seek government cost-sharing to make sure that the ICT pilots are scaled up and sustained.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key action(s)</th>
<th>Time frame</th>
<th>Responsible unit(s)</th>
<th>Tracking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1. Within the context of UNDP work on the SDG indicators (particularly for Goal 16). Review and update UNDP tools and instruments supporting anti-corruption and governance diagnostics and measurement.</td>
<td>By December 2017</td>
<td>BPPS (Oslo Governance Centre – OGC – in particular), in cooperation with regional hubs, regional bureaux and Country Offices and other relevant partners (such as UNODC and the Praia City Group)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. Provide capacity-building and advisory support to Country Offices in relation to anti-corruption and governance integrity diagnostics and measurement.</td>
<td>Continuous (by end 2018)</td>
<td>BPPS (OGC in particular), in cooperation with regional hubs and regional bureaux</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Recommendation 4. Increase support for local-level initiatives to strengthen demand-side accountability, particularly concerning access to information and social accountability initiatives.**

**Management response:** UNDP management fully agrees with the recommendation. During the last eight years, UNDP contributed to anti-corruption and addressed drivers of corruption by strengthening its engagement with youth, women's groups, communities and many local-level civil society actors and non-government organizations in order to raise the demand side of accountability. UNDP will continue its engagement with various civil society actors, such as Transparency International, Integrity Action and the Huairou Commission (the international organization of grassroots women's networks) at the global level, while continuing its engagement with national and local-level civil society organizations (CSOs), youth and women's group, communities and non-governmental organizations to strengthen service delivery, budgets and infrastructures, and the monitoring of corruption. UNDP will include government and non-governmental actors to make sure that there is a two-way dialogue contributing to an effective feedback mechanism that produces tangible results from the increase in demand-side accountability.

One of the main objectives of UNDP initiatives will be to strengthen social accountability in the health, education, water, infrastructure, justice and security and other relevant sectors to contribute to the attainment of the SDGs. Measures will include:

(a) Continue UNDP partnership with Transparency International and other global partners to raise the global demand for social accountability;

(b) At the national and local level, work with civil society actors and the private sector to promote and scale up successful initiatives on open data, access to information and procurement transparency in service delivery at the local level;

(c) Continue to support the monitoring of budgets, expenditure and services by civil society and the community, including through the adoption of new technologies to monitor services;

(d) Strengthen women's networks to improve transparency and accountability in service delivery by scaling up successful local and national-level initiatives; and

(e) Provide support to youth networks for their innovative social accountability projects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key action(s)</th>
<th>Time frame</th>
<th>Responsible unit(s)</th>
<th>Tracking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1. Provide capacity-building and advisory support to Country Offices on how the country-level projects could enhance their engagement in social accountability, including monitoring and oversight related to the SDGs.</td>
<td>By December 2018</td>
<td>BPPS and regional hubs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2. Provide capacity-building support to national and local-level youth and women's groups, CSOs and community organizations on how they could work together with government authorities to monitor services, budgets and infrastructures.</td>
<td>By December 2018</td>
<td>BPPS and regional hubs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3. Continue UNDP engagement in knowledge, advocacy and partnership to integrate anti-corruption into local development and urban governance agenda, including through work on open data, open budgeting and open contracting as part of the 'smart cities' initiative.</td>
<td>Continuous (by end 2018)</td>
<td>BPPS and regional hubs with relevant partners Regional Bureau for Eastern Europe (on open data in particular)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Recommendation 5. Further strengthen global and regional anti-corruption projects to support country programmes as well as to enable UNDP to contribute to regional and global policy debates and advocacy. Global and regional projects should be used to develop key streams of programme support at the country level.**

**Management response:** UNDP management fully agrees with the recommendation. UNDP will consider opportunities for strengthening anti-corruption components in existing global and regional governance programmes and initiatives. In line with this recommendation, UNDP has rolled out the 'Anti-corruption for Peaceful and Inclusive Societies' global project (known as 'ACPIS') to continue UNDP global policy and programme support on anti-corruption.

The new UNDP funding windows (such as the window on governance for peaceful and inclusive societies) will be used as an opportunity for UNDP to allocate funding to global, regional and country-level anti-corruption initiatives.
### Key action(s) | Time frame | Responsible unit(s) | Tracking
--- | --- | --- | ---
5.1. Integrate global and regional anti-corruption targets in the results and resources frameworks of the new UNDP strategic plan, global and regional programmes. | By December 2017 | BPPS, in cooperation with regional hubs and regional bureaux | Status | Comments
5.2. Continue mobilizing more resources for UNDP global and regional anti-corruption initiatives and working together with other relevant partners for joint global and regional activities on anti-corruption. | Continuous (by end 2018) | BPPS, the Bureau for External Relations and Advocacy (BERA) and regional hubs (with partners) | Status | Comments

### Recommendation 6. Enhance fund mobilization for anti-corruption support, championing select areas of anti-corruption and accountability initiatives.

**Management response:** UNDP management fully agrees with the recommendation, while noting the challenges resulting from the high degree of dependence on a handful of donors to its global anti-corruption programme. UNDP will intensify its partnership development efforts and diversify the donor base when mobilizing resources for supporting anti-corruption and governance interventions, focusing particularly on multilateral development banks, the private sector and donor agencies.

The roll-out of the Anti-Corruption for Peaceful and Inclusive Societies global project, 2016–2020, is an opportunity for donor partners to contribute specifically to UNDP anti-corruption work. The new UNDP funding windows (such as the window on governance for peaceful and inclusive societies) also provide an opportunity for interested donor partners to provide pooled, flexible funding through which they can support implementation of the UNDP strategic plan. The objective of the funding windows is to improve the quality of non-core funding to UNDP, promote more integrated programming, and respond to emerging issues. The windows are intended to help UNDP and its partners align around common goals to support country-focused efforts to achieve the SDGs.

UNDP will: (a) Work with UNODC and other United Nations partners to design joint programmes/projects on anti-corruption and governance integrity; (b) Continue to brief donor partners on UNDP plans to implement Goal 16 and mainstream it into other goals (this will help to mobilize additional resources in support of the SDGs); and (c) Brief donor partners on the UNDP approach, niche and priorities regarding anti-corruption and its global, regional and country-level projects and activities.

### Key action(s) | Time frame | Responsible unit(s) | Tracking
--- | --- | --- | ---
6.1. Develop resource mobilization and partnership strategy, emphasizing the importance of anti-corruption and addressing the drivers of corruption in the context of implementing, measuring and monitoring the SDGs. | By December 2017 | BPPS, in cooperation with BERA and regional hubs, regional bureaux and Country Offices | Status | Comments
6.2. Showcase innovative responses to corruption, including tools for openness, use of open data and technologies that are of particular interest to some donors and partners | By December 2017 | BPPS, in cooperation with BERA and regional hubs, regional bureaux and Country Offices | Status | Comments

### Recommendation 7. Strengthen staff capacities at the global and regional level to specifically address the need for more specialized policy and technical services for anti-corruption programming.

**Management response:** UNDP management fully agrees with the recommendation, while recognizing that an expansion of capacities is dependent on additional resources. UNDP will ensure that relevant capacities in support of development and implementation of anti-corruption programming are maintained and strengthened to the extent possible and pending the mobilization of additional resources.

### Key action(s) | Time frame | Responsible unit(s) | Tracking
--- | --- | --- | ---
7.1. Ensure that designated capacities for anti-corruption programming are in place in Country Offices, regional service centres and headquarters to advise and support other practices to design, monitor, implement and evaluate anti-corruption programmes | By December 2017 | BPPS, in cooperation with respective regional hubs, regional bureaux and Country Offices | Status | Comments