

Mid-term Evaluation of Strengthening Institutional  
Capacity for Development Effectiveness and Accountability  
Programme (DEAP)

**DRAFT REPORT<sup>1</sup>**

PREPARED FOR

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MALAWI**

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## ACRONYMS

AMP	Aid Management Platform
CABS	Common Approach to Budget Support
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DAD	Debt and Aid Division
DEAP	Development Effectiveness and Accountability Programme
DCS	Development Cooperation Strategy
DMEC	District Monitoring and Evaluation Committee
EP&D	Economic Planning and Development
ET	Evaluation Team
EU	European Union
GoM	Government of Malawi
HRBA	Human Rights Based Approaches
JP	Joint Programme
MDA	Ministry Department Agency
MOFEPD	Ministry of Finance Economic Planning and Development
MGDS	Malawi Growth and Development Strategy
M & E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NDS	National Development Strategy
PFEM RP	Public Finance and Economic Management – Reform Programme
SWG	Sector Working Group
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The DEAP is premised on the realisation that development results will largely depend on availability and proper management of resources, domestic and external, in the process, necessitating the strengthening of national capacities in central ministries and at district level and among non-state actors. DEAP supports national institutions to become more results-oriented and improve synergies between planning, monitoring and evaluation and aid management functions in supporting the realisation of national goals and priorities.

Key strategic areas of support include: 1) National Institutions utilize Results-Based Management (RBM) systems for planning, monitoring and evaluation to enhance ownership and leadership for achievement of development results; 2) National Institutions have the capacity to align policies, programmes and budgets with national development strategies for efficient achievement of development results; and 3) Government has sufficient capacity to effectively negotiate, manage and account for development assistance. All the prioritised areas are vital in the development context of Malawi in view of the bottlenecks and challenges noted in recent years.

The project is aligned to the MGDS II and Vision 2020; it is a good intervention to the capacitation of Malawi to strengthen development effectiveness in managing development aid and enabling improved accountability. The project is largely relevant to the needs of the country. The DEAP priorities and results-matrix have, however, not been properly revised to reflect the much reduced available resource envelop, resulting in the programme being somewhat ambitious. In the framing of the DEAP, resources allocation pertaining to mandates did not correspond to demands, with an under-resourcing of key activities at planning stage. Examples include mainstreaming of monitoring and evaluation and national statistical capacity and achievement of gender equality outcomes. Strategically, DEAP opted for a lean structured arrangement, which is good for sustainability, with dependence of government officers as key resource persons. The issue, however, is the extent to which the existing arrangements in the MOFEPD have worked and been effective.

Whilst progress has been made with other work plans, some of the components and sub-components have faced substantial challenges in resourcing key activities due to bureaucracy-rooted delays. Delays have been experienced partly due to procurement constraints, challenges in resource planning and inadequate human resources provision in the implementation structures. The coordination mechanism, roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders are largely clear and adequate, with a demonstration of some commitment by the GoM and other key stakeholders in steering the Action forward. However, commitment on the part of Government, in some cases, has not been backed up by adequate financial and human resources deployment, the latter being both in terms of numbers and quality. Overall, the resources availed through the DEAP, though significant fall short of the needs of the

programme, being less than 38 percent of the original budget projections for the entire DEAP.

Overall, although commendable progress has been made in the delivery of outputs, full delivery and roll out of key activities remains as work-in-progress. The ET concludes that the Action is monitored by the key IPs, through the PSC and the PMCC, to satisfactory levels. However, some of the key decisions made at the PSC and PMCC have not been followed up with appropriate timely action, resulting in some loss of confidence and trust between the principal stakeholders involved. Review the existing DEAP human resources, and fill in the key staffing gaps, for components and sub-components facing constraints. Given the existing under-spends, and the status of the programme coordination office, the UNDP in collaboration with MOFEPD need to expedite filling in of key expert positions, where these are identified, with possibility of additional short-to medium TA, where feasible; to fast-track certain priority activities that have lagged behind.

Starting at senior level, despite of claims of 'business unusual', a 'business as usual' culture still persists in many circles in government, and in the absence of demonstration of effective implementation or adoption of a system of rewards for good performers, penalties and sanctions for non-performers. There are persistent challenges faced in the M & E indicator framework: Lack of harmonization of the indicator framework linked to PE, PBB, Budget allocation, IFMIS, MIS and M & E, resulting in misalignment of implementation of priority interventions, and this leads to confusion and stagnation, slowing down progress in all key result areas. Lack of integration in M & E, reporting structures, between OPC, Performance Enforcement, EP & D, MGDS, Treasury, PBB, IFMIS, Decentralisation, Local Government, District Councils, MIS, National Statistical Office; M & E at different sector level.

Institutionalising RBM in the public sector requires substantial investment and unwavering and sustained effort in capacity building and training in RBM principles accompanied with overhaul of bad habits in public officials in favour of new progressive approaches. It would be wishful thinking that with an orientation and a training of officers in RBM then the MDAs will take on RBM as a framework for planning, managing implementation and M&E. Capacity building and technical support plus continuous provision of direction from management at a minimum is required to ensure adoption and use RBM in the public institutions.

DEAP supported the strengthening of the aid management through financing a number of activities in the Debt and Aid Division (DAD). The programme supported training of the DAD officers in monitoring and evaluation and debt management. Support was also provided to production of the development cooperation atlas covering years 2012/2013 to 2014/2015; and later the 2016 development cooperation calendar and its dissemination was undertaken.

The DEAP has been very useful and relevant to the DAD and has assisted the Division to undertake activities that in the absence of the programme the Division would not have done. The Evaluation Team quotes:

*“DEAP actually supported the activities that we as a division are supposed to undertake and the support assisted us and ensured that the activities were actually done which has been a big plus for the programme”. Deputy Director, DAD.*

DEAP provided effective technical assistance support for the development of Development Cooperation Strategy for Malawi (2014-2018). The development of the strategy was done through very consultative and inclusive approach which involved all key stakeholders. The focus of the strategy is to contribute to the improved quality and effectiveness of development cooperation and ensure support to all development partners and other stakeholders is coordinated, harmonized focused on results and aligned to national priorities, institutions and systems<sup>2</sup>. Since its development, the strategy has been guiding and will continue to guide development cooperation in Malawi up to 2018, and well beyond the DEAP period.

The Development Cooperation Strategy (DCs, 20014 -2018) identified dialogue as an important aspect of development cooperation and it therefore outlined a number of dialogue structures, most of which were already existing including the following: a) the High Level Forum on Development Effectiveness (HFL) a multi-stakeholder platform for dialogue on development cooperation in Malawi. Under the DCS, Malawi now has regular HLF meetings spread in the first half and second half of the year.

**Malawi and the development cooperation architecture:** Malawi is a very active member of global networks and partnerships in development cooperation strategy making and review processes, including monitoring processes for implementation of the Paris Declaration, several regional and global post-Busan processes, including the post-Busan Building Blocks, the Africa Action Plan on Development Effectiveness. Malawi is co-Chair, together with Mexico of the High Level Forum of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. However, there has been an inability by Malawi to effectively use the global networks and partnerships to influence the development cooperation and aid architecture in a manner that enables the country and developing countries in a similar status to directly benefit from the global platforms.

DEAP also supported the development and management of the Aid Management Platform (AMP). The programme supported the paying of the user fees and technical support for the platform. The platform is web-based and all development partners have since been able to enter their support in the platform- self reporting. The system is very essential because it gives information on all aid that each development partner is investing into the Malawi economy including all aid beyond the government and off-budget. The Information on aid flows has been of particular importance to the Government in its budget formulation and review process. However, getting timely, comprehensive and forward looking information has been a challenge due to the fact

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<sup>2</sup> Development Cooperation Strategy for Malawi 2014-2018

differences in reporting periods and parliamentary appropriation processes in donor countries.

With the launch of the AMP public portal in October 2013, information on aid flows to Malawi is now accessible to members of the general public. This is important for purposes of improving domestic accountability in Malawi. This is a milestone as far as issues of transparency and domestic accountability in development financing and management in Malawi are concerned. The AMP provides support to the pursuit of development effectiveness by giving information to all stakeholders including CSOs and private sector and the general citizenry for them to be able to follow aid flows development financing and to hold government accountable. In Malawi development cooperation dialogue structures are working and this has improved the dialogue between government and the development partners.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### Policy level

**Recommendation 1: GoM/Policy:** The development partners are looking forward to government taking more decisive leadership and undertaking objective analysis that would bring up priorities that actually show comparative advantages of investing in the chosen areas in relation to those not prioritized. The analysis and synthesis should go to a level where for example the national benefits of investing in the sector, for example, food and nutrition security would be stated clearly, with evidence, compared to the other sectors. While everything can be categorized as priority, the NDS should come up with critical manageable priorities that require investment in the medium term.

### Sectoral

**Recommendation 2:** No effort should be spared to ensure that all the SWGs are revamped and fully operational. One way to do this is to develop scheduled meetings for SWGs which should be adhered to so that their meetings are not dependent on the decision of one person. The Government should strictly ensure that scheduled meetings take place as planned, including the convening of these meetings as one of the key performance assessment factors for the responsible SWG coordinator. This could entail producing a calendar whereby in a particular quarter all SWGs are expected to be Prioritizing; in another quarter Planning; in another quarter Budgeting and the other quarter doing Joint Sector Reviews.

**Recommendation 3: Databanks at RDCs:** The databanks at the district level are not functional and they have not really effectively worked since their inception due to many technical glitches they faced. Based on discussions with the District Council, the evaluation team is of the view that to revamp the district data bank, the government should use IFMIS infrastructure that already exists in district councils for the district databanks. The evaluation team understands that the IFMIS has several modules and one can be used for the district data bank and in this way there would be saving on



resources and the sustainability issues will be taken care of. The technical backstopping for the databanks would not be problematic in this case as it would be integrated and embedded in the already existing technical support for the IFMIS.

**Recommendation 4: Sector Working Groups:** One area that would need to be worked on is to inject new vigour in the private sector and NGOs so that they get committed and take ownership in the SWG. The private sector and CSOs should financial and logistical incentives to participate in the SWG otherwise expecting them to prioritise the SWG activities and spending on them over their private operations will be difficult.

For the accompanying TWGs, it would be important that the government and development partners also support the participation of the private sector and the NGOs. The TWG need to be taken seriously by Government and the chain of command between the TWG and the SWG should be seen to be strong otherwise the meetings can be viewed as waste of time and lead to loss of interest from the stakeholders. Related to this, the SWG and the TWG meetings should be seen to be effective in the conduct of their meetings to sustain interest and continued participation by the stakeholders. In this regard, the meetings should always have clear agenda and the meetings should be conducted professionally and effectively to achieve the purposes for which they are set. Without a business-like focus, the meetings would be viewed as time wasters and lead to reduced interest among the private sector and NGO stakeholders.

## **Institutional**

### **Recommendation 5: Beefing up human resource for institutionalisation of RBM**

Considering that there is no stability of personnel in the public service and also the general inadequacy of staff especially at district council level, the evaluation team recommends that for the initial period of say three years, professional UNVs should be deployed to the district councils and line ministries that require human resources support. The UNVs could assist in institutionalization of the RBM in decentralised organisations and in line ministries. It should be stated that the persons involved should be professional UNVs that would support and develop capacity of the organisations to incorporate the RBM principles and practices in the organization and develop the architecture for the RBM in organisational planning, implementation and M&E architecture. The UNVs would assist in developing M&E frameworks of the district councils and ministries that are struggling to do so. A good example of where this is working is the Ministry of Gender and Children Affairs where UNICEF placed UNVs to support the development of Child Protection Information Management System and its roll out to the districts.

**Recommendation 6:** GoM develop harmonized M & E, performance enforcement and indicator assessment frameworks implementation arrangements. GoM integrate M &

E reporting structures, between OPC, Performance Enforcement, EP & D, RBM, IFMIS, MIS, Budget, Treasury, National Statistical Office; different sectors, including Decentralisation at District Councils.

## **Strategic positioning**

**Recommendation 7: UNDP/EU:** Is there need for UNDP/EU to support another DEAP phase? YES, drawing on lessons learnt from the current phase, future support can ensure:

- i. Adequate financial resources are mobilised;
- ii. Have more substantial TA to support programme, in a focused and more comprehensive manner, targeting delivery in key pillars of DEAP – with much stronger results focus!
- iii. New DEAP design be accompanied with a strong performance and results tracking system (beyond activities analysis/reviews); PSC focusing more on policy, strategic issues and results.

There is need for the UNDP, the EU and the GoM to recommit themselves to fast-tracking implementation of key out-standing and priority activities, on the basis of the annual work plans and programme reviews. Where human resource gaps are noted, including quality, these ought to be addressed.

**Recommendation 8: UNDP:** In view of the frustrations generated on the side of the implementation partners with the procurement process, UNDP ought to expedite the procurement process, improve communication/dialogue with IP management and focal persons, to ensure that that any challenges linked to payment requests are tackled without delays.

**Recommendation 9: Gender Equality:** Improvements are required to consistently use gender analysis/assessments and disaggregate the benefits and show groups of men, women. Where project level successes have been documented, they have not been vertically captured in UNDAF outcome annual reports to inform gender mainstreaming results at the higher level.

## **1. Introduction**

### **1.1. Purpose of the Evaluation**

The purpose of evaluating the Joint Programme on Strengthening Institutional Capacity for Development Effectiveness and Accountability (DEAP) is to assess the extent to which the programme has achieved the objectives and results for which it was formulated. The evaluation will assist to identify and isolate lessons and learning points from the implementation of the programme that will be used for reshaping the programme (during its remaining period) and also for programming other similar programmes in future.

This evaluation is both a summative evaluation as well as a formative evaluation considering that the DEAP was supposed to end in 2016 and has been extended by one more year to 2017.

#### **1.1.2 Scope of the Evaluation**

The scope of the evaluation centres on assessing the extent to which the programme has made progress in the delivery of expected outputs and results in the prioritized strategic areas. The evaluation focuses on the key strategic areas of support, which are stated in the terms of reference (ToR) as follows:

- i. Institutionalizing results based management practices in the public sector;
- ii. Harmonizing and aligning development planning and budgeting tools including the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), the Public Sector Investment Programme (PSIP) and the national budget to support implementation of Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) priorities; and
- iii. Strengthening capacity for development assistance management with a view to contributing to improvements in management, allocation and utilization of public resources for effective development and service delivery.

#### **1.1.3 Specific Objectives and Scope of the Evaluation**

The specific objectives of the evaluation are:

- i. Assessing the relevance of the outputs to the effective achievement of the outcome;
- ii. Assessing the relevance of the programme to national priorities;
- iii. Assessing and analysing the progress made by the programme to date towards achieving the programme outputs and outcome and the sustainability of these results;

- iv. Examining and analysing factors which have positively and negatively affected achievement of programme outputs and outcome;
- v. Assessing the effectiveness of institutional arrangements and partnership strategies;
- vi. Assessing the sustainability of the programme contribution in the achievement of the outputs and outcome;
- vii. Determining the impact, both positive and negative, from contribution of the programme to the achievement of the outcome;
- viii. Examining the extent to which gender equality and women empowerment and human rights targets as cross-cutting issues were integrated and achieved;
- ix. Distilling recommendations, lessons and best practices for future programming and improvement in planning for the remainder of the programme;
- x. Making recommendations in strategic areas for improving the programme design, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, impact, partnership arrangement and cross-cutting issues.

A template of evaluation criteria and questions, which focus on design and relevance; efficiency (pertaining to implementation arrangements) and efficiency (related to programme resources, quality and quantity, including cost-effectiveness); effectiveness and sustainability is attached in the annex of the report.

## **1.2 Evaluation questions**

The evaluation will address the following evaluation questions in order to assess achievement and progress towards achievement of the programme results:

- 1) To what extent has the joint programme institutionalized utilization of RBM systems for planning, monitoring and evaluation as a way of enhancing ownership and leadership for achieving development results
- 2) To what extent has the programme assisted national institutions to acquire capacity to align policies, programmes and budgets with national development strategies and MDGs for efficient achievement of development results.
- 3) To what extent has the joint programme development capacity of the government to effectively negotiate, manage and account for development assistance

## **2. Methodology**

### **2.1 Theory of change**

For this evaluation, both qualitative and quantitative methods are used because of the need to link the development challenge being addressed in the results chain, to the outcome areas. The theory of change (TOC)/logic model guided this evaluation with a conceptual framework that mostly leaned toward qualitative analysis and less

toward quantitative. The evaluation was used for validating the TOC – to assess the TOC’s causal logic the risks and the assumptions. The evaluation took into account new emerging development realities and challenges facing the economy. There were realities and challenges that the programme faced over its implementation period that did not exist when DEAP was designed, yet some have become central to progress toward achievement of the programme results.

The evaluation discusses performance in each indicator area and identifies lessons learnt in the implementation of the programme and also describes the challenges that were encountered in the process. In addition, the evaluation also discusses the funding for the programme – flow and adequacy in relation to the programme scope.

### **Evaluation Scoring/Rating**

The evaluation uses a two tier scoring method 1) for the achievement/effectiveness in the indicator area of intervention and 2) for the Evaluation criteria. The scoring/rating used for achievements in the indicator are gauges how much has been achieved in each indicator area. The scoring for the evaluation criteria is for assessing how relevant is the programme to the Malawian development context and how the programme has performed in relation to overall effectiveness, efficiency and gauging the sustainability of the programme results after the programme funding cease. The two scoring criteria are described below.

<b>Performance Assessment Rating for Achievements under each Indicator area</b>	
<b>Rating</b>	<b>Explanation of the Rating/ Scoring</b>
<b>Fully achieved</b>	The programme has implemented the interventions and fully achieved the expected results
<b>Partially Achieved</b>	The programme has implemented the interventions or some of the interventions and has to a larger extent achieved results but not to the expected level (not all results achieved)
<b>Work in Progress</b>	The programme is implementing the interventions that have not yet materialised into results. The interventions need to be given time to materialise into results
<b>Not Achieved</b>	The programme has implemented or has not implemented the required interventions and has not achieved any results in the indicator area

### **Evaluation Criteria Performance Assessment Rating**

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Rating	Explanation of the Rating
Green Colour	Describe full achievement of the results in the indicator area
Yellow Colour	Used to describe the partial substantial achievements in the indicator or evaluation area and
Red Colour	Describes limited achievements in the indicator area.

## 2.2 Data sources

The evaluation sourced data from different sources and the data was both secondary and primary.

### 2.2.1 Secondary Data

The evaluation reviewed programme documents and all other relevant documents, such as the UN Joint Programme Document, DEAP, MGDS II (2011 – 2016) document, the MGS II Review Report (2015), UNDAF Document and recent reviews, relevant project evaluation and review reports, minutes of the programme management committees, various publications from UNDP, other UN agencies and Government and national policy documents. Other material reviewed included all documents relevant to the outcome evaluation and strategic focus areas, including international development partners, civil society organisations (CSOs) and beneficiaries, all material not in the public domain but available; work plans, mission and workshop reports, baseline surveys, monitoring data, country data and previous M & E reports, where they existed and quarterly and annual progress reports.

### 2.2.2 Primary data

The evaluation also collected primary data through Key Informant Interviews, focus group discussions and meetings with the reference group. The evaluation also benefitted from discussions with programme staff both at UNDP and at Ministry of Finance.

## 2.3 Data collection and analysis

Data and information was collected from relevant sources through desk review and was followed up with individual and focus group interviews, with triangulation where it is necessary to do so. A series of meetings were convened with selected UN management and programme staff. One on one interviews were conducted with representatives of key stakeholders from UN agencies, government ministries, District Councils, academia and CSOs. The information was triangulated with different stakeholders, to validate the data generated.

Focus group discussions were conducted with selected stakeholders and this assisted in collecting information that was already validated by a group of stakeholders present at the discussion. This information was triangulated with information from the other data sources.

Data analysis comprised analysis of all kinds of quantitative information and quantitative data from relevant documents collected from UNDP and implementing agencies. The qualitative information collected through interviews and focus group discussion was coded based on thematic areas and analysed.

## **2.4 Performance and ethical standards**

While efforts were made to make the evaluation participatory, the evaluation team maintained independence and objectivity, in line with the UNDP Evaluation standards, guidelines and ethical standards.

## **2.5 Limitations**

First and foremost, there are substantial data gaps in Malawi, with many of the indicators being not up-to-date for progress tracking. The visibility of DEAP in the various sectors involved in implementation of the Action has tended to be low. Some informants struggled to remember the activities and issues covered by the DEAP either because they had no records or because they were not personally involved with the programme. This was especially true for the people interviewed at the district level whose responses were not pinpointed at the programme interventions because they did not interact with relevant DEAP components to the extent that is desirable. The evaluation takes into account the timing of the assignment and the need to focus on realisation of the outcomes.

## **Country Context and Background**

The UN has been implementing programmes in Malawi using 5-year programming cycles. Under its 2007 to 2011 programming cycle, the UN implemented three projects namely: i) Development Assistance Coordination Unit (DACU) that aimed building capacity for aid management and coordination; ii) Joint Support for Strengthening Monitoring and Evaluation (JSFSM&E) that aimed at developing capacity and M&E infrastructure for evidence based decision making and programming and ; iii) MGDS based planning and budgeting which was a UNDP corporate level assistance to countries on how to operationalize and implement the MGDs (in Malawi the focus was on MGDS).

Due to some reasons, the implementation of the JSFSM&E went into the UN's subsequent programming cycle (2012 - 2016). This affected the start of the next

development support which instead of starting in 2012 started a year later. The DEAP was formulated as a successor development support to the three projects that were implemented in the 2007 – 2011 and it took on a programme approach by combining all the three project intervention areas of its predecessor projects which became output areas in the new DEAP.

In this regard, starting in 2013, the Malawi Government implemented DEAP which was a joint programme by the UN family and the Delegation of European Union. The DEAP aimed at strengthening institutional capacity for development effectiveness and accountability and centered on entrenching the culture of accountability for effective use of public resources and achievement of results in public institutions. The programme responded to UNDAF 2012 – 2016 and MGDS 2011 – 2016 that identified improved development effectiveness and improved good governance respectively as priority areas that needed interventions over their respective programming periods. The programme strategy to enhance development effectiveness was through capacity building in the central government to improve systems, tools and mechanisms for national policy formulation, development planning and management, monitoring and evaluation, reporting and accountability for results.

Specifically, the DEAP supported; i) entrenchment of utilization of Results-Based Management in planning, monitoring and evaluation of public development initiatives ii) building capacity for aligning policies, programmes and budgets to national strategies for effective allocation of resources and iii) enhancing capacity to effectively negotiate, manage and account for development assistance.

The programme was supposed to end in 2016 but was extended for an additional year to give time to some activities to be implemented.

For a long time, the Malawi economy has depended on aid from its development partners which accounted to approximately 40 per cent of the national budget - up to the year 2013. The scandal nicknamed “Cashgate” where massive amounts of money were stolen from government coffers changed the development aid architecture and landscape with many development partners stopping direct support to the national budget preferring to use other means including funding through NGOs. This reduced the general amount of resources available to the government for development and service delivery. This reinforced the need and relevance for capacity building both in terms of knowledge and skills and systems to enhance accountability and effective resource utilisation with evidence generation and use being central to this.

The DEAP focuses on development planning, aid coordination and actual service delivery that achieve desired results evidenced through M&E.



## **The DEAP as a UN Response to Development Structural Weaknesses**

DEAP actually supports implementation of the government mandate so that it focuses and achieves results and improves service delivery through effective management and use of limited resources at its disposal. The DEAP formulation took cognizant of the Public Finance and Economic Management – Reform Programme (PFEM RP) whose structure and institution set-up had already been conceptualized and already set at that time. The DEAP focused on three of the 10 components of the PFEM and wanted to use the structures and its control in the implementation of the programme. At operational level there was deliberate attempt to work together with the PFEM, however the bigger PFEM PR agenda did not materialise and the envisaged institution structures did not work and DEAP therefore was never able to use the PFEM structures and control.

In addition, the formation of DEAP as a joint programme was also based on the international commitments on aid and development effectiveness that the GoM is a part of, such as; the Paris Declaration on Aid effectiveness; the Accra Agenda for Action; and Busan partnership for effective Development Cooperation. In Busan, national governments and cooperating partners reached an agreement to form a new, more inclusive Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation and shift the focus of aid effectiveness towards development effectiveness.

DEAP is based on a number of key assumptions, which needed to be met for the programme to realize its objectives. In the theory of change, the key assumptions are stated as follows:

- i. Commitment by government to ownership and leadership to Common Approach to Budget Support (CABS), sector-wide approaches (SWAP) and to result-based management;
- ii. Government commitment to efficient achievement of MGDS II ‘priorities of priorities’ and turnaround strategies;
- iii. Government commitment to reporting on utilization of development assistance;

Government leadership and commitment has been demonstrated to a large extent in many strategic areas such as Aid Negotiations and Aid Management, with support to effective development cooperation provided. There is also a good indication that Government is committed to key processes such as CABS and the entire DEAP process. Government has demonstrated commitment to the MGDS II. However, between 2011 – 2015, the implementation of the national growth and development strategy was faced with a number of challenges which are linked to design level constraints and a number of factors which were clearly stated in the 2015 comprehensive review of the MGDS II. High staff turnover in the public sector and availability of stable high quality personnel has also affected the effectiveness of key

interventions in Government service. The risks associated with the staffing situation in the public sector have been real and partly explains the degree of achievements under the DEAP.

The joint Programme was also based on the UN principle of “**Delivering as One**”.

In response to the structural and operational challenges in the national development planning and programming including service delivery, the DEAP aimed at addressing the following weaknesses:

### **3.1.1 MGDS II prioritisation**

The MGDS II presented a comprehensive picture of the many challenges and issues facing the country and given the limited resources, there was need to prioritise and focus on results that will accelerate economic development and address social problems to leapfrog the economy into transformation. This therefore required that there should be adequate analysis and prioritisation of the Malawi’s development focus and programmes in line with the available resource envelope.

### **3.1.2 Gender, human rights and pro-poor focus in programme planning and implementation**

Despite the 2010/11 integrated Household Survey (HIS) reported slight decline in incidence of poverty, from 52.4 per cent to 50.7 per cent, extreme poverty continued to worsen and income remained unevenly distributed reflecting inequalities in the access to assets, services and opportunities across the population. Poverty rates among female-headed households were significantly higher than male-headed households. The use of tools that bring pro-poor focus and a gender and human rights perspective to programme planning and implementation was limited. The underlying challenge was that overall, gender equality dimensions were not well mainstreamed in the implementation of various key components and sub-components of DEAP. The reasons are partly to do with lack of human resources capacity and lack of demonstrable commitment in the public sector hierarchy.

### **3.1.3 Weaknesses of aligning policies, programmes and budget**

The credibility of the budget was undermined by the weak links between the MTEF, Public Sector Investment Programme (PSIP) and the MGDS planning process. This led to ineffective use of development resources and non-alignment of programmes and budgets to national priority interventions.

### **3.1.4 Weak capacities for results oriented planning, M&E and reporting**

The planning and policy analysis in Malawi was not straight forward and could be termed as disjointed and weak. The main responsibility for this function lied within

the Planning and Development Division of the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development which now under Ministry of Finance. The following challenges and weaknesses needed to be addressed to have a modern and functioning planning and policy analysis:

- i. Strategic planning often was undertaken without linking it to the available resources
- ii. Policy Analysis work was not always undertaken and utilised for decision making
- iii. There was need to improve the quality of public investment through focused and properly appraised public investment based on improved use of investment analysis linked to the medium term budgeting framework
- iv. The capacity to develop improved macroeconomic forecasting was weak-strengthening this function is crucial as the Government moves forward with a number of critical reforms.
- v. Non-inclusive and non-participatory planning processes have left out key players and stakeholders in the economy thereby compromising on the ownership and contribution of the larger members of the society.

In addition, the M&E framework necessitate establishment of appropriate institutional capacities and incentives to motivate both the supply of and the demand for solid evidence to inform public decision making; developing managerial and technical capacities to ensure the application of robust methodology; and developing a result oriented public sector culture that embeds the effective use of M&E within the broader purpose of generating credible evidence to enhance understanding and support decisions for development results.

Results-based management (RBM) practices had not yet permeated throughout the planning, budgeting and M&E systems in Malawian public institutions. The planning, budgeting and M&E functions were said to be not aligned, with the need to promote a culture of performance in the public service based on agreed results.

Little attention was paid to evaluation and more specifically to the evaluation of national development projects, programmes and policies. Up-to date data was not always reliable and there were inconsistencies in the data that was collected using different tools and methods which made comparison over time and space very difficult.

### **The DEAP**

The UNDAF Action Plan which was formulated to operationalize the UNDAF outcome defined four outputs which were contributing to the outcome 4.2, namely; Public Institutions are better equipped to manage, allocate and utilize resources for effective development and service delivery by 2016. DEAP is the sole contributor for output 4.2.2, 4.2.3 and 4.2.4.

Output 4.2.1:	Capacity for public sector management strengthened for effective service delivery
Output 4.2.2	National Institutions utilize RBM systems for planning, monitoring and evaluation to enhance ownership and leadership for achievement of development results
Output 4.2.3	Government has sufficient capacity to effectively negotiate, manage and account for development assistance
Output 4.2.4	National Institutions have the capacity to align policies, programmes and budgets with national development strategies and MDGs for efficient achievement of development results.

The key beneficiaries of the DEAP Joint Programme are institutional stakeholders, policy makers, civil servants, non-state actors and service providers. The key secondary beneficiaries were said to be the larger Malawian population who were expected to benefit from effective and quality driven public service delivery if the programme delivered according to the plan.

As already alluded to, the joint Programme was built on the lessons learnt from the comprehensive review of the MGDS (2007 -2011), Development Assistance Strategy (DAS), and final evaluation of three previous project evaluations namely: MDG-based Planning and Costing, Joint Programme Support for Strengthening Monitoring and Evaluation (JPSME) and Development Assistance Coordination (DACU) project.

UNDP is the biggest UN agency contributor to DEAP which has the following outputs which except for output 4, are also UNDAF outputs:

**Output 1:** National Institutions utilise RBM systems for planning, monitoring and evaluation to enhance ownership and leadership for achievement of development results.

**Output 2:** National institutions have the capacity to align policies, programmes and budgets with national development strategies and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for efficient achievement of development results

**Output 3:** Government has sufficient capacity to effectively negotiate, manage and account for development assistance

#### **Output 4: Effective project management services delivered**

The joint Programme started to be implemented in earnest in 2013 due to the programming cycle overlap of the JPSM&E which went into the 2012 -2016 programming cycle from the 2007 -2011 programming cycle. The three main components of the programme were implemented by Ministry of Finance Budget Section and Debt and Aid Department and Economic Planning and Development. The Economic Planning and Development department is championing the institutionalisation of the RBM, alignment of policies, programmes and budgets with national development strategies and MDGs and the Budget Section in Ministry of Finance is championing the programme based budgeting while the Debt and Aid Management Department is implementing the third component i.e. negotiating and managing development assistance. The scope for each of the DEAP output are outlined below:

#### **Output 1: National Institutions Utilise the RBM Systems for planning, monitoring and evaluation to enhance ownership and leadership for achievement of development results.**

The output is intended to promote and institutionalize RBM systems in the ministries and at district level as a means for enhancing ownership and leadership for achievement of development results. It provides support to establish sustainable training for RBM, MGDS/MDG planning and costing and Human Rights Based Approaches (HRBA) in University of Malawi, Bunda College, Malawi Institute of Management (MIM) and Staff Development Institute. Support is also provided for training managers and planning, debt and aid, budget and M&E officers in OPC, ministries and district RBM, HRBA, MGDS/MDG-based planning and costing and links to budgeting.

Other activities funded under this output is aimed at improving the capacity of MEPD to undertake MGDS annual reviews and the OPC Performance Enforcement Department (PED) to assess performance and accountability for results.

A key element of the support under this output focused at upgrading the M&E architecture in order to secure its integrity and development relevance. The aim of the intervention in this area was to strengthen impact monitoring focusing on results and mechanism for coordinating M&E initiatives at the national, sector and district levels. The support specifically was aimed at implementing activities that would ensure improved quality of development data and improved data flow from district to sector ministries and between ministries and between sectors to the central ministries.

It was believed that there will be gradual development of skills among the national institutions in RBM, MGDS/MDG-based planning and budgeting, HRBA, and policy analysis. As Management systems for planning and M&E become more result oriented, it was expected that MGDS implementation would embed a culture of greater learning and adjustment in the decision-making in service of development effectiveness.

**Output 2: National Institutions have the capacity to align policies, programmes and budgets with national development strategies and MDGs for efficient achievement of development results.**

The support under this output is geared towards improving alignment of policies, programmes and budgets with national development strategy and MDGs on the basis of comprehensive RBM Manual agreed with all stakeholders. The Joint programme planned to support at least 10 districts and 5 sectors to practically apply the RBM practices and undertake sector, respectively district review and planning process. It was envisaged that selected government agencies would receive technical and organizational support during the process of institutionalizing RBM.

Another set of activities under this output is supporting the SWG management process including; i) periodically reviewing SWG functionality and updating SWG guidelines ii) setting up a calendar and reporting mechanism for SWG meetings iii) supporting ministries in launching SWG iv) organizing joint learning events for members of the SWGs in relevant technical areas such as SWAs/PBAs, national debt and aid policy and strategy requirements v) organize joint discussions between sectors to ensure coherence of sector planning processes and alignment with national priorities.

**Output 3: Government has sufficient capacity to effectively negotiate. Manage and account for development assistance**

This output intended to implement activities that complement activities that complement the first two outputs but focusing specifically on strengthening the coordination role of the Debt and Aid Division (DAD) under ministry of Finance. The focus is on the provision of capacity building support for strengthening debt and aid management functions, and aid and debt policy and strategy formulation, improved preparations for Common Approach to Budget Support (CABS) group meetings and High Level Forum (HLF) dialogue and stakeholder engagement, sensitization and education activities targeting broad range of actors. Some of the expected results were the finalization and dissemination of debt and aid management policies and development of the development cooperation strategy for the period of 2012 – 2016 and functional Aid Management Platform and CD-DRMS system that will allow better integration of donor partners flow into the budget and the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF).

The support to preparation of CABS review meetings aimed at enabling the central and line ministries to play a stronger leadership role in aid dialogue in order to strengthen Government and DPs' mutual accountability for results of development cooperation.

Sensitization and education activities for all the stakeholders including the civil society, academia and private sector was aimed at creating support for implementation of country level Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation commitments on inclusive country ownership and greater transparency and accountability for the use of development resources.

### **3.2 DEAP as part of the public financial management reform**

The Public Finance and Economic Reform Management (PFEM) Reform Programme (RP) had 10 components including Planning and resource mobilization. However, funding through the World Bank executed Multi-Donor Trust Fund only financed 3 out of 10 components. The DEAP therefore was one such programme that came in to complement the efforts in the implementation of PFEM RP. The DEAP complemented the implementation of the RP by providing funding to some of the components including planning, resource mobilization and monitoring and evaluation.

### **3.3 Participating agencies and their roles**

Apart from the UN agencies the Delegation of European Union participated in the Joint programme. The initial conceptualization had the following agencies: UNDP, UNAIDS, UNICEF and UNFPA. UNDP is the coordinating agency for the programme and it committed to supporting the RBM, alignment and aid management and coordination aiming at achieving output 1-3 of the joint programme.

UNICEF committed to supporting the MASEDA and improving data collection and statistics including development of the district data base. UNICEF also committed to supporting training activities and practical roll out of RBM to selected sectors and districts, as well as implementation of MGDS review and public expenditure tracking.

UNAIDS committed to supporting MASEDA, RBM, HRBA, MGDS/MGD-based planning and costing training and the roll out of the RBM practices to selected sectors and districts.

UNFPA committed to support MASEDA and also provision of training in RBM, HRBA, MGDS/MDG-based planning and costing and the roll out of RBM practices to selected districts and sectors.

EU support is for all DEAP interventions i.e. entrenchment RBM, PBB, strengthening M&E and support to National Statistics Strategy training in statistics, the roll out of RBM to selected sector ministries and the district council. The European Union (EU) also provided support for performance assessments and development of performance contracts under the PED.

### **3.4 Gender Mainstreaming**

The joint plan aims to ensuring that capacities are built to mainstream gender in planning, implementation and M&E of development services. The joint plan specifically focused at ensuring that participatory and evidence based MGDS/MDG-based planning and reporting is gender sensitive. The programme envisaged to provide guidelines for collection and analysis of gender disaggregated data and for incorporating gender, HIV and AIDS and HR issues in national, sector and district planning processes and in budget preparation process. The guidelines were expected to be incorporated in the RBM manual and informed through a survey of result-based and gender sensitive M&E reporting capacity across all MDAs and district councils.

The programme plan was to seek to encourage women's organisations participation in aid and development effectiveness agenda and mechanisms for dialogue.

### **3.5 Sustainability of Results**

DEAP was very optimistic that the programme results will be sustainable based on the fact that there was strong commitment from the government given that the DEAP's objectives and strategies were consistent with arrangements for MGDS programming and PFEM RP implementation. Activities under the JP were going to strengthen the capacities of the institutions to fulfill their mandate effectively. The programme was therefore going to develop skills and transfer knowledge to key staff in the beneficiary institutions as well as development of systems, guidelines and tools for effective development service delivery.

The DEAP was going to develop capacity in the public teaching and learning institutions including Malawi Institute of Management, Mpemba Staff Development Institute and the University of Malawi to deliver RBM, MGDS/MDG-based planning and costing and HRBA training to ensure many staff from different public sector institutions are trained to perpetuate the systems for results. The JP aimed at promoting development of curriculum for use by learning institutions in their regular training programmes. The programme was also open to come up with innovative arrangements to fully develop capacities of these learning institutions and subsequently engaging them to provide tailor made training services for public sector personnel.



Table 1 shows a Theory of Change/Logic Model Analytical Framework for focus area 1, Development Effectiveness and Accountability (DEAP)

Table 1: Theory of Change/Logic Model Analytical Framework, Development Effectiveness and Accountability				
Situation Analysis	Goal	Outputs/Indicators	Outcomes - Impact	Key Assumptions, Risks and Barriers
<i>Inadequate pro-poor orientation, gender and human rights perspective in programme planning and implementation; Weaknesses of aligning policies, programmes and budgets; Lack of results oriented planning, M &amp; E and reporting; Withdrawal of development partners' contribution from budget support, making the case for managing more efficiently and effectively limited public resources stronger.</i>	Development challenge	<b>Outputs - UNDAF (linked, but specific)</b>	<b>Short, Medium and Long-term</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>
	Weak institutional capacity for development effectiveness and accountability management - inaction on critical decisions required to turnaround a 'business as usual' approach to managing change	<p>Use of RBM for planning and M &amp; E (see indicators, template; overall indicators defined well, but need further scrutiny)</p> <p>Gvt capacity to effectively negotiate, manage and account for development assistance under spotlight (refer to indicators template)</p> <p>National institutions capacity to align policies, programmes and budgets with national strategies and MGDS II for efficient achievement of development results (refer to indicators template);</p> <p>Capacity of the state (central government) to respond positively to unforeseen developments/events; such as donor withdrawal to budget support, with a repositioning for substantial</p>	<p><u>Short-term:</u> Government able to initiate new urgent turnaround measures to manage and account for utilization of resources more effectively;</p> <p><u>Medium/Long-Term</u> <u>Improved utilization</u> of RBM by national institutions for planning, monitoring and evaluation to enhance ownership and leadership for attainment of development results;</p> <p><u>Sufficient capacity</u> of government to negotiate, manage and account for development assistance, effectively</p> <p><u>Improved capacity</u> to align policies, programmes and budgets with national strategies</p>	<p>Commitment by government ownership and leadership to CABS and SWAP process</p> <p>Government commitment to reporting on utilization of development assistance;</p> <p>Government commitment to efficient achievement of MGDS II 'priorities' and turnaround strategies;</p> <p><b>Risks</b></p> <p>High turnover of skilled staff in government;</p> <p>Insufficient resources to implement MGDS II and in developing successor strategy, to</p>

			<i>transformation in the way of doing business by the public sector.</i>	and MGDS II to achieve development outcomes	focus on 'priorities of priorities', lessons learnt in MGDS II taken into account for MGDS II.
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The theory of change for the programme is good and its causal links are sound. The programme design is sound and exhibit potential for increasing national development effectiveness. The DEAP logical framework has been adaptable throughout the implementation of the programme and has managed to shed off some outputs and activities that were seen not to be relevant as time went and took on board some activities and outputs based on emerging realities.

The design of the programme made a few assumptions and the following assumptions were not spelt out:

*i. Commitment to prudent financial management and accountability*

The programme was formulated with an assumption that public officials were accountable and had integrity in as far as accounting for financial resources was concerned. This assumption was put to the test in 2013 when massive amounts of money were looted by public officials in a scandal codenamed 'Cashgate'. The scandal prompted donors to withhold their support and limit their budgetary support. This affected budgets and the amount of resources for many MDAs and led to compromised service delivery in the public sector. The DEAP would have had a ride on implementation of development interventions that were well resourced. The implementation of the DEAP therefore was also affected because donors have become strict and reduced amount of money available to the government and its agencies for implementation of their mandates. For example, at the district level due to low funding levels, it was said that the M&E function gets very little resources.

*ii. DSA Versus full board*

At the time the DEAP was developed there was a tacit assumption that government staff will be getting allowances as was the case at the time. However, things changed and full board was introduced – meaning that the public officers were supposed to be given full board (accommodation and food) when they go out of their duty station. The Evaluation of the trainings that included RBM training for public officials and implementing partners revealed that attendance and participation to RBM trainings and workshops in terms of numbers and rank of official was affected as public officials protested the system of giving them full board.

#### **4. Findings**

The findings are organized and discussed around the outputs as laid out in the programme design. Under each output there are different interventions that were implemented for achievement of the results on the said output. It should be mentioned, however that the DEAP intervention logical was adjusted over time and some interventions were added during the course of implementation while some activities were taken out based on emerging realities. The programme design and implementation

was flexible enough to accommodate emerging issues. In this regard, the discussion on achievements of results will focus on both original output areas and those that were taken on board in the course of implementing the programme for a complete picture of what has been achieved so far. In order to be exhaustive and complete the picture, the evaluation discusses all the activities and interventions in the approved DEAP annual work plans to date.

**Output 1: National Institutions Utilise the RBM Systems for planning, monitoring and evaluation to enhance ownership and leadership for achievement of development results.**

**Evaluation Question 1:** To what extent has the joint programme institutionalized utilization of RBM systems for planning, monitoring and evaluation as a way of enhancing ownership and leadership for achieving development results?

The following activities were supposed to be implemented under output 1:

<b>1.1</b>	<b><i>RBM capacity and practice:</i></b>
(i)	Developed a comprehensive RBM training manual with HRBA principles, MGDS/MGD-based planning and budgeting and guidelines for mainstreaming gender;
(ii)	Development capacity of learning and training institutions in RBM and signed MOU for delivering training in RBM;
(iv)	Undertook training on policy and impact evaluations
(v)	Piloted of RBM application in selected districts and line ministries.

**Achievements**

Capacity Development for RBM and RBM Practice					
Output Indicators	Baseline	2016 Status	Target 2016	Project Term Target	Remarks
<b>No. of public institutions practicing RBM</b>	0 (2010);	4 institutions (Gender, NAO, EPD and MITC)	12	16	The target is likely to be achieved by 2017
<b>Number of staff in ministries and districts trained in RBM tools</b>	56 at district level; -25 in line ministries	110 oriented in RBM and at district level and 41 trained at central ministry level	-448 at district level; -200 at central level and in line ministries (2016)	800 at district level; 260 at central level and in line ministries	Unless some drastic measures are taken, it is unlikely that the target will be achieved by the end of the programme in 2017

Number of staff in learning and training institutions who have RBM skills and knowledge and are delivering RBM training	4	7 officers (3 MIM and 4 Polytechnic)	30: (2016)	30	Unlikely to hit target. Two officers at MIM left
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## 4.1 Results-Based Management

### 4.1.1 Institutionalization of RBM in the public sector

#### *Development of RBM Manual and Capacity for Learning and Teaching Institutions*

Two RBM manuals were developed with the support from DEAP. The first manual was the RBM training manual which was developed through a consultative process with the Polytechnic taking the lead. The RBM training manual is good and when used for training, it supported the training process very well because it has all the ingredients of the training manual as well as RBM principles and requirements. In essence therefore, the training manual is said to be effective.

The second manual supported by DEAP was Practical Results-Based Management (RBM) users Handbook that was developed for EP&D by a consultant. The Manual gives a run through of the RBM principles and practices and signposts users to the requirements for incorporating RBM into the strategic documents of the public sector organisations. The manual runs down step by step requirements for incorporating RBM principles and practices in the organization. This manual briefly describes the requirements for mainstreaming cross cutting issues of gender, HIV and human rights. One weakness of the manual is that it does not give practical examples or instructions on how to do it. Nevertheless, the manual has proved to be useful to the users in rolling out RBM in line ministries and district councils. This manual is said to be effective.

#### *Support for RBM Capacity Development in Training Institutions*

DEAP supported capacity building for learning and training institutions for them to deliver RBM training to the public sector. The training provided to the institutions was adequate and these training institutions were empowered and were able to train officers in the line ministries and the district councils in RBM.

Over time however, the trained staff for example, from MIM have moved on and there is currently no more capacity at MIM to train the public sector in RBM. This indicates that there were no sustainability mechanisms put in place to perpetuate MIM's capacity in RBM beyond the training of the initial trainers and indeed beyond the joint programme.

#### *Training Public Sector Officials in RBM*

Using the RBM training manual discussed above, the Polytechnic with DEAP support organised training for officials in the public sector including the district councils. Impact evaluation of the training conducted by HACT in March 2016 revealed that the impact of the training was constrained because the people that attended the training were not of the right calibre. Discussions with the people that attended the RBM training revealed that they were using the RBM skills and knowledge in general but were not able to use it for incorporating or influencing the incorporation RBM in the strategic processes and documents of their organisations because of their non-involvement in such due to their lower ranks. The evaluation concluded that “A key lesson learned is that training alone cannot bring about required changes if the general accountability environment and culture as well as the commitment from the very high management levels of IP organisations do not promote change. This is exemplified by non-attendance of most senior managers from the IPs in the training sessions”<sup>3</sup> including RBM training sessions. One central tenets of institutionalizing RBM in an organization is securing buy-in at all levels in an organization starting with the senior managers.

One issue that is said to have affected the attendance to RBM training was the issue of giving the participants full board instead of allowances (DSA). The trainers intimated that when they started the training, there was good attendance in terms of numbers as well as the high rank of the people from invited organisations– at that time people were getting DSA when they attended these trainings. Subsequently when the allowance had been removed and replaced with full board, the attendance was reduced in terms of numbers and rank meaning those that attended were junior officers.

This issues discussed above limited the effectiveness of the RBM training and their knock on effect on institutionalizing RBM in the implementing partner organisations.

### **Training for Senior Managers**

When training was organised for senior managers in Government office, the training failed to take place because the senior managers were unwilling to attend the training despite reducing the period of the training and changing the venue to a lake resort. Considering that it is a requirement for integrating RBM principles into the strategic documents for the RBM to meaningfully take root in the public sector, it was a lost opportunity for the senior managers to appreciate RBM and therefore provide leadership and direction on embedding RBM into their organisational strategic processes and documents.

### **Roll-out of RBM to Ministries and District Councils**

The full roll-out of RBM application in selected districts and line ministries as part of institutionalizing RBM was undertaken and this involved practical and focused orientation and training on how to actually to incorporate RBM principles in the concerned institution’s strategic plans, policies, budgets and other documents using the

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<sup>3</sup> Impact evaluation of past HACT training workshops in Malawi, Final Evaluation Report, March 2016

RBM manual developed for the purpose as mentioned earlier on. This was supposed to build on the training that already equipped the officers with RBM knowledge, skills and principles.

This is work in progress and the full impact of these preparatory activities will be realised after the ministries and districts start to develop their strategic plans and district development plans, respectively, in tandem with the new NDS.

It should be said however, that adoption of RBM requires serious change of mind-set among the public development practitioners starting from (Strategic) planners, implementers and the M&E personnel so that planning is result focused, implementation of intervention is result focused and monitoring and evaluation exercises are result focused. Mind-set change takes longer because it involves behaviour change and therefore, this area requires longer time and more investment (than what has been done so far) for it to yield meaningful desired results.

Institutionalising RBM in the public sector requires substantial investment and unwavering and sustained effort in capacity building and training in RBM principles accompanied with overhaul of bad habits in public officials in favour of new progressive approaches. It would be wishful thinking that with an orientation and a training of officers in RBM then the MDAs will take on RBM as a framework for planning, managing implementation and M&E. Capacity building and technical support plus continuous provision of direction from management at a minimum is required to ensure adoption and use RBM in the public institutions.

RBM is a management strategy for ensuring that organisational processes and activities focus on achieving results and leadership is very key for an organisation to adopt the strategy. Without buy in from the leadership in the public sector it will be difficult to institutionalise RBM.

EP&D has to move fast in order to tie-up/consolidate the achievements and efforts that have been implemented so far. Public sector institutions and their respective leadership should first appreciate the role RBM and M&E so that they commit the right personnel and adequate resources to this function at the headquarters and at district level.

### **Rating/Scoring**

The performance in area has been slow and the evaluation team scored it as **Partially Achieved** because the systems and processes have been done however, the changes that were expected (all documents processes take on RBM) not yet materialized due to constraints as discussed in this evaluation.

## 4.2 Strengthening M&E System At All Levels

With support from DEAP a series of activities were undertaken by EP&D to strengthen the M&E system in MDAs in Malawi including the district councils.

### *Strengthening M&E System*

Output Indicators	Baseline	2016 Status	Target 2016	Project Target	Remarks
% of Ministries with functional M&E systems.	60% (2010)	70% Ministries have M&E frameworks (3 more working on the M&E Frameworks)	90% (2016);	90%	Likely to achieved the target
% of district councils with functional M&E systems	20% (2012)	40% (11 District Councils have M&E frameworks and 16 with working District M&E coordination Committees)	80% (2016);	80%	Not likely to achieve target by the end of the programme next year. The M&E Coordination committees failing to function properly due to lack of resources

EP&D undertook training for various districts and the training was among others in M&E principles and concepts, data collection and analysis and setting up M&E frameworks. EP&D is currently championing the setting up of a web-based Integrated Performance Management Information System (IPMIS) and a prototype has been already uploaded on Government Wide network (GWAN) for trial run and comments. At the time of the evaluation, the IPMIS was not yet functional and therefore it is work in progress. The district councils are looking forward to the time the IPMIS will be functional and up and running considering that at the moment everything is done manually. The IPMIS is expected to fill the gap that the non-functional data base has created in the district councils.

### *Strengthening District Level M&E*

The larger plan in the M&E area was to strengthen and revamp the M&E structure that was built in the district council through the DEAP predecessor programmes – however, the evaluation discovered that while there is some M&E infrastructure and capacity existing at the district council level the functionality of such is limited due to resources constraints and the fact that the district data base that was built through the preceding efforts were not functional.

The other area that the DEAP supported strengthening of M&E was to establish district M&E coordination committees that would ensure that the all the sectors at the district level were involved in M&E at that level and that they were able to generate data, feed the district M&E officer and use it for decisions and programming at that level. In much as the DMEC have been set up in the districts, their functionality is limited due to lack of



resources. The functionality of the DMEC is further affected because of lack the right personnel with the right skills and right positions in most of the sectors at district level with the exception of Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education. The DMEC has big potential for increasing uptake and improving the quality of M&E at district council level.

The key informants that the evaluation team consulted at the district councils intimated that there is limited demand for M&E information for decision making and programming for the sectors at district level. This finding reinforces the finding in the study of State of M&E in Malawi that was conducted in 2014.<sup>4</sup> The M&E office at the district council is more geared towards getting information for onward transmission to EP&D and Ministry of Local Government. EP&D intimated to the evaluation team that of appreciation of the M&E function and lack of demand for the M&E information that is collected affects the District M&E officers' zeal to collect, process and disseminate the M&E information for consumption at the district level and instead do it as a requirement at the central government.

In the course of consultations one M&E officer confessed that he was discouraged as many of his M&E colleagues were, due to the fact that they never get feedback on the M&E reports they send to EP&D. He went further to give an example where one of his colleagues from one of the district councils actually deliberately sent the same report for two months and never got feedback from EP&D which made the district M&E officer to concluded that EP&D does not even look at the district M&E reports. As much as it is important to send the M&E reports to EP&D, the primary consumer for the district council M&E data should be the district councils themselves. The ideal situation is that the district sector line managers should be at the forefront of demanding for M&E information for programming and decision making at that level and the sending of a copy to EP&D should be a secondary consideration.

There is no budget to run the M&E at the district level and the M&E function mainly runs using resources from projects that are available at that level. This, therefore, means that the district M&E cannot be focused on their functions. In Zomba the evaluation team was informed that many times the internet is erratic and the office goes 2-3 months without paying for the internet. This state of affairs reduces the effectiveness and efficiency of the district M&E function.

Following recommendation of the study on the State of M&E in Malawi, the National M&E Coordination Committee has been established to guide and coordinate M&E initiatives in the country. The committee is new and is yet to start operating and making impact on the national M&E situation. An M&E policy is in the offing and it is hoped that

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<sup>4</sup> State of M&E in Malawi, A Report to Put Monitoring and Evaluation in The Driving Seat of Malawi's Development Agenda

with its development M&E will be improved as it will have the required framework and mandate.

EP&D reported that 40 per cent compared to 80 per cent target of district councils have M&E frameworks. The evaluation team followed up to assess the functionality of the M&E frameworks for the district councils and based on the DEAP present criteria for functionality it was found out that the M&E frameworks were actually functional and generating the required reports.

### Rating and Scoring

The programme has **Partially Achieved** the results in this indicator area because a considerable effort have been exerted and some targets have been achieved. There remains a lot of effort and interventions required to be completed for the programme to fully achieve the planned results.

### 4.3 National Statistical System Strategic Plan and Use of Statistics

This intervention was not in the original DEAP programme result areas however the DEAP took it on in the process of implementation.

Output Indicators	Baseline	2016 Status	Target 2016	Project Target	Remarks
<b>National Statistics Strategic Plan Supported</b>	None	Supported the NSO Strategic Plan	All Surveys	All Surveys	Supported
<b>Chancellor College running a Diploma Course</b>	None	Diploma Course Materials Developed and a Diploma Course Running at Chancoll	I course running for 25 statistical personnel	25 statistical personnel	Diploma Course running for two years for statistical personnel. The intention is to institutionalize this course at Chancoll
<b>Quality Framework for statistics</b>	None	11 ministries	11 ministries	-	NSO intends to do as many as can be supported

The joint programme supported the implementation of the National Statistical System Strategic Plan. DEAP (with UNICEF funding) supported the implementation of the

periodic surveys that were planned under the NSO Strategic Plan for 2012 – 2016 and it was used as a means for mobilising financial resources and technical assistance from development partners for periodic surveys as well. UNICEF was mentioned to have been very instrumental in supporting the various activities that were off programme and off budget for NSO.

The NSO with support from DEAP was also able to roll out quality assurance framework for statistics in 11 ministries.

Another milestone for DEAP has been the support that was given to the development of a diploma in statistics at Chancellor College in Zomba where DEAP resources were used to develop the curriculum and the teaching and learning materials for the initially two years now 3-year diploma programme in statistics. As mentioned above, this activity was not part of the original DEAP plan – however DEAP flexibility ensured that the activity was accommodated. The diploma course is targeting to benefit in service statistical officers, lower level cadres, initially providing 20 of them with a scholarship to cover two years of training. The programme is however open to outsiders paying students. The support from DEAP will be for the first cohort, however NSO were of the view that the support should be for minimum, two intakes by which time the course is expected to have been established enough to be run on its own at Chancellor College, as part and parcel of the courses that the college offers.

It is anticipated that the diploma course will assist to address capacity gaps in various ministries since training the lower cadres has proved to be more beneficial as they deliver for longer than the higher cadres, who are highly mobile since they become attracted to other organisations within the country and outside after they get qualified and acquire experience. There are very few lower cadre officers that have statistics qualifications and the output from this diploma course will be very crucial to development and perpetuation of a critical mass of qualified statistical personnel in the public sector and improvement in generation of quality statistics which will improve input to evidence based decision making and programming in the public sector. This is

DEAP supported NSO in collaboration with EP&D to undertake the prioritisation of the SGDs and developing of the national goals to go into the successor MGDS.

### **Rating/Scoring**

The performance rating for this indicator area is **Fully Achieved** because the programme has managed to support and achieve the targets and results.

#### **4.4 MGDS II annual; mid-term and end of term review processes supported**

The programme implemented the following interventions under this output

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>i. Undertake MGDS II Annual Reviews</li><li>ii. Produce and disseminate annual MGDS II review reports;</li><li>iii. Produce and disseminate MDGs reports.</li><li>iv. Undertake public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS) in key sectors;</li><li>v. Agree SDG Indicators and targets and produce SDG baseline report</li></ul> |
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The DEAP supported the annual MGDS II reviews and the comprehensive end of term review processes. EP&D has conducted annual MGDS II reviews from since the NDS was developed. The annual evaluation processes made recommendations based on what was actually being planned in the annual implementation of the MGDS. The end-term MGDS review process was completed in 2015 with recommendations and the results were reported to the UNGA 2016. The end-line evaluation will also inform the development of the successor NDS.

The annual MGDS reviews reports have been produced largely erratically as far as timing is concerned, leaning toward being mis-timed since they were not produced so late that they failed to inform the national budget process and resource allocation. The MGDS annual reviews availed the EPD with information for analysing the picture on funding versus priority/thematic areas in order to inform the budget framework and the PSIP. This makes the MGDS annual reviews useful and important to EP&D's sectoral and budget analysis.

However, the annual reviews were not able to go as deep as recommending adjustment to the MGDS design whereby the design weaknesses could be addressed through the annual reviews.<sup>5</sup>

#### ***Support to Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys***

The DEAP supported the public sector expenditure tracking surveys for Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education to establish if government funds and materials do indeed reach the intended beneficiaries and assess the proportion of the public funds that actually reach the frontline service provider. The PETS also aimed at assessing quality of services provided at facility levels in Health and Education Sectors. The results of the PETS are not yet out as they are being looked at internally in order to seal the gaps that were found. The effectiveness of the PETS will only be judged once the results are out but it suffices to say that the results of the PETS conducted are taking too long and in the end they will not serve much purpose as they will be outdated.

The PETS are very important and the results are supposed to inform the implementing agencies and Ministry of Finance and economic planning on how the resources allocated to MDAs are transmitted to the frontline service providers and how much or what

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<sup>5</sup> End Term MGDS II Review

proportion of resources that are budgeted and funded are actually used for the intended purpose. It is planned that if there are any issues or problems related to the use of the resources PETS will recommend that the concerned ministry should take up the issues and solve them and if the issues relate to the budget the Treasury will take up the issues and work on them.

The PETS results will be more useful if a window for advocacy based on the results was created under the DEAP advocacy to have more resources go to the areas that yield more results or benefits and advocacy to ensure that resources are used properly if misuse is identified. Since the results are not yet out, their use and the impact is yet to be seen.

### **Support for SDGs localization**

The preparatory work on SDGs has started and a Road Map for SDGs and a work plan to localise the SDGs has been done and discussed at the HLF. EPD staff have been trained and are ready to engage with line ministries to prioritize and come up with realistic targets that should be incorporated into the new NDS. This intervention is on track as it is work in progress.

In order to strengthen data analysis and reporting skills, DEAP supported training of government officials in Statistical Packages for Social Sciences (SPSS) and STATA at Chancellor College. The training was expected to develop skills and capacity for improved policy analysis and impact evaluations by public officers. It is also expected that the work on MDG End-line, MGDS Annual Reviews and Sector Policy and development of successor national strategy will directly benefit from these skills.

### **Rating/Scoring**

The score for performance in this area is Partially Achieved. The scoring has been influenced by the mixed achievements where in some interventions the performance is very good while in others the performance is very limited. The PETS results have not seen the light of day despite being conducted some time ago.

## **4.5 Performance Enforcement Department Strengthened for Results Assessment**

DEAP supported the Performance Enforcement Department of the OPC in several ways to strengthen its capacity to provide effective monitoring and performance assessments for the public sector MDAs.

### **Achieved**

<b>Output Indicators</b>	<b>Baseline</b>	<b>2016 Status</b>	<b>Target 2016</b>	<b>Project Target</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
<b>Number of institutions</b>	0 (2011)	0 (Final report wasn't done since	38 (2016)	38	Work in progress

reviewed for performance and provided with feedback.		Independent Evaluators term of office expired).			
Number of MDAs that have implemented at least 70 % of OPA recommendations	0	0 MDAs were not provided feedback on performance	75 % (2016)	75%	Work in progress

The DEAP supported the development of the performance contracts and development of the performance systems and tools for MDAs. Training on the same was undertaken. However, planned take-off was affected due to resource constraints. PED planned to have a big take-off and requested for US\$400,000 for the activities but only US\$90,000.00 was availed and therefore PED could only concentrate at central level without going downstream to the district councils and parastatals. Out of the 82 MDAs in 2016, 25 of them had signed the performance contracts and PED was training them at the time of the consultation for this evaluation.

The dependence on DEAP resources to operationalize the work of PED speaks a lot on the government commitment in the area of performance enforcement. One would only ponder the sustainability of the interventions after DEAP funding ceases. If resources were available PED are of the view that the ideal approach would have been to train all MDAs on the performance management framework before 2017.

On training the district councils on performance management, PED anticipates that it will take them longer and more effort to be able to get the councils to understand the framework. This anticipation is based on the experience that PED had with the central ministries where the central ministries were taking time and a lot of effort to understand the performance management system. The district councils will need more capacity building and with the high staff turnovers in the district councils, the situation will be much more complicated than that at central ministries.

### Rating/Scoring

The scoring for this indicator area is **Work in Progress** as PED has developed the necessary tools and systems for performance assessment. The achievements will be assessed better after the systems and tools have been effectively used for their intended purpose and achieved results.

## **Output 2: National Institutions have capacity to align policies, programmes and budgets with national development strategies and MDG for efficient achievement of development results**

**Evaluation Question 2:** To what extent has the programme assisted national institutions to acquire capacity to align policies, programmes and budgets with national development strategies and MDGs for efficient achievement of development results.

### **4.6 Support to Programme Based Budgeting**

Several activities were implemented to develop capacity of public sector institutions for them to be able to align policies, programmes and budgets with national development strategies. The following is what was achieved:

#### **Achievements**

<b>Output Indicators</b>	<b>Baseline</b>	<b>2016 Status</b>	<b>Target 2016</b>	<b>Project Target</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
Indicator 1: <b>Programme based budgeting piloted in institutions.</b>	Baseline: None (2012);	13	33	46	Will be rolled out to all Ministries for 2016/2017 budget
Indicator 2: <b>Number of functional SWGs</b>	Baseline: 6 (2012);	11	16	16	The SWG guidelines are in place. Working at the 5 that are not functional
Indicator 3: <b>National development strategy formulated through a participatory process by Dec 2015</b>	Baseline: 0	No document. But drafting team and issues paper for successor strategy in place	1	1	The issue of Establishing the Economic Commission delayed the process. Now work is progressing consultations have been undertaken
Indicator 4: <b>Sector and district plans aligned with MGDS priorities and linked to MTEF process</b>	Baseline: 0 (2011);	11 sectors have Strategic Plans though most do not synchronise with MGDS II calendar	Target: 5 sectors and 10 districts	Target: 5 sectors and 10 districts	

The PBB output area was introduced into the DEAP in 2014. Under this output area the DEAP supported the programme Based Budgeting in various ways to ensure adoption of the PBB budgeting framework by the MDAs. The activities for PBB adoption were implemented by the budget division of Ministry of finance. The Ministry (i) Training

MDAs on PBB structures, templates and performance indicators; (ii) Developing the PBB manual, templates and budget guidelines; (iii) Modifying the budget preparation software to ensure it is compatible with PBB; (iv) Sensitizing, briefing and training on PBB, Gender Responsive Budgeting and changes to the PFM Act for key stakeholders (with different target audiences such as Senior Government Officials, Budget committees in MDA, Parliamentary committees, Civil society, Local Councils).

Use of PBB means that resources are allocated to results pursued by the MDA which directly links planning and programming to achievement of meaningful development outcomes that matter and therefore contributing to results based management. The remaining MDAs will be introduced to the framework in the 2016-17 financial year which commenced July 2016. At the time of this evaluation consultation, the Budget Division was working with all MDAs to come up with their programs and the related performance indicators.

The PBB manual was developed and it is being used Treasury to train the MDAs on how to prepare PBB budgets and at the same time it is being used by the MDAs as a reference material for preparation of the PBB budgets. The manual is said to be adequate for both functions.

The MDAs that have piloted the PBB are of the view that the framework is good and will improve focus of public interventions and improve service delivery. The MDAs strongly believe that PBB is the right direction to go although they resisted it at the beginning due to lack of proper understanding. The MDAs, however, advised the evaluation that to date, nothing much had changed because the outputs and targets formulated under the PBB are almost the same as the those formulated under the previous output based budget framework. The process leading to the development of the PBB had not been very rigorous where extra thought and analysis in coming up with the targets and outputs was applied.

Treasury is of the view that it is too early to talk of the quality of the PBB budgets from the line ministries as they expect that each year the quality of such will continue to improve. The evaluation team concurs with these sentiments as PBB is new and the MDAs are likely to slowly catch onto the framework.

MDAs are of the view that Treasury and the MDAs themselves need to do a lot of work to ensure that PBB framework can be effectively instituted within the public sector. There are still a lot of capacity gaps among the heads of departments on PBB for them to effectively give direction regarding programming and allocation of resources to the

The ministries also pointed out that the PBB is not integrated with the performance management system being implemented by PED. It would make more sense if the contracts signed with PED were linked to PBB then assessment would be linked to



implementation of the allocated budget and corresponding programme results which they feel is not the case at the moment where the MDAs are assessed based on a different criterion rather than the implementation of the budget and attainment of the programme results therein.

PED should coordinate with Treasury and EP&D to design and implement assessment that would focus on meaningful results.

Another area is lack of joint planning by the MDAs that are working in related areas for them to ride on each other's efforts. For example, the Health Sector would ride on the efforts of Ministry of Water and Sanitation and Agriculture if there was joint planning and this would increase development effectiveness. While this might not have been envisaged in the current programme it is a good idea to explore this further in future. The implementation of the SDGs would greatly benefit from joint planning and programming and conscious recognition and working towards bringing synergy in the MDAs operations.

In addition, the IFMIS is not aligned to the PBB and the RBM approach which means that reporting performance will have to be done using different formats when it can be unified. The chart of accounts should be to reflect PBB as well unlike the present situation where MDAs are able to make virements at will with no major restrictions and without consideration of the results tied to the financial allocation in the budget.

The Evaluation Team (ET) is of the view that much ground has been covered on the PBB, from the pilot phase, with many lessons learnt. Those MDAs that still have reservations ought to take a leaf from the MDAs involved in pilot phase and find ways of tackling their concerns, instead of waiting for the PBB to be a self-driven process. What this means is that substantial commitment is required at both senior and middle management levels, instead of seeking 'push the clock' back. However, Treasury in collaboration with EP&D and MDAs should ensure that most of the basic issues associated with PBB (capacity is developed for those actually developing the budget, the Departments Heads are involved) are address before the MDAs can implement objective and sound PBBs.

### **Rating/Scoring**

The rating for this area is **Partially Achieved** and this scoring is on the basis of incompleteness of Treasury roll-out of PBB to all district councils. The PBB intervention came late into the DEAP and yet has made substantial mileage and by the end of the programme the PBB would have been achieved with the legal framework in place.

## **4.7 Strengthened SWG process**

The following activities were implemented to strengthen SWG processes

i. Revamping dormant SWG
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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>ii. Developing the SWG guidelines</li><li>iii. Operationalize the SWG</li><li>iv. Undertake joint learning for SWG secretariat and desk officers</li></ul> |
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The DEAP support for the strengthening of the SWG culminated into the launch of 11 SWG out of the 16 that were formalized by Government in 2008. The SWG are a development coordination mechanism for Malawi. The SWG provide a window for private sector and CSOs participation in public service planning, implementation and M&E for inclusiveness and development effectiveness.

In 2014 DEAP funded a study to review the functionality of SWG and at that time about 4-5 SWG were found to be functional at different levels. “The objective of the assignment was to review the overall performance of the Groups and to make recommendations that would improve their utilisation for development programming in Malawi.”<sup>6</sup> The report made several recommendations regarding the revamping and strengthening the functionality of the SWG in Malawi.

Based on the recommendation of the Study on SWG, to strengthen the SWG approach, Government developed the 2015 Sector Working Group Planning and Management (SPM) Guidelines to complement the 2008 Guidelines for Institutionalizing SWGs. The revised Guidelines are supposed to act as a management tool for Government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) to effectively and competently manage its operations. The guidelines also provide a framework for assisting policy makers and planners, technical experts, development partners, academia, civil society organizations, private sector and all stakeholders in any SWG with practical ways of developing a Joint Sector Strategy (JSS), its implementation, management and monitoring of its activities in a coordinated manner.

Much as the SWG have been launched and that the guidelines have been developed, it is too early to gauge their practical functionality in promoting joint sector planning and undertaking their rightful role as a mechanism for development and aid coordination for their sectors. Already it has been said that among the 11 that are functioning, their functionality is uneven. Each sector will have to work hard to ensure the functionality of their SWG and consequential TWGs.

One area that will need to be worked on is to inject new vigour in the private sector NGOs so that they get committed and take ownership in the SWG. The private sector and CSOs

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<sup>6</sup> 2014 - Review of The Functionality of Sector Working Groups in Malawi: *A Report Prepared for the Government of Malawi, Ministry of Finance Economic Planning and Development Department of Economic Planning and Development*

should get financial and logistical support to participate in the SWG otherwise expecting them to prioritise the SWG activities and spending on them over their private operations will be difficult.

For the accompanying TWGs, it will be very important that the government and development partners also support the participation of the private sector and the NGOs. The TWG will have to be seen to be taken seriously by the government and the chain of command between the TWG and the SWG should be seen to be strong otherwise the meetings will be seen as waste of time and lead to loss of interest from the stakeholders. Related to this, the SWG and the TWG meetings should be seen to be effective in conduction of their meetings to sustain interest and continued participation by the stakeholders. In this regard, the meetings should always have clear agenda and the meetings should be conducted professionally and effectively to achieve the meeting objectives set otherwise the meetings will be seen as time wasters and lead to ebbing interest among the private sector and NGOs.

The management structure for the SWG has been set up and the staff managing these have been oriented and were involved in exchange learning. The coordinating ministry staff were oriented to the SWG guidelines.

Consultations to investigate the reasons underlying the non-functionality of some of the SWG while other are working revealed a few challenges. Taking an example of the Economic Governance SWG which is deemed very important but non-functional revealed that the non-functionality for the SWG was because the coordinator of the SWG was not active and was not calling for meetings. The Secretary to the Treasury is very willing to hold and Chair the meetings, however, the meetings are not frequently called leading to the dormancy of the SWG. Since Treasury has a lot of other dialogue channels where the stakeholders that are in the SWG meet and this might have contributed to the dormancy of the SWG.

### **Rating/Scoring**

The performance score for SWG Revamping and Strengthening is **Work in Progress**. This score is based on the fact that some of the SWG revamped are yet to become active and that there are 5 SWG that are still completely dormant. The guidelines developed to date will assist to revamp the SWG and make them functional.

### **Development of Successor NDS**

A core team was instituted and Government using its resources undertaken sector consultations and a draft issues paper has been submitted to the Chief Secretary. The MGDS II review report and the draft issues paper will guide discussions and formulation of priorities for the new NDS.

The formulation of the new NDS has been delayed by the Malawi Government. Plans to institute a National Planning Commission was expected to coincide the formulation of

the NDS which would have been a progressive move for the sustainability of the MGDS II successor strategy. A bill for the formation of the Commission envisaged was drafted and it is awaiting Parliamentary enactment. The government, however, has decided to go ahead with the process so that whatever level the process reaches will be handed over to the envisaged Economic Commission when it finally gets established. If enactment of the Commission delays further, one recommendation is that the NDS should be formulated and at a later when the Commission is formed, members of the Commission would input into the new NDS through an annual review process. With the recommendations of the MGDS II review at the table, the team developing the successor NDS already has some of the necessary ingredients to develop an improved successor NDS.

Notwithstanding the idea that the envisaged National Planning Commission would develop the successor NDS, it is very important that the development of the NDS should be government led and the development partners should support the process. Government leadership is going to instill the spirit of ownership and is also going to assist in having the real Malawian vision and prioritization of development issues that matter. On the side of donors, given the spirit of government leadership and division of labour, this enables renewed confidence that the government of Malawi cares for its development and is in charge of its destiny. This also renews the momentum for the development partnership and support for the Malawian direction and a Malawian vision.

The annual reviews for the successor NDS should have a window for adjusting the NDS based on evidence and new emergent issues if required. The annual reviews for the successor NDS should allow for refocusing and fine tuning of the NDS if required.

### **Rating/Scoring**

This is **Work in Progress** until the new NDS is in place.

### **Output 3: Government has sufficient capacity to effectively negotiate, manage and account for development assistance**

**Under output 3, the focus was as follows:**

#### **Strengthened aid and debt management functions**

##### Key outputs:

- (i) Updated description of functions in DAD and staff job descriptions;
- (ii) (ii) Produce and disseminate Debt and aid reports produced and disseminated;
- (iii) (iii) Upgraded and extended access to the Aid Management Platform (AMP) and CS-DRMS systems and link them to the budget system.

## 4.8 Support to effective Development Cooperation

### Key outputs

- i. Development Cooperation Strategy (DCS) for 2012-2016 formulated; preparation and follow up to national dialogue structures (HLF, CABS, etc.) supported effectively; DCS mid-term review completed;
- ii. Reviewed, updated and disseminated Government Debt and Aid Management policies and Medium Term Debt Management Strategy in place;
- iii. Learning supported; information exchange enhanced on development effectiveness agenda for government, civil society, academia, media, Members of Parliament and private sector including South-South Cooperation and Triangular Cooperation and participation in Global Partnership and other international meetings;

DEAP supported the strengthening of the aid management functions through financing a number of activities in the Debt and Aid Division (DAD). The programme supported training of the DAD officers in monitoring and evaluation and debt management. Support was also given to production of the development cooperation atlas covering years 2012/2013 to 2014/2015; and later the 2016 development cooperation calendar and its dissemination was undertaken.

The DEAP has been found to be very useful and relevant to the DAD and has assisted the Division to undertake activities that in the absence of the programme the Division would not have done. The Evaluation Team quotes:

*“DEAP actually supported the activities that we as a division are supposed to undertake and the support assisted us and ensured that the activities were actually done which has been a big plus for the programme”.* Deputy Director, DAD.

DEAP gave technical assistance support for the development of Development Cooperation Strategy for Malawi (2014-2018). The development of the strategy was done through very consultative and inclusive approach which involved all key stakeholders. The focus of the strategy is to contribute to the improved quality and effectiveness of development cooperation and ensure support to all development partners and other stakeholders is coordinated, harmonized focused on results and aligned to national priorities, institutions and systems<sup>7</sup>. Since its development, the strategy has been guiding and will continue to guide development cooperation in Malawi up to 2018, and well beyond the DEAP period.

The Development Cooperation Strategy (DCs, 20014 -2018) identified dialogue as an important aspect of development cooperation and it therefore outlined a number of

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<sup>7</sup> Development Cooperation Strategy for Malawi 2014-2018

dialogue structures, most of which were already existing including the following: a) the High Level Forum on Development Effectiveness (HFL) a multi-stakeholder platform for dialogue on development cooperation in Malawi. Under the DCS, Malawi has the HFL in July 2015 and June 2016. Both Forums facilitated dialogue on the key burning issues that matter for Malawi's future as well as the important issue of breaking the cycle of food insecurity. It also helped Malawi prepare its messages to the 3rd International Conference on Financing for Development and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation meetings.

Through its multi-stakeholder nature, frank dialogue and amount of effort that goes into its preparations, the HFL has helped Malawi embrace the principles of development effectiveness which are ownership, inclusivity, focus on results and transparency and accountability.

DEAP also supported the development and management of the Aid Management Platform (AMP). The programme supported the paying of the user fees and technical support for the platform. The platform is web-based and all development partners have since been able to enter their support in the platform- self reporting. The system is very essential because it gives information on all aid that each development partner is investing into the Malawi economy including all aid beyond the government and off-budget. The Information on aid flows has been of particular importance to the Government in its budget formulation and review process. However, getting timely, comprehensive and forward looking information has been a challenge due to the fact differences in reporting periods and parliamentary appropriation processes in donor countries.

The AMP is a source of aid information beyond aid that is captured into the national budget. The national budget has for the past 3 years or so, contained aid that is not subjected to Parliamentary scrutiny, off budget support. It is expected that this would help parliament make informed decisions on the voted expenditure. Of course, in order to increase aid capture, aid on budget, scrutinised by parliament, Government has redefined on and off budget support.

The information is used by the Government for publishing Aid Atlas for Malawi whose primary purpose is to provide a snapshot of development cooperation activities across all sectors of the Malawi economy. This is in support of DCS and international aid transparency principles and the Atlas has been the basis for holding the Government and development partners to account for development results in different sectors. The Aid Atlas has also assisted and made it possible to know and identify donor activities by sector, modality and locations as well as depicting how fragmented aid has been in Malawi and its predictability. This knowledge has empowered government in planning

negotiating and marshaling development assistance to deserving sectors in order to balance resources equation for the different sectors.

With the launch of the AMP public portal in October 2013, information on aid flows to Malawi is now accessible to members of the general public. This is important for purposes of improving domestic accountability in Malawi. This is a milestone as far as issues of transparency and domestic accountability in development financing and management in Malawi are concerned. The AMP provides support to the pursuit of development effectiveness by giving information to all stakeholders including CSOs and private sector and the general citizenry for them to be able to follow aid flows development financing and to hold government accountable. What remains now is to generate interest among the citizens and the other development partners like CSOs so that they should be able to log into the AMP and start following developments in the aid management arena and therefore get empowered to be able to hold government accountable otherwise the effort and resources that have gone into developing and managing the public portal will be considered vain.

Treasury trained all the development partners on how to report their aid and specifically how to enter the information. The donors are confident that the AMP can be more user friendly than it is at the moment. It was said that AMP should be able to lock into the donor system so that the updating can be undertaken electronically rather than manually as it is currently done. However, one glitch is that there are many development partners with equally many systems which will potentially make it difficult for the AMP to lock into all these different systems.

### **Development Cooperation Monitoring**

The Busan agreement on Development effectiveness created structures for ensuring continued dialogue and for monitoring country development efforts. DEAP supported monitoring the Global Partnership through supporting the Malawi Ministerial chairmanship on the global partnership on effective development cooperation representing aid recipients.

In 2016, Malawi hosted the 9<sup>th</sup> Steering Committee on Global partnership which shows signs that the initiative is getting settled for the nation. All these initiatives are laying ground for effective development cooperation and ultimately effective development management that focuses on development results.

In Malawi the development cooperation dialogue structures are working and this has improved the dialogue between government and the development partners.

The Programme also sought to support the other development partners on developing their capacity to be able to follow public aid management and development processes. This has not materialized because it largely depends on the interest of these development partners. Treasury has to create awareness first and these development partners will start

to understand their role and therefore start to demand support from Treasury for them to effectively fulfill their mandate in the development effectiveness area.

There was a proposal from Treasury that the DEAP efforts to develop capacity to negotiate for aid needed to develop the capacity of other departments, especially Ministry of Justice who are part of the negotiating team for aid to Malawi. To effectively improve capacity for aid negotiation and allocation, there was need to go beyond the DAD and involve other key stakeholders such as Ministry of Justice, Budget Division, EP&D, OPC and other relevant departments. This would ensure that there is sufficient capacity to negotiate, manage and account to development aid in the public sector.

All in all, Output 3 seemed to have been mainstreamed in the daily operations of DAD and this is one of the building blocks for sustainability. Unlike in EP&D, the Treasury has managed output three using the existing staff in the organization and the DEAP activities have been absorbed in their work-plan. In EP&D, a special management unit was set up to manage the DEAP activities and the DEAP activities were considered extra to the daily operations of the department. This state of affairs goes against the spirit of shared responsibility and division of labour and ultimately compromises the sustainability of the programme.

Overall, the DEAP achieved the result in this area. The outputs produced under this area have created the necessary desired changes and will continue to give benefits to the public sector beyond DEAP period. There are a few outstanding issues that need to be looked at for the remaining DEAP period and these include interesting the general public and the CSOs and private sector to follow issues in public finance through the public portal of the AMP in order for them to hold government to account.

Another area that need immediate attention is the building of the capacity for Ministry of Finance staff to be able to host the AMP and ensure its real time functionality instead of hosting the same in the United States with DEAP support as currently is which is not be sustainable.

### **Rating/Scoring**

The rating for this area is **Fully Achieved**. The national dialogue structures have been developed and are working well. They tackle national challenges with all the planned outputs having been achieved

## **4.9 Challenges**

DEAP has met several challenges in its implementation. The following are some of the challenges the evaluation team has highlighted.



#### **4.9.1 Coordination of the various efforts of the Programme**

DEAP is a programme that encompasses a whole set of activities spread across many MDAs in the public sector. The DEAP is a reform programme aimed at redefining and refocusing development effectiveness and making the whole public sector machinery account for the development results based on implementation of the budget. The programme ultimately aims at improving service delivery of all public institutions in Malawi. While everyone agrees that this programme is very essential and has the potential of increasing efficiency and effectiveness in public service delivery, there is the problem of spread and uncoordinated efforts – by the different players. While there are the coordination meetings and the steering committee meetings aimed at coordinating the implementation of the programme – there is no deep and engagement to unravel issues requiring working together and delivering as one – understanding how each as they operate individually are each assisting each other to achieve the common goal – development effectiveness. The situation currently is that each implementers effort by the hand of God will eventually be a part of the whole – contributing to the holistic approach of the programme. For example, the PED and the EPD would achieve more in the performance enforcement area if they jointly planned and implemented the performance monitoring and enforcement for the MDAs. The key performance indicators used would reflect the results that matter nationally and matter to the larger populace. Another example is how the ministries would be able to ride on each other's efforts if the programme jointly planned their development interventions.

#### **4.9.2 Staff turnover and availability of human resources**

In order to entrench a culture of results in Malawi, there is need for staff to understand the concepts of RBM and the principles and practice. There is also a requirement for staff that can understand and catch onto the principles and be able to practice the same at ministry and district levels. However, the situation in the human resource area is currently so fluid that some people that the programme has engaged and developed their capacity have moved on leaving replacements that do not have knowledge of the programme. In the district councils, the M&E officers are not on established positions. In the statistics office, the vacancy rate is about 50 percent. In the most of the sector ministries there are no qualified people that can take on the M&E function at the district level. The government transfers people from place to place without considering the investment that the ministry or programmes like DEAP have made in the said officer to implement the programme activities. The new person replacing such officers are sometimes so new that the training process has to start all over again.

#### **4.9.3 Delays in implementing activities due to delays in funds disbursements**

The implementing agents said they found it difficult to implement programme activities on time because UNDP was late in disbursing funds. It was said that UNDP was not releasing funds in good time despite the fact that EP&D requested; a typical example is support to the NSO, which was held up for several months. During the 2016 financial year, many project activities failed to secure funding in good time, in particular, this being linked to the new policy on per diem policy. UNDP is understood to be engaged as a

second approval layer of work-plans and funds after EP&D got all the required approvals for their work-plan and funding, including through the PSC. This was delaying implementation of activities by EP&D, NSO and PED who were getting their funding through the UNDP procurement and accounting system.

#### **4.9.4 Lack of trust for mutual accountability**

UNDP is providing accounting services to EP&D which is not in line with the aspect of mutual accountability. The ET understands the reasons that led to UNDP taking over the accounting functions from EP&D. However, after addressing of the concerns raised, the UNDP and EP&D needed to discuss and reach a common understanding, with a handover of the programme accounting function back to EP&D in the spirit of mutual accountability and division of labour – under certain agreed conditions. The handover would need to be subjected to monitoring over time, to assess if procurement and financial management rules were being fully adhered to.

#### **4.9.5 Coordination**

Some development partners feel left out on planning and reporting of the DEAP. Specifically, some UN agencies are of the view that their contributions are not reported under the DEAP due to coordination challenges. There is a perception that there are operational challenges that lead to this situation where at times the UN agencies miss out on some meetings, worsened with gaps in sharing information between the lead UN agency and the others. This sometimes leads to reporting that does not fully cover the reality in implementation, within the context of Delivering as One.

### **5. ASSESSMENT BY EVALUATION CRITERIA**

#### **5.1 RELEVANCE**

The DEAP is premised on that the realisation of development results will largely depend on availability and proper management of resources, domestic and external, in the process, necessitating the strengthening of national capacities in central ministries and at district level and among non-state actors. DEAP supports national institutions to become more results-oriented and improve synergies between planning, monitoring and evaluation and aid management functions in supporting the realisation of national goals and priorities.

Key strategic areas of support include: 1) National Institutions utilize Results-Based Management (RBM) systems for planning, monitoring and evaluation to enhance ownership and leadership for achievement of development results; 2) National Institutions have the capacity to align policies, programmes and budgets with national development strategies for efficient achievement of development results; and 3) Government has sufficient capacity to effectively negotiate, manage and account for development assistance.

All the prioritised areas are vital in the development context of Malawi in view of the bottlenecks and challenges noted recently, including in the comprehensive MGDS II review (2015).

The programme design recognizes the challenges in institutional, human and financial capacities, of both central and local government structures, as well as those of the other key stakeholders involved, including non-state actors in dealing with critical management issues. Institutionalization of Results Based Management (RBM) is still ongoing and RBM user's handbook has been developed to strengthen planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting of results both at district and national levels. The establishment of an overdue National Monitoring and Evaluation Coordination Committee designed to guide implementation of a functional M&E system is yet to be effected.

In view of the complexity of implementation modalities, DEAP envisaged engagement of a high level and experienced professional as Programme Coordinator who would report to the Secretary to the Treasury. In the MOFEPD, the Director, Debt and Aid Division was delegated the responsibility of PC. The director was supported by a technical assistance (TA) expert, P4 Grade, reporting to the Deputy Resident Representative (Programme). The TA was envisaged to be a top-notch technical expert in development policy, strategy development and implementation, innovations and best practices in RBM, development cooperation and national development goals. The TA would also have management, coordination, monitoring and evaluation capacity, focusing on quality control, full circle of programming from formulation, monitoring, implementation and reviews. The TA would also be pivotal in providing strategic leadership in nurturing and development of partnerships and resource mobilization; advocacy and information, education and communication and contribute to learning and knowledge management. The ET found that at planning stage, there was adequate provision of the key resources to carry forward the programme development agenda.

At the policy and strategic levels of DEAP, the composition of the Project Steering Committee (PSC), chaired by the Secretary to the Treasury (ST) and comprising the UNDP and the European Union, representing development partners (DPs), involvement of several senior Government representatives was well considered to provide the programme with the required leadership and guidance. At the implementation level, the Programme Management Coordination Committee (PMCC overseas the DEAP implementation), also giving technical advice to the PSC, which is in line with good practice.

In an attempt to build effective public institutions, the Government brought together all capacity development initiatives under a unified Public Financial and Economic Management Reform Program (PFEM RP). The PFEM RP's focus is to achieve fiscal

discipline; resource allocation according to a well presented government strategy; and value for money in terms of effective, efficient and regulated use of resources to achieve service delivery. Because of the challenges facing non-state actors, with a weak private sector and fragmented civil society organisations, bottlenecks that have been acknowledged at planning stage, there were plans to ensure that non-state actors get positioned to assume their roles in the development arena through a process of full engagement and dialogue.

The programme has stakeholders that are drawn from a wide variety of organisations, development partners, UN agencies, government ministries, district councils, NGOs and private sector, with varying levels of participation. Government, in collaboration with key stakeholders such as development partners, has been instrumental in development various policies and strategies to support the DEAP. The GoM has taken the lead in carrying out an independent comprehensive MGDS II Review, with an expressed willingness to adopt key recommendations from that review. Government has also moved to initiate the development of the successor to the MGDS II, in a participatory manner, in keeping with one of the key requirements of spreading ownership of development processes beyond central government authorities.

The Ministry of Finance Economic Planning and Development (MOFEPD), the lead ministry, and the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC), play key roles in the DEAP, the former, hosting the programme, and providing policy and sector level coordination. Though in some of the areas, progress has not been as expected, the development of the Development Cooperation Strategy (DCS) and a range of other key complementary actions shows a fair level of commitment at central government level.

The MGDS II Review (GoM, 2016) made extensive reference to governance challenges, including in terms of coordination on issues of capacity development and other key issues such as monitoring and evaluation, results based management (RBM) and the functionality of sector working groups (SWGs). The analysis of these broader issues, amongst others has implications on the effectiveness of government led system of sector coordination, which involves other stakeholders, including donors. Essentially the analysis points to challenges in sector coordination, which, the DEAP sought to tackle.

The DEAP supports the MGDS II and Vision 2020. The drive in the DEAP is to focus on capacity development of government ministries and their institutional structures, including at district levels in an attempt to address a critical gap in the Malawian development context. Capacity development in the public sector has been identified by previous GoM supported reviews as a key binding constraint to managing development effectiveness and ensuring public sector accountability. The programme complemented the implementation of the MGDS II, Public Financial Management reforms, the Development Cooperation Strategy (DCS) and Vision 2020.

Malawi has remained relatively stable, politically, with peaceful transitions of governments. Malawi has been known to develop a number of policies and strategies, but implementation structures have been below expectation, with the track record of achieving results being less than desirable. In recognition of this bottleneck, the DEAP put in place a two-level structure to over-see the DEAP implementation. This involved the establishment of a high-level Project Steering Committee (PSC), chaired by the Secretary to Treasury (ST), MOFEPD and comprising key staff from implementing MDA. Below the PSC is the Programme Management Coordination Committee (PMCC), which oversees the management of the DEAP and conducts regular reviews. Ideally, the structure is adequate to deliver the task at hand. Relevant circumstances and risks were considered and the intervention logic has largely been updated.

Both quantitative and qualitative indicators have been defined. On the basis of baselines, where they exist, indicators for the Joint programme measure the achievement of outputs as stated in this evaluation.

Because of challenges in the NSO, baseline data is to a large extent, outdated, some of it dating back 4 to 5 years. In view of the challenges related to the NSO and the national M & E system, there are substantial data gaps at the broader development context. The data gaps are linked to constraints which are beyond the control of DEAP management.

The following is the evaluation rating score used in the evaluation against key criteria. The criteria considered are *Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness and Sustainability*.

#### EVALUATION RATING SCORE

RELEVANCE Select	On-track	Partially on-track	Low
	XXX		
The DEAP has a clear strategic focus, drawing important lessons from existing and previous interventions, including binding constraints encountered. DEAP is a comprehensive approach to addressing a range of challenges in the public sector through the existing and new institutional mechanisms.			

#### Conclusions

At the policy and strategic level, the PSC is well-constituted, has strategically identified membership, and is technically supported by the PMCC, s structure which is appropriate to deliver the expected development results. The structural, organisational and human resource arrangements understated the demands of the programme, depended on unfulfilled assumptions about Government capacities. DEAP is well designed with adequate consideration of the human resources needed to carry out the envisaged mandate, using existing senior government staff.

However, in other components, the assumption regarding capacities within Government in term of delivery of outputs are not in keeping with the realities at practical levels. Human resource and organisational leadership staffing gaps are noted in some of the sector, for example, at the department of EP&D and at the NSO.

Within some components, the DEAP had an optimistic scenario in its design and in projected attainment of the programme results which was envisaged to be sustainable based on strong commitment from Government. This is in particular as it pertains to achievement of a turnaround in a relatively short space of time, taking into account the timeframe to achieve the outcomes and the process type of changes required for such interventions. Such change often requires breaking ‘government institutional traditional cultural and practice barriers’. This requires long term engagement, at least twice the period in the DEAP project document.

The project is aligned to the MGDS II and Vision 2020; it is a good intervention to the capacitation of Malawi to strengthen development effectiveness in managing development aid and enabling improved accountability. The project is largely relevant to the needs of the country. The DEAP priorities and results-matrix have, however, not been properly revised to reflect the much reduced available resource envelop, resulting in the programme being somewhat ambitious. In the framing of the DEAP, resources allocation pertaining to mandates did not correspond to demands, with an under-resourcing of key activities at planning stage. Examples include mainstreaming of monitoring and evaluation and national statistical capacity and achievement of gender equality outcomes.

## **5.2 EFFICIENCY**

The identification of focal points in various MDAs to champion the implementation of specific activities under each priority area was appropriate and a step in the right direction. This was in some way, cost effective and reduced the need to create another

layer of project staff, which would not have been sustainable. However, such an arrangement required a stronger networking arrangement to facilitate with a view to developing required synergies in the DEAP action.

The PSC and PMCC was well conceived, with the PSC focusing on policy and strategic issues; the PMCC focusing on project management and implementation of the activities. However, there was a lack of commitment on the part of senior management to adequate evidence based tracking of progress, including budget and human resources performance and adoption of results-oriented approaches which are key to 'diagnosing challenges from afar', and taking appropriate and timely remedial action.

Strategically, DEAP opted for a lean structured arrangement, which is good for sustainability, with dependence of government officers as key resource persons. The department of EPD has ICT, procurement and M & E services. ICT personnel in the department work on the IFMIS, which is being supported by the DEAP – as a deliberate strategy. The issue, however, is the extent to which the existing arrangements in the EP&D have worked and been effective. There has not been a human resources audit of the DEAP convened component of the PMU at EP&D, no availing of the requisite quality and numbers of staff to facilitate programme implementation.

Although the GoM has made a tremendous effort in DEAP implementation, with a number of achievements made under difficult circumstances, the components managed at EP&D faced many challenges in their organisational and management, facing some financial and procurement challenges, which slowed down implementation of activities. However, components managed from Treasury have not faced the challenges faced at EP&D. There are important lessons learnt between the project managed at EP&D and those managed at Treasury.

Whilst the original project document estimated DEAP budget for 4 years of US\$18,482,500; only US\$7 million, (approximately 38 percent of the original budget estimated at project design was secured). As at 25 April 2016, there was a 56 percent utilization of the budgetary allocation, a year before the project closure. In the on-going internal Project Steering Committee (PSC) and Programme Management Coordination Committee (PMCC) reviews, there was not enough attention to reviewing priorities to adequately match revised and recast priorities as these related to the available resource envelop and to reflect emerging realities linked to the funding of DEAP. There were some gaps between financial resources anticipated at planning stage with those availed during implementation.

A number of short-term consultants were engaged for specific assignments, which on the whole, were done to satisfactory levels. These included commissioned work designed to enhance the effectiveness of SWGs, the Study of the State of M & E, and the comprehensive review of the MGDS II, capacity development and training in RBM, PBB, amongst other areas. Some of the interventions included central government staff, district council staff, and personnel employed by government departments and NGOs, not necessarily at HQ and sub-components of the work supported by the DEAP. GoM MDAs, deployed some resources, staff time, (including in-kind contributions), participation and contributing to PSC strategic meetings and PMCC meetings, deliberating on key issues facing the DEAP, including those related to implementation of specific activities. A pivotal government contribution has been in the GoM commitment to RBM, PBB and AMP, PFM, IFMIS, MGDS II reviews and formulation of the successor national strategy.

Furthermore, the creation of an enabling environment by GoM remains work in progress. Government financial contribution to DEAP has been in terms of infrastructure support, payment of staff salaries involved in DEAP activities. These have been provided on time. The project experienced substantial delays, with certain key activities delayed for more than 12 months, others failing to take off completely. Procurement delays have been cited as major constraints to implementation of key DEAP activities in priority areas, in a number of MDAs, including the following, MOFEPD (e.g., support to formulation of successor national development strategy), Local Government, support to M & E activities, the National Statistical Office NSO) roll-out of MASEDA, roll-out of M & E, RBM and PBB capacity building with district councils, review of the DCS (which was never undertaken). The delays resultant upon inadequate handling of procurement issues, misunderstandings between UNDP and the DEAP hosting institution, has created a situation of despondency in the latter, with capacity and bureaucratic bottlenecks in the procurement system cited as major reason for the delays in implementation of work plans. The delays stated were rooted in constraints in coordination and supervisory arrangements of development partner support at national level.

There are conflicting signals on the underlying factors behind the delays, both from the UN side and the national government side. The bottlenecks associated with UNDP procedures have been cited to be the cause of the delays. The bottom line, however, is that the real issues are also linked to challenges in managing the delivery of development results at national level, results based management and accountability in management of development resources. Following the challenges encountered during the earlier phases



of the action, and qualified audit reports, the UNDP and MOFEPD moved to turn around the situation, by changing project accountant, the previous one being the reason for the financial chaos cited at a critical stage of DEAP implementation. To enable improved financial management accountability, there were changes in the procurement of DEAP activities. Whilst the changes were favourable to enhancing financial accountability and transparency, the changes worsened procurement delays.

Annual work plans have also been developed, and annual reports prepared and shared with stakeholders. The work plans have also been revised taking into account financial and implementation reality on the ground, in terms of time-frames. The work plans have also considered the available human resources, both in terms of quality and quantity and the existence of complementary inputs from different stakeholders.

A few months before programme closure, there remains a large number of activities and outputs still not delivered. For example, whilst progress has been made in a number of strategic areas, the implementation of roll-out plans were behind, in many of the areas. Substantial work was required to ensure that essential systems were adopted and rolled out to districts (examples in current text). Because of the incompleteness of delivery of some of the key outputs, insufficient evidence, the ET is unable to give a decisive conclusion whether or not the outputs were delivered in a cost-efficient manner.

EFFICIENCY	On-track	Partially on-track	Low
Select		XXX	
<p>DEAP has made notable accomplishments under a very challenging operational environment and complex implementation modalities. Areas where progress is noteworthy are:</p> <p>Programme based budgeting;</p> <p>Capacity building in DAD, aid management and negotiations; support to development cooperation, through a substantial development cooperation mechanism, review of the DCS and establishment of functional AMP, now adopted</p> <p>Reviews of the state of M &amp; E in Malawi and SWG and the establishment of government-led institutional structures to implement key recommendations from recent reviews;</p> <p>Despite marked progress, there remains substantial work to be done, which requires more demonstration of commitment by the implementing partners and in ensuring that at every stage the established structures are well-resourced and able to deliver expected results timeously.</p>			

## **Conclusions**

Whilst progress has been made with other work plans, some of the components and sub-components have faced substantial challenges in resourcing key activities due to bureaucracy-rooted delays. Delays have been experienced partly due to procurement constraints, challenges in resource planning and inadequate human resources provision in the implementation structures. The coordination mechanism, roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders are largely clear and adequate, with a demonstration of some commitment by the GoM and other key stakeholders in steering the Action forward.

However, commitment on the part of Government, in some cases, has not been backed up by adequate financial and human resources deployment, the latter being both in terms of numbers and quality. Overall, the resources availed through the DEAP, though significant fall short of the needs of the programme, being less than 38 percent of the original budget projections for the entire DEAP.

Overall, although commendable progress has been made in the delivery of outputs, full delivery and roll out of key activities remains as work-in-progress. The ET concludes that the Action is monitored by the key IPs, through the PSC and the PMCC, to satisfactory levels. However, some of the key decisions made at the PSC and PMCC have not been followed up with appropriate timely action, resulting in some loss of confidence and trust between the principal stakeholders involved.

## **Recommendations**

Review the existing DEAP human resources, and fill in the key staffing gaps, for components and sub-components facing constraints. Given the existing under-spends, and the status of the programme coordination office, the UNDP in collaboration with MOFEPD need to expedite filling in of key expert positions, where these are identified, with possibility of additional short-to medium TA, where feasible; to fast-track certain priority activities that have lagged behind.

Similarly, there is need for the UNDP to undertake a major shake-up of the existing procurement system to bring delays linked to funds disbursement and payments to an absolute minimum.

## **5.3 EFFECTIVENESS**

**Output 1: National Institutions utilize RBM systems for planning, monitoring and evaluation to enhance ownership and leadership for achievement of development results.**

### **5.3.1 RBM capacity and practice enhanced in public sector**

RBM was pilot tested initially with training targeting 3 government ministries and 4 districts (Mchinji, Dedza, Karonga and Mwanza). And further opened for other MDAs. The RBM manual has been updated and awaiting further review to make sure that it satisfies HRBA, programme based budgeting and gender mainstreaming; RBM manual introduced in 10 – 12 districts, plans to train MDAs in RBMs done but not targeting right senior staff; c) Over 60 line ministry of district staff from all three regions of the country have been trained in RBM concepts and practice. However, some challenges have emerged.

Although substantial capacity development on RBM was internalised in learning training institutions (on the supply side), at the demand side, there was a low up-take. RBM training was done and was meant to incorporate senior government officials (PSs, Planning Directors, DCs, and others), ended up accessing only junior government staff in non-influential positions; with low update at senior levels despite repeated appeals by trainers. The new GoM policy that covers full accommodation costs for workshop participants with abolition of payment of daily subsistence allowances (DSA), in an environment that staff often consider this to be a benefit or incentive for them to get out of their work stations is blamed for poor participation by senior government officers.

Non-participation of senior staff from IP institutions and the general lack of commitment to change made it difficult for participants to apply knowledge gained in their day to day work, especially where a major change was required, e.g., moving to a results based planning and reporting system. There was also a general lack of high level commitment to change, in the absence of monitoring frameworks to ensure that training received benefited the organization sending training beneficiaries in a meaningful way. Against this background, the piloting of RBM application in selected line ministries and selected districts did not have scaling up impact which was expected.

### **5.3.2 National Statistical Office (NSO), ‘establishment of the Malawi Social Economic Database (MASEDA), with updated indicators reviewed’;**

Although the National Statistical System Strategic Plan was developed, with a 50 percent of professional staff compliment, there have been limited resources to carry forward the MASEDA. Limited progress was achieved due low capacity within the NSO, both in terms of human resources, equipment including data management software. A major area of support by DEAP to the NSO has been TA support in the development of course materials and modules for a Diploma in Statistics and Chancellor College, University of

Malawi, with financial support to 20 initial batch of students, for the two-year Diploma. The supported recruits comprise lower level cadre working in statistics units such as statistics clerk, data management assistants. This is expected to strengthen the human resource capacity of the NSO. The challenges associated with national capacity development in statistics are many. One of them cited is the placement of statisticians under the planning department in the MDAs, which has its merits as well as demerits. However, the critical issue remained, which is the underlying capacity gaps linked to the work of the NSO and its linkages within MDAs, where in the main, there were organisational challenges of vision, strategy, organisational, resources management. These issues ultimately affected the capacity of the NSO to deliver high quality outputs.

### **5.3.3 Government M & E system strengthened**

As part of the contribution to the implementation of the MGDS II, DEAP was instrumental in the development of the MGDS II linked monitoring indicator framework, which formed the basis for Annual MGDS II reviews; facilitated the Annual MGDS II reviews, and facilitated the comprehensive MGDS II Review (2015), which identified achievements, opportunities, bottlenecks and recommendations for action by the GoM and other stakeholders, including development partners.

With facilitation from the DEAP, a comprehensive, a review of the M & E architecture was undertaken with critical issues in M & E development, binding constraints identified at policy and institutional level analysed through the Study of State of M & E in Malawi (2015). Follow up work resulted in substantial awareness raising on M & E development, nationally and the need to establish a robust M & E system in Malawi, with a view to strengthening development effectiveness and accountability systems.

The establishment of management information system (MIS) to monitor development results, down to district levels remains, with district databanks still non-functional, with the M & E system at district level remaining problematic because it is not accompanied by the right instruments. Fragmentation and overlapping of activities with those implemented in different projects is still an issue of concern. A good example is the proliferation of M&E of projects in the central ministries and Government as a whole. Going forward, M&E systems in Government should be harmonized and linked to each other in a supplementary manner.

With a lack of institutionalisation of data management linking central and decentralised district structures, sectors continued to use different indicators, which were difficult to synchronise. In the absence of a centralised system of data management, substantial coordination challenges have been encountered, including in reporting and reviews at sector level and in linking up with the MASEDA. However, the development of M & E capabilities and the implementation of a functional system linking the Centre with decentralised local government structures remained at a critical stage, where further

momentum, in terms of financing and human resource capacity development was key to attainment of rapid progress.

Amongst other measures, the establishment of a National M & E Committee to drive the M & E agenda is noted, if it functions well. This move should enable tackling of the most binding constraints cited in this evaluation and on the basis of the previous reviews.

**Output.2: National Institutions have capacity to align policies, programmes and budgets with national development strategies and MDGs for efficient achievement of development results**

#### **5.3.4 Programme Based Budgeting**

DEAP engaged an international expert to pilot test the Programme Based Budget (PBB), starting off with 6 ministries. The pilot work involved awareness and preliminary capacity development and training, which has been continued and been extended and culminated in the production of an integrated PBB manual in 2015. Since then, more than 46 MDAs have been trained and all Central Government MDAs are in the process of implementing PBB, with different levels of uptake. In order to strengthen awareness on PBB. DEAP has also broadened outreach, training and awareness to Members of Parliament (MPs), engaging 60 MP; all members of Budget and Finance Committees, all members of Public Accounts Committee. Plans were in place to reach out and secure awareness raising with all MPs as a way of strengthening and consolidating the roll out of the PBB. PBB structures have been established in MDAs at central level. Challenges were encountered linking performance enforcement indicators, PBB, IFMIS and overall MGDS M & E Indicators and sectoral indicators, resulting in need to assess how linkages between the PED, Treasury, Budget Department, EP & D, MGDS II indicators and sectoral indicators, could be strengthened for a more integrated and harmonized system.

However, more awareness raising was pending at senior levels within the government structures, with awareness planned for Permanent Secretaries (PSs), and induction in district councils and roll out of PBB to local government structures, district councils, and to statutory bodies. A results-based M & E system to monitor progress of PBB was also required to ensure trouble-shooting measures, where these encountered with a view to attainment of more rapid progress.

Despite the constraints noted related to slow take-off of the PBB approach by MDAs, which is not abnormal for most major transformational process, the process of engagement in support to the development of the PBB was progressive. However, a key observation is that the development of the PBB had not been very rigorous, in particular pertaining extra strategic planning and analysis in developing the targets and outputs. The traditional tendency amongst the public MDAs to leave the budgeting exercise to accounts and finance personnel and clerks persisted without ensuring conformity and applying substantial objective analysis. Nevertheless, the PBB continued to offer high

transformational possibilities for the public sector and in terms of improvement of service delivery. The positive feedback from the MDAs that had piloted the PBB is acknowledged and demonstrates in-roads made by the DEAP supported initiative.

The assessment of the ET is that much ground has been covered on the PBB, especially during the pilot phase. The MDAs still harbouring reservations on PBB ought to take a leaf from the MDAs involved in pilot phase and explore mechanisms of tackling whatever reservations exist, avoiding waiting for the PBB to be self-driven process, which will not happen. To be noted is that substantial commitment is needed at both senior and middle management levels to drive the process.

However, Treasury in collaboration with EP&D and MDAs should ensure that most of the basic issues associated with PBB (capacity is developed for those actually developing the budget, ensure that the Departments Heads are involved) are addressed before the MDAs can implement objective and sound PBBs.

### **5.3.5 Strengthened SWG process**

DEAP also facilitated a comprehensive review of Sector Working Groups (SWGs), which showed a less than desirable performance of SWGs, with only five or six functional SWGs, out of about 16 to 17. Follow up work which involved a review of the 2008 SWG guidelines and subsequent development of new SWG guidelines, which were adopted by the Office of the President and Cabinet, following a validation workshop. Focal points placed in strategic MDAs have since been identified with a view to strengthening the agenda of SWGs tracking of sector level progress. To date, 10 – 11 SWGs have since become functional, with the number expected to increase over time. This is expected to improve M & E oversight functions at sector level. M&E frameworks were also updated in 7 districts, enabling the Local Government Finance Committee to assess performance of the assisted districts.

The establishment of a new management structure for the SWGs and subsequent effort at orientation of staff of the coordinating ministry is applauded. The revamped SWG structures that have now been established, if followed through with agreed actions should enable improved performance of SWGs. Though it is still early days, at the time of this evaluation, the number of what are understood to be functional SWGs had jumped to 11. However, progress would ultimately depend on how far senior management in Government are prepared to follow through the key actions required, including investing in the realisation of key actions agreed. In the final analysis, the realisation of expected outcome in this and many other areas, depends to a large extent on follow up actions and developments beyond the control of DEAP.

### 5.3.6 Strengthening of performance enforcement

There has been a commendable initial start, with performance contracts designed, accompanied with some performance assessment systems and tools, training and awareness raising undertaken in all MDAs. Independent evaluators were also being deployed to the MDAs to carry out assessments, with promising results. However, the huge budget short-fall of nearly 80 percent, extending to the 2015/16 financial year, meant that a substantial number of key activities could not be undertaken, negatively affecting progress. The 25 MDAs which have signed performance contracts should pave the path for the outstanding MDAs to follow.

### **Output 3: Government has sufficient capacity to effectively negotiate, manage and account for development assistance**

#### 5.3.7 Has there been strengthening of aid and debt management functions?

The DEAP is acknowledged by the DAD as an effective engagement mechanism targeted at strengthening an improving approaches to managing and accounting for development assistance. Notable is support given to the training of DAD officers in monitoring and evaluating and debt management. The production of the first development cooperation atlas covering years 2012/2013 to 2014/2015 is also attributed to the support that came through DEAP. Subsequently, the 2016 development cooperation calendar and its dissemination was undertaken with the input packaged through DEAP. Although there remains more work to be undertaken, with a greater focus on results, the programme is understood by the ET to be a strategic move to enhancing capacity to negotiate effectively, manage and account for development assistance.

#### **Malawi and the development cooperation architecture**

Malawi is a very active member of global networks and partnerships in development cooperation strategy making and review processes, including monitoring processes for implementation of the Paris Declaration, several regional and global post-Busan processes, including the post-Busan Building Blocks, the Africa Action Plan on Development Effectiveness. Malawi is co-Chair, together with Mexico of the High Level Forum of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. However, there has been an inability by Malawi to effectively use the global networks and partnerships to influence the development cooperation and aid architecture in a manner that enables the country and developing countries in a similar status to directly benefit from the global platforms.

### **Quality of the outputs produced**

The DEAP has had a multi-faceted approach, seeking to address capacity development of the public sector across a range of areas as discussed to. The CD has focused on priority issues, seeking to increase technical and organisational knowledge and skills within the various intervention areas, starting from awareness raising, training, using carefully selected resource persons, often drawn internationally, commissioned a number of assignments which are undertaken based on transparent competitive bidding processes. Quality measurement processes were established and many of the outputs were subjected to quality control, apart from also being reviewed and scrutinised by a wide range stakeholders at validation workshops, with recommendations made to improve the outputs, as far as was possible. Most the work undertaken to date has fed into additional follow-up work to improve the DEAP implementation processes, in key strategic areas.

### **Are the outputs still likely to lead to the expected outcomes?**

It is observed that substantial progress has been made, under difficult circumstances, within the Malawian socio-economic, political development context. What this evaluation can categorically state is that, indeed challenges have been encountered with the DEAP, which are in many ways rooted to programme design challenges, which have also led to constraints at implementation level in capacitating and enabling the programme to deliver in the key result areas. At the same time, substantial progress has been made in laying building blocks which if given a chance could result in realisation of the expected outcomes, to a large extent.

The DEAP does support the MGDS II, Vision 2020, public sector reforms, PFM, IFMIS, RBM, and other key components, which are central to turning around the country from its low international human development ranking to an improved status. Malawi is seeking to adopt the recommendations made from a number of key DEAP linked reviews and assessments, including those made through recent HLF engagements, the DCS framework, the comprehensive MGDS II review (2015) and others.

However, there remains some gaps in that the national government partners are still perceived within the DP and some development circles as not taking adequate decisive leadership in implementing the country's own national policies and strategies, by following them through with practical action. There has continued to be half-hearted attempts at the level of implementation of national policies and national development strategies (*notable is the Decentralisation Policy and measures to empower decentralised local government*), with weak national resources mobilisation. Whilst the DEAP facilitated engagement is noted, within government, essential financial and human resources have not been deployed to implement the key strategies to required extents. Appropriate actions to implement the policies are lacking, including some of the key actions agreed at the level of the DEAP project steering committee. The DEAP has not been anchored by an effective policy and legislative environment where there is a demonstrable commitment to get things moving at practical level at the right pace. Malawi continues



to have substantial weaknesses in implementing her own national policies, creating some gaps between the policies and the reality on the ground. At the surface, these challenges can be attributable to the DEAP, but in reality there are bigger challenges beyond what the DEAP as a programme can handle.

EFFECTIVENESS Select	On-track	Partially on-track	Low
		XXX	
There is a lack of integration between the various key processes, M &E, RBM, performance enforcement, PBB, IFMIS, with commitment at senior government level has not been fully demonstrated by action. DEAP has established implementation structures that are designed to deliver results in a progressive and measurable way. With many of the planned activities behind schedule, performance measurement criteria for delivery of key outputs has not been developed. Whilst certain progress has been made in achievement of some outputs, indications are that a lot more effort is needed for full achievement of the planned outputs			

## Conclusion

Starting at senior level, despite of claims of ‘business unusual’, a ‘business as usual’ culture still persists in many circles in government, and in the absence of demonstration of effective implementation or adoption of a system of rewards for good performers, penalties and sanctions for non-performers.

There are persistent challenges faced in the M & E indicator framework: Lack of harmonization of the indicator framework linked to PE, PBB, Budget allocation, IFMIS, MIS and M & E, resulting in misalignment of implementation of priority interventions, and this leads to confusion and stagnation, slowing down progress in all key result areas.

Lack of integration in M & E, reporting structures, between OPC, Performance Enforcement, EP & D, MGDS, Treasury, PBB, IFMIS, Decentralisation, Local Government, District Councils, MIS, National Statistical Office; M & E at different sector level.

## Recommendations

GoM develop harmonized M & E, performance enforcement and indicator assessment frameworks implementation arrangements.

GoM integrate M & E reporting structures, between OPC, Performance Enforcement, EP & D, RBM, IFMIS, MIS, Budget, Treasury, National Statistical Office; different sectors, including Decentralisation at District Councils.

## **5.4 SUSTAINABILITY**

### **5.4.1 Is there necessary and adequate human and institutional capacities to sustain flow of benefits?**

Key stakeholders, in their various forms, especially, within government are positioned to acquire the necessary institutional and human capacities to sustain the flow of the DEAP benefits as they would begin to show. To varying extents, staff from MDAs, and some at district levels efforts have been made build necessary human resources capacities and know-how to coordinate and manage complex organisational arrangements, especially at middle and lower management. However, there is no evidence available to show the extent previous and current efforts have delivered in the key area of capacity development and training in the public sector as linked to DEAP initiatives. This is against the background of lack of proper performance tracking measures in the public sector and inadequate progress tracking at both central and decentralised levels, including sectoral level.

### **5.4.2 Is the role of the UN sufficiently respectful of the leading role of partners?**

The PD states clearly the role of the UNDP, other UN agencies as well as that of the MOFEPD, the PSC and the PMCC. The roles and responsibilities of the parties involved, in terms of planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting are clear. The role of the UN is regarded as one of facilitating the action by ensuring that planned activities are adequately resourced and monitored, on the basis of the agreed work plans. In the original implementation modalities, prior to the UNDP taking over the DEAP accounting function, it was clear that the process of planning, monitoring and evaluation was effectively led by Government, that is, MOFEPD, with the UNDP giving support. When the accounting responsibilities were taken over by the UNDP, at that point, the Government also seemed to have ‘lost’ its leading role. There was an impression ‘despondency, resignation... and resignation’ given to the ET during the review, that the UNDP was no longer sufficiently respectful of the GoM role on DEAP. The Government role was apparently ‘lost’ after a qualified audit for DEAP was presented, which led to an erosion of trust by UNDP in the GoM procurement system, a situation which actually retarded programme implementation as the DEAP vacillated between two procurement systems, one for government and the other for the UNDP. Even in cases, where planning was done with decisions endorsed by the PSC, following the UNDP procurement system, there was no guarantee for speedy execution of required actions, against the background of absence of a performance progress tracking mechanism or tool.

### **5.4.3 Have relevant authorities taken the measures needed to ensure continuation of the services after the end of the DEAP?**

Key structures have been established, which should further the capacity development and training agenda for the Malawian public sector. These include the Performance Enforcement Department under the OPC, the new SWG coordination structure and the new National M&E coordination committee, spearheaded through EP & D and plans for the establishment of a new Planning Commission, amongst other developments. What might be missing is the policy and legal framework to guarantee enforcement of many of these structures, especially relating to cases where critical decisions and actions have to be made. The absence of such key enforcement instruments is what leads to a tendency in the eyes of many of reverting to usual practices which do not result in the completion of the required actions. Also notable is the lack of involvement or marginalisation of the Human Resources Department as a key stakeholder in the implementation of DEAP, especially as this pertains to long term sustainability. The ET also observes that many of these issues are linked to high level governance and policy issues which this evaluation has not been mandated to analyse and yet are so crucial to the implementation of DEAP.

The existing policy and strategic framework, including the legal framework are vital ingredients for successful resources mobilization. However, tangible coordinated action at central level is missing, resulting in a situation tending toward an uncertain future, in view of the previous heavy dependence of Malawi on DP support, including the financial contribution of the EU and other development partners. There is the major challenge of financing of the DEAP activities at the end of the DP supported phase.

Clearly the GoM has provided substantial in-kind support to the DEAP through payment of staff salaries, with many of the government officers acting as strategic focal points. What is clear from the lessons learnt is that in order to achieve far reaching results, targeting and direct financing of certain key capacity development and training activities, which ought to be sustained over time is required. Through the application of the UN system, DEAP has benefitted greatly from largely short-term TA support given to various programme pillars. At this stage, given the work-in-progress type of many of the activities and outputs in most key result areas, including the M & E system, SWGs, Performance Enforcement, IFMIS, MIS, PBB, RBM, and others, it is clear that without DP support for DEAP, the GoM would not be in a position to sustain the efforts begun with the programme to a significant – apart from possibly reverting to the business as usual mode. From the foregoing, it seems clear that relevant authorities, specifically the GoM needs to take more adequate financial measures to ensure continuation of the services after the end of the Action. Clearly substantial support (human, financial and material) would still be required to deepen and consolidate work begun with DEAP support.

#### **5.4.4 Measures to ensure gender equality**

In principle, within the DEAP approach, with GoM commitment to advancing gender equality has led to the prioritization of the following:

- Support to development and implementation of a gender equality mainstreaming policy;
- Support to gender sensitization in the design of the MGDS III, in line with the recommendations of the recent comprehensive MGDS II review and other recent reviews; with staff in the public sector; including in gender budgeting;
- Gathering of gender disaggregated data for purposes of monitoring and evaluation and reporting.

A recent UNDP evaluation of the outcome that deals with gender mainstreaming and anchors many DEAP linked interventions, indicates establishment of positive context for advancing gender equality (UNDP, 2015). This is demonstrated in the various policy and framework documents and establishment of national mechanisms on gender equality. However, at a practical level, there has been limited progress in the realization of gender outcomes. There is inadequate capacity for gender mainstreaming and gender analysis with no evidence of substantive engagement on gender overall. Within the programming context, whilst there is recognition that achieving progress on gender equality and women's empowerment requires working collaboratively with other actors, the ET finds no partnership strategy for advancing gender equality.

Gender has not been effectively mainstreamed across most of the outcomes in DEAP. Several projects that are expected to contribute to the outcomes do not show gender mainstreaming in their objectives, outcomes and outputs. Gender mainstreaming has not taken place in any meaningful and effective manner that translates into concrete outcome level results. In view of the mainstreaming and analysis gaps, Evaluation Team concludes that DEAP has not been adequately informed by a systematic gender analysis to identify priority gender equality results needed in all interventions and actions.

Within the UNDAF and DEAP framework, the potential to contribute to gender equality through substantive engagement mechanisms has not been effective in monitoring the change process towards realization of tangible results. Development of guidelines should not be an end in itself but should result in monitoring of its use which should be factored into key interventions.

## **Recommendations**

Improvements are required to use gender analysis/assessments consistently, disaggregate the benefits and show differences between groups of women and men. Where project level successes have been documented, they have not been vertically captured in UNDAF outcome annual reports to inform gender mainstreaming results at the higher level.

SUSTAINABILITY	On-track	Partially on-track	Low
Select			
		XX	
<p>GoM commitment to financing DEAP exists and has been shown in sustaining the staff of government involved. However, direct funding of project activities is still dependent on external (DP) funding, with a lack of resources from government. There is no demonstration that Government is able to sustain the financing of the activities to any significant levels.</p> <p><i>Is there an adequate policy, institutional and legal framework to implement DEAP facilitated structures?</i> The framework is still weak and whilst some structures have been established, the mechanisms to enforce their effectiveness and functionality remain absent or missing.</p>			

### Important Observations

#### Roll-out of RBM to Ministries and District Councils

Progress on the rolling out of RBM in selected ministries and district councils is slow. However, it should be acknowledged that the ground work has been done. The adoption of RBM requires mind set change and desisting from applying frameworks that have been used over a long period – with no significant benefits. This new thrust requires more time than the timeframe allocated for this endeavour under the DEAP.

#### DSA in relation to full board arrangements

The implementation of the DEAP has shown that decisions taken to rectify one development challenge do have repercussions for other development interventions. This has a bearing on the interrelatedness between development initiatives in Malawi. The decision to get government officials to be on full board, whenever they are engaged in official business, rather than paying DSA to them is said to have affected the implementation of the DEAP. There was need to undertake an informed analysis of the decisions taken and how such decisions were likely to impact on development efforts where substantial resources are committed. A balancing act weighed against other initiatives should always be undertaken when coming up with decisions that affect development operations in Malawi.

Government and the development partners need to quickly resolve the DSA issue in relation to the decision for full board so that it does not further compromise the activities of the programme and many other government related initiatives. One way to do this is to give allowances for one meal (dinner) or make it half board as a compromise.

## LESSONS LEARNT

### **Sustainability through mainstreaming DEAP activities**

DEAP implementation using existing government structures and personnel has proved to be better than creating new structures specifically for the purpose of implementing the DEAP activities. In the first place, a lesson has been learnt in EP&D where audits have not had favourable results yet specific personnel were engaged to manage the resources advanced to the institution. This is in contrast to how resources have been managed at Ministry of Finance where government accounting personnel have been used to manage DEAP resources. In addition, DAD used the government officers to manage the joint programme and the operations were smooth and the division was able to full achieve the results as compared to EP&D where a coordinator was put in place for the same function. Government personnel at EP&D tended to take DEAP activities as extra to their work and considered the DEAP activities as a responsibility of the coordinator.

### **M&E personnel situation**

One major stumbling block for improving M&E at district level relates to the fact that M&E personnel that were recruited on non-established positions in the districts continue to operate on non-established positions since 2006. There is a proposal to absorb the M&E officers in the mainline local council establishment, but this is taking a long time and as such the officers are one by one being poached by NGOs because they mostly get frustrated since they do not have career progression at the district councils in their present circumstances. The decision to recruit the M&E persons was good but the way it was done (imposing them on Local Government as non-established staff) was not very effective. Ministry of Local Government should have employed these M&E officers in the first place not EP&D as it is – that is why up to now these M&E officers are still considered strangers at the district councils.

### **Leadership Buy-In**

Management and leadership buy in is very crucial when there are strategic and operational changes in the organisation. The DEAP has to ensure that the public sector departmental or unit leaders have buy in at the beginning of each initiative to smooth integration and institutionalisation of systems.

### **Conclusions**

DEAP is linked to the overall policy and governance environment of Malawi, which has far reaching effects on performance on many key development indicators and overall in enhancing accountability in managing development effectiveness.

DEAP is a comprehensive approach, which requires substantial political commitment and making of hard decisions, a direction which requires a combination of approaches, guidance in political and economic governance, over which the programme has no control.

The GoM has made substantial progress in establishing management and coordination of national structures to sustain DEAP. However, financial arrangements have not been established to sustain the structures for their effective functioning.

SWGs are very important and are supposed to play a crucial role in Malawi's development effectiveness and accountability due to their coordination mechanisms. SWGs have a high potential for strengthening collaboration between and among the various stakeholders in a sector.

For example, the SWG will strengthen collaboration of the Divisions in the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development and link planning, budgeting and M&E at national level. Despite the fact that the divisions are significantly interrelated in that an output from one division is an input into the other division currently the divisions are operating independent of each other. To fully realize the mandate of the Ministry, there is need for the Economic Planning Division, which is responsible for coordinating the development and prioritization of the national development plans; the Development Planning Division which is responsible for the PSIP; the Budget Division responsible for budgeting process and the Monitoring and Evaluation Division to collaborate and work together since their outputs feed into each other. This will strengthen the link between the planning, budgeting and review of development programmes and strengthen delivery of public services and budget allocations will then be based on national development priorities.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **Policy level**

**GoM/Policy:** The development partners are looking forward to government taking more decisive leadership and undertaking objective analysis that would bring up priorities that actually show comparative advantages of investing in the chosen areas in relation to those not prioritized. The analysis and synthesis should go to a level where for example the national benefits of investing in the sector, for example, food and nutrition security would be stated clearly, with evidence, compared to the other sectors. While everything can be categorized as priority, the NDS should come up with critical manageable priorities that require investment in the medium term.

## Sectoral

No effort should be spared to ensure that all the SWGs are revamped and fully operational. One way to do this is to develop scheduled meetings for SWGs which should be adhered to so that their meetings are not dependent on the decision of one person. The Government should strictly ensure that scheduled meetings take place as planned, including the convening of these meetings as one of the key performance assessment factors for the responsible SWG coordinator. This could entail producing a calendar whereby in a particular quarter all SWGs are expected to be Prioritizing; in another quarter Planning; in another quarter Budgeting and the other quarter doing Joint Sector Reviews.

**Databanks at RDCs:** The databanks at the district level are not functional and they have not really effectively worked since their inception due to many technical glitches they faced. Based on discussions with the District Council, the evaluation team is of the view that to revamp the district data bank, the government should use IFMIS infrastructure that already exists in district councils for the district databanks. The evaluation team understands that the IFMIS has several modules and one can be used for the district data bank and in this way there would be saving on resources and the sustainability issues will be taken care of. The technical backstopping for the databanks would not be problematic in this case as it would be integrated and embedded in the already existing technical support for the IFMIS.

One area that would need to be worked on is to inject new vigour in the private sector and NGOs so that they get committed and take ownership in the SWG. The private sector and CSOs should financial and logistical incentives to participate in the SWG otherwise expecting them to prioritise the SWG activities and spending on them over their private operations will be difficult.

For the accompanying TWGs, it would be important that the government and development partners also support the participation of the private sector and the NGOs. The TWG need to be taken seriously by Government and the chain of command between the TWG and the SWG should be seen to be strong otherwise the meetings can be viewed as waste of time and lead to loss of interest from the stakeholders. Related to this, the SWG and the TWG meetings should be seen to be effective in the conduct of their meetings to sustain interest and continued participation by the stakeholders. In this regard, the meetings should always have clear agenda and the meetings should be conducted professionally and effectively to achieve the purposes for which they are set.



Without a business-like focus, the meetings would be viewed as time wasters and lead to reduced interest among the private sector and NGO stakeholders.

## **Institutional**

### **Beefing up human resource for institutionalisation of RBM**

Considering that there is no stability of personnel in the public service and also the general inadequacy of staff especially at district council level, the evaluation team recommends that for the initial period of say three years, professional UNVs should be deployed to the district councils and line ministries that require human resources support. The UNVs could assist in institutionalization of the RBM in decentralised organisations and in line ministries. It should be stated that the persons involved should be professional UNVs that would support and develop capacity of the organisations to incorporate the RBM principles and practices in the organization and develop the architecture for the RBM in organisational planning, implementation and M&E architecture. The UNVs would assist in developing M&E frameworks of the district councils and ministries that are struggling to do so. A good example of where this is working is the Ministry of Gender and Children Affairs where UNICEF placed UNVs to support the development of Child Protection Information Management System and its roll out to the districts.

## **Strategic positioning**

**UNDP/EU:** Is there need for UNDP/EU to support another DEAP phase? YES, drawing on lessons learnt from the current phase, future support can ensure:

- iv. Adequate financial resources are mobilised;
- v. Have more substantial TA to support programme, in a focused and more comprehensive manner, targeting delivery in key pillars of DEAP – with much stronger results focus!
- vi. New DEAP design be accompanied with a strong performance and results tracking system (beyond activities analysis/reviews); PSC focusing more on policy, strategic issues and results.

There is need for the UNDP, the EU and the GoM to recommit themselves to fast-tracking implementation of key out-standing and priority activities, on the basis of the annual work plans and programme reviews. Where human resource gaps are noted, including quality, these ought to be addressed.

**UNDP:** In view of the frustrations generated on the side of the implementation partners with the procurement process, UNDP ought to expedite the procurement process, improve communication/dialogue with IP management and focal persons, to ensure that that any challenges linked to payment requests are tackled without delays.

**Gender Equality:** Improvements are required to consistently use gender analysis/assessments and disaggregate the benefits and show groups of men, women. Where project level successes have been documented, they have not been vertically captured in UNDAF outcome annual reports to inform gender mainstreaming results at the higher level.

**List of Stakeholders to Contacts: DEAP Evaluation 2016**

	<b>Name of Focal Person (Government)</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Institution/ Organization</b>	
	Walusungu Kayira	Deputy Director, Planning	Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development	
	Emma Mabvumbe	Director, Planning	Ministry of Health	
	Peterson Ponderani	Deputy Director, M & E	EP & D	
	Jimmy Kawaye	Programme Coordinator	EP&D	
	Simon Namagonya	Director	Performance Enforcement Dept. (PED)	
	Mr. Kamlongera	Deputy Director	PED	
	Mercy Safaraoh	Deputy Director	PED	
	Betty Ngoma	Assistant Director	Debt and AID, Treasury, MOF	
	Jane Mbughi	Project Officer, Economist	DAD	
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	Tithokoze Samuel	TBA	Treasury, Budget	
	Chisomo Tsonga	Economist	Treasury Budget	
	Yusuf Edward	Economist	Treasury Budget	

	Victoria Geresomo	Acting Director, M & E	EP&D	
	Richard Chakhame	Director of Planning	Ministry of Gender and Children's Affairs	
	Mercy Kanyuka	Commissioner of Statistics	National Statistical Office (NSO)	
	Ali Mphonda	Principal Statistician & Project Manager	NSO	
	James Changadeya	Planning Officer	Ministry of Education	
	John Chizonga	Planning Officer	Ministry of Education	
	Evans	SWAP focal point	Ministry of Education	
	Jean	SWAP focal point	Ministry of Education	
	Ali Phiri	District Commissioner	Chiradzulu District Council	
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	Kondwani Ghambi	District M&E Officer	Nkhata Bay District Council	
	Charles Makanga	District Commissioner	Lilongwe District Council	
	TBA	Director Planning and Development	Lilongwe District Council	
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	TBA	Acting M & E Officer	Lilongwe District Council	
	<b>Name of NGOs/CSOs/Youth/Women</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Institution/ Organization</b>	
	Kondwani Kaunda	Director	MEJN	
	TBA	Programme Manager	MEJN	

	International Development/Donors	Title	Institution/ Organization	
	TBA	UNFPA Representative	UNFPA	
	Mia Seppo	UNDP RC & UNDP RR	UN & UNDP	
	Chipso Msowoya	Programme Manager	European Union	
	Jose Navarro	Senior Programme Manager	European Union	
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