The research team from Verité Research comprised Dr Nishan de Mel, Gehan Gunatilleke, Sabrina Esufally, Shamara Wettimuny, Rehana Mohammed, and Ashani Basnayake. The team wishes to thank environment consultant Kiran Dhanapala for her valuable insights and support.

Verité Research wishes to thank UNDP Country Director Joern Soerensen, Deputy Country Director (Programmes and Operations) Lovita Ramguttee, Resident Representative Peter Batchelor, and the UNDP Country Team in Sri Lanka for their support and cooperation throughout this MTR. Verité Research also wishes to thank key informants from UNDP, the government, civil society, academia, and the private sector.

Design and layout by Dinuk Senapatiratne.

Verité Research aims to be a leader in the provision of information and analysis for negotiations and policy making in Asia, while also promoting dialogue and education for social development in the region. The firm contributes actively to research and dialogue in the areas of economics, sociology, politics, law, and media, and provides services in data collection, information verification, strategy development, and decision analysis.

Email comments to: publications@veriteresearch.org

Intended for recipient only and not for further distribution without the consent of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Sri Lanka.
# Contents

**Introduction** .................................................................................................................. V

1. **Research Design and Method** ......................................................................................... 1
   1.1 Research Components ................................................................................................. 1
   1.2 Research Methodology ............................................................................................... 4

2. **Context Analysis** ............................................................................................................ 7
   2.1 Global Developments ................................................................................................. 7
   2.2 Pre-2015 Local Context .............................................................................................. 11
   2.3 Post-2015 Local Context: Duality, Incoherence and Flux ........................................... 11

3. **Assessment of the UNDP Country Programme** ................................................................. 29
   3.1 The UNDP Country Programme ................................................................................. 29
   3.2 Assessing Fitness for Purpose ...................................................................................... 33
   3.3 Revising the Country Programme ............................................................................... 35

4. **Developing a New Country Programme: Programming Entry Points** ......................... 57
   4.1 Strategic Filters ........................................................................................................... 57
   4.2 Entry Points ............................................................................................................... 58
   4.3 Intervention Targeting ............................................................................................... 66

5. **Summary of Recommendations** ...................................................................................... 69

**Annex 1: Key Informant Interviewees** .............................................................................. 75
Introduction

In August 2012, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Government of Sri Lanka signed the Country Programme Document (CPD) (2013-2017), outlining UNDP’s contributions towards national development priorities. The CPD was designed to align with the then government’s development policy framework, the Mahinda Chinthana (2011-2016), and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). The CPD aimed to support national development priorities in two broad focus areas: Governance for Empowerment and Social Inclusion (GESI) and Environmental Sustainability and Disaster Resilience (ESDR). The estimated budgetary resources within UNDP CPD (2013-2017) for GESI are USD 38m (68%) and for ESDR are USD 18m (32%). As of September 2016, USD 12.4m has been mobilised for GESI, and USD 49.7m for ESDR (including USD 38m approved by the Green Climate Fund Board), for the 2013-2017 CPD cycle. Support for ESDR activities was entirely raised through project initiatives rather than allocated from UNDP’s core/regular funding resources.1 There are ten and sixteen different project initiatives under the GESI and ESDR cluster areas respectively, in addition to initiatives under the Policy and Communications Units.

As the CPD reached the mid-point of its term in 2015, Sri Lanka went through a major political transition, with the election of President Maithripala Sirisena and a coalition government comprising the two largest political parties in the country. In light of these changes, UNDP in Sri Lanka contracted Verité Research (VR) to conduct a Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the CPD. The overall aim of the MTR is to assess its relevance in Sri Lanka’s current context with a view to informing UNDP’s next programme cycle. It will also recommend potential adjustments to the current programme cycle for the remainder of its term.

This MTR involves four components:

a. Analysis of the current national context

b. Assessment of the UNDP Country Programme

c. Analysis of the relevance and effectiveness of the Strengthening Enforcement of Law,  

---

Access to Justice and Social Integration (SELAJSI) Programme; and

d. Forward-looking recommendations

This Report is the outcome document of the MTR, and is presented in three sections. Section 1 details VR’s research design and methodology for the MTR. Section 2 presents findings on the evolving international context and Sri Lanka’s national context. Section 3 contains VR’s assessment of the UNDP Country Programme, with a particular focus on the SELAJSI Programme. The section will (a) examine key findings in relation to UNDP’s Country Programme; and (b) suggest recommendations for revising the Country Programme in the current operating context. It is noted that these recommendations are confined to the overall framework of the existing Country Programme. By contrast, section 4 includes recommendations on the design of a new Country Programme, which presents UNDP with an important opportunity to adopt certain strategic filters in determining future interventions. This section accordingly offers insights on the manner in which the evolving context in Sri Lanka ought to inform UNDP’s future programming. Finally, section 5 presents a summary of recommendations.
This MTR comprises four components: (1) context analysis, (2) assessment of the relevance of the Country Programme, (3) assessment of the relevance and effectiveness of the SELAJSI programme; and (4) forward-looking recommendations. The main research questions pertaining to each component and the overall methodological approach adopted are detailed below.

### 1.1 Research Components

#### A. Context analysis

Sri Lanka has undergone considerable socioeconomic and political change over the past year. Meanwhile, the UN’s post-2015 sustainable development agenda was brought into effect in January 2016. Moreover, the timeframe of UNDP’s current CPD overlaps with the timeframe of the UNDAF signed in 2012 between the Sri Lankan government and the UN. This component of the MTR was divided into two subcomponents.

First, VR focused on assessing the post-2015 context against UNDP’s current country programme. Accordingly, VR focused on the following research question:

**A1.** What changes have occurred in Sri Lanka’s political, socioeconomic and environmental context to date since the design of the CPD and the corresponding Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP)?

In analysing the country’s national context, VR built on the relevant context analysis undertaken as part of the UNDAF MTR, paying special attention to UNDP’s two main focus areas:

1. **GESI** – relating to sustainable livelihoods, public service delivery, governance for local economic development, rule of law, and access to justice, human rights and gender equality, with additional focus on specific issues relevant to the SELAJSI programme.

2. **ESDR** – relating to environmental sustainability, climate change and disaster risk management.

Second, VR located the evolving national context in Sri Lanka within the global discourse on sustainable development. VR focused on the following key question under this subcomponent:

**A2.** What are the main linkages between the current national context and the emerging...
international sustainable development agenda?

VR sought to identify convergences between UNDP’s focus areas and national and international priorities, and specific development challenges that UNDP can address in short-term, mid-term and long-term programming in the country.

B. Assessment of the relevance of the Country Programme

Under this component, VR assessed the relevance of the current CPD in terms of its contribution to national development to date. Moreover, VR assessed the extent to which the CPD remains relevant in light of the changes in national and international development priorities.

This component of the study accordingly contains two subcomponents.

First, VR assessed the past performance of UNDP’s country programme in terms of the CPD and the corresponding CPAP. VR focused on the following key questions:

B1. What were the major achievements and lessons learnt in terms of UNDP’s current country programme?

B2. Has the Country Programme been appropriately responsive to political, institutional, economic, environmental, legal and other changes in the country?

B3. What were UNDP’s contributions, gaps and missed opportunities in terms of enabling progress towards the country’s development priorities as identified in the Results and Resources Framework, as well as in initiatives undertaken outside this framework?

B4. Have UNDP’s systems created human resource, systemic and structural capacities for sustained results of its programmes?

Second, VR assessed UNDP’s country programme in terms of its continued relevance to Sri Lanka’s national context and the emerging international sustainable development agenda. This subcomponent was therefore forward-looking, and focused on the following key questions set out in the RFP:

B5. To what extent is the country programme relevant to the evolving context and the national development agenda?

B6. Is the current country programme relevant to the post-2015 sustainable development agenda?

B7. How can the relevance, efficiency and sustainability of UNDP’s current programme cycle be enhanced?

B8. To what extent is UNDP’s engagement in Sri Lanka a reflection of strategic considerations and the agency’s comparative advantage?

B9. To what extent is UNDP’s selected method of implementation and partnership modalities suitable to the country and the development context?

In responding to these key research questions, VR set out to assess the Country Programme’s performance.
C. Assessment of the relevance and effectiveness of the SELAJSI programme

This MTR includes an analysis of the SELAJSI programme in light of changes in Sri Lanka’s national context. VR assessed the effectiveness of the programme’s implementation thus far, and the extent to which it remains relevant and effective in the national context. Accordingly, VR focused on the following key questions:

C1. How effective has the management and implementation of the SELAJSI programme been to date?

C2. To what extent is the SELAJSI programme relevant to the evolving context and the national development agenda?

C3. To what extent is UNDP’s engagement in SELAJSI a reflection of strategic considerations and the agency’s comparative advantage?

D. Forward-looking recommendations

The final component of this MTR envisages certain forward-looking recommendations on adjustments to UNDP’s Country Programme and a revised Results and Resources Framework for the current CPD, based on the findings of the previous three components. The recommendations emerging from this component aim to inform (a) possible adjustments to UNDP’s current programme cycle; and (b) adjustments to UNDP’s next programme cycle.

VR focused on the following key questions in this regard:

D1. What revisions to the CPD are required to ensure that UNDP is relevant and responsive in the evolving national and international context, while leveraging its comparative advantages?

D2. What are the entry-points to enhance UNDP’s contributions to national priorities and the international sustainable development agenda?

The recommendations arising out of this MTR on any revisions to the current CPD and its Results and Resources Framework was developed in consultation with UNDP and other relevant external stakeholders.
1.2 Research Methodology

The overall methodological approach adopted for components A, B and C of the MTR is detailed in Table 1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY</th>
<th>FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT</th>
<th>SECONDARY SOURCES</th>
<th>OUTPUTS/DELIVERABLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| A   | 1. Key legislative enactments  
E.g. The Interim Budget, Appropriation Act 2016, 19th Amendment to the Constitution | 1. Statements made in parliament e.g. Parliamentary Hansard and www.manthri.lk  
2. Media reports in all three language media via The Media Analysis  
3. Reports by intergovernmental and multilateral organisations including the UN, World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)  
2. Civil society representatives  
3. Representatives of donor organisations and development partners  
4. Representatives from the private sector |
|     | 2. Policy documents  
E.g. The Election Manifesto of Maithripala Sirisena, National Plan of Action to Implement the Recommendations of the LLRC, MoU between the SLFP and the UNP, new guidance from the Ministry of Sustainable Development and Wildlife, A Blue Green Era Statement by President Sirisena, Ministry of Mahaweli Development and Environment | | |
|     | 3. International policy documents and reports  

Narrative section (6–10 pages) that analyses the main features of the current national context  
Narrative section (2–3 pages) summarising the international sustainable development agenda and linkages to national priorities
3. 2014 ROAR
4. 2015 ROAR

1. UNDP project and programme documents

2. Mid-Term Review Reports
   E.g. Promoting Sustainable Biomass Energy Production and Modern Bio-Energy Technologies

3. Evaluation reports
   E.g. Assessment of Development Results Evaluation of UNDP Contribution 2012, Evaluation of The Joint UN Programme on Prevention and Response to Gender Based Violence (GBV)

1. UNDP staff
2. Government officials and policy makers
3. Civil society representatives
4. Representatives of donor organisations and development partners
5. Representatives from the private sector

Narrative section (5-7 pages) on performance of the CPD and UNDP’s contribution to national development thus far

Narrative section (5-7) pages on continued relevance of the CPD to national context and priorities, as well as the international sustainable development agenda
| C       | SELAJSI Programme Document | 1. SELAJSI Progress and Results Update Programme Board Meeting (2014 and 2015) |
|         |                           | 3. ROARs (2014 and 2015)                                       |
|         | 1. SELAJSI programme staff | 2. SELAJSI technical staff                                     |
|         | 3. SELAJSI government counterparts | 4. SELAJSI civil society counterparts |
|         | Narrative section (3 - 5) pages on relevance and effectiveness of the SELAJSI programme |
2.1 Global Developments

The sustainable development agenda

2015 marked a significant point in global development as the year for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); the articulation of a new post-2015 sustainable development agenda; and the agreements made at the United Nations Conference on Climate Change (COP21) in Paris.

While Sri Lanka met many of the global MDG targets well in advance of 2015, some gaps in achievement have remained. For example, national poverty rates were halved between 1990 and 2012, but inequality gaps still persist. Gender parity has been achieved in primary education, but women’s participation in the labour force and political decision-making is limited.

Meanwhile, development partners and civil society organisations (CSOs) observed that Sri Lanka underperformed in terms of MDG 7 (i.e. ensure environmental sustainability) ahead of the 2015 milestone. Moreover, the World Bank noted that while Sri Lanka was an early achiever on some indicators (e.g. protected area, ozone depleting substance consumption, and access to water and basic sanitation), it fared poorly with respect to forest cover and CO₂ emissions. CSOs also observed that poor progress with respect to MDG 7 could be attributed to weaknesses in service delivery, inadequate stakeholder consultation, data gaps, insufficient knowledge among officials on MDGs and regional imbalances. In light of Sri Lanka’s underperformance with regard to MDG 7, and shortcomings relating to forest cover and CO₂ emissions, it is crucial that the government begins to prioritise environmental considerations such as environmental sustainability.

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) aim to inform development priorities in a manner that balances economic, social, and environmental aspects of sustainable development. The Sri


Lankan government has endorsed the SDGs and as detailed above, is currently developing mechanisms to ensure their implementation. In May 2016, Sri Lanka signed the Paris Agreement as a precursor to ratification of the agreement.

The 17 SDGs with their 169 targets represent a ‘plan of action for people, planet and prosperity’ as well as peace and partnership, aiming to realise significant global changes by 2030. Diverse stakeholders including businesses shaped both the SDGs and COP21 agreements. The SDGs provide for closer integration of social, economic, and environmental elements of sustainable development within a holistic framework. This holistic approach represents a departure from the MDGs. Illustratively, in addition to being narrower in scope than the SDGs, the MDGs were addressed largely in isolation from one another. For example, MDGs dealing with maternal health were dealt with in isolation from those on hunger. Further, the SDGs’ treatment of environmental issues is far more comprehensive than that of the MDGs. Goal 8 aims to ‘decouple economic growth from environmental degradation’, with strong implications for the future of sustainable business, growth, and consumption. Further, the SDGs are also universal in scope, in that they apply to countries at all levels of development. As such, they aim to address systemic challenges, including (a) unsustainable production and consumption (b) environmental degradation; and (c) inequality. At present, UNDP’s individual programmes are substantially aligned with the SDGs. For example, the fifth SDG – ‘achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls’ – is incorporated into the SELAJSI and G-LED projects.4

There is increasing global recognition of how intertwined economic growth is with natural capital, and that environmental protection is a necessary condition to achieving sustainable and inclusive growth. The Yale Environmental Performance Index (EPI) 2016 Global scorecard5 shows overall progress worldwide in some areas (e.g. Health Impacts, Access to Drinking Water and Sanitation) but worsening performance in others. Challenges include deteriorating air quality, over-exploited or collapsed fish stocks, biodiversity and deforestation, inadequate wastewater treatment, and underachievement in meeting Nitrogen Oxide targets affecting climate change. Environmental measurement-related priorities included the growing recognition of how measurement is linked with declining environmental and human health. There is also recognition that science-based policy-relevant indicators are vital to the measurement and management of data gaps, and that there is an urgent need to strengthen key environmental measures to track country performance and progress.6

These events imply a growing understanding that environmental support services are essential for sustainable and inclusive growth.7 There is an increasing awareness of the risks posed to these services and thereby to sustainable growth. This is illustrated in the trends seen in annual multi-stakeholder surveys on perceptions of risks affecting the business climate in terms of likelihood and severity of impact by the World

5. The EPI ranks countries and provides issue specific metrics in relation to priority environmental issues in two areas; human health protection and eco-system protection.
6. Urgent data gaps in the EPI are noted for free water quality, species loss, climate adaptation, and waste management.
7. Natural environmental resources or assets provide a range of public good services that are not explicitly valued in the market but are essential for sustainable growth. These services include flood control, soil protection, preventing salt-water intrusion into fresh water bodies and coastal lands, watershed services etc. The loss or damage of these assets are often unpriced and hence ignored, but cause significant impacts in terms of loss of livelihoods, human mortality and morbidity costs, and economic losses.
Economic Forum (WEF).\(^8\) The 2016 WEF survey report notes that four of the top five Global Risks of Highest Concern for the next 10 years are environment or climate change-related. Climate change, water crises, and energy-related risks are therefore globally perceived as common risks.

Meanwhile, there is also greater emphasis internationally on a more collaborative approach to development financing. The Accra Agenda for Action, Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation and the Addis Ababa Agenda on Financing for Development agreed in July 2015 emphasise the need for the involvement of partners beyond government and donors. New sources of financing that could be considered include private business and finance, and international and ‘South-South’ development cooperation. The SDG framework also emphasises improvements in internal revenue generating capacity, and engagement with the private sector in order to access a wider pool of potential development funding.

**The donor landscape**

Sri Lanka’s transition to lower-middle income status has contributed to (1) a decrease inOfficial Development Assistance (ODA) as a proportion of Gross National Income (GNI); and (2) a greater focus on ‘upstream’ programming. Subsequent to the change in government and the co-sponsored resolution on reconciliation, accountability and human rights passed at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in 2015, governance, reconciliation and transitional justice have become new donor priority areas for Sri Lanka. Therefore, although overall donor funding to Sri Lanka has depleted, UNDP programme areas such as governance reform and reconciliation have seen an increase in donor funding commitments post-2015.

The European Union (EU) is considering expanding its programme in Sri Lanka to include a second focal sector: governance and reconciliation, in addition to its existing programme focus on integrated rural development. The EU’s Support to the District Development Programme (SDDP) (2012-2017) is currently underway, and is implemented by the ILO, FAO, UNICEF, UNDP, UNOPS, and IFC. The SDDP programme focuses on local economic development, local governance and poverty reduction. Moreover, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has identified governance and democratic reforms as key funding priority areas for Sri Lanka. USAID-supported programmes include those on rule of law, public procurement and support to Parliament. Meanwhile, Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) places a relatively higher priority on disaster risk reduction (DRR) and economic development, with a secondary focus on infrastructure development.

Table 2 below illustrates donor priority areas. Overall, issues such as reconciliation, democratic governance, and rural development were identified as high priority areas for donor key informants (KIs). Livelihood development and poverty alleviation were identified as medium priority areas for donor KIs, largely attributed to Sri Lanka’s status as a lower-middle income country. Meanwhile, apart from JICA, climate change and DRR were identified as low priority areas for donor KIs. Notwithstanding these

---

\(^8\) The WEF defines a global risk as ‘an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, can cause significant negative impact for several countries or industries within the next 10 years’ while a global trend ‘is a long-term pattern that is currently taking place and that could contribute to amplifying global risks and/or altering the relationship between them.’
priorities, certain donors stated that they were in the process of realigning their strategic plans with Sri Lanka’s country context. As such, Table 2 below may need to be periodically revisited.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DONOR</th>
<th>HIGH PRIORITY</th>
<th>MEDIUM PRIORITY</th>
<th>LOW PRIORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government of Norway</td>
<td>Reconciliation; reconstruction; transitional justice; protection of minority rights</td>
<td>Livelihood development; media education and independent media</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR); climate change mitigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Democratic governance: (a) strengthen cohesion among regional, ethnic, and religious communities; (b) strengthen capacities of key democratic institutions, improve independent oversight of government policies and performance; and (c) enhance civic engagement, emphasising marginalised populations</td>
<td>Economic governance: (a) improve business enabling environment; (b) encourage private sector-led inclusive growth and investment; and (c) improve public fiscal transparency and financial management</td>
<td>DRR; climate change mitigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Rural development</td>
<td>Governance and reconciliation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Disaster management and DRR; infrastructure development, including a focus on Brown environmental issues a</td>
<td></td>
<td>Governance and transitional justice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Brown environmental issues include solid waste, effluent pollution etc.

Donors prioritising governance and strengthening democratic institutions valued UNDP’s experience and technical expertise on these areas. Further, the UN’s image of neutrality and its relationships with government (at both national and local levels) were seen as giving UNDP a unique advantage over other development actors. Moreover, given the political sensitivity of some aspects of governance reform in the Sri Lankan context, UNDP’s status as an ‘apolitical’ development counterpart was particularly welcomed by donors. On the areas of livelihoods development, donor KIs expressed doubts over UNDP’s ‘unique selling point’ (USP). These doubts were primarily attributed to the existence of local CSOs that had the capacity to address livelihood issues at a lower cost. Currently, donors express a low level of awareness on UNDP’s work in its ESDR cluster. Furthermore, few donors KIs identified environment as a stand-alone high priority area. Yet, donors are likely to be open to integrating environmental aspects into identified priority areas, thus mainstreaming environment across diverse interventions. For example, JICA builds work on Brown issues into its programmes on infrastructure development.

Some donor KIs expected that further reductions...
in development aid to Sri Lanka would enhance the profile of the private sector as an important funding source. Programming on SDGs was identified as being able to enhance private sector partnerships with UNDP. According to donor KIs, UNDP had the potential to partner with the private sector to develop environmental monitoring tools in alignment with international best practices.

2.2 Pre-2015 Local Context

In May 2009 the conflict between successive Sri Lankan governments and the secessionist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) came to a decisive end, with the state’s military victory over the LTTE. Former President Mahinda Rajapaksa won his second presidential term a year later and the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA), headed by Rajapaksa, went on to win a landslide victory in the April 2010 parliamentary elections.

The years following the end of the war in 2009 were marked by increasing centralisation of power – specifically under the executive president – and the unprecedented erosion of the country’s institutional framework. In that context, weak governance became compounded and felt across various spheres, including economic development, environmental protection, post-war reconciliation, religious violence and rights protection.

It was within this context that the UNDP CPD and the corresponding CPAP were developed. Within the politically restrictive environment under the Rajapaksa government, donors and development actors shifted towards aligning their programmes solely with government priorities. This shift resulted in reduced engagement with the government on issues such as human rights and environmental oversight. During this period, programming became highly centralised and projects shifted to a National Implementation Modality (NIM). Under this modality, the relevant government partner is responsible for the achievement of project results and management of project resources, with all projects subject to a centralised government approval process prior to implementation.

2.3 Post-2015 Local Context: Duality, Incoherence and Flux

2.3.1 The emerging political landscape

Sri Lanka underwent a major political transition in 2015 with the election of President Maithripala Sirisena and a new coalition government between the United Front for Good Governance (UNFGG) and the UPFA. The current government can be characterised as a loose coalition between Sri Lanka’s two largest parties: the United National Party (UNP), which dominates the UNFGG, and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), which forms the core of the UPFA. The UNFGG secured the highest number of seats in parliamentary elections last year, and the UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe was subsequently appointed Prime Minister. President Sirisena currently leads the SLFP as well as the UPFA.

The alliance between the SLFP and UNP is unprecedented; the two parties have historically competed for alternate terms in power, rather than shared it in a unified coalition. The alliance was the outcome of the convergence of anti-incumbent forces in the run up to the January 2015 presidential election, which brought an end to former President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s decade-long spell in power. However, the current arrangement has given rise to political competition within the coalition government as
both the President and Prime Minister attempt to consolidate their individual power bases. The effects of this competition have permeated into policy-making, as well as the functioning of state institutions.

In general, KIs were optimistic that the change in government enhanced the prospects for better governance, post-war reconciliation, and sustainable economic growth. The government has embarked on a broad agenda of constitutional reform, reconciliation, and economic progress. The weakness of state institutions along with the delicacy of the current UNP-SLFP alliance presents some of the biggest challenges for progressing the government’s reform agenda.

Sri Lanka’s post-2015 national context presents certain key challenges for UNDP’s Country Programme. First, there is duality at the highest levels of decision-making due to the existence of two competing centres of power within the government – embodied in the President and Prime Minister – with each attempting to consolidate their own power bases within the state machinery. This has led to divergent compulsions within government agencies and institutions in terms of leadership structures and reporting lines. Second, this duality has contributed to considerable incoherence in policy-making. There has been a proliferation of parallel institutions with overlapping mandates and jurisdictions, often functioning with little communication or coordination between one another. Third, in the aftermath of the two elections held in 2015, there also remains considerable bureaucratic and administrative flux, resulting from indiscriminate changes in personnel and policy preferences. This administrative flux has undermined effective programme execution by weakening institutional memory and causing unforeseeable delays in implementation.

2.3.2 Governance and institutions

Post-election governance reforms

Governance reform was a key anchor of both Sirisena’s and the UNFGG’s election campaigns. Immediately after the January election, the government initiated its 100-Day Programme that comprised a number of governance reforms. In April 2015, the 19th Amendment to the Constitution was passed. The 19th Amendment restored checks on executive presidential power and instituted a degree of power sharing between the President and Prime Minister. Under the 100-Day Programme, the government also committed to passing a Right to Information (RTI) Act, a National Audit Act, and introducing a Code of Ethical Conduct for Members of Parliament (MPs).

However, there has been limited progress in delivering these reforms. The RTI Bill was gazetted in December 2015 and unanimously passed by Parliament in June 2016. The Ethical Code of Conduct for MPs was tabled in Parliament on 7 April 2016 but is yet to be taken up for debate. There has been no significant traction in relation to the National Audit Bill.

Among the most popular pledges of the yahapalana (good governance) campaign was ending the corruption that marked the Rajapaksa presidency. The eradication of corruption was also championed by several civil society movements that backed Sirisena’s campaign. For instance, prior to the August 2015 general elections, all political party leaders signed the March 12 Declaration. The Declaration was developed by a coalition of CSOs and aimed to secure commitments from political parties to withhold nominations of individuals who had a past record of engaging in bribery and corruption. The SLFP also included the criteria of the March 12 Declaration in their election manifesto. However,
progress in investigating allegations of corruption among powerful actors in the previous government has been slow. Incidents such as the Central Bank bond scandal\(^9\) and allegations of nepotism\(^10\) under the Sirisena-UNP government have contributed to disillusionment with regard to the government’s pledges to combat corruption. Public opinion surveys indicate decreased confidence in the government’s commitment to eradicating corruption. In October 2015, in a survey conducted by the Centre for Policy Alternatives, 49.6% of respondents felt that the government was committed to eradicating corruption. In February 2016, only 34.5% of survey respondents indicated the same.\(^11\)

In December 2015, Parliament adopted a resolution establishing sixteen Sectoral Oversight Committees (SOCs) and a Finance Committee to exercise legislative oversight functions. The SOCs are mandated to ‘examine all Bills, Resolutions, Treaties, and Reports...relating to subjects within their jurisdiction.’\(^12\) Each SOC is also mandated to proactively review the effectiveness and utility of legislation pertaining to their relevant subject areas.

In March 2016, the government formally initiated a renewed constitutional reform process, through a resolution enabling Parliament to function as a Constitutional Assembly. The process is expected to deliver on key governance reforms pledged by the government; particularly reforms targeting at the electoral system, as well as state reforms forming part of a political settlement to the ethnic conflict. A 20-member Public Representations Committee (PRC) was appointed to solicit public submissions on constitutional reform, comprising prominent civil society members and government officials.\(^13\) Members of the public were permitted to submit written representations to the PRC or provide oral representations during the Committee’s public sittings. The PRC completed and submitted its final report in May 2016.

**Institutional weaknesses**

The post-election consolidation of the coalition government has involved the establishment of an exceedingly large Cabinet, generating further challenges to effective service delivery. Cabinet ministries and agencies established under them often serve to distribute the benefits of political patronage to voters, for example, through jobs and access to state resources. Hence, awarding ministerial portfolios to party members is often a means of consolidating support for the ruling coalition. At present, the Cabinet comprises 27 Ministers, 10 State Ministers and 8 Deputy Ministers. These patronage structures that result in the over-politicisation of institutions continue to operate at all levels of government. These structures undermine the ability of government institutions to deliver services in a cohesive, professional, equitable and effective manner.

KIs pointed to an extended period of


\(^12\) Order 8, section 1(a), (b) and (c), Order Paper of Parliament for Saturday, December 19, 2015; Oversight functions are allocated to the SOC in relation the subjects, functions and departments assigned to their relevant Ministries under Article 44(1) of the Constitution.

\(^13\) See http://www.yourconstitution.lk/.
administrative and institutional flux within ministries in the aftermath of the two elections in 2015. During this period, appointments to leadership positions within bureaucracies, such as Ministry Secretaries, were periodically changed. These changes resulted in lags in pick-up time between appointments that delayed the implementation of ministerial functions. Moreover, there is also little coordination within and between agencies at all levels of government, leading to bureaucratic inefficiencies and policy deadlock. Service delivery in government agencies is also impeded by poor resource allocation, capacity gaps and the lack of performance-based incentives for personnel. Poor oversight and accountability mechanisms have further contributed to mismanagement.

**Parallel institutions**

Far reaching public sector reforms are likely to result in high political costs, given the extent to which state agencies have come to serve as patronage distribution mechanisms. Hence, in response to the systemic weaknesses of public institutions, successive governments have opted to establish *ad hoc* parallel institutions as a stopgap measure. The proliferation of parallel institutions is particularly marked in the current context, in light of the competing interests within the centres of power, i.e. the President and Prime Minister in the coalition government. While a degree of cooperation is necessary to prevent policy deadlock, the present alignment of political power within the government tends to move towards competition between Sirisena and Wickremesinghe. Both have an interest in maximising their legitimacy in the eyes of the public by gaining credit for populist policies. This competition has manifested in the proliferation of *ad hoc* institutions reporting to or closely associated with either Sirisena or Wickremesinghe. Such *ad hoc* institutions have been established to deal with a range of issues, including economic development, reconciliation, public accountability and environmental sustainability.

For example, KIs pointed to an initiative by the Office of National Unity and Reconciliation (ONUR, established in mid–2015) to carry out grassroots-level Inter-faith Dialogues. This initiative was simultaneous to an effort by the Ministry of National Coexistence, Dialogue and Official Languages to convert existing local-level Language Societies to new ‘Coexistence Societies’. There was little indication of efforts to co-ordinate or integrate these broadly similar initiatives by the relevant government agencies.14

There has been a similar proliferation of *ad hoc* institutions under dual centres of power in the sphere of public accountability. The Anti-Corruption Secretariat falls under the purview of the Prime Minister, while President Sirisena appointed the Commission of Inquiry (CoI) on Serious Acts of Fraud, Corruption and Abuse of Power, State Resources and Privileges as well as the Presidential Task Force on Stolen Asset Recovery. The mandates and jurisdictions of these *ad hoc* institutions overlap with each other as well as with standing institutions such as the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC).

**Environmental governance**

Over time, institutional deficiencies have severely undermined the effectiveness of national environmental governance. Sri Lanka has had a history of early achievements in environmental legislation and regulation (such as the National Environmental Act No. 47 of 1980

---

14. See Section 2.3.4 below for more information on the various institutions and mechanisms proposed for dealing with transitional justice and reconciliation.
and subsequent amendments by Act No. 56 of 1988 and Act No. 53 of 2000; and an environmental protection licensing regime). However, institutional weaknesses coupled with increased fragmentation of environment-related institutions and mandates, as well as an erosion of environment-related skills and capacities from the 1990s, have impaired the efficacy of existing environmental laws and regulations.

For example, KIs attested to weaknesses in the existing Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure that undermines environmental protection goals in development. These weaknesses include the limited time period of 30 days granted for public consultation, and poor post-EIA monitoring and impact auditing. KIs noted an urgent need to review, evaluate and update EIA practices in line with current environmental safeguard practices, as used by multilateral institutions. Political pressure and poor accountability mechanisms have also inhibited the ability of key environmental governance institutions (e.g. the Central Environmental Authority) to (a) function independently (b) build oversight capacity; and (c) implement their mandates. These institutions also suffer from poor inter-agency coordination and information sharing, which limits the coherence of environmental governance and regulatory mechanisms.

Amendments are currently underway to resolve ambiguities in the EIA Regulations of 1993. Changes include empowering the Central Environmental Authority to (a) stop industry pollution during a legal process (b) implement the ‘Polluter Pays’ principle, and the use of taxing negative environmental externalities (c) strengthen the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) (d) focus on disaster risks in planning processes; and (e) initiate greater dialogue with CSOs.

Further, political competition between the President and the Prime Minister has resulted in a considerable overlap in institutional mandates and jurisdictions – including those related to natural resources, climate change, and environmental sustainability. KIs reiterated that the continued fragmentation of existing environmental governance institutions and mechanisms, and the proliferation of new institutions have contributed to the lack of a coherent and holistic approach to managing environmental sustainability.

For example, the newly created Ministry of Sustainable Development & Wildlife, set up by the Prime Minister, is currently developing a range of new institutional structures that address sustainable development concerns. Such institutional reform will be implemented following the passage of a Sustainable Development Act. The Act is expected to establish a semi-governmental council that will develop a National Sustainable Development Strategy. Additionally, Wickremesinghe, who is also the Minister of Policy Planning and Economic Affairs, is developing a National Policy on Economic Affairs and a corresponding action plan that will inform the implementation of the SDGs. As KIs noted, the Prime Minister has pursued the creation of new and parallel institutions that often undermine existing structures and centralise control under his purview. Meanwhile, President Sirisena has pursued more populist initiatives aimed at creating results within a three year period. Sirisena, who is the Minister of Mahaweli Development and Environment, spearheads the ‘Sri Lanka

15. The institutional framework relating to environmental areas has changed over time. For example from 2005 to 2015, this included the Ministry of Agriculture, Environment, Irrigation and Mahaweli Development (23/11/2005 to 28/01/2007), Ministry of Environment (28/01/2007 to 09/02/2010), Ministry of Environment (23/04/2010 to 28/01/2013), Ministry of Environment and Renewable Energy (28/01/2013 to 09/01/2015) and Ministry of Mahaweli Development and Environment (12/01/2015).
Next’ campaign aimed at ushering in a ‘Blue-Green Era’. As such, the President’s reform agenda surrounding sustainable consumption and production, and the sustainable development agenda pursued by the Prime Minister is expected to result in significant political competition and mandate overlap in environmental sustainability management and environmental governance.

In this context of institutional weaknesses and duality in government policies, KIs identified the following environmental sustainability priorities:

a. Integration of environmental considerations into development planning

b. Institutional strengthening of environmental agencies; and

c. Strategies, policies and actions to restore degraded ecosystems

Civil society as enablers of change

There has been a marked improvement in the space for civil society activity in 2015. Oversight of CSOs has shifted from the Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of National Coexistence, Dialogue and Official Languages. This shift from military to civilian oversight has reduced state-sponsored harassment against CSOs in the country.

Further, there has been greater cooperation between civil society and the government, through both formal and informal mechanisms. Many prominent civil society activists now hold positions in government bodies or in independent commissions. For instance, the former executive director of Transparency International Sri Lanka, J.C. Weliamuna, was appointed the Chairperson of the Special Presidential Task Force for the Recovery of Illegally Acquired State Assets.

Such appointments have enhanced the ability of civil society actors to influence change from within government. Civil society mobilisation was instrumental in building public support for governance reforms such as the abolishment of the executive presidency. Civil society members have been able to work closely with the government on key reform initiatives; for example prominent CSO activists and experts were involved in drafting the 19th Amendment to the Constitution and the Right to Information Bill.

Civil society has also been at the forefront of activism on issues of human rights, reconciliation, and transitional justice. For example, campaigns for action on missing persons and enforced disappearances have been largely sustained by organised civil society movements, alongside victims and families of the disappeared. While the space for CSO activity on these issues has improved markedly since the change in the government, surveillance and harassment of CSOs working on rights issues has persisted – particularly from the state security apparatus in the North and East of the country.

CSOs have been important drivers of public opinion on environmental issues, especially when environmental concerns have intersected with economic, cultural and human rights issues. For example, civil society mobilisation against the controversial Norochcholai coal power plant involved local religious and community leaders as well as environmental CSOs, protesting against the displacement of the area’s Catholic community, interruption of fishing livelihoods, and environmental damage. Yet KIs noted that the changed political context had relatively lower bearing on environmental issues compared to governance or rights issues. KIs in fact acknowledged certain weaknesses within civil society in the environmental sector. These included poor collaboration, weak environment specific analytical skills, and the absence of a strategic and
principle-based vision in many CSOs working on environmental issues.

The improvement in operational space with the change in government, points to a vulnerability of the CSO sector in the face of repeated political transitions. CSOs in Sri Lanka, particularly those working on issues pertaining to governance, human rights and democracy, have often relied on relationship-based access channels to powerful actors within government to secure operational space. Hence, while these CSOs have been influential in the direct lobbying of government, they have been less successful in generating public support for reforms. A useful case study in this regard is the CSO-championed campaign on the Right to Information (RTI). Progress on the enactment of the RTI legislation has been slow, partly due to the low level of public demand for a guaranteed right to information. A survey carried out in early 2015 indicated that over two-thirds of respondents experienced difficulty in accessing government information; yet almost 50% were unaware of a ‘right to information’. 73% were unaware of the previous attempts to enact RTI legislation. The data above points to the weaknesses in the capacity of CSOs to generate public support for high priority governance reforms. It is critical that these weaknesses are remedied if CSOs are to be perceived as being central to public accountability systems.

The experience of CSOs working on issues of human rights and accountability also indicates the extent to which success of advocacy efforts is shaped by political dynamics. Civil society has been able to successfully capitalise on competition between the President and Prime Minister for legitimacy over issues of governance and anti-corruption; where such competition is absent – such as on the issue of missing persons – CSO advocacy has had far less success.

CSO activity has also benefitted from enhanced media freedom since the 2015 transition, which helped improve the public image of CSOs. In the past, CSOs have often been pejoratively cast as subject to foreign influence and acting against national interests. In contrast to the pre-2015 period, the media has not portrayed advocacy CSOs in such a negative light. Nevertheless, while there is greater space for critical media reporting in the current context, the quality of reporting on key public interest issues is often weak in the vernacular press. Coverage often lacks responsible, evidence-based reporting, limiting the utility of the press to inform public debate and reasoning over proposed reform measures. For example, justifications for restricting the scope of the RTI Bill on the basis of national security were often uncritically advanced in the press; in fact, this claim is belied by an overriding public interest clause contained in the Bill. Press coverage also often reproduces gender, ethnic and religious biases in reporting.18

2.3.3 Sustainable and inclusive economic growth

The economic policy direction of the current coalition government has reflected ‘compromise’ between the SLFP and the UNP. The UNP has been more outward-looking and market-oriented, while the SLFP has been relatively inward-looking and protectionist. The current government’s overall emerging policy direction has been more outward-looking, emphasising foreign investment and international trade. However, given the

---


high propensity for political competition within the current arrangement of power, there are likely to be divergences on economic policy within government on key issues such as pension reform, and in approaches to sustainable development and economic liberalisation.

Environmentally sustainable development

Beyond the discussion of SDGs presented above, there is a growing recognition by the government of the need to set its economic growth along a more environmentally sustainable trajectory. However, KIs felt that high initial expectations regarding the integration of environmental concerns in development planning have not been met. For example, KIs noted that the Colombo Port City development project resumed after a temporary suspension, despite concerns over the project’s second and allegedly sub-standard EIA.

In the past, the government’s international commitments have played a role in creating incentives for the integration of environmental concerns in economic policy. For example, in 2014 the European Commission (EC) banned exports of fish from Sri Lanka to the EU on the basis that Sri Lanka’s fisheries engaged in Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing. In 2013, Sri Lanka was the second largest exporter of fresh and chilled swordfish and tuna to the EU, accounting for EUR 74m (or LKR 13bn) of fisheries imports to Europe. The government’s subsequent efforts to regain access to the EU export market through amendments to the legal and regulatory framework governing fisheries resulted in the EC’s proposal to lift the ban.19

Furthermore, given energy imports and thereby high electricity prices, electricity conservation and a shift towards renewable energy sources will become a cost-saving strategy in the medium to long-run. Moreover, water will be an increasing concern that needs to be prioritised for investment. Effluents and solid waste management are urgent issues that require innovative thinking and effective policies to support a move towards a circular economy.

Yet there is an increasing lack of policy coherence, even disjointedness, in forging a green growth policy for Sri Lanka. For example, despite a national policy on moving towards specific renewable energy targets, there have been moves to re-start an Indian-funded coal power project. This has galvanised increasing public debate on the importance of sustainable approaches to development. Furthermore, while a focus on Blue and Green environmental issues is welcome in national policy, there is an urgent need to address increasing Brown (e.g. waste and chemical discharges) issues as part of Sri Lanka’s cleaner growth trajectory.

The Sri Lanka Next initiative, which focuses on sustainable production and consumption, is currently underway. The Ministry of Mahaweli Development and Environment is formulating its three-year Master Plan for the environment. The Plan represents an amalgamation of the former Ministry programme with new initiatives associated with the Sri Lanka Next Blue Green initiative.

Green issues include green energy in the energy and health sectors, and in agriculture and industry, in order to promote green industrial policy in Sri Lanka. The Ministry of Mahaweli Development and Environment’s role is to support the transition towards a green economy. The programme also includes: (a) the establishment of the new Climate Change Commission (b)

an annual Climate Change Adaptation Forum (c) the Youth Institute to promote Blue Green in Sri Lanka (d) the development of 10,000 Blue Green Smart villages (e) the promotion of Green Building and organic agriculture (f) national and international conferences; and (g) an annual environmental exhibition. Furthermore, environmental education initiatives will be held throughout a National Environment Week\(^{20}\) with a new monthly District Environmental Day on a rotational basis.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Sustainable Development and Wildlife is developing a Sustainable Development Roadmap that includes: (a) a National Sustainable Development Task Force (b) a National Sustainable Development Platform (c) capacity building and implementation of policies (d) sustainable development indicators, guidelines and standards (e) a National Sustainable Development Strategy and Policy; and (f) demonstration projects. The sustainable development indicators and National Sustainable Development Strategy and Policy are planned for completion by March 2017. There will be a central Convergence Committee with links to working groups on social, economic, environmental, and governance dimensions. There will also be a National Sustainable Development Portal that collates all information and knowledge, and will build capacity. The Ministry of Sustainable Development and Wildlife is seeking partnerships for five-year periods in the 15-year time horizon.

Furthermore, standards on environmental sustainability, social sustainability, good governance, and economic sustainability will be developed with indicators, performance measures and criteria for proposal assessment. The Ministry of Sustainable Development and Wildlife will play a big role in the monitoring and capacity building of all ministries in relation to sustainable development. The role of the Ministry would be to facilitate and monitor all other ministries’ sustainable development targets.

\(\text{a. Urban Planning: Megapolis}\)

The Western Region Megapolis Master Plan (WRMMP), spearheaded by the Ministry of Megapolis and Western Development, is a comprehensive document proposing sweeping changes to the region’s development policy, including environmental issues such as waste management and water. Further, a draft bill of the Western Region Megapolis Development Authority of Sri Lanka Act (Megapolis Bill) is pending along with the Sustainable Development Act, both spearheaded by the Prime Minister’s Office. Both provide for substantial powers to the new institutions created by these Acts. However, concerns have been expressed regarding the new legislation overriding existing institutional structures and frameworks. There is room for UNDP to provide greater guidance on building in all aspects of sustainability into the Megapolis Plan.\(^{21}\)

A critique of the Megapolis initiative focuses on constitutional, governance, legal, and human rights concerns, while also noting that other concerns on environment and livelihoods remain partially unexplored.\(^{22}\) Specific concerns noted

---

20. To be held immediately prior to the National Environment Day (June 5th).
21. A KI noted that UNDP, with its global expertise, would be ideally placed to contribute towards stronger integration of environmental sustainability in new large-scale initiatives such as the Megapolis Plan that will have significant impacts including on the environment.
include: (a) the possibility of an infringement on the role of the provincial councils by the Megapolis Authority (b) ineffective and obscure uses of public resources; and (c) the threat of arbitrary land acquisition by the Megapolis Authority.

b. Blue Issues

Comprehensive work on Blue issues has been missing, with gaps noted particularly on sustainable fisheries (e.g., monitoring of dynamite and illegal fishing). There is a need to undertake a wider mapping that will broaden the focus beyond tourism-related issues.\(^23\) In this context, the President’s Sri Lanka Next Blue-Green Era initiative is welcome. Issues under this include sustainable management of all marine resources including (a) corals and other marine life (b) coastline and ocean floor (c) oceanic navigation and port facilities (d) tourism industry use (beach and oceanic sports) (e) maritime archaeology and anthropology (f) oceanic energy; and (g) potential medicinal values of oceanic resources.\(^24\)

Discussions are ongoing between the Ministry of Mahaweli Development and Environment and the World Bank on assistance for the Blue economy initiatives. Also underway are negotiations to implement a Blue Green Bond issue, and the setting up of a Blue-Green Secretariat. Blue issues have been prioritised recently with the award of funding to UNDP through the Green Climate Fund, for an inter-ministerial project to develop Dry Zone tanks to provide clean water facilities to those areas.

Governance and Blue issues are particularly interwoven with regard to the illegal fishing by Tamil Nadu trawlers in Sri Lankan waters, which impacts livelihoods and marine production. Additionally, mechanised bottom trawling significantly harms marine biodiversity. Most communities directly affected are in the Northern and North Western provinces, particularly those recovering from the conflict in Puttalam, Mannar, Killinochchi, Jaffna and Mullaitivu.\(^25\)

The FAO in 2015 estimated IUU catch from Sri Lankan waters to be 61,200 tonnes, which amounts to a financial loss of USD 750m with respect to the Sri Lankan side of Palk Bay.\(^26\)

Informal agreements on both sides are viewed as insufficient and lacking in commitment on the part of Indian fishermen.\(^27\)

There has been an increasing trend in focusing on marine-based tourism. A recent regional workshop\(^28\) sought to develop a roadmap for sustainable whale and dolphin watching tourism, including (a) measures to further share expertise and experiences, particularly capacity building (b) the establishment of a Whale and Dolphin Watching Tourism Network; and (c) the strengthening of scientific and academic collaboration. Furthermore, an Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) Whale and Dolphin Watching Network was established with terms of reference and priorities to be detailed by IORA.\(^29\)

Assessment of the value of marine resources has been limited in Sri Lanka. However, the

---

23. Key informant interview (KII), Wildlife scientist, 4 March 2016.
27. Ibid.
28. In February 2016, the Sri Lankan government and the Australian government in collaboration with the Sri Lankan Institute of Policy Studies, the International Whaling Commission (IWC), the Murdoch University Cetaceans Research Unit and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) Secretariat hosted a workshop on sustainable whale and dolphin watching tourism.
29. Sri Lanka has been an IORA Member since its formation in 1997.
quantification of ecological goods and services associated with coral reefs has demonstrated the value of preserving the remaining coral reefs in Sri Lanka.\(^{30}\) The net financial losses from coral mining in developed areas come from increased erosion and hence loss of land and reduced tourist attractions. Policy inaction regarding coral reefs has negatively impacted sustainable fishery, food security, biodiversity, coastal protection and tourism. Greater valuation-based evidence on Blue resources would be useful for strengthening decision-making and sustainable management of the sector.

c. Sustainable Consumption and Production Initiatives

The EU has been active in supporting Sustainable Consumption and Production (SCP)\(^{31}\) initiatives globally including in Sri Lanka from the 1990s onwards. The EU’s activities in Sri Lanka were implemented via its SWITCH-Asia programme with a sectoral approach using relevant private-public and civil society partnerships. EU support for Sri Lanka totalled EUR 5m from 2009 to 2015 with four different projects. The Ceylon Chamber of Commerce implemented three of these projects. They focused on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in the Food and Beverage sector, greening hotels, and sustainable production practices and technology in key export sectors.\(^{32}\)

Currently, the SWITCH-Asia SCP National Policy Support Component is ongoing, having started in April 2015 to support the government of Sri Lanka in choosing economic and regulatory policy instruments to support SCP.

The SCP Policy Framework has 3 pilot sectors: dairy, rice and tea production. It seeks to strengthen the institutional and policy framework for SCP initiatives. The EU technical assistance programme collaborates with the Department of Sustainable Development in the Ministry of Mahaweli Development and Environment.

The project will undertake a series of policy review studies and stakeholder consultations for the development of a National SCP Policy Framework, and provide training and capacity development for Ministry staff and others. Further, a knowledge platform and e-learning training of trainers’ tools and courses, as well as media campaigns will target improving public awareness.

It aims to improve:

1. National SCP Policy and Organisational set up
2. the sustainable production framework and the application of
3. SCP principles in selected sectors
4. the sustainable consumption framework and implementation of Green Procurement Policy and Eco-Labelling; and
5. SCP knowledge among public sector, private sector and civil society.


\(^{31}\) SCP promotes resource efficiency along increasingly interconnected value chains where consumption in one country is linked to impacts in another. It decouples economic growth from environmental degradation as part of Green Growth. SCP is usually embedded in broader national sustainable development strategies.

Role of the private sector in development

The private sector has developed into an informed actor – rather than a passive donor – in environmental sustainability, making these issues part of their core business under sustainability-related as well as more philanthropic CSR activities.

Private sector KI’s highlighted environmental sustainability priorities including gaps in environmental aspects of SDGs, rural-based livelihoods, and water-related needs. More specific issues included UNDP leveraging its global capacity to strengthen environmental sustainability in new initiatives like the Megapolis Plan, environmental valuation (e.g. non-carbon eco-system services of reforestation and the values of forest land), and the amendment of the EIA process.

Prospects for inclusive economic growth

The government has adopted an export-led growth strategy, emphasising the importance of connecting Sri Lanka to the world through trade and integration into global value chains. The government also aimed to institute wide ranging economic reforms, including improvement in fiscal discipline. The IMF recently agreed to a $1.5 billion loan for Sri Lanka over a three-year period to support the government’s economic reform agenda, particularly with regard to enhancing revenue and reviving growth. Accordingly, the government is set to raise the tax-to-GDP ratio to near 15% by 2020, by reforms in taxation policy and administration, the implementation of a new Inland Revenue Act, and capacity enhancement of tax institutions. State enterprise reform is also on the government’s agenda. In May 2016, the government increased Value Added Tax (VAT) from 11% to 15% in an initial effort to shore up revenue. Regional disparities in income distribution and growth persist. Official data is also likely to underestimate the extent of poverty in the country. The World Bank Country Diagnostic notes that approximately a quarter of Sri Lankans are nearly poor when defined as living on below USD 2.50 per day, while the official poverty rate stands at 6.7%. According to the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (2012/13) the Uva Province was the poorest province in the country, with a poverty headcount index of 15.4%, followed by the Eastern Province (11%) and the Northern Province (10.9%). The Northern and Eastern Provinces also recorded the lowest mean incomes in the country. However, both these provinces have grown at a faster pace than others since. Meanwhile, there are income disparities between the different ethnic and religious groups. In 2012/13, 12% of Hindus in Sri Lanka were poor, compared to 6% of Buddhists, Muslims and Christians. There is also a large gap between male and female labour force participation in Sri Lanka; only 36.4% of women participate in the labour force, compared to 73.9% of men.

33. Four PS related KIs were conducted in relation to ESDR issues.
35. Ibid.
36. Department of Census and Statistics, Household Income and Expenditure Survey (2012/13). We note that there are large income disparities within the North and East, with Mullaitivu, Mannar, Kilinochchi and Batticaloa being among the poorest in the country while other districts in the two provinces are performing significantly better. The North and East have also grown at a higher pace since the end of the war, and by 2012 the Eastern Province ranked fourth out of nine provinces in GDP per capita, and the Northern Province ranked sixth.
In 2015 the budget deficit grew to 7.4% of GDP, from 4.9% in 2014.\(^{39}\) The unemployment rate increased from 4.3% in 2014 to 4.6% in 2015. The female unemployment rate increased from 6.5% to 7.6%, while male unemployment rate declined from 3.1% to 3.0%.\(^{40}\) The labour force participation rate increased to 53.8% in 2015, from 53.3% in 2014, with increased participation of rural sector women in the labour force.\(^{41}\) There has also been a sharp decline of 12.4% in the total number of departures for foreign employment,\(^{42}\) which has affected overall unemployment and labour force participation.

The livelihoods of many Sri Lankans are connected to sectors that are highly vulnerable to climate change, disaster risks, and environmental factors. As at 2014, the agricultural sector employed 28.5% of the working population, or 2.4 million people in Sri Lanka.\(^{43}\) There tends to be a higher prevalence of poverty among agriculture-based populations. In this context, economic growth in the urban sector alone is unlikely to substantially improve the wellbeing of this large segment of the country’s population whose livelihoods are agriculture-based.

In some instances, measures towards post-war restoration of livelihoods have come into conflict with environmental protection. The controversial resettlement of displaced families within the Wilpattu National Park by the former government is a significant case in this regard. The case reflects serious gaps in the planning and administration of the resettlement process. The resettled families reportedly lacked basic facilities as well as physical security, as they had been resettled in an area reportedly inhabited by a large wild elephant population.\(^{44}\) The resettlement also resulted in deforestation of large tracts of land to make way for shelter and infrastructure such as roads. It also contributed to the loss of wildlife habitats within the sanctuary.\(^{45}\) Environmental groups challenged the resettlement on the grounds that it violated environmental regulations, with some activists alleging that the resettlement was an extension of political patronage towards the displaced Muslim families by Muslim Minister Rishad Bathiudeen.\(^{46}\) Meanwhile the Bodhu Bala Sena (BBS) – an ultranationalist group led by members of the Buddhist clergy - pointed to the issue as evidence of land encroachment and ‘colonisation’ by Muslims. The case is an illustration of how the government’s responsibilities in environmental protection and its responsibilities to vulnerable populations intersect and potentially come into conflict with each other, within a broader context.
of institutional weakness and poor management. The government’s economic policy direction on key issues has received some public pushback, stemming from perceptions of ‘unfairness’ to particular groups. For example, there has been widespread resistance from professionals and domestic industry groups to the proposed Indo-Lanka Economic & Technology Cooperation Framework Agreement. The government’s liberalisation-oriented economic reform agenda can be expected to generate public resistance, especially if poorly communicated and managed. Moreover, there has been political competition between the President and the Prime Minister over economic decision-making, with each attempting to gain credit for popular policies and dissociate themselves from those that are perceived as being unpopular. This dynamic was evident in Sirisena’s response to public discontent over the recent VAT hike, which he publicly opposed, claiming to be unaware of the relevant Cabinet decision.

2.3.4 Post-war reconciliation and accountability

The early post-war years witnessed poor progress with regard to reconciliation and peacebuilding. A need to work within a restrictive political climate meant that advocating on contentious issues such as reconciliation and accountability for wartime abuses risked sanctions by the Rajapaksa government.

In this context, the change in government has been viewed as opening a window of opportunity to progress towards meaningful post-war reconciliation and peace. The government has also committed to a range of transitional justice mechanisms pursuant to the co-sponsored resolution passed at the 30th Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in September 2015. However, the government currently lacks a coherent, overarching framework within which the proposed reconciliation and transitional justice agenda will be pursued. As detailed below, there has been a proliferation of institutions and mechanisms dealing with reconciliation and transitional justice since the 2015 transition, often operating with little coordination, resources and strategic direction. The proliferation of these institutions under dual centres of power points to a deeper lack of consensus within the government on the form and contours of the country’s transitional justice agenda. These gaps are likely to impede meaningful realisation of the government’s domestic and international commitments on reconciliation and accountability on the ground.

Reconciliation

In addition to addressing the immediate consequences of the war borne by people of all communities, reconciliation in Sri Lanka’s context entails the political resolution of the unresolved conflict between the Tamil community and the state. The most recently concluded attempt to generate consensus on power sharing in the legislature was the All Party Representatives Committee (APRC) process initiated by former President Rajapaksa in 2006. In addition, the previous government engaged in bilateral talks with the TNA, followed by the appointment of a Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) in October 2011 to deliberate on a political solution to the ethnic conflict. All three initiatives failed to amount to credible progress towards consensus on a political solution to the conflict. Despite its important contributions to the debate on devolution, the APRC process came to an inconclusive end, with the former government failing to formally acknowledge its final report. Bilateral discussions between the former government and the TNA ended in impasse. The TNA subsequently boycotted the PSC’s proceedings, along with other key opposition parties, resulting in the ruling UPFA being solely represented in
the Committee.

In 2010, Rajapaksa appointed the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC), which submitted its final report in December 2011. The Commission’s mandate included the recommendation of institutional, administrative and legislative measures aimed at strengthening national unity and non-recurrence of ethnic conflict. While the LLRC’s assessment of accountability was considered weak, its recommendations on human rights and governance were well received. The work of the LLRC remains relevant in the current context as it possesses a high degree of legitimacy as a ‘home-grown’ framework for reconciliation. Progress in implementation of certain LLRC recommendations improved to some extent since the change in government. For example, the government has taken steps to return some tracts of military-occupied land, enact RTI legislation, and has lifted an unofficial ban on singing the national anthem in both Sinhala and Tamil.

The ongoing constitutional reform process is expected to re-open the debate on devolution of power, a key component of the broader reconciliation process. The TNA currently represents the formal opposition in Parliament. Significantly, the current process marks the first instance of formal participation by Tamil political representatives in constitution-making in Sri Lanka. However, any movement towards a political resolution will have to contend with prevailing political realities and challenges. Historically, state reform attempts have been repeatedly undermined by ethnic outbidding – in which each party contests the other’s power-sharing proposals – as governments alternate terms in power.

In the current context, there is competition within both the Sinhalese and Tamil political camps that is likely to incentivise outbidding. In the Sinhalese political camp, there is competition from (a) within the governing coalition i.e. between Sirisena and Wickremesinghe; and (b) the pro-Rajapaksa ‘Joint-Opposition’ within the UPFA. Meanwhile, the TNA leadership has faced competition from (a) within the coalition, particularly from the elected representatives in the Northern Provincial Council and its Chief Minister C.V. Wigneswaran;47 and (b) other relatively radical Tamil political parties, such as the Tamil National People’s Front (TNPF).

Competition within Sinhalese and Tamil polities is aided by deeper societal divides over reforms to the structure and character of the state. Public opinion surveys carried out in 2015 showed that while 48.8% of Sri Lankans agree that the national anthem should be sung in both Sinhala and Tamil, 41.3% of Sri Lankans disagreed with the same.48 Almost 50% of Sri Lankans felt that certain powers could be decentralised but the powers of the central government should not be reduced.49 Over 40% of Sinhalese respondents believe powers of administration and control over state land should be held exclusively by the central government, while 48.4% of Tamil, 38.6% of Up-Country Tamil, and 27.2% of Muslim respondents believe it should be held exclusively by provincial governments.50 Furthermore, strong resistance can be expected from...

---


49. Ibid.

50. Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA). “Opinion Poll on Constitutional Reform: Top Line Report” (February...
the Muslim community to any power sharing arrangement that entails the establishment of a single North-Eastern territorial unit. This resistance is likely to stem from the region’s Muslim inhabitants being unwilling to become a regional ethnic minority in a Tamil-dominated North-Eastern Province.

The pre-January 2015 period saw a surge in hostility and violence towards religious minorities in Sri Lanka, particularly the Muslim and Christian communities. While religious violence is not a new phenomenon in Sri Lanka, its persistence has much to do with the consistent failure of the state to effectively protect minority communities. In many instances, the state has exacerbated hostilities between religious communities through discriminatory regulatory and administrative practices. Amidst the rise of powerful extremist organisations advocating supremacist Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, and an increase in religious violence under the previous government, law enforcement agencies demonstrated a reluctance to take action against perpetrators, particularly members of the Buddhist clergy. There has been negligible progress in investigations and prosecutions of alleged perpetrators of violence against religious minorities thus far.

An effective reconciliation process would involve addressing a historical sense of alienation from the state that minority communities have experienced and continue to experience since the end of the war. The realisation of a credible political settlement to the ethnic conflict is also contingent on equitable and inclusive economic dividends to all communities. Discontent over economic wellbeing, particularly among the Sinhalese in the south, risks undermining the passage of crucial state reforms that require public endorsement through a referendum. In this context, sustainable and inclusive economic growth is an important prerequisite for achieving lasting post-war reconciliation and peace.

**Accountability**

A vital element of the peacebuilding process is the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms to deal with issues of accountability, truth-seeking, non-recurrence, and reparations for losses experienced by all ethnic communities in the course of the war. In the co-sponsored resolution adopted by the UNHRC in September 2015, the government committed to the establishment of a judicial mechanism with a special counsel to investigate alleged violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. The following institutions have since been established by the government as part of its transitional justice and reconciliation agenda:

1. The Prime Ministerial Action Group (PMAG) chaired by the Prime Minister and consisting of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister for Prison Reforms, Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Hindu Religious Affairs, Minister for Justice, Minister of State for Defence, and Minister for National Dialogue;

   A. A Steering Committee established under the PMAG includes Secretaries to key ministries and officials responsible for implementing the provisions of the co-sponsored UNHRC Resolution and civil society actors

   B. A Secretariat for Coordinating the Reconciliation Mechanisms supports the Steering Committee

2. The Office of National Unity and Reconciliation (ONUR) headed by former President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga

---

3. A Consultation Task Force to hold national consultations on transitional justice. The Task Force’s members are drawn mainly from civil society and academia, aided by an Expert Advisory Panel. Provincial and District Task Forces are also to be appointed.

4. An All Party Conference convened by President Sirisena

The government has also committed to establishing the following institutions:

5. A Commission for Truth, Justice, Reconciliation and Non-Recurrence

6. An Office on Missing Persons

7. A Judicial Mechanism with a Special Counsel; and

8. An Office for Reparations

However, there are likely to be gaps between the government’s commitments made on the international stage and the realisation of these commitments domestically.

These gaps are attributed to: (1) public resistance to potential war crimes prosecutions if they are perceived to ‘betray’ the 2009 military victory; and (2) weaknesses in Sri Lanka’s judicial institutions in giving effect to a robust and meaningful transitional justice agenda.

The first gap is likely to condition the government’s willingness to pursue an accountability mechanism as part of a wider reconciliation agenda. President Sirisena has appeared to backtrack on the government’s stated commitments on accountability by dismissing the possibility of the participation of foreign judges in any war crimes prosecution. Proposed transitional justice initiatives such as truth-seeking are potentially deeply divisive. As such, poor communication of the value of such measures, especially in the Sinhalese south, risks jeopardising the limited space that has currently opened up to pursue a transitional justice agenda.

The second gap is attributed to the historical erosion of Sri Lanka’s judicial institutions. Criminal justice institutions have been severely undermined over time by capacity weaknesses, bureaucratic inefficiencies and poor management. Judicial institutions have also been subject to decades of politicisation, impeding their impartiality in the disposal of their functions. There is evidence that the judiciary has consistently failed to uphold the values of equality and justice in its treatment of litigants from minority communities. This trend is evident in the judiciary’s response to issues of language rights, employment rights, land rights and religious freedom. Furthermore, the judiciary has failed to uphold the rights of minorities, especially Tamils, in cases regarding public security. The post-war years witnessed the exacerbation of this trend – in that courts became unwilling to protect individual rights in light of public security concerns, regardless of litigants’ ethnicity. Hence there remains a deep mistrust of Sri Lanka’s judicial institutions among minorities in Sri Lanka, especially the Tamil people. The historical failures of the judiciary to deliver equal and just treatment to all people call into question its ability to support the proposed transitional justice agenda.

52. The ONUR falls under the purview of the Ministry of National Integration and Reconciliation.


55. Ibid.
This section of the MTR assesses UNDP’s existing Country Programme. As mentioned in the introduction, the analysis and recommendations on revising the Country Programme are confined to the existing framework and therefore do not offer radical departures from the design and priorities set out in the existing Country Programme. In this context, the analysis and recommendations in this section focus mainly on improvements to the modes of delivery (rather than on new areas of intervention) to ensure greater ‘Fitness for Purpose’. It is understood that revising UNDP’s thematic priorities and programmatic entry points forms a part of the process of designing a new Country Programme.

### 3.1 The UNDP Country Programme

#### 3.1.1 Elements of the UNDP Country Programme

The UNDP Country Programme comprises:

1. The Country Programme Document (CPD)
2. The Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP)

The CPD determined the scope of UNDP’s five-year development strategy in Sri Lanka (i.e. from 2013 – 2017). The CPD was formulated to complement the government’s development plan the ‘Mahinda Chinthana’ – which sought to elevate Sri Lanka to middle-income status by 2016. Moreover, the CPD was also created in alignment with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2013-2017. This Framework was an agreement signed with the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) to create operational space for the mandates of UN agencies in Sri Lanka. Further, the CPD was tailored to encompass and integrate the Millennium Development Goals, most of which Sri Lanka was on track to meet by 2015. Thus, UNDP’s CPD was designed to complement the government’s development framework, the UNDAF, and the international MDG agenda. The CPD’s four outcomes below replicate those of the UNDAF:

1. An enabled environment for equal opportunities to sustainable livelihoods, decent work and employability;
2. Strengthened provision of, access to and demand for equitable and quality social services delivery and enhanced capacity...
of national institutions for evidence-based policy development;

3. Communities empowered and institutions strengthened to support local governance, access to justice, social integration, gender equality, and monitoring, promotion and protection of human rights in alignment with international treaties and obligations and in alignment to the constitution of Sri Lanka;

4. Policies, programmes and capacities to ensure environmental sustainability, address climate change, mitigation and adaptation and reduce disaster risks in place at national, sub-national and community levels.

Subsequent to the formulation of the CPD, then UNDP Country Director Ms Razina Bilgrami and former Secretary to the Treasury Mr P. B. Jayasundera signed UNDP’s CPAP in May 2013. The CPAP outlined the commitments and responsibilities of UNDP and GoSL in relation to the CPD. As such, the CPAP stipulated the basis of the relationship between UNDP and the GoSL; provided a situation analysis; detailed past cooperation and lessons learned; and laid out the proposed programme and partnership strategy for the years 2013-2017. The CPAP also included a breakdown of how the overall programme would be managed, monitored and evaluated. Further, the CPAP presented a Results and Resources Framework, which would be used as the basis for creating and implementing projects, and tracking outputs and outcomes.

UNDP has two main programme areas that form independent clusters:

1. Governance for Empowerment and Social Inclusion (GESI); and

2. Environmental Sustainability and Disaster Resilience (ESDR).

The GESI cluster comprises three projects: (1) Strengthening Enforcement of Law, Access to Justice and Social Integration in Sri Lanka (SELAJSI) (2) Governance for Local Economic Development (G-LED); and (3) Human Rights Commission Phase II project. The three broad projects are further divided into smaller focus projects. For example, the SELAJSI project consists of 4 sub-projects: (a) Access to Justice (b) Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (c) Social Integration; and (d) Prison Reforms.

The ESDR cluster comprises sixteen projects spanning three key thematic areas, namely, natural resources, climate change, and disaster management. For example, ESDR includes a Community Forestry Project, a Strategic Support to Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme, and an Invasive Alien Species Project. Notably, the Community Forestry Approach – field tested through a UNDP project – has been formally adopted by the Forest Department.

Furthermore, UNDP has developed its disaster management sector, shifting from a focus on disaster management to preparedness and risk mitigation. As such, UNDP intervention areas now include risk mapping, identifying high-risk areas, and instituting early warning systems.

The UNDP CPD introduced (a) a Policy Unit; and (b) a Communications Unit. UNDP’s Policy Unit was established in April 2013 to facilitate UNDP’s upstream-level engagement. The Unit

57. SELAJSI Project Document.
is dedicated to providing (1) upstream policy support, including support for politically sensitive initiatives (e.g. technical assistance for identified priority areas under President Sirisena’s 100 Day Programme in 2015); (2) policy research and advocacy (e.g. National Human Development Reports); context analyses for corporate requirements, including the identification of programme entry points, challenges and risks; (3) technical assistance for the conceptualisation and development of programmes and projects (e.g. the formulation of UNDP’s Parliamentary Development Support Project, and projects for the Green Climate Fund and Global Environment Facility); (4) technical inputs at various stages of programme/project implementation and evaluation; and (5) facilitation of South-South cooperation projects (e.g. to complement existing energy and environmental initiatives).

The UNDP’s Communications Unit supports Country Office efforts to reposition UNDP’s image as a development partner - as opposed to a donor. The Communications Unit aims to highlight UNDP’s role as a ‘connector’ and a ‘knowledge leader’. This Unit also manages UNDP’s innovation initiatives, aimed at leveraging the potential of Sri Lanka’s ‘techno-sociability’ generation in order to meet development challenges. The Communications Unit launched the Sri Lanka National Human Development Report on Youth and Development in 2014, followed by UNDP’s first Corporate Strategy on Youth. The Unit also manages (a) ‘Youth Lead’, which aims to engage youth in development initiatives, and (b) ‘UNLOCKED’, a youth and development themed blog supported by UNDP.

### 3.1.2 Key observations from the UNDP Country Office

Three key observations were made in interviews with KIs from UNDP management, technical staff, and cluster specialists.

**First**, the political transition in January 2015 resulted in renewed expectations from UNDP and the donor community. These renewed expectations centred on (a) increased operational space to conduct programme activity; and (b) improved access to government. KIs noted that under the previous government the threat of forcible closure limited the breadth of UNDP’s programming interventions. Further, the openly expressed state hostility towards UN operations in Sri Lanka created challenges for UNDP’s programming both at a sub-national and a national level. In this context, the CPD was viewed as a tool to facilitate and negotiate access to government. Further, according to KIs, the restrictive operating context prevented UNDP from prioritising certain human rights interventions. For example, KIs stated that narrowing the scope of interventions in areas such as reconciliation and transitional justice were intrinsic to the National Planning Department agreeing to sign off on UNDP’s CPAP. KIs also noted a restricted space for UNDP’s engagement and partnerships with CSOs, particularly with regard to projects implemented under its NIM portfolio.

Following the electoral victory of President Sirisena, KIs noted a stark difference in the attitude of the current government towards the UN. This change in attitude has resulted in a more conducive environment for UNDP operations, particularly in the fields of human rights, transitional justice and governance. As

59. UNDP Sri Lanka, Strategic Communications and Re-Positioning Document.
60. UNDP Sri Lanka, Youth and Innovation Document.
61. Ibid.
such, this change in the operating environment has resulted in UNDP supporting governance reform initiatives, despite the framing restrictions of the CPD. However, notwithstanding the shift in the operating environment, KIs noted growing challenges associated with project implementation due to bureaucratic resistance and mandate confusion within government institutions. Further, KIs stated that the duality of leadership roles played by the President and the Prime Minister within the National Unity Government resulted in a number of overlapping ad hoc institutions that affected the efficiency and effectiveness of UNDP’s assistance to government.

Second, KIs noted that increased donor pledges and commitments made in the aftermath of the political transition did not necessarily materialise into increased funding, particularly in the areas of livelihood development and sustainable growth. Shrinking donor funding was largely attributed to the refugee crisis in Europe and the instability in the Middle East. KIs noted that donors were increasingly channelling their ODA funds to border management in Greece and refugee camps in Turkey. Notwithstanding this, it was noted that donors were beginning to strategically reposition their funding commitments in light of Sri Lanka’s political transition. As such, this strategic repositioning is likely to result in increased donor investment in UNDP focus areas such as governance reform, and strengthening public accountability and oversight mechanisms. However, KIs anticipated that a significant portion of this donor investment would be from the US, and channelled through USAID. According to KIs, UNDP would not necessarily be eligible to access these funds, as USAID had indicated a preference for implementation through USAID contractors and local CSOs.

Third, against the backdrop of the adoption of the SDGs at the Paris Climate Change Conference in September 2015, KIs recognised a need to mainstream the SDGs into UNDP’s Country Programme. KIs stated that devising and implementing projects through independent clusters (i.e. governance-oriented and environment-oriented), posed challenges to integrating ‘sustainability thinking’ into UNDP’s interventions. KIs noted that the lack of inter-cluster linkages resulted in projects that impeded the holistic mainstreaming of SDGs in UNDP’s interventions. Further, the lack of inter-cluster linkages was also seen as inhibiting the co-ordination of UNDP with government and other stakeholders at national, district and provincial levels. For example, KIs noted that there were instances where representatives from the GESI and ESDR clusters independently conducted meetings with the same government official. It was reported that the lack of internal co-ordination between UNDP’s programmatic clusters resulted in confusion among government officials, and increased chances of duplication in the agency’s programming.

In addition to insufficient inter-cluster coordination, KIs noted poor inter-agency collaboration within the UN Country Team. For example, the joint programme with FAO and UNEP on UNREDD and Biomass Energy showed limited results at the Mid Term evaluation in early 2015 due to agency-specific processes on approvals and implementation. Moreover, KIs noted that despite the fact that UNDP co-chairs the UNDAF Pillar on Environmental Sustainability and Disaster Resilience, the Pillar’s priorities demonstrated weak linkages with ESDR.

3.2 Assessing Fitness for Purpose

3.2.1 UNDAF criteria

In its MTR of UNDAF, VR highlighted the need to understand the concept of ‘Fitness for Purpose’ in relation to the particular context of Sri Lanka. Accordingly, Fitness for Purpose was assessed along two axes: (a) how UN agencies respond to national priorities; and (b) how they leverage their unique strengths.

In the context of ‘national priorities’, it should be noted that the priorities identified in a particular government’s development agenda might not necessarily align with the public interest. Therefore, ‘national priorities’ are understood to comprise both government priorities and public interest issues. For example, although the previous government did not allocate substantial resources towards reconciliation, it remained a major public interest issue and therefore a national priority. Moreover, successive governments have tended to prioritise areas that deliver political capital in the short-term. These areas may not necessarily align to the longer-term needs and interests of the public. In this context, civil society is often an important source of ascertaining issues of public interest, particularly where government priorities and the public interest are not aligned. Moreover, meaningful research and analysis can inform the process of ascertaining public interest issues. Hence public interest issues can also encompass citizen needs that are not vocalised by civil society, but are discoverable through available data.

Additionally, ‘Fitness for Purpose’ also requires UN agencies to harness and leverage their unique strengths when responding to national priorities. The UNDAF MTR identified four important strengths of the UN in Sri Lanka. They are:

1. Convening power
2. Policy advocacy
3. Technical and policy advice; and

This shift from ‘downstream’ programming (i.e. largely service delivery-oriented) to ‘upstream’ programming (encapsulated by the four unique strengths of the UN) was deemed necessary in light of Sri Lanka’s transition to lower-middle income country status. In this context, ‘upstream’ programming is defined by the nature of programming, rather than the administrative level at which the programme is delivered. As such, it is possible for the UN to engage in ‘upstream’ programming at a sub-national level, if the particular programme encompasses activities such as technical capacity development and technical advice. For example, the programme could include support for drafting legislation at the local government level.

The UNDAF MTR assessed the UN’s relevance in Sri Lanka along the two axes of ‘Fitness for Purpose’. Accordingly, Figure 1 below illustrates the strategic direction that UN agency programming ought to take.

To this end, programming interventions should be prioritised in a manner where they are able to respond to national priorities while also leveraging the UN agency’s unique strengths (i.e. green

---

64. Sri Lanka is categorised as a ‘pink country’ and as such, downstream capacity building (e.g. community training workshops) can no longer be delivered under the programme. However, this does not preclude the CPAP from supporting the delivery of upstream or systems levels capacity building (e.g. designing monitoring systems and rolling out data classification systems).
As such, the extent to which UNDP is ‘Fit for Purpose’ will be dependent on programming interventions (a) demonstrating strong alignment with national priorities, and (b) being executed in a manner that enables UNDP to leverage its unique strengths. Figure 2 below illustrates the strategic direction UNDP’s programming ought to take.

Accordingly, UNDP’s programmes that align with the national context and are executed in a manner that enables UNDP to leverage its unique strengths are classified as being ‘Fit for Purpose’ to a high degree (i.e. green quadrant: upper right corner). Further, in a dynamic operating environment, being able to respond effectively to national priorities in a manner that optimises programme outputs are prioritised over leveraging UNDP’s unique strengths. Accordingly, interventions that...
demonstrate strong alignment to national priorities but do not leverage UNDP’s unique delivery strengths (i.e. orange quadrant: upper left corner) are ‘Fit for Purpose’ to a greater degree than interventions that leverage unique organisational strengths but remain relatively weak in terms of alignment with national priorities (i.e. yellow quadrant: lower right corner). Finally, interventions that neither align to national priorities nor demonstrate strong execution are not ‘Fit for Purpose’ (i.e. red quadrant: lower left corner). UNDP should move away from including such interventions in its programmes.

### 3.3 Revising the Country Programme

This section assesses the performance of UNDP’s Country Programme in terms of five key factors, and an additional crosscutting factor. These factors are consistent with the ‘Fitness for Purpose’ criteria set out above. This section will also recommend revisions to the Country Programme based on VR’s assessment under each element. The identified five key factors aim to influence (a) the strategic direction of UNDP’s current Country Programme, and (b) the modality in which UNDP programming is executed.

They are:

1. **Flexibility** – UNDP’s ability to respond and adapt to evolving national priorities and global developments.

2. **Priority** – UNDP’s ability to focus its mandate in a manner that leverages the agency’s ‘unique selling point’.

3. **Complementarity** – UNDP’s ability to structure partnerships in a manner that enhances holistic programming both within the UN and in the wider development space. Complementarity comprises both internal complementarity and external complementarity. Internal complementarity refers to programme cohesiveness (a) within UNDP and (b) between UNDP and the rest of the UN Country Team (UNCT). External complementarity refers to UNDP’s partnerships with other development partners, CSOs, and the private sector in the delivery of programmes.

4. **Subsidiarity** – UNDP’s ability to select state and non-state project partners that operate at a level that is most decentralised or devolved, while maintaining competence in terms of delivery.

5. **Hybridity** – UNDP’s ability to integrate its implementation modalities in a manner that incentivises and optimises performance.

6. **Measurability** – UNDP’s ability to evaluate the impact of its work on an ongoing basis. This is an important crosscutting factor that is vital to ensuring the overall effectiveness and success of the Country Programme.
3.3.1 Flexibility

Flexibility refers to UNDP’s ability to respond and adapt to evolving national priorities. The current context has demonstrated a prevalent need for programmatic flexibility. Following the General Election in August 2015, the parallel institutional structures forming under the President and the Prime Minister have created institutional and administrative flux in the policy environment. This institutional and administrative flux creates inconsistencies in decision-making, leadership structures and operational mandates within public bodies. It was observed that existing Implementing Partner (IP) Ministries have undergone significant changes in their composition, at times weakening the link between the implementing Ministry’s thematic mandate and UNDP-funded projects. For example, prior to the Presidential Election, the portfolios of Public Administration and Home Affairs were amalgamated under one Ministry. After the coalition government was instituted, a separate Ministry of Home Affairs was created, creating considerable challenges associated with programmatic realignment in accordance with the revised mandate of the Ministry. For example, G-LED had to approach a non-implementing partner, the new Ministry of Home Affairs, in order to secure necessary project approvals. As a result, this approval process contributed to administrative delays within the project.

Additionally, differing interests between the President and the Prime Minister has led to the proliferation of parallel institutions. As detailed above, these parallel institutions are often created in an ad hoc manner in alignment with the priorities of either the Prime Minister or the President. Therefore, while such institutions enjoy the patronage of the country’s leadership, they fail to address and alleviate the prevalent capacity gaps in the public service.

Further, there has also been an increasing demand to codify the mandates of parallel structures in an attempt to consolidate their role within the government’s policy platform. This increased demand for codification has the potential to result in the creation of contradictory and overlapping legislation. For instance, at present the Ministry of Sustainable Development and Wildlife (with the support of the Prime Minister) is drafting a Sustainable Development Act; while the President has lent his support to the 'Blue-Green initiative' under the Ministry of Mahaweli Development and Environment. These parallel initiatives are likely to result in legislation with jurisdictional overlaps due to weak information sharing between the Ministry of Sustainable Development and Wildlife and the Ministry of Mahaweli Development and Environment.

In light of increasing institutional and administrative flux in Sri Lanka’s political economy, KIs interviewed appeared to value UNDP’s programmatic flexibility. It was stated that the broad framing of the CPD created a number of opportunities for UNDP to demonstrate programmatic agility in light of changes in the political context. To this end, KIs stated that UNDP has demonstrated its capacity to respond to emerging national priorities. According to KIs, UNDP’s work in supporting areas outlined under Sirisena’s 100-Day Plan and Presidential Manifesto enhanced the responsiveness of the agency to national priorities. For example, in view of anticipated legislative reform, UNDP supported and trained 28 officers from the Legal Draftsman’s Department on matters of legislative drafting. Further, government KIs were particularly supportive of UNDP’s ability to source technical expertise in a timely manner. This expertise was valued in the context of governance reform such as the Right to Information Bill, and the 19th Amendment. For example, UNDP provided a team of legal draftspersons, researchers and translators to aid Dr. Jayampathy...
Wickremesinghe, who was credited as being one of the primary architects of the 19th Amendment. Further, donors such as the Government of Norway expressed a high degree of satisfaction with UNDP being able to ensure that minimum constitution-making principles were adhered to during the drafting process, while maintaining a low profile. Additionally, donors perceive UNDP as an impartial entity that has the potential to function as an intermediary between themselves and the government.

UNDP also facilitated consultations on the draft 20th Amendment and the Right to Information Bill, thus enabling issues of public interest to reinforce government priorities. Additionally, KIs noted flexibility in UNDP’s projects associated with DRR. For example, government KIs commended UNDP’s timely assistance in supporting GoSL’s Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme in the aftermath of numerous disaster related-losses. The Programme is expected to transform the way Disaster Risk Resilience (DRR) is planned and implemented in Sri Lanka.

In certain instances, UNDP has demonstrated programme agility when responding to emerging public interest issues such as the disenfranchise-ment of vulnerable and marginalised groups. The Additional Secretary of the Ministry of Justice noted that the tri-lingual translation of criminal justice legislation conducted by UNDP addressed a pressing constraint of the Ministry vis-à-vis translation services. The Additional Secretary stated that such translation services resulted in improving the accessibility of such laws among the legal profession and judges, and enhancing access to justice for litigants in the North and East of the country. Moreover, KIs valued UNDP’s ability to provide certain types of livelihood support that was restricted during the Rajapaksa presidency. For example, KIs noted that UNDP’s willingness to re-focus livelihood programming around ‘recovery’ (e.g. resettlement) as opposed to ‘economic development’, signalled programme flexibility and adaptability to the more conducive operating environment.

In an operating environment typified by administrative and institutional flux, KIs pointed to the importance of UNDP’s programmatic flexibility being deployed in a manner that strengthens standing democratic institutions. According to KIs, this strategy will enable the longer-term sustainability of UNDP’s investments, as it seeks to minimise the effect of institutional flux on programming. Although UNDP has engaged with ad hoc political structures that emerged under the Sirisena government, it has recently signalled its commitment to working with standing government institutions. UNDP’s Parliamentary Development Support Project is one such example. According to the Secretary General of Parliament, UNDP’s assistance in devising a strategic plan for Parliamentary Development Support was perceived as crucial to strengthening Parliament’s oversight capabilities.65

UNDP has also demonstrated the ability to respond to emerging data deficits within government. This responsiveness is likely to facilitate the extent to which data is able to influence evidence-based policymaking. For instance, UNDP is currently developing a data portal with Geographical Information Systems (GIS) data. This portal would allow the National Building Research Organisation (NBRO) and associated institutions to have differential access, including access to approval-tracking processes.

UNDP’s current policies provides for a relatively high degree of flexibility. Thus adopting a flexible approach to programming does not

represent a significant departure from the current CPD. With regard to programme oversight, UNDP’s Monitoring Policy notes that monitoring provides opportunities to ‘adjust the theory of change and make evidence-based decisions to improve programming performance and results achievement.’ It stipulates that the frequency of monitoring must be appropriate to decision-making, and defined during programming design. Outcomes must be monitored at least annually through the Results-Oriented Annual Report (ROAR), while outputs must be monitored at least twice a year. As per the Monitoring Policy, analysis from monitoring is expected to inform adjustments to programme design, implementation arrangements and risk management strategies. Furthermore, according to section 2.4.1 of the Programmes and Operations Policies and Procedures (POPP) UNDP’s CPD is subject to annual review, which provides the agency with an opportunity to review the Country Programme. Substantive amendments to the CPD are initiated through consultations between the government and UNDP, and subject to approval of the Executive Board.

Despite the above Policy, there is significant room for improvement in UNDP’s flexibility and responsiveness. According to KIs, the frequency of programme adjustment in light of emerging contextual changes was dependent on the technical capacity of individual project leads. It was noted that project leads often have varying levels of understanding in relation to developments in the Sri Lanka’s political economy. These varying levels of understanding have contributed to project activities not being consistently updated to reflect emerging national priorities, thus leading to project deadlock and excessive delays in implementation.

**SELAJSI specific analysis**

SELAJSI aims to promote access to justice, social integration, gender equality and human rights. To this end, SELAJSI includes sub-projects that are designed to (a) increase the administration of justice mechanisms (b) improve access to justice for vulnerable and marginalised populations through the provision of legal aid (c) strengthen the capacity of the justice sector to respond to gender-based violence (GBV) and (d) increase public awareness and dialogues on social integration and reconciliation. SELAJSI operates entirely through a NIM modality in partnership with three IP ministries: the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of National Co-Existence, Dialogue and Official Languages, and the Ministry of Women and Child Affairs.

KIs noted that during the Rajapaksa era, SELAJSI was crucial to UNDP being able to respond to issues concerning the administration of justice and social integration. Consequently, in the framing of the project, words such as ‘reconciliation’ were often replaced by ‘social integration’ and, words such as ‘rule of law’ were replaced by ‘access to justice’ and ‘enforcement of law’. The post-January 2015 context has enabled SELAJSI to widen its programmatic scope. Where previously UNDP was required to work within the bounds of a shrinking operating space, programmatic relevance in the current political context will depend on SELAJSI’s flexibility and adaptability to emerging national priorities.

Notwithstanding emerging opportunities for wider programmatic scope, the current political context has placed a significant strain on SELAJSI implementation. For instance, the duality of leadership roles played by the President and Prime Minister within the National Unity Government has resulted in a proliferation of parallel institutions dealing with reconciliation. In this context, KIs noted that there was a lack of clarity around the specific roles of ONUR, the Ministry of National Co-Existence, Dialogue and Official Languages, and the Ministry of National
Integration and Reconciliation. Further, KIs also stated that this lack of clarity resulted in an emergence of competition between these three bodies. In light of this 'turf war', SELAJSI project staff at the Ministry of National Co-Existence, Dialogue and Official Languages noted challenges associated with obtaining approvals and designing cohesive sub-projects.

KIs highlighted certain instances where SELAJSI enabled UNDP to respond to national priorities. For example, KIs highlighted the success of a SELAJSI sub-project conducted in partnership with the Ministry of National Co-Existence, Dialogue and Official Languages. The sub-project sensitised 60 journalists working in the Sinhala and Tamil media on the topic of social integration and reconciliation. Further, SELAJSI sub-projects have demonstrated the ability to align government policy in accordance with issues of public interest. For instance, the ‘referral system’ initiated in partnership with the Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs, has strengthened multi-sectoral responses (e.g. among stakeholders in the police, local CSOs, hospital staff and battered women’s shelters) to gender-based violence.

Notwithstanding the above, KIs noted that the increased programmatic space post-2015 did not translate into enhanced project outcomes. For example, KIs stated that although the space for women’s rights advocacy had increased dramatically, the implementation of SELAJSI did not improve to the same degree. This lag in implementation was attributed to the fact that while emerging government priorities focused on equality for women, SELAJSI continued to focus solely on issues of gender-based violence. Furthermore, difficulties in responding to institutional flux have resulted in SELAJSI being compelled to discontinue a number of its activities. For instance, KIs noted that UNDP’s project with the Department of Prisons had to be brought to a closure due to the fact that the Department was moved to three different Ministries in the span of a year. It was also noted that the project had limited traction with donors, which further contributed to its closure. Additionally, a sub-project that involved the development of a ‘teledrama’ (including developing a script) on social integration was abruptly terminated on account of a change in ministry composition, and the incumbent leadership being reluctant to continue with the activity.

KIs stated that SELAJSI experienced difficulties associated with programme agility and responsiveness to national priorities. KIs noted that IP ministries rarely reviewed, updated or adjusted programme activities to suit emerging national priorities. Moreover, even when it was discovered that SELAJSI projects failed to demonstrate linkages with national priorities, KIs stated that the activities were often shelved rather than revisited. For example, KIs noted that during the implementation of the 100-Day Programme, SELAJSI projects were de-prioritised as they did not match the government’s reform agenda. This de-prioritisation resulted in significant delays in project implementation. Further, KIs noted that, since government agencies were responsible for SELAJSI project implementation, certain challenges arose in terms of responding to public interest issues where government priorities and public interest issues were not aligned.

Further, SELAJSI sub-projects surrounding access to justice may face challenges in terms of programme adaption in accordance with emerging donor priorities. These challenges are attributed to the fact that donors are unlikely to prioritise rule of law reforms that focus exclusively on the strengthening the administration of justice and courtroom management. Instead, donor priorities in relation to strengthening the rule of law are likely to emerge in the context of broader governance reform. Against this
backdrop, governance reform will involve pro-
gramming that extends beyond the justice sector,
to capture reform initiatives in parliamentary
oversight, public procurement, the right to inform-
a tion, auditing practices and the functioning
of independent commissions under the 19th
Amendment.

In terms of programme oversight, the SELAJSI
Programme Board is mandated to oversee pro-
gramme management and ensure transparency
and accountability in programming. The Board is
currently chaired by the Secretary of the Ministry
of National Co-Existence, Dialogue and Official
Languages, and co-chaired by UNDP. The
Board comprises, among others, the Secretaries
of all Implementing Partner Ministries under
SELAJSI (i.e. Secretaries from the Ministry of
National Co-Existence, Dialogue and Official
Languages, the Ministry of Justice, and the Min-
istry of Women and Child Affairs).

KIs noted that prior to the Presidential elec-
tion in 2015, the Secretaries enjoyed a positive
working relationship and utilised the Board to
make substantive decisions on SELAJSI’s pro-
grammatic direction. However, post-2015 the
Secretaries of the Implementing Partner Min-
istries were changed a number of times. These
changes weakened the working relationship
between the members of the Board and resulted
in poor attendance and engagement at meetings.
Further, KIs noted that due to the breakdown in
the relationship between Board members, discus-
sions at meetings were neither substantive, nor
reflective of emerging priorities. This tendency
limited the strategic value of decisions taken at
SELAJSI Board level. Furthermore, the limita-
tions of the Board also prevented adequate
monitoring and oversight in relation to SELAJSI
implementation.

Recommendations

UNDP has demonstrated overall success in
moving swiftly to capitalise on opportunities to
advance national priorities. Given that a degree
of volatility and institutional flux is likely to per-
sist through the upcoming programme cycle,
it is necessary that the flexibility of UNDP’s
programme is further entrenched in order
to maximise the agency’s responsiveness to a
dynamic context.

Building flexibility into UNDP’s Country Pro-
grame requires two interventions. First, UNDP
will need to ensure its responsiveness to emerging
national priorities. Second, UNDP will need to
structure its programmes so as to ensure con-
tinuous path adjustment in a dynamic political
context.

Responsiveness

UNDP should aim to enhance its programmatic
responsiveness in two important areas. First, it
should aim to improve responsiveness in terms of
evolving government priorities. For this purpose,
Technical Coordinators should be specifically
mandated to obtain and document information
on policy developments within IP ministries –
for example, in the form of a policy brief. These
efforts can be supplemented by quarterly brief-
ings on developments pertaining to Sri Lanka’s
political economy for UNDP staff, particularly
Project Managers and UNDP’s senior manage-
ment. These briefings will help UNDP remain
attuned to emerging contextual developments
and better inform decision-making with regard
to programme adjustments.

Second, UNDP should improve its ability to
discern and respond to shifts in public interest
priorities. In order to achieve such improve-
ment, it should better utilise its sub-national
networks (e.g. by convening sub-national focus groups) to inform intervention areas, particularly in relation to issues such as reconciliation, and livelihood development. This practice will enhance UNDP’s ability to be informed by public interest issues emerging at the sub-national level. Moreover, in terms of augmenting responsiveness to public interest issues, UNDP can ensure that it institutes systems for better data gathering and processing through the projects that it supports. For example, UNDP can enhance its support in the areas of livelihood development by training communities to gather data on patterns of land use. These community-led land use surveys can in turn benefit UNDP’s programming targeted at optimising the effectiveness of land use in rural areas. Such increased capacity for knowledge management will ensure that UNDP is able to make data driven and evidence-based decisions on the direction of its programming.

Path adjustment

Path adjustment refers to the ability for UNDP to change its programming direction in light of emerging contextual developments. The ability to path adjust within programmes will ensure that programmes remain relevant and effective. Path adjustment needs to take place through two approaches.

First, path adjustment could take place through a top-down approach where the highest managerial level within UNDP’s organisational structure is provided the necessary data and tools for regular path adjustment. In this regard, UNDP should more effectively leverage existing mechanisms – such as Programme Boards, quarterly or annual reviews, and mid-term evaluations – to enable changes in overall strategy, methodology, and implementation modalities as the programme develops.

Second, path adjustment could take place through a bottom-up approach where programme management personnel are equipped to change course in consultation with their line management. Currently, fulfilment of POPP guidelines and other oversight requirements is weak across major UNDP programmes. Hence UNDP would benefit from enhancing the ability of programme management personnel to utilise existing mechanisms to ensure dynamic programme adjustment in light of emerging national priorities.

The two suggested approaches need to be adopted depending on the degree of path adjustment contemplated i.e. adjustment at a broader strategic level requiring a top-down approach, and adjustment at the implementation level requiring a bottom up approach. Moreover, as discussed below, certain practical challenges need to be considered when determining which approach is most appropriate.

Meanwhile, UNDP will need to consider more dynamic forms of M&E to enable path adjustment. While periodic reviews can be adequately effective in stable political environments, the prevalence of high levels of flux and uncertainty in Sri Lanka’s current context warrants more dynamic processes of programme oversight. In this context, path adjustments can be facilitated through the institution of continuous (rather than periodic) programme oversight, rather than solely relying on formal M&E processes to adjust programmes. Informal mechanisms and practices could include regular programme oversight discussions with programme staff, technical staff and M&E personnel. These
discussions can offer a forum to identify challenges in programme implementation and devise strategies for overcoming such challenges from a cross-sectoral perspective. Such informal systems would enable UNDP staff to communicate and respond to everyday realities of programme implementation, while averting potentially higher turnaround times between formal M&E reporting and consequent path adjustments.

Adopting recommended path adjustment strategies will invariably be confronted by practical challenges. For example, in the context of NIM projects, overall programme oversight is currently vested with Programme Boards. In the absence of IP ownership over programmes and outcomes, decision-making by Programme Boards can become vulnerable to bureaucratic delays and activity stagnation. Hence the ability for Programme Boards to function in a manner that strengthens programme implementation is currently limited. Moreover, project monitoring and general coordination functions are carried out by Project Implementation Units (PIUs). The PIUs pertaining to the SELAJSI programme comprise officers from respective IPs, and are chaired by the IP ministry Secretaries. Hence, the functionality of both Programme Boards and PIUs as effective oversight bodies is heavily contingent on the commitment and initiative of IPs. The requirement for Secretary-level initiative in taking projects forward has left SELAJSI highly vulnerable to project stagnation.

Whenever such practical challenges at higher management levels emerge, UNDP may need to adopt a more bottom up approach to path adjustment. For example, UNDP could set up an intermediate-level Project Management Committee, comprising IP project staff, UNDP project staff and Technical Coordinators. The Committee would be tasked with overseeing project implementation and documenting relevant developments as they occur. The Committee could also create uniform systems for monitoring and assessment of IP activities, through the use of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) with regard to delivery timelines and resource allocation. The information and analysis generated by such a Committee could assist Programme Boards to engage in path adjustment when necessary. The Committee would also be delegated the responsibility of problem solving with regard to day-to-day implementation challenges, averting the need to rely on Board-level interventions.

3.3.2 Priority

Priority refers to UNDP’s ability to focus its mandate in a manner that leverages the agency’s ‘Unique Selling Point’ (USP). There are two contextual factors that motivate increased prioritisation within UNDP’s mandate. First, donor funding to Sri Lanka has been gradually depleting since 2013. This depletion is attributed to (a) the humanitarian crises in Europe and the Middle East, and (b) Sri Lanka's LMIC status. The reduction of donor funding has impacted certain aspects of UNDP’s programming, particularly in the area of service delivery. For example, UNDP’s project with the Department of Prisons was scaled down primarily because there has been insufficient donor traction to support the initiative. Further, with regard to the G-LED project, technical officers were forced to cut down project interventions, as the budget – due to exchange rate losses - could no longer extend across all planned sub-projects, Second, KIs expressed that prevailing resource constraints resulted in an inability to optimise performance across a wide portfolio of projects.

External stakeholders do not appear to perceive UNDP’s CP as having a particularly strong programmatic focus. For instance, government KIs demonstrated a general lack of knowledge on UNDP’s specific mandate and programmatic focus. Moreover, a number of UN agencies noted
that there were prevailing programmatic overlaps between UNDP’s CP and the programmes of other UN agencies. According to KIs, such overlaps resulted in reduced specialisation and cohesiveness in UN programmes. KIs from the UNCT noted that both UNDP and UNFPA conduct projects on GBV. Moreover, it was also noted that UNDP’s work on gender under SELAJSI overlapped with programmes conducted by UN Women. Further, donor KIs also noted concerns associated with the breadth of UNDP’s programme portfolio. Donors noted the potential for overlap in the mandates of UNDP and other development partners, including agencies in the UNCT. For instance, a donor KI considered UNDP’s work on access to justice largely similar to a USAID project. It was subsequently clarified that UNDP’s access to justice project preceded USAID’s project. However, such perceptions of overlap have the potential to lead to donor reluctance to fund UNDP due to the risk of resource duplication.

In the shrinking donor landscape, private sector partnerships are crucial to ensuring UNDP’s longer-term organisational sustainability. However, the lack of clarity surrounding UNDP’s programmatic focus also has the potential to impede private sector partnerships. For instance, certain private sector KIs noted that there was a level of uncertainty surrounding UNDP’s ‘Unique Selling Point’, as the agency’s particular focus and expertise areas failed to be easily identifiable.

While noting the widespread perception among stakeholders (including those within the UN) that UNDP lacks programmatic focus, it may be useful to highlight UNDP’s own understanding of its mandate. According to senior level staff, UNDP is the UN’s primary programming agency. Apart from agencies such as UNICEF, which has an extensive history in delivering programmes, other UN agencies often do (and should) rely on UNDP to design and implement programmes, while the relevant agency provides technical expertise. Stakeholders often do not understand this seemingly broad mandate, which in turn has resulted in the impression of programmatic overlap between UNDP and other specialised agencies. However, it is still important to differentiate between UNDP’s general programming mandate and its thematic focus. UNDP’s comparative advantage as a programming agency depends on its ability to implement effective joint programmes. Such programmes depend on UNDP being able to design and deliver programmes utilising the technical expertise of another UN agency (e.g. joint programming with UN Women, where UN Women provide the technical expertise and UNDP designs and delivers programmes). Such approaches will necessitate UNDP leveraging its strengths in areas of capacity building, convening power and policy advocacy. Interventions within UNDP’s thematic focus contemplate a prioritisation of its unique strengths, in particular areas of policy advice and technical expertise. For example, governance programmes where UNDP provides technical expertise in addition to leveraging other unique strengths such as convening power, policy advocacy, and capacity development.

**SELAJSI specific analysis**

A number of KIs expressed concerns with respect to the breadth of activities contemplated under SELAJSI. According to KIs, this broad scope prevented effective activity and IP ministry prioritisation, thus impeding the delivery of project outputs. For instance, KIs noted weak project focus and prioritisation of SELAJSI activities focused on the areas of law enforcement and reconciliation. Further, KIs stated that there were significant technical and financial resource constraints associated with certain SELAJSI projects. As such, it was noted that the failure to narrow down the scope of SELAJSI in accordance with available technical and financial
resources further contributed to weaknesses in project implementation.

UNDP also tended to be hampered by limited strategic prioritisation of interventions within its expansive portfolio. This limited strategic prioritisation posed challenges for the agency’s ability to identify key programming entry points in accordance with its core competencies.

**Recommendations**

Prioritisation within UNDP’s Country Programme needs to take place at two levels. First, UNDP needs to ensure greater internal clarity in terms of the distinction between its general programming mandate and its thematic focus areas. In this regard, UNDP would benefit from a comprehensive review of its thematic focus areas, with a view to maximising its USP within the UNCT and its operating context more broadly. The review ought to clarify thematic areas that (a) UNDP has (or ought to have) technical expertise in; and (b) UN agencies have technical expertise in.

When UNDP has technical expertise with respect to a particular thematic area, it should ensure that all its unique strengths are leveraged to deliver effective and efficient programmes that include its own technical and policy advice and expertise. In these specific circumstances, UNDP should also focus on delivering structural and systems-level interventions within its thematic focus areas.

When another UN agency is better suited to providing technical expertise, UNDP should confine its role to programme design and delivery, and prioritise its unique strengths in terms of convening government and civil society actors, advocating for policy positions and building capacity. In these specific circumstances, UNDP ought to prioritise leveraging its strengths as a programming, as opposed to a technical agency. More detailed recommendations on prioritisation of UNDP interventions are explored in section 4 below.

Second, UNDP needs to strengthen its programme cohesiveness from an external perspective. This strategy can include utilising the Communications Unit to disseminate information concerning UNDP’s areas of engagement. Moreover, UNDP should consider instituting regular engagements with stakeholders such as IP ministries, the private sector and government departments. These engagements should focus on equipping participants with information surrounding UNDP intervention areas, with a view to strengthening existing and future partnerships.

**3.3.3 Complementarity**

Complementarity comprises both internal and external complementarity. Internal complementarity refers to programme cohesiveness (a) within the UNDP and (b) between the UNDP and the UNCT. External complementarity refers to UNDP’s partnerships with other development partners, CSOs and the private sector in the delivery of programmes.

Complementarity ensures that UNDP has the ability to structure its partnerships in a manner that is conducive to holistic programming. Recent developments in the global sustainable development agenda indicate that mainstreaming SDGs requires increasing focus on delivering integrated programming solutions. However, according to organisations such as GiZ, there is little co-ordination among development partners on matters of project implementation and design. It was stated that this lack of co-ordination has limited the cohesiveness of programmes, and created multiple overlaps in programming. Thus
the ability for UNDP to strengthen its internal and external complementarity is intrinsic to the agency’s continued relevance and effectiveness.

Internal complementarity

In the context of ensuring internal complementarity, KIs expressed concern with respect to the segregation of and lack of co-ordination between UNDP’s programmatic clusters (i.e. GESI and ESDR). According to KIs, this lack of inter-cluster connectivity has prevented governance and environmental issues being addressed through integrated programming solutions. It was stated that barriers to inter-cluster connectivity include a separation between the outcomes of GESI and ESDR. As a result, processes such as planning, staffing, implementation and M&E for these two clusters operate independently of each other. KIs noted that each cluster often dedicates time and resources to securing funding directed towards their thematic focus. Ostensibly, this could limit the scope for intra-agency collaboration when designing project proposals. According to KIs, this lack of intra-agency collaboration is likely to fragment UNDP’s programming cohesion, hinder effective resource mobilisation, and limit the success of the agency’s outcomes – as opposed to effectively leveraging UNDP’s unique comparative strengths.

Additionally, another barrier to inter-cluster connectivity is the fact that each cluster has its own IP ministries and independent cluster units. These independent frameworks prevent the alignment of management and implementation structures in a manner that facilitates holistic outcomes. Limited inter-cluster connectivity also has the potential to reduce UNDP’s overall funding. For example, certain donors such as the Government of Norway and USAID expressed a reluctance to fund DRR and climate change mitigation, as they did not see these issues

as being of crucial importance in Sri Lanka’s country context. However, if DRR and climate change mitigation were integrated into a project on livelihood support or citizen engagement with government, these integrated projects would have a higher chance of ‘matching’ donor funding requirements. Furthermore, an integrated approach would increase the sustainability of results and translate into a greater impact on beneficiaries.

Notwithstanding the above, UNDP has been moving towards better internal complementarity in recent programming interventions. For example, UNDP has secured funding from the Green Climate Fund for a project that includes aspects of both environment and governance, such as the role of Provincial Councils and Divisional Secretariats in environmental protection. Moreover, UNDP’s proposal in the aftermath of the Koslanda Landslide in October 2014 was designed to be holistic - incorporating both DRR outputs as well as livelihood outputs. Further, UNDP’s proposed Parliamentary Development Support project also attempts to integrate governance and environmental issues by channelling environmental protection and advocacy through the Sectoral Oversight Committees in Parliament. Meanwhile, UNDP has developed strong partnerships with other UN agencies, which has also contributed towards greater internal complementarity. For example, according to the ROAR 2014, inter-agency collaboration in the EU-SDDP project contributed to its programmatic success.

External complementarity

In terms of external complementarity, UNDP has had success in building partnerships among government agencies and among civil society actors. For instance, the UNDP has collaborated with government agencies such as the Legal
Draftsman's Department and the Department of Police. Furthermore, the UNDP has also demonstrated its ability to build partnerships with civil society actors such as Women in Need and the Centre for Policy Alternatives.

However, UNDP’s private sector partnerships have been limited. These limited partnerships are largely due to the fact that the private sector perceives UNDP as a donor rather than a development partner. Moreover, UNDP partnerships with the private sector have encountered challenges in implementation. For example, the excessive delays associated with UNDP’s Conversion of Biomass to Energy Project resulted in project outputs being out-dated, and unable to meet the present needs of industry. According to KIs, such delays contributed to the private sector’s reluctance to partner with the UNDP.

Notwithstanding the above, the private sector viewed future partnerships with UNDP favourably, in the context of the SDGs. According to KIs, external complementarity with private sector initiatives can be strengthened around the SDG implementation process in Sri Lanka. KIs noted that UNDP has the opportunity to consult relevant stakeholders and conduct SDG mapping exercises with corporate entities and the government in order to ensure coherent and comprehensive SDG implementation. These interventions could include (a) facilitating the tracking and monitoring of SDGs, and (b) designing models for SDG mainstreaming.

Furthermore, private sector KIs recognised UNDP’s ability to obtain and synthesise government information. These KIs stated that UNDP’s ability to partner with the government would be particularly useful for the purposes of supplying the private sector with reliable government data, for example, on issues such as disaster management.

**SELAJSI specific analysis**

**Internal complementarity**

According to KIs, internal complementarity within the SELAJSI project was weak. The design of SELAJSI to encompass three IP ministries was targeted at improving the inter-connectedness between judicial reform and social integration. However, according to KIs, the co-ordination between the three IP ministries within SELAJSI has been limited. Consequently, ministries often act without consulting other IP ministries when implementing SELAJSI activities. This lack of co-ordination and collaboration impedes the extent to which (a) IP ministries are able to complement each other’s projects, and (b) SELAJSI is able to deliver holistic and coherent outputs.

Furthermore, some KIs noted the lack of synergies between SELAJSI and other UNCT projects, resulting in ‘mandate creep’ and programme overlaps. For instance, UN Women noted that certain aspects of SELAJSI could be strengthened if there were closer linkages between UN Women and the gender components of SELAJSI (e.g. in the context of CEDAW reporting). Meanwhile, UNICEF noted a lack of collaboration between its access to justice projects and SELAJSI. KIs from the UNCT noted the importance of building inter-agency synergies at the point of project design, rather than during project implementation. Further, these KIs also noted that the scope for continued collaboration and partnership between SELAJSI and the UNCT could be enhanced through the better utilisation of the crosscutting Gender Theme Group.

**External complementarity**

SELAJSI also demonstrates weak external complementarity. Development partners noted that there were a number of overlaps between
SELAJSI and other access to justice and social integration programming. According to KIs, these overlaps sometimes resulted in programme duplication. For instance, overlaps were noted in the policy advocacy surrounding the National Policy Framework for Social Integration. Accordingly, development partners such as GiZ noted the scope for increased SELAJSI collaboration with programmes such as Facilitating Initiatives for Social Cohesion & Transformation (FLICT).

**Recommendations**

UNDP needs to focus on enhancing both internal and external complementarity in its programming.

**Internal complementarity**

Enhancing complementarity within UNDP entails greater collaboration between the two programmatic clusters, GESI and ESDR. UNDP should thus consider a transition from the rigidity of its current cluster-led approach. This will enable UNDP to design holistic projects, both in substance and in modality of implementation. For instance, livelihood projects can be designed to integrate components of environmental protection and economic empowerment.

Similarly, the design of UNDP programmes should ensure stronger partnerships with agencies in the UNCT, in the event there is a ‘mandate match’. For instance, UNDP should build stronger partnerships with UN Women when delivering the gender components of its programming. As discussed in the section on prioritisation, there is a need for better communication between agencies to enable greater clarity on UNDP’s general programming mandate and on its particular thematic focus areas. Such clarity is likely to enhance internal complementarity by enabling clearer divisions of labour and better coordination between agencies.

UNDP should nevertheless ensure that it retains a degree of flexibility to design complementarity in a manner that best optimises outcomes. UNDP programming can comprise three forms: (a) singular programming (b) dual programming and (c) integrated programming.

‘Singular programming’ refers to projects that are best implemented through the ESDR or GESI cluster alone. Singular programming comprises activities that are particular to the relevant UNDP cluster (e.g. technical support on legislative drafting). ‘Dual programming’ refers to projects that are made up of a number of independent components. Therefore, under dual programming, each component is carried out by a different UNDP cluster or different agencies in the UNCT (e.g. support to the Sectoral Oversight Committees by creating independent deliverables for ESDR, GESI and relevant agencies in the UNCT). It is noted that internal complementarity within UNDP should be built into programme conceptualisation and design. As such, representatives from both the GESI and the ESDR clusters should be involved in programme conceptualisation and design – regardless of which cluster has undertaken responsibility for implementation. Regularising such ‘informal’ complementarity would entail a shift in mind-set, from a largely ‘siloed’ approach to one that places high value on cross-cluster brainstorming and deliberation in programme design. Meanwhile, ‘integrated programming’ refers to the fusing of project deliverables. This mode of programming does not attempt to compartmentalise project implementation by distinguishing between outcomes delivered by UNDP clusters and other agencies in the UNCT, (e.g. developing a policy on DRR that encompasses both livelihood development and environmental protection).
External complementarity

UNDP should also focus on strengthening its partnerships with external entities, such as development partners and the private sector. These partnerships are likely to optimise UNDP’s ability to deliver coherent, sustainable and cost-effective projects. For instance UNDP could partner with the private sector to set up SDG tracking and monitoring tools. Such partnerships are likely to accelerate SDG implementation in shared priority areas. Furthermore, UNDP could also work with its international networks to develop a system of KPIs for the purpose of monitoring progress in relation to SDG targets. These KPIs could be used as a base to form partnerships with the private sector and government stakeholders.

Additionally, UNDP should enhance external complementarity by entering into cost-sharing agreements with government agencies, at national and sub-national levels. For example, the government could secure donor funding to strengthen the capacity of the Legal Draftsman’s Department. However, the government may lack the necessary technical expertise required to fulfil expected project outputs, such as designing a review process for legislative drafting or developing a manual on legislative drafting techniques. In this event, UNDP could enter into an agreement with the government to support delivery of these outputs with government funding.

There is little doubt that UNDP is well positioned to ensure greater subsidiarity in programming. A number of donor, private sector, and development partners noted the strength of UNDP’s CSO networks at the sub-national level. Donors in particular noted that UNDP’s sub-national networks were significantly more extensive than any individual donor network. According to KIs, UNDP’s sub-national networks of officers in local authorities and provincial councils were seen as being intrinsic to the agency’s ability to deliver to its local constituencies. For example, donor KIs stated that UNDP’s sub-national networks aided in the implementation and delivery of livelihood projects, specifically in the context of the identification of beneficiaries and obtaining operational permits. Further, donors recognised UNDP’s ability to effectively convene community-based organisations. As such, UNDP’s convening power both at local government and CSO level were seen as factors influencing donor engagement. Collectively, these factors optimise UNDP’s ability to utilise subsidiarity to enhance the effectiveness of programme outcomes.

3.3.4 Subsidiarity

Subsidiarity refers to the ability for UNDP to select suitable and competent partners in programming. This approach is often understood to require engagement at the lowest possible level of decision-making within a decentralised or devolved structure, provided the entity concerned meets the level of competence required by UNDP. For instance, if both a national level entity and a local level entity are competent to deliver a water sanitation programme, the principle of subsidiarity requires that preference be given to the local level entity. This principle may be extended to working with non-state actors as well. In the wake of the 2015 political transition, the operational space for CSOs operating at the national and sub-national level increased. Capitalising on this increased space, UNDP programming should be targeted at strengthening the capacity of local CSOs and the media to influence and shape the trajectory of government priorities in accordance with issues of public interest. Furthermore, strengthening linkages between local CSOs and UNDP programmes in the project delivery pipeline is likely to facilitate UNDP’s shift towards ‘upstream programming’ – thus strengthening UNDP’s ability to focus on delivering outputs that leverage its unique strengths and facilitate effective resource mobilisation.
Referring to the post-2015 context, KIs stated that UNDP partnered with CSOs to enhance collaboration on governance reform by supporting roundtables and issue-based coalitions. Meanwhile, UNDP has also demonstrated its capacity to partner with sub-national CSOs to inform electoral reform proposals advanced at the national and ministerial level. Moreover the Secretary General of Parliament noted that UNDP’s Parliamentary Development Support Project would facilitate the presentation of research and policy documents developed by CSOs to relevant Sectoral Oversight Committees.

Further, according to CSOs with localised operations such as Sarvodaya, UNDP is able to supplement the organisation’s advocacy initiatives by providing district development councils with technical information and policy advice. With regard to environmental CSOs, UNDP is well placed to support local CSO platforms such as the grassroots-level Sri Lanka Forest and Climate Action Network. KIs noted that the existence of such platforms was expected to strengthen environmental protection, advocacy and coalition-building.

UNDP has also facilitated subsidiarity by entering into Project Cooperation Agreements with international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs) to facilitate the delivery of DIM-based projects. These Project Cooperation Agreements are targeted at partnering with local CSOs to deliver project outcomes. However, the use of such Project Cooperation Agreements has been infrequent. This infrequency can be attributed to the restricted operating space occupied by CSOs under the previous government. As such, during this period, UNDP did not view CSOs viable ‘IPs’ in programme delivery.

KIs and donors viewed UNDP’s linkages with devolved and decentralised structures such as provincial councils and local authorities positively. For instance, the Government of Norway noted that UNDP’s linkages with local government agencies were intrinsic to the agency’s ability to execute programme outputs in a timely manner, particularly in relation to livelihood programming. Further, a number of KIs stated that in some instances UNDP’s sub-national networks helped to secure government ‘buy-in’ when advancing policy interventions at the local level, thus maximising UNDP’s ability to deliver in a challenging operating environment.

However, KIs stated that UNDP’s inclusion of sub-national project partners in its programme implementation (i.e. their inclusion in programme planning and development) was not widespread. This factor can contribute to weak integration between UNDP’s sub-national and national level programming. The lack of such integration can also impede the formation of vertical consensus between different levels of government on national policy interventions advanced by UNDP. Consequently, the failure to integrate sub-national government partners in a more systematic manner can prevent UNDP’s programmes from being optimised to their full potential.

Furthermore, KIs noted that certain UNDP programmes tended to bear similarities with projects implemented by local CSOs. For example, both CSOs and UNDP provided water management services in similar locations the North and the East. According to KIs, the support provided by UNDP to CBOs replicated capacity building activities conducted by other local CSOs. As such, KIs were of the opinion that such project overlaps led to poor resource allocation and significant beneficiary duplication. Moreover, KIs noted that the failure to integrate non-state institutions into programming had adverse consequences for UNDP’s programme exit strategies and the durability of its interventions. For
example, rural CBOs would rely on UNDP to lobby the government on their behalf, and therefore lacked the ability to advocate for change once the particular project came to a close.

KIs stated that CSOs were often perceived as entities to be funded rather than agents that facilitated project implementation. It was noted that this perception could be attributed to the fact that CSOs were not considered viable partners during the Rajapaksa presidency. However, in the changed political context the failure to better integrate CSOs in UNDP programming can impede the operationalisation of subsidiarity.

**SELAJSI specific analysis**

According to the SELAJSI project document, partnerships with ‘civil society, and non-governmental women’s and youth organisations’ are permitted. Notwithstanding this space for partnership, the integration of CSOs as project implementing partners in SELAJSI has been limited. Furthermore, where CSOs have been integrated into SELAJSI programme implementation, such integration has been limited to utilising CSOs as service providers. For example, SELAJSI engaged the British Council and Search for Common Ground in the capacity of service providers, as opposed to project partners. By contrast, in 2016, SELAJSI engaged Women in Need as a project partner to implement activities on gender-based violence. Notwithstanding the above, SELAJSI has demonstrated weakness in engaging and partnering with CSOs at the sub-national level.

In light of the more conducive operating environment for CSOs, KIs noted that the overall sustainability of SELAJSI would depend on CSOs being integrated into the programme’s delivery pipeline. For example, development partners such as GiZ noted that the integration of CSOs as implementing partners in their programmes (e.g. FLICT) has increased the cost-effectiveness and timelines of outcomes. However, even within the wider development sphere, CSO partnerships at the sub-national level are not widespread. Such limitations inhibit the formation of vertical consensus and technical transfer between national and sub-national actors. Thus, the ability of CSOs and development partners to build sustainable networks on key public interest issues such as transitional justice and public accountability is limited.

**Recommendations**

Incorporating the principle of subsidiarity into the UNDP CP contemplates programmes that are executed through stakeholders (e.g. local authorities, CSOs and the private sector) operating at a level that is decentralised or devolved while maintaining competence in terms of delivery. However, in light of the increasing operational space for programme activity, UNDP will need to ensure integrity in its method of selection, particularly with respect to civil society and private sector partners. Thus developing rigorous selection criteria is essential to UNDP being able to link project activities with suitable sub-national project partners. UNDP already has extensive guidelines on selecting implementation partners as per section 2.6.2 of the POPP guidelines. The existing seven-step process aims to rigorously select ‘the best candidate for implementing partner from among several potential partners’, taking into account factors that include financial management capacity, management arrangements and assurance mechanisms. In addition to these criteria, UNDP should aim to partner with the most capable IP at the most devolved level of competence. In this regard, UNDP could adopt the following two-step test. First, UNDP could compile a list of all entities competent and qualified to execute the activity under its own guidelines. Once a list of qualifying sub-national actors has been compiled,
UNDP could select a partner that demonstrates the strongest nexus to the locality or thematic area in which the project would be implemented.

An approach based on subsidiarity is likely to strengthen UNDP’s Country Programme on several counts. First, it will help UNDP to secure greater buy in and support at the sub-national level among government counterparts, civil society and the private sector. Such buy in and support invariably enhances the sustainability of programme outcomes. Second, as detailed in the section on flexibility, UNDP’s aims of remaining flexible and responsive will depend on its ability to gather information and insights from partners at the sub-national level. Delivering programmes and projects through sub-national partners enhances the potential for such data gathering and insights.

3.3.5 Hybridity

There are two factors that prompt a need for designing innovative and resource efficient programmes. These are: (a) the institutional flux that dominates Sri Lanka’s political context, and (b) UNDP’s role as a development partner (as opposed to a donor). ‘Hybridity’ ensures that UNDP leverages its comparative advantages and those of its stakeholders in order to optimise programme implementation.

UNDP has two broad modalities of implementation. They are (a) the Direct Implementation Model (DIM) and (b) the National Implementation Model (NIM). Due to the restrictive environment in which the CPD was formulated (and the fact that the government communicated a preference for NIM), UNDP tended to adopt a NIM modality over a hybrid modality to facilitate project implementation. DIM and NIM allocate responsibility and accountability for achieving targets to UNDP and the government respectively. It is, however, noted that DIM and NIM project modalities refer to the level of engagement rather than the type of engagement. Thus the DIM-NIM dichotomy is not synonymous with the downstream-upstream dichotomy. It is possible to engage in upstream programming through DIM and downstream programming through NIM and vice versa.

A number of KIs expressed concerns regarding the execution of DIM, particularly in relation to livelihood and poverty alleviation projects. These concerns largely revolved around the transactional and project implementation costs associated with projects directly implemented by UNDP. Moreover, government KIs commented that despite a higher budgetary allocation, DIM yielded lower outputs. KIs also perceived that an over reliance on DIM-based projects involves the substantial risk of eroding government ownership of UNDP implemented projects, thereby weakening the sustainability of institutional investments.

Donor KIs echoed the above concerns associated with DIM. First, donors were of the impression that the cost of engaging UNDP to deliver on livelihood projects was considerably high compared to engaging local CSOs. Second, donor KIs stated that the number of beneficiaries impacted by UNDP’s programming interventions in the livelihood and poverty alleviation sectors were insufficient. Notwithstanding these observations, certain donors such as the Government of Canada preferred funding DIM-based projects on account of the fact that it minimised navigating the debilitative bureaucratic processes associated with government institutions.

KIs noted that there were certain instances in which DIM was more suitable compared to NIM for achieving project outcomes. This observation was particularly relevant to upstream programming interventions. For example, DIM aided the drafting of a Bill that includes greater provisions for monitoring the implementation of
the National Building Research Organisation’s (NBRO) recommendations. The Bill aims to convert the NRBO into a National Building Research Institute. The Bill also proposes to institute a new screening process termed Disaster Impact Assessments (DIAs), which will apply to all forms of construction. Moreover, KIs noted that higher transaction costs associated with DIM-based projects were partly attributed to the additional capacity building initiatives tied to UNDP funding, particularly in the case of livelihood projects. For instance, UNDP-funded livelihood projects included representative beneficiary selection and sustainability planning initiatives in addition to disbursing seed funding to beneficiaries.

In the context of NIM, government KIs perceived UNDP Technical Coordinators as important enablers both to advance CSO needs within government, and to increase the linkages between the UN and government. Further, according to government KIs, Technical Coordinators were uniquely placed to alleviate existing capacity gaps in government institutions. For example, government KIs noted that there is an opportunity for UNDP Technical Coordinators to strengthen the agency’s capacity in the context of environmental strategic planning.

However, particularly in relation to GESI, the NIM modality presents significant challenges to the effectiveness and impact of projects. These challenges are attributed to increased stagnation of project outputs due to the existing lack of capacity within government institutions. Consequently, the Technical Coordinators that are placed in government institutions on NIM-based projects are often compelled to perform administrative tasks, thus limiting their ability to offer high-level technical support. As such, these weaknesses impede performance within NIM-based projects. In the case of ESDR, weak capacity within IP ministries selected for NIM-based projects meant that UNDP was required to provide additional support to ensure effective implementation. For example, the institutionalisation of the Invasive Alien Species Project was severely delayed due to the limited capacity of the IP ministry in terms of the human resources and technical competency necessary to implement the project. Such delays prompted UNDP to disburse additional funding to hire an external advisor to augment project implementation.

The evolving political context has placed a considerable strain on NIM-based projects. UNDP staff observed that selecting government IPs has become increasingly difficult due to constant fluctuations in the composition of Ministries. For example, there were four administrative changes in the Ministry of Disaster Management. Meanwhile, the Secretary of the Ministry of Environment changed three times in 2015.

Additionally, constant fluctuations in the Secretaries of IP ministries overseeing UNDP projects have resulted in considerable delays in project implementation. These delays are attributed to the time lag associated with building awareness and ownership among the incumbent Secretaries in relation to project activities and requirements. As such, according to KIs, although DIM is more expensive in the short term, NIM becomes more expensive in the longer term due to the substantial administrative support it requires from UNDP. For example, ESDR staff costs have risen – even for low budget projects – because of capacity gaps in national implementation partners.

As such, both NIM and DIM present significant practical challenges for project implementation. It is noted that UNDP has already demonstrated a willingness to remedy the dichotomisation resulting from implementing projects either through a DIM or a NIM modality, thus embracing the concept of hybridity.
First, UNDP has demonstrated the ability to deploy DIM in a manner that ensures government responsibility for the completion of project activities. For example, certain components of DIM-based livelihood projects are contracted out to government following a Letter of Agreement. Second, UNDP has shifted towards integrating DIM and NIM approaches through an integrated support modality. This support modality contemplates a ‘Hybrid Implementation Model’ (i.e. incorporating elements of DIM and NIM), which is designed to give UNDP the ability to maximise the effectiveness of its resources. For example, UNDP has assisted with procurement and contracting of service providers for NIM projects. For a SELAJSI focus project, UNDP procured equipment for two language-learning labs within the Department of Official Languages and National Institute of Language Education Training. Moreover, according to project documentation, ‘although based at the office of National Languages, the Chief Technical Adviser (for SELAJSI) spends time at all IP ministries and is involved in key meetings’.

UNDP further secured the services of the British Council and the Centre for Policy Alternatives for implementing project activities with the IP ministry. The Hybrid Implementation Model allows UNDP to leverage its unique strengths by prioritising and selecting project activities that warrant a DIM-based approach, and aspects of the project that would be better serviced through a NIM-based approach.

**SELAJSI specific analysis**

SELAJSI focuses on systems enhancement through increased institutional linkages both within and between the spheres of justice and social integration. Moreover, SELAJSI was designed on an ‘area model’ approach. This approach enabled the government agencies to pilot programmatic interventions in selected districts, prior to nationwide rollout. This mechanism of pilot programming was designed to strengthen policy implementation by adopting a ‘tried and tested approach’.

SELAJSI comprises sub-projects that are implemented solely through NIM. At design stage, NIM was adopted in order to facilitate government responsibility for project implementation. KIs noted that this was done primarily because the previous government was reluctant to permit UNDP to implement projects on sensitive areas such as access to justice and social integration through DIM. Further, NIM provided opportunities for capacity building within government through the placement of a Technical Coordinator in each IP ministry. KIs noted that the placement of Technical Coordinators within ministries gave UNDP significant comparative advantages in terms of (a) access to policy makers, (b) knowledge of the internal dynamics within ministries, and (c) awareness of emerging policy developments. These comparative advantages place UNDP in a position where it is able to leverage its access to government in order to deliver project outcomes. For example, UNDP’s in-house technical support in relation to the Legal Aid Policy contributed to the Policy securing the approval of the Legal Aid Commission.

However, NIM has created significant operational challenges that impede the effectiveness of SELAJSI execution. In the context of increasing administrative and institutional flux, secretaries of IP ministries have regularly changed. For instance, the Secretary of the Ministry of Women and Child Affairs and the Secretary of the Ministry of National Dialogue, Co-Existence and Official Languages has been changed three times since January 2015. KIs stated that these constant fluctuations resulted in time lags associated with

technical and institutional capacity building of the incumbent secretaries and project approval sign-offs. Further, KIs also noted that in certain instances, incumbent secretaries had less exposure to the subject matter of their Ministries. Collectively, these factors sought to weaken the effectiveness of SELAJSI project implementation.

The increased administrative and institutional flux also resulted in SELAJSI facing challenges associated with broader government ownership over project outcomes. As such, government officials assigned to work on SELAJSI often see the project as being in addition to their daily tasks at their respective ministries, despite the fact that such tasks are contemplated under IP ministries’ mandates, and were prioritised by their predecessors. Moreover, KIs noted that certain ministry officials failed to recognise that SELAJSI outputs simultaneously contributed to achieving IP ministry mandates. This misperception of SELAJSI activity often impedes project prioritisation and timely delivery of project outcomes.

Additionally, the current structuring of the NIM modality risks the creation of perverse incentives within IP ministries. This is attributed to the fact that Secretaries are paid one third of their salaries in exchange for overseeing SELAJSI sub-projects. First, this has the potential to result in individuals volunteering to oversee SELAJSI sub-projects on the grounds of financial incentives, rather than a genuine interest in the project. Second, the added remuneration has the potential to create incentives for Secretaries to prioritise UNDP projects above their day-to-day work at the Ministry. This de-prioritisation of routine work can result in bureaucratic delays and policy deadlocks when addressing national priorities that do not correspond to SELAJSI. Third, the fact that remuneration is payable to Secretaries on oversight rather than on the achievement of programmatic outcomes results in the failure to create performance-based incentives. This failure has the potential to erode the efficacy of project implementation within ministries.

SELAJSI has faced challenges associated with the functionality of Technical Coordinators who are located within IP ministries. Technical Coordinators are placed in IP ministries for the purpose of carrying out capacity building and technical transfers within government. However, the effectiveness of these activities is limited in practice. These limitations are attributed to the fact that Technical Coordinators are often tasked with performing purely administrative functions (e.g. writing speeches, proof reading, drafting MoUs and project proposals), preventing the delivery of upstream services through SELAJSI. Moreover, in certain instances Technical Coordinators have been designated ministry tasks that do not correspond directly to SELAJSI outcomes, indicating a lack of clarity surrounding the role of the Technical Coordinator within the IP ministry. This practice (a) impedes the ownership of SELAJSI and the development of implementation capacities within government, and (b) results in Technical Coordinators being unable to fulfil their intended up-stream functions.

KIs also noted prevailing programmatic hurdles arising out of the weak nexus between the IP ministry and project outputs. For instance, KIs stated that the Ministry of Justice wields insufficient power to address SELAJSI outputs targeted at improving access to justice through better courtroom management and protection. In this context, KIs stated that the Ministry of Justice is mandated to focus on providing courtroom infrastructure and courtroom support staff, rather than providing substantive support targeted at judicial reform. Thus, KIs were of the view that the Judicial Services Commission, the Attorney General’s Department and the Legal Aid Commission were more suitable partners to
enable SELAJSI implementation. Further, it was also noted that while the Ministry of Women’s Affairs has demonstrated willingness to engage in gender reform initiatives, such initiatives often have low impact. According to KIs, this is attributed to the fact that the Ministry of Women’s Affairs is not perceived as a key player in the government’s reform agenda. As such, increasing linkages between the Department of Police and the National Child Protection Authority will increase the ability of SELAJSI to transform the responsiveness of institutions to issues of gender-based violence.

**Recommendations**

Depending on the context, both NIM and DIM run the risk of project stagnation, weak government ownership and the creation of perverse incentives within government institutions. In such instances, optimising the achievement of UNDP outcomes will depend on the design of a hybrid implementation model that aims to address the above weaknesses. As noted above, UNDP has already begun to shift towards such a hybrid implementation modality—for example by incorporating DIM components into NIM programmes.

In this context, the implementation of future UNDP projects should not be categorised as being either DIM or NIM. Projects should attempt to integrate components of these two modalities in a manner that best suits the requirement of the project. However, projects should elect a ‘project lead’ that functions as the entity that drives the implementation of the outcomes and is accountable for poor performance. In the event the government is the project lead, UNDP funding should be made contingent on IP ministries meeting certain KPIs on programme output delivery. This practice will minimise the effects of perverse incentives within NIM by creating performance-based incentives within IP ministries. Further, in the event there is undue project stagnation in projects led by government, there should be a process to ensure that the project can be transferred from a predominantly government-led implementation structure to a predominantly UNDP-led implementation structure. However, to minimise the adverse impacts on the relationship between UNDP and government, this transfer process should operate in an independent and transparent manner.

As such, the implementation status of UNDP projects, and projects in partnership with government, should be subject to a status labelling system (i.e. a system that indicates whether the project is on track, at risk or stagnant) that indicates the status of the project or sub-project. In the context of NIM projects, this status labelling system can be implemented through the Project Management Committee proposed above.67

Further, in terms of the existing NIM programmes a review of current IP ministry selection may be warranted. Selection criteria usually applied to potential IPs should also include an assessment of a partner’s capacity and openness to reform.

To ensure that technical personnel seconded to ministries perform technical functions and not coordination or logistical functions, UNDP could consider deploying the terminology of ‘Technical Advisers’ rather than ‘Technical Coordinators’ to mitigate potential misconceptions of the precise role of these officers. Such terminology will limit the instances in which technical staff are compelled to perform administrative tasks and functions that are not necessarily related to UNDP project implementation. Furthermore, UNDP can consider mandating that Technical Coordinators spend at least two working days at

---

67. See section 3.3.1 above.
the UNDP country office. This requirement will increase the independence of Technical Coordinators within IP ministries.

### 3.3.6 Measurability

The relevance and effectiveness of the UNDP CP is contingent on UNDP being able to deliver on programme outputs. UNDP currently utilises a Results and Resources Framework (RRF) to measure the performance of its programmes. The RRF aligns UNDAF and CPD outcomes by presenting outcome-level indicators, baselines, and targets for UNDP’s contribution to UNDAF and CPD outcomes. It further documents the implementation modalities, and IPs pertaining to a particular project. KIs noted that the failure to consistently update the RRF in accordance with developments in the national context impeded the responsiveness and execution of UNDP’s interventions. Moreover, KIs expressed concerns regarding UNDP adopting UNDAF outcomes in its RRF. According to KIs, this limited UNDP’s ability to strategically develop its comparative advantages within the broader UNCT. In remedying the above, KIs stated that while maintaining UNDAF outcomes as an overarching framework, UNDP could identify measurable short term and medium term outcomes, which more accurately reflect agency priorities.

KIs also noted that the RRF did not place a strong focus on activities that would ensure that UNDP outputs brought about structural change at programme outcome level. To this end, KIs stressed the importance of UNDP playing a stronger policy advocacy role in order to ensure the transition of UNDP interventions from programme outputs to programme outcomes. For instance, it was stated that UNDP should work with relevant government agencies to ensure that draft policies supported by the agency obtain approval at Cabinet level.

#### Recommendations

Poorly formulated indicators and targets can impede UNDP’s ability to generate transformative outcomes. Further, the framing of the RRF undermines the ability for UNDP to adequately measure and evaluate the impact of its projects. As such, in designing its RRF, UNDP should ensure that it is also geared towards measuring impact in relation to programme outcomes, in addition to programme outputs. For example, a possible UNDP intervention could be in supporting a national policy on sustainable production and consumption. Impact in relation to the project should be measured on (1) drafting and finalisation of the policy and (2) the approval of the policy by Cabinet. Accordingly, weighting the success of UNDP’s interventions on both output and outcome achievement is likely to increase the agency’s ability to bring about structural, and institutional change. Furthermore, in order to ensure the transition from project outputs to broader programme outcomes, UNDP should leverage its strengths in policy advocacy.

In addition, UNDP should also ensure stronger focus and prioritisation in the design of activities and outcomes. Country Programme outcomes are currently required to conform to those of the UNDAF. However, conformity to UNDAF outcomes ideally should not serve as the starting point for revisions to the RFF. Instead, development of UNDP’s Country Programme outcomes should be based on an assessment of national priorities and UNDP’s own unique strengths. UNDAF outcomes that match the findings of this assessment should be adopted by UNDP. To this end, adopting UNDAF outcome(s) should be identified in the process of Country Programme conceptualisation, and not at its onset.
Sri Lanka’s political economy and operating context have undergone substantial changes since UNDP’s Country Programme was developed. The development of a new Country Programme provides a renewed opportunity to optimise the strategic prioritisation of UNDP’s interventions in light of Sri Lanka’s changing political economy and operating context. This section presents forward-looking recommendations on programming entry points for UNDP’s new Country Programme.

VR has adopted a three-step approach that UNDP could utilise in identifying and prioritising interventions under the new Country Programme. First, three strategic filters are suggested to test potential thematic intervention areas for their relevance within the national and global context analysed in this MTR. Second, we suggest entry points for UNDP programming interventions within selected thematic areas. These areas are identified through application of the above strategic filters. Finally, VR recommends three levels at which interventions should be targeted to maximise their impact and effectiveness in the Sri Lankan context.

4.1 Strategic Filters

VR recommends that UNDP should utilise the following strategic filters when identifying potential thematic intervention areas:

1. **UNDP’s normative goals**: Normative work is at the core of UNDP’s mandate. UNDP is often unique among development actors in that a strong international normative framework guides its work. Such a normative framework necessarily includes adopting a rights-based approach to development, and promoting sustainable development. Potential programming intervention areas should therefore conform to UNDP’s own normative goals and priorities, particularly with regard to its work in policy advice and advocacy.

2. **Fitness for Purpose**: UNDP’s interventions should conform to the two criteria of ‘Fitness for Purpose’ identified above. Accordingly, interventions should:

   i) Correspond to national priorities,
encompassing both government priorities and major public interest issues.

ii) Leverage UNDP’s unique strengths in Sri Lanka. In addition to leveraging the UN’s strengths identified in section 3.2 above, UNDP also possesses unique strengths that distinguish the agency within the UNCT. In particular, UNDP has built extensive expertise as a key programming organisation, delivering interventions across a wide portfolio of thematic areas. Accordingly, programming interventions should leverage UNDP’s unique strengths as an upstream ‘enabler’ of development, rather than directly deliver downstream, micro-level, institution-specific programmes.

3. Availability of funding: As noted above, Sri Lanka’s changed political context is likely to have prompted a strategic realignment of donor funding priorities. As illustrated in Table 2, donor priority areas include democratic governance, reconciliation and disaster management.

Donor interests and priorities heavily drive donor funding, potentially risking the unavailability of funding with regard to key national priority issues. When designing its new Country Programme, UNDP should consider both the availability of funding and its own ability to shape donor priorities in the event of funding shortfalls for interventions that are targeted at key national priorities.

Meanwhile, the global sustainable development agenda provides a guiding framework for linking interventions to global development priorities. In this context, VR recommends that UNDP gears its Country Programme towards operating at the intersection of its strengths in governance interventions, the demands of the national context, and the SDGs. Operating at this intersection will involve UNDP placing a stronger focus on delivering ‘upstream’ and systems-level governance interventions across its thematic mandate. UNDP’s strength as a major programming agency, coupled with its expertise in governance and institutional strengthening, make the agency uniquely well-positioned to deliver such systems-level interventions.

Accordingly, VR recommends that UNDP consider the following thematic areas of intervention, guided by the strategic filters identified above:

1. Public accountability
2. Sub-national governance and development
3. Governance for peacebuilding
4. Transformative structural impact

4.2 Entry Points

UNDP’s main thematic focus areas have been: (1) governance and peacebuilding, (2) climate and disaster resilience, and (3) sustainable and inclusive growth. Moreover, UNDP integrates the promotion of gender equality across its programmatic portfolio. In Sri Lanka’s context, UNDP’s work on delivering governance solutions has been of particularly high value and remains central to UNDP’s USP. Sri Lanka’s current context is marked by pervasive institutional deficiencies that impede national development in several priority areas, including environment, transitional justice and economic growth. Accordingly, the value of UNDP’s work is likely to be maximised in governance interventions that address systemic impediments to development outcomes, rather than projects targeted at specific beneficiary groups.
4.2.1 Public accountability

Over time, the efficacy of Sri Lanka’s economic, political and bureaucratic institutions have been eroded by structural deficiencies, politicisation and the lack of professionalism. These systemic institutional weaknesses currently undermine sustainable development outcomes in Sri Lanka. In this context, the resilience of sustainable development in Sri Lanka is dependent on stronger public accountability systems. UNDP interventions aimed at enhancing public accountability can involve three inter-related components:

1. Information: The capacity for citizens to exercise monitoring and oversight functions over government is a key component of public accountability. Hence UNDP should prioritise interventions that increase the amount of analysable and accessible information in the public domain. UNDP can also aim to make available information more comprehensible to the general public (e.g. through engagement with the media and rigorous data analysis). Furthermore, UNDP can complement the above efforts by enhancing the capacity of government agencies to collect, analyse and disseminate information. Table 3 below details examples of intervention areas to strengthen monitoring and oversight through the use of public information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERVENTION AREA</th>
<th>INTERVENTION ENTRY-POINT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental and livelihood sustainability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental sustainability</td>
<td>- Compile information and create databases on key environmental indicators (e.g. water, waste and climate data).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster resilience</td>
<td>- Develop tools and systems for DRR and natural resource management, such as Early Warning Systems and vulnerability assessments. Tools for DRR can also include education and training for climate change mitigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional transparency and accountability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to information</td>
<td>- Support the Right to Information Commission in designing public information requesting procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary activity</td>
<td>- Develop data management and collection systems for public authorities to aid compliance with the Right to Information Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Collate, analyse and publish data on parliamentary activity (e.g. MP voting records).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Support the digitisation of the Parliament Library.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Enhance the transparency of bureaucratic processes by publishing criteria on selection, transfers and dismissal of public officers.

Assist the government to introduce performance based incentives within the public service (e.g. performance evaluations).

Create mechanisms that enhance public participation in budget formulation (e.g. public hearings, focus groups discussions).

Support national and local government agencies to carry out and publish mid-year financial reviews.

Support the Ministry of Finance in developing and disseminating a citizen’s budget.

**2. Answerability:** Public accountability necessitates the institution of robust oversight mechanisms to ensure that violations of standards do not go unnoticed. Answerability entails ensuring that public officials and agencies explain, clarify and justify their decisions to the public and to oversight institutions. Table 4 below recommends potential UNDP interventions that enhance answerability within the government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention Area</th>
<th>Intervention Entry-Point</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long-term public sector reform</td>
<td>Enhance the transparency of bureaucratic processes by publishing criteria on selection, transfers and dismissal of public officers. Assist the government to introduce performance based incentives within the public service (e.g. performance evaluations).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public finance</td>
<td>Create mechanisms that enhance public participation in budget formulation (e.g. public hearings, focus groups discussions). Support national and local government agencies to carry out and publish mid-year financial reviews. Support the Ministry of Finance in developing and disseminating a citizen’s budget.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4:** Developing a New Country Programme: Programming Entry Points

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention Area</th>
<th>Intervention Entry-Point</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and oversight</td>
<td>• Strengthen the legislative oversight capacity of parliamentary Sectoral Oversight Committees (SOCs) by sourcing subject-specific expertise on the SOCs thematic areas. • Strengthen the financial oversight capacity of parliamentary committees, i.e. the Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE) and the Committee on Public Accounts (COPA) by sourcing relevant financial and technical expertise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary oversight</td>
<td>• Monitor the integration of EIA findings into development planning. • Strengthen post-EIA monitoring and impact assessments. • Support legislative reforms aimed at improving the EIA process. • Monitor environmental protection within the Megapolis Plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental regulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. **Enforcement**: Enforcement forms a key component in ensuring public accountability. The existence of effective enforcement mechanisms attaches punitive and reputational consequences to abuses of authority. In the absence of such mechanisms, the notion of the rule of law and public accountability cease to exist. Table 5 below illustrates the ways in which UNDP can assist in strengthening sanctions associated with abuses of authority.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Intervention Area</strong></th>
<th><strong>Intervention entry-point</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Enforcement mechanisms | • Use international benchmarks to strengthen enforcement mechanisms by supporting legislative drafting of proposed or pending legislation (e.g. the National Audit Act, CIABOC Act, Police Act, National Procurement Act, Sustainable Development Act).  
• Support the drafting of amendments to existing legislation and regulatory frameworks to enhance enforcement mechanisms (e.g. by revising the fine and penalty structure for offences under the National Environment Act). |
| Legislative interventions |  |
| Strengthening public sanction |  |
| Public interest media | • Strengthen media ‘literacy’ on key public interest issues (e.g. on the concept of conflict of interest when reporting on corruption).  
• Enhance credibility of the media as an advocate of public interest issues by introducing standards of reporting and ethical conduct.  
• Enhance ability of media personnel to access information, such as through RTI. |
4.2.2. Sub-national governance and development

Sub-national development in Sri Lanka is currently undermined by weak integration between central and local development planning, and challenges in securing adequate national budget allocations and human resources, as well as accessing national-level networks and value chains. These gaps are further compounded by institutional weaknesses in local service delivery. Enhancing the quality of governance and service delivery at the sub-national level hence necessitates interventions that mitigate these structural impediments to local development.

Accordingly, UNDP interventions should leverage its strengths as a ‘connector’, by building and sustaining institutional linkages and networks that facilitate sub-national development. Table 6 suggests entry points for such strategic interventions.

### Table 6: Developing a New Country Programme: Programming Entry Points

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention Area</th>
<th>Intervention Entry Point</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Development planning                | • Support government agencies to harmonise national, provincial and district level development plans and strategies.  
  • Channel seed funding to enable government agencies to pilot key activities in their development plans.  
  • Support provincial councils to co-ordinate inter-provincial development plans, particularly with regard to use of shared resources (e.g. waterways and forestry resources). |
| Knowledge management for SME development | • Create platforms for knowledge sharing through the use of technology (e.g. by linking smallholder local farmers to information sources and national level expertise).  
  • Help SMEs mitigate risk through information-sharing systems (e.g. mobile technology to share information on weather patterns, market prices, and possible crop disease outbreaks; this platform could be incorporated into a wider disaster-risk management system, where users are provided early warning and situation updates in the event of a disaster). |
Market linkages

- Help SMEs access national level value chains and export markets (e.g. offer sustainable solutions to agricultural product transporters to minimise losses incurred due to wastage and crop damage during transport).

- Incentivise clean production by connecting SMEs to financing options such as interest free loans.

Resource management

- Support sub-national government agencies to carry out land use surveys, and support initiatives to integrate their findings into local development planning.

- Source technical expertise and input on environmental protection in land use (e.g. expertise with regard to protecting local habitats).

### 4.2.3 Governance for peacebuilding

Governance reforms aimed at mitigating the various structural inequalities and grievances that fuel ethnic competition form a vital component of peacebuilding in Sri Lanka. The 2015 transition has opened up the political space to pursue such a peacebuilding agenda. As outlined in section 2 above, this change in the national context is likely to have triggered re-alignment of donor priorities towards placing greater emphasis on peacebuilding and reconciliation. As such, linking UNDP interventions to the emerging peacebuilding agenda is likely to be of strategic value. Furthermore, approaching peacebuilding through a governance lens also leverages UNDP’s demonstrated strengths in the area of institutional strengthening, while also capitalising on the prevailing emphasis on good governance in the current political context.

Meanwhile, it is important to utilise the renewed space in Sri Lanka to protect and promote human rights and secure transitional justice. The mutually reinforcing relationship between human rights advancement, combating impunity and sustainable peace must be understood in determining programmatic entry points. In this context, and also bearing in mind UNDP’s own normative framework vis-à-vis the rights-based approach to development, the broader ‘governance for peacebuilding’ agenda must include the strengthening of human rights institutions and protection frameworks.

Table 7 outlines entry points for potential UNDP interventions in the area of governance for peacebuilding.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERVENTION AREA</th>
<th>INTERVENTION ENTRY POINT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missing persons and enforced</td>
<td>• Compile a database of information on missing persons using reports of commissions, such as the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission and the Presidential Commission of Inquiry to Investigate into Complaints Regarding Missing Persons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disappearances</td>
<td>• Support the Office of Missing Persons to analyse data relating to missing persons (e.g. in relation to geographic area and circumstances of disappearance).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional strengthening</td>
<td>• Support the Inter-ministerial Committee on Human Rights and other key institutions such as the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka in the development of Sri Lanka’s next National Human Rights Action Plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Support judicial, investigative, prosecutorial and law enforcement institutions in designing transformative and practical solutions to improve access to justice and to enhance efficiency within the penal chain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhancing human rights protection</td>
<td>• Support drafting of legislation to incorporate the recently ratified international conventions (e.g. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>protection frameworks</td>
<td>• Support civil society organisations in monitoring fulfilment of Sri Lanka’s international commitments on good governance, human rights and sustainable peace. (e.g. the UN Human Rights Council Resolution 30/1; the Open-Government Partnership).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language policy compliance</td>
<td>• Support the Official Languages Commission to carry out language audits of public institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Create an integrated government translation platform linking government agencies to an island-wide network of translators able to bridge the gap between demand and supply of translated government documents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Create systems for citizen monitoring of language policy compliance in government institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Support the Official Languages Commission to translate signboards in public places (e.g. monuments, museums, parks and public transport), and government issued forms into Tamil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land access and tenure</td>
<td>• Support legislative reforms to improve access to land and tenure of widows and female heads of households.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2.4. Transformative structural impact

Transformative structural impact refers to key changes at the structural level that transforms society for the better in some discernible way. Interventions in this area aim to capitalise on contextual developments that create windows for systemic changes in the governance of institutions. UNDP has previously been successful in supporting initiatives that deliver transformative structural impact in response to emerging national priorities – for instance, through supporting the drafting of the 19th Amendment to the Constitution through technical inputs.

To deliver transformative structural impact, UNDP should leverage its unique strengths to mobilise technical, financial and other resources to respond effectively to emerging national priorities. UNDP must accordingly be sufficiently attuned to contextual developments to enable proactive interventions as and when such opportunities arise. Accordingly, UNDP should consistently monitor policy developments within government, with particular regard to those that are likely to arise from the duality of leadership roles played by the President and the Prime Minister. In such instances, UNDP should demonstrate programmatic agility to bolster positive outcomes and enhance democratic space.

A two-step test can be deployed by UNDP in determining which interventions could amount to transformative structural impact. Interventions should: (a) be borne out of a key national priority i.e. they are demand-driven both in terms of government priorities and the public interest; and (b) entail the prospect of securing structural transformation in governance.

Table 8 below outlines potential entry points for interventions that have the ability to deliver transformative structural impact. At present, UNDP’s interventions in this area ought to focus on the current process of constitutional reform.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention Area</th>
<th>Intervention Entry-Point</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional reform</td>
<td>• Provide technical expertise and research support to the current drafting process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Convene public consultations and dialogues with experts and CSOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Support the dissemination of information on the substance of constitutional proposals to the public, and develop feedback loops to ensure that the framers of a new constitution consider such feedback.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Identify and financially support existing pro bono advisers within government structures, in order to bolster positive outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental reform</td>
<td>• Facilitate the mainstreaming and prioritisation of environmental issues within government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Deploy research on emerging environmental issues to the Office of the President, to assist him in his capacity of the Minister of Mahaweli Development and Environment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 4.3 Intervention Targeting

The context analysis contained in section 2 above pointed to three key features of Sri Lanka’s national context in which the new Country Programme will be developed. The first was duality at the level of political decision-making due to competing interests within two centres of power within the unity government. This duality has contributed to the second key feature: incoherence in policy-making. The third was bureaucratic and administrative flux within state institutions, which has caused a degree of dysfunction in their operations.

This MTR has uncovered certain distinct capabilities of UNDP that distinguish it from the wider community of development partners in Sri Lanka. UNDP possesses unique strengths as a *convenor*, of government, civil society actors and political actors. UNDP’s convening power allows it to function as an impartial, high-level mediator of debate and discussions on national priority issues. UNDP’s work has also enabled it to build relationships with various development actors at international, national and sub-national levels. These networks allow UNDP to function as a *connector* between various actors engaging on similar issues. These actors include state institutions, government actors, CSOs and other development partners. Finally, UNDP has functioned as a *knowledge broker*, drawing from its comparative experience and access to technical expertise to support national priorities through its programmes.

Hence UNDP is well-positioned to provide the systems-level interventions necessary for development in Sri Lanka’s context through its new Country Programme, subject to the three filters identified above: UNDP’s normative goals, UNDP’s ‘Fitness for Purpose’ in the Sri Lankan context, and funding considerations. To maximise the effectiveness of UNDP’s next Country Programme, VR recommends that UNDP target its interventions at three strategic levels:

1. **Political leadership level**: UNDP should leverage its unique strength as a *convenor* of government and political actors to secure commitments at decision-making levels within the government. Securing the buy-in of the political leadership will in turn facilitate implementation by creating bureaucratic will to support UNDP to deliver government priority interventions.

2. **Discourse level**: UNDP should aim to bridge gaps between public interests and government priorities by transmitting public priority issues into political discourse. To this end, UNDP should work closely to *connect* civil society and other non-government actors, (including the private sector),...
at national and sub-national levels working on similar issues of public interest. Furthermore, UNDP should convene forums where civil society and non-government actors can discuss opportunities and strategies for policy reform with members of the government.

3. Technical level: UNDP should function as a knowledge broker, leveraging its comparative experience to provide technical expertise across all levels of government in its interventions. For example, UNDP can source technical expertise – both locally and internationally – to benchmark policies and legislation at draft stage.

Maximising the value of UNDP’s work in Sri Lanka necessitates that all three approaches are applied simultaneously in development interventions. The success of two key governance reform initiatives: the 19th Amendment and the passage of the RTI Act, are testament to the value of interventions at each of the three levels identified above. Reform initiatives concerning the 19th Amendment and the RTI Act included buy-in at the political leadership-level, civil society activism and mobilisation, and access to external technical expertise from both national and international experts. The success of these reform initiatives was highly contingent on engagement at each of these levels. By contrast, the Assistance to and Protection of Victims of Crime and Witnesses Act, No. 4 of 2015 (enacted in February 2015) lacked engagement with civil society concerns and created little impact in terms of a public debate. Hence despite enjoying both political buy-in and some level of technical support, the Act has failed to secure the endorsement of civil society or the victims that it aims to protect. The Act also falls short of minimum international standards.

As such, it is through simultaneous, strategic engagement at all three levels (i.e. the political leadership, discourse and technical levels) that UNDP could ensure that its interventions fulfil its normative goals as well as meets the requirements of ‘Fitness for Purpose’ in Sri Lanka. Meanwhile, interventions that engage at these multiple levels – as they are more likely to succeed – are more likely to receive the broad support of the donor community. This section ends by offering illustrations of how some of the proposed interventions should be designed to ensure engagement at all three strategic levels.

1. Public Accountability: Environmental regulation

At the political leadership level, it is important that interventions are linked to the public commitments of both the President and Prime Minister on sustainable development, and particularly the SDGs. Thus holding high-level discussions and supporting initiatives that give wider publicity to policy commitments on environmental protection is crucial. Policy commitments are important outcomes of such high level engagement. E.g. the adoption of a National Policy on Sustainable Development. At the discourse level, supporting civil society initiatives that bring to light environmental degradation caused by poorly planned development projects is important. UNDP could also connect academics, environmental activists, the legal profession, political actors, the media and vulnerable communities by convening public consultations on specific areas of environmental concern. Through such activities, a public conversation on the need for better environmental regulation could be engendered and sustained. Finally, at the technical level, the three entry points identified above could be considered. For example, UNDP could monitor the integration of EIA findings into development planning, strengthen post-EIA monitoring and impact assessments, and support legislative reforms aimed
at improving the EIA process. By engaging at each of these three levels, UNDP is more likely to succeed in advancing public accountability in the realm of environmental regulation.

2. Sub-national Governance and Development: Knowledge Management for SME Development

At present, farmers have limited access to data concerning weather patterns, market prices, and crop disease outbreaks. Accordingly, in order to advance agricultural productivity, it is crucial that farmers are able to access information in relation to emerging developments concerning their crops. At the political leadership level, UNDP can support interventions that prioritise and codify agricultural extension services in government policy. At the technical level, UNDP can facilitate the development of mobile technology that provides farmers with agricultural extension services that enable them to identify and analyse their production problems (e.g., scientific research on possible crop disease outbreaks and soil conditions). Moreover, UNDP can also support programmes that enable farmers to rate certain government services essential for production. Such services include water supply, produce storage facilities and waste management facilities. At the discourse level, UNDP can conduct outreach efforts in partnership with CBOs and sub-national CSOs to (a) communicate the benefits of such technology platforms to farmers; and (b) assist farmers to use the technology to increase the efficiency of their production. These activities could include practical training sessions and field-testing. The three-pronged approach utilised above is likely to both increase productivity and foster innovation in the agricultural sector.

3. Governance for Peacebuilding: Language Policy Compliance

Language policy compliance is currently weak across public institutions. In this context, UNDP can assist citizens to effectively monitor language compliance across Sri Lanka. At the discourse level, UNDP could establish a digital portal that is designed to receive complaints regarding non-compliance with regard to language policy. Such a portal could receive geo-tagged complaints with visual evidence (for example, public signage that appears only in Sinhala), in order to help identify policy violations and increase citizen engagement with (and monitoring of) language policy compliance. UNDP can utilise the collated data to advance the discourse on language policy compliance in the media and within policymaking bodies. At the political leadership level, UNDP can use the data gathered from the portal to partner with local government to prioritise and audit language compliance in districts under its purview. At the technical level, UNDP can facilitate methods for enabling the Official Languages Commission to address shortcomings in the language compliance of public institutions. Moreover, UNDP can assist the Commission to analyse data on language compliance, thereby enhancing its capacity to function as an effective government oversight and monitoring body. UNDP can also assist local governments in drafting circulars pertaining to the implementation of the Official Languages Policy (such as Public Administration Circular No. 01/2014 [III]).
Summary of Recommendations

The recommendations of this MTR are interlinked, with the wider objective of informing the design and impact of UNDP’s Country Programme in both the short and long terms. Table 9 below provides an overview of these recommendations and denotes their applicability in the short-term (i.e. to the current Country Programme), and in the long-term (i.e. to UNDP’s new Country Programme).

In terms of identifying programming entry points for UNDP’s new Country Programme, VR recommends the following three-pronged approach:

1. Identify thematic intervention areas that fall within three strategic filters: UNDP’s normative goals, UNDP’s ‘Fitness for Purpose’, and funding priorities.

2. Identify entry points to delivering ‘upstream’ and systems-level governance interventions across its thematic mandate that capitalises on UNDP’s unique strengths. VR recommends four potential entry points: (a) public accountability, (b) sub-national governance and development, (c) governance for peace-building, and (d) transformative structural impact.

3. Target interventions at three levels: (a) political leadership level, (b) discourse level, and (c) technical level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>RECOMMENDATION</strong></th>
<th><strong>CURRENT COUNTRY PROGRAMME</strong></th>
<th><strong>NEW COUNTRY PROGRAMME</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. <strong>Enhance responsiveness to emerging government priorities by:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1. Mandating Technical Officers to obtain and document information surrounding policy development within IP ministries e.g. in the form of policy briefs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2. Quarterly briefings on Sri Lanka’s political economy for UNDP staff.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <strong>Enhance responsiveness to public interest priorities by:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1. Utilising sub-national networks to inform better identification and understanding of public interest issues e.g. by convening sub-national focus groups to inform intervention areas, particularly in relation to issues such as reconciliation, and livelihood development.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. Instituting systems for better data gathering and processing in project partners through initiatives supported by UNDP.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. <strong>Institute mechanisms for path adjustment that enable changes in overall strategy, methodology, and implementation modalities during the project implementation. Two approaches to path adjustment can be considered:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1. Top-down adjustment at a broader strategic level by UNDP’s highest managerial levels through better utilisation of existing mechanisms, such as Programme Boards, quarterly or annual reviews and mid-term evaluations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2. Bottom-up adjustment at the implementation level, by enhancing the ability of programme management personnel to utilise existing mechanisms, such as the POPP guidelines, to path-adjust in consultation with their line management.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. For NIM projects, address practical challenges at the management-level by setting up intermediate-level project management committees. These committees can be tasked with overseeing project implementation, documenting relevant developments, and problem solving with regard to day-to-day implementation challenges averting the need to rely on Board-level interventions, thus enabling ‘bottom-up’ path adjustment.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Institute systems for continuous and dynamic programme oversight to avert potentially higher turnaround times between formal M&amp;E reporting and consequent path adjustments e.g. through informal programme oversight discussions among project staff, M&amp;E personnel and technical staff, to identify and communicate challenges in programme implementation and devise strategies for overcoming them.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Ensure greater internal clarity over the distinction between UNDP’s general programming mandate and its thematic focus areas, by engaging in a comprehensive review of UNDP’s thematic focus areas. This review should clarify which thematic areas UNDP possesses technical expertise in, and which thematic areas other UN agencies have technical expertise in. In the case of the former, UNDP should aim to deliver its own technical and policy advice and expertise alongside structural and systems-level interventions. In the case of the latter, UNDP should confine its role to programme design and delivery, and leverage its strengths in convening and policy advocacy rather than its technical expertise.

7. Strengthen programme cohesiveness from an external perspective by:
   7.1. Utilising the Communications Unit to disseminate information on UNDP’s areas of engagement.
   7.2. Regular engagements with external partners and stakeholders to share information surrounding UNDP intervention areas utilising the Communications Unit and strengthen existing and future partnerships.

8. Enhance internal complementarity within both UNDP and the UNCT by:
   8.1. Shifting away from the current cluster-led approach towards three possible options for programme design:
       (a) singular programming, which involves projects that can be implemented solely by a single cluster;
       (b) dual programming, where specific components of a project can be implemented by different clusters or agencies; and
       (c) integrated programming, where project deliverables are fused and no single cluster or agency can deliver independently of others involved in the project.
   8.2. Involving representatives from both the GESI and the ESDR clusters in project design and conceptualisation, regardless of which cluster has undertaken responsibility for implementation.
   8.3. Developing stronger partnerships with agencies in the UNCT in the event there is a ‘mandate match’.
## Summary of Recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Current Country Programme</th>
<th>New Country Programme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9. Enhance external complementarity by:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1. Strengthening UNDP’s partnerships with external entities, such as development partners and the private sector.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2. Entering into cost-sharing agreements with government agencies at national and sub-national levels, to deliver specific interventions with government funding where government agencies are unable to fulfil their implementation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. In addition to conforming to existing POPP criteria on implementation partner selection, aim to execute projects through stakeholders (e.g. local authorities, CSOs and the private sector) operating at the most decentralised or devolved level while maintaining competence in terms of delivery. A two-step test for subsidiarity can be utilised:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) identify all entities competent and qualified to execute the activity; and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) of all entities so identified, select the partner that demonstrates a ‘domain match’ i.e. the strongest nexus to the locality or thematic area in which the relevant project would be implemented.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Increase flexibility in project management modality with regard to NIM and DIM in a move towards a hybrid implementation model that is receptive to changes in the operational context. This model should include:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1. A process to transfer a project from a predominantly government-led implementation structure to a predominantly UNDP-led implementation structure, through an independent mechanism, such as a status labelling system that triggers a decision on project leadership. This system can be implemented by the project management committee recommended above.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Improve delivery and impact of NIM projects by:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.1. Including an assessment of a partner’s capacity for and openness to reform in selection criteria for future IPs for NIM projects. In terms of the SELAJSI project, undertake a review of current IP ministry selection.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.2. Using the terminology of ‘Technical Advisers’ rather than ‘Technical Coordinators’ to mitigate potential misconceptions of the precise role of these officers, and mandating that they spend at least two working days at the UNDP country office to increase their independence from IP ministries.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.3. Instituting clear MoUs between UNDP and government counterparts that define the role of the Technical Adviser within the IP ministry.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation</td>
<td>Current Country Programme</td>
<td>New Country Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Review and revise the RRF with a view towards:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.1. Measuring impact in relation to project outcomes, as well as project outputs. UNDP should leverage its strengths in policy advocacy in order to ensure the transition from output-level to outcome-level impact.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.2. Ensuring stronger focus and prioritisation in the design of activities and outcomes. Conformity to UNDAF outcomes ideally should not serve as the starting point for revisions to the RFF; instead, development of UNDP’s Country Programme outcomes should be based on an assessment of national priorities and UNDP’s own unique strengths. Adopting UNDAF outcome/s should be identified in the process of Country Programme conceptualisation, and not at its onset.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annex 1: Key Informant Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Eric Wikramanayake and Chamila Weerathunghe</td>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Chairperson and COO</td>
<td>Environmental Foundation Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ranga Pallawala</td>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Janathakshana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hemantha Withanage</td>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Centre for Environmental Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Vinya Ariyaratne</td>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>General Secretary</td>
<td>Sarvodhaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Carmeline Jayasuriya and Isuru Gunasekara</td>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Head of Operations, CSR, Asst. VP JK Group and Head of Sustainability, VP JK Group</td>
<td>John Keells Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Rasika Vithanage</td>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Contact point</td>
<td>UN Global Compact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Kumudini Samuel</td>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Programme/ Research Associate</td>
<td>Women and Media Collective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Knut Nyfløt</td>
<td>Donors</td>
<td>Diplomatic Counselor</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Fabrizio Senesi</td>
<td>Donors</td>
<td>Programme Manager</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Reed Aeschliman</td>
<td>Donors</td>
<td>Acting Mission Director</td>
<td>USAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Sector</td>
<td>Designation</td>
<td>Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Toshiyuki Shimano</td>
<td>Donors</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>JICA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Mahishini Colonne</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Spokesperson</td>
<td>UN Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Piyumanti Pieris</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Jinasiri Dadallage</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Prageeth Gunasekara and Rizna Anees</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Director and Assistant Director of UN, Technical Assistance and NGO Division</td>
<td>Ministry of Policy Planning and Economic Affairs, Dept. of External Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Ranjith Pathmasiri</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Directory General</td>
<td>Sustainable Energy Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Ashoka Abeygunawardana</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Advisor on Environment and Energy and Executive Director</td>
<td>President’s Office and Energy Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Sena Srinath Miyanawala</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Ministry of Disaster Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Uchitha De Zoysa</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Advisor</td>
<td>Ministry of Sustainable Development and Wildlife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Chandrani Senaratne</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Ministry of Child Development and Women’s Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Waduwatte Sumathipala</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Head</td>
<td>Climate Change Mitigation Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Asiri Karunawardena</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Director General</td>
<td>NBRO Ministry of Disaster Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Buddhi Marambe</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Head</td>
<td>Climate Change Adaptation Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Kolita Himal Muthukudaarachchi</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Director General</td>
<td>Central Environment Authority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annex 1: Key Informant Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mangala Yapa</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Managing Director (Designate), Agency for Develop-</td>
<td>Ministry of Development Strategies and Internatio-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ment</td>
<td>nal Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhammika Dasanayake</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
<td>Parliament of Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charitha Ratwatte</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister</td>
<td>Prime Minister's Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chandrani Senaratne and SELAJSI team</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Ministry of Child Development and Women's Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Hazeem, Gayan Munasinghe</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Senior Assistant Secretary &amp; Project Manager and</td>
<td>Ministry of National Coexistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udaya Senevirathine</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Ministry of Mahaweli Development and Environment, GEF Operational Focal Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asanka Abayakoon</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Dilmah Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anushka Wijesinha</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>Chief Economist and Head of Economic Intelligence Unit</td>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiranee Yasaratne</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>Co-Founder</td>
<td>Sri Lanka Business and Biodiversity Platform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCT Focus Group Discussion on SELAJSI</td>
<td>UNCT</td>
<td>Representatives</td>
<td>UNCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Muzain, Asitha Kodithuwakkuge, Rajendrakumar Ganesarajah</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Representatives</td>
<td>Livelihoods team, G-LED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visaka Hidellage, Dhanushki Abbayaratne</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Representatives</td>
<td>Environment team, ESDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amanthi Wickramasinghe, Nimmi Ariyaratne</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Representatives</td>
<td>SELAJSI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Sector</td>
<td>Designation</td>
<td>Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonali Dayaratne, Tharuka Dissanaike</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Representatives</td>
<td>Policy Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dilki Palliyeguruge, Tashya de Silva</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Representatives</td>
<td>Management Support Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Batchelor</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Former Resident Representative</td>
<td>Senior Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jorn Sorensen</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Country Director</td>
<td>Senior Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lovita Ramguttee</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Deputy Country Director</td>
<td>Senior Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manori Gunawardena</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Wildlife Scientist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steve Creech</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Fisheries Expert</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumith Pilapitiya</td>
<td>Independent but moved to Government during report period</td>
<td>Environmental Expert</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>