**Strengthening Capacities for the Consensual and Sustainable Management of Land and Natural Resources (Phase III):**

**Strengthening Capacities and Knowledge of Civil Society for the Consensual and Sustainable Management of Land and Natural Resources**

**Great Lakes Operation Evaluation Report**

10 February 2015

**Evaluation Consultant:** Mr. Souleymane Baldé

Table of Contents

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 4

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 5

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6**

1. **INTRODUCTION AND EVALUATION OVERVIEW 11**
2. **BACKGROUND 12**

Brief description of the project

1. **EVALUATION FRAMEWORK 14**
2. Purpose of the evaluation 14
3. Methodology 14
4. Limitations to the Evaluation Findings 15
5. **EVALUATION RESULTS 16**
6. Overview 16
7. Program Design 17
8. Program Management 18
9. Operational Management 18
10. Financial Management 19
11. Financial Performance 19
12. Monitoring and Evaluation
13. **ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT KEY RESULTS 20**
14. Overview
15. **ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE BASED ON OECD/DAC Criteria 23**
16. Relevance 23
17. National NGO Participation 25
18. Cooperation with Governmental Institutions 25
19. Effectiveness 26
20. Impact 26
21. Sustainability 27
22. Capacity-Building 29
23. Coordination 30
24. Cross-cutting themes 31
	1. Environment 31
	2. Gender 32
	3. Child Labor 33
	4. Media Participation 33
	5. Pro-poor 34
25. **RECOMMENDATIONS 35**
26. Design and Management 35
27. Thematic 37
28. Regional Issues and ICGLR 40

**ANNEXES**

**Annex 1: Evaluation Terms of Reference**

**Annex 2: Evaluation Inception Report**

**Annex 3: Data Collection Questionnaires**

**Annex 4: List of People met**

**Annex 5: Evaluation of EU-UN Cooperation and Collaboration**

**Annex 6: CSO Self-Evaluation and Workshop Presentations, Draft Guide and Outline**

**LIST OF TABLES**

**Table 1: List of projects and Implementing NGO/CSO by country**

**Table 2: Evaluation of Project Key Results**

**ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

AM Artisanal Miners

AMA Artisanal Miners Association

CPPB Conflict Prevention and Peace Building

CR Conflict Resolution

CS Civil Society

CSO Civil Society Organization

COOPERAMMA Coopérative des Exploitants Artisanaux Miniers de Masisi – **Artisanal Mining Cooperative of Masisi**

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

EU European Union

FGD Focus Group Discussion

GLR Great Lakes Region

KII Key Informant Interview

MCB Mining/Mineral Consultation Board (**Generic name** for Dialogue and conflict mediation mechanism established between artisanal miner or civil society organizations and mining rights or land concession holders, with dialogue facilitation by government and local leaders and authorities).

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

UN United Nations

UNCT UN Country Team

UNDAF UN Development Assistance Framework

UNDP United Nations Development Program

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the EU-UN Partnership Program Management Team and to all the Partner NGOs personnel for the invaluable support they provided to me throughout the mission. It made the assignment that much more manageable. My gratitude goes also to the EU Delegation officials that I met in Bujumbura and Kigali for making time to meet with me and discuss the implementation of the project. Many thanks also to the GIZ officials that I met in Burundi and in Uganda for sharing their extensive knowledge of the context in the two countries.

I am equally grateful for the evaluation participants and government officials at both national, district/county and sub-district/county levels, and of course to the artisanal miners, community leaders, and other project stakeholders at the grassroots that I met during the mission.

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

This is the report of the final evaluation of phase 3 of the EU-UN partnership program, “Strengthening Capacities and Knowledge of Civil Society for the Consensual and Sustainable Management of Land and Natural Resources in the Great Lakes Region (Rwanda, Burundi, Congo DRC and Uganda)”.

**The overall objective** of phase 3 of the EU-UN partnership program is to contribute to a reduction in conflicts relating to land and natural resources in the Great Lakes Region. The specific objectives are to:

* Enhance the capacity of civil society stakeholders in the Great Lakes Region (i.e. DRC, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda) to understand, address and use a conflict-sensitive approach to land and natural resource conflicts, as well as to better communicate with their governments and private sector counterparts on this issue. A s**pecific focus** will be on strengthening networks and participation capacity among national and sub-regional civil society groups in order to achieve greater coherence, coordination, and influence regarding international, regional, national and local level policies.
* Strengthen the EU-UN Partnership through advocacy both within organizations as well as with external partners at a global level.

The evaluation provides an independent assessment of the key results achieved by the EU-UN partnership projects over the 12 month period of project implementation in terms of outputs, outcomes, impact, and also in terms of capacity-building for conflict resolution and peace- building. The evaluation also assesses project performance in terms of environmental impact and human rights – gender and child rights, and in regard to the OEC/DAC/UNEG evaluation criteria, namely: relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. The evaluation draws conclusions and lessons learned and makes recommendations for future programming for conflict resolution and mitigation and for peace-building in the African Great Lakes Region.

The evaluation was conducted over the period 15 November – 10 December 2014, and included field visits to five of the six EU-UN Partnership projects. Data for the sixth project (Ituri project) was collected through a desk review of reports, and a remote administration of the evaluation questionnaire.

**FINDINGS**

**Achievements**

1. The project objective of building the capacity of civil society organization in the Great Lakes Region was effectively achieved. More than 95% of the outputs scheduled in the project documents were produced, including the outputs related to the building of capacity for the Resolution of Conflict over Land and Natural Resources. The projects were successful also in developing bilateral cooperation arrangements with government departments, national NGOs, academia and the private sector where applicable.
2. The knowledge accumulated through studies and the collection of information, and passed on through training, will continue to be **sustainable** conflict-resolution assets and potential sources of benefits after the end of the project. In the same vein, the sensitization and mobilization of CSO and other grassroots entities, and the collaborations and partnerships developed with governmental entities, will continue to be **sustainable** conflict-resolution assets.
3. Activities for the mitigation of the **environmental impact** of mining were undertaken across the board by the projects. The projects developed effective partnerships in this regard with the government agencies and departments, and with Community Based Organizations and Associations working on environmental protection.
4. The projects are likely to produce positive peace outcomes and **impact** positively on the conflict drivers, provided they (the projects) are afforded additional resources and time to build on the foundations established, in particular the Mining Consultation Boards-MCB.
5. The evaluator found the operational and financial management of the projects, and the M&E system, to be effective, notwithstanding periodic delays in the release of funds to the implementing NGOs, which caused some time-lags in project implementation.
6. The success thus achieved in building the capacity and/or mobilizing the broad range of key stakeholders in the conflict relating to land and natural resources in the Great Lakes Region makes the achievement of peace outcomes a realistically achievable objective over time.
7. T**he overall performance of the projects based on the assessment of project key results is rated “5 - Satisfactory”** on a scale of 1 to 6 : 6 - Highly Satisfactory, 5 - Satisfactory, 4 - Moderately Satisfactory, 3 - Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU), 2 – Unsatisfactory, 1 - Highly Unsatisfactory.

**Challenges**

1. The achievements listed above were, however, at the output level. With the exception of the project in Ituri, the evaluation found no evidence of peace outcomes that can be attributed to the project interventions (conflicts successfully resolved or/mediated or conflicts averted).
2. Above all, the budget and time allocated for the projects ($120 000 per project and 12 months) are simply not sufficient to produce a measurable impact on the level of conflict in the GLR. Note. The time and project budget were set as parameters at the program level, i.e., exogenously from the project perspective.
3. The approximate cause of the absence of peace outcomes has to be seen, however, first and foremost in the context of the fragility of the Mining Consultation Boards – MCB, which are the Conflict Resolution mechanisms established to bring together in face-to-face negotiations the artisanal miners and the private sector (mining license or concession holders). The Private Sector has not yet evidenced a genuine commitment to the MCB process.
4. Project performance was affected otherwise by issues that range from project design as opposed to program design and project implementation. Design issues include problems with the formulation and definition of key results, (outputs, outcomes, and impact), and the result metrics (indicator, baseline and target). Project outputs and project outcomes are often formulated indistinguishably, with both reading like activity descriptions.
5. The evidence available shows that conflict resolution relating to land and natural resources in the GLR requires a long-term approach. And, Conflict Resolution projects with a small budget and short duration must avoid spreading themselves too thinly. Such projects need to focus on a limited range of mutually reinforcing interventions with a direct bearing on the resolution of the conflict.
6. The projects’ overall **effectiveness** was circumscribed to the extent that they did not produce tangible peace outcomes during its implementation period, notwithstanding the fact that they are in a position to do so in the not-too-distant future, if provided with additional time and resources.
7. The sustainability of the cooperative-based model for the formalization of artisanal mining is doubtful in its current form, given its inability to improve the socio-economic conditions of artisanal miners. The model is not pro-poor. While it provides a valuable framework for improving security, health, sanitation and taxation, at the current stage, it benefits primarily the mining license holders/investors and not the artisanal miners.
8. There is a general prevalence of **gender bias** in the artisanal mining sector in the GLR. Women are largely excluded from the sector. There was no evidence of **action** taken by the projects or the authorities to combat the discrimination.
9. **Under-aged boys and girls** were observed working in or loitering around some of the mines targeted by the projects. School attendance is seriously hampered in some cases by the flocking of children and young adults to the mines. The AM associations and the district authorities are aware of the problem, but to no effect so far.
10. **Coordination and collaboration between the six participating NGOs**. To all intents and purposes, the projects were implemented separately from one another, even in cases where there was scope for collaboration (Burundi).
11. The coordination and collaboration at country level between the Program Management Team on the one hand and the Country Project Teams (EU Delegation and UNDP Representatives) on the other hand was satisfactory overall, with variations from country to country. The collaboration was excellent in Burundi and limited in Uganda.
12. **RECOMMENDATIONS.**

The recommendations are divided into three groups: (a) Program/Project Design. (b) Thematic (c) Regional- related to the ICGLR Protocols and Executive arm.

1. **Program/Project Design and Management**

The recommendations are based on the best and worst practices of project implementation.

* Corrective actions for future project design and implementation
* Capacity-building (CB) for conflict prevention should not be delinked from the conflict reduction outcomes. Conversely, the design of conflict resolution projects should establish a clear link between CB and peace outcomes.
* Capacity-building (CB) for conflict prevention projects requires a medium to long- term approach with greater budgetary resources.
* In the same vein, CB projects for conflict prevention with a limited budget and timeframe should have a limited number of mutually reinforcing interventions with a direct bearing on conflict prevention and resolution.
* Extend the projects for two years in order to enable the consolidation of the gains made, including taking action for:
* Strengthening the analytical capacity of CSOs on LNR and concessions;
* Establishing a conflict resolution network among the NGOs that participated in the current 3rd phase to enable systematic sharing of knowledge and experiences,
* Enabling the GLR NGO/CSOs to engage with global and regional stakeholders such as the UN Global Compact, the World Economic Forum, the World Bank, the ICGLR, Land Policy Initiative, Africa Mining Vision and the AU.
* Provide additional Capacity-building support to CSO in the form of workshops and seminars held on a quarterly basis (every 3 months) rotating between the 4 countries covered under phase 3, on the following subjects: (i) Program and project development, and RBM including defining/formulating program/project key results and key result metrics, (ii) Post-conflict Peace & Development programming and program implementation, (iii) Land and Natural resources mediation techniques, conflict analysis and related subjects, (iv) etc.
1. **Thematic Recommendations**

**Environment**

* Provide technical support to GLR governments in the harmonization of overlapping or inconsistent departmental jurisdictions, laws and regulations on the use of LNR (Uganda).
* Provide technical support to the government for the establishment and enforcement of requisite environmental and social impact studies in the mining licensing process,
* Provide financial and technical support for scaling up the Rubaya comprehensive project on ASM and the mitigation of environmental degradation across the GLR.
* Provide technical training to the CSO on the oversight and management of environmental protection rules and regulations,

**Land and property rights**

* The EU-UN partnership should support the organization of the 6 NGO/CSO into a core network and CS platform on land and property rights, to be expanded gradually over time.
* The EU-UN partnership should provide additional capacity building support to the above land and property network to enable it to support the ICGLR Secretariat in the implementation of the GLR National Action Plans for the domestication of the ICGLR protocol on Land and Displacement after adoption by the upcoming ICGLR ministerial summit.
* The EU-UN Partnership Program should support the ICGLR Secretariat and the national coordination mechanisms in building technical capacity to address land and natural resources conflict issues, and land and property rights beginning with the 4 countries currently covered.

**Poverty**

The formalization of the artisanal mining sector is a key to the resolution of conflict over land and natural resources in the GLR, provided that it treats equitably all those who contribute to the mining value chain. The EU-UN Partnership should support the conduct of studies by the regional network of CSOs to produce a well-documented advocacy report for a pro-poor regulatory framework for the mining sector. Among other things, the studies should consider the barriers to entry created by the license fees and tax regimes applied to the sector.

1. **Regional/ICGLR Recommendations**

**Trans-border conflicts**

* The EU-UN partnership together with WB Great Lakes Conflict Facility, and within the framework of the Peace and Security Framework for the region, should encourage CSOs to share experiences, build trans-boundary networks
* The EU-UN Partnership should support the ICGLR Secretariat in the organization by GLR CSOs of a mapping of regional trans-boundary conflicts
* The EU-UN Partnership should support the GLR CSO together with ICGLR Secretariat to engage with the private sector and build a land and mining coordination group
* In the same vein, the EU-UN Partnership should provide support for the strengthening of the conflict resolution mechanisms (The Mines Consultation Boards-MCB) established under the current 3rd phase, through the development of a legal framework of action, granting the MCB a legal status and a legally enforceable mandate.

**Cooperation and collaboration with the ICGLR Secretariat;**

* The EU UN Partnership should provide support for the Domestication of the ICGLR protocols, **including the protocol against the illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, in particular the six special tools of the Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in the Great Lakes Region (RINR)**
* In relation to the upcoming ICGLR High level Ministerial meeting on land and property rights, the EU-UN partnership support should include:
* An analysis of the current status of the domestication of the protocol on protection of property rights for IDPs and refugees in each Member State in order to define a road map for further support to Member States.
* An analysis and lessons learned from the ICGLR Member States’ experiences and approaches on land management and property rights related to IDPs and Refugees.
* Advocacy for a renewal by Member States of their commitment to take appropriate measures for the implementation of the international principles contained in the Protocol and develop cooperation mechanisms for the reintegration of IDPs/Refugees.
* Put in place a follow-up and evaluation of mechanisms for monitoring progress in the implementation of the protocol.
* The EU-UN partnership should also support the ICGLR Secretariat in the creation of a dedicated web-based information system to promote and facilitate communication between the Secretariat, the national coordination mechanisms and NGO/CSOs across the GLR.

**EU-UN Partnership Program**

**Final Evaluation report**

1. **Introduction and evaluation overview**

This is the report of the final evaluation of phase 3 of the EU-UN partnership program, “Strengthening Capacities and Knowledge of Civil Society for the Consensual and Sustainable Management of Land and Natural Resources in the Great Lakes Region (Rwanda, Burundi, Congo DRC and Uganda)”.The evaluation is conducted in line with Art. 8 of the General Conditions described in Annex 2 to the contribution agreement.

The evaluation was conducted over the period 15 November – 10 December 2014, based on the Terms of Reference TORs attached as Annex 1, and the inception report attached as Annex 2. The inception report outlines as required the evaluation consultant´s understanding of the objectives of the evaluation, and the elements of the methodology to be employed during the evaluation. Field visits were undertaken to five of the six projects.

The evaluation is guided by the OEC/DAC/UNEG evaluation criteria, namely: relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. In addition, the evaluation assesses project performance in regard to the UN programming principles, namely, capacity-building, the environment, human rights/gender, and children`s rights, so-called cross-cutting themes. Capacity-building, being one of the immediate objectives of the program is addressed throughout the report. Issues of efficiency related to project costs are not considered in detail.

The preliminary findings of the evaluation were presented at the final evaluation workshop held in Kampala, Uganda on 11-12 December 2014.

**II Background**

**Brief description of the project[[1]](#footnote-1)**

The illegal exploitation of natural resources and land disputes are the root causes of conflict in the Great Lakes Region and especially in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Despite its natural wealth, the majority of the DRC population lives in poverty and do not enjoy any benefit from its natural resources. This is the case to varying degrees across the Great Lakes Region.

As a result, the link between land, natural resources and conflict has become an issue of great importance to civil society, governments, multilateral and regional organizations and businesses alike across the GLR.

The importance of strengthening civil society capacity in post-conflict settings was recognized in the recent UN report on *Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict* (referred to as *Civcap).* In addition, the recent World Development Report (WDR) on *Conflict, Security and Development* (World Bank, 2011) also recognized the role that natural resources play in fuelling grievances, increasing competition between groups, encouraging illegal extraction, or directly financing violence. The WDR notes the importance of civil society in advocating for greater national and political unity, and the inclusion of civil society in addressing issues of violence and conflict.

It is against this background, that the current action aims to strengthen the capacity and knowledge of local NGOs and CSOs to address land and natural resource conflicts in the GLR. The project seeks to develop civil society’s ability to engage with government and private sector counterparts on issues related to land, natural resources, and conflict with a view to prevent or mitigate violent outcomes, influence national policies and revenue allocation, and mediate local conflicts over natural resources.

In addition, this action aims to strengthen the EU-UN Partnership on land, natural resources and conflict prevention, enhance global visibility of this subject, and provide broad awareness-raising through wide dissemination of the EU-UN Toolkit.

The work in the African Great Lakes region is three-fold: the **main component** relates to strengthening the capacities of CSOs to better manage and adopt a conflict-sensitive approach to land and natural resources conflicts through regional trainings workshops; the **second component** will be to strengthen coordination among local and regional stakeholders working on land and natural resources (UNHABITAT has been active in this particular aspect for the last four years); and **finally**, to provide grants to CSOs to implement selected 12 month projects on land and natural resources dispute resolution. It is important to highlight that as important as making funds available to selected CSOs to undertake their own projects is the training of the broader civil society community in the region , with a view to facilitating coordination.

**The overall objective** of phase 3 of the EU-UN partnership program is to contribute to a reduction in conflicts regarding land and natural resources in the Great Lakes Region. The specific objectives are to:

* Enhance the capacity of civil society stakeholders in the Great Lakes Region (i.e. DRC, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda) to understand, address and use a conflict-sensitive approach to land and natural resource conflicts as well as to better communicate with their governments and private sector counterparts on this issue. **Specific focus** will be on strengthening networks and participation capacity among national and sub-regional civil society groups in order to achieve greater coherence, coordination, and influence regarding international, regional, national and local level policies.
* Strengthen the EU-UN Partnership through advocacy both within organizations as well as with external partners at a global level.

Note. The projects under evaluation are the product of a two-stage process. First, an umbrella Program Document (EU Contract N.: 2012/305-846) provides the overall framework for the action. The Program Document sets the overall objectives of the action, its target beneficiaries, its final beneficiaries, its estimated results, as well as its main activities and an indicative list of activities that may be part of the individual country projects.

Second, the projects under current evaluation (listed in table 1 below) articulate the framework for the action to be undertaken at country level. The projects were formulated by national NGOs from the 4 GLR countries (see table (1) below) in response to a call for proposals issued by the EU-UN partnership in late 2013. The call for proposals was issued following an EU-UN partnership training workshop held in Bujumbura Burundi on 16-17 September 2013.

The two-day training workshop was divided into thematic sessions built around the subject of Land and the Extractive industries with sessions on:

1-The EU-UN Partnership and its knowledge products that includes the EU-UN Toolkit and on-line training,

2-The Land and Conflict theme includes a training on mediation, the land policy initiative of the ECA/ADB and AU, the Great Lakes context of displacement and the regional legal instrument for protection of property rights, as well as linkages with the ongoing initiative on land within the Great Lakes region

3-The Extractive and Conflict theme includes sessions on the OECD Due Diligence guidance, the ICGLR tools for certification and whistle-blowing mechanisms, the conflict risks in the DRC mining sector as well as the UNDP extractive strategy and Africa Mining Vision.

The workshop aimed to achieve the following results:

* CSOs are familiarized with the use of the EU-UN toolkit and the on-line training modules and are able to use these tools for their own internal capacity-building
* CSOs have a better understanding of existing regional instruments such as policy, legal frameworks and guidance and are in a better position to make use of them
* CSOs networks are strengthened and able to engage in dialogue around land and natural resources conflict prevention in the region through regular exchanges organized by the EU-UN project team
* CSOs are able to formulate and submit their proposals to the EU-UN Partnership according to the methodology presented at the workshop.

**Table (1)**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **List of Projects and Implementing Partner (NGO/CSO) by Country** |
| **N°** | **Project Title** | **Country** | **Implementing Partner (NGO/CSO)** |
| **Name** | **Acronym** |
| 1. | Strengthening CSO capacities to better understand the dynamics of land and natural resources conflicts in Karamoja. | UGANDA | ECOLOGICAL CHRISTIAN ORGANIZATION  | ECO |
| 2. | Empowering Civil Society and Abunzi to mediate land disputes | RWANDA | RWANDA INITIATIVE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT  | RISD |
| 3. | Projetd’appui à la formalisation de l’exploitationminièreartisanale | BURUNDI | CONSEIL POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT INTEGRE  | CONSEDI |
| 4. | Campagne pour l’adhésion et la mise en œuvre de l’ITIE Initiative pour la Transparence dansl’Industrie Extractive au Burundi. | BURUNDI | ORGANISATION DE LUTTE CONTRE LA CORRUPTION ET LA MALVERSATION DE FONDS  | OLUCOME |
| 5. | Appuiau cadre de médiationpour la conciliation entre les exploitantsartisanauxminiers et l’entreprise MHI propriétaired’untitreminierdans la zoneminière de Rubaya en Territoire de Masisi Nord Kivu-RDC | R.D. CONGO | COMITE D’APPUI A L’AUTOPROMOTION  | (CAAP) – TUJITEGEMEE |
| 6. | Projetd’Appui à la sociétécivile pour une bonne gouvernancefoncière en Ituri : cas des grandes concessions | R.D. CONGO | ACTION JUSTICE ET PAIX  | AJP  |

1. **Evaluation framework**
	1. **Purpose of the evaluation**

The purpose of the evaluation as defined in the Terms of Reference (Annex 1) and detailed in the evaluation Inception Report (Annex 2) is to provide the project partners i.e. EU, UN/UNDP, the Implementing Partner-NGOs (IP) other NGOs and the governments of the 4 GLR countries with an independent assessment of the key achievements of the projects over the 12 month period of project implementation as compared to the objectives and targets set in the individual project documents and the program document.

Specifically, the evaluation aims to assess the key results achieved by the projects in terms of outputs, outcomes, impact and in terms of capacity-building for conflict resolution and peace- building, environment protection, human rights – gender and children´s rights. The evaluation aims to draw conclusions and lessons learned, and make recommendations for future programming for conflict resolution and mitigation and for peace building.

* 1. **Methodology**

**Evaluation criteria**

The evaluation is guided by the OECD-DAC/UNEG criteria for evaluating conflict prevention and peace-building (CPPB) programs and projects, namely: relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. National ownership and stakeholder involvement are used as proxies for relevance. Project design and the cross-cutting themes related to the UN programming principles are also covered. Measures of efficiency **related to** project cost are not covered in depth.

**The evaluation process consisted of the following steps:**

* Collect and assess available data
* Gather additional data necessary to fill information gaps
* Assess project implementation and achievement of project results (outputs, outcomes) using various **evaluation** criteria
* Draw conclusions and make recommendations
* Conduct reporting

**Data collection draws on two broad sources of information:**

* First, the variety of documents covering project design, implementation, progress monitoring and review generated during the project cycle.
* Second, the views of a wide range of project stakeholders (Key informants (KI) and Focus Groups (FG)) gathered through face-to-face interviews and discussion, using “semi-structured interviews” conducted in a conversational format. Key informants and Focus Groups members interviewed include:
* Project teams,
* Staff of UNDP and EU delegations
* Government officials at national and local level
* Regional and district authorities and technical officers
* Community-based organizations
* Project stakeholders at local level
* Private sector individuals and organizations

The interviews and discussions were guided by questionnaires developed by the Evaluator (Annex3).The wide sourcing of the information provided the basis for cross-checking the accuracy and reliability of the information and evidence collected from the various sources, including the project reports.

The evaluation covered five of the six projects. The project in the Ituri District in DRC Congo was not visited because of logistical difficulties, but information was collected through remote administration of the relevant questionnaires and a telephone interview.

* 1. **Limitations to Evaluation Findings**

Data collection was constrained by a number of factors. First is the difficulty in getting appointments with representatives of some of the key informants groups, in particular the Private Sector/interest (PS) groups. The private sector groups did not respond to the request for meetings even after multiple attempts. Time was also a limiting factor. The mission spent an average of one week per country including travel time between and within the countries. Some of the projects sites are located in remote areas, 8 to 10kms away from the nearest road, accessible only on foot. This reduced the time spent holding discussion with the beneficiaries on the project sites. This was the case of the Coltan mine in Kabarore Kayanza district in Burundi.

Data collection was constrained also by language barriers. Translation was required for all the Focus Groups meetings, which reduced the actual discussion time. Translation was provided by the project staff on a few occasions, or by the occasional literate member of the focus group. The Implementing Partner staff was asked to leave when interviews were being conducted with the help of others, but they continued to be a lingering presence. The presence of members of cooperative management/investors also influenced the discussions.

1. **Evaluation Results**

**Overview**

 It is the consultant’s conclusion, that the project objective of building the capacity of CSOs, NGOs, and other stakeholders was effectively achieved. More than 95% of the outputs scheduled in the project documents were produced, including the outputs related to the building of capacity for Conflict Resolution (CR) regarding Land and Natural Resources (LNR). The projects were successful in the conduct of studies, in the provision of training in Conflict Resolution to the wide range of stakeholders targeted, and in the establishment of key Conflict Resolution mechanisms, (Mining Consultation Boards - MCB).

It must be emphasized, however, that these achievements are at output level. With the exception of the project in Ituri, there is no evidence yet of peace outcomes that can be attributed to the project interventions (conflicts successfully resolved/mediated or averted).

However, while the absence of peace outcomes must be viewed as a significant performance shortfall, it must be noted that the goal articulated in most, though not all, of the projects is, in fact, capacity-building for conflict resolution and not conflict resolution per se. In that context, the absence of peace outcomes should not be seen to detract from the progress made in terms building capacity. The latter is indeed a prerequisite for the former. The success achieved in building the capacity of CSO and other stakeholder makes the achievement of peace outcomes a realistically achievable objective.

The overall performance of the projects was determined by factors including project design, program (as opposed to project) design, and project implementation. First on the list is the question of the adequacy of the time and budget allocated for the implementation of the projects. This is a program design issue. The stakeholders met were unanimous, and the consultant shares the view, that the time and the budget allocated are inadequate for producing a measurable impact on the level of conflict in the GLR. It is unrealistic to expect projects of the scale and duration involved in this evaluation ($120 000 and 12 months) to contribute measurably to a reduction of conflict regarding land and natural resources in a region like the GLR, which is still barely emerging from years of civil strife.

The exception that confirms this rule is the project in Ituri which achieved some tangible peace outcomes. The progress made in this instance is attributable in good measure to the work done over many previous years under the UN Habitat led project which preceded the EU-UN partnership program.

The above raises the obvious question of whether an assessment of impact, and for that matter effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability is justified at the end of the 12 month project period. An evaluation assessment should have answered that question before the evaluation began. Be that as it may, a final evaluation was planned and its findings are hereby presented.

1. **Program Design**

The analysis of the projects´ logical framework in the project reports prepared for the final evaluation workshop reveal a number of issues, notably regarding the logic and structure of the results framework. There are issues with the formulation and definition of the key results, (outputs, outcomes, and impact), and the key result metrics (indicator, baseline and target), and with the logic that ties them together. Project outputs and project outcomes are often formulated in very similar terms, with both reading like activity descriptions. Target indicators are equated with target beneficiaries.

A problem shared by all the projects is with the definition of the project objectives. Capacity- building is presented in effect as the overall objective of the projects. No link is articulated between the overall objective of conflict reduction on one hand and the activities, outputs and outcomes listed on the other hand. The indicators listed in nearly all cases relate solely to the building of capacity.

This is clearly implied in the RISD project document[[2]](#footnote-2).The RISD project spent nearly two thirds of the budget on the development of reference and didactic material, (the study - 49.5% of the core budget, the basic law booklets 14.8%, etc.).

This leads to the overall situation found in the current evaluation in which the building of capacity (provision of training, formal establishment of CR mechanisms) is undertaken successfully in many of the projects but with no evidence of peace outcomes (conflicts mitigated, resolved or averted) generated/produced.

Another design problem relates to the allocation of project resources between project components and interventions. With a small budget and a short timeframe, a project should concentrate on a limited number of mutually reinforcing interventions, to avoid spreading its resources too thinly (financial, human and material resources) in order to achieve a significant impact. A menu of potential activities was provided for guidance in the program document. But, some of the projects devote a large share of their resources to activities outside the menu that have only a marginal bearing on the project´s overall objective. This is the case of the project in Rubaya where Income Generating Activities (IGA)/livelihood activities absorbed close to 50% of the project budget. The project also reallocated funds programmed for the networking with GLR NGO/CBOs to the IGA activities (Purchase of a generator for the brick- making machine).

A related problem is the scaling and sequencing/timing of project activities. Background studies were undertaken in all the projects, ostensibly to develop a detailed picture of the context in which the projects were going to operate. Logically, such studies should be completed early in the project cycle, and should absorb a balanced share of the project budget, lest they circumscribe the range and funding of the other project activities. Five out of the six projects completed the background study within the first trimester of implementation. In the case of Rwanda, the background study absorbed close to half of the project budget[[3]](#footnote-3) and was not yet formally endorsed by the government at the time of the evaluation. As a result, in this case an activity with a direct bearing on conflict resolution and the training of the conflict mediators, (140 Abunzis), was yet to be fully implemented at the time of the evaluation, though the training of trainers had been completed.

1. **Program Management**

The project was administered contractually by UNDP using UNDP rules and procedures. A program steering committee (PSC) supported by a project management team assumed the program coordination role.

**Operational management**

The EU-UN Project Manager (PM) took the lead and - together with participating agencies and the EU-UN Program Coordinator (PC) - was responsible for oversight of activities, including the follow-up of the projects in the field through monitoring and evaluation missions undertaken by the Project Manager as well as by the Project Coordinator. Day-to-day follow-up was ensured in each country by an EU-UN team made up of EU Delegation staff and UNDP Country office staff.

The evaluation found the program operational management system to be effective. It provided the flexibility necessary to adapt and respond to changes in the operating environment of the program. The level of authority given to the Project Manager enabled him to make quick decisions and to provide timely support to the participating NGOs, leveraging the proximity of the Program Coordinator based in Goma. The Program Coordinator undertook more than twenty (20) missions to the countries to provide administrative and program support to the implementing partner NGOs, and to conduct project monitoring on behalf of the management team. The Program Coordinator was particularly effective in providing liaison between the projects and the UNDP Country Offices, including facilitating the interaction between the implementing partners and UNDP administration in the processing of project fund replenishment.

The coordination and collaboration between the Program Management Team (The Project Manager based in New York and the Program Coordinator based in Goma) and the Country Project Teams-CPT (EUD and UNDP country office) was satisfactory overall with variations from country to country. The collaboration was excellent in Burundi, where it was very effective in overcoming obstacles to project implementation that emerged in the relation with the government. The collaboration was also very good between the Program Management Team and the EU delegation in Rwanda, and between the Program Management Team and the UNDP Office in Goma. The UNDP Office in Goma was the UNDP counterpart to the project. It provided office space and logistics support to the EU-UN Project Management Team. Collaboration with individual CPT members in the other countries left room for improvement.

**Financial management**

Grants were allocated to the CSOs following a collective decision and approval of the Project Team and the EU-UN Partnership Steering Committee. The financial management system was built around the fund replenishment mechanism, under which the IPs prepared their individual work plans with budget requirements at the start of each quarter, which were then submitted to UNDP for vetting and processing. The reports of the previous quarter, along with the new work plan and budget for the next quarter, were submitted to the PSC for approval. The funds were then released by UNDP directly into the bank account of the IP who managed the funds thereafter. *T*he financial management system was connected with the M&E system in that it provided a real incentive for the IP to conduct rigorous monitoring and reporting of project implementation (see M&E section below). Their funding depended on it. The system also complied with the requirement of separation of financial powers. Moreover, the IP were required to demonstrate the separation of financial powers in their own structures, as part of the process of qualification for participating in the program.

The evaluator found this management arrangement to be effective in spite of the reported frustration of the IP with the periodic delays in the release of funds by UNDP, which caused some delays in project implementation. To their credit, the IP were able to adapt and minimize the impact of the disbursement delays on their work.

**Financial Performance**

The EU-UN Partnership Program Phase 3 has a budget of US$1.8 million for 12 months, of which $720 000 was shared equally between the six projects. The program delivery rate as of 11 December 2014 (Workshop opening day) is approximately 95%. Delivery should reach 100% by year end.

The project funds were used generally in accordance with the approved project budgets and Logical Framework. This includes the project revised during the course of implementation, (The CAAP executed project in Rubaya, DRC). The project revision in this case affected the use of the funds allocated for the development of the regional CSO/NGO network.

**Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)**

The projects’ Monitoring and Evaluation M&E system is articulated around the project work plan. The M&E activities include weekly field visits, periodic progress/activity reports, (monthly, quarterly and annual reports) and two evaluations (a mid-term and a final evaluation). The monthly and quarterly reports (QR) provided an on-going analysis of project implementation. The QRs served among others to identify the difficulties and constraints encountered and to describe the solutions/corrective actions proposed. Project monitoring visits were undertaken also by the EU-UN Program Coordinator based in Goma DRC, sometimes jointly with the New York based EU-UN Program Manager. The visits enabled the management team to gain first-hand knowledge and insight into the project implementation process and of the difficulties and constraints associated with it. The visits enabled the management team to provide support to the IPs in their interaction with UNDP, which was particularly useful in the processing of the fund replenishment requests submitted by the IP. The evaluation found the project M&E system to be very effective both in concept and in practice.

1. **Assessment of project key Results (*Outputs, Outcomes and objectives/impact.)***

Table (2) presents the evaluation of project performance based on the key results (output, outcome, impact/objectives) presented in the final project reports prepared for the project evaluation and the final evaluation workshop.

The project’s key result are rated based on a scale of 1 to 6 : 6 - Highly Satisfactory, 5 - Satisfactory, 4 - Moderately Satisfactory, 3 - Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU), 2 – Unsatisfactory, 1 - Highly Unsatisfactory.

**Overview**

The project objective of building the Conflict Resolution (CR) capacity of CSOs NGOs, etc. was effectively achieved. More than 95% of the outputs scheduled in the project documents were produced, including the outputs related to the building of capacity for the Resolution of Conflict over LNR. The projects were successful in the conduct of studies, in the provision of CR training to the wide range of stakeholders targeted, and in the establishment of key CR mechanisms, (Mineral Consultation Boards MCB).(See table 2 pages 46-68 for an assessment of activities, outputs and outcomes project by project).

The establishment of Mineral Consultation Boards (MCB) is a noteworthy achievement. The MCBs are a unique asset in the sense that they are set up to bring together in direct face-to- face discussions and negotiations the leading players in the conflicts over LNR in the GLR, i.e., the artisanal miners and the mineral license or concession holders. In the view of the evaluator, a solution to the conflicts over LNR in the GLR is difficult to envision without face-to-face negotiations between the protagonists in the conflict. The MCBs thus have the potential to make a real contribution to the reduction of conflicts over Land and Natural Resources in the Great Lakes Region. However, the realization of this potential requires the strengthening of the MCB by providing a legal basis for their operations with a view to making their decisions legally enforceable.

MCBs or a variant were established under all the projects. An MCBs was established under the ECO project in Karamoja Uganda, the IJP project in Ituri DRC and the CAAP project in Rubaya DRC. The MCB equivalent in Rwanda is the Abunzi system targeted by the RISD project. The Abunzi predates the EU-UN partnership project. Its tenth anniversary has just been celebrated. In Burundi, the MCB is not a standalone mechanism in the sense established in Uganda and Congo DRC, but a three-way relationship which brings together the parties to the conflict over Land and Mineral Resources, i.e., the Artisanal Mining Cooperatives (which combine artisanal miners and mining investors), and the Mineral Purchasing Houses and the Government.

The projects were successful also in the development of **bilateral** working relationships and partnerships with a wide range of national stakeholders: CSOs, local NGOs, and governmental Ministries and Departments. They were successful also in developing cooperative relationships with international development agencies active in the region (UNICEF, UN Habitat, and bilateral agencies such as the German International Cooperation GIZ.

This broad-based sensitization and mobilization of the wide range of stakeholders in the conflict regarding land and natural resources in the GLR is a real asset for the EU-UN partnership and IP’s endeavors to contribute to the reduction of conflict over LNR in the GLR.

**On the other hand**, the above-mentioned progress does not alter the fact that the absence of peace outcomes attributable to the projects detracts from the overall performance of the projects because, in the view of the evaluator, peace outcomes must be treated as the single most important measure of performance for conflict reduction/resolution programs/projects. Indeed, in the absence of peace outcomes, evaluating capacity-building for conflict resolution risks becoming a purely theoretical exercise. Otherwise, the purpose of this evaluation as stated in its TOR is to review progress towards reaching the stated outcomes.

**Based on all of the above, the overall performance of the projects is rated “5 - Satisfactory”.**

As to the causes of the performance gap, first and foremost, this has to be attributed to the time-frame (parameters) set for the projects. The time and budget parameters were set at the program level, i.e., exogenously from the project perspective. As already noted, one year is simply not enough time for Conflict Resolution capacity to be developed and to lead to tangible peace outcomes in a context such as that prevailing in the GLR. This view is shared by all the stakeholders met during the mission. Indeed, the conflict regarding land and natural resources in the GLR has been on-going for years if not decades despite concerted international efforts to resolve it. It will take more than 12 months to succeed.

Apart from these formal considerations, the approximate causes of the lack of peace outcomes has to be seen within the context of the fragility of the CR mechanisms put in place by the projects. The reality is that the Private Sector has not yet shown a genuine commitment to the CR mechanisms the MCBs or MCB process[[4]](#footnote-4). The formal commitments have not yet been translated into concrete actions. **In Rubaya/Goma**, DRC for instance, the mining company “Mwangacucu Hizi International-HMI” has not complied with the key terms of the agreement it has reached with the artisanal mining association COPPERAMA, i.e., the terms of payment for the ore delivered. This is an important source of tension between the HMI and the AM in the cooperative, which threatens to jeopardize the agreement. **In Karamoja**, the participation of the mining companies regarding the MCB is undermined by their working directly with the Ministry of Energy and Mines in Kampala, i.e., bypassing the MCB. The mining companies and purchasing agents in Karamoja also use questionable pricing practices for the minerals produced by the AM. For instance, the mining companies purchase the broken marble processed by the AM by volume (truckload) rather than by weight, a practice that the AM strongly object to.

**In Burundi**, the MCB equivalent is not a formal structure like the one in Goma for the Rubaya mines, but a three-way relationship between the AM cooperatives which itself consists of two entities, -the Artisanal Miners and the Investors-, and the mineral purchasing houses of the government. The Cooperative investors consist of the small group of people who together own the mining license, but are technically members of the cooperative. They appropriate most of the revenue generated by the mines. Very little of the revenue is paid out to the AM, who play no role in the management of the cooperative financing. According to AM members of the Cooperatives, they earn less in wages than their counterpart outside of the cooperatives, selling on the illicit markets. This is a disincentive for both new AM joining the cooperatives, and for AM already in the cooperatives, in terms of being fully loyal to the cooperatives. Many of the former are trying to establish AMA without investor groups, while many of the latter divert part of their production for sale on the illicit market. The main obstacle to new AM forming AMA without investors groups is the exorbitant mining license fees imposed by the government. They just cannot come close to that level of funding. Reportedly, the mineral purchasing houses use questionable pricing practices in Burundi that are similar to those in Karamoja, Uganda. And allegedly they do so in connivance with the investors-group that are members of the cooperatives.

**Ituri** is the exception. An active and productive dialogue has been set in motion between the land concession and title holders and the local population in the two districts covered by the project. The dialogue is facilitated and supported by local offices of national government departments, local government, local authorities, CSOs and other groups. The project has conducted studies on the broad range of issues underlying the conflict in Ituri including gender issues, it has developed an extensive database on land concessions, it has facilitated the establishment of committees that bring together the members of various groups involved in the conflict, and the broader platform where all the groups meet to discuss the issues on a more or less regular basis. An important recent development is the establishment by the concession holders of a group of their own (private owners), that enables them to develop a consensus among themselves before entering into negotiations conducted in the broader mediation platform. The credit for this progress goes in good measure to the years of previous work done and the expertise developed under the UN Habitat led project, which preceded the EU-UN partnership project. All the same, it is a substantial achievement for the EU-UN partnership.

The Ituri experience bears out two important points. First, it bears out the view that conflict resolution regarding land and natural resources in the GLR requires a long-term approach. As indicated above, the success of the EU-UN project in Ituri is owed in good measure to the work done over many years under the preceding UN Habitat led project. Secondly, it bears out the view that conflict resolution projects with small budgets and short durations can be more effective by focusing on a narrow range of mutually reinforcing interventions with a direct bearing on resolving conflict. In contrast to the project in Rubaya, the project in Ituri concentrated entirely on conflict resolution.

Last but not least, the performance gap has to be attributed to an omission, namely the fact that most of the NGOs undertook no action on building the network of NGO/CBO envisioned in both the program document and some of the project documents. Progress toward this goal would have enabled the NGOs to greatly enhance their capacities. While language differences may have been a factor, competition between the NGOs seems to be the more important reason for the lack of inter-ONG cooperation. Indeed, there was no cooperation between NGOs even when language and/or distance were no impediment. This is the case with the two NGOs in Burundi, CONSEDI and OLUCOME, which operated in one case in the same location, Kabarore, and have their headquarters in Bujumbura, within walking distance of each other, yet operated in near total isolation of one another. There was a similar lack of cooperation between the EU-UN projects in Rubaya and Ituri both in Congo DRC, even though distance was a possible constraining factor in this case. Moreover, in one case, (Rubaya) the funds originally programmed for the NGO networking were reallocated to other project activities. In the view of the evaluator, this absence of action regarding an important program and project objective detract from the overall performance of the projects.

The only exception is the study tour/visit organized by CONSEDI to two mines in Burundi and one mine in Rwanda. The study tours proved useful in terms of transfer of know-how. Even then, however, the visits were one-shot-operations. No follow-up action was undertaken in terms of networking.

1. **Assessment of performance based on the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria**
2. **Relevance**

The link between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, violent conflict and socio-economic under-development in the Great Lakes Region is widely recognized. It is the basis for multiple agreements and decisions signed or made individually or collectively by the governments of the GLR countries. The EU-UN partnership program and projects are in full harmony with these agreement and decisions.

These include the Pact on Security, Stability and Development for the Great Lakes Region signed in December 2006, the Lusaka Declaration signed in December 2010 which marked the start of the regional initiative against the illegal exploitation of Natural Resources, and the amendment of the Pact on Security, Stability and Development signed in November 2012, in particular, Article 9 -Protocol Against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources.

The projects also fall well within the UN-Government Framework for Development assistance, known as “UNDAF”. . Specifically: In the case of Rwanda, the RISD executed project fall under UNDAF Outcome 2.2.In the case of Congo DRC, the relevant outcomes are UNDAF Outcome 5 and 6. .In the case of Burundi, the relevant UNDAF priority is UNDAF Axe n°2.**[[5]](#footnote-5)**

Regarding stakeholder participation, the evaluation is able to confirm the broad-based participation of **stakeholders** throughout the project cycle. Stakeholders include government at the national and local level, local leaders, CS, CSO and NGOs, and direct beneficiaries. The IP organized focus group meetings during the project development phase, enabling the prospective beneficiaries to provide inputs in the content of the project proposals. Following the approval of the projects, the IP organized Inception meetings to inform the project stakeholders on the content of the approved projects. Occasionally, the beneficiaries were given the opportunity to amend the projects and introduce new activities better in line with their on-going needs and priorities, (e.g., CAAP executed project in Rubaya, and the CONSEDI executed projects in Burundi).

1. **National NGO participation**

The Implementation Partners also developed successful **bilateral** collaborations with national CSOs and NGOs during project implementation. In Uganda, ECO worked in close cooperation with two local NGOs, ACODE and RIAMRIAM in Karamoja. In Burundi, CONSEDI established limited relationships with two national mining cooperatives (cooperative DUSHIRINGUVU HAMWE in Kirundo and site Ndera, in Muyinga) and a private mining company in Rwanda (Rwankuba Mining Co.). OLUCOME worked closely with the GIZ office in Bujumbura. GIZ sponsored the participation of OLUCOM staff in training workshops in and out of the country, including a workshop on the EITI held in South Africa. In Uganda, ECO developed a close partnership with the GIZ in its work in Karamoja. In Rubaya, the CAAP project worked in partnership with the « Mutuelle de Solidarité » MECAM which specialized in community development and community-based environment protection. In Rwanda, RISD worked closely with the University of Rwanda in the conduct of the study of the national Conflict Resolution system.

It must be underlined, however, that these collaborations were bilateral and project-specific, and not part of building the network of Conflict Resolution NGO/CSOs.

1. **Cooperation and collaboration with government institutions.**

The implementing partners (IP) were very successful in developing bilateral cooperation arrangements with government department and institutions in the four countries. Government departments provided technical support to the projects on a regular basis.

In Uganda, the project worked in close cooperation with the Ministry of Energy and Mines. The project sponsored several visits of the Director of the Department of Energy and Mines to provide briefings to the artisanal miners in Karamoja on the mining code and its various provisions, including the provisions concerning the establishment of AM cooperatives. The project also sponsored visits to Karamoja for staff of the Ministry of the Environment, and other Ministries with jurisdiction over the management of natural resources in the district. The project worked closely also with the various agencies of local government and administration.

In the case of Rubaya, DRC, the Regional Director of the Ministry of Energy and Mines played a key role in the establishment of the conflict mediation platform (MC) that brought together the mining cooperative “COPERAMA” and the private sector Marketing Board (HMI). The DG Ministry contributed also to the workshops and other meetings organized by the project, including the sensitization campaign and training of the artisanal miners regarding the practice of saving and investment and revenue management.

In Burundi, the Ministry of Energy and Mines and the Ministry of Environment provided technical support to the project in the design and conduct of an environmental awareness and education outreach for the miners in Mabayi. The Ministry of Energy and Mines deployed staff to the mines in Mabayi to provide briefings on the Mining Code (Code Minier), personal safety and mining security. The Ministry of the Environment deployed technical staff to the mine sites to provide briefings on the environment protection laws, rules and regulations, and to provide training on environmental protection techniques.

In Rwanda, the project worked in close collaboration with the University of Rwanda in the study of the Conflict Mediation systems in the two districts covered by the project. The project worked in partnership with the Access to Justice Units (MAJ) of the Ministry of Justice both at the national and the district levels. The MINJUST also provided support for the development of the law training booklet and its district staff coordinates with the project in planning the training in basic law for the Abunzis.

In the view of the evaluator, the success in mobilizing the wide range of stakeholders (target beneficiaries, CS, CSO and Government) across the four countries is a crucial achievement. It is a pre-requisite for successfully addressing the conflicts over land and natural resources in the GLR.

1. **Effectiveness.** The extent to which the project outputs, outcomes and objectives are achieved.

As noted earlier, the implementation of the projects was very effective in terms of producing **the outputs scheduled** in the project documents. The projects were successful in the conduct of studies, the provision of training in CR to the wide range of stakeholders, and in the establishment of the key CR mechanisms (The Mining Consultation Boards-MCB).The projects were successful also in the development of bilateral partnerships with a wide range of national stakeholders and entities: CSOs, local NGOs, local and traditional leaders, and Governmental Ministries and Departments, etc.

Yet, the evaluator is of the view that the projects’ overall effectiveness was diminished to some extent by the absence of positive peace outcomes attributable to the projects, and the general lack of progress on the development of the network of CSO and NGOs.

1. **Impact.**

Impact evaluation assesses the changes that can be attributed to a particular intervention, such as a project, program or policy- both the intended and the unintended changes. Outcome monitoring examines whether targets have been achieved. Impact evaluation is structured to answer the question on how outcomes would have changed if the intervention had not been undertaken. Impact evaluations seek to answer cause-and-effect questions. This involves counterfactual analysis, which it is not possible to undertake in the current evaluation.

The TOR proposes the significance of impact method as an alternative, which is defined as “determining the impact of the project outcomes on the main conflict drivers”. This definition was revised in the inception report to focus on “**determining the likelihood** of the project generating the desired impact on the main conflict drivers after the end of the project(s) rather than during the life of the project(s)”.

Based on the revised criteria, the evaluator is of the view that the projects are likely to produce positive peace outcomes and impact positively on the conflict drivers, provided they (the projects) are afforded additional resources and time to build on the foundations established, in particular by strengthening the Mining Consultation Boards-MCB.

1. **Sustainability**

Sustainability is the extent to which the project benefits will continue after EU-UNDP external assistance has come to an end. A distinction is made between the benefits associated with the acquisition of knowledge through studies, the collecting of information and training and the benefits associated with the establishment of Conflict Resolution mechanisms.

First, a requirement for ensuring project sustainability is the development of a sustainability strategy. None of the projects developed a sustainability strategy document.

Otherwise, it can safely be assumed that the knowledge generated through studies, data collection and didactic material and/or passed on through training will remain CR assets and sources of benefits after the end of the project. In the same vein, it can be assumed that the sensitization and mobilization of CS, CSO, other local and grassroots entities and governmental institutions at national and local level, undertaken by the projects and the collaborations and partnerships developed in the process including the collaboration with government entities, will remain CR assets and sources of benefits after EU-UNDP external assistance has come to an end.

However, as discussed earlier, the viability and sustainability of the newly established CR mechanisms, the MCBs, remain uncertain. The private sector (PS) members of the MCBs do not yet show a genuine commitment to the system. They are not abiding by the key provisions of the agreements reached in the MCB. **In Rubaya/Goma**, DRC for instance, the HMI has not complied with the agreement’s provisions regarding the timing of the payment for the ore delivered by the mines. This is a source of great frustration among the AM and of great tension between the HMI and the AM. **In Karamoja**, the participation of the mining companies on the MCB is undermined by their continued practice of bypassing the MCB and working directly with the Ministry of Energy and Mines in Kampala.

The reluctance of the private sector extends to some extent to the international corporate sector. Contacts were established by the Project Manager and promising discussions initiated with a number of private international companies operating in Uganda, (Total, Elf, etc). Reportedly, the companies showed a keen interest in developing peaceful and cooperative relationships at grassroots level in the areas where they were undertaking or considering making investments. Some of the companies agreed in principle to participate in the workshop in Kampala. Apparently, however, the clearance to participate never came from their global headquarters. They withdrew at the last minute.

In the view of the evaluator, the fragility of the MCB stemming from the private sector´s reluctance to participate fully has to be seen as a major stumbling-block. It is difficult to envision a resolution of the conflicts over land and natural resources in the GLR without well- functioning MCBs that enable face-to-face discussions and negotiations between the principals to the conflicts. Yet, as daunting as the problem seems, in the view of the evaluator, it has to be viewed as a developmental problem. The MCBs have just been established, bringing together parties that have been in conflict for years. It will take time and sustained effort to overcome the natural suspicions and miscalculations that are bound to occur in the early stages of transforming a relationship long mired in conflict into a cooperative relationship. But, with perseverance and systematic information and education highlighting both the win-win nature of the MCB process and of course its lose-lose potential as well, a genuine adhesion of all the parties, including the private sector, can be brought about. To this end, a medium to long-term approach is required, as showed by the Ituri case. At the same time, the realization of the full potential of the MCB requires strengthening the system by, among other things, conferring a legal status upon it, providing a legal basis for its operations through legislation adopted by the national or regional parliament with a view to making its decisions legally binding and enforceable.

**In Burundi**, where the MCB equivalent is a three-way relationship involving the two sides of the AM cooperatives and the mineral purchasing houses of the government, the sustainability of the project benefits also continues to be uncertain. The AM lack confidence in the pricing practices of the mineral purchasing houses, and suspect their connivance with the investors-group members of the cooperatives. Underlying the suspicion is the fact that the AM in the cooperatives earn less in wages than their counterparts outside of the cooperatives do by selling on the illicit markets. Both are a disincentive for loyalty to the cooperative of the AM already in the cooperatives and a disincentive for new artisanal miners joining the cooperatives. The sustainability of the formalization of artisanal mining is therefore in doubt.

The advocacy for change in this case should be directed mainly at revising the mining code, to reduce the mining license fees and taxes. According to AM operating outside the cooperatives, it will require a drastic reduction of the current license fees to enable them to operate legally under the framework of the mining code. They will continue otherwise working outside the law. A reduction of the mining license fees would also encourage and enable more private investors to enter the mining sector, thereby creating more employment opportunities for AM. The high license fees and taxes make mining financially a very risky business, and a deterrent for investors to enter the business in Burundi.

**In Rwanda,** the project is focused on conflict over land as opposed to mining, and the MCB equivalent is the Abunzi. Given the government’s long-term commitment to the Abunzi, the support for the Abunzi should focus not on its sustainability as such, but on its efficiency and effectiveness. The Abunzi are unpaid volunteers who work using rudimentary means, (pen and paper, manual paper filling, etc.), and apply traditional ways of resolving conflict. Their rulings often are voided due to minor technicalities by the courts. The efficiency and effectiveness of the Abunzi could be improved significantly by the introduction of more modern working methods and tools**,** such as equipment to create, store, edit and manage documents on case hearings, filling systems and basic implements for land demarcation (measuring tape and kits and other land demarcation tools), etc. The Ministry of Justice is to provide basic legal training to the Abunzi.

Other **sustainable** project benefits, i.e., benefits that will continue after EU-UNDP external assistance has come to an end, are those flowing from the use of the tool kits developed under the EU-UN Partnership and introduced during the Partnership´s first workshop held in Bujumbura. The tool kit includes the new UNEP-DPA Guidance on NR conflict mediation, the guidance notes on land mediation, land and conflict, and extractive. The partner NGOs generally acknowledge the general relevance of the tool kit for work in the specific context of the GLR and its usefulness for their individual work. Some report using the tools kit in the development of new project proposals. For instance, in DRC and in Uganda, new proposals on land and NR are under development by the partner NGOs for submission to other funding sources. Similarly, background studies undertaken by AJP, ECO and CAAP are being referenced and/or used by the UNDP Country Offices in the development of projects on NR.

1. **Capacity-building,**

Capacity-building in the sense of transfer of know-how and the establishment of formal structures has been the most successful area of intervention for the projects. The projects were successful both in terms of providing short-term training (workshops and seminars and IEC, etc.) and in terms of establishing formal CR mechanisms (the MCBs) expected to last for the long term.

The EU-UN partnership program also provided the partner NGOs with the opportunity to acquire additional on-the-job training and hands-on practice of their own in the formulation and implementation of CR programs and projects. First, The NGOs also leveraged the training programs that they commissioned for the project beneficiaries to acquire additional training of their own in various skills including Conflict Resolution. Furthermore, the training in the formulation and implementation of CR programs and projects began at the workshop held in Bujumbura in September 2013, with the introduction of the EU-UN Tool Kit for preventing and managing land and natural resources conflict[[6]](#footnote-6). Use of the tool kit was a requirement in the development of the project proposals to be submitted in response to the call for proposals issued by the partnership.

The evidence shows varying degrees of use of the toolkit in the four countries. In Rwanda for instance the guidance note and the online training have both been used by the RISD staff to strengthen their own capacity and in the formulation of project proposals. In Burundi, there was no direct use of the tool kit in project implementation as transparency and formalization of Artisanal Mining are not specifically covered by the toolkit. But, both Burundian partner NGOs acknowledge the relevance of the tool kit to the country context and report using it in the development of project proposals for submission to other funding sources.

In DRC some of the examples cited in the land and conflict guidance note are directly linked to the DRC UNHABITAT land mediation program, which provided the knowledge and experience base that was capitalized on by the current EU-UN partnership project in Ituri. In Uganda, ECO reports using the toolkit for its in-house knowledge development and for proposal formulation and implementation.

Lastly, the EU-UN website was presented anew and discussed during the final workshop in Kampala.  One of the workshop recommendations which has seen some follow-up action is to establish a website to promote and facilitate communication among the EU-UN partner NGOs.

Technical assistance was provided to the six CSOs in the preparation of their own evaluation of their respective projects to be presented at the final workshop. The assistance sought to build on the assessment of project implementation undertaken during the life of projects as part of the project M&E system. As indicated earlier under M&E, the monthly and quarterly reports (QR) provided an on-going analysis of the project implementation. The QRs served among others to identify the difficulties and constraints encountered and to describe the solutions/corrective actions proposed. A model PowerPoint presentation was also provided by the evaluator to guide the project teams. **See Annex 6: “Country Presentations, Draft Guide and Outline”** for the guidance note and a compilation of the results of the projects’ self-evaluation presented at the workshop.

1. **Coordination:**

Coordination and collaboration between the partner NGOs did not figure much in the implementation of the projects. To all intents and purposes, the projects were implemented separately from one another, even in cases where there was scope for collaboration. For instance, the two projects in Burundi operated in the same location in the Kayanza District, (Kabarore) targeting the same population, (the artisanal miners), yet there was no collaboration between the two projects. In fact they supported two competing AM groups, the artisanal miners in the cooperatives, and those outside the cooperatives, using contrasting approaches.. The OLUCOME’s project promoted transparency and the rights of the artisanal miners. It supported the AM in the establishment of associations where the members have equal rights and duties, while CONSEDI supported the formation of cooperatives, which as explained earlier cater in reality to the interest of the investors/mining license owners. They appropriate the lion’s share of the revenue generated by the mines.

Coordination and collaboration between the partner NGOs will require an activist approach. Firstly, it must be mandated with dedicated resources set aside for the purpose in all the projects. Secondly, collaboration mechanisms must be established. An information exchange and experience sharing system must be put in place, preferably a web-based system. Finally, regular periodic information exchange and experience sharing events must be scheduled. The project management teams must be brought together in one place every quarter or so to engage in face-to-face interaction and exchange of experience. The practice of the PRODERE program in Central America in the 1990s provides a useful example. PRODERE was a UN inter-agency program that included UNDP, ILO, FAO, UNICEF, and covered the six countries in Central America. The country project management teams met every two months on a rotating basis in the various countries to share experience including project site visits and draw up lessons. PRODERE developed most of the UNDP reference material on the Area Based Development approach.

Unlike the individual NGOs, there was a degree of coordination and collaboration at the project oversight level, i.e., between the Project Management Team (Project Manager and Program Coordinator), and the Country Project Teams made up of representatives of the EU Delegations and the UN/UNDP Country Offices. Effective coordination and collaboration at this level was a specific goal of the EU-UN Partnership.

Coordination mechanisms were established prior to the launch of the projects, both at the global level and at the country level. At country level, a country project team (CPT) was established in each of the four countries covered. The team comprised a representative of the EU Delegation and a representative of each of the UN agencies involved, (Usually UNDP). At the global level a Coordination Committee called the EU-UN Partnership Steering Committee was established, with its Secretariat assured by the Project Manager in New York. Among the attributes of the country project teams was the approval of project quarterly work plans and budgets, which provide the basis for the quarterly disbursement of funds to the implementing NGOs. The Project Management Team worked actively to promote the operationalization of the individual country teams, but it was only partly successful.

Burundi provides the most effective instance of country project team work, in particular in crisis management. The EU and UNDP offices worked with the Program Manager to persuade the government to lift the freeze it had placed on the work of the two EU-UN partnership projects in the country. Ultimately, this led to the government announcement after initial opposition, of its intention to join the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), a major achievement, which stands to contribute greatly to the reduction of conflict in the mining sector in Burundi. In addition, both the EU and UNDP offices in Burundi provided active support to the evaluation exercise. In Rwanda, the Project Management Team worked closest with the EU delegation. The EU delegation showed a keen interest in the project, providing substantive input and in-depth oversight of project implementation during the project´s entire duration. The EU office also provided active and substantive support to the evaluation. The involvement of UNDP office was limited to the financial management functions attributed to it under the partnership agreement. The evaluation was not able to meet the UNDP member of the Country Project Team because of scheduling issues on his part. In Congo DRC the collaboration between the PMT and the CPT was limited by distance. The EU office is located in Kinshasa, while the projects and the UNDP office in charge are located in Eastern DRC, 3 to 4 hours away by plane from Kinshasa. As a result, the EU delegation participation in the work of the Country Project Team was rather limited. The UNDP Office in Goma was the main program counterpart. It housed the office of the Program Coordinator, and the Deputy UNDP Head of Office in Goma held working sessions with the evaluation mission in Goma and during the workshop in Kampala. He provided very useful guidance to the evaluation based on his intimate knowledge of Eastern DRC. One of UNDP´s main recovery and development programs in Eastern DRC is based in Rubaya. The EU Delegation office in Uganda played a less prominent role in both project oversight and evaluation. The UNDP sub-Office in Morotto was the UNDP direct partner to the project in Uganda. The level of its involvement in project oversight could not be ascertained, but it was represented at the final workshop. The UNDP Country Director opened the workshop in Kampala.

Regarding the value added of having multiple agencies working together in a complicated system of funding CSO activities, it continues to have potential, in the same way as for most UN and other inter-agency collaboration and coordination initiatives and systems. Judging from the best case scenario experienced in this phase, (Burundi) it holds some promise.

1. **Cross-cutting themes**

The Program achieved mixed results with regard to the cross-cutting themes of Environment and Human Rights/Gender and Child rights.

1. **Environment.** Activities for the protection of the environment were undertaken across the board by the projects. The projects developed effective partnerships with the government agencies and departments and with local Community Based Associations working on environmental protection. Collaboration included mitigation of the environmental impact of the mining activities, the restoration of mining sites and community lands.

In Rubaya, the CAAP project worked in partnership with the « Mutuelle de Solidarité » MECAM which is a local CBO specializing in community development and community-based environment protection. With funding and overall supervision of the project, MECAM undertook reforestation, tree planting and other environmental restoration and protection activities using community-based information and education to mobilize the communities.

In Burundi, the Ministry of Energy and Mines and the Ministry of Environment provided technical support to the project in the design and conduct of an environmental awareness and educational outreach for the miners in Mabayi. The Ministry of the Environment deployed technical staff to the mine sites to provide briefings on environmental protection laws, rules and regulations, and to provide training on environmental protection techniques.

In Uganda, the project sponsored visits to Karamoja for staff of the Ministry of the Environment, and other Ministries with jurisdiction over the management of natural resources in the district. The project worked closely also with the various agencies of local government and administration.

1. **Gender,** The evaluation found a prevalence of gender bias in the artisanal mining sector in the GLR. Women are largely excluded from the sector. No women were observed in the mines visited in Burundi. In Congo, the women operated small restaurants and shops on the periphery of the mines. The prevailing view in both countries is that artisanal mining is the rightful preserve of men because of its physical nature.

In contrast, women participate in near equal numbers with the men in the physical work of artisanal mining in Karamoja, Uganda. They dig, shovel and burrow side by side with the men and they are exposed to the same risks associated with the trade, such as a mine pit collapse, etc. The discrimination in this case is in regard to the income generated. The income earned by women in the mines and any other activity for that matter **is** by tradition managed and controlled by the husband/male head of the household. There was no evidence of **action** taken by the projects or the authorities to combat this type of discrimination.

There was general acknowledgement of the problem of female exclusion from the mining sector in Congo and Burundi too, but an apparent resignation to the dictate of tradition. No evidence was found of concrete action taken by the projects or the authorities to address the problem. Micro-grants were provided to a limited numbers of spouses of artisanal miners in the district of Rubaya as a means of diversifying and stabilizing family income, but in the view of evaluator, this is a mitigation measure which falls short of giving women equal opportunity to participate in the sector.

Mines were not visited in Rwanda and Ituri DRC. The mission did not visit the Iturbi district.

1. **Child labor,** Under-aged boys and girls were observed working in or loitering around the mines in Rubaya DRC and in Karamoja, Uganda. In Karamoja, girls were observed carrying water to the mines washing points. According to government officials in Karamoja, school attendance is seriously hampered by the flocking of children and young adults to the mines. The IP staff reported raising the matter with the AM associations and with the district authorities, but to no effect. In Rubaya, the cooperative committee and the IP expressed preoccupation with the risk of disqualification of the mine(s) from exporting to Western markets that might result from the violation of international child labor laws and conventions.
2. **Media Participation.** The projects worked with various media outlets in carrying out information and education campaigns at country level. In Rwanda, the project worked with 2 radio and TV stations in its public information campaign on the role of ABZ. In Burundi, OLUCOME made extensive use of radio and TV and to good effect in its campaign for the mobilization of the general public and CS in support of the country adhesion to the ITIE. The campaign was responsible in part for the government announcement in November 2014, after initial reticence, of its intention to join the ITIE.

In contrast, in Rubaya DRC, the opportunity to capitalize on the UNDP-funded rural radio station was not taken. The radio station’s area of coverage extends to most of the Kivus and parts of Ituri and it had a substantial amount of vacant air time, but it lacked the funding necessary to produce radio programs. The radio could have been used to mount an effective Information and Education campaigns on conflict resolution covering most of Eastern DRC, and would have made a direct and much more significant contribution to the reduction of conflict in Eastern DRC including Rubaya itself. According to the station manager, he offered to collaborate with the project, but the project did not take up the offer.

In sum, the EU-UN partnership experience working with the media was varied, with both instances of good collaboration and missed opportunity for collaboration. The experience shows a clear potential for mobilizing the media in effective support for the promotion of peace-building and the resolution of conflicts over land and natural resources at local level in the GLR. There was, however, no evidence of coverage of the issues in national news outlets that came as a result of media participation in the two regional workshops. Perhaps, this was an unrealistic expectation, given the grassroots orientation and remote locations of the interventions and, perhaps more importantly, the small scale of the interventions. Typically, news outlets in small media markets favor issues that command larger audiences. They are resource-strapped and, as a result, they require financial support to provide coverage for internationally-funded programs and projects, which they assume to be well-funded, as a rule.

1. **Pro-poor.** The EU-UN partnership program document does not call specifically for the project interventions to be pro-poor, but UN grassroots interventions are required to be pro-poor as a matter of course. The artisanal miners are among the poorest members of their societies. The CAAP project in Rubaya, DRC and the CONSEDI project in Burundi undertook some interventions that are pro-poor in nature. These include the training of AM in the practices of savings and investment by the CAAP project in Rubaya DRC and in the CONSEDI project in Burundi, and the provision of livestock and micro-grants to spouses of artisanal miners in Rubaya, and the assistance for access to better housing in Rubaya.

On the other hand, the organizing model used in both Burundi and Congo, (formalization of Artisanal Mining),is not truly consistent with the pro-poor requirement of UN grassroots interventions. While the cooperative system provides legality to the work of the artisanal miners in the cooperatives, which is a benefit in itself in that the AM in the cooperatives are able to work openly without being molested by the authorities, the system does not cater for the economic interest of the AM. Very little of the revenue generated by the mining is paid out to the AM. The investor group (less than 10 people out of the total membership of about 300) accrues the lion’s share of the revenue generated. According to the AM in the cooperatives, they earn less in wages than their counterparts outside the cooperative system earn selling on the parallel market. And, cooperative membership does not provide employment security. An AM can be laid off or terminated at any time at the total discretion of the investors.

The sharing of the mining revenue between the AM and the investors in the cooperatives must be improved if the cooperative system is to become a viable organizing model in the medium to long term.

1. **RECOMMENDATIONS**

This section provides recommendations for follow-up action to build on the achievement made by the projects, capitalizing on the ‘best’ practices that have developed during project implementation and, of course, avoiding the ‘worst’ practices identified.

The recommendations build on the evaluation conclusion that the projects have been very successful in the development of capacity for conflict resolution and in the broad-based sensitization and mobilization of stakeholders but they have not yet translated this success into tangible peace outcomes. The objective is to build on the wealth of first-hand knowledge and experience generated in the course of project implementation in order to transition from capacity-building to the actual reduction of conflict regarding land and natural resources.

The way forward centers on promoting the sharing/exchange of knowledge and experience, among the NGO/CBOs which participated in the current 3rdphase, and on enhancing the EU-UN partnership program support for the implementation of the peace and development agenda of the ICGLR.

The recommendations are divided into three groups: (a) Recommendations on design and management relates to observations made during the evaluation on the implementation capacity of the IP who participated in the current phase. (b) Thematic recommendations relates to recommendations on sector and thematic issues identified, some of which were formulated by the Working Groups held at the Kampala Workshop. (c) Recommendations on regional issues relate to the implementation of the ICGLR Protocols and strengthening the ICGLR executive arm, i.e., the ICGLR Secretariat and the National Coordination Mechanisms.

1. **Design and Management**

This section covers the best and worst practices that emerged during the course of project implementation. Recommendations are formulated on:

* Corrective actions for future project design and implementation,
* Actions to take in order to strengthen benefits generated by the project,
* Changes to the project strategy, moving from short-term project to long-term programming, including indicators and targets in the project log frame,
* Additional capacity-building support for civil society organizations.

**Best practices:** The Conflict resolution mechanisms (Mining Consultation Board -MCB) that bring together in face-to-face discussions and negotiations the protagonists directly involved in the LNR conflict has a clear potential for being an effective means of conflict resolution and reduction. Therefore, establishing and operationalizing MCB or similar mechanisms should become a standard part of projects that aimto reduce conflict over Land and Natural Resources.

 Strengthening the link between natural resources and land tenure allows for a comprehensive multidisciplinary approach to the development of methodologies.

 Linking Income Generating Activities IGA and livelihood activities with land and natural resources conflict prevention allows for a comprehensive response to a multi-dimensional and complex local tension.

**Worst practices:** IGA/livelihood activities when included in small-budget Conflict Prevention projects tend to absorb a disproportionate amount of the project resources (human and financial)at the expense of the conflict prevention interventions of the project. Note also that while strengthened social cohesion can be a by-product of community economic development (CED), CED is not a significant determinant of increased capacities in conflict management.

The absence of a regional NGO network on Conflict Resolution deprived the current set of projects of an effective mechanism for learning from one another and enriching individual experiences so as to be in a better position to influence national policy on the reduction of conflict regarding land and natural resources. This was a key objective of the EU-UN Partnership program which was initiated at the Bujumbura workshop and was to be continued during project implementation.

**Recommendations**:

* Corrective actions for future project design and implementation
* Capacity-building for conflict prevention should not be delinked from the conflict reduction outcomes. Therefore, the design of projects should clearly show the link between capacity-building and peace outcomes. Such projects require, however, a medium to long term approach and larger funding
* The focus of projects with limited budget and short timeframe should be on a limited number of mutually reinforcing interventions that contribute directly to Conflict Prevention and Resolution in order to maximize the benefits from the limited budget.
* Actions to take in order to reinforce benefits generated by the project
* provide additional funding to extend the projects for two years in order to enable the consolidation of the gains already made in terms of conflict resolution capacity and conflict resolution mechanisms including taking action for:
	+ Strengthening the analytical capacity of CSOs to understand implications of land and natural resource policies and concession agreements;
	+ Establishing network of conflict resolution among NGOs that participated in the current 3rd phase to enable systematic sharing of knowledge and experiences,
* Enabling the GLR NGO/CSOs to engage with international stakeholders such as the UN Global Compact, the World Economic Forum, the World Bank, and regional stakeholders such as the ICGLR, the land Policy Initiative and Africa Mining Vision Secretariat as well as the AU.
* Changes to the project strategy, including the indicators and targets in the project log frame
* The Key Results (outputs, outcomes, impact) should be defined in a manner that clearly articulates and shows the Result Chain, i.e., the logical and hierarchy link between the key results.
* The Key Results metrics (indicators, baseline and targets) should be defined in a manner that permits ready determination of project performance, i.e., change in indicators over time.
* **Substantial knowledge development and capacity-building activities require medium to long term programming instead of short-term projects.**
* Additional capacity-building support to civil society in the form of workshops and seminars in the following subject areas :
* Program and project development, financial management and reporting, RBM and formulation of results chain(s).results
* Post-conflict Peace and Development programming and program implementation
* Land and Natural Resources mediation techniques, conflict analysis and several technical subjects such as environmental protection standards, health and safety.
1. **Thematic**

**Environment**

Artisanal mining is causing significant damage to the environment in the GLR, notwithstanding the mitigation efforts initiated by the EU-UN partnership projects in partnership with competent government departments and civil society organizations. The mines covered by the projects are but a small fraction of the mines under operation. Of course, substantial environmental damage was already caused long before the projects started, and that environmental damage continues to occur. This includes deforestation, soil erosion, landslides, silting of marshlands, river pollution, the destruction of protected areas and eco-systems, all causing loss of fauna and flora, and of arable lands.

**Recommendations:**

Provide technical support to the governments in the harmonization of the overlapping jurisdictions of government departments and the inconsistent laws and regulations governing the use of land and natural resources, i.e., mining license issuing, environment, wildlife, forestry, protected areas, and land (Case of Uganda).

Provide technical support to the government for the establishment and enforcement of the requirement of environmental and social impact studies as part of the mining license application process

Provide technical support to the government for the development of instruments and the establishment of enforcement mechanisms for the preservation of protected areas,

Provide technical training to the CSO on environmental protection

Provide support for scaling up the Rubaya comprehensive project on ASM and the mitigation of environmental degradation across the GLR.

**Land and property rights**

Three of the six projects undertaken under the EU-UN Partnership program focused exclusively on the nexus between conflict and land and property rights. They include the land conflict mediation capacity-building in Rwanda, the land tenure and mining project in Uganda, and the project on land concessions in Ituri DRC. Taken together, however, these cases represent but a fraction of the land and property rights problem affecting the GLR.

The importance of the issue of land and property rights to peace in the GLR is reflected in the fact that one of the ten protocols of the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes region is dedicated to the issue, albeit with a focus on the property rights of returning IDP and refugees. Addressing the issue of Land and Property Rights is also one of the objectives of the ICGLR Program of Action on “Humanitarian, Social and Environmental Issues”.

Indeed, land and property rights remain a source of social tensions across the GLR, not just in regard to the displaced but also the non-displaced population as they compete for rights in mining, agriculture and forestry, and many other sectors.

Land and property rights are also adding a new layer to the conflict in the GLR. The recent discovery of oil and minerals deposits in the region is already a source of land disputes and tensions in many of the countries. The conflict in Karamoja, for instance, is essentially a conflict over land and property rights. It concerns the determination of the rightful recipients of the share of the royalties paid by the mining companies that goes to the land owner(s).

Yet, in spite of this relevance, the ICGLR member states have not yet taken the steps required for the domestication of the protocol, i.e., the integration of the protocol in the national legal frameworks. Compared to the mining sector, there have been very few consultation or dialogue mechanisms established at the national or regional levels around the issue of access to land, including in relation to displacement. Rwanda is the exception. The Abunzi system is country/nation-wide, and the majority of conflicts resolved through the Abunzis are land related.

The EU-UN Partnership program should build on its experiences in Ituri and in Rwanda to expand its actions on land and property rights in the GLR.

**Recommendations**

The EU-UN partnership should leverage the experience gained though its project in Ituri DRC, and Karamoja Uganda to organize the group of 6 NGO/CSO into a core NGO/CSO network regarding land and property rights, to be e expanded gradually to include additional GLR NGO/CSO. A request was formulated to that effect by the CSOs at the workshop in Kampala. The CSO view it as critical to create an equivalent of the existing civil society platform on illegal exploitation of minerals in the region for Land Tenure and Property Rights.

The EU-UN partnership should provide additional capacity-building support to the newly created land and property CSO network. The core NGO/CSO should be encouraged to work in collaboration with the Secretariat of the ICGLR to advocate and support the process of domestication of protocols 9 and 10 of the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, and the six articles/tools of the **Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources (RINR)**. The ICGLR Ministerial summit is planned for April 2015 and will lead to the development of a national action plan for the domestication of the RNIR.

The EU-UN Partnership should support as a next phase of activity, the Great Lakes national action plan for domestication of the ICGLR protocol on Land and Displacement following the ICGLR Land and Displacement Ministerial Summit.

The EU-UN Partnership program should provide support to the Secretariat of the ICGLR in building technical capacity to address land and natural resources conflict issues, including national ICGLR coordination mechanisms, beginning with the four countries covered by the current project.

The EU-UN Partnership program should provide support to the Governments of the GLR in the development of integrated approaches and strategies regarding land and property rights, leveraging the NGO/CSOs network and the ICGLR Secretariat.

**Poverty**

The formalization of the artisanal mining sector is regarded as a key to the resolution of conflict regarding land and natural resources in the GLR. The act of formalization is viewed as a vehicle for providing legality to the work of the artisanal miners, and also as a means of preventing conflicts between the artisanal miners who join the cooperatives and the mining investors/license holders.

Long-term viability of the formalization process depends on the ability of the cooperative system to improve the living conditions of artisanal miners. Currently, however, the artisanal miners in the cooperatives derive very little economic benefits from their work. They earn less in wages than their counterparts outside the cooperatives operating on the illicit/parallel market. The investors appropriate the lion’s share of the revenue generated by the mines. This is a long-term threat to the stability of the cooperatives. More importantly, it is a disincentive for new artisanal miners joining the cooperatives. This shortcoming limits the extent to which the cooperatives system can serve as the organizing model for the mining sector.

**Recommendations:**

The CSOs should document cases and produce a well-documented report to advocate for a pro-poor regulatory framework.

The EU-UN Partnership should support a regional network of CSO to undertake specific analysis and identify, through members of the partnership, international practices and relevant experiences in ASM formalization using a pro-poor approach. The study should also identify and recommend ways and means of reducing the mining license fees which constitute the greatest barrier to entry into the mining sector. Many artisanal miners would organize themselves into regular mining cooperatives, i.e., cooperatives where members enjoy equal rights and privileges, were it not for exorbitant government license fees.

1. **Regional and ICGLR**

**Trans-border conflicts**

Cross-border conflict regarding land and natural resources is an on-going reality in the GLR. The conflicts over the waters and grazing lands around Lake Turkana are typical of that area, as are oil exploitation and fishery conflicts in Lake Albert, and conflict over land and resources on the Burundi-DRC border. Water pollution in Uganda generates tension in neighboring parts of Kenya while people from one country interfere and profit in the gold trade in another. Gold from Burundi is smuggled and sold in Rwanda and Uganda. In addition, conflict over one kind of resource easily spills over into other resources and sectors while conflicts between small groups of individuals easily degenerate into larger tribal conflicts. With population growth, displacement and lack of employment opportunities reinforcing each other, these competitions and conflicts have been growing more severe and frequent.

The Protocol on the Specific Reconstruction and Development Zone under Article 10 of the ICGLR Pact relates in part to these concerns. Article 10 stipulates that the Member States agree, in accordance with the Protocol on the Specific Reconstruction and Development Zone, to implement an economic development and local regional integration process, pursuant to the decision contained in the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration to declare the Great Lakes Region as a Specific Reconstruction and Development Zone, and for this purpose, to institute in particular:

1. Trans-border development basins to promote local regional integration of the border populations;
2. A Special Reconstruction and Development Fund for the purpose of supporting the implementation of the Protocols and Programs of Action in priority areas of peace and security, democracy and good governance, economic development and regional integration, and humanitarian, social and environmental issues.

**Recommendations:**

The EU-UN partnership together with WB Great lakes Conflict Facility, and within the framework of the Peace and Security Framework for the region, should encourage CSOs to share experiences, build trans-boundary networks and undertake a trans-boundary conflict analysis study to develop action plans;

The EU-UN partnership should support the ICGLR Secretariat in the organization by GLR CSO of a mapping of regional trans-boundary conflicts;

Similarly, with the discovery of oil and mineral deposits attracting international oil and mining companies to various corners of the GLR, the EU-UN Partnership should support the GLR CSO together with the ICGLR Secretariat to engage with the private sector and develop a training for CSO on how to engage with the private sector and how to build a land and mining coordination group.

In the same vein, the conflict resolution mechanisms (The Mines Consultation Boards-MCB) established with support from the EU-UN partnership 3rd phase should be strengthened, through the development of a legal framework of action granting the MCB a legal status and a legally enforceable mandate.

**Cooperation and collaboration with the ICGLR Secretariat;**

Nearly nine years after the signing of the Pact on Security, Stability and Development,

the ICGLR Member States have not yet taken the steps necessary for domestication of most of the Pact’s protocols. Except for the mining sector, there have rarely been consultation mechanisms established or consultations held at the national or regional levels on the other nine protocols of the pact.

Similarly, the institutional mechanisms of the ICGLR are not yet fully in place and operational. The ICGLR Secretariat is not yet able to provide the support required by the CSO in their effort to promote and support the implementation of the ICGLR agenda in their respective countries. Associated with the weakness of the Secretariat is the similar weakness of the National Coordination Mechanisms established in the ICGLR countries.

**Recommendations**

Provide support for the Domestication of the ICGLR protocols. In this regard, provide support for the organization by the CSO of national information and education campaigns and public mobilization campaigns for the domestication and implementation at the national level of **the ICGLR protocols, including the protocol against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, in particular the six special tools of the Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in the Great Lakes Region (RINR)**[[7]](#footnote-7)**, with special emphasis on** the Traceability Instruments and Mechanisms, (Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative - EITI). The recent work of the Burundian NGO OLUCOME provides a good source of experience and lessons learned for the development of future initiatives in other countries.

In relation to the coming ICGLR High level Ministerial on land and property rights, the EU-UN support should include:

* An analysis of the current status of the domestication of the protocol regarding protection of property rights for IDPs and refugees and identifying practical successes and challenges in each Member State to better define a road-map for further support to Member States in their domestication effort;
* An analysis and lessons learned from the ICGLR Member States’ experiences and approaches on land management and property rights related to IDPs and Refugees;
* Advocacy for a renewal by Member States of their commitment to take appropriate measures for the implementation of the international principles contained in the Protocol and to develop cooperation mechanisms to achieve lasting solutions for the reintegration of IDPs and refugees;
* Put in place a follow-up and evaluation mechanisms for monitoring progress in the implementation of the protocol.

This high level consultation meeting intends to:

* Engage ICGLR Member States through their Ministers in a formal declaration to enact the required legal and institutional provisions to operationalize the Protocol at the national level and establish national legislation on land issues related to population movement to ensure sustainable solutions and the promotion of social cohesion;
* Encourage Member States to share their experiences in the area of the reintegration of IDPs and refugees in relation to land and property rights;
* Encourage Members States to develop cooperation mechanisms to efficiently deal with the sustainable reintegration of IDPs and refugees.

The EU-UN partnership should also provide support for the ICGLR Secretariat in the creation of a dedicated web-based information system on land and mining linked to the offices of National Coordination Mechanisms established in the ICGLR countries, to among other things, facilitate direct communication and interaction between the national coordination mechanisms with the CSOs across the Great Lakes region. The web-based information system will help ICGLR to better serve Member States, share land and mining conflict prevention methodologies and best practices.

**Annex 6**

**Strengthening Capacities for the Consensual and Sustainable Management of Land and Natural Resources (Phase III): Strengthening Capacities and Knowledge of Civil Society for the Consensual and Sustainable Management of Land and Natural Resources**

**Great Lakes Operation Evaluation Report**

**Evaluation of the EU-UN Cooperation and Collaboration in the four countries**

With six NGOs implementing as many projects in four countries in the framework of the roll-out of a new methodology, and with separate funding and support from EU and UN agencies, Phase 3 of the EU-UN partnership on Land and Natural Resource Conflicts in the Great Lakes region obviously required a strong and effective coordination system. This was articulated in the TOR of EU-UN Partnership, which states, **“This project will be mainly implemented by local CSOs in the four countries but with the logistical and substantive support/capacity of EU Delegations and UN agencies”.** …. **each organization is represented by a focal point to facilitate coordination….”** It is in line with this stipulation that an elaborate coordination system was conceived and put in place, led by the Program Manager, before the launch of projects.

The coordination system consisted of a hierarchy of three decision-making bodies with individual mandates[[8]](#footnote-8).

*A-Great Lakes Project Teams*

*B-Great Lakes National Officer*

*C- EU-UN Partnership Steering Committee*

The coordination mechanisms were therefore established at both the global level and the country level. At the country level, a country project team (CPT) was established in each of the four countries. The team consisted of a representative of the EU Delegation and a representative of each of the UN agencies involved, (Usually UNDP). The Project Management Team (PMT) was comprised of the NY-based Project Manager and the Goma-based Program Coordinator. The PMT was required to be present during major project events and meetings. At the global level a Steering Committee was established at UNDP Headquarters in New York (the EU-UN Partnership Steering Committee). The EU-UN Program Manager, who served as Secretary of the Global Level Steering Committee, played the leading role in the establishment of the coordination system and the regional EU-UN Coordinator was instrumental in coordinating and supporting the work at country level.

From the evidence gathered during the evaluation mission, the coordination mechanism worked satisfactorily overall, but with substantial variations from country to country and between its various levels, (national and global).

**Country Experiences**

Burundi provides the most effective instance of a close EU-UN working relationship, in particular in the context of political tensions management. The EU and UNDP offices in Burundi worked in close collaboration with the Program Manager in persuading the government to lift the freeze it had placed on the work of the two EU-UN partnership projects in the country. Ultimately, and together with GIZ transparency-related activities, this led to the government announcement, after initial opposition, of its intention to join the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI). This is a major achievement of the partnership in Burundi that stands to contribute greatly to the reduction of conflict in the mining sector in the country. Last but not least, both the EU and UNDP offices in Burundi provided active support to the final evaluation exercise. Although both EUD and UNDP offices subscribe fully to the need to address land and natural resources conflict, especially in countries where land tenure has always been a trigger for violent conflict, a commitment to continue with the close working relationship established still has to be announced.

Rwanda provides an example of a dual performance by a country project team. The EU Delegation Representative worked closely with the Project Management Team and notably the Regional Coordinator in the oversight, follow-up and support for project implementation. EUD participated regularly in the project meetings and provided active and substantive input in the work of the project. The thorough EUD knowledge of project implementation opportunities and challenges was very helpful in terms of the project implementation, and to the evaluation mission. In comparison, the evaluation team was not able to meet the UNDP member of the country project team because of scheduling issues on his part, in spite of many attempts. The involvement of the UNDP office appears to have been limited to financial management functions, while UNDP´s interest in land and natural resources issues was very limited.

Congo DRC provides another example of a dual country project team performance. Because of logistical constraints, the EU Delegation had limited involvement in the provision of day- to-day coordination support for the projects. The EU office is located in Kinshasa, 6 hours away by plane from the geographic area of intervention of the projects in Eastern DRC. The provision of coordination support was the responsibility of the UNDP office in Goma, which hosted the office of the Project Coordinator. The Deputy UNDP Head of Office in Goma played a strong role in the oversight of the projects. UNDP Goma has been working on land and natural resources for a number of years, notably through the work of UNHABITAT in the eastern provinces. However, the UNDP office in Goma and the EUD in Congo have yet to develop a cooperative relationship.

In Uganda, both the EU Delegation and UNDP office played a much less active role compared to the EU Delegation offices in Rwanda and Burundi and the UNDP Offices in Burundi and Congo DRC. The evaluation mission was unable to get an appointment and/or hold discussions with either the EU Delegation or the UNDP Offices in Kampala and Morotto. However, UNDP has been fully supportive and engaged in a substantive manner in land and natural resources in Uganda. At the time of the evaluation, a new UNDP project on social cohesion was designed, including a land and natural resources conflict management component based on the EU-UN findings and initial conflict prevention work.

**Key findings**

1. The EU-UN partnership can be very effective, especially in the management of the political challenges that are liable to occur in the process of conflict resolution. Burundi provides the best example of this scenario.
2. There are differences in understanding among the members of the EU-UN partnership of the individual and collective roles they are expected to play in the implementation of the EU-UN Partnership Program. This is liable to be detrimental to efforts to promote the partnership and its visibility.
3. There was very little communication and interaction between the EUD and the UN agencies at country level. The limited communication that took place was primarily in meetings arranged by the Program Manager and/or the Regional Coordinator during their visits to the countries.
4. The guidance and support of an in-house expertise on land and NR conflict prevention and resolution in the EUD and UNDP country offices would greatly enhance the effectiveness on the part of the partnership of conflict prevention and resolution initiatives.
5. Land and NR conflict prevention initiatives can be more effective and gain a higher profile, buy-in and interest, if positioned in larger cooperation frameworks such as: the global extractive strategy of UNDP, the ICGLR, the ECA, the Land Policy Initiative and the Africa Mining Vision.
6. The EU-UN partnership is not known well enough in the EUD and UNDP CO, leading to a limited buy-in by the organizations

**Recommendations**

The following recommendations are formulated, consistent with recommendations made in the evaluation report, to provide additional funding to continue with the 6 projects under Phase 3 for two years at least:

1. Ensure that the EU-UN operational relationship is clearly defined for each country project in written TORs (as was done for the current project). The TOR should cover project management, respective contribution to trainings, seminars and workshops, and contribution to substantive orientation of projects.
2. In project implementation, ensure that regular EUD–UN meetings are scheduled, to include a mid-term regional meeting of EUD and UN to review implementation and recommend corrective measures and steps with a regional perspective, and a final review meeting to set the parameters of a new proposal for a subsequent phase, if any.
3. Ensure adequate level of representation of the EUD, UNDP and other UN Agencies regarding the country project teams through a focal point at a senior level (ex-Burundi).
4. Ensure EUD would be part of a quarterly review of project implementation (ex. Rwanda) and undertake its own initiatives in project monitoring and implementation (Ex: EUD holding regular meetings with CSO in Rwanda).
5. Ensure EUD and UN define a joint strategy for engaging with the private sector when addressing land and NR conflict prevention.
6. Ensure EUD and UN agencies engage with the ICGLR Secretariat as well as with other regional organizations such as the ECA which hosts the Land Policy Initiative and the Africa Mining Vision, two framework tools that remain largely unknown in both EU Delegations and UNDP CO.
7. Ensure participation of EUD and UNDP CO in field visits, seminars, workshops, campaign events, trainings and all relevant events and ensure EUD and UN would invite other development partners to participate in order to ensure sustainability of action.
8. Ensure EUD and UN disseminate project-related information internally and externally for visibility.

.

Table (2)

**Evaluation of Project Key Results**

Table (2) presents the evaluation of project performance based on the key results (output, outcome, impact/objectives) presented in the final project reports prepared for the project evaluation and the final evaluation workshop.

The project’s key result are rated based on a scale of 1 to 6 : 6 - Highly Satisfactory, 5 - Satisfactory, 4 - Moderately Satisfactory, 3 - Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU), 2 – Unsatisfactory, 1 - Highly Unsatisfactory.

| **(Source) Implementing Partners Reports** | **Evaluation** |
| --- | --- |
| **Intervention Logic** | **Indicator(s)** | **Baseline** | **Target** | **Achievement** | **Rating** | **Remarks** |
| **Narrative** | **Rate** |
| **Uganda ECO** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Overall Objective:**To strengthen civil society organizations’ (CSO) capacity to understand the dynamics of conflicts related to land and natural resources (LNR) in Karamoja Region. |  |  |  |  |  | **4** | The objective as stated is only one of two sub-objectives encompassed by the first objective stated in the Program Document.The second sub-objective consists of strengthening networks and participation capacity among national and sub-regional CSOs.**Note.** The overall objective is a reduction of Land and Natural Resources (LNR) conflicts in the GLR, which is not shown as a motivating factor.Neither of the latter two objectives is addressed specifically in the project. Hence the overall rating of 4. |
| **Outcome 1.1.** Current situation, challenges and possible solutions regarding actual and potential conflicts related to land and mining activities in Rupa Sub-county is assessed and info widely disseminated. | Assessment report is produced and disseminated. | 0 | 1 | Assessment conducted and results disseminated to all stakeholders. | 100% | **5** | OK |
| Output 1.1.1A rapid assessment of the dynamics of conflict related to LNR in Rupa sub-county is carried out and report produced. | Assessment report is produced and disseminated. | 0 | 1 | Assessment conducted and results disseminated to all stakeholders. | 100% | **5** | OK |
| **Outcome 1.2**The capacity of CSOs/CBOs and local communities to understand, prevent, manage and resolve conflicts related to land and NR is strengthened. | N° of CSO/CBO Local Govt and private Co. That are knowledgeable regarding causes, implications and management of conflict related to NRM (Land &Minerals).N° of CSO/CBOs able to use conflict-sensitive tools and approaches to engage in advocacy with government and other decision-making bodies and the private mining Cos. regarding issues of land, minerals and conflicts. | 00 | 9045 | 90 CSO/CBO acquired k’ge on NR related to conflicts mitigation and management.The target was at least half the trained CSO/CBOs to demonstrate use of conflict-sensitive tools, (turned out too costly to measure). | 100%100% Estimate | **3** | Stakeholders’ awareness raised regarding issues, causes, implications and management of conflict related to NRM (Land &Minerals). But no evidence that capacity was acquired by LGvt and more importantly no evidence of willingness of private sector to engage in the use of conflict-sensitive tools regarding land and mineral conflict.Private sector reluctant to engage in CR discussions regarding issues of land and Natural Resources LNR. |
| **Output 1.2.1**A training module/tool is developed for strengthening key stakeholder capacities and skills for conflict mediation/resolution and addressing conflict related to NRM. | N° CSO/CBOs, Local government offices, with access to training manuals. | 0 | 50 | At least 60 CSO/CBO and Local government offices have access to training manuals. | 120% | **5** | OK |
| **Output 1.2.2**CSO/CBOs, local authorities, Artisanal Miners Associations (AMA), Women Associations, local chiefs are trained to formulate and operationalize preventive measures in relation to NRM and conflict. | N° CSO/CBOs, local authorities, Artisanal Miners Associations (AMA), Women`s Associations, local chiefs operationalizing preventive measures in relation to NRM and conflict. | 0 | 90 | 90 | 100% | **5** | OK |
| **Output 1.2.3**Artisanal and small-scale miners in Rupa s-c are empowered through strong, functioning and gender responsive local ASM association. | N° AM organized in one AM Association. | 0 | 500 | 900 AM currently in Rupa AMA. | 100%, to grow over time | **4** | Gender responsiveness of association limited by cultural and societal gender bias. Women participate in mining but do not have control over revenue generated. Men have the control. |
| **Outcome 1.3.**Communication mechanisms are established to increase access by individuals to understanding, and benefitting from, info regarding minerals, mining revenues and their use. | N° of CSO/CBOs, AMA & local government officers receiving geo-information, production and revenue statistics and license holder information, new concessions annually. | 0 | 90 | Over 90 CSO/CBOs, AMA &local government officers now receive info, license holder info, but no production and revenue. | 100% | **3** | The unavailability of info on production and revenue handicaps CSO/CBO/ AMA in the revenue- sharing process. |
| **Output 1.3.1**Communication strategy and mechanism with DGMS, LGvt, mining Cos, and LCommunities, established to disseminate mineral sector info regularly and comprehensively. | N° of CSO/CBOs, AMA & local government officers sensitized on geo-info.DGSM submits production & revenue stats and license holder information, new concessions to LGvt on quarterly and annual basis.N° of CSO/CBOs submitting land and mining info queries and receiving adequate responses of LGvt or DGMS. | 000 | 904X/Year50 | 97Only info on license holders, new concessions and maps has been submitted. MOU developed w/ DGMS still a draft.Done through face- to-face dialogue btw local and central government in 3 meetings. | 100%75%100% | **5****4****5** | OKEvaluation rating aligned with the achievement of 75% of target.OK |
| **Output 1.3.2**Coordination with DGMS to sensitize LGvt, CSO/CBOs regarding mineral sector legislation and mineral resources is established. | N° of sensitization meetings organized. | 0 | 4 | 3 mtgs organized btw DGMS and LGvt and Communities. | 75% | **4** |  |
| **Output 1.3.3**Project generates documents and relevant data and lessons learned to support mineral sector policy dialogue initiatives. | N° of times documents are generated by project to inform policy dialogue initiatives. | 0 | 3 | 1 info sheet, + proposals for mineral law review, and a position statement on a mineral law proposal produced. |  | **5** | OK |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Rwanda RISD** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Objective 1 (Impact):** *To improve the levels of sustainable land dispute management at the local level in Kamonyi and Musanze* Districts. | % of land related disputes mediated by Abunzi and other local institutions to satisfaction in Kamonyi and Musanze. | 25% of claims are satisfactorily managed by Abunzi, local leaders and Civil Society in Kamonyi and Musanze (RISD study 2012). | Up to 75% (EDPRS 2 target) of claims are managed satisfactorily by Abunzilocal leaders and Civil Society in 2 Districts. | *Progress will be assessed through follow-on projects as this particular project was too short (see log frame).* | *Progress will be assessed through follow-on projects as this particular project was too short (see log frame).* | **4** |  |
| ***Outcome 1.1:***Tools to improve the mediation capacities of local structures and organizations are developed based on a good understanding of the institutional and legal framework of land dispute management in Rwanda. | *Knowledge regarding land* related dispute management, institutions and related legal framework. Training Manual for training of participants from Kamonyi and Musanze is developed in Kinyarwanda. | Roles and scope of land- related dispute management institutions not clear to the population and related institutions.A Technical training manual to use in training Abunzi and local institutions in land dispute resolution and mediation mechanisms is non-existent. | Land-related dispute management institutions and related legal framework analyzed and documented after assessment phase..Training Manual to be used by 20 trainers who will train the 140 Abunzi is developed before the ToT is held. | *Institutions identified through research and documented in assessment report; legal framework analyzed and documented in training manual.**Training manual developed and tested during training of trainers and training of beneficiaries.* | *100%**90% (final training manual prints to be distributed to trainers).* | **4** | Assessment conducted but report not yet officially approved. Training manual developed. Both are CR assets for RISD and Rwanda in general, for the future. Achievement was made late in the project life, preventing its timely use in the training of the Abunzi.Duration of study influenced timing of the training of the Abunzi. The TOT took place in the 1Oth month of the project life. By the time of the evaluation the training of Abunzi had not yet been completed.The cost of the study (49.5% of the total budget)is high compared to the other EU-UN partnership projects. |
| ***Output 1.1.1***Findings of a rapid assessment of capacity- building needs of land mediation institutions and organizations in Kamonyi andMusanze validated by local leaders, Abunzi& Community members. |  |  |  |  |  | **5** | Completed. |
| ***Output 1.1.2***A training module on land disputes mediation adapted to locally-identified capacity and knowledge gaps is produced and used as a reference tool. |  |  |  |  |  | **4** | Training module produced but its usefulness is linked to the training of the Abunzi, which experienced some delays.  |
| ***Outcome 1.2***The capacities of Abunzi, local leaders and CSO to mediate land-related conflicts in Musanze and Kamonyi districts are improved. | % of Abunzi, local leaders and CS with satisfactory knowledge on mediation and the understanding of land- related disputes in Musanze and Kamonyi.  | 18% of Abunzi, local leaders and civil society in 2 districts have skills in dispute analysis and mediation (Source: RISD qualitative research 2012, percentage to be established). | % of Abunzi, local leaders and CS in 2 districts with knowledge regarding mediation and disputes analysis increase by 25% after training. | 65% of participants stated that they learned how to analyze and resolve disputes through mediation; 27% stated that their knowledge about Family Law, Abunzi Law and Land Law increased (Eval questionnaires). | 100% | **3** | Outcome rating by NGO not fully consistent with the evidence on related actual outputs. Abunzi training not yet completed. |
| ***Output 1.2.1***53 Abunzi, 10 local leaders and 7 members of CSOs are trained for 5 days in mediation skills, with emphasis on land related disputes. |  |  |  |  |  | **3** | Training of Abunzis not yet completed by the time of the evaluation.  |
| ***Output 1.2.2***A pool of 20 trainers of trainers trained for 5 days is created and is functional. |  |  |  |  |  | **5** | TOT completed in 10th month.OK otherwise. |
| ***Outcome 1.3***Increased level of awareness by the community, local institutions and civil society on notions of land-related rights, land-related laws, land management procedures and the appreciation of the role of Abunzi as mediators. | *% of the community aware of the basic land laws and procedures and the roles of Abunzi increase.*  | 77% of the community in Musanze andKamonyi not aware of the basic land- related laws and appreciation of Abunzi as Mediators. | 40% *of target group is aware of land rights and role of Abunzi after the public information awareness programme.* | *Number of land- related community disputes going to court have reduced due to increased confidence in Abunzi.* | *80%* | **4** | The expected outputs have been produced at the reported levels.The increased confidence in Abunzi, comes also from the reaffirmation of its role by government and the outreach by Access to Justice program of Min of Justice.  |
| ***Output 1.3.1***2 radio talk shows about Land Rights and Mediation streamed. |  |  |  |  |  | **5** | OK |
| ***Output 1.3.2***10 community meetings held about Land Rights and Mediation. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Output 1.3.3***Simplified Law Booklets. |  |  |  |  |  | **5** | OK |
| ***Output 1.3.4***10.000 flyers on Land Rights and supporting institutions distributed to the community members in the 2 districts. |  |  |  |  |  | **5** | OK |
| ***Outcome 1.4****Rwanda experience on land- related mediation skills documented and incorporated in the UN-EU Great Lakes Region experience.*  | Rwanda land-related mediation methodology experience documented and published. | Rwanda home- grown mediation experience not documented. | Rwandan home-grown mediation experience and challenges documented by November 2014. | *The Rwandan mediation experience is documented in a lessons* learned *document that will be finalized and printed in 12/2014 after receiving input from the final workshop in Uganda.* | *90%* (lessons learned document to be finalized in 12/2014 after presenting content of lessons learned document in Uganda workshop). | **3** | Work in progress.Lessons learned document was yet to be finalized by time of the evaluation.Therefore, suitability of the lessons learned document for incorporation in EU-UN GLR experience yet to be determined. |
| ***Output 1.4.1****A lessons learnt workshop is held.* |  |  |  |  |  |  | Pending |
| ***Output 1.4.2****A report documenting lessons learnt through the pilot training projects in Musanze and Kamonyi is produced.* |  |  |  |  |  |  | Pending |
|  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Congo DRC CAAP**  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Objectif 1 (Impact)**Contribuer à la cohésion sociale dans la zoned’exploitation minière de Rubaya en Territoire de Masisid’ici 12 mois | *Nombre des conflits ouverts entre MHI et la COOPERAMMA* | 1 | 0 | Conflitatténué | 60% |  | Tension between COOPERAMA and MHI under some level of management in principle due to the establishment of the Dialogue and Mediation committee (MCB). But non-compliance in full by HMI with the agreements reached undermines the truce. |
| ***Résultat (effet) 1:*** L’exploitation minière dans la zone de Rubaya se passe dans un climat de cohésion sociale | Nombre de plaintes reçues par le cadre de mediation entre les deux parties | Plaintes permanentes | 3 | Toutes les plaintes sont canaliséesvers le cadre de mediation | Plus de 3 soit 50% | **4** | Mediation Committee, Mining Consultation Board (MCB) formally established. The effectiveness of the MCB contingent on the cooperation of MHI, which remains elusive. The evaluation mission was unable to meet HMI in spite of official requests by CAAP and DGMS ahead of the mission and multiple attempts by the evaluation team after its arrival in Goma. |
| **Produit 1**: Une étude de la problématique du conflit entre les creuseurs et MHI estréalisée | *Nombre d’étude réalisée* | 0  | 1  | Etude réalisée et partagée | 100%  | **6** | Study conducted successfully, in a timely manner and with a reasonable budget. |
| **Produit 2**: Un cadre de concertation pour la médiation et la conciliation entre les artisanaux et MHI estfonctionnel | *Nombre de cadre de concertation appuyé* | 0  | 1  | Le projet appui le CM à travers la DPMG  | 100%  | **4** | Mediation Committee/Framework (MCB) formally established. However, effectiveness of MCB contingent on **full** MHI cooperation, which has not yet been forthcoming.  |
| ***Résultat (effet) 2:*** *Les creuseursartisanauxaméliorentleurs conditions socio-économiques* | *Nombre des membres locaux de la COOPERAMMA disposantd’un logement décent à Rubaya* | *<de 20% (<de300 membres)* | *>à40% (>à 600 membres)* | Nouvelles maisons en construction Promotion des Briques Hydraform a Rubaya | Environ 150 Maisons en semi-durable, 20 maisons en durable construites | **5** | Successful Pro-poor intervention with a capacity building dimension, but more peace and development than conflict resolution and peace- building.Impact of improved living conditions on CR is generally indirect and minor. |
| ***Résultat (effet) 2 Suite:****Les creuseurs artisanaux améliorentleurs conditions socio-économiques* | *% des enfantsscolarisés des ménages des membreslocaux de la COOPERAMMA et de la MECAM*  | *<de50%* | *>à 80%* | Education des enfantsprise en compte par les creuseurs | 64% des enfants scolarisés | **3** | Increased school attendance of children cannot be verified. It is unlikely that an increase greater than 14% in school enrollment is attributable to the project given the short duration of the action. |
| Produit 3:*Les Capacités de la COOPERAMMA sont renforcées pour améliorer les conditions de vie de ses membres* | *Nombre de crédit soctroyé spar la COOPERAMMA et la MECAM à ses membres* | 0 | *Au moins 100* | 15 MUSO fonctionnelles au sein de la MECAMDistribution de 50 vaches/CMMA30 chèvres distribuées par CAAP | 98% | **5** | Successful Pro-poor intervention with a capacity-building dimension, but more peace and development than conflict resolution.Impact of improved living conditions on CPR generally indirect and minor. |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Burundi CONSEDI** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Objectif spécifique 1:** Accompagner360 artisans miniers (AM) à s’organiser en coopératives minières agrées.  | Nombre de coopératives structurées et agrées% d’artisans minier regroupés autour des coopérative sopérationnelles | Système informel pour échapper aux redevances minièresDégradation de l’environment | Artisans miniers regroupés ou non en associations | 3 coopératives minières sont créées et agréées | 100% | **5** | The target of 360 miners organized into 3 operational cooperatives was achieved. However, the organizational structure of the cooperatives limits the beneficial impact of coop membership on the lives of AM. The revenue generated by coop mining goes mostly to the investors. Note. Reportedly, the AM **outside** the cooperatives earn more selling on the illicit market than those inside the cooperatives do selling on the legal market. This discourages new AM from joining the cooperatives.Moreover, 360 AM organized into cooperatives is a low rate of coverage for a total AM population in the thousands.  |
| ***Résultatattendu 1.1:*** 360 artisansminiers des 3 sites sontregroupésdans des structures formelles de production et vente de minerais et appliquent des bonnespratiques de gestionorganisationnelle et financière. | * Documentsréglementaires
* Outils de gestion des coopératives
 | Exploitationanarchique et mauvaisegestion des revenusissus de la production | 360 artisansminiers | Les 3 coopérativessontreconnues par l’API et disposentd’unpermisd’exploitationdélivré par ministère de l’énergie et des mines | 100% | **5** | OK |
| ***Activité 1.1.1: Réaliser une étude de base sur l’exploitationminièreartisanaledans la zoned’action du projet.*** | -Nombre d’associationsd’artisansminiersidentifiés-Type de conflitsidentifiés | -Les artisans minierstravaillantindividuellementou en associationsFréquence de conflitsliés à l’exploitationminière | - ArtisansminiersAdministrationlocaleMembres de la communautéavoisinante des sites | Les forces et les faiblesses des AM sontidentifiéesafind’yapporter des solutions appropriées | 100% | **5** | Study conducted successfully, in timely manner and with a reasonable budget (5% of the total budget).Problems with the formulation of key results (outputs, outcomes, impact) and results metrics (indicators, baseline and targets). |
| ***Activité 1.1.2: Sensibiliser les artisansminiers sur l’importance du regroupement en coopératives.***  | -Nombre d’ateliers de sensibilisationorganisés-Nombre d’AMsensibilisés (60) | Les AM n’étaientpassuffisammentinformés sur le nouveaucodeminier | ArtisansminiersMembres de la communautélocale | Les AM de la zoned’actionontcrée~~six~~troiscoopérativesminières et disposent de permisd’exploitation | 80% | **5** | Planned workshops organized and projected number of AM provided introductory training on the Mining Code.Problems with the formulation of key results (outputs, outcomes, impact) and results metrics (indicators, baseline and targets). |
| ***Activité 1.1.3:*** *Accompagner la création et suivre les structures.* | Agrément des 3 coopérativesNombre de permisd’exploitationacquis | Les AM ignoraientl’importance des entreprisescoopératives | Artisansminiers | Les organesdirigeants des 3 coopérativessont en place | 100% | **5** | Activity successfully carried out. Cooperatives authorized and registered officially and granted mining licenses. |
| Activité 1.1.4: Organiser 3 visites d’échanged’expérience (intersitesencadrés par CONSEDI), en dehors de la zoned’action et à l’extérieurdu pays | Rapports de visitesNombre d’artisansminiersayant participé aux visitesNombre de leçonstirées des expériencesdes coopérativesvisitées | Insuffisance du savoir faire en matièred’organisation, gestion des coopératives et des méthodesd’exploitationminière | Artisansminiers des 3 coopérativesencadrées | Les AM ontacquis de nouvellesconnaissances en organisation , en gestion des coopératives et en techniquesd’exploitationminièreartisanale | 100% | **4** | Planned exchange/study visits successfully organized and proved beneficial to the AM. AM acquired improved mining and environment protection techniques and skills, which are leading to increased revenue for the mines and better compliance with environmental protection rules and regulations.Study visits were a one shot action, with no follow up, which limits intended networking impact. |
| **Objectifspécifique 2:** Renforcer les capacitéstechniques et entrepreneuriales des AM pourpromouvoirl’exploitationrationnelle et durable du secteurminier | Nombre d’ateliers de formationorganisésQuantité et nature de kits octroyésauxbénéficiaires | Manque de connaissance en matièred’organisation et gestion des coopérativesFaiblerendement | Les AM des troiscoopératives | Les AM disposent des outils de gestionfinancière et les appliquentAmélioration des techniques d’exploitation et respect des normes | 100% | **5** | Objective achieved. The cooperatives acquired and began using good financial management tools and practices, and good production tools and techniques.Problems with the formulation of key results (outputs, outcomes, impact) and results metrics (indicators, baseline and targets). |
| ***Résultatattendu 2.1:*** 3 structures formelles de production et vente de minerais des 3 sites disposent des capacités techniques et matérielles pour une exploitation minière plus transparente et conforme aux normessociales+environnementales en vigueur. | Nombre d’artisansminiersrespectant le codeminier et le code de l’environnement | Insuffisanced’information sur les texteslégauxrégissant le secteurminierau Burundi | Les AM des 3 coopératives | Professionnalisation des AM grâce à la maîtrise de techniques appropriées | 80% | **5** | Result achieved. The cooperatives acquired some technical tools and equipment and capacity necessary for mining in compliance with transparency rules and social and environmental norms. Problems with the formulation of key results (outputs, outcomes, impact) and results metrics (indicators, baseline and targets). |
| ***Activité 2.1.1:*** *Organiser 3 ateliers deformation des artisansminierssur la gestionorganisationnelle et financière des coopératives.* | Module de formationNombre d’AMformés (60)Rapport de formation | Méconnaissance des techniques de gestion des coopératives | Les membres des coopératives et les ouvriers | Les 3 coopérativesdisposent des structures de gestion (CA & CS) |  | **5** | Three planned training workshops held successfully. |
| ***Activité 2.1.2:***Organiser 3 ateliers de formation des artisansminiers sur les aspectstechniques et réglementaires du secteurd’activité | Module de formationNombre d’AMformés(60)Rapport de formation | Utilisation des techniquesrudimentaires | Les membres des coopératives et les ouvriers | Maîtrise des techniques et des normesd’exploitation |  | **5** | Three planned training workshop held successfully.Problems with the formulation of key results (outputs, outcomes, impact) and results metrics (indicators, baseline and targets). |
| ***Activité 2.1.3:***Doter les 3 coopératives du matériel de protectionindividuelle et d’équipementspouraméliorerl’exploitation | Documentsd’achatCertificat de réception des équipements par les AM | Insuffisance du matérielSites non aménagés | Les 3 coopérativesencadrées | Amélioration des conditions de travail; protection de l’environnementAugmentation de la production |  | **5** | Activity successfully implemented. Better production and personal protection of material and equipment provided to the cooperatives, resulting in improved working conditions and increased production.The protection equipment is provided, however, with a project subsidy, not fully by the cooperatives. This raises the question of whether the practice is sustainable or can be replicated by other mines not assisted by the project. |
| **Objectifspécifique 3:** Renforcer les capacités des artisans miniers et des représentants des structures communautaires en gestion des conflitslés à la terre et aux ressourcesnaturelles | Nombre de personnesformées | Forte fréquence de conflitsfonciers et des conflitsliésaux RN | ArtisansminiersReprésentants de l’administration, de la sociétécivile et de la communauté | Les bénéficiairesmaîtrisent les techniques de prévention et de résolution pacifique des conflits |  | **5** | Community leaders and organizations and representatives of AM cooperatives confirmed successful training in LNR conflict resolution/management. |
| ***Résultatattendu 3.1:***Les membres des 3 coopératives et les Bashingantahe, avec les rep des autoritéstraditionnelles et administratives locales, communales, religieusessontoutillés pour gérer les conflitsfonciers et liés aux RessourcesNaturelles. | Identification et représentativité des participants | Non maîtrise des techniques de transformation des conflits | ArtisansminiersReprésentants de l’administration, de la sociétécivile et de la communauté | Les participants à la formationsont à mesure de prévenir et de gérer les conflitspotentiels |  | **5** | LNR conflict resolution/management tools and skills provided to the AM and their cooperatives as reported and to community-based leaders, organizations & institutions. |
| ***Activité 3.1.1:*** Organiser 3 ateliers de formation des AM sur le respect des DH avec un accent particuliersur les droits économiques des artisansminiers, les droits des femmes, des enfants et des groupesdéfavorisés***.*** | Nombre d’AMformés (60)Outils de formationutilisésListe des participantsRapports de formation | Partage non équitable des revenus de la coopérativeDiscriminationbasée sur le genrelors de l’enrôlement des ouvriers | Artisansminiers | Les AM sontinformés sur le code du travail, et sur la discriminationbasée sur le genre | 100% | **4** | Workshops held as planned on subjects of HR, economic rights of AM, and women´s and children´s rights.Impact of training on women´s rights not yet apparent, as women remain excluded from working in the mines visited and are likely to remain so in the near future. No children were seen in the mines visited in Burundi. However, due to the reported prevalence of the problem in the region, including the reported widespread participation of adolescent and children in the sector in Burundi during week-ends and holidays, the impact of the training with regard to child labor cannot be ascertained.  |
| ***Activité 3.1.2:***Organiser 3 ateliers de formation des AM et des représentants des notables (Bashingantahe), des conseils de collines, des responsablesadministratifs à la base, des membres des services foncierscommunaux, des CDC et CCDC, des confessions religieuses et des ligues des droits humains pour gérer les conflitsfonciers et liés aux RN  | Nombre de personnesformées (60 AM et 120 représentant s de la communauté)Outils de formationutilisésListe des participantsRapports de formation | Multiplicité de conflitsfonciers et des conflitsliésaux RN | ArtisansminiersReprésentants de l’administration , de la sociétécivile et de la communauté | Les bénéficiaires de la formation se sontengagés à favoriser un climatd’ententeausein de leurcommunautéd’origine | 100%  | **5** |  Focus Group Discussions with AM and community members who received the training confirmed their commitment to the promotion of social cohesion and harmony in their communities. |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Burundi OLUCOME** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Objectif:** Contribuer à la mobilisation et au renforcement des capacités des acteurs de l’exploitation minière (acteurs étatiques, exploitants miniers, société civile,..) sur le processus ITIE et leur implication au suivi de sa mise œuvre  | Les outils de sensibilisation sur l’ITIE sont disponiblesLes acteurs de l’exploitation minière ont une bonne compréhension des différents aspects de l’ITIE et s’en approprient Les acteurs sensibilisés participent aux différentes initiatives engagées en faveur de l’ITIE - | Faible capacité des acteurs de l’exploitation minière sur les différents aspects de l’ITIEFaible implication des acteurs en faveur de la transparence dans le secteur minier | Des organisations actives en matière de la bonne gouvernance et protection de l’env des droits de l’homme (enfants et femmes en particulier), des syndicats de travailleurs d’organisation participant au plaidoyer et suivi de l’adhésion et la mise en œuvre de l’ITIE  | Les outils de sensibilisation sur l’ITIE sont conçus et disséminésUn rapport d'étude sur l’état des lieux en matière de transparence et de responsabilité dans le secteur minier est produit et validéUne campagne médiatique visant une information et un débat public sur les sujets de la transparence et de la responsabilité dans la gestion des ressources issues des l’activité minière de sensibilisation et de plaidoyer sur l'ITIE est organisée Un plaidoyer est mené auprès des autorités et des partenaires en faveur du processus de lancement et de mise en œuvre de l’ITIE Les acteurs clés de l’exploitation minière ont vu leurs capacités renforcées pour une implication effective dans le processus ITIE |  99% | **5** | Project successful in the mobilization and strengthening of the capacity of the wide range of stakeholders with a role to play in the country adhesion to the ITEI. This includes the government.Project overcame a long implementation delay because of a freeze imposed on its activities by the government. Project illustrates effectiveness of EU-UN Partnership in crisis management and overcoming government reticence towards new international agreements, policy initiatives and conventions.Recurrent problems throughout the report with the formulation of key results (outputs, outcomes, impact) and results metrics (indicators, baseline and targets). The project overall performance is rated “5”, in spite of the key results formulation issues. This is based first, on the FGD and direct observations made during the field visit to the project site in Kabarore Kayanza district. It is based also on the evidence gathered on the extensive and successful social mobilization campaign undertaken by the project. This social mobilization campaign contributed to success in getting the government to change course and announce its readiness to adhere to the EITI. |
|  | -62 spots audio, émissions radio et télévisées et publireportages audio sur l'ITIE sont produits et diffusés en langue française et en Kirundi: (64 diffusion de deux spot, diffusion des émissions télévisées en Français (2) et en Kirundi(2) ; 2 diffusions des émissions radio ; 2 publireportages audio visuels (Français - Kirundi) produit et diffusés ; -1 Rapport d’Etude sur l'état des lieux en matière de gestion financière, de transparence et de responsabilité dans le secteur minier - Plus de 20 documents synthèses de plaidoyer sur l'ITIE produits. -6 émissions débats sur ITIE dont deux par radio et 4 télévisées réalisés et diffusées  | -Manque d’informations et de connaissances en rapport avec la transparence et la responsabilité dans le secteur minier -manque de connaissance des exploitants miniers sur la gestion logistique, comptable et financière en rapport avec la transparence dans l’exploitation minière et améliorent  progressivement leur façon de faire;  |  | Il est en langue local et il est sur des supports audio visuels et continue a été diffusé à la radio et à la télévision pour permettre de toucher le reste du public qui n’a pas été touché par les activités de sensibilisation et de formation sur ITIE. Production et diffusion de 62 spots audio sur ITIE Réalisation de 6 émissions radio et télévisées sur ITIE dont 4 télévisés et 2 radioMontage et diffusion d’un publireportage audio-visuel sur l'ITIE |  | **5** | OK as reported |
| **PRODUITS En lien avec le résultat 2:** Les acteurs clés de l’exploitation minière ont vu leurs capacités renforcées pour une implication effective dans le processus ITIE **Produit 2.1.** 280 acteurs locaux ont participé à des ateliers de sensibilisation et de consultation locale sur la participation communautaire aux mécanismes de gouvernance et la transparence en rapport avec l’exploitation minière **Produit 2.2.**75 participants (exploitants miniers, administratifs, autorités étatiques et société civile) ont participé à un atelier de formation et concertation nationale de 3 jours à Bujumbura | -280 agents des coopératives minières ont été formés sur la transparence dans l’exploitation minière et améliorent progressivement leur façon de faire; -75 participants (exploitants miniers, administratifs, étatiques et société civile) ont participé à un atelier de formation et de concertation nationale de 3 jours à Bujumbura -60 représentants de 30 organisations de la société civile sont formés sur l’ITIE et autres initiatives régionales et internationales sur la transparence et la traçabilité, 60 représentants de la société civile participent à un atelier de partage des leçons apprises et de réflexion  |  -Insuffisantes connaissances des acteurs clés sur les questions essentielles de gouvernance du secteur minier (situation actuelle, cadre légal et institutionnel, normes ITIE, lignes directrices sur la transparence, la traçabilité, etc.)  | Des organisations actives en matière de la bonne gouvernance et de la protection de l’environnement, des droits de l’homme (enfants et femmes en particulier), des syndicats de travailleurs…. d’organisation qui participent au plaidoyer et au suivi de l’adhésion et la mise en œuvre de l’ITIE  | Les acteurs locaux ont été sensibilisés et formés sur la transparence et la responsabilité en rapport avec la gestion des recettes de l’activité minière. Des séances de discussions ont permis de dégager une compréhension sur les enjeux de la transparence et du rôle à jouer par les acteurs locaux pour améliorer les bénéfices réciproques. De même, à l’issue de ces ateliers, une synthèse des recommandations a été élaborée pour une discussion à l’échelle nationale. Ces 7 ateliers ont été organisés au niveau des communes à forte exploitation minière. Muyinga, Cibitoke, Kayanza, et Ngozi  |  | **5****5****5** | OK as reportedOK as reportedOK as reported |
| **Produit 2.3.** 45 agents des coopératives minières ont participé à une formation sur la gestion logistique, comptable et financière en rapport avec la transparence dans l’exploitation minière**Produit 2.4.** 60 représentants de 30 organisations de la société civile sont formés sur l’ITIE et autres initiatives régionales et internationales sur la transparence et la traçabilité dans la chaine d’approvisionnement **Produit.2.5.**60 représentants des OSC ont partagé les leçons apprises |  |  |  | 45 agents des coopératives minières ont participé à une formation sur la gestion logistique, comptable et financière pour la transparence dans l’exploitation minière 60 représentants des OSC se sont réunis à la fin du projet pour partager les leçons apprises et pour la pérennisation des acquis.  |  | **5****5****5** | OK as reportedOK as reportedOK as reported |

1. This section draws extensively from the Program Document formulated under EU Contract N.: 2012/305-846 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. “Since the activity (meaning project) is designed for short-term (12 months), emphasis will be put on sustainability through provision of appropriate information. So a bigger part of the activity resources and time will be spent on the production of materials that will remain to be used by Abunzi and local leaders in their daily work, even civil society at the end of the project”. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The study/survey absorbed more than fifty four percent of the project core budget (Total budget minus Agency support cost) ($53,700 out of $108,300 or 49.6%). In comparison, the other projects spent less than 10% on background studies and completed the studies before the end of the first quarter. Moreover, based on the FGD and KII held in the districts covered by the project, the funds utilized on the background study would have made a much larger and more immediate impact in terms of strengthening the capacity of the ABZ had they been devoted to the actual training of the 140 individual ABZs and the provision of basic working tools and material for the ABZ. The ABZ offices needs include: stationary, a filing system, typewriters or other more modern writing devices, some basic office furniture, and measuring tapes for measuring and marking land boundaries, etc. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The PS groups on the MCB in Congo and Uganda did not agree to meet the evaluation mission. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. **Rwanda**

***Outcome 2.2: Human rights, justice and gender equality are promoted at al l levels.*** The United Nations will support the promotion of the rule of law through development of a comprehensive programme on access to justice for women, children and other vulnerable groups. Initiatives will be anchored in the justice sector plan and will respond to immediate needs,,including through support to legal aid provision and strengthening existing dispute resolution mechanisms such as the Access to Justice Offices, abunzi mediation committees, and the courts. The United Nations will complement the successful *gacaca* experience with support fo rthe special chamber created to try crimes against humanity.

**Congo DRC**

**UNDAF Effet5 :L’Étatcongolaisaméliore la gestion de sesressourcesnaturelles (minières, énergétiques, biodiversité et foncières) et les bénéficesassociés, les mécanismes de gestion des catastrophes et s’engagedansl’économieverte.**

Effet UNDAF 6 :Toutes les régions de la RDC enregistrent des progrèssignificatifsdans la protection des civils, le respect des droits humains et la réduction des tensions et conflits.

• Opérationnalisation de stratégies et mécanismes de prévention et de résolution des conflitsauniveaunational, provincial et local afin de réduire les tensions, conflits  et violences.

• L’appui au Gouvernement    pour une    meilleuregestion des ressourcesfoncièresetminièresafin de réduire les tensions et conflitsliés à cesressources.

**Burundi**

**UNDAF II – 2. Axe 2: Transformation de l’économieburundaise pour unecroissancesoutenue et créatriced’emplois**

La paixet le relèvement socio-économiquedoivent se construire à travers des processusvisant le renforcement des leviers de développement de l’économieaussibien au niveau national qu’auniveau local et communautaire. La contribution du SNU s’inscritdans la vision de faire du Burundi, d’ici en 2025, une nation qui jouitd’unecroissanceéconomique durable et inclusive, baséesuruneéconomiediversifiée, professionnalisée, compétitive, sur les plans sous régional et international. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. The EU-UN Toolkit was developed collectively by the EU-UN member agencies and contains a number of practical guidance notes and training material on land and conflict, extractives and conflict, renewable resources and conflict, capacity building for natural resource management and conflict prevention in resource rich economies. The partnership also produced an analysis called Capacity Inventory of the available capacities for the consensual and sustainable management of land and natural resources within the UN system. Guidance Notes and  [on-line interactive modules](http://www.un.org/en/land-natural-resources-conflict/onlinetraining/overview.shtml%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) have also been developed to impart knowledge and skills particularly to field staff in both the UN and EU, as well as relevant HQ personnel and partners in countries including civil society. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. The cooperation with and support for the ICGLR and its Secretariat revolves around the implementation of article 9 of the Lusaka Declaration - the Protocol against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources -, and the six tools of the **Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources (**RINR).

Tool I: Regional Certification Mechanism Tracking of the chain of custody of four selected natural resources, namely cassiterite, wolframite, coltan and gold.

Tool II: Harmonization of National Legislations As  prescribed  in  the  Protocol  §22,  the  legal  provisions  of  the  Protocol  are  to  be domesticated by the ICGLR Member States into their national legislation.

Tool III: Regional Database on Mineral Flows.  This tool foresees the establishment of a regional database on production and trade with selected primary commodities in the Great Lakes Region.

Tool IV: Formalization The objective of this tool is to encourage the transformation of artisanal mining to improve taxation systems, provision of extension services and capacity-building.

Tool V: EITI Peer Learning Mechanism As the experience of more advanced countries is very valuable to newcomers, the ICGLR is a suitable forum for the facilitation of a pee- learning mechanism.

Tool VI: Whistle-blowing Mechanism The implementation of a whistle-blowing mechanism aims at capitalizing on the knowledge of individuals witnessing or participating in illicit mineral activities. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. 1. **The Great Lakes Project Team includes**
	* A representative from each of the following agencies: UNDP, UNEP and UN Habitat
	* A representative from each of the EU Delegations involved (DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi) and a representative of FPI.
	* A DRC-based national officer recruited specifically for the aim of the projectThe Project Team will be responsible for:

	* Tendering process for NGO and proposal selection
	* Contracting through UNDP
	* Supporting CSOs with on-going technical expertise and administrative backstopping
	* Monitoring implementation
	* Ensuring reporting from CSO using a common template
	1. **The Great Lakes Regional Coordinator**
	2. **The EU-UN Partnership Steering Committee**The EU UN Steering Committee consists of the focal point of the seven UN agencies. It is responsible for the overall strategic direction of the Partnership and is the main decision-making body. It supervises the Project Team through its Executive Secretariat. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)