#### Annex 1 Terms of Reference Evaluation Mission for Afghan Voter Registration and Elections 2004/2005

#### 1. Background

UNDP executed a Voter Registration Project (VRP) from end of 2003 to August 2004 in support of the November 2003 decree on Registration of voters for the 2004 Presidential elections. Under this decree, the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) was given extensive authority to organize the Presidential elections in October 2004 and later the national elections for the Lower House (Wolesi Jirga), the provincial and district council elections representing two thirds of the Upper House (Meshrano Jirga) in spring 2005.

The Joint Electoral Management Body announced in July 2004 that presidential elections would be held on 9 October 2004, with parliamentary and provincial/district council elections to be held in spring 2005. Subsequently, the presidential elections were successfully held with over 8 million voters (of whom 42% were women) casting their ballots, resulting in the election of President Hamid Karzai. A substantive revision of the project was approved in order to undertake activities facilitating the Wolesi Jirga and Provincial Council Elections in 2005. It reflected the activities to be undertaken in the second phase of the project, as outlined in the addendum to the project document which formed an integral part of the 2004 Afghan Elections Project. Under this phase, the project aimed to provide comprehensive support to the preparation and organization of the National Assembly elections in 2005 (i.e. Wolesi Jirga and Provincial Council Electoral Council Elections). The Project facilitated the work of the newly established Independent Afghan Electoral Commission and the Joint Electoral Management Body in the following areas: (1) resource mobilization and management; (2) operational support, including additions and corrections to the register of voters; (3) polling; (4) risk management/security; (5) public outreach; and (6) facilitate international electoral observation.

The Wolesi Jirga and Provincial Council Elections took place on 18 September 2005 with final certified results announced on 10 November 2005. Subsequently, Meshrano Jirga Elections by the elected Provincial Council Members were held on 12 November 2005 completing all activities related to electing the representatives of the Afghan National Assembly.

The Voter Registration Project (VRP) started in August 2003 continued well through the 2004 Afghan Elections Project (Elections 2004) which was launched parallel to VRP in May 2004. Although the VRP operationally closed in August 2004, the same VRP project staff who functioned as the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) Secretariat was designed to support the Presidential Elections in 2004. Thus, both staffing and assets continued to be used under the two projects which were in practice merged and referred to as the Voter Registration and Elections Project (VREP) following the launch of the 2004 Afghan Elections Project.

The Presidential Elections were successfully held on 9 October 2004. Following the conclusion of the elections, all observer missions recommended that the electoral structure be streamlined in moving forward on the parliamentary elections in 2005. UNAMA took the lead in reviewing the UN's electoral management and operational structure. Subsequently, in December 2004 a new electoral management structure for the implementation of Afghan Elections Project (phase II) to support the Wolesi Jirga and Provincial Council elections was agreed upon by a UNDP mission from the Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific which was proposed by UNAMA. Under the new structure it was agreed that UNDP would manage the funds contributed to the phase II project through cost sharing, UNOPS will be the implementing agency of the project and UNAMA will maintain its role of political oversight and coordination.

### 2. Overall objective of the evaluation

The main objective of the evaluation is to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the United Nations and international community supported voter registration and elections.

The mission will particularly focus on the following activities:

- Review how well, the UN and international community supported voter registration and elections were conducted in Afghanistan;
- Extract the lessons learned and best practices that can be incorporated into the planning and design of future electoral activities in Afghanistan;
- Build national ownership and propose priority measures that might be undertaken by UN in the future to ensure long-term viability and sustainability of the democratic process in Afghanistan to strengthen the capacity of all electoral activities.

The evaluation should specifically include an assessment of the technical aspects of the two projects that would result in recommendations for affordable and sustainable electoral system and laws in Afghanistan.

#### 3. Approach and methodology of the evaluation

The team in evaluating the projects should pay particular attention to the following criteria:

- <u>Project design and implementation</u>: Evaluate the logics and completeness of the process in planning and designing the activities for elections 2004/2005, with particular focus on the process that led to the decision to change the organizational structure to manage 2005 Wolesi Jirga and Provincial Council Elections;
- <u>Efficiency</u>: Evaluate the efficiency of the project vis-à-vis the quality of the results achieved and the time/political constraints underlying the implementation of the project activities envisaged under the two elections;
- <u>Effectiveness</u>: Conduct an assessment of how assumptions have affected project achievements and the subsequent management decisions vis-à-vis the cost effectiveness;
- <u>Impact</u>: Evaluate the effect of the projects on their wider environment and its contribution to the wider sectoral objectives summarized in the projects' overall objectives (i.e. participation in and acceptance of the democratic process);
- <u>Sustainability</u>: Assess the sustainability of the results achieved with particular reference to national institutional capacity, socio-cultural, legal, economical and financial factors, gender, geographical factors vis-à-vis the appropriateness of technology used.

In particular, the following aspects are to be highlighted in the final report:

- How the elections were conducted
  - Evaluate the policy decisions with regard to constitution of JEMB and JEMB Secretariat, and how the operational plans for the two projects were formulated.

Study the management arrangements of the two projects and provide an analysis of the findings.

• Evaluate the implementation of the operational plans including how the various resources were obtained and mobilized (i.e. recruitment and procurement).

#### • Recommendations for the future

- Review the electoral law and the subsequent methodology adopted in Afghanistan;
- Review how the international support were utilized to conduct these elections;
- Give recommendations on how Afghanistan can hold affordable and efficient elections in the future which are led and owned by its nationals.

#### 4. Mission composition and work plan

- <u>Composition</u>: The mission will compose of four international electoral experts including one UN electoral expert (Team Leader), one voter registration expert, one electoral administration expert and one electoral law expert. The experts should have relevant experience in evaluation of electoral projects. One national support staff would be made available for the duration of the mission.
- <u>Duration</u>: The mission will conduct a thorough review of all relevant documents made available prior to starting the mission by e-mail or on paper by UNDP Afghanistan.
  - The total duration of the mission will be six weeks. This includes three weeks of field visits in Afghanistan and two weeks for report drafting. The Team Leader (or a representative of the mission) will be expected to return to Kabul following the finalization of the draft report for a period of one week. This will be to present the findings of the report to a wider audience including national and international stakeholders to finalize the evaluation report.
  - The team will work six days a week (Saturday to Thursday). Total working days for the team leader (or a representative of the mission) will be 36 (excluding travel and weekends) with the other experts 30 (excluding travel and weekends). This will be reviewed as appropriate.
- <u>Support in the field</u>: UNDP will be responsible for preparing the full agenda of the mission, in consultation with the relevant national and international stakeholders, and to organize local transportation and logistics in support of the mission. It is anticipated that the mission will meet the key partners including:
  - 1. Chairman and Commissioners of JEMB;
  - 2. Senior management of JEMBS;
  - 3. Representatives of UNAMA;
  - 4. Representatives of UNOPS;
  - 5. Representatives of other relevant implementing partners including IOM and civil society organizations;
  - 6. Representatives of donor community;
  - 7. Representatives of observer groups;
  - 8. Representatives of relevant ministries including Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Women's Affairs, Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled, Ministry of Finance and Civil Service Commission ;
  - 9. UNDP management and staff.

#### Annex 2 List of Acronyms

- DPA (United Nations) Department of Political Affairs
- EAD (United Nations) Electoral Assistance Division
- ALD Assignment of Limited Duration
- DFID British Department for International Development
- CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
- CEO Chief Election Officer
- CTA Chief Technical Adviser
- Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary DSRSG General
- IEC Independent Election Commission
- IFES International Foundation for Election Systems
- IAEC Interim Afghan Election Commission
- IOM International Organization for Migration
- JEMB Joint Electoral Management Body
- JEMBS Joint Electoral Management Body Secretariat
- NDI National Democratic Institute
- OCV Out of Country Voting
- SMT Senior Management Team
- SNTV Single Non Transferable Vote
- SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General
- SSA Special Service Agreement
- TAF The Asia Foundation
- UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
- UNDP United Nations Development Programme
- UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services
- USAID United States Agency for International Development
- VL Voters List
- VR Voters Registration
- VREP Voters Registration and Election Project
- VRP Voters Registration Project
- VRP Voters Registration Project

#### Annex 3 Evaluation Team

#### Margie Cook Team Leader

Since 2001 Margie Cook has managed UNDP election projects in Africa specialising in technical support to EMBs; communications, information and public affairs, civic education, police training, media training and capacity building with political parties. She has undertaken needs assessments, reviews, studies and evaluations for the Commonwealth Secretariat, DFID, DANIDA and IFES; and provided training to various human rights commission staff through the Raoul Wallenberg Institute. She has been the Senior Political Consultant (Elections) for the National Nine Television Network in Australia since 1987, and is the former Director of Public Affairs at the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission.

#### Dan Finn

Dan Finn is a lawyer, consultant, professor, academic researcher, and former Congressional official. He advises governments and organizations, such as the OSCE, USAID and IFES on international and comparative law and public policy, especially in the areas of democracy and governance including election administration, parliamentary organization and the rule of law. Most recently he was election adviser to the American Ambassador in Liberia though 2005. He specialises in International Law, Public Affairs, Election Administration, Environmental Policy, Political Analysis and Security issues. <u>danfinnxyz@hotmail.com</u>

#### Mario Valle

Mario Valle is a specialist IT consultant with specific expertise in voter registration. He was formerly attached the Mexican Electoral Commission where he coordinated the introduction of voter ID card processes, and has worked as an expert consultant for U.N. Electoral Missions in East Timor (1999) and Baghdad, Iraq (2005) where he was consultant for the Electoral Registration Process reviewing the plan for Iraqi People's Registration process. <u>mevalleh@dca.pemex.com</u>; mvalle48@prodigy.net.mx

#### Annex 4 Evaluation Methodology List of Persons Consulted List of Scheduled Meetings

Face to face discussions were held with a broad range of persons in Kabul.

For those people now out of the country, questionnaires were provided and follow up interviews conducted over the phone. The questionnaire is attached at Annex 5.

Field visits were conducted to Herat, Shindand and Bamiyan at which consultations were held with locally elected representatives, district administrators, failed candidates, community leaders, NGO representatives, provincial IEC staff and individuals formerly engaged in the 2003/4/or 2005 processes in civic education, counting centres and elsewhere.

Extensive documentation was provided by UNDP and from other individuals. A CD of documents provided by UNDP is attached at Annex 10.

Persons consulted in person, via questionnaire or by phone:

Abdullah Ahmedzai, Head of Operations IEC Adam Boulokos, Deputy COUntry Director, UNOPS Kabul Ahmad Ahmadzai, Presidential Candidate Ameerah Haq, DSRSG UNAMA, Resident Representative UNDP Afghanistan Anita Nirody, Deputy Country Director, UNDP Afghanistan Anthony Langmaid, UNOPS Afghanistan AREA (NGO), Heart Atigullah Ahmadzai Aziz Rafiee, Managing Director, Afghan Civil Society Forum Banyan: IEC Provincial staff (4); former field staff (18); Provincial Council (2) and Deputy Governor. Bissmillah Bissmil Chairman IEC Charlie Callanan, UNOPS Afghanistan Christopher Alexander DSRSG, UNAMA Craig Jenness, OSCE Mission Leader Daoud Najafi, Chief Electoral Officer, IEC David Lockwood, UNDP NY David Avery, Chief of Operations 2004 David Ennis IFES Legal Adviser Deborah Alexander, Senior Adviser for Elections, US Embassy Kabul Eng. M. Naeem Asghari, Executive Director, Free and Fair Elections Foundation of Afghanistan Ercan Murat, Former UNDP Country Director Faroog Wardak, Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs Filipo Grandi, former DSRSG Afghanistan Frederick Lyons, Country Director, Afghanistan Gary Helseth, OSU Division Chief, UNOPS Dr Gisela Hayfa, Country Director, GTZ Grant Kippen NDI. ECC Herat/ Shindand: Provincial Council Members (6); former IEC staff (10); AREA NGO (2) Community leaders and former Field Administrators (30). Hiroko Takagi UNDP

Isabel Marcal UNEAD NY Jackie Creighton, DFID Afghanistan Jerome Leyraud, UNDP Project Manager 2003/4 Jon L Summers, Representative, The Asia Foundation Jose Maria Aranaz, Chief Legal Adviser and International Commissioner, JEMB Julian Type, International Member JEMB 2004/5 Kabir Raniber. Presidential Candidate Karl Harbo, Head of Delegation, European Union Kevin Gilroy UNV Kit Spence NDI Mahmoud Saikal, Deputy Minister Foreign Affairs Marc Spurling UNV Martine Van Bijlert, Political Adviser, Office of Special Rep. of the EU for Afghanistan Matthew Blakely, Consultant Expert, Voter's Register Mohd Naziri, Commissioner, IEC Mohammad Younos Qanoni, Speaker of the Parliament Mohd Younis Abdullan Zada, Finance Associate, UNDP Afghanistan Mohd Younis Abdullan Zada, Finance Associate, UNDP Afghanistan Najila Ayobi, Commissioner, IEC Nipa Banerjee CIDA Noor Mohammed, CTA ELECT Peter Erben IFES Peter Spellman, Chief of Operations 2003 Peter Williams IFES Reg Austin, former Chief Technical Adviser 2003/4 Richard Atwood, SMT 2005 Richard E Scott. Chief of Mission. IOM Afghanistan Rina Amiri, Political Officer, SRSG's Office Sarah Lister, Senior Researcher, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Saved Naveed Ziway, Parliamentary Candidate Scott Smith UNEAD, NY Silvana Spuizana, Civic Education Sitara, Assistant Country Director, UNDP Afghanistan Stafan Lutz, UNOPS Afghanistan Staffan Darnolf, International Member IEC Tom Koenigs, SRSG, UNAMA, Ambasador Steck, Ambassador of Germany Zekria Barakzai, Deputy Chief Electoral Officer, IEC

No responses were received from:

Jean Arnault KarenJorgensen Richard Gee

### Annex 5

### **Election Evaluation Mission: Request for Comments**

Thank you for your time and cooperation in providing comments to the review team.

### 1. Instructions

- 1. Please download and save this document as **EEM Response.**
- 2. Your comments can be inserted after each question using a different font or *italics*.
- 3. Where questions seek technical information not in your area of expertise, please simply write N/A.
- 4. Save the completed document as **EEM Response.**
- 5. Send EEM Response as an attachment to <u>margiecook@fastmail.fm</u> copied to <u>DanFinnxyz@hotmail.com</u> and <u>mevalleh2000@yahoo.com.mx</u>
- 6. Please **rsvp as soon as possible** and preferably within one week of receipt. Apologies in advance for this tight timeframe.

Given the subjective nature of the responses sought, we ask that you provide a narrative response based on the questions outlined below. Your remarks may be elaborated as fully as you feel necessary.

We will also pursue telephone interviews to the fullest extent possible. Please note:

### 2. Period Commented Upon

In your comments, please confirm, by **highlighting in bold**, the period to which you are referring i.e.

2003 - Voter Registration Project2004 - Presidential Election Project2005 - Parliamentary Election Project

### 3. Title and responsibilities

Please briefly identify your job title and scope of responsibility and, the periods for each role if there was more than one; and if you represent a partner organisation, the role of your organisation in the project.

### 4. Attribution

Comments will not be attributed personally unless approval to do so is specifically indicated.

### 5. General Remarks

In addition to the specific questions below, **please comment generally against the TORs** (attached) highlighting those aspects on which you have particular insight. Please feel free to contribute any additional perspectives you feel will assist the evaluation.

Many thanks. <u>Margie Cook</u> EEM Team Leader **TOPIC AREA 1: Impact, Sustainability and Effectiveness** 

### 1. Constraints

It is recognised that each of the projects under review were instituted and carried out in periods of heightened political instability with results required within extremely tight deadlines and in the context of challenging demographic, logistical, security and socio-cultural environments. To what extent, and how, do *you* believe the quality of results was constrained, if at all, by environmental factors external to the project? What internal constraints, if any, created management or implementation challenges?

### 2. Overall Impact and Effectiveness

To what extent did the project contribute to confidence in democracy-building, and what is your overall assessment of the impact and effectiveness of the project(s) on the electoral processes in Afghanistan generally? What might be the reasons behind the lower than expected voter turn-out in 2005?

### 3. Sustainability

The EEM has identified a number of key project elements/components against which sustainability might be assessed. They include (but are not limited to):

- The intention, or otherwise, that the voter's register as first established be the basis for a national register able to be updated and enhanced past 2005;
- The development of long term capacity and institutional strength within the IEC such that the institution is able to effectively manage and deliver interim election support projects and future elections with limited international support;
- The capacity of the IEC to continue to utilise (and the wisdom of building upon) the technology and the information database utilised during the registration and election processes;
- The confidence of the electorate in the overall electoral process;
- The will of the government to enact electoral reforms at the constitutional and / or legislative levels;
- Confidence by donors in the effective management of their investments in electoral projects.

Can you comment on the above areas and indicate whether in your view, an adequate balance was achieved between the attainment of results and a focus on development goals, and how this was demonstrated.

### **TOPIC AREA 2: Project Design and Management**

### Management Structure

For the purposes of this review, management is restricted to two key levels:

- a) The institutional (UN) management framework, and
- b) The project management structures of 2003/4 and 2005 (ie registration periods and elections)
- 1. General Performance

Do you have any general remarks on the performance of either the institutional management or the project management levels?

#### 2. Management Lines of Authority

Did the project design, documents and management structures provide clear and unambiguous leadership, 'ownership', responsibility for policy and decision-making, and lines of authority? If so, were these lines followed? If there were weaknesses in management design, what were they in your view?

### 3. Amendments

Did the project documents make adequate provision for amendment to the scope of activities and for progress reporting to donors?

### 4. Management Challenges

What implementation and management challenges, if any, were faced by the project management teams of 2003/4 and 2005? In what ways did the change in organisational structure benefit or hinder the delivery of project outputs?

### 5. Organisational Changes

Organisational structures were amended in early 2005. What were the reasons for the changeover? Who was responsible for proposing a new management structure? What major differences were there between international management and support structures for the 2004 and 2005 elections?

### **TOPIC AREA 3: Project Implementation**

#### 1. Role of partner agencies

Partner agencies including EAD, IOM, UNV, IFES, TAF and others played important roles in the delivery of outputs throughout the period. What were the significant achievements, and management or component delivery challenges, faced by partner agencies? Were partner agencies adequately represented at consultative and reporting levels?

#### 2. Project Management Teams

In your view were management teams supported effectively by the managing institutions?

#### 3. Recruitment

Are you satisfied that proper procedures were followed in the recruitment of staff under each project component? (Specify for years 2004 and 2005)

#### 4. Procurement

Are you satisfied that proper procedures were followed in the procurement of goods and services under each project component?

#### 5. Fraud and Intimidation

Were any of the processes – e.g. voter registration, candidate vetting, the voting process, the count, results transmission, movement of ballot papers etc – subject to fraud, intimidation or other influences? If so, how and what might be some contributory causes? Were these problems adequately anticipated, addressed and corrected at the management levels? What lessons might be learned for future elections?

### 6. Logistics and Operations

Recognising the demographic, security and other constraints on field operations and the operational achievements in these circumstances, are there any operational patterns or procedures that might be identified as best practice or models for other election projects especially in post conflict environments?

### 7. Voters Registration Exercise.

Did somebody or some organization explore the possibility of using alternative sources of information before planned the Voters Registration Exercise? If so, for what reasons were such ideas dismissed? (For instance: Census, National ID Card, etc)

### 8. Civic and Voter Education / Public Outreach

What lessons or models can be taken from the outreach activities of the projects in terms of content, training methodology and engagement of local NGOs? Do you have a view on the effectives of these efforts?

### 9. Project Gaps

What, if any, project goals were not able to be achieved and why? Were donors appraised of potential shortfalls in results achievement?

#### **10. Legal /Institutional Factors**

What legal elements or institutionalised factors were particularly significant in terms of impacting project design or implementation? Could some of these elements / factors have been corrected prior to the elections in question? Must some of them be addressed prior to any future election?

### **TOPIC AREA 4: Lessons Learned**

- 1. What are the key lessons learned from the 2003, 2004 and / or 2005 projects?
- 2. Are there areas of best practice that can usefully be shared as electoral project management principles or practice notes?

Thank you.

Please feel free to contribute any additional perspectives you feel will assist the evaluation.

Annex 6
Timeline of Projects and Key Related Events

Period /	Project / Event	Key Agencies / Personnel
Phase		
January 2001	Note of Guidance for UNDPA and UNDP on Electoral Assistance signed.	UNDPA, UNDP
2001	Integrated Mission	UNDPA, UNDPKO
2001	Taskforce; Design of UNAMA; Bonn process	
Nov 2002	UNAMA transferred to DPKO	UNDPA, UNDPKO, UNEAD
5 Dec 2001	Bonn Agreement concluded, Set framework for conduct of registration and elections incl Pres. In June 2004.	
Feb 2003	Formal request from President of TISA to UNSG asking UN to assist, advise and coordinate electoral assistance.	
March 2003	UNAMA Electoral Unit established	Preliminary planning commences. Later renamed UNAMA Electoral Component (UEC).
23 July 2003	JEMB established	6 internationals and 5 members of the IEC. Policy "Afghanisation" of process commenced, urged by cost factors attaching to VRP.
Aug 03 – Dec 04	Voter Registration Project for Afghanistan AFG/03/020/01/34 Focus Voter's register established	Implementing Agency <sup>1</sup> : UNDP operations/contracts through DEX; resource mobilisation SRSG – political leadership DSRSG – political liaison DSRSG/RR/RC - UNDP – operational leadership. Reporting to DPKO, EAD, DPA Other agencies: UNV : field registration staff UNOPS: operations support IFES: on grant from USAID and CIDA, civic ed, security, registration, capacity bldg NDI: capacity bldg of polt. parties, conferences, domestic monitoring. Management Personnel Project Manager for UNDP: contracts/ops/ procurement /recruitment through EAD. Voters Register Adviser, with support through EAD Chief Technical Adviser within UEU plus Chief of Ops reported to SRSG on matters of substance. Funding/Budget \$120m <sup>2</sup> (\$95m????)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Organisational chart 1

Presidential Decrees est Interim Afghan Electoral Commission (advisory) and	
a Joint Electoral Management Body. IAEC	
appointed. JEMB Secretariat	
aiso established.	
UNEAD Evaluation Mission	UNEAD. Highly critical of progress in voter registration and election planning.
Registration commenced	UNDP, UEU, JEMB, IAEC. CHECK TAF
Presidential Decree establishes JEMB Secretariat	All national and international staff hired through UNAMA, UNDP or UNOPS became part fo JEMBS (Secretariat). Head of UEC became CTA. Farouq Wardack appointed Chairman of JEMBS.
2004-2005 Afghan Elections Project	Implementing Agency UNDP through DEX.
(merged with VRP to become VREP)	Other partners JEMB and UNAMA.
Focus Phase 1: Presidential	IOM for out-of -country registration and voting. (was this subcontracted to IFES or the other way around?) UNVs for regional staffing.
Elections and related	UNOPS operational support.
country registration and voting	Separate funding from USAID to TAF for security through Global and Kroll.?
	Management Personnel Jerome Leyraud , Project Manager for UNDP contracts/ops/ procurement /recruitment through EAD.
	Reg Austin (CTA) and 3 successive Chiefs of Ops (Spelman, Heisner, Avery) reported to SRSG on matters of substance. USAID funding to IFES for civic ed?
	Initial Budget: \$107,817,858
	<b>Combined budget</b> : 2004/05 \$167, 075, 903.
June: decision taken to extend voting to refugees in Iran and Pakistan. July: MoUs signed with Iran and Pakistan for out of country registration and voting.	UNAMA. IOM subcontracted to deliver OCV. IFES team subcontracted by IOM to manage process.
Presidential Elections held	UNAMA, UNDP with operational support from UNOPS and IOM.
<b>Focus</b> Discussions on Management Change for Parliamentary Elections	Agencies engaged in discussion: SRSG, DSRSG, UNDP, UNOPS, IFES.
	also established. UNEAD Evaluation Mission Registration commenced Presidential Decree establishes JEMB Secretariat 2004-2005 Afghan Elections Project (merged with VRP to become VREP) Focus Phase 1: Presidential Elections and related activities including out-of- country registration and voting June: decision taken to extend voting to refugees in Iran and Pakistan. July: MoUs signed with Iran and Pakistan for out of country registration and voting. Presidential Elections held Focus Discussions on Management Change for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> All budgets are expressed in US\$.

24 Nov 04	Decision taken to streamline management by replacing UNDP management and team with UNOPS as implementation agency.	
Dec 04	Changed mngt cemented	UNAMA, UNDP NY, UNOPS, UNDP (Afgh) SRSG DPA (EAD) requested to endorse proposal
Jan 1- Mar 15	Focus Transition Period. Implementation responsibility and handover of assets to UNOPS. New management team recruited by UNOPS.	SRSG, UNOPS, IFES (contract between UNOPS and IFES for IFES recruitment of senior management team); UNDP (resource mobilisation) Discussion between EAD and SRSG on range of matters including election timetable, planning and staffing.
24 Jan 05	Reconfiguration of IEC and JEMB.	13 members: 9 Afghans (all new appointees), 4 internationals.
Jan 31 - Dec 05	Focus Afghan Elections Project Phase 2: Parliamentary Elections and related activities Substantive Project Revision	Agencies <sup>3</sup> SRSG, UNOPS, UNDP, JEMB, IEC, IFES. Implementing Agencies UNOPS and IOM Partner Agencies: JEMB, UNAMA Other Agency Involvement UNDP not listed on ProDoc as partner but retained responsibility for resource mobilisation and reporting to donors. The Asia Foundation: capacity building with IEC; also subcontracted Kroll and Global Security (separate USAID funding) for field-based security IFES: Civic Education (separate USAID funding); provided Senior Management Team <i>UNV????</i> Personnel Jan 05: 2004 team disbanded. Feb 05: IFES field evaluation on operational and management options for Parliamentary elections conducted by Peter Erben. March 05: IFES contracted by UNOPS to provide senior management team. IFES contracted Peter Erben in dual role as CTA and Chief Electoral Officer and a number of other SMT officials. UNOPS Chief of Staff placed within IEC.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See Organisational chart 2

		Budget First estimates c. \$129m. Raised eventually to \$157m plus 10 per cent contingency. Final budget c. \$172m
15 Nov 05-20 Mar 06	2004-2005 Afghan Elections Project Phase 2 (Transitional Phase) <b>Focus</b> 1. Sustain IEC operations 2. Review of registration and 2004-5 election activities 3. Civil Registry Pilot Project Planned and designed	Implementing Partner UNOPS (when did this pass back to UNDP?) Other Partners IEC/JEMB, Ministry of Information; Civil Service Commission; UNAMA, The Asia Foundation, IFES. This is an unsigned ProDoc. Activity 3 not commence during this phase. Review carried out under UNDP management, not UNOPS. Budget: Incorporated under Parliamentary and Transitional elections project.
Mar 06 – Mar 08	ELECT Focus: National ID / Voter Card and continued capacity building with IEC.	Implementing Agency UNDP through DEX. Partner Agencies IEC IFES The Asia Foundation Proposed Budget: \$US8m (Commitments not yet secured) and project on hold pending resolution of closure of previous projects and funding commitments.

April 2006.

Annex 7

# **Voters Registration**

# **Technical Evaluation**

Author:

Mario Valle

April 2006.

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### **1. VOTERS REGISTRATION EVALUATION STRATEGY**

The Strategy which we used to make the information collection was: Document reviewing; Questionnaires, interviews and direct intervention (IT).

In some cases, certain fragments of this report were taken literally from our interviews and these appear in italics.

The reviewed aspects were the following ones:

- 1. Initial Assessment.
- 2. Planning.
- 3. Voters Registration Execution.
- 4. Data Processing.
- 5. Future Events.

### 2. DESCRIPTION OF VOTER REGISTRATION PROJECT PROCESSES

Next the reviewed aspects are described briefly:

- INITIAL ASSESSMENT. In reference to this point, we looked for to analyze those parameters and calculations that were due to carry out before to make the planning, For example: The universe of people to register; population statistics and the location of these; socialdemographic data; possible alternatives that could be evaluated to determine the mechanics of project; the legal frame, etc.
- PLANNING: During this process a revision was made to find who, how and when the activities were defined in order to obtain the primary targets of the VRP like Human Resources, Technical, procedural and Materials; Security, Registry execution, Data processing, etc.
- VOTERS REGISTRATION EXECUTION. For this heading, all the found documents were reviewed to be able to determine how it were executed and that constraints and results were had, the deviations to the original plan and their causes, the possible impacts to further processes of data capture, information processing and finally delivery of voters list.
- DATA PROCESSING. We reviewed when this was possible, the diverse aspects of the data processing; procedures written for datacenter operations; the creation of datacenter; its evolution; the computer applications developed to create and to update the voters database and for printing voters listing. The technological platform was also reviewed,

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that it was used; (Hardware/software, communications, database system, etc.).

FUTURE EVENTS. In this point we analyzed the tasks that are being made and that would be the natural sequence of the activities in electoral matter, as they could be: To continue with the update of the data base of the voters; plans on training IEC staff; refining and to make complementing of procedures and the data base, and finally the projects in mind, etc.

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### 3. BACKGROUND

### Chronology.

- ✓ December 6, 2001. Bonn Agreement calls upon the UN to support voter registration, and the President of Afghanistan requested UN support in preparing, organizing and fundraising for the electoral process.
- ✓ March 2003. UNAMA was established. Four specialists on elections started the project. Nevertheless, preliminary assessments for election planning and preparation in Afghanistan began in December 2002.
- ✓ 26 July 2003 JEMB and IAEC were established.
- ✓ October 2003. Voter Registration Decree was adopted.
- ✓ May 2004. Electoral Law was adopted.

### Chronology of events related to VRP.

- ✓ 26 July 2003: Presidential decree is issued creating an Interim Afghan Electoral Commission (IAEC) and a Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB). The IAEC was conformed by six Electoral Commissioners (Nationals) and five international members appointed by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for Afghanistan.
- ✓ 31 July 2003: Operational Plan is established
- ✓ 14 August 2003: VRP was launched.
- ✓ 1 December 2003: Phase I of Registration commences in the 8 large urban Regional Centers.
- ✓ 1 May 2004: Phase II of Registration begins to capture the remaining voters in each of the 356 districts and 34 provincial centers of Afghanistan;
- ✓ 20 August 2004: Registration ends;
- ✓ 21 September 2004: The Final Voters' List was completed, containing nearly 9,716,413 records.
- ✓ 24 September 2004: The Final Voters' List was submitted to the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) for approval, according to the Electoral Law.
- ✓ 1-4 October 2004. Out of Country Registration and Voting (OCRV) was executed in Pakistan. (In Iran Afghans Refugees voted without registry).

"The Voters Registration Project (VRP) was designed to provide minimum threshold of international assistance, involving more Afghans in capacity

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building process that would enable them to manage Elections in the future." (As is stated in the Annual Report 2003-2004 on VRP and Afghan Elections Project).

### Voters Registration Project's Main Objectives. (2003)

- Creation of a registry of eligible voters (Men and Women) that could meets international standards available for use in National Elections. <u>Deliveries</u>: Plans, Training at National and Regional level and execution. Creation a *sustainable*\_Database that could be used in further events.
- Awareness of rights and duties to all Afghanis as well as encourage them to participate in the VRP and future Elections. <u>Deliveries</u>: Public Outreach and Civic Education planed, developed and implemented.
- Capacity of the IAEC built to support the VRP and prepare to 2004 Presidential Elections. <u>Deliveries:</u> Voters Registration Project executed and Database created.

### Principles and Strategies.

- a. Planning VRP with also anticipating needs of the election to allow continuity and avoid work duplication.
- b. Planning and allocation of responsibilities followed for the Afghan administrative structure and their decentralization to "localize" or "regionalize" them to local conditions.
- c. Operational planning focused on the involvement of Afghans in planning, implementation and training.
- d. Active recruitment of women to support both, the VRP and Elections.
- e. Public Outreach and Civil education based on Afghan traditions and diversity.
- f. Civic Education work through partnerships with civil organizations.
- g. The project used must have sustainable methods (procedures, material production, and Public Outreach strategies).

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### 4. INITIAL ASSESSMENT

### **DISCUSSION.**

Two phases were planned to conduct VRP. Phase 1 started in December 2003 and continued thru the Second phase which started in May 2004 and finished 20<sup>th</sup> of August 2004. An update voter registration was executed during 2005. The Out of Country Registration was also executed in Pakistan; in Iran there was not registration, just voting directly using the Refugee ID card.

<u>Initial estimation.</u> There were not document on this issue, but some documents and interviews refer there were not enough bases to calculate them. No census (Was out of date and unfinished) or any other information about the Afghanistan population existed except (Tazkera) but finally it was decided no to use it.

Nevertheless, the international and national organisms devoted to Electoral affairs decided to plan in a basis of expected 10.5 million Afghanis that could be registered.

#### Facts on VRP

- ✓ 356 districts in Afganistán.
- ✓ 5000+ registration sites (2004).
- ✓ Registration Centers planned to accommodate up to 2,000 citizens.
- ✓ People registered in Phase I: 1,876,536
- ✓ People registered in Phase II: 8,691,298
- ✓ Total Afghanis registered in 2003 and 2004: 10,567,834, plus the ones registered in Pakistan.
- ✓ People registered in 2005 (Update): 1,700,000.
- ✓ Out of Country Registration (2004) in Pakistan:
  - Registration Centers: 630 on 8 Field Offices.
  - Registration Stations: 1,657
  - Registration period: 5 days (1-4 October 2004)
  - People registered: 737,936 (Not included into the Electoral Database).
- ✓ Out of Country Registration in Iran: None.

In no document the sources of intelligence were about the numbers of population by each district, used to calculate the project. This information is crucial to obtain the first approaches in the amount of registry points that could have by each one of the districts.

Another important parameter to planning is the existence of nomenclature on addresses, at least in urban and semi rural areas.

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Other parameters to analyze in the initial stage of the project, they are: The geographic location of the places where people live, the urban infrastructure they have, its topography, the socio-demographic conditions of each town, village or city. Also it is required to have the characteristics of the accesses; the identification of sites where the voting or registry centers could settle (Schools, mosques, social centers, government offices, etc.).

Other aspects were due to take into account, like the identification of the regions that they have or they could have problems as far as political rivalries, ethnic and the religious differences. It will affect the planning for the selection of the best places for installation of registry/polling sites and to define where it is required to carry far security precautions.

### PROBLEMS.

- Was not any general or specific information in relation to how initial estimations were made. It is assumed that there were them, since the plan was elaborated.
- At the beginning of the VRP accurate information did not exist about the population of Afghanistan and its distribution.
- Was not any document that could indicate to us as the number of registry sites calculated that were installed, as well as the personnel required for each one of them.
- The antecedents regarding of how the registration kits conformed are confused. Nevertheless there were no major problems in this sense.
- The initial plan describes the resources that were required, the times, etc. Nevertheless during our interviews or in the findings found in the existing documentation, it is mentioned that the original plan was changing constantly. The greater problem was that some changes were no made formal nor communicated in general form.
- The streets nomenclature in the majority of cities and villages in Afghanistan is not clear or does not exist at all.

### CONCLUSIONS.

No good plan can be made without the investment of time necessary to obtain the fundamental figures which will serve to planning. Plans are not perfect, but the collection of the mentioned data (and others according to circumstances) cause that the developed plan to has less weaknesses and increase its possibilities of success (In times, less changes, better relation cost- benefit, sustainability, etc.).

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### **RECOMMENDATIONS.**

In order to obtain better results in future elections, the Electoral Authorities, must prepare an early collection of parameters and information in order to plan the activities to make a Registration Exercise capable to outcome a certain and inexpensive (as possible) one.

The specific plans should be elaborated by specialists in diverse disciplines used during the exercise of electoral registry (Based in Initial assessment results and figures). With specific plans, a Master Plan will be produced and the consolidation of it had to be made by the project's group of direction. This would have given a greater certainty of than this plan would be less susceptible to fail.

It is very important to take in account the following issues:

- 1. During the last exercises on voters registration (2003-2005) some results were obtained that can be used to calculate, for example, the number of registration/polling sites, Since now a more realistic database existed, able to even produce lists with valuable (Although there is the doubt in that the data base is not useful).
- 2. A new permanent addresses nomenclature and categorization must be created, but it is not an IEC duty, but the government.
- 3. Take advantage of the past registration processes experiences (general and personal) and lessons learned to make future events smoother, less expensive and certain.
- 4. Before facing a new exercise in the registry, The IEC has the opportunity to visit other countries that have mature electoral systems and with problematic similar to Afghanistan. Generally, this generates a valuable source of ideas and knowledge.
- 5. Avoid the use of sophisticated equipment to produce the electoral ID card and the voters list. Sometimes such technology is not tested enough and could result in greater costs, the risks of failure increase since an appropriate level of knowledge is required on those technologies and the specialists are even scarce.
- 6. ID cards for voting must be a secure document, no doubt at all, but it doesn't need to contain expensive and sophisticated security elements. The fact to increase the number of security elements increases the cost, but the use of less elements of security does not mean that the document can be less safe, but if more cheap. It is required to find the balance security-cost.
- 7. At this moment, the IEC has opportunity to begin to collect and to prepare the information necessary to plan the future events. Once this activity is developed, the following step, the formal planning can become.

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8. The specific plans should be elaborated by the specialists in the diverse disciplines used during the exercise of the electoral registry (Based in Initial assessment results and figures). With specific plans a Master Plan will be produced and the consolidation of it had to be made by the project's group of direction. This would have given a greater certainty of than this plan would be less susceptible to fail.

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### 5. PLANNING

### **DISCUSSION.**

There were constant changes in initial master plan. Nowadays, we can only emphasize the fact that the project of the registry was a fact, we can observe the results: They were registered to almost 13 million Afghan citizens. Also we know that such exercises were expensive and erratic and they did not leave sufficient sustainability and the little obtained is had lost for different reasons. It was already commented that the initial evaluation had to be made to elaborate of the master plan. We assumed that there was it.

### PROBLEMS.

The problems that appeared during the initial stages of the VRP were commented (funding, timelines, etc.), nevertheless others appeared and new challenges and problems were had that gradually increased the complexity of the exercise and made more critics the subsequent activities in the project.

- A fairly ambitious Operational Plan was developed and issued on 31 July 2003. However, this had to be reviewed on a number of occasions primarily because of the slow receipt of funding".
- Formal plans were available to reviewing for phases I in 2003, II in 2004 but information related to the master plan for Updating (2005) and OCVR were not available.
- There was in some sense, a chaotic situation at the beginning of the registration Phase I, it was told for international former officers which were involved in 2003.
- Diverse problems existed in almost all fronts: Budgeting, Procurement, Logistics, transportation, Registration sites, Data Entry, IT, Human Resources, etc.
- Plans changed constantly and some changes were not registered because time pressures.
- "Tight (and unrealistic) timelines imposed by the Bonn Agreement".
- "The frantic (and unjustified) 100% turnover in the international and Afghan commissioners and managers in the JEMBS and the loss of any historical memory"
- The political pressure to conduct the OCV exercise.

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### CONCLUSIONS.

It was already commented that a plan that is more successful needs a detailed exercise of initial evaluation. Also it requires that the specific plans are developed by professionals who know their discipline. There is no doubt about the knowledge and the experience of the advisors and the officials who participated in the diverse stages of the VRP. Nevertheless, due to the initial problems and outer pressures, the consequence nowadays, was that VRP was too expensive and it almost left to little or nothing in the matter of sustainability.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS.**

- 9. The future electoral projects require of the time sufficient to carry out the initial investigations and estimations to obtain the necessary data for a successfully planning of the IEC proper actions.
- 10. Afghanistan, with the continued aid of UN and from the international community, needs to reinforce, to fortify and to create a solid and harmonious structure in the IEC.
- 11. Additional recommendations are not provided in this aspect, because each country and its circumstances have its own solutions, but a project for people registry has foundations common able to be applied anywhere.

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### 6. REGISTRATION DEVELOPMENT

### **DISCUSSION.**

The executed steps of electoral registry were developed inside and outside the country. Nevertheless the celebrated ones within Afghanistan against those executed ones in Pakistan did not use the same methodologies and procedures. Additionally, the registered Afghan citizens in this last country were not including into voters database.

- VRP Phase I (December 2003-April 2004).
- The execution of Phase I of VRP started in December 2003. Registration Centers were allocated at Regional level (8). The number of citizens registered was 1,876,536.
- VRP Phase II.
- The execution of Phase of VRP started in May 2004. More than 5,000 Registration Centers were allocated at Provincial and District level. 36,000 staff was deployed. The number of registered citizens was 8,691,298.
- VRP Update (2005). 1.7 million Citizens were updated; the majority was new voters and minor changes.
- Out of Country Registration. (4 days in Oct 2004) In Pakistan.
  738,000 citizens registered and registration sites were installed in 7 Pakistani cities.

### PROBLEMS.

- "The slow cash flow to fund the project(s)".
- "The political pressure to conduct the OCV exercise".
- Another factor affecting the timetable and progress of the VR project was the security situation in Afghanistan".
- "There was in some sense, a chaotic situation at the beginning of the registration Phase I".
- \* "No formalization on changes that were made to packing lists and/or procedures, and there was not a formal sign-off procedure for the packing lists and the authority to change it".
- "Lack of warehouse storage and working space prevented a bettercoordinated packing effort, resulting in haphazard packing line procedures".

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- Obtaining clear, accurate, concise and timely information from the relevant departments as to the composition and packing requirements of the registration kits were an on-going problem throughout the project".
- Few staff for writing procedures.
- Nobody of our interviewed knew who designed the registration books.
- The booklets that contained ID card for vote and that would be test of the registry of the people was not filled appropriately, since due to the time pressure they were not includes some data (Information on Sub-Village and Guzar).
- Since the beginning the procedures to registration were misunderstood and the practical work was not according to them. It allowed the existence of multiple registries of the same person.
- The citizens were no asked for a document which could proof they live around the registration center, nor proofing they were Afghanis.
- The transportation of booklets to datacenters was slow and erratic. Sometimes the booklets were lost.
- Not tying registration to polling places.
- "Inadequate levels of information thus rendering the card useless for future elections".
- Kuchis have periods of movements.
- "Registration Projects were useless and expensive; the resources wasted in them could serve to build schools and hospitals".
- "Database is not usable for Municipal Elections or any election at all, it is uncompleted and lots of duplicated people are in it".

### CONCLUSIONS.

As it were mentioned previously, the acts to register people during 2003, 2004 and 2005 were a fact, but those four exercises had similar problems and were too expensive and they did not leave sustainability.

An important injection of resources must occur to the IEC, based on a rigorous exercise of planning and based on goal achieved, in order to create and to maintain the consolidated and fortified affluent organism; otherwise the following elections will be equally expensive, little effective, no efficient and without allowing again that sustainability exists.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS.**

We will list some recommendations in case of future registration events.

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- 12. Exhaustive Analysis must be made on districts-population. Today, voter's database could provide valuable information.
- 13. An effort of the government is required, so that the nomenclature of the streets and directions can be corrected and be maintained permanently. It would be sufficient that this became at urban and semi-rural level.
- 14. Also it would be desirable to classify and to catalogue the zones, districts and villas, where people live in order to have a greater understanding of the conditions by zone and for having additional inputs for other tasks, as they are the public outreach, security, transport, etc.
- 15. To be able to count on a solid institution that deserves the respect of the citizenship, political parties and government, IEC requires of national professional expertise dedicated to develop the electoral tasks and all staff must be trained constantly.
- 16. Planning, planning and more planning. It is the best moment to make a deep initial analysis of necessities and to elaborate a maste plan with the defined activities on short, medium and long term. IEC must avoid embarking on new projects without the necessary investment of time to elaborate this plan.
- 17. IEC should make an effort to trying to recover and complete the Voters Database. A deep analysis on the way to "clean" and recover it could be done and finally IEC will decide if it is useful or not.
- 18. Also, for a new project, database could provide the listings of people by District and/or village of residence; and other valuable data.

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### 7. DATA PROCESSING.

### DISCUSSION.

For VRP, phases 1 and 2 and to process the collected information, datacenter was constructed in Kabul and this it was equipped with 130 computers (122 for the entry of data), 2 servers to allocate database based on MS-SQL y 2 domain controllers for LAN.

They were contracted 239 people who worked in 2 eight-hour shifts. A total of approximately 10,5 million data of the registry was captured twice for reasons of the validation of data. (SOURCE: "Annual Report on VRP and 2004 Afghan Election Project From 2003-2004").

Some applications were developed and implemented in order to accomplish the main tasks needed to conduct a VR and elections projects, such as data entry system and database designed and implemented, Statistics and reporting on electoral data, and elections results.

At the end of VRP and presidential elections efforts were done by the international staff to pass the knowledge to national staff counterparts.

Now, the computer system is based under the concept of multiple Servers (5) interconnected with PC's networked. The database used is MS-SQL Server and the Operating System is Windows NT.

### PROBLEMS.

Substantial problems during data entry and data processing did not exist, except some mentioned in the following list of found problems. Nevertheless, currently the IEC's IT department is facing serious problems.

- The factors which affected the initial deployment of VRP (Assessment, Planning and execution of the VR Project), like Funding, Security, Political pressures and short timeline, did impact on Data Center operation as well.
- Hiring national staff was not on time and operations of datacenter were significantly delayed. Source: A former datacenter manager.
- Limited staff skills, and illiteracy (2003) Source: A former datacenter manager.
- Procedures and Systems Documentation and operations.
  - > Few staff for writing procedures before the datacenter was built.
  - > 2006. Most of IT staff does not know the procedures written neither the job done from 2004-2005 related VRP and Elections.

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- In a period of two weeks in April 2006, the database specialist and the Chief of IT resigned because they found better work conditions in other organizations. We talked about with former database specialist and another young man which was part of JEMB IT staff in 2004-2005.
- 2006, IT staff is not backing information up (saving it) because they don't have the software license to back up and recovery. And Information could be irremediably lost.
- 2006. Data Security does not exist; the whole tasks in IEC are in risk. There is not a DRP (Disaster and Recovery Plan); in times like this in Afghanistan, every time risks exist and any place could be a terrorist target, so therefore, a complete and serious DRP is needed.
- Database.
  - Database was planned and designed well, but IEC officers told us there were too many duplicated registers and there is no data in fields: District, Village and Date of Birth. After a direct evaluation on database there are no problem with district and village fields, because information exists and it is correct because there are reference tables with name of districts an villages. Other fields are empty, like Sub Village and Guzar.
  - > No efforts to validate such sayings have been done.
  - IT staff does not agree with those assumptions because they had achieved some data mining on database and they know is almost complete and useful (if some work is done in it). We personally could navigate thru it. In general, those fields are not empty, at least those above mentioned and there are other fields which could be important on a deep searching. (I.E. Bags Table and Batch Table).
  - 2006. We asked for some query's on database, but had been difficult to get all of them because the lack of knowledge of the new specialist on how it was designed and implemented.
  - Date of Birth, indeed, does not exist into database, but it could be inserted and filled with a simple calculation between date of registration field and age field. Of course it does not give the exact date of bird, but this data will permit to plan, for instance, an update exercise.
- ✤ Infrastructure. (2006).
  - > Limited communications infrastructure.
  - Constant failures on electricity could cause damages in the IT infrastructure and information.

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- Most of the PC's and laptop computers are losing its "useful life" and they are not quite powerful to run some processes that demand more faster memory and processors.
- Nowadays, there is no maintenance service for the equipment. There is not, at least one person who develops these tasks like part of the staff. It is necessary to give "first aid" to the infrastructure.
- The servers urgently require additional disc space (more disk drives) This could cause loss of information worse or still, a total stop in the routinary activities of IEC, as well as in the services that are in use (Internet, electronic mail, printing thru network, etc.). Obviously new computational applications cannot be implemented above up if they need great amounts of space in disc
- Currently, there are not antivirus licenses; IT staff sometimes downloads trial software from the web which can not be used at Server level.
- ✤ Staff.(2006).
  - Only 5 people are in charge of IT. But just one (hired middle April) is getting some knowledge about the electoral database.
  - Most of the IT staff is in charge of tasks like: Tech support, LAN Administration, E-Mail Administration and some applications maintenance (No Voters Database maintenance).
  - > Capacity Building was lost because the constant turnovers.

### CONCLUSIONS.

In spite of the problems already mentioned during the VRP, datacenter had minor problems, but nowadays a potential risk exists to deteriorate itself completely.

The database structure was designed well (No too complex); it is a voter database designed by a person with experience in electoral systems. Nevertheless, the data base is there, without being used by anybody, except by the new database specialist.

It is clear that time and effort must be done to make an analysis trying to recover it ("to clean it"). They are due to make some simple "Query's" to detect and to erase the multiple registries of a same person; to complete some of the fields that can be important to obtain specific data. This last process could be done automatically since the database is related between information archives (Tables).<sup>4</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See "Data structure and query samples at end of this section.

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The database contains fields like "Number of citizens registered by District, by Province, by gender ", or, "population 18+ and under 18 years old, by District, by gender " and for example, the database administrator could group citizens by village where they registered themselves. In addition, he could group citizens by registration site during the events in 2003-2004.

With these processes an important universe of duplicates that registered in the same site or the same Village or small city would be eliminated. In order to locate another universe of duplicates is possible to run querys with phonetic comparison of names, age and gender (With this process, duplicated records could be deleted and would be people who registered several in different villages and/or districts and/or provinces and this number of cases is considerably smaller to those registered several times in same village or registration site). In this last case, the previous elimination of the registries in the database entails previous tasks of physical examination on listings containing the possible duplicates.

Special consideration is due to put in information security stored in the IEC servers, because not only the voters database could be lost, but the whole operations based on IT and communications could even be interrupted (LAN, Internet, Electronic mail, administrative applications, etc.)

### **RECOMMENDATIONS.**

It could be thought that most of the mentioned problems and recommendations described are out of scope of electoral matters and from this Elections Evaluation team too, but nowadays, in any organization, the majority their of tasks are based on technological systems. Therefore any incident in the IT department could cause loss of information and the resources allocated in IEC's datacenter.

- Procedures, systems documentation and operations.
  - 19. Continuously train the IT personnel, mainly in the main activity of the IEC: To lead elections.
  - 20. Writing procedures in the present circumstances is a good exercise to be able to confront future events and to create capacity building.
  - 21..IT staff have to define and write a DRP (Disaster and Recovery Plan) and have constan assays to test DRP and/or amend it.
- Database.
  - 22. As was mentioned above, Voters database could be useful and valuable from the information which could be extracted from it. A profound and serious analysis must be done in order to define in detail the tasks to have to be executed in order to complete and cleanse the

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database. It is desirable to hire an expert (two weeks could be enough) for this job and preferable the one which designed and implemented it. Such recommendation could have better benefit because it will be possible to IT staff to recover also the lost Capacity Building on this aspect.

- 23. Date of Birth and other needed fields could be obtained automatically with the above suggested database specialist's support as well.
- 4 Infrastructure.
  - 24. Make an evaluation of the actual infrastructure and plan for the future, according with the IEC plans and needs.
  - 25. Consider modernization of infrastructure based in the current technological platform, but depending on timeframes planned to other electoral event (Servers interconnected, faster networking appliances, more powerful PC's, licensing of operating systems, database system, antivirus, Backup systems, etc.). Meanwhile, it is strongly suggested to have a maintenance service policy to avoid major problems or hire a specialist in hardware maintenance.
  - 26. The current IT infrastructure is possibly the most common system used throughout the world; this is one major advantage because there are vast numbers of technicians capable to support this kind of systems.
  - 27. Related with disk space and security, it is urgent to undertake several actions: Acquire more disk units and add them to current space; afterwards save information no needed any more to tape; erase that information and other no related to IEC; Contract all necessary elements to properly back the information up; procure the number of antivirus licenses needed and define and put in practice your own Disaster Recovery Plan.
  - 28. Avoid the use of sophisticate equipment and systems because are expensive and there are no too many specialist on some of newest technologies.

#### 🚽 Staff.

- 29. Accordingly with the IEC's wider plans, define a fix organizational structure for the IT department, and keep them.
- 30. IEC must to find the best solution, cost effective to keep its staff, with training, incentives based on work done, better salaries and other factors which are provoking desertion.

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### 8. THE VOTERS REGISTRATION PROJECT FUTURE EVENTS.

### **DISCUSSION.**

There are two possible approaches or options when we are talking about the IEC main Mission: Conduct Citizens Registration projects and Elections:

- 1.- Planning and execution of an specific project to re-engineer all processes and even a new Voters Registration Project. This approach will give certainty and confidence to people, political parties and civil society over their Electoral Authorities, the certainty which IEC is an independent and impartial organism. Nevertheless, Afghan authorities must decide what method of registration must be used: a) Periodic List (Voter List produced prior to each election.) or b) Continuous Register (Voter List that is continually maintained regardless of election events). Or,
- 2. Undertaking the Joint Registration Project with the Ministry of Interior, looking for a new and trustable National ID Card. (This modality is named the Civil Registry system and consists basically on a central database maintained by the state where all country population is registered and the voter's list becomes a subset and can be extracted from the database).

On this point some reflections have to be made.

Despite of complexity of VRP, the high costs and resources spent and some shortcomings during the past 4 Voters Registration events since 2003, Afghanistan now, after 30 years of war and violence, has it Voters Registration Database with more than 12 million citizens, and each eligible voter have its ID card for voting. Nevertheless, the whole VRP have had a very high cost, not only in money but in too many other issues.

It is true, Voters Database has some errors (As was already commented) and we have mentioned the reasons. Some of the errors are important but should be possible to correct them, but the data base exists and contains the fruit from such an enormous effort, the first, at least after more of 3 decades. Today, in the mind of all Afghans exists the new idea and fact that they can elect their own candidates to occupy public posts.

So, is it a good idea to exclude all this achievements without a previous small and inexpensive effort to rescue them? And above all, is Afghanistan and the international community able to spend more resources again in a new voters registration?

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Addition on that, the joint project between the MoI and IEC could be target of critics on partiality and other possible consequences.

One document was given to us few days ago: "Pilot Project for Joint Civil and Voter Registry in 3 Districts of Afghanistan – Final Draft".

### PROBLEMS.

- A possible contradiction was found of between Mol and IEC's main concerns: Security which the new ID card must have (control). Nevertheless, on the other hand the ID card production and printing of the voters listing will be made in decentralized form (At district or province level). Then the control will be delegated in many people and this entails the risk which security could be broken. Final. Draft, Page 3, point 11
- The Joint Pilot Project between Ministry of Interior and IEC has started and will be developed in 6 months (Page 3, point 12). The plan in general is well structured but lacks of maturity. Would be pitiful if history repeats. We must remember the problems had during the past registration project because.
- Draft does not mention the initial assessment on expected quantity of resources which could be used in the real exercise. It is reasonable because the real numbers and other parameters will be obtained for the real event, but how the calculations were made to get for example, the number of scanners that pilot project will need? The same method could be used for get preliminary figures for the whole project.
- If the pilot project (6 months) results no feasible for whatever reason, what the Joint Group expects? What is next?.
- There is not a specific designs of the new ID card. No specifications are included into document (No core materials description on ID card; there is not a list of security elements; kind of lamination if the card core requires it? What requirements on printers, etc.). Page 5, points 2.4 and 3.
- The project will use sophisticated equipment to scan the persona's iris and a database which will contain the people's data, plus its biometrics (Iris, face and fingerprint). We see a high risk using the Iris recognition system:
  - This technology and its patents are property of Iridian Technologies and this company certificates their partners through very exhaustive tests, so then, just few companies are able to provide it (Experience, knowledge, support, and other issues. It is still expensive).

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- The application of this technology has not been proven even massively. In fact it is being used in some international airports in a random way (Narita, Japan and Heathrow, England). Also is being used in customs and the borders (Canada and the Emirates) and in the UNHCR program this technology is used since 2002, scanning and storing the Afghan refugee's eyes iris in Peshawar Pakistan. Finally, the use of this technology is expanding at level of some hospitals and for access control in jails. Please refer to Iridian Tech's web page for more details: www.iridiantech.com
- The still, excessive cost of this technology could result in a huge project spending.
- Final Draft does not delineate the conceptual design and how the datacenter(s). Even measures on building's security and operations.

## CONCLUSIONS.

Again, the members of the joint project should have to evaluate the most convenient and feasible alternative through a deep and extensive assessment on the circumstances upon all, to avoid to repeat the history.

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### **RECOMMENDATIONS.**

- 31. Assessment, Research, Planning. As we mentioned in other sections of this report, a deep initial assessment must be done. First, identify and asses and define exactly what type of method is more convenient to Afghanistan for voters registration. Seems like decision had been made and Civil Registry and extraction of electoral data was selected. Was it quite well defined or still in study?
- 32. ID card definition. It is really necessary to have a much protected ID card? Above all, if the card will contains biometrics in it. There are in the market less expensive solutions and no less secure. The first ID card in México was equivalent to approximately 1.6 US dlls. each, and the second contract was 0.60 US Dlls. each (with more security elements) and we evaluated more than 6 proposals with more than three different technologies mixtures.
- 33. Review the standard ISO/IEC 7810:2003 on ID cards specifications and all other international standards related to lamination, holograms, micro printing, etc. (See the following link fore more details: http://www.iso.org/iso/en/prodsservices/popstds/.../en/CatalogueDetailPage.CatalogueDetail?CSNUMBER=3 1432&ICS1=35&ICS2=240&ICS3=15

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- 34. Once that new ID card is defined, unit price most be surveyed for each component: Core (Material, I.E. Paper, mylar, plastic, polycarbonate, etc.), security elements (what and how many different), lamination, magnetic strip, holograms, micro printing and other elements.
- 35. Take into account which depending on card materials whereupon will be made, it will last some number of years, for that reason, it is essential to define exact specifications that it will have, because that a bad quality of the materials could cause an excessive replacement of the card. For example, if of cards core is made of laminated paper, this one will last less than one made with mylar or polycarbonate.
- 36. ID card is defined and its possible cost calculated. Asses on technology is required to get the print/emboss technology to use. Review the timing required to produce cards (reviewing speed and other specifications of printers). This initial assessments just could be achieved with technical representatives from the market or attending seminars on IT, Biometrics, hardware, software, etc.
- 37. Evaluation on computer's speed and strength required for processing all data (images consumes huge amount of system resources). Servers must have more than one processor and memory should be more than the required for conventional processing..
- 38. Assess the magnetic storage needed to store database containing voter's biometrics (Pictures, fingerprints, iris image) plus all other fields with text information required. Images, usually take large amount of disk space.
- 39. Work out deeply in computers hardware and software technology to use and evaluate pros and cons, analyze the possible use of UNIX machines or keep the one you had been using. On hardware issues the most extend technology is Intel based machines (Multi processors Servers and PC's) Microsoft platform products are strong and vastly spread in the market and there are more specialist (Windows NT, Exchange, SQL Server, etc.), but the power needed to manage huge amounts of data and images must be benchmarked.
- 40. In general terms, the pilot project must be matured and better assessed; still there are many gaps on draft or few details. A set of technical annexes should be added with descriptions and specs; datacenter security measures, etc. because procedures are not enough when security is the main concern.

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41. There is a discrepancy regarding security and control. By one side a very secure document is required (ID card and database with biometrics) and by other side the security and control is delegated to many points (Production of ID card and Voters List) and when we talk about security, control should be centralized. A serious reflection and study in this matter must be done; if the security and control is strongly desired, the possibility of having all control at central level will ensures security. In other words, it is recommended to have a centralized datacenter and database (replicated in other site); production center – with high security measures - and at decentralized levels (Provinces or districts) just the data input and remote transfer of the information entered and products distribution. This approach is good for control and the know-how is also centralized and problems are focused and quickly solved.