

**Governance, Social Development, Conflict and Humanitarian**

**PEAKS Consortium led by Coffey International Development**

Draft Mid-Term Review  
Mid Term Review of Phase II of Sharing and Learning on Community Based Disaster Management in Asia Programme

December 2016



Client: DFID

Project Title: Mid-Term Review of Phase II of Sharing and Learning on Community Based Disaster Management in Asia Programme

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December 2016

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Draft Mid-Term Review

Mid Term Review of Phase II of Sharing and Learning on Community Based Disaster Management in Asia Programme

This document has been approved for submission by Coffey’s Project Director, based on a review of satisfactory adherence to our policies on:

* Quality management
* HSSE and risk management
* Financial management and Value for Money (VfM)
* Personnel recruitment and management
* Performance Management and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)

Jeremy Swainson, Principal



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Abbreviations and Acronyms

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **AMCDRR** | Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Asia |
| **App** | Software application (typically for a smartphone) |
| **AR** | Annual Review |
| **ASEAN** | Association of Southeast Asian Nations |
| **AWP** | Annual Work Plan |
| **BHC** | British High Commission |
| **BNU** | Beijing Normal University |
| **CBDM** | Community-Based Disaster Management |
| **CBDRM** | Community-Based Disaster Risk Management |
| **CBDRR** | Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction |
| **CBO** | Community-Based Organisation |
| **CCED** | Climate Change, Environment and Disaster Management (Bangladesh) |
| **CDMP** | Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (Bangladesh) |
| **CDRMP** | Comprehensive Disaster Risk Management Programme (Nepal) |
| **CDRMP** | Comprehensive Disaster Risk Management Programme (UNDP Nepal) |
| **CNCIDR** | China National Committee for International Disaster Reduction |
| **CSR** | Corporate Social Responsibility |
| **DAC** | Development Assistance Committee (OECD) |
| **DFID** | Department for International Development (UK) |
| **DHM** | Department of Hydrology and Meteorology (Nepal) |
| **DRM** | Disaster Risk Management |
| **DRR** | Disaster Risk Reduction |
| **eBPS** | e-Building Permit System |
| **ESCAP** | United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific |
| **FSCD** | Fire Service and Civil Defence (Bangladesh) |
| **GPRC** | Government of the People’s Republic of China |
| **HERR** | Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (UK) |
| **HQ** | Headquarters |
| **IASC** | Inter Agency Steering Committee |
| **IC** | Individual Contractor (UNDP) |
| **ICCR-DRR** | International Centre for Collaborative Research on Disaster Risk Reduction |
| **IT** | Information Technology |
| **IWHR** | Institute of Water Resources and Hydropower Research (China) |
| **KMC** | Kathmandu Municipal Council |
| **LDTA** | Local Development Training Academy (Nepal) |
| **M&E** | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| **MOCA** | Ministry of Civil Affairs (People’s Republic of China) |
| **MoFALD** | Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development (Nepal) |
| **MOFCOM** | Ministry of Commerce (People’s Republic of China) |
| **MoHA** | Ministry of Home Affairs (Nepal) |
| **MTR** | Mid-Term Review |
| **NARRI** | National Alliance for Risk Reduction & Response Consortium (Bangladesh) |
| **NASC** | National Administrative Staff College (Nepal) |
| **NBC** | National Building Code (Nepal) |
| **NDRCC** | National Disaster Reduction Centre of China |
| **NGO** | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| **NPC** | National Planning Commission (Nepal) |
| **NRP** | National Resilience Programme (Bangladesh) |
| **NRRC** | Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (Nepal) |
| **OECD** | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| **OPMMC** | Office of Prime Minister & Council of Ministers (Nepal) |
| **PIP** | Programme Implementation Plan |
| **PMO** | Programme Management Office |
| **PMU** | Programme Management Unit |
| **PRC** | People’s Republic of China |
| **PSC** | Programme Steering Committee |
| **RSLUP** | Risk-sensitive Land Use Planning |
| **SFDRR** | Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction |
| **SSC** | South-South Cooperation |
| **ToC** | Theory of Change |
| **TOR** | Terms of Reference |
| **TrC** | Triangular Cooperation |
| **UK** | United Kingdom |
| **UN** | United Nations |
| **UNDP** | United Nations Development Programme |
| **UNDSS** | United Nations Department of Safety and Security |
| **US** | United States of America |

# Executive Summary

This report sets out the results of the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of Phase II of the Sharing and Learning on Community-Based Disaster Management in Asia (the Programme). The MTR team has also prepared an Annual Review (AR) of the Programme for 2016. The AR has more details on the Programme progress and results than this report.

This report and the AR are based on a review of the programme documents and on interviews with 85 key informants as well as observations, broader research, and analysis of the information collected. The team’s transcribed rough notes amounted to over 16,000 words. The team collated 684 pieces of evidence from 72 different sources in arriving at their conclusions about the Programme.

The Programme was initiated in 2012, as part of the UK-China Development Partnership to address global challenges and the UK Government’s Humanitarian Policy commitments. The Programme aimed to strengthen regional South-South Cooperation (SSC) in Asia, building on the strong China/UK global partnership to improve cooperation through joint initiatives on Community-Based Disaster Management (CBDM) in parts of Asia. The impact of the interventions was intended to be increased resilience to disasters of poor communities in developing countries in the Asia region.

The Programme was planned to be a five-year initiative implemented in two phases. The Programme completed its first phase in March 2015, with overall performance rated “moderately satisfactory”. For several reasons, including changes of personnel and a strong desire to see Phase II performing better than Phase I, all the components of Phase II did not start until 15 months after the end of Phase I.

This is a complex programme, involving different agencies across three countries in the region with very different political, socio-economic and cultural environments. The different institutions involved also have their own practices and norms, making the whole Programme very complex.

The Programme has both a strategic component and an operational component. The strategic component focused on building South-South Cooperation (SSC) on risk reduction, disaster preparedness, response, and recovery. The operational component focused on interventions intended to provide at-risk populations with the capacity to prepare, respond to, or recover from disasters. The transition from Phase I to Phase II led to a much greater emphasis on the strategic component.

The Programme was designed to have four outputs:

* At the policy level, with high-level exchanges and the development of policy guidance.
* At the practice level, with community exchanges and the demonstration of key technologies and practices.
* At the research level, with the establishment of a research network and research partnerships.
* At the information services level, with an information sharing platform.

All outputs, except for the last, have met or exceeded their targets for 2016. At the information services level the MTR team have flagged up concerns about the development of the information platform. However, even for this fourth output, Bangladesh and Nepal have supplemented the information platform effort with other information sharing work that was not originally planned.

The MTR found that the Programme has met the planned outcomes at both the operational and policy level for 2016, and that it is achieving an impact with improved cooperation on disaster management.

The MTR team concluded that the Programme has largely achieved or exceeded, or is on course to achieve or exceed the targets for 2016. This is in spite for the much delayed start. This has only been possible because of both the previous investment by UNDP in DRR in both Nepal and Bangladesh, and because the Programme activities could be inserted into existing UNDP DRR programmes in both Nepal and Bangladesh. This has helped leverage the Programme inputs to have much greater impact.

The MTR team considered the Programme design to be broadly appropriate. The use of seven guiding principles to guide implementation in Phase II was particularly useful and provides a model for other such complex programmes. The Programme was a learning one with an experimental approach. It was this experimental approach that led, in part, to the long pause between Phase I and Phase II as the lessons from Phase I were taken on board for Phase II.

The MTR team considered that the design has been surprisingly effective. It has enabled the partners to develop effective collaboration and learning between them.

The Programme has represented excellent value-for-money for DIFD. The combination of fitting into larger programmes and building on existing investments in DRR means that the Programme represents tremendous value for money

While the gender balance of participation in the Programme interventions in China is adequate, gender inequality is significant in both Bangladesh and Nepal. This leads to relatively low participation by women in exchange events. The Programme needs to do more to encourage the participation by women in the learning and exchange events. While recognising that gender imbalance in leadership position within institutions in Nepal and Bangladesh limit the scope for participation by women in exchange events, more can be done to promote female participation.

DFID has taken a very direct role in the implementation rather than just acting as a funder. The MTR team considered that the close attention to Programme quality by DFID China has resulted in a higher quality Programme that might otherwise have been the case.

The Programme is well managed, with close attention to management by both UNDP China and DFID China. Quarterly reporting imposes a large load on the Programme partners, and while it was a necessary measure in the first part of Phase I, system should have matured to the stage where the Programme could revert to six-monthly reporting.

The MTR team identified several lessons from the Programme. Those involved in the Programme have learned lessons about managing such a complex programme. It has only managed to function as well as it has because of the determined effort by UNDP China and DFID China to actively manage the Programme.

The MTR team noted many examples of best practice in the Programme, especially at the practice and research levels.

The major risk that the MTR identified is that the Programme ends as planned in September 2017. Implementing partners have made clear that time, rather than funds or other physical or political factors, constrain the full implementation of the Programme.

While DFID would face a serious reputational risk from such a termination, reminiscent of the clumsy termination of the UK’s bilateral aid programme of China in 2011, there is a countervailing risk: the risk of DFID extended the time-period for the Programme without any clear path forward towards cost-sharing by China for the Programme.

The operational risk facing the Programme are the risk that the information platform may not be developed on time and the risks imposed by the quarterly reporting load.

Sustainability for the Programme interventions in themselves is not really an issue. For the Chinese implementing partners, they can probably access other state funding to continue their own programmes. For Nepal and Bangladesh, the individual activities can probably be continued under the larger programmes of which they are part, so long as UNDP can secure funding for them.

The MTR team see no great advantage in continuing the current demonstration activities beyond the extended end of Phase II. They will have served their purpose by that time. However, there is still an advantage to be gained from sharing experience between the countries and in experimenting with new approaches culled from the different countries. This does not require demonstration activities but can build upon the existing DRR programmes in the three countries.

However, simply extending the Programme without any clear plan to transition to cost-sharing with China, or Chinese funding from the South-South Aid Fund would just be postponing the end of Programme activities without any sustained benefit.

## Recommendations

The MTR team recommends that:

* NDRCC should consider if the present plans for the information platform are appropriate and whether the plans should be revised to focus on a narrower target group.
* DFID should consider using the development of guiding principles as a tool for the management of programmes of this complexity to ensure that they are effective.
* DFID should consider reverting to bi-annual reporting for the Programme.
* The PSC consider establishing quotas for female participation in exchange events.
* DFID grant a no-cost extension of six to twelve months for the completion of the Programme, subject to the PSC identifying a possible route for cost-sharing or to Chinese funding for the Programme.
* The PSC should decide what form any third phase of the Programme should take. Ideally any further phase should build on the seven principles of Phase II and should focus on peer-learning exchanges between the countries involved on community-based projects. An early decision is critical here, to give the partners enough time to plan without losing the momentum that has developed in Phase II.

# Introduction

## Introduction

This report sets out the results of the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of Phase II of the Sharing and Learning on community-based disaster management in Asia (the Programme). The MTR team has prepared an Annual Review of the Programme for 2016 at the same time which has more detail on the Programme results than this report.

## Background

The Programme was initiated in 2012, as part of the UK-China Development Partnership to address global challenges and the UK Government’s Humanitarian Policy commitments[[1]](#footnote-1). The Programme aimed to strengthen regional South-South Cooperation (SSC) in Asia, building on the strong China/UK global partnership to improve cooperation through joint initiatives on community-based disaster management (CBDM) in parts of Asia. The impact of the interventions was intended to be increased resilience to disasters of poor communities in developing countries in the Asia region.

## The Timeline

The Programme was planned to be a five-year initiative implemented in two phases. The Programme completed its first phase in March 2015, with overall performance rated “moderately satisfactory”. The agreement for Phase I was signed between the Ministry of Commerce of China (MOFCOM) and DFID in September 2012, the agreement between DFID and UNDP China in October 2012, and the first funds were disbursed to UNDP at the end of November 2012. Phase I of the Programme came to an end in March 2015, 30 months after the agreement was signed but just over 28 months after the initial disbursement by DFID.

The first phase of the Programme ended with over half a million US dollars[[2]](#footnote-2) in unspent funds. This amount was offset against the contributions for the second phase. This issue is discussed further in the section on financial management.

Phase II was due to start in April 2015 but was delayed by a perfect storm of staff changes and by the desire to ensure that Phase II of the Programme was not just a repeat of Phase I, but drew on the lessons from that phase. The delays led to some frustration among implementing partners.

We spent a whole year discussing the plan for Phase II, then the team changed, and we spent the next year with the same discussions – Programme implementing partner

The staff changes included:

* The change of staff at the Chinese MOFCOM, DFID’s counterpart in China, delayed the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding for Phase II. Thus, it was only signed in June 2015.
* A new head took over in DFID China in May 2015 and he was concerned about the performance of Phase I of the Programme and what he saw as the excessive focus on activities with an inadequate attention to strategic issues. These concerns led to a delay in signing the agreement between UNDP China and DFID China.
* The experienced UNDP manager who had managed the implementation of Phase I of the Programme also left during this period and the newly recruited manager, while having an excellent track record in the National Disaster Reduction Centre for China (NDRCC), did not have experience of UNDP systems and processes, or of managing such a complex programme in accordance with UNDP rules.

DFID China was concerned that the new UNDP team did not then have the experience needed to revise the Programme to meet the need for a more strategic focus and suggesting to UNDP that they employ a consultant to assist with the formulation of a revised implementation plan and log-frame for Phase II.

The consultant selected was already familiar with the Programme as he had led the MTR of Phase I. However, due to pressure of other work, his arrival in China was delayed, and his final report was also delayed until early January 2016. The implementation plan was then developed or revised with inputs from UNDP Nepal and UNDP Bangladesh as well as the two Chinese implementing partners.

Revision of the 2016 Annual Work Plan (AWP) took time and the revised overall AWP was only approved in April 2016, with approval of the Nepal one in June 2016. This meant a considerable delay in the start of the implementation of the second phase. The end date remained fixed at September 2017, two-and-a half years after the initial planned start of Phase II, 2 years after the signing of the DFID-UNDP China agreement, and just 15 months after the Nepal AWP was agreed.

## The tension at the heart of the Programme

The MTR team were presented with two views of the Programme.

* First, there is the strategic level, where the intent is that the Programme should promote of South-South cooperation in Disaster Risk Reduction, Disaster Preparedness, Disaster Response, and Disaster Recovery.
* Second, there is the interventions level, where interventions are intended to provide at-risk populations with the capacity to prepare, respond to, or recover from disasters.

The first, strategic perception of the Programme was found among senior staff in China. This is perhaps a natural follow on from Phase I of the Programme for which the outputs were:

1. Help build China’s capacity for working ‘internationally’ and provide opportunities for Chinese CBDRR officials, technical experts and community practitioners to exchange experience and knowledge with counterparts from other Asian countries;
2. Facilitate community level visits and pilots;
3. Conduct joint research;
4. Set up Community-based Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR) information platforms and websites.

The outputs for Phase II were reformulated to be much sharper and more focused as follows:

* Output 1: Relevant learning about disaster management practices shared between China, UK and developing countries in Asia to strengthen national resilience through policy/institutional support for national disaster risk management and response planning;
* Output 2: Exchanges of practice on CBDRR enhanced among practitioners and communities;
* Output 3: Collaborative research strengthened between research institutes in China, UK and developing countries in the Asia region; and
* Output 4: Information sharing and service platforms established to promote collaboration, learning and communication around CBDRR.

These revised outputs for Phase II are much more strategic than the planned Programme impact as set out in the Programme log-frame, shown in Table 1. The senior staff interviewed in China viewed this project as a strategic one.

By contrast to interviewees in China the implementing partners staff in Nepal and Bangladesh were almost exclusively focused on the activity level, as it was activities, and not the broader strategic objective that they had committed to in their AWPs.

Table 1: Planned Programme impact

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Desired impact | Impact indicator one | Impact indicator two |
| Increased resilience to disasters of poor communities in developing countries in the Asia region | Number of people with adaptive capacity of preparing for, responding to or recovering from disasters (disaggregated data to be provided wherever possible: direct and indirect beneficiaries from CBDM Asia – disaggregated by programme type, gender & age) | Extent to which institutional mechanisms taking effect at local, national or regional levels for coordinated disaster preparedness and response built upon CBDM networks |

*Source: The Programme log-frame as updated in April 2016.*

There is only a weak linkage between the intervention level and the strategic level.

* While interventions that perform well can help to promote South-South Cooperation and scaling up poor replication, the lessons of bad practice can also become a focus for SSC.
* The fact that an activity performs well, is not in itself a guarantee that it will contribute to SSC and learning.

To ensure that the Programme has a strategic outcome, rather than simply meeting a list of activity targets, the Implementation Plan for the Phase II used seven guiding principles for the Programme activities. The activities in Phase II were to be:

1) Based on priority needs.

2) Focus on activities that are priorities in more than one country.

3) Coherent with other domestic and international programmes.

4) Built on the learning and activities in Phase I.

5) Have the potential for replication.

6) Represent value-for-money.

7) Based on an appropriate context analysis.

The principles are described in detail in the design chapter. However, it should be noted that the MTR team found them to be an excellent solution to the problem commonly found in complex interventions. In such interventions the linkage between activities and strategic objective does not follow a simple linear path and is difficult to describe using tools such as the log-frame which are built around the assumptions of a simple linear path.

A reading of the document texts suggests that the following changes are expected from Phase II of the Programme

* Increased understanding of priority needs in Nepal and Bangladesh and how to address them with technical solutions and approaches adapted to the specific contexts;
* Researchers and other stakeholders collaborating in structured applied research projects;
* Positive influence on national and regional policy and legal frameworks based on learning and evidence generated during Phase II.

The MTR team used this formulation rather than the graphical presentation of the expected changes as is roughly follows the outputs, outcome, and impact set out in the logical framework for the Programme (Table 2).

Table 2: Planned Programme Outputs, Outcome, and Impact

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Outputs | Outcomes | Impact |
| 1. Relevant learning about disaster management practices between China, UK and developing countries in Asia shared to strengthen national resilience through policy/institutional support for national disaster risk management and response planning. | Improved regional cooperation on community-based disaster management | Increased resilience to disasters of poor communities in developing countries in the Asia region |
| 1. Exchanges of practice on community-based DRR enhanced among practitioners and communities. |
| 1. Collaborative research strengthened between research institutes in China, UK and developing countries in the Asia region. |
| 1. Information sharing and service platforms established to facilitate collaboration, learning and coordination around CBDRR. |

*Source: The Programme log-frame as updated in April 2016.*

Four million pounds were allocated for the Programme, with the more than half a million dollars remaining with partners from Phase I to be offset against this amount. The funding is allocated among the components as shown in Figure 1

Figure 1: Allocation of the budget of £4 million among the outputs and programme management

*Source: Phase II Programme Implementation Plan*

However, the actual allocation of funds within the 2016 AWP does not match the allocations in the Programme implementation plan. This is discussed below in section 2.2.4.

# Results

## Introduction

This section seeks to answer the following questions:

* To what extent has the Programme made progress towards the planned outputs?
* To what extent has the Programme made progress towards the planned outcomes?
* To what extent has the Programme contributed to setting policies around CBDM?
* What examples of best practice can be seen in the Programme?
* What impact has the Programme had?

Project results are dealt with in more detail in the accompanying Annual Review.

## Output

One issue with identifying progress towards planned outputs is that not all the outputs have targets for 2016. This is the case for the output that the MTR team had the greatest concern about, the development of an information platform under Output 4.

Table 3: Progress against planned outputs to the end of 2016

| Outputs | Output Indicators | Planned | Achieved |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1: Relevant learning about disaster management practices between China, UK and developing countries in Asia shared to strengthen national resilience through policy/institutional support for national disaster risk management and response planning. | 1.1: Number of events for priority themes for:  - High-level exchange activities between UK, China, Bangladesh and Nepal; - Policy dialogues and workshops/seminars on community-based disaster risk reduction (CBDRR); | 1 | 1 |
| 1.2: Number of policy studies/advisory notes developed; | 2 | 3 |
| 2: Exchanges of practice on community-based DRR enhanced among practitioners and communities. | 2.1: Number of exchange activities among CBDM pilot communities; | 1 | 3 |
| 2.2: Number of key technologies and practices in CBDRR demonstrated for peer-learning; | 2 | 6 |
| 3: Collaborative research strengthened between research institutes in China, UK and developing countries in the Asia region. | 3.1 Number of research partnerships established through CBDM research network; | 10 | 15 |
| 3.2 Number of collaborative research activities through CBDM research projects and networks | 9 | 9 |
| 3.3 Number of research papers, study reports & knowledge products published, disseminated and applied through CBDM Asia and relevant projects; | 3 | 3 |
| 4: Information sharing and service platforms established to facilitate collaboration, learning and coordination around community-based disaster risk reduction. | 4.1 Number of programme publications shared on the platform | 0 | 0 |
| 4.2 Extent to which CBDM resources and information reaching community users through the platform | Partially | None |

*Source: Progress trackers, project documents, and interviews*

### Output 1: Policy

For this output, one high-level meeting on mega-disaster response capacity took place in Xi’an on October 25-26 2016. Some interviewees from DFID expressed their concern that it was not readily apparent to those attending the event that DFID was funding it. However, UKaid is clearly identified in the meeting backdrop banner (Figure 2) and in the e-book of the meeting.

Also, as the objective of the Programme is to promote SSC, it is entirely appropriate that the donor not be at the forefront. Nevertheless, the key implementing partners are fully aware of DFID’s role, if only in consequence of the active role that DFID China has taken in the overall management of the Programme.

*Source: Pcloud repository for the high-level meeting at* *http://pc.cd/ukzotalK. No photographer credited with photo.*

Figure : Opening for the High-level Forum at Xi'an

Another criticism voiced of the meeting was that it was bland and not critical of the aspects of response to, for example, the Gorkha Earthquake in Nepal. However, such critical reviews are uncommon at this level of meeting and would violate the cultural norms in East Asia.

Interviewees who had attended this, and the other exchange events, including the events organised under other Programme outputs were unstinting in their praise of the opportunities that the meetings had given them for learning from others and for networking.

The Xi’an high-level meeting was prepared after the views of the participating stakeholders were canvassed. Chinese implementing partners had hoped to have a further high-level meeting in the UK on DRR, but that has not yet been organised. This would have been additional to the target of one event in the log-frame.

In the case of policy papers, three (as opposed to the target of two in the log-frame) are currently been finalised:

* A paper on "Social Mobilisation and Service in Disaster Relief: A Case Study of Nepal Earthquake”
* A lessons-learned report and documentary video on the 2015 Gorkha Earthquake Response. The video has been prepared as two 25 minute episodes with one already broadcast by Nepal TV, (the second one was broadcasted on 30th Nov 2016) The learning report (based in part on a series of workshops in the affected district as well as nationally) is currently being translated into English after which it will be reviewed by an international expert to identify issues that resonate more broadly.
* A paper on the implementation of risk-sensitive land use planning and e-BPS (Electronic Building Permit System) in Nepal for safer construction.
  + 1. **Output 2: Practice**

The practice area is one which has seen a great deal of Programme activity and outputs, far more than originally planned in the log-frame. First there have been two peer-learning and exchange events in 2016 plus one at the end of 2015, against the target of one such events by the end of 2016.

The three events were:

* The Seminar on Multi Stakeholder Partnership in CBDRR held in Chengdu from November 30 to December 3 2015. This seminar included two days of field trips to communities which were seriously affected by the 2008 Great Wenchuan Earthquake[[3]](#footnote-3). It is noted that this visit included a demonstration of the use of an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) for disaster reconnaissance, a technique subsequently used by UNDP in Bangladesh for reconnaissance after a tropical cyclone in 2016 (funded under a different programme).
* The experience-sharing workshop on Community Disaster Reduction and Relief held in Chengdu in June 2016. This workshop also included a field trip to earthquake affected areas in Sichuan.
* The visit by a team from NDRCC to Bangladesh and Nepal in November and December 2016. This visit provided NDRCC to identify potential targets for the information platform they are developing, as well as gaining a better understanding of the context in Nepal and Bangladesh.

The key CBDRR technologies and practices demonstrated in the Programme included:

* The development of a methodology for community-based disaster risk and assessment in well underway, and is scheduled for peer review before the end of 2016.
* Guidelines for emergency materials stocks for families and communities are currently in draft.
* The use of smartphone applications for rapid building vulnerability assessment at the municipal level. This technology has been tested in Bangladesh.
* The use of smartphone applications for ensuring compliance with the National Building Code has been developed and demonstrated in Kathmandu.
* Bangladesh has demonstrated the training of urban disaster response volunteers and mass mobilisation to raise earthquake risk awareness.
* Nepal has demonstrated a new approach to community outreach with the mobile information clinics on safe construction and building code compliance. These clinics are a new approach not just because of the use of information technology, but also because they are conducted by an engineer who can answer technical questions rather than just by a trained community worker.

Many of the examples of best practice (described in section 2.6) seen in the Programme fall under Output 2.

The reason that so much progress has been made in Output 2 is because the Programme was inserted in to the national DRR programmes managed by UNDP in both Nepal and Bangladesh. In Nepal especially, this has led to a large number of different activities under the Comprehensive Disaster Risk Management Programme (CDRMP).

In both Nepal and Bangladesh the Programme has benefited from prior UNDP investments in DRR.

### Output 3: Research

Research is another area where outputs have exceeded planned levels. Not only that, but the quality of the ICCR-DRR process is better than one might have expected. Not only are individual projects subject to peer review, as is normal, but the selection of research themes has been through a collaborative peer-reviewed process. The result has been the establishment of a very solid research network.

Additionally, the ICCR-DRR requirements for research proposals is that there should be significant engagement by more than one country. Despite ICCR-DRR being based in China, there is no requirement for Chinese engagement in the research project, nor is there a requirement that the projects only involve the Programme countries.

In terms of research partnerships, while 10 partnerships were planned, there are currently 15 research partners formally engaged in the ICCR-DRR research programme (seven in China, two each in Nepal, Bangladesh and the UK, and one each in Germany and Singapore). It should be noted that the number of theoretical partnerships between 15 partners is a very large number[[4]](#footnote-4).

Academic research is not a rapid process. The procedures, such as peer review, needed to ensure quality research take time. Therefore, it is not surprising that of the nine planned collaborative research projects, one has been contracted, and another eight are in the peer review process. Two research projects were selected for peer review from the first call for proposals, one of these is still in peer review, and the other is well under way. Seven projects selected from the second call for proposals are currently in peer review.

Three research papers have been published in peer-reviewed academic journals and further papers are expected. Output 3 also showed several examples of best practices as described in section 2.6.

### Output 4: Information Platform

Output 4 has the smallest planned budget of the four components at £350,000. However, the budget in the 2016 AWP is over $600,000, considerably more than this, even at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of development of the implementation plan[[5]](#footnote-5). The share of the budget for Output 4 in the 2016 AWP is much higher than its share in the implementation plan Figure 3, and even is expenditure on Output 4 is low in 2017, it will still exceed the allocated share in the original implementation plan.

*Source: Analysis of Programme Implementation plan and 2016 Annual Work Plan*




Figure : Comparison of distribution of budget for outputs in the implementation plan and in the 2016 AWP

It is also the component that is the most ambitious in its scope and has the largest potential for impacting CBDM practice across the region. However, it is the component that has made the least progress and is the one that has the lowest score in the Annual Review. In fact, Output 4 only misses an unsatisfactory score because of the contribution of elements not included in the original log-frame.

This was the output that the MTR team was most concerned about for the following reasons:

* Historically, large IT projects often over-run budgets and timelines[[6]](#footnote-6).
* The presentations to the MTR team on the software development did not provide an indication that the project was being tightly managed (a critical success factor in IT projects)[[7]](#footnote-7) There was no information on compliance with internal timelines, or any presentation of a detailed schedule for implementation.
* The platform seeks to be all things to all people, to provide different information to communities, disaster managers, responders, and government.
* The platform has been developed to data with relatively little input from Nepal and Bangladesh.
* The platform development team plans to develop a website as well as a smart-phone application. The internet environment in China is very different from that in Nepal and Bangladesh, and this is particularly true for smartphones using the Android operating system (the most common type in Nepal and Bangladesh). Also, the levels of smart-phone penetration are much lower in Nepal and Bangladesh than in China, and internet access and bandwidth are much more limited in rural areas than in China.
* The central question, about who is to provide the content for the platform remains unanswered. The experience of such platforms is that content is the critical issue. It is relatively simple to develop a content delivery system, using any of the off-the-shelf content-management solutions, but with a continual flow of new and relevant content, the platform will not be able to attract users in the longer term.

The lack of early engagement by NDRCC with partners in Bangladesh and Nepal has led to UNDP there initiating other information sharing activities under Output 4 in the absence of the information platform.

## Outcomes

Table 4: Progress against planned outcomes

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Planned Outcome | Outcome Indicator | Planned for end 2016 | Achieved by end 2016 |
| Improved regional cooperation on community-based disaster management | Number of official mechanisms / channels established to enhance communication and coordination between the partner countries and beyond | 2 | 2 |
| Number of collaborative partnerships generating learning beyond the project | 13 | 15+ |
| Extent to which practical knowledge and tools promoted by CBDM collaborations are utilised to strengthen capacity of DRR at community level | Partially | Considerable |

The official mechanism established include:

* A channel for communication and coordination among government agencies working on DRR through the engagement of Nepal and Bangladesh with their country progammes; and
* A mechanism for academic cooperation via the ICCR-DRR research network.

The collaborative partnerships generated include more than 15 institutions engaged in the ICCR-DRR research network. These include the 15 formal members of the research network, and others who have engaged in specific research projects such as the Bangladesh University for Engineering and Technology (BUET) which has joined the ICCR-DRR funded retrofitting research project.

The practical knowledge generated by collaboration has been used to strengthen capacity at the community level including:

* The exchange events previously referred to. Interviewees from Nepal and Bangladesh who attended these told the MTR team that they had taken home lessons about preparedness for earthquake risks from these events.
* There are many outputs from the Programme collaborations that are being used to strengthen DRR capacity at community level. These include:
  + The use of mobile information clinics to promote safe construction in Nepal.
  + The development of a smartphone app for checking compliance with the National Building Code.
  + A new approach to rapid earthquake vulnerability assessment for building in Nepal.
  + Earthquake vulnerability assessment in Bangladesh.
  + The creation of Disaster Management Committees in Mymensingh.
* The training of the Mymensingh volunteers in Bangladesh has been based in part from lessons from the Ghorka Earthquake in Nepal.

In Bangladesh, the approach from the Programme has been replicated in aspects of the new National Resilience Programme (NRP) and the Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP) III.

## Policy outcomes

Policy is established in two ways:

* From the top down in response to political decisions at the Ministerial level.
* From the middle up, through the establishment of normal working practices by operational agencies. Such working practices then become the norm and establish de-facto policy through bureaucratic inertia.

In the Programme, DFID China is engaged more with operational agencies than with the ministerial level. Even so, this engagement is generating policies around CBDM through the implementing partners in China and in Nepal and Bangladesh.

Thus, in Bangladesh, the Programme approach has been incorporated into Phase III of the CDMP, which is expected to be funded wholly by the Bangladesh Government. In Nepal, the district governments are using the building permit forms developed by the Programme staff.

In Bangladesh, the decision to implement the Programme via Mymensingh Municipality rather than via NGOs means that, while the launch of activities has been slow, they are being incorporated into the Municipality policies.

## Impact

The Programme has already achieved the outcome of improved regional cooperation on regional disaster management. However, it is a long step from there to the desired impact of increased resilience to disasters of poor communities in developing countries in the Asia region.

The MTR team observed impact at two levels:

* In the effect of interventions on the communities directly engaged with the Programme; and
* In the linkages already built between different countries on disaster management.

The major impact of the Programme has been on establishing the validity of a model for triangular cooperation.

## Best practice

Many examples of best practice were found by the MTR team in the overall approach, in the management of the Programme, and in the Programme interventions.

### Best practice in the overall approach

Phase I of the Programme already provided examples of best practice in the overall approach:

* Financing an experimental programme: One clear example of best practice in the overall approach was that this was, as one interviewee described it, an experimental programme. An experiment is only useful if it leads to increased knowledge. The reason for the delays in the launch of Phase II was because of the desire of the Programme managers to ensure that lessons from Phase I were learned.
* Establishing a new model for Triangular Cooperation (TrC) where a Northern donor supports South-South Cooperation (SSC). Nothing like it had been attempted before in China and it provided an example for TrC that other donors then followed.

Phase II of the Programme continued the learning approach seen in Phase I and:

* Ensured that the lessons from Phase I were reflected in the detailed plans for Phase II by distilling the lessons from Phase I into the seven guiding principles underlying Phase II.

### Best practice in Programme interventions

The team noted many examples of innovative and best practice in the activities conducted under the Programme:

* In Nepal, UNDP is funding one of vansmobile technology clinic with Programme funding to support owner driven reconstruction by outreaching earthquake affected communities with socio-technical support for safer reconstruction. . The vans have solar panels to recharge their batteries and a large flat-screen television to present videos with risk reduction and recovery messages. The vans are innovative in that they can operate in day-light hours (in contrast to cinema vans), and are literally covered with the risk reduction messages.
* In Nepal, UNDP recruited an engineer to accompany the mobile van. This is a huge advance on the usual practice of having a community worker present technical materials, as the engineer could answer technical questions from the audience.
* In Nepal, all the Information, Education, and Communication material on risk reduction and reconstruction were agreed by the members of the Shelter Cluster. This is a welcome departure from each agency developing their own materials.
* In Nepal, UNDP conducted workshops at both the district and national level to establish lessons-learned for the Programme information products. Such exercises are too often limited to the national level and miss the learning that has taken place at the local level.
* In Nepal, UNDP financed the production of a television programme on lessons from the 2015 Gorkha Earthquake response and aired through National Television. This is a departure from the norm which sees learning products produced or officials only with the media transmitting only the more sensational messages to the public.
* In Bangladesh, the training of urban volunteers, based in the community is a new initiative (other urban volunteers are based in the Fire Service and Civil Defence rather than in the community). Bangladesh has large number of rural disaster preparedness volunteers in area at risk of tropical cyclones and storm surges.
* In China, 4 pilot communities have been selected to the corresponding needs from Bangladesh and Nepal for different types of disasters.



Figure : The earthquake information van at work in a village. The boards show illustrations on safe construction practice and are supported by information leaflets. A flat screen television in the shade inside the van has just finished showing a video on safe construction, and the engineer is presenting a summary and taking questions. (Source- MTR team photo).

### Best practice in establishing linkages

* In China, the International Centre for Collaborative Research on Disaster Risk Reduction (ICCR-DRR) of Beijing Normal University (BNU) has introduced the rule that all applications for research funding under the Programme must involve two countries in a non-trivial way.
* The ICCR-DRR also used an international consultative process to establish what the research priorities should be.
* The ICCR-DRR told applicants that it was not a requirement that a Chinese institution be one of the research partners. This is a departure from the norm for research funds managed from China.
* The most developed research partnership was broadened to include BUET in Bangladesh when they expressed interest in joining the research.

### Best practice in programme implementation and management

### Programme management manual shared and trained to all implementation partners to make sure the regulations and processes are acknowledged and followed.

### The integration with existing resources represents value-for-money and contribute to smooth programme progress.

### Collaborative and participatory approach throughout the planning and implementation make sure that planned activities are needs-oriented to better fit into communities, and it also brings great potential of sustainability because the changes are brought about by voluntary communities.

### Guiding principles run through programme implementation & management

### Communication and coordination mechanism built through various opportunities, for example, meetings, task forces, visits, seminars and so on. Meeting minutes, E-books , project tracker and publications are also timely shared and circulated.

## Conclusions

The Programme has largely achieved or exceeded, or is on course to achieve or exceed the targets for 2016. This is in spite for the much delayed start. This has only been possible because of both the previous investment by UNDP in DRR in both Nepal and Bangladesh, and because the Programme activities could be inserted into existing UNDP DRR programmes in both Nepal and Bangladesh. This has helped leverage the Programme inputs to have much greater impact.

The one aspect of the Programme that raises concern about whether it will achieve the planned outputs is the information platform.

## Recommendation

The MTR team recommends that:

* NDRCC should consider if the present plans for the information platform are appropriate and whether the plans should be revised to focus on a narrower target group.

# Design

This section seeks to answer the following questions:

* To what extent is the Theory of Change valid
* How effective has the cooperation model been?
* How effectively have the seven guiding principles of the implementation plan guided implementation?
* To what extent is the Programme design appropriate to the Programme objectives

## Validity of the Theory of Change

The Theory of Change (ToC) is presented in slightly different flavours in different documents. The graphical presentation is not the same as the presentation in the text of the implementation plan. The MTR team has used this version as it is the most coherent.

**Box: Expected changes from the intervention as set out in the Intervention Plan**

1. Increased understanding of priority needs in Nepal and Bangladesh and how to address them with technical solutions and approaches adapted to the specific contexts;
2. Researchers and other stakeholders collaborating in structured applied research projects;
3. Positive influence on national and regional policy and legal frameworks based on learning and evidence generated during Phase II.

The MTR team considered that the ToC at this level is broadly valid, but that the linkages between these changes and reduced vulnerability are complex and outside the direct control of the Programme.

Another complexity is the linkage between the activities, broader learning, and the implementation of policy to actually reduce vulnerability. For example, Nepal has had a National Building Code (NBC) since 1994, although it was only approved by the Government in 2003. It was quite clear from the work of the Programme in Nepal that the NBC has not yet been applied in practice, but the Programme intervention is helping to address this by providing technical support to the municipalities in establishment of code compliant building permit system.

## Cooperation model

The cooperation model is complex – TrC rather than just South-South Cooperation (SSC). UNDP China stated that it was the first such cooperative project that they had managed, and that others have followed in its wake. It was seen as an excellent example of TrC.

The TrC model is a good one. While China does not really need donor resources, the policy inputs and international experience that DFID can supply have been useful in the Programme.

## The seven guiding principles

As noted earlier the elaboration of seven guiding principles is an example of best practice. The seven principles are set out in the following box. The development of such principles is very useful in such a complex project with many different actors. It also helped to ensure a strategic focus for the activities.

**Box: The seven guiding principles**

Prioritization Based on Needs: The programme shall prioritize those areas that pilot countries (Bangladesh, Nepal) have identified as CBDRR strategic areas where China and the UK, share common needs or interests and whose expertise and capacity can potentially add significant value. Given the changing contexts (end of community-based project cycles in both countries, earthquake recovery scenario in Nepal), assessments should be regularly updated and integrated into intervention design to ensure that Phase II intervention adds value to existing initiatives and learning to meet priority needs in Nepal and Bangladesh.

Focussing on common priorities and regional collaboration: As recommended in the evaluation of Phase I, the implementation strategy for Phase II should shift from a focus on standalone activities (such as workshops) to collaborating on common priorities guided by a shared workplan which should be jointly developed by partners in the four countries. The work plan should aim at specific targets and support regional collaboration, rather than unilateral activities.

Cohesion with Other Domestic and International Programmes: CBDM Asia Phase II initiatives should seek to contribute to outcome of other programmes or initiatives in pilot countries and elsewhere in the Asian region. Strategic links with ongoing or planned activities in pilot countries and elsewhere in the region will help avoid the need to establish and to test new systems within a very tight timeframe and, at the same time, to promote sustainability. Partners should actively seek complementary resources to promote ownership and sustainability

Building upon Phase I: Based on the achievements of Phase I, CBDM Asia Phase II will focus on dissemination and application of key knowledge (critical technologies), where relevant and appropriate.

Operability and Potential for Replication: The context and priorities of partner countries and communities shall be taken into account and common concerns of the communities highlighted. An expected outcome of the Programme is that participants emerge with a much better understanding of how knowledge and technologies can be contextualised and applied. When testing and piloting techniques, relevant learning about adaptation systems and approaches in China and the UK will also be captured.

Value for Money: The programme interventions should demonstrate solutions to problems or improvement during programme period that offer value-for-money. There should be a robust Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) mechanism in place based on the Theory of Change to provide evidence of results or the process of changes.

Contextual analysis: CBDM Asia II should ensure that activities are informed by an appropriate contextual analysis that takes account of gender, vulnerability (e.g. caste), social, economic and environmental impact.

### The use of the seven principles in ensuring Programme quality

The MTR team found that the seven guiding principles have been a very effective tool for ensuring the quality of Programme activities.

1. Prioritization Based on Needs. The review of AWP activities has helped to ensure that project priorities are based on needs, and not just on individual actor’s own agendas.
2. Focussing on common priorities and regional collaboration. The clearest
3. Cohesion with Other Domestic and International Programmes. The integration of the Programme in with existing national DRR activity in Nepal and Bangladesh had helped to ensure not only that the Programme is coherent with them, but has also served to inject a focus on Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) into such national programmes.
4. Building upon Phase I. Phase II clearly builds on the activities under Phase I. Several interviewees in Nepal and Bangladesh referred positively to learning on exchange visits they had made as part of Phase I.
5. Operability and Potential for Replication. While the Chinese model cannot be applied in the different government and socio-economic contexts of Nepal and Bangladesh, there are still lessons that Nepal and Bangladesh have for each other and for China. The Programme activities in Nepal and Bangladesh have a very operational focus, and there is already some evidence of broader replication.
6. Value for Money. The MTR team is satisfied that the Programme represents value for money for DFID as:

* Programme outputs have been greater than planned.
* The insertion into existing national programmes, and the building on past DRR investments, have leveraged the Programme investment to have greater impact.

1. Contextual analysis. The Nepal and Bangladesh elements of the Programme sit within their own national contexts and are as appropriate for the context as the other UNDP interventions in those countries. The biggest challenge for appropriate contextual analysis occurs with cross border interventions. The ICCR-DRR has dealt with this issue through the use of multi-country peer review and joint priority setting. NDRCC has not been as successful and the MTR team was concerned by the lack of consultation with partners on the planned information platform.

## Appropriateness of the design

The MTR team considered that the Programme was well designed for what it was. The Programme was a learning one with an experimental approach. It was this experimental approach that led, in part, to the long pause between Phase I and Phase II as the lessons from Phase I were taken on board for Phase II.

The design has been surprisingly effective. It has enabled the partners to develop effective collaboration and learning between them.

## Conclusions

The Programme ToC is largely valid. As with all ToCs, the biggest question is about the linkages between Programme activities and the broader processes which are subject to many other influences. The TrC model has been effective and has served as a guide for other TrC projects implemented by UNDP. The seven guiding principles were very effective in ensuring Programme quality in what was a very complex intervention.

## Recommendation

The MTR team recommend that:

* DFID should consider using the development of guiding principles as a tool for the management of programmes of this complexity to ensure that they are effective.

We note that this is effectively already the case for DFID-funded humanitarian interventions which are expected to conform to humanitarian standards and codes of practice. Using guiding principles are particular appropriate in experimental approaches like this Programme.

# Programme Management

This section seeks to answer the following questions:

* To what extent have the management and implementation mechanisms been appropriate?
* To what extent have the management and implementation mechanisms been able to address challenges and risks?
* To what extent has financial management been effective?

## Management

As noted earlier, the Programme is a complex one, covering multiple institutions in multiple countries, all of which have different political and socio-economic contexts[[8]](#footnote-8).

The Programme is an unusual one in that DFID has taken a very direct role in the implementation rather than just acting as a funder. The MTR team considered that the close attention to quality by DFID has led to a higher quality Programme that might otherwise have been the case.

At times this close control has been a source of frustration to partners, as they waited for agreement on work plans. However, in a collaborative programme of this type, it is critical that there be broad agreement on the plans and that plans pay attention to the principles underlying the implementation.

## Managing challenges and risks

The more intensive approach that DFID took to managing Phase II of the Programme was based on two factors:

* Phase I ended with a balance of over half a million dollars in partner accounts.
* The experienced Programme management team in UNDP changed and was replaced by new hires.

DFID China took a proactive stance on Programme management, including assisting UNDP China with a revised Programme management manual and changing the frequency of reporting. While the business case for the Programme foresaw bi-annual reporting and payments to partners, DFID changed this to quarterly reporting and transfers to avoid a repetition of the large balances at the end of Phase I.

The frequency of reporting has been an issue for partners, with twice the transaction cost for reporting that they would normally expect. UNDP in Nepal and Bangladesh have pointed out that that this is a heavy load for what is, for them a relatively small programme[[9]](#footnote-9).

The close management has ensured that any risks arising have been quickly dealt with.

## Financial management

The frequent reporting also introduces additional constraints on funding for partners, in that there are now four occasions a year where partner are waiting for new tranches of funding. Funding is based not on approved financial reports, but on a quality assured quarterly budget. In theory, it should be possible for this to be completed before the start of the new quarter, but in practice this has not happened. For example, the transfer for 2016Q3 (July to September 2016) was only made in late August, and then had to make its way through the UNDP system before being disbursed to partners.

Partners reported that this delay had improved. The transfers for 2016Q4 (October-December 2016) were expected to be made on 30 October. The basic reason is delays in presenting budgets, and the time it takes to quality assure them.

## Conclusions

The Programme is well managed, with close attention to management by both UNDP China and DFID China. Quarterly reporting imposes a large load on the Programme partners, and while it was a necessary measure in the first part of Phase I, system should have matured to the stage where the Programme could revert to six-monthly reporting.

## Recommendation

The MTR team recommends that:

* Consider moving back to bi-annual reporting

# Learning

This section seeks to answer the following questions:

* What lessons have been learned from the Programme?
* How effective has the Programme M&E been?

## Lessons

The MTR team identified the following lessons:

* Such programmes, involving multiple partners from different political, socio-economic, and cultural contexts, are complex and need careful management. DFID China has invested significant time in getting the Programme right. This has paid off in the results seen by the MTR team.
* The Programme approach was experimental. This was a learning initiative that tried something that had not previously been tried, and that resulted in significant learning for the partners. Part of that learning has been about the complexity of such a programme and about how to manage such complexity. This will be very useful for partners in future peer-learning programmes in the region.
* The Programme is relatively small, but it has had a significant impact, in that it has helped share ideas and experience across the region.
* Basing the Programme on actual issues has helped. Even the academic research has focused on issues that are of immediate practical use in the region (e.g. the study on the retro-fitting of existing building against earthquake risks). This has ensured that learning from the Programme can be used instrumentally rather than merely contribution to a broad body of knowledge.
* While each learning event is an excellent starting point for building collaborative partnerships, an ongoing communication mechanism, such as a list-server, is needed to that event participants can keep in touch and inform each other of opportunities for collaboration.
* Communication is critically important for such a complex programme. One interviewee noted that you need to over-communicate in joint programmes like this one to ensure that everyone gets the message. Greater clarity on roles and expectations would have helped to avoid some mis-communication. A lack of a common understanding is harmful to collaboration
* Everyone has something to contribute. While China has enormous disaster management experience, especially on response and recovery, it is not as strong on risk reduction and prevention. China also has less experience of working with Civil Society Organisations than does Nepal, or of working with Volunteers than does Bangladesh. Every country has something to bring to the table.

## M&E

The present MTR is the first evaluation of Phase II of the Programme. We found that most of the issues identified in the MTR of Phase I have been addressed in the design phase for Phase II. The contracting of the team-leader of the Phase I MTR by UNDP to assist with the development of the Phase II implementation plan was just one measure to help ensure that lessons were learned.

The MTR team have been impressed by the close monitoring of the Programme by DFID China and by UNDP China. The minutes of the monthly meetings between DFID and UNDP show an attention to detail that has helped to ensure the quality of the Programme activities.

## Conclusions

Those involved have learned lessons about managing such a complex programme, where two Chinese implementing partners are implementing the Programme in China and two UNDP country offices in Nepal and Bangladesh act both as implementers and as Programme Management Units. Differences in national contexts, in styles of work, and of priorities have all added complexity to the Programme. It has only managed to function as well as it has because of the determined effort by UNDP China and DFID China to actively manage the Programme.

# Cross-cutting Issues

This section seeks to answer the following questions:

* To what extent has the Programme paid attention to gender?
* To what extent has the Programme paid attention to other cross-cutting issues?
* To what extent has the Programme represented value or money?

## Gender

Gender is an important issue in disaster risk reduction, as natural disasters kill more women than men[[10]](#footnote-10). Not only this but the greater the gap between the socioeconomic position of women and men, the greater the disparity of mortality between women and men.[[11]](#footnote-11)

The position of women is very different in the three countries which we visited. This reflects the position of women in the different societies. This can be seen from the Gender Inequality Index[[12]](#footnote-12) scores for the Programme members.

Table 5: Gender Inequality Index for Programme countries. A higher index indicates greater inequality

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Programme member | Gender Inequality Index |
| Bangladesh | 0.503 |
| China | 0.191 |
| Nepal | 0.489 |
| United Kingdom | 0.177 |

*Source: 2015 Human Development Report[[13]](#footnote-13)*

The gender balance of interviewees shows the domination of men in Nepal and Bangladesh. In China one implementing partner was led by a woman, the other by a man. The Programme management team in both DFID and UNDP China were led by women. However, all the institutions visited in Nepal and Bangladesh were led by men. The only exception was a community DRR committee in Ganeshistan which was chaired by a woman.

Despite this disadvantage, the Programme has tried to maintain a focus on gender. It is a programming priority for UNDP, and UNDP was careful to keep track of female participation in Programme activities. In Nepal, the UNDP staff implementing the Programme have identified women as the primary target for earthquake risk and safe building education.

However, the gender disparity is evident in the group photos from the experience exchange events. The group photo (Figure 5) for the Chengdu experience-sharing workshop on community disaster reduction and relief in Jun 2016 shows over forty participants, of which less than one-quarter are female. Very few of the attendees from Bangladesh and Nepal are female.

*Source: E-book on Experience-Sharing Workshop*




Figure : Group photo from the Chengdu experience-sharing workshop in (June 27-30, 2016)

## Other cross-cutting issues including community engagement

Community engagement was surprisingly high in Nepal and Bangladesh. This is due to historic factors rather than to the Programme itself.

In Nepal, the demonstration communities selected by UNDP are communities where UNDP had previously established DRR committees under an old project. These committees continued to function even after the end of UNDP funding.

Critically, the District Government of [Sindhupalchowk](https://www.google.ie/search?num=30&safe=off&espv=2&rlz=1C1CHBF_enIE690IE690&q=Sindhupalchowk&spell=1&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj43dX589rQAhUmC8AKHRRQDyMQvwUIGCgA), in their review of the response to the 2015 Ghorka Earthquake, noted that communities with DRR committees were far more organised after the earthquake, much faster to provide information to the district government, had already begun rescue activities, had mobilised community resources, and played a key role in aid distribution. The result is that the district government is now seeking to establish such committees in all communities of the district.

Thus in Nepal, all of the hard work of generating community engagement has already been done. This was not the case in Bangladesh, where a new area was selected by UNDP, the Municipality of Mymensingh. However, the inhabitants of Mymensingh got a bad fright when they experienced tremors from the April 2016 Myanmar Earthquake[[14]](#footnote-14).

The Nepal Earthquake the previous year had already sensitised people to earthquake risk, and the tremors from the Myanmar Earthquake frightened people. The MTR team found a high level of interest in earthquake risks in Mymensingh and a great deal of community engagement with the Programme. For example, the volunteers trained under the Programme had been selected by the community through a consultative process.

## Value for money

**Box: The components of Value for Money for DFID**

Economy: Are we or our agents buying inputs of the appropriate quality at the right price?

Efficiency: How well do we or our agents convert inputs into outputs?

Effectiveness: How well are the outputs from an intervention achieving the desired outcome? (Note that in contrast to outputs, we or our agents do not exercise direct control over outcomes)

Cost-effectiveness: How much impact on outcomes does an intervention achieve relative to the inputs that we or our agents invest in it?

*Source: DFID’s Approach to Value for Money (2011)*

### Economy

The use of UN procurement rules and other agency procurement rules help to ensure that inputs are purchased at the right price.

### Efficiency

Efficiency could possibly be higher in the short term if using NGOs rather than state partners. However, this would be less sustainable and would limit the opportunities for learning between countries.

### Effectiveness

The MTR team considered that the outputs in Nepal and Bangladesh have been effectively turned into outcomes in part by building on previous UNDP investment and larger UNDP programmes.

### Cost-effectiveness

The combination of fitting into larger programmes and building on existing investments in DRR means that the Programme represents tremendous value for money

The only fly in the ointment is the information platform under Output four. While this has the potential for enormous cost-effectiveness it is still not developed enough to enable a judgement of how useful it will actually be.

## Conclusions

While gender participation in China is adequate, gender inequality is significant in both Bangladesh and Nepal. This leads to relatively low participation by women in exchange events. The project needs to do more to encourage the participation by women in the learning and exchange events. While recognising that gender imbalance in leadership position within institutions in Nepal and Bangladesh limit the scope for participation by women in exchange events, more can be done to promote female participation.

## Recommendation

The MTR team recommend that:

* The PSC consider establishing quotas for female participation in exchange events.

Even a quote as low as one-third overall would dramatically improve the gender balance at the exchange events.

# Risks, Sustainability and Future Direction

This section seeks to answer the following questions:

* What risks does the Programme face?
* How can the Programme ensure sustainability after the end of UK funding?
* What future direction should the Programme take?

## Risks

### Strategic risks

The major risk that the MTR identified is that the Programme ends as planned in September 2017. Implementing partners have made clear that time, rather than funds or other physical or political factors, constrains the full implementation of the Programme.

DFID would face a significant reputational risk from such a termination, given the negative way in which the termination of the UK bilateral aid programme was managed. The 2016 ICAI report on transition notes that: “In China, funds not disbursed on 31 March 2011 (the scheduled end date for bilateral aid) were cut. This affected several programmes, including two that were jointly financed with the World Bank on water and sanitation and support through civil society for marginalised groups. The Ministry of Education of China requested a non-cost extension in order to maximise learning from its programme. This was denied. DFID was unique among the exiting donors in China in not honouring its commitments. Both the Chinese Government and the World Bank expressed their concerns about this decision.”[[15]](#footnote-15)

Repeating this with the Programme would damage relations with Chinese implementing partners, and make it more difficult to pursue DFID’s strategic objectives as set out in the 2016 business plan, especially as one of the implementing partners (NDRCC) is a key actor in Chinese overseas aid for disaster management.

However, there is a countervailing risk: the risk that if DFID extended the time-period for the Programme without any clear path forward towards cost-sharing by China for the Programme, the investment might be wasted if the Programme were to end when DFID funding ended.

One further risk is that broadening the number of countries involved would reduce the opportunities or peer-learning. All of those asked about peer-learning in Bangladesh and Nepal said that they favoured this as it provided them with more learning opportunities that broader regional programmes. Some interviewees even specifically asked that the Programme not be extended to other countries.

### Operational risks

One operational risk is that the information platform will not be ready on time or that it will not meet its objectives. Discussion of NDRCC with partners in Bangladesh suggested that some in NDRCC had not yet grasped the concept of mutual learning. There has been little engagement with the other countries in the development of the data platform, and NDRCC has only lately asked for information inputs for the platform. However, there was no prior discussion on what type of information might be available and how it might best be collected.

The MTR team were concerned that NDRCC, while working as the technical coordinator and lead, was not engaging partners in Bangladesh and Nepal as counterparts in the process. Such a collaborative approach is essential for the success of such a joint project.

A second operational risk is that the reporting load imposed on the partners may mitigate against effective control of the Programme. While the reasons for shifting to quarterly reporting are very clear, now that the Programme Management Unit is well established and the Programme is well under way, it may be time to review the need for such frequent reporting.

## Sustainability[[16]](#footnote-16)

Sustainability for the Programme interventions in themselves is not really an issue. For the Chinese implementing partners, they can probably access other state funding to continue their own programme activities. For Nepal and Bangladesh, the individual activities can probably be continued under the larger programmes of which they are part, so long as UNDP can secure funding for them.

What will not survive without DFID funding is the interchange of experience between the different countries. In interviews, it seemed that Chinese partners perceived the Programme as a bilateral programme with DFID rather than a regional programme. It was also clear that some in China saw the exchange with other countries more as the export of the Chinese experience than a true exchange.

The MTR team notes that the Sendai Frameworks for Disaster Risk Reduction[[17]](#footnote-17) calls for peer-learning to help understand the nature of disaster risks, and call upon the international community to support this. Phase II of the Programme has been an example of the type of learning that the framework calls for. The Regional Ministerial Meeting endorsed the regional action plan for the Sendai Framework in November 2016.

## Future direction

There was no unanimity on the future direction of the Programme. Different persons interviewed had very different views. For DFID, the policy was stated clearly, there would be no continuation of the Programme in the present format as DFID is now much more interested in activities in China which have:

* A strategic rather than an operational focus; and
* Need inputs which only DFID can provide.

One intriguing proposal was that Phase III could concentrate on an area where the UK had a commanding lead, that of humanitarian response. Being a small island in the temperate zone, the UK faces far fewer major disasters than do the other members of the Programme. However, the UK has unparalleled experience at responding to humanitarian crises. However, this would require significant engagement by the Conflict, Humanitarian and Security (CHASE) team in DFID, and the CHASE team already has a very full workload.

Whatever the future for the Programme there is clearly a need for more peer-learning in the region on CBDRM, and on how CBDRM can play a role in broader regional processes.

## Conclusions

The current planned end of Programme activities in September 2017 will mitigate against the strategic objectives of the Programme. A no-cost extension of the Programme implementation would enable:

* All the planned activities to be completed despite the delayed start to Phase II.
* All dissemination of learning from the experiences to date.
* Provide more time for the implementing partners to reflect on and learn from their experience to date.
* Provide time for a transition to either cost-sharing with China or funding via the Chinese South-South Aid Fund.

The MTR team see no great advantage in continuing the current demonstration activities beyond the extended end of Phase II. They will have served their purpose by that time. However, there is still an advantage to be gained from sharing experience between the countries and in experimenting with new approaches culled from the different countries. This does not require demonstration activities but can build upon the existing DRR programmes in the three countries.

However, simply extending the Programme without any clear plan to transition to cost-sharing with China, or Chinese funding from the South-South Aid Fund would just be postponing the end of Programme activities. While this would allow more time for drawing lessons from the Programme it would be unlikely to get approval from DFID Head Office.

Phase II has been successful in drawing lessons from community-based projects in the region. This is what has been unique about the Programme in contrast to broader regional initiatives, and to other DRR initiatives.

## Recommendation

The MTR team recommends that:

* DFID grants a no-cost extension of six to twelve months for the completion of the Programme, subject to the PSC identifying a possible route for cost-sharing or to Chinese funding for the Programme.

The MTR team further recommends that:

* The Programme Steering Committee should decide what form any third phase of the Programme should take. Ideally any further phase should build on the seven principles of Phase II and should focus on peer-learning exchanges between the countries involved on community-based projects. An early decision is critical here, to give the partners enough time to plan without losing the momentum that has developed in Phase II.

# Appendix 1: Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference – Mid-Term Review of

Phase II of Sharing and Learning on Community Based Disaster Management in Asia Programme

**1. Background**

The *Sharing and Learning on Community Based Disaster Management in Asia* Programme (CBDM Asia) aims to increase resilience of poor communities to disasters in developing countries in the Asian region through improved regional cooperation. The programme is part of the UK-China Development Partnership to address global challenges. Initiated in 2012, the Programme completed its first phase in March 2015, with overall performance rated “moderately satisfactory”. Phase II started from July 2015 and will end in September 2017.

Outputs for Phase II are as follows:

Output 1: Relevant learning about disaster management practices shared between China, UK and developing countries in Asia to strengthen national resilience through policy/institutional support for national disaster risk management and response planning

Output 2: Exchanges of practice on community-based disaster risk reduction (DRR) enhanced among practitioners and communities

Output 3: Collaborative research strengthened between research institutes in China, UK and developing countries in the Asia region

Output 4: Information sharing and service platforms established to promote collaboration, learning and communication around Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction

National Disaster Reduction Centre of China (NDRCC) and Beijing Normal University (BNU) lead the implementation on the Chinese side. UNDP China serves as the Programme Management Unit, working together with UNDP country offices in Bangladesh and Nepal to coordinate activities in the two countries.

**2. Objective**

The assignment is a combination of project mid-term review and annual review of 2016 to assess performance and progress of the Programme and to make recommendations. It will allow all partners to make informed decisions about implementation for the remaining period of Phase II and the future direction of the partnership and activities established under the Programme. The review shall cover all activities undertaken by the Programme since its start in July 2015. Since DFID funding is due to end in September 2017 the review will also make recommendations on how partners could seek to ensure sustainability of activities supported.

**3. Methodology**

The review method will include the following as a minimum:

* Desk review of the key documents including business case, log-frame, implementation plan, M&E framework and annual review reports
* Interviews with key informants including
* Ministry of Civil Affairs, NDRCC, BNU, UNDP and DFID teams including Humanitarian Response Group (London) and country offices in China, Nepal and Bangladesh
* Nepalese and Bangladesh agencies participating in programme activities
* Site visits to selected communities in China, Bangladesh and Nepal where necessary

**4. Tasks**

The review team shall:

1. Develop a review plan
2. Assess the achievements of the Programme toward expected outputs and outcome
3. Assess validity of theory of change and programme design
4. Review management and implementation mechanisms of the Programme, including challenges and risk management
5. Assess value-for-money and the effectiveness of financial management
6. Document best practice and key lessons learned and make recommendations on future direction of the Programme and how to ensure sustainability when UK funding comes to an end
7. Complete a final review report based on findings of the evaluation

**5. Reporting and logistic support**

The review will be carried out by a team of two consultants, with advisory support from the Programme Steering Committee. The team will be selected through tendering managed by DFID’s Procurement Team. The Team Leader will report to Su Zhang, Agriculture and Natural Resource Adviser at DFID China. Programme Officer Ruo Zhang will coordinate finance and logistical arrangement to/from China. UNDP China will facilitate the arrangement of meetings and field visits in China, Bangladesh and Nepal. Translation will be provided during interviews where necessary.

**6. Timing**

The expected inputs are up to 30 days from the lead consultant and up to 25 days from the other member of the review team.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Timeframe | Activities |
| By 13 November 2016 | Reviewing programme documents and preparing an evaluation plan |
| By 4 December 2016 | Interviewing stakeholders in UK, China, Bangladesh and Nepal and conducting site visits if required |
| By 9 December 2016 | Submitting draft reports |
| w/c 12 December | Briefing the Programme Steering Committee |
| By 19 December 2016 | Finalising the evaluation report according to Programme Steering Committee’s feedback |

**7. Deliverables**

1. A review plan, including methodology, evaluation questions and list of key-informant interviews to be held. The Programme Steering Committee will provide advice and support where necessary.
2. A draft evidence-supported evaluation report. The evaluation report should be no more than 20 pages excluding annexes, including all elements mentioned in Task 2-7. It should have an executive summary of up to three pages.
3. A draft annual review report in DFID standard template
4. A video-recorded presentation of review findings at the Programme Steering Committee meeting

**8. Qualifications**

The review team will consist of two members, who should have

* A minimum of 10-year demonstrable experience in disaster programme management and evaluation. The team leader should have at least 5-year experience in leading evaluation of international development programmes in this field.
* Excellent knowledge of disaster management institutions and development context in China, Bangladesh and Nepal
* Good communication skills, with excellent command of spoken and written English. One member should be able to speak and read Mandarin.
* Strong analytical, quantitative and qualitative research and report writing skills
* Strong knowledge/experience of results-based management.
* Demonstrated ability to work in a multi-cultural environment
* Good knowledge of DFID standards and UNDP planning and programming instruments a plus

# Appendix 2: Persons Met

A total of 85 persons were interviewed. Some key informants were interviewed multiple time but only the first instance in listed.

The low number of female interviewees among Programme implementing partners in Bangladesh and Nepal is particularly notable.

Table 6: Summary of Interviews by category of person

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Category of person interviewed* | *Cat* | *Persons* | *as %* | *Of which ♀* | *♀ as %* |
| *DFID staff* | *D* | 5 | 6% | 3 | 60% |
| *Programme Management and support* | *P* | 7 | 8% | 4 | 57% |
| *Chinese implementing partners* | *C* | 12 | 14% | 4 | 33% |
| *Nepalese Implementing partners* | *N* | 33 | 39% | 5 | 15% |
| *Bangladesh implementing partners* | *B* | 24 | 28% | 3 | 13% |
| *External to project* | *E* | 3 | 4% | 2 | 67% |
| *Others* | *X* | 1 | 1% | 0 |  |
| Total |  | 85 | 100% | 21 | 25% |

*Source: MTR team interview notes. Rounding errors may lead to sum totals exceeding 100%*

Table 7: Summary of interviews by type

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Type of interview method* | *Type* | *Persons* | *as %* | *Of which ♀* | *♀ as %* |
| *General meeting* | *gm* | *27* | *32%* | *5* | *19%* |
| *Semi-structured Interview (Individual interviewee)* | *ssi* | *6* | *7%* | *1* | *17%* |
| *Semi-structured Interview (Group - two or more interviewees)* | *ssg* | *45* | *53%* | *13* | *29%* |
| *Brief Discussion (less than ten minutes on one or more topics)* | *bd* | *4* | *5%* | *2* | *50%* |
| *Detailed discussion (more than ten minutes on one or more topics)* | *dd* | 1 | 1% | 0 |  |
| *Telephone interview* | *ti* | 2 | 2% | 0 |  |
| Total |  | 85 | 100% | 21 | 25% |

*Source: MTR team interview notes. Rounding errors may lead to sum totals exceeding 100%*

Table 8: Summary by country where interview took place

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Country* | *Code* | *Persons* | *as %* | *Of which ♀* | *♀ as %* |
| *China* | *CN* | 20 | 24% | 9 | 45% |
| *Nepal* | *NP* | 37 | 44% | 7 | 19% |
| *Bangladesh* | *BD* | 27 | 32% | 5 | 19% |
| *United Kingdom* | *UK* | 1 | 1% | 0 |  |
| Total |  | 85 | 100% | 21 | 25% |

*Source: MTR team interview notes*

Table 9: Summary by country where group meetings took place

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Country* | ♂+♀ | ♀ | ♂ | No of meetings | *♀ as %* |
| *Nepal* | 11 | 6 | 5 | 1 | 55% |
| *Bangladesh* | 231 | 83 | 148 | 7 | 36% |
| Total | 242 | 89 | 153 | 8 | 37% |

*Source: MTR team interview notes*

Table 10: List of persons met. See summary tables for the meanings of method, category, and country codes

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Person* | *Organisation and function* | ♂♀ | *Meth* | *Cat* | *Place* | *Co* | *Date* |
| Acharya. Shankar | MOHA Nepal, Under-Secretary | ♂ | ssg | n | Kathmandu | NP | Tue 22 Nov |
| Ahmed, Mohammed Reaz | DDM Bangladesh, Director General | ♂ | gm | b | Dhaka | BD | Sun 27 Nov |
| Alam, AKM Tariqul | Mymensingh Municipality, Chief Executive Officer | ♂ | gm | b | Dhaka | BD | Mon 28 Nov |
| Alam, Khurshid | UNDP Bangladesh, Assistant Country Director | ♂ | gm | b | Dhaka | BD | Sun 27 Nov |
| Alam, Mohammed Monsur Alan | Mymensingh Teaching Hospital, Managing director | ♂ | gm | b | Dhaka | BD | Mon 28 Nov |
| Ansary, Mehedi Ahmed | BUET, Department of Engieering, Senior Professor | ♂ | gm | b | Dhaka | BD | Sun 27 Nov |
| Ashikari, Rajendra | NASC, Director of Studies | ♂ | ssg | n | Kathmandu | NP | Tue 22 Nov |
| Baojun, Zhang | NDRCC Technology Standard Department, Deputy Director and member of CN delegation to BD and NP | ♂ | ssg | c | Beijing | CN | Wed 16 Nov |
| Bhujel, Badri | Municipal Engineer, Earthquake Engineer, Chautara Municipality | ♂ | ssg | n | Chautara | NP | Fri 25 Nov |
| Binod Parajuli | DHM, Hydrologist, Flood Forecasting Section | ♂ | ssg | n | Kathmandu | NP | Wed 23 Nov |
| Bishakorma (BK), Gopal | Sinpani Community, Community Organiser | ♂ | bd | n | Ganeshistan | NP | Fri 25 Nov |
| Carpy, Jim | DFID China, Head | ♂ | ssi | d | Beijing | CN | Wed 16 Nov |
| Chakravorty, Rakesh | Spotlight, Chief Operating Officer | ♂ | gm | b | Dhaka | BD | Sun 27 Nov |
| Chinatsu, Endo | UNDP Nepal, Programme Analyst | ♀ | ssg | p | Kathmandu | NP | Wed 23 Nov |
| Choddry, Sanjee | National Reconstruction Authority, Engineer | ♂ | ssg | X | Melanchi | NP | Thu 24 Nov |
| Dahal, Achala | NASC, Training and Research Officer | ♀ | ssg | n | Kathmandu | NP | Tue 22 Nov |
| Dahal, Dinass | UNDP Nepal, Individual Contractor, Civil Engineer | ♂ | dd | n | Ganeshistan | NP | Thu 24 Nov |
| Dangal, Rameshwor | OPMMC Nepal, Joint-Secretary | ♂ | ssi | n | Kathmandu | NP | Tue 22 Nov |
| Dipu, Animul Kawser | UNDP, Individual Consultant seconded to Ward 14 | ♂ | gm | b | Dhaka | BD | Mon 28 Nov |
| Dmamala, Naryan Prasad | Sinpani Community, 72-year old man with only son inDubai | ♂ | bd | n | Ganeshistan | NP | Fri 25 Nov |
| Donati, Henry | DFID UK, member of the CHASE emergnecy response team and attendee as the XI'an high-level forum | ♂ | ti | d | London | UK | Thu 17 Nov |
| Dulal, Ananta | Melanchi Municipality, Sub-engineer | ♂ | ssg | n | Melanchi | NP | Thu 24 Nov |
| Dulal, Mohammed Dulal Uddid | Myenshing Municipality, Ward 14 Councillor | ♂ | gm | b | Dhaka | BD | Mon 28 Nov |
| Gautam, Tulasi | NPC Nepal, Joint-Secretary | ♂ | ssi | n | Kathmandu | NP | Tue 22 Nov |
| Ghorhasinee, Krishna | Melanchi Municipality, Acting Executive Officer | ♂ | ssg | n | Melanchi | NP | Thu 24 Nov |
| Haarsiger, Cathrine | UNDP Bangladesh, Project Development | ♀ | gm | b | Dhaka | BD | Sun 27 Nov |
| Haque, Aminul | IFRC, Disaster Management Officer | ♂ | gm | b | Dhaka | BD | Sun 27 Nov |
| Haque, Quazi Mohammed Falul | UDD, Senior Planner | ♂ | gm | b | Dhaka | BD | Sun 27 Nov |
| Hau, Shali | Asia Foundation, Program Associate | ♀ | ssg | e | Beijing | CN | Fri 18 Nov |
| Haverman, Patrick, | UNDP China, Deputy Director | ♂ | ti | p | Beijing | CN | Fri 18 Nov |
| Hossain, Mohammed Akram | FSCD Bangladesh, Captain, Planning Cell, Assistant Director | ♂ | gm | b | Dhaka | BD | Sun 27 Nov |
| Hossain, Mohammed Musharaf | FSCD Bangladesh, Lt. Colonel | ♂ | gm | b | Dhaka | BD | Sun 27 Nov |
| Hossain, Rokeya | Mymensingh Municipality, Ward 13,14,15 Reserve Concillor | ♀ | gm | b | Dhaka | BD | Mon 28 Nov |
| Huang, Zhen | Asia Foundation, Program Officer | ♀ | ssg | e | Beijing | CN | Fri 18 Nov |
| Jingdong, Li | BMSoft, Vice President | ♂ | ssg | c | Beijing | CN | Wed 16 Nov |
| Kaphie, Krishna Raj | UNDP Nepal, Senior Programme Officer, CDRMP | ♂ | ssg | n | Kathmandu | NP | Wed 23 Nov |
| KC, Deepak | UNDP Nepal, Senior Programme Officer, CDRMP | ♂ | ssg | n | Kathmandu | NP | Wed 23 Nov |
| Khan, Ali | FSCD Bangladesh, Brigadier General, Director General | ♂ | gm | b | Dhaka | BD | Sun 27 Nov |
| Khan, Arif Abdullah | UNDP Bangladesh, CBDM Focal Point, accompanied the CN delegation to all meetings on 27 and 28th | ♂ | gm | b | Dhaka | BD | Sun 27 Nov |
| Khanal, Gopi | MoFALD Nepal, Joint-Secretary | ♂ | ssi | n | Kathmandu | NP | Tue 22 Nov |
| Kharel, Tara Prasad | NASC, Training and Research Officer | ♂ | ssg | n | Kathmandu | NP | Tue 22 Nov |
| Kumari, Chitra | Ganeshistan Community, DRR Committee, Chair | ♀ | ssg | n | Ganeshistan | NP | Thu 24 Nov |
| Liping, Chen | NDRRC, Publicity and Education Officer, and member of CN delegation to BD and NP | ♀ | gm | c | Dhaka | BD | Sat 26 Nov |
| Manandhar, Pragati | UNDP Nepal, UNV Architect, CDRMP | ♀ | ssg | n | Kathmandu | NP | Wed 23 Nov |
| Menming, Yu | UNDP China, Disaster management Team, Knowledge Sharing Assistant and member of CN delegation to BD and NP | ♀ | ssg | p | Beijing | CN | Thu 17 Nov |
| Ming, Wang | BNU, Team leader of Collaborative Research on retrofitting | ♂ | ssg | c | Beijing | CN | Fri 18 Nov |
| Mishra, Abishek | UNDP Nepal, Individual Contractor, Civil Engineer 2nd'd to Chautara Municipality | ♂ | ssg | n | Chautara | NP | Fri 25 Nov |
| Miyah, Mohammed Rafiqul Islam | Myenshing Municipality, Member of Disaster Management Committee | ♂ | gm | b | Dhaka | BD | Mon 28 Nov |
| Mmahmoud, Khalid | DDM Bangladesh, Joint-Secretary and Director (Planning and Development) | ♂ | gm | b | Dhaka | BD | Sun 27 Nov |
| Momem, Mohammed Abdul | FSCD Bangladesh, Captain, Deputy Assistant Director | ♂ | gm | b | Dhaka | BD | Sun 27 Nov |
| Mukerjee, Sudipto | UNDP Bangladesh, Country Director | ♂ | gm | b | Dhaka | BD | Sun 27 Nov |
| Murray, Nicola | DFID Nepal, Disaster Resilience Manager | ♀ | ssi | d | Kathmandu | NP | Mon 21 Nov |
| Nepal, Anirudra | Sinupalchowk District, Internal Audior, DRR Focal point and UNDAC Member | ♂ | ssg | n | Chautara | NP | Fri 25 Nov |
| Noble, Glen | Research Council UK, Programme Manager | ♂ | ssi | e | Beijing | CN | Thu 17 Nov |
| Panta, Saiman | Melanchi Municipality, Account officer | ♂ | ssg | n | Melanchi | NP | Thu 24 Nov |
| Pokharel, Trilochan | NASC, Director of Studies | ♂ | ssg | n | Kathmandu | NP | Tue 22 Nov |
| Punjali, Khun Raj | NASC, Senior Director of Studies | ♂ | ssg | n | Kathmandu | NP | Tue 22 Nov |
| Qingtong, Gong | BMSoft, Consulting Director | ♂ | ssg | c | Beijing | CN | Wed 16 Nov |
| Rajadra Sharma | DHM, Chief of Flood Forecast Section | ♂ | ssg | n | Kathmandu | NP | Wed 23 Nov |
| Raut, Krishna B | MOHA Nepal, Joint-Secretary | ♂ | ssg | n | Kathmandu | NP | Tue 22 Nov |
| Rejina Maskey Byanju | Tribhuvan University, Central Department of Environmental Science, Professor | ♀ | ssg | n | Kathmandu | NP | Wed 23 Nov |
| Rijal, Kedar | Tribhuvan University, Central Department of Environmental Science, Professor and Head | ♂ | ssg | n | Kathmandu | NP | Wed 23 Nov |
| Rudmila, Nafisa Shamim | UNDP Bangladesh, Research Assistant, accompanied the CN delegation to all meetings on 27 and 28th | ♀ | gm | b | Dhaka | BD | Sun 27 Nov |
| Ruo, Zhang | DFID China, Project Officer | ♀ | bd | d | Beijing | CN | Fri 18 Nov |
| Ruo, Zhang | DFID China, Project Officer | ♀ | ssg | d | Beijing | CN | Wed 16 Nov |
| Saini, Yang | BNU, ICCR-DRR Coordinator | ♀ | ssg | c | Beijing | CN | Fri 18 Nov |
| Shestra, Jeetendra | UNDP, Individual Contractor, Civil and Structural Engineer | ♂ | ssg | n | Melanchi | NP | Thu 24 Nov |
| Shrestha, Gyan Laxmi | NASC, Director of Studies | ♀ | ssg | n | Kathmandu | NP | Tue 22 Nov |
| Shrestha, Jaya Krishna | LDTA, Director | ♂ | ssg | n | Kathmandu | NP | Tue 22 Nov |
| Siguan, Yang | NDRCC, Deputy Director General and leader of CN delegation to BD and NP | ♂ | ssg | c | Beijing | CN | Wed 16 Nov |
| Su, Zhang | DFID China, Senior Project Officer | ♀ | bd | d | Beijing | CN | Fri 18 Nov |
| Su, Zhang | DFID China, Senior Project Officer and member of CN delegation to BD and NP | ♀ | ssg | d | Beijing | CN | Wed 16 Nov |
| Sujuan, Zhang | UNDP China, Disaster management Team, Programme Manager and member of CN delegation to BD and NP | ♀ | ssg | p | Beijing | CN | Thu 17 Nov |
| Taufique, Khurshid Zabin Hossain | UDD, Director General | ♂ | gm | b | Dhaka | BD | Sun 27 Nov |
| Thapa, Deepak | LDTA, Training and Research Officer | ♂ | ssg | n | Kathmandu | NP | Tue 22 Nov |
| Timilsina, Aditya | UNDP Nepal, UNV, Civil Engineer 2nd'd to Chautara Municipality | ♂ | ssg | n | Chautara | NP | Fri 25 Nov |
| Titu, Mohammed Ekramul Haque Titu | Mymensingh Municipality, Mayor | ♂ | gm | b | Dhaka | BD | Mon 28 Nov |
| Tuza, Suresh | UNDP, UNV, Civil Engineer | ♂ | ssg | n | Melanchi | NP | Thu 24 Nov |
| Uddin, AM Nasir | ActionAid, Programme Manager | ♂ | gm | b | Dhaka | BD | Sun 27 Nov |
| Vijaya P. Singh | UNDP Nepal, Assistant Country Director | ♂ | ssg | p | Kathmandu | NP | Wed 23 Nov |
| Xiao, Zheng | UNDP China, Disaster management Team, Associate Programme Officer | ♂ | ssg | p | Beijing | CN | Thu 17 Nov |
| Xinyin, Kang | NDRCC International Cooperation Department, Project Officer | ♀ | ssg | c | Beijing | CN | Wed 16 Nov |
| Xuan, Wang | UNDP China, Disaster management Team, Programme Assistant | ♀ | ssg | p | Beijing | CN | Thu 17 Nov |
| Yadav, Kamlesh Kumar | UNDP Nepal, Programme Officer for Monitoring, Evaluation and Knowledge Management, Gender | ♂ | ssg | n | Kathmandu | NP | Wed 23 Nov |
| Yalin, Liu | BMSoft, Project Manager | ♂ | ssg | c | Beijing | CN | Wed 16 Nov |
| Yan, Guan | NDRCC, International Cooperations Department, Director and member of CN delegation to BD and NP | ♀ | gm | c | Dhaka | BD | Sat 26 Nov |
| Yi, Zhu | BMSoft, Manager of Business Department | ♂ | ssg | c | Beijing | CN | Wed 16 Nov |
| Yongfeng, Liao | NDRCC, Key Laboratory of Disaster Assessment and Risk Governance, Deputy Director and member of CN delegation to BD and NP | ♂ | gm | c | Dhaka | BD | Sat 26 Nov |

*Source: MTR team interview notes*

# Appendix 3: Stakeholder Analysis

This project is somewhat complex with many levels. DFID is not only the funder but also provides substantive input into the Programme. The UNDP offices in Nepal and Bangladesh have function both as Programme management and as Programme implementers.

Table 11: Stakeholder analysis for Programme

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Agency | Role | Interest in the review |
| DFID | Funder. Also provides technical input. | Identifying best practice and learning lessons. Validating choices made in the Programme. Improving Programme performance if there is room from improvement. Interested in the possible replication of the North-South-South cooperation model elsewhere. The future direction of the Programme. |
| MOFCOM | Ministry of Commerce of the PRC. The coordinating agency in the Chinese Government for the Programme. | Interest in learning lessons from the review and in ensuring that the Programme is of good quality. Interest in strengthening the national institutions involved in the Programme. |
| MOCA | Ministry of Civil Affairs of the PRC. | Interested in identifying lessons learned that could be applied to DRR in China. |
| UNDP China | Programme Management Unit. | Identifying best practice and learning lessons (SSC, TrC, Gender mainstreaming, Programme Management and Governance, M&E, cross-country office coordination, stakeholder engagement, regional programming, etc.). Validating choices made in the Programme. Improving Programme performance if there is room from improvement. |
| UNDP Nepal | Management Support Unit for the Nepal component. | Identifying best practice and learning lessons for Nepal. Improving Programme performance if there is room from improvement. |
| UNDP Bangladesh | Management Support Unit for the Bangladesh component. | Identifying best practice and learning lessons for Bangladesh. Improving Programme performance if there is room from improvement. |
| PSC | Programme Steering Committee with representatives from: MOCA, MOFCOM, DFID, UNDP China. The PSC provides Programme direction, oversight, budget and work plan approval. | Identifying best practice and learning lessons. Validating choices made in the Programme. Improving Programme performance if there is room from improvement. Interested in the possible replication of the North-South-South cooperation model elsewhere. The future direction of the Programme. |
| NDRCC | National Disaster Reduction Centre of China. The lead implementing agency of the Programme. | Identifying best practice and learning lessons. Validating choices made in the Programme. Improving Programme performance if there is room from improvement. Capacity development in international services and Programme implementation. |
| ICCR-DRR of BNU | The International Centre for Collaborative Research on DRR of Beijing Normal University. The implementing partner of the Programme in charge of collaborative research. | Identifying research themes and potential knowledge products. Identifying best practice and learning lessons. Capacity development in international research and collaboration. |
| MDMR | The Ministry for Disaster Mitigation and Reduction. The Bangladesh Government counterpart in the Programme. | Identifying best practice and learning lessons. Links with strong regional actors. Effectiveness of the coordination model. |
| NoHA | Ministry of Home Affairs in Nepal. The Nepalese Government counterpart in the Programme. | Identifying best practice and learning lessons. Links with strong regional actors. Effectiveness of the coordination model. |
| National Implementing partners | Various partner agencies implementing the Programme as part of the national Programme in China, Bangladesh, and Nepal. | Identifying best practice and learning lessons. Continuation of support. Opportunities or exchanging information and lessons. Access to lessons from elsewhere. |
| Communities | Communities for demonstration. | The promotion of effective DRR and the transmission of lessons learned elsewhere to benefit their community. |

# Appendix 4: Evaluation Matrix

Based on a desk review of the Terms of Reference and the document set, the team developed the following evaluation matrix which they used for the MTR. This matrix sets out the five main review questions, and the related sub-questions, with the criteria for judgement, and the methods and sources of information to be used.

Table 12: Review question matrix

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Question | Judgement Criteria | Methods and Sources |
| What results has the Programme achieved? | | |
| To what extent has the Programme made progress towards the planned outputs and outcomes? | Comparison of outputs against the indicators in the log-frame. | Analysis of the Programme reporting. Key-informant interviews. |
| What examples of best practice can be seen in the Programme? | Triangulated examples of both established and innovative best practice noted in the Programme documents, by interviewees or observed directly during the fieldwork. | Document review. Key-informant interviews. Observation. |
| To what extent was the design appropriate? | | |
| To what extent is the ToC valid? | Extent to which the ToC follows a logical path. | Examination of the linkages in the ToC. Comparison with other statements of the Programme theory as set out in the Log-Frame and other Programme documents. Interviews with key informants. |
| To what extent are the seven guiding principles addressed in the Phase II design? | Activities and associated outputs identified for each principles | Mapping out the relevance of activities and associated outputs to the addressed principles from annual work plan, progress track, and quarterly progress reports, etc. |
| To what extent is the Programme design appropriate for the Programme objectives? | The extent of logical linkage between the design and the Programme objectives. | Comparison of the design with the stated objectives. Interviews with key informants. |
| To what extent has the Programme been well managed | | |
| To what extent have the management and implementation? mechanisms been appropriate. | An assessment of management and implementation mechanisms. | Key-informant interviews, especially with the steering committee and downstream partners. |
| To what extent have the management and implementation mechanisms been able to address challenges and risks? | Triangulated clear examples of the addressing of risks and challenges that have arisen. | Document review. Key-informant interviews. |
| To what extent has financial management been effective? | An assessment of financial management. Absence of triangulated examples of ineffective management. | Document review. Key-informant interview. |
| Value-for-money? | The extent to which the inputs have generated a reasonable level of outputs. | Document review. Calculation of unit costs. Key-informant interviews. |
| Can the Programme be sustained? | | |
| How can the Programme ensure sustainability after the end of UK funding? | Assessment of the alternative funding options available to the Programme | Key-informant interviews |
| What has been learned by the Programme? | | |
| What lessons have been learned from the Programme? | Triangulated examples of lessons noted in the Programme documents, by interviewees or observed directly during the fieldwork. | An initial review of the Programme documents shows that, although the documents do include some lessons, relatively few lessons have been identified as such, so the team will rely on key-informant interviews and observation to identify lessons which they then triangulate through the document set and observation. |

# Appendix 5: Approach and Methods

Basis for the MTR

This MTR is based on:

* The seven guiding principles for Phase II design and implementation.
* The ToC for Phase II, as described above.
* The review team’s understanding of the Programme from reading the key documents.
* The MTR team’s understanding of the Programme from interviews with DFID, the PSC members, and other stakeholders during the fieldwork.

The team also considered sustainability and any potential future for the Programme in the light of the planned end of DFID funding in September 2017.

Steps in the MTR

The review consisted of the following steps:

* Desk Review: Review of the document set provided to identify the context and nature of the Programme, the stakeholders, and the key points to be specifically addressed in the MTR.
* Preparation of Inception Report which set out the evaluation plan.
* Methodology Design: Development of the review question matrix, interview guides, etc.
* Country visits: Interviews with key stakeholders. Group interviews and site visits.
* Analysis of the data collected: Collating the evidence gathered in the evidence tool to develop evidence-based findings, conclusions, and recommendations.
* Preparation of the key deliverables:

The evaluation report for the MTR

The 2016 Annual Review Report

A video-presentation of the key findings.

Aspects evaluated

The review examined, to extent that time constraints allowed, all the Phase II activities of the Programme with specific attention to:

* Programme design: The MTR reviewed the Programme components and associated activities against the seven guiding principles and the ToC set for designing Phase II. In addition, the MTR team will examine the design of the Programme activities by reference to the regional action plan for implementing the Sendai Framework for DRR[[18]](#footnote-18). The validity of the ToC for Phase II will be assessed based on discussion with the stakeholders. The Programme design review will look at the interlinkages among the four output areas.
* Programme progress and achievements towards expected outputs and outcomes: This review was based on Programme Implementation Plan, Results log-frame, Annual Work Plan, Programme progress tracker, and quarterly progress reports, based on a systematic inventory and review of the interim outputs during the country visits and desk review.
* Programme governance and management: The Programme management and implementation mechanisms were reviewed in terms of the specific nature of the Programme (TrC – North-South-South), Money for Value (practical solutions to the actual issues), and the effectiveness of financial management. In addition, the review examined and discuss on the Programme management and M&E framework with relevant stakeholders from the TrC Programme management perspective.
* Programme risks and sustainability: based on documenting the issues and challenges emerging in the Programme implementation, the MTR will work with the PMU and PMOs, and implementing team and partners to identify the issues and challenges that the Programme may face in implementing of the remaining activities.
* Documentation of best practice and lessons learned: The MTR team will do their best to document best practice and lessons learned in the Programme implementation, including policy dialogue, practice exchange, collaborative research, information and knowledge inventory and repository, with a focus on CBDM or CBDRM/DRR.
* Cross-cutting issues include value or money and gender.

Methods

The review team used mixed-methods, although qualitative methods predominated. Quantitative methods were used for very limited numerical data analysis of budgets.

Key-informant interviews

These were one of the principle sources for the evaluation. Key-informant interviews helped the team answer many of the evaluation questions. The key-informant interviews took the form of semi-structured interviews using an interview guide developed by the team. We interviewed:

* DFID staff in China
* DFID Humanitarian Response Group
* UNDP Programme Management staff in China, Nepal, and Bangladesh
* Government officials in China, Nepal, and Bangladesh
* Project partners including staff from NDRCC, BNU
* Community members

Interviews were conducted under a modification of the Chatham House Rule (Chatham House, 2007) whereby nothing that interviewees is directly or indirectly attributed to them. Interviews were a mixture of semi-structured interviews with single individuals and with groups of individuals.

The team interviews provided a rich source of information on why the Programme has been developed as it has and what the lessons and achievements have been.

Desk study

The team has already reviewed the supplied document set. The documents were indexed (using the dtSearch indexing software) so that any issues arising in the field could be quickly researched in the document set.

Numerical data analysis

Numerical data analysis was limited to the examination of budget data.

Observation

The team took advantage of field visits to observe the Programme interventions in practice. The team also had the opportunity to observe the interactions of UNDP staff with the community and to observe how the Chinese Delegation interacted with partner in Bangladesh. This enabled the team to form a view of how the relationship functions.

Observation was be an important source of data for triangulating information gathered from interviews and the document set.

Community consultation

The team used the field visit to consult with some of the community groups engaged with the Programme. While the fieldwork timetable limited the depth of interaction, the meetings and observations were sufficient for the MTR team to draw grounded conclusions about community engagement with the Programme.

Triangulation

The team used triangulation to ensure that the MTR findings are accurate and reliable. We used the following types of triangulation:

* Source triangulation. We compared information from different sources, e.g. from DFID, from partners, from Government officials, from academics and from the community, including data from different levels of the same source.
* Method triangulation: We compared information collected by different methods, e.g. interviews and document review.
* Researcher triangulation. The team consists of two researchers with very different backgrounds. This provided two independent (and occasionally conflicting) approaches to the data from very different perspectives.

In addition, we compared the information from the different types of interventions.

Sampling

The interview targets were effectively selected in advance by DFID and the PMU. However, the MTR team are satisfied that the selection was wholly appropriate for the review. The MTR team conducted some additional interviews in Bangladesh with UNDP to answer some detailed questions.

No samples were drawn from the document set, but the full set of documents was reviewed.

|  |
| --- |
| Preliminary Category List |
| Best practice  Community engagement  Design  Experience sharing  Future direction  Gender  Impact  Implementation  Issues and Challenges  Lessons  M&E  Management  Outcomes  Outputs  Ownership  Power relations  Priorities  Programme logic  Progress  Risks  SC direction  SSC and TrC  Sustainability  Value-for-money |

Analysis


The team used a simple evidence tool[[19]](#footnote-19) to record evidence on a spreadsheet from the different parts of the work studies. This tool essentially simplifies attaching categories to all the evidence gathered. The categories were developed from the review questions and other themes identified in the document set. The categories were updated as needed during the field work.

The evidence recorded in the tool consists of short snippets encapsulating key points from key informants, interviews, documents, and numerical analysis. Each snippet is typically one to three sentences.

Categorising the evidence in this way is essential for qualitative methods like key-informant interviews. Using the tool enabled the team to ensure that the findings are well grounded in evidence, and that conclusions are based on findings, recommendations on conclusions.

The tool records the sources of information but even without this the sources may sometimes be evident from the specifics of the evidence. Therefore, the tool will remain internal to the team, in order not to breach the Chatham House rule under which the interviews are conducted.

We also ensured reliability by building a strong chain of evidence[[20]](#footnote-20). We built this chain of evidence on triangulated sources of information.

Figure 6: The chain of evidence

Triangulation is the only way to achieve accuracy and reliability in mixed method research like this.

The MTR team collected 684 pieces of evidence totalling 16,384 words from 72 sources (Table 13). Group interviews provided the most evidence, while individual semi-structured interviews provided the richest source in terms of the number of pieces of evidence per interview. This reflects the formal nature of many of the group interviews.

Table 13: Summary of evidence from different sources

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Number of sources | Method | Number of pieces of evidence from this source |
| 28 | Group semi-structured interview | 273 |
| 11 | Individual semi-structured Interview | 209 |
| 14 | Detailed discussion (>10min) | 78 |
| 10 | Document | 40 |
| 2 | Telephone interview | 35 |
| 2 | Reflection | 22 |
| 2 | General meeting | 12 |
| 2 | Observation | 12 |
| 1 | Brief Discussion (<10min) | 3 |
| 72 | **Total** | 684 |

The MTR team used the collated evidence in preparing the MTR report and the AR.

Risks

The risks foreseen for this MTR assignment includes the interviewees have been selected by DFID and UNDP rather than by the review team. This risk was not realised as the selected interviewees are the same as the team would have selected on its own. There are no large gaps. All of the partners were found to be open in their dealings with the MTR team and the MTR team were satisfied that they obtained an accurate view of the status of the Programme.

# Appendix 6: Team Itinerary

The itinerary for the review is shown below. It was planned by DFID China with input from the UNDP offices in Nepal and Bangladesh. The team would like to express their appreciation to all those involved in preparing their itinerary and preparing the visits.

Table 14: Work plan for review

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Date | Activity |
| Monday 14 November | MTR team begins travel to China |
| Tuesday 15 November | MTR team arrives in China |
| Wednesday 16 November | Meetings with DFID and NDRC |
| Thursday 17 November | Meetings with RCUK and UNDP PMU |
| Friday 18 November | Meetings with Asia Foundation and ICCR-DRR. Debriefing with the DFID Programme management team |
| Saturday 19 November | MTR team travels from Beijing to Kathmandu via Kunming |
| Sunday 20 November | MTR team reviews evidence to date and works on draft report |
| Monday 21 November | Meeting with DFID Disaster Resilience Manager in Nepal |
| Tuesday 22 November | Meetings with various Government Departments and training providers in Nepal |
| Wednesday 23 November | Meeting with the UNDP CDRMP team, with Tribhuvan University, and the Department of Hydrology and Meteorology |
| Thursday 24 November | MTR team travels 4 hours to Melanchi in Sindhupalchowk District. Meets with Municipal officials, visit the construction demonstration site and observe the information van in action before travelling 3 hours to Chautara |
| Friday 25 November | Team visits Sinpani community and observes the information van in action before returning to Chautara to meet with Municipal and District officials and visit construction demonstration sites before travelling back to Kathmandu |
| Saturday 26 November | MTR Team flies from Kathmandu to Dhaka. Dinner with Chinese Delegation |
| Sunday 27 November | MTR Team and Chinese Delegation meet with UNDP, have mandatory UNDSS briefing, and high-level meetings with various Government Ministries and Departments, and with BUET. Formal dinner with Chinese Delegation and UNDP |
| Monday 28 November | MTR Team and Chines delegation travel three hours to Mymensingh. Meet with mayor, have a tour on foot of Ward 14, observing a school drill and meeting with DRR committee members, community members, and volunteers. Follow-up meeting with stakeholders before travelling four hours back to Dhaka (traffic worse in evening than in morning) |
| Tuesday 29 November | Chinese delegation flies from Dhaka to Kathmandu. MTR team has follow-up meetings with UNDP |
| Wednesday 30 November | MTR team writing up interviews and observations and meeting to agree outline for draft report |
| Thursday 1 December | MTR team members depart Dhaka |
| Friday 2 December | MTR team members return home |

# Appendix 7: Data Collection and Analysis Tools

Key-informant interview guide

The team used the following guide for key-informant interviews. These interviews were semi-structured, and additional questions were asked to follow-up on the answers made. In some meetings, the team observed the interactions and limited the number of questions they asked. In interviews with UNDP country offices we worked through the progress tracker and asked about the status of each activity.

Introduction and informed consent

We are Jianping Yan and John Cosgrave. We have been contracted by DFID, through Coffey International to conduct a Mid-term Review of the DFID-funded Sharing and Learning on CBDM in Asia Programme. We will be making recommendations to all the stakeholders on the implementation and the future of the Programme. We thank you for agreeing to talk to us. Nothing you say will be attributed to you directly or indirectly in our report. You are free to end the interview at any time or to decline to answer any specific questions. Do we have your agreement to begin?

Opening questions

What role have you played in this project?

Were you involved in, or consulted at any stage, about the design of the Programme or any of its components?

How does your organisation fit into the overall Programme?

Main questions

How is the Programme perceived in your organisation?

How do you perceive this Programme?

What are your priorities for the Programme?

To what extent so they overlap with the priorities of others (upstream and downstream)?

What are the most successful aspects of the Programme?

Which aspects have posed the greatest difficulty?

What do you think of the underlying idea? (summarise ToC if necessary)

To what extent is this Programme the best way to achieve this idea? Would another approach have been better?

What have the biggest challenges been in the management of the Programme?

How heavy a load have the reporting requirements been?

Which aspects of the Programme do you regard as providing the best value or money? Why do you think that is so?

Who makes the decisions on the Programme?

Who makes the decisions on the component you are responsible for?

Who has benefited most from this Programme?

In the community, who benefits most from the Programme, men or women? Why?

How much of your own resources have you been committing to the Programme

What future do you see for this Programme after the end of DFID funding?

Closing questions

What aspects of the Programme do you regards as displaying best practice?

If this Programme were repeated, what do you thing should be done differently?

What lessons have you personally learned or had reinforced by your experience of the Programme?

Whom else would you suggest we talk to?

1. On 15 December 2004, the then Secretary of State for International Development proposed in a speech at the Overseas Development Institute that DFID should in future spend 10% of its disaster response funding on disaster risk reduction. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. While DFID maintains accounts in Pounds Sterling, UNDP maintains its accounts in US Dollars. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. More commonly known as the Sichuan Earthquake internationally. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. 15 research partners can combine in 32,725 different partnerships with 2 to 15 members. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. At that time, £350,000 pounds was worth US$539,291. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. While this project has a much smaller budget than many large projects, it has quite a large ambition. Large IT projects often (45%) run over budget and may also run over time (7%). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Jones, C. (2004). Software Project Management Practices: Failure Versus Success. Crosstalk: *The Journal of Defense Software Engineer, 17 (10), 5-9.* [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. This is illustrated by the discussions on issues such as taxation and institutional levies on research work, with every institution having a different policy on overhead cost recovery. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. The overall funding managed by UNDP Nepal and Bangladesh was budgeted at £300,000 each over the life of the Programme, or about £30,000 a quarter. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. For example, the fatality rate for the 2015 Gorkha Earthquake in Nepal was 21% higher for women than for men (based on the data presented in *Gender Equality: Bulletin No 1: Response to the Nepal Earthquake* from http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/gender\_equality\_bulletin\_no\_1\_-\_21\_may\_2015.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Neumayer, E., & Plümper, T. (2007). The Gendered Nature of Natural Disasters: The Impact of Catastrophic Events on the Gender Gap in Life Expectancy, 1981-2002. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 97 (3), 551-566.* [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. The Gender Inequality Index was introduced in the 2010 Human development report. *“It shows the loss in potential human development due to disparity between female and male achievements in two dimensions, empowerment and economic status, and reflects a country’s position relative to normative ideals for the key dimension of women’s health. Overall, the GII reflects how women are disadvantaged in these dimensions.”* - Frequently Asked Questions:- Gender Inequality Index (GII) at http://hdr.undp.org/en/faq-page/gender-inequality-index-gii#faq-expand-all-link. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Jahan, et al. (2015). Human Development Report (pp. 288). New York: UNDP [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. The M6.9 earthquake in Eastern Myanmar was felt throughout the region. In Bangladesh, at least 50 people injured and 4 buildings damaged in the Chittagong area, and about 50 people were injured fleeing buildings at Dhaka and Sylhet, Bangladesh. Maximum Modified Mercalli Intensities of VI at Sylhet, V at Chittagong and IV at Barisal and Dhaka. No deaths were recorded in Myanmar, but 2 deaths were recorded in India. From USGS at http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eventpage/us20005hqz#impact. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. ICAI. (2016, p24). *When aid relationships change: DFID’s approach to managing exit and transition in its development partnerships: A performance review.* London: Independent Commission for Aid Impact. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. AMCDRR. (2016). *Asia Regional Plan for Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (pp. 13)*. New Delhi: Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. UNISDR. (2015). *Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction: 2015-2030.* Geneva: UNISDR. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. This plan was just adopted by the Asia Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (AMCDRR) held in New Deli, India, on November 3-5, 2016. It can be found at: https://www.amcdrrindia.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/FINAL-Asia-Regional-Plan-for-implementation-of-Sendai-Framework-05-November-2016.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Buchanan-Smith, M., Cosgrave, J., & Warner, A. (2016). *Evaluation of Humanitarian Action Guide*. London: ALNAP. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Yin, R. (2003). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (3rd ed. Applied Social Research Methods Series: 5). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)