

that were used as baseline correspond fully to the profiles of the communities where capacity was being built and projects implemented;

- (b) Gender-disaggregated data are not provided in spite of its specific relevance in the two target provinces (internal reporting that was shared with the Evaluation Team did provide disaggregated figures, but these were not reported to the EU);
- (c) In Annual report 2014, there are numerous mathematical errors, with entire outputs incorrectly calculated, e.g. table 1, table 2, table 3, table 4, table 4.1, table 4.5, table 5, table 5.2;
- (d) It is unclear how the subjective criterion of satisfaction was measured. This indicator requires to be scientifically measured through for instance a Knowledge, Attitude and Practice study (KAP-study);
- (e) Extra-ordinary mathematical differences are factually reported but remain unexplained, e.g. between targets and achievements (result 3; table 4.1; table 5; table 5.1.);
- (f) While indicators are in many instances a legacy of the past and a result of flawed design, the currently operational monitoring and evaluation department at UNDP could have revised the most essential indicators;
- (g) Scientific evidence supporting the values of a number of indicators is very weak, e.g. increase of income after training "through field reports and follow-up" (as opposed to objective measurement on the basis of for instance a household survey); and
- (h) The number of direct beneficiaries is in several instances reported to be higher than the indirect number of beneficiaries, or no distinction between both categories is provided (output 3.1).

UNDP has requested a technical assistance session on how to provide quality reporting (which the Evaluation Team agreed to) and they also requested report templates.

## 5. EFFECTIVENESS

### 5.1. Result 1 - Greater social cohesion and empowerment through community development in refugee/IDP affected and hosting areas

<b>Result 1.</b> Greater social cohesion and empowerment through community development in refugee/IDP affected and hosting areas.	Balochistan target	Balochistan progress	KP Target	KP Progress	Total Target	Total Progress
<b>1.1.1</b> Organise communities (60% Men & 40% Women) into 2000 COs, 350 VO's and 40 LSOs	800 140 16	1159 124 14	1200 210 24	2153 174 21	2000 350 40	3312 298 35
<b>1.1.2.</b> Train 4000 CO representative in CMSTs, 700 VO representatives in LMSTs and 80 LSO representatives on leadership	1873	3269	2907	2262	4780	5531
<b>1.1.3</b> Conduct 2390 need identification and prioritisation (at least three needs of each community)	956	3477	1434	6459	2390	9936
<b>1.1.4</b> Identify 4500 most vulnerable households to be supported under livelihood initiatives	1800	4282	2700	2904	4500	7186
<b>1.1.5</b> Organise 350 village assemblies to develop 350 VDPs through participatory and right based approach, ensuring the participation of communities and other stakeholders (Govt & Non Govt)	150 150	111 111	200 200	174 174	350 350	285 285
<b>1.1.6</b> Awareness raising of (4000) community members on social development and environmental conservation, (6000) members on water sanitation and health, (2000) members on solid and liquid waste management and (1000) on GBV and human rights	1500 2500 700 400	1110 4046 1701 1940	2500 3500 1300 600	2600 3650 1980 1254	4000 6000 2000 1000	3710 7696 3681 3194
<b>1.2.1:</b> Conduct 2 training need assessments of Government Officials in target districts and provinces.	1	1	1	1	2	2
<b>1.2.2:</b> Train 500 government officials (men and women) in relevant profession/expertise from national level recognised institutes in Pakistan.	200	164	300	393	500	557



The organisation of communities (a notion that is subject to in-depth analysis further-on) is overachieved by 3312/2000. Explanation for this over-achievement is provided on the basis of the number of communities as quantified in the programme design. 2000 communities were calculated to be insufficient for the specific objective target (40% of the target population has their income increased by 10%) to be reached.

However, the mathematic minimum number of communities to reach the 40% threshold was not calculated and no reason was provided as to what determined that 3312 communities was indeed an adequate target.

Mathematically this argument is baseless as 40% of the target population is 40% regardless of the size of the target population. In June 2015, during the Evaluation Team's first mission, the decision to train more Community Organisations over and above the 1,200 that were contractually targeted, was described to have been based on a moral obligation and not on the argument that is now being invoked.

The Evaluation Team is of the opinion that it would have been more judicious to maintain the number of target communities at the contractually agreed level and to increase and enhance the capacity building component by adding follow-up training rather than dispersing the efforts to yet more communities - in a context in which the initial number of target communities was already well beyond the capacity of any project implementation body.

The social organisers in KP experienced difficulties reaching their training number objectives, eventually outsourcing the training in November 2014. The question can legitimately be asked why the capacity building programme was extended to almost double the size if the existing staff could not cope with the tasks and outsourcing became necessary.

The achievement of targets of re-organisation of villages into networks (in the terminology of RAHA this is called Village Organisations (VO)) is much lower at a ratio of 298/350, and the organisation of communities into LSOs is "achieved" by a ratio of 16/40, or more accurately 16/120 as the target of 40 was already reduced from 120. Progress in Balochistan is significantly lower than in KP.

We will substantiate in further sections that, while quantitatively this notion of Community Organisation may have been reached, UNDP is not entitled to ownership of the organisation of communities across the board. This is especially the case where it claims that it has "organised" communities - it can and should be argued that **any** community has its generic community organisation. The difficulties in mobilising communities to do actual work outside of an attractive physical infrastructure work, such as producing Village Development Plans (VDP), are statistically underpinned by the comparatively lower results in reaching the target of 350 such development plans: only 285 out of the targeted 350 plans were developed.

The process of finalisation of a Village Development Plan is a two day exercise in which gaps between objectives and resources are assessed and an action plan is formulated. Recurring weakness is that no financial resources are allocated to these plans. Community members are cognisant of that gap and - depending on the maturity of the organisation - take steps to raise funds with wealthy people

in the village, with the industry or through contacts with local authorities. Obviously not all needs can be addressed.

At the same time, the dynamics at VO and LSO level are much more complex than at CO level. Capacity building at CO level is a relatively straightforward exercise, whereas the VO and LSO levels require networking and cooperation between differing layers of society and require a high degree of institutional maturity. Some Village Organisations have benefited from SRSP, the Sarhat Rural Support Programme and were able to start at a higher level as a consequence.

The capacity building at LSO level has been observed in several meetings in the field to be of good quality. It is undeniable that a sound groundwork has been laid for continued capacity building at this level (some LSOs existed prior to RAHA as community-based organisation). The services provided are not uniform. In one LSO the focus can be on administrative facilitation (such as assisting people in obtaining birth, marriage or death certificates), whereas others may concentrate on education, health and other sector-specific interventions. The plans that are developed are mostly not financially sustained, but some high quality examples exist of sound community planning.

However, the LSO capacity building process is quantitatively not as successful as at the more local levels. This is logical as it is the last sequence in the capacitation of communities. The import model may well be another explanation for the low success ratio, as communities stressed in almost all meetings with LSOs that their efforts came into being "at the insistence" of RAHA - and mostly in the course of the very last months of implementation, which means that the dynamics have not yet matured enough to yield substantial benefits. The picture is not identical for all LSOs: some are even registering already with the Social Welfare Department, a sign of good capacity, whereas others are merely in the formative process.

Capacitation of the local communities is confined to:

- (1) the four day basic Community Management Skills Training (CMST) training course;
- (2) an Leadership Management Skills Training (LMST) for two members per community organisation;
- (3) village conferences (one day);
- (4) follow-up visits; and
- (5) the standard list of additional training on gender, water and sanitation, ...

There is little evidence that either community or duty bearers are fully capacitated by means of this training. The capacity building process is not a sustained, continuous, four year long process that would have constituted a proper capacity building programme. It is a focused crash course process that has an obvious objective, consisting in providing the target communities with "just enough" management capacity to implement the infrastructure works. The Chief Foreign Aid of Balochistan confirms that RAHA is an infrastructure project and not a capacity building project. In his 2014 *ad hoc* report he writes that:

*"a community can never be a force of veteran managers after a training of four days or having dealt with a Community Physical Infrastructure project (report 26 Sep 2014, p 16)."*



This is supported by the social organisers themselves (whose task it is to develop community capacity and duty bearers) and several key staff at the highest management level. Infrastructure was confirmed to have *"come in because communities expect something"*, really as a way of *"luring people into the community mobilisation, otherwise no one would be interested"* (verbatim quote; source undisclosed, senior management).

Community organisers in Quetta, who attended a meeting on 13 May 2015, agree unanimously that the communities are happy because they receive infrastructure, not because their community got "organised". The meeting equally unanimously agreed that the community organisation training imparted during four days merely supports the only purpose of the community - being plus or minus - capable of accompanying the infrastructure works. The community organisers assert that *"community organisation did not aim at sustainably building communities."* This of course reflects the number of micro-projects and related communities.

In result area 1.1.4, identification of the most vulnerable households appears to have been done correctly through a vulnerability assessment, partly based on the Benazir Income Support Scheme data. Criteria to determine who are the "poorest of the poor" include orphans, disabled, widows, destitute, and female-headed households. The assessment was done by the community organisations, identified by the community members and formalised in a community resolution. The criteria differed from village to village and district to district, but were negotiated with RAHA to approximate the project criteria in an exercise that lasted 1 to 2 days.

## 5.2. Result 2 - Improve livelihood and local economies in refugee/IDP affected and hosting areas

Result 2. Improve livelihood and local economies in refugee/IDP affected and hosting areas	Balochistan target	Balochistan progress	KP Target	KP Progress	Total Target	Total Progress
2.1.1 Conduct 6 livelihood training need assessments at community and market level to identify potential livelihood opportunities in target UCs, districts and provinces.	3	3	3	2	6	5
2.1.2: Train 4500 members from most vulnerable households on different potential vocational training skills and provide toolkits	1800	1659	2700	2904	4500	4563
2.1.3 Strengthen 9 government employment information centres for providing post training support and referral to public and private enterprise	4	6	5	5	9	11
2.2.1: Conduct 510 social, technical and environmental feasibility of proposed social service projects	200	243	310	604	510	847
2.2.2: Implement at least 500 social services projects such as road/irrigation/solar energy	200	243	300	604	500	847
2.2.3: Trained 3000 O&M committee members	1000	2021	2000	1772	3000	3793

A total of 3,151 Community members have been provided with skills development training in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) – direct beneficiaries (1588 males and 1563 females). RAHA reports that as a result of this training, some 1,730 enterprises have so far been established. Skills include poultry farming, heavy machinery training, generator repairing, embroidery and tailoring.

To provide employment opportunities to the trainees, in KP five Employment Information Centres (EIC) have been established in Haripur, Swabi, Nowshera, Peshawar and Lower Dir. These EIC maintain a database of the skilled, employable work force in the region. The EIC facilitate line departments; line departments get information regarding registered professionals in different trades/sectors that in turn provide them information on available jobs as per their criteria. 2,950 already trained cadres have been registered with EIC. Out of these, 450 individuals have been linked with various organisations such as Government Line Departments and Small Private businesses for employment while 1,871 individuals are self-employed.

The Peshawar based employment centre reports the following RAHA registered trainees database figures:

District	Skilled Registered	Placed
Peshawar	943	103
Haripur	720	50
Nowshera	820	90
Swabi	529	82
Lower Dir	467	77
Total	3479	402

The number of proposed social projects that were subjected to a feasibility study is identical to the number of projects that was effectively implemented. This theoretically suggests, obviously, that firstly none of the project proposals was refused and, secondly, that the infrastructure works went ahead without consideration for the under-achievement in the soft component of this result.

However, these figures that were provided by the national RAHA office **were contradicted** by the provincial team in KP, where social organisers with a vast majority stated that there was a feasibility study and that on average 10 to 20% of the projects were refused. As a result, the reported figures are probably incorrect and should be increased by 10 to 20%.

Progress in Balochistan is far lower in some areas than it is in KP, e.g. training of members of vulnerable households in Balochistan is under-achieved and over-achieved in KP. The aggregate result, however, is not far from an acceptable average. The consolidation of figures for both provinces distorts the implementation assessment significantly.

Finally, 847 projects were implemented versus 500 planned. This raises the question whether and to what extent the initially budgeted projects were cost-realistic.



### 5.3. Result 3 - Restoration of social services and infrastructure in refugee/IDP affected and hosting areas

<b>Result 3. Restoration of social services and infrastructure in refugee/IDP affected and hosting areas</b>	Balochistan target	Balochistan progress	KP Target	KP Progress	Total Target	Total Progress
<b>3.1.1</b> Conduct 1020 social, technical and environmental feasibility study of proposed social Services (Water, Sanitation, Health, Education etc.)	505	533	515	865	1020	1398
<b>3.1.2:</b> Implement 1000 proposed social services projects to improve the access of communities to Water, Sanitation, Health, Education etc.	500	533	500	865	1000	1398

Here as well, the statistics on feasibility studies appear to be incorrect, under-reporting by about 20% the real achievement (see section 4.3).

Comments on this section are provided in Chapter V - community physical infrastructure and in Annex 1.

### 5.4. Result 4 - Improve social protection among co-existing refugee/IDP and host communities

<b>Result 4. Improve social protection among co-existing refugee/IDP and host communities</b>	Balochistan target	Balochistan progress	KP Target	KP Progress	Total Target	Total Progress
<b>4.1.1</b> Strengthen at least 16 welfare centres	6	6	10	16	16	22
<b>4.1.2:</b> Establish 120 protection committees to address GBV	48	45	72	120	120	165
<b>4.1.3:</b> Develop mechanism at 120 communities to identify and link the vulnerable (men, women and children) to social welfare centres	48	45	72	110	120	155
<b>4.1.4:</b> Train 400 individuals on GBV and human rights	160	1940	240	1254	400	3194

Some interesting social protection issues are addressed in this result area. The most relevant is certainly a vulnerability mapping that identified 9,960 vulnerable individuals in KP, who were subsequently linked to social welfare mechanisms.

The contractually scheduled Gender Based Violence (GBV) and human rights training appears also to have been dispensed. During field visits, gender issues were quite frequently addressed. There is no way to ascertain to which extent this can be attributed to the project but the prevalence of the issues contrasted with the conservative context of the target provinces. Other valid interventions include registration with National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) for obtaining national identity cards (which grants access to the national social protection system, at least in theory), provision of disability aids (wheel chairs, tricycles) to physically handicapped persons.

Other interventions reported by UNDP in this result area in their 2014 Annual Report do not fall under social protection. The provision of sewing machines is the remit of the livelihoods section. Arranging social events such as weddings for needy members of the community is not social protection (this was reported by provincial RAHA staff in the 2014 annual report as eligible activity; the Evaluation Team was not present). Repair of electric transformers is economic livelihoods at best, as are linkages to support their micro investment plans and village development plans with relevant sectors. Linking 300 poor families and facilitate them in getting dresses from Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal can hardly be categorised as social protection. Village cleaning and filling sand bags for expected floods belong to the environment result area. In this section, we find also several education initiatives that were reported on in result area 3, and a case of individual medical treatment that lacks a structural approach.

The high figures in result area 4.1.4 are explained by project staff on the basis of the open character of this training. No targeting was done, anyone who was interested could attend the training, which took place in the local village house.

This result includes alternate dispute resolution mechanisms that are reported to have resolved more than 300 cases. Such dispute mechanisms were not foreseen in the project rationale and it can easily be argued that the professional competency that is required for such arbitration exceeds the competency level of project staff. Similar interventions elsewhere employ highly specialised legal staff. Similarly, 1,865 community conflict cases were resolved including Gender Based Violence, early marriages, inheritance, domestic based violence etc. Sixty-four social protection committees' resolved issues related to gender based violence, corporal punishment in primary schools, property inheritance, early marriages and rehabilitation of drug addicts in rehabilitation centres.

RAHA conducted a mapping study of the social protection institutions in KP and Balochistan. The study findings have been published under the name "*Avenues of Assistance for the Vulnerable*" which also contains a chapter on policy recommendations. Based on the study, a separate strategy has also been developed, outside of RAHA.

In result area 4.1.1, social welfare centres have been strengthened, primarily through provision of equipment. Four centres in Peshawar have been visited. The average investment per centre is about €10,000. The quality of the material support has been found to be very good, with very significant impact on the beneficiaries (e.g. hearing aids for the deaf).

Several overlaps exist between this section and the gender strategy. More comments can be found in Chapter VIII - Gender Mainstreaming.



## 5.5. Result 5 - Restoration/improvement of environment in refugee/IDP affected area

<b>Result 5. Restoration/improvement of environment in refugee/IDP affected area</b>	Balochistan target	Balochistan progress	KP Target	KP Progress	Total Target	Total Progress
<b>5.1.1: Establish/rehabilitate 40 nurseries and carry out agro forestry activities such as tree grafting, new plans generation</b>	16	14	24	16	40	30
<b>5.1.2: Plant 20000 trees of various indigenous species that require less water</b>	8000	190 000	12 000	262 000	20 000	452 000
<b>5.1.3: Conduct at least 63 social, technical and environmental feasibility studies of proposed natural resource protection/conservation services projects</b>	24	45	39	62	63	107
<b>5.1.4: Implement 60 proposed natural resource protection/conservation service project</b>	24	45	36	62	60	107
<b>5.1.5: Conduct 50 awareness raising sessions on environmental awareness and hygiene</b>	20	9	30	50	50	59

Under this result area, a variety of environment-friendly activities have taken place on a modest scale and with limited ambitions. These include soil conservation projects, planting of 69,000 forest plants (to protect natural climate and environment) and nursing 160,000 plants, olive production (training and establishment of two olive growers associations, grafting of olive plants) and two projects for water conservation and productivity enhancement (involving a sprinkler irrigation system).

The waste management component in this result area is especially worth mentioning. 175 solid waste management committees and 10 environment committees were formed, a solid and liquid disposal system was established (and replicated elsewhere), cleanliness campaigns were organised. Solid and liquid waste management and environment committees were formed. These are all very small-scale compared to the number of communities where RAHA is working but the awareness-raising aspect is laudable.

## 5.6. Result 6 - IDP return anchored and absorption capacity created by small-scale community-based organisation

Result 6. IDP return anchored and absorptions capacity created by small-scale community-based integration	KP Target	KP Progress	Total Target	Total Progress
6.1.1: Organise IDP communities (60% Men & 40% Women) into 400 COs, 10 VOs	400 10	505 14	400 10	505 14
6.1.2: Train 800 community representatives in CMST	800	636	800	636
6.1.3: Conduct 400 needs identification and prioritisation exercises (at least three needs)	400	1515	400	1515
6.1.4: Identify 700 most vulnerable households to be supported under livelihood initiatives	700	2020	700	2020
6.1.5: Organise 10 village assemblies to develop 10 VDPs through participatory and right based approach, ensuring the participation of communities with other stakeholders (Govt & Non Govt)	10 10	14 14	10 10	14 14

This result area was added to the five original results in 2011 to cater for the influx of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) displaced from the Malakand region due to military operations there to eradicate militancy and clear the area of Taliban. Intervention in Lower Dir and Buner served two main aims:

- to enhance the absorption capacity of these areas to accommodate both the IDPs and hosting communities; and
- to ensure that the IDPs are well-anchored in these regions (i.e. that they are accommodated over here and do not migrate further south, straining resources and making the future repatriation harder).

The Community Organisation capacity building process contributed to the social cohesion factor. The skills development trainings provided people the opportunity to learn skills and earn a living for themselves rather than rely on their hosts. Further, these trainees were registered with the EIC to help them to find jobs. The CPI schemes were developed in a participatory manner i.e. it involved joint planning between the host and IDP communities to provide the necessary infrastructure support to both the host and the IDP communities. These CPI schemes include the construction of additional rooms, renovation of existing schools, BHUs, electrification of RHCs, construction of RCC Bridges, flood protection walls etc.

Comments on the Village Development Plans and the identification of needs for livelihoods initiatives can be found in Chapter 4.1, considering that these activities fall under several results areas.



## **6. GENERAL FINDINGS ON THE COMMUNITY PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (CPI) WORKS**

### **6.1. Community resolutions**

The resolutions that were passed by Community Organisations, in which schemes are proposed for funding by RAHA, are mostly on record. In a number of cases Partnership Agreements between Community Organisations and RAHA in Balochistan were left incomplete for unexplained reasons.

### **6.2. Design capacity**

Community Organisations, as well as most of the field staff, were insufficiently trained for the preparation of the detailed design and cost estimates at formulation stage of the scheme. The drawings are mostly sketchy, incomplete and void of specifications for most of the items of work. Drawings and cost estimates prepared by the Field Engineers were not checked or supervised by a Senior Engineer, yet approved at provincial level without said supervision.

### **6.3. Quotations and procurement**

Construction material was to be procured by obtaining three quotations, as per PCOM rules and regulations. In many files that were physically inspected in the field, these quotations clearly appeared to have originated from a single source, as evidenced by identical handwriting and similar or identical patterns of quoted rates. In some of the cases addresses of the bidders for material were not given on their letterhead. Neither UNDP field staff nor O&M Committees formed by the community organisations were aware about quantification of the material - a central element in construction engineering though. These elements invalidate the competitive character of the bidding process in manners that are often critical.

Procurement of materials has been done through suppliers who have not provided General Sales Tax numbers. It is recognised that a strict application of the General Sales Tax registration requirement is not always realistic. The most common material that is procured for civil works is crush, sand and cement. In the remote areas where the project implements construction works, vendors often don't have official sales tax numbers; as a result, a balance needs to be struck between regulations and the reality in the field, resulting in the possibility to buy from an un-registered supplier in the event no registered suppliers are available.

### **6.4. Quality control mechanisms**

During the construction phase, the quality control system was deficient. Tests were not carried out on concrete, steel reinforcement or bricks. In Balochistan, the lack of quality control is evidenced by the absence of a register for recording instructions by supervisory staff and by the fact that oversight missions carried out by project staff were not reflected in written records (in which recommendations could have been made about quality of work, quality of procurement documents or any guidance on quality and cost control in general). Snapshots taken during construction work,

particularly for work in foundation and steel reinforcement in concrete slabs and columns, are not available in the records that were shared, in spite of its importance.

In spite of the flawed quality control, overall quality of works is assessed to be structurally safe and acceptable. Quality and workmanship is much better in works implemented in KPK than in Balochistan. Improvement in work quality was noted on CPIs implemented by UNDP in Balochistan since last mission, particularly street pavement in Chaman. Inferior quality work was carried out by IPs of UNHCR on street pavement and paid for superior specifications in Qila Abdullah of Balochistan province. The quality of work in Chaghi district, however, was noted to be better than that of UNDP in Chaghi district of Balochistan.

The security context needs to be taken into account if the area is remote. In addition, schemes were implemented by the communities that were not well trained enough to implement such schemes according to prevailing engineering principles and practices in the sector nor did they have any past experience.

## 6.5. Cost control mechanisms

These appear to have been insufficient. The time at which major cost effectiveness can be achieved is during planning and design process. For cost control, the associated cash flow estimates can provide the baseline reference for subsequent project monitoring and control. Work specifications provide the criteria by which to assess and assure the required quality of construction. The detailed cost estimate provides a baseline for the assessment of financial performance during implementation of scheme. As long as incurred costs are within the detailed cost estimate, then the scheme is considered to be under financial control. Interviews and discussions in Balochistan and KP suggest that community organisations and most field staff were unaware of the impact of preparation of detailed drawings, design and tender documents at formulation stage on cost effectiveness. The drawings are mostly sketchy, incomplete and do not provide specifications for most items.

In June 2015, during the Evaluation Team's first mission, it transpired that UNDP did not trace the real incurred cost but only the bank transfers to the communities. Meanwhile, UNDP and IPs have commissioned an audit company to independently verify the CPI documentation, records and financial statements. The audit company's findings were used for the purposes of this report. These figures have been obtained ex-post and only after extensive iterations about the need for calculation of real incurred cost. UNDP claims that the community managed construction model has ensured that RAHA projects have been designed and completed at approximately 20-30% lesser cost compared to the government's CSR rates and that these calculations can be independently verified. By any account, the calculations were not made during the works but only at the end of the project implementation, and as a result there was no "real time" cost control.

Furthermore, in the absence of fully dimensioned detailed drawings, specifications, detailed cost estimate of acceptable standard and measurements/quantification of as constructed work, construction cost can neither be evaluated nor can it be compared with prevailing market cost for such CPIs.



As a consequence, cost control tools were insufficient for implementing the CPIs.

## 6.6. Formal completion of work

Measurement of completed item at site was neither taken nor did the Field Engineer record the certification that *"the work has been carried as per specifications and quantities are the same as those given in the detailed estimate / BOQ of the scheme"*. Next instalments of RAHA funds were released by NPDs and PPMs without giving due consideration to the requirement of such quantification and certification in construction schemes.

## 6.7. Record keeping

This was not satisfactory, with files often incomplete. The sum of the expenditure documents available on file does not match with the amount withdrawn from the bank account of CO and the cost estimate of CPI. During the first mission, consolidated monthly statements of actual expenditure incurred (based on purchase vouchers), were not seen for all the CPIs. These were repeatedly requested, both during the first mission and before the field visits during the second mission – unfortunately to no avail. In the absence of that actual expenditure statement, comments on the eligibility of expenditure cannot be made.

## 6.8. Cash withdrawals from bank account of community organisations

The Provincial and Federal Government Departments in Pakistan are not permitted to make payments in cash. To avoid possible fraud or embezzlement of funds in procurement process it is mandatory to make such payments through crossed cheques written in the name of the vendor.

Review of the RAHA schemes implemented by UNHCR, indicate that no payment was made in cash and all payments were made through crossed cheques written in the names of the vendors. It was also noted in UNHCR records that deduction on account of Income Tax as well as General Sales Tax (GST) were made from vendor's invoices and paid to the Income Tax Department and General sales Tax Department through crossed cheques.

However, in case of RAHA schemes implemented by UNDP only in a few cases was payment made through cheques written in the vendors names. Some 95% of the amount spent for execution of CPIs was withdrawn from the CO bank accounts in cash. Also, no such deduction from vendors invoices has been made.

Cash withdrawals from the bank accounts, instead of paying the vendors by cheques, casts serious doubts over the legitimacy of the expenditure incurred. The doubt about embezzlement of the funds is further reinforced by non-sharing the details of actual expenditure by UNDP despite repeated requests. Detailed factual references can be found in the scheme wise comments in Annex 1.

## **7. SPECIFIC FINDINGS ON THE COMMUNITY PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (CPI) WORKS IN BALOCHISTAN AND KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA**

Please refer to annexes 1 and 2 for details.



## 8. GENDER MAINSTREAMING

The mid-term review made a strong recommendation for the programme to formulate a gender strategy, as this did not exist in the original design. This was a critical oversight in the Pakistan-Afghanistan context. It was only in the last quarter of 2014 that it was formally submitted.

There was never a full time gender focal point in Balochistan and in Islamabad: the capital based staff member was absent due to maternity leave for most of the time, and in Balochistan a suitable staff member could not be identified. Project management adds that for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, they were "*somehow managing gender activities*". Thus, it is clear that follow-up on this gender strategy was not possible or feasible.

From a **methodological point of view**, the gender approach for the RAHA programme was incomplete and contentious on a variety of grounds. In fact, the four premises that were essential for the gender strategy to be implemented were missing, and this despite of the basic document outlining these requirements correctly:

- a framework for implementation was never developed (i.e. the principles that were laid out in the strategy have not been translated into a document that could formulate ways of implementation);
- gender has not been integrated into operations;
- no financial resources were allocated to the strategy; and
- a monitoring and evaluation system focused explicitly on gender has never been set up.

As a result of these four fundamental flaws, it follows that the RAHA programme had **no effective gender strategy**, but rather only a document that was entitled "gender strategy". As a result of this, several fundamental parts of the strategy were not implemented:

- a behaviour change campaign (only some minor activities have taken place);
- set-up of women and children protection centres for survivors of GBV;
- appropriate legal support, referral mechanisms and psycho-social support made available to those seeking help;
- comprehensive GBV survey;
- capacity building plan on gender;
- results framework;
- capacity enhancement in disaster risk reduction;
- hazard mapping; and
- vulnerability assessments of communities.

Staff report that they implemented only the gender aspects that were in the logical framework, effectively leaving the gender strategy an "empty box".

From a **contractual point of view**, the gender document goes well beyond what was contractually agreed between the European Union and UNDP in the logical framework. The objectives listed above

can be found only in the gender strategy and not in any contractually binding document. Contractually, there is therefore no objection against these objectives not having been reached; it does beg the question, however, on what basis the gender strategy was developed.

From a **substance point of view**, the gender document is context-insensitive with no realistic perspective on the specific gender issues that are rife in the Pakistan-Afghanistan setting, to the point that it comes across as a generic gender policy with no effort to relate it to the challenges that are so visible in the ultra-conservative male-dominated RAHA project implementation setting. Here the woman has barely any space and communities have been observed to be in full denial of gender issues (claiming that gender based violence for instance does not exist in their communities). This translates into unrealistic objectives such as equal representation of women at the village level and the recognition and embracement of the fact that gender based violence "is not only a woman's issue". Reality on the ground is quite distant from these objectives. Project management points out that the gender sensitivity on the team was not conducive to implementation and that the first challenge was to make RAHA staff gender-sensitive.

The GBV protection mechanisms are subject of debate. RAHA had as objective to provide women with basic protection mechanisms through the formation of "protection committees". These entirely depend on the social acceptance by the communities, who already have their protection mechanisms in place by means of the Jirga structure. In the official statistics, the number of protection committees that have been set up is higher than the target value, but this is explained by the fact that these committees were automatically set up along with the community organisations (and then left to exist without substantive guidance in the absence of gender focal points, and, significantly "on a volunteer basis because of the context" (social organisers report that protection committee work is a risk to their personal security, as people "can flare up anytime").

Based on the above, it is concluded that the overly ambitious objectives that are enshrined in the gender strategy were not contractually binding, never implemented and basically not more than a document.

This does not mean, however, that the RAHA programme has no bearing on gender - it only demonstrates that the gender *strategy* was inadequate. Several gender-positive activities have taken place throughout RAHA. These are documented and itemised in the effectiveness section.

These are valid for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province only, as project management expressly states that gender was not a focus in Balochistan.

**Training:** Extensively documented gender-disaggregated data on training have been provided. The number of women who attended training sessions in KP is very satisfactory in most areas: 1397 women out of 2897 persons attended capacity training; 2014 women out of 3950 persons attended vocational training; 187 women out of 400 persons attended GBV training; 86 sessions out of 169 on environmental awareness focused on women. In sharp contrast with those encouraging figures are the government civil servant trainings, where only 104 out of 500 trainees were women, and a mere 180 out of 3000 persons were women in the operations and maintenance trainings.



**Livelihoods Development:** In result 2.1.2, a total of 3950 persons (these figures are incorporated into the reporting on result 2.1.2, which itself is larger), including 2014 females, with negligible income were trained in 36 different marketable skills in Peshawar, Nowshera, Swabi, Haripur, Buner & Lower Dir. An estimated 70% of these female trainees have been reported to be gainfully employed and surge in incomes ranges between PKR. 7000/-to 10000/- per month for female trainees and PKR. 9,000-15,000 per month for male trainees. Under a small grant initiative, a special initiative through which 5% of the total of estimated cost of CPIs accumulated was provided to 301 poor of the poorest community members including 125 females. Almost 98% of the grant beneficiaries are still benefitting. Women working from home are benefitting the most. Average Increase of Rps. 6,000 - 8,000 per month in income recorded in each target district.

**Women's Access to Basic Facilities:** 66 specific women Village Organisations exist, and 28 mixed ones. 2658 Community Organisations (COs) including 1053 Women Community Organisations (WCO) were formed and strengthened in the six districts to identify & prioritise 7974 pressing needs through 2658 Participatory Resource Constraint Analyses. 202 Village Organisations (VOs), including 66 women and 28 mixed were formed after federating the village level COs. 23 Local support organisations (LSO), including 2 female and 17 mixed were also formed at the UC level in Peshawar, Nowshera, Swabi and Haripur after federating UC level VOs. Community female activists were empowered enough that 39 female community activists contested the local body election of 2015 and 36 females were elected on general body seats of their respective union councils.

**Implementation of small and medium scale infrastructure projects:** in result 2.2.2: (implementation of at least 500 social services projects such as road/irrigation/solar energy), 35 road schemes were initiated and completed by 35 WCOs directly benefitting 87,556 females. 22 irrigation schemes done by 22 WCOs directly benefitting 130,366 women along with 3 solar schemes prioritised by women community members, completed by 3 WCOs benefitting 60721. In result 3.1.2 (implementation of 1000 proposed social services projects to improve the access of communities to Water, Sanitation, Health, Education), 24 Health units benefitting directly 122,747 women, 38 DWSS schemes were completed benefitting 60,505 women, 133 in house latrines benefitting 73,722 and 99 street pavement and drains were completed benefitting 167,941 females, 145 educational schemes benefitting 158,834 girls of the area.

**Protection Committees:** Out of 120 social protection committees 30 female and 22 mixed social protection committees were formed. 67 conflicts related to GBV were amicably resolved by these committees.

## 9. IMPACT

It is impossible to assess impact in the absence of a relevant baseline. In the early stages of the project, the Benazir Income Support scheme was used as baseline, and subsequently (but only in 2013, or two years into the project) the UC profiles were used for all 103 UCs. Scorecards were then drafted, based on consultation of the Benazir Income Support scheme.

It is regrettable that the simple exercise of determining a small community's capacity "*before and after*" was not done. The target communities are small, and a very simple, short questionnaire administered by the community organisers prior to the start of their work would have sufficed to provide a credible idea of the communities' capacity – a work that would take about a three hour meeting with the community. At the end of the four years, a similar exercise would have been possible with minimal effort. The same logic applies to the baseline for the indicators at higher level, where a simple household survey (or, in the event of lack of resources and time, a quick survey) would have provided tangible evidence that could have been used to measure progress. Social organisers in KP state that they did a half hour to one hour formal assessment (the results of which have not been shared) before and after the activities, but that is by no means sufficient to obtain a workable baseline.

There are, however, already some elements that can be considered at overall and specific objective levels.

The **overall objective** is to support the GoP's pro-poor development efforts to bring the poor communities in Balochistan and KP into mainstream of development by improving access to, and reducing existing inequalities in resources, income and livelihood opportunities. The **indicator** for this objective was:

*"10% decrease in the number of people living below the (national) poverty line in KP and Balochistan".*

The **verification source** was a government census as ante-project assessment and final evaluation as post-project assessment. Senior management acknowledges that this 10% increase has not been achieved. Contributing factors include the economic downturn, double digit inflation, decreased foreign investment and militancy. Most if not all of these factors that are said to have contributed were to some extent and often even fully known as external factors that can jeopardise the potential impact.

The **specific objective** is to improve livelihoods, rehabilitate the environment and enhance social cohesion within communities of refugee/IDP affected and hosting areas. The **indicator** for this objective was:

- 60% of targeted population household income increased by 10%;
- More than 60% of households have access to improved public services; and



- More than 60% of targeted men, women and children are direct beneficiaries of the programme intervention.

The **verification sources** are, according to the project documents, a Survey Evaluation Report, field visits, project progress reports and government reports. Here as well, the appropriate mechanism would have been a baseline survey followed by an end of project survey that measures the same criteria again.

There are several elements that we can take into account to determine impact at levels other than overall and specific objectives.

The **impact of the elevated number of small scale projects is undoubtedly there**. A community will experience significant impact from having reliable water supply, paved roads, solar energy and other interventions. Even though the impact of infrastructures in such a big number of UCs will be admittedly diluted when compared to larger scale projects (this was a strategic decision which cannot be undone anymore), livelihood training and capitalisation as well as better access and use of internal and external resources enabled by community organisations will improve the overall quality of life.

Improving **local governance** by allowing the population to structure itself and feel more self-confident to address state services (the Evaluation Team is of the opinion that these are "big words" for a four day training course), could bear longer term social changes if properly sustained. If successful in the longer term the Community Organisations, the Village Organisations and the Local Support Organisations could spread among new communities with or without external support. At community organisation level, this capacity building may have less impact than at Local Support Organisation level, where some good examples of capacitation have been observed.

Programme-wide impact is certainly diluted by the lack of common understanding of the programme's objectives, the very wide geographic dispersion of micro-projects and all the efficiency and effectiveness issues that make implementation a challenge (see mainly section on efficiency).

Unexpected positive impact includes:

- a reasonable expectation that some community members who have been capacitated under RAHA will be elected in local elections;
- a KP government concept paper on how RAHA communities can be integrated into local governance/government; and
- youth empowerment.

## 10. SUSTAINABILITY

### 10.1. Introduction

Sustainability varies from activity to activity, area to area and the political and economic situation of the province. In Balochistan, it is described by government as "a major issue that requires more dynamics", with government "pondering on how to achieve sustainability". The Mid-Term Review already stated that the project needs to prepare communities for ending dependency and for exit of the project. Exposure to previous projects dramatically enhances potential access to projects and funds. The level of education of key community members plays an obvious role as well.

It is important to recognise some major challenges that exist to build capacities of communities. Most of the communities that RAHA works with lag behind considerably in terms of human development. Some communities confront major access challenges and very high illiteracy rates. Against such a backdrop, improving capacities of these communities remains a major challenge. The fact that these communities were able to successfully manage their infrastructure projects suggests that some level of capacity building has happened. The strength of the RAHA project lies in its implementation through the government (Planning and Development Department) and in collaboration with government line departments. Notwithstanding the exceptions, the level of visibility and ownership by the government is likely to ensure a higher likelihood of sustainability of the RAHA schemes after the end of the project.

UNDP aims to achieve the following by 2020:

- 70% of the households of the area are organised with the help of LSOs;
- each organisation has a fundraising mechanism and contributes sufficient funds;
- engagement of youth in employment and trainings;
- maximum benefits from natural resources; and
- in upcoming elections 90% of successful candidates are from these organised communities.

### 10.2. Policy support

The action is **coherent with Pakistan's policies**:

- a) RAHA is an integral part of the 'Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees to Support Voluntary Repatriation, Sustainable Reintegration and Assistance to Host Countries' (SSAR) 2012-2014;
- b) It is in line with Pakistan's rural development strategy as laid out in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) adopted in 2004. The 2004 PRSP is built around **four pillars**:
  - (i) achieving broad-based economic growth focusing on the rural economy;
  - (ii) improving governance and consolidating devolution;
  - (iii) investing in human capital and delivery of basic social services, and
  - (iv) targeting the poor and vulnerable.



- c) This strategy is, of course, in line with the decentralisation process foreseen by the 18th amendment of the constitution of Pakistan; and
- d) EC programmes in Pakistan are designed to contribute towards its objectives in line with the targets set out by the Pakistan Government in its five year Medium-Term Development Framework and its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.

In addition to being in conformity with the national policies, the project achieved strong cooperation and support from districts where several decisions are taken.

### **Institutional and management capacity**

Relevant Ministries (EAD and SAFRON) are strategically managing the project, while Province and District authorities are piloting the details in close collaboration with the implementing organisation. The project ownership by the final recipients is also reinforced through consultations held at Community Organisations level. The government representatives are clearly steering the project in both provinces.

### **10.3. Ownership**

Target groups have been fully involved in the planning and implementation process. Selection of needs has been effectuated by the communities on the basis of their priorities. RAHA is a community driven project with a bottom-up approach. RAHA has endeavoured to provide the communities what they wanted. After this identification that involved the beneficiaries fully, the projects were implemented by the local communities. The project is thus fully embedded in local structures: all 2,352 community infrastructure projects that were implemented, are fully owned by the communities.

There are, however, diverging views as to how profound the ownership really is. It is true that theoretically the CO and VO and LSOs are the local actors responsible for project implementation and, eventually, accountable for its results. Some more cynical observers argue, however, that the implementation of the target population has been limited to the needs identification (and that RAHA accepted all of their needs), and that this needs assessment was followed by only four days of capacity building - not enough for the ownership to take on a meaningful aspect of empowerment. This is hard to measure in the absence of a proper base line and of an *ex post* measurement of ownership.

Government of Pakistan, through its relevant representatives, is actively involved in decision-making concerning project orientation and implementation. The section on management structures identifies this clearly.

EAD states that it knows less about RAHA than it would like to know and desires more openness. It will, however, perform a one day assessment of the project in the near future, which will then be the start of a process of involvement (admittedly now that the project comes to an end, but still better than nothing). This stems partly from a demand from Parliament for EAD to report on progress.

## 10.4. Financial sustainability

### 10.4.1. Assessment of current situation

The major factors that can play a pivotal role in ensuring sustainability of livelihood related physical infrastructure projects (e.g. farm to market road and irrigation channels) include:

- 1) proper identification and prioritisation of needs;
- 2) savings/provision of funds for operations and maintenance;
- 3) designing the projects in a manner that will require comparatively less effort in terms of repair and maintenance;
- 4) willingness of the communities to play a proactive role in repair and maintenance of the schemes; and
- 5) availability of alternate mechanisms for maintenance of such schemes. Irrigation systems are the most likely to be maintained, as most of the work depends just on man power.

We have seen in the field that a lot of infrastructure is very quickly out of use and that there is no money to do the maintenance, whether for water supply, sanitation, roads, retention walls, solar panels. The CPI are for the vast majority not financially sustainable, both in Balochistan and KPK. It depends on community efforts. Out of all projects that were visited by the Evaluation Team, only a few communities had some knowledge or intuition about how to generate funds for maintenance. In water supply projects, water management committees are rarely set up, consumers do not contribute financially for their usage. When confronted with the theoretical option of setting up a structure, community representatives respond that they received the project "for free" and that this does not give them the right to levy toll on its use by consumers (as this would be considered a sin).

One of the major challenges for sustainability of the physical infrastructure projects is that community institutions, that are supposed to take the lead in operations and maintenance of the schemes, often become dormant after the completion of the projects. This is, of course, not helped by the assessment by the community organisers in Quetta that in their opinion the capacity building measures basically come to an end when the infrastructure works are finished (barring a one-off training session).

Other than the communities, there is little possibility that local authorities or government will assume the maintenance of the project infrastructures. Apart from the odd individual contribution, resources are mostly lacking and all the highest political representatives we interviewed in both target provinces have implored us to ensure a "second phase RAHA". Although government owns the project interventions both in KP and Balochistan to a large extent, this ownership has not resulted in financial support from the government to take responsibility for repair and maintenance of infrastructure schemes implemented under this project. The Balochistan Government has allocated Rps 500 million in Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) for replication of the solar pumps initiative.



In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the provincial government has decreed that a minimum of 10% of the funds allocated at each tier of the local government system shall be allocated to community based projects. This is a very positive development.

#### **10.4.2. Renewed sustainability plan at project end**

UNDP is cognisant that operations and maintenance of community infrastructure projects remains an important challenge. Based on the recommendations made by the Evaluation Team in June 2015, the organisation has developed an O&M manual for communities and a sustainability plan, which will encourage the community organisations to charge regular 'user fees' for infrastructure projects in order to improve sustainability. During the closure phase of the project, the RAHA social mobilisation team is conducting these O&M sessions with the communities and helping them develop sustainability action plans.

The plans that have been drafted are similar for the three levels (CO, VO and LSO), barring a few minor institution-specific details. They lay down the fundamentals that any community organisation should reasonably be expected to be doing independently, including legal entity, record keeping, fund raising, operation and maintenance of the CPIs, transparency and accountability and linkages. When properly implemented, these plans can be very useful.

#### **10.4.3. Amendment of the agreements with the communities**

With a view of keeping communities liable for utilising any savings for project maintenance, the RAHA project shall amend the existing agreement with the communities to reflect this. The addendum to the agreement with the VOs and LSOs prescribes that "a strategy will be devised by them to maintain the projects on sustainable basis" and that they "will maintain the long term sustainability of their projects under the principle of equality and participation". It commits these umbrella organisations to three main contractual obligations that have a bearing with financial viability:

- 1) Start a voluntary savings mechanism that should lead to the establishment of a community managed fund for operation and maintenance (and maintain proper accounts of these funds);
- 2) To maintain the project in good condition and to make all efforts to save it from any possible damages; and
- 3) In case of damage to the project, the Operations and Maintenance Committee will be responsible to repair the project in consultation with all the members.

Obligations other than those covering financial aspects look at the existence of the organisations themselves:

- 1) keep the organisation functional through ensuring the presence of its members in monthly meetings;
- 2) maintain all the records pertaining to the projects and make these records accessible to all members upon demand; and

- 3) make efforts to register under the Social Welfare Act 1961.

Finally, where possible the VOs and LSOs commit to participate in any relevant development forum at village and Union Council level, and to make efforts to establish linkages with Government line departments, civil society and non-governmental organisations to enhance the financial resources of the organisation and to explore possibility of access to development funds.

### **10.5. Environmental sustainability**

Unsustainable uses of natural resources render the livelihoods of the communities insecure in the long run. Environmental sustainability is an important component of sustainable livelihoods approach. There is a need for a mechanism to ensure that physical infrastructure projects (e.g. farm to market roads, water supply projects) are environmentally sensitive, especially in drought-stricken areas like the target areas. There are instances where this is taken into consideration: solar panels for pumping ground water do not have a battery that would allow the pumps to operate at night, because the pumping would be continuous and deplete the ground water; government allows water use in limited amounts per day only.



## 11. UNHCR PROJECTS

### 11.1. Efficiency

UNHCR works through NGOs that have a valid registration with Government of Pakistan in the form of an "allowed to work status" (ATW), issued the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions that works with UNHCR as line ministry.

In total, thirteen projects were implemented in Balochistan, mostly in health, education and WASH. All of them are larger than the micro-projects UNDP has implemented.

UNHCR's work as convening agent is limited to the Steering Committee and the Federal Task Force. Frequency of these meetings is very limited: the Steering Committee has not yet met, and the Federal Task Force has met five times. Details of these management arrangements are described in the general section on efficiency.

The Contribution Agreement prescribes that project selection of beneficiary communities should pass through UNDP's procedures. This (fundamental) implementation aspect was not abided by UNHCR for the ten first projects it did in Balochistan. UNHCR argued that the Task Force had approved the projects, and claimed that they did not know about the UNDP methodology (to note that the Japanese government had actually approved UNHCR's selection methodology on other projects, which exonerates the agency to a certain degree; it does not, however, exonerate it from ignoring the EC contribution agreement procedures).

The EUD declared US\$1.1m project expenditure on these ten projects ineligible on the grounds that the contractually agreed project selection methodology had not been followed. According to the file, (Annex 2 – note n°2305 of 26/11/12 to UNDP), UNDP had not consulted the EUD on the sub-contracting modality, contrary to article 10.1 of the General Conditions. Yet after lengthy discussions the Delegation has agreed to come back on that decision and retroactively consider the 10 projects eligible.

A financial expenditure table for the 2012-2013 projects is shown below. Figures are approximate because of currency exchange rates (the original table was presented in Pakistani Rupees and US Dollars). Financial information for the projects implemented in 2015 cannot be provided here, as the final statements are not available yet.

Implementer	Budget in €	Total expenditure charged to EU (in €)	Total expenditure €
Balochistan rural development and research society	48,446	48,446	48,446
Balochistan rural development and research society	166,167	95,511	95,511
Innovative development Organisation	182,686	56,227	56,227
Innovative development Organisation	180,123	37,485	37,485
Balochistan forest and wildlife department	81,300	81,300	81,300
Youth organisation	88,180	88,180	88,180
Chaghi Development organisation	74,556	74,556	74,556
Koshan welfare society	193,251	63,652	63,652
Gender and reproductive Health organisation	122,819	88,180	88,180
Tameer-e khalq Foundation	69,836	69,836	69,836
Tameer-e khalq Foundation	76,581	76,581	76,581
Water, environment and Sanitation society	135,382	38,771	38,771
Azat Foundation	58,703	58,703	58,703
Azat Foundation	140,676	41,098	41,098
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,618,706</b>	<b>918,526</b>	<b>918,526</b>

## 11.2. Effectiveness

Work in Balochistan province is not an easy task, and UNHCR reports a number of challenges. The agency works with pre-qualified partners that should facilitate implementation, but the province remains a difficult place. There are significant logistical issues that rarely fail to materialise.

Availability of qualified implementing partners is an issue. This is the case in many if not all of the countries where UNHCR works, and not less so in Balochistan. Humanitarian activities mostly take place in areas where capacity at the origin is low or has been further reduced by external factors such as war or displacement. UNHCR itself reports the capacity of NGOs and states as low (although they add that capacity has increased since 2009) and that most projects were not properly implemented.

Political interference (including from the relevant Ministry) has been wielded in order to exercise pressure on the selection of projects and implementing partners. It is interesting to note that this has never been brought up by UNDP, although this kind of interference is obvious.

Remoteness and security context make monitoring very difficult.

In the procurement process, qualified vendors are not easily available.

These factors justify the various extensions to the projects. The overall quality of the work is assessed to be satisfactory in spite of the challenges UNHCR invokes. A detailed analysis of the thirteen projects is attached as Annex 2. One example of a very good project is the EPI intervention in Quetta town, where UNHCR has facilitated the construction of a cold chain refrigerator unit for use in vaccination campaigns. The quality of the work there is very satisfactory.

However, two projects are exposed to major difficulties:



- a) In Quetta town, AHAN implemented a project entitled "Improving Sustainable Livelihoods through Skill Enhancement Training Programme". The company that ran the project is a hybrid public-private enterprise, with its overheads funded by the relevant line Ministry. The garments that are produced by the women-beneficiaries as a result of the vocational training they receive, appear to be sold on the market at quite high prices for the benefit of the owner of the company. When confronted with this suspicion, the person in question claimed that this "keeps being brought up by outsiders", which only adds to the gravity and raises questions as to why UNHCR did not investigate this - particularly because the monitoring officer who attended the visit volunteered the information that he had made a similar observation at the time of identification of the project. It was, at that point, however, too late to alter the project as it had gone through the approval process already. This does not take away UNHCR's responsibility to investigate during implementation; and
- (b) In Quetta town, OPPC (Orthopaedic, Prosthetic and Physiotherapy Centre) and implemented by SOCIO Pakistan (Society of Collective Interests Orientation) ran a project entitled "Strengthening of orthopaedic, prosthetic and physiotherapy centre Quetta by provision of equipment". Visual site inspection suggests that the budget of about €300,000 – a considerable amount in Pakistan – had not been fully invested. Several parts of the building were manifestly not maintained, severe roof leakage had caused widespread wall damage, equipment that was budgeted for new purchase was clearly not new (it appeared to be 20 to 30 years old, with the exception of one orthopaedic heating device). The building did not at all show signs of having undergone a rehabilitation project. Right when the Evaluation Team intended to address these observations with the centre's management who had benefited from the intervention, a physiotherapist in the employ of the orthopaedic clinic approached and levelled serious accusations at the clinic's director. The gist of these accusations was that with €300,000 he could build an entirely new orthopaedic centre (which is probably true), and that the money had been misappropriated by the director and his friends. We have not been able to independently verify these allegations but have convened a meeting with UNHCR. When asked about the above allegations, UNHCR sub-office Quetta responded that they can only do ex-post monitoring of projects that are being implemented. This explanation is, however, in full contradiction with the mandate as confirmed by UNHCR Islamabad and a grave misinterpretation of field procedures.

In addition, procurement has been done by one single supplier for 27 m PKR instead of taking the best offers on individual items from the various offers.

UNHCR Islamabad have been briefed about these two projects.

### 11.3. Sustainability

UNHCR does not focus on community mobilisation to the same extent as UNDP, and as a result is very open about the one-off humanitarian aspect of their projects, forewarning the Evaluation Team not to expect any sustainability. A community organisation is constituted for the purposes of the initial needs assessment but otherwise not involved; the work is done by contractors and the implementing partners. In parallel, there is "some" capacity building but UNHCR does not substantiate that aspect. The only soft component resides in the maintenance committees.

Legitimate questions can be asked about this approach, as explained in the relevance section of this chapter. UNHCR implement a UNDP project that contractually comes with a community focus. The implementation modalities were intended to follow the UNDP intervention logic.



## 12. LESSONS LEARNED

The selection of a multitude of micro-projects was evidently a deliberate choice, but implementation in more than 2,000 small communities is not manageable and indeed should be advised against. The Evaluation Team has been able to see only a fraction of the projects (under heavily scripted and managed visits) and has nevertheless exposed significant operational flaws in monitoring. In essence, it is impossible to properly manage a project in such a geographic context, with security constraints complicating matters even more. The quality of monitoring at the provincial level could be improved. There are not enough human resources to physically accompany all projects that are being implemented by the communities and this in spite of the CO capacity issues.

The financial follow-up by UNDP of all these small projects was nothing less than unacceptable, with the organisation unable to provide credible financial expenditure data. Cost control mechanisms appear to have been insufficient or inexistent. Even the most basic accounting principle of justifying the actual expenditure (the real cost), as opposed to cash flow (what communities have received by way of a bank transfer) was not followed until this deficiency was exposed during the Evaluation Team's first mission in June 2015. Even after that time, the notion was still not clear to UNDP and financial reporting figures kept on changing on a regular basis. Risks occur at identification of project level and at the level of implementation of the projects in the communities. RAHA is a high-risk project with money transfers to community organisations that operate in mostly destitute geographic areas where the average project funding amount is the equivalent of a life-times earning or more.

A Management Information System and Monitoring Dashboard are kept at Islamabad level. It was usable for internal UNDP purposes since September 2013. As a consequence, data inputting over the entire project implementation time frame can be flawed in some circumstances, e.g. not all data were collected in the field prior to the MIS being operational. Several essential data are not available for all projects: the number of direct and indirect beneficiaries, number of Pakistani and Afghan refugees that are beneficiaries of the CPIs, gender disaggregated data, real incurred cost per project, details on the engineering works. For any future UN project, this Management Information System can be of great value.

On two occasions, the EUD has suspended payments to UNDP pending clarification on some reporting and management issues. UNDP should have continued funding the 2,352 communities it was working with, in the knowledge that the ability of these communities to pre-finance was inexistent.

There was little or no strategic oversight from the national level. The Steering Committee never convened, and the Federal Task Force met only five times (three times of which within one single year). All responsibilities were devolved to the Provincial Task Force. The lack of strategic management at Steering Committee and Federal Task Force is most certainly at the origin of most if not all of the targeting issues.

The human resources available in the two provinces are a serious problem for project management. It is hard to select, recruit and retain competent personnel in these remote areas of Pakistan, and the logistical challenges of getting these personnel to the projects that are being implemented by the local communities are daunting. Without a doubt, these factors have adversely affected the programme's community building, management, monitoring and technical assistance. The Mid-Term Review severely criticised the project for not having enough competent staff. The Evaluation Team has found that the quality of human resources is mostly good and in some cases excellent, but that not sufficient staff is available to provide a continued field presence.

Community Organisations as well as most of the field staff were insufficiently trained for preparation of the detailed design and cost estimates at formulation stage of the scheme. The drawings are mostly sketchy, incomplete and void of specifications for most of the items of work. The work was noted to be structurally safe and can be termed as acceptable after removal of flaws mentioned against visited CPIs in view of the security risks involved, remoteness of the areas, also bearing in mind that schemes were implemented by the communities that were not trained enough to implement such schemes according to the acceptable engineering principles and practices in the sector nor they had any past experience. During the construction phase, the quality control system appears to have been insufficient or absent.

The quality of works in KP was relatively better than Balochistan, structurally safe and can be termed acceptable.



## 13. CONCLUSIONS

### Relevance

1. The action is coherent with the European Commission's development programme and with Pakistan's policies. ✓
2. The programme is fully relevant to the needs of the target groups. ✓

### Design

3. The design is sub-optimal from many perspectives and was not improved during implementation. This includes very poor targeting, especially geographically and to a lesser degree thematically. The number of micro-projects was unmanageable.

### Efficiency

4. It is impossible to determine with certainty, at the time of reporting, what the expenditure is against the €30,000,000 budget line for CPIs, in spite of the significance of this budget line. Calculation of real cost expenditure accounting has only been initiated in June 2015, for it to replace bank transfer accounting.
5. The expenditure tables have changed frequently, often by significant amounts. The evaluation team has considerable reservations about the accuracy of the accounts and leaves the final judgment to the EUD's Contracts and Finance section.
6. Payment suspensions have had a negative impact on the implementation time table.
7. RAHA did not work as "One UN", even though collaboration between UNDP and UNHCR is good.
8. There was barely any national programme oversight, with the provinces effectively in charge of strategic management. Provincial coordination is strong.
9. Monitoring of field activities is sub-standard as a result of the unmanageable number of project sites.
10. Reporting quality is sub-standard.

### Effectiveness

11. The quality of the work on the CPIs is acceptable.
12. Capacity building of the local communities was just enough to provide them with the most basic skills.

### Impact

13. At the level of overall and specific objectives, the contractually agreed impact has not been achieved. At micro-level, there is undoubtedly a major impact on peoples' lives with the completion of the CPI works.

### Sustainability

14. Ownership is good, with target groups fully involved in the planning and implementation process. There is a clearly apparent dynamic of networking at the levels of village organisations and local support organisations (Village Organisation (VO) and Local Support Organisation (LSO)). However, capacity building at community level has not reached such

depths of sustainability and ownership. The local communities still need more empowerment, as they have been capacitated in a limited manner only. Government of Pakistan is actively engaged in decision making.

15. Financial sustainability at community level is not good, but a renewed sustainability plan at the end of the project may mitigate that to some extent.
16. Significant efforts to guarantee sustainability have been undertaken towards the end of the project, with good prospects for success.