AUTOMATION OF VOTERS’ IDENTIFICATION PROCESS DURING THE ELECTORAL CYCLE IN 2015-2017

Independent Final Evaluation

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Acronyms and Abbreviations
CEC – Central Election Commission
CO – Country Office
CPD – Country Program Document
EVID – Electronic Voter Identification
HACT – Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers
IRI – International Republican Institute
JICA – Japan International Cooperation Agency
KESP II – Kyrgyz Electoral Support Project II
LTA – Long Term Agreement
PMU – Project Management Office
PSO – Procurement Support Office
QPR – Quarterly Progress Report
SRS – State Registration Service
TAR – True Acceptance Rate
TOT – Training of Trainers
UNDAF – United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP – United Nations Development Program
UNEG – United Nations Evaluation Group
Executive Summary

Kyrgyzstan’s brief history as an electoral democracy has been marred by flawed voter lists, undermining public confidence in the country’s electoral institutions, processes and outcomes. The lack of an accurate registry of voters was viewed by many as an opening for fraudulent behavior and manipulations before and during Election Day.

In 2013, the government made improving electoral practices a key priority, to be achieved through the introduction of new technologies, including the means to identify eligible voters on Election Day. The government initiated a new system of biometric registration of citizens in 2014, to be used to form the country’s voter lists and verify voters’ identity beginning with the October 2015 parliamentary elections. To implement this new arrangement, the government of Kyrgyzstan turned to the international community, including UNDP, for assistance.

In May of 2015, with support from the government of Japan, UNDP launched the “Automation of Voter’s Identification Process during the Electoral Cycles in 2015-2017” project. Through this project, and working closely with the State Registration Service (SRS), UNDP would procure the equipment needed to determine voters’ eligibility and identity at more than 2,400 polling places around the country. The project also contained several other training-related components to ensure that operators and technicians had the skills necessary to use and maintain the equipment.

Upon conclusion of the activities, UNDP commissioned this Independent Evaluation to assess the achievements, outcomes and impact of the project. Guided by the terms of reference and key project documents, the evaluation explored in detail the implementation of the planned activities, project management and communications, project monitoring and evaluation, visibility, and sustainability of the activities. Ultimately, the evaluation sought to understand how, and to what degree, the project realized its key outputs and overall goal, and whether it successfully contributed to the United Nation’s Development Assistance Framework and Country Program Document for Kyrgyzstan. The evaluation took place in February and March 2017, and consisted of a desk review and field mission to interview key stakeholders.

Despite a very condensed timeframe for implementation, UNDP and the SRS succeeded in procuring the equipment necessary to enable biometric identification of voters in polling stations during the October 2015 elections. UNDP and the SRS trained over 10,000 operators, technicians and polling station staff on the proper use and maintenance of the equipment and database of voters. While some problems did occur on Election Day, these were relatively minor, and for the most part successfully and quickly resolved by the SRS and polling station officials. Observers, while noting some of these problems, lauded the improvements in election administration, including the biometric registration and identification of voters. Following the 2015 parliamentary elections, the equipment has been successfully used in by-elections and the December 2016 municipal elections and national referendum.

UNDP’s project management arrangements appeared slightly unorthodox, due mainly to severe time constraints and the heavy procurement emphasis of the activities. Such an approach may have been inevitable, and even necessary, in order ensure success of the key activities. However, it may have also contributed to the uneven application of project management and monitoring and evaluation tools and methods. Donors and stakeholders were highly satisfied with the level of communication with UNDP, and with the overall visibility of the project. Attribution to the support provided by the government of Japan was appropriate and consistent.
Overall, the project met its key output in the timely delivery of the equipment and requisite training to support the voter identification process during elections. The use of the equipment and technology was widely accepted by citizens, and appears to be a sustainable practice – being used in elections at least through 2017, presumably beyond. In helping Kyrgyzstan use its new biometric registry to identify voters on Election Day, UNDP made a key contribution to free and fair elections, and improved a component of elections (voter registration and identification) that was considered a threat to the integrity of the voting process, and ultimately peace and security in the country.
I. Background and Context

Following the political upheaval in 2009 that ousted President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, Kyrgyzstan adopted a new electoral system for the country’s Jogorku Kenesh, or parliament. This new parliamentary electoral system attempted to prevent abuses and a single political party from acquiring monopolistic control over the legislature, something that Kyrgyzstan had repeatedly experienced in its brief, post-Soviet electoral history.¹ However, reforming the electoral system alone would not ensure that the country’s elections would be free and fair, and peaceful, in the long term. Several fundamental weaknesses in electoral administration had been repeatedly cited by politicians, academics and domestic and international observers, which, if left unaddressed, would continue to undermine citizens’ trust in elections and potentially once again destabilize the country during future political transitions.

Voter Registration in Kyrgyzstan

Chief among these weaknesses was the inability to compile a complete and accurate list of voters. Poor quality of voter lists had contributed to a number of problems in prior elections, including disenfranchising voters, opportunities for fraudulently using lists inflated with duplicate, deceased and other “phantom” voters, and other politically motivated consequences.² To compile voter lists, Kyrgyzstan’s Central Election Commission (CEC) and local government officials continued to tinker with a process that was essentially a verification and update of civil registry data by local authorities charged with compiling the lists of voters. However, the inability to crosscheck voters to avoid duplicates, find deceased voters or to handle considerable external and internal migration (mostly economic, but also from interethnic tensions in the south of the country), left the voter lists open to manipulation – both real and perceived – and one of the most serious threats to electoral processes in Kyrgyzstan.

Under the new election legal framework, efforts to improve the voter lists were introduced for presidential elections in 2011, including the elimination of same-day registration and the introduction of an “electoral address”. Such measures were designed to remedy problems caused by the combination of frequent migration and changes in life status, and the country’s existing, insufficient methods of updating records of civic data. Notwithstanding these improvements, these practices proved only partially successful, and serious concerns about the accuracy of Kyrgyzstan’s voter lists remained.³

The October 2011 presidential elections were viewed by many as the concluding event in a transition that had begun with the interim government and adoption of the 2010 constitution via national referendum. The next major cycle of parliamentary, local and presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan were scheduled to take place from 2015 to 2017. Thus, there existed a window of time sufficient to reform the country’s electoral

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¹ At the time, Kyrgyzstan had already experimented with no less than five different systems for electing the national legislature in just two decades. Only once was a parliament elected in the same way as the one that preceded it (1995 and 2000). Changes were generally introduced to consolidate holds on power by incumbents.
² These included, for example, using inflated numbers of registered voters to increase the various electoral thresholds needed for political parties to obtain seats in the legislature.
³ For these elections the CEC also attempted to introduce a new, centralized voter registration database; however, delays in launching this database and a lack of guidance and procedures obliged the CEC to revert to updating the original 2001 voter lists. There were also several technical problems encountered in inadvertently removing categories of voters and changing requirements for inclusion in the lists shortly before Election Day.
administration. President Almazbek Atambaev would make such reform a key imperative of his presidency: on 22 May 2013, he issued the decree “On Measures on the Improvement of the Electoral System of the Kyrgyz Republic.” This decree created a working group to address the National Council of State Development with proposals to specifically: improve the legal framework for the Jorgu Kenesh elections in 2015; improve the legal framework on political parties; and introduce modern technologies in the electoral process – specifically, to improve voter registration, the voting process and counting of ballots. The decree also established a 1 November 2013 deadline to propose improved methods for voter identification, transparency and counting of votes.4

Biometrics in Election Administration

The government’s eventual decision regarding the voter registration process was to compile a new biometric registry of citizens, which could be used to create voter lists and verify the eligibility of voters on Election Day. To accomplish this, an active registration process would take place, whereby the State Registration Service (SRS) would take biometric fingerprint and photo data beginning in September 2014, soon after the passage of the law on biometric registration.5 This undertaking consisted of nationwide information campaigns, the opening of temporary and permanent registration centers, and proactive efforts to seek-out unregistered citizens. The initial collection of biometric data was carried out in several phases, and was largely complete by September 2015.6

The use of modern technologies to improve election administration, including biometric registration and identification, was viewed critical to eliminating certain malpractices and fraudulent behavior in elections, and contributing to a peaceful transfer of power. However, introducing such costly, new and fundamentally different technologies within a rapidly dwindling timeline presented several challenges for the government, which, if not properly addressed, could produce the opposite effect: destabilizing the elections and current peace in the country.

In order to use biometric data to identify voters at the polls, the government turned to the international community for technical and financial assistance. Chief among these partners were UNDP and the governments of Japan, Korea, Germany and Switzerland. Following an official request from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic on 23 December 2014, UNDP and the Embassy of Japan, through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), developed the project “Automation of Voter’s Identification Process during the Electoral Cycles in 2015-2017.” The project was scheduled to last for one year (May 2015 – May 2016), and to run concurrently with UNDP’s other election activities within the Kyrgyz Election Support Project (KESP II).7

II. Project Goal and Output

The overall goal of the “Automation of Voters’ Identification Process during the Electoral Cycle in 2015-2017” project was free, fair and peaceful October 2015 Parliamentary Election and beyond (2016 Municipal and 2017 presidential elections) in the Kyrgyz Republic. The expected Project Output was New

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5 President Atambaev signed the Law on Biometric Registration of Citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic on 14 July 2014; it came in to force shortly thereafter.
6 After this initial period, data collection has continued through permanent SRS registration points.
electoral technologies introduced to support Electronic Voter Identification. To achieve this goal and output, the project envisioned several components, primarily the procurement of Electronic Voter Identification (EVID) equipment. All activities are described in detail within the Project Document and succinctly identified in both the Project Document Logical Framework and the Quality Management for Project Activity Results (Annexes 8 and 5 to the Project Document).

The UNDP Country Program Document (CPD) and United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for the Kyrgyz Republic identifies areas for UN support according to the country’s development priorities, including those of the National Sustainable Development Strategy (2013-2017) and the Programme for Transition to Sustainable Development for the Kyrgyz Republic (2013-2017). The project fits under the first cluster of the UNDAF, Peace and Cohesion, Effective Democratic Governance, and Human Rights and contributes to Outcome 1: A national infrastructure for peace (at local regional and national levels, involving government, civil society, communities and individuals) effectively prevents violent conflict and engages in peace building. Part of the baseline for UNDAF Outcome 1 utilizes a 2009 El-Pikir survey that shows 35.1% of Kyrgyz citizens view non-transparent and unfair elections as a key impediment to peace and security in their country, behind only corruption (58.2%) and poor implementation of laws (42.2%). The project also is closely aligned with UNDP’s current Strategy Note.

III. Purpose, Methodology and Scope of Evaluation

Per the Project Document, upon the conclusion of the project an Independent Evaluation is required to assess the delivery of outputs, outcomes and impact of the project. The initial period of project performance was extended, and the Independent Evaluation postponed, eventually taking place in February and March of 2017.

Evaluation Scope

This evaluation thoroughly reviews the implementation of the program activities as intended in the Project Document. This includes an analysis of deliverables, deadlines, overall project management and monitoring and evaluation, and project visibility and sustainability, and how these factors contributed to the project outcome and goals, and ultimately to the outcomes of UNDP Kyrgyzstan’s CPD and UNDAF. The evaluation also includes the activities of the Kyrgyz beneficiaries that were supported directly by the project and whether these led to the desired outcome and goal.

The technical specifications and costs of the biometric identification solution, and the financial management and procurement practices followed, are outside the scope of this project evaluation.

Methodology

The methodology for the Independent Evaluation consists of elements of both outcome and process evaluations. A process evaluation examines whether specific program strategies and activities were implemented as planned, and if, and why, an approach or particular activity changed over time. Outcome

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8 The CPD and UNDAF were designed to respond to 2012-2016 priorities; however, were extended through 2017 to align with the national strategy documents and more fully support Kyrgyzstan’s own development cycle.

9 Per UNDP’s Strategy Note (2016), “UNDP will continue supporting the development and implementation of the policies to foster effective and accountable governance and citizens’ participation and engagement. Innovation approaches, including new ICT technologies, will be strongly applied.”

10 The project now officially closes 31 March 2017.
evaluation techniques will investigate whether the project had the overall effects as desired. This combined approach is designed to help UNDP understand whether or not the goal and output(s) were achieved, and equally important, yield insight into why, and to what extent. The evaluation strives to uphold the norms of impartiality, independence, and professionalism, among others, set forth in the United Nation Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and Standards for Evaluation.

Specific evaluative methodologies employed include: a primary document review; key informant interviews with UNDP staff, primary beneficiaries, donor representatives, and other relevant stakeholders; and review of secondary sources of information relevant to project implementation and outcomes. Most interviews took place in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan between 20 February and 1 March 2017. Several additional interviews took place outside of Kyrgyzstan either before or after the mission, both in person and over Skype. Per the UNEG code of conduct, the evaluation recognized and protected the ethical rights and confidentiality of these key informants. Documents reviewed are cited in Annex 2, and a list of individuals and institutions interviewed in Annex 3.

The project Logic Framework (Annex 8 to the Project Document) by itself proved only partially useful in determining whether key outputs and outcomes were met. Therefore, elements of the Logic Framework are used where applicable and appropriate, supplemented by additional sources and means of verification to more effectively evaluate the project. Understanding the use of biometric identification in Kyrgyzstan, while not the primary subject of the evaluation, was in part guided by the recently issued document: “Principles for Identification”, to which UNDP has subscribed.

Acknowledgments

The evaluation would not have been possible without the assistance provided by the UNDP Kyrgyzstan Country Office and Project Management Unit, and the willing cooperation of the State Registration Service, Central Election Commission and representatives of international and domestic civic organizations interviewed.

IV. Implementation of Project Activities

The project was narrow in scope, consisting primarily of procurement of the necessary EVID equipment (or “kits”) and a Training of Trainers (TOT) activity on use of the equipment. Envisioned were four activity results: the development of the technical specifications for the EVID kits; the procurement of the equipment; the development and publishing of training materials on using and maintaining the equipment; and training of a pool of experts responsible for training the operators of the EVID kits.

According to their initial calculations, the government of Kyrgyzstan would require 4,000 EVID kits to implement biometric identification of voters at the polling place on Election Day. Of this number, 3000 were to be provided by JICA-UNDP, as the SRS already possessed 1,000 partial kits, used to collect citizens’ biometric data over the prior year. Discussion and correspondence with UNDP on various components of EVID equipment began in mid to late 2014. UNDP and SRS began joint work on the

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11 See Agenda, Annex 1.
12 For example, several of the means of verification, including a Knowledge, Attitudes and Perceptions survey and minutes or notations of certain meetings, do not exist (to date).
14 Quality Management for Project Activity Results, (Annex 5 to the Project Document).
technical specifications for the EVID equipment in early 2015.\textsuperscript{15} To administer such a large procurement, UNDP worked closely with the UNDP Procurement Support Office (PSO) in Copenhagen. For the required equipment, two procurement methods were employed: Long-Term Agreement (LTA) holders were invited to provide quotations for the equipment covered by LTAs, while a separate, open Invitation-to-Bid (ITB) tender was conducted for all other items. In late May of 2015, SRS and UNDP representatives travelled to Copenhagen to participate in the tender review process. A list of components procured for the EVID kits can be found in the table of project expenditures, Annex 4.

The end result of the tendering process was a significant cost-savings in the project. This was mainly due to suppliers quoting prices lower than their published prices, and the use of land transportation, which proved less expensive than the air freight calculation in the project budget. These cost-savings would later prove critical to the project’s success.

Items began arriving in country in late July, in accordance with the expedited schedule projected by UNDP. All equipment arrived and cleared customs by 1 August 2015, with an official handover ceremony taking place a few days later. According to the Grant Agreement, UNDP was also to ensure proper maintenance of equipment and, together with the SRS, arranged for safe storage at the “Uchkun” warehouse in Bishkek prior to, and after, its use on Election Day.\textsuperscript{16}

Based on SRS’ estimations, the 4,000 EVID kits would be sufficient for up to 2.4 million voters, with each EVID kit capable of processing up to 600 voters during the Election Day. This estimation was likely to be inaccurate for several reasons. First, the more recent parliamentary elections tended to average about 1.6-7 million voters only. Second, the number of 600 voters per operator per day appears to have been a straight mathematical calculation of 50 voters per hour over the 12-hour voting day, which assumes several, unlikely conditions.\textsuperscript{17}

It is perhaps not surprising that after piloting EVID kits in by-elections in Talas and Batken, the SRS revised downward its estimate of the number of voters an operator could process within voting hours, to 300-400 voters. Based on these figures, the SRS estimated it may need up to 9,470 EVID kits, and issued an official inquiry to UNDP about any cost-savings within the project. After discussions with UNDP and JICA, it was determined that a further 2,000 EVID kits could be procured through the project budget due to the cost-savings from the initial procurement.\textsuperscript{18} The SRS also put forward close to 800,000 USD of its own funds to purchase an additional 1,000 kits. These funds were formally transferred to UNDP through a Cost Share Agreement, signed 20 August 2015. This second procurement was completed with items arriving in country by 29 September 2015, just a few days’ shy of the 4 October Election Day. UNDP also procured around 75,000 USD worth of software and hardware for the central SRS office.\textsuperscript{19}

Given that the SRS’s new estimate of 9,470 EVID kits was based on a very high estimation of voter turnout – around 2.4 million, or 312,000 per hour during peak morning hours – the final number of 6,000

\textsuperscript{15} While this was technically prior to any Grant Agreement from JICA, it was necessary for UNDP to assume this risk if the procurement deadlines were to be met.

\textsuperscript{16} The SRS identified the warehouse as the only suitable facility available. UNDP made several recommendations to improve the facility.

\textsuperscript{17} This calculation assumed that voter traffic is perfectly constant during the day, there is no equipment malfunction or troubleshooting that takes an EVID kit offline for a period of time, there are no interruptions to voting for any other (non-equipment) reason, and precincts are evenly divided into 600 person units.

\textsuperscript{18} The only difference in the procurement of these kits was the omission of the thermal printers which were to be sourced by the Kyrgyz government.

\textsuperscript{19} This was mostly related to increasing the server capacities of SRS.
EVID kits was likely to be sufficient for even the busiest periods on Election Day. The actual peak hour turned out to be between 11am-12pm, with 186,430 voters.\(^2^0\)

To further manage the risk of overcrowding at the polls due to too few EVID kits, UNDP and SRS focused on the training element of the project to increase operators’ efficiency in using the equipment.\(^2^1\) The Project Document specified the possible use of UN’s Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers (HACT) mechanism as a capacity building tool to equip a core group of trainers, who in turn would train close to 10,000 operators and 2,500 polling station commissioners at the local level.\(^2^2\) Originally, it was planned that a budget of approximately 75,000 USD would be required to train 307 core trainers and EVID technicians. However, the SRS submitted to UNDP a reduced budget for the HACT, with the savings primarily due to the merging of training groups and reduction of the number of trainers. These cost-savings were redistributed towards UNDP’s direct procurement of training materials, specifically: an interactive, short training video for SRS operators; 3,000 CD copies of the video; instructional guides on operating the EVID kits; educational banners on the identification and voting process at the precincts; and additional IT specialists.

Another potential project risk identified in the Offline Risk Log of the Project Document concerned the security of voters’ data. Citizen data protection is regulated by the country’s Law on Personal Data (2008). Each operator and technician was required to sign a nondisclosure agreement (following the Risk Log’s mitigation strategy). Per the SRS, operators and technicians were also subject to background checks carried out by investigative and security agencies.

Shortly before the 4 October parliamentary elections, UNDP, via a contract with State Enterprise “Office of Special Communication”, supported the distribution of EVID kits to SRS facilities in the regions. The SRS and regional CEC representatives in turn distributed the kits to the precincts. On Election Day, EVID kits were successfully used across the country in the identification of voters, with limited difficulties (see below). A small number of EVID kits were deployed in the spring of 2016 in a series of by-elections. The EVID kits were again used countrywide in the 11 December 2016 municipal elections, held together with a national referendum.

**Evaluative Assessment**

The design and delivery of the EVID kit specifications and equipment was successfully completed per the schedule set forth in the Project Document. (See Figure 1 for a visualization of the planned vs. actual timeline). This was confirmed by a review of the correspondence among UNDP Kyrgyzstan, PSO, and SRS concerning product specifications, three separate purchase orders for equipment, cost-sharing agreement between UNDP and SRS, shipping and customs documentation, official transfers of title of ownership, and other documents. UNDP displayed considerable flexibility in rapidly responding to the request from the SRS for the procurement of additional EVID kits. This additional equipment was critical to ensuring full deployment of the EVID technology in the country for the 2015 parliamentary election. UNDP also assisted in the timely distribution of EVID equipment to each region via their contracting of the State Enterprise “Office of Special Communication”.

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\(^{20}\) [https://data.srs.kg/](https://data.srs.kg/)

\(^{21}\) Another strategy was to use public service announcements and other informational campaigns to encourage voting in off-peak hours; however, neither the SRS or CEC decided to pursue this idea.

\(^{22}\) HACT is a common operational framework of participating UN agencies for transferring cash to government and non-government implementing partners.
Figure 1: Timeline of key milestones of Automation of Voters’ Identification Process During the Electoral Cycle in 2015-2017

**Training**

Per the original timeline in the Project Document, with exception of the development of training materials, training activities took place as scheduled. The Implementing Partner Checklist completed for the HACT was thorough and comprehensive, justifying use of the mechanism with the SRS to complete the project’s training outputs. Several documents produced under this agreement (training materials, forms, other instructions, lists of trainers, etc.) attesting to the completion of the activities under the HACT were reviewed as part of the evaluation. Per UNDP staff, the SRS accounted for funds appropriately within two separate financial audits of UNDP programming. Using cost-savings resulting from the difference between the budgeted and actual HACT expenditures, UNDP was able to procure and deliver in time the additional training materials to assist the SRS training efforts. These activities were verified through a review of the contracts, requests for payment based on deliverables, and the materials themselves. While not formally a part of this project, UNDP also played a key role in securing additional funds for the training of operators and precinct commission members.23

While there were reports of operators having difficulty working with the EVID technology, these appeared to be the exception rather than the norm.24 Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that the TOT and subsequent local trainings of operators and technicians were successful, and achieved their objective of imparting

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23 UNDP provided an additional 532,232 USD for the local trainings through the Swiss funded KESP-II budget.
24 While a number of statements and observation reports were reviewed, the evaluation relies primarily on reports of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, Association of World Election Bodies (A-WEB) Election Visitor Program, “Taza Shailoo” Association, and Public Association “Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society”. Unless attributed to a specific organization, citations refer to these reports generally and collectively.
information on operating and maintaining equipment. Unfortunately, UNDP staff could not attend any of the TOT events, nor a sample of the subsequent trainings at the local level.25

The SRS also provided technical support specialists to assist operators throughout Election Day. Support included information obtained through the internet portal shailoo.srs.kg (194,056 visits), and SRS call center (7,496 phone calls).26 The SRS identified 2044 issues where it aided operators and technicians. A summary of the problems (and typical resolutions) can be found in Figure 2.

Voter identification

Observer organizations assessed positively the new technologies deployed for the first time in the 2015 parliamentary elections, including the biometric identification process. There appeared to be no widespread issues with SRS staff operating the EVID equipment during Election Day (as opposed to the ballot box scanners, which posed more problems, particularly in the beginning of the day). However, observer reports cited a number of other issues, including voters who could not be identified by their fingerprints, who were in the wrong polling place, or not in the registry at all. (See Figure 3 for the type of issues experienced in Kyrgyzstan with the biometric identification of voters). Of course, these problems are not all attributable to biometric technology or equipment. Unwillingness of citizens to provide biometric data, problems of electoral administration and political behavior were all cited as contributing causes.27

Interlocutors expressed that it is difficult to know just how many voters remain outside the new database, simply because all previous indicators of the Kyrgyz population numbers are flawed. According to figures provided by the SRS, in the recent 2016 referendum and local elections, some 6,997 citizens attempted to vote but were not in the database. Another 3,349 citizens were in the database, but could not be identified through their biometrics (fingerprints). This number, or about 0.14% of registered voters, best represents the number of citizens potentially disenfranchised through the introduction of biometric identification.28 Of course, some of these cases may be attempted fraudulent voting, and biometric identification systems are

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25 The SRS apparently did not inform UNDP of the training dates in time. While local trainings were not financed through this project, they may have yielded some insight into the quality of the TOT events.
27 For example, some observers considered the very high number of voters (over 200,000) opting to use an election address instead of their residency address to be the machinations of political parties, who transferred many unknowing voters from one polling station to another (often in different regions), to gain votes or “reduce” regional thresholds. “Taza Shailoo” Association, Final Report on the Results of independent monitoring of Kyrgyz Republic Jogorku Kenesh elections in 2015.
28 While it is true biometric information on the entire of-age population remains incomplete, the prevailing opinion seems to be that the responsibility for being in the country’s biometric database now lies with the citizen. Additional potentially disenfranchised voters may have been those assigned to the wrong polling station, where that polling station was located not in the next precinct over, but in another region of the country.
never perfect: there is always a True Acceptance Rate (TAR) of less than 100% for any system. TARs for fingerprint recognition are, however, generally considered more accurate than simple human recognition (by facial features).

This being said, no citizen should be denied the right to vote. The government should consider introducing adequate measures to protect the right of citizens to vote in such cases where a voter is confirmed in the database, but unable to establish identity through biometrics. For example, the voter could complete an affidavit and cast a provisional ballot, which would only be counted once the voter’s eligibility is established (by the CEC or SRS, after Election Day). For the 2017 presidential elections, the SRS is planning to provide a second biometric option, facial recognition, to potentially identify voters whose fingerprints fail (wrongfully) to match the database.

Data Protection

Per the SRS, no breaches of citizen data have occurred to date. Each operator and technician signed a special nondisclosure agreement, and was subject to background vetting by the National Security Agency. The National Security Agency also provides oversight over the access and use of the data collected. Other government agencies have special agreements on the type of access they can have to citizen information (typically, viewer access only). Such access is oftentimes limited to formal requests, for example by a court order. Certain commercial entities, such as banks, may also access the data to obtain basic info on citizenship and passport details, but only with a citizen’s consent. These provisions and practices appear to be in line with norms and standards regarding data privacy, security and user rights, and establishing institutional mandates and oversight mechanisms.

In addition to the SRS using nondisclosure agreements and background checks, UNDP had also envisioned supporting SRS with an external expert(s) to aid in mitigating security risks. However, a UN Department of Political Affairs assessment mission did not recommend UNDP engage in software development, including IT security issues, without a proper feasibility study. In addition it appeared that such assistance was not required, nor requested, during the period of implementation.

Equipment (EVID Kits)

There were relatively few instances of malfunctioning equipment. Most equipment defects were related to transport, particularly of public display monitors. The SRS reported having to replace only a handful of monitors and laptops, and no printers. The issues resolved by SRS technicians on Election Day were mostly minor: for example, operators and polling station staff had trouble switching on the monitors, paper had been inserted incorrectly in the printers, operators had forgotten passwords, etc. Several of the problems encountered were due to failing to follow the proper sequence for setting up the EVID kits. Per the SRS, voting was interrupted for a serious time-period due to EVID equipment malfunctioning in only one instance, in both the 2015 and 2016 elections. In these cases, replacement EVID kits had to be delivered from the regional offices before voting could recommence. Several interlocuters also mentioned issues with biometric readers malfunctioning in the morning of the December 2016 election, due to the cold weather.

Some observer reports suggested higher levels of equipment failure. However, it was difficult to ascertain from the reports just what was meant by “failure” — one report for the December 2016 elections stated that

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29 Per the SRS, this function is supposedly to become the responsibility of a new agency or office dedicated to this purpose; however, this institution is yet to be established.
failure of equipment was observed in 25% of their precincts sampled countrywide – and a full 50% within Bishkek City. Presumably this included all types and degrees of issues, such as simply needing more than one attempt to identify a voter, a voter in the wrong precinct, a voter who never registered, etc., as no interviewees indicated serious problems with the biometric identification equipment on such a scale.

Conclusions

The development of equipment specifications, procurement, and delivery was achieved successfully within the project timeline and under budget. Success was due to considerable preparatory work by UNDP, JICA and the Embassy of Japan, and counterparts from the government of Kyrgyzstan, well before the Grant Agreement was formalized. Cooperation with the PSO and use of the LTA mechanism also greatly expedited the procurement process. The commitment and efforts of UNDP CO and PMU, and SRS staff, were also instrumental in bringing about the desired outcome.

All stakeholders interviewed during this evaluation expressed extreme satisfaction and deep gratitude for the work of UNDP within the framework of this project, including partners at the SRS and CEC, and also international and local organizations working in the area of elections and democratic governance. There was much skepticism surrounding the government’s ambitious plans to use biometrics for voter identification, and the timeframe remaining before the 2015 parliamentary elections to implement this solution. More than one interlocutor singled out UNDP for its commitment and belief that the biometric identification of voters could be introduced in time for the October 2015 parliamentary elections, and that the government should be supported in its efforts to do so. JICA expressed a similar high level of satisfaction with the work of UNDP, and were astounded by the frenetic pace of UNDP and SRS to bring the project to fruition. JICA was very pleased with the ultimate outcome of the partnership, and the ability to report the success to their head office.

The project’s training activities, implemented primarily through the HACT arrangement with the SRS, also proved successful, as evidenced by the relatively few problems that operators had using the equipment. UNDP made a critical contribution through its work under KESP-II, by sourcing funds for the local level trainings that took place following the TOT events. Operators’ skills were also strengthened by practice sessions and dry-runs that took place at the polling places the days before the election. Such “run throughs” are a critical step to the roll-out of any new technology, especially that which depends on thousands of individuals at the local level on a single day.

Nevertheless, UNDP should continue to focus on training, both to improve familiarity with the technology and to instill long-term sustainability of the practice. The SRS indicated a willingness to engage in future activities related to training, and envisions setting-up a training center or similar operation within the SRS.

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Ideally, a core group of trainers, technicians and operators could be trained periodically, and then quickly contracted and deployed in future elections. UNDP is also strongly recommended to take a more a hands-on approach to monitoring the training activities of the SRS (or any partner) within such projects in the future, to be able to quickly identify if additional training resources or other interventions are required.

Although various reports noted technical difficulties in the rollout of biometric voter identification, the overwhelming majority of these were resolvable, and did not seriously undermine elections in 2015 or 2016. In the December 2016 elections, 72% of respondents to a phone survey viewed the SRS’s preparation of the lists of voters and the performance of operators on Election Day as “good or satisfactory”. More significantly, observers pointed to the absence of the kind of behaviors (carousel voting, ballot box stuffing, etc.) that the new technologies were designed to thwart, and thus viewed the introduction of these technologies as highly successful. These sentiments, along with positive assessments of the quality of the voter lists and heightened confidence in the electoral process as a whole, were widely shared among all stakeholders interviewed.

V. Management and Communications

The original project design envisioned several staff responsible for project implementation, including a Project Coordinator (SC8), Project Admin/Finance Assistant (SC5), Project Procurement Assistant (SC5), Project IT Expert (SC7), and Project Communications, Outreach and Capacity Building Expert (SC7). This team in the UNDP Project Management Unit (PMU) was to be responsible for day-to-day implementation, supported by Steering and Technical Committees, as prescribed in the UNDP Electoral Assistance Implementation Guide. The project management organigram can be seen in Annex 5.

During the development of the Project Document the Japanese Embassy transferred stewardship of the grant to JICA, and UNDP was requested by JICA to only use existing staff to manage the project (in addition to any Country Office (CO) staff that would provide contributions to the project), as UNDP’s contribution or a kind of cost-share. Thus, all management, procurement, monitoring and evaluation, and other tasks were exclusively performed by existing CO and PMU staff. Communications and outreach activities were also handled by the CO and PMU, while formal correspondence took place on occasion between UNDP senior management and donors and government of Kyrgyzstan. While no regularly occurring form of update was used outside of the Quarterly Progress Reports (QPR), the volume and frequency of communication was extremely high (daily, and even hourly) during certain peak periods.

Evaluative Assessment

The project management arrangements appear to have been fragmented within UNDP, the result of the heavy procurement nature of activities, condensed timeframe, and as mentioned above, donor expectations. It proved initially difficult in the evaluation to distinguish just who was the principal “owner” of the project – the PMU or CO, due to changes in the management set up. It appears that the original idea was to assign the project under the direction of the KESP II Project Coordinator in the PMU; however, it was later decided

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32 Public Association Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society, Kyrgyzstan People’s Attitude towards the Past Referendum and Elections of Members of Local Councils, December 2016.
34 This team essentially consisted of: Democracy and Governance Team Leader, Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, Procurement Officer (CO), and KESP II Project Manager and ICTD/e-Governance Consultant (PMU). One short-term contractor was hired to assist with procurement, and four specialists to review the EVID equipment.
to coordinate the project from the CO, under the direction of the Democratic Governance Team Leader with support from the PMU and CO on certain issues. Non-procurement related activities (essentially training support), remained primarily the activity of the PMU. While the governance and election staff were logical choices to lead the implementation, the demands of KESP II would also be in their peak period, which likely put a strain on both projects. Again, it would have benefited the project to have additional, dedicated staff for these activities if possible.

All interlocutors expressed a high degree of satisfaction with communication from UNDP regarding ongoing project developments, including the SRS, CEC, JICA, and UNDP PSO, as well as other donors, implementers and local organizations. UNDP served as the primary coordinator of election assistance (from the international side), where the details of this project and updates were discussed in detail. JICA was complimentary of the information obtained through the QPRs and the Steering Group Meetings (and was grateful for the translation provided by UNDP).

JICA did express some concern about what they delicately described as a “difference in approaches” – they would have liked more background information and elaboration on certain implementation practices within the project. For instance, JICA would have appreciated being more informed about (and prior to) the HACT transfer of funds to the SRS for training, and to have received more details on the purchase of the additional 2,000 EVID kits after the initial procurement. JICA representatives were quick to point out, however, that they were in full agreement with such measures – only that they often require detailed information to provide project updates and explain certain decisions to their headquarters and ministries.

Conclusions

The collaborative management of the PMU and CO was successful in achieving the desired outcome of the project. Interlocutors were largely satisfied with the frequency of communication and project updates. Donors and partners rarely complain of too much information, however. Communications and information sharing might be enhanced by establishing regularly occurring updates and other ongoing communication methods (e.g., weekly email status updates, shared (online) drives of materials produced, etc.).

Additional, dedicated staffing resources would have enabled UNDP to provide more thorough reporting, monitoring, communications and risk management of the activities; however, the principal aims of the project were still met: procuring the EVID technology and equipping the SRS and CEC with the means to use it successfully in the 2015 parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, given that the project was incredibly critical to successful (and potentially, peaceful) elections, of the highest profile nationally and even internationally, and carried out in a timeframe which offered no room for error, UNDP (and donors) should endeavor to dedicate more resources to project management. It is also recommended to clarify ownership of such projects at the outset, and ensure all required project management activities are undertaken (including reporting, Atlas updates, etc.).

VI. Project Monitoring and Evaluation

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35 Concerns over where the project resided were raised within UNDP early in the project’s implementation, as was the need to support the KESP II coordinator with additional assistance. Minutes of LPAC Meeting 19 May 2015.

36 As the Steering Group only met once, during the initial LPAC, this was most likely the KESP II Steering Group Meetings where JICA was a participant (and the project was discussed).

37 It should be noted that the HACT facility was discussed in the original Steering Group (LPAC) meeting.
Per the Project Document, there were several evaluation tools and methods to be employed to ensure progress, quality and due diligence. These include a quarterly Quality Assessment, an Issue Log within Atlas to track and resolve problems, and a Risk Log activated in Atlas based on the initial risk analysis of the Project Document and regularly updated. UNDP was to use these tools and other information to compile the QPRs, create and update regularly a Lesson-Learned Log, and provide other informal updates and communications to the CO and project partners. On an annual basis, UNDP would compose a Yearly Review Report comprised of a summation of the QPRs, and hold a separate Yearly Project Review.

**Evaluative Assessment**

UNDP provided JICA with QPRs for the periods May-August 2015 (on 17 October 2015), and September-November 2015 (on 21 January 2016), periods which comprised the bulk of the activities under the Grant Agreement. UNDP also provided a Final Report to JICA on 17 October 2016. This report was to be “interim” until the Independent Evaluation and final expenditures are completed. Given that the Project Document did specify monitoring activities in the post-election period through May 2016, and municipal by-elections elections took place in March and May of 2016 (using the EVID kits), UNDP could have submitted a third QPR covering this period. However, UNDP CO and PMU staff indicated that JICA agreed the impending Independent Evaluation and Final Report could be provided in lieu of future QPRs.

Overall, project monitoring and management tools described in the Project Document appear to have been only partially utilized. The monitoring framework was entered in Atlas with key project monitoring activities, including: tripartite project review meetings, regular monitoring visits, the installation of equipment prior to election, project audit, and final Independent Evaluation. The Risk Log was activated in Atlas based on the Project Document’s Offline Risk Log; however, was not updated following the inception of the project. The Atlas Issue Log contained only one entry concerning the delay in procurement, and does not appear to have been used further as a project monitoring tool. There was no Lessons-Learned Log created. In 2016, the project began using UNDP’s Project Quality Assurance Monitoring, and did complete substantial entries for the implementation phase, and presumably will complete the closure phase upon completion of all activities. There was no Yearly Review Report compiled from the QPRs, although given the brief nature of the project this would have been redundant with the project Final Report. During project implementation, UNDP did conduct a Yearly Project Review which encompassed the activities and results of the project, and their contribution to the UNDAF governance cluster outcomes.

**Conclusions**

The number and types of activities and tools invoked to monitor this project follow standard UNDP approaches to monitoring and evaluation of project performance. Only a fraction of these activities, however, were used consistently, or at all. In future, it is strongly recommended to comply with internal project monitoring requirements as stipulated in the Project Document.

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38 The use of the EVID in the March elections were included in the 17 October 2016 Final Report.
39 There does not appear to be any formal communication on this issue, rather the agreement was informal.
40 The project had already commenced when this new management tool was introduced. Consequently, information in the design (first) phase was not entered. Lessons learned will be entered during the closure (third) phase.
This being said, as the Project Document itself states: “the main purpose of monitoring is to ensure systemic and deliberate assessment of the project progress.” Given the type and duration of project activities, several of the tools listed in the Project Document would have been of little use to the project team. Moreover, accurate and thorough tracking and monitoring of project activities through all the methods proposed may have been counterproductive, in that they could detract from completing the activities themselves in the absence of additional staff resources. Admittedly, many of these methods are required via Atlas and other UNDP project management practices. When designing future projects, UNDP staff should ensure that proposed monitoring and management tools are both required and helpful to assess project performance and progress, and that sufficient resources exist to carry out these activities.

VII. Visibility

According to the Grant Agreement, UNDP was to ensure the visibility of the government of Japan’s contribution by referring to this contribution in relevant publications and marking appropriate products.\(^{42}\) UNDP, per the Project Document, proposed to accomplish this through press events related to important milestones within the project, website posts, social media posts, display boards on the investment site stating the contribution of the government of Japan, promotional and informational materials and photo and video stories.

Based on the media coverage that could be found at the time of this evaluation, the government of Japan was consistently credited with financing the project. Several press releases highlighted important events or milestones within the project, and are still available through the UNDP website. EVID kit components seen at the warehouse displayed stickers with information on the support of Japan, although not always.\(^{43}\) The video produced by UNDP gave proper attribution to the government of Japan, as did the SRS training materials. Operator manuals did not give credit to the government of Japan, as these were financed from a separate budget.

Evaluative Assessment

As the Independent Evaluation took place more than a year after the major events and milestones of the project, it was somewhat difficult to assess whether all visibility obligations were fulfilled. However, the involvement of the government of Japan was consistently highlighted in what items and documents could be reviewed. This includes all UNDP-produced products for the SRS, including public information banners for the polling places, instructional materials for operators, and the educational video.\(^{44}\) Moreover, JICA and Embassy representatives felt the project appropriately credited Japan for the financial and other support given to the project. It was noted that stickers and other such branding were randomly placed (including upside down) on certain items. “Display boards on the investment site” does not appear to have been an applicable branding practice for this project, and may have simply been standard language from another Japanese-funded project. Similarly, there were no photo or video stories created to highlight the project.

\(^{42}\) Grant Agreement for the Project of Automation of Voters’ Identification Process During the Electoral Cycles from 2015-2017 in the Kyrgyz Republic, Article 5.4.

\(^{43}\) Only a cursory review of equipment took place during a visit to the warehouse. It was not possible to assess the overall consistency of the branding and marking from this visit alone.

\(^{44}\) Training and informational materials created by the SRS (under the HACT) did not appear to contain any reference to UNDP or the government of Japan. Many of these were the actual forms and documents to be used by operators in executing their duties, and should not likely bear any attribution. Some of the training guides, agendas from trainings, etc. likely could have referenced the support of UNDP and the government of Japan.
Conclusions

Overall, the project appeared to properly and consistently credit the role and support of the government of Japan. Donor expectations for level of visibility and media coverage were met. There did appear to be a rather “random” approach to marking; in future, UNDP might consider developing with the donor more prescriptive marking guidelines to be followed by UNDP staff and beneficiaries. While Japan did not provide the funds for the operator manuals, much of the content of these manuals was based on the equipment acquired through the Japanese grant, and the subject matter specifically concerned using this equipment. Consequently, attribution to the government of Japan may have been appropriate. UNDP should also pay careful attention to maintaining any marking and branding on the equipment procured, as it will be used in future elections.45

VIII. Sustainability

Sustainability of the project essentially concerns three things: the legal status of biometric registration and its use in elections, whether the use of the biometric fingerprints will be widely accepted and integrated into electoral processes for the foreseeable future, and whether the equipment itself can be used in multiple elections to prove a cost-effective investment. Biometrics is definitively grounded in the country’s legal framework, with the promulgation of the 2014 Law on Biometric Registration, and its use in elections through the April 2015 amendments to the Election Law. As indicated numerous times in this report, biometric identification of voters was successfully introduced on a countrywide basis in 2015, and used again in multiple elections since (and will be used in the upcoming presidential elections). Independent observation groups have widely commended the introduction of this practice in the administration of Kyrgyzstan’s elections. Between elections, the SRS has kept the equipment secure at the “Uchkun” warehouse in Bishkek City.

Evaluative Assessment

Overall, it appears citizens in Kyrgyzstan are comprehending and accepting the reality of biometric registration, and its use for identification purposes in elections. To wit, citizen understanding of the changes in the Electoral Law and new election technologies showed a dramatic 26-point increase when comparing opinion polls conducted in February 2015, and March 2016.46 While there remains a small minority of citizens who do not wish to provide their biometric data, this number is likely to continue to decrease with time, especially after the introduction of biometric passports beginning in April 2017. Although not specifically within the mandate of this project, UNDP’s wider cooperation with SRS and CEC in future could entail public information campaigns to address concerns about providing biometric information.

Based on the brief visit to the “Uchkun” warehouse, there are potential issues with the long-term storage of the equipment. The warehouse is an old, dilapidated building, and not really designed to store sensitive technologies. The different equipment appears to be returned to original packaging and stacked in large piles. There also does not appear to be an adequate system of climate control. JICA expressed interest in

45 For example, stickers on components wear off or are sometimes removed, and any new, replacement components must also be appropriately branded.

Question: Do you feel you have sufficient information on recent changes to the Electoral Code and voting processes?
the status of the equipment, and plan to focus on what happens to the equipment after the 2017 presidential election. It is their wish that every piece of equipment purchased through the project be accounted for.

Per the SRS, they can account for all EVID equipment purchased with the support of the government of Japan. Following the 2017 presidential elections, JICA and UNDP may (if appropriate) want to obtain some form of inventory report from the SRS. Upon completion of the 2017 elections, the SRS is considering transferring the equipment to other government agencies (such as the Ministry of Education), as the next series of national elections will not begin until 2020. While this is a good “recycling” of equipment, it is not clear that an entirely new technological solution will be required in only three years’ time. Electoral bodies often use the same technologies for several years to justify these investments, before upgrading to newer equipment and systems. As seen with biometric identification, citizens will also need time to adjust to any major new procedures or technologies. Moreover, there will be by-elections, and always the possibility of an early election due to unforeseen events, for which the country’s electoral administration must be prepared.

Conclusions

The fact that biometric identification of voters has a sound legal basis, and has been successfully used in consecutive nationwide elections, indicates that the use of this technology is fast becoming an established practice in Kyrgyzstan. The exact number of citizens outside the registry remains a concern, and mystery, one that even the SRS cannot elucidate. However, those citizens either not reached or “holding out” are a small fraction of the population, and of those, many are thought to be disposed to eventually registering.\footnote{The March 2016 IRI public opinion poll found that about 97% of citizens had either provided their registered data (95%), or have intention of doing so (2%). Reasons given for not having registered include being out of the country, not of age, lack of time, or simply not wanting to (about 1% of all respondents). Admittedly, there is likely a positive bias in these estimates, as answers are from residents who were both found and willing to answer survey questions, conditions that may correlate positively with a willingness to provide one’s biometric information.}

As mentioned earlier, the introduction of the new, free biometric passport and its use for various official, social and other services will likely further erode the number of unregistered citizens, as remaining outside the state registration system will make functioning within society difficult.\footnote{Per the SRS, the passport will be free for the first several months, after which citizens requiring a new or replacement passport will be required to pay a 9-11$ fee.}

The storage of the EVID equipment between elections is an issue of concern. Serious consideration should be given to upgrading the current facility to a level appropriate for such sensitive technological components, including temperature and humidity controls, and security. This applies not only to the EVID kits, but also the electronic ballot box scanning equipment which the CEC stores at the same warehouse. The SRS has a plan for redesigning the area of the warehouse that they are currently using to store equipment. Per the SRS, they must first secure an agreement from the government to have permanent use of the facility, as well as the required funding for the renovation. The SRS has approached some donor organizations for assistance with this issue. As of the time of this evaluation, they had yet to secure any financial support.

IX. Lessons Learned and Recommendations

Procurement

The “Automation of Voters’ Identification Process during the Electoral Cycle in 2015-2017” project demonstrated how UNDP can deliver complex, large-scale programming on a condensed schedule with
firm deadlines. This was the result of careful planning and constant communication between the different actors involved, as well as using certain instruments like the LTA for procurements.

➢ As elections often dictate the need for rapid and flexible responses, UNDP should continue to follow such practices when applicable in future, and note the steps and lessons from the procurement of the EVID equipment.

➢ While the procurement element within this project was undoubtedly successful, it did not by itself ensure that the project goal was met. UNDP should consider using other available programming resources (such as it did for training of local operators through KESP II funds) to address other issues critical to the roll-out of biometric identification, for example: voter education efforts, legal and procedural reform, and capacity building of key government institutions.

Technology and Equipment

The technical solution and equipment provided by UNDP and the SRS performed its function with minimal issues on the day of election. Moreover, the use of the fingerprint readers to identify voters is a practice now generally accepted by the population.

➢ In the spring by-elections, the EVID operators could only process 50-60% of the initial SRS estimates. This demonstrates the critical importance of conducting pilots and other tests of any new voting practice or technology prior to a full-scale implementation. It is a lesson that UNDP should heed in any future election assistance project.

➢ As the SRS designed the software itself (as opposed to a commercially available product), UNDP could, if requested, support the SRS with technical expertise in the form of quality assurance and auditing of software.

➢ Data privacy is, and likely will remain for some time, a serious concern of citizens in Kyrgyzstan. UNDP could support its partners in developing the oversight mechanisms for the new registry and data protection as envisioned in current legal framework.

➢ UNDP and JICA should carefully consider their position on the future of the EVID equipment after the 2017 elections. Both the equipment and the identification solution will likely still be adequate for future elections. Citizens have only recently become familiar with the technology: introducing additional new technologies will have repercussions on voter understanding, behavior and confidence. Without donor support, it is unclear whether the equipment needed for this election cycle would have been in place. It is also unclear whether such donor support will be available in future.

➢ While no registration and identification system is perfect, there should be recourse for voters who believe that they have been wrongly disenfranchised. The CEC and lawmakers in Kyrgyzstan should consider introducing restorative measures – such as provisional voting in select cases where equipment may be at fault – to better protect the right of citizens to vote. UNDP could assist the CEC and others in identifying the appropriate scenarios, and mechanisms for addressing them.

Voter education
While not a specific focus of this project, voter education is critical to introducing major new election practices or technologies. Several organizations (state, civic and international) appear to have been involved in educating voters about various election issues, including changes to the current legislation and election processes.

- **UNDP should consider taking a more involved role in public education in similar situations in future.** Successful roll-out of the new technology was partially dependent upon UNDP, and consequently the organization was exposed to considerable performance risk. Taking more proactive measures in voter education (through other election programming budgets, for example) would provide some insurance that such a critical project is successful.

- **Issues for UNDP to address in educational initiatives could include:** data privacy concerns, verification of one’s biometric registration and eligibility to vote, remedies for possible disenfranchisement on Election Day, and others.

**Training**

Training is a critical component to rolling out any new technology in elections. The HACT mechanism proved an effective tool in equipping the SRS with the means to train its operators and technicians, and helped build capacity within the institution to develop and manage its own training programs. UNDP’s quick mobilization of resources under KESP-II also secured funding needed for the local level trainings. Nevertheless, UNDP could consider taking a more involved role in some aspects of training activities, to both ensure quality of trainings, and maximize its (and donors’) overall investment.

- **UNDP should explore long-term capacity development, particularly of the SRS’s training functions (including their plans to establish a kind of Training Center), as this represents an opportunity to continue the partnership with the SRS. This could include expert assistance with the creation of training methodologies, or strategic planning/ institutional development of the Training Center.**

- **Sound project management approaches dictate that UNDP can identify, and remedy if needed, any issues that may jeopardize the overall success of its programs. Consequently, UNDP should take a more hands-on approach to monitoring the training and similar activities of the SRS and other beneficiaries, to both better support its partners and take any corrective measures if needed.**

**Project management and communication**

As mentioned in detail in this evaluation, the management arrangements appeared rather unorthodox, a product of the short timelines and procurement-heavy nature of the activities. These arrangements nevertheless worked, in that they achieved the goal of delivering the equipment and activities on schedule. However, this may not always be the case – having greater clarity of roles and lines of responsibility will help ensure effective and accountable project administration and oversight.

- **In any major project, UNDP should clearly identify the Project Coordinator (Manager), his/her support team and specific roles and responsibilities of all individuals involved. Simultaneously, the role and authorities of all team members should be respected.**

- **If UNDP feels such a project is “too short” in duration to merit its own Project Coordinator (Manager) and team, it could consider placing the project activities under an existing, appropriate team, such as an elections, ICT e-governance, or similar portfolio.**
➢ Donor organizations are urged to provide needed resources to effectively manage programs. Multi-million dollar projects need adequate staffing and support resources, regardless of the type of activity. This is to ensure not only delivery of activities, but also that things like risk monitoring, problem and issue identification, communications, etc. are sufficiently supported.

➢ UNDP should undertake more diligent documentation of meetings and decisions, and perhaps hold key check-in meetings (like the project Steering Committee) with greater regularity.

➢ While not required under this project, UNDP should consider formalized project updates (e.g., a weekly status update). This will ensure that donors and perhaps other stakeholders are well-informed about the progress of activities, and may also serve as a helpful reporting or tracking tool within UNDP (for example, in putting together the Quarterly Progress Reports).

➢ Certain official reports contained misspellings and other grammatical mistakes. Such reports are official documents, and often read by more than just the local donor representatives (such as donor and UNDP head offices). Again, this could likely be a consequence of stretching staff resources too thin. Every effort should be taken to ensure such reporting is of the highest quality – in terms of content, but also writing style, spelling and grammar.

Monitoring and Evaluation

Effective project monitoring and evaluation is essential for tracking progress against benchmarks, identifying risks of underperformance, and reporting on outputs and results to donors and beneficiaries. For various reasons, including the fragmented nature of the project ownership, short time frame, and competing resource demands on staff, the strategies and tools of UNDP were not fully used to monitor the project.

➢ When designing such projects, UNDP should consider using specific, measurable, agreed-upon, reasonable and time-sensitive (SMART) goals to better demonstrate how the implementation of activities is clearly linked to attaining the project goal (see Final Conclusions, below).

➢ As project monitoring tools are standard practice within UNDP, careful attention should be given to fully utilizing these tools in future. Specifically, this involves updating documents like risk and issue logs, both within Atlas and offline.

➢ UNDP staff should also carefully consider the need for, and utility of, certain monitoring tools and techniques. While certain practices are required by UNDP, it is likely unnecessary to employ every monitoring and evaluation tool for each project.

➢ To better demonstrate how the project contributed to the UNDAF and CPD Outcome, UNDP should consider a follow-up survey (or placing questions on an omnibus survey instrument), to better understand citizens’ perceptions of biometric identification of voters, confidence in institutions like the SRS, and whether elections are a threat to peace and security in Kyrgyzstan.

Visibility

Due to the high stakes of parliamentary elections and the scrutiny surrounding the introduction of new voting technologies, it was inevitable that the project enjoyed a certain level of visibility. UNDP ensured that proper attribution was made to the government of Japan in all press releases, media events, marking of equipment and other opportunities.
➢ To ensure uniform application of any branding requirements, UNDP should consider developing, with donor’s input, guidelines for SRS staff and others who will be charged with applying logos, labels and other types of attribution.

➢ UNDP could also consider developing an unofficial “visibility strategy” to ensure that UNDP, donors and beneficiaries have the same understanding and expectations for proper branding and marking of materials, equipment, public events and other similar outputs within the project.

➢ UNDP and the SRS should take advantage of the period between elections to ensure that all existing EVID kits are properly branded in accordance with the expectations of JICA and Embassy of Japan.

➢ UNDP should be sure that project branding requirements are properly “flowed down” to subcontractors and implementing partners, including those carrying out activities through subgrants, HACTs and similar mechanisms. Such a practice not only raises visibility, but may also be a compliance requirement.

Storage

The “Uchkun” warehouse was purportedly the best option available to the SRS in terms of storage at the time of purchase and delivery of equipment to Kyrgyzstan. In the absence of adequate facilities, continued storage of sensitive biometric and other voting equipment in between uses at the current facility may pose a threat to the sustainability of the project.

➢ To protect the current investment in equipment, UNDP should support measures that would help prolong usage life and minimize replacement costs over time, including how such equipment is stored. There are definite improvements that can be made in terms of the existing facility’s physical layout, climate control technology, and security.

➢ If necessary, UNDP should consider providing the SRS with expert assistance to develop storage and ongoing maintenance plans for the different types of software and hardware used in biometric voter identification.

➢ Prior to, or immediately after, the 2017 presidential elections, UNDP and JICA should obtain up-to-date inventory lists for all equipment purchased under the project.

X. Final Conclusions

As documented throughout this report, the “Automation of Voters’ Identification Process during the Electoral Cycle in 2015-2017” project was highly successful. Procurement of the necessary equipment for the identification of voters through biometric information took place exactly on schedule. EVID kits were successfully deployed for use on Election Day to every polling location in the country. The SRS trained requisite numbers of technicians and operators who could effectively use the technology and equipment, and take actions to troubleshoot, repair and replace components if needed, without jeopardizing the voting process. As such, the Project Output: New electoral technologies introduced to support Electronic Voter Identification, was fulfilled.

Introducing biometric registration of citizens is a process UNDP has, and will likely continue, to support in Kyrgyzstan, and is a contribution to the Outcome 1 of the CPD and UNDAF: A national infrastructure for
peace (at local regional and national levels, involving government, civil society, communities and individuals) effectively prevents violent conflict and engages in peace building. Through this project, UNDP played a crucial role in introducing a new, biometric technology for an “everyday use” (elections) in Kyrgyzstan. The successful roll-out of biometric identification for voting bodes well for its accepted use in other aspects of civic and political life.

It is reasonable to conclude that the work of UNDP was a key, contributing factor in bringing about the Project Goal of free, fair and peaceful October 2015 Parliamentary Election and beyond (2016 Municipal and 2017 presidential elections) in the Kyrgyz Republic. There are, however, many external factors which have affected the Project Goal; it is not possible to infer that the project alone has brought about free, fair and peaceful elections. A more concrete goal, and one more closely linked to the project’s activities, might have made it easier for UNDP to directly credit project activities and outcomes with achieving the Project Goal.\\footnote{For example: “Kyrgyzstan uses a new system of voter identification that increases confidence and trust in the country’s electoral process and outcomes.”}

Nevertheless, the successful implementation of the project has improved the process of voter registration and identification – a fundamental component of elections, and has undoubtedly made a significant contribution to free, fair and peaceful elections in Kyrgyzstan.
Annex 1: Agenda, Bishkek 20.2-2.3

Evaluation Mission Programme

Gavin Weise, Evaluation Expert for the Project “Project for automation of voters’ identification process during the electoral cycle in 2015-2017”

20 February – 2 March 2017

Sunday, 19 February
Arrival to Bishkek

Monday, 20 February
09.30  Departure hotel
10.00  Internal meeting with UNDP PMU staff, Ulan Omuraliev, KESP-2 Project coordinator
11.30-12.00  Meeting with Lucio Valerio Sarandrea, UNDP CTA on Rule of Law, UNDP PMU a.i. Chief of Dimensions, Democratic Governance Programme (DGP)
12.00-13.00  Lunch
13.30 – 14.45  Meeting with UNDP Electoral Support staff: Erkin Kasybekov, Assistant Resident Representative, Cholponbek Omuraliev, Procurement Specialist, Aidai Arstanbekova, M&E Focal point, Ulan Omuraliev, KESP-2 Project coordinator
15.00  Briefing with UNDSS
16.00 – 17.00  Working with documents, interview with UNDP staff
18.00  Free time

Tuesday, 21 February
10.00 – 12.00  Meeting with SRS deputy chair Dastan Dogoev and SRS “Infocom” SE deputy director Kubanychbek Sadambekov
12.30 – 14.00  Lunch meeting with IRI Country Director John DiPiro
15.00 – 16.00  Visit to SRS warehouse accompanied by SRS staff (Rustam Shabyev, chief of ICT support unit of SRS)
16.30 – 18.30  Meeting with CEC deputy Atyr Abdrahmatova

Wednesday, 22 February
09.00 – 10.00  Meeting with Mr. Deguchi Katsuyuki, JICA Deputy Representative
10.00 – 12.00  Working with documents, UNDP PMU
12.00 – 13.00  Lunch
14.30 – 17.00  Meeting with Cholponbek Omuraliev, UNDP CO procurement specialist

Thursday, 23 February
Official holiday (former Red Army Day)

Working with documents

**Friday, 24 February**

10.00 – 11.00 Meeting with KOICA Country director Sunjin Park

14.00 – 16.00 Meeting with Aidai Arstanbekova, UNDP CO M&E Focal Point

**Saturday, 25 February**

14.00 Meeting with Ainura Usupbekova, Civic Platform (former president of Taza-Shailoo)

**Sunday, 26 February**

11:00 Meeting with Carina Cepoi, Internews

**Monday, 27 February**

10.30 – 12.00 Meeting with SRS, Dastan Dogoev, deputy SRS, and Talant Abdullaev, director “Infocom”

14.00 – 15.30 Wrap-up meeting with Aliona Nikulita and UNDP election team (Aidai Arstanbekova, Cholponbek Omuraliev and Ulan Omuraliev)

16:30 – 17:30 Meeting with IFES, Renata Levovski and Alexander Orekhov

**Tuesday, 28 February**

09.00 – 12.00 Meeting with Aidai Arstanbekova, M&E focal point

13.00 – 17.00 Working with documents, UNDP PMU

**Wednesday, 1 March**

10.00 – 17.00 Working with documents, UNDP PMU

**Thursday, 2 March**

Departure Bishkek
Annex 2: Documents reviewed


+ Press Release. "Kyrgyzstan has received modern electronic equipment for the elections." UNDP Kyrgyzstan, August 6 2015. <http://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/ru/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2015/08/06/-0.html>


+ Letter from CEC to Japanese Embassy (requesting support for equipment for modernization of electoral process), February 10 2015.

+ Letter from Government of Kyrgyzstan to Embassy of Japan (on financial support for the project of automation of voters that will be JICA - UNDP implemented), March 27 2015.

+ Letter from MFA of Kyrgyz Republic to Embassy of Japan (forwarding CECs request for needs of technical equipment), August 19 2014.

+ Letter from MFA to Embassy of Japan (forwarding list of equipment requested by CEC), December 23 2014.

Agreement between Kyrgyz Republic and UNDP on Cooperation and Support on development of most important problems in economical area and stimulating of social progress and improving of livelihood, September 14 1992.


Institutional Contract with State Enterprise "Office of Special Communication" (PM15162), Provision for the delivery of equipment for the elections. UNDP Kyrgyzstan, October 1 2015.


"Kyrgyzstan People’s Attitude towards the Past Referendum and Elections of Members of Local Councils." Public Union Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society, December 2016.


https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/2015_ifes_kyrgyzstan_parliamentary_elections_faq_final_0.pdf

http://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/understanding_the_proposed_kyrgyz_parliament_0.pdf


Concept, "Of the training on application of innovation technologies in election process." State Registration Service and Central Election Commission of Kyrgyzstan, June 24 2015.

Letter from UNDP Kyrgyzstan to UNDP Procurement Support Office (regarding the appointment of the PSO as sole procurement agent and absorption of cost recovery fee), August 6 2015.


Press Release, "Kyrgyzstan has received electronic identification equipment ahead of the elections." UNDP Kyrgyzstan, August 3 2015. (offline)


Letter from the Embassy of Japan to UNDP Kyrgyzstan (on Grant Agreement), May 20 2015.

Letter from UNDP Kyrgyzstan to Embassy of Japan (on Grant Agreement), May 20 2015.
Cost-Sharing Agreement between UNDP and the State Registry Service under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, August 20 2015.

Transfer of Title of Equipment from UNDP in the Kyrgyz Republic to the State Registration Service under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, August 3 2015.

+Letter from the Central Election Commission to Japanese Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic (on equipment needs and specifications), March 19 2015

+Training materials, instructions and forms from the SRS on the operation of equipment – various documents, (undated).

+"Instructions on the work of operators of the State Registration Service under the government of Kyrgyz Republic for the members of the precincts on the day of the election for the deputies of the Jorgorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic and one day before the election day until the election day." State Registration Service, (undated).


Purchase Order from ‘Dan Office’ (KGZ10-GP500124), August 28 2015.

+Letter from the SRS to UNDP (on informational materials), August 18 2015.

+Invoice from Kariankin, O.E. for the production of banners, October 2 2015.

+Invoice from Janar Elektronic for the copying of training materials for SRS, September 7 2015.

Feedback Note on the PSO Election Team Support Provided. UNDP Procurement Support Office, November 10 2015.


+Letter from UNDP to the State Registration Service (on possible cost savings), July 8 2015.

+Letter from State Registration Service to UNDP (on need for additional equipment), July 23 2015.

+Letter from State Registration Service to UNDP (on equipment specifications), August 4 2015.

+Letter from State Registration Service to UNDP (on equipment specifications), August 5 2015.

+Letter from the State Customs Service to UNDP (on importation of equipment), July 28 2015.

+= author’s unofficial translation of title/subject matter. All other non-English sources listed were previously (officially or unofficially) translated into English, and the translated text is used here.
Annex 3: Interviews

Ulan Omuraliev, Project Coordinator KESP-II, UNDP Kyrgyzstan
Aidai Arstanbekova, M&E Focal Point, UNDP Kyrgyzstan
Cholponbek Omuraliev, Procurement Associate, UNDP Kyrgyzstan
Erkinbek Kasybekov, Assistant Resident Representative, UNDP Kyrgyzstan
Aliona Niculita, Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP Kyrgyzstan
Lucio Valerio Sarandrea, Chief Technical Advisor on Rule of Law, UNDP Kyrgyzstan
Naoki Nihei, Peace and Development Advisor, UNDP Kyrgyzstan

Dan Malinovich, Electoral Assistance Specialist, Joint EC-UNDP Task Force on Electoral Assistance
Paul DeGregorio, Senior Advisor, Association of World Election Bodies (A-WEB)
Atyr Abdrahmatova, Deputy Chair, Central Election Commission (CEC) of Kyrgyzstan

Ainura Usupbekova, Civic Platform

Renata Levovski (Lapti), Chief of Party, IFES Kyrgyzstan
Alexander Orehov, Program Manager, IFES Kyrgyzstan

John DiPiro, Country Director, International Republican Institute (IRI) Kyrgyzstan
Carina Cepoi, Chief of Party, Internews Kyrgyzstan
Deguchi Katsujuki, Deputy Representative, Japan International Cooperation Agency, (JICA)
Kamila Alisheva, Program Officer, JICA

Sunjin Park, Country Director, Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)
Ulan Jykylbaev, Project Coordinator, KOICA

Talant Abdullaev, Director, State Enterprise “Infocom”
Kubanychbek Sadambekov, Deputy Director, State Enterprise “Infocom”

Dastan Dogoev, Deputy Chairman, State Registration Service (SRS)
Rustam Shabyev, Chief of ICT Support Unit, SRS
Annex 4: Project Expenditures and EVID Equipment

<table>
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<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Q-ty</th>
<th>Unit price, USD</th>
<th>Total, USD</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Server's and network equipment (annex 5, from Lot1 to Lot7)</td>
<td>SRS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>404,911.7</td>
<td>404,911.70</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Thermal printer with paper</td>
<td>SRS</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>114.65</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Additional terminal paper</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>SRS</td>
<td>3000</td>
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<td>Notebook</td>
<td>SRS</td>
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<td>480.85</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Fingerprint reader</td>
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<td>Only onetime fee U.are.U SDK Developer Kit</td>
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<td>Subtotal cost 1</td>
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<td>Transportation/Insurance/custom clearance/PSO 4.5% and 4%</td>
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<td>SRS&amp;CEC</td>
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<td>Grand total cost</td>
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<td>5,942,242.84</td>
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</table>
Annex 5: Project Management Organogram

Steering Committee
Project Executive (UNDP Resident Representative)
Senior Beneficiaries (President Office, Government, CEC, SRS)

Technical Committee
Project Executive (UNDP)
Senior Beneficiaries (CEC)
Senior Supplier (Donors)

Project Assurance
UNDP Programme Officer

Project Management Unit
Project Coordinator
Finance/Admin Assistant
Procurement Assistant
IT Expert
Communication Specialist

Project Support
UNDP Operations

Project team for Component 1
Procurement Support

Project team for Component 2
Training Support

Project team for Component 3
Monitoring Group