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MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE MULTI-DONOR PARLIAMENTRARY SUPPORT PROGRAMME (2014 – 2017)

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JLMM&NM

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# Abbreviations and Acronyms

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| AfDB | Africa Development Bank |
| CPD | Country Programme Document |
| CSOs | Civil Society Organisations |
| CSW | Convention on the Status of Women |
| DPs | Development Partners |
| ESAP | Economic Structural Adjustment Programme |
| EU | European Union |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GOS | Government of Sweden |
| GOZ | Government of Zimbabwe |
| GPA | Global Political Agreement |
| ICT | Information Communication Technology |
| ISO | International Standards Organisation |
| ISP | Institutional Strategic Plan |
| LCC | Liaison and Coordination Committee |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MoJLPA | Ministry of Justice Legal and Parliamentary Affairs |
| MoMMD | Ministry of Mines and Mining Development |
| MPs | Members of Parliament |
| MWAGCD | The Ministry of Women Affairs, Gender and Community Development |
| NERA | National Electoral Reform Agenda |
| NEX | National Execution Modality |
| NPRC | National Peace and Reconciliation |
| NRZ | National Railways of Zimbabwe |
| NSSA | National Social Security Authority |
| PAC | Parliament Audit Committee |
| PCU | Programme Coordination Unit |
| PLC | Parliamentary Legal Committee |
| POSA | Public Order and Security Act () |
| POZ | Parliament of Zimbabwe |
| PRC | Parliamentary Reform Committee |
| PSP | Parliamentary Support Programme |
| QMS | Quality Management System |
| SAPST | Southern Africa Parliamentary Support Trust |
| SC | Steering Committee |
| SEZ | Special Economic Zones |
| SIDA | Swedish International Development Agency |
| ToCToC | Theory of Change |
| UN Women | United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNICEF | The United Nations Children's Fund |
| VfM | Value for Money |
| WB | World Bank |
| ZIM/ZAM | Zimbabwe and Zambia Parliament Annual Meeting |
| ZimAsset | Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation |
| ZISCO | Zimbabwe Steel Company |
| ZUNDAF | Zimbabwe United Nations Development Framework |
| ZWPC | Zimbabwe Women’s Parliamentary Caucus |

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

# Executive Summary

# Introduction

The Parliament of Zimbabwe (PoZ) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) commissioned a review of the Multi-Donor Parliamentary Support Programme (2014 – 2017) (PSP). The review, carried out by Joseph L M Mugore (International Consultant and Team Leader) and Ngonidzaishe Marimo (National Consultant and M&E Specialist) was carried out in twenty-four days between 1st May and 31st August 2017.

The PSP, which was designed and implemented against the background of an emerging new governance dispensation, ushered in by the adoption and implementation of a new constitution, and a rapidly declining economy, with a shrinking fiscal space, was built around five outcomes.

1. New laws enacted and old laws aligned with the Constitution.
2. Oversight function of Parliament strengthened; Governance systems enhanced.
3. People’s participation in legislation formulation, decision-making and related democratic processes increased.
4. Parliament's performance of its core functions strengthened through capacitating Parliament leadership and staff; and
5. Strengthened gender mainstreaming in the work of Parliament.

This mid-term review assesses the progress that has been made so far towards achieving the outcomes and outputs, against targets and indicators in the PSP, and identifies challenges, gaps and areas needing strengthening, redesign, or course correction for the rest of the implementation period. It recommends measures for refocusing the programme strategies, highlighting areas of strength and opportunities for achieving the desired results and capturing the lessons learned.

# Findings

The review made the following findings:

On Strategy, the review finds that:

* although the PSP asserts that it is anchoredin key national and UN strategy papers and agreements with development partners, insufficient attention was paid to linking these strategies to the PSP strategy and outcomes, in order to be able to make the connection between PSP results and the national strategic outcomes, except for the Parliament’s Institutional Strategic Plan (ISP).
* The theory of change did not adequately analyse the logic and assumptions of the intervention in relation to the results sought. It merely restated the strategy and summarised the results framework.
* There is insufficient recognition of lessons learned from previous PSP programmes informing the design of the current PSP
* The project document does not present, analyse and justify the partnership modelused in the r support to PoZ. It is assumed to be both understood and acceptable.
* The project timeframe is not aligned to the key strategies it purports to be based on. Duration alignment is necessary, with carefully timed overlaps to allow to allow completion and start-up support..
* Ownership was a positive design and implementation preoccupation, and was in accordance with the principles of the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action.
* The programme design process was transparent in that it followed an inclusive consultative process, encompassing all stakeholders, including development partners. Steering Committee and Project Board further reinforce transparency
* Inclusiveness is reinforced by the gender mainstreaming outcome, but there is need to include other categories missing in the project design (youth, disabled and minorities etc.)

On relevance, the review finds that;

* The PSP draws its outcomes directly from the ISP objectives, which makes it relevant to an important national strategy.
* It would have been helpful to prioritise the five outcomes and the outputs within these on the basis of both relevance and impact.
* While the outcomes fit directly in the ISP, there is need to be clear on the strategic fit of PSP vis a vis core funding of parliament from the fiscus. Such clarity will show the degree to which the PSP is a strategic intervention as against being a supplementary funding instrument to PoZ
* Strategic decision by UNDP and development partners to continue to support PoZ was relevant and directed at the core of the agenda to consolidate democratic governance in Zimbabwe.
* Chosen outcomes are relevant to context of parliament and of the governance landscape in Zimbabwe

On Efficiency, the review finds that;

* The basket fund has provided a platform for the convergence of all PoZ’s development partners, including those not contributing to the basket
* The PSP has enabled PoZ to effectively coordinate support from development partners enhancing efficiency of support
* Such enhanced coordination is reflected in AfDB contributing to PCU and positive sentiments from CSOs and other UN agencies working PoZ
* While there are opposing views on duplication among DPs in the basket and outside the basket, PoZ and UNDP, the review finds no evidence of real duplication: funding the same person to do the same thing…but rather facilitated consolidation of inputs to enhance scale which improved effectiveness e.g. OAG is a clear example
* PoZ could exert leadership to ensure DPs without significant constraints to fund through the basket do so to enhance alignment and predictability
* Despite parallel funding by some donors, the basket fund has provided a platform for aligning support to parliament from multiple funders creating opportunities for cost sharing that enhance the depth and quality of intervention
* To support DPs contribution to the basket fund, there is need to resolve the issue of DSA…opportunity exists at project formulation and signing of cooperation agreement
* Conclusion: multi-donor approach symbolised by the basket fund is an appropriate approach for enhancing efficiency in support to parliament
* Programme management is cost efficient but investments and quality of support in M&E need to increase
* Public hearings, bench marking visits, conferences and workshops, while useful and essential, are expensive and there is need to develop more cost effective approaches tof meeting the same objectives.
* Women voices not being heard enough and consultation process does not always facilitate participation of women and other vulnerable groups
* PSP has spread itself too thinly across PoZ resulting in less depth of intervention and Value for money of the PSP can therefore be improved with reduced scope of the project

On effectiveness, the review finds that;

* The project has made significant contribution to results observed in parliament and OAG but remains off course to meet its targets
* This is as much a function of slow implementation (average 50.2% delivery rate) as unrealistic targets and faulty indicators

Main achievements of the project include:

* Capacity development of parliamentarians in legislative and policy analysis - improvement in legislative review, review of budget statements etc
* Oversight function was strengthened through the provision of resources for fact-finding missions and training on roles and responsibilities of parliamentarians
* Capacity development of OAG has seen professional and timely reporting of public accounts – which enhances capacity of parliament in oversight
* Support for ISO recertification and other processes are contributing to Parliament’s growth in stature and positive perceptions of its effectiveness among the populace
* Women parliamentarians capacity improving but slow…

Shortcomings for effectiveness are:

* Alignment targets were faulty and needed to recognise the supply side of bills…role of synergy with projects working with the Executive
* While a strengthened will for oversight is clearly visible for some committees (Mines, Environment etc) there is a missing link to actualise implementation of parliament recommendations
* Increased oversight function of parliament misunderstood by the Executive as Parliament overstepping boundaries and following personal interests - need for joint parliament and Executive orientation on the role of parliament to improve Executive and Parliament relationship e.g. the Ministry of Environment.
* Research capacity within Parliament administration is still weak which constrains parliamentarians
* The ZWPC strategic plan remains under funded whereas it provides opportunities for deepening gender mainstreaming in Parliament and its programmes

On management and coordination, the review finds that;

* Overall management and coordination arrangements were appropriate and in accordance with UNDP practice
* However, although UNDP RR and Speaker do meet informally to discuss institutional blockages and other matters requiring higher level input, the Steering committee has not met consistently to provide the needed policy guidance and oversight to the project
* The project board has effectively monitored project performance and results and given feedback to PCU through UNDP, leading to improved reporting
* The programme made strategic use of coordination, partnerships, synergies and linkages and collaboration with other partners to increase its effectiveness and impact
* However, M&E of the PSP is inadequate
* Project Coordination Unit has made significant contributions to efficiency of implementing the PSP within its capacity constraints
* It has not been successful in steering the programme to achieve its set targets
* But…it has been successful in maximising opportunities where they arose
* By bringing the opinions of a parliamentary expert to review the project UNDP played its role of leveraging global expertise, but could have done more….1) supporting M&E design and implementation….2) Linking PSP outputs with other interventions in the Governance Unit for mutual reinforcing…3) regular availability of senior technical parliamentary support expertise to tap into the global knowledge of UNDP and DPs

On sustainability, the review finds that;

* The Programme lacks a strategy for sustaining results being achieved, especially in the current economic and fiscal context.

Nonetheless:

* there is scope for sustainability of organisational and individual capacity development efforts through documented training manuals, organisational systems manuals etc. but continuation is likely to be constrained by the lack of financial resources for continued implementation
* Legislative alignment to the Constitution supports governance objectives and the legacy is likely to last, barring an unforeseen and unlikely Constitutional change
* Capacity of the OAG is likely to wane with the withdrawal of the PSP as funding is being provided for operation and logistical support due to underfunding of the institution from central government
* There are opportunities for self-funding given its Constitutional independence
* Sustainability of capacity, while anchored on the training manuals produced, is not broad enough to formulate a system that allows regeneration of capacity to the levels of that developed by the PSP
* Citizen participation in legislation is likely to be stalled unless alternative and effective means are identified and piloted

# Conclusion

The review concludes that;

* The PSP has added value to parliament not only in bringing resources that would not have been there but also enhancing substantively the functioning of parliament in terms of mandate of legislation, oversight and representation
* The added value of UNDP is in its global expertise in parliamentary support, diplomatic role to unlock institutional blockages to advance the programme and the potential synergies that can be created with interventions in the Governance Unit to advance results in the governance landscape
* This added value could be enhanced in the remaining period and in a future PSP
* Overall the PSP implements the right activities, the multi-donor basket fund is appropriate and effective
* The PSP has made significant contributions to the functioning of Parliament
* Its value can be enhanced by narrowing focus, being more strategic in implementation to support the governance context, more vigilant in results reporting and following through achievement of results
* Some activities such as benchmarking visits need to be reviewed for their return on investment
* The project lacks a broad strategy for gender mainstreaming
* Main shortcomings include:
* Capacity enhancement is largely limited to individual capacities a capacity development strategy would have enhanced the capacity development approach
* Approach to capacity development for critical staff for the programmatic functioning of parliamentarians e.g. Research needs a multi-pronged approach – long and short term training and increasing numbers of staff

# Recommendations

And makes the following recommendations;

## Recommendations

### Strategy

* **Recommendation 1**: It is recommended that UNDP Zimbabwe develop a theory of change for each of their major sectoral clusters. One such theory of change should be developed for governance to help explain and clarify the logic and assumptions underlying the achievement of governance results over time in Zimbabwe.
* **Recommendation 2**: Meanwhile the ToCToC in the PSP under review should be significantly improved to enable a more coherent understanding of the logic and development assumptions behind the programme design, which will contribute to better articulation, M&E and final evaluation.
* **Recommendation 3:** The review recommends that the Steering Committee authorises an extension for the PSP as far as six months into the life of the 9th Parliament. This extension should be more focused on strategic interventions targeted at specific outputs and institutions (e.g. key committees rather than all committees). The extension should also support the next ISP preparation as well as fund start-up activities for the 9th Parliament that will input into the design of the next PSP. This extension should of course be a with-cost-extension.
* **Recommendation 4**: The review identified a missed opportunity in creating complementary actions between the outputs from parliament and work of civil society and media. Such linkages would enhance the effectiveness of the PSP. It is recommended that Project Board explores, further opportunities for linking outputs from the PSP with citizen voice, transparency and accountability programmes funded by the EU, GOS and UNDP. Such an approach is likely to reinforce results of the PSP.
* **Recommendation 5:** Although the PSP model has helped limit duplication per se, it is still recommended that donor support to related priority for parliament be much more coordinated to enhance synergy in strategy, implementation and results reporting.
* **Recommendation 6:** UNDP and its partners should do more to leverage technical support for parliament to add value to both capacity development, improved legislative processes and enhanced oversight function to ensure that the PSP resources achieve more than plug a funding gap created by the shrunk fiscus.
* **Recommendation 7:** Parliament should be more pro-active in engaging with the executive to improve the supply of bills as well as to ensure the implementation of recommendations from parliamentary committees.

### Efficiency

* **Recommendation 8:** While maintaining interventions during parliamentary seating the PCU needs to more systematically plan ahead to maximise the number of activities carried out through these windows.
* **Recommendation 9:** The departments of parliament need to be held more accountable for their own delivery under the PSP so they are less reliant on the PCU.
* **Recommendation 10**: Parliament needs to exercise greater leadership in ensuring that those donors who can contribute through the basket, in-terms of institutional regulations, do so.

### Effectiveness

* **Recommendation 11**: The review team observed significant number of achievements that remain undocumented. The review therefore recommends that UNDP and POZ, go through a process of identifying results in each of the outcomes. This should go beyond quantification of results but also document the qualitative achievements that have been achieved e.g. changing relationships and attitudes, commitments, and changing confidence levels.
* **Recommendation 12**: The PSP has instruments to strengthen gender mainstreaming that include the ZWPC strategic plan and the Gender Policy of Parliament. The review team recommends that in the remaining period, the PSP should prioritise facilitating implementation of the ZWPC strategic plan.
* **Recommendation 13**: The PSP needs to broaden its conceptual appreciation of capacity development beyond individual training to include institutional and organisational capacity strengthening.

### Management and Coordination

* **Recommendation 14**: The weakness of the current M&E system for the programme is well known to the Project Board. Attempts to rectify the challenge are still to yield the required results. UNDP, working with POZ, should revise the M&E system and associated tools informed by global good practice for measurement of results from parliamentary support programmes for which UNDP is a global leader.
* **Recommendation 15:** It is recommended that in the final evaluation of the PSP, resources (time, money and expertise) be made available to include lessons learnt. This could include from previous PSP’s.
* **Recommendation 16:** It is recommended that the PSP’s be treated as a continuous process with the next one building on the previous and that each programme be sequentially numbered (e.g. PSP 3).
* **Recommendation 17:** It is recommended that a senior technical expert in governance and parliamentary support be appointed to support both PCU and UNDP in the implementation of the PSP. The senior technical expert will also facilitate knowledge sharing with the programme from UNDP and the PSP development partners’ global experience.

### Sustainability

**Recommendation 18**: The review team recommends that Parliament should consider options for sustaining individual and organisational level results through institutionalisation of capacity development and resource mobilisation from treasury.

INTRODUCTION

# Introduction

## Background

### The Programme Background

The Parliament of Zimbabwe has been pursuing its own reform programme for two decades, with the objective of strengthening its institutional and human capacity to effectively perform its legislative, oversight and representation functions, as well as improve its administration. This was mostly in response to public pressure for a parliament, which is effective in the discharge of its constitutional mandate[[1]](#footnote-1), in a context in which the Executive had been steadily centralising state functions in the wake of the introduction of the executive presidential system in 1987. The Parliamentary Reform Committee (PRC) had the leading role in recommending a number of reforms designed to strengthen parliament against the other branches of the state. The successor to the PRC is the Liaison and Coordination Committee (LCC), a forum of party whips and chairpersons of portfolio, thematic and other committees. The LCC has inherited the mandate of the PRC and leads the reforms intended to strengthen the legislative branch, which had been perceived as a weak partner of the executive branch.

UNDP has been instrumental, throughout this period, in providing both technical and financial support to Parliament to achieve its reform objectives.[[2]](#footnote-2)

The first “Three-Year Rolling Multi Donor Parliamentary Support Program” was introduced in 2005, evaluated at the end of 2008, and was deemed by the independent evaluation to have achieved a number of important milestones - capacity building of parliamentarians in a number of issues and subjects: a fully entrenched portfolio committee system, legislative and policy analysis, an upgraded ICT system, and professionalization in the administration of Parliament.[[3]](#footnote-3) The second “Three-Year Rolling Multi-Donor Parliamentary Support Program (2009-2011)”, was designed on the basis of lessons learnt from the first, and parliament’s revised Strategic Plan, albeit needing to take into account the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and the Government of National Unity which the former ushered in. Its key achievements included: 1) strengthened legislative and policy analysis; 2) enhanced oversight of parliamentary committees; 3) strengthened the capacity of both MPs and staff to better manage and communicate the business of parliament; and 4) improved capacity of parliament staff to effectively support the work of parliamentarians. Despite these achievements, several shortcomings were identified with regards to absence of a sustainability strategy, delay in finalising the cooperation agreement which reduced the implementation period to 20 months, and limited oversight and policy guidance to the project by the Steering Committee.

Although the Multi-Donor Parliamentary Support Programme 2014 – 2017 (PSP) under review was a sequel to the two others before it, it was among a range of programmes designed by the UN System to support the achievement of Zimbabwe‘s development priorities as articulated in the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZimAsset). Achievement of these priorities is through the implementation of the Zimbabwe United Nations Development Framework (ZUNDAF) 2012-2015, agreed between the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) and the United Nations System in Zimbabwe. The priorities included those related to the implementation of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, as provided for in the Parliament of Zimbabwe (PoZ)’s Institutional Strategic Plan 2014-2018 (ISP), which is the main framework guiding the work of PoZ. One of the key priorities in the ISP is the implementation of the Constitution. Thus, the PSP was meant to be both a continuation of a particular programme thrust as well as a response to the new challenges and opportunities vis a vis the new constitution.

While the Constitution provides for the principle of separation of powers among the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, Section 119 of the Constitution confers Parliament with the responsibility to protect the same Constitution and promote democratic governance in Zimbabwe. Clearly, the implementation of the ISP is an enormous capacity and resource challenge, especially against the background of overall fiscal constraints facing Zimbabwe.

While Phase 2 was designed to respond to the opportunities presented by the GPA in terms of designing a new governance era it focused primarily on building consensus around a new system and constitutionalising, the Phase under review coincided with the challenge of implementation of the agreed new dispensation and Parliament’s role and challenges in that process. It is against this background that PSP was designed, to provide the support needed to strengthen Parliament’s wherewithal and develop its capacity to carry out its legislative, representative and oversight functions in Zimbabwe, now even more clearly enunciated in the new constitution. Thus, the overall objective of the programme, as defined in the Project document, is to enable the PoZ to improve the performance of its core functions of legislation, oversight and representation ensuring participation of the public in their governance. It is supported by a consortium of donors in a basket funding arrangement including the European Union (EU), the Embassy of Sweden (GOS) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which manages the fund.

The PSP has five core elements derived from the key goal and operationalised to achieve five outcomes through delivery of several outputs.

The specific programme outcomes are; -

1. New laws enacted and old laws aligned with the Constitution.
2. Oversight function of Parliament strengthened; Governance systems enhanced.
3. People’s participation in legislation formulation, decision-making and related democratic processes increased.
4. Parliament's performance of its core functions strengthened through capacitating Parliament leadership and staff; and
5. Strengthened gender mainstreaming in the work of Parliament.

The outcomes and outputs are elaborated in Table 1 below.

Table 1: PSP Core Elements

| **Multi-Donor Programme Support for Parliament [PSP] and the Office of the Auditor General: Core Elements** | | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **OUTCOMES** | OUTCOME 1  New laws enacted and old laws aligned with the Constitution | OUTCOME 2  Oversight function of Parliament strengthened; Governance systems enhanced. | OUTCOME 3  People’s participation in legislation formulation, decision-making and related democratic processes increased | OUTCOME 4  Parliament’s performance of its core functions strengthened through capacitating Parliament leadership and staff | OUTCOME 5  Gender Mainstreamed in Parliament systems and processes |
| **OUTPUTS** | All priority non-compliant pieces of legislation aligned to the constitution | Statutory Reports on the management of public resources submitted by Ministries, State Enterprises and Institutions reviewed and tabled in Parliament; | Participation of ordinary citizens in the legislative processes of Parliament increased | Management of all programmes supported by Development Partners, Donors, Civil Society Organisations, and other non-State Actors coordinated. | Parliamentary Committees and the Administration of Parliament capacity in gender mainstreaming improved |
| Capacity of legislators in legislative and policy analysis strengthened | Institutional knowledge base and analytical capacity on sector specific issues built; |  | Technical capacity for the professional functioning of parliament increased. | Zimbabwe Parliamentary Women Caucus' capacity in lobbying and advocacy for gender equality and women empowerment Increased. |
|  | Parliamentary Code of Conduct and Ethics for legislators and staff adopted and implemented; |  | Internal Parliamentary service delivery systems and processes improved |  |
|  | Oversight processes and systems of the Auditor General' office improved |  |  |  |

### Country Context

The political economy of Zimbabwe has gone through several phases in its recent history. It quickly transitioned from a post crisis country following the liberation struggle and the Lancaster House settlement, through a period of stabilisation and recovery, before experiencing a ten-year period of high economic growth and rapid transformation of the social sector, in particular health and education. There was a concerted and largely successful effort at deepening democratic governance. Parliament was strengthened and continued to be the national arena for robust political debate. In the early nineties, however, the country experienced economic slowdown, leading to the agreement with the Bretton Woods institutions on Zimbabwe’s first ever Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), whose design was faulty and implementation unsuccessful.[[4]](#footnote-4)

At the same time, governance challenges began to emerge and the early gains began to slip away with fissions arising within the ruling party and between the ruling party and its allies, such as the trade unions. Then followed almost two decades of both economic and governance strife, from which the country has hardly emerged.[[5]](#footnote-5)

However, the PSP was designed following a major turning point on the governance history of the country. A new, governance focused constitution had just been adopted with unprecedented citizen participation and a convincing endorsement during a national referendum. All three branches of government were expressing their commitment to the new dispensation and civil society was declaring its own readiness to help mid-wife the new dispensation. A previous Parliamentary support programme had been successfully concluded. A vastly more empowered Parliament, fresh from playing a pivotal role in the making of the constitution, was eager to carry out its mandate to the fullest.

The positive governance picture was not, however, reflected in the economy. As the PSP itself states, “The economy in 2014 has been characterized by shrinking fiscal space, insufficient budget allocations, a large public-sector wage bill, poor investor confidence, weak public and private sector governance systems. Climate change and variability may result in uncertain food security despite the good rains during the 2013/2014 season”.

In fact, after peaking at 10.6 percent GDP growth in 2011, the economy decelerated to 4.4% in 2012 and continued that downward slide to an estimated 0.5 percent in 2016.[[6]](#footnote-6) Underlying this dramatic slowdown are various factors. Deindustrialisation resulting in shrinking capacity utilisation, estimated at 39.6% in 2013,[[7]](#footnote-7) and 34.3% in 2015, in turn fuelling formal unemployment growth - now standing at 80%, with about 94% of jobs now being in the informal sector.[[8]](#footnote-8) Although capacity utilisation is reported to have risen to 47.4% in 2016, this is not reflected in employment figures.[[9]](#footnote-9) This may be due to the fact that the rise is more a reflection of factory closures than increased production. It may also be because the recent restriction on imports has generated some import substitution manufacturing.[[10]](#footnote-10)

Figure : Zimbabwe GDP Growth Rate

Source: World Bank Group Data[[11]](#footnote-11)

The economic shrinkage and the burgeoning of the informal sector have of course meant low revenue levels to the state. For example, cumulative expected fiscal revenues from January to October 2016 fell short by 9.8%, a 1.5% drop from 2015.[[12]](#footnote-12) This is to be seen against continuous increase in recurrent expenditure. During the same January to October period, expenditure exceeded Government’s target by 13.5%, due to the need to respond to the drought by importing grain, payment of salary arrears and debt servicing.[[13]](#footnote-13) The 2016 fiscal deficit is estimated at USD 1 billion (7.3% of GDP), against a target of USD 150 million. In fact, the World Bank estimates it at 10% of GDP.[[14]](#footnote-14) A big part of that is explained by a continuous rise in the wage bill, from 1% of GDP in 2008 to 22.2% in 2015 and estimated 23.9% in 2016.

Domestic public debt has risen by about 85% from about USD 2 billion in 2015 to about USD 3.7 billion by 31 October 2016. Employment costs amounted to USD 2.6 billion constituting 91% of total revenues, 92 percent of which is from taxes. In the absence of any significant inflows, the fiscal deficit is almost exclusively financed through domestic borrowing, which in the medium to long run, is bound to impact the financial sector and undermine macroeconomic sustainability. While this calls for policy shifts towards tighter expenditure management and higher revenue receipts, the reality is that higher expenditures are likely, given the up-coming elections and wage bill commitments, putting more pressure on government to resort to further domestic borrowing.[[15]](#footnote-15)

## 

## Objectives of the review

The PSP is now just past the mid-point of its implementation. Although the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework of the project document does not specifically call for a mid-term review, it does state that the “The programme will be ……………. evaluated in accordance with the requirements of the Steering Committee”. To that end, the Programme Steering Committee recommended that a Mid-Term Review be carried out, with the following objectives:

1. Assess the progress that has been made so far against the Results Resources Framework as well as progress made per outcome for the specific indicators. In this regard, this Mid-Term Review will determine whether the project outputs are on track, are in line with the original theory of change, and the project strategy and most importantly whether the stated project objectives/outcomes will be achieved within the life of the project. It will also determine the immediate impact and contribution to results of several capacity development interventions within the programme.
2. Map the operational, technical and programmatic gaps, challenges and areas that need improvement;
3. Make a review and an assessment of the cost effectiveness and efficiency of the project using a value for money analysis informed by experiences of similar programmes, including coordination and synergies with other programmes
4. Make recommendations to scale up programme delivery moving forward, and adjust/improve programming effectiveness and efficiency for optimal results achievement.
5. Recommend approaches for aligning the current programme to the time-frame of Parliament’s strategic plan
6. Recommend concrete actions for strengthening and sustaining gender equality results of the programme
7. Make recommendation on sustainability
8. Make recommendation on communication

In summary, this mid-term review therefore assesses the progress that has been made so far towards achieving the outcomes and outputs, against targets and indicators in the PSP, and identifies challenges, gaps and areas needing strengthening, redesign, or course correction for the rest of the implementation period. It recommends appropriate measures for refocusing the programme strategies where necessary, highlighting areas of strength and opportunities for achieving the desired results and capturing the lessons learned.

## Structure of the Report

This report is presented in four sections. After this introduction, which is the first section, which provides country context and explains the background of the PSP, its intended objectives, scope, and components. Section 2 explains the approach and methodology used to conduct the review. Chapter three presents the main findings of the review with respect to each of the five PSP outcomes and against the planned programme deliverables. Chapter four examines the core elements of project management which underpin implementation including monitoring and evaluation, and finance and administration. Lastly, chapter five presents key conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations for stakeholder consideration.

METHODOLOGY

# Review Approach and Methodology

The review was designed to be participatory, with stakeholders participating in the design, identification of results, and validation of findings. A mix of key informant interviews and group discussions were used to collect data, with qualitative methods being used to inform the review. Key informant interviews formed the main method for primary data collection.

The process of development of tools was participatory and involved review of proposed tools by the client, and incorporation of any revisions requested, where appropriate, by the review team.

## Data collection

The review team interviewed a cross-section of stakeholders of the PSP. These included:

* Staff and Members of Parliament;
* Office of the Auditor General (OAG);
* UNDP;
* Development partners funding the PSP;
* Other funders of parliament and OAG;
* UN agencies;
* Civil Society; and
* Government ministries.

Sixteen key informants and two focus group discussions (with parliamentarians) were conducted. Annex 4 presents a list of people consulted for the review.

In addition to key informant interviews and focus group discussions, and because of the inadequate detailing of results in annual reports, the review team facilitated a two-day Outcome Harvesting Workshop. The workshop, attended by staff from Parliament, OAG and UNDP enabled participants to envision achievements across the programme’s results chains, contribution of the PSP to those achievements and the evidence to demonstrate the contribution. Findings of this workshop were used to enrich the Effectiveness section of the review.

Literature review was another key method used to gather secondary data to provide key input in the evaluation of strategy, efficiency (including analysis of value for money), effectiveness, and relevance. A variety of documents were reviewed and these are presented in Annex 3.

## Data analysis

All data was collated, triangulated and verified before conclusions were made. For the qualitative data, an MS Excel software, a thematic analysis tool that distils trends in qualitative data on different themes of analysis, was used.

## Review and validation process

All outputs of the evaluation were reviewed by all stakeholders through: 1) individual comments on the draft reports; 2) presentation to and feedback from the project board ; and 3) presentation to and feedback from the Programme Steering Committee. A previously intended stakeholders workshop was not carried out.

## Stakeholder participation

Primary stakeholders of the PSP (UNDP, SIDA, EU, Parliament, and OAG) participated in the review in various ways as:

1. reviewers of the evaluation design;
2. respondents during the consultations;
3. reviewers of the draft report; and
4. members of either the board or the SC..

## Limitations

1. Due to time and budgetary constraints, citizens, as a critical stakeholder, were not consulted as part of this review. Such consultations would have been helpful for the review team to gain their feedback on inclusiveness of the legislative process, and perceptions of parliamentary effectiveness in delivering better services. To address this challenge the review sought opinions of civil society on parliamentary effectiveness as proxy for citizen voice.
2. A Value for Money assessment requires a comparator with similar main characteristics, to judge costs of the programme. In this case, no comparator was available that matched all the variables analysed. In the circumstances, the main comparator used was the Parliament Support Programme implemented in Eastern and Southern Africa by UNICEF. However, even this has the shortcomings in that some costs may not be comparable as the UNICEF programme is at regional level.

MAIN FINDINGS

# Main Findings

The main findings of the review, which are presented here, have been analysed according to the review framework developed from the Terms of Reference for this assignment. The findings are organised according to the seven evaluation criteria therein. These are: strategy; relevance; efficiency; effectiveness; management and coordination; and sustainability. National ownership has been addressed under sustainability, while cross cutting issues of capacity development and gender equality have been addressed in the context of strategy, effectiveness and sustainability.

## Strategy

The PSP has, correctly, a section that describes the strategy of the programme and the principles guiding the implementation. The core of the strategy is to show the link between output and inputs, between outputs and outcomes, and to draw lessons from the previous programme and the evaluation thereof. It justifies any continuity from the previous programme by the high turnover of members of parliament between the last programme and itself. It also commits support to uphold the regional and global engagements of Parliament.

The strategy is the programme’s response to the challenges to Parliament of Zimbabwe and to the Office of the Auditor General, which have been clearly articulated, but without reference to what has been achieved through or if not, the shortcomings of the previous programmes.

### Framing Strategies and Policies

The PSP asserts that “The strategy of this programme document is anchored on, and is consistent with, a number of key policy documents of the Government of Zimbabwe, relevant international and regional frameworks as well as agreements with its development partners.” First, apart from listing them, this is all that is said about these documents. It does not demonstrate even briefly how these, individually and collectively anchor the strategy, except in the results resources matrix where the link to the UNDP strategic plan, UNDAF and Country Programme Document (CPD) are associated with the PSP outcome areas, which is mandatory. In addition, the agreements with development partners are mentioned but not elaborated in terms of how they were factored into the PSP. Highlighting key elements in these institutional documents – government, UNDP, EU, POZ, Sweden etc. – help to understand how much the PSP is based on them. A programme document that brings more than one partner together represents either a convergence of interests or compromise, understanding either of which is important in anticipating implementation issues down the line. This is because it is important to grasp and take into account the partners’ interests in supporting POZ and the perspectives they bring, and how each’s comparative advantage would be leveraged for the success of the programme.[[16]](#footnote-16) A good theory of change would have been able to capture these.

The Review Team finds that, although during the design of the programme, an effort was made to anchor the PSP strategy in the strategy papers of key stakeholders, **insufficient attention was paid to demonstrate the relevance of these antecedent strategies and how they had been applied to the choice and implementation of the PSP outcomes**.

**Theory of Change**

Then the programme discusses its underlying theory of change. In section II, the programme discusses challenges for both Parliament and the Office of the Auditor General. These are presumably the basis for the strategy, but are not discussed at all in the strategy section.

The programme discusses a theory of change (ToC), which it says “is primarily intended to inform the planning of the PSP”. Indeed, that is what a ToC should do. But there is hardly any presentation of the ToC. After mentioning the ToC on Page 10 para 33. Apart from part of para 34 that discusses the importance of Parliament, the discussion that follows is in fact an introduction of the programme components and the process of selecting outcomes from Parliament’s ISP. Thus, while theory of change is mentioned in the document, there is no discussion either in the main body of the document or as an annex. The one complete presentation is in the table at the end of the document titled “Theory of Change/Results Chain.”

A theory of change in programme design is the designers’ understanding of how change happens in general and how that applies in the specific programming context and the causal relationships of the variables presumed to be determinant of change. It therefore assists the designers of a programme to structure an appropriate results framework premised on the logic and assumptions made explicit by the Theory of change. The results framework should be derived from, but is not the theory of change. A review of the scant mention of the ToC and the matrix referenced above, shows clearly that the proffered ToC is hardly distinguishable from the results framework.

**The Review finds that the theory of change was insufficiently presented and not at all linked to the strategy design**. An adequate ToC would have explained the logic and assumptions behind the choice of Parliament as the focus of governance related support, project methodology and design, partnership model and implementation strategy.

At the time when the PSP was being designed, UNDP was still introducing the concept of the ToC and requiring Country Offices to incorporate it in their programming, at least as a technical note. It is thus commendable that the PSP attempts to articulate a ToC. Although not clearly specified, UNDP’s adoption of results based programming has always been underpinned by an assumed ToC. Thus, despite the inadequate articulation of the theory of change, the experience with results based programming usually helps, as it did in the case of the PSP, with the development of a logically coherent results framework.

### Application of Lessons to the design

Also mentioned but not discussed is the fact that the programme has benefitted from the lessons of the previous programme. Except for M&E, it does not say which lessons and how these have been factored in the PSP. The final evaluation of this PSP’s most recent predecessor programme does not contain a section on lessons so it would be difficult to check the lessons learnt unless they were stated. Showing which lessons learnt were applied to the design of this programme would have been helpful to all stakeholders and indeed evaluators to appreciate the progressive learning by all involved institutions – especially in this case where some of the key players are the same - and to assess how the learning may or may not have led to improved development results. Also missing is any significant mention of the programme’s pedigree as the third in the rolling plan of multi-donor supported PSP, or demonstration of the continuity or lack thereof.

This part of the strategy could have enriched the PSP by situating it’s successful past and shown it as a continuation that is building on those past successes. While it mentions that Zimbabwe has had a history of successful parliamentary reform, there is very little elaboration to situate this PSP in that tradition and show how it is taking it forward.

### Partnership Strategy

The PSP is designed to respond to, and help implement Parliament’s ISP. Development and other partners are expected to derive their focus and develop their support strategies to the PSP from their understanding and commitment to support PoZ in the implementation of the ISP. The partnership strategy is not discussed in the PSP, but simply stated, as a principle and in the required section of the project document. It is a basket funding arrangement, managed by UNDP. According to this partnership strategy, donors and others who support PoZPoZ outside the PSP are to be considered as PSP partners. So, there are different kinds of partnerships that provide resources to the PoZ. While the PSP is the largest programme, not all support to Parliament goes through the PSP. The development partners in the PSP also provide some support to Parliament through their civil society partners. Of those who work through the PSP, not all - for example civil society - bring in financial resources, making only technical contribution. POZ uses the PSP to coordinate support to itself even from those who do not contribute their support through the PSP. This is true of several civil society organisations, and of the African Development Bank and the World Bank. This makes three types of partners working with PoZ, either directly within or coordinated by/with the PSP. 1) There are those who provide financial resources such as UNDP, EU and Sweden, AfDB, WB; 2) those who provide technical resources such as UNDP and several civil society organisations, and 3) those who coordinate all or some of the partners. Of course, many of these are the same institution providing different kinds of services to PoZ.

A robust theory of change would have helped explain the rationale for the partnership models chosen and how they are expected to work and what the assumptions and risks are. One of the persistent questions in UNDP managed basket funding is that of UNDP’s value addition. The ToC would have offered a clear hypothesis on why UNDP management offered the best comparative advantage, why the EU and GOS would be more likely to achieve their objectives under this arrangement than any other alternative.

The Review Team, however, finds that the partnership model described above, was successful in coordinating support to PoZ. There was information sharing and joint reporting, duplication of effort was to a large extent avoided. The funding of two of the PCU posts by the AfDB further demonstrates the value of the coordination.

The success of the partnership could also be explained by the fact that the partners to the programme have experience in similar partnerships both in Zimbabwe and elsewhere, and they participated to some extent in the programme design, and appear committed to the management and implementation arrangements. Also, likely to contribute to success is the fact that the fulcrum of the partnership is the Parliament of Zimbabwe, which is the main beneficiary, as well as the coordinator, of the programme along with UNDP. To a certain extent that potential is being realised as reflected in the results being achieved through the PSP.

A further opportunity for strengthening the partnership was the need for the programme design document to be clear on the strategic fit of PSP within the framework of Parliament’s funding from the fiscus. One stakeholder noted how the lack of clarity on the strategic fit of PSP within Parliament’s funding promulgated a view that the PSP was merely supplementing funding from the fiscus. Better articulation of the strategic fit of the PSP would therefore avoid it being seen as a supplementary funding instrument to Parliament.

### Programme Duration

The programme was designed to cover the period from 2014 – 2017. The life of the current Parliament is 2013 – 2018. Thus, the programme came about a year after the new Parliament had begun and is scheduled to end one year before the Parliament ends. It is not clear how the timing was determined, but the ZUNDAF and the UNDP Country Programme Document both of which it purports to be based on cover the period 20112 – 2015. The ZIMASSET covers 2013 -2018 and PoZ’s ISP covers the period 2014 -2018. Of all the documents mentioned as its basis, only the global UNDP strategic plan covers the same period as the PSP. It is unlikely that this is the basis of its duration.

Concerns have been expressed that the programme is not being in sync with, not only the life of parliament but also with the ISP, is problematic. It is argued that it should see both parliament and its plan to the end, and should be there right at the beginning of a new Parliament to support it immediately as it takes off. However, there is a view that it would be best for the programme in such a way that it can be there when the new Parliament is coming in in order to help jump start support activities for the new parliament, which it would not be able to do if it ends together with the outgoing parliament. Designing and implementing a new programme takes time, so there would effectively be a period during which a new parliament is in place and the new programme is not yet in place.

It is doubtless important that the PSP should position itself to support Parliament throughout the life of a particular parliament by helping to fully implement the ISP. However, it is important to look at the feasibility. If the PSP ends when Parliament ends, and going by previous experience of how long it takes to design and start implementing a new programme, it may be difficult to have another PSP in place in time for the new parliament. It could be argued that the design of the new programme should start before the end of the current programme. There is merit in that, except that evaluation is supposed to be close to the end, and it is a sine qua non for for the next programme formulation. In addition, the baseline studies of Parliamentarians, which form the basis of capacity development interventions, can only be carried out after elections when it is known who is coming to Parliament.

For these reasons, it may be helpful to look at overlap, instead of synchronisation. While the programme should be as long as the life of Parliament, it need not start and end at the same time, but could be designed to go into the first six months to a year of the next Parliament. That way final evaluation can be taken into account, and it can fund start up activities such as baseline studies for the new Parliament.

### Guiding Principles for Programme Implementation

The programme strategy lists seven principles for programme implementation. “to ensure that the Parliament of Zimbabwe is consciously responsive to its Constitutional mandate.” In reality, there are probably only three principles – ownership, inclusiveness and transparency. The rest are in fact either the whole point of the programme, “the programme should at all times support Parliament in its Constitutional mandate………” or management imperatives like flexibility in implementation.

Thus, in terms of guiding programme design and implementation, the strategy offers the three important principles. Unfortunately, for two of these – ownership and transparency – it does not say how these principles would be applied to programme implementation, and what the challenges would be. The only thing mentioned in relation to ownership is the PCU control of funds, which while important is not the only factor for ownership.

#### Ownership

An important question in evaluating the appropriateness of any donor support programme to a national institution such as POZ is the extent to which such support reinforces ownership and thus, in the case of any Parliament the national sovereignty imbedded in it in jurisdictions where it is regarded as the first branch of the state. Donor aid, by its very nature, always runs the risk of subordinating, wittingly or unwittingly, the recipient’s priorities to those of the donor. How the partnership is designed determines how well that risk is managed. The current standard is still of course the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action. The PSP asserts its management design basis as the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda. The main design and management consequence of this commitment is the Project Coordination Unit, based in PoZ and responsible for programme coordination and day to day implementation activities. The PSP is also anchored in the ISP and thus is clearly designed to implement PoZ’s own national programme.

A number of issues with implications for ownership have been raised in the context of this review. On the one hand there has been a view expressed that the PCU lacks sufficient authority and resources to manage in a way that actualises PoZ’s ownership of the programme. On the other hand, the issue has been raised that UNDP has not exerted sufficient pressure on the PCU to provide quality reports, as well as that the donors do not have sufficient opportunity to influence day-to-day implementation of the programme as well as to influence the programme to intervene in issues they consider important, such as contentious governance issues. A different but pervasive issue is the now supposedly settled question of daily subsistence allowance, where no one seems happy with the solutions found to the challenge of whether to use Parliament’s own rates, previously-agreed-to GoZ rates or some other compromise solution. This review had to pay what it considers to be a disproportionate amount of attention to this issue. All these issues, and others, have a critical bearing on the perception and reality of ownership. Hence, we deal with them below.

The PCU could be the most important instrument for realising ownership of the programme by PoZ. But for that to happen the PCU would need to be a unit of parliament , i.e., capacity in Parliament to manage the PSP. Inadequate Government resources for the PCU means that the PCU is dependent on project funds for both staff and activity funding. It is therefore not a sustainable institutional arrangement. Its effectiveness can only be justified in terms of project implementation not in terms of long-term institutional strengthening of PoZ.

The Review Team heard from Parliamentarians donors and UNDP on the issue of DSA. At issue is the fact that Parliament disagreed with the DSA levels agreed to between Government of Zimbabwe and donors which UNDP sought to apply. Donors objected to the rates preferred by Parliament. We were informed that in the case of one donor there was a standoff that resulted in project implementation being put on hold for a while until a solution was eventually found. This solution, however, does not appear acceptable to Parliamentarians, who appealed to the Review Team to address the issue, despite explanations that we were outsiders and not part of decision-making. While the travel allowances of Parliament do indeed differ from those of Government, the disagreement and subsequent preoccupation with the issue on the part of parliamentarians appear to be due to the fiscal situation, which makes the PSP a significant source of the Parliament’s programme budget. This situation is not conducive to an increased sense of ownership. Nor does the fact that Parliamentarians appeared to look to the programme to provide as many of their operational needs as possible.

The donor related sentiments vis-à-vis the PCU, cited above point to the partial commitment to the Paris Declaration, in that qualitative accountability for the programme is seen as that of UNDP, consistent with basket funding agreements, and not of PoZ management, consistent with the PSP, which goes back to the incongruence of the institutional strengthening objective of Paris and the accountability needs of donors.

In a situation where donor resources were a small fraction of the resources available to Parliament, all the above issues would be seen and treated from a different perspective. In this case, however, given the fiscal situation described elsewhere in this review, the PSP constitutes about 50% of the funding for PoZ programmes.

In spite of the Paris Declaration, a situation in which the aid recipient partner is almost totally dependent on the aid, reduces the ability of the recipient to exercise the leadership that Paris requires. Hence the PSP’s bold objective to support PoZ to fulfil its goal of being an effective parliament, able to exercise its mandate and achieve the objectives of oversight, legislation and representation while enhancing democratic participation in its processes, and based on its own ISP, is commendable. The strategy of the PSP – achieve five key outcomes, uphold Paris through strengthening Parliament by establishing a PCU, ensure programme direction and compliance through a Steering Committee and implementation through a project board – is sound and informed by previous experience. However, the own resource context has steadily deteriorated. Despite this situation, there is no discussion of how this dire situation affects programme strategy, beyond mentioning it as a fact. As will be seen later in the report, the whole sustainability question hangs on it.

#### Transparency

Discussions with stakeholders showed the PSP was designed through an extensive consultative process. This is further supported by the programme document itself, which gives that consultation as one of the reasons for delayed start-up. Consultation helps to increase transparency because it provides stakeholders with the opportunity to make their institutional positions clear and for engaging in forging a common position. One of the thirty recommendations of the last PSP evaluation was that the design of the next phase – that is the PSP under review – should be done following extensive consultations with donors to ensure that it is a joint policy, programming and funding effort. If that recommendation was followed, as the PSP suggests, there would have been no need for some stakeholders to express discomfort relating to the priorities pursued by the PCU. It is not clear to the review team the depth to which the consultation went and the extent to which it helped to create the collective sense of programme ownership that makes for smooth implementation.

#### Inclusiveness

The programme’s gender mainstreaming outcome area is responsive to the inclusiveness principle. However, the programme missed incorporating other categories to enhance inclusiveness – youth, the disabled and minorities.

### 

### Programme Priorities

The PSP derives its priorities from the ISP. The ISP has sixteen priorities and the PSP picked nine of these, collapsed them and came up with five outcome areas of the programme. While it is commendable that the temptation to replicate the entire list in the ISP was avoided, the only rationale shown is that those left “are outside the funding parameters of the partners”. There is no link back to the earlier assertions regarding the key strategies on which the PSP is based. Another opportunity to demonstrate how the PSP is anchored in these key strategic documents is missed. And this is true of all the five outcomes.

However, the outcomes in themselves are clearly articulated. The five outcomes are distinguishable one from the other, and the results chains fairly well sequenced. ToC

Outcome 1: In the discussion of this outcome and setting out the targets, there is a fundamental flow in the argument that “The quality of legislation enacted and the effectiveness of the legislative function of Parliament is directly related to the capacity of the legislators to understand their functions”, without any reference to the bill-supply role of the executive. Certainly, one of the most important mandates of Parliament is the legislative mandate. However, the draft bills that Parliament debates and eventually pass come from the Executive branch of government. Therefore setting legislative targets without a mechanism for engagement with the supply side meant that the two sides might not have been working towards the same quantitative targets. Hence the impression given to the review team that the Executive believes that it has achieved more on legislative alignment than the Legislature believes. In fact, even the way of counting is not clear. There is disagreement among key stakeholders whether the general amendment law is one piece of legislation or one multiplied by the number of laws amended by the single legislation. In fact, this lack of an all-of-Government system’s approach turned out to be the blind spot of the PSP with respect to this outcome, as well as, to a certain extent, outcome 2. The Review Team has been informed that there is a programme funded by one of the PSP partners directed at the executive. In our discussion with both the Executive and Parliament, we did not gain the impression that the two programmes are regarded as complimentary. Nor did we find any cross reference in the PSP to the other programme, which we did not have an opportunity to see. Prioritising the laws targeted for alignment would have also helped bring key players on the same page, in addition to ensuring that priority legislation is addressed first.

Concerning outcome 2, exercising the oversight function is the mandate of Parliament. But its effective implementation requires cooperation with the Executive, because it would be counter-productive to rely on the coercive authority of Parliament alone. That is why there is difficulty in ensuring that the oversight activities of Parliamentary committees result into executive responsive action. As noted in the discussion of results, pro-active engagement with the Executive by Parliament’s leadership has contributed to some of the progress realised. But committing resources, or coordinating efforts, to support the mutually inter-dependent relationship of the two branches of state would have led to a more effective systemic change. One of the recommendations of the evaluation of the last PSP deals with that precise issue. It says, “One of the obstacles to more effective parliamentary oversight over government, is the limited understanding and acceptance of parliamentary scrutiny by the executive. The evaluation team recommends that in addition to the building of knowledge and skills of MPs and Committees, the successor project should involve the executive in order to sensitize ministers on their obligations and accountability to parliament. This can be done through high level policy / leadership dialogue with the executive, taking into account the doctrine of separation of powers.”[[17]](#footnote-17)

This was not designed into the PSP and thus not done, but it would have gone a long way towards increasing the responsiveness to oversight findings by the Executive which is discussed under effectiveness in this report.

**In summary, the evaluation team finds that the strategy formulation did not show how it is rooted in the strategy documents of the key stakeholders, what lessons learnt it had drawn from previous programmes, how the interdependence between the Executive and Parliament would affect programme implementation, and did not prioritise the five outcomes and the outputs within these. This had an effect on the implementation and reporting of results as will be seen in the results section of this report**

## 

## Relevance

Parliament is at the centre of any governance agenda. Any commitment to the deepening of democracy in Zimbabwe would have to include commitment to the strengthening of the first branch of the State. The main governance agenda in Zimbabwe since independence, but intensifying in the last decade and half has been the constitution – first it was the need to amend or replace the Lancaster House (independence) Constitution, evidenced by the fact that it had undergone nineteen amendments by 2009, twenty-nine years since its adoption. Then there was the constitutional commission which produced a draft constitution which was rejected in 2000, and finally the 2013 constitution which had the widest acceptance level in the history of the country.

Section 119 of the 2013 Constitution gives Parliament the role to protect the Constitution and promote democratic governance in Zimbabwe. This is considerably more responsibility than in the previous constitution, making it essential to develop Parliament’s capacity to fulfill its enlarged mandate.

The review team finds **that the strategic choice by Parliament of Zimbabwe, UNDP and their partners to continue to support POZ was therefore relevant and directed at the core of the agenda to consolidate democratic governance in Zimbabwe.**

**It is commendable that the PSP anchored itself in the ISP.**  The five outcomes it chose to focus on are pivotal to the implementation of the ISP and thus, if successful, would be a major contribution to the achievement of PoZ agenda and thus the national governance agenda.

### Outcome 1: New laws enacted and old laws aligned with the Constitution

This outcome is a major national priority recommended in all relevant evaluations carried out after the constitution had been adopted, and advocated for by the Zimbabwe Law Society, which developed the original list of laws needing alignment. It is therefore very relevant to the implementation of the Constitution and to the ushering in of the new dispensation envisaged by its adoption. Some of the laws needing alignment at the time of the programme design included strategic ones like the electoral laws, with direct relevance to upcoming national elections.

### Outcome 2: Oversight function of Parliament strengthened; Governance systems enhanced.

This outcome links directly to the constitutional provision that states that “all institutions and agencies of the State and Government at every level are accountable to Parliament”. It is clearly essential to institute all possible measures to create individual and institutional capacity of Parliament and its committees to be able to exercise this authority and to effectively ensure and leverage it for deepening governance in Zimbabwe as per its mandate.

The PSP focuses on enhancing the capacity of Parliament and the Office of the Auditor General. However, this capacity enhancement is largely limited to individual capacities. Oversight is a massive and on-going challenge. Capacity for oversight requires enhancement of individual, sectoral and overall institutional capacity. A more broadly defined and operationalised capacity development strategy would have made this outcome even more relevant to the enhancement of the oversight function of PoZ.

### **Outcome 3: People’s participation in legislation formulation, decision-making and related democratic processes increased**.

This outcome is relevant to the functioning of Parliament especially because of the constitutional requirement for public participation in governance, in particular legislative processes. PoZ uses public hearings as the main strategy for participation in the legislative process. The programme, however, in its elaboration of this outcome conflates public hearings with effective constituency representation. Since public hearings are linked to Portfolio or thematic committees, they are not constituency based. Parliamentary Constituency Information Centres are signaled for ICT enhancement, but do not seem to still exist, which some Parliamentarians lamented. Public hearings are important, and have been effective in bringing people’s input into legislation. But Zimbabwe’s electoral system is constituency based and people’s participation and parliamentary accountability should be strengthened at constituency level as well.

### Outcome 4: Parliament's performance of its core functions strengthened through capacitating Parliament leadership and staff

This outcome is perhaps one of the most relevant. At the end of the day, Parliament is an institution which needs internal capacities to deliver its mandate. For without capable institutional capacity, PoZ cannot effectively carry out all the priorities it has set for itself, including the PSP. Given the capacity gaps demonstrated by the baseline studies on parliamentarians, it would be difficult to see how PoZ could achieve its objectives without the support that addresses these gaps.

### Outcome 5: Strengthened gender mainstreaming in the work of Parliament

This outcome is relevant because, as the programme states, previous efforts have not helped achieve full mainstreaming of gender. The new constitutional provisions on women membership of Parliament have contributed significantly to progress towards gender balance in the Legislature. In spite of these developments and gender mainstreaming policies and programmes in Zimbabwe over the years, the programme recognises that more needs to be done, especially in relation to the quantity and quality of female representation in parliament. A gender outcome of the PSP was necessary and relevant, as confirmed quite enthusiastically by the leadership of the Women’s Parliamentary Caucus and studies on women’s participation in parliament[[18]](#footnote-18).

**Given the above, the review team finds that the interventions are relevant to Parliament and Zimbabwe’s priorities.**

## Efficiency

### Timeliness in delivery

Table 2 shows analysis of quarterly expenditure for the programme. On average, the delivery rate has been 50.2%, at a time when the programme is well past the half way mark. Delivery has thus been slow, leading to the situation where quantitative programme targets are unlikely to be met. Table 2 shows the delivery rate for the PSP.

Table : Delivery rate for the PSP

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Year** | **Quarterly Financial Reports** | **Authorised Amount** | **Actual Expenditure** | **Budget Outturn %** |
| 2015 | Jan-March | 220,490.09 | 112,990.05 | 51.2% |
| 2015 | April-June | 1,178,394.40 | 654,511.50 | 55.5% |
| 2015 | July-September | 1,418,166.20 | 800,220.40 | 56.4% |
| 2015 | Oct-December | 1,001,339.20 | 789,942.90 | 78.9% |
| 2016 | Jan-March | 668,428.80 | 402,964.80 | 60.3% |
| 2016 | April-June | 2,105,029.10 | 952,482.40 | 45.2% |
| 2016 | July-September | 1,510,529.30 | 353,380.80 | 23.4% |
| 2016 | Oct-December | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Total |  | 8,102,377.09 | 4,066,492.85 | 50.2% |

*Source: Quarterly financial reports*

The programme limits undertaking of activities with parliamentarians largely to the period of parliamentary sitting. This approach allows the programme to reduce costs of implementation, as the costs related to their presence in Harare are met by the parliament core budget. In between, the PSP carries out those activities directed at the administration of Parliament. In some cases, however, where approval is granted, some work with parliamentarians is undertaken. Because parliament meets 80 days per year, translating to an average of 3 months, it is a small window available for activity implementation. Delays in procurement and other upstream administrative processes, highlighted in the minutes of quarterly board meetings, reduce this window further. However, mobilising MPs outside the parliamentary seating may solve the timeliness of implementation but will increase the costs of the project.

Another factor delaying implementation has been capacity of some departments within parliament to develop work plans in time to enable the PCU to consolidate and submit to UNDP for review and the Project Board for approval. The PCU’s efforts to support these departments has been hampered by the PCU’s own human resources constraints.

Another problem was the slow start due to delays in finalising the programme document and eventual receipt of the first tranche of funding from EU (first quarter 2015) and then from SIDA (mid 2015). These delays have significantly reduced the period of implementing the programme from four to about two and a half years. The timeline presented in Table 3 shows the chronology of significant events for the PSP.

Table : Chronology of key events in the life of PSP

| **Year** | **Significant event** |
| --- | --- |
| 2013 | New parliament |
| 2014 | Consultation on the programme design. Consultation was as it included all stakeholders of a parliamentary support programme: media, CSOs, UN agencies, parliamentarians, development partners. The development of the programme was informed by the evaluation of the previous programme. Evaluation stressed on the need to be consultative during development of the PSP |
| Programme signed off |
| Putting in place PCU using Trac funds (UNDP) |
| 2015 | Launch after receipt of funds initially from EU |
| SIDA signs cooperation agreement |
| Procurement for baseline studies |
| Movement of resources high due to alignment of laws. Due mainly to Public Hearings which are a constitutional requirement and rights of the citizen. |
| 2016 | Baseline Studies conducted |
| AfDB (sit in the project board), M&E Officer, Procurement Specialist (paid by ADB) recruited, World Bank begins to support Parliament |

*Source: Interviews with key informants*

### Effectiveness of multi-donor approach

The basket fund has provided a platform for the convergence of all PoZ’s development partners, including those not contributing into the basket.

The one report, one work plan, and one governance structure for parliament support adopted for the PSP has reduced the time of engagement with individual partners by parliament. The major development partners of parliament: SIDA, EU, UNDP, AfDB, World Bank and Southern Africa Parliamentary Support Trust (SAPST) are all part of the PSP Project Board. One quarterly report is presented on progress on activities with parliament and discussed in the Project Board. However, additional individual development partner reports, for those not contributing to the basket fund, are still prepared for their specific activities. This can be burdensome especially for an already constrained PCU. The burden can be reduced if the major partners financing parliament fund through the basket: World Bank and AfDB.

The basket fund has enabled the establishment of the PCU through cost sharing among DPs contributing to the modality. The PCU has in turn increased capacity of Parliament, at least for the duration of the PSP, to coordinate development partners’ support.

*“For every activity we would like to do we have to go through the PCU…you cannot do what you want in parliament…it has to be according to what is planned by the PCU.”* KII with a UN agency.

*“Work with parliament is now more structured and organised… the PSP has increased coordination of work with parliament and has provided us with opportunities for collaboration and strengthening of our work… We no longer have instances where organisations do the same thing.”* **Interview with a CSO**

*“The biggest added value [of the PSP] is the coordination…We are leveraging on each other’s support and resources, ensuring parliament gets to perform its functions.”* **Interview with CSO**

Such a cost sharing arrangement, as established through the basket fund, has facilitated other partners not contributing to it, such as the AfDB, to provide additional human resources support through financing positions of a Procurement Specialist and M&E Officer. AfDB’s support has seen an increase in efficiency of the PSP and improvements in the quality of results reporting.

Partners that would ordinarily not be able to afford working with parliament, but whose technical expertise is required, e.g. UN Women, specialised CSOs etc, have been able to engage with parliament through cost sharing with the PSP. Because of this flexibility in the basket fund, the quality of PSP activities have been enhanced and their depth deepened.

*“The resources we have are little against what the parliament can mobilise….We have been able to do more because of the resources of PSP…We have engaged more than we would have…We are now working the other committees than just the gender or parliamentary caucus.”* **KIIs with a** **CSOs**

**The review finds the multi-donor approach symbolised by the basket fund an appropriate approach for enhancing efficiency in support to parliament. Despite parallel funding by some donors, the basket fund has provided a platform for aligning support to parliament from multiple funders creating opportunities for cost sharing that enhance the depth and quality of intervention.**

These advantages of the basket funding modality would suggest that, if there are no significant institutional constraints for these development partners to finance through the basket, greater leadership is required from parliament to direct resources through the basket fund. Having the ISP already reinforces Parliament’s leadership. There is need, however, to address the constraints for contributing to the basket fund, especially for major partners, which include, but are not limited to agreeing on the issue of DSA. While there seems to be an agreement on this issue among majority of partners, its constant mention during interviews shows it is still an outstanding issue. DSA rates for parliament are the main cost driver for activities with parliamentarians. The importance of the DSA rate in the context of this programme and some of the effects in moving support elsewhere cannot be over-emphasised. Some partners (excluding those in the PSP) that work with parliament who were interviewed during the evaluation stated that they had reduced their scope of working with parliament because of the high costs of engagement driven by the DSA rate. This issue should be settled during programme formulation.

**Another issue is that of duplication of activities.** There are two views on duplication by the development partners working with Parliament and the OAG. One view considers two development partners supporting the same entity or committee as duplication. The other views this situation as an opportunity to increase depth of support e.g. where training could have been limited to 10 committee members, an even larger number can be trained if donors outside the basket add to the same training. The first view would consider this as duplication because such funds could be allocated to areas where the basket fund is not investing. These contrasting views influence perceptions on the effectiveness of current efforts to enhance coordination, primarily, so far, through the consolidated work plan.

Findings of the review show that the PSP has helped avoid duplication even where development partners are outside the basket framework, which is one of its outstanding successes. A typical example is the convergence of development partners funding of the OAG, with the PSP contributing US$375,645.00, AfDB US$807,960.00 and World Bank US$2,284,502.00. While there are multiple funding pipelines for the OAG, the majority of the support is distinct (i.e. supporting a specific activity not financed by other partners). There are activities, which are co-funded (see Table 4). In each of the instances, the support is aimed at increasing the scale of the activity. For example, the basket fund was only able to fund 20 participants for the training on international Public Accounting Standards. But with additional funding from AfDB, the number of trainees was scaled up to 120. The OAG acknowledges this level of support as having made a significant contribution to its capacity. Another is the purchase of laptops. Through contribution from development partners a total of 210 laptops were purchased, a scale the PSP would not have achieved alone. Discussions with staff of the OAG highlighted how the purchase of this significant number of laptops enhanced their efficiency in preparing audit reports as they had been sharing computers before this.

Table : Coordination of funding

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Activity** | **UNDP** | **AfDB** | **World Bank** |
| Professional training and certification in ( 30 ACCA, 15 ICAZ,10 CPA ,10 CISA , 4CIPS - AfDB ) ( 31 ACCA, 6 CPA, 5 CISA, 4 CFE (WB) |  | 142,530.00 | 30,000.00 |
| Training on International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) | 12,000.00 | 137,475.00 |  |
| Laptops |  | 90,000.00 | 120,000.00 |

*Source: Consolidated work plan 2016*

Given the size of Parliament, significant investment is required to reach the scale required for effectiveness. For example, discussions with LCC showed the PSP has not been funding all committees. Committees, while appreciating support from the PSP, bemoaned the level of investment, where a few members were trained or where verification visits were made only to one area when more was needed to gather enough evidence etc. Sentiments on the scale of training were particularly pronounced in the Zimbabwe Women’s Parliamentary Caucus, which has 146 members. Not all members are trained or are able to go through other capacity building initiatives. Thus, PSP alone does not have the capacity to implement at the scale required for the desired impact.

*“There is a belief that there are a lot of DPs in parliament but it’s a big institution. The PSP is not dealing with all committees. Parliament is a big institution we need to coordinate well because of the institutional structure of parliament. Sentiments of overcrowding of partners in parliament is not true because of this.”* **Interview with development partner**

One illustration of the effectiveness of PSP coordination of DPs is the fact that although the World Bank and AfDB contribute a large amount of money to OAG, the perception in reporting and discussion treats the entire resource package as PSP intervention.

Given this context, the argument on duplication should be whether investments by other development partners is repeating interventions for the same MPs rather than increasing scale or filling an identified gap. This is where the PCU has provided the added value in coordination, not only of the PSP but of support to parliament as a whole as discussed earlier.

Through this, the basket fund has:

1. reduced duplication of activities in support of parliament by various development partners,
2. reduced transactions costs for parliament;
3. increased predictability of funding for parliament activities which has improved medium term planning for parliamentary development; and
4. provided a platform for partners with limited resources to engage with parliament through joint implementation.
5. Increased opportunities for partners such as civil society to bring their technical support to Parliament.


### Value for money assessment

The value for money (VfM) assessment drew from the widely used ‘3Es framework’:

* **Economy:** getting the best value inputs
* **Efficiency:** maximising the outputs for a given level of inputs
* **Effectiveness:** ensuring that the outputs deliver the desired outcomes and impact

As Figure 1 illustrates the 3Es framework relates closely to the programme’s results chain.

Figure : 3E's Framework



#### Efficiency

Programme management

Table 5 provides a summary on the analysis of programme management cost. The cumulative total expenditure of the programme during the period under review is US$3,396,113.38 of which US$2,963,170.12 was spent on programme costs and the balance of US$432,943.26 (12.7%) was spent on indirect/recovery costs (overheads). The overheads to programmes ratio is a healthy 1:8 giving rise to a cost of transfer of US$0.15 administrative costs per every US$1.00 value of direct benefit transferred to parliamentarians in the form of training workshops and supporting materials. The cost of transfer shows that most of the budget went into goods and services that benefitted directly the beneficiaries.

Table : Cost of programme management

| **Item** | **Indicator and units** | **Formula** | **Value** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| A | Programme expenditure (USD) |  | 2,963,170.12 |
| B | aOverheads/cost recovery (USD) |  | 432,943.26 |
| C | Total expenditure (USD) |  | 3,396,113.38 |
| D | Share of overhead in total cost (%) | (B/C)\*100 | 12.7% |
| E | Cost of transferring USD1 value of benefit (USD) | B/A | 0.146 |

*aOverhead includes 7% UNDP standard overhead charge and costs of PCU staff*

**The review finds programme management costs low showing prudence in containing administrative costs.**

While the programme has been cost efficient, it has not invested adequately in monitoring – which could be one of the major reasons for the weaknesses of the current M&E system of the programme. Weak monitoring was as due to capacity in the PCU as to the untenable results framework. Monitoring costs constitute 2.1% of the total expenditure of the programme for which 59% has been towards conducting baseline studies finalised in 2016. If the baseline studies expenditure is removed, the programme monitoring was 0.85% of the total budget totalling US$28,974.14. Spread over the two-year period under review, this translates to US$3,621.77 per quarter.

The slow pace of implementation (see section on timely delivery above) will likely increase the costs of programme management due to an extended period of implementation. However, this increase in overhead costs is unlikely to be significant, as 71% of the budget had been expended during the review period.

#### Economy

The key question at the 'economy' level of VFM analysis is whether inputs are obtained at the appropriate price and quality. Assessment involves looking at both the robustness of the procurement processes through which inputs are obtained and the resultant programme unit costs per beneficiary.

In terms of procurement, the PSP uses strict procurement guidelines, which are generally competitive, fair and transparent; and the tendering process has ensured competitive bids, quotations and project proposals are obtained and evaluated for the best value.

An analysis of the unit costs of the PSP major activities is provided below.

Public hearings

The cost of reaching one citizen for public hearings on draft bills is US$34.49/person. This cost is high and unsustainable for parliament to scale up with their current design. Innovative ways of seeking views of a large proportion of the population are required. Already the programme is exploring the use of a mobile application. In 2016, it piloted public hearings through radio. There is the option of increasing constituency outreach through utilising PICs; however, their current low functional state will be a hindrance. These initiatives, if implemented, will likely reduce this cost and increase the reach of public consultations on draft bills but questions remain on the quality of engagement vis a vis face to face interactions and the fear of views not being considered in non-face to face interaction.

Further analysis of the cost of public consultations shows that specialised bills cost six times more (US$193.45) to reach one citizen when compared to popular non-specialised bills (US$32.83) (see Table 6). To improve the value for money, Parliament needs to consider expert review for technical bills.

Table : Unit cost for public hearings on draft bills

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Bill** | **Total persons reached** | **Total cost, US$** | **Cost per person reached, US$** |
| Specialised bills[[19]](#footnote-19) | 2,175 | 420,744.10 | 193.45 |
| Non-specialised popular bills | 6,539 | 214,665.36 | 32.83 |
| **Total** | **8,714** | **300,531.50** | **34.49** |

*Source: Project records and quarterly financial reports*

**Findings of the review show the current model used for public hearings is inefficient and costly to implement. The costs make the model unsustainable in the long term.**

Despite the costs of the public hearings, some significant achievements were recorded in the review of legislation. Findings from public hearings have led to improvements of the proposed Bills or refusal of assent by the President. The section on Effectiveness discusses this further.

Nonetheless, alternative and cost-efficient ways need to be explored that ensure: a large proportion of the population is reached and citizen engagement and discussions are well-informed to ensure quality of participation. This issue is discussed in more depth under Effectiveness.

International conferences and workshops

**The unit cost for conferences and workshops is US$2,779.89 (see Table 7)**. The main cost driver is the CSW conference at US$2,999.05 per participant. While women parliamentarians spoke of the empowering effect of this conference as it provided immense opportunities to learn from many countries in a single visit, improvements are required mainly through post CSW action planning to provide strong justification for this investment on a recurrent basis.

Table : Costs of international conferences and workshops

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Conference** | **No. of participants** | **Cost** | **Unit Cost** | **Changes/Results** |
| Participants of the ZWPC attend the CSW Annual Women`s conference in New York | 6 | 65,792.55 | 8,224.07 | *“We are supported to attend the CSW at the United Nations in New York. It is also the cheapest way to visit other countries especially through the side meetings. So it provides us an opportunity to benchmark ourselves against other countries..”* **FGD with ZWPC** |
| Support Parliamentary Committees members and staff attend International Conferences and meetings- Committees | 16 | 47,984.75 | 2,999.05 | The PLC has been able to issue Adverse report on the National Peace and Reconciliation Bill which led to it being withdrawn, Adverse report on Finance Bill of 2016 which did not provide allocations to Independent Commissions led to revisions by an amendment being issued by the Minister of Finance reinforcing constitutional Supremacy. |
| hold a 3 days ZIM/ZAM senior managers development programme workshop | 45 | 72,475.33 | 1,610.56 | The ZIM/ZAM has led to empowering of the Portfolio Committees in the Budget Process through National Budget Consultations that were conducted and a Pre-Budget Seminar and meetings of the Committee Chairpersons and the Minister of Finance. 33 (more than 50% of the recommendations made) Recommendations from the Committees were implemented in the 2017 National Budget. Innovative ways for increasing visibility of Parliament were used which include the Parliament Open Day. |
| **Total** | **67** | **186,252.63** | **2,779.89** |  |

*Source: Project records and Quarterly Financial Reports 2015-2016*

Table 7 shows achievements to which international conferences and workshops have contributed. The direct contribution of these workshops and conferences cannot be ascertained as post conference and workshop action planning is not apparent. Such planning will greatly improve the value of this investment.

Benchmarking visits

Table 8 provides the costs for benchmarking visits. The total cost per person for a benchmarking visit to other regional parliaments or countries is US$1,838.69. While the benchmarking visits have shown potential to deliver results (as shown in Table 6) more could have been achieved if the visits were accompanied with consistent action planning and follow up. Given the cost to the programme, there is need for the PSP to strategically invest in benchmarking visits and ensure findings translate to tangible actions in Parliament.

Table : Costs of benchmarking visits

| **Exchange visits** | **Number of participants** | **Total cost of visit** | **Unit cost** | **Changes/Results** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Officers undertake exchange programme with supreme Audit Institutions to learn best practises and share audit experiences | 9 | 24,321.61 | 2,702.40 | The study tours contributed Human Resources Policies and Code of Conduct that have been recently finalised. A Communications Officer is the process of being engaged after it was recommended from the visit and a Training Policy is being worked on resulting from the visits. |
| Parliament Officers undertake international exchange programmes with similar institutions | 12 | 14,607.43 | 1,217.29 | Recommendations made by Parliament for the Executive to ratify the Doha amendment to the Kyoto proToCToCol and the landmark Paris Climate Change Agreement. Both were taken up and accented to by the President in 2016. |
| Presiding officers and Chairpersons panel and staff undertake learning exchange visits to regional parliaments | 15 | 19,912.85 | 1,327.52 | This led to the successful set up of the Parliament Budget Office which is now working with the PAC and Finance Committee in the Budget process and analysis of OAG reports |
| members of the ZWPC undertake a bench marking visit to 2 Regional Country | 20 | 37,898.63 | 1,894.93 | The following documents were produced  1. 2018 Women’s manifesto  2.Election campaign  3. ZWPC, in partnership with Katswe Sistahood, lobbied the SADC Parliamentary Forum to develop a model law on provision of sanitary ware in all primary schools following best practices from Kenya |
| Foreign Affairs Committee Members go on a study tour of Botswana Foreign Missions and related organisations | 5 | 8,072.85 | 1,614.57 | Embassies which were in a dilapidated state were rehabilitated following the recommendations from the visits. |
| **Total** | **61** | **112,159.99** | **1,838.69** |  |

*Source: Project records and Quarterly Financial Reports 2015-2016*

Training workshops

About US$964,096.18 was spent on training approximately 1,425 participants leading to a cost of US$ 676.56 per participant. The cost of training is higher than similar programmes using non-Purchasing Power Parity adjusted prices[[20]](#footnote-20). For example, the UNICEF Parliamentary Support Project in Eastern and Southern Africa incurred a cost of US$594.47 per participant for training workshops[[21]](#footnote-21). While the cost for delivering training in the PSP is higher in absolute terms than comparable programmes, the difference of US$82.09 could be due to multiple factors including the issue of DSA and higher service charges in Zimbabwe than countries used for the analysis - Botswana, Swaziland and Tanzania.

While the PSP made significant investments in individual capacity, return on this investment could be enhanced by remodelling the conceptual framework from individual capacities to include institutional and organisational capacity strengthening. The main advantage of this approach is the potential to create a reservoir of capacity within the institution which can be transferred in each life cycle of parliamentarians. Such incremental benefits would reduce the cost outlay for the project over time.

#### Cost-Effectiveness

As mentioned in the Inception Report of this evaluation, the assessment of cost effectiveness heavily depended on the availability of the output data in the PSP M&E system. However, data on outputs is not available or not measured in the PSP M&E system, which has undermined this assessment.

To enable this assessment in the end line evaluation, investments need to be made in collecting quantitative output and outcome data on activities of the PSP.

## Effectiveness

In this section, the review assesses how effective the PSP has been, or how much progress it is making towards, achieving the results it was designed to achieve. In assessing the meeting of targets and achievement of results in a programme whose results could be both tangible and intangible as this one certainly is, care should be taken in not being overly quantitative and due weight should be given to the effect of process. That said, the results are mixed.

### Outcome 1: New laws enacted and old laws aligned with the constitution

Sixty two percent of targets under Outcome 1 have been achieved or are likely to be achieved by the end of the programme. The rest will not be achieved in the remaining timeframe. Table 8 provides progress in outputs under this outcome.

Table : Progress on outputs in Outcome 1

| **Output** | **Indicator** | **Baseline** | **Cumulative Target as of 31 December 2016** | **Achieved** | **Status** | **Comment** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Output 1.1: All priority non- compliant pieces of legislation aligned to the Constitution | #Number of public hearings held on legislation requiring alignment | 11 | 35 | 15 |  | In Yr 1 some of the bills that were passed by Parliament were not subjected to public hearings |
| #number of major pieces of legislation due for alignment with Constitution passed | 11 | 35 | 15 |  |  |
| # number of independent Commission laws passed | 1 | 2 | 2 |  | The Gender Commission was passed and the NPRC bill was withdrawn by the Executive. |
| Output 1.2: Capacity of legislators in legislative and policy analysis developed | # number of baseline surveys completed | 0 | 6 | 5 |  | 5 Baselines completed and 1 being finalised |
| % of well-informed contributions made by MPs | n/a | n/a | n/a |  | Need to define well informed. |
| #number of quality Parliament publications | n/a | 12 | 0 |  | Baselines and reports to be published are still in the process of being published. |
| #number of MPs trained in legislative & policy analysis | n/a | 75 | 379 |  | Achieved |

\*n/a – Not available,

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Off track *(will not be achieved by end of programme)* |  | On track *(will be achieved by end of programme)* |  | Achieved |

**The review finds that the targets for alignment of legislation were unrealistic given the political system and law-making process in Zimbabwe.**

During the period under review a total of 20 pieces of legislation were passed by parliament against a target of 35, representing 57% achievement. Given the pace of alignment, it is unlikely that the programme will meet the target of 80 pieces of legislation aligned with the constitution by programme end. Parliament generally does not initiate legislation, the Executive does. Parliament therefore gets involved at the tail end of the process. One approach that could speed up the alignment process would be the introduction of Private Member bills. However, Westminster parliamentary political party system adopted in Zimbabwe does not lend itself to easy introduction and passage of private member’s bills. The whipping system of parliament ensures that MPs’ actions are within their political party dictates and policy. This is not to say that in theory it cannot be done. Zimbabwe, in recent past has seen the introduction of Private Members’ bills including:

1. the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, Sub-section three of Section 121 and Public Order and Security Amendment Bill (2013) introduced by then MDC-T Chief Whip; and
2. the Urban Councils Amendment Bill H.B.5. (2011) introduced by Buhera Central MP Honourable Tangwara Matimba of MDC-T.

All Bills were stiffly contested by ZANU PF MPs. However, the Public Order and Security Amendment Bill was passed by the House when the MDC-T took advantage of the low numbers of ZANU PF MPs in the House before it was halted in the Senate. Progress on the Bills was hampered by the then Global Political Agreement (GPA), which drew matters of legislative and policy to inter-party dialogue. Debating on the Urban Councils Amendment Bill, for example, was halted after a High Court application by then Minister of Local Government, Honourable Ignatius Chombo, deemed the introduction of Private Members’ bills unlawful as the GPA superseded the Constitution on such matters.

This limited and brief history on the introduction of Private Members’ Bills demonstrates the complexities of introducing Private Members’ Bills in parliament. First, private member needs the technical capacity to draw up the Bill. Secondly, they need support within their party to present such a Bill in Parliament, which can be difficult if the Bill goes against party position. Third, the support needed from the opposing party, first for the motion to introduce the Bill to be approved by parliament and for such Bills to pass through the House and Senate, can be difficult to achieve in a polarised political environment such as in Zimbabwe. Such negotiation also has to overcome the consequences of the whipping system if the proposed Bills falls out of party positions.

Thus, in reality, it is hard to introduce private members’ bills in the Zimbabwe Parliament.

While the Ministry of Justice Legal and Parliamentary Affairs (MoJLPA), which chairs the Inter-Ministerial Taskforce on Alignment takes the lead, sector ministries have the responsibility to initiate alignment relevant to their areas of competence. The PSP did not include this supply side in its strategy and in determining the targets. It turns out there are issues of both capacity and/or willingness which the PSP was not designed to address in the Executive side of Government. Thus, the targets themselves may have been unrealistic given this context. It would therefore have been ideal for the PSP, as it developed its performance indicators specific to the legislative role of Parliament, to seek linkages to other support programmes that deal with the executive role in legislative making.

However, there have been efforts by Parliament, facilitated by the programme to influence the pace of alignment through structured meetings between the Speaker of the National Assembly and the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs. Progress from these meetings is still to be realised especially due to the law-making process for which the Ministry of Justice has no capacity/authority to hold other ministries to account[[22]](#footnote-22).

While, parliament does not directly influence the number of revised bills that come for passing, it does determine the pace of passing bills and their quality for presidential assent. This is where the PSP has made a direct contribution. It was clear to the review team that without PSP funding, it would have taken much more time to pass the 20 bills achieved in the programme period mainly because of inadequate funding for public hearings, which are PoZ’s key strategy for ensuring participation, a constitutional requirement. Additional tools for tracking public input into the bills during public hearings were developed and piloted to support the alignment process.

**The review further finds that capacity-building support on legislative analysis and financing of public hearings from the PSP is contributing to: 1) improved quality of bills sent for presidential ascent; and 2) pace of passage of bills in Parliament.**

However, there are still some outstanding issues that impact on the legislative ability of PoZ. Quality of legislation passed by parliament is premised on capacity of MPs to analyse draft bills submitted to them. This capacity is influenced by MPs education levels and experience in legislative analysis. MPs in the current parliament have different educational backgrounds (see Table 9) which has a bearing on their capacity to adequately review draft bills sent to parliament for debating and passing, mediated of course by experience, self-learning and other factors. Sixty-six percent of male and 38% of female MPs have a degree qualification respectively. A large proportion of women (42.86%) have only secondary education. A baseline study of economic literacy of MPs showed more males (54%) were economically literate than females (40%)[[23]](#footnote-23).

Table : Levels of education of the 8th Parliament

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Primary School** | **Secondary School** | **National**  **Certificate/Diploma** | **University Degree** | **Other** | **Grand Total** |
| Male | 4.17% | 16.67% | 4.17% | 66.67% | 8.33% | 100.00% |
| Female | 9.52% | 42.86% | 4.76% | 38.10% | 4.76% | 100.00% |
| Grand Total | 6.67% | 28.89% | 4.44% | 53.33% | 6.66% | 100.00% |

*Source: ZEPARU 2016*

Parliament has undertaken several initiatives to increase capacity of MPs in legislative analyses. On the one hand, Parliament initiated, from the onset of the current parliament, a process of ensuring that parliamentary committees had a mix of those with high and low academic qualifications. According to the Speaker of the National Assembly, it was hoped that those with academic and professional qualifications more suited to the parliamentary committee would provide a “spark” for discussions on draft bills in the committees. Other initiatives adopted to improve academic qualifications of MPs include special arrangements with Universities for bridging courses to enrol them in various degree programmes. At the time of the review, 147 MPs were at various stages in their degree programmes, with five doing their doctoral studies. While degree programmes represent a long-term strategy, the PSP provided a short-term stopgap measure through short courses on legislative and policy analysis to ensure high quality debates on the draft legislation took place in Parliament. One hundred and eighty five (185) MPs drawn from 10 Portfolio Committees received the training. The training was well appreciated by MPs as shown in excepts.

|  |
| --- |
| Box 1: Excepts on capacity building from Focus Group Discussion with the LCC |
| *“Capacity building workshops helped us understand our roles. We did not quite understand our roles. I can engage in parliament and the public on imparting the knowledge that I have learnt.”*  *Capacity building of female members of parliament, unpacked the constitution, it has improved female member of parliaments in terms of oversight*. |

Through these initiatives, unprecedented levels of citizen participation and influence as well as Parliament’s autonomy, have been achieved. Key results of this include the withdrawal of the National Peace and Reconciliation (NPRC) Bill. The NPRC Bill received an adverse report from the Parliamentary Legal Committee (PLC) citing 22 clauses in the bill deemed unconstitutional. The PLC benefited extensively from the submissions made by citizens through public hearings convened with support from the programme. The Special Economic Zones Bill was refused assent by the President due to discriminatory labour practice identified by MPs. The Ministry of Women Affairs, Gender and Community Development took on board recommendations that improved the Gender Commission Act to align as much as possible to the Paris Principles on the Establishment of Human Rights National Institutions. Another example is the Labour Amendment Bill, which received an adverse report from the Parliamentary Legal Committee.

An interesting PSP achievement was in the area of “Ease of doing business”, which though relevant was not a specific intended output of the programme. The PSP facilitated Parliament to play a significant role in increasing the speed at which requisite bills were brought to parliament, debated and passed, by engaging business and labour to seek their input on legislation that needed review. Forty-three (43), pieces of legislation were identified for review to facilitate the ease of doing business in Zimbabwe. Once this was done additional support was provided to parliament leadership to engage with the Office of the President and Cabinet to facilitate and ensure speedy legislation. The ease of doing business bills have been adopted under the Rapid Results approach, which aims to complete the law making in 100 days. At the time of the review a new companies bill, and special economic zones bill had been gazetted.

There are concerns that contested laws (e.g. Electoral laws, Access to Information and Publicity Act), Public Order and Security Act (POSA), local government) have received less attention in the programme yet they enable the PSP directly influence the broader governance landscape in the country. There are views that parliament could have done more to advocate for these changes. Part of this could be the lack of process to prioritise legislation for alignment for the programme. Nonetheless, Parliament is well aware of the urgency of these laws especially in the context of looming harmonised elections in 2018. On their part, parliament has been considering submissions from CSOs, such as Southern African Parliamentary Support Trust (SAPST) on amendments to these pieces of legislation. In partnership with the Law Society, Parliament has also advocated for development of several model bills, which were forwarded to the Ministry of Justice and Inter-ministerial task force on alignment of laws for consideration.

Despite these steps towards engaging stakeholders, the entrenched and opposing viewpoints on the status of these laws between the opposition parties and ruling party makes this engagement process a complex undertaking which parliament can find very difficult to navigate, given the majority of the ruling party in the National Assembly and Senate.

**While some successes have been recorded in the alignment process, the review finds that laws critical to the implementation of the constitution, and have the potential to deliver on democratisation and governance objectives of the programme still lag behind.**

### Outcome 2: Oversight function of Parliament strengthened; Governance systems enhanced

Achievement of the stated outputs in this outcome stands at 70%. One challenge worth noting in this outcome is the large number of output indicators that are not measurable because tools and methods to do so are not in place. Of those indicators rated as not achieved, 60% have not been measured by the programme or do not have set targets.

This said, it is unlikely the programme will meet the 30% outstanding targets because: 1) the time remaining is too short for implementing activities (including development and roll out of requisite M&E tools); and 2) the funding remaining in the last year is inadequate to meet these activities. In any case, it will be necessary to rationalise and prioritise to ensure that the remaining period is focused on specific achievable and impactful priorities and targets. The rationalisation process provides opportunities for the programme to focus on supporting the achievement of results in the last year.

Table : Progress on outputs in Outcome 2

| **Output** | **Indicator** | **Baseline** | **Cumulative Target** | **Achieved** | **Status** | **Comment** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Output 2.1: Statutory Reports on the management of public resources submitted by Ministries, State Enterprises and Institutions reviewed and tabled in Parliament | # number of reports received and reviewed within statutory requirements | 0% | 50% | 0% |  | 5 (19%) reports which were received from the Executive were not reviewed as the Committees lacked capacity to do the reviews. |
| #number of quality debates and recommendations made from the reports adopted | n/a | 50% | 0% |  | There is need to re define the indicator on quality debates |
| # of issues considered by Portfolio and Thematic Committees from the field visits reviewed and tabled in Parliament | n/a | n/a | 116 |  | 116 recommendations were tabled in Parliament |
| % percentage of issues from public consultations incorporated in recommendations to the executive | n/a | 50% | 85% |  | 85% of the issues from public consultations were recommended to the Executive |
| # of public proposals incorporated in the National Budget | n/a | n/a | 33 |  | 33 (which is more than 50% of the recommendations made) Recommendations by the Committees were in cooperated in the National Budget |
| Output 2.2: Institutional knowledge base and analytical capacity on legislative, oversight and representative functions built. | # number MPs making recommendation on issues of international relations and Parliamentary diplomacy | n/a | 70 | 23 |  | 23 MPs recommended on issues of international relations and diplomacy |
| % of senior members of the Executive (Ministers and Permanent Secretaries) responding to issues under their portfolio | n/a | 70 | 80 |  | 80% of the Executive respond to issues under their portfolios and in some cases ask for questions in writing. |
| #number of committee members trained in legislative oversight & representation function | n/a | 192 | 235 |  | 122% achieved |
| Output 2.3: Parliamentary Code of Conduct and Ethics for legislators and staff adopted and implemented | Parliamentary Code of Conduct and Ethics in place | no Code of Conduct in place | Code of conduct | Code of conduct in place |  | Achieved |
| # number of Parliamentarians sensitized on the aligned code of conduct and ethics | 0 | 352 | 0 |  | Code of conduct developed and circulated. MPs have been sensitised in 2017. |
| Output 2.4: Oversight systems and processes of the Auditor General's Office improved | Revised Strategic Plan document | Strategic plan expired | Strategic plan in place | Strategic plan in place |  | 100% completed |
| # number of audits carried out using the Customised and Regularity Manual | 320 | 314 | 314 |  | Completed |
| # number of risk profiling reports of all ministries | 1 | 1 | 1 |  | Completed |
| # number of Audit reports published | 3 | 3 | 3 |  | Achieved |
| SAP system installed | No SAP system | SAP System installed | SAP system not installed |  | The cost for the SAP installation is too expensive as compared to the budgeted amount |
| # number of HR policies and procedures | HR Policy not in place | HR Policy in place | HR Policy not in place |  | Draft Policy available |
| # of national and international exchange visits conducted | 0 | 2 | 2 |  | 100% achieved |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Off track *(will not be achieved by end of programme)* |  | On track *(will be achieved by end of programme)* |  | Achieved |  | No baseline/ Progress not ascertained |

While progress on stated outputs is slow, the programme has made contributions to the strengthening of Parliament’s oversight role, as some stakeholders put it, *“the Auditor General’s Office is now more courageous in its reporting”*, that, *“Parliamentary committees are more adventurous”* *and “some ministers are not comfortable with the strict oversight role of the parliamentary committees, some are calling complaining.”* In a Newsday article of 29 May, the Speaker of the National Assembly is quoted as saying,

*“Some of my chairmen of committees have been threatened by ministers who say to the chairman you want to take over my ministerial responsibilities — why is your committee so inquisitive? My answer is that it is not the committee that is inquisitive — it is the Constitution that is inquisitive and says all State institutions and agencies must be accountable to Parliament, and if you do not like that then let us amend the Constitution.”* Newsday Article 29 May, <https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/05/29/parly-committees-chairpersons-threatened-ministers-mudenda/>

**The review found clear evidence of the influence of PSP on Parliament’s oversight capacity demonstrated by far reaching consequences on accountability of government ministries and parastatals from findings of parliamentary committees’ verification visits.**

It is clear the programme cannot take all the credit for these results but it did make direct contribution through providing the funding for generating evidence to hold the Executive to account and capacity of parliament to review ministerial progress reports and make recommendations. Verification visits to Hwange and the Chiadzwa Diamond field by Parliamentary Committee on Mines and Mining Development (MoMMD) unearthed the non-payment of workers’ salaries and weaknesses in the community share ownership schemes between mining companies and surrounding communities respectively. The introduction of the Community Share Ownership Trusts was not premised on a legal framework that obliged diamond companies to fund them and thus they remained on paper with no benefits accruing to the communities. Recommendations for a legal framework for Community Share Ownership Trusts has been taken up by the MoMMD within the harmonisation process of mining and land laws to minimise natural resource conflicts. In this regard, a Mines Bill was included in the 2016 list of priority bills (but this was still to be concluded at the time of the review).

The enquiry on Community Share Ownership Trusts also led to unearthing of illicit financial flows in the diamond sector. The exposition led to the expulsion of the General Manager of the National Social Security Authority (NSSA) who was the Acting Managing Director for Jinan Private Limited which was accused of externalising US$300 million in connivance with Chinese counterparts. For Hwange, recommendations by the Parliamentary Committee for the MoMMD to ensure payment of workers’ salaries at Hwange was taken up. Recommendations from other parliamentary committees had far reaching consequences e.g. the parliamentary committee on transport. Through hearings with the national airline it was discovered that air control were sometimes using cell phones to direct Air Zimbabwe airplanes because radar equipment were not fully operational on some of the planes. Due to the Parliamentary Committee report, IITA intervened with licence cancellation which caused the urgent repair of the equipment on the airplanes.

The Parliament Audit Committee (PAC) is another committee that provides clear demonstration of the influence of the PSP. After its members went through several workshops together with the Office of the Auditor General on reviewing audit reports, their analysis and contributions improved, resulting in some decisive recommendations.

*“Parliament are getting a lot sharper in their skills for reviewing the reports. In the past the PAC would rely on us to formulate the question to ask the accounting officers. After the training you can see they are a lot sharper. In the oral interviews with accounting officers, some come in with follow up questions which are brilliant – we attribute those to the training they received from the PSP.”* Interview with the OAG.

A review of the 2015/16 accounts by the PAC came up with 18 recommendations which were adopted by the Ministry of Finance. One of the recommendations has led to the Ministry of Finance employing 10 more officers identified by the review.

The Budget and Accounts Committee has improved in its analysis of budget statements and inputs in pre-budget seminars between parliamentarians and the Ministry of finance (organised by the PSP). Some of the key recommendations from the pre-budget seminars and adopted by the Ministry of Finance include: re-capitalization of key Parastatals such as the Cold Storage Commission (with potential of huge beef market in the EU), Zimbabwe Steel Company (ZISCO) steel and National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) so as to attract investors. In the 2016 budget statement US$3 million were allocated to NRZ to replace some of the old equipment and buy new trains.

There are several other instances where Parliamentary Committees have made contributions ensuring accountability of the Executive as shown in Table 11.

Table : Results of parliament oversight capacity

| Committee | Action, that demonstrates oversight capacity | Link to PSP |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Portfolio Committee on Environment, Climate and the Hospitality Industry | Recommendations made by Parliament for the Executive to ratify the Doha amendment to the Kyoto proToCToCol and the landmark Paris Climate Change Agreement. Both were taken up and accented to by the President in 2016. | PSP supported training of the committee members in environmental issues to prepare them for their travel to COP21. Capacity of the MPs, from this training complemented by the visit to COP21 has increased MPs awareness and knowledge of environment and climate issues demonstrated in the increased interaction between Ministry of Environment and MPs in the committee due to mutual respect. |
| Parliamentary Legal Committee | Following Adverse report on the National Peace and Reconciliation Bill, Vice President Mphoko withdrew the Bill in-order to address the issues raised. Another adverse report on Finance Bill of 2016 which did not provide allocations to Independent Commissions led to revisions by an amendment being issued by the Minister of Finance reinforcing constitutional Supremacy. | Public hearings on the National Peace and Reconciliation Bill were fully funded by the PSP. Information from these public hearings informed the Adverse Report.  Through capacity building on budget analysis, and facilitation of pre-budget briefings (which equipped Committee Chairpersons to deliver targeted presentations and recommendations to the Minister), a positive working relationship has been developed with the Minister of Finance, who now respects the inputs from parliament. |
| Public Accounts Committee | Through greater capacity to analysis, the OAG’s audit reports the PAC has unearthed several unethical conduct of management of public finances.  PAC lobbied for feedback on extent of implementation of OAG’s recommendations. Ministry of Finance and Economic Development established a Department in the Accountant General’s Department that will follow up on all PAC observations as well reports of the Auditor General. An inaugural report on extent of implementation of OAG’s recommendations by government ministries, parastatals and local governments was presented to parliament in 2016. | The PSP supported interaction between the PAC and OAG’s office improving the latter’s skills in analysing audit and other financial reports from the OAG. Improvement in capacity to analyse audit and financial reports was noted by the OAG’s office during the evaluation. This has improved the quality of interaction between the OAG’s office, the PAC and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development.  *“Our reports are being received and seeing constructive questions coming from the parliament unlike from the previous parliament.”* **OAG office**  *“In the past the PAC would rely on us to formulate the question to ask the accounting officers. After the training, you can see they are a lot sharper. In the oral interviews with accounting officers, some come up with follow up questions which are brilliant – we attribute those to the training they received from the PSP.”* **OAG office.** |
| Portfolio Committee on Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment | The Portfolio Committee responsible for Indigenisation exposed capricious conduct in respect of the management of Community Share Ownership Trusts. It further exposed illegal structures that had been put in place at Chisumbanje by the then Minister of Energy and Power Development. The illegal structures that were contrary to a Cabinet Directive were disbanded after exposure by the Committee. | PSP supported the verification visits for the mining sector. |

*Source: Survey results and Johane (2017)[[24]](#footnote-24)*

Table 12 provides a list of verification visits supported by the PSP and their status. While all verification visits have been presented in parliament the main issue remains follow through by Parliament on action taken on the recommendations by the relevant committee. Focusing more on ensuring the complete chain of activities is implemented (fact-finding, reporting, presentation and follow up/monitoring) will improve assessment of the influence of PSP on public service delivery. Because of these challenges, results at this level (public service delivery) were not yet clear at the time of the mid-term review.

Table : Follow up of recommendations

| **Fact finding mission** | **Status** |
| --- | --- |
| Challenges in Primary and Secondary Education | Report prepared and tabled in Parliament in 2015 |
| To assess Community Ownership Trust In Zimunya /Marange | Report prepared and tabled in Parliament in 2016 |
| To assess Children’s Home conditions | Report prepared and tabled in Parliament in 2016 |
| To assess the progress on Digitalisation | Report prepared and tabled in Parliament in 2016 |
| To assess Service Delivery by the Registrar General’s Department | Report prepared and tabled in Parliament in 2017 |
| To assess the service delivery at local government departments | Report prepared and tabled in Parliament in 2017 |
| Assess Village Health Workers working conditions | Report prepared and tabled in Parliament in 2017 |
| To assess causes of Child Marriages in Mash Central | Report prepared and tabled in Parliament in 2016 |
| Verification tour of Irrigation schemes | Report prepared and tabled in Parliament in in 2016 |
| HIV and AIDS in Institutions of Higher Learning in Zimbabwe | Report prepared and tabled in Parliament in in 2017 |

*Source: Project quarterly technical and financial reports and Project activity reports*

**Because the programme and Parliament have limited focus on following up implementation of the latter’s recommendations by the Executive, there is limited evidence of the impact of PSP on service delivery.**

To strengthen the accountability function of parliament and ensure translation of recommendations into concrete actions by responsible authorities there is need for creating stronger linkages with the media and programmes that support citizen participation. Doing this will galvanise citizen voice around the findings providing another layer of accountability. UNDP, EU and SIDA governance programmes present excellent opportunity for this and needs to be explored in the remaining period of the programme.

Exchange visits

As noted under the value for money section, exchange visits have contributed to various results in Parliament. Weighting the cost and return, as discussed under the value for money section, there is need for the programme to review their planning with a view of improving their effectiveness.

Support to the Office of the Auditor General

The OAG is a central institution in Parliament’s capacity to hold the executive to account for use of public resources. With support from PSP and other development partners (AfDB and World Bank), the OAG has experienced tremendous improvements in operational efficiencies resulting from support of PSP and other development partners. The OAG now consistently meets the June 30 deadline for submissions of statutory reports on the management of public resources to parliament. Before support from development partners, these reports were submitted in November or December. This constrained parliament in using the reports to influence resource allocation and advocate for punitive measures as they did not coincide with the government budgeting cycle. OAG audit reports have also been commended for improved transparency and professionalisms. The content provides Parliament enough evidence to hold the Executive to account. PSP has made direct contribution to this by addressing numerous challenges faced by the OAG that constrained efficiency as detailed in Table 13.

Table : Contribution of PSP to OAG organisational efficiency

| **Problem** | **Effect** | **Contribution of PSP** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Audit teams were sharing laptops | This slowed report writing and eventually submission of audit reports for review | Provision of 20 laptops. This has improved availability of computers for report writing in turn contributing to timely production of audit reports. |
| High staff turnover in the OAGs office eroded capacity for supervision of quality of audits. | Supervision was of poor quality, delaying completion and submission of reports to parliament. | Training in supervision of audits has seen an improvement in the quality of reports from the OAG. Greater supervision capacity also increased turnaround time for reports. Interim audits are no longer undertaken concurrently with main audits as before the training, helping in the quality of the audit process. |
| Due to a combination of limited financial resources and delayed funding, the OAG was failing to print audit reports | Only printed reports are tabled in parliament. Their absence delayed submission of reports to parliament | PSP has been supporting printing of audit reports for the OAG contributing to improvements in timely tabling of reports in parliament. |
| Due to the many reports prepared by the OAG (covering local government, central government and parastatals) compilation of reports was slow. | This contributed to delays in completion and approval of reports | PSP is supporting compilation of audit reports through financing report-writing meetings for audit officers. |

*Source: Survey results*

The PSP provides operational and strategic support to OAG. While such orientation is necessary at this point, it poses significant risk of displacing government allocations in the future resulting in a perpetually under-funded institution. As shall be discussed later under sustainability, support to the OAG needs to be provided with an associated exit plan that sustains its capacity.

**PSP support filled a critical financial resource gap in the context of declining funding from the fiscus. The support has contributed to improved efficiencies of OAG’s operations and reporting which in turn have enhanced the quality of reports it produces.**

### Outcome 3: People’s participation in legislation formulation, decision-making, and related democratic processes increased

Table 14 summarises achievements in this outcome. Majority of the indicators are likely to be met, according to the data provided by the programme.

Table : Progress on outputs in Outcome 3

| **Output** | **Indicator** | **Baseline** | **Cumulative Target** | **Achieved** | **Status** | **Comment** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Output 3.1: Participation of ordinary citizens in the legislative processes of Parliament increased | #number of public hearings in legislative, oversight and representation functions of Parliament | 11 | 35 | 21 |  | The budget remaining for the programme may not be sufficient to meet the remaining public hearings. |
| # number of proposed amendments to legislation adopted arising from public hearings | N/a | N/a | 42 |  | 42 recommendations were adopted arising from public hearings |
| # number of women - specific issues from field visits discussed in the National Assembly and the Senate | N/a | 50% | 12 |  | Indicator not consistently monitored |
| % of women participation in public hearing | N/a | 50% | 45% |  |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Off track *(will not be achieved by end of programme)* |  | On track *(will be achieved by end of programme)* |  | Achieved |  | No baseline/ Progress not ascertained |

Eight thousand seven hundred and fourteen (8,714) citizens have been reached through public hearings financed by the programme. At least 43% of the participants were women. While 28 bills have been passed by the current 8th Parliament, feedback from public hearings has made significant contributions to an adverse report for the NPRC bill, amendments to the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) bill (e.g. issue of the application of Labour Laws in the SEZs and the Labour Amendment Bill.

**Public hearings have provided opportunities for citizens to participate and make contributions in the legislation making process. However, there remain concerns of 1) proportion of the population reached and 2) quality of facilitation of the public hearing process**.

Current public hearings have been criticised for their limited reach, and methodology used to obtain feedback from citizens. Public hearings are undertaken in mainly urban area leaving out rural areas because of the high costs of holding a public hearing in those areas. There were concerns that some of the methodologies being used by parliamentarians, where for example they all sit at the high table and watch the crowds, were not participatory, and suggestions that less daunting formats should be used to enhance citizen participation, regardless of age and sex.

Parliamentarians interviewed observed in most public hearings, citizens do not have adequate knowledge of the Bills for discussion because of poor dissemination and or that the bills are not available in local languages. This undermines the quality of discussions.

*“For public hearings, we need to find mechanisms to spread information to people. We discover people are not knowing what is happening. People are unaware of the bills we go for public hearings for…the bills are in English and not in vernacular which limits the number of people who can understand them.”* **Focus Group Discussion with LCC**

*“Rural people do not have access to the public hearings, there is need to find a way for reaching the rural electorate.”* **Focus Group Discussion with LCC**

*“Public hearings we are doing the bear minimum as we concentrate on the major towns or centre and leave out the rural areas. There is need for a mechanisms to reach them.”* **Focus Group Discussion with LCC**

To address concerns of reach, parliament through support from the PSP, has initiated public hearings through special radio programmes where the public can phone in with their input. Another alternative is the website, which provides facilities for the public to provide input in parliamentary processes. In 2016, the website received 86,459 visitors (sex of the visitor is not recorded). At the time of the review, parliament with support from the PSP was exploring the development of a mobile web application to facilitate citizen contributions to parliament processes. Confidence by public in these alternative approaches needs nurturing to ensure they facilitate meaningful participation of citizens in the democratisation process.

### Outcome 4: Parliament’s performance of its core functions strengthened through capacitating parliament leadership and staff

Table 15 presents progress under this outcome. All indicators have reached their target or are on track to do so by the end of the programme period.

Table : Progress on outputs in Outcome 4

| **Output** | **Indicator** | **Baseline** | **Cumulative Target** | **Achieved** | **Status** | **Comment** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Output 4.1: Management of all programmes supported by Development Partners, Donors, Civil Society Organisations, and other non-State Actors coordinated | Compliance with quality reporting and meeting deadlines requirements | not compliant | Compliant | Compliant |  | 4 Quarterly reports were submitted to UNDP and Annual reports for both Year 1 and Year 2. 4 Project Boards and 1 Steering Committee were conducted for both Year 1 and Year 2. |
| Functional Coordination mechanism through number of joint meetings. | no functional coordination in place | functional coordination in place | functional coordination in place |  | Functional Coordination is now in place |
| Resource Mobilization Strategy in place | No Resource Mobilisation strategy in place | Resource mobilisation in place | None |  | This is could be achieved in the remaining period. |
| #number of PCU staff trained | n/a | 4 | 2 |  | 50% have been trained. |
| Output 4.2: Technical capacity for the professional functioning of Parliament enhanced | Comprehensive skills audit report of both MPs and staff | No Skills audit report | Skills audit in place | Skills audit in place |  | Skills audit report finalised. |
| Number of benchmarking visits conducted by Presiding officers and Senior staff | 0 | 2 | 2 |  | Achieved |
| Functional QMS System | Functional QMS system | Functional QMS system in place | Functional QMS system in place |  | Achieved |
| Number of petitions raised by the public through Parliament Website | 10 | n/a | 21 |  | 21 petitions were raised in 2016 but not through the Parliament website |
| \* ICT Strategy in place | No ICT Strategy in place | ICT Strategy in place | ICT Strategy in place |  | ICT Strategy developed in 2016 |
| Output 4.3: Internal Parliamentary service delivery systems and processes enhanced | #number of Hansards produced and uploaded on the website within four hours of adjournment of the house. | 174 | n/a | 311 |  | All Hansard were produced within 4 hours of adjournment. |
| #number of ISO Audit reports produced on agreed schedule | n/a | 1 | 1 |  | Achieved |
| ISO certification to be upgraded to 2015 | Not upgraded | ISO certification upgraded | ISO certification upgraded to 2015 |  | Achieved |
| ISO Audit reports produced on agreed schedule | n/a | 2 | 2 |  | Achieved |
| Upgraded Website | Website not upgraded | Website upgraded | Website upgraded |  | Achieved |
| Report of Customer Satisfaction survey for MPs , Staff and external stakeholders | No customer satisfaction report | Customer satisfaction survey conducted | Customer satisfaction survey conducted |  | Achieved |
| #number of Committee Clerks, researchers and other relevant staff trained in report writing | 0 | 62 | 58 |  |  |
| #number of reporters trained in advanced Hansard Reporting | 0 | 30 | 25 |  |  |
| ISO Certificate retained | 0 | Retain certificate | Certificate retained |  | Achieved |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Off track *(will not be achieved by end of programme)* |  | On track *(will be achieved by end of programme)* |  | Achieved |

Support to development of parliament’s organisational systems

The PSP has made direct contribution to improving organisational systems of parliament through supporting:

1. upgrading the ISO 9001-2008 of parliament, quality management system (QMS) monitoring and review, and capacity building of staff in the ISO 9001; and
2. training of parliament staff in customer care and public relations.

The recertification of the administration of Parliament under the ISO 9001-2008 standards in September 2015 which runs into September 2018 continues to demonstrate PoZ’s continued growth in stature. It is also clear the PSP has fostered greater coordination of development partners’ support to parliament, especially through the establishment of the PCU, which has become the central entry point for this funding. There is an acknowledgement and agreement among stakeholders interviewed during the review that indeed coordination has improved.

While the organisation has grown its systems, capacity in areas such as research, report writing and monitoring and evaluation remain weak.

Capacity of Committee Clerks and Researchers

Competencies in report writing among Committees Clerks and Researchers have improved. Members of the LCC interviewed confirmed improvements in support offered to committees by Committees Clerks and Researchers. However, they bemoaned the inadequate staffing levels, which undermine the adequacy of this support. While report writing has improved, analytical skills for bills, budget policies, audit and financial reports needs improvement.

*“[There is] More confidence among staff in writing or preparing documents, presentation of the work and confidence in articulating issues. Staff are of mixed education levels - some with first degrees, others Masters etc, but in general I observe better preparation reports among staff as a result of the training from the PSP.”* **Interview with staff of parliament**

Table 16 provides a summary of other results

Table : Summary of results at OAG

| **Support** | **Status** | **Result** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Laptops to Committee Clerks and Researchers | Laptops in use and highly appreciated by parliament. | Laptops have helped parliament staff to produce the Hansard within a maximum of four hours after seating. In the past, this would take more than a day to produce. |
| Assisted by the programme to populate the database of constituency profiles. | Publishing of the profiles is still outstanding. | No results observed yet. |
| Upgrading of website | Website is currently fully functional with all Hansards available. | The number of visitors to the website increased from 9254 in 2015 to 86,459 in 2016 due to increased relevance of the website. This is more than ten times the number of people reached with public hearings. |
| Support visibility of parliament through financing: i) exhibition stands at the Zimbabwe International Trade Fair (ZITF) and the Zimbabwe Agricultural Show (ZAS); and ii) Parliament open days. | Exhibitions were consistently held over the period of the review. | While the interventions support visibility and positive perceptions of parliament, there is yet a system to capture this visibility. Two data sources exists: The Afro barometer survey and the recently conducted Customer Satisfaction Survey. While these surveys provide a positive perception of parliament among the population, there is no baseline to determine contribution of this PSP. |

*Source: Survey results*

**Capacity of Committee clerks and researchers in report writing have improved as a direct result of the PSP but understaffing undermines their effectiveness.**

### Outcome 5: Strengthened gender mainstreaming in the work of parliament

Majority of indicators under this outcome are off track mainly because the programme is failing to measure them.

Table : Progress on outputs in Outcome 5

| **Output** | **Indicator** | **Baseline** | **Cumulative Target** | **Achieved** | **Status** | **Comment** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Output 5.1: Parliamentary Committees and the Administration of Parliament capacity in gender mainstreaming improved | The Administration of Parliament Gender Policy is in place | No Gender Policy | Gender Policy in place | Draft policy in place |  | Draft Gender Policy is being finalised. |
| Gender sensitive legislation to be passed | n/a | n/a | n/a |  | Not measured by the programme. No definition of gender sensitive legislation. |
| Output 5.2: Zimbabwe Parliamentary Women Caucus capacity in lobbying and advocacy for gender equality and women empowerment increased | \*ZWPC Strategic Plan (2014-2018) disseminated | No strategic plan | Strategic plan in place and disseminated | Strategic plan in place and disseminated |  | Achieved |
| # Number of recommendations made to Parliamentary debates by women MPs adopted | n/a | n/a | 34 |  | 20 recommendations made in the National Assembly and 13 in the Child Marriages report and the SADC Model on eradicating Child Marriages |
| #number of members able to use ICTs for research and presentation. | 0 | 55 | 55 |  | 55 caucus members were trained and are able to use ICTs |
| # number of Best Practice adopted from the Regional exchange visit by members of the ZWPC. | N/a | N/a | 3 |  | 1. 2018 Women’s manifesto  2.Election campaign  3. ZWPC, in partnership with Katswe Sistahood, lobbied the SADC Parliamentary Forum to develop a model law on provision of sanitary ware |
| Quality of contributing to political and economic governance issues | n/a | n/a | n/a |  | Indicator needs to be refined. |
| #number of women caucus members trained in Peace Building initiatives | 0 | 70 | 74 |  | 105% achieved |
| #number of women caucus members trained in facets of Parliament operations | 0 | 70 | 76 |  | 108% achieved |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Off track *(will not be achieved by end of programme)* |  | On track *(will be achieved by end of programme)* |  | Achieved |  | No baseline/ Progress not ascertained |

**The review finds that women’s capacity to debate in parliament and parliamentary processes is increasing but at a slow pace**. Interviews with a women focused organisation and UN Women highlighted emerging changes on articulation of gender as observed in the quality of the debates and motions. There is greater sensitivity and articulation of gender issues with both male and female MPs demonstrating this capacity. These changes are attributed to gender analysis training of both male and female MPs. There were also specific issues reported as showing increased capacity among female MPS. Women MPs interviewed during an FGD with the Zimbabwe Women’s Parliamentary Caucus (ZWPC) stated that,

*“Members’ trained on gender based violence have become very effective in terms of question and answer. We [note this from] monitoring participation of women MPs [in parliament].”*

Gender mainstreaming is enshrined in the Constitution, Section 17 Chapter 2. Pursuant to this, Parliament is very conscious of the need to ensure gender is a key focus in its operations and statutes. For example, the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders appointed nine female Members of Parliament as Chairpersons of Oversight Committees, representing 34.6% of the Oversight Committees[[25]](#footnote-25). A gender mainstreaming strategy is awaiting approval to entrench gender mainstreaming in the wider working of parliament.

Translations of these commitments into tangible gender sensitive legislation and budgets reflects in the capacity of the MPs to debate motions and critically analyse budgets and bills with gender lenses. Improvements in capacity in women is observed but slow. For example, the number of new women MPs debating the National Budget remained at 5% between 2014 and 2016 (i.e. five new women MPs). There is general reluctance by women when compared to their male counterparts, to contribute to technical matters in parliament. This observation is consistent with that made by Dube (2013); showing progress is still very slow despite the investment from PSP[[26]](#footnote-26). A review of the third session of the 8th Parliament, showed 19 motions were moved by backbenchers in the National Assembly. Five of these motions were from women MPs but three came from only one woman MP. Furthermore, analysis conducted by the PSP showed women MPs made 103 recommendations to Parliamentary debates in the year 2016. The low education levels of female MPs compared to their male counterparts could be a contributing factor. At least 52% of female MPs compared to 20% of male MPs have primary or secondary as their highest qualification. Another issue highlighted by stakeholders is the capacity of women selected for the reserved seats in parliament. There are sentiments that sometimes capacity is sacrificed for party loyalty and- the potential to go against political party dictates. A third issue highlighted by women MPs in the Women’s caucus is that not all women MPs go through the various capacity building initiatives targeted at them. There are 146 women parliamentarians which puts a heavy cost burden on initiatives that build capacity of women MPs.

**Development of the strategic plan for the Zimbabwe Women’s Parliamentary Caucus (ZWPC) provides opportunities for harnessing the power of political parties’ convergence on issues pertinent to supporting gender and women’s empowerment.** The ZWPC provides the greatest opportunity for inter-party dialogue on issues of interest for women. Such key issues include the successful motion on enlisting government’s support for returning women trafficked to Kuwait back to Zimbabwe.

Supporting the ZWPC’s envisioning process through the elaboration of a strategic plan that enhances the capacity of the ZWPC to agree on common issues of interest in parliament and national development supports this inter-party dialogue. If strategically utilised, the strategic plan provides immense potential to leverage the capacity of the collective to advance the interests of women and gender equality. This requires financial support. Supporting the ZWPC mobilise resources for implementation of the strategy will go a long way in harnessing this potential. For example, ZWPC members in an FGD stated that,

*“We need support staff for the caucus. We have one but need support for more to be able to be efficient. Technical support is needed all the time.”*

Support staff would provide more effective research and discussion points for women MPs to strengthen their debates in parliament.

## Management and Coordination

The delineation of project management and coordination responsibility followed a fairly standard UNDP template, with agreement on basket funding and UNDP’s management of it, setting up of a Steering Committee as the highest policy and strategy making body for the programme and a Project Board as the management of the implementation of the programme. The PCU is responsible for the day to day management of the programme, its finances and its staff. The entire management and coordination mechanism of the PSP, including majority of staff in the PCU, is paid for by the programme. The Parliament of Zimbabwe provides the leadership in the implementation of the programme through the National Implementation Modality (NIM), while UNDP provides technical, advisory and financial support services. While the NIM modality might have been a difficult decision in the current circumstances of Zimbabwe, it was consistent with previous evaluation recommendations.

The review **finds that management and coordination arrangements were appropriate and in accordance with UNDP practice**.

Despite the standard programme management model, it turned out that the experience of its implementation was not as smooth.

### Steering Committee

The Steering Committee comprises the Presiding Officers of the Parliament of Zimbabwe, UNDP Resident Representative, UNDP Country Director and Heads of Cooperating Partners, and is supposed to “meet semi-annually or more frequently if need arises”[[27]](#footnote-27).

The SC has in fact met only twice in the life of the PSP, thus hampering decision making and proper direction of the programme**.** The reasons given to the review revolve around the busy schedules of the principals. At the same time the review has been informed by all the stakeholders including the representatives of the development partners, that this high profile programme is an important priority. If that were the case, then finding time for SC meetings less than 50% of the time would not seem consistent.

Whilst the evaluation of the last PSP recommended that the SC meets three times a year, the **review team finds that in fact even the twice a year stipulated in the PSP have not been fulfilled.**

### Project Board

The project board comprises the Clerk of Parliament, The Auditor General, UNDP Deputy Country Director (Programmes), Head of UNDP Governance Unit, UNDP Programme Manager, Two Parliament of Zimbabwe Deputy Clerks, Parliament of Zimbabwe Programme Coordinator and a representative of Cooperating Development Partners. Clerk of Parliament and the UNDP Deputy Country Director - Programmes co-chair the Board. The project board has met more or less as expected. To the extent that the project management at board level has been successful, this may be attributable to this level of management. It is at this level that non-PSP partners such as AfDB and WB have been coordinated and invited to participate in the board. It is also at this level that consolidated work plans and reports have been created.

The team has confirmed marginal qualitative improvement to the reports from the PCU. While most of it has been attributed to additional staff, some of it has been attributed by development partners to increased supervision and coaching by UNDP following feedback through the project board meetings.

The project board has effectively monitored programme performance and results and given feedback to the PCUthrough UNDP, leading to reports of improved reporting. **The project board has effectively monitored programme performance and results and given feedback to the PCU through UNDP, leading to reports of improved reporting**

The quality of indicators and targets is mixed, and the ability of programme management to follow and monitor results across the five outcome areas is not uniform. Complicating this is that programme staff find it difficult to measure the proposed indicators as they do not provide clear means of verification. Hence some results, like stakeholder consultations, are over-reported, while others, like oversight, are very successful and yet under-reported. By and large, the PSP could benefit from looking at alternative ways of capturing results that measures not only the quantitative result expected at the end of the results chain, but also more qualitative issues such as relationships between Parliament and the Executive, intra- and inter-party relationships in parliament, confidence of parliamentarians to engage in debates etc. This way a more nuanced assessment of performance can be obtained.

The review team **finds that the monitoring and evaluation of the PSP is inadequate, even though it was supposed to be the one lesson articulated as learnt from the previous programme evaluation.**

As discussed under the strategy section, the programme has made itself an omnibus coordination forum for all support to POZ and has realised benefits for both POZ and different kinds of partnerships.

The review team **finds that the programme made strategic use of coordination, partnerships, synergies and linkages and collaboration with other partners to increase its effectiveness and impact.**

### Programme Coordination Unit

**A review of the programme achievement section shows that overall, the programme is not on course to achieve its quantitative targets.** However, this should be discussed against the fact that the quantitative shortfall in delivery is found to mask more pervasive qualitative achievement referred to elsewhere. The review team finds that the PCU demonstrated the flexibility and responsiveness essential for success in a multi- stakeholder programme like the PSP and took results where they could.

While  **the management and coordination has not been wholly successful in steering the programme towards achieving results, it has been successful in maximising opportunities where they arose.** However, to the extent that the PCU was made “responsible for day-to-day management and decision-making for the programme, as well as ensuring that the programme produces the outputs and results specified in this programme document, in compliance with the required standards of quality, within the specified limits of time and cost and in line with UNDP rules and regulations”, it is to that extent **accountable for overall results, along with the other management and oversight structures.** We have discussed elsewhere in this report the circumstances the PCU finds itself in – understaffing, late programme funding and thus late start-up, inadequately capacitated departments of parliament needing PCU assistance and thus spreading them thin, and being called upon to perform other non-PSP functions.

The review team found that **UNDP is deemed to have performed their role in managing the basket fund well and provided an opportunity for all stakeholders to realise their common mission. In addition, by bringing a parliamentary expert, UNDP leveraged on their global and regional knowledge to enrich both the substantive and the operational dimensions of project implementation.** However, there is more UNDP could have done to support the PCU in areas such as monitoring and linking the PSP with other initiatives in the Governance Unit that can reinforce the results of the PSP e.g. media, legislation alignment, and citizen voice programmes. Both UNDP and PCU have not been able to consistently situate the PSP in the overall governance context for which the whole of government in responsible. This will have enabled the necessary linkages to be established as discussed earlier. The review team finds merit in the previous identification of the need for senior technical advisor capacity to support the PCU and UNDP in the implementation of the PSP. Such senior technical expertise would facilitate tapping into UNDP global knowledge in both governance and parliamentary processes, help the PCU codify its results and lessons into knowledge products and link the knowledge bases resident in the development partners who are in the PSP who have knowledge from other countries.

* 1. Sustainability

As this is a mid-term review, **Impact and Sustainability** cannot be realistically addressed at this stage. However, the extent to which the design and implementation so far have the potential to contribute to sustainability through capacity development, national ownership and approaches towards self-sustaining resource strategies have been assessed.

Sustainability is achieved when:

1. there is ownership and continuity of programme results which can influence development of policies and/or support maintenance or scale up of the outputs achieved;
2. products are developed that enhance technical capacity of the beneficiary to replicate outputs in the future; and
3. there is both financial capacity and commitment to enable the necessary investment to maintain or scale up results achieved.

The programme design and implementation approach have cultivated strong ownership of activities and outputs of the PSP. Implementing within the framework of the ISP and the engagement of all stakeholders concerned with parliamentary development has ensured the programme remains within the priorities and needs of stakeholders, and therefore relevant. Using national capacity to deliver on programme outputs has further strengthened support of the programme in parliament. There is strong will, from the level of Speaker of the National Assembly to Parliamentarians, to see the results of the PSP sustained.

**The review finds significant ownership sentiment among key stakeholders of the programme.**

In addition to ownership, capacity-building work of PSP was guided by standardised training manuals which will continue to be used by alternative trainers in the future. Support to development of organisational manuals (e.g. Human Resource Policy and Procedures in OAG, development of various audit manuals in OAG, Code of Conduct for Parliament, ISO Certification in parliament etc), and alignment of legislation provides inherent mechanisms for sustaining programme influenced capacity.

**The review finds there is scope for sustainability of organisational and individual capacity development efforts through documented training manuals, organisational systems manuals etc. but continuation is likely to be constrained by the lack of financial resources for continued implementation. It further finds the programme lacks a strategy for sustaining results being achieved. As a result, there is little focus on implementing measures to sustain them**

By far the most predictably sustainable results of the programme emanate from the outcome to do with legislative alignment. To the extent that legislation that entrenches the constitution has been achieved, it bodes well not just for the legislation itself but for the governance agenda as a whole. Provision for the implementation of the constitution has high potential for scaling up other governance related activities. The **review team therefore finds that Outcome 1 is likely to yield the most sustainable result, barring an unforeseen and highly unlikely constitutional change**. The rest of the results, especially those that require financial investment, are unlikely to be sustainable. These are results pertaining to efficiencies of the OAG, capacity of MPs, citizen participation and improved coordination of development partners’ support to parliament. These are directly affected by the fiscal situation that Zimbabwe is in,[[28]](#footnote-28) which has resulted in the government being unable to meet the needs of parliament in terms of capacity building and other basic parliamentary operations within their mandates. In addition, the programme design did not sufficiently address the challenge of sustaining results.

### Capacity of OAG

**Capacity of the OAG is likely to wane with the withdrawal of the PSP as funding is being provided for operation and logistical support due to underfunding of the institution from central government.** The OAG has remained grossly underfunded. The programme financed key operational expenses for the OAG, acting as a replacement fund for the gap left by inadequate funding from fiscus. Removal of the programme will, in the short term, likely reverse gains made by the PSP in supporting efficiency of this critical institution that supports Parliament’s oversight role on the executive.

However, there are opportunities, given by its constitutional independence that could sustain the current level of efficiencies. The OAG can retain audit fees from parastatals. To take advantage of this opportunity, the OAG is currently in the process of professionalising the office to increase its capacity to undertake these audits which will increase their income base and reduce dependence on the constrained fiscus.

OAG staff are no longer part of the civil service. The recently developed Human Resources Manual and Procedures provides for improved salary scales comparable with competitors for audit skills in the private sector. The retained fees will enable the OAG meet these new salary scales ensuring a greater proportion of the developed capacity is retained in the office. Nonetheless, these results will materialise in the medium to long term given the slow process of reforms and capacity development (especially to annually audit over 100 parastatals).

### Capacity of MPs

Significant investment was made by the programme in building capacity of MPs to exercise their oversight, legislative and representation roles. As discussed under Effectiveness, there is demonstrable evidence of increased capacity of parliamentarians to play their roles. Because parliament evolves every five years, with new members voted in and others exiting, capacity building should be a constant feature of parliament. From discussions with parliament and stakeholders there does not seem to be sufficient capacity within the parliament administration or government institutional structure to regenerate this capacity which is lost every five years. While there is an assumption that building the capacity of parliament administration, under Outcome 3 of the PSP, there has not been adequate investment in this regard to support the level of capacity building required to regenerate capacity to the state achieved by the PSP. There are also arguments that, in each electoral cycle, an average of 60% of parliamentarians are retained thus in turn a significant proportion of the capacity developed is retained.

**Sustainability of capacity, while anchored on the training manuals produced, is not broad enough to formulate a system that allows regeneration of capacity to the levels of that developed by the PSP**.

### Citizen participation in oversight and legislative process

**As highlighted under Value for Money, public hearings, in their current form, are very expensive and POZ will be unable to implement them at the same scale as that funded by the PSP as long as the current economic context persists.** Support to public hearing ensured: 1) fulfilment of constitutional provisions under Section 141; and 2) parliament could test feasibility of the constitutional provisions. The support from PSP filled a financial and skills gap to ensure civic participation in the legislative process was effective. Because of the number of bills that needed to be aligned to the constitution, parliament would have found it impossible to meet this constitutional provision which would have resulted in the passage of legislation that may not stand a constitutional challenge or does not reflect the views of the population. The main format of civic engagement has been public meetings between MPs and the population. These, as demonstrated in the Efficiency section, are costly to undertake and would be nearly impossible to sustain at the same scale within the current economic context. New innovations being explored (e.g. use of mobile applications for citizen engagement), and piloted (radio sessions, the website) provide less costly alternatives for citizen engagement. These innovations will greatly improve the gains made by PSP in strengthening citizen engagement and in turn the representation mandate of parliament.

### Improved coordination of parliament

**Coordination of interventions in parliament is centred on the PCU. However, it is unlikely that parliament can sustain the institution beyond PSP support due to the current freeze on civil service posts and cost of running such an institution.** It was evident from discussions with stakeholders in parliament, development partners and CSOs that there was strong coordination leadership and coordination of interventions to parliament. Establishment of the PCU and institutional structure for managing the PSP (Project, Board and Project Steering Committee) and support to parliament (e.g. the Partners’ Forum) have been credited with contributing to improving coordination. Accompanying tools such as the Consolidated Annual Work Plan (though with some weaknesses) have enabled the PCU and partners to determine their strategic fit in parliament. Nonetheless, the central glue holding these structures together is the functionality of the PCU. Sustaining it would ensure continued coordination in the long term. The history of development assistance shows that the establishment of project units to run specific programmes is not usually sustainable because:

1. staff in the project unit normally have different working conditions as compared to the rest within the institution making it difficult for the host institution to assimilate them after project end; and
2. the different working conditions sometimes create uneasy working relationships between staff of the project unit and those in the “mainstream”;

Parliament, by assimilating the finance officer from the previous PSP in mainstream Parliament administrative staff, has shown that it could have ability sustain the PCU capacity. However, the current freeze on civil service posts, and the cost of running a PCU, it is unlikely that Parliament will sustain this capacity in full. There are also currently no alternative plans to support donor coordination capacity established by the PCU.

Conclusion and Recommendations

# Conclusion and Recommendations

## Conclusions

**Added value of the PSP**

The PSP has added value to parliament, not only in bringing resources that would not have been available, but by enhancing substantialy the functioning of parliament in terms of its mandate of legislation, oversight and representation. It has also enabled Parliament to conceptualise and operationalise the key constitutional requirements of a participative legislative process.

**On relevance**The project was found to be extremely relevant to the context of Zimbabwe and the challenges faced by both PoZ and OAG.

**On strategy**

The Theory of Change underlying the programme strategy was inadequate and thus the programme lacked a coherent conceptual framework on which to base its logic and assumptions. Hence, the programme strategy was not optimally designed.

It makes sense to ensure that a programme as important to PoZ as the PSP is, be designed in such a way that it covers the life of the Parliament. However, it is equally important to ensure that there is no start-up lag which reduces the life of the programme leading to weaknesses in achieving its intended targets.

**On efficiency**

The project is found to be generally inefficient and not cost effective for the reasons analysed in the relevant section, which are embedded in the design and modalities agreed to and not wholly in the management of the project. However, the coordination of all support to parliament has realised significant efficiencies for both PoZ and stakeholders.

**On effectiveness**

The PSP is the most important source of support to PoZ, and PoZ has undergone significant change in terms of its ability to carry out its core mandate. Therefore the effect of PSP on the functioning of Parliament and on the governance landscape in Zimbabwe has been significant.

The PSP, in spite of the design flows earlier mentioned, has achieved highly impactful results with qualitative institutional changes in the way Parliament functions. This despite rate of attainment of targets in the Results Resources Framework, being under par.

The review concludes that overall project outputs are not on track to be achieved within the remaining life of the project, due to both late start-up and design constraints.

**On Sustainability**

Investment in the constitutional alignment process has produced sustainable results, which could have long-term impact on the future of governance in Zimbabwe. However, the capacity development, participation and operational investments will not be sustainable in the current fiscal environment, without continued programme support.

More time and resources are needed if the original objectives and outcomes are to be achieved and sustainability of results, so far achieved, assured.

Sustainability of the programme results will remain elusive if no strategy is put in place. While many of the results hinge on the capacity of targeted institutions to provide the necessary financial resources to support them, this might be a challenge in the current constrained fiscal environment. Key results such as capacity of MPs, and efficiency gains in OAG are at risk of reversal with withdrawal of the project.

**On Management and Coordination**

Overall the programme management arrangements were adequate and execution has been effective, with some qualifications as noted above.

## Recommendations

### Strategy

* **Recommendation 1**: It is recommended that UNDP Zimbabwe develop a theory of change for each of their major sectoral clusters. One such theory of change should be developed for governance to help explain and clarify the logic and assumptions underlying the achievement of governance results over time in Zimbabwe.
* **Recommendation 2**: Meanwhile the ToCToC in the PSP under review should be significantly improved to enable a more coherent understanding of the logic and development assumptions behind the programme design, which will contribute to better articulation, M&E and final evaluation.
* **Recommendation 3:** The review recommends that the Steering Committee authorises an extension for the PSP as far as six months into the life of the 9th Parliament. This extension should be more focused on strategic interventions targeted at specific outputs and institutions (e.g. key committees rather than all committees). The extension should also support the next ISP preparation as well as fund start-up activities for the 9th Parliament that will input into the design of the next PSP. This extension should of course be a with-cost-extension.
* **Recommendation 4**: The review identified a missed opportunity in creating complementary actions between the outputs from parliament and work of civil society and media. Such linkages would enhance the effectiveness of the PSP. It is recommended that Project Board explores, further opportunities for linking outputs from the PSP with citizen voice, transparency and accountability programmes funded by the EU, GOS and UNDP. Such an approach is likely to reinforce results of the PSP.
* **Recommendation 5:** Although the PSP model has helped limit duplication per se, it is still recommended that donor support to related priority for parliament be much
* more coordinated to enhance synergy in strategy, implementation and results reporting.
* **Recommendation 6:** UNDP and its partners should do more to leverage technical support for parliament to add value to both capacity development, improved legislative processes and enhanced oversight function to ensure that the PSP resources achieve more than plug a funding gap created by the shrunk fiscus.
* **Recommendation 7:** Parliament should be more pro-active in engaging with the executive to improve the supply of bills as well as to ensure the implementation of recommendations from parliamentary committees.

### Efficiency

* **Recommendation 8:** While maintaining interventions during parliamentary seating the PCU needs to more systematically plan ahead to maximise the number of activities carried out through these windows.
* **Recommendation 9:** The departments of parliament need to be held more accountable for their own delivery under the PSP so they are less reliant on the PCU.
* **Recommendation 10**: Parliament needs to exercise greater leadership in ensuring that those donors who can contribute through the basket, in-terms of institutional regulations, do so.

### Effectiveness

* **Recommendation 11**: The review team observed significant number of achievements that remain undocumented. The review therefore recommends that UNDP and POZ, go through a process of identifying results in each of the outcomes. This should go beyond quantification of results but also document the qualitative achievements that have been achieved e.g. changing relationships and attitudes, commitments, and changing confidence levels.
* **Recommendation 12**: The PSP has instruments to strengthen gender mainstreaming that include the ZWPC strategic plan and the Gender Policy of Parliament. The review team recommends that in the remaining period, the PSP should prioritise facilitating implementation of the ZWPC strategic plan.
* **Recommendation 13**: The PSP needs to broaden its conceptual appreciation of capacity development beyond individual training to include institutional and organisational capacity strengthening.

### Management and Coordination

* **Recommendation 14**: The weakness of the current M&E system for the programme is well known to the Project Board. Attempts to rectify the challenge are still to yield the required results. UNDP, working with POZ, should revise the M&E system and associated tools informed by global good practice for measurement of results from parliamentary support programmes for which UNDP is a global leader.
* **Recommendation 15:** It is recommended that in the final evaluation of the PSP, resources (time, money and expertise) be made available to include lessons learnt. This could include from previous PSP’s.
* **Recommendation 16:** It is recommended that the PSP’s be treated as a continuous process with the next one building on the previous and that each programme be sequentially numbered (e.g. PSP 3).
* **Recommendation 17:** It is recommended that a senior technical expert in governance and parliamentary support be appointed to support both PCU and UNDP in the implementation of the PSP. The senior technical expert will also facilitate knowledge sharing with the programme from UNDP and the PSP development partners’ global experience.

### Sustainability

* **Recommendation 18**: The review team recommends that Parliament should consider options for sustaining individual and organisational level results through institutionalisation of capacity development and resource mobilisation from treasury.

ANNEXES

# Annexes

## Annex 1: Terms of Reference



**Terms of Reference**

**Mid-Term Review of the Multi-Donor Programme Support for Parliament [PSP] and the Office of the Auditor General of Zimbabwe**

**Background**

The *Multi-donor Parliamentary Support Programme for Parliament (PSP) and the Office of the Auditor General* of Zimbabwe was designed in response to Zimbabwe‘s development priorities outlined in the Zimbabwe United Nations Development Framework (ZUNDAF) 2012-2015, the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZimAsset), the Constitution of Zimbabwe, and the Parliament of Zimbabwe Institutional Strategic Plan 2014-2018. This programme is supported by the UNDP, the European Union and the Government of Sweden.

The Constitution of Zimbabwe has expanded the powers of Parliament in line with the doctrine of the Separation of Powers, between and amongst the Judiciary, the Executive and Parliament. Section 119 of the Constitution confers Parliament with the power to protect the Constitution and promote democratic governance in Zimbabwe. Although it is a rarity to have total application of this doctrine, in particular, as it relates to the intricate and intimate relationship between Parliament and the Executive, the Constitution has provided considerable powers to enable parliamentary sovereignty and democracy.

The overall objective of the programme, as defined in the Project document, is to enable the Parliament of Zimbabwe (POZ) to perform its core functions for improved legislation, participation, representation and accountability. The specific outcomes of the project are articulated as follows:-

**Outcome 1**: New laws enacted and old laws aligned with the Constitution.

**Outcome 2**: Oversight function of Parliament strengthened; Governance systems enhanced.

**Outcome 3**: People’s participation in legislation formulation, decision-making and related democratic processes increased.

**Outcome 4**: Parliament’s performance of its core functions strengthened through capacitating Parliament leadership and staff.

**Outcome 5**: Gender Mainstreamed in Parliament systems and processes

**Rationale for the assignment**

The Multi-Donor Parliamentary Support Programme provides the overall programme framework for strengthening Parliament’s legislative, representative and oversight functions in Zimbabwe. The programme is now at the mid-level of its implementation. The Programme Steering Committee held on the 26th of September, 2016, in line with the provisions of the Parliamentary Support Programme (PSP) document, recommended the need for a Mid-Term Review of the Programme as part of a process to ensure the PSP’s alignment to the cycle of Parliament’s Strategic Plan which comes to an end in 2018 (coinciding with the end of the current life of Parliament). This mid-term review provides a strategic opportunity, to review the progress that has been made so far towards achieving the outcomes, outputs, targets and indicators in the PSP and the Parliament’s Institutional Strategic Plan; determine appropriate measures for refocusing the programme strategies where necessary, highlight areas of strength and opportunities for achieving the desired results and capture effectively the lessons learned while also identifying the possible challenges, gaps and areas needing strengthening. It also provides an opportunity for the programme to further integrate any emerging and contemporary programming aspects that are relevant for Parliament’s work and which might have been left out at design stage. In order to buttress and compliment programme management and coordination expertise, the programme seeks to engage a consultant in this process whose efforts will be complemented by a UNDP Parliamentary Development Expert.

**Scope of the Mid Term Review**

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| --- |
| The mid-term review will assess the effectiveness of the implementation strategy to ascertain whether the specific and overall interventions and approaches including the theory of change were appropriate and effective. This will include:   1. The implementation modalities, in particular the effectiveness of the multi-donor approach; 2. Partnership arrangements, institutional strengthening, and beneficiary participation 3. Replication and Scalability; 4. Cost effectiveness and efficiency as well as sustainability of the programme; and 5. Linkages, synergies and coordination with other Parliament supported projects   Secondly, the mid-term review will also assess the project design and assumptions made at the beginning of the project and the development process. In this regard, the review will place emphasis on:   1. The extent to which the programme results have been achieved, partnerships established, capacities built, and cross cutting issues such as gender equality have been addressed. 2. Whether the programme implementation strategy has been optimum and recommend areas for improvement and learning. 3. Further, the review will investigate the specific activities relating to each of the project objectives/outcomes listed above including training and technical support through co-located team members. 4. The capacity building approach including training design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation initiatives will also be reviewed. 5. The extent to which gender equality issues have been addressed, integrated, implemented and monitored in the programme 6. Extent to which the Office of the Auditor General has been strengthened to deliver quality Audit products. 7. Programme accountability in as far as communication and visibility is concerned   The mid-term review will assess and make recommendations on further support to the programme post 2017. |

**Objectives of the Mid-Term Review**

The objectives of this mid-review are to:

1. Assess the progress that has been made so far against the Results Resources Framework as well as progress made per outcome for the specific indicators. In this regard, this Mid-Term Review will determine whether the project outputs are on track, are in line with the original theory of change, and the project strategy and most importantly whether the stated project objectives/outcomes will be achieved within the life of the project. It will also determine the immediate impact and contribution to results of several capacity development interventions within the programme.
2. Map the operational, technical and programmatic gaps, challenges and areas that need improvement;
3. Make a review and an assessment of the cost effectiveness and efficiency of the project using a value for money analysis informed by experiences of similar programmes, including coordination and synergies with other programmes
4. Make recommendations to scale up programme delivery moving forward, and adjust/improve programming effectiveness and efficiency for optimal results achievement.
5. Recommend approaches for aligning the current programme to the time-frame of Parliament’s strategic plan
6. Recommend concrete actions for strengthening and sustaining gender equality results of the programme
7. Make recommendation on sustainability
8. Make recommendation on communication

**Methodology:**

The proposed mid-term review of the programme will be undertaken based on Parliament of Zimbabwe’s Evaluation procedures and the eight UNDP quality standards for programming which focus on:

1. Strategy,
2. Relevance,
3. Efficiency and effectiveness,
4. Social and environmental standards,
5. Management and Monitoring,
6. Sustainability and
7. National ownership.
8. Cross cutting programming principles such as capacity development and gender equality will also be considered.

The following is proposed as broad methodologies to be employed, though the successful consultant will have to further flesh out a methodology:

1. Desk review of key operational and programme documents and reports
2. Consultationswith key partners including relevant government ministries and departments, Programme Coordination Unit, UNDP, Development Partners to the PSP (EU, Sweden), and other partners supporting the work of Parliament**.**
3. Primary beneficiaries of the Programme – Presiding Officers of Parliament led by the Speaker of the National Assembly of the National Assembly, the Clerk of Parliament, Members of Parliament, Parliament Heads of Departments and Parliamentary Staff.
4. Secondary beneficiaries – CSOs, academia, think tanks, organised citizens groups

**Deliverables**

1. Inception report demonstrating the consultant’s understanding of the assignment, proposed methodology, expected results and work plan
2. Consolidated report covering the following
   * strategic and high-level achievements of the PSP to date informed by consultations with key stakeholders
   * recommendations and clear alternatives, if any, on how to address any identified programme needs and challenges contributing to development results
   * Recommendations on how to align the current programme to the life cycle of Parliament’s Strategic Plan taking on board 1 and 2 above.
   * Recommendations on how to strategically position the PSP based on its comparative advantage and have optimum results
3. Workshop to present initial findings to all relevant stakeholders.

**Implementation arrangements:**

* The successful applicant in this case a consortium or a firm with expertise in Monitoring and Evaluationas well as experience in reviewingGovernanceProgrammeswill beaccompanied by a UNDP Parliamentary Development Expert in carrying out this mid-term review. They will work under the guidance of the Clerk of Parliament and in close collaboration with the Programme Coordination Unit and UNDP Programme Support Team.

**Duration of the Assignment**

Assignment is proposed to last for 25 working days.

**Qualifications**

The applying Firm or Consortium should comprise of a team of at least 2 experts demonstrating the following specific skills and experience.

**Team Member 1:** [Governance Specialist]

1. Master’s Degree in International Development, Public Policy, Political Science, Development studies or relevant field
2. Minimum of 7 years’ experience in design, implementation, review or management of Democratic Governance Programmes in Zimbabwe / Africa
3. Experience in design, review and management of Parliamentary Development Programmes will be an added advantage
4. Strong writing and analytical Skills

**Team Member 2:** [M&E Specialist]

1. Advanced Degree in Programme Management, Development Studies, Social Sciences or related field
2. At least 5 years of experience in carrying out evaluations, assessments or reviews of development programmes
3. Experience in evaluating democratic governance programmes will be an added advantage.
4. Strong knowledge of key programme design principles for example theory of change, results-based management and reporting

Strong analytical and writing skills

## Annex 2: Evaluation Framework

| **Main question** | **Detailed questions/Issues** | **Indicators** | **Methods and sources** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Strategy** | Is the Theory of Change (TOCTOC) appropriate? | Results and activities address the identified underlying causes  Assumptions for the causal linkages are appropriate | **Key informant interviews** (UNDP, PCU, Parliament, OAG)  **Literature review** (programme document, annual reports, minutes of steering committee) |
| Is a multi-donor approach appropriate for the intended results of the programme? | Level funding provided  Coordination of parliamentary support activities | **Key informant interviews** (UNDP, PCU, Parliament, World Bank, AfDB, OAG, CSOs, other UN agencies supporting parliament)  **Literature review** (programme document, annual reports, minutes of steering committee, Parliament ISP 2014-2018) |
| Are the chosen partnerships appropriate to deliver on the results? | Partners capacity to deliver roles and responsibilities  Value addition of the partners | **Key informant interviews** (UNDP, PCU, Parliament, OAG)  **Literature review** (programme document, annual reports, minutes of steering committee) |
| Are the interventions logical and their “strategic fit” in the desired causality chain? | Interventions respond to needs of parliament and OAG  Interventions align with the outcomes in the TOCTOC  Interventions align with the Parliament ISP 2014-2018 | **Key informant interviews** (UNDP, PCU, Parliament, OAG)  **Literature review** (programme document, annual reports, minutes of steering committee, Parliament ISP 2014-2018) |
| **Relevance**  To what extent are the objectives of the PSP consistent with the evolving needs and priorities of the beneficiaries, partners, and stakeholders? | To what extent are the PSP outcomes aligned to country’s development framework and the UNDP operating framework? | Alignment of PSP to:  Parliament ISP 2014-2018  UNDP CPD  ZUNDAF  ZIMASSET | **Key informant interviews** (UNDP, PCU, Parliament, OAG)  **Literature review** (programme document, UNDP CPD, ZIMASSET, ZUNDAF, Parliament ISP 2014-2018) |
| How has the PSP evolved to remain relevant to a changing operational context? | Changes in the operating framework  Changes made to the programme in response to the changing operating framework | **Key informant interviews** (UNDP, PCU, Parliament, OAG)  **Literature review** (programme document, annual reports, minutes of steering committee) |
| To what extent is programme owned by national stakeholders? | Perceptions on ownership among stakeholders  Participation of beneficiaries in programme cycle  Contributions by parliament to the programme | **Key informant interviews** (UNDP, PCU, Parliament, OAG, CSOs,)  **Literature review** (programme document, annual reports, minutes of steering committee) |
| **Efficiency**  How economically were resources / inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) converted to results? | Is the PSP value for money? | Measures for ensuring value for money employed by the PSP  Cost of training an MP  Cost of Exchange visits per MP  Cost per person reached with outreach  Cost minimization strategies used by the PSP  Perception on quality of support (training, exchange, legislative consultation processes)  Ratio of administration to total budget  Cost per output (measured as monetised cost per 1% output achieved).  Perception on quality of support (training, exchange, legislative consultation processes) | **Key informant interviews** (UNDP, PCU, parliamentarian, Clerk of Parliament, World Bank, AfDB, OAG, CSOs)  **Literature review** (programme document, annual reports, minutes of steering committee, programme annual work plans and financial reports) |
| To what extent has the PSP improved coordination and created linkages and synergies to improve efficiency in parliamentary support? | Value addition of the PSP in improving the coordination of support to parliament  Linkages established by the PSP management  Synergies established by the PSP management to support results | **Key informant interviews** (UNDP, PCU, Parliament, World Bank, AfDB, OAG, CSOs)  **Literature review** (programme document, annual reports, minutes of steering committee, Parliament ISP 2014-2018, consolidated annual work plan) |
| Was the multi-donor approach effective in achieving the outcomes of the PSP? | Advantages of the multi-donor approach to the PSP  Disadvantages of the multi-donor approach to the PSP | **Key informant interviews** (UNDP, PCU, Parliament, World Bank, AfDB, OAG, CSOs, other UN agencies working with Parliament)  **Literature review** (programme document, annual reports, minutes of steering committee, Parliament ISP 2014-2018, consolidated annual work plan) |
| What were the constraints (e.g. political, practical, and bureaucratic) to addressing human rights and gender equality efficiently during implementation? What level of effort was made to overcome these challenges? | Perceptions of stakeholders on human rights and gender equality programming (knowledge of, adequacy of funding for, and coherence in human rights and gender equality programming) | **Key informant interviews** (UNDP, PCU, parliamentarian, Clerk of Parliament, World Bank, AfDB, OAG, CSOs)  **Literature review** (programme document, annual reports, minutes of steering committee, Parliament ISP 2014-2018, consolidated annual work plan) |
| Could the activities and outputs have been delivered with fewer resources without reducing their quality and quantity? | Alternative mechanisms of delivery identified by stakeholders and beneficiaries | **Key informant interviews** (UNDP, PCU, parliamentarian, Clerk of Parliament, World Bank, AfDB, OAG, CSOs)  **Literature review** (programme document, annual reports, minutes of steering committee, Parliament ISP 2014-2018, consolidated annual work plan) |
| **Effectiveness**  To what extent were the PSP’s objectives achieved, or are expected / likely to be achieved? | What has been the progress made towards achievement of the expected outcomes and expected results? What are the results achieved? | Progress on results outcomes and outputs as per indicators in the Results Framework  Specific successes registered in:  In alignment of laws to the constitution  Strengthening oversight of parliament and governance systems  In people’s participation in legislation formulation, decision making, democratic processes  Capacity strengthening of Parliament’s performance on core functions  Gender mainstreaming in the work of parliament | **Key informant interviews** (UNDP, PCU, parliamentarian, Clerk of Parliament, World Bank, AfDB, OAG, CSOs)  **Literature review** (programme document, annual reports, minutes of steering committee, Parliament ISP 2014-2018, consolidated annual work plan) |
| What are the reasons for the achievement or non-achievement? | Success factors  Factors for failure |
| To what extent have beneficiaries (OAG, and the general population) been satisfied with the results? | Perceptions of beneficiaries on the quality of benefits provided – by the programme | **Key informant interviews** (UNDP, PCU, parliamentarians, Clerk of Parliament, World Bank, AfDB, OAG, CSOs)  **Literature review** (programme document, annual reports, minutes of steering committee, Parliament ISP 2014-2018, consolidated annual work plan) |
| **Management and Monitoring**  How well was the program managed and coordinated? | How well were the responsibilities delineated and implemented in a complementary fashion (Parliament, UNDP, DPs? | Clear management and Coordination roles  between UNDP, Parliament and DPs | **Key informant interviews** (UNDP, PCU, parliamentarian, Clerk of Parliament, World Bank, AfDB, OAG, CSOs)  **Literature review** (programme document, annual reports, minutes of steering committee, Parliament ISP 2014-2018, consolidated annual work plan) |
| How well have the coordination functions been fulfilled? | Opinions of stakeholders on PCU’s coordination capacity (technical support, M&E, linking agencies) |
| How effectively has the programme management monitored programme performance and results?  Sub-questions: How appropriate and useful are the indicators described in the programme document in assessing the programme's progress?  Are the targeted indicator values realistic and can they be tracked? If necessary, how should they be modified to be more useful? Are the means of verification for the indicators appropriate? | Evidence of a robust M&E system (SMART indicators, clear means of verification, clear structures for data flow, clear frequency of data collection and reporting)  Evidence of monitoring data being used for decision making (at PCU and Steering Committee level) |
| How (if at all) has the programme made strategic use of coordination, partnerships, synergies and linkages and collaboration with other partners to increase its effectiveness and impact? | Examples of collaboration between the PSP and other partners supporting parliament. |
| **Sustainability**  What is the likelihood of a continuation of benefits from the PSP after the intervention is completed or the probability of continued long-term benefits? | What is the likelihood that the benefits from the program will be maintained for a reasonably long period of time if the program were to cease? | Opinions of stakeholders on the likelihood of sustainability  Perceptions of beneficiaries on the sustainability of benefits | **Key informant interviews** (UNDP, PCU, parliamentarian, Clerk of Parliament, World Bank, AfDB, OAG, CSOs)  **Literature review** (programme document, annual reports, minutes of steering committee, Parliament ISP 2014-2018, consolidated annual work plan) |
| Does parliament have sufficient technical capacity and options for financing the PSP to ensure capacity building of parliament continues at the same (or larger) scale and quality? | Evidence of available resource in the present and future to sustain interventions (including alternative sources of funding) |

## Annex 3: List of documents reviewed

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| 1 | AfDB 2017. African Economic Outlook, |
| 2 | Dube, R. 2013. Parliamentary Performance and Gender. Accesses at <http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/demgg/rau_gender_analysis_7th_parliament_1311.pdf> |
| 3 | Evaluation of the UNDP parliamentary support project in Zimbabwe & recommendations |
| 4 | Final Evaluation Report, Franklin De Vrieze & Rukudzo Murapa, 17-10-2012 |
| 5 | Franklin De Vrieze & Rukudzo Murapa. 2012. Evaluation of the UNDP parliamentary support project in Zimbabwe: Final Evaluation Report”. |
| 6 | Good Governance for Sustainable Development: Outcome Evaluation Report, UNDP, 2014 |
| 7 | Johane, G. 2017. A Review of Key Oversight and Law Making Actions Undertaken by the 8th Parliament: |
| 8 | Outcomes and Impacts of the various capacity building Initiatives. A report prepared by the AC-Committees of Parliament. |
| 9 | Parliament (2012) POZ ISP (PoZ ISP) 2011-2015 |
| 10 | Parliamentary Support Programme 2016 Annual Work Plan |
| 11 | Parliamentary Support Programme 2017 Annual Work Plan |
| 12 | Parliamentary Support Programme Annual Progress Report, 2015 |
| 13 | Parliamentary Support Programme Annual Progress Report, 2016 |
| 14 | Parliamentary Support Programme Document |
| 15 | Parliamentary Support Programme January to March 2017 Quarterly Report |
| 16 | Parliamentary Support Programme July to September 2016 Quarterly Report |
| 17 | Programme Activity Reports |
| 18 | Programme Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, 26 September 2016 |
| 19 | Programme Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, 28 October 2015 |
| 20 | PSP Financial report for year 1 and year 2 |
| 21 | UNDP (2014) Parliamentary Support Programme Project Document |
| 22 | World Bank 2017. World Bank Overview of Zimbabwe, April 2017 |
| 23 | Zimbabwe Economic Policy Analysis and Research Unit (ZEPARU) 2016. Baseline Survey of Economic Literacy for the Parliament of Zimbabwe. |
| 24 | Zimbabwe Independent, November 25, 2016 |

## Annex 4: List of People Interviewed

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **First Name** | **Surname** | **Organisation** |
| Honourable Emmerson | Mnangangwa | Vice President and Ministry of Justice Legal and Parliamentary Affairs |
| Honourable Advocate Jacob | Mudenda | Parliament of Zimbabwe (Speaker of the National Assembly |
| Bishow | Parajuli | UNDP (Resident Representative) |
| Mr. K . M. | Chokuda | Parliament of Zimbabwe (Clerk of Parliament) |
| Verity | Nyagah | UNDP (Country Director) |
| Malin | Krook | Swedish Embassy |
| Francisca | Onai Midzi | Delegation of the European Union |
| Nicholas | Taylor | Delegation of the European Union |
| Mr Anthony | Mhlanga | Parliament of Zimbabwe |
| Dr Andries M. | Rukobo | Parliament of Zimbabwe (Information Services) |
| Anthony | Malunga | Parliament of Zimbabwe (Human Resources and Administration) |
| Tapiwa F | Godzi | Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs (Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs) |
| William | Tsuma | UNDP |
| Revai | Makanje-Aalbaek | UNDP |
| Doreen | Nyamukapa | UNDP |
| Nesbert | Samu | Parliament of Zimbabwe (PCU) |
| Beverly | Chinyama | Parliament of Zimbabwe(PCU) |
| Pamela | Mhlanga | ZWRCN |
| Mrs Eyerusalem | Fasika | Africa Development Bank |
| Maureen | Mushonge | UN Women |
| Mrs. Vongai | Shiri | OAG |
| Mrs. Angela | Nyangeni | OAG |
| Mr. S.T. | Mutsau | OAG (Deptuty Auditor General) |
| Mrs Mildret | Chiri | OAG (Auditor General) |
| Honourable Paulina (MP) | Mparariwa | Parliament of Zimbabwe (ZWPC) |
| Honourable Monica (MP) | Mutsvangwa | Parliament of Zimbabwe (ZWPC) |
| Honourable Nancy (MP) | Masuku | Parliament of Zimbabwe (ZWPC) |
| Mrs Anna | Mangani | Parliament of Zimbabwe (ZWPC) |
| Senator Thobabile | Khumalo | Parliament of Zimbabwe (ZWPC) |
| Patricia | Muganhiri | Women in Politics Support Unit |
| Isaac | Maposa | Zimbabwe Institute |
| Nomusa | Zindoga | Zimbabwe Institute |
| McDonald | Nyazvigo | World Bank |
| LCC members |  |  |

1. Evaluation of the UNDP parliamentary support project in Zimbabwe & recommendations

   Final Evaluation Report, Franklin De Vrieze & Rukudzo Murapa, 17-10-2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. For a chronological account of the evolution of the Parliamentary Reform Programme see “Evaluation of the UNDP parliamentary support project in Zimbabwe & recommendations:

   Final Evaluation Report”, Franklin De Vrieze & Rukudzo Murapa, 17-10-2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See Good Governance for Sustainable Development: Outcome Evaluation Report, UNDP, 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. See Figure 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. African Economic Outlook, AfDB 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Zimbabwe Independent, November 25, 2016 [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. African Economic Outlook 2017, AfDB [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. World Bank Overview of Zimbabwe April 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. African Economic Outlook 2017, AfDB [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. See the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Evaluation of the UNDP parliamentary support project in Zimbabwe & recommendations

    Final Evaluation Report, 17-10-2012, Franklin De Vrieze & Rukudzo Murapa [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Discussion with Women’s Parliamentary Caucus leadership. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Specialised bills include: Public Hearing SEZ and PFM Bill, RBZ Bill and Procurement Bill, Public Hearing on National Competitiveness, MEMC and PAMU Bill, Gwanda State University Bill and Manicaland State University Bill, Debt Management and Joint Ventures Bills, Generals Laws Amendment Bill, and Criminal Procedure and Evidence Amendment Bill (5 PH) [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. No Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjustment was undertaken for the basket of goods and services for trainings conducted mainly because the detail required for such an analysis was not available for the UNICEF Parliamentary Support programme. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Smiddy, K. Muchini, B. Marimo, N. (2010) Evaluation of UNICEF’s Parliamentary Support Work in Eastern and Southern Africa. A report prepared for UNICEF ESARO by JIMAT Development Consultants [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. An inter-ministerial Committee on Alignment chaired by the Ministry of Justice Legal and Parliamentary Affairs was established in 2014. The Committee receives funding from the European Union, through the Centre for Applied Legal Research (CALR). Significant progress has been made but progress is still hampered by ministries who either do not have the capacity or the motivation to review legislation they administer. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Zimbabwe Economic Policy Analysis and Research Unit (ZEPARU) 2016. Baseline Survey of Economic Literacy for the Parliament of Zimbabwe. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Johane, G. 2017. A Review of Key Oversight and Law Making Actions Undertaken by the 8th Parliament:

    Outcomes and Impacts of the various capacity building Initiatives. A report prepared by the AC-Committees of Parliament. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Johane, G. 2017. A Review of Key Oversight and Law Making Actions Undertaken by the 8th Parliament:

    Outcomes and Impacts of the various capacity building Initiatives. A report prepared by the AC-Committees of Parliament. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Dube, R. 2013. Parliamentary Performance and Gender. Accesses at <http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/demgg/rau_gender_analysis_7th_parliament_1311.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. PSP document [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. See analysis of fiscal situation in Chapter 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-28)