

# UNDP – COMMUNITY RESILIENCE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (CRDP)



## Evaluation Report

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## **PREFACE**

The members of the AWRAD Team, who undertook the Final Evaluation of the Community Resilience Development Programme (CRDP), wish to express their utmost gratitude to the Senior officials of the Palestinian Authority from the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministries of Agriculture (MOA), of Local Government (MOLG) and of Jerusalem Affairs (MOJA), and to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for the opportunity to undertake this challenging assignment. They are grateful, in particular, to Estephan Salameh, Office of the Prime Minister, Marwan Durzi, of Area C Coordination Office (ACCO), Abdullah Q. Lahlouh of MOA, Mutasem Anani of MOLG, and Inad Surkhi of MOJA; to Roberto Valent, Narjess Saidane, Chikako Kodama, Nader Atta, Ruba El-Ghoul, Amjad Al Sharif and Dania Darwish of UNDP; to Jamal Al Aref, head of the CRDP-Project Management Unit and his colleagues; to Maher Daoudi, and Johan Schaar of the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), to Andrea Nasi of the Austrian Representative Office and Riham Kharoub of the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), Tor Gjerde, Morten Aulund and Ghassan Shakhshir of the Norwegian Representative Office of Norway to the Palestinian Authority, Susana Fernandez Rodrigues of the European Union (EU), Karita Laisi of the Representative Office of Finland and Eric De Muynck of the Belgian Development Cooperation.

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## List of Acronyms

ACCO	Area C National Coordination Office
ACTED	Agency for Technical and Development Cooperation
ADA	Austrian Development Agency
AFD	Agence Francaise de Developpement
AHLC	Ad Hoc Liaison Committee
APR	Annual Programme Review
AWP	Annual Work Plan
BoQ	Bills of Quantities
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CBO	Community Based Organization
CCA	Climate Change Adaptation
CCE	Birzeit Continuing Community Education Unit
CfP	Call for Proposal
COGAT	Coordinator of [Israeli] Government Activities in the Territories
CRDP	Community Resilience Development Programme
CSNGS	Cross Sectoral National Gender Strategy
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development, UK
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ECHO	European Civil-protection and Humanitarian-aid Operations
EJ	East Jerusalem
EU	European Union
EU HOMS	European Union Heads of Mission
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
FAIR	Facilitating Access to Infrastructure Resilience in Area C and EJ Programme
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK
GMS	General Management Support
GVS	Gruppo di Volontariato Civile
GU	Government Unit
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HPC	Humanitarian Programme Cycle
ICA	Israeli Civil Administration
ICBS	Israel Central Bureau of Statistics
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
ISS	Implementation Support Services
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IP	Implementation Partner
JG	Jerusalem Governorate
JSC	Joint Service Council
KM	Knowledge Management
LED	Local Economic Development
LL	Lessons Learned
LGU	Local Government Unit
LNGO	Local Non-Governmental Organization
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDLF	Municipal Development and Lending Fund

MOA	Ministry of Agriculture
MOJA	Ministry of Jerusalem Affairs
MOLG	Ministry of Local Government
MOPAD	Ministry of Planning and Development
MR	Management Response
MTE	Midterm Evaluation
NDC	NGO Development Center
NPA	National Policy Agenda
OM	Operational Manual
oPt	Occupied Palestinian Territory
PA	Palestinian Authority
PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau for Statistics
PD	Programme Document
PCARL	Partnership for Community-led Action for Resilience and Livelihoods
PMU	Project Management Unit
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
PNDP	Palestinian National Development Plan
RB	Review Board
RRF	Resources and Results Framework
RRM	Revised Risk Matrix
SB	Steering Board
SC	Steering Committee
SHS	Solar Home System
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SMDP	Strategic Multi-sectoral Development Plan
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
TCR	Technical Committee Report
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP/PAPP	United Nations Development Programme/Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNISDR	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UNSCO	United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process
USIP	United States Institute for Peace
VC	Village Council
VNDP	Village and Neighborhood Program
WFP	World Food Programme
YWCA	Young Women's Christian Association

## CRDP Evaluation: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The CRDP is a five-year UNDP-managed and multi donor-funded mechanism developed to address the primary issues necessary to facilitate the critical transition from humanitarian to development assistance in the communities of Area C and EJ through larger, sectorial and geographically-integrated investments. The CRDP was designed to launch the process of reclaiming the resources of Area C, the territory considered especially critical to long-term economic growth and the vision of a two-state solution. The reputation and expertise of the UNDP, led by the PA and funded by donors, would provide the management necessary to manage risks related to the investments.

Implementation started in September 2012, with initial, significant funding from Sweden of over USD 13 million. The United Kingdom (UK) joined the Programme in 2012, followed by Austria in 2013 and Norway in December 2014. UNDP provided an initial funding of USD 300,000. While the Programme was scheduled for completion by September 2015, its duration was extended. Sweden provided additional funding in December 2016, in the amount of USD 4.3 million. The Programme was extended until December 2017, with Sweden contributing 71 percent of donor funding.

This report represents the independent, final evaluation of the Programme, conducted between February and May 2017, and has been designed to build on the findings of the Midterm Evaluation, conducted in 2014. This Evaluation, commissioned by UNDP, assesses the CRDP initiative at the macro level, the progress made towards achieving the outputs and outcomes, and provides concrete recommendations (strategic, operational and financial) for the design of a new phase of the Programme. The Evaluation capitalized on the findings of the Midterm Review, and aims to benchmark CRDP's achievements to date, obtain an insight into Programme performance issues and how and why the midterm recommendations were incorporated into design and implementation strategies.

### **Findings**

The CRDP is a major and commendable achievement by all stakeholders, particularly the Project Management Unit (PMU-UNDP). It serves as a strong basis for continuous and sustainable efforts to develop and improve resilience in Area C and EJ. The Evaluation has identified four major strengths in the Programme<sup>1</sup>:

1. *The Programme developed a **Strategy for Area C and EJ**, which:*

- Placed Area C and EJ on the political and development map, and raised awareness regarding the urgency of addressing the development issues of these two areas of the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), both with the PA and the international donor community.

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<sup>1</sup> All findings are elaborated in the relevant text.



- Legitimized the right and urgency of investing in the sustainable development of Area C and EJ, rather than providing only short-term, humanitarian assistance.
  - Demonstrated that, with a focused mix of interventions, it is possible to evolve from humanitarian to development assistance.
  - Demonstrated that increasing connectedness between Area C and Areas A/B is possible, either for social services or economic activities (e.g., marketing of agricultural produce).
2. *The Programme prioritized **Institution Building**, which:*
- Laid the foundations for institution building in the PA, including the establishment of ACCO, the participation of MOLG, MOA, MOJA in the Review Board (RB), and the participation of Local Government Units (LGUs)/Village Councils (VCs)/Joint Service Councils (JSCs) and ministries at the governorate level in project design and implementation. More recently, the Programme has started supporting the Local Economic Development (LED) process in the governorates of Qalqilya and Tubas.
  - Increased local and national ownership of the development of Area C, and the protection of EJ (e.g., land registration), and started capitalizing on domestic talent (e.g., JSC engineers).
  - Achieved greater gender and social inclusion sensitivity across a wide range of activities and contexts (e.g., development of female sports clubs, so women and girls have a safe outlet outside home and work, while also learning to improve the nutrition of their families).
3. *The Programme encouraged **Innovation in Development Interventions**, which:*
- Tested new approaches for scaling-up lower-risk models for the delivery of essential services, such as the mobile information technology classrooms, or strengthening the agricultural value chain (e.g., milk collection trucks to reduce Bedouin transport and storage costs; regular supply of milk for cooperatives; community-based solar systems, in locales where electricity grids are unlikely to be installed; provision of buses for safe transport of children to Area A and B schools, rather than risk building a school in Area C).
  - Demonstrated that some risk-taking projects are possible and worth doing, even in the face of the Israeli government's restrictions and practices, and settlers' harassment of the Palestinian population.
  - Strengthened the value of a multi-sector approach to resilience, in order to achieve greater results and impacts.
4. *The Programme employed **CRDP implementation arrangements**, which*
- Strategically positioned UNDP to implement such complex and large initiatives, given its local experience in the oPt (i.e., conflict and occupation setting). UNDP has a track record in implementing such programmes and has utilized its expertise in the achievements and relative success of the CRDP.

The Evaluation has also identified five overall areas for improvement in the implementation of the CRDP to date:

1. *Design*

- In spite of the geographical refocusing of the Programme in two governorates of Area C and in EJ, the projects are still somewhat dispersed, weakening the level of synergy needed to generate a greater impact on resilience.
  - The sustainability of the individual projects and of the Programme as a whole is uncertain as no long-term provision has yet been made to ensure the technical, financial and institutional viability of the activities or of the *modus operandi* of the Programme.
  - Capitalization on the comparative advantage of UNDP as an experienced development organization and on the experience of various organizations and programmes operating in Area C and EJ is currently underway and further synergies must be pursued, such as with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in the implementation of agriculture interventions.
2. *Procedures*
- The allocation of Programme resources does not always follow rigorous, well-documented, and consistent procedures for the selection of all projects, which risks creating misunderstandings and misperceptions among the various stakeholders.
3. *Governance*
- The current governance structure, under the supervision of the RB, provides invaluable support, but must also provide additional strategic direction and improve its oversight responsibility.
  - While communications with communities, local and national stakeholders developed over time, the CRDP must further improve its communication and dissemination efforts, in order to avoid any misunderstanding or misinformation. A clear communication strategy established at the outset of the Programme would improve both information on the CRDP and its visibility.
4. *Management*
- The management responsibilities of the United Nations Development Programme/Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People (UNDP/PAPP) are delineated and communicated. The relation between UNDP/PAPP/PMU and the RB needs further clarity and delineation of accountability.
  - The Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Framework must be strengthened with additional, simple, but rigorous M&E tools and processes. In the absence of such improvements, the true impact of individual projects and of the Programme as a whole will not sufficiently be recognized, as it would rely heavily on anecdotal information and miss valuable information.
  - While a small number of knowledge products were produced (e.g., videos), project implementation experience does not efficiently inform decision-making or strategy, as no formal CRDP-led Knowledge Management system is in place to ensure capitalization of experience from one set of projects to the next. UNDP is currently making concerted efforts to produce knowledge products, which will address CRDP needs.

- The communication and advocacy strategies are not sufficiently capitalizing on the remarkable achievements of the Programme, hence limiting UNDP's ability to raise resources from new and additional donors.

#### *Resources*

- The PMU is understaffed, but receiving additional support from other UNDP staff.
- Funding is relatively small, in regards to guaranteeing long-term impact and equity in project implementation
- Some donors asserted that the reporting on programme financial results must strive to improve timeliness and consistency.

### **Recommendations**

The recommendations are based on the premise that there is a need to continue support for the present efforts of CRDP-UNDP. The Evaluation Team believes that, if the report's recommendations are properly implemented, CRDP-UNDP would be the appropriate mechanism for continuity. On the one hand, UNDP has the historical experience and institutional comparative advantage of working in Palestine and in development internationally. On the other hand, UNDP had accumulated rich experience during the past years, through managing the CRDP, and it would be more cost-effective to develop the CRDP based on the recommendations of this report, as opposed to venturing into other options.

The following recommendations are presented in four categories: recommendations for all stakeholders, followed by those for the PA, UNDP/PAPP/PMU, and donors.

#### ***For all stakeholders***

1. Recognize the CRDP as a true partnership between the PA, donors, UNDP and other international and local stakeholders, including 'beneficiaries'. On that basis, the Evaluation team believes that it is important to recognize both the accomplishments and the weaknesses of the Programme so far, and take equal responsibility for what has worked well and produced good results and what has not worked well. The stakes are extremely high for Area C and EJ and for Palestine. It is worth striving to consolidate what has been achieved in the first phase of the CRDP.
2. Proceed immediately with the establishment of the Steering Committee, initially envisaged to provide policy direction (in annual meetings), and maintain the RB as an oversight body for the delivery of the Programme (in quarterly meetings). In addition, ensure separation of powers between the two bodies. Furthermore, the roles and decision-making powers of each party must be clarified and agreed, so as to ensure that all decisions are made in a joint and transparent manner. The PA's strategic directions, as stipulated in national strategies, must be the main point of reference for decision-making on Area C and EJ.
3. Analyze thoroughly the lessons from CRDP I and determine, through answers to the following questions, what the next phase should be:
  - ✓ *Objectives/focus:* Should the same broad objectives be maintained or reformulated into more selective and time-bound resilience elements?

- ✓ *Pre-conditions:* Is it realistic to envisage sustainable development activities, so long as progress towards the two-state solution is stalled?
- ✓ *Size:* CRDP I received about USD 25 million. Should the size at least double for another five-year implementation period?
- ✓ *Content:* Should the Programme be an activity-based “small-grants programme” or should it aim at larger multi-year community-based development projects? What should be CRDP’s comparative advantage, as compared to other donor-supported programmes?
- ✓ *Operating modalities:* Under what arrangements with UNDP/PAPP should the PMU continue? Should there be implementation partners (IPs), and what kind? What is the best organizational arrangement to implement the Programme?

#### **For the PA**

1. Issue the strategies for Area C and EJ that will, in principle, lay the foundations for institutional and other development interventions, necessary not only for ‘resilience’ building, but also for the sustainable development of these areas.
2. Provide strategic guidance on national needs while providing technical support and oversight at the operational level, strengthen synergies and avoid duplication of support.
3. Formalize the role of ACCO as the true, leading institution for planning for Area C and EJ, in partnership with PA ministries, to ensure that all work -- including donor-funded work -- in Areas A & B mainstreams the needs of Area C and is coherent with the National Policy Agenda and the sector strategies.
4. As a co-chair, ACCO must convey national priorities during the RB meetings and ensure that there is no duplication of projects.

#### **Insights and Recommendations by the PMO**

While the views of all stakeholders are fully integrated in the report, the views of the PMO are highlighted, as they provide overall guidance from the highest authority on strategic development in the oPt. According to a written document provided by the PMO:

*The Palestinian Government would like to thank Sweden, Austria, Norway and UNDP in supporting and managing the CRDP. The CRDP remains to be an important programme that supports the resilience of the Palestinians in Area C and East Jerusalem, and the findings of the final evaluation clearly show a vested interest by all parties to learn from the previous experience and look forward to better improve ways of supporting Palestinian communities and the State of Palestine. While noting that there is still a room to engage the relevant ministries and directorates. The Palestinian Government is also pleased to see an increased ownership by the different directorates and*

*Government units in provision of support and guidance to the CRDP. Considering that none of the government members of the RB was involved in the selection of implementing partners from the civil society sector, the Government reiterates again the importance of following a transparent set of selection of criteria for selection of partners in Area C and in East Jerusalem. This Government emphasizes the need to clearly agree on the role of all partners during the decision making process.*

**For UNDP/PAPP-CRDP**

- Measures to improve CRDP performance towards objectives include the following:
  - ✓ Further clarify the roles between UNDP/PAPP and the PMU, so that the PMU is empowered to be accountable in its efforts to deliver a quality programme in full compliance with UNDP quality standards.
  - ✓ Facilitate adequate staffing, top quality training and mentoring of PMU staff currently in place, particularly the M&E staff, so that the Results and Resources Framework (RRF) can be revised with an effective hierarchy of results, outcomes, and impact indicators, and the methodology, which informs these indicators, can be designed and adopted (Systematic before-and-after interviews with beneficiaries would be a significant improvement and is an example of a better methodology that employs well-tested M&E tools).
  - ✓ Engage proactively in knowledge dissemination with all stakeholders in Palestine to improve project/activity design, and provide documentation that donors and other stakeholders can use to mobilize their electorates to advocate for their governments to continue or start engaging in the CRDP.
  - ✓ Prepare, in partnership with the PMU and the PA, a Proposal Document for the continuation of the CRDP, based on the critical lessons learned from CRDP I. This Proposal Document should include a review and documentation of lessons learned to inform the next phase of the CRDP. It should also include an implementation structure and implementation modalities with clear objective criteria against which oversight can be performed and evaluated, including transparency and accountability measures in the selection of project/activities and implementation partners. Capacity building of PA institutions should remain a core objective for the long-term sustainability of the Programme outcomes and impacts.
  - ✓ Support the PA in convening a conference chaired by the Prime Minister, responsible for leading harmonization of policy interventions in Area C and EJ and assisting the PA in raising funds for CRDP II.
  - ✓ Further utilize the technical experience and lessons learned accumulated from other existing programmes implementing similar interventions (e.g., land reclamation, support to income generation projects, infrastructure, etc.), in addition to the experience of previous programmes (e.g., area development programme).

- ✓ Engage in communications on the results of the CRDP, and advocacy based on results on the ground from CRDP implementation, including with and through the UN, for the benefit of two-state solution. These include:
  - Detail its 2017 work-programme with dated performance/output indicators.
  - Complete the PMU staffing proposal for submission to UNDP/PAPP.
  - Strengthen the financial management function to ensure consistency and timeliness of financial reporting.
  - Increase networking with other specialized UN agencies and other development actors through the UN Cluster System, in order to identify potential cooperation and complementarity.
  - Document project and Programme-level indicator, capable of measuring beneficiary responses to, and perceptions of, Programme investments related to increasing resilience.

#### ***For Donors***

1. Agree as a unified group on implementation modalities and the best means of exercising their oversight responsibility over CRDP, within the parameters of existing contracts with the PA and UNDP.
2. Clearly establish the reporting needs and agree on unified reporting requirements.
3. Based on UNDP experience, commit to funding the next phase of CRDP implementation, provided the reforms, based on the recommendations in this report, are continued.
4. Assist UNDP raise resources for the next phase of the Programme from additional donors.
5. Increase engagement in advocacy for Area C and EJ at the international level and with the Israeli government.

## Chapter I: Introduction and Background

This section undertakes to: (i) summarize background information presented in the Midterm Evaluation Report (conducted in January 2015); (ii) highlight the changes which have taken place in the design and implementation of the Programme following the Midterm Evaluation; and (iii) provide the background to the Final Evaluation of the Programme and the Terms of Reference.

### 1.1 Summary presentation of the CRDP

**Historical Background<sup>2</sup>.** The CRDP was the result of a three-year process, initiated by Sweden in 2009, when the country held the EU Presidency. At the time, and again in 2011, following its analysis of the Palestinian National Development Plan, Sweden emphasized the importance of Area C under the two-state solution. Sweden further asserted that the time had come to shift the focus of aid policy and programmes, away from humanitarian assistance and, instead, provide development aid. This meant being willing to take risks vis-à-vis the Israeli Civil Administration (ICA) and undertake legitimate development actions in Area C and EJ that did not need ICA's prior approval.

Subsequently, a process designed to determine practical measures, capable of address the issue of Area C and EJ, was initiated. It began with the EU Heads of Missions (EU HOMs) Report on Area C and the EU Council Conclusions of May 14, 2012. In parallel, the PA placed the issue of Area C on the agenda of subsequent Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) meetings, and initiated the CRDP with the donors and the United Nations Development Programme<sup>3</sup>. At the same time, the EU also reconsidered its assistance in the oPt, but opted to provide its aid on the basis of Master Plans, approved by the ICA.

Sweden pursued three goals, all in support of the two-state solution, as articulated by the Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995:

- (i) To evolve its aid from humanitarian aid to development assistance;
- (ii) To challenge the PA to take charge of Area C and EJ; and
- (iii) To give the Palestinians of Area C and EJ a chance to protect their basic civil rights, to stay on their land and safeguard their livelihoods, to live productively and with dignity, and to have access to education, health, and housing.

After in-depth discussions with various UN agencies, such as the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO) and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), the PA and Sweden selected UNDP as the executing agency to launch such a programme, in 2012, on account of its development experience. The CRDP was prepared through close collaboration between the PA, through the Ministry of Planning and Development (MOPAD)<sup>4</sup>, the United Nations Development Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People and the Government of Sweden. The UK

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<sup>2</sup>This section draws on the written documentation reviewed, as well as interviews with SIDA and UNDP staff. It is significant to note that this section records facts and processes not previously registered in the CRDP Programme Document.

<sup>3</sup>Interviews with SIDA and UNDP.

<sup>4</sup> MOPAD was dissolved in 2016; the planning functions were transferred to the Prime Minister's Office.

joined the Programme in 2012, Austria in 2013 and Norway in 2014; they all endorsed the selection of UNDP because of its risk management experience in the West Bank and Gaza.<sup>5</sup>

**Objectives.** The CRDP was designed to meet the overall goal: “to empower local stakeholders in Area C and EJ, through the most appropriate partners (local NGOs (LNGOs), International NGOs (INGOs)), to act with resilience to respond to threats that affect their sustenance on the land,”<sup>6</sup> and included three specific objectives:

- i) Prevent the erosion of living conditions of Palestinians in Area C and EJ that undermines their development capital;
- ii) Protect Palestinian land and property in Area C and EJ; and
- iii) Mitigate and ideally reverse the migration flow from Area C and EJ by enhancing human security and the livelihood of Palestinians.

The Programme was structured along four major outputs:<sup>7</sup>

- (i) Output 1: Public and social infrastructure in Area C and EJ are improved;
- (ii) Output 2: Access to and protection of natural resources is improved;
- (iii) Output 3: Economic opportunities are enhanced through support to livelihoods in Area C and EJ; and,
- (iv) Output 4: Rights of Palestinian citizens in Area C and EJ are upheld through legal protection, advocacy, and community participation and mobilization.

The Programme was to be implemented through projects identified and selected through a competitive system of calls for proposals (in Rounds 1-3). A four-tier institutional structure was adopted for the Programme execution:

- i) A Steering Committee of PA ministers and heads of donor agencies was to provide the Programme’s overall policy direction;
- ii) A Review Board, co-chaired by MOPAD and UNDP, comprising representatives from the PA and donor agencies, was to make decisions on the selection of projects;
- iii) A Programme implementation unit was to be set-up to undertake the overall programme management and field supervision; and,
- iv) International and local non-governmental organizations<sup>8</sup> were expected to develop and implement projects at the field level.

In addition, technical support to the PMU was to be provided by the technical staff of UNDP. Periodic monitoring reports would be prepared by field-level implementing partners, collated and sent to the members of the Steering Committee by the PMU. At the end of each project, a completion report would be prepared to assess the projects achievements, impacts, and lessons learned.

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<sup>5</sup> CRDP Mid-term Evaluation, interviews.

<sup>6</sup> Programme Document, Community Resilience and Development Programme for area C and East Jerusalem (CRDP), 2012.

<sup>7</sup> These original outputs were modified as clarified in section 1.2.

<sup>8</sup> Community-based organizations (CBOs) were not mentioned in the original CRDP Project Document, only in the revised document of 2016.



Implementation started in September 2012<sup>9</sup>, with initial, significant funding from Sweden of over USD 13 million. The UK joined the Programme in 2012 followed by Austria in 2013, and Norway in December 2014. UNDP provided an initial funding of USD 300,000. The Programme was scheduled for completion by September 2015. Sweden and Austria provided additional funding in 2016. Sweden's contribution represents 71 percent of the donors' funding. The duration of the Programme was extended to December 2017. Table 1 below presents the funds provided by donors to the CRDP as of March, 2017.

**Table 1: Donor Contributions in Dollars, March 2017**

Donor Contributions	Figures, up to March 2017
SIDA	17,064,211
ADA	4,736,203
Norway	1,801,299
UK (FCO)	453,172
<b>Total</b>	<b>24,054,885</b>

**The Evaluation team used the figures provided from various progress reports to donors and confirmed by UNDP on May 19, 2017<sup>10</sup>. Any updates are included in the footnotes.**

## 1.2 Changes in Programme Design and Implementation Arrangements since the Midterm Evaluation

In the early months of 2015, the CRDP Programme management began to experience an extended period of change, including staffing changes and attritions. The PMU staff composition underwent frequent changes, including interim arrangements with UNDP staff. The current Manager was only appointed in December 2016. The evaluation of those changes is addressed in section 4.3. Most importantly, there were significant changes in Programme design and implementation arrangements.

<sup>9</sup> In 2012, an agreement was signed between the Government of Sweden and UNDP/PAPP to support a three-year programme (from 2012 to 2015), with a total amount of SEK 90,000,000, equivalent to around USD 13,717,420. In the same year, the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) joined the Programme and provided £300,000, equivalent to USD 453,172 for the first year of the Programme. In 2013, the government of Austria joined the Programme and contributed €1,900,000, equivalent to around USD 2,620,691, to support the Programme for two years.

<sup>10</sup> In the CRDP Year 1 Narrative Progress Report, under "Other funding sources (for Year 1)," a contribution of USD 300,000 USD was listed from UNDP/PAPP. This amount has not been carried forward into the figures reported by the PMU nor UNDP/PAPP in table 1; of this USD 150,000 was reported expensed towards the initial needs assessment. In the Year 2 Annual Progress Report sent to Norway on September 13, 2014, an additional sum was mentioned in the "Revenue received" described as "Trust Fund Cost Sharing" of 150,000 USD. The same additional item was mentioned in the "Revenue received" in the Year 2 Annual Progress Report sent to ADA on March 22, 2015. The RFP for this Evaluation states the total Austrian contribution as USD 4,759,999 (USD 4,202,585 paid up + USD 557,414 that has been paid in later part of 2017), i.e. a discrepancy of USD 23,796 with the figures in progress reports to donors.

With the objective of supporting the economic viability of communities and remaining present as a basic entry point to resilience building, the primary changes that occurred following the Midterm Evaluation (MTE) included<sup>11</sup>:

- An **integrated clustering and community approach** to development interventions was adopted focusing on two areas of Area C, identified through socio-economic research;
- The **process of call for proposals (CfP) was changed** to focus on working with IPs that have strong ties to the selected cluster;
- In EJ, a **greater focus on strategic interventions** was adopted, in order to create potential impact on the ground beyond project-by-project activities; and,
- A stronger emphasis was placed **on advancing the development agenda in Area C and EJ** through community-based platforms and advocacy tools.

By contrast to the 2012-2014 implementation period, which had a broad geographical scope across the West Bank and EJ, reflective of the new means by which the calls for proposals were formulated, for 2015-2017 the Programme was refocused and limited geographically to the Qalqilya and Tubas governorates in Area C<sup>12</sup>, and to EJ.

- In Qalqilya, the Programme targets 9 villages: Immatin, Jinsafut, Kafr Laqif, Jit, Kafr Qaddum, Al Funduq, Baqat al Hatab, Hajja and Far'ata with a total population of 22,409.
- In Tubas, 19 communities are targeted with an estimated population of 6,744<sup>13</sup>. These communities are subject to: movement restrictions, prevention of access to agriculture land and water resources, and access to basic needs. The targeted communities are: Aqaba, Khirbet Yarza, Hamammat al Maleh- al Burj, Hamammat al Maleh – al Meiteh, Hamammat al Maleh, Ein al Hilwa Wadi al Faw, Ein al Hilwa - Um al Jmal, Ein al Hilwa, Al Farisiya Nab'a Al Ghazal, Al Farsiya Ihmayyer, Al Farisiya Khallet Khader, Al Farisiya - al Zu'bi, Al Farisiya - al Jubiya, Al Qaffaf, Ad Deir, Khirbet Tell el Himma, Kardala, Bardala and Ein el Beida.


The process adopted to select the governorates, villages and communities is discussed in section 4.3. The Programme outputs (results) were redefined as follows:

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<sup>11</sup> CDRP Implementation Strategy 2016-2017 as agreed by all relevant stakeholders.

<sup>12</sup> The Tubas and Hebron governorates were initially proposed by the PMU. Tubas was selected on the basis of being under-served by overall interventions. However, on the recommendation of the MOLG and MOA, the RB agreed to Qalqilya, as well. Source: Minutes of RB meetings.

<sup>13</sup> Data collected from April to November 2015. Source: GVC Need Assessment.



It is worth highlighting that the scope of the original output 2: “Access to and protection of natural resources” was partially merged with output 3 “Economic opportunities are enhanced through support to livelihoods” and expanded into “Access to sustainable livelihood and business opportunities”. Output 4, specifically its focus on “rights and community participation” was split into two outputs: institutional and capacity building (new output 3), and nationally-led development role in Area C and [development process] supported in EJ (new output 4).

The main changes in the implementation arrangements were to include:

- The calls for proposals was to be based on needs assessments to be carried out in the two selected governorates of Area C;
- The Steering Committee, which had been envisaged at the onset of the Programme but not implemented by the time of the MTE, was to be revived as per the recommendation of MOPAD<sup>14</sup>.

### 1.3 Background to the Final Evaluation and Terms of Reference

UNDP/PAPP commissioned an independent evaluation to assess the CRDP initiative at the macro level, with the objective of providing concrete recommendations (strategic, operational and financial) design of a new phase of the Programme. The evaluation Terms of Reference included:

- (i) to assess how the CRDP has contributed to the change of thinking of different stakeholders from humanitarian to development assistance;
- (ii) to provide concrete recommendations (strategic, operational and financial) for the continuation of the Programme; and
- (iii) to assess the level of progress made towards achieving the outputs and outcomes listed in the refocused Programme Document (adjusted approach)<sup>15</sup>.

<sup>14</sup> RB meeting minutes, January 27, 2015. MOPAD’s proposal is not included in the CRDP Implementation Strategy 2016-17. The minutes of the various technical and RB meetings after the January 27, 2015 meeting do not include any further discussion of this point.

<sup>15</sup> Annex 1 provides the detailed terms of reference.

## Chapter II: Evaluation Analytical Framework and Methodology

This chapter presents the analytical framework and the methodology used by the Final Evaluation. The first section re-examines the basic concept of resilience used to design the CRDP, particularly in light of the lessons learned from resilience planning in the oPt and new thinking that has been generated since the MTE. The second section presents the analytical framework used by the Final Evaluation, and the third section outlines the methodology.

### 2.1 Analytical Framework

Resilience<sup>16</sup>-building in the sustainable development process, as well as resilience of capacities, can best be understood as composed of three levels, each of which exists on a spectrum: *absorptive*, the ability to cope with shocks in order to return to equilibrium; *adaptive*, or adjustment to shocks; and *transformative*, or actual change, is the capacity to cross thresholds into new development trajectories, moving beyond the existing model<sup>17</sup>. Vulnerability will not be reduced by absorptive or adaptive capacities alone, but requires transformative change for genuine empowerment to take place.

Adapted to the objective of the CRDP, this framework demonstrates that CRDP would assist to (a) not only strengthen the individuals, households, and communities of Area C and EJ, but to preserve their assets and productive capacity in order to recover from the exogenous disruptions from the Occupation or from other events, e.g., those induced by climate change; (b) adapt, in terms of having strategies and competencies to manage the continuing effects and ever-present threats of both occupation policies and other unforeseen events, rather than potentially succumb over time, and (c) create the conditions for those individuals, households, and communities to transform to a higher level of performance, as they manage their assets, improve their livelihood and take charge of their social and economic development for the current and future generations. Applied to aid, the evolution from a lower to a higher level of resilience would mean moving away from providing humanitarian assistance to providing development assistance, which was one of Sweden's goals when launching of the Programme. Applied to policy, however, the implementation of the two-state solution and the promoting of full PA sovereignty over the Palestinian territory under the two-state solution are *sine qua non* conditions for sustainable development. For the purpose of the Final Evaluation, a key question is, therefore, whether the CRDP has the potential to achieve both outcomes: increased resilience and sustainable development.

The Evaluation has subsumed the evaluation questions and themes delineated in the Terms of Reference (ToR) under the standard Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria for evaluation, i.e., relevance, ownership, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.

- *Relevance* focuses on the appropriateness of the Programme to the needs and interest of the local population and communities, as well as alignment with PA and donors' goals.

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<sup>16</sup> For more on the concept of resilience, please refer to Annex 2.

<sup>17</sup> Adapted from Carver, Charles S., 1998. Resilience and Thriving: Issues, Models, and Linkages. *Journal of Social Issues*. Vol. 54, No.2, pp. 245-266.

- *Ownership* looks at the degree of involvement, and buy-in by the national and local stakeholders during the different stages of the Programme.
- *Efficiency* is the assessment of the extent to which resources/inputs have led to the intended results.
- *Effectiveness* addresses the level of achievement of the different expected outputs and major bottlenecks faced and those that are likely to continue during the implementation of the Programme. Finally,
- *Sustainability* refers to examining the determinants of sustainability in the operational context, as well as the probability of the Programme impacts to continue in the long-term.

In addition, the Evaluation carefully reviewed the use of the logical framework applied by UNDP for the re-design of the Programme, a document which aims to link a programme goal and expected results with the actions to be taken in order to achieve the goal and results. One important element is to clearly identify the conditions and assumptions for success or the constraints. The Evaluation specifically focused on whether the outcomes and assumptions for the Programme were clearly specified at the outset, and whether the risks and vulnerabilities were adequately conceptualized.

## 2.2 Methodology

The Final Evaluation was conducted according to the following methodology:

- (i) A literature review, comprising a comprehensive review of all documentation provided by UNDP, the PMU, and other stakeholders engaged. In addition, the team carried out its own research and review of PA documents, publications of bilateral and multilateral agencies, as well as academic literature. Annex 3 provides a bibliography and Annex 4 provides a list of documents reviewed.
- (ii) Interviews: 19 individual interviews, 11 field visits (which included interviews with stakeholders) and three debriefing meetings were carried out with stakeholders, who included donors, implementers, beneficiaries, and other relevant informants.
- (iii) Focus groups: The Evaluation Team conducted two focus group discussions: one with representatives of implementing agencies in EJ and one with representatives of IPs in Area C and one with a group of beneficiaries. Annex 5 provides a list of interview and focus group participants.
- (iv) Field visits: The Evaluation Team visited 11 projects in the two clusters of Tubas and Qalqilya, three projects in EJ, and two projects in the Bethlehem governorate were revisited. Due to the limited time allocated for this evaluation, a proposed visit to the South Hebron Hills projects was cancelled. The projects were selected by the Evaluation Team in agreement with the PMU<sup>18</sup> in order to: cover the new clusters, EJ and some of the projects

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<sup>18</sup> The PMU added suggestions to the list proposed by the Evaluation Team in the draft Inception Report. Therefore, the Evaluation team assumed that the final list had been approved by UNDP/PAPP.

completed in Round 1-3; reach a balanced coverage of the four Programme outputs, and, within each output, receive exposure to various issues and the full range of implementers (INGOs, LNGOs, CBOs and LGUs). The PMU facilitated the contacts with the implementers, and the Evaluation Team finalized the programme of field visits based on time, distance, and the availability of implementers' staff and beneficiaries. During field visits, the Team met with representatives of LGUs, as well as INGOs, LNGOs, CBOs and beneficiaries. A rapid appraisal methodology through group and individual in-depth interviews was used, and preferred to focus groups of formal beneficiaries. Separate meetings were held with women, where appropriate and feasible<sup>19</sup>.

- (v) A review of CRDP Programme documentation. The Evaluation team selected a representative sample of 20 percent of projects by number and 12 percent by dollar value, from Rounds 4 and 5 (based on type of IP, project theme, location of intervention, and dollar value) for a deeper analysis of how gender considerations, risks, M&E, and sustainability were presented in the project proposals and reported on by IPs. The findings have been integrated into the relevant sections<sup>20</sup>.
- (vi) An interim debriefing meeting was held with the head of the PMU, on March 2nd, 2017, towards the close of field work, to obtain feedback on the team's preliminary observations.
- (vii) A draft version of the report was discussed with UNDP on April 13<sup>th</sup>, 2017, and a debriefing presentation was made to the RB on May 17<sup>th</sup>, 2017.

The Evaluation Team had to overcome a number of difficulties in completing the work within the agreed timeframe. The field-work period was shorter than optimal. Fewer than expected IPs responded to the invitation for the focus groups. Although CRDP made significant progress in its data collection, and in reconciling data and statistics on Area C and EJ, much of the reporting by IPs for the final rounds is not yet completed and some documents were missing. The CRDP-UNDP team was responsive in providing documents, but some were transmitted later in the evaluation.<sup>21</sup>

Most of the challenges relate to the overall context of Area C and EJ and are faced by all organizations working in these areas. Any research or evaluation will suffer from the differing understandings between donors, the PA and experts related to which parts of Area C are truly available for development, the various methodologies used to undertake needs, communities and institutional assessments (for example, representative sample versus surveys), and the use of terminology that is not precisely defined (e.g., outputs and outcomes; resilience; high, medium, and low risks)<sup>22</sup>. Data accuracy and terminology precision may not be important to organizations supporting humanitarian assistance (help

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<sup>19</sup> The list of field visits is provided in Annex 6.

<sup>20</sup> A sample of reviewed project documents is available in Annex 7.

<sup>21</sup> The last set of documents and inputs was received on May 22nd, 2017.

<sup>22</sup> Refer to: AIDA, *Failing to Make the Grade: How the EU can pass its own test and work to improve the lives of Palestinians in Area C*, 2012. Also refer to: Diakonia, 'Planning to Fail: The planning regime in Area C of the West Bank: an international law perspective', October 2016.

people in crisis situation), but is essential for development work. For example, even though the PMU uses maps and data from OCHA, there continues to be a need for a document that clearly presents the distribution of the land area in the West Bank, in Area C or the localization of the CRDP-financed projects in Area C and EJ. Although OCHA has made a major effort in producing maps<sup>23</sup>, they are not detailed enough to easily do fieldwork. Information on the demographics of Area C and EJ is still somewhat fluid, in spite of the numerous studies by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) (see Chapter III). Data on infrastructure and natural resources are also very fragmented. This question of data should be addressed for the continuation of the Programme, including for the need to document project and programme-level indicators which would measure beneficiary responses to, and perceptions of, programme investments related to increasing resilience.

## **Chapter III: Understanding the Context for the CRDP (Overall and Project Context)**

The design and implementation of the CRDP has taken place in a complex political, economic, and institutional environment, which poses significant challenges. The overall political, economic, and institutional context is briefly described in the next sections. In addition, this chapter presents an analysis of the CRDP portfolio, as it is a basis for couching the evaluation questions.

### **3.1 Political Context**

Since the Oslo Accords signed in 1993 and 1995, the West Bank has been divided into three areas: Area A, under the control of the PA, Area B, under the joint control of the PA and Israel, and Area C, under the sole control of Israel. The Accords stipulated that Area B and C would be progressively transferred to the PA within a three to five-year period. After 1995, the PA focused on Areas A and B, while the donors earmarked them for development assistance, and Area C and EJ were earmarked for humanitarian assistance.

Despite shifts in the policies of the PA and of some major development actors since the MTE, progress towards more sustainable, development-oriented assistance to Area C communities has been slow. As a result, humanitarian efforts remain the primary form of assistance for Area C communities and access to basic services is still compromised in many locations. The limitations – and potential impact - of current approaches carry some risks, with the potential to increase short-term risks to the communities, as well as longer-term risks, in terms of increased emigration to Area A and B and further fragmentation of the West Bank into segregated and ‘de-developed’ enclaves, which poses a severe risk to the two-state solution.

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<sup>23</sup> The team collected them and found them most useful.

The PA policies on national development in general, and Area C in particular, have become more clearly articulated since 2014, when the Government of Palestine prepared a “National Strategic Framework for Development Policies and Interventions in ‘Area C’ (2014-16). This was followed by the publication of a new National Strategy Agenda 2017-2022 (see Section 3.4).

The impetus for the PA to devote increasing resources and energy to the development of Area C has been prompted by several factors. In 2013, the World Bank published a report<sup>24</sup> that highlighted the economic importance of Area C for the Palestinian economy and as a corner-stone of the two-state solution. More recent factors include: President Abbas’s speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2015, which underlined the PA’s shift to asking for open development support to Area C and EJ; in 2016, the rise to power of Donald Trump, which has raised new questions concerning the continuation of the two-decades-old US commitment to the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel as part of a permanent Middle-East peace agreement; and the vote in the Israeli parliament to retroactively legalize thousands of illegitimate settler homes in outposts built on private Palestinian land, in a highly controversial move described by critics as a “land grab.”<sup>25</sup> Donors have become increasingly engaged in Area C and EJ in support of the PA strategy. Although different approaches are adopted, those that are working are moving into somewhat uncharted areas of engagement in an effort to save the two-state solution.<sup>26</sup>

### **3.2 Economic and Social Development Potential in Area C**

Since 2000, Palestinian economic growth has been increasingly volatile. Dependent on foreign aid and private consumption of imports, this growth has been judged to be unsustainable.<sup>27</sup> At the same time, the Israeli occupation has increasingly separated and shrunk the areas of the West Bank available for Palestinian expansion and development, creating a dysfunctional economic base, which does not provide a viable foundation for sustainable and equitable social development. Although there has been steady progress in some Palestinian development indicators – for example, levels of literacy and education,

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<sup>24</sup> World Bank, “Area C and the future of the Palestinian Economy,” 2013.

<sup>25</sup> A PA report to the AHLC in September 2016 claimed that, if the current rate of settlement expansion continues, the settler population will surpass one million people by 2030. For a fuller review of the land and settlement issue, see: Kerem Navot: Blue and White Make Black. The Work of Blue Line Team in the West Bank. December 2016. As regards American resolve to a two-state solution, the President visited the West Bank in May 2017. According to the Los Angeles Times of May 24th, 2017: “the U.S. president’s remarks [in Bethlehem] did not include any reference to a “two-state solution,” with Israel and a Palestinian state existing side by side.” According to the May 21<sup>st</sup>, 2017 of Ha’retz, a leading Israeli newspaper, in anticipation of the US President’s visit, the Israeli security cabinet approved some economic measures in favor of Palestinians in Area C, including the regularization of homes built in Area C, without permit. No announcement was made by the US President on his pledge to move the US Embassy to Jerusalem.

<sup>26</sup> For example, the EU is already implementing projects in communities where Master Plans, submitted for Israeli approval, have passed an 18-month moratorium without Israeli approval.

<sup>27</sup> World Bank, ‘Economic Monitoring Report to the ad hoc liaison committee’, April 2016.



maternal mortality – other key indicators suggest a deteriorating situation, with social conditions and living standards stagnating or deteriorating.<sup>28</sup>

Over 60 percent of the West Bank is classified as Area C and remains under the administrative and political control of Israel. Palestinians in Area C are subject to a complex system of control by the Israeli authorities, including those induced by Israeli settlements and settlement infrastructure, which restricts their movement and access, as well as their ability to use land, plan their communities, and build homes and infrastructure. These restrictions are the prime contributing factor to chronic vulnerability, humanitarian needs, and violation of human rights among many Palestinian communities.

Area C of the West Bank is crucial to the prosperity of the Palestinian economy, as it is endowed with minerals, stone quarries, potential for tourism, housing, air space for telecommunications, and agriculture-based and other economic activities. Area C is also critical to maintaining the contiguity of the territory required for freedom of movement in the West Bank.<sup>29</sup> It contains the bulk of agricultural and grazing land, as well as land reserves and resources that are essential for Palestinian growth and development.

### **3.3 Institutional Context**

Neither the PA, nor any PA institutions operating in EJ, has any jurisdiction in Area C, although small, local government structures do exist in larger communities and limited government health, education, social and policing services are provided. In EJ, an impressive range of donor-funded LNGOs, CBOs and INGOs provide social services and development programmes to the community. In contrast, few LNGOs or CBOs are based in Area C. These institutions do provide donor-funded humanitarian assistance to communities and have built up considerable experience in how best to meet community needs, in ways that go transcend merely addressing humanitarian vulnerabilities. As a result, the institutional environment in both areas lacks coherence, while Area C lacks the institutional assets and operational structures found in Areas A and B.

The PA has focused its assistance – supported by significant donor contributions – in Areas A and B since 1994, and has been cautious in considering Area C and EJ, not least because it fears that the successes achieved in Areas A and B would be compromised by such a shift of focus, but also because it lacks administrative and political jurisdiction. Donors, notably the EU, have invested in development initiatives in EJ since 2007 and a multi-donor mechanism to address humanitarian needs in Palestine has been in place for many years<sup>30</sup> through

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<sup>28</sup> Unemployment and poverty is growing. In 2016, unemployment stood at 18 percent, compared to 16 percent in 2015. Food insecurity is endemic with an estimated 1.6 million people in the West Bank (27 percent of the population) projected to require some form of humanitarian assistance in 2014. At the World Economic Forum for the Middle East and North Africa (Dead Sea, Jordan, May 19-21 2017), Dr. Saeb Erekat, Chief Peace Negotiator for Palestine, quoted unemployment rates of 26 percent in the West Bank and 59 percent in Gaza.

<sup>29</sup> World Bank, 'Area C and the future of the Palestinian Economy'.

<sup>30</sup> Humanitarian assistance was primarily channeled through the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) managed by the UN, OCHA, INGOs and the UN clusters who identified the humanitarian needs of communities in Area C, EJ and Gaza. Projects funded through CAP were implemented primarily through INGOs and LNGOs who partnered

INGOs, LNGOs and CBOs. Coordination of interventions has not always been optimal; sector coverage has been fragmented and a lack of clear national plans – which can rapidly become outdated in such volatile operating environments – have hampered effectiveness. In addition, donors and UN agencies were, and still are, themselves cautious about a more collective approach to work in Area C and EJ, partly because of blurred boundaries and mandates between humanitarian and development actors, but also because of the implications on funding for their ongoing programmes there. Although the PA has made attempts to improve aid coordination overall, donors have not always responded positively to these efforts. One of the roles of the newly established ACCO is to enhance donor coordination, in order to enhance aid effectiveness.

To sum up: the CRDP mechanism was developed in an attempt to address the main issues necessary to shepherd the critical transition from humanitarian to development assistance in the communities of Area C and EJ by much larger, sectorial and geographically-integrated investments. The risks related to these investments could be managed through the clout and expertise of the international community (UNDP), led by the PA (MOPAD), and funded by donors. The CRDP was meant to trigger the process of reclaiming the resources of Area C, seen as critically vital to both long-term economic growth<sup>31</sup> and the vision of a two-state solution. It was envisaged that the UNDP would provide cost-effective management and effective reporting for donors. As government structures in the areas were either non-existent or institutionally weak, the mechanism would also draw on the implementation expertise of INGOs, LNGOs and CBOs.

### **3.4 Guiding Documents**

The CRDP implementation period 2012-2017 coincides with the implementation of a number of fundamental policy documents, which serve to guide the PA's policies for Area C and EJ, as well as UN and donor documents, which frame their policies and activities in Palestine. The main documents include:

The PA's most recent national plans:

- The 2011-13 National Development Plan: Establishing the State, Building our Future
- The 2014-16 National Development Plan: State Building to Sovereignty
- The 2017-22: National Policy Agenda: Putting Citizens First.

In addition to, the National Strategic Framework for Development Policies and Interventions (2014-2016), published in May 2014.

Every PA National Development Plan has emphasized human and institutional capacity building, improved social services and infrastructure, and measures to improve economic growth in an effort to move towards the two-state solution. Although building the resilience of the Palestinian people and communities was mentioned in these plans, there was no

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with CBOs. The CAP Programme was designed to target the most urgent needs, but these needs extend far beyond addressing humanitarian vulnerabilities.

<sup>31</sup>Calculations done by the UNDP and later published by the World Bank estimate potential revenue from Area C activities of USD 3.5 billion, and would create over 150,000 jobs.

strategic attention or emphasis devoted to Area C and EJ. Reflecting this deficiency, the National Policy Agenda (NPA), 2017-22 goes far beyond previous plans. It lays bare the urgency of prioritizing Area C, as an integral part of the Palestinian territory, and of EJ as the future capital of the State of Palestine. For the PA's institutional, social and development interventions, it highlights the proposed support to Area C and EJ. The third pillar of the NPA's agenda: 'Sustainable Development' articulates five national priorities: economic independence; social justice and rule of law; quality education for all; quality health care for all; and resilient communities<sup>32</sup>. An action plan, delineating planning and development approaches to Area C, is due for release in June 2017. The plan will form an annex to national sectorial strategies and guide the planning approach by treating Areas A, B and C as one unified territory.

The PA National Strategic Framework for Development Policies and Interventions (2014-2016) sought to:

- Safeguard Palestinian sovereignty over territory and natural resources, and preserve the historic and cultural legacy of Area C.
- Protect Area C as an integral part of Palestine, not as an annex to the rest of the West Bank.
- Support the steadfastness of Palestinian citizens, providing a decent living and public services.
- Assert citizens' right to free movement and a decent life in Area C, and, indeed, anywhere in their homeland within the pre-June 1967 borders.
- Preserve the unity and integrity of Palestinian territory, enabling equitable development and sharing of available resources throughout Palestine.
- Ensure engagement of all key stakeholders and support their efforts. And,
- Support the achievement of overarching national objectives, including bridging development disparities and geographical and socio-economic fragmentation created by the Israeli occupation.

The 16 proposed policies and areas of intervention covered governance, human development and social services, protection of land rights, agricultural and infrastructure development. Besides the role of PA institutions, the Strategic Framework for Area C confirmed the significant role of local, as well as INGOs and a concerted cooperation with donors. Although it represents a first attempt to consolidate basic ideas and possible approaches to work in Area C, a more refined and practical strategy for work in the territory is still needed. The document also highlights the need for risk-taking by all stakeholders active in Area C. The PMO informed the Evaluation Team that the 'implementation plan' of the Strategic Framework for Area C should be ready by June 2017, and will be linked to all detailed PA sector strategies, currently being developed in alignment with the National Policy Agenda.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> State of Palestine. National Policy Agenda 2017-2022: Putting Citizens First. December 2016

<sup>33</sup> Meeting with ACCO director.

The first United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)<sup>34</sup> 2014-2016 identified six pillars for its development assistance:

- Economic empowerment, livelihoods, food security and decent work
- Governance, rule of law, justice and human rights
- Education
- Health
- Social protection
- Urban development, natural resource management and infrastructure

UNDAF is signed by all United Nations agencies present in Palestine. It can be expected, therefore, that, not only the UNDAF is congruent with the priorities of the National Development Plans, but that the complementarity between the programmes of the relevant UN agencies will be carefully designed and assessed by each.

The CRDP is anchored in the UNDP/PAPP strategic document entitled 'Development for Freedom. Empowering lives. Resilient Nation. Consolidated Plan of Assistance 2012-2014'<sup>35</sup> which was extended until 2017. The 2012-2014 document identified four areas for UNDP's activities:

- Strengthening Democratic Governance and the Social Contract
- Promoting Productivity and Dignity through Livelihoods
- Protecting Natural Resources and the Environment
- Public and Social Infrastructure

In total, 19 sub-areas were identified for potential UNDP interventions, many of which are thematically linked with those of other specialized UN agencies. The document also recognizes the strategic importance of Area C for its land area, and that of EJ (and Gaza), which harbors the most vulnerable people. UNDP/PAPP's comparative advantage is described through three main criteria:

1. Its development approach of empowering the Palestinian people and their institutions, in order to achieve a resilient Palestinian nation – based on national ownership and capacity development towards sustainability.
2. Its long-standing presence in, and works throughout, the occupied Palestinian territory. And,
3. Its close partnership with Palestinian institutions, civil society, communities, academia, the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) and international development partners.

In addition to the UN and its agencies, the main donors to the CRDP – Sweden, Austria, Norway and, for the first year, the UK – all have priorities for their assistance to Palestine. Following the lead of Sweden, other participating donors subscribed to the urgency of

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<sup>34</sup> United Nations Development Framework. June 2013. Note that footnote 1, page 2 of that document explains that, in accordance with the UN Secretary General's Report on the Status of Palestine in the United Nations (A/67/738), the UNDAF report uses both 'The State of Palestine' and the Occupied Palestinian Territory (oPt).

<sup>35</sup> <http://www.undp.ps/en/newsroom/publications/pdf/other/devforfreedom.pdf> This document is aligned with the global UNDP strategy.

investing in Area C and EJ, and to take moderate risks vis-à-vis Israel, lest their interventions in those areas backfire, with serious consequences for the Palestinians<sup>36</sup>.

## Chapter IV: Evaluation Analysis

This chapter will sequentially review the five evaluation criteria used to assess the CRDP: Relevance, ownership, effectiveness (in terms of governance, management and accountability), efficiency, and impact and sustainability.

### 4.1 Relevance

The Evaluation addressed three questions:

- To what extent are the objectives of the CRDP still valid in the overall Palestinian context?
- To what extent have the Programme activities contributed to meet its objectives?
- To what extent have Programme activities and results been consistent with the intended results and aligned with the PA's needs and priorities for Area C and EJ?

In summary, the CRDP portfolio is fairly well-aligned, thematically, with the key strategic objectives of the Programme, although the trend in the projects of the last two Rounds suggests lesser priority related to the economic dimension of resilience.<sup>37</sup> The portfolio analysis also shows increased participation of LGUs and CBOs, which is consistent with the institution development and capacity building objective for the development of a future Palestinian state. It also highlights the importance of establishing clear selection criteria, upfront, such as the vulnerability profile of the communities where the CRDP is active<sup>38</sup>.

#### 4.1.1 CRDP Objectives in the Overall Palestinian Context

Regarding the CRDP's objectives, the Final Evaluation re-confirmed the conclusion of the MTE, i.e., that the CRDP's overall goal "to empower local stakeholders in Area C and EJ, through the most appropriate partners LNGOs and INGOs, to act with resilience to respond to threats that affect their sustenance on the land," continues to be very relevant in the context of the oPt. It is well-aligned with the PA's national development plans, in particular the urgency accorded to Area C and EJ in the National Policy Agenda 2017-2022. Likewise, the CRDP's three specific objectives continue to be fully relevant:

- i) Prevent the erosion of living conditions of Palestinians in Area C and EJ that undermines their development capital;
- ii) Protect Palestinian land and property in Area C and EJ; and
- iii) Mitigate and ideally reverse the migration flow from Area C and EJ by enhancing human security and the livelihood of Palestinians.

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<sup>36</sup> Source: Interviews with donors during both Midterm and Final Evaluation missions.

<sup>37</sup> Allocations to economic development plus agriculture (an economic activity) amounted to 46.7% in Rounds 1-3 versus 32.33% in Rounds 4-5.

<sup>38</sup> For a detailed analysis of the CRDP profile, please refer to Annex 9.

The CRDP has been most relevant, initially in the context of the two-state solution to which the PA and donors were committed. Five years later, the two-state solution continues to be the foundation for the PA and donors – even though some donors expressed concern that time has run out and the two-state solution may no longer be feasible, especially in view of the changes on the ground and the regional and international political realities. Some progress has been achieved in raising international awareness of, and commitment to, Area C and EJ, but as a direct result of CRDP interventions, only limited progress is visible at the macro-level, especially as it relates to the living conditions of Palestinians in Area C and EJ and on the protection of the land. This is primarily due to the relatively small size of the Programme and budget, which promotes small, sub-regional interventions.

In the broader context of the CRDP, the most recent reports and analyses show that the overall situation of the oPt may have improved in certain domains – fiscal management, performance of local government entities – but deteriorated in others – increasing unemployment, increasing cost of living, impact of the Separation Wall on children’s access to schools, increased harassment and abuse from settlers, increasing numbers of demolitions and threats of demolitions of Palestinian owned-structures (including those provided by donors), persistent denial of construction permits for Palestinians<sup>39</sup>, and continuing controls and restrictions on movement and access in Area C through a complex system of physical and administrative procedures. All of the above-listed practices undermine livelihoods, access to basic services and create a constant climate of fear and uncertainty, which undercuts Palestinian physical presence in the area.<sup>40</sup> The impact of Israel’s constraints on Area C continues to be detrimental to economic growth and employment. A World Bank analysis has reported that access to Area C could increase Palestinian GDP by 35 percent and would be expected to lead to a 35 percent increase in employment<sup>41</sup>. Other reports illustrate that Palestinian industry suffers from underinvestment. Investment in plant and machinery alone, in the West Bank and Gaza, as a proportion of GDP has fallen from 12.9 percent in 2000 to 4.8 percent in 2014, with underinvestment amounting to approximately USD 1.4 billion a year<sup>42</sup>. Similarly, all infrastructure sectors are in dire need of investment. The levels of risks caused by Israel’s Occupation are increasing in certain areas, as described in section 3.1, which details the threat posed by expansion of settlements. In the past five years, a total of 44,500 settlers have moved into the West Bank.<sup>43</sup> Further, the rate of settlement construction in the first six months of 2016 increased by 41 percent, compared to 2015.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> It remains to be seen how the decision of the Israeli security cabinet related to the legalization of Palestinian constructions in Area C will be implemented.

<sup>40</sup> OCHA, Demolitions and Displacements in 2016.

<sup>41</sup> World Bank. 2016. Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee. September 19.

<sup>42</sup> Report of the Quartet to the AHLC. September 2016.

<sup>43</sup> Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics quoted in <http://peacenow.org.il/en/category/settlement-watch> accessed 10 April, 2017.

<sup>44</sup> Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics quoted in United Press International ‘Israeli settlement in West Bank up 41%’, 15<sup>th</sup> September, 2017.

#### 4.1.2. Contribution of CRDP Activities to Meet the Programme's Objectives

The CRDP, as a programme, has made a number of positive contributions towards its goal and objectives<sup>45</sup>. For example:

##### Importance of Area C and EJ on PA and Donor Agendas:

- Area C and EJ have been placed firmly on the PA, UN and donors' agenda, which was not the case prior to 2009. This is best exemplified by the number of donor-supported programmes now being implemented or under consideration for Area C and EJ, as well as the importance attributed to Area C and EJ in the recently issued National Policy Agenda 2017-2022.

##### Transition from Humanitarian to Development Assistance:

- The transition from humanitarian to development assistance is a long-term process, but it has now been initiated: There is presently consensus among both PA institutions and donors that the two-state solution has to be anchored on Palestinians' control over their assets in Area C and EJ, on their ability to use those assets effectively – whether those assets are land or businesses – and their development of the competencies needed to earn a sustainable income and maintain or improve their livelihood. Under the initial impetus provided by the CRDP, there is an increasing convergence towards development assistance programmes.

##### Social and Economic Empowerment:

- The CRDP has been an incubator for new types of interventions, which have provided social and economic empowerment to over 600 beneficiaries, in the form of professional training to youth and women (sewing, food processing, multimedia, photography), establishment of social and sports clubs, and support to productive activities, such as a milk truck for a women's cooperative in Al Aqaba. These interventions have enabled testing both the feasibility of such of interventions, and the way to manage risks.
- Education: 6,961 beneficiaries, of whom 3,132 are females, have benefited from the rehabilitation of 70 educational units in Area C and EJ. 145 teachers have benefited from the improvement of the educational environment and the on-the-job training.
- Economic Empowerment: Activities focused on land reclamation, irrigation, support to the livestock farmers, energy, youth job training, have yielded significant economic benefits, either in terms of increased or potentially increased incomes, or cost reductions (roads, water, and energy). That said, the Evaluation Team heard from project beneficiaries that the project activities (enacted during the relatively short period of implementation) have not yet led to significant displacement of income earning opportunities from the Israeli settlements to Palestinian farms and services.
- Economic Benefits: Activities have increased incomes, in the form of revenues from established and operational small businesses (photography, food processing, sewing,)

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<sup>45</sup> The source for all the quantitative results in this section is the [un-dated] UNDP Note: CRDP Consolidated Results 2012-2016.

and increased productivity from new energy sources (dairy production in Bedouin communities). Families have also benefited from tax and land registration savings, achieved through the cooperative housing projects in EJ, which have resulted in cheaper housing.

*Improved Living Conditions:*

- Health and education: 10,216 beneficiaries, of whom 5,782 are females, have benefited from numerous health activities. In Area C, for example, 6,423 patients were screened for ophthalmic diseases and 634 were referred for advanced treatment. In another area, a database of diseases and patients was prepared. In addition, five health clinics, benefiting 550 people in five communities, were rehabilitated to accommodate people with special needs. Eight schools were rehabilitated as well.
- Housing: In Area C, a total of 864 beneficiaries have benefited from the upgrading of 144 residential structures. In addition, 1,722 people are expected to benefit from the construction of 287 housing units in EJ, as a result of surveying 12 land parcels in the Beit Safafa area. A perception survey, conducted with owners of 49 projects in south Hebron, has shown improvements in quality of life associated with shelter rehabilitation. The renovation of these shelters covered 100 percent of the shelter needs in 12 communities in Masafer Yatta, located in the south Hebron hills.
- Water: Over 12,000 people have benefited from improved water quality, linked to the rehabilitation of cisterns.
- Energy: 1,772 people have benefited from the provision of 196 solar panel units, improving not only their quality of life, but also, in particular, their productivity for butter making.

*Land Reclamation and Improvement of Productive Infrastructure (Roads, Water):*

- Land: 2,065 dunums have been reclaimed, which constitutes roughly three percent of Area C land area available for agriculture (94,796 dunums)<sup>46</sup>, and 4,449 dunums have been indirectly reclaimed through the construction/rehabilitation of agricultural roads. These results represent 14.5 percent of the 45,000 dunums targeted for the first three years of the Programme.
- Agricultural roads: 29 kilometers (km) were rehabilitated, directly benefiting over 4,600 people and indirectly benefiting an additional 4,200 people in eight communities.
- Irrigation water networks: Over 40 km rehabilitated, benefiting about 37,000 people.
- Avoided Emigration from or Reverse Migration into Area C and EJ: There are some anecdotal stories (e.g., in Al Aqaba, Tubas) of families returning to the villages or of farmers deciding to expand their activities (e.g., in Kardala, Tubas), but no data as to the 'avoided emigration' is available. The initial target was that 42,500 people in

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<sup>46</sup> Based on CCE (2013) needs' assessment study for CRDP, 94,796 dunums are suitable for land reclamation and fruit and forest trees in Area C. The first year Progress Report (through September 2013) calculated baseline values of: 23 percent of Area C (810,000 dunums) available for reclamation, of which 30 percent are suitable for fruit trees, 22 percent for forests and 48 percent for rangeland.



Area C and 48,000 in EJ would stay (avoided migration)<sup>47</sup>.

Capacity Building and PA ownership:

- Some innovative delivery models are being experimented, such as the ‘Mobile Computer Unit’, managed by Al Quds Open University. Capitalizing on an inaugural experience in Hebron, a fully equipped truck is to provide computer classes to several schools during the week and to community members, especially women, on Saturdays. This model is an alternative to building-up and equipping classrooms, which are at constant risk of demolition by the Occupation. This is a very effective model of a solution that meets many of the CRDP criteria for resilience and sustainability: empowerment of local communities, development of human capital, efficient use of resources, and sustainability (provided the financial model sustains the operating and reinvestment costs). Improved knowledge sharing and networking amongst organizations would enhance the utility of the model, for example, integrating solar energy into the design of the mobile unit<sup>48</sup>.
- The CRDP contributed to the establishment of ACCO, in the PMO, both through dialogue with the PA and the provision of first year funding. This has been a major strategic contribution of CRDP to on-going policy formulation and coordination of work in Area C and the region’s integration into mainstream development work in the West Bank. ACCO was established “to enhance coordination of both government and international efforts in supporting the resilience of people in Area C (including EJ). It is envisioned that the Area C Coordination Office (framed within the PMO) ensures the Palestinian Government’s provision of policy, coordination, institutional guidance and facilitation of liaison between the ministerial and technical committees and the international community.” ACCO is now poised to take the lead in developing the Implementation Plan for Area C and EJ and for coordinating donors’ engagement.<sup>49</sup>
- As further discussed in Section 4.2 on Ownership, greater engagement with local government structures was not witnessed until Rounds 4 and 5. These Rounds included greater engagement with PA ministries, in particular the MOA, the MOLG, and the MOJA, both in the central and decentralized services. In addition, the last two Rounds employed more effectively decentralized structures, such as the JSCs and the VCs. It was apparent in interviews that the sample of officials from these institutions who were interviewed were significantly more motivated and involved during Rounds 4 and 5.
- Other examples of growing engagement with local government structures exist, including the Ministry of Education (MOE) at the local level, which has often partnered with IPs to provide teachers for newly constructed classrooms (Hebron)

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<sup>47</sup> CRDP Year 1 Report 25.11.13. p. 9. CRDP outcome, target: “50,000 Palestinians will be targeted in Area C, 85% of which stay on their land “(= 42,500 people) “60,000 Palestinians will be targeted in EJ, 80% of which will not leave EJ “(=48,000).

<sup>48</sup> During one of the Evaluation Team’s focus groups, various stakeholders had the opportunity to discuss these issues of technical design. They expressed their need for additional, similar transfer of knowledge across CRDP activities in order to improve design, relevance, and performance.

<sup>49</sup> ACCO Concept Note [undated].

or bus drivers. In Kafr Qadoun, the costs of pipes for the extensive rehabilitation of the water network were shared by the Ministry of Finance, the Palestinian Water Authority and the VC. However, the element of capacity and institutional development has been reflected only in a limited way in the CRDP portfolio. Positive changes were observed with the approval of several Round 5 projects, which targeted farmers, CBO's and LGUs in both the Qalqilya and Tubas clusters.

*Integration of, and Synergy between, Area C and Areas A and B:*

- Certain positive examples of such integration and synergy were identified during field visits: in Tubas where farmers send their products to Area A or B to be conditioned (processed or packaged) and marketed either within the West Bank or for export to Israel or other countries (Gulf countries, in particular); in Al Aqaba, Tubas Governorate, the kindergarten and middle school are attracting children from Area A, because of the quality of teaching in those schools.

#### **4.1.3 Alignment of Programme's Activities and Results with the PA's Needs and Priorities for Area C and EJ**

In view of the results presented in the preceding section, it is difficult to assess whether the CRDP's activities are well-aligned with the PA's needs and priorities for Area C and Jerusalem. The PA has not yet developed an implementation plan articulating its global goal and objectives for Area C and EJ and covering the lifespan of the CRDP. Such a document would enable the benchmarking of results expected from the CRDP at design, and the results obtained following five years of implementation. This is further discussed in Section 4.3 on M&E.

To conclude, in terms of the PA's global goal and objectives the CRDP activities seem to be as well-aligned as possible. However, in terms of specific needs and priorities over a given implementation period, it is important to assess whether this first phase of the CRDP has reached the depth intended. Learning from the experience of the past five years, many questions need to be revisited: were the Programme objectives too broad-reaching and ambitious in the prevailing political environment? Should the Programme have been designed as a pilot rather than a standard UNDP 'development programme'? Were the resources allocated to the Programme too small to generate a deeper impact? Were the implementation modalities and the redirection of the Programme after the MTE effective? These questions will be addressed in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

## **4.2 Ownership**

This section addresses the question of ownership and appropriation of the Programme from the perspective of three categories of stakeholders:

- The PA government institutions
- Other local partners, in particular international and local NGOs which have been associated with the implementation of the Programme, and

- Communities/CBOs, households and individuals involved in the implementation of the Programme either as service providers or beneficiaries.

#### **4.2.1 Programme Ownership by PA Institutions**

The initial discussions for the design of the Programme took place between the Government of Sweden and MOPAD. At the time, there was substantial impetus on the part of the PA for a programme that would launch interventions in Area C and EJ and allocate attention and accord the regions a degree of prominence. As the discussions, and, in part, the Programme, triggered the [annual] reporting to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, MOPAD became the focal point in charge of preparing the report to the AHLC.

MOPAD was to co-chair the Steering Committee and the RB. MOPAD was also to coordinate with other relevant PA ministries between the sessions of the RB. Even as the Board became the primary organ responsible for providing policy direction and oversight of the Programme, MOPAD's role and performance declined. By the MTE, MOPAD was limiting its contribution to co-chairing the RB meetings, but did not get involved much further. MOPAD has since been merged with the Ministry of Finance, and ACCO was established in mid-2016. Stakeholders welcomed ACCO as an opportunity to improve effective coordination and implementation of the CRDP and other programmes in Area C and EJ and its role in the CRDP governance as a chance to further build its capacity.

In addition to ACCO's role, which increases the PA's ownership of the CRDP, at least two of the technical ministries have progressively assumed a more prominent and dynamic role and taken increased ownership of the Programme: the Ministry of Local Government and the Ministry of Agriculture. After those ministries were invited to attend the RB meetings, they began perceiving the CRDP as a potentially very effective mechanism to enhance the capacity of local government institutions and to provide quality services to the Programme's interventions through their offices at the governorate level. For example, representatives of these two ministries commented on their satisfaction in being able to provide inputs on project proposals, in particular for Rounds 4 and 5, both in the field and at RB meetings. They also had a clear process to undertake their own assessment of needs in the clusters, e.g., on the standards for the construction of agricultural roads or on the provision of improved seeds and other inputs for animal husbandry activities. Farmers in Tubas expressed satisfaction at the support received from the MOA in terms of seeds/seedlings to plant in reclaimed lands. The Evaluation Team observed a significantly stronger ownership of, and enthusiasm for, the Programme in the MOLG and MOA as a result of the changes made for Rounds 4 and 5. More recently, the MOJA was also invited to participate in the RB, and is expected to be more involved with the CRDP.

At the local government level, on the basis of information received at the meetings held with a sample JSCs and VCs, it seems that there is strong and growing ownership of the Programme.

#### **4.2.2 Ownership of the Programme by other Local Partners**

The MTE observed a very strong commitment to, and ownership of, the Programme from the INGOs and NGOs that had participated in Rounds 1-3 as IPs. The same is true of the organizations that have been involved in the execution of Rounds 4 and 5. All are proud of their activities and achievements, thanks to the support made available by the CRDP. However, some of the INGOs and NGOs that were not selected feel that they do not have sufficient information on the reasons for their lack of selection in the new rounds<sup>50</sup>.

During focus groups and field visits, this group of stakeholders (INGOs and LNGOs) expressed concern at the perceived lack of communication from the UNDP/CRDP, as regards explaining why the process of calls for proposals had not been continued.

#### **4.2.3 Ownership by Other Stakeholders: CBOs, Households, and Individuals**

Various reports by the CRDP M&E team highlight some success stories. The Evaluation Team corroborated various individual, household, and community successes. For example, in EJ, a young man trained as a photographer now has a budding business; a woman trained to develop her own business making prepared foods has enlisted the support of her sister and husband to expand the business. With the income generated, she is able to pay for the university and high-school education of her four older children (out of six). Other examples include the beneficiaries of a land reclamation project in Bethlehem who have inspired neighboring landowners to rehabilitate their land with their own means, and a group of women from Qalqilya who decided to create their own 'embroidery club' after receiving a training on women's empowerment, in the context of the elections. These examples suggest that the CRDP interventions can indeed motivate individuals or group of individuals to move forward, in spite of the harsh living conditions in Area C and EJ.

To sum up, the Evaluation team concluded that there is increasing ownership by PA institutions, at virtually all levels, from the PMO to the main ministries involved and local institutions, as well as from individuals and communities. However, given the relatively small size of the Programme, it has not yet permeated a sufficient geographical coverage

### **4.3 Assessing Effectiveness: Governance, Management, and Accountability**

The objective of this section is to assess the effectiveness with which the Programme was [designed and] implemented. The criteria for effectiveness include:

- The adequacy – strengths and weaknesses -- of the governance structure and the way it functioned, in terms of the PA's and donors' and other partners' engagement, policy directions, decision making, and oversight over Programme implementation.
- The quality of the PMU's management of the Programme, within the UNDP/PAPP's, and the role of UNDP/PAPP in the execution of the Programme, including its relations with the PMU, donors and the Palestinian government.
- The effectiveness of the implementation modalities with which the Programme activities have been carried out, taking into account other existing interventions in

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<sup>50</sup> Some felt that their contribution was perhaps not valued by the CRDP.

- Area C and EJ and the comparative advantage of UNDP, vis-à-vis other institutions; and,
- The relevance and utilization of the M&E processes to inform both the governance structure and the CRDP management.

#### **4.3.1 Governance: Adequacy of the CRDP's Governance Structure**

The governance structure initially envisaged consisted of two levels: a Steering Committee (SC), responsible for providing policy direction, and a Review Board (RB). The MTE highlighted that the Steering Committee was never set up. The RB has been the only body responsible for the governance of the CRDP. The rest of this section therefore essentially analyses the performance of the RB alone. One of the constraints for this Evaluation is the incomplete documentation. Some of the minutes for the RB meetings for 2015 and 2016 were not readily available to the Team at the time of field work. Subsequently, for those two years, the CRDP-UNDP team made great efforts to make available all documents and minutes, including the minutes of donors' preparatory or follow-up meetings to the RB meetings.

Since the MTE, the RB continued to function under the joint *chairmanship* of MOPAD and UNDP, until MOPAD was merged into the Ministry of Finance. After ACCO was established, the head of ACCO was asked by the Palestinian Government to serve as the co-chair representing the PA. The PA continued the practice, initiated in the second year of the Programme, of having representatives of MOLG and MOA attend the meetings, and more recently MOJA. The RB has met quite a number of times, pretty much 'as needed', especially to approve new projects and the annual work plan. The joint chairmanship of the Programme has had its own challenges, owing to unclear authority and terms of reference for the various representatives.

The strength of the RB has been its ability to provide forum and an opportunity for the UNDP and the donors to exchange views on Programme interventions with PA technical ministries, in particular MOLG and MOA, and more recently, with MOJA. Representatives from these ministries commended the RB for including them and listening to them, especially with respect to the selection of the Programme activities; they felt they could contribute their knowledge of the situation on the ground.

The RB meeting minutes and interviews by the Evaluation team suggest the following weaknesses of the RB:

- To a large extent, it has been focused on the selection of Programme interventions and budget allocations, from which the annual workplan is determined. While this is essential, some concern was raised about how some projects were selected.
- As a result of the focus on individual programme interventions, the RB was unable to fully provide the leadership and policy direction - expected from the Steering Committee - as intended in the design of the initial governance arrangements.
- The RB has delivered on a number of its 'oversight' responsibilities. For example, the RB received and reviewed the first two annual reports presenting the Programme results, as a function of the agreed outputs and base-line data. The RB is yet to

review such reports after the MTE. The 2016 financial report had not yet been received from UNDP at the time the Evaluation mission took place. If not yet completed, the RB could also request information, such as the results of due diligence on the selection of implementation partners for Rounds 4 and 5 – although ACCO raised the issue in RB meetings of 2017. Similarly, the RB could request outcomes of due diligence of beneficiaries.

#### **4.3.2 Programme Management**

By the Midterm, the Programme was functioning reasonably well. The PMU had established clear processes to identify activities, implementation partners, and budgets through calls for proposals (Rounds 1-3). The team was small (five staff) but fairly competent, very committed, and well appreciated by IPs, demonstrating a certain degree of flexibility to solve issues. Some of the procedures were too cumbersome – in particular the disbursement and reporting procedures, but there was a willingness to adjust the procedures and focus on getting results. UNDP intensified its efforts in providing technical and management support. The detailed reporting arrangements between the PMU and UNDP/PAPP were still being worked out. This section will focus on three questions:

- Has the CRDP PMU staffing been adequate?
- Has UNDP/PAPP provided the needed support to the PMU?
- Have the operational procedures led to an efficient implementation of the Programme?

##### **A. Staffing**

Following the delivery of the final MTE report (January 2015), significant staffing changes occurred in the PMU.

- In April 2015, most of the staff contracts were terminated, and the day-to-day management of the Programme was left in the hands of the two remaining staff members, together with the Financial Associate.
- In July 2015, the PMU team, including the PMU Manager, was reappointed. The PMU Manager remained in his position until he was appointed Head of Office, in June 2016, to the newly-established ACCO within the PMO.
- Many staff left in 2015/16 for other opportunities: the Grants Manager, Jerusalem Field Coordinator, Financial Associate, and Qalqilya Field Coordinator, and some have not been replaced. For example, the position of Grants Manager has not been reinstated, on the grounds that, currently, the Programme does not hold calls for proposals. As a result, it remains that the PMU still has to manage a large number of grant contracts.
- From July-December 2016, the PMU team consisted of 4.3 people (Table 2<sup>51</sup>): The M&E and Reporting Manager, 2.5 Field Coordinators, and four-fifths of the time of the Financial Associate.

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<sup>51</sup> Source: Details provided by the PMU from the dates of the contracts.

- A new PMU Manager was appointed two months before the Final Evaluation, in December 2016.
- The current PMU team is small, consisting of only 5.4 staff persons (The Manager, the M&E Manager, the Financial Associate, two Field Coordinators [although one resigned just before the Evaluation mission], and a half-time Coordinator for EJ). This compares to eight staff from the onset of the Programme in April 2015. The field coordinator for EJ works 50 percent for the CRDP PMU and 50 percent on administrative tasks at UNDP/PAPP. The Field Coordinator/s for the north of the West Bank do not reside in the governorates, and rather travel there often. While this may not be the most efficient way of interacting with the IPs, it does remove the potential risk of local pressures on the Field Coordinators. The new Manager has defined the human resources needed for the successful implementation of the 2017 Programme, indicating that he needs about 10 people (with functions and competencies fully defined) to be able to function adequately.

Table 2 presents the staffing over the five years of the programme implementation period, by professional position. The findings illustrate that the overall staffing levels have declined since programme start-up, with a slight uptake in Year 5, but have never returned to the levels of Year 1.

**Table 2: PMU staffing from CRDP inception to May 17, 2017.**

	CRDP Position	Year 1 (Sept 2012 – Aug 2013)	Year 2 (Sept 2013 – Aug 2014)	Year 3 (Sept 2014 – Aug 2015)	Year 4 (Sept 2015 – Aug 2016)	Year 5 (Sept 2016 – Aug 2017)	Total
1	Programme Manager	1	1	0.5	0.5	1	0.8
2	M&E and Reporting Officer	1	1	1	1	1	1.0
3	Financial Associate	1	1	1	0.8	1	0.96
4	Grants Managers	1	1	0	0	0	0.4
5	Field Coordinator	1	1	0.2	1	1	0.84
6	Field Coordinator	1	1	0.2	1	0.9	0.82
7	Field Coordinator	1	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
8	Communications Officer	1	0	0	0	0	0.2
	<b>Totals</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>4.8</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>5.52</b>

The data also shows that the communications position has suffered most, followed by the management function. During all 'interim' periods, UNDP endeavored to find solutions, and deployed some of its own staff, such as the Deputy Team Leader for Governance, to keep the momentum and ensure continuation in the delivery of the CRDP work programmes and the levels of disbursements. In addition, other personnel from UNDP's own specialized staff members were mobilized to provide additional support, for example, 'on communications, to produce videos and dissemination materials'.

Regardless of the PMU staffing changes, the PMU and UNDP staff assigned to the Programme has demonstrated remarkable dedication and commitment, and tremendous efforts to keep close to the field and meet the needs of field implementers. However, CRDP staff noted that the lack of sufficient full-time, in-house human resources over-burdened them, and created difficulties in focusing on core tasks, which was compounded by work from under-resourced functions that was re-allocated and added to their standard workloads. This has impacted the work on key tasks, including to a lack of time to deliver on the results and impact monitoring and reporting of the Programme, as discussed in section 4.3.4.

### ***B. UNDP Support***

As per the donor agreements, UNDP/PAPP is to provide technical support to the PMU and implementation partners, both on administrative processes and technical questions. Besides the staffing support described above, the UNDP/PAPP provided:

- PMU staff and IP training on UNDP procedures, in particular on procurement and financial management, the Results Oriented Annual Report (ROAR) quality assurance system, the ATLAS system for updating targets, the financial management system (including how to fill and maintain records for the FACE form) and, on Monitoring and Evaluation<sup>52</sup>.
- Technical support on project implementation, in particular for the design of bills of quantities, procurement on infrastructure projects, such as roads and water supply, and on agriculture and supervision of works<sup>53</sup>.

Interviews and field visits indicated that the technical support has been valuable and appreciated, both for the PMU staff and the IPs. For some of the IPs, it has been particularly helpful to learn how to go through a competitive process of selecting contractors. Areas where the value-added of the UNDP/PAPP technical support was still progressing include: the definition of the bills of quantities, in cases where technical ministries have already published parameters and their own engineering staff, and the actual supervision of the contractors' work, when this could be performed by competent Palestinian firms. During field visits to certain infrastructure works, certain challenges, both in design and execution, were observed. These issues are linked to local capacity building, private sector participation, and sustainability, all of which merit further discussion for a future phase of the CRDP.

### ***C. Operational Procedures***

Prepared by the PMU and approved internally by UNDP's Programme Team Leader, followed by the RB, the CRDP annual workplan is the key operational instrument. Other operational procedures were included in the Operational Manual, which was being updated at the time

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<sup>52</sup> As an integral part of UNDP, CRDP-PMU has access to all support units including the Management Support Unit. PMU staff members were included in a number of trainings. In addition, all staff members have access to the Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures (POPP).

<sup>53</sup> The Evaluation could not assess the extent or content of such technical support, including for agriculture, as the PMU does not receive UNDP's quality control or field visit reports, although they have been requested.



of the MTE. The Evaluation Team was told that the Operational Manual was no longer a ready source of reference, as plans to update it were still underway.

In the first two years of the CRDP, the workplan was used to monitor and report on results in the Annual Report. With the managerial transitions of 2015 and 2016, the UNDP stepped in to provide daily support and formally meet twice a month with the PMU staff to discuss progress. These meetings still take place, although there is still some disagreement on who is responsible for managing these meetings (e.g., the PMU Manager or the Deputy Team Leader of the Governance and Social Development Unit). The PMU Manager would then report to the Deputy Team Leader responsible for overseeing the CRDP within UNDP/PAPP and to the RB, when requested. The Deputy Team Leader would then report to the Team Leader and Special Representative of the Administrator.

- The Evaluation Team was informed, through a range of interviews, that the roles and responsibilities between UNDP/PAPP staff and the PMU team are yet to be fully and clearly defined. For example, the line of accountability for delivering on the workplan outputs must be clearer: UNDP/PAPP's management believes the PMU Manager should be accountable for delivering on agreed workplan outputs, within the agreed budget, yet the PMU Manager exercises no authority over the most efficient way to use the budget, including the timely hiring of staff needed to complete work. Another example is the participation of UNDP/PAPP in such forums as the UN Cluster meetings. Although they are forums for both exchanging experience and facilitating operational coordination on the ground in Area C, PMU staff do not attend the meetings. The respective accountabilities and responsibilities of UNDP and PMU are clearly spelled out in the CRDP Programme Document, but how this manifests in reality requires further attention. Improved lines of accountability would, in principle, reduce overhead costs, facilitate the work of the PMU Manager and UNDP Deputy Team Leader respectively, and still enable UNDP staff to join in field visits, as needed.
- Similarly, the line of accountability and responsibility with the RB needs to be revisited. Until recently, all project allocations had to be approved by the RB. At one of the RB meetings (February 7<sup>th</sup>, 2017), it was decided that incremental allocations of up to 10 percent of the project funding would no longer require RB approval and could be decided by UNDP. This is a step in the right direction, as regards lessening RB involvement in the details of programme management.
- Regarding relations with donors outside of RB meetings, further clarification of lines of accountability and a clear definition of the lines of communications would help all parties. In the past, donors have gone directly to the PMU for urgently needed information on CRDP results, including financial statements. The parameters for the PMU to respond to such requests should be well established, while recognizing that the main discussions on resource mobilization and accountability for the use of donor funding rest with the UNDP.

#### **4.3.3. Implementation Modalities**

This section will address two main questions:

1. Are the CRDP portfolio implementation modalities managed in a transparent manner, in terms of selection of governorates, clusters, project, IP selection, and resource allocation to project activities?
2. Have the implementation modalities been efficient in achieving the Programme's goals and objectives

As indicated earlier, after the MTE the CRDP implementation modalities were changed: from a call for proposals system, with published selection criteria for both projects and implementing partners to the 'cluster system'. The Evaluation therefore focused on understanding the impact of this change on the efficiency of the Programme.

#### **A. Selection of Governorates and Clusters.**

CRDP did an initial selection of two Area C governorates – Tubas and Hebron - based on an analysis of vulnerability,<sup>54</sup> poverty levels, and unemployment figures. The RB initially wanted to focus the CRDP's remaining and relatively limited resources to one Governorate<sup>55</sup>. Tubas was chosen as it was assessed to be relatively under-served in terms of interventions, in comparison to Hebron.<sup>56</sup> Subsequently, Qalqilya was added as a second governorate, specifically the cluster of communities called Joret Amra on the recommendation of the MOLG. The Evaluation Team did not receive a clear explanation or a document as to how the decision was made. Map number 2, in Annex 8, shows that Qalqilya is, in fact, better off when benchmarked with the FAO resilience analysis and the vulnerability index<sup>57</sup> than Hebron<sup>58</sup>. Reviewing the findings of the needs assessment for Qalqilya (carried out once the Qalqilya cluster of villages was selected) the Evaluation Team noticed the relative absence of access issues, related to education and health services, and also that the unemployment rate for the cluster (12.6 percent) is somewhat below the West Bank average (18 percent - 25 percent).<sup>59</sup> As noted in section 3.5 on the Project Portfolio Analysis, this suggests the need for clearer and more systematic criteria to proceed with the selection of the governorates and clusters of villages.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Vulnerability status derived from OHCA maps and databases.

<sup>55</sup> PMU Briefing, February 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2017.

<sup>56</sup> In the FAO Programme Framework 2014-2016, a map is provided on Page 24 of the document which presents their rationale for the designation of priority geographical areas – Tubas and Tulkarem, the Jordan Valley and the southern part of Hebron governorate. The prioritization is based on resilience data gathered as part of their Resilience Index and is fully aligned with priorities outlined in the Humanitarian Programme Cycle (HPC) and UNDAF 2014-2016. The data was analyzed at the governorate level to define geographical areas of focus. Tubas and Tulkarem are defined as areas of low resilience, Hebron, Bethlehem and Jericho as areas of medium resilience, and Qalqilya and Jenin as areas of high resilience. The Map is appended as Annex 8.

<sup>57</sup> This index was chosen as no other such index was available.

<sup>58</sup> Use of available criteria (especially that of the FAO, as a sister UN organization) is needed for benchmarking and comparison in an evaluation.

<sup>59</sup> PCBS, FAO, WFP, UNRWA, Socio Economic Food Security Survey 2014; S. Erekat statement at the World Economic Forum on the Middle East, May 19-21, 2017, op. cit.

<sup>60</sup> The revised Risk Matrix (RRM) of June 30<sup>th</sup>, 2016, as Annex 2 to the Progress Report of 2015 prepared by the PMU does identify a risk that '*decisions on project approvals are not taken on technical grounds and (are) influenced by third parties.*' The management response/countermeasure confirms that the final accountability for this lies with UNDP, who co-chairs the Steering Board (SB), and that clear guidelines are to be developed for CRDP. The Evaluation Team has not seen any revised guidelines. The probability of this risk is rated at 2 (medium), but the impact is rated at 4 (high).

To summarize, meeting PA requests is commendable and helps align CRDP with national priorities and funding gaps. It must, however, be noted that a clear systematic justification and explanation of the selection is necessary.

#### **B. Project Selection.**

- Two needs assessments were conducted, with two rather different approaches. The CRDP-PMU conducted a needs' assessment in Qalqilya focused on development indicators. The Gruppo di Volontariato Civile (GVC), an INGO, conducted a needs assessment in Tubas, considering both humanitarian and developmental issues within the communities. It proposed the villages based on their rank in the GVC "protection vulnerability index."<sup>61</sup> The time taken for these assessments was different: two months for Qalqilya and five months for Tubas. The methodology for these needs assessments was also different from the one used by Birzeit University at the beginning of the Programme.
- Both needs assessments were validated with the communities through an externally-contracted facilitator. Interventions were prioritized according to the outputs of the CRDP framework and a proposed list of prioritized projects was presented in the implementation strategy for Round 4 of March 16, 2016.
- In Rounds 4 and 5, although 62 percent of the interventions identified from the Qalqilya needs assessment were approved and 69 percent of those from Tubas needs assessment, the synergy of interventions, designed to promote increased resilience, must be systematically established. For example, in Qalqilya, rehabilitation of agricultural roads was proposed, but no parallel land reclamation or irrigation works were put forward. Projects additional to those identified in the needs assessments were subsequently approved based on community consultations, field experience and additional data from the relevant ministries.
- Assessments and consultations included LGUs, line ministries at the governorate level (including health, education, labor, agriculture and the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA)), and a broad cross section of the community (agricultural coops, women and youth CBOs, school and university students, the elderly, housewives and youth, including the unemployed youth). Yet, the results of the needs assessments and the process to respond to those needs are not fully aligned, which risks weakening the accountability of CRDP to those communities.<sup>62</sup> For example, there was clear evidence of the need for legal empowerment at the local level, capable of addressing stop work and demolition orders in real time<sup>63</sup>, and the need to build social cohesion in the clusters. However, neither the projects proposing legal awareness training for the VCs in the cluster, nor the proposals for community-wide meetings to disseminate knowledge and introduce some form of accountability for

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<sup>61</sup> GVC is developing an index, based on the documentation of about 200 variables. Their report is due to be issued in 2017.

<sup>62</sup> The RRM states that the assessments done in the communities define the priorities for the target population

<sup>63</sup> In the Qalqilya cluster there are a total of 127 pending demolition orders

the interventions, moved forward to the approval stage.<sup>64</sup> By contrast, the list of proposals presented in the CRDP Implementation Strategy for Rounds 4 and 5 of March 2016, did not mention land reclamation, despite continued settler encroachment on the lands of the clusters.<sup>65</sup> However, three land reclamation projects have since been designed and approved, one in the Tubas cluster (Kardala village) and two in the Qalqilya cluster (Kafr Qaddom and Jinsafut villages) as well as related rehabilitation of irrigation networks and agricultural roads in the same villages. This collection of projects indicates flexibility and responsiveness, in addition to thought process being devoted to the synergies required to bring land back into production and provide improved livelihoods – as expressed in the CRDP objectives -- despite not being supported by the summary recommendations of the needs assessments.

### **C. Selection of Implementing Partners.**

Until the MTE, the process of calls for proposals was well-structured and publicized. Potential partners were aware of the criteria they had to meet, and the PMU was able to select implementation partners based on pre-set, written and clear qualification benchmarks. Since the cluster approach has been adopted, the Evaluation Team has found only two examples of a relatively competitive publicized process being followed in the selection of IPs.<sup>66</sup> In all other cases, grants were made either:

- to continue an already existing and successful partnership that originated through a call for proposals in Rounds 1-3;
- through informal discussions with NGOs known to CRDP, whose work fits within the CRDP framework;
- with VCs and JSCs who have strong ties with the Area C communities in the clusters identified; or,
- with partners who ‘owned’ infrastructure identified as a priority for service provision by the needs assessment (e.g., kindergartens).

Some written criteria for partner and project selection to guide the process are presented in the second page of the Project Profiles for Qalqilya, 2016-2017. The criteria are not as clearly elaborated as in the CRPD PD or the guidelines for proposal development, similar to the concept notes developed in Rounds 1-2 of the Programme. Some IPs attending the focus groups conducted during the Evaluation said that they were not well-informed on how the selection process happened.

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<sup>64</sup> The RRM states that the assessments done in the communities define the priorities for the target population

<sup>65</sup> CRDP – Implementation Strategy 2015-2016.

<sup>66</sup> The selection of Hiwar was based on a competition with two other Gender focused NGOs chosen by CRDP. The selection of the partner for the promotion of cultural events and after school activities to ‘mitigate stress’ was also based on limited competition. CRDP selected 30 appropriate CSO’s and asked for a proposal which would embrace several organizations within a consortia. CRDP got three proposals, but only one with consortia approach.

This *perceived* issue, concerning clear communication, is a source of concern for CRDP staff themselves<sup>67</sup>: they receive complaints from NGOs and/or previous partners as to how the current partners have been chosen. The Programme Phase 2016-2017 document says that *'the process of call for proposals has changed to focus on working with IPs who have strong ties to the selected identified cluster.'* The process of a call for proposal does not preclude working with cluster-based IPs, or partners who may have strong links with the communities. To the contrary, the MTE had actually envisaged that a call for a proposal to serve the needs of a cluster would likely lead to the constitution of consortia who could better deliver on the synergy of interventions. A system of calls for proposals was intended to make the process transparent, with IPs who can be held accountable for the delivery of the outputs required. In the course of the community consultations, it should have been possible for the PMU to identify and draw in different implementation partners with comparative advantage in these particular areas. Instead, the present selection criteria of IPs led to a perception of a subjective selection of IPs by the UNDP and some donors.<sup>68</sup> The Evaluation Team could not verify the merit of these perceptions.

Regarding the selection of IPs, the Evaluation attempted to identify the gaps and synergies between other UNDP programmes and other humanitarian and development actors working in Area C.<sup>69</sup> The documentation illustrates that some efforts were made to identify those partners and their activities, but records of decisions made to include or exclude were not readily available. It must also be noted that UNDP has also started a process of 'area' coordination across its own programmes to increase operational synergies: this initiative is beginning to improve cross-departmental exchanges. Coordination with other bilateral or international donors, including other UN agencies, working in Area C has taken place at UNDP's initiative, to delineate their areas of technical comparative advantage, or benefit from their experience.

#### **D. Project Design**

In addition to the issues of project and implementation selection discussed so far, it has been very difficult for the Evaluation Team to establish how the projects - especially with LGUs (JSC, VCs) - have been designed, how the budgets have been calculated, and therefore how resources have been allocated. The general requirements for IPs are to *'Submit proposals for project funding to UNDP'*.<sup>70</sup> While it is understandable that LGUs will not always have the capacity to develop their proposals to the same standard as NGOs, as part of the capacity building process, PMU staff should be able to adapt the guidelines, and/or

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<sup>67</sup> The RB meeting records show that at no time was the option of the call for proposals pushed by the RB members. Time pressures may also explained why the CRDP management was pressed to proceed quickly with the selection of IPs.

<sup>68</sup> As one interviewee said *"The time allocated for the needs assessments, the lack of PMU technical capacity, the selection modality and the methodology, all created the problem of perceived lack of transparency."*

<sup>69</sup> See CRDP Frameworks for Jerusalem, Qalqilya and Tubas

<sup>70</sup> See section IV, Annex 3 (CRDP guidelines) of the Programme Document 'Community Resilience & Development Programme for Area C & East Jerusalem (CRDP)' of 2012.

UNDP provide the capacity building support, so that such partners are able to provide a suitable proposal along the lines of the Concept Note format used by other prospective IPs.

The profiles prepared by the PMU for the projects implemented by LGUs would greatly benefit from including the following basic requirements:

- Detailed budgets rather than lump sums;<sup>71</sup>
- Clear problem statement linked to the CRDP Programme objectives;
- A thorough and contextualized risk assessment;
- Clear statement of outputs and outcomes; and,
- Presentation of a detailed M&E plan (especially given the advice provided in the CRDP Guidelines, delineated in an Annex of the CRDP Programme Document of 2012, that states *'evaluation/monitoring costs including auditors' fees should be charged to the CRDP'*).

By contrast, the proposals developed by LNGO and INGO partners are understandably much more impressive in every respect, with clear milestones and indicators for monitoring and oversight processes.

#### **E. Implementation Procedures**

CRDP has set up **technical oversight committees** for projects in the clusters comprised of all stakeholders including the JVCs, VCs, representative of the MOA and MOLG, and community representatives to build ownership and local capacities. In some projects visited, rather than agreeing on a delegation of responsibility to the most qualified committee member, a total of seven different entities (VC, JSC, MOLG, MOA, Community representatives) all had to approve, stamp and sign the BOQ and the beneficiary lists. This said, the same IPs also felt that involving all the partners had been a valuable learning process. For future projects, there is a desire for more efficient procedures, including delegating some of these tasks to appropriate points of competencies, in order to promote smoother implementation. The operation and maintenance oversight is currently carried out by the Oversight Committee, but in Kafr Qadoun, for example, the VC plans to appoint an engineer to perform more regular and professional checks. The VC in Kafr Qadoun also pointed out the need for additional resources such as a fully operational Technical Unit that would carry out operational and maintenance work in the longer term. To help in cost recovery of the water network, the VC had also increased the price of water for both domestic and agricultural consumption.

To summarize, the new implementation modalities appear to need improvement in terms of systematic and clear procedures and criteria, as used in the first three Rounds of project development for project or IP selection and project design across the Programme. The criteria for the elaboration of projects were not always clear; the evaluation criteria were not consistently linked to CRDP objectives, nor to the essential resilience elements (capacity and institutional building, access to livelihood/employment/business creation, natural

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<sup>71</sup> A reference to a previous BOQ or UNDP's past experience in the type of costs expected would be a significant improvement.

resource assets, knowledge management) or coordination and synergy requirements, gender issues and the M&E approach. The full package of outputs (cluster of interventions) was not focused in one community or adjacent communities, even though some good synergies are being released in the agriculture sector with the construction of agricultural roads, and land and water resource rehabilitation. The level of funding per community appeared insufficient to allow for full community coverage. For example, in land reclamation projects in Kafr Qadoun, Qalqilya, only eight households directly benefited, out of a total of 700 households in the village. The issue of focused/consolidated impact deserves further discussion, as well as how to best define synergy criteria for project evaluation.

#### **4.3.4 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), including Reporting**

This section will address two questions:

1. How effective is the M&E system for monitoring and reporting on outputs and outcomes of the Programme as a whole?
2. Is the reporting timely and informative for policy direction and programmatic decision-making?

##### **A. Monitoring and Evaluation Framework and process**

The M&E requirements and responsibilities of IPs and the UNDP/PMU are clearly laid out in section IV of Annex 3 of the original Programme Document and templates are provided for a standard final report. UNDP/PMU is responsible for monitoring and evaluating the CRDP as a whole, using the logical framework (Results and Resources Framework) and undertaking independent M&E of projects being implemented in the field. UNDP/PMU also has a responsibility to provide feedback on its M&E work to the 'Steering Board' and to donors in the form of quarterly and annual reports.

Recommendations of the MTE included:

- the revision of the current outcome indicators in the RRF to enable the better measurement of resilience
- the development of a solid baseline for the next round of interventions with control communities established to help assess more accurately whether the 'cluster approach' provides more significant results on the potential resilience and sustainability in Area C and EJ.

These recommendations have not been fully addressed. The baseline for the Programme was not modified after the MTE to establish the current status of the communities in the clusters before implementation began, compared to the results expected:

- improvement in current living conditions
- economic and social empowerment, and
- reduced migration from the clusters.

Consequently, the changes happening as a result of Programme activities in the two clusters will be difficult to measure except through the field visits and interviews.

Current CRDP M&E methodologies are generating significant programme-level data, but the focus is more on outputs than outcomes. The data show to what extent the IP has been able to deliver the project outputs agreed on, but they do not synthesize evidence on the validity of the overall programme approach in building resilience.

Using simple survey methodologies, such the Rapid [Rural] Appraisal Methodology,<sup>72</sup> it would still be possible, however, to gauge the level of changes occurring within the communities. Indicators that provide evidence that project activities are supporting the achievement of programme goal and objectives could be used for measurement and, for such sample surveys, would typically focus on evidence of improvements in the lives of the targeted individuals and communities. Examples include:

- the decrease in costs of water or availability of water as a result of cistern and water network rehabilitation;
- the creation of additional economic opportunities in the form of income-generating activities;
- the increase – or potential increase - in incomes as a result of improved agricultural production and processing methods, or additional professional training;
- reduced concerns of further land confiscation or displacement as a result of in-time legal assistance; and,
- changes in beneficiary behaviors and perceptions around infrastructure, livelihood, natural resource, capital investments, and social or cultural opportunities.

The current goal/impact indicators in the RRF 2015-2017 do not provide evidence of these types of changes which could lead to increased resilience.

Over the programme period, PMU staff have documented impact statements from their own field visits using semi-structured interviews with beneficiaries of project activities. These illustrate that changes are happening in their lives as a result of CRDP activities, as highlighted in other sections. However, the approach has not been systematic and coherent across the five years of the Programme and does not give a sense of the trend. It is also not possible to assess whether the cluster approach has yielded greater positive results than the call for proposals approach. As a result of the absence of a programme-level approach to performance measurement, it has been difficult for the Evaluation Team to assess the level of achievement of overall CRDP programme impact. Furthermore, the Evaluation Team could not find written evidence of UNDP review and feedback to the M&E function, as required in the Quality Assurance framework in the PD. PMU staff perform the quality assurance checks and update the relevant UNDP systems. UNDP/PAPP's feedback should be consistently documented in the form of minutes; it would be more useful to provide

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<sup>72</sup> Decades ago, Jeannette Murphy of the World Bank Operations and Evaluation Department tested the results of the RRA methodology with those of more comprehensive and formal surveys, and found them statistically significant. This is the cardinal reason why methodology has been so widely applied, both to establish baseline data and monitor and measure outcomes.



continuous written feedback to the PMU, including copying UNDP/PAPP senior management as a matter of 'briefing'.

#### Role of IPs and external evaluators

Evaluating changes in resilience as a result of interventions should not be CRDP's responsibility alone. Analysis of how and why project interventions have contributed to resilience, and if and how projects have created synergistic and multiplier effects must be continually assessed for future project design methodologies. An emerging understanding of beneficiary behaviors around infrastructure, livelihood, natural resource and social capital investments, for example, is a critical component of future sustainability and must be documented and synthesized. CRDP IPs can include a plan and budget within their proposals for how they will provide this information. IPs/CRDP could commission independent and unified beneficiary perception surveys, which could then be triangulated with CRDP's own surveys to provide a richer and more coherent picture of impact.

#### Accountability for project outputs

As noted previously, UNDP/PAPP has provided some guidance in the revision of the CRDP RRF. PMU staff have updated the indicators and targets in the RRF as project activities have evolved so that a clear understanding of outputs – and to some extent beneficiaries - is available. They have also revised the formulations of the outputs based on the UNDAF framework and participated in the UNDAF workshop for this purpose.

Expectations of output achievements presented in the CRDP RRF are somewhat unrealistic, as the precise content of proposals is difficult to predict with the iterative process of proposal development in place. However, with tighter thematic focus informed by the needs assessments, more realistic proactive targets could be set. At present, it is unreasonable for CRDP to be held accountable for the current targets set in the RRF.

#### Assessment of the project logic hierarchy

In the revised implementation framework 2015-2016, outputs are still phrased as outcomes. This is only important insofar as it creates confusion as to what the Programme is expected to deliver. As an illustration, the correct formulation for output 1 should be 'Rehabilitation of public and social infrastructure'; 'Improved' infrastructure (for example, 'farmers can access their land more quickly') would be the outcome or result. The monitoring indicators at the outcome/results level would be, for example, the time saved on transport.

As a result the indicators developed to measure project outputs are often either (1) a mix of output and outcome measures, also creating confusion as to what the project is expected to deliver. For example, is it the number of educational units built/refurbished? is it increased access to education? Is it improvement in the quality of education? or (2) the target set is simply a repetition of the indicator. The CRDP RRF would benefit from an exercise which would:

- Identify clearly and unambiguously why CRDP wants to improve the output areas selected – i.e., how does it link to building resilience?

- What CRDP is actually trying to achieve in these areas – what result is expected from this improvement?
- Intentionally develop indicators that can provide evidence of the extent to which the results expected are achieved
- Develop a method for assessing the current status of each indicator and use this to establish a baseline. Repeat the measurement at periodic intervals.

These more technical findings can be easily remedied by providing training and mentoring support to PMU staff, and requesting additional support from the UNDP M&E office. If appropriate training is not easily available in Palestine, there are many opportunities through UN and professional networks of evaluators. The achievements for Rounds 4 and 5 will be captured at the end of the Programme, when all projects and reports are completed. As mentioned in other places in the Report, as this evaluation took place months before the end of the Programme, no final data had been obtained<sup>73</sup>.

## **B. Reporting**

### **Reporting as a support to decision-making.**

At the level of output reporting, the 2013-2015 reports to donors are synthetic, well structured, and thorough. The most recent annual report of 2015 meticulously documents beneficiary numbers and volumes of outputs. The reports also describe the lessons learned from implementation experience and highlight the external incidents that have affected project implementation. The impact statements from beneficiaries, which provide the evidence for results and goal-based programme achievements, could be given more visibility in the more recent programme reports; they are added as comments to the RRF reports, or hidden in other documents, or are not highlighted.

At the level of reporting on outcomes, the reporting process is impeded by the absence of a systematic approach to programme performance measurement described above. Consequently, there is little sense of how overall project activities themselves (rather than the implementation process itself) contribute or do not contribute to achieving the Programme goal of increasing resilience. There is programme-level narrative documentation of such risks in the details of demolitions occurring during programme implementation, but there is no analysis of the documentation, in terms of how effective the mitigation measures were, which would enable trends to be identified to inform future risk management strategies.<sup>74</sup> As a result, the CRDP progress reports provide limited guidance for management or donors on future design methodologies, or where and how to focus the next steps and why.

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<sup>73</sup> In order to get a sense for the achievement of Programme results, the evaluation team reviewed the Programme results for the early rounds against the original RFF for the period. For details on these achievements, please refer to Annex 13.

<sup>74</sup> See CRDP, Demolitions and Confiscation of Assets, February 2016.

### **IP reporting process**

Reporting requirements from IPs, which were very burdensome initially, seem to have become uneven amongst IPs.

- LGUs complete a Technical Committee Report (TCR), which is a simpler format of the full progress report submitted by all other partners. The TCR is a very basic two-pager, which details progress of the technical work, challenges faced, and the nature of risks arising. They also attach technical reports.
- Other IPs, at least in Rounds 1 – 3,<sup>75</sup> complete a lengthier document, which addresses key implementation issues, as well as progress against the M&E plan, beneficiary numbers, lessons learnt, additional community needs identified, status of partnerships and networking, sustainability, risks, gender issues and advocacy. An updated action plan and budget is also required. All IPs from Rounds 1-3 submitted their reports. For Rounds 4-5, the agreements with the IPs mention “other agreed documentation,” without specificity. The Evaluation Team has not received any progress or completion reports, and therefore could not take stock of the situation.
- The short implementation periods of many of the grants means that even projects as small as USD 100,000 have to submit three progress reports and all other required documentation over the project period. Larger grants of, for example, USD 600,000, to be disbursed over an 18-month period, are required to submit six quarterly narrative and financial reports over the period, as well as a final report and audited financial statements<sup>76</sup>.
- The reporting requirements also seem to have been customized per project, based on the investment risk.

To the Evaluation Team, these requirements still seem somewhat burdensome for both partners and PMU staff, who need to review them, in addition to undertaking very regular monitoring field visits of projects under implementation<sup>77</sup>. A key question is how to make the reporting system more efficient, in particular for LGUs. While it is understandable that LGUs do not always have the capacity to navigate the requirements of institutionalized aid, the lack of detailed financial information, in particular, does not document expenditure against budget, in order to detect up-front cost overruns and assure transparency. Bringing the LGUs capacity up to a point where they are able to understand and practice basic project reporting issues would represent both an increase in skills and empowerment.

### **Documentation prepared for the RB**

Donors informed the Evaluation that the documentation for the RB meetings could be improved, with:

- more details on the risks involved;

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<sup>75</sup> The Evaluation team was not provided with review progress and completion reports from Rounds 4 to 5 as they were not available.

<sup>76</sup> FACE form and supporting documents.

<sup>77</sup> 280 field visits were conducted by PMU staff in 2015.

- Clearer information on how the projects proposed are linked together in terms of potential synergies, their linkage to the needs assessments and how they will contribute to achieving the project goals.
- Better contextualization in the project profiles<sup>78</sup> in order to understand the risks involved, referring, possibly, to the key risks highlighted in the RRM and the new Standard Operating Procedures for security incidents.<sup>79</sup>

#### 4.4 Efficiency

This section looks at the overall efficiency of the CRDP mechanism in terms of resource allocation, disbursement rates and optimization of overhead expenses charged to the Programme. Two questions are addressed:

- Have the CRDP financial resources been allocated and spent efficiently (\$/output)?
- Have the overhead expenses been optimal/optimized?

The overall financial status of the Programme as of March 2017 based on figures received from the PMU is presented in Table 3.

**Table 3: Overall Financial Status of CRDP as of March 2017**

Allocations to projects 2012 - 2016	Allocations to programme management costs 2012-2016	Actual and projected allocations to projects 2017	Actual and projected allocations to programme management costs 2017	Total Programme costs
\$14,622,888	\$2,662,303	\$5,582,602	\$1,187,092	\$24,054,885

Disbursement rates were slower at Programme start-up but subsequently steadily increased, demonstrating by Year 4 were a consistent upward trajectory. Average annual disbursements over the first five years of the Programme are just over USD US4 million.

##### 4.4.1 Project Size and Coverage

The actual average value of the projects for round 4 and 5 has decreased relative to the previous rounds. The MTE had already pointed out that projects in Rounds 1-3 were unable to provide blanket coverage to even the small communities targeted. This question remains even more acutely. The size of the project budgets is too small to make the intended impact on the communities targeted. In addition, as mentioned earlier, by generating inequitable

<sup>78</sup> The Evaluation Team understands that these are presented to the RB meetings.

<sup>79</sup> The new Standard Operating Procedures for security incidents has integrated some of the very practical policy guidance provided in the draft HCT Policy Framework of November 2013 as agreed in the RB meeting of January 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2015. (See section 4.8 for a fuller treatment of risk management)

project benefits, CRDP also runs the risk of negatively impacting community cohesion essential to developing greater resilience. With even smaller project values, this risk could increase and this should be a concern.

#### **4.4.2. Financial Management and Reporting**

Donors would like to see some improvement in the CRDP's financial reporting and financial management. Donors have pointed out that financial figures requested or reported were not always readily available or updated, and with insufficient explanation in some instances.<sup>80</sup> Donors also noted delays in obtaining responses to requests for clarifications and explanations on financial figures, raising concerns as to the accuracy of financial reporting. The Evaluation team was informed that UNDP has auditing procedures and that audit reports are made available to the donors.

To sum up, the Evaluation has concluded that, with 84% of the financial resources allocated to projects, the donors funds have undoubtedly been expended towards the main objectives of the CRDP, but there is room to improve consistent financial reporting. The remaining 16% cover other related expenses related to the PMU, ISS and GMS. In order to evaluate the efficiency of the Programme in terms of output or outcome per dollar spent, one would need much more information, both on outputs, outcomes and detailed expenses.

One area of concern is the relatively small amount of funding allocated per project, at the risk of not achieving a critical mass of outcomes, distributed equitably, in a given community or cluster of communities, and therefore of not achieving substantial outcomes in building the resilience of Palestinians living in Area C and EJ. This also raises the question of the overall size of the Programme. Initially, it was envisaged that about USD 33 million would be needed for the first five years. Only USD 24 million were mobilized. Despite strong Swedish advocacy for EU members to support CRDP, Italy opted in 2014 to fund a parallel but very similar mechanism managed through UNDP and led by the MOLG. Other donor-funded programmes are working in Area C but only the UNDP/FAIR and the EU programmes are of the same relative scale as CRDP. Finland and Belgium are possibly interested in joining the CRDP. It remains that the CRDP would need additional and very significant financial and political support of other EU donors, Canada, the World Bank and Arab donors to be able to create a critical mass of integrated multi-sectoral interventions, lay the basis for long-term sustainability development in Area C and EJ, and strengthen the resilience of Palestinian communities to sustain a productive presence on their land.<sup>81</sup>

#### **4.5 Sustainability**

In the difficult and volatile political context of Area C and EJ, the following questions can be addressed with respect to the sustainability of the CRDP:

- Are the outcomes of the CRDP activities likely to be sustainable? And,

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<sup>80</sup> Donors commented that when a budget was queried during RB meetings, they were subsequently revised in the minutes of the Review Board meetings with no explanations.

<sup>81</sup> The potential interest of Arab donors in the CRDP mechanism was raised by both UNDP and other donors.

- Is the CRDP, including the implementation modalities, a sustainable mechanism for raising and pooling donor resources for development programmes in Area C and EJ.
- To what extent has the CRDP contributed to building the capacity of institutions in Area C and EJ to sustain the two-state solution?

#### **4.5.1 Sustainability of CRDP interventions**

The Evaluation team has little ground for assessing the likelihood that the CRDP interventions will be viable over the long-term, when it is a productive activity, or whether the impact will be lasting, e.g., on projects that support social cohesion, or capacity building. As explained in Section 4.4, the Programme is yet to generate a methodology to assess the capacity of either the implementation partners or the beneficiaries to continue their activities once the CRDP funding they have is terminated. Anecdotal evidence leads to conclude on a mix of situations. Activities centered on productive investments or paid services have more chance to continue – provided the capital investments are not destroyed by the Occupant -- than social services which do not have a stable revenue base and need a longer time to create an impact. Under a situation of Occupation it is definitely challenging to find ways of securing financing for social services (education and health) or community activities aimed at building social cohesion. This question has not yet been addressed by the various programmes working in Area C and EJ. CRDP might initiate a broad-based thinking and research process on this issue.

What are the options? More donor financing? More private sector participation and financing? More PA financing out of general revenues? If the CRDP had been designed as an experimental programme, the question of the sustainability of the activities should have been part of the design and addressed activity by activity. However, there was not ex ante analysis, for each activity, to assess what could be the components of sustainability. This question was not addressed either in the Revised Implementation Programme 2015-2016.

#### **4.5.2 Sustainability of the CRDP mechanism**

The CRDP has launched a transformative process through a small grant allocation programme towards the strategic pillars of community-based resilience. While perfectly appropriate in the short or medium-term, for the long-term, the question remains whether such a mechanism can fold into more standard mechanisms that governments use to channel investments, development and social programmes. To further support the transformative process, certain areas would require strengthening during the continuation of the Programme, including:

- Improving the governance and management structure, with a clear delineation of responsibilities and accountability between the management (UNDP/PAPP, PMU) and oversight bodies (Review Board, and potentially a Steering Committee).

- Rigorous and timely reporting of activity results, outcomes and impacts, and use of financial resources.
- Closer verification of potential achievements and risks of activities in relation to the main criteria of resilience.
- More emphasis on capacity building of local institutions. And,
- Paving the way for a similar programme to be integrated in due course in such PA institutional programmes as the one managed by the MDLF, adopt clear criteria for the competitive selection of lead institutions to manage such a mechanism for the areas of intervention, implementation partners, and beneficiaries so that the Programme operates efficiently and in full transparency.

#### **4.5.3 Capacity and Institution Building**

As the goal of the CRDP is to support the foundations for the two-state solution, capacity and institution building should be core interventions of the Programme. Through Rounds 1-4, the main contributions of the Programme have consisted in:

- Support for the Creation of ACCO, as addressed in the report.
- Increasing the participation of important PA ministries – Local Government, Agriculture, EJ, and to a lesser extent Health and Education, in CRDP processes, including through their local directorates.
- Involving LGUs (JVCs and VCs), LNGOs and CBOs, as implementing partners, and more recently supporting the LED process.

Regarding ACCO, the main contribution of the UNDP and the donors has been to successfully negotiate its establishment with the PMO, and to provide two years of funding. However, the CRDP has not been requested to provide technical support. The Evaluation team is not aware that ACCO is obligated to submit progress reports, covering the substance of its activities; it does submit a report on its expenditures. It is not clear either how ACCO's performance will be assessed or whether there are some agreed indicators between ACCO and the CRDP/UNDP. Finally, it is not yet clear whether or not ACCO will become a permanent structure within the PMO. These concerns are mainly due to the recent establishment of ACCO and must be mitigated in the future.

In addition, it is at the level of LGUs, that the CRDP have had clearer impact, although, the Evaluation team did not receive any document that would clearly explain what services were provided to them to build their capacities for the long-term. Field visits however suggested 'learning by doing', in particular on procurement procedures, and reporting. This might be mitigated through systematic provision of technical assistance/services (local planning, supervision, computerized systems, beneficiary selection etc.) to LGUs so that they can demonstrate their competencies for the long-term and qualify for future funding. What CRDP has contributed to the development of LGUs would merit a more thorough investigation than what was feasible in the context of this Evaluation.

The Local Economic Development (LED) process is a UNDP initiative with MOLG, that aims *"to optimize the utilization of a territory's resources (productive, economic, natural, human,*

*locational and other) and effectively leverages a range of external inputs to advance its economic development objectives.”* No detailed information has been provided to assess how this process complements other efforts with the MOLG and MDLF, the extent of the services/capacity building efforts to be covered by the CRDP, nor the performance indicators that will be used to assess effectiveness and efficiency of the CRDP support to build local institutions.

## **4.6 Gender Considerations**

This section reviews gender mainstreaming in CRDP project documents in light of the PA and UNDPs commitment to gender equality.

### **4.6.1 UNDP’s and PA’s gender policy**

*PA’s Cross-Sectoral National Gender Strategy: Promoting Gender Equality and Equity 2011-2013.* Gender equality is gaining ground within the Palestinian society, thanks to the involvement of women in the Palestinian struggle for self-determination and in spite of cultural, political, and social obstacles. The PA has progressively addressed the issue since 1994. Twenty four gender units now operate in various ministries and governmental institutions. The council of ministers issued a decision in 2009 for ministries to adopt a gender sensitive budget. Nevertheless, the gap is still present between the government’s will and implementation. Thus, gender units in ministries are facing several problems such as the lack of will and commitment of individual ministries, inadequate budget allocation, and exclusion of gender staff from planning and budgeting, and more importantly, insufficient gender sensitivity or targeting in programmes on the ground.

A Cross Sectoral National Gender Strategy (CSNGS) was approved in 2014. The CSNGS is the result of an institutional gender analysis of ministries and it seeks to provide guiding principles: the 9<sup>th</sup> strategic objective in the strategy is to mainstream gender concerns and issues in the work of Palestinian governmental ministries.

The CSNGS is a part of the national development strategy of the PA, and reflects its commitment to equality, equity, and involvement in combating all types of discrimination. Other than advocating gender equality and equity, the strategy gives guidance for reducing gender gaps. The gender issue is considered a cross sectoral issue because all ministries and governmental institutions have an important role in gender mainstreaming and in decreasing the gender gap across all sectors. All ministries were involved in the development of the CSNGS.

*UNDP Gender Equality Strategy 2014-2017: “The Future We Want: Rights and Empowerment.”* The UNDP Gender Equality Strategy 2014-2017 is the second UNDP gender equality strategy since 2005. It promotes gender equality and women empowerment that are considered central to UNDP’s mandate and fundamental for its development approach. The Gender Equality Strategy is consistent with the UNDP Strategic Plan. It aims to decrease poverty and make significant reductions in gender inequalities, and help create a more inclusive, sustainable, and resilient environment for women. The strategy focuses on women



and girls facing multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination. It is to be implemented through three main strategic pillars in the oPt: sustainable development pathways, inclusive and effective democratic governance, and resilience building. The strategy includes coordination and partnerships as vital implementation tools, including with UN Women and other UN entities, civil society, and other important partners. UNDP strategy aims to mainstream gender in all its activities<sup>82</sup>.

#### **4.6.2 Integration of Gender in the CRDP**

##### **A. Gender in the CRDP Portfolio**

A review of the total project portfolio (See section 3.5 above) for the Programme shows that eighteen projects (16 percent) of the 113 CRDP projects targeted women and/or addressed gender relations and needs. Eight (8 percent) have women's empowerment as their sole focus addressing women's leadership, building their technical and business skills, and preparing them for employment and economic empowerment. In addition, there are five other projects that address gender issues as part of their project design and target women with specific activities.<sup>83</sup> Furthermore, there are five other energy projects<sup>84</sup> which have women as their main beneficiaries although this outcome was not envisaged in their proposals. Total budgets allocated to the three project types amount to almost USD 2.0 million, that is 9 percent of total budgets in the project portfolio<sup>85</sup>.

##### **B. Project Results<sup>86</sup>**

Project completion reports for projects in Round 4 and 5 are not yet available, so it has not been possible for the Evaluation team to assess the full scope of gender results across the Programme portfolio. However, the PMU included some quantitative gender indicators<sup>87</sup> and impact statements in their reporting for Round 1. The projects contributed positively to addressing gender issues but, altogether, the projects are too small and fragmented to be able to generate a significant impact in closing the gender gap. The Evaluation team's field visits did reveal, however, that beneficiaries of women-focused projects are very proud of their achievements. For example, the projects providing training for women in political participation skills in the Qalqilya cluster had resulted in one woman being elected to the VC. All the female participants from the different communities had started a women's network which meets regularly for discussions and income-earning activities. Women involved in a newly established women's gym reported organizing regular classes with the Palestinian kick box champion from Nablus and were exploring classes in healthier lifestyles, including better

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<sup>82</sup> For more analysis on gender – related data, please refer to Table 9 in Annex 9; and for guidance and lessons learned on gender and resilience-based programming, please refer to Annex 11.

<sup>83</sup> Old City Youth, Action Aid and Jerusalem Bedouin Cooperative Committee in Rounds 1-3 and Youth Development Department, and Al Aqaba Women Capacity building in rounds 4-5.

<sup>84</sup> Danchurch Aid x 2 in Rounds 1-3, Al Jit girls school, An part of the MTE, although gender Najah x2.

<sup>85</sup> YWCA and Al Murtaqa in Rounds 1-3, and Hiwar x 2, An Naama, Kufr Laqef, and Al Wehdeh

<sup>86</sup> The analysis in this section is based on the nine project visits accomplished, a review of CRDP's own M&E records, and progress and close out project reports which were received for 16 projects.

<sup>87</sup> Number of women reporting increased economic opportunities of number of women completing training courses.

nutrition. A female beneficiary of the YDD project which provided financial grants for income generating activities to assist families excluded from Israeli social insurance schemes in Jerusalem pending family reunification, talked about the sense of achievement gained from being able to support the higher education of her children.

The MTE report cited the impressive gender results of the projects providing solar home systems to Bedouin families. These projects eased the work burden on women of milk-churning tasks: once solar electricity becomes available, families can use an electric churner and refrigerate their milk products and food. Those projects also provide women with the opportunity of some leisure (watching TV for fun or to feel connected to the world). Projects where women and youth acquire new skills [YWCA –Photography class for young women in EJ] give them a sense of worth and hope that they can have a fulfilling professional life.<sup>88</sup>

Although it is not possible to provide an overall and adequate evaluation of the extent of gender mainstreaming, inclusiveness and women's empowerment in CRDP projects, the interviews and field visits did reveal a high level of gender awareness, and where women had been the targets of project activities, they were significantly empowered.

### **C. Monitoring gender – related results**

The use of gender indicators and gender disaggregated results reporting is somewhat integrated into log frames and reporting. In projects from Rounds 1-3, gender analysis is included in problem statements, but the gender issue is often not addressed in the project design or indicators. Due to the lack of project documentation for the projects in Rounds 4-5 which partnered LGUs and GUs, it has not been possible to provide an overview of the percentage of projects which had gender indicators as part of their log frames and reporting frameworks. In addition, few projects consistently provided gender disaggregated results data<sup>89</sup>. As a result it is not always apparent to what extent men and women are provided with equal opportunities to participate in project activities, what factors affect the different levels of participation, and how women and men are differently impacted by the project results. Finally, it is to be noted that although sex disaggregated data on participation rates and project impacts on women and youth is required in UNDP guidelines, the evaluation criteria presented in the Evaluation Grid in the CRDP November, 2012 Operational Manual did not include an assessment of gender mainstreaming in the project proposals.

At the project level, based on the quantitative data provided, it would seem that gender mainstreaming is inadequate. However, qualitative data provided in implementation reporting, as well as interviews with beneficiaries during field visits indicates that gender perspectives and attention to the goal of gender equality are more central to the design of

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<sup>88</sup> AWRAD, CRDP MTE, January 2015.

<sup>89</sup> For the round 1-3 projects reviewed an analysis is included in problem statements, but this is rarely carried through to project design elements. When the design does include gender elements – there are no indicators to assess their impact on project products or participants. For example, Al Maqdasee includes a training programme to ensure the mainstreaming of gender into all municipal policies and practice, but does not include an indicator that assesses the impact of this on publications produced or on the perceptions of participants themselves.

project activities than the available quantitative data suggest. For example, in the CADL project to improve livelihood of Bedouin families in Area C through the provision of solar packages, while there were no gender indicators included in the log frame, it was clear in interviews with both the women and the men in the community of Ras Ein Al Auja that women had been the prime beneficiaries of the project, dramatically relieving them from some household burdens and changing their lives and opening up space for the pursuit of more social and educational activities.

## **4.7 Knowledge Management**

This section addresses the effectiveness and efficiency of the CRDP's knowledge management (KM), in terms of both knowledge generation and management. Knowledge Management has not been developed as a separate output to support all other outputs. Instead it is grouped under output 3 with the elements of human capital and public participation

### **4.7.1 Knowledge generation.**

As a new and innovative programme, it was expected that the CRDP would generate considerable new knowledge on how to pursue the transition from humanitarian to development donor-support activities in Area and EJ, how to lay the foundations for a sustainable socio-economic and institutional environment towards the implementation of the two-state solution. Learning from implementation experience is therefore one of the CRDP's main objectives, so that donors and PA entities can assess the value-added of the approach. This is particularly pertinent at this point as ACCO is in the process of preparing an 'implementation strategy' for Area C and the PMO expressed keen interest in the results of this final evaluation for informing their strategy development.<sup>90</sup> The MTE recommendations in this regard included several provisions for facilitating the knowledge generation process and learning from CRDP. There is still room for improvement:

- As has been noted in section 4.3.4.1 on Monitoring and Evaluation, although a large amount of qualitative and quantitative data and information are collected (needs assessments, project reviews and progress reports, technical reports, annual reports etc.), the approach to data collection and analysis has not been strategic enough to allow for a full appreciation of how results – including beneficiary behaviors – and risk mitigation measures are contributing to the achievement of Programme goals and objectives and enable an assessment of the replicability of the approach in the pursuit of increased community resilience.
- IPs do not include a Knowledge Generation component in their proposal to elaborate on how they will identify the implementation lessons learned around sustainability, risk mitigation and beneficiary behaviors and unify these in their reporting.

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<sup>90</sup> Interview with the PMO

- Finally, PMU resources have not been freed up from reporting to enable a focus on a modification of the M&E system, tools and technology which would most flexibly and appropriately enable partners to generate useful data on emerging outcomes and implementation experience which could deepen the analysis of lessons learned at the programme level. The current M&E and Reporting Manager still spends the majority of her time in the office (70 percent) and only 30 percent in the field, whereas a division of 50/50 would seem optimal, and is indeed her preference. This office-based focus is a result of the general understaffing of the PMU (See section 4.3.2 above where staffing issues are more fully discussed).

#### **4.7.2 Knowledge Dissemination**

In addition to recommendations to improve data collection, the MTE had formulated a number of suggestions on knowledge dissemination activities and instruments, so that there would be some cross-fertilization not only between IPs, but also with other UNDP programmes and development partners.

- Knowledge dissemination meetings: In response to these MTE recommendations, the PMU team proposed in the Year 4 annual work-programme a series of facilitated roundtables, including three workshops with IPs (in Hebron, Jordan valley, and EJRM), and one with academics. At least, two meetings were held with IPs (March and April 2016), and one with UNDP and donors (September 2016). The latter focused on lessons learned from work in Jerusalem. In the first meeting, IPs were given a chance to present both their projects and Lessons Learned (LL). In the second meeting, although CRDP presented a synthesis of lessons learned to date, the inclusion of other presentations limited the time available for open discussion, review, and validation. This could easily be remedied through a more proactive role for CRDP in the coming future.
- In the 2016 annual work-programme, the PMU has included a budget of USD 30,000 under the project line for a consultant to conduct a lessons learned review, suggesting that the meetings in 2016, although a good start, may not have produced the results anticipated.
- Lessons learned are included in Bi-Weekly Progress Reports to donors and management for decision-making purposes, but are not regularly disseminated to IPs for ongoing validation, reflection and feedback, which was the intent of the MTE recommendation.
- Website: there is a website linked to the UNDP/PAPP website but the content does not include a lessons learned section, nor any link to more detailed and valuable reports such as the Annual Reports. In order to make the website a more effective tool of knowledge sharing, would require additional investment in human resources to update and monitor content, in particular to protect the communities where the projects try to keep a low profile vis-à-vis the Israelis both to preserve implementation achievements and mitigate future risks to the communities.

- The use of lessons learned is not clear. They might be synthesized and disseminated to all IPs and used as a resource to modify application design requirements of future proposals, and evaluation criteria as necessary?

In summary, some progress has been made to address the MTE recommendations and suggestions. M&E methodologies and activities continue to generate lesson learned, and some efforts have been made to share and validate implementation lessons with IPs and donor. However, there are still opportunities:

- There is no systematic knowledge management system in place which provides a sufficient level of analysis to generate and share knowledge which can help IPs improve their performance in reaching programme-level results, test the validity of the Programme approach, inform Programme decision-making, or enable an assessment as to the replicability of the CRDP approach.
- Knowledge sharing is improving still a little ad hoc. PMU staff, within their time and work load constraints, grasp every opportunity to network and learn through their work. For example, they attend the UNDAF process so that they can become familiar with its indicators. Project coordinators spend significant amounts of time networking with other IPs in their clusters, and manage an informal sharing of implementation lessons learned through the project steering committee meetings. Although informal exchanges between staff and networking opportunities have their merit, a systematic approach is needed to achieve knowledge results commensurate with expectations from the CRDP.
- Human and budgetary resources have been limited and would require an increase in both staffing and financial allocations.
- In addition, CRDP has not been able to fully capitalize on the knowledge of other programmes operating in Area C, although as noted in Section 4.3.3 above, some headway is being made on intra-UNDP coordination. As also noted in section 4.3.3, PMU staff do not attend the UN cluster meetings, which act as platforms for the exchange of operational lessons.
- The role of ACCO in facilitating knowledge sharing and use from and for CRDP could be significant.

#### **4.8 Communication, Visibility and Advocacy**

The complexity of the CRDP and the risky environment in which it operates requires that communication between the Programme and its donors be proactive, responsive and that communication lines be clear. CRDP uses a range of communication tools and processes to provide information to its donors and other stakeholders, including bi-weekly updates, excellent videos, and success stories.

Donors informed the Evaluation team that the lines of communication are not always clear. This is partly attributed to the revolving nature of CRDP management over 2015 and 2016. With the arrival of the new Programme Manager in December 2016, communication lines

have become more streamlined; he clearly is the focal point for queries and requests. Donors also mentioned that communications have not been consistently proactive or responsive. There are some delays between their requests for information and submission. This has resulted in some donors increased interest in the details of the Programme, a role which they feel is not theirs.

The Evaluation team reviewed project videos received from the PMU and some samples of success stories provided. These are very professionally produced and provide evidence of CRDP outcomes and goal achievement. CRDP must work on intensifying its efforts to disseminate them. By May 28, 2017 two videos had 386 and 338 views, one 116 views, and three had only 28, 22 and 18 views. The location of the CRDP is not easily accessible due to the global structure of the website. They could also be widely disseminated through the Palestinian diaspora and local media.

#### **4.9 Managing risks**

This section deals with one question:

- How effective have the PMU and UNDP/PAPPs been in managing the CRDP risks?

##### **4.9.1 Initial design and MTE recommendations**

Those who designed the CRDP understood well that this was a high-risk programme – not only in terms of the financial risks attached to the activities they would support, but also in terms of the ‘international relations risks’ since it involved proceeding with activities against or over the procedures established by the Israeli occupant. Donors therefore expected an acute monitoring of programme and project risks. The MTE determined that CRDP’s ability to react to, and quickly and effectively resolve issues on the ground, was challenged by the lack of a comprehensive risk-management structure where responsibilities and expectations of all stakeholders are clearly delineated and risk-response tools elaborated. This had the effect of - to a greater or lesser extent - leaving the population participating in the Programme and the implementing partners to manage the risks themselves. This was already noted by the MTE, which, as a result, recommended the setting-up of a mechanism so that the distribution of responsibility and the level of intervention expected would be well understood by all stakeholders, allowing the burden of risk management to be appropriately shared among stakeholders. The risk management and response system was to be anchored on the respect of international law and the Oslo Accords recognized by the PA and the International Community so that development work in Area C and East Jerusalem would be legitimized.

It is clear that communities are aware of how to deal with the risks of implementation, but this experience needs to be informed with solid legal knowledge so that judicious strategies can be developed to confer greater protection. The MTE had recommended that a legal component be part of every project so that communities be empowered with the knowledge needed to act and also that each project set contingency funds aside for legal assistance to manage urgent risks.

#### **4.9.2 Evaluation Analysis**

A revised CRDP Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for security incidents in Area C and EJ has been drafted.<sup>91</sup>

- The document models the policy advice from the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) Policy Framework for Area C of November 2013 on humanitarian risks. The pre-amble says that the SOPs are to be read 'as an integral part of the HCT Policy Framework for Area C', guiding UN modalities of engagement in Area C. The HCT Policy framework was developed to support more effective implementation of humanitarian activities in Area C. It provides clear operational guidance on permitting Israeli approvals for projects, destruction of assistance, confiscation of equipment, reparations, harassment, arrest and detention of staff. However, there are additional operational implications for Contractors hired by IPs, which are not explicitly covered by the framework and are also not covered in the CRDP SOPs which only deal with the risk management of donor assets.
- The Revised Risk Matrix (June 2016 – June 30, 2017) details risk mitigation measures to be taken across a range of possible incidents, but does not explicitly mention Contractors, although risks to IPs and the community are addressed.

#### **A. Protecting local contractors**

The International Association of Development Agencies (AIDA) has reviewed the HCT Area C framework and has made some suggestions on how to better protect the Contractors involved in Area C work. These include reviews of contractual frameworks used with IPs, the need for a proper protection and risk analysis on a case-by-case basis and a clear understanding of what actions the donor (in this case CRDP/UNDP) is prepared to take to mitigate the risks during the implementation period; provision of legal support; payment of legal fees; provision of ID cards; establishing a reserve pool of funding available to meet potential costs relating to compensating contractors/implementing partners for delays, assets confiscated/damaged, legal fees, and adoption of alternative modalities. As the largest volume of CRDP funds is committed to the improvement of public and social infrastructure which involves the frequent use of local Contractors, CRDP may want to consider including such issues in their RRM and translating them into operational procedures.

#### **B. Risk documentation and analysis**

- An analysis of the CRDP risk registry over the CRDP programme period shows that the HCT humanitarian response mechanism has been increasingly used in responding to incidents around CRDP projects, while the frequency in the use of private lawyers has decreased.
- Unfortunately, the documentation of the precise actions taken is a little opaque where UNDP has become engaged; the registry refers to 'high level meetings held'.

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<sup>91</sup> CRDP, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for security incidents in Area C & East Jerusalem.

As a result there is no clarity on which actors have been involved, and are influential on either the Israeli or donor sides.

- The risk registry shows that out of 25 security incidents occurring related to CRDP projects (10 of these repeat incidents related to three CRDP projects) less than 50 percent have been resolved and closed.
- The remaining incidents have either been managed by requesting the IP to formulate an alternative approach, or no discernible action has been taken, or they are left unresolved and open.

The only trends that can be discerned for lessons learned purposes are that most incidents occur in Area C and that the HCT policy framework seems quite effective. While narrative documentation of the details of demolitions and confiscations occurring during Programme implementation exist. However, it is not analysed and therefore does not generate knowledge on enable on trends to inform future risk management strategies. Donors informed the Evaluation team that they are not adequately or responsively updated on the status of the security incidents occurring, and are not aware of when, or how the incident is resolved, or whether it has been resolved.

#### **C. Project-level contingencies for incidents**

A review of project document budgets shows that there are no legal components or contingency funds set aside in CRDP projects. This was confirmed by PMU staff; they are not involved in providing direct legal counsel to IPs. The IPs are informed of the organizations who provide legal assistance.

- The Evaluation team noted that in spite of the security incidents that have been faced during implementation with Stop Work Orders and harassment of farmers and MOA staff on land reclamation and water-related projects, the two CRDP projects proposed to empower local councils to be able to act on the basis of their legal rights through legal education, were not approved by the RB. If compliant with selection criteria, such projects would certainly increase local capacity to provide immediate protection for their CRDP and other projects. This has actually been one of the pillars of the very successful ECHO-funded West Bank Consortium, whose members are actively providing protection assistance in 180 Area C communities.

#### **D. Project-level risk assessment documentation**

Project documents, especially for LGU projects, have weak risk assessments:

- The risks are not contextualized to the locality or the particular project and are presented in quite a generic way.
- In the more formal project proposals, IPs continue to confuse the security risks with general risks in the operating environment. For example, IPs mention 'beneficiaries may not attend the training in the required numbers' as a risk. For donors, who want to avoid risks to their investments, the lack of depth in the risk assessments is a concern.



To summarize, the CRDP has put a revised security incident mechanism in place, but operational implications for Palestinian contractors involved in Area C work are not yet fully addressed. Risk documentation and analysis does not provide sufficient data that could inform how effective the current SOPs are. Although very few incidents have occurred during the implementation of CRDP projects, and the total value of demolitions is only 4.5 percent of donor contributions, risk assessments and planned mitigation in project documents is inadequate, which is a cause for concern for donors who want to continue to minimize the risks attached to their investment.

## **Chapter V: Moving forward: Findings, Challenges and Opportunities, and Recommendations**

Chapter V provides a summary of the most important conclusions of the evaluation by addressing strengths, weaknesses, challenges and opportunities of the CRDP. It also provides a comprehensive set of recommendations directed at all relevant stakeholders.

### **5.1 Findings**

The CRDP is on an exciting and promising journey, supported by the strong commitment of the donors who have supported the development of the Programme. Given the difficult environment of Area C and EJ, reflective of the Israeli occupation and the lack of progress towards the two-state solution, the CRDP is a complex and high-risk programme, with ambitious objectives. The first phase of the CRDP (2012-2016) has been, in many ways, experimental and, like all experiments, it has encountered many difficulties. The conclusions of this Evaluation must be read not only in this complex context, but also as part of the dynamics to implement change, recognizing that four years are not enough to resolve issues which have not been resolved in 20-25 years.

The CRDP is a major and commendable achievement by all stakeholders, in particular the PMU-UNDP. The Programme serves as a strong basis for continuous and sustainable efforts to develop and improve resilience in Area C and EJ. The Evaluation has identified four major strengths in the Programme<sup>92</sup>:

#### **A. Strategy for Area C and EJ**

- Placed Area C and EJ on the political and development map, and raised awareness on the urgency of addressing the development issues of these two areas of the oPt, both with the PA and with the international donor community.
- Legitimized the right and urgency of investing in the sustainable development of Area C and EJ, rather than providing only short-term, humanitarian assistance.
- Demonstrated that, with a focused mix of interventions, it should be feasible to evolve from humanitarian to development assistance.

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<sup>92</sup> All findings are elaborated in the relevant text.

- Demonstrated that increasing connectedness between Area C and Areas A/B is possible, either for social services or economic activities (e.g., marketing of agricultural produce).

#### **B. Institution Building**

- Laid the foundations for institution building in the PA, reflected in the establishment of ACCO, and the participation of MOLG, MOA, MOJA in the RB and LGUs/VCs/JSCs and ministries at the governorate level in project design and implementation. More recently, the Programme has started supporting the LED process in the two governorates of Qalqilya and Tubas.
- Increased local and national ownership of the development of Area C, and the protection of EJ (e.g., land registration), and started capitalizing on domestic talent (e.g., JSC engineers).
- Achieved greater gender and social inclusion sensitivity across a wide range of activities and contexts (e.g., development of female sports clubs, so that women and girls have a safe outlet outside home and work, while also learning to improve the nutrition of their families).

#### **C. Innovation in Development Interventions**

- Tested new approaches for scaling-up lower risk models for the delivery of essential services, such as the mobile information technology classrooms, or strengthening the agricultural value chain (e.g., milk collection trucks to reduce Bedouin's transport and storage costs; regular supply of milk for cooperatives; community-based solar systems in locales where electricity grids are unlikely to be installed; provision of buses for the safe transport of children to area A and B schools rather than risk building a school in Area C).
- Demonstrated that some risk-taking projects are possible and worth doing, even in the face of the Israeli government's restrictions and practices, and settlers' harassment of the Palestinian population.
- Strengthened the value of a multi-sector approach to resilience, in order to achieve greater results and impacts.

#### **D. CRDP implementation arrangements**

- Strategically positioned UNDP to implement such complex and large initiatives, given its local experience in the oPt (i.e., conflict and occupation setting). UNDP has a track record in implementing such programmes and has utilized its expertise in the achievements and relative success of the CRDP.

The Evaluation has also identified five overall areas for improvement in the implementation of the CRDP to date:

#### **A. Design**

- In spite of the geographical refocusing of the Programme in two governorates of Area C and in EJ, the projects are still somewhat dispersed, weakening the level of synergy needed to generate a greater impact on resilience.
- The sustainability of the individual projects and of the Programme as a whole is uncertain as no long-term provision has yet been made to ensure the technical,

financial and institutional viability of the activities or of the *modus operandi* of the Programme.

- Capitalization on the comparative advantage of UNDP as an experienced development organization and on the experience of various organizations and programs operating in Area C and EJ is currently underway and further synergies must be pursued, such as with the FAO in the implementation of agriculture interventions.

#### **B. Procedures**

- The allocation of Programme resources does not always follow rigorous, well-documented, and consistent procedures for the selection of all projects, which risks creating misunderstandings and misperceptions among the various stakeholders.

#### **C. Governance**

- The current governance structure, under the supervision of the RB, provides invaluable support, but must also provide additional strategic direction and improve its oversight responsibility.
- While communications with communities, local and national stakeholders developed over time, the CRDP must further improve its communication and dissemination efforts, in order to avoid any misunderstanding or misinformation. A clear communication strategy established at the outset of the Programme would improve both information on the CRDP and its visibility.

#### **D. Management**

- The management responsibilities of the UNDP/PAPP are delineated and communicated. The relation between UNDP/PAPP/PMU and the RB needs further clarity and delineation of accountability.
- The M&E Framework must be strengthened with additional, simple, but rigorous M&E tools and processes. In the absence of such improvements, the true impact of individual projects and of the programme as a whole will not sufficiently be recognized, as it would rely heavily on anecdotal information and miss valuable information.
- While a small number of knowledge products were produced (e.g., videos), project implementation experience does not efficiently inform decision-making or strategy, as no formal CRDP-led Knowledge Management system is in place to ensure capitalization of experience from one set of projects to the next. UNDP is currently making concerted efforts to produce knowledge products, which will address CRDP needs.
- The communication and advocacy strategies are not sufficiently capitalizing on the remarkable achievements of the Programme, hence limiting UNDP's ability to raise resources from new and additional donors.

#### **E. Resources**

- The PMU is understaffed, but receiving additional support from other UNDP staff.

- Funding is relatively small, in regards to guaranteeing long-term impact and equity in project implementation
- Some donors asserted that the reporting on Programme financial results must strive to improve timeliness and consistency.

## 5.2 Recommendations

The recommendations are based on the premise that there is a need to continue support for the present efforts of CRDP-UNDP. The Evaluation Team believes that, if the report's recommendations are properly implemented, CRDP-UNDP would be the appropriate mechanism for continuity. On the one hand, UNDP has the historical experience and institutional comparative advantage of working in Palestine and in development internationally. On the other hand, UNDP had accumulated rich experience during the past years, through managing the CRDP, and it would be more cost-effective to develop the CRDP based on the recommendations of this report, as opposed to venturing into other options.

The following recommendations are presented in four categories: recommendations for all stakeholders, followed by those for the PA, UNDP/PAPP/PMU, and donors.

### A. For all stakeholders

1. Recognize the CRDP as a true partnership between the PA, donors, UNDP and other international and local stakeholders, including 'beneficiaries'. On that basis, the Evaluation team believes that it is important to recognize both the accomplishments and the weaknesses of the Programme so far, and take equal responsibility for what has worked well and produced good results and what has not worked well. The stakes are extremely high for Area C and EJ and for Palestine. It is worth striving to consolidate what has been achieved in the first phase of the CRDP.
2. Proceed immediately with the establishment of the Steering Committee, initially envisaged to provide policy direction (in annual meetings), and maintain the RB as an oversight body for the delivery of the Programme (in quarterly meetings). In addition, ensure separation of powers between the two bodies. Furthermore, the roles and decision-making powers of each party must be clarified and agreed, so as to ensure that all decisions are made in a joint and transparent manner. The PA's strategic directions, as stipulated in national strategies, must be the main point of reference for decision-making on Area C and EJ.
3. Analyze thoroughly the lessons from CRDP I and determine, through answers to the following questions, what the next phase should be:
  - ✓ *Objectives/focus*: Should the same broad objectives be maintained or reformulated into more selective and time-bound resilience elements?
  - ✓ *Pre-conditions*: Is it realistic to envisage sustainable development activities, so long as progress towards the two-state solution is stalled?
  - ✓ *Size*: CRDP I received about USD 25 million. Should the size at least double for another five-year implementation period?

- ✓ *Content*: Should the Programme be an activity-based “small-grants programme” or should it aim at larger multi-year community-based development projects? What should be CRDP’s comparative advantage, as compared to other donor-supported programs?
- ✓ *Operating modalities*: Under what arrangements with UNDP/PAPP should the PMU continue? Should there be IPs and what kind? What is the best organizational arrangement to implement the Program?

## **B. For the PA**

1. Issue the strategies for Area C and EJ that will, in principle, lay the foundations for institutional and other development interventions, necessary not only for ‘resilience’ building, but also for the sustainable development of these areas.
2. Provide strategic guidance on national needs while providing technical support and oversight at the operational level, strengthen synergies and avoid duplication of support.
3. Formalize the role of ACCO as the true, leading institution for planning for Area C and EJ, in partnership with PA ministries, to ensure that all work -- including donor-funded work -- in Areas A & B mainstreams the needs of Area C and is coherent with the National Policy Agenda and the sector strategies.
4. As a co-chair, ACCO must convey national priorities during the RB meetings and ensure that there is no duplication of projects.

### **Insights and Recommendations by the PMO**

While the views of all stakeholders are fully integrated in the report, the views of the PMO are highlighted, as they provide overall guidance from the highest authority on strategic development in the oPt. According to a written document provided by the PMO:

*The Palestinian Government would like to thank Sweden, Austria, Norway and UNDP in supporting and managing the CRDP. The CRDP remains to be an important programme that supports the resilience of the Palestinians in Area C and East Jerusalem, and the findings of the final evaluation clearly show a vested interest by all parties to learn from the previous experience and look forward to better improve ways of supporting Palestinian communities and the State of Palestine. While noting that there is still a room to engage the relevant ministries and directorates. The Palestinian Government is also pleased to see an increased ownership by the different directorates and Government units in provision of support and guidance to the CRDP. Considering that none of the government members of the RB was involved in the selection of implementing partners from the civil society sector, the Government reiterates again the importance of following a transparent set of selection of criteria for selection of partners in Area C and in East Jerusalem. This Government emphasizes the need to clearly agree on the role of all partners during the decision making process.*

## **C. For UNDP/PAPP-CRDP**

- Measures to improve CRDP performance towards objectives include the following:
- ✓ Further clarify the roles between UNDP/PAPP and the PMU, so that the PMU is empowered to be accountable in its efforts to deliver a quality programme in full compliance with UNDP quality standards.
- ✓ Facilitate adequate staffing, top quality training and mentoring of PMU staff currently in place, particularly the M&E staff, so that the RRF can be revised with an effective hierarchy of results, outcomes, and impact indicators, and the methodology, which informs these indicators, can be designed and adopted (Systematic before-and-after interviews with beneficiaries would be a significant improvement and is an example of a better methodology that employs well-tested M&E tools).
- ✓ Engage proactively in knowledge dissemination with all stakeholders in Palestine to improve project/activity design, and provide documentation that donors and other stakeholders can use to mobilize their electorates to advocate for their governments to continue or start engaging in the CRDP.
- ✓ Prepare, in partnership with the PMU and the PA, a Proposal Document for the continuation of the CRDP, based on the critical lessons learned from CRDP I. This Proposal Document should include a review and documentation of lessons learned to inform the next phase of the CRDP. It should also include an implementation structure and implementation modalities with clear objective criteria against which oversight can be performed and evaluated, including transparency and accountability measures in the selection of project/activities and implementation partners. Capacity building of PA institutions should remain a core objective for the long-term sustainability of the Programme outcomes and impacts.
- ✓ Support the PA in convening a conference chaired by the Prime Minister, responsible for leading harmonization of policy interventions in Area C and EJ and assisting the PA in raising funds for CRDP II.
- ✓ Further utilize the technical experience and lessons learned accumulated from other existing programmes implementing similar interventions (e.g., land reclamation, support to income generation projects, infrastructure, etc.), in addition to the experience of previous programmes (e.g., area development programme).
- ✓ Engage in communications on the results of the CRDP, and advocacy based on results on the ground from CRDP implementation, including with and through the UN, for the benefit of two-state solution. These include:
  - Detail its 2017 work-program with dated performance/output indicators.
  - Complete the PMU staffing proposal for submission to UNDP/PAPP.
  - Strengthen the financial management function to ensure consistency and timeliness of financial reporting.
  - Increase networking with other specialized UN agencies and other development actors through the UN Cluster System, in order to identify potential cooperation and complementarity.

- Document project and Programme-level indicator, capable of measuring beneficiary responses to, and perceptions of, Programme investments related to increasing resilience.

#### **D. For Donors**

- Agree as a unified group on implementation modalities and the best means of exercising their oversight responsibility over CRDP, within the parameters of existing contracts with the PA and UNDP.
- Clearly establish the reporting needs and agree on unified reporting requirements.
- Based on UNDP experience, commit to funding the next phase of CRDP implementation, provided the reforms, based on the recommendations in this report, are continued.
- Assist UNDP raise resources for the next phase of the Programme from additional donors.
- Increase engagement in advocacy for Area C and EJ at the international level and with the Israeli government.