

# Evaluation Report

**UNDP Parliamentary Support Project (2013-17)**

S O M A L I A 2 0 1 7

## Table of Contents

<b>List of Abbreviations .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Executive Summary .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Background.....</b>	<b>7</b>
Situating in Context:.....	9
<b>Scope of the Parliamentary Support Project .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Scope and Objectives of the Current Review .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Outcomes, outputs, activities and management.....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Theory of Change .....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Strengths of the ToC.....</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>Possible areas of Improvement for ToC .....</b>	<b>15</b>
Management, staffing, office accommodation.....	16
<b>Assessment of results and immediate future priorities.....</b>	<b>16</b>
Assessment of the Specific Outputs.....	20
<b>Discussion on Possible Gaps and Lessons Learned .....</b>	<b>26</b>
Expectations Management:.....	27
Improving Beneficiary Targeting .....	28
Capturing Knowledge and Expertise.....	28
Peace Building and Conflict Sensitivity.....	29
<b>Evidence Base and Monitoring .....</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>Recommendations for future support to Parliament.....</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>Conclusions.....</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>Appendices.....</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>Annex 1: Evaluation Design and Evaluation Matrix .....</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>References:.....</b>	<b>36</b>

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## List of Abbreviations

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AWEPA	Association of European Parliamentarians With Africa
AWP	Annual Work Plan
CPD	Country Programme Document
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CTA	Chief Technical Advisor
DFID	Department for International Development
EU	European Union
GROL	Governance and Rule of Law Project
HACT	Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfer (HACT) FRAMEWORK
HoR:	House of Representatives
ISF	Integrated Strategic Framework
NFP	National Federal Parliament
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PSGs	Peacebuilding and State building Goals
PSP	Parliamentary Support Project
TFP	Transitional Federal Parliament
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
ToC	Theory of Change
TPM:	Third Party Monitoring
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSOM	UN Assistance Mission in Somalia

## Executive Summary

This report provides information on the impact and effectiveness of the support provided by UNDP to the parliaments in Somalia: specifically NFP, Somaliland and Puntland. It provides a follow up of the earlier evaluation and provides recommendations for future support of UNDP projects for the parliaments in Somalia.

The strategy set out in the UNDP Country Programme Document (CPD) for Somalia (2011-2015) cites inclusive, equitable and accountable governance as one of four broad themes for priority activity. Within that, “strengthening parliamentary and civil society actors” is a sub-outcome.

An in-depth evaluation of the project was conducted by a team of international experts in 2016. As per the evaluation report, the assignment had two main purposes: (1) To provide information on the impact, effectiveness, relevance and value addition of the support provided to parliaments in Somalia and Somaliland by UNDP since 2013; and to provide recommendations for corrective actions to be implemented prior to the end of the project; and, <sup>[1]</sup><sub>[SEP]</sub> (2) Strategic prioritization / Project Outline: Based on the findings of the evaluation provide information related to strategic prioritization and project outline for a follow up project for the period 2017-2020, including support to established parliaments, the Upper Houses, and newly formed parliaments, as well as the overall funding strategy.

Somalia represents one of the most protracted cases of statelessness. The purpose of the project was to establish and transform parliaments from institutions without the capacities to perform their constitutional functions into more effective representative, legislative, and oversight institutions. Parliamentary partners—the political and staff leadership (particularly the Office of the Speaker), participating MPs, and staff—were participants in both the design and direction of the project, and the agents through which transformations were supposed to occur.

The activities of the project were to be implemented in priority phases over a period of four years: starting with a) setting up the entity itself b) creating functionality and c) operationalizing functionality. This approach seems to have been founded on a careful appreciation of parallel initiatives by other donors and implementers, and also recognition of the critical importance of coordinating all Parliamentary strengthening initiatives, as noted in mission report of September 2012 and the consequent project document.

As required, a twin track, internal/external approach was adopted tactically reflecting both the intrinsic needs of Parliament and its importance within national governance and State-building arrangements. However, the external support function does not become readily explicit.

The theory of change for the project was based on institutional development as the main supply-side impetus to democratic development. This was supported by mechanisms to extend outreach, to enhance the representation functionality, and to initiate a process of transparent function and accountability of MPs.

Going forward, the ToC should qualify the functioning further and move towards achieving effectiveness in parliaments. The programme must base its design and operations on a realistic projection of how democratic governance in Somalia is likely to evolve, while still maintaining the flexibility to allow for rapid adaptation to a fluid scenario. The upcoming elections in Somaliland will be indicative of how well the current political context can support a transition into electoral democracy. Moreover, the ToC should elaborate coverage and how engaging with regional parliaments will result in more inclusive politics leading to peaceful political settlement.

Sequentially the project Theory of Change should be developed against the findings of the baseline political economy analysis and conflict analysis. The ToC narrative must take a broader view of both supply-side and demand-side dynamics – where in the first phase of the programme necessarily focused on the supply side institutional establishment, the next phase must necessarily focus on the functionality of stakeholders within that institutional infrastructure.

The priorities set out were sensible and the trajectories chosen were those which might have reasonably been expected to make progress towards the overall outcome identified by the UNDP: *The National Federal Parliaments (NFP) and Parliaments of Somaliland and Puntland capacitated to operate as inclusive, transparent and effective law-making, oversight and representative bodies contributing to national peace-building and nation-building goals*. However, whether the outcome was achievable by any single project rather than the donor/implementer group as a whole is, debatable.

There was almost universal agreement in the third party monitoring (TPM) reports, in the evaluation report, in an EU ROM evaluation report, and from those consulted by the evaluators during the mission that the Project was worthwhile and strategically necessary in the context. The strategic plan for the People’s House of Somalia views the parliament as a space “where potential sources of conflict can be aired and addressed publicly and where issues of national importance including laws, government policies and other issues of public interest can be debated.” (Somali Parliament Strategic Plan 2012) In other words, Parliament remains an integral part of national reconciliation and the progress towards peace.

Elaborations, in the TPM, other reports reviewed, and also, some of the discussions, (specifically discussions with the ex-CTA and this review team), were along the lines of ‘the Project is doing what it is supposed to but it needs to do more of what it is doing at present’ and to build linkages where the results chain is de-linked, weak or non-existent. No respondent/key informant stated that the Project was unnecessary or unwelcome. All the Project staff Members are self evidently dedicated and determined to do their utmost in support of Parliament, a fact clearly acknowledged in the evaluation report.

Reviewing Project outputs in detail, a pattern is discernable in which subordinate or marginal activities, usually thoroughly worthwhile in themselves, generate relatively positive results whereas more fundamental reforms fare less well. This is perfectly understandable because subordinate activities may often be inherently more straightforward and achievable than fundamental reforms.

Outcomes are related to the external aspects of the intervention, and parliament’s position within the overall governance infrastructure of the country.

To a large extent, it is logical to agree with the ex-CTA’s argument of relating design relevance to time relevance<sup>1</sup>. The project design is in line with parliament’s functionality: oversight, legislation and representation. The priorities are set within the needs/baseline identified in September 2012, which articulates the need while conceptualizing parliamentary structure, roles and functions, whilst relating it to the baseline situation in Somalia at the time (David Payne Report 2012). However, the project did not have the flexibility of selecting its own timeline, as it is part of the support contributing to PSG 1, Inclusive Politics- the timeline it chose was up to the end of 2016. However, since the Somali Compact aimed at setting the foundations for peace and state-building, then by extension, the Parliamentary Support Project also aimed at setting the foundation of parliamentary functionality in Somalia. In our discussions with project staff, it appeared that they consider their work, to-date, as laying the groundwork, and of setting the pace. We agree with the ex-CTA that the overall outcome envisaged for the Parliament in the original Project document is probably some years away and we have found that it would not have been realistic, given the context, that the outcome could be achieved within the lifetime of this Project, although a solid basis has been established at output level towards achieving Outcome level results in the future.

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<sup>1</sup> Also, acknowledged by evaluators and termed realistic expectations

Further, as mentioned in the evaluation report, the project came to a virtual halt following the terrorist attack on the Parliament, resulting in loss of lives. Moreover, “The months October–December in 2013 and again in 2014 were characterized by gridlock and infighting within the SFG over the dismissal of incumbent prime ministers and horse-trading over the selection of replacements.” (Mosley 2014: 5)

It was, therefore, only towards the third quarter of 2014 that re-hiring resulted in a team being reinstated to resume the project. This, effectively, gave the project 15-18 months to implement a 36 month project trajectory which were an ambitious course of action to begin with and required more than 36 months to complete in order to deliver outcome level results.

In discussion with the evaluators, it was discovered that the project had planned a mid-term evaluation which could not materialize. This was based on the fact that the ToRs shared with the evaluators were that of a mid-term evaluation (MTE) even though they came onboard for the evaluation in the final year of the project.

Given that a project document rationalization exercise was, rightfully, undertaken in early 2015- a MTE would have provided the necessary roadmap for mid-term course correction and rationalization of the overall scope, activities, outputs and targets.

Programming interventions in democratic governance are generally subject to certain stakeholder dynamics, which have direct implications for program management and implementation. This is due to the inherently political nature of the beneficiaries, where the “buy-in” and engagement of political actors is necessary for the programme to achieve its outcomes. The dynamic renders a certain level of agency to political actors where their level of participation affects the timeline and inclusion in the implementation process more directly compared with other programmes in which project beneficiaries have less control. The project has responded well to this dynamic by maintaining a centralized system of communication, where the project (specifically the project staff) is the sole interlocutor with the Parliaments.

The proposed project design in the new phase, therefore, adapted well to build on being in this position, by assuming the responsibility for building connectivity and networking. Secondly, these institutions are nascent bodies in an evolving context and parliamentary stakeholders will require a regular re-orientation (corresponding to capacity development) on their roles and responsibilities within the institutional framework. For instance, as the representative function of MPs evolves into an electorate-based model, re-orientation on aspects of constituency relationship management and responsive governance will be required.

In spite of a challenging context, UNDP’s substantial effort at creating functionality through capacity development of Parliamentary staff and MPs has broadly been successful in terms of transferring skills. Training reports indicate a rich curriculum of training content has been delivered through the project. The gap arises in being able to track and establish how well the transferred skills have been operationalised to create impact. The project successfully delivered competence and capability for selected functions for both Parliamentary staff and MPs. On the other hand, measures of the staff providing assistance to Parliamentarians or Parliamentarians actively engaging staff in initiating parliamentary business are sparse.

Overall PSP has made a substantial contribution to state building in Somalia through the establishment of active and functioning Parliamentary institutions. That the project has done so in a difficult post-conflict context is also highly commendable. This review considers the general dynamics of democratic governance programming and the adaptability of the programme structure and implementation approach to the local context of Somalia.

Our purpose in doing so is to identify where the project structure and implementation processes can be strengthened to improve delivery against project outcomes.

Going into phase 2, the project looks well-poised to continue supporting the evolving reform process. It is considered that a project supporting a reform process cannot be held accountable for the political economy of reform deterring any process i.e barriers to reform are pre-determined and therefore exogenous variables which the project must consider and mitigate, but not necessarily be able to address. However, the project by virtue of its positioning must be the information hub not just on reform progress but sustained political economy analysis should be knowledge products regularly shared with a larger donor and stakeholder group. Mainstreaming political economy intelligence into the programmatic Results and Resources Framework, logframe and risk matrix will be key to building in context-responsiveness for best results. Coordination will only work if the convened group gets regular analysis and information, beyond what they might have as being part of the development agencies group for Somalia.

## **Background**

The UNDP Parliamentary Support Project for Somalia parliaments (PSP) officially began in March of 2013 (though UN assistance preceded that date) and was scheduled to continue through December of 2016. Creation of parliaments and support for existing bodies is part of an internationally supported process of joint projects in support of peace and state-building goals.

The strategy set out in the UNDP Country Programme Document (CPD) for Somalia (2011-2015) inclusive, equitable and accountable governance as one of four broad themes for priority activity. Within that, “strengthening parliamentary and civil society actors” is a sub-outcome.

The Provisional Constitution was adopted on 1st August 2012 with 20 August [YEAR] set as the date for the end of the transition period in the End of Transition Roadmap document. UNDP NY mobilized a mission to Mogadishu (14 August to 24 August 2012) for critical support to the Parliament which subsequently also reported back on an ‘as is’ situation analysis of parliamentary support needs. (source: communication with mission lead).

Hence, UNDP support was initiated in time for supporting the Inauguration of Parliament. This support led to the election of the Speaker, which was not held in the inaugural session like most parliaments, owing the to the special circumstances of the Somali parliament.

The UNDP mission reported back on an overview of parliamentary needs with 68 recommendations in the following areas:

- Quorum and Decorum
- Human resources requirements
- Material and Equipment requirements
- Question Period and Interpellation
- Committee systems that enable the Parliament to ensure better scrutiny of legislation and oversight
- Legislative drafting
- Parliamentary backup services including library, research, documentation and modern information technology

At the request of the Speaker, UNDP conducted an initial assessment of priority needs and developed a matrix of six-month priorities, which has been shared with international partners. UNDP worked with AWEPA on an assessment of the current parliamentary staff capacities and outlined a revised structure for the parliament administration. (ProDoc PSP: 8)

An in-depth evaluation of the project was conducted by two international experts between 2015 and 2016. As per the evaluation report, the assignment had two main purposes: (1) To provide information on the impact, effectiveness, relevance and value addition of the support provided to parliaments in Somalia and Somaliland by UNDP since 2013; and to provide recommendations for corrective actions to implement prior to the end of the project; and, (2) Strategic prioritization / Project Outline: Based on the findings of the evaluation provide information related to strategic prioritization and project outline for a follow up project for the period 2017-2020, including support to established parliaments, the Upper Houses, and newly formed parliaments, as well as the overall funding strategy. The final evaluation report of the detailed evaluation of 2016, was expected to provide the following:

- Before-and-after-assessment
- Assessment of the Theory of Change
- Assessment of achievement of outputs and contribution to outcomes
- An assessment of what worked and what did not work
- Assessment of partnership principles
- Assessment of project governance and implementation
- Assessment of Results Framework monitoring

Research has shown that a combination of disquiet, insecurity and contradictions shape political perceptions, options and reactions of internal and external stakeholders of the political process in Somalia. Nevertheless, international pressure for an electoral and a political transition continue to mount. (Mosley 2015).

The purpose of this report is not to attempt to understand the intricacies of the Somali Governance model. However, broadly framing some key issues in the socio-political milieu, as follows, to the extent that it may help contextualize UNDP's intervention.

At present, federalism is at the heart of the governance project in Somalia. It is accepted by the international community and any internal political contests arising,



for example, contestation over leadership (expulsion of PMs) has happened within a federal framework. However imperfect, “Federalism in Somalia remains the dominant political process with which to engage” (Mosley 2015).

Although high expectations of a transition to one person, one vote did not give way to an elections framework supporting universal adult franchise. The framework of the 2016 elections in Somalia sought to achieve small but sure gains: including expanding the electoral college from 135 to 14000, introducing a 30% quota of seats for women in the parliament, and the passing of Political Parities legislation. However, there is still a long way to go and the process to reach one person, one vote may take a few years.

It is often argued that political space continues to be captured by clanism and elite negotiations since colonization. In the colonial era, clans were used as vassals, which gave it an economic and institutional structure. One argument, then, is that ‘clanism’ as a political identity emerged later, because of this economic and institutional base provided in the colonial era. (Leroy 1989, Samatar 1997 in Adan 2015). Luling asserts that “Clanism” as political identity, in the post-colonial period, served the interests of the political elites created by the colonial powers. However, although the manipulation of politicians may be said to cause “clanism”, this could not be effected if “Clan” ties were not a reality in peoples’ minds and lives (Luling 1997, p. 289 in *ibid*).

State failure occurs (Ali 2016) in an ‘acephalous’ socio-political milieu (Mosley 2015). Thus, it is widely accepted that the ‘failure’ and ‘collapse’ of the Somali state rests on two key factors: a history of poor or absent leadership, with a particular focus on the individual figure of Siyaad Barre; and the Somali culture characterized by clanism. (Jones 2008).

Lack of political institutions, political parties, parliaments, caucuses coupled with the lack of civic organization, interest groups, media, association of persons, trade unions contributed to creating a vacuum filled by clans and Al-Shabab (Ali 2016; Luling 1997).

There is a consensus on federalism, specifically the 4.5 formula, for developing democratic political processes in Somalia. However, it is imperative for external support to the federalism project that the following occur:

- Engage with and strengthen the regional parliaments
- Create democratic space by engaging with the grassroots through civil society and media - specifically media to generate debates and dialogue
- Channel debates into parliament through caucuses which cut across clans
- Engage with the process of political parties formation to avoid, at best, the past practice of representing clan/sub clan interests through political parties

#### **Situating in Context:**

Somalia represents one of the most protracted cases of statelessness. State institutions, effectively, collapsed in 1991. Two years of complicated negotiations in an internationally mediated peace and reconciliation conference in Kenya led to the formation of a Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) and Transitional Federal

Government (TFG) of Somalia, in 2004. The interim period of the TFG ended with the endorsement of the Somali compact/New Deal<sup>2</sup> put in place in Aug 2012. Amidst renewed optimism, international development partners and donors took on the task of operationalizing the Somali compact along with the FGS and other relevant national stakeholders.

Supported by the UN and international donors, a federal parliament was selected, which in turn elected Sharif Hassan president in January 2013. Following on from which, support to the Somali compact (2014-2016) was provided to lay the foundations for “a sovereign, secure, democratic, united and federal Somalia at peace with itself and the world, and for the benefit of its people”. (Copenhagen High Level Partnership Forum Communique 2014)

UNDP’s involvement in supporting the Parliament in support of the Peace and State-building goals (PSGs), can be looked at in three distinct phases:

1. Initial support to Somalia Parliament in setting up basic procedures to elect its leadership and the election of the President and overview of parliamentary needs - September 2012 (David Payne Report 2012)
2. Development of a 6 month support matrix and support provided to the parliament - dates not given (Project Document March 2015)
3. Parliamentary Support Project implementation (2013-2016)

The 2016 evaluation report observes: In our experience as evaluators, we have rarely assessed parliamentary development projects that have worked with legislatures that started with less and in circumstances that were as dangerous. Territorial control by governments was in most cases problematic and tenuous. According to UN assessments, nearly all of Somalia is classified as posing the highest levels of security risk. Notably, since 2012, 17 members of parliament have been assassinated.

Moreover, parliaments in most developing countries have colonial legislation and institutions for precedent and institutional memory. In this unique situation, the project worked on archiving of Italian and British laws to create legal history/precedents.

The 2016 evaluation acknowledges that Parliamentary partners brought legitimacy to the enterprise and the means by which the benefits of these external efforts would be delivered to the Somali people. Parliaments constituted the apex representative institutions of the Somali states. The purpose of the project was to transform parliaments from institutions without the capacities to perform their constitutional functions into more effective representative, legislative, and oversight institutions. Parliamentary partners—the political and staff leadership, participating MPs, and staff—were participants in both the design and direction of the project, and the agents through which transformations were supposed to occur.

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<sup>2</sup> There are special arrangements for Somaliland within the compact. However, that layer of detail is not discussed here.

As we shall see, PSP relied primarily on capacity building efforts. And capacity goes nowhere without somebody with the motivation and ability to use that capacity to further institutional development. So assisting parliamentary partners to develop capacity was PSP's entrée into institutional development. But parliamentary partners were also critical to the next—utilization of that capacity—that was largely beyond UNDP control.

Parliamentary partners, too, had more specific interests of their own. They frequently lacked resources for many of the basic functioning's often taken for granted in legislative assistance projects: buildings, rooms, electricity, supplies, security, etc. Rarely are such basic infrastructural requirements considered by donors to be on their agendas and rarely are they part of the achievements they are mandated to report on.

### **Scope of the Parliamentary Support Project**

The activities of the project were to be implemented in priority phases over a period of four years: starting with setting up the entity itself, creating functionality and operationalizing functionality. This approach seems to have been founded on a careful appreciation of parallel initiatives by other donors and implementers, and also recognition of the critical importance of coordinating all Parliamentary strengthening initiatives, as noted in mission report of September 2012 and the consequent project document.

As required, a twin track, internal/external approach was adopted tactically reflecting both the intrinsic needs of Parliament and its importance within national governance and State-building arrangements. However, the external support function does not become readily explicit. This will be discussed in the next section along with some of the key findings and analysis as extracted from the project evaluation conducted in 2016.

### **Scope and Objectives of the Current Review**

The current assignment is a follow-up to the detailed evaluation, reviewing and building on the findings of the report. The review of the evaluation report was followed up with a discussion with the evaluation team. Key persons associated with the project, including current and previous CTAs, were also interviewed.

By the time the current assignment was initiated a draft new project document had already been developed. It was therefore agreed to pursue a forward-looking review, providing summary findings based on agreed upon criteria, with emphasis on:

- fair in-depth analysis and solid recommendations for the future support of UNDP to the Parliaments in Somalia
- important information on strategic prioritization and project priorities for the new phase of the project over the next four years from Jul 2107-Jun 2021 including support to established parliaments, the Upper Houses, and newly formed state assemblies, as well as the overall funding strategy.

As mentioned, the current evaluation reviews and analyses information from the in-depth interviews (conducted via Skype) with key project personnel and an assessment of documentation provided by the project staff. It was also agreed with UNDP that the length of the final report should not exceed 10,000 words, as that might become unmanageable to take forward as an action document from which to extract information for further discussions and negotiations with project stakeholders.

Somalia is at an important point of its political history. Having re-established democratic institutions, measures to strengthen democratic institutions and to support Members of the Parliament – in particular, through the expansion of the Secretariat capacities, increasing the impact of Parliamentary committees, and strengthening the links between Somali society and Parliament – should be pursued as a matter of priority. International assistance, though, needs to be appropriate and responsive to contextual requirements.

## Outcomes, outputs, activities and management

This section provides the findings and analysis of the evaluation conducted in 2016, within an evaluation and analytical framework that takes into account the nuances of the context.

The outcomes, outputs, and activities for the purposes of this analysis are defined as:

**Outcomes** –the direct effects of parliamentary activities on the outside world, specifically in relation to three governance functions—accountability, transparency and participation.

**Outputs** –the products of parliamentary activity, notably debates, laws, resolutions, and reports and assistance to constituents/communities/citizens.

**Activities** – Support provided for functionality (including provision of material and equipment) and operationalizing functionality by providing technical support to MPs and staff in parliamentary sessions, in committees, with communities (constituents).

*“Outcomes describe the intended changes in development conditions that result from the interventions of governments and other stakeholders, including international development agencies such as UNDP. They are medium-term development results created through the delivery of outputs and the contributions of various partners and non-partners. Outcomes provide a clear vision of what has changed or will change globally or in a particular region, country or community within a period of time. They normally relate to changes in institutional performance or behaviour among individuals or groups. Outcomes cannot normally be achieved by only one agency and are not under the direct control of a project manager. (UNDP PME Handbook 2009)*

## Theory of Change

The theory of change for the project was based on institutional development as the main supply-side impetus to democratic development. This was supported by mechanisms to extend outreach, to enhance the representation function, and to initiate a process of transparent function and accountability of MPs.

Initially, there was an emphasis on drafting of a new constitution. However, this was compartmentalized as constitution support took on the shape of an independent undertaking supported by UNDP.

The institutional development inputs were to contribute, in the longer run, to peace-building, state building and negotiating peaceful political settlements.

In the short run, the ToC was aimed at parliaments functioning as inclusive and transparent law-making, oversight, and representative bodies.

## Strengths of the ToC

- i) Keeping functionality as the main objective gave the project flexibility to be responsive to changing needs. For example when the Turkish government support to parliament building and structure did not materialise, the project was able to mobilise its resources to provide the basic infrastructure necessary for a functioning parliament.
- ii) In line with the ToC, the project design as elaborated in the outputs, lends itself to function i.e parliamentary function. Parliaments will have to legislate, represent, and do oversight. This, in view of this evaluation, gives it focus and distinguishes it from other governance and democratization projects, while clearly supporting larger goals of governance and democratization.
- iii) In view of the unique context presented to UNDP and other development partners in Somalia, an institutional development impetus was relevant. Parliaments, usually exist within contexts of some history, albeit often colonial legacy, some institutional memory, some precedent, etc – however in this unique situation none of those things exist so that space had to be created and the process actually had to begin from the very basic.

## Possible areas of Improvement for ToC

- i) The ToC mentioned inclusion as part of the institutional processes. Inclusion, in view of this evaluation, goes beyond any one institution. Inclusion is a function of developing a narrative supporting a pluralistic polity. Therefore, a political settlement, which recognizes pluralism and appreciates an inclusive political evolution, must be included within the ToC, going forward.
- ii) The review team had to decipher the ToC from a diagram only, there was no comprehensive narrative of the ToC. The theory of change is recognized as a successful approach in large part due to its ability to make the assumptions explicit. In absence of a ToC narrative, this important function of ToC is not achieved.
- iii) Finally, the bifurcation of interventions for constitutional and parliament projects required a more detail overhaul of the ToC than we could see.

Going forward, the ToC should qualify the functioning further and move towards achieving effective parliaments. The programme must base its design and operations on a realistic projection of how democratic governance in Somalia is likely to evolve, while still maintaining the flexibility to allow for rapid adaptation to a fluid scenario. The upcoming elections in Somaliland will be indicative of how well the current political context can support a transition into electoral democracy. Moreover, the ToC should elaborate coverage and how engaging with regional parliaments will result in more inclusive politics leading to peaceful political settlement.

Sequentially the project Theory of Change should be developed against the findings of the baseline political economy analysis and conflict analysis. The TOC narrative must take a broader view of both supply-side and demand-side dynamics – where in the first phase of the programme necessarily focused on the supply side institutional establishment, the next phase must necessarily focus on the functionality of stakeholders within that institutional infrastructure.

The UN Somalia Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) 2014-2016 is well aligned to the Somali compact. The strategic objective of the ISF that the project may be mapped to, directly, is “Inclusive Politics: Achieve a stable and peaceful federal Somalia through inclusive political processes.”

Initially, the project set out to achieve two distinct sets of outputs, one dealing exclusively with the constitutional review as part of the PSP. A project revision in March 2015 resulted in the outcome on constitutional revisions being taken out of the project document.

At the time of the 2016 evaluation, the project was working on the following identified outputs:

***Output 1 (Parliament Strategic Plan Objective 1): NFP and Parliaments of Somaliland and Puntland*** supported to enact quality legislation and to maintain effective oversight over the other branches of government according to the interests of all people and in support of peace-building and nation-building

***Output 2 (Parliament Strategic Plan Objective 3): NFP and Parliaments of Somaliland and Puntland*** established as an effective institution, with a functioning administration and infrastructure and leadership supported to discharge their constitutional mandates to fairly, inclusively and transparently manage the business of Parliament and lead the Parliamentary Administration

***Output 3 (Parliament Strategic Plan Objective 2):*** MPs are empowered to represent and remain accountable to the people and to provide leadership in a way that promotes national unity for Somalis, including young people and women, participative & representative democracy and more effective contribution to political decision-making.

These outputs translate into 100s of activities – the Annual Workplan for 2016, for instance, had 52 activities against these three outputs.

#### **Management, staffing, office accommodation**

The project is led by a Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) The CTA is supported by an Operations Specialist leading the national staff for Operations and a Parliamentary Development Specialist leading the technical support national staff. The organogram of the project is attached as annex.

The project has had up to five offices UNCC and MIA in Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Somaliland, Garowe, Puntland and Nairobi Kenya.

These staff are responsible for project implementation, which in practice meant negotiating annual work plans and letters of agreement, and delivering activities. Since much of the project's activities were delivered through national and international consultants, the project structure had to organize the timing and venues for these consultants to undertake their work.

#### **Assessment of results and immediate future priorities**

##### ***a. Overall Assessment***

We understand that this review follows the 2016 evaluation, with interaction with project staff and interlocutors, including the 2016 evaluation team, over Skype or conference calls.

We believe that the document review and discussions conducted have provided the review with an thorough appreciation of the Project, and that this, in turn, provides pertinent 'lessons' for application in a 'phase two' (Part II).

Reviewing the project document and the baseline recommendations emerging from the initial overview of parliamentary needs in 2012, the outputs of the project are responsive to the overview of needs, specifically after the March 2015 revisions.

The priorities set out were sensible and the trajectories chosen were those which might have reasonably been expected to make progress towards the overall outcome identified by the UNDP: The National Federal Parliaments (NFP) and Parliaments of Somaliland and Puntland capacitated to operate as inclusive, transparent and effective law-making, oversight and representative bodies contributing to national peace-



building and nation-building goals. However, whether the outcome was achievable by any single project rather than the donor/implementer group as a whole is, debatable.

There was almost universal agreement in the third party monitoring (TPM) reports, in the evaluation report, an EU ROM evaluation report, and from those consulted by the evaluators during the mission that the Project was worthwhile. The strategic plan for the People's House of Somalia views the parliament as a space "where potential sources of conflict can be aired and addressed publicly and where issues of national importance including laws, government policies and other issues of public interest can be debated." (Somali Parliament Strategic Plan 2012) In other words, Parliament remains an integral part of national reconciliation and the progress towards peace.

*"The action is relevant to the Somali Compact, the New Deal and the focal areas of the National Indicative Programme, and to needs of the target groups and the end beneficiaries. The Parliament's priorities are UNDP's priorities. The Compact, as it is known in shorthand, sets out the most important priorities within the five Peace- and State-Building Goals for Somalia and incorporates a special arrangement for Somaliland. The parliamentary reform that is the essence of this project corresponds to the first strategic objective as outlined in the Compact : to achieve a stable and peaceful federal Somalia through inclusive political processes (EU 2016, Consolidated ROM report: p.2)*

Elaborations, in the TPM, other reports reviewed, and also, some of the discussions, specifically discussions with the ex-CTA and the evaluators, were along the lines of 'the Project is doing what it is supposed to but it needs do more of what it is doing at present' and to build linkages where the results chain is de-linked, weak or non-existent. No respondent stated that the Project was unnecessary or unwelcome. All the Project staff Members are self evidently dedicated and determined to do their utmost in support of Parliament, a fact clearly acknowledged in the evaluation report.

Reviewing Project outputs in detail, a pattern is discernable in which subordinate or marginal activities, usually thoroughly worthwhile in themselves, generate relatively positive results whereas more fundamental reforms fare less well. This is perfectly understandable. Subordinate activities may often be inherently more straightforward to achieve than fundamental reforms.

This pattern is equally true for the outcome, where, in the main, a causal link was not clearly discernable. Outcomes are related to the external aspects of the intervention, and parliament's position within the overall governance infrastructure of the country.

To a large extent, it is logical to agree with the ex-CTA's argument of relating design relevance to time relevance<sup>3</sup>. The project design is in line with parliament's functionality: oversight, legislation and representation. The priorities are set within the needs/baseline identified in September 2012, which articulates the need while conceptualizing parliamentary structure, roles and functions, whilst relating it to the baseline situation in Somalia at the time (David Payne Report 2012). However, the project did not have the flexibility of selecting its own timeline, as it is part of the support contributing to PSG 1, Inclusive Politics- the timeline it chose was up to the end of 2016. However, since the Somali Compact aimed at setting the foundations for peace and state-building, then by extension, the Parliamentary Support Project also aimed at setting the foundation of parliamentary functionality in Somalia. In our

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<sup>3</sup> Also, acknowledged by evaluators and termed realistic expectations

discussions with project staff, it appeared that they considered their work, to-date, as laying the groundwork, and of setting the pace. We agree with the ex-CTA that the overall outcome envisaged for the Parliament in the original Project document is probably some years away and we have found that it would not have been realistic, given the context, that the outcome could be achieved within the lifetime of this Project, although a solid basis has been established at output level towards achieving Outcome level results.

Further, as mentioned in the evaluation report, the project came to a virtual halt following the terrorist attack on the Parliament, resulting in loss of lives. Moreover, “The months October–December in 2013 and again in 2014 were characterized by gridlock and infighting within the SFG over the dismissal of incumbent prime ministers and horse-trading over the selection of replacements.” (Mosley 2014: 5)

It was, therefore, only towards the third quarter of 2014 that rehiring resulted in a team being reinstated to restart the project. This, effectively, gave the project 15-18 months to implement a 36 month project which to begin with required more than 36 months to complete trajectories culminating in outcome level results.

In discussion with the evaluators, it was discovered that the project had planned a mid term evaluation which could not materialize. This was based on the fact that the ToRs shared with them were that of a mid-term evaluation (MTE) even though they came onboard for the evaluation in the final year of the project.

Given that a project document rationalization exercise was, rightfully, undertaken in early 2015- a MTE would have provided the necessary roadmap for mid-term course correction and rationalization of the overall scope, activities, outputs and targets.

Finally, the contribution of donors to the modernization of Parliament is a task that needs to be coordinated amongst the contributing donors if overall efficiency and effectiveness is not to be sacrificed. There was certainly a recognition from an early stage that donor coordination would be vital in the design and implementation of the Project but, in our view, fully efficacious means to make such coordination effective did not transpire.

For example, the project document identifies the Governance Institutional Support Working Group, chaired by EU and DFID, as a forum to discuss updates and issues related to ‘relevant political governance and legislative reform’- in other words, progress and impediments regarding outcome level results which (as is experienced in other countries) enable the necessary coordinated and collective solutions leading to achievement of the desired results. However, we were not able to verify that the forum is currently functional.

Traditionally, the great strength of the UNDP is its perceived non-partisan and inclusive approach. We consider, therefore, that in addition to direct support to the Parliament at its own hand, the UNDP has a major role in seeking to provide a coordination function for a range of those supporting the Parliament, donors, implementers, and within the UN family where a wealth of technical/subject matter expertise resides, much is probably as yet fully untapped in Parliament’s interest.

Looking forward, therefore, we are confident that an adequately resourced project with appropriate political and top management support, mounting a sustained support effort with the cooperation of donor partners, can assist Parliament to strengthen its legitimate role within national governance.

## Assessment of the Specific Outputs

### 1. *Output 1 Summary*

Output	Indicative Progress	Cumulative Results
NFP and Parliaments of Somaliland and Puntland supported to enact quality legislation and to maintain effective oversight over the other branches of government according to the interests of all people and in support of peace-building and nation-building	<p>The NFP budget for 2013-2014 and 2015 approved by the NFP.</p> <p>2015 budget approved by the PL and SL.</p> <p>Training on Administrative and Financial Procedures offered to Somaliland House of Representatives (HoR) staff by international consultant tasked to provide technical and advisory support to the Somaliland HoR.</p> <p>Support to the Legislative &amp; Legal Services Department has been provided by Young Graduates.</p> <p>Strategic Planning and Parliament Development Consultant has been working with the staff of the L&amp;LSD to develop their legislative, analysis &amp; research skills.</p> <p>4 trainings were delivered to NFP Committee Staff on legal analysis and legal drafting, gender neutral legal drafting and legal research (M:105; F:25).</p> <p>In Somaliland:</p> <p>Workshop on legal research delivered to SL HoR (M:15; F:1).</p> <p>3 day workshop on Legislative Drafting was conducted for Members &amp; staff (24 M) of the House of Representatives and</p>	<p>NFP established the Budget, Finance &amp; Planning Committee to undertake review of government budget</p> <p>13 oversight missions and 7 constituency visits conducted</p>

Members of the House of  
Elders (Guurti) of the  
Somaliland Parliament

(Adapted from objective vs achievement table shared by the project)

This output has not been achieved, fully though adequate starts have been made in the production of a body of manuals, other publications, and a relevant set of trainings for Members. While this is, to an extent, subordinate activity it is nonetheless important and the successor project should consider continuing with this work building on what has been achieved.

Overall, meeting this output has been a challenge for the Project partly due to the consequences of heightened security tensions which were outside its control and which limited the intervention of the international expert working on committees.

A discussion on progress and results are given for consideration of the future phase of the project, later in the report.

**Output 2: Summary**

<b>Output</b>	<b>Indicative Progress</b>	<b>Cumulative Results</b>
<i>NFP and Parliaments of Somaliland and Puntland established as an effective institution, with functioning administration and infrastructure and leadership supported to discharge their constitutional mandates to fairly, inclusively and transparently manage the business of Parliament and lead the Parliamentary Administration</i>	<p>Work plans have been developed and being implemented by the NFP committees</p> <p>Manuals on Committee Reporting and Public Hearing were developed for NFP Committees</p> <p>UNDP support to the Young Graduates has continued to be the mainstay of the Parliamentary Secretariat</p>	<p>The UNDP policy consultant continues to provide support to the office of the Speaker 240 (M: 194 F: 46) MPs and Parliamentary staff have participated in direct trainings</p> <p>4 Strategic plans developed for NFP HoR, Somaliland HoR, Somaliland HoE and Jubaland HoR with the support of UNDP</p>

A training needs assessment conducted by the project M&E staff was also shared with us. The production of such documentation provides positive human resources change and can be developed with training activities designed to broaden the awareness of the Secretariat staff about the nature and structure of modern Parliamentary Secretariat work. A future project should certainly continue with targeted training activities similar to those undertaken in this period and which have continued utility.

Moreover, under this output support to was provided to Puntland and Somaliland parliaments. An essential element of this support was the development of parliamentary strategic plans, owned by the parliament as their document.

“PSP supported parliament committees and government oversight authorities and evaluated how they are providing services to the public, and how they are spending public funds. Whether inline with the approved national budget or not” (Staff, HoR, Somaliland).

Moreover, support was provided by UNDP to NFP staff on public hearings, M&E, Budget and Financial oversight procedures.

The achievements by the project on HACT compliance have been acknowledged by the 2016 evaluation as value-addition that has made a significant progress towards the ultimate objective of gradually shifting to national systems, thus achieving institutional independence.

### *The Success of HACT Compliance*

One of PSP's most widely cited successes was the creation and implementation of HACT (Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers) compliant systems in several parliaments. The HACT is a set of common principles and a processes for managing cash transfers among UN agencies that have adopted the approach across all countries and operational contexts.<sup>4</sup>HACT standards envision a transparent and rigorous system for managing the use of funds. HACT is a detailed process that is challenging to implement and cumbersome to some of the institutions, however, it is a necessary process to ensure that UNDP resources (ultimately donors money) are protected through carefully applied procedures and checks and balances.

The difficulties of working within the uncertain security environment presented by Somalia meant that UNDP would like to have as much done by the parliaments themselves as possible. This meant permitting a limited degree of financial autonomy in the form of accounts administered by the parliaments used to run procurement processes, manage disbursements, and be subject to periodic audits and other means of insuring that money was being properly accounted for.

For their part, the parliaments themselves were anxious to have some funds under their own control and this was an important incentive for them to cooperate in the creation of HACT compliant systems.

For both parties to achieve their goals, then, required participants to cooperate in a relatively long series of demanding activities to design, adopt, staff, and ultimately to run what amounted to the first integrated financial management and accountability systems in each institutions history.

In order to assess the capacity of the parliaments to implement HACT in their financial management of UNDP funds, a Kenyan based company ABRIMO was contracted to conduct HACT assessments on the 6 parliaments. The assessment uncovered institutional weaknesses and specified areas that required the attention of UNDP. The Project in turn developed a series of mitigation measures, which allowed them to provide the funding to the parliaments. We were told that there have been very few cases of conflict between UNDP and the parliaments in the way they applied the HACT rules, but those were addressed to the satisfaction of UNDP.

The process for each institution is well documented: initial external assessments which identified risks and needs, parliamentary efforts to design systems facilitated by UNDP consultants, the formal adoption of systems and creation of necessary structures, the recruitment and training of staff, and the subsequent reassessment of capabilities to determine the degree of HACT compliance and improvements in legislative capacities., i.e. evidence that a more synoptic approach worked in the context of Somalia. Later in this report we will note that the specifications for HACT provided a comprehensive

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4 For a description, see Agora. <https://agora.unicef.org/course/info.php?id=1312>

vision—linking inputs of training, changes in rules, recruitment of personnel, and other parts into a viable operating system.

Since much of the budget for the operation of the parliaments is currently coming from the Project we assume that the incentives for continuing HACT compliance is part of the package that comes with external funding. For now, at least, this constitutes the major part of parliamentary budgets, wherein, except for salaries and basic secretariat services, all other activities are paid for by the Project. We are, however, concerned about continuing HACT compliance in the future when the Parliaments will have more of their own (Local) funds to spend. It is important to consider whether UNDP can encourage and work to ensure that HACT Procedures become the internal procedures of the parliaments, and are accepted as the norm to be applied to all present and future monies that parliaments spend.

Source: 2016 Evaluation Report

Substantial progress, however, will depend crucially on political and top management will to initiate and apply a thorough ‘training needs assessment’ or ‘present skills review’ exercise to identify key current gaps and structural weaknesses within the Secretariats, building upon, and where necessary supplementing, the work commissioned by the Project to date, and thereafter applying fully transparent and comprehensive staffing processes to implement the findings. Our proposals is for a ‘second phase’ project seek to address these key requirements by linking Secretariat reform to key Member-driven requirements.

The 2016 evaluation report notes that UNDP PSP was extremely fortunate in being able to work in some cases with political and staff leaders who were, in the best cases, fully committed to institutional development. Joel Barkan, political scientist with particular expertise in political development in Africa, has asserted that a committed cadre of reformers has proven critical to successful legislative development efforts throughout Africa and elsewhere. *Notably, the distribution of successes in Somalia follows that pattern: most dramatic progress was made in the Federal Parliament under the leadership of its respected Speaker who has articulated his vision of what the parliament’s role in governing should be. and in Somaliland where the Speaker and Secretary General found common cause with the external projects in developing desired capacities, and least of all in Puntland where leadership instability delayed efforts.*

Taking this work forward to emerging parliaments in Somalia is a key aspect to consider. Phase 2 successes will be conceivable under such leadership support. This reports elaborates a further on this, in the lessons learned section



### *Output 3 Summary*

<b>Output</b>	<b>Indicative Progress</b>	<b>Cumulative Results</b>
MPs are empowered to represent and remain accountable to the people and to provide leadership in a way that promotes national unity for Somalis, including young people and women, participative & representative democracy and more effective contribution to political decision-making.	Outreach and Communication Strategies developed for National Federal Parliament (2016-2018) and Somaliland House of Representatives  SL HoR conducted “Opens Doors Day” for the public and produced brochures and parliamentary newsletter.	3 outreach visits conducted 2 Communication and Outreach Plans developed for NFP and SL HoR

This output is clearly linked to creating legitimacy of the parliament among citizens. The presentation of progress, evidence and results for this output are therefore, perhaps, scattered across the three outputs e.g. committee visits to communities though covered under oversight also contributes towards achieving this output. Substantial benefits could flow to Parliament if key components such as committees are seen going out and about throughout the country engaged on enquiries focused upon the key concerns of the citizenry, interacting directly with them and local CSOs.

We are proposing that for ‘phase two’ the focus of attention in this area for the Project itself should be directed towards media and CSO support, starting with taking along media representatives in the regions where the MP visits have worked successfully.

Quite often, membership based organizations of marginalized group are the best advocates for their cause and can act as interest groups. These groups may range from Associations of Persons with Disability (e.g Somali Disability Empowerment Network) to organizations with membership from and working for marginalized groups like the Bantu and Nilotic groups in Somalia, to youth and women groups.

The impression gained by the Review Team was of the enormous potential for Parliamentarians to work closely with civil society organisations in Somalia. A sustained effort will be required therefore to build up mutual trust in order to develop the sophisticated relationship between Parliament and civil society (including vulnerable and marginalized groups) which can be beneficial in enriching political society and sharpening the oversight and law making functions of Parliament. To the Project’s credit a start has been made as described above. This work needs to continue and we have proposed driving this forward as a major component of a ‘second phase’.


## Discussion on Possible Gaps and Lessons Learned


The PSP has made a significant contribution to state building in Somalia through the establishment of, and support to, functioning Parliamentary institutions. That the project has done so in a particularly difficult post-conflict context also needs to be recognized and commended.

According to our assessment, the project is taking the same approach as the Somali Compact by laying the foundation for parliaments to be *inclusive, transparent and effective law-making, oversight and representative bodies contributing to national peace-building and nation-building goals*. The current project design lends itself to function, as it will have had to, given the baseline of end of the transition roadmap. However, design flexibility depends on the approach taken.

### Results Management:

An aspect that can be more clearly articulated are the very useful products like the ‘objective vs achievement’ document (see annex 2). The findings in the ‘Cumulative Results’ column must be clearly linked to the activity where the causal chain of the ‘result’ reported can be mapped backwards to the output and corresponding indicator. A review of the matrix show that it is not consistently possible to do that.





Using a causal logic similar to the flow chart, above, a training delivered would have produced increased knowledge either for staff or MPs – the cumulative results at the outcome level would then have to show whether that enhanced or increased their participation in plenaries, evidence of producing better committee reports at the immediate level and at the very least tabling, if not approving, legislation. The example given, is generic and illustrative and not prescriptive. Moreover, linkages between outcome level results and activities need to be strengthened within Results narratives and project reports. Through discussions with staff, it was quite clear that they know and can articulate the flow well.

While not being directly in control of the outcome, UNDP, as per the PME handbook, is responsible for results. It is, therefore, important to establish partnerships and forums where efforts can be coordinated to effect results. The project document does mention the Governance Group (see above), the 2016 evaluation mentions increased involvement in the compact related forums for establishing and strengthening partnership forums. However, in our discussions we did not find any information on a Governance Group. Going forward and into the new phase both actions are important and other such partnerships, policy platforms and forums should also be explored.

### **Expectations Management:**

As with other D&G programming, parliamentary support programmes exist at the cusp of political and development roles - often one sees that coordination groups for elections support projects and sometimes, even parliamentary development projects are attended by both the development and political sections representatives from bilateral partners.

A membership based organization UNDP is expected, therefore, to tread the line between the development and the political – expected to provide as much of the political analysis as the technical support side. While, we can safely assume informal sharing would happen, the evaluation assessed that the expectation also is to present it in a more structured/formal manner. However, there is a need for the project and the

GROL/UNDPCO to determine how to divide the roles given the sheer volume of work for the project and the direct interface with the host government counterparts.

In the context of Somalia, like many other countries, development partners have been working much longer with the executive than with the parliament- in such cases we appreciate that UNDP's role becomes more critical in managing expectations in terms of delivery from MPs. These MPs yield a certain level of influence to be part of the parliament, albeit a fairly nascent parliament.

### **Improving Beneficiary Targeting**

As discussed earlier in the analysis, Somalia's post-conflict context leaves a vacuum in terms of precedents and established Parliamentary processes, particularly due to the absence of a political party basis for organization. In such cases it is incumbent on the project to broaden its influence over outreach activities and the targeting of beneficiaries, particularly related to activities that focus on capacity development through trainings and workshops. For instance, nominations for training participants are received from the Office of the Secretary General. What is unclear is whether this nomination process is carried out against a set of criteria provided to the nominating office by the UNDP. Some of the evidence from interviews carried out for the purposes of this evaluation indicate improvements are required in beneficiary selection for trainings to ensure the most appropriate attendees are targeted. This may be assisted by the development of nomination criteria for each planned training and communication to the nominating office clear guidance on the process, alongside broadening the scope for inclusion. The nomination criteria may identify the proportion of women, youth, and under-represented groups to be included in the nomination list. While the updated project documented provides details of a planned outreach strategy to engage under-represented groups, targeted communication in this area is also required within the project structure, which we recommend is devised (if not already in the pipeline) for the new phase of the project.

### **Capturing Knowledge and Expertise**

The project relies on international consultants for core technical expertise in an extremely challenging physical environment. International consultants have limited time and access within which to deliver their expertise. The project plays a central role in coordinating and organizing this process. The two salient aspects of this situation are a) there is a significant disparity in the Parliamentary experience and skills of the national staff and the international experts; and b) the engagement of international consultants appears to be more activity-oriented than process-oriented. Capturing expertise of through a series of trainings is an effective short-term measure, however, the sustainability aspect of knowledge and skill transfer raises certain questions. The project has been successful in the recruitment of young motivated national staff through the Young Graduates Program. On the other hand, the difficulties of access and security make it is, in some cases in the past, been impossible for international experts to undertake a more active role in the knowledge building of trainees. Secondly, the security challenges also created a disincentive for MPs to properly engage with the trainings. Finally, trainers were unsure of how well the training material had been communicated through translation into Somali and if there was a mechanism to institutionalise the training curricula for future generations

of Parliamentarians, and also to revise the training tools and modules based on the feedback of the trainees. This we believe is a low-lying fruit that the next phase of the project can quite easily aim for.

### Peace Building and Conflict Sensitivity

As previously mentioned, the PSP has supported the establishment and functioning of democratic institutions in an extremely challenging conflict-affected environment. One forward-looking question that arises from the review process is how PSP can better prepare itself to a) mitigate the impact of conflict on project processes and outputs; and b) better inform the project as it transitions from a phase of infrastructure development and institutional establishment to a phase of democratization and improving institutional functionality for good governance. Through deliberations in our review process we have determined that the project faces a number of conflict-related risks. Specifically these include three different types of conflict:

- Inter-institutional conflict: As democratic institutions evolve, power sharing dynamics between institutions, as already experienced between the Legislature and the Executive, are more likely to become more complex and conflicted. This level of conflict will most directly affect the project if stakeholders refuse to cooperate or coordinate with each other. Instituting strong and systematised communication and negotiation mechanisms will be required to address this risk.
- Armed conflict<sup>5</sup>: Conflict between state structures and non-state actors is a pervasive and perpetual issue in Somalia. This has had a direct manifestation on the project and will require a more effective backup plan and protocols to help the project protect its activities and staff.
- Regional level conflict: The PSP paradigm is an experiment in federalism in an inherently clan based social structure. Clanism has already been described in this document as an important principle of social organization, which through a process of political settlement has been mapped into the state structure.
- Community level conflict: Parliamentarians as members of their communities will exercise representation as a function of political patronage. As the current system changes into an electoral system, in order to uphold the principle of inclusiveness, it is necessary for the project to know which members of their communities are at risk of being marginalized and excluded from this patronage network.

The NFP has a role to play in transforming potential conflict into a nonviolent policy dialogue aimed at creating a national consensus, thereby contributing to the peace-building process. The involvement of NFP staff, directly, in setting up of regional parliaments is a good start. More can be done in terms of creating peace caucuses at NFP and emerging parliaments. Support to these caucuses should be end-to-end. A caucus on SDG 16 can serve the purpose well, created in all parliaments with regular exchanges and network (at NFP, Puntland and Somaliland) and membership in regional level caucuses working on a similar agenda.

### Evidence Base and Monitoring

An emphasis on data-based support for the programmes has been laid by the review team and this is to be guided by a clear concept of how the programme will conceive the functions of representation and responsive governance in Somalia's current context. Clear expectations

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<sup>5</sup> Al-habab mainly, but armed conflict also between clans, and sub clans

and definition of the role to be performed by MPs will support the development of data generation systems to support output level indicators around performance, accountability, and sustainability.

Data collection instruments must be designed to support clear performance indicators and UNDP diagnostic analysis on performance to compare differences in performance among groups of MPs (across regional parliaments, across different gender and age groups). MP performance on legislation as well as MP performance on representation must be considered separately and captured.

### **Recommendations<sup>6</sup> for future support to Parliament**

Given the challenges faced by the project in the past three years and the areas in which there has been success, there are clearly some areas of intervention in which the project can provide support to the National and regional parliaments in Somalia.

One message that was made clear through the evaluation report and our consultations was that the project must focus more on strategic interventions. Work with Parliaments is inherently dynamic, but this is accentuated to a greater degree in Somalia's recent political and security trajectory and current political environment.

Another consistent message was that the PSP structure, like many similar programmes, is not seen to be grounded in a strong political economy analysis of the local context. Broadly, our observations and recommendations fall in the categories of energising the project's internal and external communications for better facilitation and outreach; and improving process-based links across project activities for improved results chain and synergistic impact.

Key priorities for reform have been articulated and mobilized in the strategic plans for parliaments. This articulation has been the result of a consultative process that has already yielded some level of consensus. Aligning these key themes with the project objectives and then informing the theory of change would be advisable. We see that that has been catered for in the new project document, although translating it into effective AWP's and Letters of agreement would be required. Moreover, a strong integrated communication strategy could be devised (informed by capturing honest, accurate data on institutional performance gathered through supply-side interventions).

We recognize that the project has to negotiate the difficult task of managing competing political agendas to deliver processes and structures that facilitate accountable oversight, legislation, and representation. It is therefore all the more vital that the project approach be informed by a robust political economy analysis and adapt to the challenges.

The future project's success can be improved by: a) finding an alternative or creative solution where structural disincentives to engage in certain behaviors and practices exist for political actors (constituency engagement efforts by MPs, for instance, are directly impeded by the high cost of making such trips to their respective regions); and b) creating incentives for performance where incentive structures are absent (for instance, trainings may be delivered but the skill transfer may remain under-utilised unless an incentive exists for trainees to demonstrate their skill development against functional goals). In the absence of such an adaptive or

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<sup>6</sup> The recommendations takes into account the new prodoc for PSP II which was shared with us by the project team

localisation approach, many of the project outcomes are at risk of remaining aspirational against the expectations of donors.

Finally, there is a lot of discussion within the evaluation report on context specificity. In our limited consultations security concerns came up again and again, similarly in all our discussions the level of understanding of an MP about his/her role was the focus of all our discussions. However, the role of MPs and parliament (beyond the fundamental State-building role) in peace building was not discussed at length in the project document. We would recommend that context specificity of design and approach be linked more specifically to peace-building than it is in the project document for the project ending December 2016.

A possible entry point maybe provided through operationalizing SDG 16 for Somalia through an ad-hoc parliamentary committee. In the new prodoc, the activities though relevant to SDG 16 are not clearly linked to the parliament. Reporting to an ad-hoc committee will create that linkage. If successful, this committee can be a good forum for linking up with media and civil society as:

- There is an interest in SDGs
- There is a constant security concerns and concerns for peace in the current scenario in most of Somalia
- The activities proposed in the new prodoc are data and information which can make for good advocacy pieces to be disseminated through media and civil society

Many successful examples of ad-hoc parliamentary committees on MDGs can be found (Mongolia being a front-runner) specifically in localizing MDGs. With localization being part of Agenda 2030, this may provide a pathway to building MPs role around peacebuilding in Somalia.

Programming interventions in democratic governance are generally subject to certain stakeholder dynamics, which have direct implications for program management and implementation. This is due to the inherently political nature of the beneficiaries, where the “buy-in” and engagement of political actors is necessary for the programme to achieve its outcomes. The dynamic renders a certain level of agency to political actors where their level of participation affects the timeline and inclusion in the implementation process more directly compared with other programmes in which project beneficiaries have less control. The project has responded well to this dynamic by maintaining a centralized system of communication, where the project is the sole interlocutor with the Parliaments.

The proposed project design in the new phase, therefore, adapted well to build on being in this position, by assuming the responsibility for building connectivity and networking. Secondly, these institutions are nascent bodies in an evolving context and parliamentary stakeholders will require a regular re-orientation (corresponding to capacity development) on their roles and responsibilities within the institutional framework. For instance, as the representative function of MPs evolves into an electorate-based model, re-orientation on aspects of constituency relationship management and responsive governance will be required.

In spite of a challenging context, UNDP’s substantial effort at creating functionality through capacity development of Parliamentary staff and MPs has broadly been successful in terms of transferring skills. Training reports indicate a rich curriculum of training content has been delivered through the project. The gap arises in being able to track and establish how well the transferred skills have been

operationalised to create impact. The project successfully delivered competence and capability for selected functions for both Parliamentary staff and MPs. On the other hand, measures of the staff providing assistance to Parliamentarians or Parliamentarians actively engaging staff in initiating parliamentary business are sparse.

However, going forward into the new phase, broadly these recommendations can assist with translating gains from activities to accrue into institutional successes:

- a. Regularized communication of staff capability to MPs following trainings and a series of mentoring sessions with staff in which the project can follow up on issues faced by staff in operationalizing newly acquired skill sets. In doing so, the UNDP will also have the opportunity to tap into MPs identification of their urgent needs and shift the training agenda development from a needs assessment system to a more urgent demand-based system where the beneficiaries have more incentive to take ownership and participate.
- b. Pilot-testing products post-training as part of the training activity and transitioning skills into processes. Certain gaps exist only in the project implementation even though they are sufficiently captured in the project design – one of these is surveying developed products and assisting trained staff and MPs through the initial stages of using new templates and skills collaboratively.
- c. Creating more incentives for MPs to engage in constituent representation through localized Parliamentarian scorecards. Scorecards are effective tools to communicate expectations to parliamentarians in terms of their roles as representatives. Parliamentarians are able to track their own activity against rational indicators, which create incentives to engage with constituents on a regular basis. As a monitoring and evaluation tool for the project, scorecards may also bridge the link between the capacity development of stakeholders and improved functionality.
- d. We strongly recommend that the project undertake a combined political economy and conflict-sensitivity assessment to serve as a baseline for the next phase, and that the baseline be revisited and updated at strategic intervals. In terms of scope, we advise the assessment be structured to answer the following questions:
  - a. What are the proximate drivers of conflict/violence?
  - b. What triggers have sparked conflict/violence in the past and risk escalating conflict/violence in the future?
  - c. Who are the main actors contributing to conflict/peace, and what are their main interests, goals, positions, capacities, and relationships?
  - d. How do PSP institutions include these actors?
- e. With respect to accountability, oversight of the accountability-related final outcome to the system gets overlooked. How can CSOs help in highlighting the impact on outcomes? Only a select group of civil society organisations have access to the legislative arena and their engagement is on an ad hoc basis, often pre-empted by the elected representatives' lack of capacity to draft legislation. CSOs therefore are included in their role as service providers. Developing citizen scorecards, or using the equivalent of legislative or manifesto watch programmes can be effectively mobilized for creating baseline, mid-line and final assessment for performance of the new parliament. However to ensure inclusion of vulnerable and marginalized



groups a targeted consultative process mobilized through CSOs will be required.

- f. It is important to consider coverage as part of sustainability. In a nascent federal state, it may not be enough to support just the national parliament and two regional parliaments<sup>7</sup>. The new state assemblies in Jubaland, Southwest, Galmudug and HirShabelle are an important indicator of the consistent commitment to federalism. Supporting these parliaments to be effective, transparent and accountable will be an important contribution towards consolidating the gains in federalism in Somalia. UNDP's PSP project is, indeed, uniquely positioned to extend this support. Synergies between State parliaments need to be explored. Possible entry point can include;
  - i) Inter-parliamentary forums focusing/specializing on specific SDGs. Thus one SDG on poverty (SDG 1) or hunger (SDG 2) with membership from all State assemblies would encourage sharing of experiences and create healthy competition even. This will also help PSP prioritize where to invest the resources earmarked for research support within the parliamentary project, given that SDG monitoring emphasizes collection of disaggregated by geography, gender and other deprivation criteria.
  - ii) Inter-parliamentary women caucus established
  - iii) Inter-parliamentary youth caucus established
  - iv) Local level political actors mapping and conflict sensitivity analysis will be required for different regions/States to design and prioritise sets of activities most relevant to their particular context. These supplemental conflict analysis will help illustrate how political and institutional actors tend to perform around active conflict faultlines, which of these faultlines are likely to become active, and how an outbreak of violent conflict will be managed/negotiated by the programme.
  - v) This can serve not only the project team in designing specific activities but can also contribute to the research support extended to these parliaments by PSP for informed debates and policy discussions.

## Conclusions

Overall PSP has made a substantial contribution to state building in Somalia through the establishment of active and functioning Parliamentary institutions. That the project has done so in a difficult post-conflict context is also highly commendable. This review considers the general dynamics of democratic governance programming and the adaptability of the programme structure and implementation approach to the local context of Somalia.

Our purpose in doing so is to identify where the project structure and implementation processes can be strengthened to improve delivery against project outcomes.

Going into phase 2, the project looks well-poised to supporting the evolving reform process. It is considered that a project supporting a reform process cannot be held

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<sup>7</sup> If Somaliland is to be independent in the future that leaves only one region, Puntland's parliament was supported.

accountable for the political economy of reform, deterring any process. However, the project by virtue of its positioning must be the information hub not just on reform progress but regular political economy analysis should be knowledge products regularly shared with a larger donor and stakeholder group. Coordination will only work if the convened group gets regular analysis and information, beyond what they might have as being part of the development agencies group for Somalia.


Achievements from phase I must be leveraged to maximise project impact, particularly in the area of inclusion for youth, women, and marginalized groups. Increased participation of youth and women has been made possible through quotas, however they can also serve as important drivers of change if capacity gaps are identified and addressed. Youth and women MPs in particular will require additional capacity building and trainings to remain competitive/comparable with adult male counterparts.

Within Somalia, a strong stakeholder engagement strategy is recommended as well as induction of longer-term trainers who can remain connected to trainees remotely.

Finally, the new project must create baselines for its intervention at output and outcome level to be able to create clear trajectories of contribution to outcomes.  
 Appendices

### Annex 1: Evaluation Design and Evaluation Matrix

#### Design



<b>Evaluation Criteria</b>	<b>Indicative Questions and Measures</b>	<b>Rating</b>	<b>Summary Assessment (cross reference to evaluation report)</b>
Relevance	Alignment to UN program and UNDP CPD	Highly Satisfactory	Aligned to UNDP CPD, aligned to ISF (pg 5, pg 16). Based on needs assessment mission circa 2012. (pg 5)
	Alignment to host government, development partners strategic priorities		
	Contributing to larger regional, sub regional, and national goals		
Effectiveness	Achievement of outputs	Satisfactory	The assessment of specific outputs (pg 23-35) shows that all outputs had some level of progress achieved. It is also noted that the use of LoAs provides a level of participation to the project interlocutors in prioritization of needs and decision making. Moreover the initial needs assessment was done in coordination with the Speaker's office. The assessment recognizes several factors which create challenges for the achievement of progress – these include gaps in the contextualization of the project design as well as the security situation.
	Participation of stakeholders (MPs and relevant parliamentary staff) in needs analysis and decision-making processes		
	Contribution of designed activities to achieving outcomes		
Efficiency		Highly Satisfactory	Insufficient information to assess within the scope of this review. HACT has been recognised as a success for the project (see pg 28), based on which we defer to the rating offered by the previous evaluation.
Sustainability/Impact	Sustainable in larger political economy context	Moderately Satisfactory	The need for a thorough political economy analysis of the local context is a consistent message in our discussion (pg 40)  Institutionally, the support to the NFP is important and impressive. However, exiting at this point is not advisable. The project has laid a good infrastructural foundation for the development of parliamentary democracy in Somalia but without developing functional strengths of regional parliaments, performance incentive structures for MPs, directly linking parliamentary performance to conflict sensitive governance, etc the gains achieved will not be consolidated and therefore will remain unsustainable. Given the deteriorating security situation there is a risk that without consistent institutional support to the NFP and regional Parliaments the system will lose legitimacy.
	Financial sustainability and exit scenario		
	Institutional Sustainability and coverage		

			<p>Any future exit strategy has to involve Somali government budget commitments to its national and regional parliaments.</p> <p>Lastly, the main reason for a moderately satisfactory rating on this is that a successful exit strategy from a new parliamentary set up is possible after completion of key processes and not completion of a project, necessarily.</p> <p>In short, UNDP needs to remain engaged to ensure the gains in capacity development and institutional development are consolidated. Necessary skills and technical support is transferred to the regional parliaments. Inclusive politics moves from slogan to action by ensuring active participation of women and youth entering the new parliament after the 2016 elections.</p>
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