Building and Consolidating National Capacities for Conflict Prevention

Mid-term Project Evaluation Report

May 2017
**Project Details:**

Project title: Building and Consolidating National Capacities for Conflict Prevention  
Sector: Democratic Governance and Peacebuilding; Bureau for Policy and Programming Support  
Countries: International, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bolivia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Malawi, Timor Leste, Togo and Yemen  
Contract No.: CRIS N.2015/358-830  
Project duration: 36 months, as of May 31st, 2015  
Funding: € 3.750.000; European Union (€3.000.000) and UNDP (€750.000)

**Project Evaluation:**

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Evaluation period: February 6th – May 15th 2017

**Acknowledgments and Disclaimer:**

The consultant would like to thank everyone who participated in this mid-term evaluation of the Project “Building and Consolidating National Capacities for Conflict Prevention” - Phase II. The views presented in this report are those of the consultant, and are based on the information and data collected through an extensive desk review of documentation as well as on interviews conducted with official representatives of the respective organizations. The findings below do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the United Nations Development Program, United Nations Department of Political Affairs, European Union or any other institution involved in this mid-term evaluation.
List of Abbreviations:

CO – Country Office
CSO – Civil Society Organizations
CONADEH - National Commission for Human Rights in Honduras
CPD – Country Program Document
DPC – District Peace Council
ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States
EU – European Union
EWER – Early warning and early response
IcSP – Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace
IfS – Instrument for Stability
LFM – Logical Framework Matrix
MPC – Malawi Peace Commission
NIPD – National Indicative Program Document
PAC – Public Affairs Committee
PDA – Peace and Development Advisor
RC – Resident Coordinator
SCG – Search for Common Ground
SDHJD – Honduras Ministry of Human Rights, Justice, Interior and Decentralization
ToR – Terms of Reference
ToT – Training of Trainers
UN – United Nations
UNCT – United Nations Country Team
UNDAF – United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP – United Nations Development Program
UNDPA – United Nations Department of Political Affairs
UNOWAS – United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel
UNPBF – United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
UNEG – United Nations Evaluation Group
WIF – Women in Faith
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Executive Summary

This report presents the findings, conclusions and recommendations from the mid-term evaluation of the Project “Building and Consolidating National Capacities for Conflict Prevention II” (hereinafter the Project). The evaluation was organized after 18 months of implementation with the objective to assess the Project impact at country, regional and global level and provide inputs for the remaining period.

Since 2012, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) have collaborated on building national and local capacities in conflict affected or fragile countries for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The collaboration is in its 2nd phase implemented in 9 countries (Bolivia, Ghana, Togo and Yemen continuing from the 1st phase and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guatemala, Honduras, Malawi and Timor Leste as newly involved). Additionally, the project supports capacity building through regional networking and integration of lessons learnt and good practices into global UN-EU Programs and policies.

The evaluation was conducted through desk review of relevant documentation, the interviews with representatives of the implementing agencies on global, regional and national levels and a field visit to Malawi as one of the beneficiary countries. Close to 90 people participated in the exercise and data were synthesized from documentation delivered from both the global and national levels. The evaluation focused on the aspects of relevance (responding to the needs of the countries, regions and global priorities), effectiveness (key achievements), efficiency (outputs against resources invested and synergies with other initiatives), impact (benefits for the communities in terms of conflict prevention and sustaining peace) and long-term sustainability (policy, institutional, financial sustainability and ownership) of the efforts.

The evaluation found that the Project is highly relevant to all the countries involved. The assistance of the UN headquarters (HQ) to the UN Country Offices (CO) and EU Delegations and collaboration on the local level in the Project preparation was of key importance to maximize relevance and increase feasibility of the country level projects. In most of the countries the Project is implemented effectively and efficiently using the resources available. Synergy with other conflict prevention initiatives is ensured in many of them.

In seven beneficiary countries collaboration with the national counterparts resulted in effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding measures (dialogues, mediation, setting up national infrastructures for peace). This has not been the case in Bolivia due to a political stalemate, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina the Project applied a different strategy as agreed by the implementing partners. Both countries may benefit from additional HQ support to further develop and engage insider mediation capacities.

There are evidences of measurable impact of conflict interventions on local, district and national level in Ghana, Togo, Yemen, Guatemala, Honduras, Malawi and Timor Leste. The mediation processes contributed in a number of situations in each of the countries to the prevention or resolution of electoral violence, inter-religious conflicts and damage on infrastructure. Indirectly, those interventions positively influenced the countries’ security and development environment. Many of the countries have a well-integrated approach to include vulnerable groups, women, youth and indigenous populations.

The vertical collaboration of the UN and the EU HQs, their regional organizational units and CO and EU country delegations advanced from the starting point of the Project. In Guatemala, Malawi, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Timor Leste it even resulted in joint field missions, implementation of the activities and
raised interest for future collaboration. In a few countries, the cooperation still experiences some challenges and should therefore be improved.

This Project should be better aligned with the Joint Program on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention (hereinafter the Joint Program), managed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA). This can result in raised interest and engagement of both agencies at different levels in the countries beyond those involved in the Joint Program and bring learnings on impact of conflict prevention and insider mediation actions from this Project to the wider UN system.

It is found that most of the COs and their national counterparts lack systematic collection of data on impact of their interventions. This has been reflected in the lack of substantial information in most of their progress reports to the HQ and also might be the reason for weaker buy-in of some of the interviewed representatives. The development of universal evaluation framework that will serve this and similar initiatives and feed relevant information across the UN system is proposed. Indicators developed in this evaluation methodology and the evaluation framework that is being prepared under the Joint Program may be helpful.

A solid base for sustainability and institutionalization of the infrastructure for peace has been established in several of the pilot countries (Ghana, Malawi, Togo). The others made achievements institutionalizing mediation on regional level or within a specific institution (Guatemala, Honduras). Many still require further support and cope with a general lack of financial resources for their activities. A diversification of sources of funding should be supported.

The regional (Workshop on Insider Mediation in West Africa in Accra) and global initiatives (Strengthening Resilience to Conflict and Turbulence Workshop in Casablanca and Insider Mediation Workshop in Belgrade) resulted in the exchanges and knowledge sharing between the project staff, implementing partners and national counterparts from the pilot countries on mapping the infrastructures for peace in Africa or exchange of lessons learnt and good practices. The Western Balkans regional initiative is still in its planning phase and should be prioritized by the end of the Project. Linking with the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael (hereinafter the Clingendael Institute) in building capacities of the UN and national counterparts’ staff was acknowledged. Bringing the knowledge from relevant international organizations, international nongovernmental organizations and think-tanks to the country level should be encouraged as well, taking into account potential language barriers in selecting the trainers and adapting the materials to the countries context.

Still, regional cooperation needs to be further supported to achieve better coordinated and complementary regional approaches as envisaged by the Project. Regional political/conflict analysis may have supported this objective, however it hasn’t been undertaken yet.

Several countries managed to address gender inequalities (Malawi, Ghana, Togo, Yemen) or increase participation of indigenous groups (Guatemala and Honduras) and have extensive experience to share. However, addressing inequalities should be further encouraged. Gender balance in conflict prevention efforts should be further supported and addressing gender related violence should also be given more emphasis in peacebuilding efforts, particularly in the countries that didn’t have these mainstreamed in their actions.
1 Introduction

1.1 Background

Since 2012, the EU and the UN have collaborated on consecutive projects to support national and local actors in conflict-affected and fragile countries or countries in transition, in internal conflict management processes and the development of skills for dialogue and constructive negotiation. The current, 2nd phase of collaboration is subsumed by the Project “Building and Consolidating National Capacities for Conflict Prevention” (CRIS N.2015/358-830, May 2015 – June 2018). The Project’s key objectives are to contribute to peace and stability by: (i) building and consolidating national capacities in nine countries1; (ii) developing coordinated regional approaches, linking country-level activities to regional initiatives; (iii) as well as strengthening knowledge management capacities, integrating lessons learned and good practices into UN-EU support and providing long-term synergetic effects of their strategies globally. After 18 months of implementation, the UNDP, the UNDPA and the EU commissioned an external evaluation of the Project.

This 2nd phase of the Project builds upon the results of the project "Equipping National and Local Actors in Internal Conflict Management Processes with Skills for Dialogue and Constructive Negotiation", (hereinafter "the 1st phase") led by UNDP in partnership with UNDPA and EU and funded by the EU Instrument for Stability (IFS). The 1st phase was implemented in nine countries (Bolivia, Nepal, Chad, the Maldives, Ghana, Guyana, Togo, Mauritania and Yemen), with activities jointly conducted by the EU and UN. It was undertaken as part of wider conflict prevention programming by UNDP in those countries. The reason behind this approach was to ensure appropriate follow-up and sustainability of the capacities built.

At least seven of the countries achieved strong initial results and a firm basis for further strengthening of their internal capacities. Strong national platforms for mediation and dialogue were established in Ghana (the National Peace Council (NPC)) and Bolivia (the National Congress on the Culture of Peace, although the momentum was lost later due to political turnovers). Moreover, the national dialogue initiatives are continued by insider mediators in Togo and Mauritania. Promising local peace efforts have been implemented on a pilot basis, through self-sustaining local committees, in some parts of Chad and Yemen. In Nepal, the selected women are now in positions to play leadership roles in addressing political and other forms of conflict. They already do so by having organized themselves into resilient networks and platforms. Political actors in Guyana and the Maldives have been less receptive to the Project efforts.

The selection of countries for the 2nd phase of the Project was the result of a collaborative process involving UNDP, UN DPA, the European External Action Service, the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, together with respective UNDP COs and EU Delegations. It was decided to keep Bolivia, Ghana, Togo and Yemen in focus and include the following new countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guatemala, Honduras, Malawi and Timor Leste. The specific country level activities were defined by UNDP COs and EU Delegations on the basis of the ability to complement their efforts with ongoing ones, and to be consistent with the existing priorities and partnerships with stakeholders. The overall objective is to: contribute to peace and stability by building and consolidating national capacities and initiatives for conflict prevention in conflict-affected, fragile countries or countries undergoing transition. Under this overall objective, four specific complementary and interlinked objectives were formulated, as follows:

1 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bolivia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Malawi, Timor Leste, Togo and Yemen
(i) Strengthen the capacity of national stakeholders, including civil society, women and youth to implement and support internal dialogue and negotiation initiatives (insider mediation). Where appropriate, provide support to the ongoing consolidation of national and local institutions on insider mediation, facilitating dialogue and negotiations (national infrastructures for peace);
(ii) At regional level, develop coordinated and complementary regional approaches through linking country-level activities to the regional level initiatives;
(iii) Strengthen the capacity and support of the UN and EU country level leadership in order to respond adequately to emerging crises where conflict prevention and peacebuilding capacities are required, as well as to support EU and UN analytical capacity at country-level.
(iv) Strengthen application and adaptation of good practices pertaining to support insider mediation capacities, through trainings for UNDP and EU counterparts at country level.

This Project has supported in-country political and conflict analyses followed by insider mediation processes such as negotiations, mediations, shuttle diplomacy and dialogue led by credible figures, groups or institutions internal to a conflict. These stakeholders – insider mediators - are able to use their influence to play a role, often largely behind the scenes or in undefined capacities, which directly or indirectly influences the trajectory of conflict in a constructive manner. Credibility and influence are central to this concept and practice. These processes have been backed up by development of new or further strengthening of existing institutional or organizational conflict prevention and resolution networks and related policy framework – so called infrastructures of peace.

The Project activities, particularly those country-level, have been further supported by deployment of Peace and Development Advisors (PDAs). They provided support to the UN COs to respond to potential conflict situations. At all levels, the Project has focused to enhance the EU-UN coordination, knowledge-sharing and cooperation and increase opportunities for substantive collaboration in the design and implementation of conflict prevention initiatives. As far as cross cutting issues are concerned such as gender, human rights and environmental and climate changes, they were taken into consideration in designing the activities at all levels.

According to the Project Progress Report (May 2015 – July 2016), there has been a strong emphasis on a training/capacity building component of insider mediators/facilitators at country level as well as knowledge sharing at regional and global levels, involving representatives of partner agencies in addition to national stakeholders. National and local institutions and organizations have become the key pillars of national infrastructure of peace in several countries.

1.2 Mid-term Evaluation Objectives

The objective of this evaluation was to assess the Project impact at country, regional and global levels and provide the Project management and the UN-EU collaboration with relevant information for effective implementation in the remaining period. Particularly, the evaluation was expected to:

(i) Collect lessons and derive recommendations from a year and a half of designing and implementing conflict prevention and resolution initiatives to ensure their continued relevance, effectiveness and ongoing contribution to key national priorities in conflict prevention and peace building;
(ii) Assess the linkages and synergies between the conflict resolution/peace and development parts and the other UN and EU portfolios (general programming, security, human rights, development, justice, gender, environment etc.) relevant for the overall conflict prevention/peacebuilding;

(iii) Assess the relative role and value added of key partners in achieving the outputs and impacts of the conflict prevention/peace building portfolio;

(iv) Assess the relevance and importance of the interventions chosen, the theory of change behind them and strategy for linkages and synergies between the partners in one pilot country.

According to the set objectives, the evaluation should not focus only on the Project progress against the set targets, its efficiency and implementing partners’ accountability. The key focus should also be on learning from practice and providing feasible, forward looking recommendations to enrich the remaining project period. Additionally, it should enhance the synergies of implementing partners within the Project as well as in their respective portfolios. In addition to the overall evaluation, an in-depth impact assessment of project activities took place in the Republic of Malawi. Data was collected from different stakeholders, exploring indicators of impact, emphasizing good practices and lessons learnt and identifying key recommendations. The selection of the country, was based on the following criteria: (i) the existence of infrastructure for peace; (ii) local ownership of the insider mediation concept; (iii) deployment opportunities for trained mediators; (iv) the presence of a PDA; (v) initiatives around EU/UN collaboration; and (vi) achievements on crosscutting issues (i.e. gender and vulnerable groups’ rights).

1.3 Methodology

The evaluation methodology was designed based on the initial review of the Project documentation and aligned with the UNDP evaluation policy, the UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) norms and standards suggesting professional approach, taking into account impartiality, credibility, utility of information, human rights and gender equality principles etc. It also integrates key principles of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development / Development Assistance Cooperation evaluation guidelines (same key principles, and focus on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the intervention) and Phillips RoI methodology for evaluation of capacity building and training programs (focusing on reaction, learning, application and impact of applied knowledge and skills).

The methodology design took into account the complexity of multi-level interventions and co-ordination and management (vertical between the HQs and the country level units and horizontal between the UN, EU and the counterparts at each of the levels involved). Variety of contexts in which the action takes place was also considered. However, as only one field visit could be conducted within the scope of this evaluation, it should be noted that certain limitations have arisen. Consequently, some of the results, at the country level might not be fully captured (see chapter 1.3.1).

The methodology consisted of secondary and primary data collection, review and evaluation. The secondary data was collected through a desk-review of documentation provided by the project team. The primary data was collected as to validate the findings of the desk review, assess the impact of Project

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3 http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm
4 http://www.roiinstitute.net/
5 See Annex 1
activities on beneficiaries, review sustainability systems and structures, as well as evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of collaboration between the main stakeholders involved in this Project. This data collection exercise consisted of:

(i) direct interviews with selected stakeholders at national, regional and global level;
(ii) a survey among selected groups of insider mediation/facilitation/early warning and early response (EWER) training participants in a selected pilot country, focusing on five aspects of training and learning effects, as follows: reaction, learning, practical application, impact on the society, and return of investment.
(iii) an evaluation workshop, in a pilot country aiming to deepen the learning and validate the data.

The evaluation focused on the following four aspects:

(i) Relevance – To what extent have the used actions and strategies been relevant to the country and the objectives of the Project?
(ii) Effectiveness – How did the project influence the key drivers of conflict and what were the key achievements?
(iii) Efficiency – How efficient is the project management and how were the resources used?
(iv) Impact and sustainability – How did the beneficiary communities benefit? How is sustainability ensured on policy, institutional and financial levels, and to what extent has the project enabled local ownership?

In each of these aspects, the evaluation process looked for recommendations and lessons learnt while identifying and highlighting the risks that may impede the sustainability of the Project’s efforts.

1.3.1 Limitations

In order to understand the scope of the evaluation report, as well as to correctly interpret and use the data presented, the following analytical limitations should be taken into consideration:

(i) There was a limited time frame to conduct the evaluation – four working days were allocated for the country level data collection, and total of 33 working days for the entire evaluation process of the global intervention. Due to the limited time frame, as well as tight respondent’s schedules, not all the anticipated interviews were conducted. However, participation of all key representatives of implementing agencies and majority of the national partners and beneficiaries was ensured;
(ii) The level of information, comprehensiveness of data and amount of documentation provided from the countries varied, so slight differences in the amount of information can be seen when referring to country level in the report.
(iii) In addition to the requirements of the ToR, this evaluation included detailed assessment of the impact of the insider mediation training and capacity building activities in a selected group of insider mediators in Malawi. This is a completely new data and goes beyond the data collected by the Project’s reporting structures. Yet, as the survey didn’t involve all the project beneficiaries (due to language and communication barriers) it was not possible to provide cumulative data on mediations’ impact on the community.

Despite these objective constraints, the evaluation process managed to collect sufficient and reliable information from a number of sources, triangulating data and as such provide an objective synthesis of conclusions.
2  Key Findings

2.1 Project Design and Approach

2.1.1 Relevance of the Project Intervention
The Project relevance reflects the extent to which the Project addresses national, regional and global conflict prevention and peacebuilding priorities, it is responsive to the objectives of the UN and EU and to the dynamics of the conflict in the target countries.

Project relevance at the country level
The nature and causes of conflict have changed over the past two decades. The risk of major interstate clashes, has decreased, while various types of internal tensions and conflicts persist. There is an increase in conflicts related to governance and elections, mass revolutions, violence due to criminal activity, conflicts over land and natural resources, or organized inter-ethnic or communal violence. The conflicts tend to produce crises at different levels and continuous and simultaneous engagement at multiple levels involving broad variety of stakeholders including the governments is required. According to the Global Peace Index, there are now only 10 countries in the world considered free from conflict\(^6\) and there are more than 50 considered to be fragile in terms of political, societal, economic, environmental and security risks, and the existing capacities to deal with those risks\(^7\).

Due to their nature and complexity, these challenges cannot be addressed only by international processes or frameworks, but require, instead, a synergy with sustainable mechanisms within a particular community or country. Therefore, at a country level, the Project aims to strengthen the capacity of national stakeholders (including civil society) to implement and support internal dialogue and negotiation initiatives (insider mediation), in a number of pilot countries jointly selected by the EU and UN. The decision on the beneficiary countries was a result of extensive consultation between the UN and the EU on the HQ level and between the HQ and the COs, where various criteria were considered. According to respondents, criteria taken into account were to select the countries in need, the countries that can benefit from a prevention initiative and at the same time showed a willingness and commitment at the national level by national stakeholders, including government counterparts.

Moreover, where appropriate, the Project supports consolidation of national and local institutions/forums facilitating dialogue and negotiations (national infrastructures for peace). The Project was closely linked to existing national strategic priorities where possible. In other cases, based on demand of the local counterparts it supported consultations and design of the new ones related to conflict prevention and peacebuilding (such as Malawi National Peace Policy, Strategic plan of the High Commission on Reconciliation and the Strengthening of the National Unity 2016-2018 in Togo, Strategic plan for the Presidential Commission for Dialogue 2016-2020 in Guatemala or Territorial Governance Platform in La Moskitia, Honduras).

It is unanimously emphasized by all interviewees that the Project has been relevant to all selected countries, particularly in the aspect of capacity building of insider mediators. Many interviewees said that in countries such as Honduras, Bolivia, Guatemala and Timor Leste, this has been a unique UN initiative

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\(^7\) States of Fragility – Understanding Violence, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris 2016
strengthening national capacities for conflict prevention, of particular relevance where there was a lack of institutionalized conflict prevention mechanisms and tradition in conflict resolution. In the other Project countries, it helped multiply the results of existing initiatives or has helped bridge a time gap between the greater conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives, such as in Malawi, Ghana and Togo. At the same time in Yemen, which is experiencing open conflict, it is one of a few ongoing initiatives, supporting conflict prevention in areas that are not severely affected yet.

**Project relevance at the regional level**

The aim of the regional component of the Project was to develop coordinated and complementary regional approaches through linking country-level activities to regional initiatives. The intention is to provide also to support insider mediators working in their complex contexts and ensure them not working in isolation. According to the Project description, this involves making available additional resources, learning and network opportunities. Substantive UN-EU collaboration in two joint conflict analysis exercises was envisaged. The two regions of West Africa and the Western Balkans were selected for support.

For now, the Project has provided two regional exchange workshops, one in each of the regions (Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015 and Accra, Ghana in 2016). The Project relevance on the regional level, was well acknowledged in the interviews by all stakeholders in West Africa with regards to sharing of good practices and lessons learnt. The momentum of the 1st phase of the project was the Accra Declaration on strengthening national, regional and continental coordination towards building national infrastructure for peace and conflict prevention (hereinafter Accra Declaration). The Accra Declaration encourages member states to establish national infrastructures for peace within the period of three years including the development of national action plans. There is a dynamic exchange of experiences on the African continent as well as transfer of practices within this Project and beyond, well supported by both the UN and EU. On the other hand, in the Western Balkans the Project is relevant to foster regional communication, but not explicitly linked to insider-mediation initiatives. The ideas being developed at this stage of the Project in the region may support future developments towards better and more relevant regional engagement and exchange, but a precondition for this is a stronger commitment of the stakeholders in the region.

In terms of bringing new experience and knowledge to their own contexts, the interviewees favored regional exchange over global exchange, as it has a better potential to address similar contexts. Therefore, the effect of adaptation and transposition of the experiences tends to be more beneficial.

The regional component of the Project might have benefited on the relevance side if the planned regional conflict analyses had been implemented. Even if initiated at this stage there would be no time to follow up on their results, so the impression is that the regional cooperation needs to be the subject of other major dedicated initiatives. Furthermore, these should focus on establishing more formal regional platforms to support insider mediators, based on political/conflict analyses and transfer of good practices.

**Project relevance at the global level**

Supporting nations to strengthen and sustain their internal capacities for dialogue, mediation and conflict resolution is among the core functions of the UN, which is reflected in the UN Charter. Such activity is also one of the core functions of the EU, as reflected in Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty.

The Project design enables collection of comparative knowledge and experience from the local and regional levels and informing the policy processes on the global level and integration of lessons learnt into
future capacity building programs for the national partners. This was proven in the Project’s 1st phase which synthetized knowledge and lessons learnt into the Insider Mediation Guidance Note, now being distributed and used as a training resource in the UN programs worldwide. The lessons from the 1st phase have also been used in capacity building of the national counterparts in the 2nd phase. As the Project structure on the HQ level involves or reaches other UN agencies and programs too, there is a potential to provide them with useful information from the country level and support their programming too.

All this becomes even more important with the Secretary-General’s dedication to prioritize conflict prevention and sustaining peace and his call to increase collaboration across the UN system and beyond. In addition, the Secretary-General’s recent decision to include “a clear focus on increased support to national and local mediators” in the UN’s mediation capacity and efforts (Decision no 2017/41), is very much in line with the Project’s objectives. As such, the best practices and lessons learnt from this Project can be used by the UN system to identify ways to enhance the UN’s support to national and local mediators.

The Project was drawn from the UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017, which emphasizes importance of peacebuilding and state-building in post-conflict and transitional settings. It fits under areas 2. Inclusive and effective democratic governance and 3. Resilience building. Both areas focus on ensuring fragile and conflict affected states are capable of reducing the likelihood of conflict and rapidly recover and return to sustainable development pathways in post-conflict and post-disaster settings. The Strategic Plan also highlights the importance of South-South and triangular cooperation as the core ways of working in its programs and operations at the global, regional and country levels. This focus is fully integrated and strongly encouraged by the Project. The Project was also based on the UNDPA Strategic Plan 2014-2015 and it continued to support the objectives of the new Strategic Plan 2016-2019 and its priority to bring conflict prevention and mediation back to the fore. It relates to goals 1: Strengthening international peace and security through inclusive prevention, mediation and peacebuilding processes, and 2: Deepening and broadening partnerships within the UN system and beyond.

This Action refers to IcSP priority area b) Article 4 as stated in the 2014-2020 Strategy Paper: Facilitating and building capacity in confidence-building, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation, particularly regarding the emerging inter-community tensions.

Taking all that into account, along with the importance of the UN Sustainable Goal 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions it can be confirmed that the Project is relevant for the efforts at the international level as well.

2.1.2 Project Design and Approach
Entry points for the design of the 2nd phase of The Project were the results and lessons learnt from its 1st phase. The Project continued to work in four countries (Bolivia, Ghana, Togo and Yemen) where there have been strong commitments from national stakeholders and some results achieved, as well as new countries. The Project focus, design and selection of countries was a result of extensive consultations between the

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UN and EU at the HQ level, followed by consultations with the COs and Delegations and to different extent national counterparts in each country. The project has a national, regional and a global component.

At country level, the action is focused on strengthening national stakeholders’ capacities to implement and support internal dialogue, mediation and negotiation initiatives (insider mediation) and support consolidation of national and local institutions facilitating these processes as infrastructures for peace, with further support of engagement of PDAs where applicable. At the regional level in West Africa and the Western Balkans the action has aimed to develop coordinated regional approaches linking country level activities to regional initiatives and on the global level to strengthen knowledge management capacities, improve ability to integrate lessons learned and good practices into UN/EU support to national partners and provide long-term synergetic effects of their strategies globally.

Strong elements of the Project design and approach:
1. In general, the project document presents clearly the intervention logic through a logical framework matrix (LFM), narrative description, and related budget. The selected approach and methodologies are appropriate and follow the logic of the theory of change and, as the evaluation shows, contributed to the Project success (elaborated under chapters 2.2 Project Results). On the country level, the intervention starts with conflict analysis, training and capacity building, then moves to the opening of the opportunities for practice and aims to consolidate the achievements and ensure sustainability of the approach through institutionalization (infrastructures for peace). The approach proved to be appropriate in all the countries except Bolivia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Good practices and lessons learnt are planned to be brought to the regional and global exchange and again through policies, guidelines, capacity building initiatives again targeted towards the end beneficiaries on the local level.

2. The Project has adopted a multi-stakeholder approach in all phases of its implementation. In planning, there were extensive consultations between the partners at all levels and national counterparts were involved at a stage of development of the country concept notes. Although the implementation is facilitated by UNDP on the ground, it often involves a joint effort of the UNDP, UNDPA, active involvement of the EU and the national counterparts. In particular, the active participation of national stakeholders is of utmost importance as the institutionalization of insider mediation should fall within the mandate of national counterparts and requires full national ownership to succeed. The Project aimed and in many countries managed to bring the key national decision makers together to discuss the conflict prevention agenda and generate overall awareness that some level of institutionalization and use of public funds is required to ensure sustainability and development of the mechanisms beyond the project period.

3. The cost-effective tactics have been used to achieve the effects with relatively small funds allocated per country, such as linking the Project to other similar initiatives, relying on existing COs’ staff and national counterparts’ resources, bringing the activities close to the beneficiary communities etc.

Graph 1. Intervention logic and simplified theory of change of the Project
4. Working in complex and fragile contexts, the Project approach is conflict sensitive and flexible enough to be adapted to often rapidly changing circumstances and political environment. General principles and strategies based on the HQs extensive global engagement have been used, but no universal or fixed solutions are enforced. The specific model was allowed to grow from within as agreed or by the national counterparts, but at the same time focused on addressing conflicts on various levels and achieving overall impact. The approaches vary from addressing the national issues of concern to those local or from those linking the infrastructure for peace to the government to the initiatives born by the civil society or religious organizations (further elaborated in Chapter 5). Deployment of expertise from HQ, regional offices and across the borders within the regions is used effectively to assist these processes (regular communication over the project implementation and country missions).

5. Linking the Project implementation to the presence of PDAs enabled a valuable continuous resource and supported its linking with other UN initiatives. In addition, PDAs supported adjusting the Project activities to political and conflict dynamics through undertaking conflict and political analysis, identifying entry points and supporting negotiation with national counterparts. PDAs were deployed in five countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Honduras, Timor Leste, Malawi and Togo) at the start of implementation. PDA function was discontinued in Timor Leste and Honduras as a result of the criticality assessment.

6. Cross cutting issues, such as gender mainstreaming, youth, indigenous people and other vulnerable groups’ rights are well integrated in most of the interventions (particularly in Yemen, Malawi, Togo, Honduras, Guatemala) taking care of affirming these principles and benefiting these groups at the result and impact level.
7. The Project approach encourages linkages and synergies with other initiatives on the global and national level, in particular the UN Joint Program. The Project also raised among other UN entities and partners to develop insider mediation capacities. UNDP has for example used its existing partnership with the Clingendael Institute to include participants from the pilot countries in a globally organized training on insider mediation as well as by supporting in country training in some of the pilot countries (Guatemala and Bosnia and Herzegovina).

8. The integration of the achievements into wider UN and EU peacebuilding support was well thought through and the Insider Mediation Guidance Note produced in the 1st phase of the Project was used to support implementation in all project countries and to a certain extent even beyond the Project in regional capacity building and global initiatives (Insider Mediation workshop in Belgrade in 2017, insider mediation trainings for COs staff and in the framework of the Peacebuilders Conference planned for May 2017 by the Regional Office Asia Pacific). Some interviewees suggested to update it with the recent learnings from this Project and other similar initiatives.

Project design and approach elements that require attention:

1. While the global project document has developed the LFM, meeting the UN and EU requirements, the initial proposals at national level were rather presented as general concept notes, highlighting the objectives, key areas of action or results and a description of implementation modalities. The concept notes vary in the approach and content and lack clear milestones and indicators of achievement. The feedback was received from the several country levels they had difficulties to adapt them to the overall Project during initial consultations. To some of them the concept of insider mediation was relatively new at the beginning of implementation. Nevertheless, at this point of the project all the countries’ initiatives and the global intervention logic are harmonized. Logical framework approach on the country level might have been used to assist in development of clearer intervention logic and indicators to monitor and evaluate upon.

2. The indicators of success for the Project are developed on a level of outputs and outcomes. The reason may be the Project duration and focus on complex and fragile countries, as this is a more measurable way to illustrate the results of the intervention that given the nature of the activities requires long term approach. On the other hand, there is a risk the process approach may take priority over the substance and its effect. In practice, there is a sense of the importance of the theory of change and impact approach. But it seems that on the country level capacities are lacking for evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives and measuring their success. Consequently, it has been a challenge in country level reporting to reflect the broader impact achieved as the reports are mostly activity focused on and providing information on outputs and to a limited extent outcomes.

3. With regards to regional and global knowledge sharing, capacity building events/training have been organized. However, the goal was also to develop coordinated and complementary regional approaches through linking country-level activities to regional initiatives, but the initiative didn’t find fertile ground across all regions. While in West Africa there has been some follow up to Accra Declaration, in Latin America the regional interaction has just been initiated by Guatemala Project staff which should be further supported. The Western Balkan approach needs to be reconsidered in the coming period as regional initiatives are still in the phase of formulation. Two regional conflict analyses that were planned have not been implemented yet.
2.1.3 Linkages and Synergies with Other Programs

From the onset, collaboration with the UNDP-DPA Joint Program on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention was strongly encouraged. The design of the management structure of the Project also supports this cooperation as the Joint Program representatives are involved in The Project Board. The Project co-finances three PDAs in Malawi, Togo and Bosnia and Herzegovina and provides a space for synergy and complementarity with the Joint Program as the PDA in these cases have the Project’s financial resources to address the conflict prevention priorities in the countries. The Project and the Joint Program also share the overall objective of building and consolidating national capacities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding and can therefore complement and strengthen mutual initiatives.

The direct beneficiaries of the Joint Program are the UNCTs which are assisted in analysis, programming, implementation, opening entry points for political engagement and provided expertise and sharing of good practices and lessons learnt. The national counterparts benefit directly through provision of the technical assistance from the PDAs and other experts to nationally driven processes and to a significant extent indirectly through programming, building of project portfolios and their implementation ultimately building the national capacities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The countries in focus of the Joint Program are selected based on the annual criticality assessment and the demand is always bigger than the available funds. There is overall consent that the Joint Program has contributed to enhanced cooperation of UNDP and DPA with relevant effects in the beneficiary countries. It is a valuable resource for the UNCT. Several interviewees affirmed a notable difference in efficiency and effectiveness of the conflict related initiatives where the PDA position was discontinued or the PDA has never been deployed.

The Project’s approach has additional value in terms of alignment with UNDP country level portfolios, direct targeted support to insider mediation initiatives adapted to each country’s needs, building infrastructures for peace efforts and in some countries engagement of national conflict prevention specialists. The Project finances 20% of the PDAs salaries in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Malawi and Togo. This way it manages to provide synergy with the Joint Program in countries where the PDAs have been deployed. In other words, it provided the PDAs with additional funding to support Insider mediation and building of national capacities in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. E.g. in Malawi and Togo these were used as complementary funding for other broader initiatives and in Bosnia and Herzegovina as an initial insider mediation oriented action devised around another joint UN joint project on dialogue.

Still, the level of engagement of implementing partners at various levels in both initiative differs. The Joint Program has a tradition, strongly built collaboration, results are well acknowledged system wide so buy-in does not appear to be an issue. The Project is a small-scale initiative, still strengthening the lines of collaboration, however politically very relevant. It is evidenced that the interest, flow of information and learning to HQ level about the countries benefiting from both initiatives is very high. In case of the other countries solely assisted through the Project, there is an evident commitment to the Project among the HQ officials involved in the action while less awareness is shown in the wider organizational structure, including regional units or departments. Several reasons were identified:

(i) for relatively small project initiatives it is more difficult to get buy-in from different organizational levels unless well aligned with the bigger programs. In addition, these initiatives sometimes struggle to reach strategic policy levels and achieve system-wide collaboration;
(ii) activity focused Project reports with less political and impact analytics have less potential to provide information of interest across the UN system and participating organizations’ structures;

(iii) limited human resources.

Considering the rising importance of conflict prevention and sustaining peace on the UN agenda and the fact that although the potential of insider-mediation has been recognized but not yet clearly positioned in the programs, like the track 1 ‘outsider’ mediation approach, there are potential and need to address the first two aforementioned challenges. The interviewees suggested:

i) improvement of Project reporting so that it meets the needs of all involved UN agencies providing more political and conflict analysis and evidences of results and impact on conflict prevention and peacebuilding as well as on position of women, youth and indigenous populations;

ii) better alignment of the Project to the Joint Program or even

iii) integration of this and similar projects under the Joint Program.

While the integration would require the analysis of the operational aspect of the Joint Program which is beyond scope of this evaluation, the first two are briefly addressed here.

As the Project is politically relevant, has a great potential and has already developed good practices and synthetized valuable lessons learned it would be of utmost importance that the implementing agencies take the position on its future, more specifically if it will become a long-term initiative instead of a short-term project. As the first step, the quality Project information from the field should be brought to policy making levels, including to the management of the Joint Program. To achieve this, firstly the reporting should be improved by agreement among the EU, UNDP, UNDPA or even the stakeholders participating in the Project Board, on the report template (key elements, result and impact orientation). This needs to be supported by improvement of the monitoring and evaluation processes on the country level which currently lacks a focus on results and impact. This may serve efforts of the managing agencies to raise interest in the Project achievements and to better coordinate and align with the Joint Program. Bringing together the experience and the expertise from both initiatives can contribute the effectiveness of each of the initiatives through planning, conflict analyses, exchange of practices and lessons learned. Potentially, as the entire UN system may have interest in impact of conflict prevention and insider mediation actions this initiative may be beneficial systemwide.

On the national level, most of the COs linked the Project to their national programs or projects of conflict prevention, social cohesion or election support (Malawi, Ghana, Togo, Timor Leste, Yemen, Bosnia and Herzegovina) or used the openings achieved through other initiatives to foster the results in this one. As the insider mediation achievements raise interest across the UN, the Project management or PDAs involved in this or previous phase of the Project have been invited to share the experiences through internal UN capacity building or external capacity building for beneficiaries.

The Project also uses the existing UNDP partnership with the Clingendael Institute in order to provide additional high quality training to the UN staff engaged in the Project as well as to a selected number of the partnering institutions and individuals at the country level and support an increase of effectiveness of their work. There is a strong appeal of the COs or beneficiaries who had this learning experience (particularly in Latin America and Africa) to provide Clingendael training to the target countries and make
it available to more national mediation practitioners as well as to connect to other respective think-tanks globally, e.g. those who will be able to deliver training in the language of the beneficiary countries.

2.1.4 Efficiency of the Project
The evaluation observed the relation between the Project outputs against the resources invested, including human, financial, technical equipment and facilities etc.

One should take into account that this Project is managed from the HQ levels in Brussels and New York, to a certain extent involve regional branches of the organization and again substantially involve UN COs and country EU Delegations and numerous national counterparts. The Project has a Board with a mandate to oversee the implementation and is comprised of the representatives from EU, DPA, UNDP (HQ and Regional hubs), the Joint Program, UNWOMEN, South-South cooperation, civil society and representatives from three pilot countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guatemala and Togo). The Board had two meetings in the observed period, which is challenging looking at the Project cycles and the needs to have a substantial input in planning, evaluation and reporting periods. A minimum of two meetings per implementation year would be recommended. A working-level, Project Group was established composed of two representatives from each of the partnering organizations, for the purpose of making key implementation decisions. The Group has communicated through scheduled meetings or as the Project dynamics required, usually via conference calls. The Group members are supposed to disseminate relevant information regarding the Project, throughout their respective organizations. However, receiving feedback takes time. Decisions tend to be made by consensus and with involvement of all stakeholders, which sometimes proved to be resource and time consuming. On the other hand, a participatory approach, improvement of collaboration and ownership over results are the key principles of the Project approach.

Such a complex organization led to delays in the initial phase caused by extensive consultations on target countries as well as in designing of the country concept notes that were supposed to transfer the global project framework to the country level. Interviewees from all levels posted the question whether a shorter consultation time would have reduced the quality of decisions. Still, DPA and some partnering agencies on the national level felt they were not involved enough in the initial discussion of UNDP and EU. Although the initial preparation cannot be considered efficient, it was a beginning of a new form of multi-stakeholder and multi-level cooperation and positioning for all involved. Challenges and initial lively debates resulted in more efficient and strengthened cooperation in the later stages of the project. However, the revision of the concept notes at the country level turned to be worth the effort and investment of resources (e.g. Honduras, Bolivia, Guatemala, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Yemen) and the countries aligned their interventions to the changed country dynamics. The financial instalments were approved after the annual work plans, which did not happen at the same time for all. This was an administrative challenge because some of the countries developed their annual work plans with delays (Bolivia, Guatemala, Yemen). Also, the implementation year ends on May 31st and the global annual report is due 90 days after (July 31), which allows for the annual funds allocation from the EU as early as mid August. This could have effected negatively the well performing countries (Togo, Malawi, Ghana) but the strong commitment at both the EU and UN HQ coupled with the commitment at the country level helped minimizing the effect of this gap on the implementation and all countries are on track with the implementation. Some more suitable administrative arrangements should be considered if the procedures
allow, as the project deals with dynamic social contexts in need for swift decision and adaptations. Nevertheless, setting up a clearer intervention logic was a priority and most of the offices caught up the planned dynamics and reached planned results.

Overall, the Project has very small financial resources in comparison to the ambitious objectives and an inpressed interest the project raised on the insider mediation stretched over nine countries and three levels of implementation. With a view of further developing the initiative in the future, in most of the countries the UN has smartly increased its contribution involving additional (existing) human resources of the CO and logistical support to the Project, financed by the UN funds. For example, in Malawi and Togo the additional focus is on developing capacities of national staff to support the action in the future. The senior management of COs, Resident Coordinators (RC) and their deputies are well informed of the initiative and support it as well. Additionally, in some countries (Malawi, Ghana, Togo, Timor Leste) the funding was used to contribute to broader conflict prevention programs so their effects were scaled up. The Project related staff in all countries is in continuous communication with national counterparts which are also highly committed to the implementation of the action.

At all levels, the Project has focused to enhance the EU-UN coordination, knowledge-sharing and cooperation and increase opportunities for substantive collaboration in the design and implementation of conflict prevention initiatives. With regards to the country EU Delegations, each appointed a focal point for the Project. Usually, they are well informed of the Project, however there is a tendency of frequent changes of focal points so neither one follows the Project’s entire cycle. In Togo, the EU would like more proactivity from both UN and the EU side so they get better exchange. They even proposed formalization of the role of the EU Delegations in future similar projects through a contractual clause defining the EU-UN cooperation at national level. The CO and the EU Delegation in Guatemala signed a memo regulating cooperation within this Project which could serve as a model. Another recommendation is that the key Project results should be better elevated internally within the EU Delegation from the focal point to the senior levels and the Ambassador, as they directly relate to the overall governance and conflict prevention development in the country. A precondition for this to happen again is more analytical and impact focused reporting.

The role and influence of the PDA on overall performance in Malawi, particularly in governance sector and gender and human rights related issues can be considered an example of good practice and as such is fully supported by the RC. The PDA is positioned in the UN Country Team, providing input and collecting relevant information and reaching all UN agencies at all stages and what is particularly important at the programming stage e.g. UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). There is an overall agreement between UNDP and UNDPA that this would be a case of good practical implementation of the PDA standard operational procedure and that only integrated well in the Country Team and in dialogue with national stakeholders in different sectors PDA function can serve its purpose.

2.1.5 Cross cutting issues (gender, human rights and vulnerable groups)
Gender, human rights and environmental issues were taken as priority cross-cutting issues in the Project design. In addition, some countries focused their intervention exclusively on working with the youth. The principle was well transferred to most of the country levels and showed results even at this stage.
In Yemen, Malawi and Togo the Project strategically ensures that actions benefit women and youth/children on the levels of results and impact. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Timor Leste youth are one of the key target groups, as a big population group affected with high unemployment rates.

In Yemen, urgent needs in conflict zones were addressed. Mediations in villages resulted in agreement on water supplies and prevent the risk for women when bringing water to their households from distant areas. Mediations also resulted in resolving the shelters for internally displaced persons, and allowing the health centers and schools they settled continue to provide services. In Malawi, women from religious associations were strategically empowered and won confidence of their religious organizations as well as in the communities to conduct mediations, including those related to gender based violence, and implement civic education programs on gender issues and teenage pregnancies. Indigenous populations rights were addressed through dialogues and mediations in Guatemala and Honduras and their capacities have been built to protect their interests better in negotiation with the Government and the extractive industries. Youth in Timor Leste and Malawi play a key role in EWER systems. Some of the country projects have among other counterparts, involved institutions in charge of human rights (Honduras, Guatemala, Malawi) actively in the implementation, building their capacities and ensuring the focus on these issues. Women mediators in Togo were provided small grants to organize mediations and dialogue sessions in their communities, raising their credibility and influence in the society. In Bosnia and Herzegovina youth capacities are built to facilitate or participate in dialogue over disputed issues related to the EU integration.

It was ensured that the country Project staff keep gender, youth and indigenous groups segregated statistics and reports accordingly to the HQ, which is further integrated in the overall Project reports.

As the evaluation collected data from the representatives from different UN agencies, it was acknowledged that the presence of PDAs in the country also supports mainstreaming gender and youth issues into the peacebuilding and conflict prevention programs. This happens either directly as some PDAs are well capacitated in gender and human rights issues or are involved in gender or human rights task forces within the UNCT. Alternatively, they are easily contacted by the respective agency or program HQ, such as UNWomen or UNICEF, as a focal point and engaged in collaboration. This is particularly important as these programs do not necessarily have strong presence in all the countries.

2.1.6 Visibility
The Project presents the initiative as a joint UN-EU effort at all levels in all its communication. Visibility is well ensured through the activities (banners, visual aids) and on all printed materials. Additionally, video testimonials about the Project have been prepared in several countries and will be broadly available. All interviewed stakeholders are well aware of the Project as the joint effort and often referred to as the “EU-UN Project”. More intensive collaboration than usual and presence of the EU delegations’ focal points contributed to such outcome.

2.2 Project Results
The Project results are defined according to those identified in the LFM provided in the project proposal. For easier elaboration, they are divided into three categories: i) country, ii) regional and iii) global project results. Some of them are also further divided into more categories, not necessarily being identical to
those in the LFM. Overview of the key results is presented in this chapter, while more detailed country information is presented in Chapter 3: Detailed Country Level Information.

2.2.1 Country Level Results
The country level results are reflected in the built capacities of the national counterparts for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, meaning primarily for application of dialogue and mediation and institutionalization of the mechanisms establishing the infrastructures for peace. The following table presents the key indicators of achieved results on national level and their presence in the countries in focus.
## Table 1: Key indicators of results achieved on the country and regional levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>indicator</th>
<th>Bolivia</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Togo</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Honduras</th>
<th>Malawi</th>
<th>Timor Leste</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insider mediators trained (in-country trainings)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict analyses performed</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross sectoral partnerships built</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructures for peace initiated/established</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social dialogues implemented</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediations practiced</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact in conflict prevention/transformation detected</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender, indigenous peoples, human rights strategically addressed</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthened UN-EU collaboration</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in regional networking</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Capacity Building of Insider Mediators and their Increased Interventions

All the country Projects started or have been continuously implementing conflict analyses in order to provide appropriate response to the current social challenges. Additionally, all the countries supported national, regional or local dialogue on conflict prevention or on the issues of contention. Many, such as Ghana, Malawi, Togo, Yemen, Honduras and Timor Leste managed to follow up on the dialogue conclusions and initiate actions by the governments or other relevant stakeholders or start developing conflict prevention, peacebuilding or dialogue related policies.

Some of the countries such as Ghana, Malawi and Timor Leste organized national level dialogues over contentious issues and brought conclusions further to the authorities in charge. These are particularly related to the election periods and key national reforms and in that case turned to be a successful practice. Youth in Bosnia and Herzegovina implemented dialogues on key transitional challenges and EU accession and presented formulated conclusions to parliamentarians and other relevant institutions in the country.

All the counties except Bosnia and Herzegovina have built insider mediator’s capacities for their further deployment in conflict resolution and conflict prevention. The mediators come from a variety of sectors including government, civil society organizations (CSOs), religious organizations, indigenous communities, media, lawyers etc. In Togo and Malawi women were specifically trained and joined the pool of mediators engaged in the field. The key precondition were the reputation, credibility and trust of the trained mediators in the respective community. In all countries having insider mediators trained, except Bolivia, there is evidence of application of mediation skills in the communities. On the national level, these are mostly election related with regards to prevention or elimination of election related violence like in Ghana and Malawi. On the lower levels, the interventions are focused on inter-religious or intra-religious issues, land issues, family issues, gender based violence, chieftaincy or addressing the conflicts over basic human needs and poor public services (like in Yemen). Many mediators first started to practice within this project, while many who mediated prior to this claim to have improved their skills and effectiveness.

In Bolivia, the community of practice developed in the 1st phase was not engaged as the CO estimated the Government would not accept nongovernmental practitioners and those who were removed from public offices as intermediaries in social conflicts. Therefore, a new group of Government officials was trained in mediation, however, these institutions see their role rather in sharing the knowledge to other colleagues than in mediating. It is evident the project led to the improvement of collaboration and an increase in demand for trainings and assistance by the Government which was not the case before.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was agreed between the UN and the EU that the Project would take a more flexible approach devised around the UN’s flagship joint initiative with Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, investing specifically in youth capacities for dialogue and piloting support to local independent media (jointly recognized by the EU and the UN as the key groups to foster trust building, stir policy and reform discussions and hold the authorities accountable). In the coming period, Bosnia and Herzegovina tends to incline more to expanding the adjusted, post-conflict context of insider mediation.

National Infrastructures for Peace

For the purpose of harmonized approach to all the countries, the national infrastructures for peace are defined as combination of institutions, mechanisms, resources and skills through which conflicts can be resolved and peace sustained within a society. The emphasis is on the fact that
these must be reflected in organized and sustainable efforts, regardless of whether they are positioned in formal public sector settings or informally within the civil society or traditional communities’ settings. Where interventions solely focused on capacity building in insider mediation, even if these skills are applied, are therefore not considered as infrastructure for peace. Six out of nine countries are considered to have such infrastructures established on various levels. They were either established or further strengthened through this UN-EU collaboration. These are Ghana, Togo, Guatemala, Honduras, Malawi and Timor Leste. Most of them also have networks of EWER volunteers that play an important role informing the national stakeholders, such as government actors but also academia and civil society organizations, about conflict risk and dynamics and can make recommendations for preventive action. While forming an important element in developing infrastructures for peace in these countries, it is apparent that these EWER networks require additional and continuous support in order to become fully sustainable.

In Ghana and Malawi, the infrastructures for peace have been established on national and district levels. They also involve EWER mechanism which includes volunteers present countrywide. In Ghana, the National Peace Council (NPC) is set up by the Act of Parliament involving representatives of religious and social groups. It is further organized through District Peace Councils (DPCs) country wide. In Malawi, the main intermediary to address socially contentious issues, including issues involving the Government, is the interreligious association: the Public Affairs Committee (PAC). It is mostly engaged on national and district level, while some of its mediators including the women’s association are present on a local level as well. The country has established 3 pilot district peace committees involving representatives from all society sectors. It is in line with the draft National Peace Policy, which after adoption will pursue organization of the National Peace Committee unit and the committees in all districts of the country. Strategic focus on gender and vulnerable groups participations was integrated in the approach as the draft National Peace Policy calls for representation and participation of women, youth and persons with disabilities in all structures of infrastructure for peace and program activities. Other conflict resolution mechanisms in civil society and political sector, developed through other initiatives, exist as well.

Honduras started from scratch building mediation capacities in local communities in a targeted region. Later after interest was expressed by the national Commission for Human Rights the capacity building of its staff and strengthening the mediation function in this institutions at the national level was supported. Togo has built the infrastructure for peace informally on a local level, through consultations with the local communities and a selection of the Local Peace Committees members. Guatemala has been building capacities for mediation on regional and local levels and supported development of the first strategic plan for the Presidential Commission for Dialogue, involving the representatives of key Government Ministries and institutions dealing with conflict prevention and dialogue.

Timor Leste has a unique on-line EWER system managed by the CSO Belun. The data base is filled by a network of EWER volunteers who monitor and respond to violent incidents throughout the country and report on key aspects of conflicts including frequency, type, location and its potential to turn into violence.
The results are communicated to the Ministry of Interior and other Ministries, and recommendations are made to national stakeholders for follow-up preventive action.

**Strengthened Analytical Capacities and EU-UN Collaboration on Conflict Risk**

Strengthening the EU and UN capacities for joint analysis and collaboration on conflict risk is an area that needs more of the partners’ joint engagement in the remaining period of implementation. However, there were some activities initiated at the country level, though. In all countries except Togo and Yemen, the UN and the EU experienced substantial improvement in collaboration. It is reflected in continuous consultations over the Project and planning of activities, while in some cases joint missions were organized for assessment of risks and designing future actions (Guatemala) and joint analysis of the achievements and challenges and recommendations for improvement (all countries).

The Project in Bosnia and Herzegovina invested in joint EU-UN research on youth implemented in July/August 2016 which looks at the youth views on the socio-economic situation in the country. Under the youth engagement activities, the CO started exploring cooperation with other CSOs in the country as well.

Global, regional and national trainings on conflict prevention and insider mediation continuously involve the relevant UN project staff related to the Project and the EU country delegations’ focal points. This builds the capacities, develops a common understanding of the concepts and facilitates planning of the actions in the country.

2.2.2 Regional Level Results

**Regional Workshop on Infrastructures for Peace in West Africa**

In June 2016, the Project organized a Regional Workshop on Infrastructures for Peace in West Africa aimed at further advancing the implementation of the Accra Declaration. The workshop reaffirmed the Declaration as the key framework within which regional and national infrastructures for peace should be established and provided a valuable opportunity for practicing insider mediators to share their experiences with institutional representatives from the EU and the UN. Specific focus was on: i) enabling the identification of options for strengthened collaboration between the EU, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), DPA and UNDP in support of insider mediation; ii) the development of concrete options for more systematic and effective engagement with civil society by the EU and the UN in support of insider mediation, iii) the identification of concrete actions to strengthen women’s insider mediation capacities and strengthening the systematic exchange and peer-to-peer support amongst insider mediators and institutions assisting their initiatives.

The workshop emphasized the need for an action plan for implementation of the Accra Declaration and a set of measures that should be implemented in the coming period, such as development of a training program on insider mediation and infrastructures for peace focusing on women’s participation; development of compendium of insider mediation best practices; establishment of an online community of practice and identification of institutional responsibility for these actions. In early 2017, the Project conducted the survey on achievements and it was concluded that the initiatives strengthened the inter-institutional collaboration between institutions such as UNOWAS, ECOWAS, the EU, UNDP and DPA. For example, in the aftermath of the workshop, DPA exchanged with ECOWAS on their support to the mapping
and setting up of local and national infrastructures for peace in all West African countries. An ECOWAS delegation joined the DPA team in New York for an exchange visit, discussing the modalities of provision of operational support to mediation and dialogue processes and knowledge management.

The workshop was equally instrumental in establishing links between multilateral institutions and CSOs, research institutes or think tanks, that have been be drawn upon in view of program design and implementation. Moreover, it has helped to inform some concrete follow-up actions in view of supporting insider mediation capacities and initiatives in the region. In Ghana, for example, the Foundation for Security and Development in Africa (FOSDA) has been closely involved in strengthening the capacities of insider mediators that engaged directly with the government and other political party groups to resolve pre- and post-election disputes in the 2016 parliamentary and presidential elections. FOSDA has equally been involved in the establishment of a Women’s Situation Room – a non-partisan mechanism that mobilized women to call for peaceful elections in 2016.

Further action is needed to sustain stakeholders’ commitment to drive the implementation of the Accra Declaration. Following up on the Workshop’s conclusions and recommendations on how to improve implementation is important in this regard. In particular, the need for research on application of insider mediation and learning from comparative practices at the regional level has been raised in this regional context too.

**The Western Balkans Regional Workshop**

The first Western Balkans regional workshop on strengthening regional collaboration between the EU and UN in conflict prevention was held in Sarajevo in 2015 opening five thematic discussions on: i) cooperation on the ground on migration challenges and ii) the provision of emergency relief during the major flooding in 2014. Participants identified the scope for conflict sensitive regional responses and cooperation in three priority areas in respect to each organization’s strengths and comparative advantages: i) rule of law, corruption and integrated border management; ii) environmental issues and iii) socio-economic development. Nevertheless, the operationalized initiative for the Western Balkan region is still in its planning phase and requires strong commitment and follow up of the partners.

**Latin America Regional Exchange**

Although Latin America was not targeted for regional level interventions, there is an exchange of information between the UN Project related staff in Honduras and Guatemala. In addition, there is a plan to strengthen South-South cooperation through organizing a regional exchange on lessons learned and best practices on the institutionalization of dialogue and socio-environmental conflict management between Bolivia, Guatemala and Honduras. The exchange will also draw upon the experiences of other Latin American countries, such as Peru and Colombia. The exchange is foreseen to take place in July 2017.

Regional and global sharing of experience and knowledge was appreciated by all interviewees in the evaluation, with slight preference given to regional initiatives rather than global exchanges due to similarity of context and challenges faced as well as due to language barriers that may occur during global exchanges.
2.2.3 Global Level Results

Some specific results on the global level were derived from the global workshops on insider mediation and conflict prevention organized in Casablanca (Morocco) in 2015 and Belgrade (Serbia) in 2017. They enabled global learning and sharing between the HQ and country level UN and EU Delegations and a limited number of national counterparts. The reactions were positive and continuation of these efforts is encouraged by all interviewed. The only suggestion is to make these events as effective as possible by avoiding any general presentations on the subjects that participants are already familiar with and focus on sharing experiences and practical advice. This is not an easy task due to very diverse groups participating, but a quick needs assessment might be made before events of this kind to enable cost effectiveness.

Continuous cooperation with Clingendael also supported capacity building of the UN, the EU and national counterparts. All stakeholders are interested in continuation of this effort, and recommendations to improve these trainings included bringing the training to the beneficiary countries as well as opening cooperation with other think-tanks, universities and organizations.

One of the Project’s 1st phase results was the EU Insider Mediation Guidance Note that was used as a resource across the countries involved in the Project and beyond through the network of the implementing agencies’ organizational units. It was mostly used in a training setting and as a resource for designing exchanges on insider mediation.

2.3 Impact of the Project

The impact assessment focused on the gains of the final beneficiaries of the Project which are the countries and the communities involved in terms of conflict and violence prevention and peacebuilding.

It has always been a challenge to identify impact of a conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions which require evolutive transformation within society if they were implemented over a short period of time. In this Project, it has been facilitated due to the fact that most of the countries have embedded the action into their country programs and projects or existing national initiatives, enabling it to achieve measurable results in a short period of implementation. Still, it caused difficulties in isolating the effects of this specific Project from the influences of other initiatives. Therefore, rather the contribution to the overall impact was observed, than the attribution of changes solely to this initiative, unless this Project intervened with unique and distinct measures leading to specific benefits.

The only country in an open conflict is Yemen and as the war imposed the environment where urgent and basic human needs were addressed, the conflict management interventions provided almost immediate lifesaving impact for larger number of people. The exceptions with no impact indicators identified are Bolivia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (due to previously elaborated reasons).

As the evaluation relied on desk review of available and provided documentation and skype interviews with a few selected stakeholders in each country10, another challenge was the lack of existing systematic and processed impact data. Project related monitoring and evaluation in the COs and their counterparts was activity focused and data on impact on final beneficiaries were not systematically captured (except

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10 Except in Malawi where a field visit was organized entailing evaluation workshop, in-depth interviews with key international and national stakeholders and surveys of a selected group of mediators and EWER volunteers.
in Yemen, which carefully tracked all the developments, while in other countries few testimonials were occasionally collected). Nevertheless, in addition to what was available in the COs, through the interviews and surveys with the national counterparts, the evaluation was able to track some clear indicators of impact or potential impact by the end of the Project. Given this challenge, it is strongly recommended to provide monitoring and evaluation framework to the COs for the next reporting period to be able to measure the impact better. Indicators developed in this evaluation methodology and the evaluation framework that is being prepared under the Joint Program may be helpful.

Country level impact

One aspect of identified impact that was first emphasized by all respondents, focuses on overall conflict prevention and resolution capacities built that will remain in the country and at the disposal of all relevant stakeholders. Hundreds of officials from relevant public institutions and community insider-mediators have been trained across the target countries and most of them got the opportunity to engage in facilitation of dialogues or mediate after the training, further enhancing their capacities. Therefore, the Project impacted the capacities of the organizations they belong or are affiliated to (PAC in Malawi and Belun in Timor Leste) or specific local communities which informally elected their own mediators of reputation and credibility (Togo and Yemen) or the institutions and networks considered infrastructures for Peace (Ghana, Honduras, Malawi and Guatemala). To limited extent the Project influenced the Government in Bolivia to open for cooperation with the UN COs and require further assistance in conflict prevention capacity building.

The other important aspect of impact are the positive effects of infrastructures for peace and mediation/dialogue processes implemented or guided on the people and communities affected by conflict. These were reflected in change of behavior of the communities/parties in conflict including continuous conflict monitoring and timely addressing, prevention of violence, material damage on assets and infrastructure, violations of human rights, casualties etc.

Overall, the nationwide effects of mediations supported by this Project were related to prevention of election related violence (during election campaign and results implementation) and the political and development reforms and their progress. E.g. EWER mechanisms effects supported by this Project were evidenced in the context of elections in Ghana (prevention of conflict related violence) and Timor Leste (early warning of violent incidents in the run up to the 2017 elections). There is a solid base for the conflict prevention effect in Malawi over the 2019 elections as the country now has the infrastructure for peace, has advanced mediators’ capacities and previous experience in prevention of election related conflicts through the national Election Peace Accord in 2014. National dialogue sessions in Malawi over reforms and development also led to identification of additional national priorities of reforms and advocacy actions which resulted in implementation of some proposals by the Government. Observing violent trends in earlier election cycles or protests over the course of the reforms led by the governments, it can be concluded the introduced mechanisms are supportive to prevention of violence, casualties, material damage on assets and infrastructure. Consequently, this represents a contribution to the countries’ security and stability enabling progress in its development processes.

In addition to this, experience from Honduras demonstrates successful use of mediation to improve and continue education services. There, the National Commission for Human Rights (CONADEH) mediated the conflict between students who occupied the University facilities in Tegucigalpa protesting for protection
of student’s standards. The agreement enabled timely continuation of education process, which can be considered an intervention of national importance.

In Guatemala, the Project has built capacities of indigenous groups to negotiate with the Government and industrial sector over construction of hydro-electrical plants in two regions of the country. If the concrete results are achieved in the frame of this Project as the CO expects, it should be followed as a case study for conflict prevention in extractive industries context and indigenous people’s rights. Although, placed in two regions of the country, the initiative has a national significance as the concessions are provided by the Government and can be relevant for the future similar situations. In Honduras, a dialogue process was initiated with support of the Project, between the Government and the indigenous authorities in the isolated region of La Moskitia over conflicts between the official and indigenous authorities and conflicts of their mandates.

In Yemen, the Project achieved impact on thousands of people affected by conflict through mediating conflicts over water and energy supplies, conflicts with water service providers or conflicts between internally displaced persons and domicile population over using of communal infrastructure (schools and health centers), proving the potential of the conflict management interventions to provide immediate effect for larger number of people.

The biggest share of the mediation processes was on a very local level, focusing on religious and land issues and affecting smaller neighborhoods or villages (Honduras, Ghana, Togo, Malawi). Some of the mediated inter-religious conflicts in Malawi were affecting the district levels as well.

Contribution of women mediators should also be emphasized here, particularly characteristic for Togo and Malawi. Women engaged in community dialogues in Togo over the local priorities, while in Malawi they were mediating a number of conflicts over land, family conflicts and gender based violence issues. They also engaged in the civic education and gender equality awareness raising initiatives. Statistically, interviewed women mediated more often than interviewed men, however in very specific types of conflicts.

In all the local level cases, the mediators noted they prevented violence, damage to property and violations of human rights in individual cases. According to the interviewees, presence of the mediators in the communities and timely management of local interreligious conflicts had positive effects on the safety and security in a multi-religious and multicultural environment. Due to the lack of systematic data from all the trained mediators it is hard to estimate how many conflicts between individuals (land issues, family issues, domestic violence) have been addressed and how they cumulatively affect the local community. However, they have positive influence on protection of human rights in individual cases.

In cases where mediation processes were implemented for the first time after trainings were delivered by this Project and there were no other supporting influences, the impact can be attributed to this initiative (as was the case in Honduras and Yemen). In the countries where the mediators were performing even prior to this intervention or were supported by additional Projects at the same time (Malaw, Ghana, Togo, Timor Leste) it was necessary to observe the trends, analyze other factors that contributed to the effects and include a mediators’ self-estimation of the contribution of the Project to her/his performance. Mediators’ self-assessment showed affirmative indicators in Togo such as improved self-confidence, reputation and effectiveness in some trained mediators. In Malawi, mediators’ mediation records showed
increase in number of mediations after the trainings taken within this Project and increase of number of settlements reached while their self-assessment showed increase of their reputation, self-confidence and effectiveness in communication skills (all attributed to the Project).

Systematic collection of data on the impact level is of key importance in order for the countries and the respective organizations in charge of mediation to be able to cumulatively analyze the data and the contribution of mediations to peace and security, including conflict prevention, human lives saving, prevention of damage to infrastructure, prevention of human rights violations and prevention of indirect negative effects (costs of reparations and reconstruction of damage, slower development or negative investment climate etc.).

Assessment of impact on women and vulnerable groups and gender and human rights situation should be integrated in these efforts. The evaluation managed to collect some data, which should be further explored in the remaining Project period and reviewed in the final Project evaluation.

For example, in Malawi strategic commitment to enhance women and youth capacities and influence led to internal reform of the main local partner PAC. The decision-making processes were improved, involving women in the management structures and recognizing them as insider mediators. Women mediators are engaged in mediation and civic education on gender based violence, teenage pregnancies and importance of girls’ education. While few women mediators claim they managed to help women victims of violence and calm the relations in the family, it is still early to make conclusions on the broader societal effects of these efforts.

Additionally, in Malawi and Timor Leste, the national counterparts build capacities and engage youth in EWER activities, claiming their education and community engagement may revert them from engaging in criminal activities or political and election related violence. In Timor Leste, the information provided through EWER system contributed to improvement of legal and policy framework, including budgetary allocations for prevention or drafting of the Law on Martial Art Groups, addressing the youth gang issues and the impact of these initiatives should be followed.

In Latin American countries, particularly Honduras and Guatemala, impact of capacity building efforts and involvement of indigenous groups in negotiations over development projects and indicators of protection of their rights and meeting their interests in these processes should be continuously followed.

In Yemen, a case of engagement of women in the villages in mediation over water supplies, significantly contributed to resolution of the conflict in line with their interests, as they are the ones who fetch the water for households often from distanced areas. Impact of mediations in the situation of open conflict should be further monitored by the end of the Project as well.

Although early to make clear conclusions on the broader Project impact on these groups, the evaluation managed to outline some of the areas which should be explored in the future efforts. Other countries should be further supported, particularly in integrating gender mainstreaming in their efforts.

With regards to the country level UN-EU and the local counterparts’ collaboration and the PDA engagement, the future impact might be in influencing the country level programming and raising funds for the continuation of conflict prevention and insider mediation initiatives. There is a potential for this to happen in Guatemala, Ghana, Togo and Malawi. The key preconditions for impact in this aspect are
general awareness and capacities present in the COs and EU Delegations for the conflict prevention and peacebuilding; openness and commitment by the leadership (RC and Head of EU Delegations); commitment of the Country Team and active engagement of the UN staff and the PDA (where available) with the community and the UN CO management. In Guatemala, there was a significant increase of the EU Delegation’s interest for the conflict prevention program after the global insider mediation workshop organized by the Project in Belgrade in 2017 opening discussions over future joint programs.

Regional and global level impact
It is still early to identify impact on the regional and global level. Regionally, implementation of the agreements such as Accra Declaration might be observed, interaction between communities of practice and collaboration of infrastructures for peace and mediations in cross-border disputes. Yet, these actions have not been intensified. Two regional conflict analyses that were originally planned by the Project might have provided more specific arguments and baselines for design of effective regional interventions. On the global UN policy level, there is a vivid discussion on conflict prevention and sustaining peace and insider mediation is frequently made their subject. It would be interesting to check when it is finally positioned in the overall UN agenda, what the contribution was of this Project. With regards to the EU policy discussions the EU representatives would rather refer to the effects of the Project as informing and influencing the policy discussions but it is still early to see it significantly changing any of the courses.

2.4 Sustainability of Achievements and Outcomes
Many of the interviewees emphasized the sustainability of knowledge and skills that has been achieved in many mediators across the targeted countries and has been built on their existing traditional roles in mediation, which is a resource that is not put in question. However, unless there is an environment which enables and empowers the application of their skills and knowledge, their work may not be sustainable. Therefore, building or strengthening the institutional setting – e.g. infrastructures of peace, or relevant policy frameworks that can establish, affirm or support these institutions, as well as increasing financial resources, are considered key elements to ensure sustainability of the Project’s results. Additionally, the effects of public awareness and trust in mediation on sustainability were investigated.

There are countries that have established policies and platforms for dialogue and developed institutional settings, or are in the initial stages of establishing such settings. Others are keeping the informal setting for the purpose of impartiality and credibility among the communities.

In Ghana, policy level sustainability is ensured by the Act 819 of the Parliament establishing the National Peace Council (NPC) with the mandate to facilitate and develop mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, resolution and to build sustainable peace in the country. In line with its mandate, the core activities of the NPC cover mediation, reconciliation, early warning, peace education, capacity-building, networking and resource mobilization. The NPC is linked to the Government, which covers the administrative costs including salaries, utilities and stationary. However, its activities are not supported and are still dependent on international funding, so options for stable funding from domestic resources should be explored in future.

In Honduras, in a targeted region of La Moskitia, populated mostly by indigenous groups, a policy and institutional framework for mediation processes has been set up through the Territorial Dialogue Platform. The Platform has been developed by the Project and led by the Secretary of Human Rights,
Justice, Governance and Decentralization (SDHGJGD) and the National Commission for Human Rights (CONADEH) – both national counterparts to the Project - as a mechanism to address the land issues and contention over the governance between the official local governments and indigenous people’s institutions, as mandates are not clearly agreed nor defined. Additionally, one local conflict resolution committee has been established by the mediators trained in La Moskitia. The Project has also built the institutional capacities of CONADEH for insider mediation to be performed within their regular mandate of human rights protection and conflict prevention countrywide. Still, securing more financial sustainability for the activities is challenging and opportunities for funding should be explored.

In Guatemala, the Project supported the development of the strategic plan for the Presidential Commission for Dialogue for the period 2016-2020, thereby providing a solid base for sustainability once the Commission is well established. The Commission was created by the Governmental Agreement in 2014 with the purpose to coordinate with the Government institutions the political, social and culturally sensitive approach to conflict management and prevention. It is coordinated by the person appointed by the President. Again, the financial aspect of sustainability is generally addressed through requirements from the budget to cover operational costs and maximization of use of domestic and international financial resources.

In Malawi, a draft National Peace Policy was prepared in close cooperation of the UN with the Office of the President and the Cabinet and the Government and is waiting to be adopted. The infrastructure for peace envisaged by the Policy consist of the National and District Peace Committees (two already established by the Project as pilot initiatives), will be coordinated and financed by the public institutions, and will involve members from various sectors of the society. This means PAC and other community based organizations will have the opportunity to participate in the Peace Committees and at the same time will continue to exist as community intermediaries and rely on their volunteer mediators network.

In Togo, the Local Peace Committees are set up as informal structures for the time being. In some cases, logistical support is provided by local CSOs and the Human Rights Centre established with UNDP support. The mediators are volunteers, which poses a challenge to the sustainability of the Committees and regulation and financial support to these structures in the future should therefore be considered, while ensuring it does not affect their impartiality and credibility.

Overall, the outlook for the establishment and further strengthening of infrastructures for peace in the abovementioned countries is good in terms of policies and partly achieved in terms of the financial support by the governments. Fundraising for the activities, unless relying on volunteers, remains a challenge. When public awareness and acceptance is concerned the development in Africa is facilitated by the fact mediation is linked to the tradition and culture there, while the stakeholders in Latin America call for investments in visibility of mediation and awareness raising support.

In Timor Leste there is comprehensive well established online EWER system managed by the CSO Belun. There is coordination with the Ministry of Interior in exchange of information and efforts made to follow-up the Government’s actions after the warnings. Occasionally collected information show the system is relevant and useful for the Government and various issues including the 2017 parliamentary elections were addressed. Still, the system is costly and based within the CSO, putting it in a challenging context as
Timor Leste is not on the top of the agenda of foreign assistance any more. Therefore, a focus on recognition of the mechanism through policies and engagement of local sources of funding is a priority.

In the remaining three countries Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yemen it is too early to speak about sustainability. In Yemen, in the situation of open and violent conflict, the Project managed to address the basic needs of population and build capacities for conflict prevention and mediation in villages over two districts. As the conflict is ongoing, it is impossible to predict sustainability, other than human capacities built for conflict prevention and mediation. The opportunity to use this community of practice in the peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts remains once the conflict is over. In Bolivia, there is a lack of political will to design and engage in practical and sustainable mediation and dialogue schemes, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina the focus on youth organizations and independent is considered a long-term effort by UN and EU in the country and is not promising sustainable conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms by the end of the Project.

Generally, building sustainability of the infrastructures for peace requires societal transformation, is a long-term process and cannot be achieved over a three-year Project period. E.g. Ghana is often used as the best practice example of successful infrastructure for peace, being supported in its efforts for more than a decade, but still hasn’t reached full sustainability and requires external support in funding and expertise.

Nevertheless, in a context of shrinking international assistance, relying on local organizational and financial resources should be further explored. The Project has built extensive experience through its two phases, developing different models adapted to each context. In Ghana, the infrastructure has been built top-down, in Togo from a very grass-root level, while in Malawi it has been integrated into different government, civil society, religious and political structures. In Timor Leste focus is on early warning system managed by the CSO and advocacy for appropriate Government’s early response, while in other regions, it is more about dialogue between the social partners (governments/public sector, citizens and business sector). Overall, all the countries still require external funding and technical/advisory support, particularly if sole reliance on local public institutions and funding might negatively affect impartiality and credibility.

Simultaneously, local solutions have to be built. Some options to be considered are: integral structures involving public and civil society sector with clear delineation of roles; public peace and dialogue structures financed by cost-sharing between different levels of the government (national, regional, local) with strong civil society monitoring; relying on traditional community structures and religious organizations or civil society sector etc. Linking of peace-building and peace-sustaining efforts with development and involvement of development and business sectors can also be taken into account. All these would require much deeper sustainability assessment that goes beyond the scope of this evaluation, within each country.

Another aspect of sustainability are the solutions or agreements reached by dialogue or mediation. The experiences are mixed, while some mediation outcomes seem to be sustainable (as is mostly the case for election related issues), some agreements don’t last and conflict rises again in several months period (especially regarding land issues, and family disputes). To some extent the reasons are likely in the nature of the latter conflicts and how deeply they are rooted in the community relations. On the other hand, the issues of elections are in the focus of the public and their resolution engages interest and synergy of
democratization efforts by national and international stakeholders. Therefore, some of the interviewed mediators and CO representatives called for additional capacity building in transformation of deep rooted conflicts and reaching durable solutions (Honduras, Malawi and Togo).

Regarding collaboration between the UN, the EU and national counterparts, the evaluation showed that the frequent changes in staff and focal points can hinder and push back the performance. It is therefore advised to distribute the information horizontally and vertically through the system and build institutional memory on the progress of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities so the new staff gets the opportunity to familiarize with the initiatives through internal communication and engage easier with other stakeholders. On the global level, the concept of insider mediation is getting recognition and if embedded into policies, will inevitably support continuation of these efforts and boost the development of practice at the country level.
3 Conclusions

The main conclusions of the Project evaluation can be synthesized as follows:

(i) The Project is highly relevant globally and to all the countries involved. With the assistance of the UN headquarters, collaboration between the national UN COs and EU Delegations, in partnership with local or national implementing partners, was effectively translated into viable national actions;

(ii) The Project is a multi-partner initiative managed at the HQ level, and implemented at the regional and country level, which makes for a very complex management setting. The vertical Project management and collaboration of the UN and the EU HQs, their regional organizational units and CO and EU country delegations improved and strengthened in most cases from the initial starting point of the Project. On the global level, the Project Board meets rarely, however there is a more operational Project Group making decisions on implementation issues. The UN-EU collaboration in Guatemala, Malawi, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Timor Leste extended beyond consultations and reporting, to organization of joint missions and implementation of activities. This has resulted in an expressed interest for continued future collaboration. In a few countries, the cooperation is still challenging and requires to be addressed. In some cases, frequent changes of EU focal points for the Project is not followed by appropriate mechanisms to build the institutional memory over such politically important initiative;

(iii) In most of the countries the Project has been implemented effectively and efficiently regardless of the initial delays in some of them due to revisions that had to be made following changes in political developments or crisis;

(iv) In most of the countries collaboration with the national counterparts resulted in effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding measures (such as dialogues, mediation, setting up national infrastructures for peace, EWER). This has however not been the case in Bolivia due to a political stalemate, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina the Project applied a different strategy agreed by the implementing partners, focused on long-term investment in youth organizations and independent media and not on providing tangible conflict prevention and peacebuilding effects in the observed period;

(v) There is evidence of measurable impact of conflict resolution and prevention interventions at the local, district and national level in Ghana, Togo, Yemen (addressing urgent challenges in a violent conflict setting), Guatemala, Honduras, Malawi and Timor Leste. Observing the approach taken by the Project, the change in conflict trends and dynamics as a result of this, it can be clearly concluded that the Project contributed to conflict prevention in each of the situations, preventing material damage on properties and infrastructure and potentially even casualties. The election and inter-religious related violence that was prevented in Ghana and Timor Leste could have had profound consequences by destabilizing the countries’ security context and development gains. An additional aspect of impact analyzed in this evaluation are the capacities built that will remain at the disposal of national stakeholders as long as the context allows the opportunities for continuous engagement in conflict prevention and peacebuilding;

(vi) Many countries have developed an integrated approach to ensure the inclusion of women (Malawi, Togo, Yemen), youth (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Malawi, Timor Leste) and indigenous population (Guatemala, Honduras) achieving results even on the impact level in improvement of their position in a certain context or negotiation position with the government;
(vii) Overall, most of the COs and their national counterparts lack systematic follow-up data on the insider mediators’ performance and impact (except Yemen, which carefully tracked all the developments). This has been evidenced in the interviews as well as in lack of substantial information in most of their progress reports to HQ and also might be the reason for weaker sense of ownership among of some of the interviewed representatives. Still, some valuable information is collected through mentoring activities, individual contacts and media;

(viii) Solid base for sustainability and institutionalization of the infrastructure for peace has been established in several target countries, particularly those continuing from the 1st phase and those integrating this Project with larger in country UN initiatives (Ghana, Togo, Malawi). Others have achievements on in-country regional level or within specific institutions (Guatemala, Honduras) and require further support to reach the level of those in the first category;

(ix) Insider mediation approach is not linked with tradition and culture of all the countries involved and some are therefore facing challenges in building the trust and credibility. So, all promotional actions and awareness raising actions integrated in the Project (such as publications, video-testimonials, awareness raising meetings etc.) were welcome;

(x) The Project design and the implementing agencies strongly encourage collaboration with the Joint Program, managed by the UNDP and UNDPA. The Project and The Joint Program share the overall objectives of building and consolidating national capacities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding and can therefore contribute to each other. This is particularly effective in the countries where the two initiatives co-finance the positions of PDA's;

(xi) The UN HQ is well informed on the development in all the countries and timely provides technical, advisory support and, when necessary, organizes missions to support the implementation progress at the national level;

(xii) The regional initiatives haven't gone beyond the networking and knowledge sharing and planned regional conflict analyses have not been undertaken. Policy initiatives for West Africa (Casablanca and Accra) have resulted in exchanges between the countries and institutional cooperation of UN agencies on mapping the infrastructures for peace in Africa or exchange of lessons learnt and good practices. A regional conflict analysis initiative for the Western Balkan is still in its planning phase. Regional and global sharing of knowledge was appreciated by all participants, with slight preference given to regional initiatives as they share similarities in context and challenges faced. Language barriers sometimes become an obstacle in bringing the knowledge to the country level;

(xiii) There are no strong evidences of influence of the Project on global programming in the UN or the EU, but the Project manages to inform and influence policy discussions on conflict prevention and sustaining peace as these are overall becoming recognized as a top priority.
4 Recommendations

Based on the conclusions the following recommendations are given for the remaining Project period:

(i) As conflict prevention and sustaining peace are global priorities and support to insider mediation, infrastructures for peace and related capacity building support are the key tools to achieve it, it is recommended to develop a monitoring and evaluation framework model (result and impact oriented). It should have the potential to be applied in this and other similar initiatives and to be flexible enough to be easily adapted to the specific national contexts. As the lessons learned from all Project countries may be beneficial across the UN system and to the EU, the framework should be based on an agreement between these stakeholders. Additionally, it can help improve accountability and credibility of the efforts. Indicators developed in this evaluation methodology and the evaluation framework that is being prepared under the Joint Program may be used in this effort.

(ii) Although the interagency cooperation has significantly enhanced from the beginning of the Project, there are still some measures to be undertaken. The Project Board meetings should be more frequent, at least twice a year to cover key stages of the management cycle, planning, evaluation and reporting. Moreover, as the Board comprises members from several UN agencies and other stakeholders’ representatives, the meeting is an opportunity to increase information exchange and disseminate the key lessons learned from the project and advise on the future developments from different perspectives. At the country level, the EU-UN exchange and coordination could be formalized through a clause in the Project contract or a separate memorandum, to further reinforce the cooperation in the countries where is functional and enable guidelines in the countries facing challenges. To make the best use of the Project results, they should be integrated into overall political reporting within the EU Delegations and communicated through different levels of the organization. A key precondition for this to happen again is more analytical and impact focused reporting (recommendation (i));

(iii) Stronger alignment of the Project with the Joint Program is recommended beyond the countries in which the PDAs are co-financed. Bringing together the experience and the expertise from both initiatives can contribute to the effectiveness of each of the initiatives through planning, conflict analyses, exchange of practices and lessons learned. This can result in raised interest and engagement of both agencies at different levels in the countries beyond those involved in the Joint Program and bring learnings on impact of conflict prevention and insider mediation actions from this Project to the wider UN system.

(iv) Ensuring the sustainability of infrastructures for peace and insider mediation should be the priority in the remaining period. Linking them to the government funding or institutionalization following the models in Malawi, Ghana and Guatemala are the options to be considered unless it may severely affect the credibility or impartiality. Other options are diversification of structures involved and funding from other local resources (local and district governments, CSOs, religious communities and businesses) and joint UN-EU and national stakeholders fundraising for which clear commitment should be decided upon in the coming period;

(v) Additional guidance, including in-country technical missions if necessary, should be provided to Bolivia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to assist them in taking more impact oriented course in the remaining period of the Project strengthen the insider mediation capacities and application of skills;
(vi) Further investment in communication and promotion of insider mediation activities is required to increase awareness among local communities of its benefits and increase interest to use it;

(vii) Building and strengthening communities of practice to increase regional and global networking and information exchange should remain a priority, with stronger emphasis on regional level cooperation;

(viii) Over the longer period of time, gender balance in conflict prevention efforts should be further supported and gender related violence also given more emphasis in peacebuilding efforts, particularly in the countries that didn’t have these mainstreamed in their actions;

(ix) Regional and global cooperation and knowledge sharing should be further encouraged and facilitated, although to some extent, several countries have already started to follow up the West Africa Workshop in Accra or in Latin America initiated exchange on conflict prevention. Further action is needed to sustain stakeholders’ commitment to drive the implementation of the Accra Declaration, including following up on West Africa Workshop’s recommendations on how to improve implementation is important in this regard. Support to the regional gathering and exchange initiative for Latin America and development of the Western Balkans Strategy should also be considered. There has been also a need for research on application of insider mediation and learning from comparative practices raised at the regional level. Regional conflict analyses, originally planned by the Project but not implemented, should be initiated to support regional efforts and provide a solid base for UN-EU collaboration on addressing root causes of conflict;

(x) In addition to exchange of practices and lessons learnt among the countries, the global workshops should also be used as an opportunity to share a feedback from the HQ on how national case studies (e.g. experience from Ghana) was used to inform regional or global policies, contribute to a global development of the idea of insider mediation and infrastructures for peace and benefit other countries;

(xi) In addition to Clingendael training, bringing the knowledge from relevant international organizations, international nongovernmental organizations and think-tanks to the country level should be encouraged as well, taking into account potential language barriers in selecting the trainers and adapting the materials to the countries context (development of programs and materials in Arabic, French and Spanish).
Annex 1: Detailed Country Level Information

This Annex summarizes developments and results from each country, followed by general conclusions and recommendations. The level of information, comprehensiveness of data and amount of documentation provided from the countries varied, so slight differences in the structure and amount of information can be present from one to another country report.

1. Bolivia

Relevance: The Project is implemented in a complex political environment, with limited opportunities for a political dialogue, characterized by a tense relationship between the Government and the international community and constant fluctuations of the Government’s focal point officials. The country participated in the 1st phase of the Project (2012-2013), achieving results in building community of practice on conflict resolution with various stakeholders, including the Government, CSOs, indigenous communities, international development agencies etc. After the 2014 elections, won by the ruling political party - Movimiento al Socialismo, most of the stakeholders that had received capacity development support through the Project, either left or were removed from their positions in public institutions. Furthermore, the CO assessed that non-governmental practitioners would not be accepted as intermediaries in social conflicts by the Government. Therefore, in consultation with the EU, the HQ and the Government, the CO changed focus of the 2nd phase and prioritized building of Government’s capacities to handle the conflicts. Public institutions response is usually rather reactive and occasional - focusing on suppressing protests and violence and calming down the situation. Recurrence of violence is frequent since the needs have not been addressed properly. The conflictual issues are social rights and public service related (mining workers’ rights, exploitation of resources, concessions and property issues, lack of regulations, water shortages, etc.) and conflicts persist on a daily basis.

All interviewed, the UN CO, EU Delegation and the counterparts in the Government agree the Project is highly relevant for the Bolivian context. Even more as this is a rare project focused on conflict prevention and peacebuilding, as the EU IfS is not available to Bolivia anymore.

Effectiveness: The initial goal of the Project in the 2nd phase was to encourage institutional action and development of an infrastructure for peace by providing EWER mechanisms and integrating insider mediation into planning and public management of the partnering Ministries. Extensive trainings were delivered and identification of up to 10 cases to be mediated had been envisaged for the later stage of the project. Revival of the community of practice and building up on results of previous UN and EU projects had been planned. Unfortunately, another recomposition in the Government in the beginning of the 2nd phase caused the key people in the Ministries to change again, affecting the project progress.

The project started with the training of indigenous groups in the region of Oruro (February 2016) upon request of their local authorities and with participation of 184 authority representatives and farmers. As an ad hoc initiative, it served as an awareness raising exercise. The focus in the following part of the project was put onto institutional cooperation with the Government.

In May 2016, the Memorandum of Understanding was signed with the Ministry of Environment and Water Management and a formal request for the assistance in conflict prevention and resolution in the mining sector was received from the Ministry of Metallurgy and Mining. Conflict analyses were performed in the
mining sector and in connection with a water and irrigation project in the municipalities of Batallas, Pucarani and El Alto and the Park Turnary, followed by capacity building workshops for the two Ministries and their executive agencies. The Ministries consider the key results of this effort to be raised awareness, exercises of conflict analysis and identification of internal capacities to deal with conflicts. However, strong evidence of the application of developed skills is missing. The institutions see their role rather in sharing the knowledge with other colleagues. It is evident the Project led to the improvement of collaboration and an increase in demand for assistance by the Ministries. Also, there are new cooperation opportunities with the Ministry of Presidency (manages negotiations in conflict situations) and the Ministry of Energy (proposed by the official formerly working in the Ministry of Environment and Water Management).

The CO has stated that the above described results are the only results possible at this stage in such a complex political setting. In the EU Delegation, there is a concern over such a perspective and limited progress achieved. They urge that the Project selects cases suitable for an intervention and support the Ministries in practicing dialogue or mediation. Additionally, EWER tools developed in the 1st phase are used partially, for statistic and political purposes (protecting the Government’s interest in case some issues need to be addressed) and not to resolve the conflicts. There is no clear picture how the created knowledge, skills and tools will be used. To assist the CO in overcoming this deadlock, the HQ mission will be organized mid-May 2017.

**Efficiency:** The initial phase of the project implementation was highly challenging for the CO. Due to the revision and consolidation of the new concept note the project started with seven months delay. The funding was not available immediately, so the CO was advancing the funding for the project implementation. An instalment was received in April 2016, just a month before the annual reporting, and was left unspent, so the remaining instalments had to be rescheduled.

In addition, senior staff at the UNCT changed and the internal transition also took some time. Constant recomposition within the Government and the Ministries also hinder the implementation. However, the UNCT and EU Delegation have jointly invested efforts in moving the activities forward. At this stage, they have different perspectives on how the Project should continue. While there is an urge from the EU to move on with the dialogue and mediation practice, the UNCT doesn’t see this viable by the end of the Project. As a solution, the EU proposed to get more involved in the interaction with the local counterparts and to call for expert support from the HQ and the consultancies. The Government representatives consider cooperation efficient and highly appreciate the readiness of UNDP to adapt to their requirements, however, this does not necessarily imply an increase in cooperation.

**Impact and sustainability:** Although the project is in the 2nd phase, aside from the gradual increased willingness of the Government for the capacity building interventions (observed as a change of behaviour and practice), there is no firm evidence of the project impact on the society. The key reasons were elaborated previously. Unfortunately, the momentum created with the community of practice in the 1st phase was lost. It should be investigated if it can potentially be revived. On the positive side, the CO is preparing new initiatives related to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The 2018-2022 Country Program Document (CPD) and UNDAF focus on justice and public administration and the issue of conflict
sensitivity is included. Three respective Ministries participated in CPD design. Potential partners/funders are UNDPA, Sweden and the Government through a cost-sharing agreement once this becomes legal\(^\text{11}\).

**Conclusions:**

(i) The Project is highly relevant for the political and social context in Bolivia;

(ii) There are challenges in implementation primarily due to a complex political space for the intervention and constant recomposition of the Government;

(iii) Substantial quality conflict analyses have been conducted and the Project invested in quality trainings to build the capacities for constructive resolution of conflicts. Aside from gradual opening of the Government for conflict interventions and an increased demand for capacity building, there is still no evidence of application of knowledge and skills that might impact the final beneficiaries;

(iv) Since fluctuation of people in the Government is a continuous issue, there is a high risk of losing the conflict resolution capacities without gaining any conflict resolution practice;

(v) The UN and the EU have different perspectives on how to continue the Project. While the EU urges for application of learnt knowledge and skills in mediation practice, the UN considers collaboration still fragile and the Government not to be ready for such a step forward.

(vi) Consequent to all, at this point, there is still no compelling evidence of the project impact on the final beneficiaries and the society.

(vii) The CO is committed to continuing efforts in conflict prevention and peacebuilding and fundraising for continuation of the activities.

**Recommendations:**

(i) The Project management should initiate a discussion with the partnering Ministries over identification of cases suitable for mediation or dialogue intervention as it is the part of the Memorandum of Understanding signed and the request for technical assistance.

(ii) The Government counterparts should be consulted to propose how to continue the Project. All options should be considered, including continued focus on those conflicts analysed in the Project or selection of the new less complex ones. The consultations should go beyond the two partnering Ministries, and involve those institutions and individuals having the good reputation and influence in the Government. Intra-governmental issues, inter-ministerial coordination or conflict of mandates can also be considered. Any opportunity from other cooperation initiatives in the CO may be considered. Use of capacities from the community of practice from the 1\(^{\text{st}}\) phase might be helpful. Support in developing conflict resolution protocols might also be an option.

(iii) The more active role of the EU Delegation should be considered, particularly if there are opportunities for insider mediation arising from any of their previous projects or contacts.

(iv) Due to a complexity of situation and fragility of the cooperation, the global Project management should provide advisory assistance and closely follow the CO in the remaining part of the Project.

\(^{11}\) Administration of public funds by the third parties is now prohibited by the Constitution, but there is a continuous discussion over this possibility with the Government.
2. Ghana

**Relevance:** Ghana is generally regarded as an oasis of peace in a turbulent sub-region. Still, there are pockets of communal based conflicts often driven or fueled by chieftaincy, land, ethnic and sometimes intra-religious clashes. If these conflicts are not given the required attention, they have the potential to take a national dimension thereby jeopardizing the peace and ultimately destroying the democratic gains Ghana has made over the last two decades. In a similar light, election related conflicts in 2008 and 2012 have brought the country on the brink of violence. The NPC was established in 2011 by the Act 818 of the Parliament and since then has been playing a key role in maintaining peace in the elections period.

The Project is strategically embedded in the UNDP long term support to development of democracy in the country. These integrate continuous support to the NPC in implementation of the national peace agenda (funded by EU and USAID), intensive support for transparency, integrity and EWER over the 2016 presidential and parliamentary elections (EU, USAID and the Government of Canada funding). Ghana participated in this Project’s 1st phase focused on development of capacities of the NPC. Now, in the 2nd phase the focus is on capacity building of the Regional Peace Councils (RPCs) established in 2014, but its results stretch to other mentioned areas of cooperation. The insider mediation skills were for the first time provided to the NPC and RPCs through the EU-UN Insider Mediation Project.

The Project is in line with UNDAF and the UNDP CPD 2012-2016 in the area of democratic governance and consolidation of peace as well as with the EU National Indicative Program Document (NIPD) for Ghana 2014-2020 and its first sector focused on governance and public sector accountability. All interviewees agreed the Project is highly relevant for the country and in particular in keeping the trend of peaceful elections and supporting the positive development and investment environment.

**Effectiveness:** Through the 2nd phase of the Project three RPC Boards were supported through trainings in conflict prevention and mediation (39 members in Brong Ahafo, Eastern and Ashanti Regions). The remaining six Councils were trained using the UNDP core funds. Some of the EU-UN resources have been used to train the traditional leaders in Western regions. As the 2016 elections were approaching, the Project engaged with the key media and developed a media framework to guide journalists on conflict sensitive reporting during the election period to reduce instigation of politically related conflicts. Simultaneously, through the NPC, CSOs, political parties, Electoral Commission and police forces were engaged in support to public sensitization on peaceful implementation of general elections.

Noting that women and youth are not recognized in conflict prevention and peacebuilding processes in Ghana, the Project delivered capacity building trainings in conflict analysis and mediation to these groups in three conflict affected areas. Data on the impact of these trainings have not been collected yet. The recent discussions with the Ministry of Chieftaincy and Religious Affairs suggest there should be more efforts invested in capacity building of local traditional leaders.

The knowledge and skills were widely applied around 2016 elections by the NPC and DPC. One of the trainees coordinated the Early Warning Group established for the elections, facilitating the dialogues, identifying trusted people of influence and legitimacy who were intervening in the communities through regional groups and contributed to prevention of election related violence. Some of the trainees continued to use the skills to replicate the training to religious leaders and civil society countrywide. While
information on effects of the Project on elections is relatively well covered, data on other types of interventions lacks. There is information about the intervention of the Board of the Northern RPC in the Bimbilla chieftaincy conflict and occasional information that the trainees are facilitating and mediating other chieftaincy and land related issues. At the time of the evaluation, collection of other data on effects of the Project was ongoing. Overall, Ghana has gone further in monitoring and evaluation in comparison to the other countries. It is managed by the UNDP staff in charge and the NPC itself. The RPCs, record the complaints and investigate and offer mediation and other services to the parties in conflict. Data are processed, sent to the National Secretariat and compiled in the institutions annual reports. Unfortunately, more than this information was not accessible at the time of evaluation.

As in Togo, the integration of the Project into the general UN program peacebuilding effort of the CO has further enhanced the effectiveness. Thanks to that and the commitment of all involved, Ghana’s national peace infrastructure has had the reputation of the best practice for African countries for a long time and is a subject of case studies and regional experience sharing events. Efforts in regional capacity building from Casablanca, Accra and Belgrade were welcomed by the COs. Still they didn’t make the effect in frequent and operational cooperation, which the CO would like to invest in in the future. They are rather limited to sharing of experiences in occasional meetings. The NPC also shared the learnings from the Project in ECOWAS EWER Meeting in Abidjan and also with colleagues in South Sudan and Liberia, but no continuous cooperation has been established. The feedback from HQ on learnings and influences from Ghana national level to the higher level policies and performance if any would be welcome by the CO.

Efficiency: Cooperation between the implementing partners and national counterparts is good and there are no challenges reported. There is an open communication with the HQ and timely advisory assistance provided by the global Project management if needed. Exchange with the local EU Delegation has been affected by changes of the focal points, but it has been improved over time. Overall, there is a good communication on the larger initiatives such as the Election Program. The available resources are efficiently used in synergy with other COs projects contributing to greater efficiency and effectiveness.

Impact and Sustainability: Policy level sustainability is ensured by the Act 819 of the Parliament establishing the NPC and regulating its mandate. UNDP invested in the development of its Strategic Plan and will support its revision for the next strategic period. The NPC is linked to the Government and administration, administrative costs including salaries, utilities and stationary, are financed by the public budget. However, its activities are not supported. Full exercising of its mandate without foreign assistance would not be sustainable. With regards to capacities, they are well established on the national level and to some extent on the regional level. There is a need for an investment in capacities of the RPC Members, traditional leaders as well as in women and youth capacities. As there is an extensive knowledge and experience gained in Ghana, the NPC proposes insider mediation concept could be introduced as a part of academic course for students enrolling conflict studies.

Conclusions:
(i) Although Ghana is the most peaceful country in West Africa region, the Project is still highly relevant for its political situation, particularly in relation to elections and land and chieftaincy issues.
(ii) The Project has been a part of a large UNDP long-term Program which enabled its increased efficiency and effectiveness and building of stable and sustainable national infrastructure for peace.
The Project delivers on time, all planned activities have been implemented in efficient manner.

Among the Project countries, monitoring and evaluation framework is the most advanced in Ghana. It is established and implemented within UNDP and within the NPC. Still, data on impact in other areas of conflict other than elections are not systematic and are collected occasionally. It is may be since 2016 was the election year and this was the primary focus limiting attention to other issues.

There is a solid base for sustainability of the efforts mirrored in policy framework and public funding of the administrative costs of the infrastructure for peace. Funding of the activities and exercising of its mandate is still donor dependent.

**Recommendations:**

(i) While the elections are well covered, addressed and analysed, more emphasis should be put on following conflict prevention in between the elections with regards to other conflictual issues.

(ii) There is a call for further capacity building of traditional leaders in conflict prevention/mediation.

(iii) Monitoring and evaluation framework should be further improved in terms of measuring the impact, analytical reporting and having the processed data ready for use which can further enhance credibility and accountability of the effort.

(iv) As there is a willingness for more intensive and operational regional cooperation and as the capacities are best built in Ghana, the initiative may be introduced in the future CO programs.

(v) Since the activities of the NPC and DPCs are still dependent on donor funding UN should keep the trend of supporting them through its governance and peacebuilding programs. Long-term sustainability of this segment should also be considered timely through public budget support from different levels of administration or by the parties wishing to address their conflicts.

(vi) As Ghana is often used as a case study in global UN conflict prevention efforts, some feedback on its effectiveness should be provided by the HQ to the CO. Systematization of knowledge and experience, might be also considered as an insider mediation concept at the university was proposed by the NPC.

3. Togo

**Relevance:** Togo is a politically fragile country with a long history of post-independence crises. Over transition from one-party to multiparty system the country witnessed elections marred by violence. Since 2007, the country has had a relatively stable democratic governance and two peaceful presidential and legislative elections. The political processes remain fragile due to unresolved issue of political reforms (elections, decentralization, constitution) and social challenges (workers protest, rising costs of living). Political communication often lacks argumentation and constructive problem-solving. Media are highly politicized and unable to play the objective role. On the other hand, Togo’s development agenda is advancing fast and the ongoing reforms include modernization of the public administration and the justice system. Moreover, the judicial sector started improving institutional and legal framework for protection of human rights and business environment.

In its efforts to prevent conflicts and specifically the ones related to the elections and move the reconciliation agenda forward, UNDP provides support to the Government of Togo through Infrastructure for Peace Project worth 3 mil. USD and developed in 2014. The insider mediation project was implemented in Togo in both phases and has been integrated to this bigger initiative. Still, it has been prepared in
consultations among the EU, the UN and the national counterparts. Throughout this period, the Project has been implemented under the guidance of the PDA in Togo.

It has been highly relevant to support efforts of keeping the situation calm throughout the upcoming political process with regards to constitutional and institutional reforms, decentralization and the elections which are to take place in 2018. It is in line with the CO Program Document 2014-2018 and its priority sector of Democratic Institutional and Local Governance. Also, it is aligned to the NIPD 2014-2020 agreed between Togo and the EU and its priority reconciliation and social cohesion under the Sector 1: Consolidation of the state and security.

**Effectiveness:** By the time of the evaluation, the project implemented countrywide consultations on national infrastructure for peace and established 36 local peace committees, one in each prefecture and 2 in Lomé. The committees’ members were selected by citizens during the consultation process. They usually are religious leaders, prefecture and community leaders, security officers, lawyers, journalists etc. having the reputation and credibility in the local community. Following the appointment, members of peace committees were trained on conflict resolution and EWER. One of the innovative ideas is to intensify the use social networks as early warning mechanisms and related training has been provided. The Project also supported development of the Strategic plan of the High Commission on Reconciliation and the Strengthening of the National Unity 2016-2018.

There is no systematic collection of data on the activities of the committees and reports on application of mediation and dialogue. There is occasional information received by the PDA or seen in the media about conflicts mediated by trainees over the land issues in the local communities in various parts of the country. In the North of the country a CSO, whose members participated in the insider mediation training, organized dialogues and mediation on the issue of the protected areas, where the conflicts arise from fear of the local population that their land will be declared a protected area by the Government and that they will not be allowed to use it anymore for agricultural production. President of Local Peace Committee in Danyi Prefecture reports of applying learnt mediation skills in disputes between individuals and family members in his parish. UNDP has been additionally supporting application of knowledge after the trainings by providing small grants to women’s groups, so they initiated dialogue or mediation process on the issues of relevance to their communities. Occasional mentorship of the PDA managing the Project was provided as well.

The Summary of the EU/UN EU Guidance Note on Insider Mediation in French was distributed by the Project and related workshops and presentations are planned for the Local Peace Committees.

Integration of the Project into the larger Infrastructure for Peace Project ensured it is a part of a long-term effort and supported its effectiveness by building on previous results. The effectiveness of the Project is additionally supported by strong commitment of the CO leadership and transfer of experience by the RC from previous engagements in West Africa. The Project gained ownership by the local counterparts.

**Efficiency:** The Project is managed by the UN PDA in Togo with support of the Program Assistant and delivers on time with no major challenges. The PDA has changed during the course of the project, which didn’t influence the continuity or efficiency of implementation. The PDA is fully integrated into UNCT and RC Office and is a head of Democratic Governance Sector, which ensures his influence on programming. In implementation of the activities the CO has relied on the national structures such as the University of
Lomé and CSOs. There is a need for further improvement of the communication with the EU and their involvement in the implementation. Although invitations to major events are communicated, there is no continuous or proactive approach to this issue from either side. The last meeting on the Project was organized in December 2016 with no follow up. There were no reports on challenges in communication with DPA, UNDP and UN Office for West African States which have all received updates on its development.

**Impact and Sustainability:** As previously mentioned the data are not systematically collected on the impact of the Project except that some of the mediation over the low-level conflicts related to land issues prevented open conflicts and violence.

The Local Peace Committees are set up as informal structures and for the time being in some cases provided some logistic support by local CSOs and one Human Rights Centre established with UNDP support. The PDA is of opinion that for the sake of impartiality and neutrality it is good that their status is not regulated by the Government and that they are not integrated in any of the existing institutions or CSOs. There is a strong belief that they will be able to survive after the end of the Project due to the commitment of the members and the community ownership, but still it is thought of the possibilities to find the structure that can help their functioning in longer terms.

Another challenge in the coming period is that PDA’s position in Togo may be discontinued in 2017 and the fact that a PDA plays significant role in the COs structure, as a sector coordinator and a project manager will have to be addressed by the Project and the CO.

**Conclusions:**

(i) The Project is highly relevant for the political situation and the development of Togo.

(ii) It has been integrated in the larger Infrastructure for Peace Project which enabled increased efficiency, effectiveness and continuous investment in building of national capacities.

(iii) The Project delivers on time, all planned activities have been implemented in the efficient manner. Interaction with the EU is not systematic and substantial.

(iv) Follow up data on performance of Local Peace Committees and insider mediators are not systematically collected. Few occasionally received information show the trainees have applied knowledge and skills to conflicts over land issues in local communities. There are data on one larger scale initiative over the land expropriation in the protected areas in the North of the country.

(v) There is a strong local and national ownership of established infrastructure for peace, still they are established as informal groups and have no permanent structure to support them administratively.

**Recommendations:**

(i) The Project should improve monitoring and evaluation procedures, tracking down mediations, dialogue and their outcome and impact countrywide. In addition to regular project reporting, the findings can be used to promote benefits of mediation and mediators in the communities. They can be used for building credibility and accountability.

(ii) The Project should consider strategical institutionalization of the Local Peace Committees over the coming period to ensure their long-term sustainability. Municipal, prefecture, justice sector or CSO infrastructure might be a viable option, considering avoiding any risk of losing impartiality and credibility they have.

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There is a need for further improvement of communication between the UN and the EU on the national level and it should be initiated by any of the parties. It was proposed to include a contractual clause in future project contracts to specify the collaboration modality and roles.

The Project should consider the potential sources of additional funding and developing the exit strategy for the components of the Project that are not likely to be continued.

4. Yemen

Two years of armed conflict in the Yemen have devastated the lives of millions of people, causing the biggest protection and humanitarian crisis. At least 10,000 people were killed. 18.8 million – almost two thirds of the population – need some kind of humanitarian or protection support. More than half are in acute need of assistance to sustain their lives, while the remaining are food insecure. At least three million people have fled their homes, public services have broken down, less than half of the health centers are functional and medicine and equipment are limited. Access to safe water has become a major challenge and the lack of proper sanitation has increased the risk of communicable diseases. Population, including children are dying of otherwise preventable causes. Yemen was already a protracted crisis characterized by widespread poverty, conflict, political instability, poor governance and weak rule of law, including widely reported human rights violations. Today, the economy is near collapse, public and private services have disappeared. Military tactics to shred the economy have moved an already weak and impoverished country towards social, economic, and institutional collapse.

The UN has, since early 2011, been actively in mediation efforts in support of a peaceful settlement, including three rounds of peace talks that were mediated in 2015 and 2016 by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen resulting in a temporary cessation of hostilities. The UN engagement continues with the Yemeni parties, states in the region and the wider international community in search for a durable cessation of hostilities, the resumption of peace talks and the political solution.

In such a situation, the momentum for dialogue reached in the 1st project phase could not be sustained. The 2nd phase of the Project was put on hold by the UN and the EU until mid-2016. It was agreed to continue the activities of relevance for social cohesion and prevention of conflict in the smaller communities and addressing the basic needs of the population. Search for Common Ground (SCG) in Yemen was contracted as a partnering organization, with extensive experience in the country. The Project is linked to the large joint EU-UN Enhanced Role of Resilience in Yemen Project worth 36 mil. EUR. It focuses on dialogue between local authorities and population in addressing the community needs and building resilience, solar energy provision, aid delivery, economic recovery and social cohesion. Other UNDP initiatives are in phase of preparation in the area of social cohesion and social protection.

Effectiveness: The Project has been implemented in two districts Al-Ma’fer and Al-Shamayatain in Taiz Governorate. Two more districts had been involved at the beginning in the Abiyan Governorate, but the action discontinued since the requests from the local communities were largely beyond the limits of this project and it was not possible to find an appropriate solution.

The Project started with conflict analysis and mapping in two selected areas, followed by the orientation workshops and conflict dialogue supported by the local CSOs. Many issues have been identified, such as security, water supplies, power cuts, poor access roads, collapsing health and education services, land use
etc. This was followed by the ToT Program selecting 20 trainers to replicate mediation training. In total 120 mediators were trained (local authorities, religious leaders, civil society), through 8 workshops. The trainees immediately applied their knowledge and skills in 46 community dialogues identifying key challenges to be addressed by the Project.

Communities were then trained in preparation of the dialogue proposals over the identified issues of conflict from which 13 were selected by the UN and SCG for implementation focusing on drinking water supplies (fighting over the water wells, local authorities not providing water pumps etc.), education and health (poor services, displaced persons occupying the facilities etc.). Small grants for the dialogue logistics and up to 5,000 USD grants for implementation of the agreed actions have been approved and signing of contracts for implementation is in progress. Local communities were actively involved in reaching the solutions and will be involved in its implementation and responsible for sustainability. The project will close with a conference, establishment of the roster of mediators and award to the most successful ones.

**Efficiency:** The project is progressing well in spite of the conflict. The SCG and UN are present on the ground and well informed on the work implemented by community mediators and progress of mediations and dialogue. Funds are used to address the immediate needs of the conflict affected population based on their priorities and agreements reached through dialogue. The comprehensive conflict analysis and specific needs reports have been distributed to other international development agencies to better focus their engagement and funding and the feedback is very positive. The EU has insufficient information on the project progress in Yemen as their focal points are mostly focusing on larger initiatives in the Middle East. Cooperation and advisory support from the HQ is present and welcomed by the local Project. The Project may need a two-month extension to complete the activities.

**Impact and Sustainability:** The Project managed to address the basic needs of population affected by violent conflict at the same time building capacities for conflict prevention and mediation in villages over two districts. There is an immediate impact in provision of water supplies, improvement of organization of public education and health services. It is estimated 5000 people will benefit from each of 13 interventions. In one of the interventions, the community mediators supported reaching a solution of use of a health care center occupied by internally displaced persons, preventing provision of basic services. Convinced they would be better positioned for humanitarian assistance if sheltered in public buildings, it was impossible to organize functioning of these services at the same time. The mediators facilitated a solution of providing shelters and organization of the use of public facilities. In other situations, they mediated a conflict over water well usage between the villages or refusal of the water provider to deliver water pumps for the villages. Women in the villages significantly contributed to resolution of the conflicts as they are the ones who fetch the water for households often from distanced areas.

As the violent conflict is ongoing, it is impossible to predict sustainability, other than human capacities built for conflict prevention and mediation and setting informal conflict resolution mechanisms. The mediators are now well known in their communities and approached for other conflicts as well. There is an overall agreement that it was of utmost importance to address the urgent needs of the small communities causing additional conflicts over basic resources and achieve immediate impact.
Conclusions:
(i) The Project is an extremely relevant contribution to addressing urgent needs in the country in severe conflict at the same time building capacities of local stakeholders for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
(ii) The Project was effective in training of insider mediators and engaging them immediately after in community interventions.
(iii) It also addressed the urgent needs of the conflict affected population ensuring immediate impact, including on women and children.
(iv) There is an efficient cooperation established on the ground between UNDP and SCG, while the EU was not able to provide more detailed information. Cooperation and support from the HQ was also appreciated by the local Project.
(v) Although sustainability in a state of conflict is challenging, the mediation capacities built have been continuously engaged and resources provided are remaining on their disposal.

Recommendations:
(i) Substantial technical and advisory support to the Project office in Yemen should be continued.
(ii) If allowed by the global Project dynamics two-month extension should be approved, taking into account the conflict environment in which the Project is implemented.
(iii) Lessons learnt from the insider mediators approach in the context of violent conflict should be further investigated and used globally.
(iv) EU interest in levelling up more information and learnings from the Project would be welcome.

5. Bosnia and Herzegovina

Relevance: More than two decades following the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina local authorities and the international community have not successfully addressed the country’s structural and functional challenges that keep it from transitioning to a genuinely self-sustaining, stable country with a strong governance and rule of law framework and respect for human rights. The underlying root causes of the conflict have not been sufficiently dealt with either and contribute to regressive dynamics. Overall, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains divided, with the majority of the population living in spaces where their nationality is the dominant group. It can be argued that the economy is still stuck in transition, impacted by high levels of corruption and manipulated by competing political interests.

The EU accession process is moving too slowly and not yielding tangible and timely gains for a population. The EU path is largely hampered by the inability of, (and, in some cases, due to obstruction by), political elites to find necessary compromises on key reform issues. Unemployment is high and especially among the youth (around 50 – 60%). All these trigger a years-long mass emigration of people, particularly youth.

Recognizing the unaddressed need for stronger focus on reconciliation and trust-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UN increased its engagement in peacebuilding and conflict prevention in the country over the past few years. A PDA was deployed in 2012 to the UNCT with a lead role in mainstreaming peacebuilding and conflict prevention into UN country programming. Subsequently, the conflict prevention and peacebuilding capacity in the CO has been strengthened (including with additional staff). The flagship joint Dialogue for the Future project supported by the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), and
implemented by UNDP, UNESCO and UNICEF in direct partnership with the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina – explicitly addresses reconciliation and peacebuilding initiatives in the local communities focusing on youth, culture and education. In addition, other UN development projects integrate aspects of conflict prevention and reconciliation supporting communities populated by displaced persons, minorities and other vulnerable groups, (as outlined in the 2015-2019 UNDAF/One program, signed with the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina).

Building upon the programming and around the flagship dialogue project, the UN and the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina have agreed to take a flexible approach during the initial phase of the Project through an intervention focused on marginalized youth and media voices and on the UN-EU research on these issues, all framed around the country’s accession to the EU. The rationale behind this was that the youth has been excluded from policy-making, unemployed and, thus, often disillusioned and susceptible to nationalist and/or radical narratives. Mainstream media organizations are not independent enough to act as important contributors and providers of critical thinking around issues related to intercultural understanding, tolerance, religion and radicalization etc. Few media outlets were found to cover identity politics as a channel for positive, constructive differences instead of a means for on-going division.

**Effectiveness:** During a 3-year period, the Project aimed to support wider youth engagement and voices in peace-building, reconciliation and regional exchanges with a reinforced focus on relevant youth-related themes pertaining to BiH’s reform and the EU accession agenda. During the first year, the youth CSO European Youth Parliament (EYP) was capacitated to expand its efforts to engage youth in a dialogue focusing on priority reforms, development and peacebuilding issues. The organization reached out to 30 high schools throughout the country in order to motivate students for dialogue and to identify those interested to join the national sessions. The latter were organized as parliamentary simulations of priority issues for the country’s development. The exercise resulted in resolutions which were later presented to the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, international development agencies and foreign embassies. Students of different nationality and geographic backgrounds were involved.

The Project subsequently engaged in capacity-building assistance and trainings in organization management, sustainable development goals and conflict resolution and negotiations. The organization was supported in its effort to become a full-fledged member of the EYP network (involving 39 countries) and in opening local offices countrywide. In the second year, the youth outreach was scaled-up regionally with EYPs and similar organizations in neighboring countries. A Regional Forum is planned for summer 2017 with a focus on cross-border cooperation. Additionally, the Project’s youth outreach contributed toward cooperation with other initiatives such as (i) the Model UN organized by high school and university students in two major cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (simulating the UN institutional organization, its work and debates over the Sustainable Development Goals and global priorities); and (ii) AIESEC, the organization which cooperates on SDGs awareness raising at the HQ level. The collaboration with EYP and leading youth-led initiatives provides the UNCO with critical analysis of, and insights into, youth priorities. It also exposes the UNCO to a wider partnership network for the next phase of the Dialogue for the Future Project that is to be financed by the UN PBF.

At the beginning of 2017, 5,000 USD grants (40,000 USD in total) were awarded to eight independent online media outlets and individuals through a competitive process, for continuous reporting and storytelling on: peace and trust building, human rights, bridging of divisions in education, interreligious dialogue,
combating hate speech and radicalization, EU integration, political participation of women etc. (UN-EU jointly identified areas of potential influence). The project will also aim to increase cooperation between other CSOs in the country with similar priorities while strengthening links of identified mediation capacities. The Project invested in joint EU-UN research on youth, analyzing youth views on the socio-economic situation in the country (in the light of the new EU’s Compact for Growth approach and the country’s Reform Agenda). In addition, joint capacity building for the UNCO and EU Delegation staff in insider mediation and conflict prevention is planned for the second half of 2017.

Due to the time-bound nature of the supported activities and their recent launch, it is not yet possible to estimate their effects in terms of conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

**Efficiency:** The Project is managed by the Peace and Development Unit in the CO, supported by the RCO and UNDP’s Justice and Security Sector. There is a continuous interaction between the UN and the EU Delegation on all issues. The EU was actively involved in the preparation and provided advise during the selection of a national partner for the initiative as well as the priority areas of the Project. The initiative is implemented efficiently with a wide reach, but with limited resources. In sum, interconnections between the Project components and their synergies could be further enhanced. The Peace and Development Unit operated with decreased capacity for a significant period of time, shifting from an initial four members to one and then subsequently – and currently – up to two. The PDA position was vacated at the beginning of the Project, with a gap of nearly a year without an adviser. This contributed to delivery delays, however the newly arrived PDA has now been well acquainted with the initiative. The communication with HQ, technical and advisory support is on-going and the knowledge and information-sharing are appreciated.

**Impact and Sustainability:** Unlike the other countries engaging in the field with conflicts of different intensity, this project is operating in a unique and specific setting; it presents a crucial, long-term investment in youth capacities in the country and it serves to strengthen the UN and the EU collaboration. As noted above, it is too early to identify evidence of the impact of these initiatives. While the country was in focus of numerous peacebuilding initiatives over the first decade after the war, in recent years the focus of international cooperation has shifted heavily toward development, institution building and EU integration. Peacebuilding is sometimes viewed as crosscutting issue in some of them. Today, a direct focus on peacebuilding and conflict resolution, such as this initiative is rare. Therefore, it is important that it is used in the most effective manner to attract additional funding. The potential for greater sustainability and on-going strengthening of the developed relations and results may be bolstered via their inclusion in the subsequent phase of the Dialogue for the Future peacebuilding initiative.

**Conclusions:**
(i) The Project is relevant for the country particularly in the context of decreased international interest in peacebuilding and conflict prevention and prioritized economic development.
(ii) The Project reached out to a substantial number of youth and managed to build their capacities for constructive dialogue over key disputed development and reform issues as well as on EU integration.
(iii) Youth activities are planned to be scaled-up to regional level and communication among the EU and the UN organizations was initiated regionally.
(iv) Type and short duration of the intervention makes it impossible to estimate effects and impact of the Project at this point, neither is there sufficient information (particularly from beneficiaries) what the potential impact will be.
(v) The Project is managed effectively and linked to other initiatives in the CO as well as it informed the future Dialogue for the Future Project that will be financed by the UN PBF.

Recommendations:
(i) The initiated activities with youth should be continued, however beneficiary organizations need to further develop a clear sense of their role and how the action contributes to the overall objectives of conflict prevention and peacebuilding as defined in the primary objective of the Project document.
(ii) Interconnections between the Project components focused on youth and independent media and their synergies could be further enhanced.
(iii) In the coming period, the Project could look for other entry points (throughout the CO and EU Delegation portfolio and externally) that can benefit from the conflict prevention and insider mediation capacities and resources collected within this initiative.
(iv) The regional co-operation should be intensified to result in larger conflict prevention initiatives.
(v) As the context in Bosnia and Herzegovina differs from other countries involved and a flexible approach was agreed at the beginning, the HQ may provide further support to the CO to benefit more from the potential of insider mediation. Additionally, the learnings from this unique approach should be followed and might be beneficial for future initiatives.

6. Guatemala

Relevance: Eighteen years after the signing of the Peace Accords, Guatemala shows progress in the consolidation of democratic institutions. However, some of the structural causes that gave rise to the nearly four decade-long internal armed conflict persist. In addition, some new threats have emerged compromising democratic governance and long term human development. Guatemala is a socially and culturally diverse country. Indigenous people make up to 40% of the population and 70% of the population is under 30 years. At the structural level, socio-economic inequalities remain along the highest in the region. Widespread poverty prevails among indigenous and rural populations. Widespread discrimination still affects them as well. 66% of the indigenous people live in rural areas and rely on nontechnical agricultural production, dependent on rain cycles. They are highly vulnerable to extreme weather conditions, which increases food insecurity, malnutrition and morbidity.

The Project has prioritized three objectives focusing on establishment of the insider mediators network, strengthening of the government counterparts for conflict management and dialogue and exchanging or practices and lessons learnt across Latin American region. For now, it has been implemented in the North-Western region of Quiche, close to Mexican border, a volatile area, where some of the leadership belonged to armed groups back in the days of conflict. The Project has built capacities of the traditional authorities to meaningfully participate and better represent their interests in the consultations with the Government and two major country’s electric companies. Based on a ruling by the Supreme Court, The Ministry of Energy and Mining has to consult communities over the investments in the regions populated by indigenous groups and at the time of the Project implementation two hydroelectric projects in the municipality of Santa María Nebaj are planned as well as the energy transmission project in San Juan Cotzal, Quiché. This also supports the implementation of the 169 ILO Convention.
Another poor and volatile area Alta Verapaz will be involved, where a mechanism for conflict monitoring will be implemented with the Government and indigenous population. The partnering institution is the Ministry of Energy and Mining.

The Project is in line with the UN Country Program Document 2015-2019 and its two priorities: i) rule of law and peace and ii) inclusive and sustainable development. The Project is furthermore aligned to the National Indicative Program Document for Guatemala 2014-2020 and its thematic sector of conflict resolution, peace and security. The initial country project design was supported by the HQ and Regional Office mission which further helped alignment with conflict prevention priorities and adapting the intervention logic to the country’s context and the UN and the EU priorities. Furthermore, this Project helped the CO to build the existing program on conflict prevention, which was relatively underdeveloped. Based on the presented information, one can conclude the project has been highly relevant, not only for the country context but also for the programming of the UN CO in Guatemala.

Effectiveness: As the Project funding is relatively small and the CO hasn’t had other larger projects in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, the intervention was linked to the areas in which the CO implements the development projects. The Project started with a consultation with the Government (Ministries in charge of energy and mining, environment, labor, Presidential Commission for Dialogue and the Human Rights Commission). This was followed by comprehensive and intensive training for the government officials, Human Rights Commission, indigenous peoples’ representatives in Quiche, women and youth from the communities as well as for the international cooperation agencies.

The Project timely reacted to the political moment of change of the Government and appointment of the new Presidential Commissioner for Dialogue and Conflict Management. It won confidence from the Guatemalan institutions and society for more comprehensive engagement in socio-political dialogue and conflict prevention and resolution. There is a buy-in from all the relevant institutions and their commitment in participation in the project activities. The Project built confidence among the indigenous population in the target regions and supported opening and conducting the first consultation process between the Government and indigenous people related to industrial projects. The indigenous groups use learnt mediation skills to address conflicts in their communities and at the same time use their negotiation skills with the Government and the industrial sector over the hydro-power plant and energy transmission. The Project also takes advantage of the 169 ILO Convention on consultations with indigenous population and related constitutional provision.

The Project also supported development of the Strategic plan for the Commission for Presidential Dialogue for the period 2016-2020. It is the body involving representatives of key Government Ministries and institutions that have to deal with conflict prevention and dialogue. This was the first strategic plan for the institution developed. The objectives and activities focus on socio-political dialogue as a strategic means of the social conflict analysis and transformation, formulation of a public policy on dialogue and social conflict management, creation of the EWER system, training and capacity building of all stakeholders and the Presidential Commission itself.

Guatemala CO established regular sharing of information and materials and quarterly communication with the Project in Honduras. There is a plan to initiate stronger South-South cooperation through a
regional exchange seminar that will involve the Project in Bolivia and Honduras too. Peru, Colombia and other countries with similar challenges will also be invited.

**Efficiency:** The Project is managed by the UNDP Conflict Prevention and Dialogue Advisor and Democratic Governance Program Officer and there is one project assistant and one UNV engaged funded by the Project. The project is a relatively standalone initiative and, considering the limited amount of funding and number of staff involved, the Project has achieved important results and is implemented in a very efficient manner. There is an efficient cooperation with the EU Delegation, which was significantly improved after the Insider Mediation Workshop in Belgrade in January 2017, and this has resulted not only in better communication, but also in the organization of joint missions to the areas targeted by the Project. Cooperation with the Regional UNDP Office and the HQ is very efficient, with timely responses to address the arising issues during the implementation. Although there is no PDA deployed, communication with the DPA desk officer for Guatemala exists, but the communication could be more frequent and the Project Board should do more to involve the DPA representative information is communicated with the DPA representative in the Project Board.

The next funding allocated is foreseen to be significantly less than previous years, so the Project will be mainly focused on phasing out. Therefore, the Project team will not start any new processes and will instead aim to consolidate its results already achieved.

**Impact and Sustainability:** Considering the first activities have started in March 2016 and the Project didn’t build on previous conflict related initiatives, it is still early to measure the indicators of impact on the local communities. However, it is a significant achievement as this is the first time since 1996 that the Government is undertaking serious consultation with indigenous people in the country and the COs is closely monitoring, supporting and learning along the way. The process of institutionalization of consultations through the Presidential Commission for Dialogue and its strategic plan and the cooperation with the Ministry of Energy and Mining can be considered a solid base to increase future impact and sustainability of the initiative. Commitment of the UN and EU staff, the local counterparts and the indigenous population in the target regions are also promising. Additionally, the project strengthened the capacities of the UN CO and its programming. Such fast developments on the other hand raise financial challenges as the Presidential Commission for dialogue does not have funding for its functioning or the activities envisaged in the strategic plan.

The CO is strongly committed to continue the initiative and would welcome if the global Project would agree to a 3rd phase. The EU Delegation in Guatemala seems to have recognized the potential and might be ready to support further actions as well. The CO also managed to raise interest from the UN PBF for potential future funding and scaling up.

**Conclusions:**

(i) The Project is highly relevant for Guatemala, particularly due to the complex socio-political situation, expressed interest and commitment by key national stakeholders and the fact this is one of the first interventions of this kind in the country.

(ii) The CO and the national stakeholders capitalized from the initiative improving their programming on conflict prevention and dialogue and attracting attention for future funding.
In a short period of less than a year of the Project implementation there are strong indicators of effectiveness in the open dialogue over the contentious issues between the Government, industries and the indigenous population in two regions.

National institutions gathered in the Presidential Commission for Dialogue were supported in development of the strategic plan on dialogue and conflict prevention and are committed to its implementation.

After initial delay the Project delivers on time, efficiently. The Project staff are aware of importance of monitoring and evaluating the progress of their initiatives, but reports could still be further improved in terms of results focused information.

Achieved momentum will not be sustainable without further external funding beyond this Project. The Presidential Commission functioning and activities also lack funding sources.

**Recommendations:**

1. Monitoring and evaluation framework should be timely developed to be able to follow and report on achievements in the regions as well as the implementation of the Commissions Strategic Plan and decisions of the Constitutional Court and ILO Convention on consultations.

2. Fundraising efforts of the office are welcome and should intensify in the coming period as the sustainability of the results is unlikely if remains solely on this Project.

7. Honduras

Although Honduras has a slow and stable economic growth, the country is still heavily burdened by unemployment, poverty, citizens’ insecurity and corruption in public sector. There is a lack of participation, particularly of the most vulnerable groups, regardless of the base of their exclusion. Consequently, they are disadvantaged in exercising their rights. The country is highly vulnerable to natural disasters leading to food insecurity and migration. There is a high incidence of violence and crime. The EU and UN have been cooperating with the Government and civil society in supporting the country’s development and institution building, including the rule of law and public participation development.

The Project "Building national capacities for conflict prevention in Honduras" was developed by the Office for the Coordination of UN System and EU Delegation, in partnership with national counterparts involving Ministry of Human Rights, Justice, Interior and Decentralization (SDHJD) and the CONADEH. The main objective is to reduce levels of conflict in the region of La Moskitia by strengthening capacities and mechanisms of national and community organizations for prevention, mediation and conflict resolution. La Moskitia is an isolated region of tropical rainforests accessible only by water and air, populated by indigenous groups and has persistent social conflicts. The region’s development has been prioritized since 2016 by the joint development initiative of the Honduran president, indigenous local population and international cooperation agencies called “Development Alliance for La Moskitia”. Social conflicts in the area mostly relate to land issues and contention over the governance between the official local governments and indigenous people’s institutions, as mandates are not clearly agreed nor defined. Only traditional conflict resolution mechanisms exist in the region, so there was a demand for institutionalizing the concept of dialogue and mediation to address the challenges.

As the Project advanced, its relevance was recognized by the CONADEH in application of insider mediation and dialogue in various issues of contention related to human rights. The Project is aligned with the EU
and UN CPDs, as well as with the numerous national policies in the areas of human rights, antidiscrimination, indigenous people and citizens’ security. The approach to conflict prevention at the local level with a focus on human rights is a priority issue for partners.

Effectiveness: After initial meetings with counterparts the insider mediation trainings and technical support in conflict analysis were provided. Trainings on dialogue and mediation in La Moskitia gathered a total of 114 participants, including partnering institutions, national institutions with presence in La Moskitia, local authorities, land commissions, CSOs (human rights and women) and organizations and authorities of local population. They were organized as a series of modules over a few months period providing an opportunity to follow up on the participants’ work between the modules. The participants were building capacities to take part in the Territorial Governance Platform designed within the Project and led by SDHJD and CONADEH, to support the Development Alliance in conflict resolution.

12 trained participants supported facilitation of the Dialogue platform meeting in 2016 which focused on addressing development and governance issues between the national, local and indigenous local institutions. The Project coordinator follows and mentors the participants in application of knowledge and skills. There are data on 15 community mediations since the end of 2016 in La Moskitia, all over the land issues. Encouraged by the training, one municipality established a conflict resolution committee involving the trainees. 12 disputes were mediated. In other communities trainees mediated another 3 cases. Most ended with settlements. A local organization of indigenous people MASTA, whose members were trained, also expressed interest to establish a mediation desk which might be an opening for further institutionalization.

Until February 2017, a series of five conflict resolution training modules were delivered to 20 participants from CONADEH and SDHJD, national indigenous population and environment organizations, Institutes of geology and mining, Institute for Property and National Council for Sustainable Development. There is a strong demand of CONADEH for further training to cover at least its 18 employees and be able to address conflicts nationwide. Although the institution has practiced mediation before (issues of human rights, education, mining), they notice improvements in techniques and stronger effectiveness after this training. The skills were applied in facilitation of dialogue over student’s protests against the university management decisions. They occupied buildings and didn’t let anyone in. Over the period July-September the CONADEH was facilitating dialogues and an agreement was reached, an action plan prepared and the university was open again. The project has also developed an online platform to share resources on mediation and conflict resolution: [http://portal.hn.undp.org](http://portal.hn.undp.org) which is open to all project beneficiaries.

Although a follow up and reporting on effectiveness is inconsistent, there are strong evidences that insider mediation capacity building resulted in application of knowledge and skills and increased effectiveness of conflict resolution interventions in the communities.

Efficiency: Project implementation was delayed due to the extensive consultations between the EUD, UNCT and the Government, which ended with an agreement to adjust the initial concept note in order to prioritize the main region for the project implementation and to identify more concretely the activities needed to achieve the objectives. The project benefited from the mission of the global project manager in April 2016 and advices on the design of the country level intervention.
The Project coordinator was contracted in March 2016 and she, with assistance of another staff member, implements the entire Project in the region. Working conditions are unfavorable, due to the distance from the CO and technical issues such as power shortages, unreliable internet connection, causing lack of continuous communication with national counterparts, etc. The Project activities sometimes get rescheduled or changed due to security issues and organized crime (narcotics traffic). Due to dislocation of the Project coordinator coordination with the central Government in Tegucigalpa over the La Moskitia initiative is challenging, however the RC and the UNDP staff in the CO engage in the negotiations and policy making on the central level.

Although the country allocated funding is limited, no major challenges in money transfers and management were reported. The country level UN-EU cooperation is reflected in sharing of information and frequent coordination meetings and timely reporting. The EU focal point is fully confident that the activities have been appropriately implemented. The national counterparts are also committed to the project success and they are efficient in performing their part of the activities. Considering the context in which the project functions, initial delay, limited financial and human resources allocated, and the number of activities and people reached, involvement of the key local and national counterparts, the project is implemented efficiently and cost-effectively, leading to planned results.

Impact and Sustainability: The post training period is very short to estimate broader impact and contribution to overall conflict prevention. It was previously emphasized that monitoring and evaluation of the training follow up period is done only to a limited extent and the project reports lack substantial information on impact. Nevertheless, there are evidences on project impact on individual households whose land issues were addressed, as well as in cases of university students’ standards. Having in mind the trends in the country both may be connected to prevention of violence and human rights violations. The EU, UNDP and the local counterparts have clear understanding of the need to improve the reporting.

With regards to sustainability, the Project provided tools to the community in La Moskitia to be able to independently engage in conflict prevention and resolution in the region. It also invested in institutionalization through building capacities of CONADEH, establishing the Territorial Dialogue Platform and a conflict resolution committee in one municipality in La Moskitia. CONADEH requires further trainings to all their staff which may be considered in the remaining part of the project. All training manuals and guidelines are available to beneficiaries online and printing of a mediation manual is planned. However, without further support to insider mediation initiatives, the mechanism and its benefits may become marginalized. It has not an innate tradition and communities tend to use other conflict resolution mechanisms. All partners agree the project should try to draw additional attention and extend support and fundraising, regardless of the fact the funding resources are being reduced which is affecting the UN portfolio and the number of people working in the CO. In line with that and the need for the community to recognize local mediators, more publicity and promotions are planned for the coming period.

Conclusions:
(i) The Project is highly relevant for the political and social context in Honduras and La Moskitia;
(ii) After initial challenges, the Project quickly caught up the implementation thanks to the implementing partners and national counterparts’ efforts and efficiency of Project management in La Moskitia;
The capacity building was designed as a continuous effort with communication and mentoring in-between the training modules.

Regardless of complexity of context in La Moskitia and unfavorable working conditions, the project has been implemented efficiently. Monitoring and evaluation of activities are not systematic enough and reporting is mostly activity focused.

There is evidence of application of learnt knowledge and skills in practice. It is still too early to assess the broader impact on beneficiaries and communities, but it can be said it is linked to prevention of violence and violations of human rights.

Mediation hasn’t built reputation yet and mediators are not widely recognized in the community. Some steps towards institutionalization have been taken through establishment of one conflict resolution committee and support to insider mediation practice in CONADEH.

Recommendations:

The Project should improve monitoring and evaluation procedures, tracking down mediations and their outcome in La Moskitia and CONADEH and following the results of the Territorial Dialogue Platform. In addition to regular project reporting, the findings can be used to promote benefits of mediation and mediators in the community, to build credibility and accountability as well as for transfer of practice to other regions and institutions. The Project should also follow up developments in other institutions involved.

In line with available funding, the Project should consider providing trainings to additional employees of CONADEH for increase of the effects on national level.

The Project should consider the potential sources of additional funding and develop exit strategy for the components of the project that are not likely to be continued.

8. Malawi

Relevance: Malawi has a reputation for being peaceful and stable. Yet, over the past decades, it has faced a number of complex challenges to its long-term stability and sustainable development. Those include vulnerability to natural disasters, periods of food shortages, an underdeveloped economy and traditional agriculture, political tensions, corruption and dependence on outside aid. Massive civilian protests raised in July 2011, demanding stronger political and economic reforms, and ended with 20 deaths. This created a collective shock, leading to an invitation to the UN to facilitate a dialogue between the Government and the civil society. Ever since, tensions have been recurrent, culminating during the elections 2014.

At that time, UNDP supported the Public Affairs Committee (PAC), a national interreligious association, in addressing the election’s turbulences via shuttle diplomacy and mediation. These efforts led to a commitment to peaceful elections signed by all political parties and helped ease a peaceful transition between the former and the new president. Both, the UN and the EU have invested significantly and continue to have a strong interest in Malawi’s stability, peace and development. A key focus of this support has been strengthening of social cohesion and use of non-violent means to resolve conflicts.

In addition to supporting PAC in facilitating a dialogue and mediation over disputed social issues, a parallel focus was put on support to the Government in the development of a national infrastructure for peace. These efforts were continued through this Project’s 2nd phase, adding a new value by introducing insider mediation skills and tools and supporting linkages among national stakeholders, the UN and the EU.
Looking at socio-economic challenges and political dynamics, the project is highly relevant as there is a constant need for intermediary supported social dialogue between the political elites; between the citizens and the government and between and within communities themselves. Project relevance is further reflected in its alignment with key national and bilateral policy and program documents as well as in the call from the Malawi Government to the UN to assist the country in conflict prevention.

**Effectiveness:** The UN CO has implemented this Project in synergy with other initiatives and as such increased the project’s overall efficiency and effectiveness. The activities entailed training and capacity building in conflict prevention and mediation as well as technical follow up assistance in conflict-related interventions and establishment of the national infrastructure for peace. Initially trained 15 mediators in 2014 continued to implement community mediations, dialogue facilitations or negotiation and advocacy. Key issues at stake are inter-religious, land issues and natural resources issues. The number of interventions has slowly increased over the last two years particularly in districts of Karonga and Mangochi. One of the challenges is that settlements do not last long and that conflicts over same or similar issues arise every three to four months. Additionally, 30 women from faith organizations were trained in insider mediation and role of women in peacebuilding, improving mediation and facilitation skills. 6 of them have been appointed as PAC mediators. All the trainees have been increasingly involved in community mediations and dialogues on political, inter-religious issues, land and natural resources and gender based violence, civic education programs on gender issues, humanitarian and community actions.

The evaluation managed to capture that mediators have been engaged more than 150 times in interventions (dialogues, mediations, negotiations) during the Project. They now need less time to prepare interventions and consider them more effective. More mediations end with settlements after the trainings (average of 40% before and 68% after the trainings). With regards to national level dialogue over contentious issues of governance and reforms, PAC has been recognized as a key intermediary by the civil society and the Government and widely enjoys respect and credibility. Many conclusions of dialogue sessions supported by the Project have been brought to implementation. Some remain a subject of extensive advocacy by PAC and other CSOs. Additional resource whose capacities have been built are 92 EWER volunteers. PAC claims there is a structure of over 4500 volunteers countrywide.

There is also a notable progress in the Government’s readiness to take on the coordination of the implementation of national conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives. The draft National Peace Policy has been prepared envisaging the institutional structure and key program areas. The civil society is cautiously starting to accept that the national infrastructure for peace should be placed under the state institutions for the sake of sustainability. The trust still needs to be built and the civil society sees the Government having rather a coordinating role, while PAC and civil society should practice mediations and act as a corrective factor, constantly monitoring and evaluating the Governments’ practice.

In addition to the activities, the Project covers a share of the PDA’s salary and creates additional value in terms of staff availability and capacity. The PDA has been well integrated into the CO team, providing technical and advisory support to the implementation of this and other projects while ensuring permanent communication with the national counterparts. Implementing the Project, the CO accounted for the need of capacity building of national UN staff, in light of potential discontinuation of the PDA position.
Efficiency: The project builds upon previous activities and is implemented in synergy with existing CO initiatives. Additionally, its achievements are taken into consideration while planning the future broader country initiatives for conflict prevention. Therefore, it was able to rely on existing human resources of the CO, in particular the Program Analyst and the PDA and the support of administrative structure. The RC is well informed and strongly committed in support to the efficiency and effectiveness of this initiative as well. In a context of limited financial resources and activity based budget, the CO has organized the project implementation in the efficient manner. As in some other countries, the complex financial procedures caused some delays in instalments and the CO advances some costs by other existing funds.

The Project related staff is in continuous communication with national counterparts, providing technical support and expertise with regards to the activities. UNDP-DPA cooperation and flow of information have strengthened over the course of the Project, particularly with regards to establishment of national peace architecture. At the technical level, there is a good and practical cooperation with the EU Delegation whose focal point joins the activities and informs the Project of the EU perspective over the priority issues. On the other hand, despite the size of the Project, it seems more information on the achievements might need to be elevated from the focal point to the senior levels and the Ambassador as they directly relate to the overall governance and conflict prevent development in the country.

Impact and Sustainability: Several areas of increased impact of mediator’s interventions were identified in their target communities after the trainings, such as reaching more settlements; preventing damage to private and public goods; averting injuries and loss of human lives; as well as changing practices in terms of how communities deal with conflicts. There are also specific achievements on the level of impact on PAC as a partner but also a beneficiary of this Project in terms of its internal reform, more democratic decision making and providing women and youth with influence on internal decision making and conducting community interventions. The Project managed to achieve strong involvement of women and youth in conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities, also improving their position and influence within PAC and within the communities they work in. In line with these achievements, the draft National Peace Policy also emphasizes the need to enhance participation of women, youth and persons with disabilities in all structures of infrastructure for peace and program activities.

When sustainability is concerned the UN CO and its national counterpart PAC are strongly committed to ensure sustainability of the results in terms of policy, institutional, financial and human capacities. There is a strong national ownership of the results, particularly when PAC is concerned, while the ownerships within public structures is still in its developing stage and is reflected in raised interest and readiness to support institutionalization of national infrastructure for peace. An office for the structure has already been provided by the Government. Over time PAC gained credibility and respect and is an organization expected to serve as intermediary in all key national reform and development issues. PAC has a small operational structure - secretariat, but largely relies on volunteering of its mediators, members and EWER volunteers and therefore it is not solely dependent on international funding.

In light of a possibility that the PDA position can be discontinued at any time, the CO is investing in contingency plans and capacity building of national UN staff to be able to take over the responsibilities and provide quality support to the country. New programs on social cohesion and elections are being developed in order to ensure durable solutions with regards to the aforementioned challenges.
Conclusions:

(i) The Project is highly relevant for political and social context in Malawi.

(ii) In a context of limited financial resources and activity based budget the CO has organized the project implementation in the efficient way connecting it to other CO initiatives. The PDA, partly financed through the project, has been well integrated into the CO team, ensured technical and advisory support to the implementation and kept effective communication with the national stakeholders.

(iii) The Project electiveness reflect in institutionalization of the national infrastructure for peace and continuously increased engagement of insider mediators in community mediation and dialogue. Communication and promotion of the National Peace Infrastructure and Peace Policy seems to be insufficient and vague. Concern over partiality of the Government managed mechanisms still exist.

(iv) PAC is seen as the future leader in mediating conflict prevention in the coming elections as well.

(v) PAC is enhancing public dialogue in the country over broad spectrum of contentious issues.

(vi) Monitoring of mediator’s performance is not systematic, but still the evaluation captured data from 15 PAC activists (mostly women and youth) and identified they were engaged more than 150 times over the last two years. Increase impact was noted, e.g. reaching more settlements in mediated issues, preventing damage to private and public goods, injuries and loss of human lives and changes of practices in how communities deal with conflicts. Surveyed activists attribute 60-80% of the results exclusively to this project. One of the challenges is the settlements do not last long and conflicts over same or similar issues arise every two to three months.

(vii) The project contributed to internal transformation of PAC, supporting it to become more open organization, with more democratic decision-making, increased involvement of women and youth.

Recommendations:

(i) The process over adoption of the National Peace Policy and implementation of the national infrastructure for peace should be communicated more clearly to all interested stakeholders to ensure ownership and commitment to the process across societal sectors.

(ii) The Project and PAC should improve monitoring and evaluation procedures, track down mediations, their outcome and their potential contribution to overall conflict prevention on community, regional and country level for credibility of the organization and building confidence in mediation.

(iii) Collaboration of PAC with other organizations in Malawi should be further strengthened particularly in light to the 2019 elections followed by action planning, networking and clarification of roles and engagement of thousands of volunteers that the organizations claim to have present in the field.

(iv) PAC should carefully perform its advocacy mandate, to keep neutrality and impartiality of its mediation efforts. This is particularly important as the tensions around next election rise.

(v) There are several good practices that should be used for further learning on regional and international level: Integration of conflict prevention and peacebuilding into UN CO overall Programs, projects and daily practice; Performance of PDA in Malawi; Role of the inter-religious faith-based organization in conflict prevention and peacebuilding; Capacity building of women and youth and improvement of their status within the organization; Individual mediation case studies.
9. Timor Leste

Relevance: Timor Leste has made a notable progress in its recovery from crisis in 2006. The country has demonstrated a degree of stability and the absence of violence following the departure of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor Leste and the International Stabilization Force, which ended their mandates in 2012. Progress has been guided by implementation of the country’s National Recovery Strategy and the country’s Strategic Development Plan (2011-2030). Progress has also been reinforced by Timor Leste’s strong commitment and political will. The UN and the EU continue to play a key role in supporting the Government to further strengthen national capacities in development and conflict prevention areas.

Still, a wide range of challenges to stability are present in this fragile country, such as lack of diversification in a weak economic sector, dependency on oil reserves, unequal regional development, high unemployment rate, especially among youth, weak justice sector legal insecurity over land, insufficient quality of public services and corruption and widening inequality and lack of participation.

In such a context, the overall aim of the Project is to strengthen the country’s existing conflict prevention and crisis management capacity by enhancing the EWER mechanism established in 2008 and managed by partnering CSO Belun. The mechanism uses an extensive network of volunteers to monitor incidents and situation changes at the sub-district level. The Project also focuses on using data generated by the EWER system to facilitate continuous dialogue between civil society and the Government on conflict dynamics and trends and jointly identify areas for preventive action. The Project is relevant in informing the key national stakeholders on the conflict situation and developments in the country and to some extent in addressing them through mediation or traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.

The Project is in line with the UN CPD 2015-2019 and its priority of support to inclusive and effective governance. It fits within the EU NIPD for Timor Leste 2014-2020 priority of good governance. The Project also links and learns from the UNDP Justice Program cooperating with Belun in mediation of land disputes.

Effectiveness: The Project supports functioning and development of the only EWER system, managed by the CSO Belun, that monitors conflict situation and provide relevant information and recommendations to the Government. The EWER system relies on 86 conflict monitors (17 female, 69 male) who work in 43 administrative posts countrywide. The monitors are guided by coordinators based in 13 municipalities.

The Project started at the end of 2015 with an inception workshop bringing together 68 key stakeholders from the Government, its agencies, civil society and development partners in the country. The workshop defined the directions of further developments in EWER through establishing the Conflict-Prevention Network chaired by the Minister of Interior, and setting up a joint data center. This was followed by a stakeholder analysis and trainings for 99 participants, EWER monitors and staff of the Ministry of Social Solidarity and National Electoral Commission.

Furthermore, the Project has trained EWER volunteers on mediation and conflict resolution and have strengthened cooperation with local governance, security and justice actors to address community-level violent incidents. The Project also invested in capacity building of EWER monitors in data collection, data analysis and improvement of efficiency of this process. A new tablet based data collection system was designed which allows for data to be entered electronically. The processed information is available within 1-2 days in a new data base system that is freely accessible online, while previously it had been done manually and took much longer. As a result, the new framework for data analysis provides for more
effective and rapid data collection and verification procedures. Inter alia, the system provides data on frequency, location and type of violent incidents and its conflict potential index, representing a useful resource of comprehensive data for all relevant stakeholders. The new system has been used for the 2017 presidential and parliamentary elections, warning about conflict dynamics and conflict risk, mostly involving youth and issues of political interference and shared with national security forces. Where necessary, Belun has organized conflict resolution processes to deteriorate tensions.

The Project has strengthened collaboration with stakeholders, through the Conflict Prevention Network involving CSOs and chaired by the Ministry of Interior. The aim is to ensure appropriate follow up actions. While the cooperation within civil society sector is relatively weak, the collaboration with the ministries is improving through signed MoUs with various Ministries and the Office of the Prime Minister. In the run up to the elections MOUs were also signed with the National Election Management Bodies in the country to ensure cooperation with security actors and to facilitate election related issues to be taken up by justice providers around the elections.

**Efficiency:** The starting was slightly delayed since the PDA managing the Project has left at that time and due to a process of obtaining clearance for the grant approval for Belun as a local partner. The replacement was found in a Policy Analyst well capacitated in conflict prevention. Despite delays the project implementation was brought on-track. Consultations among the implementing partners, the UN, the EU, Belun and other national counterparts take place on a regular basis. The EU Delegation reports this Project developed the cooperation with the UN at all levels, including operational so the agencies are sharing the resources of equipment and facilities when necessary. The exchange with UNDPA is also ongoing and even their additional funding of 15,000 USD was approved for the activities. More funding was also made available from the remaining contribution of the PDA salary that was left unspent although it took a while before it was approved. The project liaises with the Regional Office in Bangkok, which is well informed of the activities in Timor Leste. There is also a regular communication with the project management in HQ providing advisory and technical support. At this stage of the Project the Policy Analyst left the position and joined the HQ team in New York. There are concerns over replacement and functioning of the Project, especially as the UNDP CO is going through a reorganization that will likely significantly reduce the size of the UNDP Country Team and will change the CO’s structure.

**Impact and Sustainability:** Evaluation and impact assessment data on further use of the EWER system reports are lacking. There are occasionally collected information by Belun. A capacity assessment of Belun, conducted in April 2016, identified challenges with M&E and as a result the recruited short-term UNDP Conflict Prevention Specialist was mandated to, among other things, focus on addressing this challenge. However, the organization has reported of interventions by the institutions based on the warning as well as of the long-term processes opened such as improvement of related legal and policy framework, including budgetary allocations for prevention or drafting of the Law on Martial Art Groups, addressing the youth gang issues. Belun volunteers are also involved in small scale mediations across the country over land issues.

With UNDP’s and the EU’s support the EWER system has been improved to allow for more rapid data collecting, verification and dissemination. The analytical skills of the EWER staff have also been improved resulting in more effective and appropriate policy recommendations. The organization has for example
extensively reported on the continuous youth gangs’ (so called Martial Arts Gangs) clashes. As a result of their reports and recommendations Belun was invited by the Prime Minister’s Office to review and provide input to the draft Law on Martial Arts before it was sent to Parliament for approval. The Project has also contributed to increased collaboration with government stakeholders. For example, through the EWER’s election related violence monitoring, Belun has established cooperation with security forces and support them to take preventive action in high risk areas. The EWER is a unique and very useful, but a costly system anchored within a CSO Belun, dependent on the external sources of funding. The organization manages to match various sources of international and local funding. However, as Timor Leste is not on the top of the foreign assistance any more, this represents a big challenge. On the other hand, drivers of conflict are still present and peacebuilding agenda is still necessary. It is of utmost importance to link the warning reports with the firm actions of the Governments and prove the benefit and accountability of the entire system, so it attracts further funding. The Project engaged a consultant to help in capturing and processing the impact data and support the organizations fundraising and long-term sustainability efforts.

Conclusions:
(i) The Project is relevant in informing the key national stakeholders on the conflict situation and developments in the country and to some extent in enabling them to be addressed through mediation or traditional conflict resolution mechanisms or follow up actions by the Government.
(ii) The activities are implemented in efficiently and effectively, through coordination of the UN, the EU, local counterpart Belun and other national stakeholders. Involvement and commitment of other CSOs to this initiative is still weak. After the leaving of the Policy Analyst in charge of the Project to the HQ there is a concern over the progress of the Project in the coming period.
(iii) Although the EWER reports are comprehensive, the data on follow up actions it informs and encourages lacks. There is occasional information on changes on the policy level (budgetary allocations for prevention, legal reforms) or security forces actions.
(iv) As the system is managed by a CSO dependent from external support there is a challenge to its sustainability.

Recommendations:
(i) Although very strong in monitoring and evaluating potential of conflicts, the Project needs to strengthen its evaluation and impact assessment to be able to follow on the actions of the Government and other relevant agencies and the final impact on the society. Highlighting of the impact may further support the efforts for achieving of the sustainability of the system.
(ii) Actions are necessary to link the system more to the Government (in terms of funding or the institutionalization) as the long-term sustainability in the current setting is insecure.
(iii) Conflict Prevention Network of CSOs should be further strengthened through action or strategic planning and synergizing their mandates and efforts.
(iv) Over the longer period of time, gender balance in conflict prevention efforts should be further supported and gender related violence also given more emphasis.
Annex 2: List of Consulted Documentation (Alphabetically)

7. Call for Proposals under the Building and Consolidating National Capacities for Conflict Prevention – Grant Scheme for Independent On-line Media and Guidelines for Application;
8. Conflictividad Minera en Bolivia, Cesar Rojas Ríos, UNDP Bolivia, 2016;
9. Consultoría de estudio de la dinámica y la problemática socioambiental relacionada con el Proyecto Multipropósito de Agua Potable y Riego para los Municipios de Batallas, Pucarani y El Alto y del Parque Tunari y diagnóstico de capacidades institucionales del MMAYA para la gestión de conflictos en el área, Fernando Aramayo Carrasco & Mirna Cuentas, 2016;
10. Diagnostico Organizacional, Gestión de conflictos en el Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Agua, Fernando Aramayo Carrasco & Mirna Cuestas;
11. Dinámica y problemática socioambiental relacionada con el Proyecto Multipropósito de Agua Potable y Riego para los Municipios de Batallas, Pucarani y El Alto, Fernando Aeamayo Carrasco, UNDP Bolivia 2016;
15. Insider Mediation Honduras, 2nd Year, Project Update, July – February 2017, UNDP Honduras;
16. Insider Mediators Activity Reports, UNDP Guatemala;
17. Insider Mediators Print and Visual Materials, UNDP Guatemala;
19. Joint support of the UN and EU to the Public Affairs Committee – A Joint Concept Note – Malawi, UN, EU Malawi, 2015;
22. Memorando de Entendimiento entre el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo y Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Agua, 2016;
23. Narrative Report – Year 1, European Youth Foundation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2016
24. National Indicative Program Documents of the beneficiary countries, EU
27. Nota de Ministerio de Minería y Metalurgia – Apoyo Técnico, 2016;
31. Protocolo de estudio para el análisis de dinámicas respecto a problemas socioambientales complejas para su aplicación a áreas geográficas o problemáticas similares a las del caso de estudio, Fernando Aramayo & Mirna Cuentas, Consultores, 2016;
33. Workshop Materials, Bolivia, 2016;
34. Workshop Reports, Bolivia, 2016;
37. Terms of Reference – 2016 Public Opinion Poll and Socio-Economic Perception of Youth Research, UNDP Bosnia and Herzegovina
38. UNDAF of the beneficiary countries;
39. UNDP Country Program Documents of the beneficiary countries
40. UNDP Malawi Newsletter, issue 2016
Annex 3: List of Interviewees

1. Stephen Jackson, Chief Policy Planning and Guidance, UNDPA
2. Kwesi Sansculotte-Greenidge, Political Affairs Officer at DPA
3. Patrick Keuleers, Director, Governance and Peacebuilding Cluster, Bureau for Policy and Program Support, UNDP
4. Katy Thompson: Team Leader Conflict Prevention Team, Bureau for Program and Policy Support
5. Vesna Markovic Dasovic, Policy Specialist, Dialogue, Facilitation and Consensus Building, Conflict Prevention Team, Bureau for Policy and Program Support, UNDP
6. Alex Schoebridge: Strategic Planning Specialist UNDP, formerly Program Specialist, UNDP-DPA Joint Program on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention
7. Daniele Senzanonna, Program Manager at European Commission's Service for Foreign Policy Instruments
8. Tomas Henning: Mediation Advisor at European External Action Service
9. Markus Mayr: Associate Political Affairs Officer, UNDPA
10. Chetan Kumar, UN PDA Philippines
11. Musa Koopedi, Member of the Project Board, Director, ACTION Support Centre, South Africa
12. David Bongwele, Political Affairs Officer, Africa I Division, UNDP
13. Andreas Karpati, Desk Officer for Malawi, UNDP
14. Marc Andre Franche, Chief, Financing for Peacebuilding Branch, Peacebuilding Support Office
15. Sanna Tasala, Program Specialist UNDP/DPA Joint Program
16. Sharif Baaser, Program Specialist, Fragility and Peacebuilding, HATIS, Programs Division UNICEF
17. Georges Van Montfort, Cluster Leader for East and Southern Africa, Regional Bureau for Africa, UNDP
18. Livio Sarandrea, Program Specialist, Rule of Law and Crisis Prevention, Bangkok Regional Hub, UNDP
19. Odran Mcmahon, UNV, Bangkok Regional Hub, UNDP
20. Malin Herwig, Conflict Prevention & Peacebuilding Program Advisor for Arab States, Regional Hub, Amman, UNDP
21. Tatyana Jiteneva, Project Board Member, UNWOMEN
22. Ozonnia Ojielo, Regional Cluster Director, Governance and Peacebuilding in Africa, UNDP Africa Hub
23. Gaston Ain, Conflict Prevention Regional Adviser in the Regional Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean, UNDP

Bolivia

24. Mirreia Villar Forner, deputy Resident Representative, UNDP Bolivia
25. Rosaly Ledesma, Project Coordinator, UNDP Bolivia
26. Francesca Majorano Sarapo, Project Focal Point, Program Officer EU Delegation to Bolivia, focal point
27. Martina Pino, Program Officer, Project Focal Point, EU Delegation to Bolivia
28. Carlos A. Lara Ugarte, Head of Public Consultation and Participation Unit, Ministry of Mining and Metallurgy
30. Mirna Angela Cuestas, consultant

Bosnia and Herzegovina
31. Dalila Sadinlija, Peace and Development Specialist, UN Resident Coordinator’s Office, Bosnia and Herzegovina
32. Margherita Vismara, Conflict Related Sexual Violence and Rule of Law Officer, UNDP Bosnia and Herzegovina
33. Haris Kusmic, President of the European Youth Parliament in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Ghana
34. Justice Agbezuge, Program analyst, UNDP Ghana
35. George Amoh, National Peace Council, Ghana

Guatemala:
36. Camilo Duplat, Advisor, Conflict Prevention and Dialogue, UNDP
37. Shabnam Sabetian, UNDP Guatemala

Honduras:
38. Elisabet Navarro, Project coordinator, UNDP Honduras
39. Veronika Jemelikova, EU Delegation Honduras
40. Maria Jose Galvez, Women’s Rights Officer, National Commission for Human Rights
41. Mariella Colemann, lawyer, MASTA

Malawi:
42. Mia Seppo, UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative Malawi
43. Rebecca Adda Dontoh, UN PDA for Malawi
44. Busekese Kilembe, Program Analyst (Democratic Consolidation), UNDP Malawi
45. Marchel Germann, Ambassador, Delegation of the EU to the Republic of Malawi
46. Julius Munthali, Program Manager/Project Focal Point, Delegation of the EU to Malawi
47. David Lokulutu Bongwele, Political Affairs Officer, Africa I Division, DPA
48. Andreas Karpati, DPA Desk Officer for Malawi
49. Robert M. Phiri, Executive Director, PAC Secretariat
50. Sophia Nthenda, Program Officer, PAC Secretariat
51. Stella Chikombole, Program Officer, PAC Secretariat
52. Ollen Mwalubunju, Executive Director, NICE
53. Martin Gift Chiphwanya, National Secretary, CCJP
54. Winston Mwafuiliwra, Malawi Human Rights Commission
55. Allan Chintedza, Program Manager, Tilitonse Fund

Timor Leste
56. Lorraine Reuter, UNDP Timor Leste
57. Scot Cunliffe, EWER consultant
58. Joana Varao, EU Delegation Timor Leste
59. Zach Abugov, Program Quality Advisor, BELUN
60. Bylah Da Costa, EWER Project Manager, BELUN
61. Laurensius A. Lein, Conflict Prevention Specialist, BELUN

Togo
62. Pierre Antoine Archange, UN PDA Togo
63. Vincent Vire, Head of Cooperation, EU Delegation, Togo
64. Bouasy Bouasvan, Program Officer, EU Delegation, Togo
65. Emile Komlan Segbedji, President, Local Peace Committee, Dany Prefecture

Yemen
66. Khaled Magead, Program Analyst Democratic Governance, UNDP Yemen
67. Ghaidaa Motahar, Social Cohesion Specialist, UNDP Yemen
68. Tawfeek Sharabi, Program Coordinator, Search for Common Ground, Yemen
69. Abdulgader Ali, Project Coordinator, Search for Common Ground Yemen
70. Jordi Carrasco-Munoz, Regional Crisis Response Planning Officer, EU Delegation Beirut
71. Edouard Belloncle, EU Delegation Tunisia

Annex 4: List of Evaluation Workshop Participants
1. Agnes Kamoto, Muslim Association of Malawi (MAM)
2. Esther Grant, Malawi Council of Churches (MCC)
3. Stella Chikombole, PAC
4. Mariam Sungamoyo Kalonga, Quadria Muslim Association of Malawi (QMAM=
5. Fr. Peter Mulomole, PAC
6. Fatima Kadango, MAM
7. Busekese Kilembe, UNDP
8. Apostle W.P. Mbewe
9. Rev. Dr. Felix Chingota, PAC
10. Rev. Towera Masiku, PAC – WIF
11. Peter Odala, PAC
12. Archbishop Thomas Msusa, Episcopal Conference of Malawi (ECM)
13. Sheikh Ali Kennedy, MAM
14. Edgar Petros, PAC
15. Rev. M. Chipea Banda
16. Masawuko Maruwacha, UNDP
17. Rev. Lazarous Kadango, PAC
18. Stella Sagawa, PAC WIF
19. Rev. Leslie Mtekateka, PAC
20. Sophia Nthenda, PAC
Annex 5: Interview Framework Questions

Context and Relevance
1. The main issues/challenges addressed by the project. Did the project address the key drivers of conflict?
2. How was your institution involved in design of the action and did you take part? What is the role of your institution now in defining the project directions?
3. Are the project objectives and expected results appropriate and relevant to the countries’ needs?
4. Did the project take advantage of any opportunities for promoting non-violence and peace (other initiatives in the country, peacebuilding related policy development, other UNDP and UN agencies, EUD projects, cultural/traditional/religious institutes etc.)?
5. What were the key issues related to capacities of UN COs and EUD addressed by the project?

Effectiveness
6. To what extent have project activities led to capacity building and deployment of insider mediators? How did the mediation process relate to broader conflict context?
7. How do you perceive the “Infrastructure of Peace” and to what extent it was developed?
8. What were your expectations from the project and how did your organization/institution benefit from the project so far? And what do you expect from the next phase?
9. What do you think about the quality of the strategies and outputs (e.g. trainings, technical assistance, reports, project team assistance etc.)? What was the contribution of PDA? What could have been done differently?
10. How were the program outputs used in practice? What was your contribution to it? What are the challenges currently and how they are being mitigated? What are potential challenges in the future? What could have been done differently? What could be done differently?
11. What are the key lessons learnt in your experience that can be brought up to the regional/global level peacebuilding efforts? Do you feel lessons learnt by you and your organization reach the project management and are brought up to regional and international level?
12. How are the achievements monitored/evaluated internally by your institution/organization? How are the success stories, lessons learned captured, synthesized and used across the target countries? Examples? Use of Insider Mediation Guidance note?
13. Which activities and how have been linked to: human rights improvement, conflict prevention, addressing the drivers of conflict, conflict transformation, status and rights of socially vulnerable groups (youth, elderly, unemployed, rural areas, indigenous peoples and minorities, persons with disabilities) and women?
14. How would you assess cooperation between the key stakeholders in this project?
15. What are the key factors that have facilitated or impeded the Project progress? To what extent can changes achieved be attributed to project?

Efficiency
16. To what extent can the Project relay on local stakeholders’ capacities, UNDP Country Offices and EUDs and in which areas is the support by UNDP/UNDPA HQ required? What was the level of involvement and the role of external service providers?
17. Were there any delays or all the activities were carried out in time? What could have been done differently? How can this be avoided in future?
18. Were the project activities implemented in a cost–effective manner? What could be done differently?
19. Is there a synergy with other similar projects in your country and can it be further improved?

Sustainability
20. To what extent has the project created local ownership over the key deliverables? What will be done to ensure it in future?
21. What has been achieved to ensure sustainability on policy, institutional and financial levels? Is the community well aware of the project?
22. What has your organization/institution done in addition to ensure sustainability of the project results?
23. What would be other evidences of project impact in your view?
24. What are the risks and threats to sustainability? What would happen with the results if the project ends now? What can be done about it?
25. What are the lessons learnt that can be transformed into cases studies, tools, policies etc.?
26. What are recommendations to maximize the Project performance in the coming period, its impact and further improve its efficiency and effectiveness? Is there anything else that you find important and should to be included in the evaluation report?
## Annex 6: Workshop Agenda

### Building and Consolidating National Capacities for Conflict Prevention

**Country Evaluation Workshop: Malawi**

**Crossroads Hotel, March 15th and 16th 2017**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• introduce participants to key aspects of evaluation process</td>
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<tr>
<td>• collect in-depth information from key stakeholders about project relevance and its contribution to conflict prevention and peacebuilding,</td>
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<td>• explore project achievements and qualitative and quantitative indicators of impact</td>
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<td>• enable elaboration of specific case studies and lessons learnt,</td>
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<td>• validate the findings and define conclusions and recommendations.</td>
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| Participants | UNDP Country Office representatives, EU Delegation, Government and Public Affairs Committee Representatives, other key project partners, insider mediators  |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day 1</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>8.30-9.00</strong></td>
<td>Registration of Participants - PAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Opening Remarks – Mia Seppo, UN Resident Coordinator</td>
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<td>Introduction of Participants</td>
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<td><strong>9.00-10.10</strong></td>
<td>Evaluation process and workshop overview</td>
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<td>Assessment of the project relevance, theories of change and potential changes of the context in Malawi</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
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<td>Group discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>10.10-10.30</strong></td>
<td>Break</td>
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<td><strong>10.30-12.30</strong></td>
<td>Assessment of the key project partners’ cooperation</td>
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<td>Identification and exploration of the key project achievements</td>
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<td>Identification of case studies/lessons learnt</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>12.30-13.30</strong></td>
<td>Lunch</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>13.30-15.00</strong></td>
<td>Analysis of the project contribution to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Malawi</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
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<td>Group discussion</td>
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<td><strong>15.00-15.20</strong></td>
<td>Break</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>15.20-17.00</strong></td>
<td>Sustainability assessment and challenges</td>
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<td>(Policy, institutional, financial, public awareness)</td>
<td>Plenary discussion</td>
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<td>Time</td>
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<td>Methodology</td>
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<td>Day 2</td>
<td>Reflection on the Day</td>
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<td>8.30-9.00</td>
<td>Opening  &lt;br&gt; Reflection on the Day 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.00-10.10</td>
<td>Training Evaluation and Impact Assessment Methodology</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
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<td>10.10-10.30</td>
<td>Break</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.30-12.00</td>
<td>Mediation Training Impact Assessment Survey</td>
<td>Presentation  &lt;br&gt; Group discussion  &lt;br&gt; Survey Exercise</td>
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<td>12.00-13.00</td>
<td>Conclusions and recommendations  &lt;br&gt; Closing remarks</td>
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<td>13.00-14.00</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
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