Mid-Term Review on implementing the National Emergency Response Mitigation and Adaptation Plan (NERMAP) 2016 - 2022
Final Report

Mid-Term Review and Lessons on Implementing the National Emergency Response Mitigation and Adaptation Plan 2016-2022

PREPARED AND SUBMITTED BY

Thulasizwe C. Dludlu
P.O.Box 6035
Manzini
Cell: 76025661
Email: dludlut@altersol.net

May 2017
# Table of Contents

Acronyms and abbreviations ........................................................................................................ v

Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................... 1

1. Introduction, Purpose and Methodologies of the Review .......................................................... 5
   1.1 Background ............................................................................................................................... 5
   1.2 Purpose and Objectives of the Review ..................................................................................... 5
   1.3 Organization of the Review ...................................................................................................... 6
   1.4 Methodology: ............................................................................................................................ 6
   1.5 Limitations: .............................................................................................................................. 8

2. Findings – NERMAP Performance against Review Objectives ................................................. 10
   2.1 NERMAP objectives and implementation .............................................................................. 10
   2.2 Technical soundness of the NERMAP .................................................................................... 10
   2.3 Agriculture and Food Security Sector .................................................................................... 11
   2.4 Education ................................................................................................................................. 16
   2.5 Health and Nutrition ................................................................................................................. 19
   2.6 Water and Sanitation Sector .................................................................................................... 22
   2.7 Storm damage rehabilitation .................................................................................................... 24
   2.8 Social Protection ....................................................................................................................... 27
   2.9 NERMAP Coordination .......................................................................................................... 29
   2.10 Other Sectors .......................................................................................................................... 31

3. Findings – Assessment against Review Framework ..................................................................... 32
   3.1 Relevance: ................................................................................................................................. 32
   3.2 Performance – Outcomes and Outputs: ................................................................................... 32
   3.3 Efficiency: ................................................................................................................................. 34
   3.4 Impact ....................................................................................................................................... 35
   3.5 Phasing out: ............................................................................................................................... 37

4. Promising practices and Lessons Learnt ..................................................................................... 39
   4.1 Promising practices .................................................................................................................. 39
   4.2 Lessons Learnt .......................................................................................................................... 41

5. Overall Conclusion and Recommendations ............................................................................... 45
   5.1 NERMAP design ..................................................................................................................... 45
5.2 NERMAP Implementation .................................................................................. 46
5.3 Resource Mobilization ...................................................................................... 47
5.4 Coordination ..................................................................................................... 47
5.5 Sustainability ..................................................................................................... 48
5.6 Innovation, knowledge management and communication .............................. 48

Annex A: NERMAP Objectives .............................................................................. 50
Annex B: Terms of Reference – NERMAP Mid-Term Review .............................. 52
Annex C: Documentary shooting schedule – MRT and Lessons Learnt ............... 54
Annex D: List of Stakeholders interviewed ........................................................... 56
Annex E: Constituencies/Communities visited by the review team ...................... 57
Annex F: List of Assessments Carried out during NERMAP ............................... 58
Annex G: Contributions from the Private Sector .................................................... 59

List of Tables

Table 1: Food Distributed Jan 2016 - Dec 2016 ......................................................... 12
Table 2: Cash Transfers by Dec 2016 .................................................................. 13
Table 3: Home Based Care supplies for RHMs ...................................................... 20
Table 4: Storm damage rehabilitation status 2016 ................................................ 26
Table 5: NERMAP Funding Update - December 2016 ............................................. 34

List of Figures

Figure 1: National Drought Emergency Coordination Model .............................. 30
**Acronyms and abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADRA</td>
<td>Adventist Development and Relief Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACAT</td>
<td>Africa Cooperation Action Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSRCS</td>
<td>Baphalali Swaziland Red Cross Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBT</td>
<td>Cash-Based Transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPIE</td>
<td>Child Protection in Emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSAM</td>
<td>Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPMO</td>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister's Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRM</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSW</td>
<td>Department of Social Welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DWA</td>
<td>Department of Water Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVLS</td>
<td>Department of Veterinary and Livestock Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Enumeration Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-Based Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ha</td>
<td>Hectare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDDS</td>
<td>Household Dietary Diversity Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH</td>
<td>Household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>Information Education Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKM</td>
<td>Information and Knowledge Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISP</td>
<td>Input Support Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEPD</td>
<td>Ministry of Economic Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MET</td>
<td>Meteorology Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNRE</td>
<td>Ministry of Natural Resources and Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTR</td>
<td>Mid-Term Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoA</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoET</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoH</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDMA</td>
<td>National Disaster Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NERMAP</td>
<td>National Emergency Response Mitigation and Adaptation Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMC</td>
<td>National Maize Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDM</td>
<td>Post-distribution monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLWH</td>
<td>People Living with HIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSPF</td>
<td>Public Service Pension Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDA</td>
<td>Rural Development Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSSC</td>
<td>Royal Swaziland Sugar Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>Severe Acute Malnutrition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNNC</td>
<td>Swaziland National Nutrition Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNPF</td>
<td>Swaziland National Provident Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRH</td>
<td>Sexual Reproductive Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRHR</td>
<td>Sexual Reproductive Health Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRIC</td>
<td>Swaziland Royal Insurance Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVAC</td>
<td>Swaziland Vulnerability Assessment Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWADE</td>
<td>Swaziland Water and Agricultural Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAGAA</td>
<td>Swaziland Action Group Against Abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWSC</td>
<td>Swaziland Water Services Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children's Education Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAA</td>
<td>Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAC</td>
<td>Vulnerability Assessment Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WVS</td>
<td>World Vision Swaziland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive Summary

Background

The National Emergency Response Mitigation and Adaptation Plan (NERMAP 2016-2022) is a response plan developed by the Government of Swaziland to respond to the effects of the El Nino induced drought which could be traced convincingly to the 2014/2015 planting season characterised by lack of rains, low dam water levels, drying up of rivers, cattle deaths and significantly reduced maize harvest amongst many impacts. The drought impacts threatened the lives of the Swazi population, leaving about half of the population vulnerable to food and water insecurity and related ills. Operationalised in 18th February 2016, following the declaration of a drought disaster emergency in the country, the NERMAP was expected to run on an emergency and early recovery mode until December 2017 and on a long-term resilience mode until 2022.

The National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA) commissioned a Mid-Term Review (MTR) in November 2016 supported by the Swaziland UN Country Office focusing primarily on the period beginning from the NERMAP launch (February 2016) to December 2016. This report presents findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons learnt from the implementation of the NERMAP during the period mentioned above. The review team assessed the effectiveness and results of how the implementation of the plan contributes towards responding to the effects of the El Nino induced drought and what changes need to be made to the plan for it to remain relevant to the purpose for which it was designed.

Overall finding

The NERMAP responded well to the drought emergency needs in terms of providing goods, services, early recovery interventions, and long-term resilience towards drought disasters. The involvement of stakeholders in the development of the NERMAP, endorsement by the government, and the shared coordination responsibility between the government and stakeholders through sectors and sector coordination mechanisms made the plan relevant to the emergency. The Vulnerability Assessments (VA) conducted at both national and sector levels were instrumental in making a case for the relevance of the NERMAP.

The NERMAP has been implemented to a greater extent, but the start of the majority of the interventions were delayed by the late release of government funds and onset of resource mobilisation, poor existing preparedness to respond to disasters and prevailing challenges with procurement processes. Some interventions of the NERMAP were not implemented due to insufficient financial and human resources, nonetheless, good progress has been made.

Detailed findings

The plan and resourcing: NERMAP lacked a results framework from which performance review could be matched against. Notably, the NERMAP does not have its overall objectives as a response plan but sector-specific objectives are reflected in the NERMAP, even though they fell short of standardization (others with overall objectives only, others with specific objectives in addition to overall sector objectives).
About 41% of required (US$96,400,000) funding has been made available for the NERMAP implementation by the government, UN agencies and other partners, with government only releasing about 39% of her share of the budget. The share of the funding to-date contributions (US$39,098,792) stands at 39%, 38% and 23% for the UN agencies, other partners and the government, respectively as of October/November 2016.

**Implementation:** Good progress has been achieved in the implementation of the NERMAP in the majority of interventions even though challenges were reported in fewer communities when it comes to targeting where omission of supposedly deserving beneficiaries, erroneous inclusion of undeserving beneficiaries and sometimes lack of transparency in targeting were observed.

Food distribution started late for partners (around June 2016), whereas the government, through NDMA, and World Vision started before declaration and only up-scaled afterwards. About 323,874 beneficiaries were reached with food while 89,679 were reached with cash, totalling 413,553 against a target of 350,000 by the NERMAP.

Water shortages were dealt with through revamping of water systems and water distribution where 4,141,000 million litres of water was distributed to communities, schools, cattle troughs and health facilities through water tankers. The drilling of boreholes did not work as planned since a total of 20 boreholes were drilled in Mbabane but only 4 were operationalised due to the fact that the 16 did not meet the minimum yield requirement. About 29 schools in the urban area benefited through the installation of water tanks and the filling with emergency water for various purposes. A total of 14 standard new boreholes were drilled and operationalised, and only two (2) high yielding boreholes drilled were operationalized, 49 rural water micro-schemes have been rehabilitated, 4 macro reticulated water schemes were rehabilitated, two (2) unprotected springs developed and 13 vandalized boreholes were cleaned to-date. In addition, the was dredging of the Hawane Dam, increasing the capacity of the abstraction weir of the Mbabane/Pholinjani rivers in order to supply the Mbabane Central Business District (CBD). To a larger extent water security was ensured through the interventions even though the distribution of water to communities was inconsistent and fell short of the demand/need.

The procurement and distribution of subsidized hay bales came seven (7) months after declaration of emergency, whereas water distribution for cattle took place earlier. The resuscitation of rangeland could not be implemented and destocking was not very successful due to cattle farmer mind-set. Lack of sufficient tractors, implements and fuel delayed early recovery processes. On the other hand, farm inputs were distributed to over 15,000 households for early recovery purposes. Water was supplied to schools to ensure continuation of learning and learning outcomes, as well as breakfast meals covering at least 70% of schools by December 2016. School water and food security scored good progress, while the hay distribution, rangeland resuscitation and early recovery efforts did not yield good results.

Schools damaged by storms are rehabilitated through the Education Sector’s Education in Emergency fund (EIE) while the NDMA took care of storm damage cases for households, found mostly in the rural areas. More storm damage cases happened than planned, reducing the NDMA’s capacity to respond to all cases, ending up prioritising the most vulnerable to the disgruntlement of communities.

Through the NERMAP, the participation of wider stakeholder group working on social protection was activated including the arm, police, Gender-Based Violence practitioners, Rural Health Motivators and others.
Implementation in the Social Security sector was challenged by lack of clear targets, not-so-good reporting of achievements and the lack of tangible evidence of the impact of interventions on the ground, making success or failure judgement difficult. Interventions included awareness campaigns, dialogues for protection, capacity building for implementers and practitioners and the distribution of dignity kits to adolescent boys and girls. This The Health and Nutrition sector scaled up their normal programming interventions such as deworming campaigns, mass food inspections, strengthening diseases surveillance systems, providing food by prescription and holding comprehensive health campaigns in the most vulnerable communities. Outbreak of diseases during the drought has been prevented through the sector’s interventions and these will continue post-NERMAP albeit at smaller scale.

**Coordination:** The NDMA provided overall coordination of the response with sector/cluster coordination dealt with by sector leads and co-leads who would normally be government departments and UN agencies respectively in most cases (and sometimes NGOs). Coordination at sector level had more challenges for some sectors than what obtains at inter-sector level. NDMA’s coordination capacity and efficiency was thwarted by the combined role of also implementing some of the NERMAP activities while they are thin on the ground in terms of headcount. The rate of implementation of the NERMAP is evidence to the quality of coordination offered, which could be regarded as good for a start, with a number of areas for improvement as mentioned above.

**Key recommendations**

**Post Disaster Needs Assessment / preparedness**

There is need for the reassessment of the drought impact situation in order to initiate a review of the NERMAP interventions for purposes of determining those required going forward given changes in the drought landscape such as the arrival of the rainy season, the status of early recovery processes as well as the availability of funding for interventions. Focus should be on early recovery (ER) and resilience interventions at medium and long-term levels. The reassessment of the drought situation should be comprehensive and cross sectoral, prioritizing the availability of tractors, implements, fuel for tractors and farm inputs to ensure food security and resilience. Increasing the country’s capacity to harvest rain water and taking a stock of the country water availability remain critical. The NDMA should consider taking stock of the equipment and infrastructure required to carry out a disaster response such as water tankers and tanks, trucks, drilling rigs, baling equipment and other.

**M&E framework**

An M&E framework that incorporates a results framework for the response plan, as well as a phase-out plan for interventions should be incorporated in the NERMAP. This would improve monitoring and control, ultimately leading to improved delivery and early elimination of bottlenecks.

**Funding resources**

The NDMA should also fast-track the establishment of the Disaster Risk Management Fund and the finalization of the Resource Mobilization Strategy in order to improve the institution’s financial capacity to respond to disasters timely. In turn, the NDMA will increase its staffing levels which are low
for adequate response. Resource mobilization should also include negotiations with government to release remaining portions of the NERMAP budget allocations.

**Accountability and Coordination**

The NDMA should work to improve the accountability of stakeholders on the NERMAP through developing and agreeing on appropriate tools for reporting. The organization should also focus its attention more on coordination of DRR and DRM interventions, limiting implementation through identifying the suitable partners to implement the activities previously done by the NDMA. Further, response coordination at sector and regional levels should be strengthened.

**Communication, Information and Knowledge Management**

The NDMA needs to quickly operationalize the communication strategy in order to realize benefits from use and deal with pertinent communication challenges experienced during the drought such as communicating at the wrong level (e.g. communication by implementing partner directly with *Bucopho Benkhundla* when it was important for such to go through *Indvuna Yenkhundla*), the sending of conflicting messages by different players, and others. The NDMA also needs to finalize the establishment of Information and Knowledge Management and Monitoring and Evaluation Systems which will be vital in informing decision-making and programming.
1. Introduction, Purpose and Methodologies of the Review

1.1 Background

Amongst a number of disasters, Swaziland suffered most from destructive effects of the 2014/15 El Nino induced drought which resulted in poor food crop harvest leading to food security challenges country-wide, threat of diseases, water shortages, death of animals, and others. The government of Swaziland, through the National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA) and other partners in the form of civil society organizations (CSO), international development agencies and other government ministries, developed the National Drought Mitigation and Adaptation Plan (NERMAP) 2016-2022 to respond to the drought impacts. Giving impetus to the plan was the declaration of a national emergency by the Prime Minister of Swaziland, His Excellency Dr. Barnabas Sibusiso Dlamini on 18 February 2016, implying the need for the country to change its approach to dealing with the crisis, and engage in an emergency mode, making resources available towards meeting the NERMAP demands. The NERMAP came as a result of a coordinated effort between the aforementioned players taking into consideration vulnerability assessment reports (such as the Vulnerability Assessment Report 2015 and others).

This MTR has been initiated by the NDMA with support from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in order to assess how the roll-out of the NERMAP is going in order to make the necessary adjustments and also gather crucial lessons for future planning purposes.

1.2 Purpose and Objectives of the Review

1.2.1 Purpose

The purpose of the Mid-term Review (MTR) was to contribute to knowledge management and propel disaster response knowledge creation, collection and sharing, as relevant and appropriate, in Swaziland networks of government, non-governmental organizations and the private institutions.

1.2.2 Scope and objectives

Whereas the MTR is focused on the NERMAP, its design and rate of implementation, the process is designed to:

a) Assess progress towards the achievement of the NERMAP objectives and outcomes;

b) Assess early signs of project success or failures with the goal of identifying the necessary changes to be made in order to re-track the plan back to achieve its intended results;

c) Identify, analyse, and share disaster risk management lessons to inform current and ongoing responses and the development of medium and long term resilience strategies, and;
d) Initiating relevant and appropriate disaster management knowledge products and sharing of information to advance continuous response interventions lessons exchange in Swaziland by the NDMA and national stakeholders.

1.3 Organization of the Review

The MTR and lessons learnt consultancy was commissioned by the NDMA with the support of the UNDP. A local consultant was recruited through a local recruitment process. The consultant worked with a team and in consultation with, and through the support of the NDMA in terms of logistics and arranging meetings and interviews, as well as ensuring that the MTR consultant has access to relevant documents.

In order to achieve these objectives, the consultant carried out the following tasks:

a) Review the NERMAP and related documents;
b) Developing data collection tools;
c) Field visits took place between January 9 and 13, 2017, interviewing the beneficiaries and community leaders (MPs, Indvuna Yenkundla, Bucopho benkhundla);
d) Discussing with NDMA officials, Cluster leads and co-leads, and NGO representatives.
e) Observing the sites and activities which are in place,
f) Summarizing data; and
g) Writing reports.

1.4 Methodology:

1.4.1 Methodological approach

The review was based on both inductive and deductive approaches using qualitative data gathered through a mixed-method approach from a carefully selected range of sources. The data collection for this review was mainly done through purposively selected key informant interviews (KIs), semi-structured discussions, documents research and carefully structured focus group discussions (FGDs) with local authorities, communities and recipients of disaster relief assistance in 15 constituencies (See ANNEX E for the list of constituencies) which were visited during the review. The review also used data from documents made available by the NDMA and NERMAP stakeholders.

1.4.2 Review framework

In the absence of a logical framework or results framework for the NERMAP, a decision was taken to follow the review questions raised by the NDMA and the UN Technical Working Group (TWG) in the terms of reference (TOR) regarding the extent to which the plan was executed at output, outcome and impact levels, as far as possible.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Development Assistance Committee\(^1\) (DAC) criteria for evaluating development assistance dictates that such reviews should be based on relevance of the NERMAP, the effectiveness of the NERMAP

regarding the extent to which its activities meet its objectives, the efficiency of the NERMAP where value for money and cost-effectiveness of the plan are on focus, the results and outcomes determined by negative and positive chances and effects from the NERMAP interventions, and the sustainability of the NERMAP interventions. These were considered in the review.

Key review questions, sources of data and methods of gathering these are detailed out in the inception report (ANNEX B) attached with this report.

1.4.3 Key methods and sources of data

Semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and site visits
Question guides were developed to focus the interviews and were administered with community groups in 15 constituencies comprising of community leaders and beneficiaries. On the other hand, interviews with implementing stakeholders in clusters (group discussions) as well as individuals (key informants) were also conducted. ANNEX E indicates the communities/constituencies visited by the review team. Each constituency covers between 3 and 8 communities and the groups met included political leaders of these communities (Bucopho Benkhundla) together with the constituency leader (Indvuna Yenkhundla), and in some cases, the Member of Parliament (MP) for the Inkundla, in addition to the beneficiaries met. Due to time limitation, only 15 constituencies spanning in all the country’s four (4) Regions were sampled with an effort to cover work done through the different NERMAP sectors.

NERMAP implementers in clusters were also met and interviewed through appointments made. The following were specifically met:

1. Agriculture and Food Security
2. Health and Nutrition
3. Water and Sanitation
4. Education
5. Social Protection

In addition, the United Nations Drought Technical Working Group (UNTWG) which is the United Nations internal technical advisory team for the drought response, was also met on a consultative forum of the review process. Further, consultative interactions between the review team and the NDMA continued throughout the process.

Documents reviewed

Some of the documents availed to the NERMAP Mid-Term Review consultant included the following:

a) The Mitigation and Adaptation Plan (NERMAP) document;
b) The Disaster Management Act of 2006;
c) The Disaster Risk Management Policy of 2010;
d) Swaziland Annual Vulnerability Assessment & Analysis Reports (2015, 2016)
e) Special assessment report on food security in Swaziland (FAO/WFP), 2015;
f) The Drought Rapid Assessment (February 2016)

g) The drought health and nutrition assessment (March 2016)  
h) Monthly/Quarterly response reports from NDMA and stakeholders;  
i) Food/water/cash distribution maps and reports;  
j) Sector reports  

**Documentary shooting**

The Terms of Reference (TORs) for the MTR also included a component of conducting interviews to capture sector (Agriculture and Food Security, WASH, Education, Health and Nutrition, and Protection) views and experiences to the drought response, thereby producing 5-7 minutes video documentaries that capture communities’ experiences on the 2015/2016 drought. The documentary also captured how communities have been coping with drought effects including how sectors have responded and were prepared further in a human interest booklet with high quality professional photographs to capture experiences of communities including how sectors have responded.

A total of six (6) constituencies were visited and interviewed for the video clips. The focus was on constituencies which would capture work done in all the different NERMAP sectors within the available time and resources. ANNEXURE C shows the schedule of visited areas and the areas of interests for the documentary shooting.

**Data Triangulation**

When a mixed-method data collection is used, data triangulations becomes critical as it ensures that the results are linked up into a coherent and credible evidence base. For the purposes of the NERMAP MTR, data triangulation was conducted in the fashion outlined below:

a) **Method triangulation** - The consultants compared information collected by different methods, e.g. interviews, focus group discussion, documents review.  
b) **Source triangulation** - The consultants compared information from different sources, i.e. at various management levels in different implementing partners, sector leads, and NERMAP partners in Government, the UN, NGOs and the private sector.  
c) **Report validation** - Triangulation is also rounded up during the presentation of draft reports and the NERMAP used the report validation workshop to fulfil this requirement.

1.5 **Limitations:**

The following limitations were experienced during the mid-term review:

a) **Non-availability of reports from some sectors** - While some sectors submitted their reports to the NDMA and to the consultants upon request, some of them did not have reports on the response. Even those who had, the content was not in a form that helped to measure actual output against planned output. This made data triangulation challenging. Apart from consolidated reports from the NDMA, only one report was received from the Social Security sector, one incomplete report from the Health and Nutrition sector, one 2015 report from the Agriculture and Food Security Sector, two reports from the Education sector and none from the WASH sector.
b) **Absence of a results framework for the NERMAP** - The NERMAP doesn't have a results framework and as such, this affected the way results were presented in the report, as well as the performance analysis of the researcher given that there virtually nothing to compare against in some cases, and reliance was posted on sector objectives as an alternative.
2. Findings – NERMAP Performance against Review Objectives

2.1 NERMAP objectives and implementation

The objectives of the NERMAP have been placed at sectorial level and not much at overall level. The table in ANNEX A shows the objectives of the different sectors of the NERMAP as detailed in the plan. Notably, some of the sectors had overall objectives while others had specific objectives only. However, from the plan, it can be deduced that central to its development was preserving human and animal lives and infrastructure, as well as livelihoods in the context of the El Nino drought disaster. While all seem specific and relevant, targeting the real issues on the ground, the NERMAP objectives lack measurability and clear timelines for delivery, i.e., they are not entirely SMART (Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant and Time-bound).

The implementation of the NERMAP was due to start at the beginning of February 2016 where the NDMA and other implementing partners were expected to mobilize and/or make available committed resources, and use those to procure goods and services for distribution to affected communities. Responsive support through the NERMAP was intended for implementation throughout the country with special emphasis to the Shiselweni and Lubombo Regions of Swaziland, targeting urban, peri-urban and rural areas.

Essentially, the NERMAP was to be implemented in all fifty-five (55) Tinkhundla (constituencies) within the four (4) administrative regions of the country through various implementing partners comprising development agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). A total of eight (7) sectors/clusters were identified by the NERMAP namely; Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), Agriculture and Food Security, Education, Health and Nutrition, Storm Damage Rehabilitation, Social Protection, and the very coordination of the NERMAP.

2.2 Technical soundness of the NERMAP

a) Positive/Good aspects

i) NERMAP was designed based on surveys conducted on the drought situation in the country with some of the targets adjusted either in the NERMAP or sector-specific plans after subsequent assessments at sector level. A plan based on scientific evidence of the problem is regarded as technically sound and good.

ii) The plan indicated resources needed for implementation, including budget estimates for the 18 months period (Feb 2016 - March 2017) and beyond (long-term interventions). This is commendable since it assists implementers and donors understand the resource requirements and mobilize accordingly;

iii) The plan was crafted to deal with the impact of the El Nino drought and accompanying natural disasters such as addressing water shortage, food shortages, Gender-Based Violence (GBV) issues, death of animals from
degraded grazing land and lack of water, provision of building and roofing material (and sometimes labour) to victims of storm wreckage and others).

b) **Poor aspects**

i) From the onset, a budget deficit was indicated without a proper and viable plan to mobilize the required resources. Without a Disaster Management Fund in place, by October/November 2016 the NERMAP had only been funded up to 41% without clear prospects for further funding. This is partly responsible for implementation delays and limited coverage of assistance;

ii) The NERMAP is not strong in identifying communities in no-so-severely affected communities from those that are severely affected except for a few dire cases such as in the Somntongo, Lubulini and Mbabane communities, blurring the concept of prioritizing the more vulnerable as the drought does not affect the entire country the same way;

iii) The absence of a results framework for the NERMAP makes it difficult to determine the level of achievement against set target results, making the plan deficient in facilitating measuring of results, in particular to inform progression from emergency (mitigation) phase to recovery (adaptation) phase;

iv) It is unclear how communities (including community leaders), and the private sector were involved in the development of the NERMAP apart from Government agencies, UN Agencies, and CSOs which indicates their limited inclusion in the response mechanism;

v) Even though the NERMAP outputs and targets were revised using assessments conducted after the launch, the revision process and documentation of such revisions remains unclear. Inability to raise sufficient funds in good time affected how the plan is implemented, including some realities on the ground such as the drying up of water tables, further drops in Dam water levels, and delays in the procurement processes. A number of assessments have been carried out since February 2016 (See **ANNEX G**).

vi) The NERMAP does not capture sustainability (i.e., maintaining the gains made and continuity of interventions that may be required after the emergency response) and gradual downscaling of the emergency implementation as an integral part and working towards recovery. Noted was the lack of the NERMAP risk-management which could result in the possible abruptness interference and negative consequences of the response.

### 2.3 Agriculture and Food Security Sector

#### 2.3.1 Overview

This sector’s overall objective ensures national food security and supports affected households with restoring their agricultural productive capacity and building resilience to future climatic shocks. As such, the sector targeted the provision of food assistance to beneficiaries in hard hit areas, providing feed and water to cattle in dire drought
situations, and the distribution of farming inputs to farmers in order to ensure the restoration of production and food security.

2.3.2 Achievements/promising aspects

a) Food distribution and cash transfers

The government, through the NDMA started distributing food to communities in 2015, way before the emergency was declared. Other partners started in June 2016 to distribute food to beneficiaries as dictated by the arrival of resources such as funds and food items. Food supplies came with funding from the Government of Swaziland, WFP donors, USAID (through World Vision) and cash donations from the private sector (See ANNEX G for details of donations). By December 2016, about 510,248 beneficiaries had received food aid. Another 89,679 beneficiaries received cash for food amounting to E 40,160,200.00, taking the total number of beneficiaries to 413,553, which makes 18% more than the original target of 350,000 beneficiaries.

The criteria used for the selection of beneficiaries according to their vulnerability status have been widely accepted by community leaders and members (because it involved them). The amount of food (Maize, beans and cooking oil) distributed (ration), was agreed upon and complied with the minimum humanitarian food assistance standards. The table below shows the amount of food distributed and the number of beneficiaries reached by December 2016.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food Pipeline</th>
<th>No.HHs</th>
<th>No.ofBs</th>
<th>MAIZE (MT)</th>
<th>BEANS (MT)</th>
<th>Oil in MT</th>
<th>Total in MT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NDMA</td>
<td>71248</td>
<td>153,167</td>
<td>4230</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>4871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>24,441</td>
<td>122,088</td>
<td>6207</td>
<td>1423</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>8272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WVS</td>
<td>1731</td>
<td>7330</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WVS-USAID</td>
<td>8086</td>
<td>41,172</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>105,506</td>
<td>323,874</td>
<td>11765</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1025</td>
<td>14787</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Cash transfers (E550 per family per month) have been welcome in the communities where they are in operation instead of food transfers. According to a study carried by the BSRCS, on average 75% of the cash transfers was used primarily for buying food items, while the rest is used for other pressing family needs such as hygiene, medical issues and others. Table 2 below shows the number of beneficiaries who received cash and the amount of cash distributed by December 2016. It is worth noting that the WFP is working on expanding the cash distribution operation to reach about 114,000 beneficiaries.

---

Table 2: Cash Transfer’s by Dec 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inhundla/Community</th>
<th>No.HHs /Bfs</th>
<th>Total Cash received/Bfs</th>
<th>Total cash distributed</th>
<th>No.HHs /Bfs</th>
<th>Total Cash received/Bfs</th>
<th>Total cash distributed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Cash Areas</td>
<td>9,800</td>
<td>58,800</td>
<td>27,860,000</td>
<td>6,174</td>
<td>30,879</td>
<td>12,300,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cash transfers for the NERMAP were funded by the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operation” (ECHO) and other donors through the World Food Programme (WFP).

The NDMA conducted during and post- monitoring of the food distribution process on an ad hoc basis. Partners with food pipelines (WFP for instance) and those responsible for distribution (e.g. World Vision) conduct their own monitoring activities also. Results from WFP’s Post-distribution monitoring (PDM) survey showed that the overall proportion of households with poor food consumption decreased significantly compared to the baseline, with an overall reduction of 70 percent. Female-headed households performed particularly well, with a reduction of 81 percent in households with poor food consumption.

Results of the PDM survey presented some differences between transfer modalities. For in-kind food assistance, the proportion of households with poor food consumption decreased by 92 percent, while it decreased by 56 percent among people supported with CBT. The positive trend for in-kind food beneficiaries is likely a result of the size of the food rations, which accounted for 84 percent of the daily energy requirement, whereas the monthly cash entitlement accounted for 42 percent of the daily energy requirement. However, it should be noted that the food consumption of CBT beneficiaries had shown improvement in a shorter period of time.

The PDM showed an overall improvement in the household dietary diversity score (HDDS) for all households. CBT beneficiaries had a slightly higher average HDDS, likely caused by their ability to buy different food items and thus further diversifying their food baskets.

b) Saving livestock

The Government led an initiative to provide a total of 5408 hay bales to livestock owners in an endeavor to save them was a very good move. In a bid to save livestock, the MOA encouraged farmers to destock and promoted further auctions meant to give farmers reasonable cash in the place of their cattle (economic benefit) instead of losing the cattle to the drought and getting nothing in return.

When rains started falling again around October 2016, rangelands started recovering, and with the significantly reduced number of animals due to the
drought, the condition of cattle was observed to be improving around the country, including in dryer places like Lubuli.

c) Distribution of farm inputs

A total of 16,700 farmers/households have been targeted for input distribution for early recovery purposes (12,500 MoA/FAO, 4,200 WVS). About 4,200 farmers have already been given input (Sorghum, cowpeas, seeds) from places such as Somntongo Matsanjeni, Mpolonjeni, Shewula) and other farmers in other areas have also received input in the form of maize seeds and others, totaling 11,000 by end of January 2017. Implementers have monitors on the ground to see to it that the programme goes well.

Training on Climate-Smart Agriculture was conducted by World Vision targeting 1221 lead-farmers who would, in turn, train a group of up to 20 farmers per attached lead-farmer. World Vision receives updates from the lead farmers who provide practical training and technical information/support to the farmers attached to them.

d) Maize farming

Whereas the long-term plan is to allocate a total of 6,000ha of land to irrigated maize farming by the private sector, only 553.8ha has been allocated by organizations such as SWADE, RSSC, ACAT and others, producing about 2,783 MT during the winter season. It is yet to be seen if the 6,000ha target will be reached in the medium as more effort will be required to get this done.

2.3.3 Challenges/short-comings

a) Food and Cash Distribution

Beneficiary list establishment at community level.

In some communities, while the criteria for identifying beneficiaries was widely accepted, the process of verifying the vulnerability status of beneficiaries by distributing partners was allegedly not transparent. Beneficiaries and community leaders interviewed in five (5) out of the fifteen (15) constituencies visited indicated dissatisfaction with the selection process, decrying the exclusion of ‘deserving’ would-be beneficiaries. Unfortunately, not all affected distributing partners were available for verifying the submissions made by communities.

Amount of food received

Communities revealed inconsistent interventions of food parcels, some of the communities visited indicated that they would receive food once a month, while others would receive food once after two months, and others after three months.

---

4 Distributing NGO would allegedly return with a reduced list of beneficiaries without the community’s involvement, and not providing answers on how the new list was arrived at.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Food distribution intervals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mayiwane</td>
<td>Received food in October and December</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khubuta</td>
<td>Received food in September, then December</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maseyisini</td>
<td>Received food twice between July and December</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even though no loss of human life has been reported from lack of access to food during the drought period, the stress that come with lack of food amidst expectation to receive food at the end of each month as promised was clearly raised in those communities where food distribution was not taking place on a monthly basis. Secondly, some communities, for instance, at Mkhiweni, Kubuta, Mafutseni and Mtfongwaneni constituencies reported that the amount of food received was reduced for larger families as a strategy to ensure that all families receive the food. This negatively tempered with the nutritional requirements per person as the larger the family, the smaller the quantities of food received per individual family member. As much as there was an effort to meet distribution standards, due to resources, some partners were not able to distribute as per number of people in the household.

**Logistics and funding**
Challenges include logistics for distributions (since Logistics as a cluster was not established in the NERMAP), poor planning for some partners and long distance to distribution points for beneficiaries. Examples of logistics challenges include inability to ferry food supplies in time, forcing distribution activities to be cancelled in the eleventh hour, infuriating communities in some cases who come to distribution points as early as 5.00am. Proper planning and availability of reliable transport system through the cluster arrangement would effectively resolve this. Further, it was reported that NDMA’s food distribution was terminated by December 2016 due to shortage of resources.

**Amount of cash received**
Even though some partners transferred cash according to the number of beneficiaries in the household, in other communities, concerns raised that the amount of money transferred is the same regardless of the size of the family, whereas, with food distribution, the amount of food increase as the family members increase in numbers. The E550 per family has been described as insufficient compared to the minimum standard for food requirement per family calculations by the NDMA indicated that the ration of food distributed per household equaled E821.00 per month. While it remains unclear when these will be ended, indications are that it might not be possible to carry on with cash transfers after April 2017.

**b) Saving livestock**
The target number of animals provided with hay and water was not necessarily estimated in the NERMAP, making it difficult to gauge achievement. In addition, lack of a risk-management approach resulted in one of the hay bales consignments procured from the Republic of South Africa was contaminated and resulted in the death of an estimated 285 cattle and this resulted in most farmers shying away from
sourcing hay bales for their cattle, Processes to test the quality of the hay were not in place. The lack of a properly established logistics sector for the NERMAP also dealt a blow to the hay distribution process as the trucks could only deliver the hay at central points and yet farmers did not have transport to take the hay bales from where they have been stored for their cattle. As a result, implementing partners report that 600 hay bales remained unused by January 2017.

The plan to drill boreholes to provide water for cattle did not proceed as funding was not available (Government did not commit funds for this intervention and donors did not fund it). Secondly, water tables dried as the drought continued and this lead to drilling that would not result in water security for the cattle. Instead, water was ferried by water tankers to the locations where cattle were reported in danger of dying from dehydration.

The plan to resuscitate grazing areas through re-grassing could not pick up as there was no sufficient water to support the programme. The original plan was that grass seeds would be spread in a cultivated area and irrigated.

Cattle were actioned but it transpired that the buyers were not doing it for slaughtering the cattle but for transferring it to other grazing land. In this regard, the plan had not yielded its intended results as the cattle farmers' paradigm had not shifted regarding destocking. Statistics on auctioned cattle was not available at Mid-Term Review.

c) Farming input distribution

Poor reporting mechanism resulted in the difficulty to monitor the status of the recovery programme apart from the successful distribution of seeds (inputs) and as such no specific updates were received on the status of the recovery programme apart from the successful distribution of seeds. The success of the lead-farmer training on climate-smart agriculture programme has not been tested yet.

2.4 Education

2.4.1 Overview

The overall objective of the education plan is to minimize the impact of the protracted drought in the school system and ensuring that learning continues and it came about because of the threat of the drought to disrupt schools and other education institutions and processes due to the shortage of water and food. A rapid sector assessment was conducted by the sector on a sampling basis to determine the impact of the drought in order to establish appropriate steps to be taken.

Central to the cluster's plan was ensuring water and food security in schools through the drilling and/or rehabilitation of boreholes and water supply through water tanks, supplying food commodities for breakfast to the schools, providing alternative sanitary and hygiene facilities, as well as raising awareness on the drought situation and how to respond appropriately.
The sector's outputs are basically aligned to other sectors such as WASH, Agriculture and Food Security, and the Health and Nutrition Sectors, leaving us with the question of whether the Education was really supposed to be singled out as a sector or covered under the other sectors as a subset.

2.4.2 Achievements/promising aspects

a) Water security

The drilling of boreholes in the urban WASH response was discouraged by the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) and was eventually not carried out in Mbabane and Ngwenya as originally planned. Instead, a total of 29 schools around Mbabane and Ngwenya received water tanks and had water distributed through tankers. The installation of tanks came along with plumbing services to ensure the connection of the tank water to the school hygiene system.

Water was also distributed to schools without functional boreholes such that no school was water insecure in the country according to the Education Cluster reports. Water was sourced from the Swaziland Water Services Corporation (SWSC) at no cost to the schools. Two (2) World Vision tankers, two (2) tankers from the Ministry of Education and Training were used to distribute water to schools and educational institutions around the country. About a 120 tanks were distributed to 60 schools in Hhohho and Manzini regions (2 per school). Water security was also a function of water harvesting mechanisms in schools and to this end, rainwater harvesting systems were installed in 9 schools and 1 clinic in the Lubombo and Shiselweni Regions through assistance from the UNDP-UNOCHA collaboration.

Through the intervention, the sector was able to achieve its objective of continued learning which would otherwise be disrupted through possible stoppage of water-based experiments in schools and reduced attendance due to food security and threat of disease outbreak from compromised hygiene.

Schools benefiting from Water Harvesting Systems (tanks)

1. Nkalashana Primary
2. Mambane Clinic
3. Loiyiwe Primary
4. Ekuphakameni Primary
5. Etjendlovu Primary
6. Etjendlovu High School
7. Kmazila Primary
8. Mgampondo Primary
9. Hhohho AME Primary
10. Sinceni Primary
b) **Food Security**

By the end of December 2016, about 70% of all public schools in the rural and peri-urban areas received the breakfast commodities\(^5\) from the NDMA, funded by the Government of Swaziland targeting all 817 schools in the country. Beneficiaries and community leaders in all visited constituencies reported that their schools received the breakfast meal and that school attendance and early coming to school improved due to the intervention.

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)

\(\text{NDMA Technical Services Quarterly Report (Oct-Dec 2016).}\)
With World Vision facilitating the construction of hygiene facilities, it was unclear what the target was beyond the 19 schools as this appears to be part of World Vision’s programme, funded by UNICEF and contextualized within the NERMAP.

The impact of the awareness creation campaigns on water, sanitation and hygiene were also not indicated.

2.5 Health and Nutrition

2.5.1 Overview

The sector intended to prevent and reduce the incidence of epidemiological hazards and other outbreaks associated with the anticipated adverse climatic conditions, mounting a coordinated emergency preparedness and response system and ensure early recovery to affected communities, and reducing mortality and morbidity by timely identification and appropriate management of acutely malnourished children (6-59 months) and pregnant and lactating women and PLWH.

The Health and Nutrition Sector conducted a rapid assessment\(^6\) nationwide on the impact of the drought on the sector with the support and funding of the World Health Organization, UNICEF, UNFPA and WFP. The assessment aimed to support drought policy, planning and implementation of intervention strategies and adaptation measures by documenting the health nutrition situation and the health system preparedness to respond to the impacts of drought. It also outlines the Emergency Response Plan for the sector in the context of the Multi-hazard Contingency Plan and the NERMAP. The box below shows some of the highlights of the assessment.

| a) | Increasing cases of Severe Acute Malnutrition starting from January 2016 |
| b) | Global Acute Malnutrition also emerged around January 2016, not observed in the pre-drought period; |
| c) | Increase in the number of people admitted in the Food by Prescription Programme during the period September 2015 to February 2016. However the ART programme has seen a decrease in the number of admissions |
| d) | Increase in the cases of anaemia during the drought period |
| e) | No cases of measles |
| f) | Decrease in cases of malaria |
| g) | Decrease in skin infections by half during the drought period |
| h) | 50% increase in eye disease cases during the drought period from 5368 in 2014 to 8078 in 2015 |
| i) | Number of ART defaulters increased by 12% and those for TB defaulters increased eight times during the drought period |
| j) | significant declines in cases of hypertension (40%), diabetes (53%), and mental disorders (55%) were observed in the drought period compared to 2014; |
| k) | Pregnant women attending antenatal care in health facilities and the number of deliveries in the health facilities declined by 55% and 11% respectively |

Targeting and results orientation was not very much reflected in the plan except for the fact that the plan was taken from the existing operational plan of the cluster, re-orientated for emergency circumstances, increasing mileage in most cases.

---

\(^6\) Swaziland Comprehensive Drought Health and Nutrition Assessment Report, March 2016
2.5.2 Achievements/promising aspects

a) Management of Acute Malnutrition in all affected areas

As of December 2016, the sector had procured and distributed stocks of Ready to Use Therapeutic Foods to treat 6,346 cases of acute malnutrition. The procurement and distribution of therapeutic feeding supplies was provided to 29 health facilities to strengthen the management of acute malnutrition with the support of UNICEF Swaziland.

According to the Health and Nutrition sector, a mass measles vaccination programme for children in schools was conducted during the NERMAP period targeting all schools in the country.

A total of 834 Rural Health Motivators were trained on health and nutrition in the face of the drought situation, in order to conduct community-level growth monitoring and referrals as well as promotion of good infant and young children feeding practices and the RHMs were supplied with Home Based Care commodities (See Table below).

Table 3: Home Based Care supplies for RHMs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ORS Sachets</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Boxes</td>
<td>Delivered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloves (Large &amp; Medium)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Boxes</td>
<td>Delivered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaseline (Blue Seal)</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>Boxes</td>
<td>Delivered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molicare (napkins)-large, medium &amp; small</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Boxes</td>
<td>Delivered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vapomol</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Boxes</td>
<td>Delivered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastic Apron</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Boxes</td>
<td>Delivered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jik (750 ml)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>bottles</td>
<td>Delivered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunlight (250g)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Boxes</td>
<td>Delivered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Risk gloves (large and medium)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Boxes</td>
<td>Delivered</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) Active Disease Surveillance and Response

The Epidemic Task Force (ETF) was activated at regional and national level in order to strengthen surveillance. Importantly, no disease outbreak was witnessed during the drought period and in the event of an outbreak, the system was well-placed to identify early warning signs for the sector to respond, even though this happens at a higher level (regional/national level, and not at community level, and not immediately).

Mass inspection of food was conducted by the sector especially in the urban area such as Siphofaneni, Mbabane, Pigg’s Peak and other areas, ensuring that food is safe and if expired not sold. Unfortunately, reports do not indicate how much coverage was made in terms of the number of outlets inspected and the findings of the inspections.
c) **Health Systems Strengthening**

Water tanks for health facilities were procured and all health facilities received water through water tankers, ensuring water security in the health facilities. Three (3) new trucks were used to ferry the water to the health facilities. In addition, 30 chemical toilets and 100 pit-latrines were bought for health facilities in the regions, as well as 50 digesters for the toilets.

Significant investments to strengthen nutrition surveillance were made with MoH and SNNC. Examples include training for 12 master trainers on screening and referral for malnutrition, who in turn trained 834 Rural Health Motivators; 21 health workers in the Integrated Management of Acute Malnutrition (IMAM); and 317 health workers on the Baby Friendly Hospital Initiative for improved Infant and Young Child Feeding practices. These skills equipped staff to improve monitoring and referral of malnutrition screening. In total 895 children were treated for acute malnutrition during the period under review.

To strengthen the national IMAM reporting system, the SNNC introduced the short message service based system to track malnutrition cases and identify hotspots, as well as RapidPro which was adopted to facilitate real time reporting of selected indicators from 25 out of the 41 health centres responsible for treating malnutrition.

d) **Emergency stock-piling and pre-positioning**

The sector reported that zinc stock piles were increased in anticipation for diarrhea outbreak. The plan did not specify what other stocks would be required.

e) **Health promotion and Child Health Day campaigns**

Comprehensive Health campaigns were held at Somntongo and Matsanjeni areas for 30 consecutive days, reaching in excess of 5,000 people. Medication and staff was provided by the government (Ministry of Health). Two cars were hired for the campaign, funded by the NDMA. The campaign revealed the following:

- a) There is an increase in Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) among the Swazi Population and they are not refilling their medication due to the impact of the drought
- b) There was no confirmed case of malnutrition among children from the campaign even though poor nutrition was observed among adults (pellagra).
- c) Stress related ailments were as a result of lack of farm inputs or not affording to start farming while others are observed doing their ploughing

2.5.3 **Challenges/Short-comings**

Whereas the plan was to expand the Immediate Diseases Notification System to incorporate feedback and connect to the community system, this remains a work-in-
progress as it has not necessarily been achieved due to a number of reasons, including staff shortages. Weekly updates were not obtained to inform the sector response.

The procurement of RTUFs and anthropometric tools was not possible due to shortage of funds. Cholera kits were not procured as planned purely because of insufficient budget.

However, concerns have been raised on the use of the chemical toilets regarding its likely impact on the natural environment.

2.6 Water and Sanitation Sector

2.6.1 Overview

In the NERMAP, the sector’s role is to prevent the loss of life during the drought by ensuring the provision of potable water supply and sanitation facilities to citizens in order to prevent the outbreak of water borne diseases such as cholera, zoonotic and diarrheal diseases in all areas.

The seriousness of the situation was characterized by falling of dam water levels with Hawane Dam falling down to 4% by August 2016, Mnjoli Dam to a low of about 3% and Mbabane river unable to supply enough water to the extraction facility, and the Maguga Dam was at 17%.

Apart from household water needs threatening the livelihood of communities, especially those in the eastern half of the country, it was estimated that about 197,157 students, teachers and workers nationally at risk of water borne diseases.

2.6.2 Achievements/promising aspects

a) Urban response

Through the NERMAP, abstraction area for the Mbabane/Pholinjani Rivers was increased for the water holding capacity. This was helpful as water could be pumped to the reservoir at Mangwaneni (Hospital hill) which was used to supply the Central Business District (CBD) with water following the complete drying up of the Hawane Dam the supply source for the city.

The City Council of Mbabane encouraged business operators secure temporal water reservoirs to fill with water in the event of a complete unavailability of water. The city council also applied water restrictions that included the banning of watering gardens and washing cars, rationing of water in the city and engaging in a massive campaign, and encouraging the conservation of water.

A total of 50 water tanks were purchased by NDMA and installed in parts of the city, and subsequently filled with water through tankers. Water was provided by the

---

7 Office of the UN Swaziland Resident Coordinator Situation Report No. 2 (as of 14 Mar 2016)
SWSC at no cost. This was preceded by the mapping of locations where it would be strategic to locate water facilities (schools, hospitals, CBD, communities). Five (5) water bowser (2 from city council and 3 from NDMA) were used to distribute water around the city. While the tanks were provided by the NDMA, the Micro Projects facilitated with the plumbing aspect.

A plan to draw water from the Luphohlo Dam to supply the Mbabane City through installing a water pipeline connecting the two (2) points was executed only to be completed after the water situation had normalized in Mbabane, with the Hawane Dam overflowing by the end of December 2016. Costing in the region of E110 Million (Approx. US$8.15Million), the project was estimated to bring a supply of at least 10 mega litres a day to a daily need of 26.5 mega litres a day under normal circumstances.

Collaboration between the Swaziland Electricity Company (SEC), the SWSC, City Council of Mbabane and the DWA on water management during the drought crisis, was instrumental in keeping the city water taps running as reflected during consultations.

Awareness levels for water usage/conservation were significantly low until the scare of a complete urban water shutdown was visible enough for all to act.

b) Rural response

A rapid assessment conducted on functioning boreholes identified 62 vandalized boreholes, requiring rehabilitation, and only 49 of these were rehabilitated.

For the rural areas, the WASH cluster targeted the drilling and installation of 77 new boreholes. A total of 14 boreholes were drilled and operationalized (benefiting 5803 beneficiaries) while 48 boreholes were only drilled and not operational by the end of December 2016. Potable water was distributed to 87 strategic sites in 16 Tinkhundla in the country. The private sector also distributed water to affected communities in adjacent areas such as the RSSC (Lomahasha and surrounding areas), and Canterbury (Lubulini, Nsoko and surrounding areas).

Potable Water Distributed to: Lomahasha, Nkilongo, Somntongo, Hlane, Lubulini, Sigwe, Dvokodvweni, Mkhweni, Shiselweni 1, Mayiwane, Mpolonjeni, Maseyisini, Motshane, Zombodze Emuva, Nhambeni and Mhlangatane.

‘Distributing potable water to communities was a life-saving intervention.’ A total of 1,470,000 litres of water was distributed to rural communities upon request in the implementation of the NERMAP.

2.6.3 Challenges/short-comings

The lowering of the water table made the drilling of boreholes in the city unsuccessful. Only four (4) out of 20 boreholes drilled yielded 3.5l/s or better, the rest did not,
making this an unviable option, thus abandoned. The lowering of the water table affected other areas, especially those in drought hit areas in the Lubombo and Shiselweni regions.

**Response plans for water shortages**

Concrete plans to respond to water shortages (from a preparedness point of view) were not in place in the urban area, evidenced by the construction of the Luphohlo-Mbabane pipeline that could take up to eight (8) months to complete, and the dredging of the Hawane Dam that did not contribute much to the alleviation of the situation apart from slightly increasing the dam holding capacity for the future. Some of the institutions directly involved in water provision, such as the SWSC, City Council of Mbabane and DWA indicated that they have long-term plans to deal with water shortages (particularly on infrastructure development for water storage) but these require funding that has not been available.

**Water distribution**

Water distribution to communities lacked consistency as some communities would have their tanks refilled days to weeks after the water was finished, e.g., Mkhiweni Inkhundla. None of the communities visited reported consistency in water distribution. The minimum amount of water received by individuals does not seem to have been standard, leading to guesswork when it comes to determining sufficiency of the potable water distribution for affected communities.

**Borehole yield and accessibility**

Communities also reported that some of the boreholes drilled did not yield water while some reported that the location of the boreholes was far, while in some cases a large communities would share a single borehole.

**Water treatment kits**

The WASH sector intended to provide water treatment kits to households in order to reduce chances for the outbreak of water-borne diseases. The procurement government and approval processes took a long time such that the kits arrived in January 2017. However, no outbreak of water-borne diseases (even during the raining season) was reported. According to UNICEF, communities were encouraged to use JIK for potable water treatment.

### 2.7 Storm damage rehabilitation

#### 2.7.1 Overview

Baphalali Swaziland Red Cross Society (BSRCS) was lead the storm damage assessment. The NDMA was responsible for rehabilitation, relying on the assessment reports produced by BSRCS, by providing material and organizing labour which, most of the time, was supplied by the armed forces in the police force and the army.
2.7.2 Achievements/Promising Aspects

a) Assessment and Rehabilitation of schools’ damaged roof

A total of 59 schools were reportedly damaged by storms between February and December 2016 and were renovated by MOET. Some were renovated in January 2017 in readiness of schools’ opening. Most of the schools (58%) are in the Lubombo (17) and Shiselweni (17) regions whilst 25 schools were in the Hhohho (15) and Manzini (10) regions. The MOET Education in Emergency Fund (EIE) was used to rehabilitate schools.

Renovations were targeting re-roofing and glazing of classrooms, staff houses, kitchens and administration blocks. No deaths were reported from the storm damage in schools.

b) Reconstruction of houses destroyed by storm

Out of 459 households affected by storms, a total of 273 was confirmed to be in need of rehabilitation. A total of hundred and fifty nine (159) houses have since been rehabilitated (58%) with 114 remaining by the end 2016. Another 70 houses required reconstruction and only 5 of those (7%) were reconstructed due to constraints in funding. It is important to note that the statistics available show that certain areas of the country experienced more damage than other areas for various reasons. Whilst a trend is being investigated in terms of geographic outlay, there is also an observation that the quality of construction, particularly roofing, is not up to standard for the majority of the houses affected by the storm, indicating the need for the country to address risk-proof infrastructure from a disaster preparedness point of view.

From a trend perspective, it is important to note that 21% of the constituencies/communities make up 73% of the cases with two (2) constituencies (Matsanjeni and Madlangempisi) making up 46% of the cases. Depending on past and future occurrences, these places should be prioritized for preparedness programmes for storm damage.

On another note, residents in some communities, such as Gundvwini, are aware of the storm trends and have come to conclude the certain type of roofing is suitable for withstanding storms in their area. For instance, roofing by corrugated iron sheets with a line of bricks around the roof is strongly recommended as those houses with such roofing were spared along the storm wreckage line.
Table 4: Storm damage rehabilitation status 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of HH affected</th>
<th>HH receiving relief</th>
<th>Houses for renovation</th>
<th>Rehabilitated houses</th>
<th>New structures needed</th>
<th>New structures constructed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manzini</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubombo</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hhohho</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiselweni</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>459</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Reconstructed by the author from NDMA reports

Apart from the rehabilitation of homes, the NDMA also provided relief assistance in the form of tents, blankets, food, mattresses for storm victims. About 157 families received relief assistance. The number of households assisted is primarily informed by the availability of resources, prioritizing the most vulnerable.

2.7.3 Challenges/short-comings

Quality of buildings / structure

The Assessment was not able to reveal the age of the buildings renovated. Some of these could be placed in this situation by the fact that they were already in bad shape. Comprehensive on-going assessment is necessary for all the schools, at least every two (2) years to reduce the risk of storm damage.

Climate-smart Designs

The planned redesign of school buildings to be climate-smart has not yet been carried out. The NDMA is in the process of engaging a consultant to work on the climate-smart designs for school with consideration to their location and recent trends.

Building material procurement

Whereas the plan was to purchase emergency stock to be readily available, NDMA could not procure material as required, given resource constraints. The NDMA was able to rely on existing stock for relief assistance material such as tents, blankets and mattresses (provided by UNDP/JICA in 2014). Delays in the release of funds for schools storm damage rehabilitation resulted in the untimely renovations.

Road conditions

The rehabilitation of the rural road infrastructure was not adequate considering the insufficient funds to cater for the intervention. The country's rural roads remain in a bad condition.
2.8 Social Protection

2.8.1 Overview

The broader intention of Social Protection interventions in the NERMAP was providing protection to all affected people especially vulnerable groups such as children, OVC, women, elderly and people living with vulnerable groups, from exploitation, violence abuse and neglect resulting from socio-economic constraints borne from the emergency situation. The premise for this position is the trendy observation that in emergency situation vulnerable groups are taken advantage of by stronger categories of people.

Led by the Deputy Prime Minister’s Office (Department of Social Welfare), the sector stakeholders include the police, the army, Save the Children Swaziland, the National Emergency Response Council on HIV and AIDS (NERCHA), Family Life Association of Swaziland (FLAS), Ministry of Health/EPR, Ministry of Education – Gender/Disability office, SWANNEPHA and the UN agencies (UNFPA, WFP, UNICEF).

2.8.2 Achievements/Promising Aspects

- **a) Decreasing the incidences of sexual abuse and Gender-Based Violence**

  The sector conducted campaigns on GBV in Malkerns, Siteki, Mbabane, Nhlangano and Siphofaneni (representatives of the four administrative regions), targeting the general public in the context of the humanitarian situation, reaching about 2000 people. The sector also facilitated the commemoration of the Day of the African Child whose theme was “Protecting children in emergencies” in the Lubulini Inkhundla.

  Monthly protection awareness sessions have been conducted alongside food distributions in 123 communities reaching about 91 747 individuals from 17337 households. On focus was increasing the knowledge in sexual and economic abuse, as well as exploitation among community members in affected areas.

  A total of 109 GBV service providers were trained. Trainees included health care workers, social workers, police from the specialized domestic violence units, and NGO service providers. The expectation is that the health facilities with trained service providers will properly manage, report and refer cases of sexual abuse.

  a) 2000 People reached with GBV campaigns at Malkerns, Siteki, Mbabane, Nhlangano and Siphofaneni;
  b) Commemoration of the Day of the African Child themed “Protecting Children in Emergencies” at Lubulini;
  c) 12 monthly sessions on sexual abuse, GBV alongside food distribution – 91747 reached;
  d) 109 GBV service providers trained on GBV, sexual violence, clinical management of rape, etc.
b) **Strengthened capacity for relevant community structures to respond to sexual and economic abuse and exploitation**

According to the sector, traditional leaders, including chiefs, were identified as central to social protection issues in the communities and as such dialogues aimed at the sensitization of the traditional leaders. These were held in all four regions of the country. In addition, 256 RHMs from Sithobela and Mpolonjeni were trained on growth monitoring and the identification of child protection issues amongst children in affected communities.

Sensitization of community child protection committees was conducted through a World Vision Swaziland interventions on responding to child protection incidences with special emphasis on maintaining an alert during the drought.

c) **Enhanced capacity of local social service centres to deliver basic social services**

The sector provided integrated SRH/HIV/GBV services through a mobile clinic arrangement during the food distribution in 30 sites in Lubombo and Shiselweni, regions and by the end of November a total of 989 clients were reached with services. Secondly, a total of **2,322 dignity kits** were distributed to most vulnerable adolescent girls and boys in the same regions which have been hardest hit by the drought.

d) **Increased awareness on available social services among all affected groups**

Through the campaigns facilitated by the sector awareness creation on GBV was provided alongside food distributions, and commemoration of the Day of the African Child, and other initiatives.

2.8.3 **Challenges/short-comings**

**Sector targets**

The social protection sector in the NERMAP lacked output targets and as such, it became difficult at review to determine the rate of achievement or the lack of. For awareness creation campaigns, for instance, measuring whether the desired awareness was created remains elusive for this sector. Secondly, feedback lacks on the effects of interventions against the observed trends which would in turn inform subsequent interventions in similar circumstances. For instance, it’s difficult to tell what the traditional leaders have done to protect the vulnerable members of their communities or how the training received by the RHMs improved the identification of child protection issues.

**Information / communication material**

IEC material for sending messages on GBV, SRHS and Economic Abuse was produced for dissemination as planned but the material was perceived by many within the cluster
to lack a clear message. Messaging had to be redone and at Mid-Term Review, this was in progress.

2.9 NERMAP Coordination

2.9.1 Overview

The coordination of the NERMAP rested with the involvement of all stakeholders affected by the drought and who have a role to play in the response including various Government Ministries and Departments, UN Agencies, non-governmental organizations and the private sector. The NDMA was the sector lead, working with the Resident Coordinator’s System through the UN TWG which provided for the co-leadership role.

Core to the function was strengthening coordination in the response and recovery planning and implementation, enhancing information management systems to inform strategic decision support for effective delivery of planned interventions, performance monitoring and reporting, as well as strengthening the capacity of the NDMA to enhance disaster prevention, preparedness, response and recovery.

2.9.2 Achievements/Promising Aspects

a) Meeting and reporting coordination

The NERMAP response was managed through two structures the policy and technical levels. The policy structure was made up of Principal Secretaries from the following Ministries DPMO, MoA, MoH, and MoET. These would meet on monthly basis and provided with update by NDMA on implementation progress and resource adequacy.

The technical level was coordinated through an inter-cluster mechanism. Initially fortnightly inter-sector coordination meeting were organized by the NDMA later changed to monthly. The weekly meetings were necessitated by the need to consolidate plans and ensure operations take off. While the inter-sector level meetings seemed to have gone well, the same may cannot be said about meetings at sector or cluster level which feed into the inter-sector meetings. Figure 1 presents the NERMAP coordination model.
At regional level, Regional Disaster Management Committees (RDMC) have been activated in all regions to validate Draft Regional Disaster Management Plans with a purpose to manage prevention, preparedness, response, mitigation and recovery at regional level. The functionality of the RDMC could not be assessed at Mid-Term Review.

b) Information management and sharing

The NDMA was able to develop a Communication Action Plan meant to promote inter-cluster communication, in order to facilitate effective decision making and comprehensive undertaking during and after the drought emergency response.

A proper Information and Knowledge Management (IKM) strategy remains needed which would outline operational standards, provide guidelines and codes in the way data is generated, analyzed, packaged for dissemination, and archived, as well as establish common datasets and databases for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). In addition, IKM training at both national and regional level has not taken place.

Situational reports were prepared at sector level and presented during inter-cluster coordination meetings. At national level, situational reports were prepared and disseminated with the technical assistance from the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office (UNOCHA technical support).

c) Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring visits to targeted Tinkhundla for spot checking was conducted on food and water interventions, and on ad hoc basis according to the NDMA. Constant intervals could not be possible from a human resource sufficiency position.
A lessons learnt workshop for stakeholders was held during the MTR with an impressive participation of stakeholders for three (3) days. Output from the workshop forms part of this report (See Section 5).

2.9.3 Challenges/shortcomings

Disaster Risk Management Fund

The establishment of the Disaster Risk Management Fund (DRMF) remains an unfinished business as the Fund Regulations are being refined. The process of engaging a firm to draw up a Resource Mobilization Strategy for the NDMA was underway at Mid-Term Review. The exploration of accessing the SADC Regional Disaster Response Fund remains a possibility following the launch of the SADC Preparedness and Response Strategy in December 2016. It is widely believed that had the NDMF been in place by the time the NERMAP was put together, the funding landscape of the NERMAP could have been different, positively impacting the delivery of the response plan.

Reporting

The inter-sector meetings could have benefitted more from streamlined and standardized reporting tools that take care of all the information needs of the NERMAP. Organizing these meetings required the NDMA to work closely with sector or cluster leads and co-leads.

2.10 Other Sectors

The Environment and Energy sectors, as well as the Transport and Logistics sector were not activated in the NERMAP. However, the need to activate these was felt during the implementation of the NERMAP as rural roads required rehabilitation, transport became a challenge for most of the sectors in the NERMAP and environmental concerns not taken care of in the NERMAP implementation. Water shortage during the drought affected the generation of electricity in the country, leading to a complete reliance on electricity importation. This indicates the need to plan for energy issues during the drought.
3. **Findings – Assessment against Review Framework**

### 3.1 Relevance:

Since the country was faced with a severe drought situation that threatened human and animal lives, including the economy of the country, there was a need to develop a mechanism to respond to the situation, and the NERMAP was developed for such a purpose. While the objectives of the NERMAP are not that SMART as indicated earlier, still they were addressing the situation obtaining in the country such as food insecurity, water insecurity, cattle deaths, threatened food production, possible disruption of basic service (education and health) delivery processes and possible outbreak of diseases to name but a few.

### 3.2 Performance – Outcomes and Outputs:

**Water, Sanitation and Health (WASH)**
The sector was able to deliver water and water related services throughout the country, targeting vulnerable communities. The process was, however, negatively affected by lack of resources such that water distribution was inconsistent and relied on appeals from communities (louder and persistent ones getting attention). Fewer boreholes were rehabilitated and drilled against the plan, some not producing water. Water tanks were successfully installed and filled with water in the urban area and in some schools and communities and the abstraction capacity of the Mbabane/Pholinjani River was increased.

**Agriculture and food security**
Even though there was no consistency in some areas on food distribution intervals, reaching 94% of the targeted beneficiaries with food, water and cash under limiting financial resources is commendable and ultimately life-saving.

Supporting affected households restore their agricultural productive capacity and eventually build resilience to future climatic shock remains a work-in-progress at the review time. The distribution of farm inputs and training on climate-smart agriculture has current and future value for households.

**Education**
From conducting a rapid assessment for the education sector in the context of the drought, interventions such as the introduction of school breakfast, rehabilitating boreholes in the schools, and supplying tanked water were achieved with a high degree of success. Schools damaged by storms were rehabilitated although the pace could have been improved.
Health and Nutrition
Programmes such as food by prescription were used to ensure timely identification and appropriate management of moderately acute malnutrition in pregnant and lactating women, as well as people living with HIV and AIDS.

The functionality of health facilities around the country was ensured, including the activation of Epidemic Task Forces (ETFs).

However, statistics to indicate impact of interventions were not available for the review.

Storm damage rehabilitation
Through the collaboration of the BSRCS (conducting storm damage assessments) and the NDMA (providing building material and labour for rehabilitation), the most vulnerable households were assisted with relief assistance (tents, mattresses, blankets, etc), roofing material as well as construction of standard two-room houses where necessary.

It is impossible to ascertain though how much of the remaining households that did not receive assistance in the form of rehabilitation or reconstruction of houses are in this situation purely for the fact that they considered capable of coping or it was because of lack of sufficient resources from the NERMAP do deal with the full extent of the challenge.

Social Security
Social protection services were certainly provided by partners through the NERMAP to affected vulnerable groups such as children, OVC, women, the elderly and other vulnerable groups from exploitation, violence, abuse and neglect, as a result of the drought emergency situation.

Activities carried out include the distribution of dignity kits to the adolescent youth, awareness creation on sessions GBV, SRH, sexual and economic abuse alongside food distribution, the training of community leadership structures (chiefs), capacity building for Rural Health Motivators (RHMs) on GBV and SRH and SRHR, sexual and economic abuse and related subject matters.

Targeting for this sector was a challenge as no clear location and or population targets were clear indicated in the sector plans.

NERMAP Coordination
From the initial joint planning the government and partners to the implementation of the NERMAP the coordination at sector and national level recorded a success in terms of sector and inter-sector/cluster meetings at least on a monthly basis. Information sharing took place albeit in a less organized/structured manner. Reporting was the downside as updates were preferred instead of reports against plans and targets. The NDMA's coordination role was hampered by lack of sufficient human resource.
3.3 Efficiency:

Testing the efficiency of the implementation of the NERMAP, it is important to consider the cost-effectiveness of activities, the timely achievement of activities, as well as determining whether implementation was done in the most efficient way compared to other alternatives available.

With regards to the use of resources, the NERMAP used about US$39,098,792 to assist over 413,553 beneficiaries (based on food and cash distribution statistics) over a period of 11 months, translating to US$94.54 per beneficiary (US$8.59/beneficiary/month), which is commendable. Notably, the figure could be higher as more funds may have been raised by the end of December 2016 than reported here. Secondly, funds received do not necessarily equal funds utilized and funds are not necessarily received on a monthly basis, and as such, the calculations are for purposes of painting the broader picture of the interventions. The table below indicates that at Mid-term review, 54% of government's short-term commitment to the response had been received and available for use even though these funds were supposed to be available by May/June 2016. As such, a number of interventions planned for implementation using government funds lagged compared to the UN-supported.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>NERMAP funding requirement</th>
<th>UN requirements (Jun-Dec 2016)</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>Partners</th>
<th>Sector Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food Security</td>
<td>63,000,000</td>
<td>16,000,000</td>
<td>4,285,714</td>
<td>9,006,960</td>
<td>11,060,685</td>
<td>25,003,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>12,000,000</td>
<td>12,000,000</td>
<td>420,000</td>
<td>3,804,796</td>
<td>2,807,929</td>
<td>7,032,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health &amp; Nutrition</td>
<td>2,430,000</td>
<td>648,000</td>
<td>659,206</td>
<td>889,000</td>
<td>18,965</td>
<td>1,567,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>14,000,000</td>
<td>1,944,000</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>1,080,710</td>
<td>460,710</td>
<td>4,041,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>567,000</td>
<td>3,692</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>570,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protection</td>
<td>640,000</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>470,000</td>
<td>192,250</td>
<td>29,095</td>
<td>691,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>330,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>92,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>102,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy/Environment</td>
<td>4,420,000</td>
<td>1,333,333</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,333,333</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>860,000</td>
<td>310,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>310,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>96,400,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>31,642,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,994,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,127,408</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,977,384</strong></td>
<td><strong>39,098,792</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Swaziland Humanitarian Response Plan, Nov/Dec 2016

The declaration of the drought as a national emergency was delayed, judging by the fact that the Government of Swaziland and other partners started distributing maize to a number of areas in the country in early 2015 and the outcry from 64,000 cattle deaths was indication of a timely recognition of the problem, but it took until February 2016 for the government to declare the drought as an emergency. Ultimately, some interventions, including resource mobilization, got delayed, reducing the efficiency of the implementation.

Efficiency is also a function of the capacity of stakeholders to perform the activities in the NERMAP. The above situation indirectly indicates the financial and human resource capacity challenges of the NDMA and other partners. While coordinating the response,
the NDMA had to also implement some of the activities including the sourcing of material and labour for storm damage rehabilitation, purchasing water tankers for water distribution, and others. This is resulted in reduced coordination efficiency.

Other partners also suffered capacity challenges from the financial and human resource front demonstrated by the late or non-delivery of goods and services, poor planning, coordination and reporting. Apart from a generic coordination capacity challenge at sector leadership levels for some sectors, other capacity challenges within each of the sectors observed include shortage of equipment essential for the delivery of response activities, services and commodities such as trucks, tankers, farm implements, extension personnel and others frustrated the timely delivery of a number of services. The NDMA was not spared from the coordination inefficiency due to lack of sufficient staff and resources as regional coordinators could only hired in November 2016 and that in itself was not to cover all the human resource challenges of the Agency.

Transportation of response items remained a serious capacity challenge for sectors including the education sector when it comes to the distribution of breakfast meal supplies. As such, by the end of 2016, food supplies belonging to over 16 schools remained in the warehouse purely as a result of transport capacity challenges.

The country’s health facilities didn’t seem to have coping challenges during the disaster, but the same may not necessarily be said if an outbreak had struck. The disease surveillance system requires strengthening, especially when it comes to real-time immediate identification of disease cases, weekly feedback and connectivity of the community and the central surveillance system. The ratio of health care workers, especially nurses, to the populations that require health care services is still not sufficient.

3.4 Impact

It is not easy to determine the impact of interventions in the short-term. However, for drought emergency response, some of the interventions have short-term impact projections that can be ascertained without much difficulty. For the different sectors, the impact of the NERMAP can be seen below, both positive and negative.

**Agriculture and Food Security**

The distribution of food to populations most vulnerable to food insecurity contributed to life preservation while the distribution of farm inputs ensured early recovery and resilience. At least 80% of daily food requirements for communities affected by the El Nino drought were ensured through food distribution and cash transfers, reducing the percentage of households with poor food consumption score from a baseline of 7.13% to less than 3%\(^8\). Dietary diversity scores were expected to be improved to more than 4.5% and these were improved to about 5%. The

---

\(^8\) WFP 2016 Standard Project Report - Emergency Assistance to Drought-affected Population in Swaziland
distribution of hay bales and water to cattle impacted positively by saving cattle lives and indirectly the livelihood of citizens and economic resilience as cattle has economic value for most Swazi families.

**Education**
Disruptions to the school system were avoided through ensuring food and water security, including the continuation of learning outcomes dependent of the availability of pupils and water. This is because reports received are too the effect that attendance and punctuality improved dramatically towards 100% in schools due to the provision of breakfast meals. Significant disruptions were also avoided through the rehabilitation of school roofing and other structures destroyed by storms.

Disease outbreaks were also avoided through the provision of water to schools especially in the urban area.

On the negative, while possessing the potential to create dependency on the breakfast meal (which is not good for the school system), there was added responsibility for the schools’ support staff, especially the cooks, without necessarily an addition to their salary, creating some disgruntlement with some of them.

**Water, Sanitation and Hygiene**
As in the case of agriculture and food security, water security interventions in the NERMAP helped to save lives. It also ensured that schools and health facilities continued to operate, including keeping the urban economy functioning.

Apart from preventing the outbreak of water-borne diseases, the campaigns and interventions by the municipal councils (especially water rationing and the application of a moratorium to watering gardens and washing cars), created the necessary water conservation awareness the country needs.

**Social Protection**
Increased awareness on social protection services was created in addition to increased capacity building for RHMs and chiefs and service providers for GBV and abuse services from the campaigns, training interventions and dialogues that flowed from the NERMAP. Awareness on GBV, SRH, sexual and economic abuse also increased, although the magnitude of such increase cannot be confirmed but the number of people reached and communities reached have been impacted positively (See Findings – Outcomes for statistics).

The dignity of adolescent boys and girls was preserved through the distribution of dignity kits to the vulnerable populations. The challenge remains with the continuation of such post-NERMAP because consensus exists that these are required
within and without the NERMAP context. Certainly, a gap will be realized on discontinuation of the distribution of these items.

**Storm damage rehabilitation**

The renovation/rehabilitation of 159 houses, construction of 6 new houses and the provision of relief assistance in the form of tents, blankets and others indicates the extent which the NERMAP went in as far as sustaining people’s lives and restoring their livelihoods. Directing such assistance to the most vulnerable has ensured that no destitute community members are created by the disaster situation.

**Coordination**

The ability of the response to deliver the planned activities, monitoring of these activities was largely dependent on the effectiveness of the coordination of the response. Some of the coordination benefits realized include the elimination of duplication of activities by stakeholders and seriously enhanced collaboration and information sharing which was responsible for the optimization of resources directed at the response. Continuous update on the response enhanced monitoring and control, ensuring that delivery is on target.

Collaboration arising from response coordinated ensured that more resources are directed to the response, expanding the reach of the response in the country as evidenced by the donations made by the public sector and other players are not ordinarily philanthropic in nature.

### 3.5 Phasing out:

A majority of the emergency response activities were planned to end by March 2017 except for a few. Most of these depended on the assumptions that rains will come and the water situation in the country will normalize around March 2017, communities would start consuming food from their farming activities, moving away from reliance on the emergency relief assistance.

A number of the NERMAP interventions can benefit from a phase-out plan coupled with a clear sustainability plan for some, especially with a clear justification and funding. The supply of breakfast meal to schools, for instance, requires funding and until it is part of government’s budget, it will not be sustainable and the repercussion on the delivery of education services would be significant.

Portable water distribution is certainly not sustainable and the emphasis has been placed on water harvesting systems for communities and the continuation of the DWA plans to rehabilitate all rural water schemes and boreholes, as well as investing in more dam infrastructure in strategic places around the country for large-scale rainwater harvesting and storage. Water conservation should be the platform
explored by all in order to minimize wastage of water and increase the return from the use of available water.

The distribution of dignity kits remains vital to communities within and outside the NERMAP context, as well as addressing GBV and SRHR, sexual and economic abuse issues. A number of organizations are on the ground on GBV and related issues and are expected to continue with lessons from the drought and raise resources for continuing with the distribution of dignity kits.

The distribution of hay bales at half the cost is not sustainable in the long term and farmers should be encouraged to find ways to destock and secure hay bales for their cattle.

Apart from attending to existing capacity issues within the health system, especially disease surveillance, the majority of the activities carried out in the NERMAP were only an up-scaled version of normally programming for the Health and Nutrition cluster.
4. Promising practices and Lessons Learnt

4.1 Promising practices

4.1.1 Response Planning, stakeholder involvement and Coordination

The wider involvement of stakeholders in the development and coordination of the NERMAP is hailed as a key driver for successful implementation and enhanced chances for achieving the objectives of the plan. Although community involvement at planning stages could not be identified during the review, relevant stakeholders consulted throughout the review process regard the development and implementation model of the NERMAP to be a good one especially because of its effects in eliminating duplication by partners, ensuring the buy-in and support for response successful implementation, and sharing of information which is critical for planning, implementation and coordination.

The mobilization of non-traditional players such as Swazi MTN, banks, security personnel and others was hailed as a good practice as their input made a number of interventions possible and much efficient.

Beneficiary targeting
Beneficiary targeting was done through disaster relief committees that included RHMs that ensured that the most vulnerable are targeted for relief assistance. Instead of inventing and using new structures, the process piggy begged on existing community leadership structures, such as Indvuna Yenkundla and Bucopho Benkhundla and the constituency's MP. This improved the process's credibility and acceptance in the communities.

4.1.2 Response output/NERMAP Operations

Introduction of breakfast meal to schools
The introduction of a breakfast meal for pupils in schools around the country as an emergency intervention has yielded positive results. The plan was to supplement the already existing lunch meal in schools during the drought disaster period. Observations point towards improved attendance in schools and punctuality by pupils. Unconfirmed reports suggest that the improvement in attendance and punctually could have a positive effect on school results.

Efficient water management measures
The sugar industry imposed water restrictions upon itself early in the drought (up to 30% of required water) and could stretch the available of water to the sustenance of both the industry and human life. In the urban area (Mbabane and Ngwenya), the municipal councils had to impose the restrictions realising that the situation was becoming dire. The existence of a database of functional and non-functional water sources facilitated the planning and timely implementation of rehabilitation work.
The installation of plastic water tanks for storing water from mobile water bowsers with an option for harvesting rain water ensured access to water for domestic and public services and taught people about investing in water harvesting and reducing reliance on tapped water from local government services.

**Multi-sectoral approaches to emergency interventions**

The Multi-sectoral approach to addressing social protection issues in the response is a step in the right direction judging by wider reach that came out of it, coupled with efficiencies in the use of resources. However, the absence of minimum standards in some of the interventions was a short-coming to the emergency response. For example the absence of minimum standards for dignity kits and portable water distribution resulted in implementing organizations using their preferences as to the standard to apply resulting in less reach where broader standards we applied as there was no guidance. This was further complicated by lack of monitoring in order to ensure equity and cost-effectiveness of the water distribution process in the communities.

Cash transfers to communities vulnerable to food shortages appear to be an effective method assuming the availability of food supplies from dealers/suppliers within the community, especially where food prices are not spiralling out of control because of the drought. The cash transfers helped beneficiaries not to only buy food but other items critical for survival. At the end of the day, beneficiaries found themselves equipped with the ability to prioritize their needs, manage finances properly, the liberty to make decisions and accountability.

**Protection**

Distribution of dignity kits to most vulnerable adolescents maintained girls’ school attendance and decreased their vulnerability to intergenerational relationships. Further spreading this to the boy child was a milestone in realizing the need for the boys as well, much against conventional approaches.

Campaigns on gender based violence (GBV) and child protection in emergencies (CPiE) increased community awareness and enhanced the identification of some GBV and CPiE cases.

The implementation of health days and health campaigns to create awareness and provision of health services enhanced comprehensive primary health care service delivery even in hard to reach areas which created a higher demand for health services.

**4.1.3 Efficient Information and communication**

Conducting rapid assessments and the dissemination of findings in the different sectors was instrumental in informing mitigation and emergency response. The health and nutrition sector, for instance, took the decision to upscale routine activities and engaged into the emergency mode after careful consideration of the findings of the rapid and comprehensive health and nutrition assessment. Similar assessments in the agriculture
and food security, education, WASH and social protection sectors proved useful in providing information needed for decision-making. In 2016 the Annual VAA was also strengthened by the VAC and the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification analysis was also conducted.

The sugar industry in Swaziland put in place drought management guidelines for all growers and this significantly improved the management of available water and the industry was able to prevent loss of cane roots.

The introduction of the U-Report database has enhanced real time data collection to inform timely targeting and implementation of effective interventions especially in the Education sector.

4.1.4 Collaboration

Collaboration has been observed to have a huge potential to augment the efforts of partners, government and the private sector in the emergency response and should be encouraged in the future, with emphasis on the exploration of more and wider opportunities for collaboration. For instance, some of the sugar cane land was switched from sugar production to food crops e.g., winter maize and dry beans to help communities. This is a significant milestone, contributing to national food security while, at the same time, the private sector also learnt of what food crops are there to help diversify from sugarcane.

Collaboration with stakeholders improved the coverage of the response, reaching larger populations and more beneficiaries and further ensured that stakeholders get early warning information provided by stakeholders such as the SWSC, the Department of Meteorology, and others. However, inadequate systems/models to inform decisions on water rationing in the country resulted in timely submission and/or sharing of information for early warning compromised.

4.2 Lessons Learnt

4.2.1 Coordination of the response

Some clusters reported poor attendance by members in meetings coupled with poor information sharing, resulting in programming overlaps. The high frequency of meetings had cost implications for some partners which affected their participation and reporting, and also resulted in a slow pace of implementation at the beginning.

The make-up of clusters for coordination purposes could be behind the challenge, especially when it comes to the Agriculture and Food Security Sector where stakeholders focusing on food production and resilience could not relate to the food assistance subject as it is seen to be counter-production to what they stand for.
Poor cluster/sector coordination, often characterised by poor or lack of reporting and attendance of meeting has resulted in not-so-well coordinated responses during the emergency. Fragmented response lead to duplication and incomplete response, minimal feedback mechanisms for continual improvement and poor reporting system for monitoring purposes. However, key attempts were made by UN agencies to support Government to improve on coordination. For example, UNICEF Swaziland brought in various technical teams from the UNICEF regional office who supported in conducted SWOT analysis especially of WASH sector coordination and developed mitigation measures. A WASH technical expert was brought in to support and strengthen coordination.

Delayed implementation of certain aspects of the response resulted in missed opportunities in recovery processes. Examples include distribution of farming inputs which has the potential to exacerbate the food insecurity challenge as low yields may be the order of the day.

Lack of agreed to multi-sector key messaging strategy resulted in poor coverage, climate change issues not being prioritized, and conflicting messages from the department of Agriculture and Department of Meteorology.

The non-prioritization of the Energy and Environment cluster in the NERMAP resulted in no resources being allocated even for due diligence related to infrastructure development (no environment impact assessment before the dredging of Hawane dam), protection of wetlands and regulation on importation of commodities derived from genetically modified organisms.

4.2.2 Response finance

The delayed release of emergency response finances by the government is partly behind the poor pace in the response. Apart from food assistance efforts, most response activities started around May/June 2016 as a result of shortage of funds. It is assumed that if the Disaster Management Fund was in place by the declaration of an emergency by government, the situation could have been different. In the WASH sector, for instance, limited resources (financial and human) resulted in the response being limited to water provision, and delays in implementation.

4.2.3 Response output/NERMAP Operations

Inactivity of sectors

The inactivity of the transport and logistics sector, and the Energy and Environment sector during response has had negative outcomes for the entire response. The transportation of commodities such as food, water, equipment and other items could have been made easier and cost-effective. The NERMAP also recognized the challenge of poor roads but no allocation of budget to fixing the roads for ease of transportation during the response. Cases of breakdown of trucks transporting food items, including schools breakfast meal, were mentioned during the review by stakeholders. Some interventions could have benefitted from environmental studies on what impact they would have on
the environment such as the dredging of the Hawane Dam. The response also neglected the importance of watershed management and the protection of wetlands which are crucial for water recharge.

The beneficiary targeting process was characterised by exclusion and inclusion errors reported in 33% of communities interviewed, and that the majority of communities (at least 75%) never understood the subject of limited resources, believing that everyone should get food assistance even if they are not in the highly vulnerable bracket.

**Disease surveillance**
The implementation of the diseases surveillance system was generally perceived as weak, responsible for poor preparedness and the lack of early warning indicators leading to delayed response. Apart from the observation that some cases were missed as they never reached the system, hence not followed, the community surveillance system is poorly linked to the national disease surveillance system.

**Communication**
There appeared to be unclear communication within community structures on the disaster and the response as information would sometimes come through one structure and sometime through another or several at the same time characterised by variations, for instance, regarding dates and times for food distribution. As a result, targeted beneficiaries were not perfectly reached and in some cases, particularly concerning food assistance, some beneficiaries were reached on the second round of distribution as they were missed in the first round.

Information on the response coming from different sources is a challenge that has led to negative responses in some areas. Where community structures are functional with clear lines of communication determined or verified, information dissemination is not a challenge and the turnaround time is convincing.

Inconsistent messaging on gender based violence (GBV) and protection issues in the emergency became a barrier for people to accessing services, which resulted in many cases going unreported.

**Recovery strategy**
Late implementation of early recovery interventions compromised beneficiaries’ ability to take full advantage of the rainy season hence the bounce back will take longer

**Monitoring and Evaluation**
Weak monitoring system at community water distribution points resulted in standard rations not being met for some people. Secondly, Inadequate systems/ models to inform decision making on water rationing affected timely submission/ sharing of information e.g. early warning data. Poor monitoring and evaluation systems restricted the response in critical mass reporting of all stakeholders’ involved and created bottlenecks in the process.
4.2.4 Response capacity

The lack of participation and involvement of pre-service institutions and in-service training into disaster risk management was observed in the lack of capacity in disaster response for some of the implementing structures and the lack of research on disaster preparedness and response. Short courses on disaster management could be instrumental for key stakeholders in emergency responses.

4.2.5 Preparedness

According to the private sector, insufficient water security and infrastructure (Storage, measuring devices, allocation of water) has made it difficult to monitor water usage effectively before and during the disaster emergency as rivers were over-subscribed. Ultimately, insufficient water is likely to be supplied to neighbouring countries, much against the transboundary protocols on water sharing. River basin authorities are not as effective as desired, evidenced by very poor coordination of water abstraction and use. There is limited understanding of the impact climate change has on crop water demand in the context of water availability, and as such, studies are required to create such understanding.
5. Overall Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1 NERMAP design

5.1.1 Conclusions

Basing the development of the NERMAP on needs identified through vulnerability assessments and credible information from stakeholders was a commendable way to start on the disaster emergency response, coupled with the involvement of a wider stakeholder network in the development of the response plan. Acceptability to, ownership by and the involvement of stakeholders in the implementation of the plan are just a few examples of the successes brought about by the approach to the development of the NERMAP.

Given its development approach and process, the NERMAP’s relevance to addressing the effects of the El Nino drought emergency situation cannot be over-emphasized. Such effects included warding away food and water insecurity, reducing several vulnerabilities brought about by a disaster emergency situation and ensured that life and property are sustained and preserved respectively.

Technical weaknesses in the design of the NERMAP were observed in the form of lacking a results framework and the lack of standardization regarding goals and objectives across sectors and the absence of a Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for the NERMAP. Some of the weaknesses of the NERMAP arise from the fact that the emergency situation came just when the NDMA was setting up shop. For instance, the NERMAP is not strong on preparedness and awareness creation simply because the NDMA team and stakeholders had to hit the road running without sufficient time to plan for any disaster.

The NERMAP had funding gaps from the onset without a clear resource mobilization strategy, causing some activities not be implementable.

5.1.2 Recommendations

a. An assessment of the drought situation to inform review of activities and extent of vulnerability of populations should be conducted to determine the appropriate revision of the NERMAP, targeting only what remains relevant, preferably before then end of March 2017. The review should include the revision of the NERMAP budget to cater for only required interventions, as well as focus on early recovery, resilience and medium to short term DRR and DRM issues, beginning with preparedness.

b. An accompanying results framework should be developed for the NERMAP in order to foster proper monitoring and evaluation, including report formats for all stakeholders. The revised interventions in the NERMAP should be accompanied by a revision in the timelines in the light of the abating El Nino situation. A phase-out plan
should be incorporated in the NERMAP for emergency activities that are still going on.

5.2 NERMAP Implementation

5.2.1 Conclusions

Declaring the El Nino drought as an emergency took longer than it would otherwise be appropriate and as such, the country missed out on mobilizing resources early enough and starting on delivering emergency relief goods and services early enough.

The implementation of NERMAP interventions through partners organized in sectors or sector-related clusters appears to work well for the response. Sectors submit status reports to inform NDMA and all stakeholders on the extent of implementation which is critical for information sharing and informed decision-making. However, the implementation of the response plan is hampered by insufficient resources, delayed release of funds by government and shortage of staff on the ground from the NDMA for monitoring purposes. However, the distribution of food commodities and water saved human and cattle lives.

The shortage of tractors, farming implements and fuel for government tractors have emerged as major impediments to the early recovery and resilience programming of the NERMAP and all constituencies and stakeholders decry the inefficiency arising. Challenges experienced by some communities when it comes to the targeting of beneficiaries have left a bitter taste of the response in a few communities, raising the question of whether better approaches can be adopted to improve this process.

5.2.2 Recommendations

Effort should be directed at ensuring sufficient resources for implementation and tracking resource usage and availability (improve accountability). The NDMA’s implementation role should be decreased while its coordination role and capacity are increased through increasing headcounts in strategic areas such as monitoring and evaluation, coordination of stakeholders and/or implementers and resource mobilization.

Inefficiencies and challenges at sector level requires NDMA’s involvement in finding solutions, including finding better ways of targeting that ensure the right beneficiaries are included, find solutions to tractor, implements, and fuel challenges.

For future disasters, ways of agreeing with or informing the government in a credible way on the status of disaster for declaration purposes is crucial. This should be agreed by June 2017.
5.3 Resource Mobilization

5.3.1 Conclusions

Sufficient funding is critical for the successful implementation of an emergency response. In the case of the NERMAP financial and human resources were not sufficient to carry out the interventions in the plan as determined by needs on the ground. Government did not necessarily live up to her commitment while the UN agencies raised about half their target in funding for period ending December 2016.

5.3.2 Recommendations

The resource mobilization strategy that the NDMA was working on at Mid-Term Review be finalized and implemented in order to ensure that sufficient resources are available for adequately preparing and responding to disasters. The NDMA should also fast-track the establishment of the Disaster Management Fund. These should be operational by August 2017 in preparation of the government’s budget season. Further the NDMA should strive to improve accountability by agreeing with stakeholders on the financial and programmatic information needs on the response by end of March 2017.

5.4 Coordination

5.4.1 Conclusions

The coordination of the response generally went well save for the regional and cluster levels where gaps were identified in terms of meeting coordination, attendance and sound reporting. Improvements in the commitments by partners and stakeholders is required for proper coordination output to be realized.

The NDMA’s role of partly coordinating and partly implementing comprises the coordination role and capacity of the NDMA. The NDMA also suffers from staff shortages, compromising the coordination quality and capacity of the organization.

5.4.2 Recommendations

The NDMA should focus on coordination and reduce (towards eliminating) its role in the implementation of the response, leaving implementation to partners and/or stakeholders specializing in certain aspects of the response to optimize resource use and the output for efficiencies.

NDMA should raise funds to finance the engagement of staff required for the proper functioning of the organization towards meeting its mandate of effectively coordinating Disaster Risk Management in the country.
Sector and regional level coordination structures should be strengthened for improved coordination. That should include technical backstopping provided by NDMA, clear terms of reference for sector work and coordination, as well as information requirements in a form of simplistic and non-tedious reporting.

5.5 Sustainability

5.5.1 Conclusions

The NERMAP does not have a clear phase-out plan for short-term NERMAP activities and output, yet some of these activities have the potential to create dependency on food aid and the distribution of other relief items such as the school breakfast. Activities driven by partners to whom these form mainstream activities outside the NERMAP have a high chance for continuance/sustainability albeit in the context of financial resource challenges. The NDMA should determine those items that require prolonged support and sustainability and create a sustainability plan for those.

5.5.2 Recommendations

A clear phase-out plan should be developed, indicating a systematic scaling down of interventions without upsetting communities and beneficiaries (safe-landing). The NDMA and partners should also determine interventions that should continue beyond short-term NERMAP and find funding alternatives for those. Specifically on the issue of school breakfast, there is need for the school committees and the Ministry of Education and Training to be engaged on options for the continuation or severing the intervention.

5.6 Innovation, knowledge management and communication

5.6.1 Conclusions

The establishment of Information and Knowledge Management processes at the NDMA should be sped up in order to ensure that information and knowledge management milestones are not lost and that decision-making is enhanced and informed by IKM processes and outputs.

Even though putting in place IKM processes at the NDMA for disaster risk management purposes is behind, the preparation and dissemination of situation reports on the drought response went ahead keeping donors, partners, potential donors and other abreast with movements in the disaster spectrum.

The development of a communication strategy is step in the right direction for the NDMA and the country at large, the implementation of which is expected to create a good platform for communication with stakeholders and information sharing.
5.6.2 Recommendations

The NDMA needs to quickly put the recently finalized communication strategy into operation in order to realize benefits from use and deal with pertinent communication challenges. Secondly, the organization should finalize the establishment of IKM system at NDMA.
### Annex A: NERMAP Objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NERMAP Sector</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Water, Sanitation and Hygiene  | **Overall objective:** To prevent the loss of life during the drought by ensuring the provision of potable water supply and sanitation facilities to citizens in order to prevent the outbreak of water borne diseases such as cholera, zoonotic and diarrheal diseases in all areas.  
**Specific objectives:**  
a) To maintain access to safe water and sanitation / hygiene facilities;  
b) To provide strategic reservoirs and Sanitation where systems have failed or are none existent;  
c) To raise awareness on sanitation and hygiene related issues; and  
d) To put in place adaptation measures that promote sustainable usage of water and energy. |
| 2. Agriculture and Food Security  | **Overall Objective:** To ensure national food security and support affected households (HHs) restore their agricultural productive capacity and eventually build resilience to future climatic shocks. |
| 3. Education                      | **Overall objective:** To minimize the impact of the protracted drought in the school system and ensuring that learning continues.                                                                               |
| 4. Health and Nutrition           | **Overall Objective:** To mount a timely and coordinated response to hazards related to anticipated adverse climatic conditions and resultant epidemiological impact from April 2016 to March 2017.  
**Specific objectives:**  
a) To prevent and reduce incidence of epidemiological hazards; and other outbreaks associated with the anticipated adverse climatic conditions;  
b) To mount a coordinated emergency preparedness and response system and ensure early recovery to affected communities;  
c) To reduce mortality and morbidity by timely identification and appropriate management of acutely malnourished children (6-59 months) and pregnant and lactating women and PLWH. |
| 5. Storm Damage Rehabilitation    | **Overall objective:** To assist vulnerable families cope with the tragedy of losing their house due to a storm by protecting their assets from bad weather and helping to rehabilitate damaged houses |
| 6. Social Protection              | **Overall Objective:** To provide social protection to all affected people especially vulnerable groups such as children, OVC, women, elderly and people living with vulnerable groups, from exploitation, violence abuse and neglect resulting from emergency situation.  
**Specific objectives** |
a) To put in place measures for prevention of sexual, economic abuse and exploitation of all vulnerable groups in affected areas;
b) To facilitate the protection care and wellbeing of affected groups; and
c) To facilitate access to all affected groups to basic social services and relief interventions.

7. **NERMAP Coordination**

**Objectives:**

a) Strengthen coordination in response and recovery planning and implementation at all levels;
b) Strengthen information management systems at all levels to inform strategic decisions Support effective delivery of planned interventions;
c) Strengthen humanitarian performance monitoring and reporting; and
d) Strengthen the capacity of the NDMA to enhance disaster prevention, preparedness, response and recovery.
### Annex B: Terms of Reference – NERMAP Mid-Term Review

**Objectives**

To contribute to knowledge management and propel disaster response knowledge creation, collection and sharing, as relevant and appropriate, in Swaziland networks of government, non-governmental organisations and the private institutions. The MTR will assess progress towards the achievement of the NERMAP objectives and outcomes, and assess early signs of project success or failures with the goal of identifying the necessary changes to be made in order to re-track plan back to achieve its intended results. While the lessons documentation will: identify, analyse, and share disaster risk management lessons to inform current and ongoing responses and the development of medium and long term resilience strategies; and initiate relevant and appropriate disaster management knowledge products and sharing of information to advance continuous response interventions lessons exchange in Swaziland by the NDMA and national stakeholders.

**Tasks for Assignment**

Working under the leadership of the NDMA supported by the UN Technical Working Group (UNTWG) and World Vision:

1. Collect information on the implementation of the disaster responses in the country as advanced by the NERMAP addressing:
   - Strategic and operational formulation relevance with focus on relevance and management arrangements
   - Stakeholders engagement and communication between response organisations, donors (UN Agencies and Development Partners), and communities and beneficiaries
   - Progress made towards intended results along resources mobilisation and response outreach,
   - Adaptive Management,
   - Monitoring and Reporting adequacy

2. Conduct an analysis of the capacities and responsiveness and of the sectors/clusters in responding to the drought through:
   - Facilitate the sectors to conduct an analysis of the responsiveness of response and capacities of the sectors/clusters (Agriculture and Food Security; WASH; Education; Health and Nutrition; Protection; and Coordination), responding to the drought emergency; and
   - Consult with the national stakeholders including communities and assessing the coordination mechanism at national, inter-cluster and cluster level in order to take stock of the delivery of the relief and recovery activities of the NERMAP.

3. Collect information from sectors and implementing partners on beneficiary feedback, monitoring information to identify potential gaps and to inform current and future interventions.
4. Identify areas of improvement on the entire response (NERMAP) and coordination mechanism and document better practices.
5. Draft the MTR Report and Lessons Report and present to NDMA and national stakeholders for approval.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliverables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specify specific deliverables:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Inception Report with a work plan indicating timeframes and allocation of tasks in undertaking of the assignment as well as, tools, process/methodology to be adopted for the assignment within five (5) days after entering into contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Institutional and community consultations and Consultative Workshop with national and Inter-Cluster Forum stakeholders and production of the lessons material e.g. short, quality, video stories for the five (5) clusters: Agriculture, Food-security, Health and Nutrition, Education and WASH.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Final NERMAP MTR Report with a Lessons Report to inform both policy and operational undertaking in the country approved by NDMA.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annex C: Documentary shooting schedule – MRT and Lessons Learnt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area to be visited</th>
<th>Interest to be covered/interviews</th>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Date/Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Somntongo Inkhundla         | ✓ Water tanking  
✓ Borehole installation/rehabilitation  
✓ Cash transfer  

NB:  
   a) Make sure MP and Indvuna Yenkundla are interviewed  
   b) At least one school visited for interview with Head teacher where practicable around the area (food/water distribution)                                                                 | WASH, Food Security, Education              | 18 Jan 2017  |
| Dvokodvweni Inkhundla       | ✓ Area visited by UN Special Envoy – Collaboration on water and food distribution by World Vision, UNICEF, WFP, NDMA  

NB:  
   a) Specifically interview “7 days” if possible.  
   b) At least one school visited for interview with Head teacher where practicable around the area (food/water distribution)                                                                 | WASH, Food Security, Education              | 16 Jan, 2017 |
| Hlane Inkhundla             | ✓ Food distribution – assisted by HMK  

NB: At least one school visited for interview with Head teacher where practicable around the area (food/water distribution)                                                                 | Food security, Education                   | 16, Jan 2017 |
| Nkilongo                    | ✓ Cash Transfers  

NB: At least one school visited for interview with Head teacher where practicable around the area (food/water distribution)                                                                 | Food Security, Education                   | 17 Jan 2017  |
| Mbabane                     | ✓ Harnessing Pholinjani River  
✓ Luphohlo/Mbabane pipeline  
✓ Tanks in all locations around the Mbabane city  
✓ Water distribution  

NB:  
   a) Also interview Gamedze from the City Council                                                                 | WASH, Food Security, Education              | 17 Jan 2017  |
| Mtfongwaneni | ✔ Food distribution  
|             | ✔ Water tanks  
|             | NB: At least one school visited for interview with Head teacher where practicable around the area (food/water distribution) | WASH, Food Security, Education | 16 Jan 2017 |
### Annex D: List of Stakeholders interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder category/type</th>
<th>Stakeholders met</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health and Nutrition cluster</td>
<td>Four stakeholders in a group (Environmental Health, Nutrition Council, Sector-lead was not around during stakeholder consultations/interviews)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Food Security</td>
<td>World Vision, Ministry of Agriculture/FAO, WFP</td>
<td>Some stakeholders promised to send through information requested, but did not send.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education cluster</td>
<td>Ministry of Education, UNICEF</td>
<td>Information requested provided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Swaziland Water Services Corporation, Department of Water Affairs, UNICEF, Mbabane City Council</td>
<td>Information requested provided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protection</td>
<td>Department of Social Welfare (DPM’s Office), UNFPA</td>
<td>Some of the stakeholders in this cluster could not provide information requested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NDMA, UNTWG</td>
<td>Guidance on the review and information required provided</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex E: Constituencies/Communities visited by the review team

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Number of people Met</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mkhiweni</td>
<td>6 Community leaders (including MP), 3 beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mafutseni</td>
<td>7 Community leaders 2 beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Lugongolweni</td>
<td>2 Community leaders (Including MP), two beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Hlane</td>
<td>3 Community leaders, 1 beneficiary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mayiwane</td>
<td>4 Community leaders 3 beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Madlangampisi</td>
<td>3 Community leaders 2 beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Lubulini</td>
<td>1 Community leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Mbabane</td>
<td>1 Municipal manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Dvokodvweni</td>
<td>3 Community leaders 4 beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Siphofaneni</td>
<td>6 Community leaders, 2 beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Khubuta</td>
<td>4 Community leaders 2 beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Maseyisini</td>
<td>7 Community leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Shiselweni 1</td>
<td>3 Community leaders, 4 beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Mtfongwaneni</td>
<td>7 Community Leaders, 1 beneficiary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Somntongo</td>
<td>5 Community leaders, 1 Inkhundla Secretary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex F: List of Assessments Carried out during NERMAP

i) Swaziland Annual Vulnerability Assessment & Analysis (2015 & 2016);
ii) Rapid Health & Nutrition Survey;
iii) Education Sector Rapid Assessment;
iv) Assessment on impact of El Nino on children, adolescents, pregnant and lactating women;
v) Impact of Drought on Vulnerable Groups) for evidence generation to inform the Cluster’s response;
vi) Multi sectoral rapid assessment; and
vii) WASH rapid assessment.
## Annex G: Contributions from the Private Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of company</th>
<th>Cash contribution (E)</th>
<th>In-Kind Contribution (Description)</th>
<th>In-Kind (E)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. SRIC</td>
<td>250,000.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. RSSC</td>
<td></td>
<td>80,000LTS per day - Water</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Illovo</td>
<td></td>
<td>40,000LTS per day - Water</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Canterbury</td>
<td></td>
<td>Water – not quantified</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. SWSC</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,141,000 litres of water</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. PSPF</td>
<td>250,000.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. SSA</td>
<td>120,000.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. SNPF</td>
<td></td>
<td>350 bags of 50Kg Maize</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. CBS</td>
<td>1,000,000.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. FNB</td>
<td>570,000.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Taiwan Embassy</td>
<td></td>
<td>260Tones of Rice</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Hlawati Savings &amp; Coop</td>
<td>10,000.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. MVA</td>
<td>300,000.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Swaziland Conference of churches</td>
<td>111,551.91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. His Majesty the King</td>
<td>2,273,621.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Royal Swazi Sun</td>
<td></td>
<td>50bags of 50Kg Mealies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,885,172.91</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Disaster Management Agency, 2016/17