partnership

technology peacebuilding

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capacities sustain process government

knowledge planning rakhine conflictsensitivity

partnerships trust monwomen civilsociety

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EAOs livelihoods peaceprocess

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participation
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strenghten JMC youth

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EVALUATION OF OUTPUT 5
Support to Social Cohesion and Livelihood

Final Report

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Disclaimer
This MTE report was prepared by two Independent Consultants: Cécile Collin and Moe Moe Browne. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

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ACRONYMS

ACTED	Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CBOs	Community Based Organizations
CPD	Country Programme Document
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peace Keeping Operations
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EAOs	Ethical Armed Organizations
ER	Early Recovery
FERD	Foreign Economic Relations Department
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GAD	General Administrative Department
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoM	Government of Myanmar
HA	Humanitarian Aid
HDI	Human Development Initiative
IA	International Alert
IDA	General Administrative Department Training Institute
INGOs	International Non-Government Organizations
IPs	Implementing Partners
IRC	International Rescue Committee
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JMC	Joint Monitoring Committee
KIO	Kachin Independence Organization
KIA	Kachin Independence Army
KII	Key Informant Interview
MCGA	Micro-capital Grant Agreement
MoHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MoBA	Ministry of Border Affairs
MPF	Ministry of Planning and Finance
NCA	Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
NDAA	National Democratic Alliance Army
NLD	National League for Democracy
OCHA	Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PRA	Participatory rural appraisal
PRC	Professional Research Consultancy
RoL	Rule of Law
ROLCs	Rule of Law Centres
RRF	Result and Resources Framework
RSG	Rakhine State Government

SEDP   Socio-Economic Development Plan
SEZs   Special Economic Zones
SSA   Shan State Army
SSPP   Shan State Progress Party
SFCG   Search for Common Ground
SGBV   Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SRGs   Self Reliance Groups
SSID   Small-Scale Industries Development
ToRs   Terms of References
ToT   Training of Trainers
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA   United Nations Population Fund
UWSA   United Wa State Army
WFP   World Food Programme

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CONTEXT

The output was implemented following a large livelihoods intervention at the downstream level, the Human Development Initiative, in the framework of the first Country Programme Development of UNDP in Myanmar. During the course of the project, a Non-Cease Fire Agreement was signed with eight Ethnical Armed Group which represents a significant progress, though the situation still remains fragile and conflicts are still active in a number of areas. International assistance strongly increased over the previous years, either in terms of funding or the number of stakeholders.

RELEVANCE

The implementation of interventions of very diverse nature and the change of focus was justified by the change of development context and the NCA ratification, and an evolution of the perceived advantage of UNDP in the country, which mostly consist in a strong access and legitimacy towards the government, as well as funding constraints. The output did not capitalize fully on the possible connectors though. To date, there is no clear government policy on community based approach, social cohesion / peacebuilding. The short timeframe of the interventions constituted a limitation to develop capacity building and social cohesion pattern.
Beneficiaries were selected in accordance with local authorities, taking into account access and security constraints, at a time where there was limited data available on general poverty level. The linkage between the interventions and specific conflict dynamics at the local level was not optimal. Further stakeholders should be engaged to address better the social cohesion / peacebuilding challenges.

EFFECTIVENESS

The original approach changed from downstream interventions (Rice banks, Cash for work to rehabilitate infrastructures, grants, vocational training, support to CBOs), and the output consequently moved to an upstream approach (Social Cohesion for Stronger Communities with a specific social cohesion framework and supporting manuals / toolkits translated in local languages and Mainstreaming Conflict Sensitivity with an inter-ministerial study group and two studies on best practices and indicators). It also piloted a support to access to innovative technologies in 100 villages, providing entrepreneur's skills to 40 salespeople.
Disbursement rate has been very good with more than 97%.
All the interventions included support to social cohesion in border areas by using different entry points, in the first place livelihoods in 2013-2014 and in 2015-2016 in Rakhine and Kachin, as well as collective infrastructure / community assets, joint capacity building / capacity building of vulnerable or strategic population (women / youths), market based / distribution networks approach or collective governance mechanisms. The social cohesion objective was addressed both at the vertical and horizontal levels, in terms of approach / processes and content as follows:

Community level
- Within the communities: Sensitization on social cohesion, Joint participation in cash for work, Community infrastructures
- Between different communities: Sensitization and meetings with clusters of villages, Joint trainings (vocational, salespeople), Breaking up of isolation of remote communities because of road rehabilitation, Distribution chain across several villages, Steering committee

Township / State levels
SC2 -   Joint participation in the training of EAOs / CSOs / Civil Servants

- Tools / techniques on social cohesion / conflict mitigation
- Joint facilitation by a pool of ethnic trainers

Livelihoods upstream work:
- Rakhine SEA planning: Consultative process and inclusion of conflict sensitivity
- Best practice committee: Joint work between CSOs and State agents

Union level

Conflict sensitivity
- Fostering conflict sensitivity into development planning.

The main results include improvement of the living standards, (including through individual or collective grants / assets, access to market - efficient stoves and solar lamps), launching of community dynamics, improvement of the connectedness (infrastructures), level of exchanges and trust, promotion of a culture of dialogue, and creation of mixed structures across categories of stakeholders.

Although the various interventions reached several hundreds of communities, the coverage remains still limited while there is a great demand for them, including on the social cohesion and conflict sensitivity at the government's level.

EFFICIENCY

The short-term funding basis relying on a main donor explains the financial constraints faced by the output.

Several layers of M&E happened, including third party M&E of some interventions. Though, the RRF did not and the contribution to the outcome was not really monitored.

So far, the results and learnings generated by the different interventions on social cohesion and livelihoods practices were not disseminated further through a specific communication / media strategy covering all the border areas.

The output engaged a significant number of implementing partners, originally mostly local NGOs in the seven border areas to a few INGOs. Little was done in terms of partner's capacity building and partnership remained rather short-term because of the funding pattern.

Synergies between the various outputs were mostly informal and the original CPD did not plan the details of an integrated approach. The output served as a repository of conflict sensitivity that it contributed to raise.

SUSTAINABILITY

Some effects of the interventions implemented are still visible to date, notably the foodbank and CBOs, or livelihoods activities of the beneficiaries. Participants to the SC2 still meet regularly in social cohesion networks that they created. Several strategies supported the sustainability of the output interventions, including training of trainers, empowerment of local stakeholders, integration into local dynamics and State contexts, and a beginning of institutionalization of the output's components, in first place social cohesion curriculum and a cross-cutting inter-ministerial conflict sensitivity and social cohesion approach, although this remains an on-going process.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The output 5 acted at several levels on livelihoods and social cohesion dynamics in Myanmar, and illustrates also the interdependency between the two aspects.

To some extent, it contributed to groundwork to prepare for a political dialogue and peace process, although a number of areas and stakeholders remain outside the political and output process. The output acted at the community level, by creating demand for social cohesion, notably by illustrating direct peace dividends, as well as at the supply level, through the involvement of local

representatives of government, EAO and CSO, while in the meantime introducing soft approaches to conflict mitigation and conflict sensitivity at the union level.

Those achievements create opportunities to facilitate dialogues and reforms addressing structural roots of the conflicts, strengthen national unity and promote an inclusive development pattern.

The evolution from a downstream approach to a capacity-development and policy support approach has also generated significant interest from the various stakeholders involved, creating dynamics which should be pursued

Based on this experience, UNDP is expected by a broad range of stakeholders in Myanmar, to play a lead role, as well as to ensure knowledge capitalization to guide other agencies and assist the government in streamlining / planning the work on livelihoods and social cohesion

UNDP is also well placed to ensure that the various conflict dynamics are addressed by the State institutions, at the township, State and Union levels. In that respect, there are clear linkages between the institutional and organizational support to the JMC and the work on social cohesion/support to institutions, in targeting more systematically JMC members / NCA signatories, or reaching out to stakeholders in high risk / conflict affected areas where stakeholders did not ratify the NCA. To date, social cohesion and peacebuilding mechanisms are limitedly institutionalized and more would be needed at the strategic / policy level on community based governance, and inter-ministerial work and policy on social cohesion. This would facilitate the commitment of the various hierarchies, and operationalize the concepts and skills disseminated through the trainings, in a cross-cutting manner. As such, the inter-ministerial work would need to be pursued by involving all the key ministries and translating the findings into action.

The output faces various strategic tensions related to UNDP positioning in Myanmar and globally,:
- UNDP got its legitimacy and experience from interventions at the local level but now has limited comparative advantage in pursuing them. Pulling out totally from any possibility of downstream interventions could then progressively limit the legitimacy as a stakeholder able to engage with all parties.
- Interventions on software are efficient when they are supported by hardware benefits, on which UNDP's comparative advantage is then more limited.
- Livelihoods and social cohesion are clearly related to UNDP's mandate for early recovery and UNDP is involved in downstream interventions in a number of countries (Mali, Côte d'Ivoire for example). The degree to which the positioning should vary according to the countries is not clearly defined and it is not clear to what extent and based on which criteria UNDP would have a comparative advantage on that respect in some countries more than others.
- Further analysis of UNDP's efficiency and strategic positioning on what concerns livelihoods and peacebuilding dynamics should then be envisaged, notably as UNDP also plays a key role in ensuring connection between the union and the grassroots levels.
- The approach of social cohesion through livelihoods constitutes a link on the continuum security and development as well as between relief and rehabilitation. It is then key for the stabilization and to ensure conflict transformation and the equilibrium needs to be found between those different components.
- Some balance must be established between a national programme design, designing common denominators across the States, and covering a broad range of contexts, with specific dynamics and synergies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To UNDP

1. UNDP's lead role in supporting State planning is key, and hence the organization should support the drafting of dedicated strategies and policies on community based approaches and social cohesion.

2. UNDP should then ensure coordination and experience sharing through dedicated coordination structures and dissemination of best practices and lessons learned through the early recovery cluster or other coordination channels. This is intended to avoid the duplication of efforts and introduction of a number of approaches and systems on similar subjects in the country, as well as to ensure capitalization and sustainability of previous approaches.

3. Further support should be provided to inter-ministerial structures on conflict sensitivity and social cohesion and UNDP should play a key role in ensuring that those aspects are included in a cross-cutting manner in sectoral governance as a way to address social cohesion challenges, particularly structural ones (related to natural resources management, including land, infrastructures etc…).

4. The evaluation understands that there has been a strategic shift from the downstream to upstream level given the change in context. Nonetheless, UNDP has a clear role in early recovery / resilience, which can make it difficult to totally withdraw from any opportunity for work at the downstream level. This possibility could still be considered when needs are particularly high and unaddressed, and when UNDP has specific comparative advantages. Those advantages consist of unique official access to conflict affected areas (owing to the good relationships with and trust of the government), and/or specific linkages with the peace process by providing peace dividends to fragile populations in unstable settings, by introducing social cohesion capacities in those areas through livelihoods support, breaking up the isolation of unstable and remote communities and creating demand for peace. Outside of any political connotation, this also means reinstating development dynamics in conflict affected areas equally benefitting all stakeholders.

5. UNDP has a clear comparative advantage in bringing together different stakeholders, which should be pursued through dialogue platforms, social cohesion networks, and some form of support to village clusters.

6. Mixed structures created should be supported further to promote entities where various types of stakeholders are involved, keep them alive and maintain their legitimacy.

   - For this, their propositions, in terms of action plans and ideas to improve social cohesion and mitigate local challenges, should be further sustained. In terms of social cohesion networks, this means supporting them directly or ensuring that an organization supports them for interventions at the community level, where conflict situations actually happen.

   - Social cohesion networks, and more broadly participants in SC2, could constitute a pool that should be nurtured with information exchanges, for example, when relevant with exchange visits for experience sharing or occasionally to sensitize hard to reach stakeholders.

   - In addition, the capacity and activity of the pool of ethnic trainers should be maintained.

7. Support institutionalization of capacity development initiatives at the Union and State levels, through linkages with Tatmadaw, linkages with universities, and integration in the capacity development plans, as well as systems of knowledge dissemination and replication.

8. The level of institutional commitment of the various State services benefitting the activities should be strengthened to increase sustainability. As such, interventions should be included in the institutions' plans, such as capacity building development plans or operational / strategic planning to strengthen the accountability line. Hence, participants should be held accountable for work on social cohesion.

9. The operational linkages of the various capacity building interventions, in terms of targeting of the participants and content of the training modules, should be strengthened. This would also include involving Tatmadaw and police in SC2, land, infrastructures, natural resources departments, and community leaders.

10. Findings of the different interventions, which have already been developed, related to the work of the best practices committee, social cohesion networks and CBOs, when relevant, should be disseminated further through specific communication strategies in various media to increase the outreach, in the first place in border / remote and fragile areas.

11. Further work should be undertaken on the identification of local resources, connectors, and coping mechanisms, to ensure that the interventions capitalize on them, in relation to context / conflict analysis and implementation of Do No Harm approaches in the various States. Notably, this should include traditional practices in conflict mitigation, role of religious structures and of religious education, festivals, and mapping of key opinion leaders.

12. Ensure that there is sufficient data available on the various types of conflicts and their intensity, particularly in border areas, as well as of situations which could create conflicts in other areas; Based on this support, an approach targeting the most vulnerable communities and households, and linkages with priorities in terms of conflicts / social cohesion issues should be used.

13. Support further engagement of EAOs in social cohesion initiatives, through specific attention to stakeholders' engagement strategies and communication, if necessary and depending on the context, through specific interventions for EAOs at the beginning, when participating in activities with other relevant stakeholders (CBOs, CSOs, community leaders, local governance structures).

14. A logical follow-up would also be to institutionalize CBOs at the national level, with clear roles and ToRs. Notably, if a number of international development interventions start to be put in place, they should ensure that they link up with Township and State level development planning

15. Gender mainstreaming should be reinforced to take into qualitative analysis in the design (which covers appropriateness of the intervention timeframe for men and women and strategies to ensure female commitment) to facilitate the access to those groups and monitoring stages.

16. In the various interventions, and particularly while supporting new structures or acting on conflict / social cohesion dynamics, ensure that a strategy is developed to analyse the impact and sustainability aspects of the interventions.

17. In the next programme design and annual work plans, support the conceptualization and planning of an integrated programmatic approach to optimize the synergies between the outputs and with other UN agencies, where relevant. Conflict sensitivity should also be streamlined in all the country programme components, and output 5 is well positioned to support this.

18. The opportunities for supporting access to markets should be considered in both ways of the trading circuits: access to efficient products and opportunities to sell local production and strengthen the value chain). Related to this, UNDP and its partners should consider further engagement of the corporate sector (companies, distributors, and professional associations) in social cohesion dynamics.

To UNDP and donors

19. Resource mobilization strategies and donor's approaches should take into account the timeframe required to trigger the required effects on capacity building and effects on the conflict patterns, by improving the predictability and funding on a longer-term (multi-year) basis.

1 Introduction

1.1 Country Context

According to the census in March/April 2014, the population of Myanmar numbers 51.5 million and the total number of households is 10.889 million. They are inhabited by Bamar and different ethnic groups in 15 States and Regions. Among them, the most populated State/Regions are Yangon (14.3%), Ayeyarwadi (12.0%) and Mandalay (12.0%), whereas the least populated States/Regions are Nay Pyi Taw (2.3%), Chin (0.9%) and Kayah (0.6%).

In 2011, Myanmar's U Thein Sein government made a push for a three-pronged reform process towards democratization, peace with ethnic armed groups and socio-economic development. In November 2015, the National League for Democracy (NLD) Party led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi won the country's elections, marking an important milestone, and formed a new government in April 2016. U Htin Kyaw was the first civilian president and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi took on the roles of State Counsellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) was signed between the GoM and eight Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), in October 2015, and hence Output 5 operated in areas where stabilization was not formalized. The NCA is not the first attempt to end the conflict and the country has a long history of "broken ceasefire."[1] The NCA provides an unprecedented opportunity to resolve the country's long-standing conflicts, as it is the first such agreement to stem from a rather inclusive consultative process involving major actors. However, there is still a large number of non-signatory groups, including several of the country's most significant EAOs. As often in peace processes, the NCA creates division and fragmentation within the EAOs groups, implicitly related to the political economy of peace and war benefits. The NCA sets up structures at the Union level for ceasefire implementation and political dialogue, but the road to a peace agreement and to stabilization and unification of the country remains long. The 21st Century Panglong was intended to kick-start the political dialogue under the new NLD Government and was a symbolic sop to the original Panglong conference convened by General Aung San in 1947. Although it was attended by 17 out of 21 EAOs, it failed to be an all-inclusive meeting, involving major armed groups like United Wa State Army (UWSA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA) and Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA), that have yet to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). The ultimate goal of this conference is to work towards the establishment of a Democratic Federal Union by first securing internal peace, resolving political problems through political means, and also finding solutions for fundamental rights and equality for ethnic national races.

Myanmar faces significant challenges. It is strategically located between and India and China and has abundant natural resources such as fertile land, water, forest, fossil fuels, minerals, and gems, and a young labor force (55% of the population is under the age of 30). These resources together with an ideal and strategic location provide strong potential for national development, but are also causes of conflicts and instabilities.

Myanmar ranks 148[2] on the human development index, after countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh and Cambodia, but before countries such as Tanzania or Nigeria. In 2014-2015, the economy

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[1] Peace and Development Conflict-Sensitive Analysis, March 2013, on behalf of UNCT.
[2] UNDP, Human Development Report 2015, hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_statistical_annex_tables_all.xls

grew by 8.5% and real GDP growth is expected to be around 8-9% annually in 2016-2020 with the support of foreign investors providing large projects in Myanmar. Myanmar is a member of ASEAN so it can not only derive benefits from regional economic integration, but Myanmar's successful democratization and socio-economic development can also strengthen ASEAN and other South East Asian countries.

The current economy relies mainly on agriculture, which is a sector with low productivity, representing around 30% of GDP and more than 60% of employment. Fast-growing developing economies tend to shift away from agriculture towards industry and services.

Most of the ethnic "minorities" are in hilly regions and geographically isolated. They suffered from decades of conflict and poverty. The vulnerable communities' issues constitute a structural issue to be addressed in the long term by focusing on building trust, improving institutions and strengthening livelihoods. Economic marginalization remains a significant concern and inequalities further threaten the social cohesion, although limited indicators are available on this. Land grabbing has been an issue for years, making landless people particularly vulnerable and subject to migrations, mostly to Thailand.

Despite economic growth, humanitarian needs remain significant, particularly in the border areas which are the most conflict affected. OCHA counts 120,000 IDPs in Rakhine and 98,000 in Kachin and Shan States.[3] Humanitarian access is restricted by the government in areas controlled by armed groups in 21 townships of Rakhine, Kachin/Shan States.

International assistance increased over the past years, from 355.96 million USD in 2009 to 1,168.52 million USD in 2015.[4] OCHA reports 472 international development actors[5] in 2016 compared to 159 in 2013.[6]

Two pooled funds target livelihoods and peacebuilding:
-   Livelihood and Food Security Trust Fund (LIFT), a multi-donor Trust fund, established in 2009 and managed by UNOPS, to which donors have committed 400 million USD, and financing 147 projects to date.
-   The Peace Support Fund, established in May 2014, to support peacebuilding interventions, and funding projects of up to 6 million USD per year. It is managed by Nordic International Support Foundation and UNOPS.

The World Bank's National Community-Driven Development Project (NCDDP) supports community based infrastructures and livelihoods through grants and loans of 554 million USD. The

While common denominators remain the issues of access to natural resources, accountability of the central State towards nationally led interventions, and specific identifies related concerns beyond ethnicity, each State faces specific dynamics and contexts. The situation is particularly specific in Rakhine, where a clear religious divider is involved, in addition to other layers of division as in other border States. The situation is especially specific because the Muslim population, which represents the majority and has a growing demographic weight, does not have citizen

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[3] http://www.unocha.org/myanmar
[4] https://stats.oecd.org/qwids
[5] Myanmar Information Management Unit http://www.themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents /3W_RefDoc_Report_Org_NameAndAcronym_09Sep2016_0.pd
[6] http://themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/assessment_file_attachments/ Overview_SubSectorSummary_VT_Map_of_the_Apr_3W_Kayin_12Nov2013_0.pdf

status. As the most vulnerable group, Muslims are the focus of a strong resentment amongst the population and the authorities, who at some points block international assistance. While Myanmar's authorities are accused of human right abuses against civilian populations, recent reports also indicate possible support from foreign Islamic groups[7] supporting fears of a possible integration into global jihadist movements.

UNDP interventions

In Myanmar, UNDP's Country Programme Document (CPD) 2013-2015, extended up to 2017, is comprised of three programmatic areas that further subdivide into outputs[8]:

- Pillar I: Effective local governance for sustainable inclusive community development.
    - **Output 1:** Strengthened institutional capacity of local governments.
    - **Output 2:** Strengthened institutional capacity of civil society organizations to provide community services.
    - **Output 3:** Strengthened capacity of local media institutions in support of local development and civic awareness.
    - **Output 4:** Strengthened capacity of institutions to support sustainable livelihoods, including development of a model of integrated village development.
    - **Output 5:** Support for social cohesion and livelihoods in districts with high poverty incidence and ceasefire area.

- Pillar II: Climate change, environment, energy and disaster risk reduction.
    - **Output 6:** Rural communities and institutions have climate and disaster resilient plans.
    - **Output 7:** Enhanced institutional and human capacity for environmental conservation and use of natural resources.
    - **Output 8**: Rural households have increased access to renewable energies.

- Pillar III: Democratic governance and development effectiveness.
    - **Output 12:** Policy analysis and advocacy provided to national and regional governments to strengthen poverty alleviation programmes and to improve development effectiveness.
    - **Output 13:** Inclusive and participatory systems demonstrated in national and regional parliaments.
    - **Output 14:** Information and capacity for justice sector development.
    - **Output 15:** Inclusive and participatory systems demonstrated in public administration.

This is the first formal CPD for UNDP in Myanmar. Previously, and working under restricted mandate phase owing to the military rule in Myanmar, UNDP implemented a large community development project called the Human Development Initiative (HDI).

1.2   Output 5

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[7] International Crisis Group, Myanmar, A new Muslim Insurgency, dec. 2016
[8] Presented as iterated in original CPD and pillar project documents.

UNDP Myanmar's **Improved Livelihoods and Social Cohesion Programme** (Pillar 1, Output 5) aims to *increase capacities of target communities and institutions for social cohesion, sustainable livelihoods, and improve opportunities for peace.* In order to meet this aim, the Output targets ceasefire and high-poverty areas in Rakhine, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Shan, Chin and Mon; uses livelihoods as an entry-point to improve community social cohesion; supports capacities for social cohesion and peacebuilding of government, non-state actors (NSAs) and civil society organizations (CSOs); and facilitates early recovery coordination.

5.1
Social protection (SP) mechanisms in place for poor households at community level

5.4
Strengthened early recovery processes in place in target locations

5
Target communities and institutions have increased capacities for social cohesion, sustainable livelihoods, and improved opportunities for peace

5.2
Target communities have increased capacities and opportunities for social cohesion and livelihoods

5.3
National and local institutions and actors have increased capacities for conflict sensitivity, social cohesion and peace-building

Output 5 is directly implemented (DIM) by UNDP through a team of UNDP programme, technical and operation staff both in Yangon and in the relevant states. It was the UNDP most relied upon intervention, justifying the existence of UNDP zonal offices. Output 5 has reached up to 330 villages in 25 townships in the 7 above mentioned states.

The approach changed over the years. In 2013-2014, the interventions focused at the downstream (village-level) and used a building block approach to livelihood assistance. Communities were supported with different livelihood opportunities, where this support was used as entry-points for improving community level cohesion. Starting in 2015, downstream assistance has gradually reduced or interventions have responded to specific needs in priority locations, such as Rakhine and Kachin. Also starting in 2015, the Output has strengthened its capacity development focus, by strengthening local capacities for social cohesion and mainstreaming conflict sensitivity into local and community development in Myanmar. From 2016, output was meant to be fully repositioned to support capacity development, knowledge management and policy support for social cohesion and peacebuilding. In 2016, in response to direct requests from the GoM and the Joint Monitoring Committee for the Ceasefire (set-up under the above mentioned NCA), the Output also housed an initiative providing institutional bridge funding to the country's

The evaluation aims to provide answers to the following questions:	
CRITERIA	**QUESTIONS**
Relevance	- *Was the Output strategy relevant and appropriate? Does it remain valid?* - *How well did the Output strategy align with national priorities and goals?* - *How did the Output contribute to principles of human rights, gender and conflict-sensitivity?* - *To what extent and how successfully did the Output adapt to respond to the external environment and organizational positioning?* - *Looking ahead, what is most relevant to continue, deepen or scale-up? What is least relevant?*
Effectiveness	- *Has the Output achieved the results against its results framework and in contribution to the overall output and outcome result statements? What have been the contributing factors and constraints?*
Efficiency	- *Did programme management, implementation, partnership, monitoring and reporting arrangements facilitate the Output to deliver as planned?*
Sustainability	- *What indications are there that the achievements will be sustained?*
Lessons learned & recommendations	- *How does and can the learning from Output 5 inform its work during the remaining time - period as well as in UNDP's new programme cycle?*

ceasefire monitoring mechanism in the interim, for the design and set up of a separate project that will take this forward in 2017.

The seven border areas targeted by the project are not all areas where groups signed the ceasefire, and in some cases, active conflicts still occur. Thus, the output intervened in a broad diversity of contexts. Townships selected were also in some cases in Special Administration Zones, under EAOs authorities.

Between Jan. 2013 and Dec. 2016, the interventions covered 16,591,520 USD out of the total allocation of 17,395,928 USD funded by the governments of Japan, Finland, Danida, Norway, SIDA, as well as UNDP.

1.3   Objective of the evaluation

The overall objective is to assess the results, achievements and constraints of Output 5, taking into consideration the evolving context. The evaluation is forward looking and will look to inform the Output's future work in 2016-2017, as well as the nature of UNDP's future work in these areas under a new country programme cycle starting in 2018.

1.4   Scope of the evaluation

The evaluation covers the interventions undertaken as part of Output 5 since 2013, in the seven States. The evaluation is not looking at the early recovery coordination results as this was only administratively housed under the output.

1.5   Key Evaluation Questions

The answers to those questions are structured based on the most salient points for the different components of the output.

2 Methodology

2.1 Theory of Change

The theory of change was not formulated as such in the project document for the Local Governance and Local Development Programme,[9] but the overall logic was to use livelihoods as an entry point to support social cohesion at the grassroots levels, and introduce and strengthen capacities for social cohesion and conflict sensitivity concepts to support peace in border areas.

2.2 Data collection methods

Desk review. The evaluator reviewed UNDP and Implementing Partners (IP) documents, project documents and progress reports, as well as national development policies and strategies. Documents from similar and complementary initiatives, as well as the last reports on the specific context of the programme were also part of the analysis. An evaluation of the Pillar 1/Outcome 1 (Local Governance and Local Development Programme) was conducted in December 2016. In order to minimize the evaluation fatigue, the team took into account the interview notes from the previous evaluation team.

Focus group discussions: For the assessment, the evaluator held meetings with groups of beneficiaries, community members, participants to the trainings, and project staff.

Semi-structured interview. Interviewees can be classified as follow:
- UNDP staff, management, operational, administrative.
- Government counterparts at union and state/region levels.
- Other Partner organizations
- Donor (Finland).
- Civil society organizations, rights holders, political parties, customary authorities.

Survey / questionnaire. The team was only able to visit two areas, out of the seven. There are implementing partners in all those areas. A survey / questionnaire was disseminated to them.

Site visits were selected by UNDP, and the team did not object to this selection, given the sensitivity of the context and the need for early planning. The choice of visiting Rakhine and Shan States indeed seem particularly relevant as they appear to be the most strategic States. In Rakhine, the team went to Muarak-oO, which is quite close to the Northern limit of UNDP interventions.[10] In Shan, the team visited Taunggyi and Hopong, the latter of which is one of the five Special Administration Zones, in that case under PaO's control.

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[9] The UNDP Myanmar Country Office did not draft individual project documents for each Output.
[10] While the Output did implement activities in Northern Rakhine in 2013-2014, activities were suspended following active conflict, and no further activities were implemented subsequently.

During the visit in Shan State, the team was accompanied by a Natala staff, who wanted to observe the process as a learning exercise. He offered to leave the meetings if people were not comfortable with him, but the evaluation team accepted that he attends the discussions. The team believes that this did not impact the findings of the visit.

The Output evaluation followed a recent outcome evaluation of the Local Governance and Local Development Programme. This also influenced UNDP's selection of field missions and contributed to some reluctance from stakeholders to receive meetings.

2.3 Evaluation steps

The assignment consisted of three interlinked phases:
- Inception and start up;
- Data collection (desk review, interviews, survey and field visits); and
- Analysis and report writing.

The following mode of implementation was proposed.

Figure 1: Evaluation Phases

Inception
- Initial document review
- Futher development of methodology and work plan
- Inception Report

Data collection
- Desk review
- Survey
- Interviews
- Field visits, including briefing and debriefing

Analysis and reporting
- Compiling and analysis of data and preimary analysis
- Report drafting
- Comments from stakeholders
- Editing
- Final report

3 RELEVANCE

Evaluation Questions
- *Was the Output strategy relevant and appropriate? Does it remain valid?*
- *How well did the Output strategy align with national priorities and goals?*
- *How did the Output contribute to principles of human rights, gender and conflict-sensitivity?*
- *To what extent and how successfully did the Output adapt to respond to the external environment and organizational positioning?*
- *Looking ahead, what is most relevant to continue, deepen or scale-up? What is least relevant?*

3.1 Output Strategy

The strategy was informed by UNDP's previous work in community development, through the HDI interventions, and by the analysis that downstream service-delivery provided an entry-point to work on what could be potentially sensitive issues such as social cohesion. This was done by:

a) Targeting the country's border or ethnic states through a sequenced package of downstream village-level assistance – broadly, rice-banks, cash grants for livelihoods, Community Based Organizations (CBOs) strengthening, vocational training, livelihood and community infrastructure, and in some locations, market systems for last-mile technologies – and integrating this assistance with strategies for strengthening social cohesion at the community level.

b) Strengthening capacities for social cohesion and conflict sensitivity among local and national stakeholders.

Livelihoods proved to be a good entry point for social cohesion, as they provided direct benefits to the population. They naturally facilitated interaction and community based governance mechanisms. Conceptually and in practice, this strategy helped to strengthen CBOs and bring communities together around common objectives and interests. This combines both soft and hard assistance, which was considered a strong advantage by several interviewees. Given the poverty and in some cases, direct conflict impacts, there is/was a trade-off between delivering hardware benefits to the communities and working on software activities, such as CBOs mobilization and training activities. Results in terms of capacity building and social cohesion are indeed sometimes more difficult to observe & understand by communities where living standards are low / who sometimes live by the day, and where basic needs are far from fulfilled. The approach also supported the acceptance by the communities for engagement on social cohesion issues. The downstream interventions were planned while funding was short-term. Consequently, this approach could not be sustained when donors reduced their funding to UNDP.

Hence, while the interventions focused first at the downstream and community level, it fully repositioned itself to support capacity-development, knowledge-management and policy support for social cohesion and peacebuilding, and reached progressively out to State Institutions, non-state actors and CSOs at the State and Union levels. It completed ongoing village-level support activities.

It was envisaged that UNDP's downstream livelihood activities would be taken forward by the new area-based projects for Rakhine, Mon and Kayin – the design and technical drafting of which were led by Output 5. Rationales for this evolution were the decreasing level of donor funding, the difficulty of sustaining a relatively large downstream assistance programme without predictable and multi-year planning and budgeting frameworks[11], increased interventions by other stakeholders including perceptions of 'over-crowding' and decreasing comparative value for UNDP in downstream assistance, and emerging and more strategic opportunities. This also allowed for initiation of social cohesion and conflict sensitivity topics to key stakeholders.

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[11] The UNDP Myanmar Country Office to-date uses a programme funding framework, where donors fund the entire programme (without the option of earmarking) and resources are distributed across pillars and outputs on an annual basis. For 05, this made it impossible to design multi-year downstream assistance interventions.

The output encompassed a broad range of activities of various natures, from early recovery assistance (Rakhine) in disaster affected areas to market development approaches (innovative technologies), which permitted to implement or pilot different approaches, and launch diverse dynamics but it also spread out the interventions.

While the livelihoods were a relevant entry point to support social cohesion mechanisms, the output did not capitalize fully on the possible connectors. Alternative connectors, such as traditional practices for conflict management and resolution, for example[12], involvement of religious leaders, have not been considered, though they play a key role in the communities. Communities interviewed indicate, for example, that the level of social cohesion can be measured by the level of participation in religious ceremony. This would mostly have impact at a symbolic and moral level, without the material benefit component. The Output could have also worked in strengthening community dispute resolution mechanisms, for example, using those connectors, or restructuring stakeholders' engagement. Further analysis on this aspect should be considered, notably as they vary from one community to another, depending on the context and culture. This would be particularly relevant in relation to the ongoing work formulating conflict sensitivity indicators for local and community development, which intends to support government institutions that are implementing or monitoring local and community development activities in Myanmar, or while building local capacities on social cohesion. Many indicators traditionally used to assess social cohesion indeed refer to perception analysis, which is often costly and difficult to measure.

The output's downstream assistance strategy aimed to support local ownership through community leadership over the interventions. While providing general guidance, it gave some flexibility to the communities to adapt them. Hence, a number of parameters for the various components of the output were determined by the communities themselves. For example, CBO members were selected by the communities, often based on existing community structures such as those for religious events, taking into account the need to be representative and to include a gender perspective.

The identification of the beneficiary communities was made jointly between UNDP and the local authorities (in the first place EAOs in the Special Administration Zones). Accessibility, both in terms of security and logistics, was considered a major criterion, hence it is not the poorest / most isolated communities in a target township which always benefited from the output, as indicated to the team in two focus groups in different States, and also as acknowledged by an IP. Hence, by design, the communities who benefitted from the rice bank were not all food insecure, and actually used the capital as a bank. Also, in some cases, there was no social cohesion issue before the project, according to the communities interviewed (in Shan State), and the project was mostly a mitigation measure to strengthen social tissue and initiate or strengthen the sense of community. The strategy was then not to systematically address specific social cohesion issues but strengthen social cohesion and to intervene in areas, where tensions could arise.

Across all interventions, work began with assessments including poverty score, and the results were fed into community planning and decision-making. One of the objectives of using the poverty score-card was to give more rigor to findings from other PRA tools that yield more 'subjective' results. The identification of beneficiaries was made within each community, based also on some own specific criteria, which fed into the poverty analysis through the scorecards. Hence, the communities could choose who would be employed in the cash for work actions, and for how long. A

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[12] See for example in Timor Leste, UNDP's work with the Department of Peacebuilding and Social Cohesion, supporting local and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.

community indicated for example that there would be one person per household and that rotation would be ensured for the various phases of the work.

Using the Simple Poverty Score-Card during the assessment phase, UNDP ranked households. Those families identified at most vulnerable are entitled to receive free provisions during food-insecure months, which is off-set by the interest-based borrowings and repayments of the more able households. However, the poverty scorecard had some limitations, as reported by an IP, as criteria on the number of family members sometimes led to poor households being excluded of the support over richer households.

Interventions were prioritized by the communities, in order to ensure some adequacy to the needs. Subsequently, UNDP and the Implementing Partner (IP) would conduct preliminary assessments and prioritize, based on technical feasibility and budget ceilings (allocated for each village) and consultation with Government and the communities. Other considerations also mattered. For example, where school buildings were identified, the team had to consider UNDP's mandate, and sustainability in terms of teachers, facilities etc. The communities themselves frequently identified roads, among others, in order to break up decades of geographic isolation and neglect by the authorities. In Kayah and Chin, linking roads was the first priority with 70% of the selected projects, and small bridges rehabilitation was the second with 13% of the projects. Roads were, in the end, systematically rehabilitated even if it was not the top priority of the community (many faced strong issues of access to water / water management) but it was not a default or unilateral choice. This was also the case in Rakhine, although Muslim communities have movement restriction, and hence the road rehabilitation logic was sometimes questioned by external stakeholders. This contributes nonetheless to connecting communities and facilitating the exchanges. In some cases, depending on the funding level, the output funded other community priorities in addition to road rehabilitation. Each community had the right to decide how to use the rice bank. They indeed applied different strategies, some decided to keep the original capital at all cost and lend resources from it, while others used the capital, leading to diverse results.

Some communities' contribution was factored in the following ways:
-   CBOs: in assessments, planning and implementation
-   Food banks: in building food bank facilities
-   Capital assistance: for e.g. they build the fencing for livestock etc.
-   Infrastructure: cash-for-work and maintenance
-   Extension services: community volunteers provided simple extension services

Some IPs also report that cash for work was done voluntarily[13] in some communities, for example in 11 villages in Demoso in Kayah State, while participants received income in other ways, for example by supplying stones and gravels.

However, the output did not plan for clear community contribution in the rehabilitation (which was done through cash for work assistance) and livelihoods, which would have contributed to strengthening community commitment and ownership. A justification, per UNDP staff, was the scattered resources at the community level, and some level of emergency in some cases (Rakhine). Noticeably, some communities took the initiative to support the rehabilitation work by improving the road level voluntarily, to facilitate further work and be able to meet the deadline set by the partner.

In the overall strategy for livelihoods interventions, in the first phase notably, or to more recent interventions in Rakhine, the trade-off of choosing a building block

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[13] Final Project Report, Kayah and Chin States, IRC, 2014

approach over more inclusive outreach can be challenged. The output targeted 330 villages in 25 townships in 7 states, averaging between 2-5 townships per state and 20-40 villages per township, which represents broad coverage but in each township, the output covered only a reduced number of communities. The output provided a broad set of assistance at both community and individual levels in some selected communities, when other vulnerable neighbouring communities received no assistance from UNDP, as reported by focus group discussions. Some community members notably indicated to the team that the population did not understand why some neighbouring villages, which were more remote and then poorer, were not included in the project. Poverty scorecards were mostly established at the beneficiary communities' level, and hence there are limited data available to illustrate the level of priority and vulnerability across target townships and villages in terms of livelihoods or social cohesion. Selection of townships and villages was based on poverty, vulnerability, identity demographics, conflict sensitivity, past targeting (related to the Human Development Index), security and access. The selection was made by UNDP, not the implementing partners, in collaboration with the authorities, EAOs in special administration zones, and Natala. In some locations, the guiding principle was also conflict sensitivity and equity across the spread. For example, in Rakhine, UNDP used a cluster village approach to target Muslim and Rakhine villages living in close proximity to each other, to avoid perceptions of bias. In addition, within a community, livelihoods benefitted the poor and very poor population. Support to agriculture mostly benefited the land owners by providing seeds, fertilizers, while the daily workers constitute the majority and the most vulnerable groups. Families with no access to land had the option to invest grants in livestock or small shops.

Interventions focusing specifically on social cohesion included the following interventions:
- In 2015-2016, UNDP with Search For Common Ground Myanmar (SFCG) launched the initiative **Social Cohesion for Stronger Communities** (SC2), a visioning and capacity building process to support skills that contribute to social cohesion among local-level actors in Myanmar, which includes a social cohesion foundation course – a training module. The roll-out of the SC foundation course ('training'), a social cohesion framework – devised through a 6-month visioning and consultation process with government, CSOs, EOs, experts etc, a pool of national trainers (from ethnic areas) and the establishment of a Community of Practice.
- **Mainstreaming conflict sensitivity into local and community development:** UNDP, with International Alert, in undertaking a series of activities to strengthen conflict sensitivity in local and community development in Myanmar. This includes: establishing an inter-ministerial study group; undertaking 2 research studies on Myanmar and UNDP global good practice on conflict sensitivity; devising and rolling out a module on conflict sensitivity; devising an indicator framework for conflict sensitivity (ongoing); and international exchange on good practice (planned).

The introduction of the social cohesion concept is particularly relevant in the Myanmar context, and although the subject is rather innovative in the country, there is a strong demand for more capacity building in that respect, particularly from the State institutions and Natala. Given the fragmentation of the Myanmar society, where armed groups and political challenges are mostly organized around ethnic groups, the need for leadership, strategy and policy, at the national level to support social cohesion is also obvious, and UNDP is particularly well positioned for it, due to its legitimacy to the State institutions.

The creation of a pool of national trainers also meets the needs of capacity building in the country. This is especially so at the State level in ethnic areas, to ensure integration and adaptation of the concept to local dynamics, as well as to create local capacities, where they remain quite limited and where the connection with national challenges is also reduced. Besides, developing tailor-made curricular and having them translated in local languages contributes also to ensuring adequacy for local specificities.

In terms of approach, using capacity-development as a platform for peacebuilding between government, EAOs and CSOs proved also to be relevant, as this is a rather unique bridge building opportunity.

Nonetheless, in SC2, the output mostly involved mid-level agents, while the hierarchy was not always fully engaged. Participants were also not always in clear need of the competencies in their daily tasks. Hence, at the participant level, the initiative was not always related to operational challenges and they were not always held accountable to it. Myanmar civil society is considered as rather strong and not recent, but CSOs met by the team have sometimes a very limited level of activity, have been quite recently created or have no funding and would need funds to start actual activities. CSOs interviewed indicated indeed that their organization had no funding for example and hence that they could not use what they learned during the training except in their daily life. Civil servants who participated were not all directly facing conflicts or engaging with a broad range of stakeholders in their daily work, and the level of institutional endorsement and commitment was not oriented to practical results through the training.

3.2   Alignment with national priorities and goals

The partnership with Natala contributed to ensure the coherence between Output 5 interventions and the government's priorities, which remain limitedly formalized and are being designed progressively. At a broad level, a general agreement was signed in 2013 by the Government of Myanmar Nay Pyi Taw (NPT) Accord, which sets out commitments for effective development cooperation[14], and makes reference to conflict sensitivity. A 'Guide to International Assistance in Myanmar' was developed by the Foreign Economic Relations Department (FERD) of the Ministry of Planning and Finance (MPF) highlighting the need to take the context into account and have an inclusive approach. Some presidential guidelines were also issued on post-disaster recovery. However, they remain rather general and impacted limitedly to the interventions. There are also some sectoral plans, such as at the Ministry of Agriculture but no policies or strategies on social cohesion and related topic for example. The team did not identify strategy / policy for community based organizations, which appear under different denomination depending on UNDP's interventions and the implementation period under output 5: CBOs, Self-Reliance Groups, Village Development Committee, Livelihood and Social Cohesion Committees. The alignment is also ensured as the output, and UNDP interventions more generally, contributed to elaboration of the government plans or more operational frameworks for the livelihoods and social cohesion.

The output is also closely related to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, as it targets border areas and involve some of the signatories EAOs. This is directly related to the para. k of Chapter 1 of the NCA "Undertake efforts to protect lives and property and improve the livelihoods of all persons living within the Republic of the Union of Myanmar," Chapter 3, "5.k. Avoid resorting to force to resolve conflicts

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[14] https://mohinga.info/statistic/docs/NPTA_Effective_Development_Cooperation.pdf

arising at lower levels and ranks." This also refers to the Chapter 6, Future Tasks, which indicates notably, "We shall carry out the following programs and projects in coordination with each other in said areas: (…) 4) Matters regarding peace and stability, and the maintenance of rule of law in the said areas". The support to the JMC, which UNDP supported under the Output 5 umbrella, also stems directly from the NCA.

The involvement of State officers at various stages, notably Natala in the output board and State agents as trainers in the vocational trainings or in the SC2 and Conflict Sensitivity interventions notably, contributed to ensuring this alignment.

3.3 Human Rights, gender and conflict sensitivity

Human rights, gender and conflict sensitivity were significantly considered both in terms of process, approach and content of the interventions, with some limitations related to the context and the monitoring of the interventions.

3.3.1 Human Rights

The objective of supporting conflict affected and poor areas aims to strengthen the equity amongst the population. Social cohesion also contributes to the fulfilment of human rights by improving security and living standards and integrating the different ethnicities and groups of the population, notably youth and women, although the coverage and constraints face by the interventions remained limited to targeting all vulnerable groups in Border areas, including the most vulnerable ones.
The output contributed to building the capacities of both rights holders and duty bearers through mutual interactions, particularly during the SC2 initiative. This includes a better knowledge of the human rights. For example, a training participant indicated "Before I did not even know that I had human rights and that they were violated." Duty bearers also feel more confident in performing their task and knowing their role. By facilitating exchanges between both duty bearers and rights holders, the output also contributed to strengthening the process by which they support human rights. Rights holders have better access to duty bearers and communicate with them more easily.
In relation to livelihoods, the output built-in interventions for promoting positive values (i.e. tolerance, diversity, human rights etc…) alongside socio-economic recovery and development interventions.
The JMC, that UNDP assists, is also supposed to include a system to report HR violations at State level electronically to be tracked which also tracks how the case is resolved.
Human rights are more directly included in other components of UNDP CPD, such as Pillar 3 "Promotion of democratic governance and the rule of law to strengthen democratic institutions and the advancement of human rights" or Output 2 of Pillar 1 "Strengthened institutional capacity of civil society organizations to provide community services (including civic and legal awareness and advocacy on human rights)."

Myanmar faces several human rights issues, in terms of economic and social rights related to land access, and civil rights. Though, the main human rights challenge in the country is the situation of the Muslim populations in Rakhine. There, Output 5 did not have effects - to date - on the restrictions that Muslim communities face. This

includes the need or habits of getting authorization for their movements out of their villages, which vary depending on the townships. Nevertheless, a township head indicated for example that he searched for the text indicating that Muslims should get specific clearance and did not identify it. Muslims are forbidden to go to city centers, also for the sake of their own security, and hence have for example limited access to health infrastructures. Access to nationality also remains an issue, which, according to the authorities, is also due to the fact that Muslim population did not want to get registered during the UNFPA census a few years ago. There is a strong fear amongst the Rakhine population that Muslims will overcome them because of a rampant demography and an increased number of towns in Northern Rakhine being populated by a clear majority of Muslims, or that they could be linked with Jihadist movements. Authorities also consider the case as a National Security issue since several attacks took place, increasing the polarization. The lack of progress on that respect illustrates limitations of recovery and development assistance, in general in addressing the systemic and structural issues in Rakhine. There is no certainty that the output could have done more than building the capacity for social cohesion and supporting mutual understanding, given the ongoing fights between the two parties, the sensitivity of the issue and the innovative aspect of such activities in the Myanmar context. This also illustrates potential limitations in addressing such challenges essentially through a downstream approach, and the relevance then of supporting social cohesion and conflict resolution skills at both the grassroots levels – in order to create the demand and alleviate pressure on the authorities – and at the institutional level, so as to ensure that the policy and strategic framework supports peaceful coexistence. This said, the recovery and livelihoods interventions always provide the opportunities for discussion around concrete issues and to raise developmental challenges, such as demography, population movements, and governance of natural resources which often underpin conflicts, and allow for such opportunities starting from micro issues.

Finally, there is always a potential concern in supporting State institutions which commit human rights abuses, which has been denounced in Rakhine by several INGOs and research centres. However, in that case, the output supported the ability of the State institutions, and other stakeholders, to address conflict in a non-violent manner and to strengthen their understanding of such concepts and legal frameworks.

3.3.2 Gender

The gender aspect was taken into account in various respects at the different stages of the project, from proposal writing to reporting on activities, although this was not systematic. While all the performance indicators ask for disaggregated data, performance for the indicators 7 to 9 are not gender disaggregated in the resource and result framework[15]. The outcome indicators do not report on gender. Activity level indicators are also not always systematically disaggregated by gender. Aside from an objective of changing the perception on the role of youth and women owing to the innovative technologies project, the targets, and then those indicators, are also largely quantitative.

In terms of content at the downstream level, when women were involved in the village planning exercise, an IP reports that "most of them were surprised and we had to encourage them not to be ashamed and to tell their opinion frankly". This illustrates the challenges of such an approach. The first indicator and target of the output was on women's participation in community based organizations and efforts

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[15] Resource and Results Framework, updated November 2016.

were undertaken to promote women in the committee, with a target of 40% participation in community governance structures. This was not achieved and stayed at 20% in 2016 but was 47% in 2015, according to the RRF[16]. Women were sometimes reluctant and scared to be part of the committee, as indicated by an IP, which then required a lot of sensitization. The extent to which they actually participated in the local governance meetings and their exact role is uncertain[17] as women, traditionally, do not go outside their home after sunset. They are also busy with domestic tasks at the end of the day and with markets. However, this varies strongly depending on the communities, in some villages women are used to participating. A community raised examples of how the women's voices were considered in the programming of the road rehabilitation for example, where they suggested that a higher number of workers be hired to ensure that the deadline was met. This is a first step in a mostly conservative environment and, as such, the results should be considered from a long-term perspective. The emphasis on the gender perspective contributed, nevertheless, to an evolution of their perceived role in the society and to some women's empowerment and a reduction of their vulnerability, notably as female head of households[18] benefitted from the grants and vocational trainings. Some vocational training largely involved women, such as sewing and provided opportunities for women to befriend and visit each other, which has a positive influence on the entire community. No formal women association - for example related to their specific field of activities - were constituted on this basis however. In Muslim communities, where the population practices a rather conservative Islam, their participation to community dynamics was more challenging. Cultural challenges were also faced in the implementation. For example, during the vocational training, women were not allowed to be in the presence of men and the facilitator had to stay outside in order not to see the women who were attending his training, which illustrates the need to include further the gender perspective and support the participation of female trainers.

The innovative technology activities included 50 % of young women as sales agents, and hence contributed to promoting them in the village. It also aimed to reduce the workload of women, who are in charge of the firewood collection, and to protect them by avoiding remote displacement. The extent of those security issues, conversely, was not formally documented.

More generally, the work on conflict mitigation and social cohesion is also of key relevance from a gender perspective as women are particularly vulnerable to attacks. Social cohesion is also relevant because it fosters broad acceptance of all groups in society despite gender and thereby lays the foundation for preventing conflicts.

Gender, and vulnerabilities more broadly, were also taken into account as a criteria in the cash for work, and in some cases, specific types of work were allocated depending on the capacities. For example, elders were for example tasked with soft ground levelling, clearing bush and women levelled road, carried soil or filled cement, which is considered as less labor intensive, according to an IP report[19]. Women, elderly, disabled and men were paid equally.

Aside from those initiatives to include women in the activities and empower them in CBOs, the actual gender mainstreaming perspective was not fully incorporated, concerning leveraging different triggers depending on the gender. Indeed, because of different traditional roles in the communities, some specific leverages can be used

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[16] An IP indicates that they tried to include 2 or 3 women in the "Livelihoods and Social Cohesion Committee", implied much lower rate of women participation in some cases.

[17] The team could meet with women in Shan State, but not in Rakhine set because of timing issues.

[18] An IP indicates notably that some women head of households did not agree to put their name as head of households even though they were actually head of households, and hence statistics are limited.

[19] Final Project Report, Kayah and Chin States, IRC, 2014

to trigger social cohesion and / or peacebuilding mechanisms, according to the gender. The analysis of those aspects as well as of the different effects of the interventions could be strengthened: how did the level of women security evolve? what was their contribution to social cohesion mechanisms and their influence on other groups?

3.3.3 Conflict Sensitivity

CPAP includes a clear definition of how conflict sensitivity will be taken into account by doing periodic contextual analysis and by having an inclusive approach ensuring representation. The overall objective of the output is to mitigate conflicts and social / political tensions, so conflict sensitivity is at the core of the interventions. As such, this was included to some extent in the various interventions.

Conflict sensitivity challenges in the output design relate potentially to the balance between ethnic groups, the political economy around the interventions, notably if it empowered some stakeholders or communities versus others, in terms of particular coverage, which was not identified during this assessment. The main issue related to negative effects of the development assistance is a general problem, which does not concern output 5 only. In Rakhine, initial targeting for early recovery assistance in 2015-2016 also focused on returnees, implying then an emphasis on Muslim, who are the predominant displaced and therefore return caseloads. In Rakhine, the perception of inequitable assistance to Muslims, is a continue cause of strong resentment among the ethnic Rakhine populations as well as some authorities. While efforts were made to balance the assistance, for example, UNDP revised its village selection to target both return villages and surrounding Rakhine villages, however it then creates a strategic tension between supporting the most vulnerable groups and equitable targeting.

There is also a risk from a conflict sensitivity perspective that the output supports local and development efforts of EAOs by building their conflict resolution skills when they administrate some territories. Indeed, according to the interviewees, they sometimes seek to expand them, and a participant to the training reported that he helped to mitigate recruitment attempts by an EAOs signatory of the NCA, by communicating the NCA to the communities (which they were not aware of).
The related risk is to be perceived as partial in the conflict, and to face some reluctance by the EAO, which happened to some extent with a relatively limited participation of their representatives in the SC2 activities in 2015.

In terms of content of the activities, several studies were undertaken to streamline conflict sensitivity into local and community development. They provide insightful analysis of the challenges related to conflict sensitivity in Myanmar. An inter-ministerial working group is also working on it and comprises the Ministry of Border Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation and Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement. This is a first step of involving key ministries involved in implementing and monitoring local and community development but does not include all the stakeholders in charge of conflict arbitration, such as land, mines, economy and infrastructures, police or justice.

The interventions developed as part of the social cohesion competency development initiative (social cohesion framework, foundation course, pool of national trainers) are to some extent related to conflict sensitivity, through the objectives of promoting peaceful coexistence and mitigating violence, and noticeably, UNDP also developed a specific visual toolbox on conflict sensitivity.

Noticeably, the output acted on several layers of conflict, through the livelihoods interventions between the communities, and to some extent by promoting interactions between the State and the communities for example by linking up with local level government extension service providers and facilitating vocation training jointly with civil servants. This remains nonetheless limited. In addition, through the SC2, it fostered social cohesion competencies and dynamics of the representatives of the various stakeholders, State institutions, EAOs and CSO actors, by favouring their interactions and level of skills.

More generally, although the output focuses on social cohesion in border areas, hence the most fragile ones, the results and potential general influence on the peace process appears rather indirect, and there is no data on the contribution of the output to the political conflict. The output played a role in empowering individuals and communities, in providing some peace dividends, and strengthening the social tissue, as well as the resilience dynamics, which can contribute to mitigate the risk of local conflicts, while interventions at the community level cannot address the structural conflict drivers.

The actual contribution to the peace process is not documented in reports such as reports to output boards, notably when the interventions concern areas where the EAOs did not sign the ceasefire. This relates to a general lack of integration of the result in terms of social cohesion, and more broadly of peacebuilding at the output and outcome levels. The output indicators related very much to individual or community results and not so much on systemic issues.

The Do No Harm approach was not formally included from the start of the project, through specific analysis. In the output 5 context, this could have helped to maximize the use of local connectors in the programming, and ensure operational articulation of the various capacity building initiatives, based on the State priorities. That said, the consultative and flexible nature of the process contributed to overcoming this limitation, and this evaluation did not identify potential reverse effects of the various aspects of the interventions for the beneficiaries.

3.4 Adaptation to external environment and organizational positioning

The output significantly evolved since 2013, when it was first designed, adapting to the context in various respects: overall change of the country political and security context and increased presence of international development organizations and the nature of the State. From an almost (i)/NGO type of role with a broad field presence, UNDP went back to what is usually considered as its core mandate, support to the institutions at the upstream level, keeping in mind its comparative advantage in the country, which mostly consist in the ability to support institutions at the strategic level. The organization took the opportunity of the change of context to start introducing key concepts of social cohesion and conflict sensitivity at the upstream level, which also appear relevant given the structural nature of the conflict with the EAOs and the need to identify broad spectrum solutions.

This change of positioning also depended on the State context. In Kachin, support continued in 2015-2016, in response to promoting durable solutions for returnees and host-communities. In Rakhine, livelihoods support was maintained in 2015-2016 owing to the fragility of the situation, in response to the returns and flood in 2015, and longstanding tensions between the Rakhine and Muslim populations, as a

legacy of the 2012 crisis and persistent troubles. At the same time, the social cohesion competency development initiative (SC2) could not be implemented in Rakhine as during the initial scoping and consultations missions, it was deemed too sensitive, including to bring different stakeholders together.

Finally, responding to the requests from the JMC and the Government of Myanmar, to provide bridge funding to the JMC, was a fairly critical action, both in terms of adapting to the external environment (i.e. the signatory of the NCA in 2015) and organizational positioning (opening UNDP and the UN to playing a broader role in the formal peace process).

3.5 Most relevant and least relevant interventions for further capitalization

UNDP benefits from a rather unique relationship with the government, with which UNDP gained a strong legitimacy, and due to this relationship, UNDP is also a legitimate partner for (I)NGOs who often struggle to establish true partnerships with Government. UNDP has a key role in ensuring connection between State institutions and other stakeholders, as part of its international mandate and of its history in the country. The government also acknowledges the experience of the organization, and the interest of learning further from UNDP. The multilateral aspect of the organization also inspires further trust, as it has no political agenda or other interests than its mandate. UNDP then has a better access than other structures in terms of connections, as well as potential coverage. UNDP has also a comparative advantage in institutional support to streamline various initiatives. Because of this legitimacy and unique access, the organization is also particularly well positioned to operate in the most fragile areas of the country, on various types of support, including on identifying and supporting infrastructure rehabilitation through cash for work schemes.

Capacity building initiatives gained strong interest from the participants, either those related to social cohesion (training / workshops / networks), as well as on livelihoods best practices ongoing in Rakhine. As such, it would seem relevant to disseminate the learnings further and support the rolling out of similar interventions, based on the specificities of each context.

At the community level, the food banks, which created social protection nets, and related community based committees for a community based approach, constitute a great success. They form a relay to launch further community based initiatives, when they were well managed, which depends on the committee and partners' capacities.

The innovative technologies approach tested the introduction of more performant technologies, selected by the communities, as a way to improve the living standards, and build local skills, the results in terms of social cohesion are less direct than other interventions, as well as the benefits for poor and vulnerable groups. Out of individual vocational training, some IPs indicate that more integrated approaches, for example integrated farming, and strengthening of the value chain would be quite helpful, while some beneficiaries stopped the activities they learnt because of difficulties to sell their product[20]. As such, supporting also the trade of local products could be an opportunity to use a related approach of support to distribution system,

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[20] Livelihoods Skills Trainings and Enterprise Start-up Training and Grants Evaluation, TNS Myanmar, Quantitative & qualitative research report.

and to mix members of different communities around professional solidarity systems.

4 EFFECTIVENESS

Evaluation Question
Has the Output achieved the results against its results framework and in contribution to the overall output and outcome result statements? What have been the contributing factors and constraints?

4.1 Contribution to outcome level results

The outcome objective was: *Community driven development institutions that support local governance in service delivery and inclusive growth, including agricultural development and enhancement of employment opportunities for women and men.* It was originally strongly related to downstream level interventions, with a focus on local governance livelihoods, while the social cohesion was more implicit. Output 5 represented a strong share of the overall outcome budget with 42% of the total.

At a general level, the output contributed to community level development (supply-side) and strengthened community level governance, through community based initiatives and CBOs. Nonetheless, the connection with other local governance mechanisms was not always direct. For example, the evaluation did not identify linkages established between communities and townships, as part of a more general local development initiative or of accountability mechanisms. The State institutions were involved when relevant, including at the technical level for vocational training for example, but not so much in relation to service delivery or inclusive growth, which remained mostly at the community level, through cash for work, individual grants, vocational skills development and infrastructure rehabilitation. Hence, the progress in terms of service delivery capacities was not identified. The output contributed to the outcome, as formulated above, through agricultural development and some employment opportunities. It was the only output which contained livelihoods, including agriculture and more general provision of employment services, by engaging with the private sector, cash for work, small grants and vocational training notably. The commitment to agricultural development, however, remained limited and was not a specific focus of the output, although this is a main component of the outcome statement. As a reminder, the other outputs under pillar 1 focused on institutional capacity and organisational management of State/Division, District and Township administration, support to CSOs and civil and legal awareness, capacity of local media and civic and legal awareness, institutional capacity to support sustainable livelihoods and reintegration programmes.
At a more strategic level, the output could show that new approaches were relevant even in fragile contexts. In Rakhine, there is an existing divide in the international community between early response activities and humanitarian assistance and this was the first early response (ER) activity. This was the first ER project and there was a lot of push back as many thought both couldn't be done at the same time. The implementation of the project managed to convert some humanitarian aid supporters to show that you can do both at once. IRC and DRC are now doing ER through USAID support.

In the revised Result Framework, the outcome indicator was defined as : *Number of times a UNDP approach to community social cohesion building has been replicated by partners.* No follow up was made of this indicator in the documents provided to the team, and this indicator - as formulated - does not provide an accurate overview of the outcome objectives of improved local governance, service delivery and employment opportunities. The evaluation of Pillar 1[21] identifies one case of replication in 2015 and three in 2016, based on the new programme implemented by some other organizations in Rakhine State. Potential limitations to this analysis also lie in the fact that UNDP's approach to community social cohesion, at a general level of mixing livelihoods / cash for work and social cohesion, is not unique to UNDP at a global level[22], and more specifically, the SC2 and conflict sensitivity also builds on the partner's experience. Other potential funding opportunities for the innovative technologies approach, which also aimed to support social cohesion, were also reported to the team.

In the original programme document, outcome indicators[23] were formulated as follows, without specific baseline and targets. They are mentioned here as indications of the output 5 contribution to broader outcome level results.

1.1: Strengthened institutional capacities for democratic governance in the delivery of public and private goods and services
No direct contribution, but State institutions were involved in trainings on social cohesion which contribute to democratic governance. The SC2 also contributed to providing skills on social cohesion and facilitating discussions which are the basis for democratic governance by civil service.

1.2: Improved management of income vulnerabilities and sustainable longer term trend in growth of net incomes.
The output contributed to the reduction of income vulnerabilities in the beneficiary villages but overall data available on the effects of the livelihoods intervention are limited.

1.3: Number of townships with a local government-led development plan, formulated through consultation with women, youth and marginalized populations, under implementation. It is expected that at least one township plan will be developed in each State/Region.
In 2016, the Rakhine State Government (RSG) has announced its plans to develop a 5-year Socio-Economic Development Plan (SEDP) – to address the multi-dimensional development challenges in Rakhine State. The RSG requested international assistance to develop the SEDP, including technical expertise for consultation and drafting, as well as the UN to coordinate this support. The request for support provided development partners an opportunity to positively contribute to the substance and process and subsequently its implementation. Against this background, UNDP provided technical support on conflict sensitivity, as part of its broader support to the SEDP process.
The studies and exchanges on conflict sensitivity contributes also to support consultative and inclusive approaches from the State institutions, although this is still rather early to analyse the effects of those interventions.

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[21] Independent Outcome Evaluation of UNDP Myanmar's Outcome 1 (Local Governance Programme – 2013-2016), February 2017, Nicolas Garrigue, Marla Zapach, U Kyaw Thu.
[22] See for example, interventions under the PBF in Ivory Coast, projects in Liberia or on resilience in Mali.
[23] Country Programme Document, February 2013, p7.

4.2 Achievements of the output

4.2.1 Output objectives and structure

The output was defined in the 2013 programme document as: *Support to social cohesion and livelihoods in districts with high poverty incidence and ceasefire areas.* It was further defined in the RRF: *Target communities and institutions have increased capacities for social cohesion, sustainable livelihoods, and improved opportunities for peace[24].*

The results framework evolved over time, as illustrated in the table below, reflecting the evolution of the output content, in relation to the change in context and funding level as indicated above. The changes notably concerns the Implementation of village based protection mechanisms and lessons learnt collection turning into support to poor households, the component of village based mechanisms / self-reliance groups and CBOs. 5.3 component was integrated into 5.2, and the 5.3 / 5.4 components were totally reorganized to include a more upstream approach. To some extent, the result framework was simplified for more direct support to vulnerable groups, which is also logical given the short timeframe for the intervention's implementation.

Table 1: Comparison original and updated result framework

INITIAL RESULT FRAMEWORK	REVISED STRUCTURE
5.1. Social protection and inclusion mechanisms in place for poorest households at the community level	**5.1 Social protection (SP) mechanisms in place for poor households at community level**
5.1.1 Assessment and identification of poorest households through village level groups/CBOs	5.1.1 Identify poor households at community level in target locations
5.1.2 Review and identification of sustainable village based social protection mechanisms	5.1.2 Identify and strengthen social protection mechanisms at community level
5.1.3 Implementation of village based protection mechanism and lessons learnt collection	5.1.3 Provide assistance to poor households at community level
5.2 Activity Result: Rural communities, community based organizations and other civil society organizations have acquired knowledge and skills for social cohesion, representation and participation in local development processes	**5.2 Target communities have increased capacities and opportunities for social cohesion and livelihoods**
5.2.1 Representative village level organizational mechanisms (e.g. village/ village tract development committees, resource centres) are identified established and engage in identifying community priorities	5.2.1 Identify early recovery, livelihoods and social cohesion baselines to target locations
5.2.2 Community capacity to implement and operate basic socio- economic infrastructure enhanced	5.2.2 Support sustainable livelihood recovery and livelihood development of communities in target locations
5.2.3 Self-reliant groups (SRGs) and community based organisations (CBOs) have acquired the knowledge, skills and capacity to engage in forming sustainable and self-reliant federated structures (based on interest and in location where SRGs are not yet formed).	5.2.3 Facilitate and support dialogue and trust-building activities in pilot locations in Rakhine and Kachin State

5.3 Livelihood stabilized for the conflicted affected people staying through livelihood asset replacement, skill enhancement and income generation opportunities **Key interventions under this component will focus on both Camp Based Livelihood Assistance; and Village Based Livelihood Assistance and Early Recovery in the conflict and disaster affected areas.**	**5.3 National and local institutions and actors have increased capacities for conflict sensitivity, social cohesion and peace building**
5.3.1 Camp level Livelihood Support: Immediate employment opportunities (cash-for-work); Daily income generations through service based activities and establishing micro and small scale enterprises; Vocational training;	5.3.1 Facilitate and support analysis and assessments on social cohesion and peace-building at national level and local level
5.3.2 Village level Livelihood Supports: Immediate job creation through cash-for-work; Cash grant or in-kind support for immediate livelihood assets replacement and livelihoods recovery; Training, technical assistance and monitoring support	5.3.2 Undertake capacity-strengthening and training activities for national and local institutions, actors and partners on conflict sensitivity, social cohesion and peace-building, particularly targeting civil society organizations (CSOs), academia, media organizations, women networks and youth networks
	5.3.3 Facilitate/ support national and local institutions, actors and partners to undertaken social cohesion and peace-building activities particularly targeting civil society organizations (CSOs), academia, media organizations, women networks and youth networks
5.4 Activity Result: Local capacities for peace identified and strengthened	**5.4 Strengthened early recovery processes in place in target locations**
5.4.1 Local mapping exercise to identify conflict drivers and peace capacities, such as community committees, traditional leadership, civil society organizations and change agents with a view to capacity and impartiality to lead and facilitate community dialogues and inter-community activities	5.4.1 Establish and facilitate Early Recovery coordination mechanisms
5.4.2 Assess the need for capacity enhancement of identified institutions and organization and test the feasibility of undertaking local dispute resolution and mediation trainings.	5.4.2 Support the government in the development of ER strategies
5.4.3 Mainstreaming conflict sensitivity into livelihoods and recovery	5.4.3 Capacity development of CSO and Government in leading recovery processes
5.5 Increased confidence-building measures supported through livelihood and other targeted interventions 5.5.1 Confidence-building measures in support of inter-community interaction 5.5.2 Livelihoods and access to services for socially vulnerable 5.5.3 Gender mainstreaming and empowerment	

4.2.2 Disbursement rate

The disbursement rate was 97.14%, with the limited gaps on the activities of social protection mechanisms and support at the community level.

Table 2: Planned budget and expenditures for 05 Interventions 2013-2016

Work-Plan Activity Results	Budget (2013-2016)	Expenditure (2013-2016)
5.1 Social protection (SP) mechanisms in place for poor households at community level **(food banks, poverty score-card research, Rakhine livelihoods best practices)**	1,161,262	993,125
5.2 Target communities have increased capacities and opportunities for social cohesion and livelihoods **(CBO strengthening, capital assistance, infrastructure, vocational training, technology innovations)**	12,349,543	11,998,390
5.3 National and local institutions and actors have increased capacities for conflict sensitivity, social cohesion and peace-building **(social cohesion study visit, capacity-development activities for social cohesion, including SC2, mainstreaming conflict sensitivity, bridge support to JMC)**	2,264,853	2,358,131
5.4 Strengthened early recovery processes in place in target locations	1,366,837	1,302,416
Total	**17,142,495**	**16,652,062**

4.2.3 Results

Output logic

The results of the **building block strategy**, understood as the delivery of a package of service in one community (food banks, capital assistance, skills development, infrastructure, and value chain while supporting social cohesion), can be apprehended by the effects of the various activities as mentioned above. Potential synergies and leverage effects resulting from the combination of those interventions are not clearly identified in a comprehensive manner. All the interventions included support to social cohesion in border areas by using different entry points, in the first place livelihoods in 2013-2014 and in 2015-2016 in Rakhine and Kachin, as well as collective infrastructure / community assets, joint capacity building / capacity building of vulnerable or strategic population (women / youths), market based / distribution networks approach or collective governance mechanisms.
The social cohesion objective was addressed both at the vertical and horizontal levels, in the following manner:

Community level
- Within the communities:
    - Village Development Committee / Community Based Organizations / Livelihoods and Social Cohesion Committee
    - Sensitization on social cohesion
    - Joint participation in cash for work
    - Community infrastructures
- Between different communities:
    - Sensitization and meetings with clusters of villages
    - Joint vocational training

- Increased transportation because of road rehabilitation
- Distribution chain across several villages
- Exchanges between salespeople
- Steering committee

Township / State levels
SC2:
- Joint participation in the training
- Tools / techniques on social cohesion / conflict mitigation
- Joint facilitation by trainers

Livelihoods upstream work:
- Rakhine SEA planning: Consultative process
- Best practice committee: Joint work

Union level
Conflict sensitivity
- Fostering conflict sensitivity into development planning

At the downstream level, there was no such interdependency approach in terms of mutual access to basic infrastructures between various communities, notably because the approach was to ask each community for its specific needs, which seems relevant given the particularly sensitive context in some areas, and the necessity for an incremental approach starting from the community itself as the first social entity. Obviously, at the community level, the rehabilitation of the road facilitates trade exchanges for the production surplus, and there is also a clear interrelation between social cohesion and trade relations between the communities.

There were limited interactions and integration between the various types of interventions under Output 5, even taking into account also that they were often implemented at various periods. For example, tools developed on SC2 by SFCG were not used for sensitization at the community level, such as support in Rakhine, as this was considered too costly by the partner in charge.

Achievement of the targets

At a general level, the output reached a significant number of beneficiaries:
- Livelihoods for social cohesion strategies – 330 villages in 25 townships in 7 States
- Community governance strengthening – 329 CBOs
- Social protection mechanisms – 194 food banks benefitting 18,260 persons
- Capital assistance for livelihoods – 6,335 households
- Community infrastructure – 469 units benefitting 259,583 people
- Infrastructure cash-for-work schemes benefitting 83,701 people
- Vocational skills development benefitting 621 persons
- Early recovery support for returnees and disaster-affected people in Kachin and Rakhine benefitting 70,000 persons
- Social cohesion and conflict sensitivity skills and capacities development for government, civil society and NSAs reaching 1167 persons.

Based on the performance targets defined for each of the indicators, the following results can be observed. The details of the achievements by activity are attached in annex 5.

Table 3: Level of achievement of the targets (Report to Output Board 2016)

Output Indicators	Targets	Progress Towards Targets (2016)
Indicator 01 - # of women representatives in community-led governance structures in target locations Baseline: 25%	**Target (cumulative)** 40% **Target (2016)** 45%	– *Not achieved.* - 20.7% of village CBO members are women.
Indicator 02 - % of persons targeted for livelihood assistance reporting increased income-levels in target locations 06 months after having received support (disaggregated by gender) Baseline:	**Target (cumulative)** 70% **Target (2016)** 70%	- *Achieved.* - 97% reporting increased-income.
Indicator 03 - # of persons targeted for micro-enterprise support reporting sustaining their enterprises 6 months after having received support (disaggregated by gender) Baseline: 0	**Target (cumulative)** 80% **Target (2016)** 80%	- *Achieved.* - 83% reporting sustaining businesses at least 6 months after having received support. - Men: 81%; Women: 85%.
Indicator 04 - # of persons using/accessing constructed/ rehabilitated infrastructure (disaggregated by gender) Baseline: 0	**Target (cumulative)** 300,000 **Target (2016)** 15,000	- *Achieved.* - 17,714 using/accessing constructed or rehabilitated infrastructure units (Rakhine). - Men: 8,498; Women: 9,216.
Indicator 05 - % Increase in # of households reporting 'more than 5' occasions for interacting with a member from another village/ethnicity in past 06 months as a result of UNDP's interventions (disaggregated by gender) Baseline: 31:100 HH	**Target (cumulative)** 37.2:100 HH **Target (2016)** 48.5:100 HH (55% increase)	– *Achieved.* – 94.9:100 HH in number of persons reporting 'more than 5 occasions for interacting with other village/ethnicity members.
Indicator 06 - % of households reporting perceptions of increased unity between people from other villages/communities in the past 6 months as a result of UNDP's interventions (disaggregated by gender) Baseline: 0%	**Target (cumulative)** 50% **Target (2016)** 55%	– *Achieved.* – 98.9% reporting perceptions of increased unity between people from other villages/communities in the past 6 months.
Indicator 07 - % of trained participants who successfully apply the knowledge and skills on social cohesion gained from training initiatives into their work Baseline: 0	**Target (cumulative)** 35% **Target (2016)** - 35%	- *Achieved.* - 97% of trained participants reporting successfully apply the knowledge and skills on social cohesion gained from training initiatives into their work.
Indicator 08 - % of people surveyed who report that their level of trust toward others have increased as a result of their participation in training initiatives (disaggregated by gender) Baseline: 0%	**Target (cumulative)** 35% **Target (2016)** -35%	- *Achieved.* - 89% of people reporting their level of trust toward others have increased as a result of their participation in training initiatives
Indicator 09 - % Households purchasing technologies reporting and improved perception of women and youth as a result of market transactions facilitated by the programme (disaggregated by men and women) Baseline: 41%	**Target (cumulative)** 75% **Target (2016)** 40%	- *Achieved.* - 92% of households purchasing technologies reporting and improved perception of women and youth as a result of market transactions facilitated by the programme.

Across the various levels of interventions, common features in terms of effectiveness cover the following elements related:
- Increased connectedness / communication and exchanges between various groups of people.
- Empowerment and capacity building.
- Creating ability to improve self-knowledge, envisage collective development, select, decide and implement projects, in relation to an Appreciative Inquiry type of approach.
- Creation of mixed structures (CBOs, social cohesion networks).

Progress in terms of livelihoods

More specifically, there are obvious examples of improved livelihoods at the community levels and, according to an IP: "The project improved access to and reduced inequalities in resources, incomes and livelihood opportunities". Notably, the output played a significant role in some particularly remote areas (in Chin State for example), as it was the first support that communities received from international stakeholders, and was also considered to be based on the community needs.
Beneficiaries learned new and improved techniques, received some equipment, and were able to increase their production (from 120 baskets to more than 200, or from 1500 to 2000 units, according to some interviewees). In some cases, the communities used the capital they received to create the rice banks to lend money, and used the interests for various community projects. For example, the team visited a community where electricity was put on the small roads of the village and a water tank was built with a contribution from the community. The community increased the initial capital of 5 million to 8,6 million Kyats. In addition, food banks obviously reduced food scarcity during the food shortage period (May – July). The individual grants sometimes allowed beneficiaries to stop borrowing money from the broker. In some communities, some households stopped depending on daily wages and started groceries stores generating got additional income. They are thus more self-reliant and can spend money on education. The evaluation of UNDP Support to Livelihoods Skills Trainings and Enterprise Start-up Training and Grants Evaluation undertaken by TNS Myanmar, quantitative & qualitative research report (2016), highlights an income increase of between 2,000 and 30,000 MMK for the majority, and half of the participants reported setting up an enterprise following the training, which increased the number of businesses and services in the communities. One in four of the newly created enterprises employs others.

Figure 2. Increased monthly income following vocational trainings

Monthly income amount %

2,000 - 10,000 MMK	15,000- 30,000 MMK	35,000 - 50,000 MMK	60,000-200,000 MMK
31	37	18	14

As indicated by a community member during a focus group, the livelihoods interventions had more results on the medium or poor categories than on the very poor. Indeed, the very poor cannot invest or spare money for future, as they can hardly fulfill their basic needs. Hence, what they received was used immediately, sometimes for health or school, and they do not have any assets to capitalize upon, (however access to new infrastructures obviously benefitted the whole of the community). Results for the farmers were more significant as they had lands and could hire cattle. The poor could invest thereby improving their current situation. However, the support was not always sufficient to make a change and in some communities, the economic life did not improve significantly, particularly for the landless.

77% of the respondents to an assessment[25] in Chin and Kayah indicated that the activities contributed to an improvement in mobility, in terms of access to neighboring villages and access to cultivation land. This contributes to lowering the transport cost / time for selling commodities. The rehabilitation of roads contributed to increased access to markets, as previously some villages were totally inaccessible during the rainy season. Some community members report up to a 60% income increase. The road is also helpful for better access to town, including basic services such as health centres and schools.

According to this assessment, livelihoods activity benefited also not only targeted villages but also surrounding villages. For example, the road rehabilitated at Thay Su Lei in Demoso Township in Chin State, benefits 12 surrounding villages by improving access to Demoso town.

Exchanges visits also occurred between different beneficiary communities and were highly appreciated as opportunities to share experiences and strategies, including on the maintenance.

Interventions **at the institutional level** contributed to building capacities and bringing stakeholders together regarding livelihoods.

A Best Practice Committee composed of various stakeholders was notably created in Rakhine, as a pilot project, with the objective of identifying livelihoods practices which could be replicated and disseminated further. Despite some challenges in the research, stakeholders indicate their strong interest in pursuing such an approach, including for best practices from other areas, possibly at the international level, and not only from the State, as in some cases local practices are very traditional and not fully efficient. Those best practices have not been disseminated so far, such as through a media campaign with radio broadcast. Coordination between CSO and the government was not optimal, according to the interviewees, and to maximize the potential sufficient time should be allocated to change behaviours and mobilize the relevant stakeholders.

The Social and Economic Development Plan in Rakhine was innovative and resulted progress, according to the State secretary, because of the inclusivity of the process and the use of a bottom up planning, which strengthened the consistency of the plan, and also took into account conflict sensitivity.

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[25] Final Project Report, Kayah and Chin States, IRC, 2014

Innovative technologies

The **innovative technologies** project provided solar lamps and fuel efficient stoves, as well as community assets, to 100 villages in border areas, which suffer from infrastructure isolation. The project employed 40 young male and female salespeople trained to become entrepreneurs, who were hired in the villages through a competitive process. The evaluation conducted in mid-2016[26] highlights interesting achievements. There is some contribution from the innovative technology project in making new technologies available to those remote villages, providing more performant products and supporting livelihoods, by reducing wood consumption notably. The project evaluation highlights that 6,371 products were sold, and the estimated savings in fuel wood cost is 139,730 USD, and 14,630 USD in lighting costs. The project included a return of the carbon credit, which takes two years to be taken back but products were subsidized[27], for an estimated 70,379 USD.

Though, the project did not target the most vulnerable households – whose income is too low to purchase the goods - or areas where poverty is the highest in the country, taking into account access constraints (the team visited beneficiary villages located close to towns). This was considered to some extent as the technologies were subsidized and instalment payments were offered, to allow more people to purchase, than they would otherwise be able to from the market. Also, the feasibility mission assessed purchasing power to ensure that this would be adequate in the context. Furthermore, the pilot was not implemented in states like Chin, Rakhine etc, where purchasing power was assessed as lower. Entrepreneurs had freedom to decide what kind of financing options to offer for better quality products. Later entrepreneurs selected additional technologies based on their own market research. The 100 target villages also benefitted from 'community assets' (e.g. large water filters for schools).

The lesson learned analysis indicate nonetheless that cultural barrier to adopt improved stoves in Kayin[28]. In addition, a specific issue happened in Shan, where, according to the salespeople, in some cases, the purchased stoves were not used in the end by the households who bought them because they did not meet cooking practices there. The stove structure is too small to be able to cook for large families, the wood needs to be cut in small pieces when traditional system almost allows to use branches, meaning then that there is additional work with the new stoves, and the fire requires constant attention, when wit the traditional system the food can cook while people do other work at the same time. In addition, in some communities, there are no issues of access to firewood, and hence the population hardly see the interest of a system which would consume less wood. Salespeople remain with stoves in stock that they don't manage to sell. Mercy Corps indicates that none of the salespeople asked for the stoves to be returned, while salespeople mentioned the opposite. Customers also wanted to return the item but this was not possible. Salespeople felt that to some extent they lost money as the stoves were purchased on their budget and also "feel sorry" for the community members who purchased the stoves and do not end up using. Nonetheless, salespeople interviewed did not face serious issues with the customers. Furthermore, this initiative provided new skills to the salespeople and an increase in income with an average monthly income of 49 975 Ks, who extended their product line and continue their activities now. In addition, those skills are useful for the communities, which, in some cases, rely more on the salespeople for accounting and purchase of the community equipment. According

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[26] Learnings from the innovative technologies for Rural Comunities Pilot Project, Kopernik
[27] ibid, p3: "The pilot offered 10% subsidy for solar products and 50% for stoves" & Mercy Corps, Affordable Technologies Innovations for Rural Communities Undp progress report 4 p4
[28] ibid

to the project evaluation, the 40 new businesses created 116 additional part-time jobs in target communities. In addition, 100% of the village leaders reported that community assets contributed to improving social cohesion. The level of effectiveness and support provided by the Steering Committee is not clear to date. It was helpless according to the four sales agents interviewed in the community and in some cases sales agents had to give them a percentage of what they earned when the committee members found clients.

The access to market approach, despite some limitations, is also an interesting entry point for further engagement with the private sector, public-private partnership and involvement of the private sector in the development dynamics, which could also link remote and border areas – through distribution networks for supply and demand – in strategies on maximizing the use of resources and supporting value chains.

Achievements on social cohesion

The Output 5 programme has undertaken a number of capacity-development and policy support activities aimed at improving the capacities of national stakeholders/institutions on social cohesion, conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding. At the SC2 level, a manual was designed taking into account the specific context of the ethnic areas, and was translated in some local languages (English, Myanmar, Mon and Kayah), with an accompanying visual tool box, trainer guides and participant guides supporting the six-day foundation course of the SC2 manual trained over 1167 people, including trainers and participants, from government, EAOs, and civil society in six States and 18 townships.

The SC2 allowed CSOs/EAOs and State authorities to attend joint meetings and collaborate for the first time directly as well as providing them with the opportunity to network. This impacts their daily work by helping create referral pathways to the administration, according to the participants. This was instrumental in solving land issues for example. In Taunggyi, staff municipalities reportedly sort out issues differently now with the sellers on the market. They used to use force, but now try to understand each other to come to an agreement, which illustrates changes in the mindset.

In some cases, the participants had the opportunity to use what they learned during the training at other levels. For example, a PaO member indicated that he offered to his hierarchy to do a sensitization workshop in a community on the risk related to poppy cultivation, with some success apparently, as the community reduced its poppy cultivation, on which they were not too reliant in any case, as they were mostly cultivating other plants. Some social cohesion networks were created based on the participant's initiative as a follow up to the training and they assembled the three categories of stakeholders.

Another EAOs member indicated that it was useful to gain more acceptance by the population and better administration of the territory. She uses the games learned during the training to reduce the fear that they would inspire in coming into communities.

A CSO staff indicates that when RCSS came to a community for recruitment, he took the initiative to distribute them a copy of the NCA agreement. The training helped him in thinking about ways to solve issues, and providing some confidence to do this.

Another participant used the skills at his community level to have a community action in building a water distribution system. He was able to discuss with the community, and come to an agreement on how the different categories could contribute: the rich by contributing with money, the poor through their work.

In some States, however, such as Chin, no EAOs representative attended the training. EAO's participation was low overall, indicating that further work should be undertaken to sensitize them or other strategy should be envisaged to reach out to them, at least for all the NCA signatories. The extent to which such types of trainings could be undertaken with non-signatory members, such as non-military branches or remotely affiliated movements, would need to be carefully analyzed, but could be discussed further with the State authorities. The continuation of such trainings could also be relevant in relation to the support to the JMC.

The trainings provide a basis for mutual understanding of key concepts, but their operationalization was not included in the output 5 interventions. This could be done through small grants for specific activities for example, or further mentoring, follow-up and experience sharing. This subject relates to the challenge of building capacities in a relatively short timeframe.

The mainstreaming conflict sensitivity work started in 2016. Two research studies generated interesting findings of interest for the whole of the international development community and further trainings on conflict sensitivity. A training module was drafted and implemented for the government and they are now devising the indicator framework. The specific tools (such as training modules, handouts) and products (social cohesion framework, IA analyses) translated this into ethnic languages (to address the poor availability of material in ethnic languages) also constitute to significant progress which should form part of a national knowledge database and should be disseminated further to streamline work by various stakeholders on social cohesion and conflict resolution.

Those interventions contribute to developing the use of soft approaches to conflict management, and building local conflict resolution skills. According to external stakeholders, this also constitutes some ground work for political dialogue, as it initiates exchanges between various categories of stakeholders and promotes a culture of discussion and mutual understanding. There is however a need to ensure that solutions raised in the various mixed structures supported by output 5 are discussed further to be taken forward and implemented when relevant, otherwise the platform / dialogue / community of practice will lose their interest / legitimacy.

At the **community level**, some results have also been identified in terms of social cohesion and yearly reports identify numerous success stories. People of different communities had the opportunity to interact, mostly during cluster level meetings and vocational trainings. It helped to reestablish or create interactions between the communities. In Rakhine, communities interviewed indicate both being back to a level of 80/90% of trust and relationships compared to the time before the 2012 crisis. They can joke together and tease each other on who is trusting the other the most for example, as observed by the evaluators. They also mention the fact that they had an history a good communication and cohabitation as a strong factor for success, as this was mostly reestablishing long term habits, instead of changing an history of conflicts and tensions. The evaluation of UNDP Support to Livelihoods Skills Trainings and Enterprise Start-up Training and Grants Evaluation undertaken by TNS Myanmar, quantitative & qualitative research report, included an analysis of the indirect benefits, based on KII and FGD. Respondents highlighted the effects in terms of networking and peaceful cohabitation.

Figure 3. Indirect benefits of the vocational training

	Group or team work skills	Presentation skills	Critical thinking skills	Organisational skills	Networking skills	Skills around living harmoniously together
Total	47	20	50	15	87	70

Location %

Kayin	37	16	58	25	83	83
Kayah	38	28	59	24	79	66
Kachin	53	7	30	5	92	68
Shan	65	36	57	5	98	60

Based on this same study, the training also contributed to increase the interactions within the communities in a broad range of features.

Figure 4: Interaction types inside village or ward prior and after the training (Average number of times)

	Prior to the training	After the training	+/- Change (%)
Spoke informally with neighbours, family and friends	6 times	9 times	+50%
Spoke at a community event	1 time	2 times	+100%
Spoke with customers or suppliers	4 times	6 times	+50%
Advertised a new business	1 time	3 times	+200%
Through a joint livelihood activity (i.e. road building or fishing)	3 times	4 times	+33%
Attending a social event within the community	4 times	5 times	+25%

Based on the team's interviews, in some beneficiary communities, however, there were no social cohesion issues (including in Shan State), and hence the output mostly acted as a preventive measure to ensure linkages between various groups of people, or strengthen, the community's sense of self and hence its resilience. No overall data, such as categorization of communities, is available on the level of conflict or social cohesion issues in the various beneficiary communities.

The interventions contributed to giving a sense of the community when the population had individualistic behaviours before, as indicated by the beneficiaries, and to supportting mutual understanding. New practices have appeared, such as hiring some people from another community for daily work, including for the cash for work project in order to be able to meet the deadline, or lending a piece of land to somebody from another community in Rakhine. However, the extent to which the results apply to the whole of the community remain uncertain and the direct interactions with other communities may not concern everybody.
Communities also took the initiative to plan for joint projects – out of output 5 interventions -, such as road rehabilitation with a contribution of 4 million kyat contributions from each of the concerned communities, and the use of reserve funds

but 2 millions were still needed. They also took the initiative to organize a ferry service as the bridge was destroyed to collect missing resources.

In terms of gender, some results were also visible. Women in the food management committee were granted with responsibilities, as treasurer for example. Women's participation also improved in public meetings over the course of the implementation, as did men's understanding that women can do same as them and have the same rights, according to IPs and focus group discussions.

The effects in terms of reduction of conflict – either ethnic, political, economic, social- could not be measured as there is no database at the State or Union level on the various types of conflict (this exists for example in other countries such as Ivory Coast, where this was one PBF project with the Decentralization department of the Ministry of Interior, or by DPKO civil affairs in the case of peacekeeping missions).

Joint Monitoring Committee

The JMC and government requested that UN/UNDP provides support to the **Joint Monitoring Committee**, which has been set up to monitor the ceasefire agreement. The request sought to leverage the UN's multilateral agenda also with a view to balancing geo-political interest. It was housed temporarily in output 5 and started in June 2016, and the Output also led the design of the JMC Support Platform, the longer-term mechanism (due to be up and running in early 2017). It works at the Union and State levels, in Kayin, Bago, Mon, Shan, Chin. Rakhine is still an open conflict, as well as Kachin, where armed groups did not sign the ceasefire. The JMC programme using through a micro-capital grant agreement (MCGA), is intended to be an interim bridge before the establishment of a UN Platform for long-term support to the JMC as requested by the State Counsellor's Office. UNDP supported the organization of meetings of JMC union committee, setting up the JMC structures at the State level, developing ToRs for ceasefire monitoring and verification procedures, developing and implementing training curricula for JMC State level committees and State level committees, and updating the conflict monitoring index. Based on the State's counsellor's request, this support was extended up to beginning 2017.

The nature of this "bridging" support is different from that envisaged through a UN Platform. For example, the support is institutional and the UN does not have an explicit substantive role. At the same time, experiences from this period demonstrate the need for building trust with all stakeholders and for incrementally and carefully increasing normative and substantive engagement with an institution that is driven by the parties (including notably the military) and more operationally, for the significant investment that will be needed for strengthening the organizational capacities of the TSC, the administrative arm of the JMC.

This is a rather unique positioning, which is usually placed under DPKO operations and is justified here by the protracted nature of a multi-stakeholder and low intensity conflict, and the possibility of starting a peace process. This is also an interesting opportunity to ensure linkages between peacebuilding, social cohesion and livelihoods in the post conflict context, as part of the NCA implementation, in working both at the institutional and grassroots levels, while in the meantime working at the limits of conflict affected areas, through community support and establishing the foundation for further potential signatories of the NCA. In that respect, synergies with output 5 interventions could be exploited, at the community level, particularly in fragile areas, and, at the institutional level, to prepare for the political dialogue, which is planned to take place at the national and local levels. The JMC and related

institutions, such as Tatmadaw and EAOs, will also need to be equipped with conflict resolution skills, related to social cohesion actions, which started under output 5. Linkages with broader governance reforms, on natural resources, infrastructures and land management for example, would also be of particular interest in showing progress in addressing conflict drivers. Indeed, despite those efforts, the ceasefire process remains fragile and several ceasefire agreements were signed in the past with limited success.

To date, requests mostly concern capacity building of the JMC on organizational skills, such as financial systems management, procurement, human resource management, and roll-out of training for NCA implementers. The outputs concerns support JMC core functions(output 1 and 2) and channeling assistance (output 3) and in some cases are mostly linked with activity level results. Thus, expected results are mostly oriented towards the functioning of the institutions and not really linked with JMC's operational objectives such as the decrease in the number of conflicts or to the start of a peace process, political dialogue and resolution of conflict drivers, or engaging with non-signatory groups – the latest is however not directly in the JMC mandate. Output 5, which has the focus on border areas and peacebuilding / social cohesion, would be the relevant UN component to engage in those issues.

4.3   Key factors of success and constraints

UNDP's good relationships with State institutions was considered a key factor for success by the partners, as it ensured their inclusion and participation in the process, and provided the partners with access to the government.
This may have also constituted a constraint for the inclusivity of the interventions, given the sensitivity of the subject, which may partly explain the limited participation of the EAOs. The weaknesses in terms of effective participation of some stakeholders (EAOs and some State institutions) also implies that further efforts are required to ensure stakeholder engagement, in order to explain the ins and outs of the intervention and how the capacities gained can be used by the various organizations, highlighting operational accountability.

The **conflict** situation also affected the implementation of the output, and prevented access to some key areas in Northern Shan or Kachin for example. The output initially planned for interventions in 18 communities in Northern Rakhine, which could not be implemented because of the conflict. Some difficulties occurred as IDPs were not inclined to leave the camps where they received WFP support. Activities were suspended in 2014 for several months because of attacks against UN/INGOs.

As indicated above, the **timing** of the interventions on social cohesion was relevant given the country context, and constituted a rather logical follow up of the HDI project, introducing progressively new notions of social cohesion.

However, the **timeframe** was sometimes quite limited for the different activities, especially taking into account the Myanmar context, where building trust with the beneficiary takes time, as reported by the various partners. Indeed, the innovative technologies project had a duration of only 15 months and 2016 support to livelihoods and social cohesion in 13 communities in Rakhine lasted one year. The creation of CBOs, considering capacity building objectives. The best practice committee indicated some issues with the very short timeframe for the project implementation, which limited stakeholder engagement. This reduced timeframe is

also related to the lack of long term and predictable funding, which would have been required for such a project. In addition, the 'intensive' downstream focus, especially in the early years, in a context where the country office was also getting used to new ways of working and given the innovative aspect of most of the initiatives in Myanmar, meant that the output team spent a lot of time operationalizing work. In Rakhine for example, the process required a lot of intermediary steps to come to the simple result of having joint meetings. Some IPs in other States also mentioned the issue of a short timeframe (6 months in 2013) for livelihoods and social cohesion outcome and impact.

IP also faced some challenges related to the weather conditions, such as heavy rain and extreme heat, which disturb the implementation of activities in proposed timeframe. This highlights the need to take into account the seasonal calendar, while implementing activities at the community level. Related to this, training on capacity and skills building for men was not as effective as the training provided to the women as men had less time to participate in and build social cohesion.

Differences in languages between the various ethnic groups is also a constraint. For example, in a same village, communication can be a challenge as different ethnic groups would speak different languages in a same village. The gap between the civil servants, who speak Burmese and local population is also significant in that respect. Related to this, local authorities also occasionally hampered the interventions process, when the context was particularly sensitive, indirectly by not allowing meetings or increasing the requirements, although State institutions met indicated their support for the project.

UNDP's livelihoods and social cohesion assistance in Rakhine, faced some issues, as livestock had to be vaccinated, which directed the purchase to the only veterinary / breeder / head of the agriculture department of the area, which got a good share of the project cost (400,000 USD). On some occasions, the population complained about the quality of the livestock, implying that it would have been more relevant to organize a fair so that the population could choose it. A good share also died, because of inadequate transportation, for example, but was replaced by the breeder.

IPs of the social cohesion and livelihoods interventions shared several indications of factors for success and constraints. For the vocational trainings, there were also constraints on the types of activities implemented, and the - sometimes subtle - difference in the market opportunities between the communities. According to IPs, some beneficiaries had difficulty identifying their real needs. For example, some women headed households selected to get small goat but they had no children who could find green grass for the goat's food in the forest nearby the village. Some farmers chose support for fishery but they have no good water source. Sewing training was also ineffective in some communities as the population is used to buying premade clothing from China, which is cheaper. According to the assessment of vocational training[29], none of the respondents who had attended food preserving training was still using these skills, because they could not afford transportation to the market and/or some key ingredients are not available where they live. The study also identified the previous experience and basic skills of the trainees in the sector they chose to be further trained as a factor of success.

The IRC evaluation[30] also found out that participants would prefer on-site technical inputs and exchange visits over formal classroom training, which illustrates a genuine interest for more practical interventions, notably through learning by doing approaches.

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[29] Livelihoods Skills Trainings and Enterprise Start-up Training and Grants Evaluation, TNS Myanmar, quantitative & qualitative research report, 2016
[30] Final Project Report, Kayah and Chin States, IRC, 2014

According to one IP, food banks were also sometimes difficult to put in place because the target area had no experience in disaster or food shortage and the villages were not too far away from the nearest Town, where they had easy access to the market. In addition, despite progress on production levels, some areas face difficulties in transportation and low crop yields.

Interestingly, some IPs indicate that participation by the community is more effective than support materials and cash, and hence that from a sustainable development perspective, it is more effective to support a village common fund, as a loan for 3 to 5 years. Indeed, this strengthens the ownership, self-esteem and legitimacy of the committee and the inhabitants.

Regarding **social cohesion**, the participation and commitment of civil servants was sometimes restrained, as some came mostly because they were nominated by their hierarchy to attend and because the training represented a significant six week commitment, while they also have to perform their duties. Those based in cities do not always have to manage conflict situations or to use these kinds of skills. Hence, it would be relevant that the training includes civil servants directly managing conflict related or social cohesion issues, such as the land department, but also potentially the police and army potentially, or any institution in sectors where conflict regularly appears. In some cases, trainers were heavily solicited and had to run several classes at the same time, up to 75 trainees altogether, according to one interviewee. EAOs also participated limitedly, but EAOs met indicate the strong interest of their colleagues for the training and believes that all their colleagues should be now trained.

The SC2 initiative and the training related to it also has a strong interest for communities, possibly through their leaders or representatives, who could be included in it, depending on their level, or specific trainings could be conducted by the trainers at the community levels. Other key stakeholders could be included, such as universities, religious leaders, for example directors of Buddhist school, who play a significant role in the social tissue.

Trainers who attended the course, could not always implement their trainings jointly with both CSOs and State authorities. This also illustrates a potential issue for their initial commitment, meaning their institutions also had limited expectations or understanding on this training or interest in institutionalizing the approach.

More generally, the various achievements must be put in perspective with the extent of the needs in the various locations, and despite contributing to make a change in the life of thousands of beneficiaries, the coverage of the interventions still remains limited, particularly at the downstream level, where the territories affected by instability and fragility are broad. For example, in M'Rauk's township in Rakhine, in 2016, the output benefited to 4 villages out of 248.

# 5 EFFICIENCY

Evaluation Question
Did programme management, implementation, partnership, monitoring and reporting arrangements facilitate the Output to deliver as planned?

5.1   Financial management

The output had eight sources of funding, with the government of Japan representing more than half of it, and UNDP core funding another 31%. Hence this constituted a rather narrow basis and explained also the inability to pursue the approach planned originally, when a second tranche expected from the government of Japan was not disbursed.

Figure 5: Financial contributions by donor

Source: Report to the Output Board december 2016

The bulk of the funding was spent during the first years of the CPD, as indeed the contributions of Japan, DANIDA and BCPR were made for 2013-2015, representing Out of UNDP core funding (6,991 million USD in 2013-2016), budget available for 2016-2017 amounted to 2,614 million USD).
As such repositioning the interventions from downstream to upstream level was an efficient use of the resources, given the limited possibility to make a difference at the community level in seven border areas when the funding is 6 times smaller.
Interestingly, the Peacebuilding Fund is not in place in Myanmar, except under the Immediate Response Facility form[31], and not with a dedicated secretariat and national peacebuilding plan, despite the extent of the needs, the change of context which allows to and the potential strategic role of the UN, and more particularly UNDP, in the peace process through the support to the JMC.

The budget allocated for the different interventions and related outreach or result highlight also the significant share for community based interventions and livelihoods, while SC2 and mainstreaming conflict sensitivity were much more reduced, as indicated in the table below. Even while assessing with the results, comparing the efficiency of the different interventions remains relatively difficult given the differences between the various interventions.
Based on data collected, the average cost can be broadly identified as such:
- Food Bank: 4000 USD / bank

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[31] http://www.unpbf.org/countries/myanmar/, PBF funded 3 projects since 2012 for 7.7 million USD.

- Capital assistance for livelihoods: 505 USD/ households
- Vocational training: 1000 USD / person
- Cash for work: 9209 USD / unit
- Technology innovations: 7 470 USD / village

Table 4: Cost of the main components (USD)

Village-level livelihoods support (5.1 + 5.2): 330 villages in 25 townships in 7 states	Budget (2013-2016)
Food banks - 194 food banks benefitting 18,260 persons	**776,000**
CBO strengthening, capital assistance for livelihoods, 329 CBOs and 6,335 households	**3,199,849**
Infrastructure - cash-for-work schemes benefitting 83,701 individuals and 469 units benefitting 259,583 individuals	**4,319,215**
Vocational training - 621 persons	**600,000**
Technology innovations – 100 villages, 40 salespeople.	**747,059**

Strengthening capacities for social cohesion and peacebuilding (5.3)	Budget (2013-2016)
Bridge support to JMC	606 581
Capacity-development activities for social cohesion, including SC2, for government, civil society and NSAs reaching 1167 persons.	648 039
Mainstreaming conflict sensitivity	200 000
Total	**1 454 620**

The innovative technologies project is quite specific and has limited point of comparison. It benefitted mostly to the 40 salespeople who got livelihoods with it, which could be considered as relatively low in terms of efficiency, as well as to some extent the buyers of products and their communities, given the above-mentioned issues related to the suitability of the stoves in Shan State (and it also benefited to the distributors and producing companies, for which it opened new markets and which were previously reluctant to target those remote areas). The equipment had to be imported as there is no local supplier. This was a pilot intervention however. As a comparison, UNDP's interventions in Rakhine, were of roughly 1.3 million USD to target 13 communities with infrastructures, vocational training and individual grants, and hence with a much larger number of direct beneficiaries.

To some extent, the flexibility to start very diverse interventions under Output 5 can be considered as a factor for efficiency, and it allowed to adjust the scope and coverage of the interventions to available resources to maximize the results, particularly by moving from downstream to upstream level and training of trainers approaches, or responding to specific needs in Rakhine and Kachin on early recovery. This was possible because of a framework funding arrangement.

The share between programme and operations expenditures remained rather rather consistent through the years and logically slightly declined over the years as the downstream interventions decreased along with the role of the field offices and while operations got transferred from a large majority of national partners in 2013/2014 to international NGOs in 2015/2016. Carving out different pieces of work, due to the projectized nature of the output, also increased the overall operation costs at UNDP and the partner levels.

Table 5: Ratio Programme / Operations

Year	Total Expenditures	Programme	Operations	Ratio Operations / Total expenditures (%)
2013	6 032 501	4 513 543	1 326 104	21,98
2014	7 041 348	5 242 751	1 798 597	25,54
2015	5 560 653	4 412 267	1 148 385	20,65
2016	2 495 815	2 024 549	471 266	18,88
TOTAL	**21 130 317**	**16 193 110**	**4 744 352**	**22,45**

5.2 Programme management and implementation

The **governance** of the output was the responsibility of the output board, but the role of Natala in the project remained at a general oversight level, based on output board minutes.

Donor participation in the output board was sometimes limited as all output board meetings take place at the same time in December, which also makes it difficult for the donors to attend.
Participants in the output board also indicated that the coordination between the three pillars is not clear, and hence they may miss a more general meeting with all the relevant ministries, to ensure coordination and similar information levels around all UNDP interventions. This would also ensure a broader strategic vision.

Reporting was done to the board at the output board meeting, and quarterly to the Union, Ministry of Border Affairs, according to an agreed format.[32] Although all the staff at the union level, may not be aware of the specificities and agreements on the reporting and monitoring, while they perform the technical work.
Natala expressed some interest in getting more information and more details on the various interventions, as the reports remain rather general. Indeed, output board meetings take place twice a year, while the Ministries have to report monthly on the activities.

At the level of **human resources**, and based on the interview conducted, staff involved is not fully representative of the country. In Rakhine, in particular, community mobilizers of implementing partners were only Rakhine, which did not facilitate access to Muslim communities. There is no evidence, however, that the project could not be implemented and that the staff did not perform their jobs. It was not possible to hire Muslim staff because of their travel restrictions and inability to stay in M'Rauk. Community mobilizers also reported some pressure or criticisms by their families / neighbours / friends because of their involvement in the project and because they were working in Muslim villages, highlighting the potential challenges for local people to get involved in such interventions.

5.3 Monitoring and evaluation, reporting

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[32] UNDP Livelihoods and Social Cohesion Output – 3rd Quarter Progress Report on State based Activities (July to Septembrer 2014), UNDP.

The **results framework** was regularly updated since the first version included in the Outcome programme document of February 2013. The most recent version communicated to the team distinguish between activity, output and outcome level indicators, and to strengthen the analysis of the effects and some sustainability of the interventions, although they are sometimes a bit obvious, for example:

- Indicator 02. % of persons targeted for livelihood assistance reporting increased income-levels in target locations 06 months after having received support. A grant representing several months of income is likely to relate to increase in income level, even after six months).
- Indicator 03. # of persons targeted for micro-enterprise support reporting sustaining their enterprises 6 months after having received support

They do not allow to measure the extent of the changes in terms of living standard, which would be the case by identifying changes income level or in categories of expenses by household for example, and which was included in the original RRF with: Number of months during which food is available for poor households.

In some cases, they do not add much more to activity indicators:
Indicator 01. % of women representatives participating in CBOs,
Indicator 04. # of persons using/accessing constructed/ rehabilitated infrastructure (disaggregated by gender)

Noticeably, four indicators concern social cohesion. They cover various aspects, in some cases with some redundancies, but do not allow to identify groups possibly excluded or to link the evolution with the output interventions.

Indicator 05. % Increase in # of households reporting 'more than 5' occasions for interacting with a member from another village/ethnicity in past 06 months as a result of UNDP's interventions (disaggregated by gender)
Indicator 06. **%** of households reporting perceptions of increased unity between people from other villages/communities in the past 6 months as a result of UNDP's interventions (disaggregated by gender)
Indicator 07. % of trained participants who successfully apply the knowledge and skills on social cohesion gained from training initiatives into their work. (disaggregated by gender)
Indicator 08. % of people surveyed who report that their level of trust toward others have increased as a result of their participation in training initiatives (disaggregated by gender)

While the project operates in fragile settings, there is no linkage with the results in terms of peacebuilding, such as internal conflicts, or contribution to conflict dynamics, which would be one level of effect after the indicator 7, in knowing how the skills on social cohesion were applied and what it changed.

Baseline and targets were also limitedly documented, largely blank in the first RRF, and not directly linked with issues identified in the communities in the last RRF, as indicators were mostly about changes / perceptions after the activities.
The annual reports to the output board include reporting on the output indicators, but there are no details on the source and calculation of the data.

For the livelihoods support at the community level, IPs used standards logframes drawn by the UNDP office and IPs indicate that those should be temporary and updated based on the field assessment depending on the area, so as to include and meet more precisely meet the community's priorities.

At the outcome level, only one indicator was included in the RRF in the end, and could hardly relate to outcome level results of the interventions on social cohesion and livelihoods, or in building up local capacities in that respect.

Outcome	Indicator
Community driven development institutions that support local governance in service delivery; and inclusive growth, including agricultural development and enhancement of employment opportunities for women and men	Number of times a UNDP approach to community social cohesion building has been replicated by partners

The RRF hence could limitedly support a monitoring of the various level of results of the output interventions, including the contribution to the outcome targets and results. Although some data was collected, notably through quantitative analysis during some evaluations / assessments, **monitoring and follow-up of the impact remains limited,** as this was no planned in the project documents and then no budget was allocated for it, either at UNDP or international partner's level.

Noticeably however, some IPs in charge of livelihoods interventions still organize villages cluster meetings / lessons learned events or follow-up of the community interventions they supported. The team visited for example a community in Shan State where such an event was recently conducted. This is to some extent a missed opportunity as this does not allow to have a comprehensive overview of the results of the interventions, in terms of livelihoods, social cohesion, or effects on the conflict dynamics, although some anecdotal evidence was collected during the community visits of this evaluation. This would also not require necessarily significant amount of time, and could just be a matter of asking a few questions to communities or training participants. This could include checking on the results with the rice bank, current role of the committees, effects of the vocational trainings (increase of production / revenue, use of the tools) and rehabilitation, level of exchanges with other communities, remaining tensions

Limitations in baseline data also constrains the analysis of the overall effects of the various interventions on the livelihoods standards and on conflict dynamics. Indeed, data on the comparative levels of poverty and conflict was available or documented in the overall process, and no comparison was drawn with control groups for example.

Frequent **monitoring visits** were made by the UNDP team.

In terms of staff allocation, between 2013 and 2015, the Output had dedicated 5 staff in the area offices, with monitoring and evaluation functions. As the Output 5 phased out its downstream activities, field level presence was also reduced. The No other staff of the office was included in the follow-up, which is also a limitation now that the advisors left, as the field offices could be used for further monitoring. Area Office Coordinators, currently in place, are not 5 staff, and perform liaison and coordinating functions for UNDP. The output indeed need programme funded staff to conduct field monitoring and hence when the programme stops, monitoring also does.

In addition, **monitoring happened at the partners' level** as specified in their ToRs, according to the results framework developed along with the proposal. This included reporting on the performance indicators through sample surveys. While UNDP proposed a methodology, partners did not always use it.

The programme also used partners and external evaluations for monitoring and reporting. For example, for the infrastructure projects, the Output contracted 4 independent engineers to monitor and do spot-checks of partners, and final deliverables and payments of the infrastructure partners was based on a final assessment by the engineer consultants. For the most recent work in Rakhine, a

UNDP-contracted engineer was based in Sittwe for most of 2016 for technical monitoring and quality assurance. The large bridge construction activity in Sittwe (2014-2015), was monitored and quality assured by a 3-member team, made up of the State engineer, NaTaLa and a UNDP contracted engineer consultant. A similar mechanism was used for a larger road construction activity in Kachin in 2014-2015. Some initiatives were also externally evaluated: the vocational training, technology innovations and social cohesion competency development initiatives.

In addition, the success of the village committees, particularly how they managed their funds varied significantly apparently, which indicates limited consistency and monitoring by the IPs, or of exchanges of lessons learnt and best practices across IPs and communities, as well as at a second level inconsistent monitoring by UNDP over the project implementation by the IPs.

According to the IP for the initial livelihood component, another level of monitoring took place at the community by the communities themselves. An IP indicates establishing and training the communities on self-monitoring and evaluation system. Hence, the gaps also were identified by community. Communities were trained as innovators of social cohesion and livelihood activities in their areas and after the project, at the level of the cluster of six villages, they knew how to coordinate, work together and how to solve problems.

As noted in the IA / UNDP Study, "Conflict Sensitivity: Experiences from Local and Community Development Practice in Myanmar", there are limited indicators "tracking the project's interaction with dividers and connectors", or specific social cohesion indicators. The work undertaken through the social cohesion framework and conflict sensitivity studies provide opportunities to strengthen M&E on that respect. The level of social cohesion is indeed mostly assessed through perception indicators, or number of interactions[33], while depending on the communities, some specific tangible indicators could be designed.

5.4   Communication and coordination

There was limited use of **communication channels**, such as radio, for example, which could have broadened the intervention's outreach, notably when speaking about new cultivation technics, best practices, social cohesion support and tools etc..

There are official and robust **coordination mechanisms** in place, in relation to cluster notably.[34] While UNDP is in charge of the early recovery coordination, which encompasses some of the livelihoods work, there is no clear coordination mechanism for what concerns social cohesion / peacebuilding or conflict sensitivity.

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[33] RRF, Nov 2016. "% of people surveyed who report that their level of trust toward others have increased as a result of their participation in training initiatives (disaggregated by gender); % of households reporting perceptions of increased unity between people from other villages/communities in the past 6 months as a result of UNDP's interventions (disaggregated by gender); % Increase in # of households reporting 'more than 5' occasions for interacting with a member from another village/ethnicity in past 06 months as a result of UNDP's interventions (disaggregated by gender)".
[34] Overview of Coordination Teams in Myanmar, http://www.themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Coordination_Teams_Overview_Country-wide_MIMU_Mar2016.pdf, last accessed 25/03/2017

This put the risk of having multiple tools, approaches, and systems put in place, duplicating efforts and confusing the various stakeholders, as the number of stakeholders in the sector increase. A number of interventions target the same beneficiaries, for example USAID funded interventions in Rakhine, or raise social cohesion / peacebuilding issues through different lens.

Synergies with other UN agencies, for example UNWOMEN, UNESCO - in taking into account culture specificities in social cohesion, conflict mitigation and development processes for example -, FAO or even UNODC - as some participants used the learnings of the training for sensitization purpose on poppy cultivation – have also not been put in place in this process.

The case of Rakhine also has specific issues in terms of efficiency. There, the **division between humanitarian and development** agencies and lack of coordination and leadership over the international response is an issue. This is particularly obvious now that stakeholders implement both humanitarian and livelihoods / early recovery interventions, without a clear coordination mechanism to maximize the coverage and link relief, rehabilitation and development. This is part of a general context of operating in Rakhine, and not attributable to the output 5, but highlights the need for leadership on early recovery / social cohesion to address those issues and justify those approaches as well as of coordination with other UN agencies. The overall approach of linking livelihoods and social cohesion contributes also to transformation of fragile situation from emergency to stabilization / rehabilitation and development.

5.5   Synergies with other outputs / outcomes

Synergies with the other outputs or pillars of the CPD mostly functioned because of good relationships between the staff but were not originally planned in the project document. They are not reported in the project documents either, indicating a potential limitation in the reporting structure or system. Synergies were not assessed nor planned at the time of the programme design and conceptualization, either within the pillar or across the relevant pillars and outcomes.

Dialogues trainings have been initiated in collaboration between several outputs and output 5 at the national and local levels. A concept note was drafted to design a dialogue platform, which could foster synergies across the various outputs, to institutionalize and streamline the platform for interaction between the stakeholders, and building capacities in that respect. Consultations between government, CSOs and EAOs are required in a number of areas of work, in the sector of justice (pillar 3, output 2), local governance (output 1), support to CSOs (output 2). This constitutes a first approach to strengthening synergies.

The drafting of the Rakhine development plan was also done in collaboration between output 5 and other UNDP outputs. With output 2, a CSO network around peace to support their engagement in the peace process also related to the output 5 area of operations. The technology innovation was also brought in at the worker level. However, there were no direct synergies regarding work on the media, for a specific communication strategy on social cohesion, dissemination of best practices and social cohesion training content, for example. Output 2 also supports ethnic

media, and that CSOs are present in areas where no ceasefire agreement was signed. There are also opportunities to strengthen linkages between CSO and CBOs.

According to other UNDP staff interviewed, the output played a role in integrating conflict sensitivity perspectives in other interventions – either through trainings or review of documents and hence acted over the last year as a center of expertise on this topic. This is of particular interest given the cross-cutting nature of conflict sensitivity while operating in a fragile context, as acknowledged by the CPD. It also contributes to mainstreaming peacebuilding and social cohesion indicators into national development monitoring. More broadly, the output fosters peace and security matters in governance structures, and interventions in conflict affected areas.

In addition, output 5 constitutes the community level for a number of sectors related to livelihoods and social cohesion, including innovative technologies. It also supported the community based structures to address general development issues. This would entail raising community perspectives and issues at the various institutional levels and building the capacities to address them, with complementary interventions at the community level. As such, the output 5 could feed into the other outputs for community based data on the various conflict causes, local coping mechanisms and recommendations, and ensuring social cohesion.

Based on the programmatic structure of the CPD, synergies would seem logical in particular with output 1 on local governance and output 4 on institutional capacity for sustainable livelihoods and reintegration.

With the other outcomes, the following interventions could be linked up:
- *Output 4. Improved financial inclusion and entrepreneurship development through national coordination and sustainable market development.* Micro finance, vocational training and entrepreneurship.
- *Output 6. Capacities to adapt to climate change and reduce disaster risk*, in relations to specific local infrastructures for DRR, or innovative technologies.
- *Output 7. Capacities to sustainably manage natural resources,* in relation to conflict mitigation, and possibly corporate social responsibility or community impacts of natural resources strategies.
- *Output 9. Strengthened capacity of national institutions for socio-economic policy-making, planning and development effectiveness with broad stakeholder participation (including women, people with disabilities and HIV/AIDS).*
- *Output 10. Transparent and participatory legislative processes are developed to a recognized standard including women's political empowerment,* in which output 5 facilitate community based discussions and sensitization of key stakeholders.
- *Output 11. Justice institutions and legal framework improved to ensure Rule of Law and Access to Justice for all with a specific focus on vulnerable groups.*
- *Output 12. Strengthened capacity for service delivery and improved responsiveness of the public administration reforms,* in which the output could bring the community perspective.

5.6   Partnerships

UNDP engaged 35 implementing partners for its village-based livelihood and social cohesion activities (2 international NGOs, and 33 NGOs) in 2013-2014. It was important to demonstrate a departure from HDI, and one of the strategies for doing that was to broad-base our partnerships, where there was a sense that UNDP had for long years circumvented local civil society (and a further conflict sensitivity perspective to this was that a largely Bamar staff contingent working in largely ethnic areas and bypassing ethnic civil society). UNDP was not able to dedicate as much time as needed for strengthening the capacities of its IPs, given pressures for programme and financial delivery over a very short time-frame. Hence UNDP could not conduct the capacity building that it originally planned in 2013. Reports indicate progress however between the two years owing to the learning by doing experience. Partners' staff, notably at the local level, such as community mobilizers also gained experience in a country where local capacities are still limited. While a majority of the IPs, already well-experienced, delivered strong results, some IPs indeed did not meet the desired objectives. In the Myanmar context where international assistance is sometimes relatively new, it is then particularly important to ensure that IPs are supported with training and on-the-job accompaniment throughout the partnership. For example, if in 2013, the Output knew that indicative resources it would have over the country programme, the ideal option would have been to enter into long-term partnerships with INGOs/NGOs/CSOs).

Experience sharing between the partners was limited. One IP also indicated to the team that monthly meetings and project situation presentation workshops should be done at the national level in order to take different lesson learned from different regions. The change of focus and approach of the output, led to new partnerships with International NGOs.
The large number of partners also means that partnerships were mostly established on a short-term basis, which had a cost in terms of efficiency. The lack of predictability of the funding, even on an indicative basis, explained the lack of longer term and then more strategic partnerships, which could have entailed the development of more meaningful relationships with the target groups and stronger exit strategies and partners who could have either focused on key geographic areas or substantive areas (assessments, capacity-development etc).
Partners have a positive feedback on their partnership with UNDP, notably as it allowed some level of flexibility in relation to the implementation and context challenges, meaning a constructive approach at the technical and financial level.

The output engaged with the private sector for the last mile technologies project, but to date the corporate sector was not involved on social cohesion or linking them to conflict sensitivity discussions. There are also clear linkages between social cohesion and economic development, through fluidity of the market and distribution channels, as well also some potential interest in understanding corporate sector role and responsibilities in a conflict context to minimize various levels of risks (staff, securing investment, sustainable practices etc…).

6   SUSTAINABILITY

The sustainability of the interventions is analyzed here taking into account three main features: persistence of the achievements at the operational level, existence of organizational dynamics ensuring the replication of the results, and integration of the results into the institutional framework, strengthening their legitimacy and ownership by local stakeholders as well as some accountability.

Persistence of the results at the community level

The output was able to launch sustainable dynamics whose results are being replicated and multiplied in some cases. Livelihoods interventions still bear fruits today. For example, in the communities visited, the rice banks interests allow for example new community initiatives and maintenance of the infrastructures but this depends on the way they were managed by the Livelihoods and Social Cohesion committee and there is no consolidated data on the number of rice banks still functioning. The small grants and vocational trainings generated new assets and revenues, although sustainability varies depending on the category of persons and is lower for the poor and very poor people, based on the interviews. Some women met by the team indicate notably that they are still able today to purchase more fertilizers than before and increase their production a few years after the grants.
The salespeoples of the innovative technology project could also extend their product lines, to other items such as phone credit or batteries or spare part for motorbikes, depending on their interest. The project evaluation[35] indicates that 18 new products were added to support the business sustainability. They are also using their additional income to lend money to others and purchase new assets like pigs. Those met by the team have some further projects.

Some efforts were made however to support the sustainability of the infrastructures in 2016, notably through independent quality assurance by a qualified engineer and tri-partite monitoring for the largest work (such as the Ye Chan Pyin bridge in Rakhine) with a dedicated monitoring committee. The road rehabilitations undertaken as part of the cash for work intervention have limited sustainability, although the communities have been trained on the maintenance. Indeed, roads will require significant maintenance given the rainy climate and nature of the soil, and it is not certain to what extent communities will be able to sustain it without external support, because of the labour required and access to necessary materials. Communities indicate indeed that "they live hand to mouth" and will not be able to buy stones or construction material when the roads will need rehabilitation after a few rainy seasons.

At this stage, it appears too early to be able to observe the sustainability of the SC2 and Mainstreaming Conflict Sensitivity components, which have been relatively recently put in place, although some approaches aim to ensure sustainability, as described below.

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[35] Independent Evaluation, Learnings from the Innovative Technologies for Rural Communities, Kopernic, 2016

Organizational strategies

The strategy for sustainability of the village level assistance was designed largely around supporting the communities to maintain inputs, assets and capacities through the CBOs notably, although their sustainability remains quite uncertain and communities gained capacities at the management and technical levels. For example, food-banks were managed by a small committee, who are responsible for disbursements and replenishments. Some committees are indeed still functioning, although unfortunately it is not certain how many and for how long. In some others - the overall share is unknown - the capital was totally depleted. The rice banks had some leverage effects, allowing the funding of other community led initiatives in some cases, although here again there is no overall vision of the proportion of successful rice banks and how many lost their initial capital.

Community level extension workers were trained to provide extension services (e.g. vaccinations) to those households receiving capital assistance for livestock for example. The infrastructure units constructed/rehabilitated were handed over to the CBOs (MOUs were signed), and the communities were trained to undertake minor repairs and improvements. For the technology innovations, sales agents were trained on product maintenance and repairs, while the community assets were handed over to the CBOs.

Besides, there are examples of capitalization on the output results for further interventions between development partners, for example the handover of some villages and committees and continuity in the approach developed by the output IP in assessing the needs and building CBOs and subsequently used by another agency, instead of their own methodology in order to ensure coherence of the various interventions, which also creates some sustainability, as the same CBOs would still be used. Similarly, in Rakhine, a vocational training center built under a UNDP supported initiative is occasionally used by other agencies.

Nonetheless, the documentation consulted does not mention a clear exit strategy for the various types of interventions, although at the operational level IP took this aspect into account and sometimes indicated that they trained the field mobilizers on exit strategy. Downstream interventions lasted less time than anticipated, which partly explain this.

Concerning SC2, output 5 was one of the first and few programmes that a) explicitly used social cohesion language, where in Myanmar, 'peacebuilding' is the more familiar term; and b) explicitly combined downstream assistance with social cohesion aims. It allowed partners, both at international and national levels, to gain capacities, and replicate their knowledge afterwards, with other donors in some cases. The output consisted also an entry point for INGOs in some areas, notably by giving them access to State authorities, and contributed to build the capacities of its partners in the country, local IP and INGOs. National NGOs are so far limitedly involved in peacebuilding work, led by SFCG and IA, and in a sustainability perspective, local competencies have also to be built on that respect.

The strategy for sustainability for the capacity-development and policy support initiatives were designed around for SC2 - using Training of Trainers approaches to developing local resources, designing a Myanmar specific course material and for the conflict sensitivity mainstreaming work – establishing an inter-ministerial study group to function as a reference group, devising a Myanmar-specific training module for government institutions on mainstreaming conflict sensitivity into local and community development; and ongoing work, devising with the government an indicator framework for measuring conflict sensitivity in local and community

development programmes. The pool of 104 local "ethnic" trainers[36] from 6 States obviously is indeed a factor for sustainability, to the extent that there is clear follow-up and mentoring (so as to avoid misunderstanding and wrong interpretation or use of a newly acquired position for damaging interventions), as well as good integration of the local practices and specificities – in terms of languages and culture notably. A tailor-made social cohesion foundation course, and the availability of course material in Myanmar, Kayah and Mon where using stock material, largely in English, is the norm, also gave a specific added value to this initiative and aimed for more sustainability to a better and deeper appropriation by the participants (who reported nonetheless to the team that drawings and content of the training manual was still work in process to be fully adequate to the audience).

A good example of existing dynamics is the fact that participants in the SC2 trainings created social cohesion networks in order to keep in touch and share regularly on social cohesion issues. In Taunggyi, out of 100 participants, between 15 and 25 of them are meeting regularly. This is a great result and a strong factor for sustainability and a great evidence of the motivation and interest generated by the training at the local level. So far, those networks have not sustained some follow up activities, involvement of the network's members in other social cohesion trainings or sensitization at the community level notably or with other local stakeholders. In addition, in the context of output 5, those networks do not appear to interact yet, or to remain in contact through for example a newsletter, communication of follow up documents and reports (when email access allows it), whereas they constitute a growing pool of resource persons.

In the case of SC2, there was no formal request by the participants to the training generally to brief their colleagues on what they learnt, and hence there was limited knowledge dissemination within each organization following the trainings, which benefitted mostly individual participants. Some of them also indicated to the team that they would lack the experience and legitimacy to conduct such sensitization. This could nonetheless take the form of restitution.

While, the main request of the beneficiaries, communities or State institutions, is to extend the coverage of the interventions at the village level, there is no mechanism that would ensure self-replication of the interventions. To some extent however, the increase in number of development's stakeholders contributes to the sustainability, as UNDP favoured increased openness to international development but it remains externally driven.

There is limited indication to date on the sustainability of the conflict sensitivity studies and implementation of the working groups, as the studies were not finalized and disseminated yet. The sustainability will depend on the ability to communicate the results, ensure that the findings are included and interest of the government to support further interministerial working group on that matter. The team had positive indications of this interest during the visit.

The approach of the output to highlighting social cohesion or peaceful coexistence, instead of peacebuilding for example, put the interventions in a broader and longer term development perspective, which also facilitates the sustainability of the interventions and their perception / acceptance by the various stakeholders. This goes indeed beyond solving conflict situation and stabilization and concerns multiple layers, outside of the political or military aspects.

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[36] Power Point, Presentation to the Output 5 Evaluation team, 17 January 2017.

Institutionalization of the output achievements

Some approaches tend to the institutionalization of some initiatives. For example, as of mid-2016, an inter-ministerial study group on conflict sensitivity (comprising 3 ministries and 6 departments implementing local and community development projects) is in place. This group serves as a reference group for the capacity-development and policy support work we've started on, to mainstream conflict sensitivity into local and community development programming in Myanmar.

The various capacity development efforts are not yet fully institutionalized. The evaluation team did not identify clear strategy or official policy of the government on community based approaches / livelihoods / social cohesion.

The structures which have been created are also not clearly institutionalized at the national level, with specific role, registration and ToRs. The status of the CBOs and their linkages with the local governance structures at the township level remain quite informal. Community of Practice, Social Cohesion networks, dialogue platforms[37] are also not yet clearly included in the institutions policies and practices, with official recognition / registration notably if a number of international development interventions start to be put in place, and clear linkages with Township and State level development planning. This raises the risk that various development actors multiply structures, at the community level or for social cohesion / peacebuilding notably.

However, regarding SC2, starting in 2016, Output 5 has made more concrete efforts to institutionalize capacity-development activities, though also recognizing that for some topics and concepts, finding institutional 'houses' is more challenging and in some instances working outside institutions provides an opportunity to bring stakeholders from across different target groups and institutions together. Also, at the request of the Ministry of Border Affairs, in 2017, Output 5 will be starting an initiative to integrate peacebuilding and social cohesion curricula into the academic and training institutions administered by the Ministry. This has not been included in capacity development planning of the various institutions, or in the curriculum of universities or professional schools. Linkages with Tatmadaw in that respect have not been identified.

Some EAOs would also like to integrate the SC2 in their training curriculum, as they have regular training programmes. A first step on this could be to strengthen their involvement in the trainings and have more regular training sessions in various locations, possibly through social cohesion networks.

The institutional commitment of the various State services benefitting the activities would be also a key factor for sustainability. Interventions are so far not included in the institutions' plans, such as capacity building development plans or operational / strategic planning, which would to strengthen the accountability line.

To the knowledge of the evaluators, the local authorities did not have to make specific commitments or for the management and maintenance of the infrastructures and roads, or for sustaining local dynamics created by the output, whereas the objective was to improve service delivery, and while a number of community assets / basic infrastructures have been rehabilitated.

As of mid-2016, an inter-ministerial study group on conflict sensitivity (comprising 3 ministries and 6 departments implementing local and community development projects) is in place. This group serves as a reference group for the capacity-development and policy support work we've started on, to mainstream conflict sensitivity into local and community development programming in Myanmar. This

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[37] For example, in Ivory Coast, along with PBF priority plan's interventions, dialogues between security and defence forces and the communities have been included into the National Security Council's strategy.

contributes to streamline the concept and related work into the government process, and would be of particular significance if it allows targeting structural conflict drivers.

7   LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES

- In a context where international assistance and the number of stakeholders is increasing, there is a strong need to build on existing coping mechanisms and initiatives and capitalization on previous achievements, in order to avoid multiplying tools and interventions. The different ministries, and various governance levels, should play a key role in this.

- Development assistance is still new in Myanmar, and the population expect support for development more than immediate response. It is of particular importance to support dynamics with clear exit strategy to transform the situation and avoid creating dependency situations, protracted crisis situations or misuse of international assistance by the local stakeholders / communities.

- Interventions are more effective when they are clearly articulated with operational outcomes expected from the participants, which implies also specific data and analysis on the priorities of the area.

- There is also a clear need not to mix the messages and to ensure consistency of the approaches of international stakeholders / NGOs operating in those contexts. Government should ideally play a lead role in this.

- Integration of livelihoods and early recovery with social cohesion/ peacebuilding is a stepping stone in the continuum security and development as well as on linking relief, rehabilitation and development, through a contribution to stabilization / conflict mitigation and improvement of the living standards, access to basic services and State legitimacy.

- Hand-over between organizations working in the same area and the use of similar CBOs / tools is a good example of coordination and collaboration.

- There is a need for a long term and predictable programing and funding for downstream interventions with capacity building and development oriented approaches, especially to ensure the effectiveness for a five years programme based approach.

- This is of particular interest to ensure that there are opportunities for partners involved in a similar intervention to share experience, lessons learned and best practices and for UNDP to identify and integrate best practices in the requirements to IPs during the course of the project implementation.

- There is a need for synergies across the programme at the conceptualization / design phase to ensure that the peacebuilding / conflict sensitivity component is fostered across the relevant interventions and to leverage the output results.

- In Myanmar, significant efforts need to be planned and put in place to engage with new stakeholders and communities, through sensitization and specific communication strategies – depending of the stakeholders - when launching a new topic / approach.

8   CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

The output 5 acted at several levels on livelihoods and social cohesion dynamics in Myanmar, and illustrates also the interdependency between the two aspects. Livelihoods proved to be a valid entry point to social cohesion, by providing immediate benefits to poor households, hence combining hard and soft assistance, and at the community level, the two aspects clearly fuel each other.

The output played a lead role in creating linkages between State authorities, CSOs, EAOs and the communities, through interventions supporting social cohesion processes (dialogues, common purpose, interactions, sense of the community). It built capacities on key concepts and practices related to social cohesion, such as conflict mitigation and resolution skills, mutual understanding and acceptance, aside from the stabilization dynamics in the country. To some extent, it contributed to groundwork to prepare for a political dialogue and peace process, although a number of areas and stakeholders remain outside the political and output process. The output acted at the community level, by creating demand for social cohesion, notably by illustrating direct peace dividends, as well as at the supply level, through the involvement of local representatives of government, EAO and CSO, while in the meantime introducing soft approaches to conflict mitigation and conflict sensitivity at the union level. Those achievements create opportunities to facilitate dialogues and reforms addressing structural roots of the conflicts, strengthen national unity and promote an inclusive development pattern. However, though the outreach was significant, areas still affected by social, political – and even armed tensions – remain and there is still a need to create the space for those local interactions between the different stakeholders in vast shares of the border areas.

Interventions at the community level and SC2 contributed to improving livelihoods and to reducing or preventing community tensions in the beneficiary communities. There is, however, limited data on the effects of the interventions on conflict dynamics and the impact level in a consolidated manner. The result framework, which evolved over time, did not allow for capturing of all of the results and contributions to the outcome, such as the impact in terms of peacebuilding or level of conflicts at the community levels.

The evolution from a downstream approach to a capacity-development and policy support approach has also generated significant interest from the various stakeholders involved, creating dynamics which should be pursued by UNDP or other stakeholders through testing and implementing the solution elaborated during those interventions and expanding at the community level where local conflicts lie. Based on this experience, UNDP is expected by a broad range of stakeholders in Myanmar, to play a lead role, as well as to ensure knowledge capitalization to guide other agencies and assist the government in streamlining / planning the work on livelihoods and social cohesion, and in promoting best practices and lessons learned. In the meantime, it bridges the gaps between State institutions and other community representatives, including EAOs.

UNDP is also well placed to ensure that the various conflict dynamics are addressed by the State institutions, at the township, State and Union levels. In that respect, there are clear linkages between the institutional and organizational support to the JMC and the work on social cohesion/support to institutions, in targeting more systematically JMC members / NCA signatories, or reaching out to stakeholders in high risk / conflict affected areas where stakeholders did not ratify the NCA. To date, social cohesion and peacebuilding mechanisms are limitedly institutionalized and

more would be needed at the strategic / policy level on community based governance, and inter-ministerial work and policy on social cohesion. This would facilitate the commitment of the various hierarchies, and operationalize the concepts and skills disseminated through the trainings, in a cross-cutting manner. As such, the inter-ministerial work would need to be pursued by involving all the key ministries and translating the findings into action.

The output faces various strategic tensions related to UNDP positioning in Myanmar and globally:
- UNDP got its legitimacy and experience from interventions at the local level but now has limited comparative advantage in pursuing them. Pulling out totally from any possibility of downstream interventions could then progressively limit the legitimacy as a stakeholder able to engage with all parties.
- Interventions on software are efficient when they are supported by hardware benefits, on which UNDP's comparative advantage is then more limited.
- Livelihoods and social cohesion are clearly related to UNDP's mandate for early recovery and UNDP is involved in downstream interventions in a number of countries (Mali, Côte d'Ivoire for example). The degree to which the positioning should vary according to the countries is not clearly defined and it is not clear to what extent and based on which criteria UNDP would have a comparative advantage on that respect in some countries more than others.
- Further analysis of UNDP's efficiency and strategic positioning on what concerns livelihoods and peacebuilding dynamics should then be envisaged, notably as UNDP also plays a key role in ensuring connection between the union and the grassroots levels.
- The approach of social cohesion through livelihoods constitutes a link on the continuum security and development as well as between relief and rehabilitation. It is then key for the stabilization and to ensure conflict transformation and the equilibrium needs to be found between those different components.
- Some balance must be established between a national programme design, designing common denominators across the States, and covering a broad range of contexts, with specific dynamics and synergies.

Recommendations

Those recommendations are drawn from the most significant topics identified by the evaluation, taking into account that a new country programme will be drafted at the end of 2017 and that previous project evaluations have already addressed some of the challenges, which have also been reported in partner's monitoring report. Those recommendations mostly concern UNDP.

To UNDP

1. UNDP's lead role in supporting State planning is key, and hence the organization should support the drafting of dedicated strategies and policies on community based approaches to livelihoods and social cohesion.

2. UNDP should then ensure coordination and experience sharing through dedicated coordination structures and dissemination of best practices and lessons learned through the early recovery cluster or other coordination channels. This is intended to avoid the duplication of efforts and introduction

of a number of approaches and systems on similar subjects in the country, as well as to ensure capitalization and sustainability of previous approaches.

3. Further support should be provided to inter-ministerial structures on conflict sensitivity and social cohesion and UNDP should play a key role in ensuring that those aspects are included in a cross-cutting manner in sectoral governance as a way to address social cohesion challenges, particularly structural ones (related to natural resources management, including land, infrastructures etc…).

4. The evaluation understands that there has been a strategic shift from the downstream to upstream level given the change in context. Nonetheless, UNDP has a clear role in early recovery / resilience, which can make it difficult to totally withdraw from any opportunity for work at the downstream level. This possibility could still be considered when needs are particularly high and unaddressed, and when UNDP has specific comparative advantages. Those advantages consist of unique official access to conflict affected areas (owing to the good relationships with and trust of the government), and/or specific linkages with the peace process by providing peace dividends to fragile populations in unstable settings, by introducing social cohesion capacities in those areas through livelihoods support, breaking up the isolation of unstable and remote communities and creating demand for peace. Outside of any political connotation, this also means reinstating development dynamics in conflict affected areas equally benefitting all stakeholders.

5. UNDP has a clear comparative advantage in bringing together different stakeholders, which should be pursued through dialogue platforms, social cohesion networks, and some form of support to village clusters.

6. Mixed structures created should be supported further to promote entities where various types of stakeholders are involved, keep them alive and maintain their legitimacy.

   - For this, their propositions, in terms of action plans and ideas to improve social cohesion and mitigate local challenges, should be further sustained. In terms of social cohesion networks, this means supporting them directly or ensuring that an organization supports them for interventions at the community level, where conflict situations actually happen.

   - Social cohesion networks, and more broadly participants in SC2, could constitute a pool that should be nurtured with information exchanges, for example, when relevant with exchange visits for experience sharing or occasionally to sensitize hard to reach stakeholders.

   - In addition, the capacity and activity of the pool of ethnic trainers should be maintained.

7. Support institutionalization of capacity development initiatives at the Union and State levels, through linkages with Tatmadaw, linkages with universities, and integration in the capacity development plans, as well as systems of knowledge dissemination and replication.

8. The level of institutional commitment of the various State services benefitting the activities should be strengthened to increase sustainability. As such, interventions should be included in the institutions' plans, such as capacity building development plans or operational / strategic planning to strengthen

the accountability line. Hence, participants should be held accountable for work on social cohesion.

9. The operational linkages of the various capacity building interventions, in terms of targeting of the participants and content of the training modules, should be strengthened. This would also include involving Tatmadaw and police in SC2, land, infrastructures, natural resources departments, and community leaders.

10. Findings of the different interventions, which have already been developed, related to the work of the best practices committee, social cohesion networks and CBOs, when relevant, should be disseminated further through specific communication strategies in various media to increase the outreach, in the first place in border / remote and fragile areas.

11. Further work should be undertaken on the identification of local resources, connectors, and coping mechanisms, to ensure that the interventions capitalize on them, in relation to context / conflict analysis and implementation of Do No Harm approaches in the various States. Notably, this should include traditional practices in conflict mitigation, role of religious structures and of religious education, festivals, and mapping of key opinion leaders.

12. Ensure that there is sufficient data available on the various types of conflicts and their intensity, particularly in border areas, as well as of situations which could create conflicts in other areas; Based on this support, an approach targeting the most vulnerable communities and households, and linkages with priorities in terms of conflicts / social cohesion issues should be used.

13. Support further engagement of EAOs in social cohesion initiatives, through specific attention to stakeholders' engagement strategies and communication, if necessary and depending on the context, through specific interventions for EAOs at the beginning, when participating in activities with other relevant stakeholders (CBOs, CSOs, community leaders, local governance structures).

14. A logical follow-up would also be to institutionalize CBOs at the national level, with clear roles and ToRs. Notably, if a number of international development interventions start to be put in place, they should ensure that they link up with Township and State level development planning

15. Gender mainstreaming should be reinforced to take into qualitative analysis in the design (which covers appropriateness of the intervention timeframe for men and women and strategies to ensure female commitment) to facilitate the access to those groups and monitoring stages.

16. In the various interventions, and particularly while supporting new structures or acting on conflict / social cohesion dynamics, ensure that a strategy is developed to analyse the impact and sustainability aspects of the interventions.

17. In the next programme design and annual work plans, support the conceptualization and planning of an integrated programmatic approach to optimize the synergies between the outputs and with other UN agencies, where relevant. Conflict sensitivity should also be streamlined in all the country programme components, and output 5 is well positioned to support this.

18. The opportunities for supporting access to markets should be considered in both ways of the trading circuits: access to efficient products and

opportunities to sell local production and strengthen the value chain). Related to this, UNDP and its partners should consider further engagement of the corporate sector (companies, distributors, and professional associations) in social cohesion dynamics.

To UNDP and donors

19. Resource mobilization strategies and donor's approaches should take into account the timeframe required to trigger the required effects on capacity building and effects on the conflict patterns, by improving the predictability and funding on a longer-term (multi-year) basis.

ANNEX 1. Evaluation Matrix

Evaluations Questions (from the ToRs)	Sub-questions	Indicators	Data source / Means for verification
Relevance: is concerned with the extent to which the programme is consistent with national and local policies and priorities and the needs of intended beneficiaries. o Was the Output strategy relevant and appropriate? Does it remain valid? o How well did the Output strategy align with national priorities and goals? o How did the Output contribute to principles of human rights, gender and conflict-sensitivity? o To what extent and how successfully did the Output adapt to respond to the external environment and organizational positioning? o Looking ahead, what is most relevant to continue, deepen or scale-up? What is least relevant?	o To what extent does the strategy meets the key needs of the communities? o How was the strategy formulated and revised? How inclusive was the process? On which basis were the revisions undertaken (needs assessment, conflict analysis etc…)? o Did the needs evolve over time? How? o Synergies and contradictions with government policies. o To what extent were the beneficiaries the most in needs selected? How were the changes in the social tissue owing to the output foreseen (integration of Do No Harm)? How were human rights principles and gender integrated in the programming (gender markers)? o Which would be the priorities to pursue the objectives of the output and ensure social cohesion? o Are some interventions within this output irrelevant or of second priority?	o Priorities as indicated by the beneficiaries, and needs assessment. o Participants to the interventions, involved in the formulation. o Existence of baseline documents (assessments, conflict mapping) / monitoring reports, whose results are taken into account in the output review. o State institution agree with the interventions. o State policies do not contradict the interventions. o Existence of groups of vulnerables based on gender, or ethnic group, or age, who could not be included in the interventions. o Potential frustrations and rivalries created by the project. o Identification of the implicit messages, dividers, connectors in the output. o Analysis of the potential effects on the conflict in the output. o Score of the intervention based on gender markers. o Evolution of the context and opportunities to capitalize on results	Desk review (context & conflict analysis, monitoring reports, revisions to the project, State strategies & policies, minutes of formulation meetings) Focus group Semi guided-interviews with project staff and external stakeholders

Effectiveness: is a measure of how well the Output contributed to developmental results. o Has the Output achieved the results against its results framework and in contribution to the overall output and outcome result statements? What have been the contributing factors and constraints?	o Which progress have been made on the implementation of activities, outputs, outcomes? o Which are the gaps in comparison with the objectives? Why those gaps? o How could the impeding factors be anticipated? Which are the key factors of success? To what extent do they relate to hypothesis on the theory of change? o Are there indirect or negative effects?	o Indicators of the results framework o Other indicators of performance / results o Difference between planned results and achievements o Changes of dynamics related to the project	Desk review (project document, monitoring & progress reports) Focus group Semi guided-interviews with project staff and external stakeholders
Efficiency: is a measure of how well the Output organized itself in delivering results. o Did programme management, implementation, partnership, monitoring and reporting arrangements facilitate the Output to deliver as planned?	o To what extent did the programme management structure and functioning facilitated the outputs results? o How were the partners selected and monitored and how efficient was the process, notably with State institutions? o How was the M&E system designed, to what extent was it adequate and to what extent could it be implemented? Were the result framework and indicators monitored? o How functional was the coordination and communication?	o Cost / efficiency of the different components o Existence of an M&E plan and deliverables o Stakeholders are aware of the objectives and M&E indicators. o Existence of coordination mechanisms o Stakeholders feel sufficiently informed and know about the interventions	Desk review (results framework, M&E docs) Focus group Semi guided-interviews with project staff and external stakeholders
Sustainability: The extent to which the Output continues after external development assistance has come to an end. o What indications are there that the achievements will be sustained?	o To what extent could the beneficiaries replicate the content and results of the interventions? o To what extent did the output create dynamics and had leverage effects? o To what extent are the interventions components institutionalized? o Will other stakeholder get involved in the subject? To what extent will the donours pursue funding those interventions?	o Beneficiaries can redo the activities / results without the project support o Beneficiaries are able to train / support themselves new beneficiaries o State institutions support and promote the activities and they have an official and documented status o Other organizations and donors are supporting beneficiaries, livelihoods and social cohesion	Desk review Focus group Semi guided-interviews with project staff and external stakeholders

ANNEX 2. Workplan

Date	Activity
9-13 Jan	Desk review Inception report
16 Jan	<u>UNDP internal meetings</u> 9.30-11.30 Meeting with Ms. Dilrukshi Fonseka, Output 5 Lead 2.30-3.30 Meeting with Ms. Mascha Matthews (Output Lead, Rule of Law and Access to Justice), Ms. Hyeran Kim (Output Lead, Development effectiveness) and Mr. Philipp Annawitt (Programme Specialist, Parliament) 4.00-5.00 Meeting with Ms. Susu Thatun, Head, Peace Support Unit; Mr. Peter Barwick, Peace and Development Advisor, of the UNRCO peace team (confirmed) <u>External meetings with donors and partners</u> 5.30-6.30 Meeting with Ms. Isla Glaister, Country Representative and Ms. Kara Wong, Head of Programmes, Search for Common Ground (implementing partner, social cohesion for stronger communities) (confirmed, Isla may run a little late)
17 Jan	<u>External meetings with donors and partners (cntd)</u> 10.30-11.30 Meeting with Robert Barclay, Country Representative, International Alert (technical partner, mainstreaming conflict sensitivities into local and community development) 11.30-12.30pm Meeting with Leo Roozendaal, Country Representative, Mercy Corps (implementing partner, affordable technologies for rural communities) 2.30-3.00 Meeting with Government of Finland - Ms. Maria Suokku (donor partner) 4-5 Meeting with Ms. Dilrukshi Fonseka, Output 5 Lead
18 Jan	10-12pm Meeting with U San Wai, Director, Natala, Ministry of Border Affairs
19 Jan	Yangon- Heho
	Heho- Taunggyi
	Taunggyi-Hopong
	Courtesy meeting with U Nan Tint - Hopong Township Administrator, General Administration Department

Date	Activity
	Meeting with Hopong Social Cohesion Network - U Win Oo- Deputy Staff Officer, Planning Department, Lite Kong village - U Nyi Nyi Soe, Staff Officer, General Administration Department - U Aung Zaw Htwe – Justice Drum, CSO Network, Hopong - Ko Sanay Aung, Pa-O Culture and Literacy Committee - U Mya Maung, Pa-O National Army-Peace Group (EAO) - U Nyunt Maung (Village Administrator)
	Hopong- Taunggyi
20 Jan	Travel from Taunggyi to Hopong, Nawng Hkone village
	Meeting with 5 sale agents - Maung Maung One- Sale Agent Nawng Hkone village - Nan Aung Paung- Sale Agent -Kyaung Lwe Village - Nan Theit Theit Htwe- Sale Agent -Han Lwe village - Nan Mi New- Sale Agent- Lon Myint Village - Khun Nay Dwein- Sale Agent- Htan Phayar village
	Meeting with women and community Leaders
	Nawng Hkone-Hopong
	Hopong – Kun Nar
	FGD with village committee on UNDP's livelihoods and social cohesion assistance - U San Shwe- Chairman - U Sai Kam- Secretary - U Sam You- Joint Secretary - San Sam- Auditor - Nan Thit Thit- Accountant - Nan Nan Kway- Member (women) - Sai Nge- Member (youth) Visit to food bank Visit to Retaining wall & water pipe line Visit to community assets
	Kun Nar- Taunggyi
21 Jan	Meeting with Taunggyi UNDP team
	Meeting with Taunggyi SC2 trainers and participants - Daw Nan Mo Mo Theda (Trainer)- Chair, Southern Shan CSO Network - U Tin Shwe (Participant)- Ward Administrator, Kan Shae Ward - Sai Myint Htay (Participant)- Chair, Township Development Committee - Daw Kyi Thar Aye, Member, CSO network - Daw Su Su, Staff Officer, Planning Department - Daw Ye Ye Aye, Maternal and Child Welfare Association - Nan Mork Yvom Hsai (participant), Restoration Council of Shan State/SSA Peace Committee Liaison Office (EAO)-TBC on 20 January - Daw War War Kyi, Danu Literature and Culture Organization and Living Earth Green Network - Daw Khin Saw Nwe, Yoma Alin Organization

Date	Activity
	Taunggyi- Heho
	Heho- Yangon
22 Jan	Depart from YGN Air Port
	Arrival to Sittway Air Port
	Visit to Kyauk Taw
	Arrival Kyauk Taw UNDP/ACTED project villages and community meeting. 1. Khaungtoke (R), 2. Khaungtoke (M), 3. Khaungtoke (Palaung), 4. Ale Kyun Zay Wa (Muslim), 5. Kyauk Gu Su, 6. Ale Kyun (Muslim), 7. Nagara, 8. San Gar Taung (Muslim), 9. Patlet Kay (Muslim)
	Lunch
	Proceed to Mrauk U
	Arrival Mrauk U UNDP/ACTED project villages and Community meeting. 1. Ahtoke The Ma village, 2. Yai The village
	Return back to Mrauk U
	Hotel check in and dinner
23 Jan	Meeting Mrauk U Township Administrator
	Meeting RI
	Meeting ACTED team
	Meeting Kyauk Taw TA
	Proceed to Sittway
	Arrival Sittway
	Meeting IRC/RERA
24 Jan	Meeting State Secretary
	Best Practice Meeting with State GAD director, heads of line departments and partner NGOs
	Meeting UNDP Sittwe team
	Check in airport and fly back to YGN
25 Wed	09.30-11.00 Meeting with Ms. Dilrukshi Fonseka, Output 5 Lead 11.30-12.00 Meeting with Local Governance Programme Lead, Mr. Christian Hainzl 1.30-2.30 Meeting with Output 2 (civil society and media strengthening programme, Output Lead, Ms. Allison Hope Moore) 3-4 Meeting with Kelsey Crowley, Country Representative (acting), ACTED (implementing partner, early recovery support for returnees and flood-affected in Rakhine)
26	Meeting with SFCG Programme Manager
27	Additional meetings, data synthesis, preparations 3-4.30 Presentation to UNDP

Date	Activity
	4.30-5 Contract and other housekeeping matters with Phyu Phyu

ANNEX 3. Interview Guide

	Project Staff	Partners	External Stakeholders
1. How was the prioritization done?	X	X	
2. Who was involved in the formulation / revision ?	X	X	
3. Which data were used for the definition of the strategy?	X	X	X
4. To what extent it is consistent with the government policies and strategies?	X	X	X
5. How were gender, human rights and conflict sensitivity integrated?	X	X	X
6. How were changes and constraints in the social tissue included in the programme design?	X	X	X
7. To what extent are some interventions less relevant? Are there new priorities?	X	X	X
8. To what extent could workplans be implemented and are objectives being reached?	X	X	
9. Which are the gaps? Why? Which are the key factors of success and obstacles? How can they be integrated in the programme?	X	X	X
10. How could social cohesion be measured? How did it improve or evolve in the various areas?	X	X	X
11. Which are the results in terms of increased livelihoods? To what extent do they link up with social cohesion?	X	X	X
12. Are there indirect or negative effects?	X	X	X
13. To what extent did the programme management structure and functioning facilitated the outputs results (Human Resources, allocation of ressources, governance structure, intervention logic)?	X	X	
14. How were the partners selected and monitored and how efficient was the process, notably with State institutions?	X	X	
15. How was the M&E system designed, to what extent was it adequate and to what extent could it be implemented? Were the result framework and indicators actually used for the monitoring?	X	X	
16. How functional was the coordination and communication (level and frequency, transparency, inclusiveness)?	X	X	
17. To what extent could the beneficiaries replicate the content and results of the interventions?			
18. To what extent did the output create dynamics and had leverage effects?	X	X	X
19. To what extent are the interventions components institutionalized?	X	X	X
20. Will other stakeholder get involved in the subject? To what extent will the donors pursue funding those interventions?	X	X	X
21. Which are your recommendations for the follow up of this output? And for further work on social cohesion and livelihoods in Myanmar?	X	X	X

ANNEX 4. Questionnaire

January 26, 2017

Dear Madam, Dear Sir,

We are currently undertaking the external and independent evaluation of the UNDP interventions regarding social cohesion and livelihoods since 2013. We would be grateful if you could spend a few minutes to answer the following questions.

The questionnaires are confidential and will be used only by the evaluation team. No individual or organization answering to this questionnaire will be quoted in debriefing and reporting, unless agreed otherwise.

Please send them back to the evaluation team by 9 February:

Cécile Collin: clmcollin@gmail.com

Moe Moe: mm.moemoe5@gmail.com

Thank you in advance for your collaboration.

With best regards,

Cécile Collin & Moe Moe

ေလးစားအပ္ပါေသာ လူ ကီးမ၈ား၊ မ်ိတ၈ဆြမ္၈ရြ၈�၊

က ၃န္ဓတို အဖြ သည၈ ယူအင္ဒီပီ၏ ၂၀၁၃

မွ စတ႕ေက႑ထ႐ည္ေဖ႑ေ႑ဆ႑င့က္ဲ့ ေသာလူမ ေပၚ႐ေစ႐႐ည္၈ ေရး ၃င္ေ့အသကေ႐မ္း၀မ၈၈ေ ကာင္၈လုပ္ဴန္၈ ၈မ္တ၈ေထာက္ဲ႑မ္ လုပ္ဴန္၈ ၈မ္၈ကို ်ဴပ၃ေြ႑တ္ဴ႐ေသာအဖြ ေအ်႐ဖင္ေအက္ဴဖ႑န္၈၈စစ၈ေ႑န္၈ဝီ႐န၈ ်ဴ႐ဖစ္ဲ႑သည၈။ အ ကယ၈၌လူ ကီးမ၈၈တို ေအ်႐ဖင္ေ႐ပါ၀င္ေ်ဴ႐ ကား႐ေပ၈ပါက ေက္ဲးဇူး အထူးတင၈ရ်ိဳမည်ဴ႐ဖစ္ဲ႑သည၈။

ေ႐ပးပို သည္ေ့႐မး်႐ခန္တ၈မ္၈က ကိုေ်ဴ႐ ကား႐မ မ္တ၈ကို အက္ဴ႐ဖ႑န္၈၈စ္႐်ွအဖြ မ္ လုံ႐ု်္႐ခံ ်ြာထိန၈၈၈သိမ္း႐ေပးမ ည္်ဴ႐ဖစ၈ ပီး အက္႑ဖ႑န္၈၈စ၄ လုပ္ဴန္၈ ၈တ္ည္႐ာ သုံ႐ေစ်ုဲ်႐ားမည္်ဴ႐ဖစ္ဲ႑သည၈။ တဦး ခ်င္၈ (သို မဟုတ၈) တဖြ ၆င္၈၈၏ ေ႐မး်႐ခန္တ၈မ္၈ေအ၈ တံ႐ဳ ်႐ဴဴန္ေ်ဴ႐ ကားထား မ မ္တ၈ကို၃င္ေ႐တို ်႐ခင္ေ်ဴ႐ပ ခက္ကရ်ိဳဘ၄ ေတြ ရ်ိဳမ္တ၈ကိုအက္ဲ႑ ၈၈ခ၈ ပ႐ ်ဴပုန္ဳ၈ည တင္်ဴ႐ပရာတြ႐ ၃င္ေ့အစီရင္ဒ့စာတို ်႐တြ႐ ရ႑ည္ ႐နာ႐သုံ႐ု်ွ်ဳမ္ည္မဟုတ္ဲ့ီ။

ေက္၈းဇူး်႐ ်ွေ်ဴ႐ ကားထ႐ေ႐သာအဒ္ကၠလက္ဝက္ဳ၈ားကို အက္ဴ႐ဖ႑န္၈၈စ္႐်ဴ်ွအဖြ သို ေဖေဖ႑၀ါရီလ (၉) ရကေ၈ အေ႐ရာ ကေ႐အ႑ကြ၈ e-mail လိပ္ဴမ္၈ကား႐သို ်ိ႑ ေ႐ပး႐ေလို်ဴ႑သည၈။

Cécile Collin: clmcollin@gmail.com

Moe Moe: mm.moemoe5@gmail.com

လူ ကီးမ၈၈တို ၏ပူး႐ေပါ႐ေ႐ပါ၀င္ဳ ကို ကိ တင္႑ေ႐ ကး႐ဇူးတ႑ဴ်္ဳသည၈။

ေလးစား်႐ွ်ဴဖ၈70

ေဆစီေကာလင၈ ၃င္ေ့ မို မို

Name of your organization:

အဖြ အမညၥ၊

Your location:

ေ႑သ၊

Your position in the organization:

ရ႑ထူး၊

1. **What was your involvement in UNDP Output 5?**

၁။ ယူအင္ဒီပီ **Output 5** တြင္႑ သ႑္ ့ ့ ပါ၀င့ မ မ္တ၈ကိုေ႑ဖ႑်ဴပပါ။

2. **Do you think that UNDP Output 5 on Livelihoods and Social Cohesion interventions were required in your (project) area? If not, why?**

၂။ သင့်| စီမံကိန်းဧရိယာတြင်ဧ ယူအင်ဒီပီ **Output 5** လူမ ေပါင်းစည်းေရး ၀င်ဧ့ အသက်ေမွးဝမ်းေ ကာင်း လုပ္ဇန်းမ်ား ေထာက္ပ့မ ကိုထည့်ြ ခင်းေ ေ ကာင့္ထည္ ေဖာ့နု္ လိုအပ့်ထ္ ျထင္ငါ့သလား။ လိုအပ္ထ္ ္ ု မထင္ငါ က ဘာေ ကာင္ငေ့ပါလဲ။

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3. **Could all the interventions be implemented as planned? Particularly, in terms of number of communities, details of the activities and resources provided?**

၃။ မူလစီစ္ဥ္ဘား ခဲ့ သည္ငအတိုင္း လုပ္ဇန္မ်ားအားလံု္ု ကိုအေကာင္ဗထည္ဇေ ဖာ္ င္ုင္ငေ ခဲ့ ပါသလား။ အထူးသ္ဖင့္ဧ့ ေ က္ိ ရြ ာမ်ားေ အေရအတြ က္ဧ အေသးစိ္ဖုပုန္ဇ္မ်ားလုပေဆာင္ မ်ား ၀င္ဧ့ ပံ ့ ပိုးခဲ့ ေသာ အရင္းအ္မစ္ဂ္ မ်ားကို ေ ္ျတ္တ္ျပပါ။

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4. **Which interventions were difficult to put in place? Which were the challenges and reasons for the gaps?**

၄။ မည္ုည္ဧ့လုပ္ဇန္မ်ား သ္ဥ္ဓကာ္ ္ထည္ဇေဖာ္ ္ နု္ခြ ္င္ငါ့ပါသလဲ။ မည္ုည္ဧ့အခက္အခဲမ်ားေ ေ္ျ က္ ္ ခဲ့ ရ ္ီးမည္ုည္ဧ့အေ ကာင္ဓရင္းမ်ားေ ာ ကာင္ဧ့ ္ ္ က္ြဟ္ခ္ ္က္ြ ္ဘား ္ျဖစ္ဇ့္ ္ ္ပါသလဲ။

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5. **Do you think that the interventions met the key needs of the communities? If not, which main priorities were not addressed? Why?**

၅။ ္ ္ျပ လုပေဆာင္ ္ြ က္ဧ္ ေသာလုပ္ဇန္မ်ားသည္ဧ ေ က္ီးရြ ာလူထု အဓိကလိုအပ္ဘ္ြ ္က္ ္ ၀င္ဧ့ ကို္က္ဇီမ ္ ရ္ိသည္ဧ ဟုသ္ုင္ငါ့ သလား။ အကယ္ဧ္ဧ၍မထင္ငါ ကမည္ုည့္ ္ ကို အဓိက ဦးစားေ ္ပး အ္ျဖစ္ဧ ္ ေ ္ျဖရ္ ္ ္ င္း ္ရန္ဧ လိုအပ္ဧ ္ ္ ္ပါသလဲ။

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6. **To what extent were the most vulnerable villages were targeted?**

၆။ မည္ုည္ဧ့အတိုင္းအတာအထိ အဆင့္ဧ္းရဲဆံု္းေ က္ီးရြ ာမ်ားကို ဦးတည္ဧ ္ ္ု္ိ္ငြ ္ ့ ္ ္ပါသလဲ။

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7. If not, which vulnerable communities were not included? Why?

၇။ အကယ်၍ မဟုတ်တဲ့ လွဲ၍ မထည့်ထား၊ ဆင်းရဲသည့်ေ ကျေးရွာလူထုမပါဝင့် ပါသလဲ။ ဘာေ ကာင့်ေ ပါလဲ။

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8. And were the most vulnerable individuals within a village targeted? If not why?

၈။ ကျေးရွာတွင်းကြွင်းသော အဆင်းရဲဆုံးျေ သာလူတဦးခင်းကိုပါဝင်ေ အာင်ဦးတည် ၍ ထားပါသလား။ မလုပ ၍ ထား အတြက္လ္ယွ္ုအခက္ခဲမ္ ်ားက ကံ ေတြ ့ ခဲ ့ ရပါသလဲ။
ပါက ဘာေ ကာင့်ေ ပါလဲ။

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9. Which are the results of the intervention? Which are the changes at the community level following the interventions?

၉။ ဤစီမံခံ့ကွပုနဲ့ ်ား အေကာင့်ထည်ေ ဖာ့ မ္ ှမထည့်ထားအက် ဝီးရလဒ့်ကျ ားရရှိခဲ ့ ပါသလဲ။ထိုသို ့ အေကာင်အထည် ေ ဖာ ်ေ ပီး ေ နာက်ွ်င်းကြင်းကျေးရွာလူထုအတြင်းကျ ားပွဲ ်ေ ကြ ျမင့်သည့် အေျ ဟင်းအလ ်မ ်ားကိုေ ဖာ်ဖျေ ေ ပပါ။

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10. To what extent could women be included in the interventions? How? Which were the constraints in that matter?

၁ဝ။ မထည့်ထားအတုင်းအတာအထိ အမ ်ဝီးသမီးမ ်ား ပါဝင် ၍ ရှိခဲ့ပါသလဲ။ ဘယ်ဲ့ုပါဝင့် ပါသလဲ။ ၄င်းက သို ့ ပါဝ
င် ၍ အတြက္လ္ယွ္ုအခက္ခဲမ္ ်ား ကံ ေတြ ့ ခဲ ့ ရပါသလဲ။

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11. Which are the specific results of the interventions on women?

၁၁။ <u>အမ ်ဝီးသမီးမ ်ား အတြကွ္ေ ကာင္ ်ထည္ ေ ဖာ့ေ ပးခဲ ့ သောလုပ္ုနဲ ်မ ်ား သီးျ ်ားး အက် ဝီးရလဒ့်ကျ ား ကိုေ ဖာ့ဖျ
ေ ပပးပါ။</u>

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12. Which are the differences of results from one community to another? What makes things work better in some communities? And what makes things difficult in other communities?

၁၂။ ကျေးရွာတရ္ြာ ့ ွင္ ်တရ္ြာတို ့ မွ ့ မတူညီေ သာ အက် ဝီးရလဒ့်ကျ ားကို့ ေ ဖာ့ဖျေ ေ ပပါ။ အခ် ဝီ ကျေးရွာမ ်ားကြင်း မထည့်
ည့်ေ အာ ကာင့်အရာမ ်ားကပိုမိုေ ကာင့်မြနေ အာင့်ျ ်ပ္ ဝင့် ပါသလဲ။ အခ် ဝီ ကျေးရွာမ ်ားကြင်း မထည့်ေ အာ
ကာင့်အရာမ ်ားက အခက္ခဲ ်ျ ်ဖစ့်ေ ေ ခဲ ့ ပါသလဲ။

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13. **Which are your recommendations to improve partner's collaboration with UNDP?**

၁၃။ ယူအင်ဒီပီ ၏ မိတ်ဖက္ကဖြ အစည်း မ်း ပူးပေါင်း ဆာင်ရွက်ကြ ပိုမိ ကာင်း မြန ေစရန မည်သည့် အခ်က်က ်းကိုအ ကံ ျပ ခင့်ါသလဲ။

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14. **Are there needs to support further social cohesion? If yes, what should be done in the future?**

၁၄။ ထပ်မံ၍လူမ ပေါင်း စည်း ရေး ၏ ပတ္တက သာ အကူအညီမ ်းလိုအပ် သေးလား။ အကယ၍လိုအပ်ပါက အနာဂတ တြင့်ရို ျပ လုပ်ဆ င့်ပါသလဲ။

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15. **Do you have any other comment, concern or key recommendation?**

၁၅။ သင့် ပေးလို သော အျခား မွတ္ခ်က်က ်း၊ အဖိကအေလးပေးစေလို သော အခ်က်က ်း ၏ အဖိကက သော အ ကံ ျပ ခ်က် က ်းကို ဖော် ျပပေးပါ။

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Thank you very much for your contribution, it will be used to improve UNDP's work!

သင ၏ပါဝင္ အတြ က္ဇ း တင္ရွိ ပါတယ၊ ထိုပါဝင္ သည ယူအင်ဒီပီ၏ လုပ္ငနး မ ်းတိုးတက ကာင်း မြန အောင္ ပ ဆာင္ ဂုဏ္ေျ့တြ က္ သံုး ျ း သြားမွ ျဖစ္ပါတယ။

If you are available for further exchanges with the team, if necessary, please kindly indicate your contact details:

အကယ၍အက္ဖုတ္တနစ္ခ်အဖြ ၏ အျခားလိုအပ္ သောပ္ ဆြ း ၉္း ဖလွယ္ မ ်း လုပ္ ဂုဏ္ေွ့ကြ က္ ေက္ ဇ ်း ိီးသင့္ ၏ ဆက္သွယ္မည္ အေသးစိပ္ လက္က လက္ခ ်းကို ဖော် ျပပေးပါ။

ANNEX 5. Documents consulted

Date / Year	Organization / Writer	Title
September 2013	European Union	KAYAH STATE SOCIO-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
August 2014	Department of Population, Ministry of Immigration and Population	THE POPULATION AND HOUSING CONCENSUS OF MYANMAR, 2014 SUMMARY OF THE PROVISIONAL RESULT
2015	Australian Human Right Commission	BUILDING SOCIAL COHESION IN OUR COMMUNITY A SUMMARY OF THE ONLINE RESOURCE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT
2015	Australian Human Right Commission	BUILDING SOCIAL COHESION IN OUR COMMUNITY A SUMMARY OF THE ONLINE RESOURCE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT
20 June 2016	House of commons library	BURMAR: JUNE 2016 UPDATE BRIEFING PAPER
Dec. 2016	International Crisis Group	Myanmar, a new Muslim insurgency
January 2016	Peace Nexus Foundation	Conflict Sensitivity Monitoring in Myanmar Findings for OECD-DAC INCAF
March 2013	UNCT	Peace and Development Conflict-Sensitive Analysis
January 2013	UNDP	UNDP_MM_Pillar_1_Project_Doc
Nov 2016	UNDP	RRF
September 2013	UNDP	P1-O5 LIVELIHOODS & SOCIAL COHESION BI-ANNUAL REPORT TO OUTPUT BOARD JANUARY- JUNE 2013
February 2016	UNDP	P1-O5 LIVELIHOODS & SOCIAL COHESION ANNUAL REPORT TO OUTPUT BOARD JANUARY- DECEMBER 2015
December 2016	UNDP	P1-O5 LIVELIHOODS & SOCIAL COHESION ANNUAL REPORT TO OUTPUT BOARD JANUARY- DECEMBER 2016
February 2015	UNDP	P1-O5 LIVELIHOODS & SOCIAL COHESION ANNUAL REPORT TO OUTPUT BOARD 2014 (draft)
September 2015	UNDP	P1-O5 LIVELIHOODS & SOCIAL COHESION SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT TO OUTPUT BOARD JANUARY- JUNE 2015
September 2016	UNDP	P1-O5 LIVELIHOODS & SOCIAL COHESION MID-ANNUAL REPORT TO OUTPUT BOARD JANUARY- JUNE 2016
January 2014	UNDP	P1-O5 LIVELIHOODS & SOCIAL COHESION ANNUAL REPORT TO OUTPUT BOARD 2013
August 2016	SFCG, Shiva K. Dhungana	Strengthening Local-Level Social Cohesion Competencies through Training and Support, Final Evaluation
2016	TNS Myanmar	Livelihoods Skills Trainings and Enterprise Start-up Training and Grants Evaluation, quantitative & qualitative research report
2016	KOPERNIC	Learnings from the innovative technologies for Rural Comunities Pilot Project
2016	Mercy Corps	Affordable Technologies Innovations for Rural Communities Undp progress report 4

2016	KOPERNIC	Learnings from the Innovative Technologies for Rural Communities Pilot Project
2014	IRC	Final Project Report, Kayah and Chin States
30 September 2016	ACTED	RAKHINE FINAL REPORT

ANNEX 6. Achievements by type of activities

(source Results & Resources Framework update Nov. 2016)

5.1. Social Protection mechanism in place for poor	# of village-level livelihood and social cohesion committees (CBOs) established		329
	# of representatives in community-led governance structures in target locations (men/ women)		T=1613
			M= 1080
			F= 533
	# of village planning exercises completed		329
	# of CBOs (members) trained in CBO concepts		3774
	# of persons participating in village planning exercises (men/women)		T=72135
			M= 34,983
			F=37,152
	# of food banks established		194
	# of households benefitting from food banks		18260
5.2: Target communities have increased capacities and opportunities for social cohesion and livelihoods	# of village livelihood and social cohesion assessments conducted		
	# of households receiving livelihood grants		T= 20280
			M=49406
			F= 47320
	# of households receiving agriculture grants		T= 6335
			M=
			F=
	# of households receiving livestock grants		T= 10204
			M=
			F=
	# of households receiving Fisheries grants		T= 722
			M=
			F=
	# of households receiving MSE assistance		T= 3019
			M=
			F=
	# of agriculture extension workers provided with training (men/women)		T=322
			M=
			F=
	# of livestock extension workers provided with training		T=342
			M
			F
	# of persons participating in cash-for-work infrastructure activities (men/women)		T=83,701
			M= 47,143
			F=29673
	# of infrastructure units constructed/rehabilitated		469
	# of persons provided with livelihood and vocational training (men/women) (activity-wise)		T=772
			M=344
			F=428
	# of persons provided with business development training (men/women)		T=645

			M=323
			F=322
	# of household with improved awareness of innovative technologies and available information	50%	99%
	# of households purchasing improved energy technologies through the market system	3000	T=6371
	# of training deliver to market actors – incl. entrepreneurs and sub-distributors	1	3
	# of entrepreneurs trained and supported on distribution of affrodable technologies	40	T=40
			M=14
			F=26
	# of women and youth serving on Steering Committees	TBC	84
	# of women and youth reporting improved confidence and leadership skills as a result of serving on cluster-level steering committees (SCs)	75%	
	# of entreprenures receiving start-up capitals, vouchers, and follow-up business development support	40	40
	# and % of entrepreneurs setting up small businesses selling innovative technologies in a market system	40	40
	#of technology fairs conducted in target areas to assess the interest and demand of affortable technologies	100	153
	# people received the affordable and innovative products(in-kind) men/ women	2500	T=167694
			M=80977
			F=86717
5.3: National and local institutions and actors have increased capacities for conflict sensitivity, social cohesion and peace-building	# of social cohesion training courses conducted	54	51
	# of persons from government, NSA and CSOs trained on strengthening social cohesion competencies concepts	1350	1063
	# of persons/ representatives from CSOs received TOTs on strengthening social cohesion competencies module	90	185
	# of Implementing members trained in social cohesion		607
	# of civil society peace building activities supported by UNDP		18
	# of Government Staff received Dialogue Training		303