

ROM report

Type of ROM review	Projects and Programmes
Project title	Support to the North West Coast Development Plan and Relevant Mine Action: Phase II
Project reference	C-351937
Delegation in charge	Egypt
Status	Draft
Report date	26/05/2017

Project - Key Information	
Domain (instrument)	ENPI - Neighbourhood - Mediterranean & Eastern Europe (NEAR)
DAC Sector	15250 - Removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war
Zone Benefitting from the Action	Egypt
Action Location	North West Coast
Type of Project/Programme	Geographic
Geographic Implementation	Single-country
Entity in Charge	NEAR B 01
OM in Charge	CITARELLA LUCA
Contracting Party	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

Project - Financial data on 19/02/2017			
Total budget	4,705,000 €		
EU contribution	4,705,000 €		
Paid Amount	4,000,000 €	Date of last payment	29/02/2016

Project - Dates				
Contractor Signature Date	02/12/2014			
Activities	Start Date	23/10/2014	End Date	22/10/2017
Final Date for Implementation (FDI)	22/10/2019			

ROM review - Key information				
Reason for ROM review	Priority - Lack of Expertise			
ROM expert(s) name(s)	RAMAZZOTTI marco			
Field phase	Start Date	08/01/2017	End Date	16/01/2017

Project Synopsis

Context

Explosive remnants of the Second World War affect an estimated 2,680 square kilometre of land in the North West Coast and has claimed almost 9,000 casualties, most civilians. In a large part, due to this contamination, The North West Coast and its inland suffer from a fragile socio-economic structure.

The Project aims at strengthening the national capacities of stakeholders to address mine action in Egypt; reintegrate mine victims in the economy as productive community members; and support the continuation of mine clearance operations in line with the National Development Plan of the North West Coast. Its first phase, like the present phase implemented by UNDP, started in 2006 and formally lasted until the end of 2009. It was however continued on an ad-hoc basis until the start of the second phase in 2014. The second phase of the project addresses the negative humanitarian and socio-economic impact of widespread contamination – actual and perceived – caused by land mines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW).

Project activities in the present phase were intended to build on results achieved during Phase I, with the aim to further strengthen the national capacities of stakeholders to address Mine Action in Egypt through the provision of relevant tools and mechanisms; to reintegrate mine victims into the economy as productive community members; and to support the continuation of mine clearance operations in line with the national Development Plan of the North West Coast. More specifically, Phase II addressed the need to clear - both for humanitarian and for development reasons - Mines and ERW in the Matrouh Governorate, targeting some of the areas where the largest number of mine accidents have been reported (Sidi Barrani, Marsa Matrouh, As Salloum), and the area where El Alamein New City is being built. It also responds to the needs for mine victims to be provided with limb replacements and economic opportunities, and to the needs of the rural population in general by supporting mine awareness and empowerment activities for rural women, as well as de-mining in their areas of residence.

The issue of developing national capacity for mine clearance was addressed by planning for the establishment of an Egyptian National Mine Action Centre at the Ministry of International Cooperation. End beneficiaries were identified as mine victims and the rural population at large, intended to benefit from reduced exposure to risk of mine explosion. Institutions targeted were the Ministry of Defence, in particular the Egyptian Corps of Engineers De-mining Teams), who were provided with equipment; the Ministry of International Cooperation; the Matrouh Governorate; and national NGOs.

Description of the Intervention Logic

As the project concerns a contribution agreement with UNDP, it does not have a logframe. It has however the usual Results and Resources Framework with intended outputs and indicators for output achievement:

1.Strengthened national capacities of relevant stakeholders to manage Mine Action in Egypt, for mine clearance operations in the North West Coast region and for accelerated mine clearance operations. This includes strengthening of the information base for mine action, development of national capacities in the field of mine action, strengthening the national capacities in mine clearance operations, upgrading of equipment for de-miners and the enhancement of the Executive Secretariat for Mine Action in the Ministry of International Cooperation.

The indicator for this output is the number of acres cleared from mines and Unexploded Ordinances (UXO). The baseline was 56,440 acres cleared at the start of the Project and the target is 174,440 acres cleared at the end of the Project.

2.Reintegration of Mine Victims into society and enabling them to contribute to the development of the North West Coast region. This includes the creation of a medical facility that will treat mine accident victims, provide post-traumatic psychosocial treatment, and restore maximum physical functionality of mine victims by providing assistive devices. It also includes the strengthening and empowering NGOs and mine victims capacities to address socio-economic reintegration of mine victims.

The indicators for this output are the number of men and women receiving loans and the status of a medical facility with equal access for men and women. The baselines were that 44 female members received loans and no such medical facility was available. The targets were that all mine action victims in the database do engage in income generating activities and a medical facility catering to victims of mine action is established and fully staffed and equipped.

3.Development and expansion of the Mine Risk Education programme and advocacy activities. This includes advocacy (conferences, exhibitions, campaigns, Facebook) initiatives and Mine Risk Education activities, as well as support for the Executive Secretariat for the implementation of such activities.

The indicator for this output is the number of new mine incidents. The baseline was 13 mine accidents in 2013 and the target is less than 3 new mine incidents annually during the last year of the Project.

Multiple stakeholders were identified in the design. Clearance of Mines and Explosive Remnants of War is to be done on behalf of the population of the Matrouh Governorate: the rural population (shepherds, farmers; mine victims) and investors in El Alamein New City. Other identified stakeholders are the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of International Cooperation, the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development, the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (the last two ministries having interest in mine clearance action in order to implement their regional development activities), El Alamein New City investors, local NGOs.

Findings

1. Relevance

The intervention logic of the action continues to be appropriate in relation to the needs of the identified stakeholders and end beneficiaries, although the latter have benefited less than intended due to circumstances that might have been anticipated at the moment of design.

According to design, the project was intended to provide advantages to all groups of end beneficiaries. Out of 666,242 acres of land that were originally contaminated, 130,446 acres were reportedly cleared in El Alamein alone (Executive Secretariat Brief, December 2016). However, the areas where the largest number of mine accidents have occurred are (in decreasing order) Sidi Barrani, Marsa Matrouh, As Salloum. The cleared area is El Alamein, which actually registers the lowest number of accidents as it was and still is a military zone with restricted access. Although multiple stakeholders were identified in the design, during implementation external investors have been privileged. Most investors in the area of El Alamein (El Alamein New City) presumably come from outside the Matrouh Governorate; their investments may benefit the population of the Matrouh Governorate by providing employment, economic activities related to construction, and tourism once housing projects are finalized.

What has actually influenced where mine clearance has and has not been done, has been the issue of availability of funds to cover running costs (per diems, fuel, batteries, etc.), paid to the Army Corps of Engineers. The project design had indeed noted that 'mobilization of resources for mine clearance operation may be difficult' but this refers largely to external funding from outside Egypt. The Description of the Action does not clearly identify where the funding of operations would come from; however, the relevant Financing Agreement clearly states that de-mining operational costs will come from the Egyptian state. Commitments were made by the Ministry of Housing as well as by the Ministry of Agriculture. So far, only the Ministry of Housing paid clearance running costs (EGP 5,887,000) to the de-mining teams of the Army Corps of Engineers, and expects to recover those costs (indirectly, e.g. via land concessions) from the investors in housing development in El Alamein New City. On the other hand, the Ministry of Agriculture has not paid its part of the running costs, amounting to about EGP 12 million. As a consequence, rural areas have not been de-mined, no humanitarian de-mining has not been undertaken although one of the pillars of the project (investment de-mining versus humanitarian de-mining).

The project remains highly relevant to the needs of mine victims although economic activities have been delayed (see Efficiency section).

Also relevant and important is the Project's continued focus on the development of institutional and financial capacities of national counterparts, by supporting the creation of an Egyptian National Mine Action Centre at the Ministry of International Cooperation, and providing equipment to the Army De-mining Teams; as well as its support to the development of institutional, human and financial capacities of the local counterparts (the rural population) through the organization and training of local NGOs, women empowerment, economic support to mine victims, and mine risk awareness.

The Project design might have been more relevant had it provided for de-mining on sea shores and ports which could become important with future developments in the fishing industry and tourism sector; nonetheless, the Navy has been called in for clearance activities by surveying the El Alamein sea shores and ports for the El Alamein New City.

As envisaged above, project action can be considered as adapted to the – albeit evolving – capacities of government institutions of the partner government (at the central and Governorate level; at the Ministry of Defence - Army level) and of other stakeholders, such as the involved NGOs. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the capacity of the different stakeholders is largely a function of the power they have, with the Ministry of Defence/Army and private investors having the most, and the rural population the least. The Governorate of Matrouh has not had the capacity to influence planning of de-mining to benefit the rural areas, which was so far neglected.

The economic activities, income generating activities, and more importantly the establishment of the Agro-industrial Centre in Marsa Matrouh were not well detailed in project design; it is a complex initiative the time for which the necessary time was underestimated in the design.

With half a year to go to the end of the Project, it is too late to make any changes to design; the issue will be how to continue de-mining efforts post-project in order to complete humanitarian de-mining, and to accelerate the creation of the National Mine Action Centre.

Despite flaws in the design, the intervention logic is clear from the UN style Results and Resources Framework. Indicators (number of acres de-mined, number of new mine victims, number of mine victims supported in socio-economic reintegration, establishment of a medical mine victims support centre) are RACER (relevance, acceptability, clarity, easiness, robustness.), baselines are available from Phase I of the project, targets are set and final values are measurable.

2. Efficiency

Project funds, as foreseen in the budget lines (EUR 4.7 million by the EU), can be deemed adequate to implement the planned activities, described in the Synopsis. EU funds are available to UNDP and UNDP resources have been made available on time, but there is a problem with local funds to cover de-mining activities by the Army Corps of Engineers. The Ministry of Housing covered running costs for de-mining for the area of El Alamein. The Ministry of Agriculture has not yet made funds available.

The Ministry of International Cooperation has so far not planned the substitution of EU funding with its own resources to pay for salaries for the future Egyptian National Mine Action Centre; this needs to be done before project closure in September 2017.

All decisions as to when and where to de-mine are effectively taken by the Ministry of Defence and specifically by the Army Corps of Engineers which is under the Ministry of Defence, a representative of which sits on the Steering Committee. There is little evidence of any funding by other Ministries and entities involved in the Steering Committee (except for the Ministry of Housing, see above). The Army Corps of Engineers decides where to do mine clearance based on from where funds are available for running costs (not paid from EU budget).

The Governorate of Matrouh is not actively involved and has reportedly not put forward any request for de-mining in rural areas (the mission requested to meet the Governor but he was unavailable).

Time and money could possibly have been saved with a correct planning on clearance (by the Army) and on economic activities for mine victims (by the Ministry of International Cooperation). Mine clearance has effectively been driven by the needs of investors in the area of El Alamein, supported by the Ministry of Housing. It is unclear whether a technical or non-technical survey on ERW was done by the Egyptian Army Corps of Engineers (on its own expenses). This survey should have been a major element of the project planning. It should be noted that the European countries, parties in World War II, who fought in the North-West Coast of Egypt - the project area - did not provide the battle maps and minefield maps necessary for a correct planning of the clearance effort. If the Army Corps of Engineers had been supported by civilian organizations / companies identifying the ERW location, and the Army had dealt with the ERW elimination only (like in most of the countries in the world), time and money would have been saved, but at present only the Army may do the identification. For clearance, the Army has its salaries paid by the Ministry of Defence, and by other Ministries for its running costs.

In general, outputs (mine clearance, activities with mine victims) were produced and delivered in an economic cost-efficient manner. Local NGOs have proved efficient in undertaking mine awareness and establishing the health centre but, with less than a year to go to the end of the project, the women's empowerment activities are much delayed and income generating activities have not started at all (due primarily to late recruitment of the NGOs themselves). Also delayed are the economic activities for mine victims, specifically the Agro-industrial centre in Marsa Matrouh which is an empty shell.

Managerial capacity in the Executive Secretariat is generally weak while some of the staff have good technical skills but lean on the UNDP person in the Secretariat for guidance. Technical assistance and overall support is being provided, and very effectively so, by UNDP. One can conclude that without the management capacities provided by UNDP, the project would have lost even more money and time.

The limited duration of the mission, as well as the sensitive political situation (particularly as regards the role of the Army and the Ministry of Defence, who tend to be secretive) did not allow for a detailed exploration of the monitoring systems of the different implementing partners.

However, cost-efficiency is not the only criterion to consider. The project outputs are also important from an anti-terrorism perspective. This project is useful in supporting anti-terrorism activities (controls on explosives coming from ERW) in a politically very unstable area. This issue touches on important EU interests.

3. Effectiveness

As regards the effective achievement of intended outputs, the following can be observed:

Output 1: Strengthened national capacities for mine clearance operations in the North West Coast region and accelerate mine clearance operations

- With respect to mine clearance, efforts focused on El Alamein, and de-mining for development, whereas humanitarian de-mining was neglected. The equipment provided to the Army by the EU project financing and by other donors allows for 250 + 70 operational de-miners, respectively. The Army declares that there are only 250 operational de-miners at work (they should therefore be able to deploy an additional 70). An assessment of the quality of mine clearance – and of the clearance quality – and thus of the technical capacities of the Egyptian Army Corps of Engineers - was not possible for security reasons. Without any doubt, the Egyptian Army has the technical capacities for normal clearance. Quality control was done on random samples at the El Alamein New City. The declared depth was 10-15 cm: it should have been at least 20 cm. The extent of the ERW pollution is so great that the present financing is not going to solve all the problem.

- Development of sustainable QA/QC capacity, and capacity-building on mine action has formally been done, but the mission was not able to obtain information as to quality and impact on the actual working procedures of national counterparts.

- With regards to the establishment of the National Mine Action Centre, the Executive Secretariat (ES) has limited power and managing capacity, although its personnel dealing with sectoral issues (mine victims, training, communications and visibility ...) are capable, as individuals. Without close UNDP support the ES would be unable to perform its project management functions. The ES directors do neither play a role in trying to influence key decisions related to the project: planning of mine clearance (towards humanitarian de-mining and not only development-related de-mining), nor in the decisions relating to the future Agro-industrial Centre of Marsa Matrouh. The ES is not ready (either from a managerial, technical and financial point of view) to become the Egyptian National Mine Action Centre.

Output 2: Normalization of the lives of Mine Victims through reintegration into society and enabling them to contribute to the development of the North West Coast region

- The amputation handling and artificial limbs maintenance centre, and the provision of artificial limbs to mine victim are being conducted in a highly professional manner; mine victims have been equipped with artificial limbs and wheelchairs.

- NGOs involvement and training has only recently started (only 10 months before the end of project). The approach to women empowerment and the involvement of religious leaders for awareness-building are innovative for the Egyptian context and very effective.

- Income generating activities are referred to in the design as intended to benefit all mine victims (an estimated 750). Only a limited number of victims have actually benefited. Same activities listed by the ES in the brief prepared for the mission lists activities such as distribution of sewing machines, kiosks, but these were funded by other donors, in particular USAID. The major focus for income generation in this project is the new Agro-Technological Centre in Marsa Matrouh (included in the EU project) which has been built but is not operational. The ES had hired a consultant to assist in planning.

- The Executive Secretariat has been strengthened through placement of national technicians specialising in mine victim assistance and in visibility, advocacy and mine risk education activities. These national technicians are individually very competent. Their salaries are currently paid by UNDP and the contract will terminate when the project closes in September 2017 unless the Ministry allocates funds to pay for third salaries (they have not so far included it in their budget).

Output 3: Development and expansion of the Mine Risk Education Programme and advocacy activities

- Mine Risk Education Activities, and in general visibility-related and communication activities concerning the project have conducted very effectively using a variety of means: newspapers, TV, schools – and have involved a large number of people and organisations. They have also used strategies that are unconventional for the Egyptian context, such as the involvement of women leaders and of religious leaders. There have reportedly not been mine victims in 2016, thanks to the mine victim education efforts by the project. However, a great number of minefields markings disappeared (stolen, washed away by rain, wind ...), which poses a risk, mainly for children.

As regards the intended development outcomes, one can conclude the following:

- With respect to eradicating extreme poverty and hunger (mine clearance targeted at clearing agricultural and grazing land and other economic targets such as feeder roads and water sources): Mine clearance has not targeted agricultural and grazing land; mine victims have benefited from a few economic activities led by UNDP and the Agro-industrial centre. The centre in Marsa Matrouh is at the moment an empty shell. The project has therefore made a limited contribution to this outcome.

- With respect to promoting gender equality and empowering women (ensuring mine action programs adopt suitable gender policies in recruiting, plus making sure that female beneficiaries are heard during community action data gathering and planning processes): The project has been using a gender approach in all its Mine Risk Education activities, in a traditional rural contexts, which is an important contribution to the issue. Some women empowerment activities have been undertaken but are running late; there is no evidence that any community action data gathering and planning processes have been undertaken (e.g. for mine clearance and mine awareness) and thus whether women participated. The project has made contributions to this outcome, but relatively little could be done on real empowerment.

- With respect to reducing child mortality (child-based mine risk education training; clearance of Unexploded Ordnance by Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams before they can be detonated by curious children; improved access to first aid and medical care. Mine clearance of agricultural and grazing land and other economic targets requires clearance of Unexploded Ordnance by EOD teams before they can be detonated by curious children) This has not been done since rural areas have not been cleared (although of course risks for children have diminished in de-mined urban areas in El Alamein). The medical facility for mine victims, including children, operates well. The project has made a limited contribution to this outcome.

- With respect to ensuring environmental sustainability (removal of landmine and UXO contamination to prevent “overload” on other, uncontaminated agricultural and grazing areas). Agricultural and grazing land has not been cleared from mines. The Project has not contributed to this outcome.

Although the project has delivered a number of important outputs (substantial area cleaned from mines, less mine victims, good medical and psychosocial care of mine victims), development outcomes have not been achieved to a large extent, mainly due to inappropriate planning of activities and priority setting. Such planning and priority setting should have taken place within the framework of regional development objectives and not be left solely to the decision of the Egyptian Army. It may however be utopian to expect otherwise in the Egyptian socio-political context.

4. Sustainability

The Egyptian Government already has the capacity to undertake mine clearance. The project's capacity building component has been implemented for stakeholders both at the central level (the Executive Secretariat) and local levels (NGOs, new limb centre, economic activities, mine risk education ...). However, assurance of a continued flow of benefits depends on a number of factors and not only on the institutional and human capacity building to which key stakeholders have been exposed during the project.

In terms of the institutional capacity of the different entities concerned, and their ability to continue operations post-project, it should be noted that:

- The Executive Secretariat has received training and additional technical staff that is currently paid by UNDP. For budget reasons, it is doubtful whether staff trained at the Ex. Sec. will remain in that position. They could leave because salaries in the state institutions are lower than what they are earning now. There is a clear issue of staff retention. Overall, despite investment in capacity building, ES project management capacity remains weak, and UNDP continues to play a major supporting role.
- The Ministry of International Cooperation appears to be concerned largely with establishing its role and visibility, for example by taking on responsibilities which are outside its mandate and capacity, such as the agro-industrial centre in Marsa Matrouh.
- The Governorate of Matrouh has played no part so far and to the knowledge of the mission, has not been involved in capacity building activities.
- Training of NGOs is of good quality but it has only just started, women empowerment also; training on rural economic development has not started yet.
- The rural population has not been given the opportunity to participate in clearance planning and they have not been provided with the relevant capacity building

In brief, capacities have been strengthened but to a level which is not yet sustainable. UNDP presence is still necessary.

It is unclear whether the Government has the will or the financial capacity to continue to provide assistance - such as micro-finance, health services and capacity building for income generating activities - to mine victims and women at an affordable cost. It is likely that external funding will be needed in the mid-term at least.


























The Ministry of International Cooperation has not budgeted for continuation of current project management and technical services of the Executive Secretariat, and its transformation into the Egyptian National Mine Action Centre. Managerial and technical staff (the latter for activities such as mine awareness and assistance to victims) are all currently paid by UNDP. The Ministry needs to allocate resources for salaries and also for the activities (planning, supervision, communication, victim assistance, etc.). It is unlikely that the Ministry will make these funds available before project closure in September 2017.

Only the Ministry of Housing has so far made funds available to cover running costs for de-mining and it is unclear if other Ministries concerned, in particular the Ministry of Agriculture, will do so in future.

Mine clearance is entirely managed by the Ministry of Defence who therefore undertakes both mine-surveying and mine clearance and sets priorities according to opportunity criteria. In other countries it is standard that private sector organisations undertake mine surveying. Such organisation existed in Egypt as well in the past, but have been dismantled, leaving them only with mine awareness tasks. Mine surveying has been taken over by the Army. Involvement of private sector organisations might have facilitated and made clearance quicker, and possibly also allowed for greater consultation of people (which the Army Corps of Engineers nevertheless declares to have done, although the mission could not verify this information). The only involvement of the private sector was of NGOs doing training, mine victim assistance and mine awareness.

Conclusions	
N°	Conclusion
C1	The design remains relevant and its objective coherent in terms of addressing the needs of the intended target groups / end beneficiaries. The design did not adequately explore and seek to mitigate the risk that implementation was skewed towards El Alamein and urban development, largely missing out on de-mining benefits for the rural population (except for mine victims).
C2	Project action can be considered as adapted to the – albeit evolving – capacities of government institutions of the partner government (at the Central and Governorate level; at the Ministry of Defence - Army level) and also of other stakeholders, such as the NGOs. Project priorities for de-mining have been set at this level and rural people - although recipients of medical and socio-economic support for mine victims and participating in its implementation - were hardly involved in such decision-making.
C3	Effective involvement and commitment of all stakeholders in making the intervention logic work is weak. The Ministry of International Cooperation is not advancing with the creation of the Egyptian National Mine Action Centre (MA), which requires budget provision for salaries to be paid to MA personnel from September 2017, when the EC project will cease. The Matrouh Governorate, which could act in favour of the rural populations, is not sufficiently involved.
C4	Implementation of de-mining has only partially led to expected results since running costs for de-mining have only been made available (and for urban development only) by the Ministry of Housing, and not by the Ministry of Agriculture or other entities involved in rural development. Thus humanitarian de-mining has not been done. At the same time, mine risk education activities have reached important targets, and also tested innovative approaches. Mine risk education campaigns, benefitted more than 160,000 individuals. NGOs are key to achieving results in mine victim assistance and mine awareness and, while their contribution is very effective, they were contracted and trained at a late stage.
C5	In terms of effectiveness in steering the project, the capacity of the Executive Secretariat is weak and all decisions regarding de-mining are effectively taken by the Corps of Army Engineers which is under the Ministry of Defence.
C6	Resources provided by the action are adequate for project implementation as it is, although de-mining has been done only in one area and only for urban development purposes. However, the extent of ERW pollution is such that further de-mining, and for humanitarian purposes, would require additional funding. Non-EU funding has been forthcoming from UNDP, but of the Egyptian institutions only the Ministry of Housing has provided funding for de-mining. The Ministry of International Cooperation has not so far budgeted for continuation of activities under the planned National Mine Action Centre after project closure in September 2017.
C7	As regards de-mining cost-efficiency should not be the only criterion for assessment, since the project is also useful in supporting anti-terrorism activities in a politically very unstable area with a presence of Salafi groups. Based on data provided by the Army through the Executive Secretariat, as well as on the equipment provided, an additional 70 de-miners could have been deployed, to undertake humanitarian de-mining.
C8	Private sector involvement has been limited to NGOs for mine victim assistance and de-mining awareness. For de-mining, the Army has assumed the tasks of both mine surveying (which in other context, including Egypt in the past, are generally done by private contractors) and actual de-mining.
C9	As regards development outcomes, since little humanitarian de-mining has been done in rural areas (including fishing communities), and economic activities are lagging behind, the contribution of the project to poverty reduction and to environmental sustainability has been limited, although the investment projects in the new city of El Alamein City could have a great impact on economic development, job creation, and therefore on poverty reduction. A large amount of Unexploded Ordnances, especially in rural areas, continue to pose as a threat for children. Mine awareness action has however been effective, and some have benefited for artificial limbs, so an impact on child mortality so some albeit limited impact of the project on reduction of child mortality, can be assumed (no new mine victims were reported in 2016). Gender equality and women's empowerment are effective although activities started late, so the project has contributed to the gender equality outcome.
C10	The project is notable for the attention given to the role of women and its strong gender strategy. Activities implemented by NGOs have focused on women economic empowerment and have also been effective in involving women leaders and support recruitment of female staff

Recommendations	
N°	Recommendation
R1	The EUD should put pressure on the Ministry of International Cooperation to allocate the necessary funds and staff to accelerate the creation of the Egyptian National Mine Action Centre
R2	For future operations, the EUD should discuss with the Ministry of International Cooperation and the Army Corps of Engineers to use civilian organizations to identify mines/ERW and keep for the Corps the responsibility for the mine/ERW destruction activities.
R3	The EUD should consider to finance a new phase of the project as de-mining is extremely relevant for the development of the North West Coast region. The extent of the ERW pollution is so great that the present financing is not going to solve the problem. Moreover the needs for humanitarian de-mining have so far been largely unmet. Further financing of the project should also be justified in view of its usefulness in supporting anti-terrorism activities (such as preventing the selling and buying of explosives) in a politically very unstable area with a presence of Salafi groups. Before considering future financing, the Executive Secretariat should provide concrete and updated figures to support any request, thus showing the extent of the problem.
R4	The Ministry of International Cooperation should ensure that the Governorate of Matrouh will be involved in last phase of the project, the discussion of an exit strategy and an eventual new phase of the present project, with a view to undertaking humanitarian de-mining in areas not touched so far
R5	The Army Corps of Engineers should deploy additional de-miners in order to make full use of all the equipment which was provided
R6	For future actions, UNDP should discuss with its Egyptian counterparts to extent de-mining to the sea shore and ports, as done for investors in El Alamein New City
R7	UNDP should, together with the Executive Secretariat intensify economic activities with mine victims in order to reach the intended targets, as in the project document which states that "all mine action victims in the database" should be engaged in income generating activities". (Author's note: these victims are around 750)
R8	UNDP should discuss with the Ministry of International Cooperation and with the Matrouh Governorate how the support to the Agro-industrial Centre in Marsa Matrouh should be upgraded in order to ensuring complementarity with the Rural Development Project for the North West Coast, financed by the EC and implemented by UNDP through the Italian Cooperation.
R9	UNDP should intensify the successful activities implemented by NGOs on women's economic empowerment, and pursue efforts to involve women as leaders, and support further recruitment of female staff.

Scoring overview											
Relevance	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7 a)	1.7 b)	1.7 c)	1.7 d)	1.7 e)
											
Efficiency	2.1	2.2	2.3 a)	2.3 b)	2.3 c)	2.4 a)	2.4 b)	2.4 c)	2.5	2.6	
											
Effectiveness	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.4							
											
Sustainability	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.7				
	