

GEF EO Verification Evaluation Review Form

1. PROJECT DATA				
		Review date:		
GEF Project ID:	1261		at endorsement (Million US\$)	at completion (Million US\$)
IA/EA Project ID:	1068	GEF financing:	3.550	3.168
Project Name:	Community-based Coastal and Marine Conservation in the Milne Bay Province	UNDP	0.500	0.500
Country:	Papua New Guinea	Government:	0.570	0
Other		Conservation International	1.650	2.034
		Government of Japan	0.350	0.206
		ACIAR	0.140	UA
		ANU	0.118	UA
		PDF-B	0.26	0.260
		Total Co-financing	3.57	2.704
Operational Program:	2	Total Project Cost:	7.123	6.908
IA	UNDP	<u>Dates</u>		
Partners involved: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conservation International, Japanese Human Development Trust Fund, National Government 		Work Program date		05/17/2002
		CEO Endorsement		10/02/2002
		Effectiveness/ Prodoc Signature (i.e. date project began)		11/29/2002
		Closing Date	Proposed: 11/28/07	Actual: 11/2006 (field activities stopped October 2005)
Prepared by: Aaron Zazueta	Reviewed by: Claudio Volonte	Duration between effectiveness date and original closing: 5 years	Duration between effectiveness date and actual closing: 4 years	Difference between original and actual closing: -1year
Author of TE: Graham Baines, John Duguman, Peter Johnston		TE completion date: 07/01/2006	TE submission date to GEF OME: September 2007	Difference between TE completion and submission date: 13 months

* Other is referred to contributions mobilized for the project from other multilateral agencies, bilateral development cooperation agencies, NGOs, the private sector and beneficiaries.

2. SUMMARY OF PROJECT RATINGS AND KEY FINDINGS					
Please refer to document "GEF Office of Evaluation Guidelines for the verification and review of terminal evaluations" for further definitions of the ratings.					
2.1 Summary of ratings	Last PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	Other IA evaluations if applicable (e.g. IEG)	GEF EO TER	GEF EO Verification
Project outcomes	S	S		MU	U
Project sustainability	N/A	MS		ML	U
Monitoring and evaluation		U		U	U
Quality of the evaluation report	N/A	N/A	NA	S	MS

2.2 Provide a summary of the key findings of the verification:

The verification mission confirmed many of the findings of the Terminal Evaluation regarding poor project execution and supervision. The verification mission found that the project did raise awareness in the communities and the provincial government regarding the key issues affecting biodiversity in Milne Bay. The project produced some educational materials and helped develop a strategy to protect turtles. Also, a modest initiative of the CI office in Alotau will very likely contribute over time to some of the project objectives. Nonetheless the mission concludes that the major promised outputs of the project were not delivered. This project was supposed to be the first phase of a two-phased intervention. A key expected outcome of this first phase was to develop capacity in the provincial government in order to operate the second phase of the initiative, including the development of a legal and institutional framework; and to pilot approaches for community managed marine protected areas to be replicated in the second phase. Except for vehicles, boats and equipment transferred to the Milne Bay Provincial government and the training of the village engagement teams, the project did not significantly contribute to the development of local capacities to follow up or implement further project activities project.. Most importantly, there is much frustration and disappointment among resource owners interviewed. Villagers, who legally own the marine resources, are unable to stop extraction by other resource users because the legal and administrative tools promised by the project were not delivered. The project financed several studies that gathered a significant amount of data on biodiversity but the studies and data seemed to be disorganized and would likely require significant effort before it can be put to further use. The verification mission also found strong indications of inefficient use of funds including choosing expensive training arrangements, hiring expensive boats, and hiring catering services while conducting surveys in the communities. Financial management and oversight was also deficient. The oversight did not ensure that funds would be dedicated to the activities essential to generate projects outcomes. Funds were also reallocated from output related components to operation and management which could be an indication of poor accounting or high management costs

The evaluation presented a project recovery plan which was agreed to in principle by the Implementing and Executing Agencies as well as The Milne Bay Provincial Government. The Implementing Agency and the Executing Agency committed to contribute additional funds for the implementation of the plan which would take place through the provincial government. Had this plan been implemented some of the losses of the project might have been mitigated. Unfortunately the recovery plan was never implemented. The findings presented by the terminal evaluation included information on project expenditures that contributed to exacerbated tensions between UNDP, the Provincial Government and CI. CI disputed the veracity of these findings in its management response to the evaluation. The combination of several factors such as the growing disagreements and tensions between UNDP and CI over financial matters, which preceded the terminal evaluation, and secondly the use of disputed financial information by local politicians in the context of a contested provincial election resulted in the polarization of positions, communication breakdown and the unwillingness to cooperate in the implementation of the project's recovery plan. The project carried a reputational liability for the GEF, UNDP and CI as the findings of the Terminal Evaluation triggered a controversy in the PNG national press and in some international journals.

Both agencies indicated that they have learned lessons and have subsequently altered their way of doing business. The UNDP country office indicated that they have now concentrated their operations in specific regions in PNG as to permit proper supervision with the available budgets. This is an important action given that travel in PNG is expensive in account of the need to use air travel. UNDP has also increased its interactions with the national environment department. This department played a very small role in the project. Had it had a stronger role, it is possible that some of the deficiencies of the project would have been identified and acted upon earlier. One of the major deficiencies of UNDP in this project was weak risk management. While UNDP identified some indications of possible problems, it did not pay sufficient attention to them nor acted on these indications until problems were unveiled by the Terminal Evaluation. UNDP reported that systems are now being put in place to make sure that red flags go to management to ensure that action and follow-up take place.

CI's major deficiencies were its failure to ensure sound financial management at the local level as well as its failure to ensure delivery of project results. CI indicated that the organization has now set in place training for country management staff on issues related to fiduciary responsibilities and financial management. In the past this training was given to administrative staff only in the form of training on administrative systems. However, CI has resolved that country managers should be aware of the procedures for which they are ultimately responsible for. In addition, all field programs have been redesigned and are more focused on local management. As an example, CI reported that the organization has opened regional offices to allow for closer supervision of projects. CI also indicated that they will be much more careful in the future before taking on complex projects under conditions of low country capacities and will make sure that the resources are there to do the necessary levels of supervision. CI also mentioned that it is now careful to define the roles of consultative bodies in ways that do not interfere with the agencies' management responsibilities.

Despite the discouraging findings, further inquiry on the issues raised in this report would be very costly as it would

require examination multiple records and contracts and contacting key project staff (such as the CTA) who are no longer in the country. On the other hand it is unlikely provide much information beyond confirming the unsatisfactory ratings of the implementing and executing agencies and of the project as a whole. Further examination is also likely to rekindle discussions and once again polarize opinions which would put at risk the modest initiative now being implemented by the local CI office which seeks to address some of the objectives of the project

There are several lessons that can be derived from this project.

- 1) Problems with financial reporting systems and different understanding of financial responsibilities among the implementing and the executing Agencies were a recurrent issue in the project. Clarity on oversight responsibilities, well integrated financial systems between the implementing and executing agency, and project execution are key and need to be worked out prior to project implementation. In this regard having conducted a financial management assessment was a good idea. The implementing agency however should have ensured that recommendations were implemented in a timely way, including the implementation of the financial assessment at midterm. In the some cases, it might be necessary to develop a more intense executing agency inductive process regarding GEF procedures and their responsibilities as executing agencies.
- 2) The role of project consultative bodies should be clearly specified and defined in such a way that does not interfere with the responsibilities of implementing and executing agencies. In this case the steering committee seemed to have been a factor that allowed the Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) to take decisions and justify expenses that were not previously approved by the executing agency (in this case CI to whom the CTA was responsible) and that were not budgeted for; leading to one of the main factors that contributed to runaway spending.
- 3) Projects implemented under conditions of low country institutional capacity require special attention to the risks inherited in these conditions. During design, attention should be given to ensure that new approaches or technologies introduced by the project can be adopted given the existing capacities. New technologies should also be phased in a way that build capacities incrementally and provide the local conditions for success down the road. In the case of this project, the attempt to incorporate state of the art approaches such as complex protected area marine systems, sophisticated reef monitoring approaches, mapping of sea floor, and detail elaboration of genealogical studies might have been premature given the absorptive capacities of the provincial government. It was also inefficient as the project was able to use only a small portion of the information generated. Projects implemented in conditions of low capacities imply higher risks to outcomes and require closer oversight. These projects should thusly have robust oversight systems with strong management oversight by the Implementing and the Executing agencies and risk monitoring should be a priority. This might imply higher costs for implementation and execution. It might be important for the GEF to give more attention to the implications that different levels of local capacity have during implementation. .
- 4) Projects implemented under conditions of low country institutional capacity also require high levels of government ownership and commitment. In the case of this project both the national and the provincial governments were strongly supportive to the project during preparation. This support diminished during implementation do to a variety of reasons (the high costs of travel to attend to the Steering Committee meetings, changes of priorities of the national government, tensions that developed between the provincial administration office and the project's CTA over the way the meetings were carried out). A more constant and substantive involvement of the national and provincial government in the steering of the project and proactive communication by the national and provincial government might have called an earlier attention by UNDP PNG to problems.
- 5) In this particular case, the project produced an excess of data, so much so, that much of it seems not to have reached the analysis stage. For example, it is not clear what use for the project of the data obtained during mapping of the sea floor, and the information on genealogies seems to have been distributed back to the communities without having been verified or analyzed. Most of it was also not used by the project and most will very likely require significant investment in organization before it can be useful. Research activities and data gathered in context of projects should consider the projects data absorptive capacity and should also have clear purposes in project implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

2.3 Should the terminal evaluation report for this project be considered a good practice? Why? No. While the Terminal Evaluation does address many of the problems faced by the project and presents evidence of serious problems, the evaluators gave the project a satisfactory rating which was not deserved. Some of the conclusions of the evaluation regarding project expenses were not correct. This is due in part to the misinterpretation of accounting categories. (For example travel expenses and tax payments).

2.4 Are there any evaluation verification findings that require follow-up, such as corruption, reallocation of GEF funds, etc.? The financial information at project closing provided by CI reports that USD 1.9 million of GEF funds

that in the project brief were allocated to operational components were spent to cover “project management and administration”¹. Without a detail examination of accounts it is difficult to say how much this difference is in account of reallocation of funds or poor accounting. There were also contractual practices that are generally not considered sound such as retroactive contracting for services rendered. Despite these unresolved issues, further inquiry is likely to be very costly as it would require examination numerous documents (financial records, communications and contracts), some of which are in PNG and other in Washington D.C. Also, to get a full picture of what happened it would be important to interview the key project staff, such as the CTA, who are no longer in PNG (and who this evaluation mission was not able to reach). It is also unlikely that additional inquiry will provide little information beyond confirming the unsatisfactory performance of the implementing and executing agencies and of the project as a whole. Further examination is also likely to rekindle discussions and polarize once again opinions in ways that could put at risk the modest initiative yet important that is now being implemented by the local CI office and which seeks to address some of the objectives of the project.

3. PROJECT OBJECTIVES

3.1 Project Objectives

a. What were the Global Environmental Objectives of the project? Were there any changes during implementation?

The Global Environmental Objective of the project was to “Conserve a representative sample of the Milne Bay Province’s exceptional high levels of marine biodiversity of global significance and its marine ecosystems and coral reefs” No change was made during implementation.

b. What were the Development Objectives of the project? Were there any changes during implementation?

According to the PAD (log frame matrix), the objectives of the project included:

- To establish a representative system of community based Marine Protected Areas in Milne Bay for the conservation of biodiversity, and the sustainable use and protection of marine resources to achieve sustainable development and livelihood benefits for vulnerable small island communities
- A community based marine conservation framework is established in partnership with national and provincial government, the private sector and NGOs.

The project was the first phase of a two-phased initiative that was to take ten years in total. The overall long term intention was to establish a community based conservation framework. In the first phase, the project was designed to establish the necessary laws and regulations, institutional capacities, and test an approach for community marine protected areas in one of the four zones identified by the project. Key to the first phase was building capacities in the provincial government and ward committees, with the aim of transferring management of the second phase to the provincial and local governments.

No change was made to the objectives from the Project Document. However, in a “Supplementary Project Document” produced by the CTA a few months after he assumed his post, changes were made to indicators and activities within these objectives. These changes were documented in the terminal evaluation of the project, which according to the Terminal Evaluation team implied important changes to the overall design of the project.

4. GEF EVALUATION OFFICE ASSESSMENT THE RELIABILITY OF FINDINGS AND THE QUALITY OF THE TERMINAL EVALUATION

Assess and rate the project outcomes based on the achievements until the point of verification and explain the extent to which the verification findings correspond to the findings presented in the terminal evaluation report.

If the verification findings differ from the findings presented in the terminal evaluation report or the terminal evaluation review, the verification evaluator will:

- Provide detailed evidence that support the different findings and conclusions found in the terminal evaluation report. In some cases the evaluator might decide to include an appendix to this form to fully explain differences.
- Assess to what extent the differences in findings, conclusions, and ratings are due to new developments that have taken place since the terminal evaluation was concluded.
- Assess the extent to which differences in findings, conclusions, and ratings are due to the way in which the terminal evaluation was conducted, including problems in methodology, gaps in reporting or underreporting key aspects of project performance, undue influences or other factors that affected the quality of the evaluation.

¹ According to the financial closing information provided by UNDP (Gwen Maru 10/09/2008) the reported funds that were reallocated are 2.5 million. More than half of the funds initially allocated to each of the three project components with GEF funding, a total of 2.5 million dollars, were dedicated to “Operations and Management”

4.1 Outcomes (use a six point scale 6= HS to 1 = HU)

a. Relevance	Rating: 5
<p>To what extent does the project support GEF mandate, policies and strategies? The project falls under OP#2: Coastal, Marine, and Freshwater Ecosystems. The project target area includes ecosystems with globally important biodiversity, high levels of endemism and populations of threatened species.</p> <p>Did the project promote international cooperation and partnership? The project was not designed with that purpose and did not promote international cooperation.</p> <p>What is the project's relevance to National Policies? Papua New Guinea is a signatory to numerous international conventions pertaining to the protection of biological diversity. PNG ratified the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) in 1992, having previously ratified the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) in 1976. PNG is also a party to the Ramsar Wetlands Convention, the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping Wastes and Other Matter, and one regional treaty, the Apia Convention on the Conservation of Nature in the South Pacific. A fundamental guiding principal of PNG's Constitution is that the natural environment be used in such a manner as to benefit all present and future generations of Papua New Guineans.</p> <p>What is the relevance to other GEF projects? Project like other operation of the GEF seeks to protect marine habitats. No other GEF project is located in the same region.</p> <p>Did the project create or supported country ownership and driveness? During verification national and provincial officers consistently commented that the objectives of the project were and remain highly relevant to PNG as they address environmental and social issues important for Papua New Guinea sustainable development. Resource owners, who are villagers that under the PNG Constitution hold ownership rights to the natural resources considered the project very highly relevant to their livelihood as it sought to provide the conditions to ensure good management of marine resources in Milne Bay. They expressed disappointment and concern when the project was abruptly interrupted. During implementation the project did not support or foster country ownership.</p> <p>To what extent did the project result in trade-offs between environment and development priorities. As indicated in section 4.1.2 below. The project has very likely resulted in a more intense exploitation of natural resources in account perverse incentives that resulted from the failure of the project to deliver results to local communities.</p>	
b. Effectiveness	Rating:2
<p>Verification rates project effectiveness as unsatisfactory. The project contributed to the awareness of the need to conserve marine resources in the Milne Bay Provincial Government and in the communities. A plan was drafted for the protection of turtles and some work was carried out for the elaboration of a plan for dugong management. The project also developed educational material ("Below the Surface"), which have been integrated into the national educational curricula. The provincial plan for the management of sea turtles seems to be functioning well. The project also conducted several studies among which were studies to prepare marine management plans, management of endangered species, improvement of community livelihood, and finally sea bed mapping. But achievements were rather minor compared with the expected project outcomes and outputs. Project funds were exhausted prematurely; the project activities were abruptly interrupted. As a consequence, most investments on studies and on developing community awareness did not result in laws, management plans, or increased institutional capacities in the provincial government or ward. The project did not get to the point in which local marine resource management systems were tested and did not result in improved management of marine resources in Milne Bay. For example, the project invested much time and money on studies in six areas. In two of these areas (Nuakata and Netuli), plans for Community Managed Marine Areas (CMAA) were developed and discussed with the communities. But these CMAAs were never formally recognized because the required Local Level Government (LLG) law was not passed. For several months after the terminal evaluation, there was a break down of relations between the provincial government and CI, thus project activities completely came to a halt. After the election of the new provincial governor, a few months prior to the arrival of the verification mission to PNG, CI resumed a much reduced operation to continue to support the provincial government in the passing of a Local Level Government Law required for the formal recognition of the Natural Resources Management and Conservation Areas which is the new way in which CMAAs are referred to. Also, recently local CI staff resumed work on the Natural Resources Management and Conservation Areas in the villages of Nuakata and Netuli while working on the LLG Law.</p>	
c. Efficiency (cost-effectiveness)	Rating: 1
<p>The project efficiency is rated as highly unsatisfactory. There are many indications of inefficient use of resources by the project. The project was implemented only over a 3.5 year period. Project implementation started in late November of 2002. It took over a year (January 2003) for spending to pick up, as the executing agency searched for a chief technical advisor (CTA). Once started, the project funds were spent quickly resulting in a funding shortfall by October 2005. As indicated in section 2.4 above, at project closing USD 1.9 million were reallocated from project output components to "project management and administration". During the verification mission several individuals reported independently that the project incurred expenses that were high for the services provided. For example, several persons mentioned that the project contracted one of the most expensive boats (a luxury boat) in Alotau for patrols conducted by the CTA and for the mapping of the sea bed, when a much simpler boat – including the boats owned by the project--</p>	

would have done the job. Also, during the field visit to Nuakata several eye witnesses reported that during the studies carried out in the island there was a large display of wealth evidenced by catering service for 30 or more people during one month; electrical generators, and tents. Similar displays were reported in the study on another island. These displays were described independently by several observers as excessive and inappropriate given the low income levels of the villagers.

After the terminal evaluation findings were disclosed and disagreements erupted between the provincial government and the executing agency, project activities stopped. Initially all parties UNDP, CI and the Provincial Government seemed to support the follow-up plan recommended by the terminal evaluation, and both UNDP and CI agreed to contribute funds for this purpose. But soon disagreements arose on what funds could be counted as additional and who would execute the new funds. The provincial government insisted in executing funds. During this verification, project staff reported that during the months following the terminal evaluation and the departure of the CTA, project staff remained idle and gradually moved to other jobs. UNDP indicated that the additional fund allocated to the project by this agency has been used to pay for storage of project assets, handover of assets to the Provincial Government and payment of consultants. UNDP hired the CTA and other consultants of the project for a few months after the terminal evaluation. UNDP has also indicated that some of these resources will be used to look for additional funding to continue the project; although it was also reported by UNDP that is highly unlikely that new donors will be found. Thus, overall new funds allocated by UNDP contributed little to the achievement of project objectives. Country staff of CI indicated that additional funds provided by CI after the terminal evaluation were mainly used to pay for staff during the time they were retained after the terminal evaluation and to pay for their dismissal in accordance with PNG labor laws. Nonetheless local CI staff have raised additional funds that are likely to result in modest contributions to some of the project objectives (see section 4.2.a)

4.1.2 Impacts

While it is possible that the management plan of the sea turtles can contribute to better management of this species in the area, there are indications that the abrupt interruption of the project might have provided perverse incentives that have contributed to more intense exploitation of marine resources. In Nuakata and Netuli, resource owners reported that they have been unable to stop fisherman from other communities fishing on their waters in anticipation of the establishment of protected areas. Unable to stop others from fishing, resource owners in Nuakata and Netuli reported that they have reverted to the use of destructive fishing methods such as use of poisons, fishing at night, fishing in spawning areas, etc. Using the information provided by the studies carried out by the project, resource owners have been able to target the most valuable species and the most productive areas. Resource owners also reported that valuable species that were plentiful before the project started are now rare catches. Resource owners are aware of the link of their destructive fishing practices and the decline in their natural resources, but feel that resources would be lost anyway, having no capacity to stop poachers. Villagers in Nuakata and Netuli also expressed considerable frustration with the project failure to meet agreements and promises in Memorandums of Understandings signed with the project. In Nuakata the villagers reported that the project promised a speed boat and a supply of fuel for a number of years if villagers committed to the management plan. In Nuakata they reported that the project promised a machine for making mango juice. These promises were part of the incentives approach to conservation, but when the project made these promises it had no budget to meet them.

The project neither made the expected contributions to the establishment of a framework for the conservation of Milne Bay marine biodiversity. As indicated, the LLG law was not passed. Particularly lacking was any accomplishment in strengthening the Milne Bay Provincial Government to manage conservation activities after the project ended. The project acted in complete independence from the provincial administrative structure, having very little operational interactions and focusing in the generation of outputs, with a strong emphasis on data gathering.

Despite the shortcomings of the project, provincial and LLG officials and villagers still have high expectations for a second phase of the project. Provincial officials have put aside the project vehicles, boats and other equipment for this purpose and hope to still find support to continue the project.

4.2 Likelihood of sustainability. Using the following sustainability criteria, include an assessment of **risks** to sustainability of project outcomes and impacts based on the information presented in the TE. Use a four point scale (4= no or negligible risk to 1= High risk). The ratings will be based on an assessment of risks at the time of verification.

a. Financial resources

Rating: High Risk 1

Since the closing of the project local CI raised \$115,000 to continue some aspects of the project, mainly the support, development of the law and continuing effort towards the establishment of Natural Resources Management and Conservation Areas in Nuakata and Netuli. Targets of the follow-up operation are significantly downscaled and the interventions more streamlined when compared with the project. The new operation appears to be much more realistic and appropriate for the institutional and cultural context of Milne Bay but no clear plans or budget exist now on the

subsequent steps that would be taken to expand lessons to the rest of the project area. The Provincial government reported that they are looking for donors to continue the project. They have requested UNDP for assistance, but UNDP reported that they have not identified any potential donors and the continuation of the project at the scale originally envisioned is very unlikely.

The project also worked with villagers and dive tour operators to develop a fee system that would benefit resource owners. The system proved to be too complex and is facing many problems. In most cases it is no longer providing cash flows to villagers. Lacking a legal framework, it is unlikely that this system, which now is voluntary, will result in any significant flows of cash to resource owners. The system also has implied significant inconveniences to villagers as they had to travel long distances to pick up their payments which were deposited in banking accounts in Alotau.

b. Socio political

Rating: High Risk 1

Support for the original concept of the project remains at all levels (central government, provincial government, local government and villages). Nevertheless, willingness to adopt changes at all levels seems also to be highly contingent in external support. During the verification visit, government officials from the Department of National Planning and Monitoring reported that the PNG government had budgeted some USD 600,000 that would be put into a follow-up project if a donor is found to continue supporting phase two of the project. But as indicated earlier in the same interview, officials indicated that the PNG government had contributed USD 100,000 to the project, when the commitment indicated in the project document was USD 570,000. The provincial government has requested support from UNDP to the search for new donors, but during the verification mission UNDP indicated that they have found no prospective donors and that it is not likely they will find new donors. From the villager's perspective, it does not make sense to restrict their catch if others will continue fishing and no benefits are accrued from fees and other "incentives" that were promised by the project in MOUs signed with the communities but that will not be delivered. In conclusion while all the relevant national stakeholders have expressed support to the idea of having a project, the support is largely contingent to the availability of external funds. As these funds are unlikely to support an initiative of the magnitude intended by the project, the sociopolitical support to undertake the necessary actions to significantly improve natural resources management in Milne Bay is also unlikely.

c. Institutional framework and governance

Rating:2

The support that the local CI staff in Alotau have provided since the project ended to establish the LLG Law and the establishment of CMMAs in Nuakata and Netuli is likely to provide a useful model for the rest of Milne Bay. Nevertheless, without additional financial and technical support, the achievements will remain localized and are unlikely to be extended beyond the original project area. There is also much work to be done before the provincial government can be effective in the promotion and oversight of the management of marine resources.

d. Environmental

Rating:1

As mentioned in section 4.1.2 above, there are indications that the project's abrupt end contributed to increase perverse incentives that is in terms contributing to the overexploitation of biodiversity resources in the areas where the project operated.

4.3 Catalytic role

a. Incentives: To what extent have the project activities provide incentives (socio-economic / market based) to catalyze changes in stakeholders? As indicated in 4.1.2, the project resulted in perverse incentives to overexploit coastal resources. Villagers report drops in catches of valuable species.

b. Institutional Change: To what extent have the project activities changed institutional behaviors

As indicated above the project trained members of the village engagement teams but failed to build the expected capacities in the provincial government and built little or no capacities in the target communities.

c. Policy Change: To what extent have project activities led to policy changes (and implementation of policy)? As indicated in 3.3.c The project failed to make any significant contribution to a regional framework for the management of natural resources. Since the project ended, the support that the local CI staff in Alotau have provided since the project ended to establish the LLG Law and the establishment of CMMAs in Nuakata and Netuli is likely to provide a useful model for the rest of Milne Bay.

d. Catalytic Financing: To what extent did the project led to sustained follow-on financing from Government and / or other donors? (this is different than co-financing) No financing is expected see 4.2.a. except for a modest set of grants obtained by the local CI office.

e. Project Champions: To what extent have changes (listed above) been catalyzed by particular individuals or

institutions (without which the project would not have achieved results)? The project did not significantly contribute to build local champions that can be effective continue to pursue the projects goals.

f. Production of a public good The project gathered large amounts of data but it is not clear how much of that data was analyzed and presented in the form of reports and studies that can be used for policy or planning. If such reports were produced they are not available to decision makers. The project also supported other researchers but there are no systematic records of whom those researchers were or on the studies they conducted. It is therefore difficult to assess the projects' contribution to knowledge as a public good.

g. Demonstration: The project did not reach the point in which CMMAs were operational, thus there was no demonstration effect.

h. Replication: No replication of CMMAs took place.

i. Scaling up No scaling-up took place as the initial demonstration phase was cut short prematurely.

4.4 Assessment of processes and factors affected attainment of project outcomes and sustainability.

a. Co-financing and Project Outcomes & Sustainability. What is your assessment of the overall reliability of the co-financing calculations used by the IA? To what extent was the reported co-financing (or proposed co-financing) essential to the achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability, and if it did affect outcomes and sustainability then in what ways and through what causal linkage did it affect it?

UNDP was asked several times to provide financial closing information but the information they provided was incomplete. CI provided a table based on the projects financial database as of April 2, 2007. This table was updated to include information provided by CI in written communications and information on co-financing at project approval from the Project Brief. The following table includes the available information on project expenditures 2006.² UNDP reported in a communication that of the USD 350 000 expected co-financing from the Government of Japan, USD 313,340 was actually used, but only USD 206,000 were account for as of the April 2, 2007 report of the project financial database. The PNG Government committed USD 570,000 on project approval but reported in an interview that its contributions were USD 100,000. No accounting was presented. Realized co-financing for ANU (USD 108,000) and ACIAR (USD140,000) was unavailable. Of the co-financing that it is known not to have materialized, co-financing by the PNG Government is likely related to an insufficient involvement of the government in project oversight. A factor that contributed to weak oversight and poor project performance.

Item	Project Approval ³	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total Amount
Total		126,431	1,392,944	2,260,482	15,626	3,795,483
Expenditures by Output						
<u>Operation & Administration</u>	-					
<i>Government of Japan</i>		0	0	206,449	0	206,449
<i>UNDP</i>		0	50,540	163,354	0	213,894

² CI also reported that it has spent an additional 103, 989 in Milne Bay marine work. In its comments to the first draft of this report CI also indicated that the total GEF funds spent were 3,168,000 US, which include additional 79,500 US of payments made directly by UNDP that were charged to the project and are in addition to the amount included in the April 2, 2008 report. CI also reported that UNDP has not accounted for the Government of Japan valance of USD 159,111 and that there remains a USD 15,442 valance that was not reimbursed to them. Amounts at project approval are from the Project Brief.

³ Source, Project Brief. This amount excludes PDF-B funds which were 349,000 of GEF funds and 260,000 of co-financing.

<i>GEF</i>		11,234	975,221	932,472	8,667	1,927,594
<i>CI</i>		227,379	174,705	410,905	1,221,493	2,034,482
Sub-total		11,234	1,025,761	1,302,275	8,667	2,347,937
<u>Education & Communication</u>						
<i>Government of Japan</i>		0	0	0	0	0
<i>UNDP</i>		0	269	22,988	0	23,257
<i>GEF</i>		50,203	91,193	220,793	6,959	369,148
Sub-total		50,203	91,462	243,781	6,959	392,405
<u>Biodiversity & Marine PA's</u>	-					
<i>Government of Japan</i>		0	0	0	0	0
<i>UNDP</i>		0	0	12,465	0	12,465
<i>GEF</i>		64,994	93,325	307,127	0	465,446
Sub-total		64,994	93,325	319,592	0	477,911
<u>Institutional Strengthening</u>	-					
<i>Government of Japan</i>		0	0	0	0	0
<i>UNDP</i>		0	150,000	78,716	0	228,716
<i>GEF</i>		0	28,633	189,580	0	218,213
Sub-total		0	178,633	268,296	0	446,929
<u>Community & Livelihood Dev.</u>	-					
<i>Government of Japan</i>		0	0	0	0	0
<i>UNDP</i>		0	0	21,667	0	21,667
<i>GEF</i>		0	3,763	104,871	0	108,634
Sub-total		0	3,763	126,538	0	130,301
(i) Total Expenditures		126,431	1,392,944	2,260,482	15,626	3,795,483
Summary by Donor						
<i>Government of Japan</i>	350,000	0	0	206,449	0	206,449 ⁴
<i>UNDP</i>	500,000	0	200,809	299,190	0	499,999
<i>GEF</i>	3,549,000	126,431	1,192,135	1,754,843	94,626 ⁵	3,168,035
<i>CI</i>	1,650,000	227,379	174,705	410,905	1,221,493	2,034,482
<i>ACIAR</i>	140,000	UA	UA	UA	UA	UA
<i>ANU</i>	108,000	UA	UA	UA	UA	UA

⁴ UNDP

⁵ This amount includes 15,626 US that was reported as of April 2, 2007 plus 79,000 US funds which CI included in its comments to the comments to the first draft of this report.

Government of PNG	570,000	UA	UA	UA	UA	UA
PDF-B	260,000					
Sub-total	7 123,000	353,810	1,567,649	2,671,387	1,237,119	5,829,965
<p>c. Country Ownership and Project Outcomes & Sustainability. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe in what ways did it affect outcomes and sustainability highlighting the causal links.</p> <p>While there was considerable country ownership during project preparation, during implementation country ownership declined, particularly after the arrival of the Chief Technical Advisor when the project acted independently from the provincial government and the national government. Low country ownership contributed to insufficient oversight as well as a weak Steering Committee and was an important factor in the escalation of a controversy between the provincial government and the executing agency following the presentation of the terminal evaluation. A break down of relationships between the provincial government and the executing agency also prevented follow up to the recommendations of the terminal evaluation regarding the reparation of the project.</p>						

4.5 Assessment of the project's monitoring and evaluation system based on the information in the TE

a. M&E design at Entry	Rating Unsatisfactory 2:
As per the PAD and its Log Frame, the M&E plan at entry was detailed, specific, tried to incorporate numerous sources of information and included time frames to assess various activities. Yet, the M&E plan at entry appears to be overly ambitious.	
b. M&E plan Implementation	Rating :Unsatisfactory 2
According to the M&E plan, a biennial biological survey would be conducted to measure the reef condition – this was not done after the initial baseline survey	
b.1 Was sufficient funding provided for M&E in the budget included in the project document? The project document does not specify a budget for monitoring	
b.2a Was sufficient and timely funding provided for M&E during project implementation? The project dedicated a large amount of resources to studies and surveys to establish baselines.	
b.2b To what extent did the M&E system provided real time feed back? Was the information provided used effectively? What factors affected use of information provided by the M&E system? The baseline studies conducted by the project appear to be quite comprehensive and complete, particularly for the areas around Nuakata and Netuli. Also, sea bed mapping information seems to be complete. There is also information on genealogies. As indicated some of this information was used for the development of the management plans with the villages of Nuakata and Netuli. It is very likely that the information gathered by the project will be valuable as a baseline to assess future changes in the biological resources in the area. Nevertheless the current state of the information is likely to require considerable organization before it can be used as a baseline for further monitoring.	
b.3 Can the project M&E system (or an aspect of the project M&E system) be considered a good practice? If so, explain why. No, despite the multiple studies and provable good science involved in these studies, the project did not contribute to local capacities or to the establishment of a system that would allow for the use of baseline information to trace changes in the environment.	

4.6 Assessment of Quality of Implementation and Execution

a. Overall Quality of Implementation and Execution (on a six point scale): Unsatisfactory 2
Discuss overall how well was the project implemented and executed
b. Overall Quality of Implementation – for IA (on a six point scale): Unsatisfactory 2
b.1 What was the quality of project design? (In this assessment consider the adequacy of project objectives, approach to achieve objectives and implementation arrangements). The project included a comprehensive set of activities to develop, test and replicate an approach to marine conservation with strong involvement of local communities. The project introduced new approaches and methodologies such as the dive tour fee payment service and approaches to reef monitoring. But the project had objectives that were too ambitious and had too many activities. The mix between project complexity, use of sophisticated methodologies and approaches, and ambitious objectives in a context of low country capacities made project implementation particularly vulnerable.
b.2 Focus on results (to what extent were the project related activities of the implementing agency geared towards achievement of the expected project results). The project was focused on results particularly at the output level. There was a strong drive to produce studies. The strong output drive precluded work with the provincial government and, except for the first phase of project implementation before the CTA was hired, it did not include

<p>training of community members in reef monitoring and other capacities development that were required for the continuation of project benefits. While capacities in the provincial government were low, the project did not do anything to address the issue, even though one of the key expected results of the project was to build capacity in the provincial government to carry on the second phase of the project. Thus, the somewhat short-sighted drive for results during implementation contributed to loss of country ownership and the breach of relations between the provincial government and the executing agency once the findings of the terminal evaluation were disclosed.</p>
<p>b.3 Adequacy of supervision inputs and processes (in this assessment consider staff continuity and skill mix, quality and frequency of missions, appropriateness of advice and other inputs and sufficiency of supervision budget). Initial supervision and inputs of the Implementing Agency and the executing agency were adequate. As the project got going supervision missions from UNDP regional office were insufficient, supervision of the project within the country office was delegated too far down in the hierarchy of the country office. It was also reported by UNDP country office that high cost of transportation contributed to few project site visits. In summary UNDP's country office did not have sufficient information on the progress of the project or, if the information was available, it did not lead to decisions to correct problems. UNDP also did not make use of instruments for adaptive management that would have permitted an earlier detection of the issues raised by the terminal evaluation. One of such instruments was the midterm evaluation, which was called by the project document and was not carried out. In the context of UNDP-PNG's light approach to supervision of the financial issues identified during project preparation, The regional office and the coordination of GEF in UNDP should have given a higher priority to the midterm evaluation and to the follow-up of the financial management review carried out during appraisal. The other instrument is the tripartite review, an annual stocktaking exercise that included the Government, UNDP and project execution agencies. This exercise was also not carried out. It is likely that had a midterm evaluation and adequate tripartite reviews taken place some of the problems would have been identified earlier and possibly corrected. As it turned out detection of problems in terminal evaluation left little room for action. Support from the regional UNDP team from Bangkok was intense during preparation, but not during implementation as staff shortages in the regional team limited time availability. Nonetheless, it was during a supervision visit by one of the regional team members to the project that red flags were initially raised about the condition of the project. The UNDP country office and the regional team both reported that, while they had some idea of problems in the project, the findings of the terminal evaluation caught them by surprise.</p>
<p>b.4 Quality of risk management: assessment at entry and management during implementation. The project document identified several risks, among them the low capacity of the provincial government and the risk that project staff would support activities of the executing agency that were not related to the project. There is no evidence that the latter took place. The extent to which the project was addressing the low capacities of the provincial government was not properly monitored by the Implementing and Executing Agencies. The project was allowed to operate independent from the provincial administration. A capacity assessment of the executing agency carried out during preparation identified financial management issues that the executing agency would need to address. This assessment recommended a second assessment in year two of project implementation. There was however, no follow up assessment to confirm that these issues were addressed. This, despite the fact that during project implementation the implementing and executing agencies had serious disagreements regarding the extent to which the executing agency complied with financial reporting requirements.</p>
<p>b.5 Quality of reporting: candor and realism in supervision reporting. Supervision reporting in the Implementing Agency was insufficient and for its most part lacked candor. The June 2006 PIR does not mention any problems and gives the project a satisfactory rating. At the country level, UNDP's oversight system did not ensure that problems were detected and acted upon in time. At the regional level, staffing problems resulted in long supervision gaps. When the UNDP regional eventually visited the project, reports were candid and raised red flags regarding the management of the project.</p>
<p>b.6. Suitability of the chosen executing agency or agencies for project execution. The chosen executing agency (CI) had in his favor a history of working in Milne Bay for several years. While funds were supposed to be administered from CI's headquarters office in Washington D.C. , during implementation the executing agency did not establish the oversight needed to keep the project's Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) on track. The executing agency reported that the CTA had its own financial spread sheet which was not consistent with the system CI's central office. The bottom line is that the executing agency was not able to control project spending or financial management practices of the CTA. The lack of attention to capacity building in the provincial government and the insular operational style of the project management also indicates insufficient attention by the executing agency to substantive issues critical to the attainment of project outcomes. It would have been expected that the executing agency had a system of checks to ensure that such an important aspect of the project was taking place.</p>
<p>c. Quality of Execution – for Executing Agencies⁶ (rating on a 6 point scale): 2</p>
<p>c.1 Focus on results. As indicated above, the project execution focused mainly on inputs and outputs including</p>

⁶ Executing Agencies for this section would mean those agencies that are executing the project in the field. For any given project this will exclude Executing Agencies that are implementing the project under expanded opportunities – for projects approved under the expanded opportunities procedure the respective executing agency will be treated as an implementing agency.

maintaining a rate of spending and producing studies. The project's isolation and narrowly defined results (studies and data gathering) was ultimately counter-productive to the intended outcomes of the project i.e. building capacity of the provincial administration and local communities.
c.2 Adequacy of management inputs and processes. (In this assessment consider staff continuity and skill mix, quality and frequency of field visits when appropriate, timeliness of activities, quality of inputs, and sufficiency of execution budget). There was poor financial management at the project level and insufficient oversight at the executing and implementing agency levels. There was also insufficient oversight on processes as the CTA financial management went unchecked and as the CTA operated in isolation from the provincial government even though one of the key expected outcomes of the project was the strengthening of the provincial government to execute the second phase of the project.
c.3 Quality of risk management: assessment at entry and management during implementation. There were three different oversight systems looking after the project. First of all, the project established a steering committee which was supposed to meet regularly and track project execution. Secondly, the executing agency also had several layers of oversight; the Chief Technical Advisor that was responsible for the execution of the project, a country office and a vice-president residing in Washington D.C; thirdly, the implementing agency has several checks and balances in place which include oversight at the country level by the country office as well as technical support by a regional office, in this case the office is based in Bangkok. Despite these multiple oversight systems, checks did not kick in time and only when the evaluation came was the extent of the problems revealed. The project steering committee did not function as a check because the process was controlled by the CTA, in general central government, provincial government and UNDP involvement was sporadic. Steering committee meetings were described by participants as ineffectual. Materials were sent with insufficient time to read, meetings were dominated by the CTA, and the projects disregard for the provincial government resulted in its reclusion from meetings. Checks and balances within CI also failed. There was a communication break down between the chief technical advisor of the project in Alotau and the executing agency (CI) in Port Moresby and CI Washington DC, such that even when red flags were raised, the follow-up was not effective. Insufficient UNDP country office attention to the project and attrition in the regional office of UNDP also contributed to a late identification of the problem. UNDP's and CI's systems of financial control did not identify the excessive expenditure in time. Project implementation also lacked specific time bound targets and indicators to track the project progress towards achieving expected outcomes.
c.4 Quality of reporting: candor and realism in reporting. Project Implementation Reports submitted described inputs and some outputs but did not address problems in the management and implementation of the project

5. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Assess the project lessons and recommendations as described in the TE

a. Assess the validity of the lessons, good practice or approaches to avoid and could have application for other GEF projects that were mentioned by the terminal evaluation report. Lessons and Recommendations of the evaluation are appropriate. The terminal evaluation identified an 8 point "recovery and repair plan". Two key aspects of the recommendations focus on the improvement of the National and provincial steering committees and engagement of the provincial government in project implementation. While the recommendations were sound, project funds had been exhausted and the recovery plan was never put into effect in account of disagreements among the Executing Agency, Implementing Agency and the Milne Bay Provincial Government. In any case the issues raised by the terminal evaluation were more a kin to a midterm evaluation; no lessons from the short comings of this project were drawn for the Executing Agency, The Implementing Agency, PNG Government or the GEF.
b. Assess the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation and listed in the Terminal Evaluation Review. Recommendations are appropriate but mainly applicable for this specific project.
c. Assess the extent to which recommendations could have been adopted and have actually been by the IA? UNDP and CI agreed to put additional funds into the project in order to finance the recovery and repair plan. Nevertheless, the problems that erupted between the provincial government and the CI precluded any further actions. There was also a disagreement between UNDP and CI on what monies qualified as additional funds after the terminal evaluation report was disclosed. This resulted in further tensions between the two agencies and contributed to an eventual communication breakdown and to each agency pursuing independent follow-up actions. During verification agencies were asked to provide information on the additional funding contributed by each agency, the activities financed by those funds and the results attained. CI reported that since November 2006 it had spent USD 104,000 in additional funds in the project to pay for staff salaries, office operational costs and consultant costs. UNDP reported that they had set aside USD 500,000. UNDP reported that USD 54,000 was used during 2007 to meet some outstanding bills of the project and to pay for storage and insurance of project assets. USD 80,000 was assigned for 2008. Some of these funds have been used to pay for the hand over of projects assets of the provincial government. Funds allocated for 2008 will also be used to assist the Milne Bay Provincial Government to identify an expert to redesign the second phase of the project and mobilize additional resources (Communication by Gwen Maru 10/09/2008) but this is not consistent with the opinion expressed during an interview in PNG by the Deputy Director of

the office whom indicated that it was unlikely that resources could be found.

6. RELIABILITY OF THE TERMINAL EVALUATION REPORT (FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS) AND QUALITY OF THE TERMINAL EVALUATION.

6.1 Comments on the summary of project ratings and terminal evaluation findings from other sources such as GEF EO field visits, etc. (This information is provided in the project terminal evaluation review)

No other GEF EO information available for this project

Provide a number rating 1-6 to each criteria based on: Highly Satisfactory = 6, Satisfactory = 5, Moderately Satisfactory = 4, Moderately Unsatisfactory = 3, Unsatisfactory = 2, and Highly Unsatisfactory = 1. Please refer to document "GEF Office of Evaluation Guidelines for the verification and review of terminal evaluations" for further definitions of the ratings. Please briefly explain each rating.

6.2 Quality of the terminal evaluation report	Ratings
a. To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?	5
b. To what extent is the report internally consistent, is the evidence complete/convincing and are the IA ratings substantiated? Are there any major evidence gaps?	3
c. To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and /or a project exit strategy? The TE does not really address risks to the continuity of benefits generated by the project. Focus is on extent to which the project generated expected results and factors affecting implementation.	3
d. To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?	5
e. Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used? The evaluation includes some calculations and identifies problems with the financial management system. It also identifies and discusses expenditures that are considered inappropriate. Perhaps in a case like this, it would have been more appropriate for the evaluation to raise the issues and recommend a more in depth review by financial specialists.	4
f. Assess the quality of the reports evaluation of project M&E systems?	5

6.3.a Quality of the terminal evaluation process and methodology	
a. Reliability of terminal evaluation process	5
a. i Did the agency recruited the appropriate evaluators for this project?	5
a. ii . What was the extent of the independence of the evaluation team⁷?	5
a. iii To what extent was the terminal evaluation team given access to all the necessary information?	6
a. iv To what extent the budget adequate for the evaluation?	6
a. v. Was the M&E system set up to facilitate evaluators in getting timely and reliable information on performance of the project	NA
6.3.b. Reliability of methodology	5
b. i To what extent did the terminal evaluation address the key issues and questions for this project?	5
b. ii To what extent did the terminal evaluation team use the right mix of tools and information sources to gather and triangulate evidence?	5
b. iii To what extent was the analysis of information satisfactory	5

7. SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR THE PRERATATION OF THE VERIFICATION REPORT IN ADDITION TO THE TERMINAL EVALUATION, THE PROJECT DOCUMENT, THE TERMINAL EVALUATION REVIEW AND FIELD VERIFICATION VISITS. (if any)

Project Document
Terminal Evaluation Report
PIRs for 2006 and 2004
Interviews with:

⁷ While assessing the independence of the evaluation, the following issues should be considered: independence from management, access to information by evaluation team, and presence of undue pressures on the evaluation team

Robert Aisi, PNG GEF Focal Point
John Hough, UNDP GEF
Jan Jilles van den Hoeven UNDP PNG Country Office
Tony Torea, UNDP PNG Country Office
Sultana Bashir UNDP Regional Center in Bangkok
Martin Krause UNDP Regional Center in Bangkok
Joseph D' Cruz UNDP Regional Center in Bangkok
Bruce Beehler, Conservation International
Claude Gascon, Conservation International
Julie Bourne, Conservation International
Martine Vedier, Conservation International
Amelia Smith, Conservation International
Sarah Banks, Conservation International
Modi Pontio, Conservation International Port Moresby PNG
David Mitchell, Conservation International Alotau PNG
Vagi Genorupa, Ministry of the Environment PNG
Kingsley Lore, Department of National Planning and Rural Development PNG
Riechert Thanda Department of National Planning and Rural Development PNG
William Kewa, Department of National Planning and Rural Development
Henry Bailasi, Administrator Milne Bay Provincial Government
Taeva Tararau, Administration of the Milne Bay Provincial Government
Michael Viula Administration of the Milne Bay Provincial Government
Richard Dawana, Administration of the Milne Bay Provincial Government
Maxine Nadile, now with the Milne Bay Provincial Administration formerly Milne Bay Education.
Jeff Kinch, former project manager during project start up
Serina Billy, village engagement team coordinator during project implementation
Fred Sando village engagement team coordinator during project implementation
Simon Alberick Milne Bay Provincial Legal Advisor
Albert Budiara, Executive officer of the Maracamana Local Level Government
Chris Abel, Masurina Business Center
Field visits to island of Nuakata were 12 villagers were interviewed
Field visit to Netuli were 11 villagers were interviewed

The verification visit to Papua New Guinea took place from July 22 to July 28, 2009. From the 24th to the 27th was spent in the project site.

Note: The verification evaluator was not able to get in touch with the Chief Technical Advisor of the project who was a key actor in this process.

Annex 1 – OPS4 Results Scoresheet

Results scoring							
0	0. 0 No or insignificant outcomes	Score (0 – 3)	0	Score (0 - 6)		Score (0 – 1)	Total
Outputs	Outcomes		Intermediary		Impact (GEBs)		
1.	1.		1.		1.		
2.	2.		2.		2.		
3.	3.		3.		3.		
4.	4.		4.				
	Justification for score:		Justification for score:		Justification for score:		
	The project did not realized any of its major outputs or its intended outcomes.		So far impact of the project appears to be negative to NRM. The project set in place perverse incentives that foster overexploitation of resources				

Outcomes:

1. No or insignificant outcomes
2. Outcomes achieved, but no evident linkages forward to intermediary stages leading towards impacts
3. Outcomes achieved have implicit forward linkages to intermediary stages and impacts
4. Outcomes have definite and explicit forward linkages to intermediary stages and impacts

Intermediary stages:

0. “Outcomes” scored 0 or 1
1. No intermediary stage achievement
2. Intermediary stage(s) planned or commenced, but no forward linkages to impact achievement, either implicit or explicit: or barriers, critical limiting factors, or failed assumptions make subsequent intermediary stage (and impact) achievement impossible
3. Intermediary stage(s) planned or commenced and have feasible direct and explicit forward linkages to impact achievement; but feasible actions to remove barriers and/or address critical assumptions are not in place
4. Intermediary stage(s) planned or commenced, and have initiated threat reduction strategies with forward linkages to impact achievement at broader scales
5. Measurable intermediary stage impacts are achieved, but with weak potential for scaling up to global levels
6. Measurable intermediary stage impacts achieved with strong potential for scaling up to global levels

Impact:

0. “Intermediary stages” scored 0 to 5
1. Measurable impacts achieved at a globally significant level

Annex 2 – Focal Area Results / Impacts (complete for the focal area address by the project and also any other multi-focal area impacts)

Biodiversity Expected Impacts and Indicators
--

Biodiversity Conserved and Sustainably Used in PA Systems		
	Direct benefits	Indirect benefits
B1. Hectares of Protected Areas (by biome type) under management	Non of the intended are is under management	
B2. Extent and percentage increase of new habitat protected (hectares)	Target protected areas are under increased stress do to an intensification of fishing and targeting of valuable species.	
B3. Increase in Protected Area management effectiveness (as measured by the scorecard)	Management areas were not put into operation	
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity incorporated in the Productive Landscape / Seascape		
B4. Hectares of production landscapes (outside of Protected Areas under sustainable management (uncertified)		
B5. Hectares of production landscapes (certified)		
B6. Extent (coverage, hectares, payments) of Payments for Environmental Service schemes		
B7. Amount of monetary / non-monetary benefits generated through Access to Benefit sharing agreements (flowing between parties to the convention)	Dive fees system was meant to generate income of the villagers for communities, but a practical system has not been put into place and payment of fees by operators is not constant.	
To safeguard biodiversity		
B8. Each request for intentional transboundary movement or domestic use is processed through a regulatory and admin framework		
B9. For each request risk assessment is completed		
B10. For each request measures / strategies to manage risks established		
B11. Number of alien species point-of-entry detections		
B12. Number of early eradications		
B13. Number of successful prevention and control programs		
Climate Change Expected Impacts and Indicators		
Improved energy efficiency in the built environment		
C1. Energy efficiency – energy consumption (in GHG emissions of buildings and appliances (Kwh/M2 and tons CO2); and \$/ t CO2eq)		
Improved energy efficiency in industrial use		
C2. Energy efficiency – of industrial use (energy use / \$ GDP); GHG emissions from industry (tons CO2 eq / \$GDP; and \$ / tons CO2eq)		
Improved energy efficiency in power generation		
C3. Energy Efficiency – power generation (tons coal / Kwh); GHG emissions per unit of electricity generated (tons CO2 eq / Kwh) and \$/t CO2 eq		
Increased production of renewable energy on grid		
C4. Market penetration of on-grid renewable energy (% from renewables) / GHG emissions from electricity generation (tons CO2 eq / Kwh; and \$ / t CO2sq)		
Increased production and use of renewable energy in rural areas		
C5. Number (or %) of rural households served with renewable energy (# HH or % HH); renewable energy of electricity for rural energy services (kwh renewable); and \$ / t CO2 eq		
Reduced cost of selected low GHG emitting technologies		
C6. Support for new low emitting technologies: Cost of		

selected low GHG emitting generating technologies (\$ / W installed or \$/kwh generated) and \$ / t CO2 eq		
Increased use of sustainable transport modes		
C7. Sustainable Transport: Number or percentage of trips using sustainable modes of transport (\$ / t CO2 eq)		
International Waters Expected Impacts and Indicators		
Political commitments to improved multi-country cooperation supporting sustainable economic opportunities and water-related security in transboundary systems		
I1. Multi-country agreements		
Participating states demonstrate the necessary ability to reduce over-exploitation of fish stocks, reduce land-based coastal pollution and balance competing water uses in basins and report subsequent water-related improvements		
I2. Tredn analysis supported through the GEF through new transboundary waters assessment program meet Johannesburg (JPOI) targets on sustainable fisheries		
Land Degradation Expected Impacts and Indicators		
Overall decrease in trend and / or severity of land degradation		
LD1. % Increased in Net primary productivity (NPP)		
Protected ecosystem functions and processes, including carbon stocks, soil, plants, biota and fresh water		
LD2. % Increase in carbon stocks (soil and plant biomass) and % increase in availability of fresh water		
A decrease in the vulnerability of local populations to the impacts of climate change		
LD3. % Decrease in mortality rates consequent upon crop failures and livestock deaths		
Improved livelihoods of rural (usually resource poor) land users		
LD4. % Decrease in number of households below the poverty line		
Diversified funding sources for SLM		
LD5. % Increase in diversity of funding sources (e.g., private sector CDM)		
Persistent Organic Pollutants Expected Impacts and Indicators		
GEF supported countries have strengthened capacity for POPs management and sound management of chemicals		
P1. Regulatory and enforcement capacity in place		
Dangerous obsolete pesticides that pose threat to human health and the environment are disposed of in an environmentally sound manner		
P2. Obsolete pesticides disposed of		
PCBs, some of the most widespread toxics are no longer a source of contamination of the local and global environment because they are phased out and disposed of		
P3. PCBs phased out and disposed of		
The risk of adverse health effects from POPs is decreased for those local communities living in close proximity to POPs wastes that have been disposed of or contained		
P4. Reduced risk of exposure of POPs of project affected people		
The basis for the future implementation of the Stockholm Convention is established through the demonstration of innovative alternative products, best practices and environmentally sound processes to the generation, use or release of POPs.		
P5. Knowledge management packages developed; the viability and cost-effectiveness of alternatives to POPs, in particular DDT, are demonstrated in a number of settings		