United Nations Development Programme

**FINAL EVALUATION REPORT**

**for the**

**Reintegration of Sierra Leone Red Cross Society (SLRCS) Volunteers Burial Teams**

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**List of acronyms and abbreviations**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Acronyms and abbreviations | English |
| BDS | Business Development Services |
| CAPS | Career Advising and Placement Services |
| CBPSS | Community Based Psychological Support |
| CEPAD | Community Environment for Peace and Agricultural Development |
| EVD | Ebola Virus Disease |
| ERW | Ebola Response Workers |
| GoSL | Government of Sierra Leone |
| HQ | Headquarters |
| IFRC | International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies |
| IPC | Infection, Prevention and Control |
| IT | Information Technology |
| PSS | Psychosocial Support |
| SDB | Safe and Dignified Burials |
| SLRCS | Sierra Leone Red Cross Society |
| TVET | Technical Vocational Education and Training |
| UNMEER | UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |

**Executive Summary**

**Introduction, background and methodology**

The Reintegration of Sierra Leone Red Cross Society (SLRCS) Volunteers Burial Teams (the “Project”) is a project funded by the United Nations Development Programme – Sierra Leone (UNDP-SL), and implemented by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in collaboration with Sierra Leone Red Cross Society (SLRCS).

The Project was initially designed for eight hundred (800) SLRCS Burial Team volunteers and Infection Prevention Control (IPC) workers in the Ebola emergency response operations in the entire country. The project was later extended to include additional five hundred (500) volunteers from the other pillars (Social mobilization, Contact Tracing, and Psycho Social Support) that also participated in the Ebola emergency operations. The overall goal was to successfully re-skill and reintegrate SLRCS volunteers to improve their access to sustainable livelihood opportunities.

The Project started with an assessment that determined volunteers skill set, educational background, and livelihood interest. This included Business Development, Vocational training, Continuing Education and Career Advisory Placement service. Psycho-Social Support, trauma treatment and stress management was also a key component that served as coping mechanisms due to stigmatization and traumatic experiences as a result of their participation in the Ebola emergency Response.

The project implementation was due to commence in August 2015 and end in June 2016, however, due to the resurgence of Ebola Virus in January 2016, the project implementation experienced delays in completion within the expected time and a no-cost extension was granted until May 2017.

The evaluation was conducted in June 2017 after the end of the second extension phase of the Project. The purpose of the evaluation is to review the Project through an assessment of its relevance, efficiency, the achievement of its outputs and outcomes, as well as to identify lessons learned and also the intended and unintended impact of the Project.

The evaluation mainly used a qualitative approach, as there were no systematic baselines available. A participatory approach, involving a wide range of stakeholders in the process, allowed for triangulation of data across the various parties concerned. Desk review and secondary data collection informed the evaluation process. Interviews were conducted with the UNDP, the IFRC, the SLRCS, service providers and beneficiaries in Freetown, Port Loko, Makeni, Bo and Kenema.

**Evaluation Findings**

The Project was in line with the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) and UNDP’s objectives for Ebola recovery, however, the Project management has experienced difficulties to deal with the beneficiaries’ expectations throughout its implementation.

The Project design included four different streams within the economic component, instead of combining activities with potentially high synergies, such as vocational trainings, soft skill and career development trainings. Although these activities are relevant to livelihood Projects which have a three to four year duration, it seems those were not relevant given its short term.

The Project appeared to have significant issues in terms of efficiency. It had an insufficiently clear division of roles and responsibilities and communication mechanisms, resulting in a slow decision making and delivery processes. Monitoring also appeared to have weaknesses throughout the Project, with different understandings on it shared by different stakeholders. The Project also suffered from the variance of quality among service providers.

Overall, the Project has been effective in reaching its outputs, even though the quality of some service providers can be questioned. However, many of the outcomes are still not reached. The most positive activities for this Project are the psychological support and financial literacy trainings, which have brought results and impact. However, there were little results observed for the economic component, which needs further monitoring, and if possible, support.

The sustainability seems to be one of the most important challenges for this Project. Some trainings are not yet finished. A majority of the volunteers needs to be monitored after the trainings to maximize the Project impact. However, the SLRCS had no consistent capacity, which might impact following up the Project beneficiaries.

**Lessons learned and recommendations**

|  |
| --- |
| Lessons learned |
| Adapt the duration or the activities for reintegration projects with a livelihood component and allocate resources accordingly |
| Provide guidance to the beneficiaries in choosing streams with high potential |
| Provide an adequate staffing |
| Improve early warning monitoring to avoid firefighting |
| High level of flexibility within the UNDP, IFRC and SLRCS |
| Recommendations to ensure the impact and sustainability |
| Monitor the results until the end of the Project and after |
| Provide a strong follow up for CAPS and vocational trainees |
| Provide follow up to BDS trainees |
| Find an arrangement for continuing education beneficiaries |
| Promote a continuing partnership with the SLRCS for an efficient follow up |
| Recommendations for future projects |
| Assess the contribution and value of service providers |
| Find the right “mix” of activities to ensure sustainability |
| Assess the quality of project design before and during implementation |
| Ensure compliance with governance arrangements |
| Build on lessons learned for Business Development |

1. **Introduction**
	1. **Context and project**

Background

The Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) Outbreak in Sierra Leone has had substantial impacts on the health system and on the national and regional economies. The crisis disrupted the agricultural production, trade and transport with movement restrictions, curfews and other regulations.

Throughout the EVD Outbreak, the IFRC/SLRCS has implemented Safe and Dignified Burials (SDB), which had a major impact on slowing down the outbreak. Between 2014 and 2016 in Sierra Leone, more than 800 volunteers have worked in ‘burial teams’. Their work was crucial in slowing down and stopping the spread of the outbreak. The teams of volunteers from the SLRCS undertook about 50% of the EVD related burials in Sierra Leone[[1]](#footnote-1).

Some volunteers were initially discriminated against in their communities and workplaces, preventing their reintegration and them getting income generating opportunities. Moreover, due to their intensive involvement in the burial process, they have often experienced stressful conditions.

The Reintegration of Sierra Leone Red Cross Society (SLRCS) Volunteers Burial Teams (the “Project”) is a project funded by the United Nations Development Programme – Sierra Leone (UNDP-SL), and implemented by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in collaboration with Sierra Leone Red Cross Society (SLRCS).

This Project has been implemented between 2015 and 2017, and initially targeted an estimated 800 SLRCS burial team members who volunteered their services throughout the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) Crisis. In late 2016, the Project expanded its target group to an additional 500 Infection Prevention Control (IPC) volunteers and staff from SLRCS, for a total of 1,300 target beneficiaries. The Project provided livelihood support by supporting business development, vocational training, tertiary education, career advisory services and financial inclusion; and psycho-social support, trauma treatment and stress management for the beneficiaries. Its overall goal is to successfully reintegrate and re-skill SLRCS volunteers, to improve their access to sustainable income generating opportunities.

The Project operations has ended on 31st May, 2017, and UNDP-SL has planned an end of project evaluation to assess the Project achievement of outcomes and lessons learned.

In June 2017, as a result of an international bidding process, Mr. Samuel Alterescu of Deloitte Tohmatsu Financial advisory LLC (hereinafter referred to as the consultant) was assigned to perform the development the end of project evaluation for this intervention in Sierra Leone. This report is an inception report for this task that summarizes the proposed methodology of work of the consultant, the work plan for this assignment, as well as the evaluation context summary.

Theory of change and relationship with project outcomes

The Project sought to reintegrate and support livelihood opportunities and employment creation schemes for the SDB volunteers. The Project was based on the assumption that the reintegration of SDB volunteers within their communities could be facilitated by providing them with Psychosocial Support (PSS) and by providing the technical and professional skills necessary to find income generating activities.

To achieve this, the Project has developed an approach to promote social and economic reintegration of the beneficiaries and to provide psychosocial support for volunteers who experienced traumatic experiences. To accomplish this, the Project initially comprised 4 core actions:

* Psychosocial assessment and support;
* Skills and livelihood assessment:
* Re-skilling, retraining and resumption of livelihood opportunities, through business development, Career Advising and Placement Services (CAPS) and vocational trainings; and
* Financial inclusion.

An additional core action, Conflict Mediation and civic engagement, was added during the implementation.

The key outcomes of the Project are:

* Improved mental health of SLRCS volunteers through enhanced treatment and management of stress and/or trauma related disorders;
* SLRCS volunteers that undergo the re-skilling, vocational training or business development stream having recovered livelihoods and are able to engage in income generation activities;
* Improved access of SLRCS volunteers to financial services; and
* Improved reskilling and reintegration programs for the wider ERW.

The theory of change is synthesized in the following figure:



Figure 1 Theory of Change

While the target beneficiaries were basically the 800 SLRCS volunteers, the Project also targeted Red Cross Staff in its Community Based Psychological Support (CBPSS) component. During its implementation, the Project also targeted an additional 500 Infection Prevention Control (IPC) volunteers and staff. The initiative was intended to be implemented nationwide.

* 1. **Evaluation purpose, scope and objectives**
		1. **Evaluation Purpose**

The overall purpose of this assignment is to plan and implement an end of project evaluation related to the Reintegration of Sierra Leone Red Cross Society (SLRCS) Volunteers Burial Teams. This includes:

1. Reviewing the Project achievement of outputs, outcomes and impact
2. Identifying lessons learned in this Project for the reintegration of volunteers during and after the final stages of the EVD crisis.
3. Analyzing the intended and unintended impact of the Project and consider suggestions to improve similar reintegration projects, in Sierra Leone or other countries affected by the EVD crisis.
	* 1. **Evaluation Scope**

As per the ToR for this assignment, the consultant has been given the following principal responsibilities:

* Develop an evaluation plan based on the following project thematic areas:
	1. Relevance
	2. Efficiency
	3. Effectiveness
	4. Assessment of outcomes and impact
	5. Sustainability
	6. Lessons learned / recommendations
* Conduct a desk review of similar reintegration and reskilling interventions post emergency response, both nationally and internationally;
* Review the achievement of outputs and impact of the Project, as well as the modalities of its implementation and execution. Also, the consultant is to provide an overall judgment on the extent the Project has been successful in its activities, including building the capacity of and supporting the target groups;
* Review the Project indicators and measure to what extent the expected results of the Project have been achieved in a timely manner.
* Conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the Project entailing the adoption of various methods to collect and analyze data, including but not limited to:
	1. Desk review of all Project documentation;
	2. Field observations of SLRCS volunteers;
	3. Interviews with key Project staff (IFRC/SLRCS/UNDP) and other stakeholders responsible for operating burial teams during the EVD crisis; and
	4. Focus group discussions involving primary Project participants.
* Compile a report containing the presentation and analysis of the data;
* Present the findings in a visual presentation for UNDP’s feedback;
* Finalize the report in publishable format.

The assignment has been executed with one mission to Sierra Leone and through extensive desk work in Tokyo, Japan, in order to fulfill the tasks and provide the deliverables outlined in the ToR. Despite the fact that this is an individual consultancy assignment, the consultant has been supported by the International Development Advisory team of Deloitte Japan.

* 1. **Methodology and approach**

The consultant evaluated the Project based on the following general criteria:

* 1. Relevance

This involves determining the extent to which the intervention is suited to the international and national context, priorities and policies, and whether the strategy of intervention has been a factor in meeting the Project’s goals;

* 1. Efficiency

Analysis of the Project implementation efficiency, through qualitative aspects of its implementation, organizational and management structure and capacities of the Project team;

* 1. Effectiveness

This involves determining if the Project has achieved its intended results, and to what extent. This includes verifying changes in the observed outputs and indicators, and their relation to the initiative activities.

* 1. Assessment of outcomes and impact

Impact involves measuring changes for direct and indirect beneficiaries of the Project, in relation with the initiative activities, whether intended or unintended.

* 1. Sustainability

Analyzing the prospects for sustaining the benefits of the Project after its completion.

* 1. Lessons learned / recommendations

This involves identifying good and innovating practices, which can be replicated to similar types of initiatives.

Based on this general framework, the evaluation focused on the following key questions:

1. Did the Project adhere to the country’s Project objectives and to international strategies?
2. Was the Project adapted to the local context?
3. Has the Project achieved its objectives and outcomes as set in the Project document?
4. Was the intervention strategy behind the Project effective?
5. What main tools/mechanisms were introduced to manage Project implementation and achieve the main objectives?
6. What are the direct outputs of the Project and have they been transformed into the intended Project outcomes?
7. To what extent has the Project reached outside of its direct beneficiaries?
8. To what extent were cross cutting themes, such as equity, gender equality and south-to-south cooperation integrated into the Project design?
9. To what extent are the goals of the Project sustainable?
10. What are the lessons learned and prospects for future development? To what extent and how can the Project lessons learned be diffused and used by other development initiatives?

Questions for the evaluation, concrete data sources and data collection methods are included in the evaluation matrix for this assignment, included in appendix 1. The schedule for the field study and the list of interviewees is available in appendix 2. The list of documents consulted is available in appendix 3.

* 1. **Limitations of the Methodology and constraints to the Evaluation process**

The evaluation faced some limitations and constraints. The main limitation for the evaluation was that a part of Project activities were still ongoing, and some had just finished, at the time of the evaluation. For example, there are still volunteers being trained in vocational centres, or beneficiaries in internships. It is, therefore difficult to assess entirely the achievement of outputs, and even more complicated to assess the achievement of outcomes.

This was addressed by using the expected future situation when there was almost no risk for the Project completion, and the current situation when there are risks concerning the future situation. Concretely, materials which were procured but not yet distributed are considered as “achieved”, whereas beneficiaries in training will not be marked as finished with their trainings.

Moreover, the baseline surveys should have been important sources of quantitative data for output, outcome and impact level changes. However, there were no systemic baselines available. The quarterly reports provided the data necessary to assess the achievement of outputs and outcomes quantitatively, but the analysis conducted for this evaluation is therefore exclusively qualitative and based on interviews or monitoring documents.

Finally, a comparative analysis with similar volunteer reintegration projects in other countries or in Sierra Leone was planned, but no such examples were available for comparison.

1. **Evaluation findings**
	1. **Relevance**

In order to review the relevance of the Project, its alignment with national priorities and the UNDP national recovery strategy for Ebola was assessed, as well as its adaptation to the local context and to the beneficiaries’ expectations. Furthermore, consistency of the Project design and linkages with the stakeholders’ mandates were reviewed.

* + 1. **Consistency with National Strategy, UNDP and UNMEER strategies**

The Project objectives are consistent with the objectives and strategies of the National Ebola Recovery Strategy for Sierra Leone (2015-2017), approved by the Government. It is in line with the objectives of restoring Economic Growth and Output, as well as with the Reintegration of EVD survivors and related persons.

The Project is also in line with UNDP Response to the Ebola Crisis in Sierra Leone, especially with its 3rd component, Livelihood and Enterprise Recovery Support and 4th component, Health Sector Strengthening. Some relevant activities include the economic reintegration of Ebola related persons, as well as the reinforcement of outreach by community health workers, which can be applied to the PSS component.

Finally, the Project’s objective of contributing to the reintegration of EVD related workers, contributes to Strategic Objective 3, Ensure essential services, MCA 8, Recovery and economy of the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER).

* + 1. **Involvement of National Counterparts**

Although Government Counterparts are usually involved in this type of project, there was no involvement from the Central or Local Governments concerning Project design or for its direct implementation / supervision. However, UNDP and the IFRC ensured national ownership by involving, as an implementing partner, the Sierra Leone Red Cross Society (SLRCS) as the National counterpart.

* + 1. **Adaptation to the local context and to the beneficiaries’ expectations**

Since its start, it seems that the Project has been misinterpreted by the public, which has undermined its implementation. The Government announced it secured a funding for the volunteers, which was equivalent to the Project budget. However, there were no explanation as how this budget would be spent, which appears to have been a misleading factor for the beneficiaries about the Project objectives. Most of them seemed to understand or believe that they would be granted allowances or sums of money for their services.

However, the Project never included grants, except for the Business Development training. The Project management experienced significant difficulties to explain to the beneficiaries what the activities were, and to manage effectively their expectations. This is linked with weak baselines and assessment of the beneficiaries’ needs.

* + 1. **Baselines and use of baselines**

Three baselines or surveys were conducted during the initial stages of the Project: a Psychosocial assessment (PSS baseline), a livelihood assessment and a market assessment.

The PSS baselines (January 2016) appears to have been assessed too late to see real and actual results. By the time the baseline was implemented, some volunteers already started recovering their livelihoods and being able to cope with stress.

The Project management team has mentioned during interviews a livelihood assessment study, which was supposed to give a clear picture of what the volunteers were doing before the EVD crisis, and of their stream choices for this Project. However, there was no paper trail for this study, which content and methodology could not be confirmed.

Finally, a market assessment study was conducted by a consultant contracted by UNDP, at Project inception. Its goal was to confirm the market needs in terms of skills in each District. Due to its poor quality, this study was not shared with other stakeholders.

With an adequate livelihood and market assessment, it would have been easier to provide guidance to the beneficiaries for them to choose relevant streams.

* + 1. **Consistency of the Project design**

The assessment focused on the approach of the Project, including the presence and use of an explicit theory of change and its relevance to achieve the project objectives. Additionally, the ways in which objectives were meant to be achieved were assessed.

First, the Theory of Change was not explicitly described in the Project Document. As explained in 1.1, the Project focused on psychosocial support and economic livelihood support, in order to provide reintegration chances to the volunteers. Although there is an implicit relationship between the psychological stability, economic skills and reintegration, there was no explicit relationship explained in the Project document between the outputs, outcomes, impact and the Project objective.

The Theory of Change also appeared to be very ambitious, as the Project management choose to spread its core activities in several streams. Whereas the PSS component, including conflict mediation, and the financial component are straightforward, the economic component has been divided in four streams, between which the beneficiaries were basically free to choose:

1. Business Development support
2. Vocational trainings
3. Career advising and placement services (CAPS)
4. Continued education

However, this involves spreading the available financial and human resources between the four streams. Given the Project duration, it would have seemed more relevant to focus on activities with a strong potential for short term impact, or to combine activities in order to strengthen the potential impact of the Project. This will be developed in the recommendations.

* + 1. **Integration of Gender and vulnerable groups**

By design, this Project targeted a predetermined group of 800 SDB and IPC volunteers, and later, an additional 500 Ebola response workers. There were only 162 women SDB volunteers and 192 women of the 500 additional beneficiaries. As this was a predetermined arrangement by design, there was therefore no possibility for the Project management to give more consideration to gender.

* 1. **Efficiency**

To review the efficiency of the Project the evaluation focused on implementation and management arrangements, coordination amongst stakeholders and the application of results-based management.

* + 1. **Project extensions**

The Project has been extended as shown this below:

Table 1 Project extensions

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Date of extension | Modification | Reason |
| Project extension 1 | September 2016 | Extended to 12/2016 | Implementation delaysChange in Project scope |
| Project extension 2 | December 2016 | Extended to 5/2017 | Implementation delays |
| Project extension 3  | May 2017 | Extended to 8/2017 | Project evaluation and closure |

The Project was launched in June 2015. In May 2015, the EVD crisis had subsided, and it seems that the Project management expected the EVD crisis to rapidly extinguish. However, there were new cases of Ebola between May and November 2015[[2]](#footnote-2), which obstructed the implementation of the Project, as its beneficiaries, SDB Volunteers, were in standby to support the SLRCS to carry out response activities if necessary.

The Project was halted until the time when there were no new cases declared, December 2015. However, new cases appeared in January 2016, stopping once more the Project activities, before the country was declared Ebola free in March 2016. The Project then resumed its activities, but out of its 12 months of implementation, it lost nearly ten months of them, which justified the first extension.

Concerning the second extension, the Project still had ongoing activities to close, such as the distribution of start up kits, and needed extension to complete those. Some trainings only finished in May 2017, and start up kits could not have been distributed beforehand.

* + 1. **Implementation arrangements and capacity of the implementing partner**

The Project has been implemented by the IFRC in collaboration with the SLRCS and several service providers. The implementation structure is the following:



Figure 2 Implementation structure

The UNDP was in charge of financial supervision, while the IFRC was in charge of technical and financial supervision. The SLRCS was the implementing partner, and was responsible for the technical implementation of the Project, monitoring and the choice of service providers when applicable. Branch managers in each District were especially in charge of monitoring the beneficiaries and service providers in their Districts. The service providers, such as BDS centers, vocational institutes, Universities, and others, provided trainings to the beneficiaries, under the supervision of SLRCS.

However, during implementation, roles and responsibilities seemed to be unclear to several stakeholders. Some branch managers seem not to understand they were responsible to implement the monitoring system and collect data. IFRC had to step in and give full support to the SLRCS on technical supervision, and sometimes directly support the technical implementation of the Project, such as explaining the Project objectives to the beneficiaries. The UNDP, as the fiduciary manager, was also involved by IFRC in some of these explanations to the beneficiaries. Roles and responsibilities were not properly explained and detailed in Project documents, which appears to have led to misunderstandings during Project implementation, at senior management level and at execution level (see this below).

Although staffing and the lack of continuity experienced for key positions within the UNDP and IFRC may have been a key factor, which is detailed below, an important reason for this confusion lies in the SLRCS capacities. Whereas there was a Project manager appointed by the SLRCS, she was responsible for a smooth implementation nationwide. While branch managers were expected to provide their support to the Project manager, she had to continuously follow some of the branch managers to confirm their monitoring, and often intervene on behalf of the Project, on subjects which could have been resolved by branch managers.

Moreover, the Project manager appointed by SLRCS was in charge of implementing the PSS component for the Red Cross nationwide as well as another project which made it more difficult for her to follow the activities efficiently. Eventually, a monitoring officer and a project officer were appointed to support the Project manager in her tasks, which appears to have made the implementation smoother.

* + 1. **Staffing arrangements and continuity**

The Project appears to have been impacted by the lack of continuity at senior level and of human resources in general. Regarding the UNDP, management including senior level officers changed throughout the Project. Although there was some sort of continuity, as the previous managers explained the Project to their successors, there currently seems to be a lack of understanding of the context of project design, which is difficult to explain.

Both the IFRC and the SLRCS had seen drastic capacity changes in 2015, due to the end of Ebola in Sierra Leone and other circumstances. Regarding the IFRC, senior management in Sierra Leone has changed between 2015 and 2016. The previous head of IFRC in Sierra Leone left in December 2015. There was an interim head of country appointed sometime after, for three months, but who did not seem to know the Project. Additionally, it appears that he could not explain the Project to the current and new head of country.

The IFRC did not appoint any project manager specific to this Project before its last stages, in November 2016. By then, the Project was already late in its activities and disbursements, and it was clear that a Project manager in the IFRC was necessary to improve the supervision and disbursement process. The IFRC then brought in a Project manager, with high and relevant technical capacities but who appeared to have little knowledge of IFRC’s financial processes at the time.

* + 1. **Monitoring system**

The Project adopted a monthly monitoring system at inception until May 2016, before modifying it to a quarterly based reporting. SLRCS branches were reporting to SLRCS HQ, which was reporting to the IFRC. Finally, the IFRC reported to the UNDP. It appears there have been several issues related with the monitoring system.

In some of the SLRCS branches visited, there was few or no paper trail of monitoring reports sent to HQ. Some of the branch managers report that they did not have a stable access to the internet and sent the reports handwritten by courier.

Moreover, the reports reviewed during the field visit in the branches were not based on the same format in all the branches. Branch managers reported that templates were not distributed by the Project manager. Finally, some branch managers reported that they only received an explanation of what was expected of them, including monitoring, in December 2016, six months before the end of the Project.

Whereas most of the branch managers have experience in project management at branch level and understand the needs of monitoring, it appears that not having templates led to inconsistent reporting and time losses to track data.

* + 1. **Decision making, roles and responsibilities**

The clarity of the decision making process and its speed have been one of the main causes for the Project delivery issues. Roles and responsibilities were not properly explained and detailed in Project documents. During the first phase of the Project, senior management level within the UNDP and the IFRC both had the same understanding of roles and responsibilities regarding decision making. However, senior management changed and without a proper written responsibility chart, it seems that the decision making process became unclear.

Whereas the IFRC was responsible for the technical supervision of the Project, it seems they had inconsistent experience in livelihood interventions, especially concerning BDS trainings. This made it difficult to take important decisions concerning the BDS, such as changing the number of business plans funded or the approach for their selection.

* + 1. **Quality of service providers**

The Project used several service providers for the trainings funded by the Project. For example, the Project used 26 service providers for vocational courses throughout the country, and three BDS providers with a nationwide network. For vocational streams, the beneficiaries were free to choose their providers. However, the quality of those service providers varied from one another. There was no or little confirmation of the service provider syllabus quality beforehand, according to several branch managers interviewed during the field mission.

Some of them provided individual guidance and monitoring, to guide the volunteers towards the most appropriate vocational stream for them, whereas others only provided the training asked by the beneficiaries, without any guidance.

Technical quality also significantly differed according to the provider. For example, whereas some service providers in IT studies provided an extensive course, including software and hardware components, others only provided basic software knowledge to the volunteers. It might have an important impact on the beneficiary’s ability to find revenues relevant to this skill.

There are also examples of poor service quality for some driving schools. Whereas the providers have agreed to provide a six month driving course to the beneficiaries, some of them only provided a month of lessons. It seems there was an insufficient monitoring concerning the services provided, as the branches only identified these issues during this evaluation.

* + 1. **Speed of delivery**

In general, the speed of delivery can be considered as slow. This includes disbursement and delivery of activities for the beneficiaries. Whereas this was improved in 2017, some service providers had to wait up to six months to receive payment for their services in 2016, which led to confusing situations between them and the beneficiaries. For example, some providers asked the beneficiaries to pay for the services provided to them.

The beneficiaries have also complained about the delivery of their start up kits, may it be startup capital or equipment. Although startup capital for BDS trainees has been provided to the beneficiaries in May 2017, most of them had submitted their business plans in September or October 2016, which were accepted in December 2016. The beneficiaries therefore experienced a gap of 6 months between the approval of their business plans and receiving their startup capital. Although some of them started their businesses without waiting for the capital, this impacted them in some way, such as delaying their payments with their contractors or with land providers. The majority was waiting on the capital to start their business.

This delay in the delivery was mainly due to modifications in the project design. Initially, 20 BDS business plans were supposed to funded by the Project. However, this was changed in May 2016. It took time for the stakeholders to discuss and decide on the approach and number of business plans to be funded. Moreover, UNDP requested the grants to be funneled through Ecobank, and some of the beneficiaries had to open new accounts, which led to additional delays.



Figure 3 Delivery timeline for BDS trainees

For vocational beneficiaries, start up kits were still not distributed during the field evaluation, despite the trainings having ended for one or two months on average. The procurement process of these kits needs approval from the IFRC abroad, which requires some additional time.

* + 1. **Budgeting and budget disbursement**

The Project was budgeted with 1,900,000 USD. It seems that some of its activities, such as the financial inclusion trainings, were initially over budgeted. The budget also seems to be high for a short term project.

It appears that disbursement was also impacted by insufficient human resources, until the arrival of the IFRC’s Project manager. The budget was then modified, new activities and beneficiaries were added. Even though disbursement has been smoother for the last part of the Project, it appears that the Project would have benefitted from a better staffing and that a more relevant budgeting would have helped to prevent these issues.

Finally, and whereas this is not the main factor in late disbursement, the Project may have been impacted by complex financial procedures.

* + 1. **Synergies with UNDP activities in Sierra Leone**

The UNDP has supported BDS providers such as CEPAD, and TVETs in Sierra Leone before this Project. It was therefore relevant to include them in this Project, as they are supposed to have proven capacities in trainings. Classic trainings provided by BDS are usually followed by monitoring from the service providers. This is usually confirmed by UNDP supervision. As the trainings provided within the Project framework are delivered within a different timeframe, it will be important to confirm arrangements for the follow up.

* 1. **Effectiveness**

For the review of effectiveness the evaluation focused on the realization of outputs of the Project and their contribution to effect (outcome) level changes. Effect and output level changes were identified in the results framework of the Project, which has guided the assessment on effectiveness. First, the potential impact of other projects will be discussed. Then, the output level changes will be presented after which the outcomes supported by that supported these outcomes are discussed.

* + 1. **Impact of other projects**

There were no other projects found which targeted specifically the same target group. Although there are some projects targeting Ebola survivors, no project has been specifically targeting the ERW. Some volunteers have received additional trainings from Universities concerning stress management, but this has only been confirmed for very few of them. Finally, although volunteers received considerable incentives during the EVD outbreak, most of them were unable to capitalize on it. There is therefore no evidence of impact from other initiatives on the target group before or during Project implementation.

* + 1. **Quality of the result matrix**

Regarding the psychosocial assessment and support, and financial inclusion, the result matrix has experienced little or no modifications. When there were modifications, these were relevant with the modifications in the number of beneficiaries. The output and outcome indicators are also relevant for a short term project, except for the number of SLRCS volunteers able to access loan facilities. Accessing loans in West Africa, even more in Sierra Leone, is challenging, and it seems that this objective could not be achieved in a short period of time for this kind of beneficiaries.

Concerning the livelihood component, the quality of the result matrix appears to be relatively poor. The beneficiaries were to choose their own stream. However, a number of beneficiaries by stream was set up beforehand. The results therefore vary from one stream to another, but are not directly linked to the success of the activity. However, the Project added a completion indicator for each stream, which allows to confirm its achievement rate.

Regarding the outcomes for this component, some of them cannot be assessed at this point, as they are designed as long term (impact) indicators. Some of them will only be assessable six months to twoyears after the end of the Project. Moreover, some of them are not directly linked with the objective of the Project. Finally, there is no clear definition of “gaining a vocational skill”. It is therefore difficult to assess this indicator as well.

Even if it seems the result matrix has important weaknesses, the achievement of outputs and outcomes will be evaluated according to its items and targets.

* + 1. **Achievement of outputs**

The achievement of outputs as identified in the Project document are presented in the tables below. The output level changes were assessed through the Project quarterly reports and cross checked with the interviews conducted in the field.

The target levels correspond to the targets as identified in the first Project document, whereas the revised target levels correspond to the targets as identified in the latest Project document information or from the latest information available (see footnotes). The following scale was used to assess the achievement of outputs:

* Far above target: above 110%
* Target reached: 85 – 110%
* Below target: 60 – 85%
* Far below target: less than 60% reached.

Output 1: Psychosocial assessment and support

Overall, outputs for this component are reached.

However, the number of SLRCS volunteers completing the psychosocial assessment is below target. Psychosocial Assessment was meant for the SDB/IPC volunteers, who were the first 800 targets of this intervention, based on the nature of work they were undertaking during the outbreaka. When the additional 500 volunteers were added, they were also supposed to receive this assessment. However, as the occurrence of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder for the initial 800 volunteers seemed to have been overestimated, the new 500 volunteers were finally exempted from the PSS assessment.

Concerning specialized care, the Project initially thought that 200 volunteers would need support. However, after conducting the psychosocial assessment only one volunteer was referred for specialized treatment. This can be partly attributed to the effectiveness of psychosocial support interventions offered to the volunteers through individual and group sessions. Most of them state they were able to cope with their background as well as new situations, and return to their normal lives.

Output 2: Assessment

All volunteers targeted by the interventions have completed their skills / educational / interest assessment. The objective of this activity was to identify the interests of the beneficiaries to link them to their stream. Although its quantitative objective has been reached, there was no particular guidance provided to the beneficiaries concerning the services and benefits in each streams. It seems this led to misconceptions for some beneficiaries who misunderstood the activities.

Although there was also a market assessment conducted, this was not linked with this assessment. Linking both assessments would have been interesting, to provide guidance to the beneficiaries as to which stream or skill had more potential on the market.

Output 3: Livelihood

Overall, the objectives for this output have been reached or are in progress, near to be reached. As the beneficiaries were to choose their own stream of interest for this activity, it appears more relevant to confirm that all beneficiaries have chosen a stream in this Project. Out of 1,300 beneficiaries, 1,293 have received trainings in one stream.

Table 3 Number of beneficiaries by stream

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Stream | Career skill development | Vocational training | business development | Continuing education | Total |
| Beneficiaries | 55 | 402 | 462 | 374 | 1,293 |

There was one main constraint to the execution of this activity. Although branch managers were supposed to guide the volunteers through their choice, it seems it significantly depended upon each branch manager’s capacity. Some of the branch managers provided extensive and adequate advice to the beneficiaries, which led to an adequate number of them choosing BDS trainings.

It appears that others provided absolutely no guidance, which led to a large number of the beneficiaries to choose BDS trainings without prior business experience or vocational skillsets without any relation to their own skills or to the market.

Beneficiaries in career skill development benefited from a week of training, including training such as personal development, soft skill development or elaboration of a CV.

Concerning vocational trainings, the beneficiaries have been trained in the following skills:

Table 4 Number of beneficiaries by skillset

| Skillset | Number of beneficiaries |
| --- | --- |
| IT and computer studies | 244 |
| Driving | 59 |
| Auto mechanic | 33 |
| Building and construction | 15 |
| Carpentry | 12 |
| Tailoring | 10 |
| Water well engineering | 6 |
| Catering | 4 |
| Equipment operators | 4 |
| Welding | 3 |
| Gara tie and dying | 2 |
| National technical certificate | 2 |
| National technician certificate | 2 |
| Masonry | 2 |
| Metal work | 2 |
| Weaving | 1 |

Although a vast majority of beneficiaries have chosen IT and computer studies, as well as driving, the contents of trainings vary greatly from one service provider to another. The quality of the trainings and the probability to find an income therefore differs within similar skillsets.

Moreover, it seems that beneficiaries were often left to themselves in choosing a service provider for the vocational stream. Those who did not know or did not want to research service providers may have ended with a poor quality provider.

Regarding training completion, career skill development training objectives have been reached. Although it should also reach its objectives, some beneficiaries are still undertaking vocational trainings and business development trainings. Further assessment to ensure their achievements will be necessary.

Generally, the beneficiaries have expressed needs concerning the provision of lunch, transportation or other allowances. As attendance and completion rates remained high for BDS, vocational and skill development trainings, it was not a determining factor. However, this might constitute an issue for the sustainability of the beneficiaries in tertiary education. This will be further discussed this below (see 2.5).

The distribution of start up kits in for business development and vocational trainings is still in progress, and should be assessed after completion of the activities. Both should reach their objectives. Start up kits include the following:

Table 5 Start-up kits

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Trainings | Description of Start-Up Kits |
| Tertiary education | Allowance for copies and internet access |
| Business Development | Start-up capital |
| Vocational Skills Training |
| IT/Computer Studies | Laptops |
| Building & Construction | Masonry Toolkit |
| Carpentry | Carpenters Tool Kit |
| Auto Mechanic | Moto mechanic Toolkit |
| Water Well Engineering | Plumber Kit |
| Driving | Driving Licences |
| Welding & Metal Work | Welding & Metal Toolkit |
| Tailoring | Tailors toolkit |

Finally, a market assessment was conducted by the UNDP for the first 800 volunteers, but can be applied to the 1,300 beneficiaries. It was not shared with IFRC or the SLRCS.

Output 4: Financial inclusion

All beneficiaries have received a training regarding financial inclusion conducted by Eco Bank. Skills, knowledge and information required by the volunteers to make prudent financial decisions were taught in this training. A vast majority of the beneficiaries interviewed stated they also shared the contents of the trainings with at least their friends or families, some with their communities.

Output 5: Peace building and conflict mediation

120 beneficiaries benefited from a training on violence prevention and peace building concepts across the 14 branches. The training strengthened the national society’s capacity to prevent, mitigate and response to any form of violence. The number of beneficiaries was far lesser than what was expected. The training purpose was to establish violence prevention structures across the 14 districts as part of the overall IFRC strategic framework for violence prevention mitigation and response.

Table 6 Achievement of outputs

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| N° | Output Indicators | Target | Revised Target[[3]](#footnote-3) | Total Achieved | % | Rating |
| 1. Psychosocial assessment and support
 |
| * 1.
 | # of SLRCS volunteers completing psychosocial assessment  | 800 | 1,300 | 800[[4]](#footnote-4) | 62 | Below |
| * 1.
 | # Red Cross Staff trained in Community Based Psychosocial Support (CBPSS) | 28 | 28 | 28 | 100 | Reached |
| * 1.
 | # of SLRCS volunteers trained in Psychological First Aid | 800 | 60 | 60 | 100 | Reached |
| * 1.
 | # of SLRCS branches with a referral system to specialized mental health services | 14 | 14 | 14 | 100 | Reached |
| * 1.
 | # of SLRCS volunteers undertaking counseling sessions | 800 | 800 | 800 | 100 | Reached |
| * 1.
 | # of SLRCS volunteers referred to specialized care and treatment and receiving ongoing support | As required (estimated 200) | As required[[5]](#footnote-5) | 1 | N/A | N/A |
| 1. Assessment
 |
| * 1.
 | # of SLRCS volunteers completing skills/educational/interest assessment | 800 | 1,300[[6]](#footnote-6) | 1,300 | 100 | Reached |
| 1. Livelihood
 |
| * 1.
 | # of SLRCS volunteers receiving career skill development training | 200 (tbd pending assessment) | 62 | 55 | 89 | Reached |
| * 1.
 | Proportion of SLRCS volunteers streamed through the career skill development training that successfully complete the training | 75 per cent | 75 per cent | 89 per cent | 119 | Far above |
| * 1.
 | # of SLRCS volunteers receiving vocational training | 200 (tbd pending assessment) | 375 | 402 | 107 | Reached |
| * 1.
 | Proportion of SLRCS volunteers streamed through the vocational training that successfully complete the training | 75 per cent | 75 per cent | 65 per cent[[7]](#footnote-7) | 87 | In progress |
| * 1.
 | # of SLRCS volunteers receiving vocational start up kits | N/A | 402[[8]](#footnote-8) | 367[[9]](#footnote-9) | 91 | In progress |
| * 1.
 | # of SLRCS volunteers receiving business development training | 200 (tbd pending assessment) | 655 | 462 | 70 | Below |
| * 1.
 | Proportion of SLRCS volunteers streamed through the business development training that successfully complete the training | 75 per cent | 75 per cent | 70.3 per cent[[10]](#footnote-10) | 94 | In Progress |
| * 1.
 | # of SLRCS volunteers receiving business start up kits | N/A | 462[[11]](#footnote-11) | 325 | 760 | In Progress |
| * 1.
 | Market assessment and analysis emergent industries/livelihood areas | 800 (through IFRC/SLRCS initially, entire ERW) | 1,300 | 1,300 | 100 | Reached |
| * 1.
 | # of SLRCS volunteers returning back to tertiary studies | 200 (tbd pending assessment | 208 | 374 | 180 | Far above |
| * 1.
 | # of SLRCS volunteers receiving back to school start up kits | N/A | 374[[12]](#footnote-12) | 331 | 89 | Reached |
| 1. Financial inclusion
 |
| * 1.
 | # of SLRC volunteers receiving planning and advisory services | 200 (tbd pending assessment) | 405 | 1,256 | 310[[13]](#footnote-13) | Far above |
| * 1.
 | # of SLRC volunteers receiving financial management advice linked to UNDP’s small and medium enterprise development and recovery programs | 200 (tbd pending assessment) | 405 | 1,260 | 310 | Far above |
| * 1.
 | # of SLRCS volunteers receiving training on financial inclusion and access to financial services such as savings, credits, insurance etc. | 800 | 1,300 | 1,260 | 97 | Reached |
| 1. Peace building and conflict mediation
 |
| * 1.
 | # of SLRC volunteers receiving training on conflict mediation and peacebuilding | N/A | 300 | 120 | 40 | Far below |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Far above target (>110%) | Far above | Below target (60 – 85%) | Below | In progress | In progress |
| Target reached (85% – 110%) | Reached | Far below target (less than 65% reached) | Far below | N/A | N/A |

* + 1. **Achievement of outcomes**

Outcome level changes are detailed in the table below. Ideally, these changes should have been assessed through a comparison of quantitative baselines and end lines, combined with a qualitative assessment. Unfortunately, there were no systematic baselines for the livelihood component, and the psychosocial component. The following analysis is therefore based on the achievement of each outcome and a qualitative analysis, based on an extensive interviewing process.

Outcome 1: Improved mental health of SLRCS volunteers through enhanced treatment and management of stress and/or trauma related disorders

The Project performed better than expected concerning this component, and reached all the beneficiaries. Although time constitutes an important factor in psychological traumas, the stress management trainings and psychological support appear to have had a clear impact on the beneficiaries.

According to the beneficiaries, stress management trainings have helped them to cope with stress linked to trauma and with stress linked with stigmatization. Many report that they have more facilities speaking with their families and communities to explain the disease and their work, avoid conflict and stigmatization. The incidence of these answers in focus groups is high, in particular in Freetown and Western Districts.

Outcome 2: SLRCS volunteers that undergo the re-skilling, vocational training or business development stream having recovered livelihoods and are able to engage in income generation activities

The Project largely underperformed during its implementation for this outcome, for the following reasons:

* The indicators selected are mainly long term indicators, which achievements could not be verified during the Project life;
* Interventions and training are not completed:
	+ Beneficiaries in career development are currently undergoing internships. There is no guarantee that they will find income generating activities afterwards.
	+ Business development training beneficiaries have received their start-up capital in May 2017. Although some of them started registering their businesses, it is too early to see how many of them started operating, how many of the remaining beneficiaries will create a company, and if those will be sustainable.
	+ The vast majority of tertiary education beneficiaries still have one or two years remaining before graduation.
* Although vocational training beneficiaries have gained “skills”, the quality of the services provided vary a lot depending on the service providers. It is therefore difficult to confirm if they gained “bankable” skills, which will allow them to find income generating activities.
	+ For example, IT / Computer studies regroups beneficiaries who studied software, which includes only an introduction to windows and Windows Office, and students who also studied computer hardware, with aspects related to maintenance.

Although this outcome will be studied more in details this below (see 2.4, 2.5), beneficiaries and some service providers expressed doubts about their ability to find an income generating activity or to finish their studies.

There are, however, some good examples. In Port Loko, Water Well Engineering students have already found clients after the end of their training, even though they have not received their start up kits. In Kenema, BDS training beneficiaries have decided to group and to form businesses similar to farmer based organizations. They have started their activities in pineapple, honey making and kola nuts. It is too early, however, to see if they will constitute sustainable income sources.

Outcome 3: Improved access of SLRCS volunteers to financial services

The Project performed better than expected concerning the volunteers’ access to financial services and savings. However, it does not show any results yet on their access to loans. A period of 90 days at least is necessary before being able to apply for a loan. Moreover, the same conditions apply for the volunteers than for usual users. This will need to be reassessed in a few months or after a year.

This component is highly appreciated by all the beneficiaries. However, it seems that a large number of them would have preferred taking the training at the start of the project to help them manage their money during the trainings.

 All the beneficiaries interviewed report having a bank account and having the basic knowledge to manage their savings.

Outcome 4: Improved reskilling and reintegration programs for the wider ERW

There are no results yet regarding this effect indicator. By definition, lessons learned can only be extracted from the Project after its end. The effect will therefore only be seen in future programs for the wider ERW, if any are launched thereafter.

Table 7 Achievement of outcomes

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| N° | Effect Indicators | Target | Revised Target | Total Achieved | % | Rating |
| 1. Improved mental health of SLRCS volunteers through enhanced treatment and management of stress and/or trauma related disorders
 |
| * 1.
 | Proportion of SLRCS volunteers with signs of stress and/or trauma related symptoms reporting an ablation of said symptoms after treatment | 50 per cent | 50 per cent | 100 per cent [[14]](#footnote-14) | 200 | Far above |
| * 1.
 | Proportion of SLRCS volunteers that require ongoing care for trauma and/or stress associated symptoms still receiving treatment | 50 per cent | 50 per cent | 100 per cent [[15]](#footnote-15) | 200 | Far above |
| * 1.
 | Proportion of SLRCS volunteers that were referred to specialized mental health care that complete the treatment and management of their condition | 50 per cent | 50 per cent | 100 per cent | 200 | Far above |
| 1. SLRCS volunteers that undergo the re-skilling, vocational training or business development stream having recovered livelihoods and are able to engage in income generation activities
 |
| * 1.
 | Proportion of SLRCS volunteers in the skill development stream successfully joining the workforce | 50 per cent | 50 per cent | 8 per cent [[16]](#footnote-16) | 16 | Far below |
| * 1.
 | Proportion of SLRCS volunteers in the vocational development stream gaining a vocational skill | 50 per cent | 50 per cent | 65 per cent [[17]](#footnote-17) | 130 | Far above |
| * 1.
 | Proportion of SLRCS volunteers in the business development stream having established small or medium enterprises | 50 per cent | 50 per cent | 37 per cent [[18]](#footnote-18) | 74 | Below |
| * 1.
 | Proportion of SLRCS volunteers that resume their studies successfully complete their education | 50 per cent | 50 per cent | 3.5 per cent [[19]](#footnote-19) | 7 | Far below |
| 1. Improved access of SLRCS volunteers to financial services
 |
| * 1.
 | Proportion of SLRCS volunteers able to access financial services and savings | 50 per cent | 50 per cent | 100 per cent | 200 | Far above |
| * 1.
 | Proportion of SLRCS volunteers able to access loan/micro-credit facilities | 20 per cent | 20 per cent | 0 per cent [[20]](#footnote-20) | 0 | Far below |
| 1. Improved reskilling and reintegration programs for the wider ERW
 |
| * 1.
 | Proportion of the wider ERW that are able to access future reintegration and reskilling programs | 50 per cent of the entire ERW | 50 per cent of the entire ERW | 0 per cent  | 0 | Far below |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Far above target (>110%) | Far above | Below target (60 – 85%) | Below | In progress | In progress |
| Target reached (85% – 110%) | Reached | Far below target (less than 65% reached) | Far below | N/A | N/A |

* 1. **Impact**

Ideally, the Project impact on the contribution towards the reintegration of volunteers should have been assessed by making use of relevant baselines and end lines, combined with a qualitative assessment. Unfortunately, there were no systematic baselines available. The impact will therefore be assessed only based on the achievement of outcomes and a qualitative analysis based on interviews conducted with the beneficiaries, service providers and the Project management team.

* + 1. **Contribution towards the improvement of mental health of SLRCS volunteers through enhanced treatment and management of stress**

Although the baseline survey showed few signs of traumas, most of the beneficiaries interviewed declared they were less stigmatized by their communities, as well as better able to cope with them. The baseline survey was conducted late after the crisis, which could explain why beneficiaries’ mental health already improved.

The Project contributed to improving their mental health through two mechanisms. First, the beneficiaries now appear to be able to manage the stress linked to their own experience with the EVD crisis. They seem to experience less nightmares and to be able to put words on their feelings.

The second mechanism is linked with communication. The volunteers now appear to be able to explain the EVD to communities calmly and to better cope with the communities’ stress. They are therefore less stigmatized.

Even though passing time has also contributed to the improvement of their situation, the Project has fairly contributed to their ability to cope with stress and to the improvement of their mental health.

* + 1. **Contribution towards the SLRCS volunteers recovering livelihoods and able to engage in income generating activities**

Due to its delivery and design issues, there are no conclusive results for the economic component. There is no evidence that business development and vocational training beneficiaries will find a sustainable income in the months or years to come. With a few exceptions, business development beneficiaries have plans to develop small enterprises, with a bulk of petty traders. It appears unlikely to see most of them succeed in developing their activity and find a revenue high enough to support themselves and their families. Beneficiaries who grouped and are currently engaged in high potential activities such as agriculture appear to have more chances to succeed and find a sustainable outcome. However, this only represents a few of the hundreds of beneficiaries for this stream.

Regarding vocational training beneficiaries, some of them have acquired highly demanded skills, such as mechanic, well engineering or building and construction skills. These specialized volunteers appear to have more chances in finding a sustainable income in the future.

However, the bulk of the beneficiaries is formed by IT students, who might experience several challenges. First, the market in Freetown for IT students might be able to absorb such a number of new graduates, but it seems very unlikely that cities such as Makeni or Bo would be able to absorb such a high number of graduates. Moreover, it seems that a high percentage of these only learnt how to use Windows and the office suite. It seems very unlikely they would be able to find an income without additional, operational skills.

Concerning CAPS beneficiaries, there is no evidence they will find a sustainable activity. However, most of them already had skills and are now able to sell themselves. With the internships they were provided, they have good prospects of continuing contracts as well.

Finally, for continuing education beneficiaries, there is no or insufficient evidence that they will be able to finish their studies and to find an activity related to it (see 2.5).

On the contrary, all beneficiaries now have a basic knowledge regarding financial management, and should be able to manage their savings from now on. In all focus groups, beneficiaries have mentioned they already talked about financial management to their families, friends or communities, which is a significant step forward.

* + 1. **Contribution towards the SLRCS volunteers having successfully been reintegrated and are involved in sustainable income generating activities**

Overall, the Project has contributed to the social reintegration of the volunteers in their communities, as well as to their mental stability. However, its contribution to their economic reintegration is unclear. Without further support from the Project or from its stakeholders, there is little impact to be expected from the Project in terms of economic activities.

* 1. **Sustainability**

In order to assess sustainability, the evaluation focused on the ownership for the SLRCS, its capacity and the volunteers’ capacity to implement the PSS component, on the involvement of service providers in the financial component and on the sustainability of the economical component.

* + 1. **Capacity of the implementing partner (SLRCS)**

Although the SLRCS has seen its capacities strengthened, inconsistencies were observed between its District branches, which might undermine following up the Project beneficiaries. The SLRCS has been supported at a technical level by the IFRC and the UNPD for Project implementation and technical components, such as the livelihood interventions, which should help the SLRCS to support any further interventions in the sector.

However, the SLRCS mainly worked with one Project manager, who was mainly the one to receive advice from the IFRC and the UNDP. Some SLRCS District Branches have had difficulties to follow up the beneficiaries and the service providers.

Furthermore, branch managers, who were in charge of following up the Project at a local level, have very different capacities. Although solar panels have been introduced at branch level to support volunteer activities, it seems that some branch managers are unclear as to how they should support these activities.

It is therefore unlikely that the SLRCS District branches will be able to continue monitoring and supporting the volunteers as it did during the Project.

* + 1. **Psychosocial support**

Although the SLRCS is unlikely to have the capacity to continue supporting the volunteers in the livelihood component, it has the knowledge and expertise in stress management training to keep supporting the beneficiaries and others in psychosocial support. Moreover, volunteers trained in stress management and psychosocial support have expressed their will to continue to help others.

* + 1. **Financial literacy**

Even though there is no guarantee for the beneficiaries to obtain credits and loans, Ecobank, as part of its services, will follow up its subscribers and support them in getting the services they need. This is a good way to ensure that the volunteers will receive follow up and help in a sustainable manner, as Ecobank wishes to retain its customers.

* + 1. **Continuing education**

There is no or insufficient guarantee that the volunteers will be able to pay their remaining tuition. Many have already complained about issues such as payment for accommodation, lunch or copies. Some of them already had significant difficulties to pay their tuition before the Project supported them for a year. Moreover, the defaulting rate in Universities in Sierra Leone is high (between 35 to 45 percent[[21]](#footnote-21)). There was no additional support from the SLRCS to the beneficiaries to elaborate a payment strategy for their remaining tuition. It seems unlikely they would be able to pay their tuitions in these conditions.

* + 1. **BDS, CAPS and vocational trainees**

Whereas the beneficiaries benefited from these trainings, there is no guarantee at this point, that they will find a sustainable activity. Most of them need monitoring and / or follow up to support their chances.

1. **Conclusions**
2. The Project was in line with GoSL and UNDP’s objectives for Ebola recovery. The Project addressed relevant needs. However, it seems there were important issues with adapting it to the local context and to the beneficiaries’ expectations.
3. The Project had an ambitious approach to reach its objective, in which psychosocial support and economic livelihood support were needed to support the volunteers’ reintegration into society. However, the Project chose to work with four different streams within the economic component, instead of combining activities with potentially high synergies, such as vocational trainings, soft skill and career development trainings. Although these activities are relevant to classic livelihood projects, which have a three to four year duration, it appears that conducting these as stand-alone trainings was less appropriate given its short term.
4. It seems the Project had significant issues in terms of efficiency. It appears that the implementation arrangement and its insufficient clarity for the division of roles and responsibilities, made the Project complicated to implement, with a slow decision making process and delivery.
5. Communication mechanisms, both within Project management and with beneficiaries, also seem to have been insufficient, and to have led to misunderstandings and further delays in delivery.
6. Efficiency also seems to have been significantly affected by the variance of quality between service providers. Whereas some providers provided high quality trainings, others provided trainings without personal guidance or without an emphasis on future possibilities to find an income.
7. Another constraining factor for the efficiency seems to have been the quality of monitoring. Branch managers were mainly in charge of following up the beneficiaries and of reporting to the SLRCS HQ. However, they had different understandings of what was expected of them. Their roles and responsibilities were only explained to them a few months before the end of the Project, according to some of the managers interviewed.
8. Overall, the Project has been effective in reaching its outputs, even though it seems the quality of some services provided by some providers[[22]](#footnote-22), could be questioned. However, many of the outcomes are still not reached. This is mainly because the outcome indicators were designed for a longer Project, to see the impact over a few years. However, activities and trainings are still not completed for some beneficiaries, and monitoring their results will be important to consider the achievement of outcomes.
9. Although baselines could not be used to establish a causal relationship, concerning the psychosocial component, there seems to be a correlation between the Project activities and the volunteers’ mental stability.
10. The financial literacy training has been a success, with a high satisfaction rate with the beneficiaries. All of them reported having a bank account, and appear to have some basic knowledge on how to manage their savings. Some expressed their wish to apply for loans in the future.
11. The sustainability of the results may constitute an important challenge for the Project. SLRCS District branches have inconsistent capacities, which might lead to having difficulties in following up on all the Project beneficiaries. Its branch managers have different capacities and understandings of their roles. The beneficiaries of BDS and vocational trainings need monitoring to ensure that they retain their knowledge and capacities, as well as to maximize their chances of finding a sustainable income generating activity.
12. **Lessons learned**
	1. **Adapt the duration or the activities for reintegration projects with a livelihood component and allocate resources accordingly**

Although reintegration projects are often implemented in an urgency context, it is important to remember that projects including livelihood components should be seen as livelihood projects, and not only reintegration projects. If the emphasis is on the urgency, and the project cannot exceed a short period of time, the design should focus on direct, short term impact, by combining activities if necessary instead of trying to implement a wide range of them. If the emphasis is on a long term reintegration, then the design should focus on more classic livelihood interventions, with long term monitoring and activities.

Designing a project with fewer activities enables to allocate resources more efficiently and to find synergies between activities if necessary. For example, it would have been interesting to see beneficiaries benefit from vocational trainings and career advisory, and not only one or the other, to maximize the impact.

* 1. **Provide guidance to the beneficiaries in choosing streams with high potential**

The beneficiaries were free to choose their stream, their specialization and their service provider. Although the liberty of choosing its own stream and its own specialization is an element in favor of ownership, it is also a constraining factor for impact. This can lead to beneficiaries choosing streams or skills without linkage with the market, with little potential to find an activity in the future.

Linking the beneficiaries to the skills with high demand on the market, guiding them through potential activities, is important to ensure the impact of the project. The Project had to possibility to use its livelihood assessment as well as its market assessment to do this.

* 1. **Provide an adequate staffing**

One of the major lessons learned of this Project is related to staffing. A project of this size and this duration cannot be implemented efficiently by such a small number of people. Although employing more people implies using more budget for personnel and less for activities, it would also allow a more efficient implementation.

For example, the Project would have needed a Project manager since its beginning with the IFRC. It would have also needed monitoring officers with the SLRCS, to support branch managers where or when needed.

* 1. **Improve early warning monitoring to avoid firefighting**

Although miscommunications and Project design seem to have constituted an important factor in the dissatisfaction of the beneficiaries, it seems there was no early warning for the Project management to deal with this issues beforehand. In the end, the Project management had to tackle the issues when they became urgent, with insufficient capacity to foresee them.

It is important, in the monitoring system, to identify issues which should be reported to Project management for immediate consideration, before they become urgent. This might be done by appointing a monitoring officer or by clearly explaining to the branch managers which kind of issues should be reported.

* 1. **High level of flexibility**

The UNDP has been able to work outside of its mandate, by cooperating with the IFRC and SLRCS, in successfully providing psychosocial support and livelihood activities. This is an interesting first experience in Sierra Leone, with high potential for synergies. However, both organizations may need to focus more on their mandate, even if collaborating within the same project. This might be done by providing technical assistance to the implementing partners in their own expertise.

1. **Recommendations**
	1. **Recommendations to ensure the impact and sustainability**
		1. **Monitor the results until the end of the Project and after**

Usually, the impact of a livelihood support project is likely to be seen a few months to a few years after the end of the intervention. To understand its real impact and potential for replication, it is important to confirm its results regularly. IFRC could continue to develop SLRCS’ Monitoring and Evaluation capacities.

* + 1. **Provide a strong follow up for CAPS and vocational trainees**

Whereas most of the volunteers are still to receive their start up kits, it is crucial to follow up their progress in finding an income generating activity. Although vocational trainees received skills during their trainings, some of those skills require additional trainings to operationalize them. Support, in the form of additional short trainings, or for short internships, will most probably be needed to operationalize their skills.

* + 1. **Provide follow up to BDS trainees**

Whereas BDS trainees are theoretically ready to start new businesses, there seems to be very little evidence to prove their businesses will or could be successful. Although the service providers should provide follow up according to their MoUs, it appears necessary for the related institutions to keep on supervising or following up them on a short / middle term. A close monitoring to confirm that they operate according to their business plan, according to good business practices appears necessary. Additionally, adapting their plans to the market reality will also be necessary.

* + 1. **Find an arrangement for continuing education beneficiaries**

Most of the beneficiaries have expressed doubts about being able to pay their remaining tuition. It is therefore important to avoid risking too many students abandoning their studies after investing one year on them. Although supporting them for their entire fees might be seen as creating dependency, some form of support to help them finishing university appears necessary. This could be addressed through a partial grant to the beneficiaries who wish to continue their studies, for example by providing them with half their remaining tuition, from the UNDP, which can support this kind of initiative.

* + 1. **Promote a continuing partnership with the SLRCS for an efficient follow up**

The SLRCS has a local network in the 13 Districts of the country. Following up the beneficiaries after the end of the Project will be easier with the network of the SLRCS. Reinforcing the capacities of the SLRCS on monitoring will be necessary for this. It might be necessary to provide guidance to the SLRCS as to which type of follow up or activities is necessary for future activities. This could be provided by the IFRC.

* 1. **Recommendations for future projects**
		1. **Assess the contribution and value of service providers**

Service providers used during this Project had various capacities and quality of service. An assessment, for future projects, appears necessary in order to know which provider can be trusted.

* + 1. **Find the right “mix” of activities to ensure sustainability**

Implementing vocational trainings without follow up is insufficient to guarantee livelihood development. There is a need to consider the development of soft skills as well. Combining these trainings with career advisory or other types of support, for a more focused project, may be effective.

* + 1. **Assess the quality of project design before and during implementation**

Design flaws impact a project until its end. For this Project, it seems there were too many activities within the economic component. In general, there is a need to reassess the project design before and during implementation, especially for large scale budgets. Whereas it is not advisable to modify the objectives and expected impact of the project, modifying the activities and outputs to reach the impact is highly desirable when necessary.

* + 1. **Ensure compliance with governance arrangements**

This includes supervising the service providers and verifying their compliance with the contracts, as well as the existence of a paper trail for technical monitoring.

* + 1. **Build on lessons learned for Business Development**

There is an important potential for agriculture in Sierra Leone. In Kenema, all beneficiaries of the BDS training have chosen agri-businesses, and seem to have sound business plans. Combining the knowledge from BDS trainings with sectoral / technical knowledge, such as in agriculture, may be pertinent to propose sustainable income generating activities. Moreover, BDS trainings generally encourage individual business plans. However, the opportunity of elaborating group business plans in the agricultural sector is interesting. It is close to farmer based organizations, and could have potential in rural Sierra Leone.

1. **Appendices**

Appendix 1: Evaluation matrix

Appendix 2: Field Study Schedule

Appendix 3  Documents consulted

**Appendix 1: Evaluation matrix**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Criteria/Sub criteria | Questions to be addressed by evaluator | What to look for | Data sources / Stakeholders | Data collection methods |
|  Relevance | How did the project contribute to Sierra Leone National Ebola Recovery Strategy?How did the project contribute to UNMEER Strategy and UNDP strategies?What problems did the project address? | Real project objectives Relevance of planned activities to the raised objectivesEstimated project outputs | Annual reports, progress reportsStrategy documentsProject team Stakeholders and beneficiaries’  | Desk research of documents produced by the projectInterviews |
| Has the project integrated cross cutting issues in its design? How? | Integration of gender within the project design and activitiesIntegration of vulnerable groups | Project document, annual reports, progress report, project management team | Desk research of documents produced by the project, Interviews |
| How was the intervention adjusted to the local context? Was there technical guidance from other developing countries provided in the project design?How and why was the intervention adjusted over time? | Management and operational strategiesRelevance of the activities to the local context | Project management teamAnnual reports, progress reports | Desk research interviews |
| Effectiveness | To what extent have the project’s objectives been reached?What outcomes does the project intend to achieve?What outputs has the project achieved?What percentage of the project results at the output level has been achieved? | Achievements of:- The psychosocial assessment and support component objectives- The assessment objectives- The livelihood component objectives- The financial inclusion component objectives | SLRCS psychological reportsEmployment records and SLRCS databaseReports from CAPsReports from BDSReports from vocational training institutesUniversity / Tertiary education facility records and student registriesVerification from Micro Finance InstitutionsProgress reports, interviews with project team, stakeholder and beneficiaries | Desk researchInterviews |
| Has the project reached its intended beneficiaries? | Intended geographic scope and achievements | Desk researchInterviews |
| In addition to this initiative, what other factors may have affected the results? | Impact of other initiatives (beneficiaries who benefited from other similar reintegration programs) | Progress reports, interviews with project team, stakeholder and beneficiaries | Desk researchInterviews |
| Were the project activities adequate to make progress towards the project objectives?To what extent was the project implemented as envisaged by the project document? If not, why not? | Achievement of the project objectivesModification of the project design during its implementation | Project management teamAnnual reports, progress reports | Desk researchInterviews |
| Where the project failed to meet the outputs identified in the project document, why was this? | Internal and external causes for not achieving the project objective | Progress reports, interviews with project team, stakeholder and beneficiaries | Desk researchInterviews |
| Efficiency | Has the initiative been implemented within deadline and cost estimates? | Have there been time extensions on the project? Why?Has there been over-expenditure or under-expenditure on the project? | Progress reports, budgets , work plans, interviews | Desk researchInterviews |
| Have UNDP and its partners taken prompt actions to solve implementation issues? | Was the logical framework of the project efficiently designed?What was the monitoring system put in place to manage the project?Was the monitoring system used and its results used in changing the project implementation structure or activities? | Logical frameworkProgress reports, budgets , work plans, interviews | Desk researchInterviews |
| Were implementation arrangements favorable to the initiative good implementation? | Were there frequent drop outs or staff changes?Were there delays in the implementation caused by the implementation process? | Progress reports, budgets , work plans, interviews | Desk researchInterviews |
| What operational challenges were faced by project implementers? How effectively were they solved to maintain quality of the content of the project outputs? | Annual work planAnalysis of changing contextual factors?Identification of risk factors and measures to solve them  | Annual reports, progress reports | Desk research |
| Were the resources focused on activities which would bring the most important impact?Was the budget adequate for its estimated impact? | Were UNDP resources focused on the set of activities that were expected to produce significant results?Was there any identified synergy between UNDP initiatives that contributed to reducing costs?Have services, such as grants and start-up kits, provided by the project to the beneficiaries been used?Cost comparison with similar EVD recovery initiatives | Logical frameworkProgress reports, budgets , work plans, interviews | Desk researchInterviews |
| Impact | To what extent did the initiative contribute to the Recovery and Economy of Sierra Leone? | To what extent has the project caused changes and effects, positive and negative, foreseen and unforeseen, on:The mental health of SLRCS volunteers?The economic reintegration of SLRCS volunteers?The access of SLRCS volunteers to financial services? | SLRCS psychological reportsEmployment records and SLRCS databaseReports from CAPsReports from BDSReports from vocational training institutesUniversity / Tertiary education facility records and student registriesVerification from Micro Finance InstitutionsProgress reports, interviews with project team, stakeholder and beneficiaries | Desk researchInterviews |
| Has the initiative reached outside of its direct beneficiaries? | To what extent has the project caused changes and effects, positive and negative, foreseen and unforeseen, For ERWs?For ERW reskilling and reintegration programs?In the communities, related to the image of ERWs?With financial institutions and employers, related to the image of ERWs? | Progress reports, interviews with project team, stakeholder and beneficiaries | Desk researchInterviews |
| Have the initiative’s lessons learned been diffused and used by other projects and programs? Is the project likely to have a catalytic effect? How? Why? | To what extent were the project activities shared with other development partners or within the UNDP?Is there any other project or program which has used the project lessons learned?Are there initiatives with private partners (CAPs, BDS, etc.) on ERW reintegration? | Progress reports, interviews with project team, stakeholder and beneficiaries.Existing improved reskilling and reintegration programs for the wider ERWPossibilities to extend the services to wider ERW | Desk researchInterviews |
| Sustainability | Is the CBPSS component sustainable? | How are Red Cross resources allocated for this component or to support Red Cross Staff trained in CBPSS to continue their activities?Is there potential for new activities or initiatives planned for this component? | Interviews with project team and stakeholders | Interviews |
| To what extent the reintegration of SLRCS volunteers can be considered sustainable? | Are SLRCS volunteers engaged in sustainable income generation activities?Have prejudices against SCLRS volunteers been mitigated in communities, vocational center and finance institutions? | Interviews with project team, beneficiaries and stakeholders | Interviews |
| To what extent will vocational centers and other partners to this project continue to implement reintegration programs for SCLRS volunteers and other Ebola related workers?  | Do the partners to this initiative plan any training for Ebola related workers? Are they supported by development partners or the government?  | Interviews with project team and stakeholders | Interviews |

**Appendix 2: Field study schedule**

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| --- | --- |
| Date | Activities |
| June 17 - 18 | Travel: Tokyo – Paris – Amsterdam – Freetown (arrive at 19:30 pm 6/18) |
| June 19 | Kick-Off meetings (UNDP, IFRC, SLRCS, etc.), security briefingDocument review, review of the schedule

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| **Morning**  | **Afternoon** |
| UNDP – Briefings  | KII – Secretary General - SLRCS |
| KII – Head of Country Office IFRC | KII – Project Manager – IFRC  |

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| June 20 - 21 | Freetown: Meetings with stakeholders, including the following:

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| --- | --- |
| **Morning – 20/06/2017** | **Afternoon -20/06/2017** |
| Time  | Activity  | Time  | Activity  |
| 8.00am – 10.00am  | UNDP – Briefings | 12.00PM – 1.00PM | KII – CAPS coordinator FBC |
| 10.00am – 11.00am | KII – Teachers at IPAM | 2.00PM – 3.00PM | KII – Ecobank Microfinance (SL) LTD  |
| 11.00AM – 12.00PM | FGD – Students at IPAM | 3.30PM – 4.15PM | FDG – BDS Volunteers  |
|  |  | 4.15pm – 5.00pm | FGDS – CAPS Volunteers |
| **Morning – 21st June, 2017** | **Afternoon 21st June 2017** |
| Time | Activity  | Time  | Activity  |
| 9.30am – 10.15am | KII – AYK logistics  | 12.00pm – 1.00pm  | FGD – Volunteers in Colleges  |
| 10.15am – 11.00am | FDG – CAPS Drivers AYK | 2.00PM – 3.00PM  | KII –Resident Coordinator – UNDP  |
| 11.00AM – 12.00PM | FDG – Volunteers – vocational Training  | 3.00PM – 4.00PM  | KII –Project Manager– UNDP |

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| June 22-23 | Visit to Port Loko and Makeni (stay in Makeni or Port Loko on June 22)

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| **Morning – 22nd June, 2017** | **Afternoon -22nd June, 2017**  |
| Time  | Activity  | Time  | Activity  |
| 6.30am – 9.30am | Travel to Port- Loko | 12.00pm – 1.00pm  | FDG – Volunteers in Continuing Education  |
| 9.30am – 10.15am | KII - Teachers & Head of Abbako Technical Training Institution  | 2.00pm – 300pm  | Interview Branch Manager  |
| 10.15AM – 11.00AM | KII - Teachers & Head of Earnest Bai Koroma University  | 3.00pm – 4.00pm  | Travel to Makeni |
| 11.00am – 12.00pm | FDG – Volunteers in Vocational Training  |  |  |
| **Morning 23rd June 2017** | **Afternoon - 23rd June 2017** |
| Time  | Activity  | Time  | Activity  |
| 8.30am – 9.30am | KII- Branch Manager | 12.15pm – 1.00pm | FDS – vocational Volunteers & CAPS |
| 9.30AM – 10.30AM | FDG – Volunteers in UNIMAK | 2.00pm – 6.00pm | Travel back To Freetown |
| 10.30AM – 11.30PM | FDG – UNIMAK Finance & Admin |  |  |
| 11.30AM – 12.15PM | FDG – Volunteers in BDS |  |  |

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| June 24-26 | Freetown: Summary of the visit findings, document review |
| June 27-28 | Visit to Bo and Kenema (stay in Bo)

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| **Monday, 27th June 2017 – Morning**  | **Monday, 27th June 2017 – Afternoon** |
| **Time** | **Activity**  | **Time**  | **Activity**  |
| 6.00am –10.00am | Travel to Bo | 2.00pm – 2.45pm | FDG – Students in Continuing education Njala University |
| 10.00am – 11.00am | KII – Branch Manager | 2.45pm – 3.15pm | KII – Head Of Vocational training Institution -AITH |
| 11.00am – 12.00pm  | FDG – Volunteers in Vocational Training  | 3.15pm – 4.00pm | KII – Head Of Vocational training Institution - PEEVIC |
| 12.00pm – 1.00pm | FDG – BDS volunteers  |  |  |
| **Tuesday. 28th June, 2017 Morning**  | **Tuesday. 28th June, 2017 Afternoon** |
| **Time** | **Activity**  | **Time**  | **Activity**  |
| 6.00am – 8.00am | Travel to Kenema | 10.00AM – 11.00AM | KII – BDS Service Provider - CEPAD |
| 8.00am – 9.00am | KII – Branch Manager  | 1.00pm - 6.00pm  | Travel to Freetown |
| 9.00am – 10.00am | FGD – BDS volunteers  |  |  |

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| June 29 | Freetown: complete visits to stakeholders and or focus groups

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| **Wednesday: 28th June 2017: Morning**  | **Wednesday: 28th June 2017: Morning** |
| **Time** | **Activity**  | **Time**  | **Activity**  |
| 9.00am – 10.00am | KII – Programme Manager – UNDP |  |  |
| 10.00am – 12.00am  | Wrap up meeting |  |  |

 |
| June 29 – July 1 | Travel: (Leaving at 19:30 pm, 6/29) Freetown – Paris – Tokyo |
| July 4 | Skype interview with SLRCS project manager |
| July 5 | Skype interview with IFRC head of Programs |

**Appendix 3: Documents consulted**

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| --- | --- |
| Type of document | Name |
| Background strategy | - National Ebola Recovery Strategy for Sierra Leone, 2015-2017- UNDP Response to the Ebola Crisis in Sierra Leone |
| Project documents | - Project documents, version 1 and 2- Revised result matrix- First and second extension document- Annual work plans (2016, 2017) |
| Progress reports | - Monthly narratives (January to April 2016)- Quarterly report (June to August 2016)- Quarterly report (September to November 2016)- Quarterly report (December 2016 to February 2017)- Quarterly report (March 2017 to May 2017)- Annual report to MPTF and summary, 2016 |
| Financial reports | - Monthly reports (January to June 2016)- Quarterly report (June to August 2016)- Quarterly report (September to November 2016)- Quarterly report (December 2016 to February 2017) |
| Monitoring reports | - Monitoring report May 2017 |
| Baseline surveys | - PSS assessment- Market assessment |
| Databases | - Volunteer database (CAPS)- Volunteer database (others) |
| Others | - Training report (CEPAD)- Training report (AFFORD)- Training report (Restless development)- Training report (Abakko vocational center) |

1. UNDP / IFRC, Reintegration of Sierra Leone Red Cross Society (SLRCS9 Volunteers Burial Teams, Project Document [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. There were several cases declared in September 2015 in northern Sierra Leone (https://www.yahoo.com/news/ebola-case-sierra-leone-quarantine-village-president-013552935.html) [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. According to the latest Result Matrix, except if indicated otherwise. For the economic streams, the number of beneficiaries was assessed and updated with the new batch of 500 beneficiaries. The final numbers achieved, were only obtained after the beneficiaries choose their streams [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. As the occurrence of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) for the initial 800 volunteers seems to have been overestimated, the new 500 volunteers were finally exempted from the PSS assessment. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Due to the nature of the support the target was revised to be only “as required”. There might be a correlation between the low number of referrals and the effectiveness of the PSS interventions offered throughout the project. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. The additional 500 volunteers were also targeted for this activity. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. 75% of those streamed through vocational training are anticipated to successfully complete one year or six months training program depending on the course they selected. Currently, 65% of the volunteers that undertook vocational training have successfully completed the training. The bulk of the remaining volunteers are to complete their training between June, 2017 and July 2018. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Originally 375 (latest project document), the number was adjusted to the number of volunteers receiving vocational training [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. The kits are in procurement, and should be provided in July 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. 70.3% of the volunteers that opted for BDS stream have successfully completed the training, developed business plans and received start-up capital to kick start their business; 57/462 (12.3%) are currently undergoing training and once they completed the would be provided with start-up capital. 17.4% that never completed the training were noncommittal, citing reasons such as unavailability of transport refund, training allowance, meals during the training among others. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Originally 225 (latest project document), the number was adjusted to the [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Originally 208 (latest project document), the number was adjusted to the number of volunteers receiving business development training [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. The financial inclusion trainings were originally designed for the beneficiaries who would undertake Business Development courses. However they were extended to the total 1,300 project beneficiaries for better sustainability of all livelihood interventions. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. It was estimated that 50% of the volunteers with signs of stress and/or trauma related symptoms would report ablation of said symptoms after treatment. Only one volunteer after psychosocial assessment showed signs of stress or trauma related symptoms and has received treatment and recovered. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. The volunteer who was under treatment recovered fully and currently there is no volunteer undergoing treatment. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. 8% (5/62) of the volunteers that opted for CAPS stream at the time of reporting had secured employment. To strengthen the ability of the other volunteers to secure jobs, an eight week internship programme was organized where the volunteers will gain work experience. This is expected to finish for some of the volunteers in June & July, 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. 65% of the volunteers that opted for vocational training have successfully completed the training and the bulk of the remaining volunteers will be completing their skills trainings between June 2017 and July, 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. A total of 148 volunteers have registered their business ventures with the various district councils. The businesses are now recognized as formal established enterprises. 80% (325/405) SDB/IPC volunteers successfully completed training and developed 186 business plans that have been funded with start-up capital. A total of 57 volunteers from the other pillars are undergoing training and once they complete the training they would be provided with start-up capital. Most of the beneficiaries initiate or will initiate the process of setting up or expanding small and medium enterprises envisioned in their business plans upon receiving the capital. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. 3.5% of the volunteers that resumed their studies after the outbreak have completed their studies based on the level of education they were prior to the outbreak. From the remaining students, some will complete their studies in 2017, in 2018 and the last batch in 2019 and 2020. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. The ability of the volunteers to access loan and microcredit facilities depends to their ability to save and borrow and their general financial management as ascertained by the banks. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. According to interviews conducted with partner universities. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. The quality of services varied greatly between service providers, such as for vocational IT trainings or driving trainings. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)