**Prospective Evaluation for UNDP**

**of**

**Strengthening Institutional Performance**

**&**

**Support to Emerging Federal States**

Evaluators:

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| Evaluation Target Summary |
| --- |
| Project Name | Somalia Capacity Development–Strengthening Institutional Performance (SIP) |
| Evaluation Period | 1 July 2015 – 30 September 2017 |
| Total $ | Budget $16,895,000Available for use: $14,970,000 | Spent to end 09/17 $10,651,000 |
| Project Name | Support to Emerging Federal States (StEFS) |
| Evaluation Period | 1 April 2016 – 30 September 2017 |
| Total $ | Budget million $13,991,000Available for use: $10 582 000 | Spent to end 09/17 $5 663 000 |

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As this is an independent report, the views expressed herein represent those of the evaluators and do not necessarily reflect the views of UNDP or the Federal Government of Somalia.

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# Acronyms

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ACU | Aid Coordination Unit |  |  |  |
| AWP | Annual Work Plan |  |  |  |
| BFC | Boundaries and Federalism Commission |  |
| CIM | Capacity Injection Mechanism |  |  |
| CIP | Capacity Injection Programme |  |  |
| CSC | Civil Service Commission |  |  |
| DPC | Direct Project Cost |  |  |
| ERP | Economic Recovery Plan |  |  |
| FCA | Finnish Church Aid |  |  |  |
| FCAS | Fragile and Conflict Affected States |  |
| FGS | Federal Government of Somalia |  |  |
| FMS | Federal Member State |  |  |  |
| GGGACB | Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Bureau (Puntland) |
| GIS | Geographic Information Systems |
| GSS | Galmudug State of Somalia |  |  |
| HACT | UN Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfer |  |
| HSS | HirShabelle State of Somalia |  |  |
| JSS | Jubaland State of Somalia |  |  |
| LOA | Letter of Agreement |  |  |  |
| MoIFAR | Ministry of Interior, Federalism and Reconciliation |
| MoLSA | Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs |  |
| MoLYS | Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sports (Puntland) |
| MoPIC | Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (fmr name in FGS, Current in all FMS) |
| MoPIED | Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development |
| MoWDFA | Ministry of Women's Development and Family Affairs (Puntland) |
| MoWHA | Ministry of Women and Human Rights (fed) |  |
| MPTF | Multi-partner Trust Fund |  |  |
| MSC | Most Significant Change |  |  |
| NDC | National Development Council |  |  |
| NDP | National Development Plan |  |  |
| NEX | National Execution |  |  |  |
| NIM | National Implementation |  |  |
| OOP | Office of the President |  |  |
| OPM | Office of Prime Minister |  |  |
| PDIA | Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation |  |
| PDP | Puntland Development Plan |  |  |
| PSS | Puntland State of Somalia |  |  |
| RBM | Results based Management |  |  |
| SDG | Sustainable Development Goals |  |  |
| SDRF | Somalia Development and Reconstruction Fund |
| SIDP | Somalia Institutional Development Project |  |
| SIP | Strengthening Institutional Performance |  |
| SNA | Somali National Army |  |  |  |
| StEFS | Support to Emerging Federal States |  |
| SWS | Southwest State |  |  |  |
| TA | Technical Advisors |  |  |  |
| TOC | Theory of Change |  |  |  |
| TOC | Technical Officers |  |  |  |
| TPM  | Third Party Monitoring |  |  |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |  |
| UNSOM | UN Somalia Mission |  |  |  |
| UNSOS | UN Support Operations Somalia |  |  |
| WB | World Bank |  |  |  |

# Executive Summary

## Evaluation Setting

UNDP Somalia recruited the two evaluators to jointly assess the work of two projects: Strengthening Institutional Performance (SIP) and Support to Emerging Federal States (StEFS) operating under its Capacity Development Programme. This report is structured to provide Findings and Conclusions for each project separately. However, as one of the underlying purposes of the evaluation was to assess the potential for continuing the work of the two projects under a single banner, a common set of Recommendations have been provided at the end.

Somalia is a remarkable case. Despite decades of operating as a non-state, the condition of many variables in the country have improved over the levels found in the 1980s when it operated as a highly centralized state. Similar improvements have been identified when the situation of Somalia has been compared to that of other countries of Africa[[1]](#footnote-2). While a case can be made regarding the potential for error in such assessments during a period of conflict, it is clear that there is an inherent capacity to overcome adversity in Somali culture that needs to be taken as a fundamental basis for any development project. This has been borne out as the evaluators identified numerous innovations undertaken by the government partners of these two projects.

In the view of the evaluators, these projects were not appropriate targets for evaluation at this time. Although the end dates for both projects are soon approaching, a substantial portion of their combined budgets remained to be spent at the end of the evaluation period, and many outputs were yet to be completed. There had been a significant downturn in the pace of project activities leading up to the national election. This was followed by an extended period when the new government set about organizing itself, with both positive and negative consequences for project implementation. After the end of the specified evaluation period (September 2017), reports of progress in some of the languishing aspects of the project added to the evaluators’ contention that if an evaluation mission were to be fielded, it should have been delayed until 2018.

 Although the TOR was structured as a standard (boiler plate) UNDP evaluation, including issues of sustainability and impact, the evaluators felt that a more appropriate orientation for their assignment would have been as a high-level Third Party Monitoring assessment to suggest either modifications during the final stages of the project. However, the evaluators felt the most appropriate time for such a TPM would have been in the early days of the political transition in the federal government before new partner agreements had been put into place.

With these concerns in mind, the evaluators decided to undertake the work as a learning evaluation rather than an accountability evaluation, making use of appropriate evaluation tools such as Appreciative Inquiry and Most Significant Result.

## Findings of SIP and StEFS

From the outset, the evaluators recognized that the two projects had undertaken a number of activities that were beginning to generate some of the basic conditions for the establishment of effective governance in Somalia, *viz.* provision of technical assistance to the tiers of Government, infrastructure provision and rehabilitation, equipment and furnishings, vehicles, and, in the case of the Support to Emerging Federal States (StEFS, collaborating in a number of interim reconciliation agreements.

Both projects operated at the Federal and State levels. The work of the SIP project was conducted with the federal units of the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development (MoPIED), Ministry of Interior Federalism and Reconciliation (MoIFAR), Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA), Civil Service Commission (CSC), Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and Office of the President (OOP), as well as with the Puntland State of Somalia (PSS). StEFS worked with the federal agencies of MoIFAR and Boundaries and Federalism Commission (BFC) and OPM while concentrating its efforts on the four emerging states of Jubaland (JSS), Southwest (SWS), HirShabelle (HSS) and Galmudug (GSS).

The SIP project was initiated first and represents the continuation of an earlier UNDP-managed Somali Institutional Development Project (SIDP). SIDP had a larger budget, perhaps not fully utilized, and longer running time (2009-2014). Although it was already winding down, SIDP had a critical evaluation in 2014 that sped up its closure. Unfortunately, the follow-on project, SIP, continued some of the same practices that were criticized by the SIDP evaluators, namely, focusing on capacity substitution and, especially in Puntland, limited follow up. Nevertheless, after 30 months of operation, SIP can point to having contributed to two significant processes: the generation of the 2016 National Development Plan together with the associated improvement in the Somali/International Community aid management regime and the correlary establishment of the National Development Council. Unfortunately, oversight of SIP was seriously limited as the Steering Committee has not met to address SIP issues for nearly two years. In contrast, the Puntland/SIP Steering Committee functions as a true partnership between project and government.

Although SIDP had earlier worked in South Central Somalia (Mogadishu), Somaliland and Puntland, the StEFS project was created as a wholly new initiative designed specifically in support of the Somali political decision to implement the constitutional provision for the formalization of new federal states in the South-central portion of the country. StEFS has provided necessary assistance to the formation and initial functioning of these four states, and to the capacity of the federal agencies of Interior and BFC. However, as the project has only been implemented for 18 months and has over half its funding remaining to be spent, the evaluators felt it was far too early to meaningfully assess whether this support would lead to sustained progress in these States.

SIP and StEFS were established as separate projects, but operating under a single UNDP programme for Capacity Development. Unfortunately, the evaluators did not identify an institutionalized sharing of lessons between the two projects. A particular case involves the international GIS expert of StEFS who worked with BFAR at the Federal level and Election Commission in Puntland. At no time was he directed to provide a modicum of expert advice to the nascent GIS efforts of MOPIED or Puntland MOPIC. In fact, within SIP itself, there was limited interaction observed between its Federal and Puntland components, and substantial amounts of underutilized financial resources were left sitting in Federal output budgets that could have been effectively utilized by the State government and for sharing lessons learned from Puntland with the FGS and FMS.

In summary, StEFS and SIP have pursued the projects’ outcomes through the following activities

* Support to the Reconciliation Process – principally through financial support to the exercises logistics (flights, subsistence for participants) with limited technical assistance provided in association with other partners. It is appreciated by the evaluators that UNDP deliberately took a back seat because the activity is best led by Somalis. (StEFS only)
* Provision of (limited) infrastructure for the new administrations since little, if any, public infrastructure had survived the 20+ years of civil war. (SIP marginally)
* Equipping government offices (office furniture, computers – desk- and laptops – printers, internet access, etc.)
* Technical advice (short-term national and international) and training in identified key functional areas for counterpart State and Federal Ministries
* Engagement with civil society, including CSOs, women’s organisations, community elders and members, and religious leaders primarily around federalism and conflict mitigation/management.

## Core Conclusions

The purpose of monitoring is to note what is evident, the purpose of evaluation is to assess the impact of that which cannot be seen. In this regard, the potential in Somalia for the ‘unknown unknown’ to influence the future remains great. Throughout this report, the evaluators have stressed that development approaches in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (FCAS) that assumed technical public administration interventions were sufficient to create sound governance have invariably failed over the long run. Hence, a critical lesson should be drawn from the consequences in South Sudan where for several years the international community placed a heavy emphasis on the creation of the trappings of a modern administrative state[[2]](#footnote-3)

The key point raised by the evaluation is to question the underlying assumption in SIP that a public administration that mimics those of developed countries is necessary for a stable Somalia. We believe that this is incorrect (or, at least, incomplete) and continuing to focus on building government capacity without an emphasis on how that capacity will be utilized for the betterment of the population could result in a worse situation. Institutions that have proven effective and resilient as countries develop rarely are based in implanted rules. When successful, they more often emerge through continuous dialogue and modification based on local knowledge and experience. Given the classic knowledge problem, the challenges to designing complex institutions in a top-down manner are generally insurmountable, particularly in an FCAS that has seriously limited revenue generation and continues to experience ongoing conflict.

The StEFS project has also placed a heavy emphasis on building the functionality of the State administrations, but has also collaborated in the initiation of a political process necessary for establishing the legitimacy of the States. This process needs to be continued, but with a greater emphasis on inclusion of a broader array of stakeholders rather than operating as a framework for an elite settlement.

The evauators contend that while a functioning bureaucracy may facilitate stable development its structure and functions should emerge from experience obtained through a progressive process of solving locally relevant problems. In particular, that process of bureaucratic design needs to be focused on how structures and rules can evolve out of customary norms so as build the capacity of the government to deliver the goods and services expected by their constituents. In the view of the evaluators, such a perspective is particularly appropriate in a country that has yet to generate more than a tiny fraction of the resources necessary to maintain even a fledgling bureaucracy. This view of the evaluators is also built on the evidence generated in Puntland and Somaliland on how an endogenous, and iterative, process leading towards improved governance and public service delivery can generate a more functional government over time.

Nevertheless, the conclusions of this evaluation should be viewed as cautionary rather than reproachful. The evaluators acknowledge in the introductory section that there is no perfect design for working with an FCAS. But precisely for this reason we believe that a continued emphasis on replicating structures and functions that mirror developed public administrations would be inappropriate. The assistance provided can be useful if (and only if) these projects begin to place far greater attention to the quality of the relationship being built among these governments and their constituents. This would potentially involve a shift away from a heavy use of international technical consultants towards the introduction of tools that can facilitate a more dialectical approach to public/private engagement.

## Prospective Recommendations

Customary institutions continue to play a critical role in the daily life of people, government and businesses in Somalia. The fact that this important aspect of Somali society has remained essentially outside the ambit of SIP and StEFS (with the exception of the state formation dialogues) is a concern. The evaluators recommend that far less emphasis should be placed on the introduction of externally created tools and processes in the future. This should be replaced by a stronger focus on understanding, and building upon, why systems currently operate the way they do[[3]](#footnote-4).

Going forward, the evaluators supports the UNDP proposal to merge the two projects. There are significant synergies to be achieved if the federal agencies and states are supported under the rubric of a common Theory of Change.

Clearly, combining SIP and StEFS into one project in the future will help, but if the experience of Puntland is any indication, the States will need to exert considerable pressure on project management to get their issues heard and sufficient resources to carry out their innovative ideas.

The current process of project implementation should be reconsidered. The evaluators argue for a substantial increase in the use of facilitated dialogue techniques as a means of introducing new concepts and structures so that these more closely match existing capacities and norms. Some movement in this direction in the StEFS work on State administrative structures apparently began to occur after the end of the evaluation period. This type of interactive engagement should become commonplace in all parts of the project.

Finally, the evaluators strongly urge that any new project should not focus on national government public administration reform. While this may be one component, we argue that a future UNDP project should emphasize seeking solutions to locally relevant problems of public service delivery as a means of concentrating on the important issue of building a coherent and supportive relationship between the States and the Federal government in ways that benefit the citizens of Somalia. The evaluators further contend, based on past SIP & StEFS achievements, UNDP’s comparative advantage would be to address this issue of federalist collaboration through a concentration of its technical assistance on improved aid management, planning, and information systems in support of actualizing coherent implementation of the National Development Plan (NDP) and State Strategic plans. However, in all cases, continuation of UNDP assistance in any area must be contingent upon Somali demand, ownership and recognition of reciprocal performance obligations.

# Key Lesson learned

‘The Planning Ministry did so well, they made us look good.”

UNDP/Somalia Country Director

Several times during the evaluation, UNDP managers voiced the question: “Why do some elements of these projects work so much better than others?” As the evaluators sorted through the interview and documentary evidence, a common pattern emerged. It became quite clear to the evaluators that project success, as measured both in completion of planned tasks and subsequent utilization of the UNDP support, could be closely associated with the level of partner commitment to the proffered assistance. The Country Director’s oft repeated remark, above, aptly encapsulates the essence of this lesson.

The aspects of these projects that worked best are those that were well tuned to the needs and interests of the partner agency. In contrast, the elements that were included in these projects because they matched the perception of ‘best international practice’ in FCAS strengthening, fared less well. In fact, many were never completed and some were never able to be started. A clear distinction in SIP can be seen in the progress made on the Civil Service Law versus the National Development Plan. The overall progress made in Puntland is also reflective of the commitment of the State Government to reform its systems to improve its capacity to deliver on its political promises. Commitment to StEFS from the Federal Member States (FMS) to complete project activities was a bit easier as each was seriously interested in being recognized as a full-fledged member of the federation. However, the steps taken by Southwest State to use project support to establish a highly collaborative relationship with non-state actors deserves note as this represents a partner-directed and owned outcome that all state-building efforts should be seeking.

For the evaluators, therefore, the key lesson learned is that, despite the nascent status of the Somali federation, the next phase support needs to clearly recognize that a state-building process must be an internally led learning process and committed to improving service to the public…as opposed to focusing on financing activities that benefit public servants (buildings, equipment, study tours and project financed posts) absent associated, and obligatory, targets that measure change in tangible benefits to citizens. This may mean that some aspects of standard institutional reform will progress more slowly, but we argue that a self-directed learning process will result in more deeply institutionalized reforms that will serve as the basis for endogenous transformation in the future. The example of the SWS engagement with civil society given below is an important one to build upon.

How does an external project support a valid learning process? In the view of the evaluators, it should start by having a design that allows a level of flexibility in choice of interventions based on partner problem identification. There are, indeed, international best practices that have been deemed critical for successful state formation. Nevertheless, time and again, evaluations point to the need for interventions to be “more nuanced, iterative and locally contextualised”[[4]](#footnote-5). However, a ‘problem’ cannot be defined by the partner as the need for a paid advisor, a car, a computer or a building. A problem must be a practical issue the partner agency is attempting to resolve, perhaps initially articulated through a facilitated problem tree analysis, that it feels is critical enough to request foreign assistance. The partner must also be willing to be responsible for setting targets to be achieved and tracking progress. In return, they would need to specify what their agency could contribute to the common resource pool and organize its available staff to deliver on commitments. No project, no matter how strong the local commitment, can progress in a linear manner, especially in a complex environment like Somalia. Therefore, commitment cannot be limited to agreements made at the beginning of an engagement, it must be sustained through a collaborative process of iterative adaptation over the life of the project. The key for this is the development of strong political feedback loops that get to terms with understanding how governance is currently undertaken so that internal awareness is built on how to influence change. Learning to work politically rather than bureaucratically is the fundamental shift that is proposed~~.~~

## Vignettes of Somali Governance Innovations

“When are you going to stop making us implement your ideas”

 Senior Official, Federal Government of Somalia

**Southwest State of Somalia**

The Southwest State (SWS) was officially created in 2014. Political stability has proven difficult to sustain with a rapid change in Cabinet members and inability to bring Lower Shebelle fully under State control.

Despite these difficulties, SWS has taken a lead in building strong relations with non-State actors, both civil and business. Several NGOs, national and international, met with the evaluators while in Baidoa. They explained how the State has taken on the role of facilitator to create closer collaboration among all actors engaged in development in the State. The team observed a coordination session of 25 NGOs working in the WASH sector from across Bay and Bakool regions meeting in the Planning Ministry’s new building, that had been constructed by StEFS. A session with the Mayor/District Commissioner of Baidoa also indicated the close collaboration among different levels of government within the State

The State helped the evaluators to organize a small discussion with young graduates in Baidoa, eight men and four women. The team was impressed with the high praise given for the State’s work over the past three years. Interestingly, the most positive comments came from the women who were adamant that their lives and those of most other women had improved immeasurably.

The State has used its enhanced relations with non-state actors to help it in devising the first Drought Intervention and Recovery Plan completed anywhere in the Republic. This plan, and that of the broader Strategic Plan developed together with StEFS, should enable the State to attract valuable international assistance in an organized manner over the coming years. The goals and outcomes noted in this Strategic Plan will be delivered through an actively managed implementation process, overseen by a Steering Committee composed of State officials, plus civil society and private sector and aligned with the indicators and reporting methods approved for use under the National Development Plan. The expectation is that all implementing partners will base their upcoming activities on the Strategic Plan and other State plans.

**Puntland State of Somalia**

The State of Puntland (PSS) formally declared its autonomous status in 1998. Since that time, it has received international assistance, including from the SIP predecessor project SIDP. In 2005, a group of Puntland intellectuals created an organization devoted to Good Governance. This group facilitated a wide range of discussions regarding the critical issues facing the State government. The group’s recommendations focused on four sectors of Finance, Security, Judiciary and Establishment (bureaucracy). In 2006, the group prepared a report advising the government to establish a Commission to manage the Civil Service, which it did in 2007.

This NGO steadily gained favour with the State government and was eventually taken in as the Good Governance Bureau. In 2013, Somaliland copied the Puntland experience, forming its own Bureau. The role of the Puntland Bureau was expanded in 2014 to include anti-corruption activities. SIP supported the Bureau, enabling it to prepare a more organized strategic plan. With that catalytic support, the Bureau has been able to craft a Citizen’s Public Service Delivery Charter for Public Services, a Public Complaints Mechanism and has initiated an advocacy strategy for anti-corruption with the public, among others.

The Ministry of Women’s Development and Family Affairs collaborated with SIP to prepare a set of Gender Mainstreaming Guidelines and undertook several regional orientation workshops on these principles. The Ministry has also created a robust presence on social media. Political support from the Women’s Minister and the First Lady of Puntland induced a set of donors outside of UNDP to sponsor an important workshop for establishing FGM as a practice to be eliminated from Puntland[[5]](#footnote-6).

Previous assistance enabled the State to prepare three strategic development plans. These plans have helped the State to rationale the use of its limited domestic financial resources. In 2015, PSS took the decision to seek assistance to modify its existing development plan (PDP) to align it with the sectoral framework and timeline of the National Development Plan. All FMS were invited to Garowe to learn how Puntland had conducted their previous planning exercises. The MoPIC views SIP as catalytic support that adds to what the Ministry has already decided it needs to accomplish during the coming year.

In a facilitated workshop with the evaluator, senior officials of the Puntland government stressed the need for future support to focus on processes that could foster governance innovations rather than expecting rote implementation of rules and systems introduced by international consultants.

**Federal Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development**

The Ministry of Planning has long been one of the major elements of the Somali government, beginning in the 1960s. In 2014, the leadership of the Ministry began to brainstorm on how to re-create its earlier capacity and influence. Their initial assessment showed there was much work to do in bringing the organization back on track. They went to UNDP to seek assistance after they had chalked out a framework for rebuilding the Ministry and shifting from a passive planning framework, with most services putatively being delivered by NGOS, to one based on rational analysis that could guide government action. After providing some initial ad hoc assistance, the SIP project was designed to place its major focus on enhancing national capacity in planning and aid coordination. Work began on building the basics of financial management and human resource strengthening together with enhancing the staffing complement, infrastructure and equipment. Gradually, as the capacity of the organization grew, attention shifted to the preparation of a national development planning framework. Support from SIP provided the financing for the Ministry of Planning and the Aid Coordination Unit to organize over 60 dialogue sessions involving federal and state governments, together with citizens, to guide the development of the plan. The National Development Council, functioning as an open dialogue platform for FGS and FMS on development matters, was fully activated through the NDP formulation efforts. Once the plan had been approved, work began to focus on how it could be implemented and how results could be tracked. A national M&E framework involving all line ministries and FMS was approved by Cabinet and, in early November 2017, the first draft of the National Statistics Bureau framework had been submitted to Parliament.

# Evaluation Background

The UNDP Somalia recruited a two-man team[[6]](#footnote-7) to evaluate two projects Strengthening Institutional Performance (SIP) and Support to Emerging Federal States (StEFS). SIP operates with federal agencies and the state of Puntland. StEFS operates with federal agencies and in four new States in the south-central part of Somalia. The SIP project activities were reviewed for the period 1 January 2015 until 30th September 2017 (additional financial data from December 2017 was incorporated in the final report). The StEFS project activities were reviewed from 1 April 2016 until 30 September 2017.

## Tools

Methods and techniques chosen by the evaluators were used to promote inclusive participation of key stakeholders. Chief among these methods were modified use of Appreciative Inquiry and Most Significant Change. These tools were selected because of the recognition that the complex development environment in Somalia does not lend itself to a standard assessment of project accomplishments and impact. In addition, the incomplete nature of both projects encouraged the team to conduct the evaluation more as a learning exercise than as an accountability examination.

### Appreciative Inquiry

Employing dialogue tools associated with an Appreciative Inquiry method, the evaluators focused on identifying the best of what UNDP has accomplished to create a basis for defining the elements of future improvements. This approach also involved the facilitation of an internal analysis of case situations to engage UNDP staff and partners in identifying shortcomings and institutionalizing mitigation measures. The evaluators used this approach rather than a more standard external critique method so that both UNDP and Somali partners would have a clear sense of ownership in the process.

### Most Significant Change

The use of the Most Significant Change (MSC) approach involved generating and analysing personal accounts of change to determine project results from the perspective of the participants. MSC is particularly useful for learning about the similarities and differences in what disparate groups and individuals involved in the same project have valued. It provides some information about impact and unintended impact, but is primarily about clarifying the values held by different stakeholders. This method, modified to match the existing ground conditions, is included in this evaluation approach to further increase participation of the project stakeholders and provide the evaluators with perspectives on progress from their eyes.

### Prospective Orientation

The Evaluation was conducted considering the future of UNDP capacity development for governance programming as its primary orientation. The Team gathered data on past and current operations with the intent to assess their potential for replication or modification under any future design.

### Output Focus

The UNDP requested the team to use an Output focus in this evaluation. They felt that the projects had been in operation for too short a period to have data to measure results at the outcome level.  UNDP felt the projects had focused on the creation of discrete building blocks that needed to be assessed separately. However, the evaluators felt that while many of these ‘building blocks’ had been generated, it was nearly impossible to identify any direct benefit accruing to Somali citizens outside the government. While the evaluators agreed to focus on outputs as a retrospective tool, they strongly noted the need to incorporate assessment tools for measuring outcome achievement in any future project formulation.

## Process

### Document Review

The team reviewed the project documents, quarterly and annual reports, newsletters, project board meetings, specialist reports and partner documentation. Unfortunately, the electronic versions of many project documents were not stored in a place where the evaluators could access them, nor was a simple listing of all available documents provided. Also the limited office space in the UN compound does not allow for a library of hard copies. Therefore, substantive materials were continually being identified and provided even after the first draft was submitted for review .

Analytical documentation of project-induced transformation proved to be nonexistant. All documentation centered on reporting of project activities. When asked about this, the programme leadership remarked this is what is required by the MPTF fund management board.

### Budget Analysis

The team reviewed and compared the budgets and expenditures by output. Although both projects had geographically disbursed activities, the UNDP financial system (Atlas) seemingly cannot generate expenditure reports by location. In SIP, although many result indicators were earmarked for Puntland deliverables, it was not possible to comparatively assess the basic costs[[7]](#footnote-8) of delivering even common interventions, such as conducting a training. In StEFS, all activities undertaken in individual States were covered under locally signed Letters of Agreement, but shadow budgets by LOA were not provided to the evaluators so comparative analysis by State was not possible. Such comparative analysis should be fundamental for any project management intent on delivering value for money.

### Meetings and observations

Interviews with key stakeholders were conducted in Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baidoa and Garowe. Due to the security situation[[8]](#footnote-9), meetings in government offices were necessarily brief, and many took place in a restaurant inside the ‘green zone’, limiting the team’s ability to properly assess the working environment of many of the partners. Similar difficulties were encountered in the States, with slightly less restrictions in Puntland.

### Limitations

In the view of the evaluators, these projects were not appropriate targets for evaluation at this time. Neither project had completed its work, with many outputs yet to be delivered and, particularly with StEFS, much of the budget was yet to be spent. Projects are designed to accomplish specific tasks and produce anticipated outcomes, the purpose of an evaluation is to measure the extent of progress towards achievement of stated outputs and an assessment of impact on the beneficiary population. However, it is an example of the use of the logical fallacy of “special pleading” when project implementors attempt to shift the goalposts of a project by arguing that the development of an FCAS is a long-t

erm process and therefore any progress should be lauded. The evaluators understand that FCAS development takes time, but the evaluation of a project must use a cut off point to assess whether an the level of progress was in line with expectations and commensurate with the level of resources employed.

# Programme Context

## Somalia is a Fragile and Conflict-Affected State (FCAS)

Somalia is a remarkable development case. Despite decades of operating as a non-state, the condition of many variables in the country have improved over the levels found in the 1980s when it operated as a highly centralized state. Similar improvements have been identified when the situation of Somalia has compared to that of other countries of Africa[[9]](#footnote-10). While a argument can be made regarding the potential for error in such assessments during a period of conflict, it is clear that there is an inherent capacity to overcome adversity in Somali culture that needs to be taken as a fundamental basis for any development project.

Unfortunately, the evaluators did not get the sense that the project implementers fully appreciated this characteristic of the Somali people. The basis for this assertion comes from project implementors insistence that there are no rules of governance in existance, therefore new rules must be introduced from the outside. Obviously this refers to the paucity of rules that mirror those of developed administratvie states. This attitude fails to recognize that much of Somalia has operated under sets of customary rules since 1989. Before attempting to create new institutions, one needs to understand why the current institutions operate the way they do. Customary institutions that are critical to establishing and facilitating norms for secure personal and economic transactions are most in jeopardy when external actors assume they do not exist (or are not effective) simply because they do not operate like those currently operating in more stable, developed nations. Since this critical step was missing at the outset of both projects, the evaluators felt that a strong word of caution needed to be made regarding the project’s heavy reliance on the introduction of external systems and rules via international and national technocrats . The evaluators contend that, if not rectified, this lack of inclusion could result in unintended negative consequences in the future. Complex institutions that prove resilient over time must be structured in ways that facilitate their evolution, therefore tracking their process of emergence is of critical importance.

## Limitations of State-Building Interventions

The 1991 overthrow of the Said Barre regime saw Somalia enter an extended period of inter-clan conflict, characterised by varying degrees of violence, which resulted in substantial loss of life and the exodus of significant numbers into asylum and exile[[10]](#footnote-11). Accompanying this civil war-inflicted disintegration was the disappearance of any concept of service delivery, which was accompanied by the disappearance of institutional memory surrounding a functional public service. This situation continued despite the establishment of the internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government in 2004 until, with assistance from Ethiopian military forces, the Islamic Courts Union was (largely) expelled in 2007 and elections held in 2011.

The following year (August 2012), the Provisional Federal Constitution was approved. In terms of the Constitution, Somalia was to be a federal state, the following powers being reserved to the Federal Government: Foreign Affairs, National Defence; Citizenship and Immigration; and Monetary Policy. All other envisaged areas of authority affecting the federal states, *viz.* Water sources, Agriculture, Animal husbandry, Pasture and forestry, The prevention of erosion and the protection of the environment, Health, Education, Relations and dialogue amongst traditional leaders, and the protection and development of traditional law, Relations amongst religious scholars and Youth, are, by implication, reserved for the federal member states[[11]](#footnote-12). Notwithstanding the emergence of a new federal administration, its writ did, and still does, not extend across the whole geographic area of *de jure* Somalia; Somaliland declared independence unilaterally (18 May 1991) and Puntland asserted its autonomous status in 1998 although it has indicated accession to the federal state.

##### Fig. 1: Map of Approximate Areas of Control in Somalia (August 2017)



Source: [www.polgeonow.com](http://www.polgeonow.com)

Furthermore, at the time of the establishment of the Federal government, only Puntland existed as a de facto federal member state: The Provisional Constitution [1 August 2012] requires that two or more regions should join to establish a state. In effect, therefore the Federal administration had (often disputed) authority[[12]](#footnote-13) over what used to be South-Central Somalia. Federal state formation commenced in 2014 (Jubaland), continued in 2015 (Galmudug and South-west) and 2016 (HirShabelle); given their institutional fragility, all are considered as emerging federal states. Nevertheless, it is commonly accepted that the states de facto operate as Federal Member States. In the remainder of this document, we will therefore refer to them as such.

Placed in an historical context, state-building a hubristic notion. There are essentially three theoretical underpinnings to the state-building approach as currently pursued in various countries:

First, State-building is perceived as an exogenous activity that is intended to build, or re-build, the institutions of a weaker, post-conflict or failing state. This is possibly best characterised by the US efforts in Iraq but can be seen even earlier in post-conflict West Africa, Sierra Leone and Liberia. In none of these cases, however, was the attempt made to remake the entire state; nor were there serious efforts made to reorganize the structure of pre-conflict elite politics. Examples that match the situation in Somalia more completely are those of Afghanistan, Iraq and Cambodia where the entire existing governance structures were eliminated and a new framework created during on-going conflict. Of the three, Somalia may wish to seek lessons from Cambodia, which is now ranked as a lower middle-income country, rather than the others, which remain failed states.

The second theoretical approach developed from the negative Iraqi experience, emerged through work commissioned by the OECD and that was released in 2007. This understood state building as an area for development assistance to an indigenous, national process, driven by state-society relations. Clearly influenced by the Paris Declaration and the Accra Accord, this theoretical approach seeks development partners’ support to an indigenous-driven strategy to address the drivers of conflict and fragility. The principal challenge to actualizing it is the complexity of fragile, conflict affected and post-conflict environments and the reality that indigenous actors may be part of the problem, rather than the solution.

Finally, to address the challenges posed by complex situations, Harvard’s Center for International Development created the Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) method. This approach seeks to encourage a multiple tool approach to addressing sustainable fragile, conflict-affected and post-conflict reconstruction and recovery through the application of an experiential learning approach[[13]](#footnote-14).

Both SIP and StEFS fare are located under the first theoretical strategic approach, with elements of the second. The evaluation’s opinion that is that the application of the third (PDIA) is necessary for achieving conditions sufficient to the state-building task.

The implication of taking such a ‘problem driven’ approach means that all aspects of the projects should emphasis repeated dialogue, such as that employed in the state formation process, faciliating the emergence of locally relevant outcomes.

##  Socio-political and Economic Constraining Factors

### Support to Peace building

In accordance with the principles of the New Deal (November 2011), the FGS and Donors agreed the Somali Compact at the international development partners’ conference in Brussels (16 September 2013). The Compact recognized capacity development as a key contribution to deliver the Compact’s peace-building and state-building priorities through

…. building core public sector capacities……[through] dedicated support to a number of core functions, including centre of government, civil service management, and public-sector capacities, as well the coordinated rollout of basic, cross-cutting administrative systems.

These priorities were further elaborated upon in the Economic Recovery Plan (ERP), highlighting the need to strengthen government capacity to regulate and, ultimately, deliver services to the public. Several interventions, *inter alia* defining the roles and responsibilities of different government institutions, improving civil service management through clarifying the legal framework and strengthening human resource management, and strengthening public sector capacity, including through capacity injection and training. The ERP also emphasised the need to strengthen central institutions to ensure a coordinated government-wide approach to building public administration capacity. Essentially, the New Deal, the compact and the ERP respond to the developmental approach to state building.

Somalis, however, identified both the Compact and the ERP as essentially externally driven and increasingly demanded that the country’s political, economic and social development should be Somali driven. Accordingly, the process was commenced to develop a National Development Plan, which was derived from a combination of public consultations and external consultants financed by both SIP and StEFS and finalized in December 2016. StEFS is providing ongoing support for the development of State Strategic Development Plans, which are designed to emphasize the complexities of the individual states[[14]](#footnote-15) and, potentially, enhance their own enthusiasm for collaborative engagement with the center and, conversely, the enthusiasm of the international community to further increase their support for the States, as they can show evidence of capacity to serve their constituents. Although time consuming, the benefits can be seen in the SWS through the generation of a subsequent plan, with support from other international organizations, devoted to drought recovery. This outcome is a good indication of endogenous capabilities that fits with the UNDP definition of capacity building described below

###  State Building

There are two generally accepted main theoretical approaches to definitions of state-building (PDIA is not yet generally accepted).

First, state-building is seen by some theorists as an activity undertaken by external actors (foreign countries) attempting to build, or re-build, the institutions of a weaker, post-conflict or failing state. This 'exogenous' or International Relations school views state-building as the activity of one country in relation to another, usually following some form of intervention[[15]](#footnote-16).

The second, developmental, theory followed a set of principles developed by the OECD in 2007 on support to conflict affected states, which identified 'state building' as an area for development assistance. The result saw work commissioned by donor countries on definitions, knowledge and practice in state-building and draws heavily on political science. It produced definitions that view state-building as an indigenous, national process, driven by state-society relations. It holds that countries cannot do state-building outside their own borders; at best, they can influence, support or hinder the process[[16]](#footnote-17).

A number of papers commissioned by development agencies broadly argue that state-building is primarily a 'political' process rather than just a question of technical capacity enhancements and sees state-building as involving a threefold dynamic of: political (usually elite) deals, the prioritization of core government functions and the willingness to respond to public expectations[[17]](#footnote-18). A further important influence on thinking on states affected by conflict was the World Bank's 2011 World Development Report, which avoided the language of state-building, but addressed related themes.

Both theoretical approaches and writing share a broad consensus that lessons on how to support state-building processes have not yet been fully learned. Some believe that supporting state-building requires the fostering of legitimate and sustainable state institutions, but most accept that the strategies to achieve this have yet to be fully developed. Little of the post-conflict support to state-building undertaken so far has been entirely successful[[18]](#footnote-19).

From an exogenous perspective, it can be argued that sustained focus on supporting state-building has tended to happen in states frequently characterized by brutalized civilian populations, destroyed economies, institutions, infrastructure, and environments, widely accessible small arms, large numbers of disgruntled soldiers to be demobilized and reintegrated, and ethnically or religiously divided peoples. These obstacles are compounded by the fundamental difficulty of grafting democratic and human rights values onto countries with different political, cultural, and religious heritages. Pluralizing societies is theoretical in its viability for immediate political and economic stability and expediency; ideological overtones can be met with opposition within host nations and issues of self-determination and external state trusteeship and stewarding of nascent institutional reform, or its creation, could damage a tenuous post-conflict national self-identity[[19]](#footnote-20).

A more developmental approach with an emphasis on composite state-building processes, which has implications for donor programmes, diplomacy and peace-keeping. Some development papers have tried to argue that state-building takes place in all countries and that much can be learnt from successful state-building, but there is a tendency to narrow the discussion to the most problematic contexts. As a result, much of the literature on state-building is preoccupied with post conflict issues[[20]](#footnote-21).

Critiques common to both schools include inadequate strategy and a lack of coordination, staffing weaknesses, and that funding is insufficient or poorly timed. Moreover, it is increasingly recognized that many of the tasks to be achieved are extremely complex and there is little clarity on how to best proceed. For instance, it is extremely difficult to provide security in a hot conflict environment, or to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate armies successfully. It remains practically impossible to address vast unemployment in states where the economy is destroyed and there is high illiteracy, or to strengthen the rule of law in a society where it has collapsed. Moreover, the unintended negative consequences of international aid are more and more evident. These range from distortion of the economy to skewing relationship of accountability by the political elite towards internationals rather than domestic population.

Scholars linked to Harvard’s Centre for International Development have posited a more nuanced approach that seeks to locate capacity building firmly within the actual context in which it is to occur. Pointing out that “…efforts to build state capability often take the form of commonly used, highly designed and engineered best practice solutions that have worked in many other places and that we suspect (and hope) will work again in many contexts. Such interventions do sometimes work, especially when the treatment actually addresses problems that fester in the context”[[21]](#footnote-22)… in cases where the problems that require solution are different…the treatment is just isomorphic mimicry—it looks good but will not be a solution to problems that actually matter. Since, according to the authors,

“Development organizations often cannot see this, however, and offer the same solution again and again—hoping for a different outcome but imposing a capability trap on the policy context, where a new diagnosis and prescription is actually needed. In some countries the treatment has an even worse impact, fostering premature load bearing—where the context cannot actually handle what is prescribed”.

It is important to emphasise that the evaluation recognizes that many socio-political and economic constraining factors challenge the Somali state building project. According to Weber, a state maintains a monopoly of the use of force within a territory. Clearly, this definition is problematic within the Somali territory because of the ability of a variety of non-state actors to utilise force in pursuit of political and economic goals. The challenging security environment, therefore, is a given, but there exist several additional challenges to state building in the country.

First, throughout the period of the evaluation, it was apparent that almost all interlocutors shared generally negative perceptions of the overall federalism process[[22]](#footnote-23) despite StEFS-commissioned survey evidence, which suggests growing acceptance of federalism. Interlocutors questioned the why a federal solution was necessary, emphasising that Somalis were one people, with one religion, and one language.

Furthermore, the constitution-making process leading up to the Provisional Constitution (2012) was attacked. Interlocutors emphasised, in line with the academic discourse at the time, that it was externally driven by 1) Regional (principally Ethiopia and Kenya[[23]](#footnote-24)); and 2) International actors (in particular, the DSRSG[[24]](#footnote-25)). Whatever the reality, the fact that these perceptions continue to be held in 2017 among the, admittedly, limited set of persons interviewed by the evaluators may indicate that the future of the federal structure is by no means certain.

Furthermore, there remains no clarity surrounding respective roles and functions of the FGS and FMS. The provisional constitution reserves four functions - Defence, Foreign Affairs, Citizenship and Immigration and Monetary Policy; a fifth, Natural Resource Management will be discussed between central and state governments – but state administrations with which the evaluation interacted contest these reserved powers. For example, the central monopoly of violence (defence) is strongly contested, states insisting that, for their own security, they need their own armed forces[[25]](#footnote-26); similarly, individual states want to engage bilaterally with the international community both within Somalia and externally[[26]](#footnote-27). In the absence of any clarity in this regard, it is problematic to speak of strengthening ‘core government functions’ as there was no agreement within the Somali government on what these are. (Having noted this, the evaluation agrees that it is important to distinguish functions, such as security or education from processes, such as planning M&E, statistics, and human resource management )

Third, a lack of popular (i.e. clan elders) understanding and ownership of federalism persists. The evaluation agrees that when explained that federalism will bring decision-making closer to local level, there is broad agreement that this is a good thing. But, Somalis know that devolved decision-making does not require a federal structure and, indeed, most decisions are already taken at local level, and have been for the past 30+ years. Hence there is a real need to secure broad consensus around the national federalist endeavor, a need that it specifically recognised in the StEFS support to the promotion of federalism.

Finally, and in practical terms perhaps most importantly, is the limited, if any administrative, access to resources. Without resources no governmental functions are possible. Given this reality, the question underlying all capacity development programmes persists: Capacity development (transformation, as defined by UNDP), for what?

## Capacity Building Programming Approach

### Introduction to the UNDP Approach to Capacity Development

UNDP sees capacity development as the process through which individuals, organizations and societies obtain, strengthen and maintain the capabilities to set and achieve their own development objectives over time.

…if capacity is the means to plan and achieve, then capacity development describes the ways to those means. An essential ingredient in the UNDP capacity development approach is **transformation**. For an activity to meet the standard of capacity development as practiced and promoted by UNDP, it must **bring about transformation that is generated and sustained over time from within.** Transformation of this kind goes beyond performing tasks; instead, it is more a matter of changing mindsets and attitudes. (Existing emphasis)[[27]](#footnote-28)

This understanding of capacity building is very close to the intended outcome of the PIDA introduced above. It remains to be seen (and thus the argument that this was an inappropriate juncture for an evauation) whether the SIP or StEFS interventions will result in outcomes that match the UNDP criteria. The three vignettes of locally led progress given above provide hope. However it is clear that any future design needs to ensure that greater emphasis must be placed in on utilizing the infrastructure and systems introduced under these the current projects to generate tangible benefits for citizens before introducing more externally designed processes and systems.

#### Institutional Capacity Development Flagship Programme

The Flagship Programme focuses on three main objectives, *viz.*

1. Injection of new Human Capacity in the Public Sector;
2. Improve HR management, especially within the Civil Service; and
3. Strengthen activities that focus on core government functions.

The Flagship Programme was initially viewed as a collaborative mechanism to implement UNDP and World Bank capacity development support to Somalia in a joint manner. The joint approach of the UNDP and World Bank support projects included a common analytical framework, a common result framework, a common management and oversight arrangement and a division of labour. However, as noted by UNDP,

“Unfortunately, the good intentions of the joint-up approach could not fully materialise during the implementation of the UNDP and World Bank projects, due to a variety of reasons, inclduing the difficulties in establishing the joint management and oversight arrangements”.

 As a result, UNDP identified and implemented two projects to achieve its objectives: the 30 month Strengthening Institutional Performance Project (SIP) (US $15 million) started on 1 July 2015 focussed on the FGS and the Government of Puntland; implementation of its 24-month federal member state complementary counterpart, Support to Emerging Federal States (StEFS) (US $14 million) commenced at the start of April 2016.

### Theory of Change

A Theory of Change is necessary and logical underpinnings of the action to be undertaken. It is not an afterthought, tweaked to meet already developed projects. Unfortunately, the design of the two projects in question are weak in this regard.

#### Strengthening Institutional Performance Theory of Change

The SIP project was not designed around any formal Theory of Change. The general assumption, as stated in the Capacity Development Flagship Programme (which remained in draft) was to “*enable the government to fill critical capacity gaps in the civil service and to strengthen the capacity of key ministries and agencies to perform core government functions*”. The SIP project outcomes were expected to be strengthened systems, processes and capabilities of the Governments to (Federal and Puntland State) to deliver on New Deal Compact.

While the SIP Prodoc does not include a TOC (the nearest to one is contained in Fig. 1: A multi-pronged approach to Capacity Development in Somalia), the implications of the narrative project’s description suggest a similar logical model to that of StEFS. The SIP project approach envisages the following beneficiaries:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Federal Government** | **Puntland State Government** |
| Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) | Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) |
| Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development (MOPIED) | Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sports (MOLYS) |
| Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA) | Civil Service Commission (Puntland) |
| Civil Service Commission | Good Governance Commission (Puntland) |
| Ministry of Women and Human Rights (MOWHA) | Ministry of Women’s Development and Family Affairs (MOWDFA) |
| Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation (MOIFAR)  |  |

These primary beneficiaries were expected to roll out capacity strengthening to other line ministries, which was expected to help ensure that throughout government, core government functions are strengthened in a harmonized and coherent manner. Key (killer) assumptions in this regard are that (a) primary beneficiaries would be willing to perform this function and (b) other line ministries would welcome this peer intervention. Based on the findings of the evaluation, both assumptions appear to have been questionable.

As there was no formal Theory of Change for SIP, the logic model for the flow of output to outcome was not well articulated in the project document. The evaluators facilitated a small session of UNDP staff to document the thinking that formed the basis for SIP. The session helped to recreate the problem tree for public administrative capacity key activities that SIP implemented in response, together with the assumptions and risks that were articulated at the time.

The results of the SIP TOC workshop can be summarized as follows: The limited capacity of government to provide public goods and services would be improved by introducing organising principles in the government structure (functional reviews) and providing advisory and staffing support. The structure would be supported by introducing systems to establish horizontal and vertical coordination arrangements. The processes to run the systems would be built by introducing civil service management policies and laws, as well as establishing national and state planning systems. The lack of sufficient and sufficiently competent human resources would be addressed by providing short-term support through paid Somali technical advisors as well as training civil servants in functional skills and providing a better, more organized, work environment. Finally, to help motivate the existing civil servants, functional reviews would be conducted to rationalize roles and functions, and gender mainstreaming would be introduced to encourage more women to join.

The approach outlined here is perfectly in keeping with the developmental approach to state-building introduced above. It illustrates a classic assumption of the developmental approach that assumes that if a FCAS begins to looks more like what a developed state looks like, it will necessarily prosper. The SIP Project Evidence section provides some examples of how this assumption can fail to facilitate the emergence of the anticipated outcomes. A second assumption that came out in the TOC workshop was that it had been felt that structural improvement in the civil service necessarily needed to begin with a reform Civil Service Law. Again, evidence will show that this was a killer assumption that undermined, or at the very least delayed, the generation of a substantial portion of the project outputs. Finally, a key risk identified at the top level of the solution tree was defined as: “Organized service delivery arrangements may go against specific interests.” While this has not been directly shown, the assessment submitted to Der Spiegel in late October 2017 would seem to substantiate the importance of this risk,[[28]](#footnote-29) arguing that powerful interests in Somalia are bent on perpetuating violence because it is good for business.

#### Support to Emerging Federal States Theory of Change

There are three key aspects to StEFS. First, building upon the New Deal Compact, the TOC holds that formal government structures are a sustainable alternative to the non-state systems that existed during the 20+ year civil war period. It is assumed that formalised government would monopolise violence[[29]](#footnote-30) and be more transparent, fairer, and more democratic. In its turn, this would address priorities for development and improvement in citizens’ quality of life.

There are a number of problems with this. In the first instance, and leaving aside the presence of AMISON peacekeepers, the Somali reality is that neither the FGS nor the FMS administrations have a monopoly of violence. At best, the state’s administrations monopolise violence in a majority of the country’s towns, while rural areas are dominated by the Al-Shabaab and inter- and intra-clan violence (see Figure 1).

Fig. 2: Districts controlled by different Somali actors

Source: @Wakilorg (2017)

Furthermore, Al-Shabaab appears able to mount attacks, including within the federal capital, almost at will.

Nor is there any necessary reason that formalised governmental structures will be transparent, fairer[[30]](#footnote-31), and accountable to the population at large. In part, this is because of the still disputed nature of the federalism, including the division of responsibilities between federal and state governments and the type of federation that Somalia needs; indeed, there remains a strong disagreement on the nature of federalism at both governmental but, more importantly, at the popular level, where the concept is simply not widely understood.

One senior government official, for example, argued that the 1963 Constitution could have been amended to allow for sufficient devolution of power within a unitary state. As he put it: “The common Somali understands federalism as ‘I can own land that my clan controls’”. In his view, the clan demands exclusive rights for its members, it does not offer inclusive rights for all citizens, as could evolve under nationalism. He suggested that warlords pushed the federalism idea to strengthen clans as a counter to a broader Somali nationalism, and that this bodes ill for the future of the country[[31]](#footnote-32).

Furthermore, issues of transparency and accountability (downward to the citizens) are seldom, if ever, a function of administrative structures. Rather they are the outcome of inclusive political cultures, which differ from society to society, but at their core, they attach significant value to peoples’ opinions and their opportunities and willingness to engage in political and economic life. In the absence of such core values, administrative structures can do little, if anything, to promote transparency and accountability.

This does not imply that work on administrative structure is wrong or irrelevant, but that the approach taken needs to be more collaborative, interative and problem-centered than the evaluators have noted thus far.

Second, the TOC assumes the so-called peace dividend, with services, clearly recognized as government-provided, delivered and contributing to improved quality of life. In many ways, this too is a killer assumption; if it is wrong, then investment in strengthening the capacity of government to deliver services efficiently is wasted.

Again, the reality is more complex that the simplistic relationship between government service delivery and popular approval of government. Recent international research[[32]](#footnote-33) reveals ‘very little evidence to support the claim that delivering services enhances state legitimacy by improving people’s perceptions of government’[[33]](#footnote-34). Similarly, ‘when people’s satisfaction with services improves, there is no consistent relationship with improved perceptions of government legitimacy across countries or sectors’[[34]](#footnote-35) . These findings undermine the basic assumptions that improved service delivery will translate into communities’ more positive perceptions of government.

While improved and increased services do not translate into better perceptions of government, this does not mean that services are irrelevant. How any service is delivered is a key determinant of communities’ perceptions; according to the research, people routinely have more positive views of government actors when service delivery is backed up by grievance and accountability mechanisms, when people are included in decision-making, and when kept informed about what is happening. [ibid, P5] Experience of the WB-funded Local Government Service Delivery project (LDSDP) in South Sudan appears to bear this out.

The issue is not the delivery of services, nor their quantitative or qualitative increase or improvement. Rather, it is how the services are determined and the extent of targeted communities’ participation/engagement in their identification (and, we would contend, implementation/monitoring) that promotes positive perceptions of government. In addition, working on how to enhance the ability of Somalia to pay for these goods and services (whether through public or private means) is critical if the citizens do not lose faith in their government when donors become more interested in some other country.

Third, existence of government structures will allow for the development of a longer-term development vision and approach that responds both to immediate peace and stabilization related requirements but also a longer-term development perspective.

The best interpretation of this is that it is possible that government would pursue such an approach. However, as is the case in respect to transparency, fairness and democratic principles, there is no inevitability that government will pursue a long-term development vision that responds to and meets the priorities of the citizenry. In fact, the experience of technocratic preparation of the NDP has been largely mirrored by the states’ development of their Strategic Development Plans. This raises concerns that interventions at either the federal or state administrative levels may not pursue inclusive outcomes unless participatory processes become a routine part of all aspects of future projects. Being inclusive means more than just holding consultations.

In the light of the foregoing, the TOC demonstrates major flaws. The above has demonstrated that it is based upon highly dubious killer assumptions, which, if incorrect, undermine any logic to the project’s design. Furthermore, as suggested below, the provision of Technical Advice, infrastructure, and its equipment (office furniture and tools – desk and laptop computers, printers, internet access) does nothing to deliver transparent, inclusive and accountable government, at whichever level, but they do enhance that impression[[35]](#footnote-36). Progress did take place in Somalia over the past decades. [[36]](#footnote-37) The next phase of assistance must emphasize support indigenous ability to use dialogue tools more effectively rather than the provision modern administrative paraphernalia.

These comments on programme context have been included for two reasons. First, to substantiate the evaluators’ contention that these two projects were far from ready for evaluation and, second, to emphasize the need for structuring future intervention as a learning process. It is possible that the creation of basic administrative building blocks is perhaps all that could be reasonably expected at this stage given the decades of anarchy. The evaluators’ concern is that this is an approach that UNDP has used in many other post-conflict countries that, as in the cases of Yemen and South Sudan, has often led to little or no sustainable improvements in the lives of citizens. Again, the approach taken in this evaluation note is to stress the need for caution when designing the follow on program. A continued focus on the creation of bureaucratic systems may have unforeseen consequences unless concomitant stress is placed on the use of dialogue/collaboration tools to ensure those systems are used to identify solutions that have tangible benefit for citizens[[37]](#footnote-38). The complexity and lack of predictability of future outcomes in Somalia is a strong argument for making use of the well recognized indigenous Somali capacity for resiliance, maintained through continual dialogue and experimentation, as a basis upon which to structure dialogue that leads, in an interative manner, to beneficial outcomes. In the view of the evaluators, introducing such a ‘learning process’[[38]](#footnote-39) is far more imporant than proceeding to, for example, define roles and responsbilities of different levels of administration. And, as we have noted in the vignettes, there is already evidence of benefit to be derived when the projects have served in more of a catalytic role, allowing endogenous ideas to drive the process. Associated with this is the need to facilitate multiple opportunities for peer learning to take place so that positive lessons diffuse more quickly and unproductive attempts can be rectified.

# Project Evidence

In this section, the evidence collected for the individual projects will be presented separately. The evaluators were advised by UNDP that an output level assessment should be prepared. Typically, taking a look at a project at the output level ends up producing a more critical review because of the level of detail being scrutinized. This proved to be the case for these two projects, particularly SIP, where significant results were achieved, but they were clustered in a single output, while others showed far less progress, at least at the federal level.

# Strengthening Institutional Performance Output Findings

To reiterate, the twofold objectives of SIP are to

* enable the government to fill critical capacity gaps in the civil service; and
* strengthen the capacities of key ministries and agencies to perform core government functions.

The resulting outcome is expected to be: *Strengthened Government systems, processes and capabilities to deliver the New Deal Compact*.

Initially, SIP was divided into three components (with outputs numbered as they are in the workplan) amenable to upscaling:

Component 1 Endowment of core institutions with the right staff in the right positions (capacity injection)

1 Provision of advisory (6) staff (through the WB Capacity Injection Mechanism - CIM)

5 Strengthening capacities for gender mainstreaming

6 Strengthening capacity for Planning and Aid coordination

Component 2 Establishing a solid civil service management framework for sound future public service management

1. Basic framework for civil service management established; and
2. Institutionalisation of training system, including establishment of Civil Service Training Institute.

Component 3 Ensuring coherent and coordinated central planning and decision-making functions.

1. Strengthening Coordination, Good Governance and Communication Capacity at the Centre of Government

A bridging phase of the project, following the closure of the SIDP, began on 1 January 2015. SIP formally began on 1 July 2015. From that point, to the end of September 2017, the project spent a total of about $10,650,000 or 71% of the available budget of $14, 970,779 (the formally amended budget in July 2016 was $16, 895, 581 but not all funds were received from donors). The project had a major revision/amendment following an increase in funding in mid-2016 that restructured the project design and added a considerable number of deliverables to several of the existing outputs. The following discussion is based on the amended version of the project document. Due to inadequacies of the UNDP financial reporting system, ATLAS, it was not possible for the evaluators to obtain disaggregated financial information for Puntland. This is a significant drawback in attempting to assess the efficiency of the project as each output had specific deliverables assigned to Puntland State. This is particularly unfortunate, as will be seen below, since in outputs 3, 4 and 5, the only meaningful deliverables generated during the evaluation period were produced by Puntland, pointing to a missed potential for higher performance at lower administrative costs if underutilized funds at the federal level had been tranferred for use in Pungland.

Implementation of outputs with each associated partner was maintained through the preparation of Letters of Agreement (LOA), updated annually, which specified the assistance to be provided, its value and a timeline for resource allocation.

## Output One Capacity Gaps Filled

Purpose: to place advisory staff in partner agencies in the FGS and Puntland State government.

Expected achievement: 39 advisors in FGS and 16 in Puntland. In addition, 75% of supervisor ratings should be satisfactory.

Significant results: All targets were met or exceeded with 53 advisors at Federal and 20 in Puntland. Nearly all assessments were positive.

There was an assumption made at the outset of the project design that the government partners did not have sufficient qualified staff remaining in the civil service to be able to perform their new functions as an organized state. As a result, one of the primary intentions of SIP was to identify and finance a set of short term consultants/advisors who could assist the partner agencies. In the agreement worked out with the World Bank, initially SIP was assigned to finance six long-term positions, but later this was downgraded to the task of providing short-term advisors while the Bank was finalizing its preparations for a formal mechanism to finance merit-recruited civil servants (at higher than normal pay scales).

However, as designed, Output One is not an output in normal project design parlance. It is an input. The use of funds here is limited to paying the salaries of Somali advisors who are selected for engagement with partner government organizations.

Despite the limitations, by all accounts, the local advisors proved to be useful and well appreciated, both in FGS and Puntland. No doubt this was the case as the national managers had greater flexibility in using these teams in the way they felt would best serve the needs of the beneficiary organization. In fact, many were extended in their posts and some have gone on to high posts in government service. Unfortunately, due to the anticipated start of the World Bank civil service remuneration program, SIP reduced its allocation for Output One by 50% in 2017 (from the expenditure level of 2016), but the World Bank program only got underway after the middle of the year. This has resulted in 43% of the output’s available budget remaining to be spent as of December 2017.

Questions have been raised regarding the ability of UNDP to effectively assess the quality of the work of these advisors who operate under government supervision at the federal level. Project staff members were responsible for tracking the work of 53 advisors in 2016 located, at various times, in the Ministries of Planning (MOPIED-14), Women (4), Labour (2), Finance (1) and Interior (2), plus the Civil Service Commission (CSC-7), Aid Coordination Unit (ACU-23), Office of the Prime Minister (OPM-1) and the Office of the President (OOP-10 advisors). This meant that the project staff had limited interaction, rarely met the advisors and had difficulty obtaining reports of their work. This was particularly problematic in the OOP and OPM, where the advisors asserted they were government staff, not under UNDP supervision. In other units, an increase in the number of staff contracted by Government facilitated the accomplishment of tasks outlined in the respective LOA. This reflects a positive move towards linking project-financed recruitment to output generation.

UN staff assessments of the reports produced by the advisors for UNDP varied from “cut and paste of TOR” to ‘short paragraphs’. A UNDP-wide Third Party Monitoring contract was issued by the M&E office of UNDP and upon request by the project, one of the purposes was to review the work of the local advisors, but management reported that this led to ‘not much difference’ in their knowledge of the advisors’ functioning due to ‘massaging of information’.

 Where the process worked best is where the government agencies had a strong interest in the outputs to be achieved. Thus, the fundamental point here is that simply adding bodies to a government unit without linking them to a specific output that has been identified by the receiving unit has a greater potential to result in less beneficial outcomes.

In the ACU, all 23 advisors were provided full-time (unclear if this was in keeping with the short-term provision in the agreement with the World Bank. However, the WB had stated it would endeavoour to take the positions over in the CIM, but as of lae 2017 this had not materialised. UNDP then decided to continue financing the ACU in this, with additional donor funding, in its critical funciton to assist existing the Aid Coordination Architecture, with 100% of salary and operational costs covered by UNDP/SIP. It was reported that ‘heavy input from UNDP in writing reports” was required, and it was felt the ‘output doesn’t match the cost’ (see Output 6 below for more details). Nevertheless, the advisors supported the Government’s efforts to engage rationally with the international community by performing secretariat functions for many of the FGS/Donor dialogue groups.

While the advisory services provided in many of the agencies have been seen generally as managerially problematic, those provided to MOPIC and Puntland State appear to have been managed more carefully. In MOPIC, the TOR for each advisor was prepared to achieve specific objectives of the Letter of Agreement. The Ministry advertised locally, sending UNDP a shortlist of candidates. UNDP sat in on the recruitment interview panels (as an observer). The Ministry signed the contract and submitted regular reports to UNDP to justify payment.

Similarly, in Puntland, each partner agency wrote the TOR for the advisor and prepared Consultant Performance Evaluation Reports for each individual per pay period. Each advisor had two formal supervisors, government and UNDP; the appraisal was done jointly with a focus on the level of effort placed on transfer of skills to civil servants. The Puntland advisors were reportedly kept for a maximum of seven months (although some seemed to recycle among the ministries due the limited talent pool), at the end of which an end of assignment report was prepared. The Puntland advisors were concentrated in the Ministry of Planning (12). This team helped to rework the Puntland Development Plan 2014-2018 into a document that was in line with the National Development Plan.

**Financial Evidence**

The financial analysis of each output has been updated to include December 2017 expenditures in order to more accurately account for late booking of expenditures during the evaluation period.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| Output | Amended Output Budget(‘000) | Available Output Budget (09/17) (‘000) | Total Spent (06/16-12/17) (‘000) | % output spent on consultants | Expenditure as % of available Output Budget (3) | Output expenditure as % of project expenditure  | Output Budget as % Available Project Budget | Output as % Amended Project Budget |
| 1 | $2,546 | $1,987 | $1,118 | 94% | 57% | 9% | 13% | 15% |

It is interesting to note in the table above that while the provision of qualified staff is characterised as one of the key purposes of SIP, the percentage of total project funds allocated to this output was reduced steadily over time. When the Amended Budget was approved in July 2016, Output 1 was allocated 15% of the total budget, but could only access 13% of the available budget reported to the evaluators. As of the time of the evaluation, only 9% of project resources had been used to finance these advisors, but only 57% of the budget allocation for this output had been utilized by end September 2017. Part of this reduction was tied to the expectation that the World Bank CIP project would be taking over this role, but as of the time of the evaluation, that had not fully materialized.

**Assessment**

Once the decision was made that UNDP would not finance long-term staff, this output should have been closed and the funds should have been reallocated so that the advisory service could be directly linked to the activities of the four substantive outputs so as to track performance against production of output deliverables. This did not happen, resulting in confused, and sometimes double, reporting on results. It seems clear that the project staff did not have enough time to adequately handle this task as well as manage all of the activities of the substantive outputs. The TPM reviews were not considered to have been of any use. It may have been advisable to have established a unit in the Civil Service Commission (as one option), similar to the one for Young Graduates, to provide quality control oversight on the recruitment and supervision of the short-term advisors or to shift recruitment of all advisors under LOA arrangements so that Government units were fully responsible for ensuring their worth in reaching output targets.

However, since the output was continued at a much lower than expected level of operation, underutilized financial resources from this Output could have been transferred to Puntland to enable that program to move ahead more rapidly and, by so doing, reduce the burden of the fixed administrative costs for the overall project .

## Output Two Civil Service management policy framework developed

Purpose: to provide a basic framework for civil service management in FGS and Puntland.

Expected achievements: to have new laws at Federal & Puntland levels prepared by 2016, approved in 2017; two HR management frameworks completed in 2016, and specific HR management instruments prepared and approved.

Significant Results: At the time of the evaluation, both Federal and Puntland laws had been sent for final review prior to submission to cabinet with legislative approval yet in the future. Regulations to accompany the Puntland civil service law have been drafted and are being reviewed simultaneously.

**Federal Results**

The design of SIP identified significant gaps in the legal and regulatory framework, put in place in the 1970s, for a modern civil service in Somalia. A design assumption was made that the civil service law would need to be re-written before further work could be undertaken on regulations and management arrangements.

Unfortunately, work on a revision of the civil service law, espcially on the Federal level, was problematic since the early days of the project. Initially, the leadership of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) was uninterested in the assistance. The leadership’s primary focus at the time was on upgrading of the national sports stadium. Disputes also arose early in the project between UNDP management and the MoLSA leadership over the recruitment of advisors for the Ministry. At a fundamental level, preparing a new civil service law without either a fully endorsed Constitution or a labour code has proven quite tricky. Within the MOLSA team, including SIP embeds , there was some disagreement over whether to incorporate the regulations in the legislative bill to be presented for approval by Parliament. Perhaps more importantly, the government was unclear what it wanted beyond getting staff they could use who were paid by the donors. They were uncertain about the political repercussions of a real civil service reform process. According to MoLSA in September 2017, there is still no agreement on what civil service reform means and how it should be undertaken. The government’s initial preference was for a cosmetic update of the existing law that could facilitate recruitment of civil servants by the new government. This attitude was overcome through quite a bit of ‘teaching’ from UNDP consultants on the purpose and process of civil service reform. Government slowly understood that the current law, which included all regulations, would require Parliamentary approval for each and every modification and this would prove unworkable in a newly forming governance environment. The situation had improved markedly by the time of writing this report.

In addition, there was a clear dichotomy in the perspectives of the MoLSA and the CSC. This partly grew out of the different advice provided by foreign agencies. Under the Latin system, the Ministry is the key player, but under the Anglo-Saxon system, the Civil Service Commission has greater authority over government employees. The current draft attempts to reduce this tension by proposing a distinction between the ‘civil service’, which would only be composed of higher level officers and a ‘public service’, which would involve lower functionaries and would not have the same status or tenure rights of a civil servant.

These issues greatly impeded progress on the design of the law. By the end of the evaluation period, the key international consultant had only logged two months of work over the entire project period due to a lack of willingness to cooperate between the federal Civil Service Commission and the Ministry of Labour. Efforts were restarted in early September 2017, after a full year’s hiatus. But this time the new Government has shown a renewed interest to advance the agenda. A technical working group consisting of the Attorney General, CSC, Labour and all DG of the line ministries work at different times to draft the bill with SIP international consultant. The draft bill was circulated for comment among donors and government in September 2017. By October all had commented, including the World Bank. While the evaluators was completing its field work, the consultant reported that final revisions to the draft bill (prepared in two languages) had been agreed by the technical working group and passed to the Minister of Labour for final review before being submitted to Cabinet for approval.

The UNDP/SIP provided assistance to the CSC in the form of equipment, furniture, training and interns/young graduates. The Young Graduates program was organized with SIP assistance. SIP also assisted the CSC to hold stakeholder review workshops in Baidoa and Garowe to discuss a coordinated approach between FSG and FSM on appointments and recruitment policy. The first meeting of all sitting CSC chairmen was anticipated in October 2017. The Garowe session formed the basis for the collaborative reform process by providing a common understanding upon which to establish the role of the federal CSC with those of the FMS. However, remarks made to the evaluators from both CSC and MoLSA, without providing evidence, that UNDP disrupts the federal relationship by going directly to the FMS to provide assistance, no doubt reflecting a normal fear of central governments that things are moving beyond their control.

**Puntland results**

Puntland established a civil service law in 1998 that is still in force. It was revised in 2005 to reduce detail. In 2006, the original Puntland Good Governance Bureau prepared a report advising the government to establish a Commission to manage the Civil Service, which it did in 2007. However, the current civil service reform process in Puntland has also faced similar delays to that at the federal level, but is now closer to completion. The Puntland State of Somalia (PSS) elected to revise Civil Service Law #5 and Civil Service management decree #150 at the same time. The process involved both national and international consultants together with PSS working groups. The discussion went through many consultations with different sets of stakeholders. Again, the disagreements between Civil Service Commission and Ministry of Labour were a major impediment to the process. By 2017, most of these disagreements had been resolved. At the end of September 2017, law #5 was being reviewed by the State President’s legal advisor with the anticipation of being presented to Cabinet by late October.

SIP also provided a series of consultant interventions to prepare technical advisory notes on public administration structure and functions, together with dialogue and drafting of the relevant set of regulations needed to accompany the civil service law. This package was being reviewed as amendments to regulation #150 at the State President’s office together with the law at the time of the evaluation.

SIP assisted the CSC with a variety of support including trainings, interns and functional review and IT technical consultants. The IT consultants assisted in automating the human resource management system. The IT consultant in station during the evaluation (Somali diaspora) provided the CSC with ongoing advice that was well documented in several useful notes and manuals including a data management policy (particularly focusing on confidentiality), IT management guidelines and an interesting case study on Puntland CSC IT management successes and failures to date. The consultant’s work was highly appreciated by the government.

In 2013, Puntland State identified that 60% of State revenue was being spent on personnel. This stimulated a human resource audit in 2014 during which they found 2,200 ghost workers, who were all terminated. The CSC is still struggling with the difficulties of maintaining a merit-based recruitment for the civil service. The World Bank CIM program has helped by introducing a 20-step recruitment process, but there remains serious resistance from politicians…making the CSC “public enemy #1 in Puntland”. However, the SIP-supported IT system is helping to make their work more transparent and accountable so the CSC can answer questions from the State leadership.

The CSC noted that work on an HR management has progressed and that a handbook has been drafted and is pending the approval of the civil service law before finalizing. They anticipate the need for an international consultant to help on this. The continued overlap of assistance from UNDP and WB left the evaluators confused as to which was being referenced in this instance.

**Financial Evidence**

The financial analysis of each output has been updated to include December 2017 expenditures in order to more accurately account for late booking of expenditures during the evaluation period.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| Output | Amended Output Budget (‘000) | Available Output Budget (09/17) (‘000) | Total Spent (06/16-12/17) (‘000) | % output spent on consultants | Expenditure as % of Output Budget (3) | Output expenditure as % of total real project expenditure | Output Budget as % Available Project Budget  | Output as % Amended Project Budget  |
| **2** | **$2,121** |  **$1,372** |  **$690** |  **75%** |  **51%** |  **6%** |  **9%** |  **13%** |

Only 6% of the total available project resources were used under this output, this turns out to be less than one-half the level planned in the July 2016 amended project budget. There was some percentage reduction in output 2 allocation between the official amended budget (13%) and the available budget (9%), but the primary reason for the limited role of the output in the overall project implementation scenario is that only 51% of the output budget had been consumed by end December 2017 due to the UNDP decision to withhold further assistance until the Government was more clear on its approach. Of the amount spent, 75% was used for national and international consultants.

As noted, it is not possible to fully distinguish the expenditures at the Federal level from those in Puntland. However, the Puntland manager was able to provide his calculation of expenditures by LOA. Thus, it can be estimated that for support to the CSC, 81% of funds were used in 2016, while 37% had been spent by September for 2017 (but it appears that several items are merely pending payment). As with the Federal level, the major cost items were for consultants, but there was also a study tour.

**Assessment**

There is greater hope for the initiation of civil service reform now that these two bills will move forward to their respective Cabinets and Parliaments. If these pass, it will be important for the respective Governments to clarify to the international community how they wish to proceed with writing the critical rules and regulations as both World Bank and UNDP have expressed an interest to lead in this area. At the time this report was being drafted, the World Bank already had consultants fielded during the time of the evaluation preparing certain regulations based on the existing law, arguing that the UNDP support was limited to a bill that had yet to be be approved by Parliament. Unless WB and UNDP can resolve their differences it can be assumed that such agency discord will remain standard practice as long as both remain involved in civil service reform in Somalia. Clearly, the FGS will need to make a decision on how (and with whom) to develop their civil service system going forward.

## Output Three Improved Training Policy

Purpose: To improve training policy, facilities and plans

Expected Achievement: civil service training policies at Federal and Puntland levels, training standards and modules developed and training institute concepts developed

Significant Results: No results at Federal level.

The Puntland training policy was prepared and approved. A reassessment of the suitability of establishing single-purpose civil service training institutes is in progress.

**Federal Evidence:**

There has been no progress at the national level on a training policy. This remains a point of friction between the CSC and MoLSA, with each arguing the other has no role to play in the matter. MoLSA believes that a training policy should go beyond the civil service, but it is unclear how this would work as private sector needs are far different, and insists that it is wholly in charge of training the civil service. CSC, on the other hand, claims that while MoLSA has a mandate from the previous government for training government employees, the ministerial TOR, apparently drawn up by the previous government in 2014, has taken that away and given it to a special unit, to be created, that will be a National Training College. CSC does not claim that it has a mandate to train civil servants.

Comments were made by UNDP that the new minister of MoLSA has endorsed resuming support to preparing a federal training policy.

At the time of the evaluation, the World Bank had initiated financial management training at the University of Somalia. This would appear to make more sense that spending limited resources on a specialised training centre for a total of 6000 employees.

A number of ad hoc training activities were conducted by SIP for Federal agencies. With the exception of an activity launch workshop for the civil service law review, all other were related to the preparation of the National Development Plan and Aid Coordination. In the 17 events that the evaluators could identify, a total of 322 persons participated, including 27% women.

**Puntland Evidence**

A training policy was developed by MOLSYS with SIP technical assistance and approved in Puntland, stating the PSS intention to devote 1.5% of its annual budget to civil service training as an incentive to improve recruitment and retention. The policy was prepared over a six month period involving five government organizations. It is expected to be taken to Cabinet in October 2017. The CSC has agreed that the training policy belongs with MoLYS, while recruitment belongs to them.

While the policy discusses the establishment of a Puntland Civil Service Training Institute, it recognizes that interim measures should build upon existing training institutes as there is a growing recognition of the high cost of such a single-purpose public institute. Recently, the CSC has engaged assistance from the Ethiopian Civil Service University for advanced degree education for an initial 24 staff and from Tanzania to improve the capacity of the Puntland State University Public Administration Department to conduct basic training for civil servants. SIP should closely monitor the progress on this in Puntland as it could have important implications for federal and State public service training policies nationwide.

Ad hoc trainings were also conducted in Puntland with almost all partner agencies taking part in one or more. These involved RBM and M&E training, LOA management, database management, HACT findings review, HR skill resource training, and gender mainstreaming. In the 16 events the evaluators was able to identify, a total of 314 persons participated, including 23% women.

Financial Evidence

The financial analysis of each output has been updated to include December 2017 expenditures in order to more accurately account for late booking of expenditures during the evaluation period.

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| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| Output | Amended Output Budget ($’000) | Available Output Budget (12/17) ($’000) | Total Spent (06/16-12/17) ($’000) | % output spent on consultants | Expenditure as % of available Output Budget (3) | Output expenditure as % of project expenditure | Output Budget as % Available Project Budget  | Output as % Amended Project Budget  |
| **3** | **1073** |  **846** |  **123** |  **74** |  **15** |  **1** |  **6** |  **6** |

Only 1% of project expenditures were used under this output and only 15% of the output budget has been consumed, again mostly consumed by consultants. It is not possible to accurately calculate the level of financial assistance to Puntland for Output 3, but financial support to MoLYS was utilized mostly for national and international consultants, rehabilitation of the ministry office, and IT equipment.

Assessment

No progress was made at the federal level, but a consultant written training policy was prepared for Puntland. A donor/government (incorporating FMS) Capacity Development Working Group, mentioned in the original CD flagship programme document, is the body that should be setting the framework for a coordinated donor approach to civil service training.

Puntland stressed that a more systematic approach to training within SIP is necessary. They are dissatisfied with the short (3-4 day) sessions provided ad hoc by individual consultants. They would prefer that SIP make an arrangement with local higher education institutes to prepare a package that civil servants can use to obtain formal certification. (The project implementers state this was SIP’s original idea.) However, the State needs to establish a policy regarding who can access formal training and what retention requirements will be placed on those who receive government assisted training. English as a medium of instruction does not appear to be an impediment, at least for higher level staff.

Underutilized financial resources from this Output could have been transferred to Puntland to enable that program to move ahead more rapidly and, by so doing, reduce the burden of the fixed administrative costs at the project headquarters level. Progress in Puntland could be used as peer learning opportunities, as was the case when the new States went to Garowe to learn about Puntland’s development planning process.

## Output Four Strategic guidelines development

Purpose: Develop strategic guidelines for internal government coordination and communication

Expected Achievement: guidance for improving executive/legislative as well as OOP/OPM relationships; federalism organic law, policy development framework, performance management structure, 10 ministerial functional reviews completed, support to PFM, concept for engagement with non-state actors

Significant results: No significant results at Federal level aside from upgrade of OPM premises.

Puntland completed 2 functional reviews, significantly upgraded the capacity of the Good Governance Bureau as a strategic link with civil society. The GGB also fulfilled its obligations of producing a Citizens’ Charter and Complaints Mechanism

**Federal Evidence:**

It would appear that the proposed work at the federal level with the OOP and OPM was premature. (Project implementors state UNDP only got into the OOP at the request of the EU, as it was not a part of the original project plan.) The fragile, consensus-oriented political setting was simply not prepared to be structured around a western-style governance framework. It was noted by UN staff that UNDP had probably failed to articulate the expected results in an understandable manner. No LOA was ever finalized with the OOP, reflecting the difficulty of establishing a sound working relationship, but funding continued through November 2016. An LOA was signed with OPM in April 2016, but progress towards objectives beyond facility rehabilitation could not be achieved. To the knowledge of the evaluators, no functional review was conducted at the federal level although an organization structure discussion paper was prepared for MOPIED. Nevertheless, an agreement with the new management team in the OPM on strategic communication and performance management has been reached and international consultants are being sought. This reflects an ability on the part of UNDP to learn and on the part of government to rationalize their demands.

**Puntland Evidence:**

Puntland had benefited from earlier assistance from the SIDP which had already done functional reviews for several ministries. Puntland began with a public sector review in 2013, followed by a more detailed civil service review and the initial 4 functional reviews in 2014. The changes that could be seen in the functionality of those offices were clear enough that the Ministry of Labour, Education and the Civil Service Commission requested functional reviews from the project. This process had a useful impact in helping the CSC and MOLYS to clarify the distinctions in their functional assignments, with civil service recruitment and management clearly being shifted to the Commission. SIP also supported a functional review of the Health Ministry. In addition, it is useful to note that the Ministry of Environment borrowed the methodology and carried out a functional review and restructuring of its own unit without any external assistance, attesting to the utility of the approach.

The Ministry of Women’s Development and Family Affairs (MoWDAFA) had two functional analysis undertaken as the first did not prove useful. Although the second international consultant only had time to undertake, in his words, a ‘theoretical desktop study’, reports from the Ministry are that it was successfully used to help clarify the roles and functions of each unit. This has enabled them to prepare departmental operational plans that reduce friction within the ministry. The Ministry now has an HR Policy, TOR for key staff and all personnel have official identity cards. This Ministry now has more staff than MoPIC and is seen as a key player in Cabinet.

The most interesting outcome of Output 4 has been the re-invigoration of the Puntland Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Bureau. The PGG/ACB was founded as an NGO in 2006 by a group of Puntland intellectuals who helped the State to rationalize its responsibilities in four sectors of Finance, Security, Judiciary and Establishment. Somaliland copied their example, creating a similar unit in 2013. The Bureau is now beginning to play a more active role within the State Government and with civil society, following SIP supported preparation of a three-year strategic plan. The current President added Anti-Corruption to their mandate in 2014. With the assistance of international and national consultants, the Bureau was able to fashion a workable strategy for its overall mandate. In addition, it completed a Citizen’s Public Service Delivery Charter for Public Services, a Public Complaints Mechanism and has initiated an advocacy strategy for anti-corruption with the public. A cursory review of the Charter indicates that it is a useful initiative. It could be improved by more adequately clarifying service delivery standards and accountability measures to objectively assess a deficiency in service. Work on the Charter was stimulated by study tours to the Kenya Anti-corruption bureau and the Rwanda Ombudsman’s Office. The Bureau engaged all sectors to validate the Charter through open discussions with follow up orientation once it was completed. It should be presented to Cabinet for approval in November 2017. The Complaints Mechanism seems to be a mix of public grievances and internal discipline issues. The document could be improved by more carefully identifying the administrative level at which the complaint should be redressed. The team had the sense that this is still a consultant output and could be upgraded with more engagement with users.

PGG/ACB was initially seen as incapable of effectively utilizing UN assistance. Government had wanted SIP to build it from scratch, but SIP refused, explaining that the State must get it started. A building was rented with sufficient furniture and management systems were put in place before the LOA was signed.

Puntland State has made progress in enhancing accountability of government. The relatively lengthy history of Puntland development planning enabled MoPIC to facilitate the establishment of the Puntland Development Forum, which has been used to organize the government into six productive sectors and fostered coordination among these. In addition, the President has held three publicly televised Cabinet performance review sessions. The Ministers are required to report on their progress and deficiencies. This has helped to build awareness of the roles and responsibilities of each ministry. Finance and Planning ministries have taken the next step to organize internal reviews of their operations. SIP also supported a MoPIC retreat during which the Ministry reviewed its restructuring plan and used a participatory method to elaborate on the roles and functions of each department.

Financial Evidence

The financial analysis of each output has been updated to include December 2017 expenditures in order to more accurately account for late booking of expenditures during the evaluation period.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| Output | Amended Output Budget ($’000) | Available Output Budget (12/17) ($’000) | Total Spent (06/16-12/17) ($’000) | % output spent on consultants | Expenditure as % of available Output Budget (3) | Output expenditure as % of total project expenditure | Output Budget as % Available Project Budget  | Output as % Amended Project Budget  |
| **4** | **2125** |  **1511** |  **420** |  **25%** |  **28%** |  **4%** |  **10%** |  **13%** |

Except for Puntland, work on Output 4 dropped off the radar. The total spent for the PGGA/CB was about $140,000 over two years. The MoPIC office management retreat only cost $3000. Compared to the lack of progress at the Federal level, despite considerable expense to upgrade the OPM facilities, Puntland clearly illustrates the value of working on areas where the partner is fully committed to the work and the consultants provided were put to useful work

**Assessment**

Puntland State shows the potential to be a leader in public service reform among the Somali States. Obviously, it has been at it for 20 years, but all interviewees, government and NGO, recognized the positive changes over the past three years. Everyone mentioned ‘enhanced accountability’ as the most significant change, but also recognized it as the biggest continuing challenge going forward. Improved vertical and horizontal coordination, coupled with a decrease in conflict within organizations was noted as a result of a number of public sector reform interventions. There was no indication that any SIP intervention had contradicted the work of any other donor, although the World Bank did make some (reportedly minor) changes to functional reviews as they introduced their CIM recruitment program.

The PGGACB has a strategic framework and internal enthusiasm for moving its agenda forward. The State government recently added the ‘AC’-anti-corruption portfolio to its name, indicating a potential commitment to further improvement. It will require strong support from the State government to be able to play a meaningful role within government, but it is already serving as a conduit for communication to the public. This institutionalized engagement with citizens is important and not seen anywhere else in SIP (in StEFS only with SWS Planning Ministry). The Federal Minister of Interior asked the Bureau to present their work to the other FMS. They are eager to gain recognition for their progress, but recognize the difficulties they will face in operationalizing their policy documents and, therefore, anticipate future support from UNDP.

A mixed group of SIP partners in Puntland participated in a short workshop session with the evaluator. They strongly pushed for more emphasis in the future on fostering innovation in governance. They sought support to further strengthen inter-ministerial coordination, arguing the Puntland Development Forum should be opened in an all-inclusive manner to mobilize more resources through collaboration of all government, civil society, private sector and development partners. They stated that this should include improving communication, coordination and implementation at district, regional and state levels.

Underutilized financial resources from this Output could have been transferred to Puntland to enable that program to move ahead more rapidly and, by so doing, reduce the burden of the fixed administrative costs to the project. Progress in Puntland could have been put to greater use as peer learning opportunities, as was the case when the new States went to Garowe to learn about Puntland’s development planning process.

## Output Five Gender mainstreaming

Purpose: Prepare assessments, tools and plans to mainstream gender

Expected Achievements: 10 Tools developed at Federal and Puntland levels, 20 partners supported and 30 staff trained

Significant Results: Puntland completed the preparation of a Gender Mainstreaming Toolkit

**Federal Evidence**

It appears that the focus of the output on the production of technical documents delayed progress at the federal level. The 2016 LOA indicated that gender data collection, gender sensitive legal and policy instruments and gender-based budgeting would be the focus of attention. Aside from the gender mainstreaming guidelines, no documentation of draft or completion of any of this work was provided to the evaluators. The international consultant recruited to produce the gender mainstreaming toolkit was deemed incapable of completing the work and was dropped before the completion of her contract.

Both MoLSA and CSC reported on their efforts to encourage women to apply, including providing a wage supplement for female civil servant entrants. A research paper funding by UNDP with the CSC on gender inequalities in civil service was still in its first draft.

**Puntland Evidence**

Puntland Ministry of Women and Family Affairs was supported to produce a Gender Mainstreaming Toolkit. This was launched by the State Vice President in November 2016 and apparently is the first in the nation. Several workshops were held during the formulation and piloting of the Toolkit. A focus of attention was placed on identifying gender gaps in government operations. A national consultant was assigned the task of ensuring gender was mainstreamed into the work of the CSC and MoLYS on the civil service reform measures. The Puntland Development Plan was also revised to make it more gender sensitive. They are currently working on modifying the toolkit to make it applicable at the district level. Special sessions in the regions were held for senior clan elders to build their awareness of the value of women in Puntland society, but the ministry acknowledges the difficulty of cultural barriers to change. Gender focal points were trained in all line ministries, a move proposed by the Minister Women to Cabinet and a women’s cell has been established in the State House. Civil society groups in the regions also received special orientation sessions as well. The Puntland MoWDFA is now quite active on social media (SIP provided an ITC consultant and a communications advisor, but the initiative is self-organized and funded) and is using that capacity to promote the role of women in Somali society.

The Ministry remarked that support from SIDP had been similar, but much more.

**Financial Evidence**

The financial analysis of each output has been updated to include December 2017 expenditures in order to more accurately account for late booking of expenditures during the evaluation period.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| Output | Amended Output Budget ($’000) | Available Output Budget (12/17) ($’000) | Total Spent (06/16-12/17) ($’000) | % output spent on consultants | Expenditure as % of available Output Budget (3) | Output expenditure as % of project expenditure | Output Budget as % Available Project Budget  | Output as % Amended Project Budget  |
| 5 | 612 |  559 |  250 |  34% |  45% |  2% |  4% |  4% |

Only 2% of total project resources were used under this output and only 45% of the available output budget has been used.

The reported expenditure on the Puntland LOA for MoWDAFA for 2016 and 2017 is $145,410. The value of the LOA at the Federal level was budgeted for a total of $194,500. Therefore, aside from the international consultancies, it appears only minimal charges were made at the federal level under this output. Four national advisors were provided to the Federal Ministry, but their costs would have been covered under Output One.

**Assessment**

It is unclear why UNDP and donors approved SIP to open a separate gender technical output at the federal level. UNSOM, UNDP, UNICEF and UNWOMEN, plus bilaterals and other agencies all have ongoing technical gender programs. There was a coordinated effort by all major actors in this field to establish a national Gender Policy that culminated in May 2016.

Given the difficulties of moving ahead technically at the federal, it was wise of the project management to hold back on further guidance-writing inputs. However, given that CSC and MoLSA had made moves to introduce recruitment and retention rule modifications, SIP could have looked at ways and means of working with other government entities to foster a more conducive working environment for women in the civil service…using guidance materials already produced by other specialised organizations.

Puntland MoWDAFA appears to have been active in completing the work under its two LOA (2016-96%; 2017-75% to end September). Underutilized financial resources from this Output could have been transferred to Puntland to enable that program to move ahead more rapidly and, by so doing, reduce the burden of the fixed administrative costs at the project headquarters level. Progress in Puntland could be used as peer learning opportunities, with the only Gender Mainstreaming Guidelines in the country being produced in Puntland.

## Output Six Aid Coordination, Development Planning, Monitoring & Evaluation

Purpose: Provide guidance to build capacity to undertake development planning, M&E and aid coordination

Expected Achievements: Variety of documents, processes and arrangements addressing the elements of the Purpose

Significant Results: Production of the first National Development Plan in 30 years, shifting of locus of aid coordination from international community to FGS; established national system of monitoring for NDP

 In Puntland, Puntland Development Plan redesigned to match timeline and structure of NDP; state Statistics Law passed; establishment of the Puntland Development Forum

**Federal Evidence**

The most significant result of this output, and of the project as a whole, was the preparation of the National Development Plan (NDP). The entire process took nearly three years. National and International consultants worked closely with MOPIED staff to organize a wide range of consultations, over 60 in total, in many parts of the country to generate ideas, interest and understanding in the national plan, the first to be produced in the past 30 years. In the process, the MoPIED[[39]](#footnote-40) has built one of the more functional units in the FGS. After consultation, the NDP was accepted by the international community as the primary framework for aid discussions between all stakeholders. All five States have agreed, to varying degrees, to be engaged with the FGS in NDP implementation. Southwest State had its Strategic Plan approved by the Cabinet and distributed to all members of the SDRF. Puntland had already reformatted their existing PDP to match the timeframe of the national. Jubaland has some concerns over the demographics used in the NDP, but has agreed to collaborate. The other two states are still in the early stages of plan preparation.

The MoPIED (originally MoPIC) acknowledges the importance of SIP assistance in building their organization and supporting the preparation of the NDP. In 2015, the FGS recognized that most public services were being funded by international agencies and delivered by NGOs, but reporting was often spotty and, at times, fake. They saw the need to upgrade the capability of government to plan and implement basic services. The first problem encountered was the lack of data in the hands of government. International agencies and NGOs had data, but they were (and still are) unwilling to share their analyses. The overall information system was haphazard (recent discussion with the DINA consultants indicates the situation had not changed by late in 2017) leading, at times, to overlapping and contradictory assistance. While recognizing that international assistance helps keep the country together, this lack of government capacity was allowing development to proceed “from the perspective of the donors”.

MoPIED leadership began to lay out a plan for improving its capacity, recognizing that little of its work was being done systematically: There was no M&E, planning was conceptual at best, statistics were managed by international agencies, their financial management system was unworkable and the concept of human resource management lacked an incentive framework.

To address these perceived gaps, the ministry turned first to UNDP for assistance. In their view, UNDP was “willing to listen” and responded immediately with support in all substantive areas, as well as refurbishing the building, adding necessary furniture and equipment and financing eight advisory posts. In the process, UNDP did not act as a controller of the process, but did keep close tabs on the use of funding through a pre-approval process that helped to build an effective working relationship. MoPIED was asked to initiate the relationship by preparing a concept note of the results it wanted to achieve. The concept note was then deconstructed into a workplan and formalized through a LOA, beginning January 2016. This assistance enabled MoPIED to begin to put its house in order, so it could manage its own resources. The next step was to devise a national development plan that would enable the FGS to have greater leverage over the use of international resources for the development of Somalia.

In December 2015, the National Advisory Council, consisting of FGS, FS, youth representatives and civil society met to elaborate the process for preparing the NDP, particularly the regional consultations to ensure broad buy-in. The first consultation in Puntland enabled the other States to recognize they needed to organize preliminary consultations among their own constituents before meeting with FGS to discuss a national plan. These State level consultations were financed by UNDP. The process continued for nearly half a year providing the opportunity for the most inclusive dialogue in many years.

The preparation of the NDP provided a raison d’etre for the National Development Council, by pushing the FGS to realize the need for consultation with the States. It also influenced the advancement of the National Statistics Act, the National NGO Act and the National M&E Framework (which has been endorsed by Cabinet). Perhaps the most important outcome of the plan preparation has been the realization of the need for systematic management of implementation and reporting on outcomes. MoPIED is currently involved in rolling out the monitoring framework to all the federal line ministries. This effort has been facilitated through the intervention of a SIP international consultant who deconstructed the NDP into a detailed Gantt chart indicating tasks, responsibilities and timelines creating a comprehensive workplan. Within MoPIED now, the M&E unit prepares an internal performance report and senior staff hold regular meetings to share progress. The workplan being finalized now is for 2017 due to the significant disturbance caused by the change in administration after the election. At this point, States are still invited to NDP Pillar meetings as observors, but next year the intent is to switch to joint programming once all FMS have completed their planning process.

As MoPIED has shown progress in its own organization, more donors are becoming involved. The M&E unit now has support from World Bank and UNICEF, while Statistics has assistance from World Bank, IMF, SIDA and UNFPA. UNDP involvement in Statistics now is limited .

Although SIP has an activity result for ‘localizing SDGs’ this seems to be managed by a unit separate from Statistics and M&E (and it was not met by the evaluator). Nevertheless, both Statistics and M&E DGs informed that all goals and indicators of the NDP are already aligned to SDGs. In addition, an M&E MOU has been prepared for all FMS to facilitate the exchange of information and to collaborate on collection of data. This has helped to advance towards a single common M&E framework with the FMS. The NDC endorsed the national M&E framework. Support for this was a collaboration of UNICEF and SIP.

While tracking SDG progress is important for the long-run, the immediate need is to improve implementation. For this, MoPIED has developed a performance monitoring framework to track implementation of all NDP indicators, both in terms of process and output by both federal line ministries and FMS. This was still in process during the evaluation, but sufficiently developed to be clearly explained by MoPIED. While progress tracking is important, building capacity of the line ministries and FMS is the paramount objective so that MoPIED can shift to a less hands on arrangement in the future as each element of government develops the capability to track its own progress.

Aid Coordination

The Aid Coordination Unit (ACU) was created by FGS in 2014, and the UNDP was the first to offer assistance. This mean providing furniture and computers, plus all 23 staff members have their salaries fully paid by SIP. UNDP supported the preparation of TOR for the unit, designed the workplan and prepared and funded the budget. In addition, an international staff has provided backup for the team to ensure quality and timeliness of reporting and event management.

According to its latest report, the “Aid Coordination Unit provides strategic advice, information and technical support to the Offices of the President and of the Prime Minister, different ministries in the Government, including the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development (MoPIED), the Parliament, Federal Member States (FMSs) and the Somali Public Cabinet to promote the effective utilization of aid resources to attain peacebuilding, state-building and development results”.

Since the ACU has the capacity to provide high level secretarial and logistic support to the Government, it has been pulled from the OPM, to Ministry of Finance, to MoPIED, and back to OPM in the matter of a few years. Fortunately, they have not had to physically move, but the change in leadership has been difficult. According to the chief, OPM is the best place as it reduces the frictions caused by attempting to formally coordinate ministries from inside another ministry.

Although all costs are covered by UNDP, SIP can still be credited with facilitating a more positive relationship between FGS and the international community on issues of aid management. The 23 advisors working in the ACU were largely responsible for the organization, facilitation and documentation of many high-level meetings such as the SDRF, May 2017 London Conference and the first Pillar Working Group (PWG) under the NDP in July. In addition, in recognition of their capacity,the ACU was also called upon to facilitate the work of the recent drought early recovery planning efforts.

At present, some of the staff are in the process of being regularized into the civil service. The impact this will have on the unit’s functionality is unknown, but it is causing friction within the organization, especially at the top. In addition, the AID MIS system has now been moved to MoPIED, with the ACU focusing on secretarial and logistic functions of international community meetings and drafting communiques.

In some ways, aid coordination remains more of an aspiration than a fixed practice. Broad agreements have been reached. An operational manual was prepared for the SDRF to regularize the project approval process, but there is still no real incentive for donors to go through this channel so there remain multiple aid flow channels.

One process that has been building momentum over the past year has been the National Development Council (NDC). The NDC was created several years ago, as the NAC. The design process of the NDP facilitated the re-design of a national coordination mechanism. SIP consultants prepared an early concept that helped to stimulate thinking in the FGS on a federal development dialogue. The NDC is not the primary forum in the overall aid architecture, but it does enable open dialogue on development issues among Somalis at national and state levels. As a result, both FGS and FMS representatives strongly support a continued role for the NDC in the aid decision making process. Although SIP does not orchestrate the NDC meetings, it does still fund the logistic costs.

**Puntland Evidence**

Puntland State has been assisted to produce three development plans this century. SIP successfully assisted the State to modify their current plan to bring it in line with the NDP. While much of the work was more a matter of reformatting, their willingness to adapt its existing plan to the structure and timeframe of the National Plan illustrated the State’s acceptance of its role in the federation.

From discussions with key actors, and review of budget and documents, it is clear that the process has been driven by the ministry with catalytic support from SIP. MoPIC acknowledges the support from SIP as providing the ‘backbone’ for the ministry. In their view, the ministry “owns all activities of SIP” because each year they identify what are the important activities to be funded by SIP. The work in 2016 focused primarily on the revision of the PDP and enhancing the functioning of the Puntland Development Council. Support from SIP consisted of one month international consultant and four national advisors (planning, Aid coordination, M&E and Finance & Procurement). The 2017 focus has been on the preparation and execution of ministerial implementation plans. This year there has been no dedicated international consultant support for this output, with only three short-term (8 month) supporting national consultants (proposal writing, Aid coordination, and communications). Much of SIP assistance went into producing PDP materials (bilingual) and facilitating orientation workshops for line ministries.

Puntland has also progressed in gaining government agreement in the area of statistics as well. SIP supported the drafting of a M&E Act, Statistics Act (cabinet endorsed) and Strategic Plan for building statistical capacity. Statistics indicators for the PDP are based on the UN Sustainable Development Goals. They have laid out a geographically stratified sampling frame, and distinguishing urban, rural and nomad (perhaps 50% of the population) to carry out the USAID-designed and funded Demographic and Health Survey[[40]](#footnote-41), with additional assistance from UNFPA and other donors

An Aid Coordination policy for Puntland was developed in August 2015, but has apparently never been approved by government. Its status remains unclear. Nevertheless, the Puntland Development Forum is also structured for resource mobilization by coordinating requests to donors. It is hoped this will improve the relationship of Puntland with the International Community, as they recognize that their resource mobilization efforts have not been well managed.

Similarly, the M&E policy was also prepared in 2015 and remains in draft. These gaps may indicate the difficulty of moving technical documents up for approval. It may also point to a problem with conversion of consultant reports into implementable outputs.

**Financial Evidence**

The financial analysis of each output has been updated to include December 2017 expenditures.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| Output | Amended Output Budget ($’000) | Available Output Budget (12/17) ($’000) | Total Spent (06/16-12/17) ($’000) | % output spent on consultants | Expenditure as % of Output available Budget (3) | Output expenditure as % of project expenditure | Output Budget as % Available Project Budget | Output as % Amended Project Budget |
| **6** | **$3,909** |  **$4,133** |  **$4,962** |  **41%** |  **120%** |  **41%** |  **28%** |  **21%** |

As the project ran into difficulties in delivery on other outputs, particularly Civil Service reform, resources were re-allocated to match the growing need from the Aid Coordination Unit and the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development (MOPIED). Over 41% of the SIP project resources have been utilized in producing the deliverables under this output and as of the end of December 2017, 120% of the available output budget had already been consumed. With increased focus on support to line ministry monitoring of the NDP and PDP it can be expected that the percentage of total budget used by this output will continue to increase as others at the federal level are far less active. In Puntland, the largest share of the 2017 SIP resources have gone to MoPIC, and over 50% of the remaining unspent funds (as of September) were associated with the MoPIC LOA.

**Assessment**

There is no question that SIP delivered with the MoPIED. The result is more than ‘a book’, as the NDP has been referred, it is the revitalization of the Ministry and, associated with that, energizing the FGS to play a greater role in the management of the international assistance it receives. It was a mutual collaboration, with the UNDP Country Director noting, “The Planning Ministry did so well, they made us look good!”

While the ACU remains essentially a step-child of UNDP, the creation of the NDC represents a true outcome level development. The NDC is perhaps the only Somali led and managed forum that facilitates regular dialogue between the FMS and FGS.

However, in both Puntland and FGS there are a number of draft policies and laws that have been lingering for over a year. The reasons for these delays likely differ from one document to another. A critical lesson, however, is SIP should perhaps temper its enthusiasm for delivering technically competent documents before ensuring that the partner (and all associated stakeholders, including politicians) fully understand and own the product. It is entirely possible that the change in the FGS leadership in 2017 has played a role in the evaluators perception of lack of ownership. Nevertheless, a more participatory, facilitated process will be explained in the Recommendations section as a suggestion for moving away from an expert-driven approach to a more catalytic engagement, requiring shorter inputs from internationals, but greater buy-in from partners.

One area that both FGS and Puntland requested additional assistance is in data management. Each of the two planning ministries respectively has set up a fledgling Geographic Information System with little or no assistance. Development planning in a large area with dispersed population needs to have a place-based development information system, especially when working at the State level. Sectors/Pillars do not help in knowing where aid is actually going (geographically) and who is being left out. In Mogadishu, a satellite image has been matched with an unlicensed GIS software to plot the locations of all building of Banadir to be used in determining the sample frame for the DHS. This level of initiative needs to be supported with technical advice, cross-visit opportunities, hardware, software and support to induce all international agencies to share their data in a single unified geographically referenced information system managed by MoPIED and shared with the FMS.

## Output Seven The SIP project management

Purpose: Establish management and implementation arrangements

Expected Achievements: Project Board meetings held, project progress reports produced, staff recruited

Actual Results: No effective project board meeting since February 2016. Project staff can be considered to be the bare minimum necessary to implement the project under UNDP rules.

**Federal Evidence**

SIP is operated by a very small team in Mogadishu. Supervised by a part-time programme manager and the part time deputy programme manager. The team consists of two full time internationals (team leader and Aid Effectiveness/Efficiency specialist), one national officer, one M&E UNV and one shared accountant. Together they have disbursed and accounted for activities amounting to over $9 million over the past two years. Despite these staffing limitations, no government partner complained about late delivery of assistance. Logistical delivery is clearly their strong suit.

Knowledge management capacity is not as well developed. Naturally, the project team cannot have technical capacity in all the subject areas of the project. However, many technical reports have been written by consultants, but, in many cases, have not been critically reviewed by either project management or government. The sense obtained by the evaluators was that delivery was the focus, and this has its merits when dealing with an FCAS that is struggling to get its feet on the ground and is anxious for immediate assistance. However, donors complain that reporting is restricted to the activity, and even input, level, failing to provide a nuanced assessment of either progress or constraints. The project leadership stressed that MPTF fund management board emphasises reporting on activity level and production of deliverables (laws, etc.)[[41]](#footnote-42) The use of Third Party Monitoring facilities from both UNDP and DFID did not provide any high-level analysis, synthesis or lessons learned to advance project or partner thinking.

There is also seemingly no shadow budget or project management tool used by the project manager to aggregate expenses of all operational budget lines by geographic location or to track progress and expenditure by LOA as none was provided to the evaluators when requested. UNDP clearly needs to upgrade their ATLAS system so it can function as a project management systems rather than just as a fund administration system.

The M&E officer prepares a annual monitoring plan for the federal part of the project. According to the SIP M&E officer, the project manager is expected to provide the implementation details, but this was not done.

Letters of Agreement have been well used to define the nature of assistance to be provided to each partner. All partners were very clear about the assistance they expected to receive and when it was due. It was less clear whether they sensed an obligation on their part to use that assistance generate change that is meaningful to their constituents.

The last effective Steering Committee meeting was in February 2016. There has been no Steering Committee meeting at all since October 2016, but UNDP was not invited to present on SIP progess at that last meeting as it focused on the lack of progress from the World Bank side. Donors have stated that an agreement was reached to downgrade the meeting chair to the Permanent Secretary from the Deputy Prime Minister, but this was never implemented. Project implementors could not adequately explain why the the critical function of external oversight fell into disarray. The national election did play a role in the latter stages, but according to donors, agreement had been made to downgrade the chairmanship post to the Permanent Secretary level.

There was a striking lack of linkage between the Puntland and Federal staff of the project, almost as if they were operating as completely different projects. This limited communication reduced the potential for the federal partners to benefit from lessons already learned in Puntland.

**Puntland Evidence**

One aspect of the project that illustrates cost savings, with accompanying quality management, was the shift from an international to a national component manager in Puntland. The evaluator found the Puntland activities to be well managed with all partners fully aligned with project objectives. A strong reason for this alignment is that all activities were already identified in the earlier Puntland Development Plan and all partners were required to prepare a concept note before initiating a LOA. Their apparent interest comes out clearly in the minutes of the Project Board meetings. These are clearly meetings of partners, rather than implementers reporting on activities completed. On several occasions, it was clear from the minutes that the State was holding UNDP accountable for promises made. Meaningful insights into project operations were obtained by scanning these documents.

Only Puntland management provided the evaluators with a detailed breakdown of the costs associated with each partner LOA and ready access to materials produced. Management and overhead costs were not included presumably as these are calculated in Mogadishu. Nevertheless, the evaluators was provided with the most comprehensive view of what work had been undertaken, what it had cost and where savings remained.

**Financial Evidence**

The financial analysis of each output has been updated to include December 2017 expenditures in order to account for late booking of expenditures.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| Output | Amended Output Budget($’000) | Available Output Budget (09/17) ($’000) | Total Spent (06/16-09/17) ($’000) | % output spent on consultants | Expenditure as % of available Output Budget (3) | Output expenditure as % of project expenditure | Output Budget as % Available Project Budget | Output as % Amended Project Budget |
| **7** | **$3,749** | **$4,568** | **$4,406** | **n/a** | **96%** | **37%** | **31%** | **22%** |

The management of SIP is an expensive affair. Fully 37% of project finances were consumed in management personnel, operational expenses and UNDP administrative costs and 96% of the available management output budget allocation has already been consumed, which amounts to 117% of the fomal amended budget for administrative charges.

The management budget has continually increased as a percentage of the total project. It was anticipated to be only 22% of the Amended Budget, but is now nominally 31% of the Available Budget, yet comprises 37% of actual expenditures through December 2017. Staff cost is emphasized as the breakdown of the management costs come out as 54% staff costs, 15% operational expense and 30% UNDP administrative costs. Considering that staff are essentially sunk costs, the percentage of project expenditures devoted to management costs may continue to increase through to the end of the project.

**Assessment**

It appears that senior project management has not been able to control administrative expenditure increases, despite leaving several international posts unfilled. The management cost as a percentage of total budget is now nearly twice what was originally proposed. This rate of growth is questionable, even for work in a FCAS. When a project budget is laid out by an implementing organization certain assumptions are made regarding holding down management costs. In the case of SIP, management costs grew steadily while the total resources available for substantive work steadily decreased. This appears to be a problem of a combination of the expensive staffing and administrative costs for UNDP.

 Slow project implementation,plus increases in UNDP chages, had a major impact on the administrative costs. However, no evidence was provided, expect in Puntland, indicating the project managers understood what it cost to deliver a specific activity. This is not the norm in professional project mangement. The evaluators were left with the sense that UNDP does not consider implementation cost reduction to be a core management objective.

This high cost of project administration is apparently in line with, or even slightly less expensive than, other international projects in Somalia. Nevertheless, the evaluators believe that more needs to be done to re-think how UNDP and other international projects are implemented in Somalia. The high administrative cost combined with the difficulty of effective oversight because of the perceived security risks seriously reduce the potential gains of international assistance

The first step needs to be to begin a discussion of how to shift, no doubt gradually, towards a NEX/NIM implementation modality, or some workable varient thereof, as this appears to be the only way to reduce the administrative costs of running the projects under UNDP rules. The HACT assessment process is an important first step, but is it clear that more concentrated effort is requred on both sides.

The lack of a functional Steering Committee has meant that critical high level issues were not discussed at an appropriate venue with Governmant, reducing the potential for donors to address these bilaterally.

If resources had been shifted from slow moving federal activities to Puntland, it is likely the available budget could have been spent at a lower fixed rate of administrative costs. Unfortunately, there has been little or no peer learning or exchange of experiences between the Puntland and federal parts of SIP. The two operate as if they were part of independent projects with the project manager in Mogadishu focused only on federal work. A more unified approach should be considered for the next phase.

Project management must be progressively handed over the Somali government once it can show verifiable and sustained capacity in financial management. This will be the only way to increase the availability of international resources for substantive work. However, while Somalis may complain that too much of the development money never reaches them, efforts on their part to improve their internal financial and management systems are also required to facilitate this shift to take place. The fact that Somalia has ranked last in the Transparency International Corruption Index for the past two years and the US Government has halted financial allocations to its military indicate there is much work yet to be done. However, experience has shown in other FCAS, that neither accountability, transparency nor performance are enhanced simply by introducing new rules and structures from the outside.

# Support to Emerging Federal States Output Findings

According to the Prodoc summary, StEFS is the key UN support to address ‘….needs primarily at the emerging federal state level but also supporting those federal government structures that critically facilitate new state formation’. StEFS overall goal supports the FGS’ Peace and State Building Goal 1 (PSG 1) to….achieve a stable and peaceful federal Somalia through inclusive political processes.

The upper end of the StEFS logic model is in line with the goal structure of the Somali Compact The StEFS overall Goal supports the Peace and State Building Goal 1 (PSG 1) to “….achieve a stable and peaceful federal Somalia through inclusive political processes. The StEFS primary Outcome, also aligned with Priority 1, is to “Advance inclusive political dialogue to clarify and settle relations between the federal Government and existing and emerging administrations and initiate processes of social reconciliation to restore trust between communities.”

It is important to note that this encompasses three intermediary level outcomes. First, the project aims to resolve the disputes/disagreements surrounding efforts to create a federal system beginning in 2012; second, it seeks to clarify the respective responsibilities of the FGS and the Somali FMS; and third, StEFS aims to support inter- and intra-clan reconciliation and trust building.

To this end, the project has five substantive outputs and associated one management output:

1. The political dialogue and consultations around federalism and state formation have been supported
2. The capacity of the FGS, particularly those institutions engaged in the federalism process, is strengthened
3. Foundational support to State Administrations to ensure an appropriate physical working environment is provided
4. The capacity of State Administrations with a dedicated focus on ‘core public sector capacities’ is enhanced
5. Civic participation and engagement with State Administrations is strengthened
6. A sixth StEFS output relates to project management.

 In the evaluation’s view, the most significant change to which StEFS contributed was the political creation of the four Federal Member States, together with a rational structuring of their Cabinet level ministries.

Brief discussion Output by Output follows

## Output 1: The political dialogue and consultations around federalism and state formation have been supported.

StEFS enabled, through planning and logistic support, for reconciliation to go ahead in two instances, Galmudug and HirShabelle, this was a critical contribution to creation of these two FMS. There is a widely shared view amongst project staff and state government officials that without StEFS support it was unlikely that these two states would have been established. Furthermore, enhanced efforts in reconciliation has contributed to the sustainability of all four. The fact that the project supported the finalisation of the state formation process and contributed to promoting their sustainability through key inputs to the reconciliation (political and social) process (see below) is notable. The evaluation emphasises that sustaining the contribution in this area will be critical to the new states medium-term sustainability.

During the course of the StEFS pre-project phase, it became clear that an extended reconciliation process was necessary if the emergent states were to achieve sustainability; so support in this regard was incorporated as an component of the full StEFS project. It is important to emphasise that, despite this understanding, the StEFS project deliberately took a back seat to the UNSOM political office and other players, such as Finnish Church Aid (FCA) in this respect[[42]](#footnote-43); its support was broadly confined to logistics and subsistence, as well as physical planning. This support was seen by all as useful in enabling the many stakeholders to be able to spend enough time together to establish a basis for understanding.

StEFS support was principally in respect of planning and provision of logistics. Because this is a demand driven area, frequently determined at short notice, planning is particularly difficult. The travel expenditure (Table below) underlines this.

Reconciliation of Travel Variations

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Output 1 | Planning Total | Expenditure Total | Variation % |
| Travel (2016) | 110 000.00 | 408 576.91 | 371 |
| Travel (2017) | 222 501.00 | 146 900.00 | (66) |

Source: Calculated from Atlas extracts

The data clearly underlines the acknowledged reality that when the project committed to support the reconciliation process, project managers were unaware of the scale of the implications of this commitment. Variations over the two years of +371% and -66% over planned totals emphasise the project’s adaptability and the efficiency with which it was able to respond to, very often, last minute requests for assistance.

Facilitators recorded the reaction of the participants to the utility of the Galmudug State Formation Workshop to the state formation process. Overall, participants expressed a positive reaction to the workshop’s utility.

Fig. 3 : Participants Perceptions of the Galmuduug State Formation Workshop, Cadadaad

Source: Project Data

Fig. 4: Practical Utility of Workshop

Source: ibid

Fig. 5 : Workshop Met Expectations (Frequency of Response)

Source: ibid

StEFS’ logistical role in the reconciliation efforts reflected the clear understanding with UNSOM’s political office that it would take the lead as the international partner in terms agenda setting and identification of desired outputs. In this respect, the key international actor was UNSOM, a StEFS partner; national actors included MOIFAR and FMS. Basically, StEFS’ role was to meet the costs associated with the reconciliations[[43]](#footnote-44).

A key reason for this was the recognition of the challenges surrounding the understanding of socio-political nuances of the reconciliation process and the impossibility of gaining such an understanding in the relatively short time available to project actors; in line with ‘Do No Harm’ principles, UNDP preferred to defer to UNSOM’s political office and federal and local partners. As a result, although cost issues were raised (e.g. Do you really need to send a party of 20?), project management accepted the explanations provided (e.g. The Minister needs to have people on the ground.). In this regard, the evaluators broadly support the background role that the project played as well as the flexibility and rapid responsiveness that project staff demonstrated[[44]](#footnote-45).

Fig. 6: Total Reconciliation Efforts by Activity

Source: Annual Report, 2016; Q 1 & 2 Reports, 2017

Fig.7 Specific Reconciliation Activities

Source: ibid

According to information received, the reconciliation processes sought to make use of established traditional reconciliation approaches. In this, key local stakeholders included clan elders, community members, and religious leaders. Clan elders’ task in traditional approaches broadly is to hold the ring and facilitate ongoing discussion and negotiation between the conflicting parties with a view to a shared consensus around an agreement on the terms of the reconciliation. Such an approach has been successfully applied in other conflicts, albeit usually on an individual level[[45]](#footnote-46).

Fig. 8: Total Reconciliation Efforts

Source: ibid

Fig. 9 : Total Specific Reconciliation Efforts

Source: ibid

**Assessment**

Notwithstanding the project’s positive use of iterative adaptation, which is to be strongly welcomed, the evaluation needs to emphasise a number of points. First, it received information from different sources that the most serious conflicts (including Lower Shabelle and Galmuduug) remain unresolved. In several instances, interlocutors questioned whether the ‘right’ people had participated, illustrating their questions by pointing out that the key participants in the reconciliation meetings were elite political actors as opposed to those active in the conflict.

The evaluation understands that the StEFS purpose is to facilitate the emergence of the FMS and, for this to occur, engagement of political elites is necessary. However, the evaluation was informed (it is important to emphasise that, with one exception[[46]](#footnote-47), the evaluation was unable to engage directly with participants in the reconciliation exercise; as a result, the evaluation cannot independently verify the reports received) that political elites with business interests were active stakeholders in the still unresolved Middle and Lower Shabelle conflict[[47]](#footnote-48); if this is the case, their involvement in reconciliation attempts appears incomplete.

Regardless of the challenges surrounding the process, interim agreements were reached in every instance in which the project was involved; but in more intractable conflicts, these quickly broke down and the conflicts resumed. It is important to emphasise that reconciliation is not a ‘once and for all’ process; rather, in most cases, it is a case of ‘one step forward, two steps back’; as such, here is an obvious ongoing need for sustained investment in this regard. As in all ‘hot’, and indeed ‘frozen’, conflicts, reconciliation remains a priority both for stabilization and general peace building and for establishing conditions under which a sustainable political dispensation (viable federal and state governments, supported by further decentralization through municipal and district government is achievable.

## Output 2: The capacity of FGS, particularly those institutions engaged in the federalism process, is strengthened.

This output had three distinct partners, the Boundaries and Federation Commission (BFC) (2.1), the Ministry of Interior (MoIFA, now MoIFAR) (2.2, 2.3) and Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) (2.3).

StEFS support was an important contribution to improve (and in BFC’s case create) the human resource capacity of both the BFC and MOIFAR. Furthermore, both federal institutions benefitted from the functional equipment of office spaces, thereby establishing the necessary conditions for both to be able to carry out, and in BFC’s case begin, basic functions. The project, for example, successfully facilitated MOIFAR’s role and functionality in Output 1, while BFC was enabled to commence operations according to its constitutional function. Despite the contentious nature of the discussion, BFC is now able to initiate dialog on state boundaries.

**Activity Result 2.1:** BFC is equipped and supported to fulfil its mandate

It is important to note that the BFC was an entirely new institution and StEFS support was critical in establishing it and its attainment of the capacity to initiate challenging formal and informal discussions around the issue of state boundaries. Comments from other government officials alluded to BFC not understanding its role before StEFS began to provide assistance. Although the Commission was to have started in 2012, it took until 2015 before approval was granted and the Commissioners were selected. By the time the evaluators visited, that situation had clearly changed. The BFC leadership is now fully capable of explaining its work, to include the political constraints they face from those who are suspicious of either boundaries or federalism. StEFS support in facilitating the clarification of the organization’s mandate and preparation of the strategic plan had helped to place BFC on more solid footing. StEFS helped to organize 13 workshops in Mogadishu aimed at alleviating such fears. Although they have been assisted to make use of public mass media, they feel more awareness is still needed in the regions because the core challenge rests with minimizing violence. StEFS financed the construction of temporary facilities for the BFC. After two years of building their team and building public awareness of their role, they feel now is the appropriate time to begin to get involved in demarcating boundaries. As a beginning, they have started to establish deconcentrated offices in the FMS. They are recruiting interns/fresh graduates to help alleviate their staffing shortages. Practical problems, such as the loss of historical maps and boundary description, are now able to be addressed through StEFS support, and facilitated links with external sources. The most recent assistance from StEFS, arriving just as the evaluation was being completed, has been the provision of a modern Geographic Information Systems workstation, plotter and access to remotely sensed imagery. The plan is to have a national map completed with all boundaries agreed in time for the 2020 election.

**Activity Result 2.2:** FGS structures are better able to fulfil their mandate with regard to the establishment of new federal states

The project has been an important contribution to the Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation’s (MOIFAR) ability to support the political reconciliation process at state level. This was clearly critical in the formation of the above two FMS and in ensuring an active federal presence in reconciliations in other states too.

Fig. 10 : Training for Federal Institutions

Source: Annual Report, 2016; Q 1 & 2 Reports, 2017

**Activity Result 2.3:** FGS/OPM is supported to facilitate federalism dialogue

Although the work with the OPM was delayed until recently, StEFS supported efforts to extend information on the national federalism process. Key aspects in this regard were successfully sponsored state and national university-based essay competitions and debates, federalism not being a topic taught in Somalia’s universities. Although of limited outreach, these events achievements were positively noted by numerous interlocutors in both states the evaluation visited. In addition, a number of public events in which federalism was discussed were held; again, inevitably, the actual outreach was limited but the evaluation was informed that they contributed to a better understanding and appreciation of federalism as more local decision-making. Finally, greater outreach was attempted through radio broadcasts and on-line streaming of discussions about federalism. The evaluation was unable to assess listenership but is aware that radio is a powerful communication tool in Somalia. There is some evidence of improved understanding and appreciation of the national federalist system of governance through the perception survey supported by the project. Having noted this, there remain clear challenges in securing a requisite level of national ownership.

**Assessment**

The process of developing Somalia’s Provisional Constitution [2012] has been subject to considerable criticism both within the country and from Somali academics in the diaspora. Major aspects of this relate to the August 2004, Ethiopian-controlled and Kenyan-hosted, peace process’s drafting of the Transitional Federal Charter, widely perceived to respond to Ethiopian and Kenyan concerns surrounding Somali irredentism, the secrecy surrounding the constitutional revisions introduced by the Committee of Experts and, subsequently by six Somali politicians[[48]](#footnote-49) and the SRSG, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah subsequently replaced by Tanzania’s Augustine Mahiga[[49]](#footnote-50). Further revisions (two in Addis Ababa and subsequently in Nairobi) were introduced without any participation by the original drafters. The revised version was signed on 22 June 2012 and subsequently endorsed[[50]](#footnote-51) the content on 1 August 2012.

Elmi[[51]](#footnote-52) concludes : “From its inception, Somalia’s constitution-making process was deeply flawed. The process was designed, funded and controlled by UNPOS, with help from the regional organization IGAD and the neighbouring countries. Originally, the constitution-making process aimed at keeping the politicians at bay. Ironically, the process ended up in the hands of six unrepresentative Somali politicians and the SRSG of the UN. These seven individuals have dominated the constitution- making process of Somalia. Elmi argued that the process excluded civic, political and Islamist forces; they have secretly and hastily negotiated on the articles of the constitution; that a poor draft was imposed through a non-transparent process.. As a result of this political expediency, secrecy and haste, both the IFCC and CoE which were tasked to prepare the draft and many civic and political forces distanced themselves from the UN-controlled constitution-making process. In short, flawed processes lead to illegitimate outcomes – and this has proved to be the case with the UN-led constitution-making process in Somalia. More problematic is that besides the failure to regulate individual, institutional and group disputes, there is an increased risk of further conflicts, particularly if plans to establish the second chamber are implemented.”

It is worth emphasising that similar critiques were shared with the evaluators on numerous occasions: Somali interlocutors questioned the need for a federation, emphasising that Somalis are one ethnicity, share the same language and religion, usual criteria for a unitary state. Interlocutors also emphasised the perception of the desire of Ethiopia and Kenya to ensure a weak Somali state[[52]](#footnote-53), referencing both the presence of Somali minorities in both countries and their predominance in Djibouti, possibly giving some legitimacy for Ethiopia and Kenya’s concerns surrounding Somali irredentism.

Furthermore, there is evident dispute surrounding the relative roles and responsibilities of centre and state[[53]](#footnote-54) despite the Provisional Constitution reserving only four areas to the central government: Defence, Foreign Affairs, Citizenship and Immigration and Monetary Policy; a fifth, Natural Resource Management will be discussed between central and state governments The contestation surrounding the constitutionally reserved powers underlines the contested nature of the federalisation process.

Nor, having survived more than two decades of Hobbesian anarchy, federalism remains little understood by the citizenry[[54]](#footnote-55). While there appears general approval of the notion of devolved decision-making, there is considerable resistance, particularly amongst pastoral communities to boundary establishment, most likely because of confusion between administrative boundaries and borders. Neither are traders nor the transport industry in favour, possibly due to the understood financial risks associated with formalization of state frontiers. Both experience taxation at the hands of SNA and Al Shabab checkpoints, although, according to several independent interviewees, the latter reportedly adhere to levying a single tax in contrast to each SNA checkpoint levying their own.

The purpose of this assessment is to substantiate the evaluators’ contention that strengthening the federalism process requires more than technical skills and equipment.

## Output 3: Foundational support to Interim State Administrations to ensure an appropriate physical working environment is provided.

Output 3 largely dealt with the establishment of a conducive work environment in the four newly established state administrations[[55]](#footnote-56). This involved building and refurbishing workspace facilities (e.g. Government and Civil Service Commission offices in JSS, office and meeting space in SWS). In both states, the project also supplied vehicles. In addition, the project provided necessary, but limited equipment, in particular office furniture, desk- and laptop computers, printers, projectors, air conditioning, etc.

**Activity Result 3.1:** Key priority infrastructure is identified and delivered in coordination with existing infrastructure support mechanisms

Over the period of the PIP and at the StEFS’s launch, the baseline revealed that FMS ministries lacked offices or the buildings from which they operated were in such states of disrepair that working was not possible. As a result, StEFS supported the refurbishment, and on occasion, construction of government offices. At the time of the evaluation, StEFS had supported the refurbishment and construction of the following infrastructure:

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **State** | **Refurbishment** | **Construction** | **Status** |
| SWS |  | Ministry of Planning OfficeMeeting RoomSWS Cabinet building | CompleteCompleteUnder construction |
| JSS | CSC Office( completed) | Cabinet OfficesMeeting RoomCustoms officeVice president office | Under ConstructionCompletedUnder construction |
| GSS |  | President office, | Complete |
|  |  | Conference room | Complete |
|  |  | Cabinet building | Under construction |
| Hirshabelle (HSS) |  | President office/cabinet building | Bid awarded |

Source: Field visit

The evaluation does not question the need for a conducive physical environment for the efficient conduct of government (or indeed any) business. However, the differences in the degree of facilities’ utilisation is worthy of comment. The JSS administration has not yet adopted the SWS approach with meeting rooms (which admittedly were not financed by the project) standing idle for most of the week. By contrast, SWS’s two meeting rooms (one a standalone building and the second in the Ministry of Planning) are utilized both by the state administration [MOPIC meetings, Donor (Drought) Coordination Meetings, Sector Working Group meetings (the evaluation observed a WASH sector meeting)] and for state and public training (the evaluation observed a Communications training taking place).

The SWS facilities are far more intensively utilized despite the state’s formation following after that of Jubaland thereby ensuring a better rate of return on the investment. The difference appears to lie in the approaches of the different administrations. On the one hand, SWS perceives networking, including with INGOs/NGOs as an opportunity, even if this is just reputational; on the other, civil society and its organisations are perceived as competition for scarce resources; Galmuduug’s Minister of Planning, his deputy, adviser and the President’s adviser all perceive INGOs/NGOs as using resources, which, otherwise, would be for the state. But, equally important, there is nothing in the LOAs that require the state to make use of the resources provided through the project in the most efficient, cost effective manner. As a result, resources can sit idle when they might be better used.

In total US $564 755.34 was spent on contracting construction companies and US $150 171.89 on providing the requisite equipment for the offices. Respectively, this represented 42% and 80% of the respective AWP totals; furthermore, 412% increase in the cost of equipment provided in 2017 over 2016 reflects sequencing.

Office Furniture and Equipment

Physical infrastructure alone is insufficient to establish a conducive working environment. Sure, they are one part. Furnishings and equipment are necessary components of any office space. StEFS sought to address this need. Fig. 11 provides an overview of the furniture, equipment and other items provided through the project.

Fig. 11: Equipping FMS Administration Offices

Source: Annual Report, 2016; Q 1 & 2 Reports, 2017

As is to be expected, Jubaland, as the longest established administration, has received the most, followed by SWS. Galmudug, recently established, has received the least and HirShabelle, nothing. Equally, the provision of office furniture has dominated, followed by computers and computer accessories (monitors, mouses, laptop carry bags, etc.).

In the course of the field visits, the evaluation noted that the goods provided were functional and in use. The evaluation concurs with the project’s premise that such equipment is necessary if the government offices are to be functional. It is important, however, to emphasise that the supply of this equipment is insufficient for a functioning and functional administration

##  Output 4: The capacity of the interim State Administrations with a dedicated focus on core public sector capacities is enhanced.

**Activity Result 4.1:** Emerging state administrations have improved understanding of capacity needs and gaps

StEFS contracted international consultants to carry out functional analyses and restructuring of state administrations and assist in developing strategic plans for their future development paths. The evaluation is not able to assess the utility of these outputs, but regardless of quality, they remained (by the end of the evaluation period) unused in they had not yet been put into practice by the individual states and departments (again bringing into question the timing of the evaluation). Much state-building activity in other FCAS fails at this hurdle, reflecting either that the partner does not perceive the activity as a priority (i.e. there is little, if any, ownership of the draft) or other, more pressing priorities intervene and turning the draft into actionable policy is, ultimately often indefinitely, shelved. The potential for this exists, but may be mitigated to a degree by the state’s potential to access World Bank RCRF II funding for senior staff following administrative restructuring[[56]](#footnote-57).

**Activity Result 4.2:** Emerging state administrations have increased human capacity and other support to deliver services

StEFS provided human resource support to the new administrations, embedding technical advisors and interns. This increased these administrations’ leadership access to advice and support (e.g. in SWS, TAs/TOs provided to the Ministry of Planning were shared with the Office of the President (OPP) so increased the advisory capacity in both arms of government). As with all embedded technical advisors, assessing their quality is a challenge: state administrations were largely positive about their contributions and their proximity to senior officials (Ministers, deputy Ministers, Permanent Secretaries and Directors General) was evident. In addition, the evaluation was also made aware of successful efforts to recruit embedded advisors to the public service in senior positions (in one instance in JSS as a Director General in the Planning Ministry) strongly suggesting that their roles were viewed positively. This is further underlined by the overwhelming contract renewal and, therefore, retention of advisers and officers by the project.

Baselines conducted for the project amongst targeted ministries and states in existence in the course of the PIP (2015 ff) clearly demonstrated the critical need for human resource capability that would enable existing (including Federal ministries) and emerging administrations to perform minimum governmental administrative functions. Functional reviews were carried out for all states and provide a basis for the elaboration of a staffing complement plan. At the time of the evaluation, these plans existed, but were still to be implemented, largely, in the evaluation’s view, owing to the acute financial resource scarcity that all FMS experience. Until such time as the resource challenge can be addressed, it appears likely that these will remain plans. It was reported that some of the FMS were encouraged to complete their functional reviews as a precursor to gaining access to external funding for senior staff from the World Bank facility.

As a result, StEFS sought to provide limited human resources to the newly established and to be established administrations for this purpose. Fig. 12 indicates the human resources provided through the project and to which arms of government. By far the greatest number were interns, who were recent university graduates.

Fig. 12: Human Resource Placements by Category

Source: Annual Report, 2016; Q 1 & 2 Reports, 2017

Fig. 13 shows the gendered numerical distribution of the project’s HR support.

Fig.13 : Distribution by Sex

Source: ibid

The evaluation engaged with both beneficiary institutions and the human resource assistance provided through the project. [It is worth emphasising that Technical Advisers and Officers were much more willing to engage than (particularly female) interns.] With two exceptions[[57]](#footnote-58), respondents expressed considerable appreciation of the support received through the deployment of TAs[[58]](#footnote-59) and TOs. Interns were particularly appreciated, not least because they provided support across a range of departmental areas. UNDP emphasised that TAs/TOs were required to report regularly on their activities and, in the main, this was carried out satisfactorily. From the project manager’s perspective, the key determinant was the relationship that the TAs/TOs succeeded in establishing with the partner institution and its leadership. If this was successful, retention, including extension of contracts, were more likely than not.

Embedding skilled personnel in government departments and commissions/agencies is intended to provide the opportunity for the transfer of skills and expertise. This is best done through mentoring, where the embedded expert is shadowed by a public service counterpart. Two factors appear to have militated against this. First, the TAs and TOs recruited through the programme were under short-term contracts; while the vast majority of contracts were renewed (66%)[[59]](#footnote-60), the situation was less than optimal for skills transfer[[60]](#footnote-61). Second, embedded TAs/TOs’ (and possibly Interns’) pay rates are substantially above those of the public service (when they get paid[[61]](#footnote-62)). International experience[[62]](#footnote-63) is that such differentials disincentivise public servants, who pass on their work and responsibilities to the much better paid international staff. This both limits the efficacy of the embedded personnel and discourages skills transfers. Notwithstanding, the foregoing general points, programme management is of the view that the overall skills transfer picture varied and was highly dependent on the individual.

Strengthening the Capacity of Human Resources through Training

StEFS provided numerous training opportunities at both Federal and State levels. Fig. 14 details the training provided for federal ministries and commissions and Fig. that for state administrations.

Fig. 14: Training for State Administrations

Source: ibid

Despite training forming a standard component of all capacity development programmes, international experience shows that it seldom achieves the expected results. StEFS is no exception in this regard; project interlocutors were hard put to identify any behavioural or procedural changes resulting from the trainings provided[[63]](#footnote-64). There are a number of reasons for this. First, participants generally are drawn from junior/middle ranking staff. Even where they are enthused by what they learn from the training, they lack to authority to introduce it into their day – to – day work. Supervisors, feeling challenged by new or unfamiliar approaches, often instruct them to carry on business as usual, undoing any benefits that might have accrued from the training.

Second, training targets/benefits individuals, not organisations, which may or may not benefit from increased individual expertise and knowledge. Very often, the capacitated individual is recruited away from the public service to employment in INGOs and other donor organisations.

Third, the training time frame is limited. The average length of training provided at federal government level by the StEFS was five (5) days[[64]](#footnote-65); that at state level was 4.3 days. Such brief (and largely one-off – repeated interventions and refresher courses/trainings have a better success ratio but take-up of repeats is often limited because of the ‘been there, done that’ syndrome) interventions are unlikely to result in necessary behavioural work changes.

Fourth, except where trainers have control over who attends, the risk always exists that the wrong people participate. Thus, the trainees may be under- or over-qualified for the training misunderstanding the content or being bored; or, if too senior or too junior, distracted by day-to-day work responsibilities. Fifth, and, based on observation in the course of the evaluation this is a clear factor in Somalia, venues may be unsuitable and trainers utilise inappropriate tools[[65]](#footnote-66).

The net result is that training is a very weak capacity development tool and is only relatively functional when it is supported by effective change management within the workplace, facilitated by a senior change champion and supported by day – to – day mentoring by senior staff and, if necessary, external expertise.

4.3 Cross-cutting Issue: Gender

Gender is a cross-cutting issue in all UNDP projects. In StEFS, gender is more than a cross-cutting issue since it seeks to support the achievement of the of the 30% quota for women’s participation. As such, it can be seen to represent a core aspect of the project. In seeking to achieve this, StEFS undertook a number of actions targeting women (and men). Fig. shows the overall number and percentage of men and women trained though the project to end June 2017.

Fig. 15 : Total Men and Women Trained

Source: ibid

The Figure shows over twice the number of women (69%) than men (31%) received training through the project. This result is skewed by three events: in two of these, no men participated; in the third, only 10% of the 100 participants were men. Men were strongly represented in the other three, and predominated in two, trainings provided through the project (respectively 70%, 47.5% and 67%). This is demonstrated in Fig. 16 below.

 Fig. 16 : Specific Training for Women (%) by training group

Source: ibid

The Figure clearly shows that there were twice as many of mixed group trainings as women-only ones. This is in keeping with current gender theory suggesting that engaging both men and women around specific gender subjects is more likely to have successful outcomes than gender-segregated events.

Fig. 17 : Training on Women’s Political Participation (%) Area

Source: ibid

Women MPs Returned and Elected in 2016/17 Elections

|  |
| --- |
| House of the People |
|  | Re-elected | Newly Elected | Total |
| Somaliland | 8 | 7 | 15 |
| South-west | 4 | 10 | 14 |
| Jubaland | 4 | 6 | 10 |
| Galmudug | 4 | 5 | 9 |
| Banadir | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| HirShabelle | 4 | 4 | 8 |
| Puntland | 1 | 5 | 6 |
| Total | 27 | 39 | 66 |

Source: Somali Women Political Participation and Leadrship: Research and Evidence, East Africa Research Fund (EARF), DFID, 2017

Figires. show that the majority of training support for women related to their participation in Somalia’s political life, which took place around the 2016 elections. While the 30% quota representation was not achieved, the 24% (at federal level, with similar numbers in states that also held elections), rising from 14%, reflects a significant degree of progress in this regard. StEFS contributed to this achievement.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the fact that only six training events specifically targeting women represents a missed opportunity, a conclusion endorsed by the project management. This is not to suggest that more events addressing women’s political participation should have taken place. But, the fact that there was only one each in regard to the federalisation process and conflict resolution is puzzling. Women, internationally, are recognized as key actors in conflict resolution; the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) in recognition of this, for example, invested significantly in women’s efforts to promote peace, particularly in the country’s provinces. Furthermore, Afghan ex-combatants emphasised the importance of female relatives (spouses, sisters, mothers, in particular) in their decision to join the country’s reintegration programmes. The absence of similar levels of attention in this respect in the StEFS is to be regretted.

Women constitute over 50% (50.279%) of the country’s population. As such, it appears entirely appropriate that female-targeted discussions of and information sessions on the federalisation process were organised. As noted above, mixed gender information meetings gathered 30% women participants but there was only one session that targeted women specifically. This appears another missed opportunity, which underlines the very limited support enjoyed by Ministries of Women at both federal and state levels. While women’s participation in all StEFS training and workshops approximated the 30% target (29.5%), greater engagement with the women’s ministries could have increased this share significantly. As one female civil servant noted:

*“The main problem is not about women getting this 30% but actually it’s more about getting women prepared for this. Most of them don’t get what it is like to be in leadership so this (increased but unskilled participation) will get us back to where we started.”*

 As noted, the fact that StEFS was able to support some capacity development for women was a plus, but more could have been done. In both JSS and SWS, the Women’s ministries reported (extremely) limited (JSS) and, despite several earlier interventions with the SWS Women’s Ministry, the incumbent remarked that her unit had no engagement with the project. There is clearly a need for more support to Somali women. Future support should specifically include Women’s ministries as primary project beneficiaries.

## Output 5: Civic participation and engagement with Interim State Administrations is strengthened

StEFS implementation commencement coincided with the 2016/17 elections and the concerted efforts to promote increased female representation in the federal and state legislatures in line with the constitutional 30% target for women’s participation. StEFS created opportunities for engagement between Women’s Ministries and civil society actors, women’s groups, in this regard and these clearly contributed to the increased female representation in the federal lower house and state legislatures.

Achievements outside this area were more limited. Despite the internationally recognized role that women can play in peace building, the gender disaggregated participation in reconciliation and conflict management and mitigation training fell below the 30% target. Furthermore, despite the generic nature of much of the training offered, participation was often limited to single ministries/government departments. As a result, outreach in this regard was limited whereas with some effort to reach out beyond individual silos, greater levels of participation, including that of women, could have been achieved.

StEFS also sought to address federalism issues by organising workshops for civil society and community members. Overall participation in these workshops was *c.* 700 persons, women comprising around 24% of the total. In addition, StEFS supported debates and an essay competition at university level around federalism, a topic not taught in the country’s universities. Following some initial resistance to identifying female student participants in both[[66]](#footnote-67), The StEFS project management insisted on the reluctant institutions identifying female participants. The evaluation was informed that the female student debate teams outperformed their male colleagues.

Recognising that workshops and competitions had limited outreach, StEFS also supported radio and TV programmes, and online streaming to achieve wider public outreach. These included information, discussions and a radio soap opera, a tool successfully used to address reconciliation issues in post-genocide Rwanda. The evaluation has no independent[[67]](#footnote-68) information relating to outreach achieved through these means, nor what, if any, effect they achieved. Reporting, in this, as in other output areas, simply notes that the activities took place.

**Activity Result 5.1:** Increased public awareness on federalism and the role of emerging state administrations

StEFS Interventions in Support of the Federalisation process

Output 5 (supporting PSG 1) of the StEFS project is ‘civic participation and engagement with Interim State Administrations is strengthened’. This is pursued through three key activities, Activity 5.1 being ‘Increased public awareness on federalism and the role of emerging state administrations’. In pursuit of this, the project supported a number of interventions intended promote such increased awareness (and understanding) of the national federalism project in an effort to address the public’s questions and concerns surrounding the intended governmental model.

Figures 18, 19, 20 set out the events, participants and gender disaggregated number of participants in each event.

In total, StEFS supported 12 events; the available data reports that there were a total of 951 participants drawn from national and state governments, academia and civil society. Fig. indicates the distribution of participants’ by the number of events.

Fig. 18 : Distribution of Participants by Event

Source: ibid.

Half (50%) of all events drew participants from both civil society and government, with civil society only participants being the next largest number (30%). The remaining 20% were only government staff.

StEFS’s targeted 30% female involvement. In this instance, the project met its target.

Fig. 19 : Women’s Participation

Source: ibid.

Fig 20 : Participants, Number and Gender

Source: ibid

In addition to the formalised events discussed above, StEFS supported radio programmes (music, talk shows, question-time like events, etc.) broadcast at both state and national levels. The outreach achieved through these events is not recorded[[68]](#footnote-69) but, given radio coverage is likely to have been considerable. Broadcasts also included radio soap operas dealing with the theme, a strategic communication approach with considerable evidence of success in, *inter alia*, Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide.

## Output 6: Project Management

Project management is relatively efficient and, in the case of Output 1, remarkably so: the evaluation was informed of numerous occasions that project management being contacted at 23.00 hours for 10+ flights the following morning and the passengers travelling as organisers planned. Furthermore, the project team has demonstrated considerable flexibility to changing circumstances; once again Output 1 underlines the point since reconciliation was not conceived of as a core part of the original project plan. Furthermore, the team has demonstrated considerable responsiveness to partner demands, adapting plans and making themselves available often at short notice. The evaluators noted partners’ positive relationships with project team members, including regret when they were unable to participate in meetings.

Organisationally, delivery was timely and in accordance with plans. Equipment supplies were positively received and used by ministries. Infrastructure improvements were appreciated and, if behind schedule, the evaluation’s experience is that this is a usual risk experienced in all infrastructure projects. One shortcoming is the team’s apparent failure to think ‘out of the box’, particularly about maximizing women’s participation. Clearly, the team are not able to issue workshop and training invitations themselves but greater encouragement may have led to greater women’s involvement and avoided the observation of Women’s ministries that, aside from a few workshops, the project had done nothing for them.

StEFS’ Project Management Board met on three occasions in the evaluation period. A review of the minutes reveals a heavy bias towards information sharing with little, if any, scope for provision of policy guidance. This is a common experience of project steering committees, but misunderstands their purpose, which is to provide policy and strategic guidance; information sharing, after all, is the role of quarterly and annual reporting and Steering Committee should be assumed to have assimilated the reports provided regularly.

A more serious shortcoming is the inadequate reporting of the project. In the evaluation’s view (UNDP disagrees with this view), reporting is at activities level and, while detailed (although it is apparent that some activities are forgotten and not reported until the following quarter, or even the one after that), the reports do not address outputs, to say nothing of outcomes. As a result, there is little if any evidence of progress to outcomes other than that that the evaluation could intuit and pursue during stakeholder engagement. Activity reporting for any project is unacceptable; at the very least, the team needs to report on outputs, preferably on progress to outcomes.

StEFS management occurred both nationally and at FMS levels. Based upon the evaluation’s two visits, personnel interacted positively with FMS counterparts, clearly demonstrating effective project management skills at local level. Furthermore, they interacted effectively with both local counterparts and national management and demonstrated clear understanding of the project and its activities.

Nationally, project staff demonstrated competence and, particularly in respect of support to reconciliation efforts, attention to responsibilities that was clearly demand-responsive and frequently well outside normal office hours. Interlocutors emphasised to the evaluation, their appreciation of the efforts made both by national and local (FMS) staff. Replacements for personnel who had resigned were in place by the conclusion of the evaluation, suggesting that, all else being equal, minor delays experienced in preparation of third-quarter reporting were now a thing of the past.

Reporting was largely of activities completed, rather than the results of those activities. As such, quarterly and annual reports reviewed did not focus on outputs, to say nothing of outcomes. However, interlocutors pointed to outputs (e.g. the effective networking with development partners, including NGOs, in SWS; the reconciliation meetings that resulted in interim agreements; the positive relationships between the TAs/TOs and interns and the institutions in which they were embedded being three examples). This strongly suggests that the project management team needs to refocus its reporting emphasis away from activities (infrastructure rehabilitation, delivery of office equipment, training participation) towards what occurred as a result of the activities (e.g. utilisation of the infrastructure, improved efficacy as a result of furnished and equipped offices, performance improvements as a result of the training, etc.). In its turn, this requires greater engagement with stakeholders since they are the ones who are able to report on this.

The Somali reality adds a particular challenge to effective and efficient project management. The security situation and the associated rules governing the period that international staff can spend outside designated areas has led to the need to identify locations that permit project management to spend the required time with counterparts. StEFS support to the SWS administration has proved advantageous in this regard for both project management and UNSOM and other stakeholders; the evaluation was informed that access to the meeting rooms provided ensured that earlier challenges experienced were now a thing of the past.

Three Steering Committee meetings were held in the course of the period to June 2017. A review of the minutes suggests that, as with most other Steering Committees in the evaluation’s experience, these were largely information sessions with project staff briefing committee members on progress. It is always challenging to make the step from information sharing to policy advice and guidance, not least because of the information gap between project personnel and committee members but if Steering Committees are to fulfil their intended function, continual effort in this regard by both members and project staff is necessary.

**StEFS Budget Utilization**

The Programme Document budgeted US $13 991 639 for StEFS envisaged two year (April 2015 – March 2017) operational period. The Annual Report 2016 and Quarterly Reports (1 & 2) 2017 indicate that StEFS budget total was *c.* 8% lower: US $12 847 772, however, accurately assessing the utilization of financial resources in an incomplete project is always problematic. The table below provides an overview of StEFS budget by donor for the project period (April 2016 – March 2018).

 StEFS Budget by Donor (June 2017)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Donor | UNMPTF US $ | Non-UNMPTF US $ | Received US $ |
| Denmark | $1,478,915 | $0 | $894,983 |
| Norway | $950,000 | $0 | $950,000 |
| UNSOM | $191,500 | $0 | $191,500 |
| Switzerland | $100,000 | $0 | $50,000 |
| Italy | $103,365 | $0 | $50,000 |
| PBF | $0 | $1,750,000 | $1,750,000 |
| DFID  | $2,535,000 | $0 | $1,270,000 |
| Germany | $4,668,896 | $0 | $4,668,896 |
| Japan | $0 | $946,903 | $757,522 |
| EU | $1,680,000 | $0 | $1,680,000  |
| Total  | $11,707,676 | 2 696 903.00 | $10,582,901 |

Source: Project Board Presentation, 19 June 2017.

According to StEFS financial data as recorded in ATLAS[[69]](#footnote-70), total resources available to the project and the AWPs for 2016 and 2017 equaled US$ 9 035143.02 and US $12 789 890 respectively. However, the fact that the UNDP fund administration orientation requires the project to report on three separate budgets, makes all of these assessments problematic.

Resources and Work Plans, 2016 – 17 (30 June 2017)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Year | Resources: US $ | AWP: US $ |
| 2016 | 5 745 227.00 | 6 225 219.00 |
| 2017 | 3 289 866.02 | 6 564 671.00 |
| Total | 9 035 143.02 | 12 789 890.00 |

Source: Project Documentation (Atlas extract by Capacity Development Programme staff)

It is notable that the AWPs in respect of each year exceeded the available resources.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Year | Difference – US $ | % |
| 2016 | 479 952 | 8 |
| 2017 | 3 274 804.98 | 99.5 |
| Total | 3 754 747 | 41 |

Source: Own Calculation

This suggests the significant widening in divergence of recorded information relating to income after StEFS’ implementation started.

3.3 Utilisation

Total StEFS expenditure by Output and donor is laid out in the Table below.

 Expenditure by Output and Donor, 2017 ( as of June 2017)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Outputs | PBF | UNMPTF | Japan | Total Expenditure – $ | Delivery % |
| 1: Political dialogue  | 105 474.00 | 20 579.00 | 27 819.00 | 153 872.00 | 24 |
| 2: FGS capacity strengthened | 4 121.00 | 379 528.00 | - | 383 649.00 | 40 |
| 3: Support to ISAs | 128 571 | 219 080.00 | 38 449.00 | 386 100.00 | 47 |
| 4: Enhanced capacity of ISAs | 61 156.00 | 200 578.00 | 5 495.00 | 267 229.00 | 62 |
| 5: Civic participation | 47 213.00 | 94 835.00 | - | 142 048.00 | 73 |
| 6: Project management costs | 122 232.00 | 289 387.00 | - | 411 619.00 | 27 |
| Direct Project Cost (DPC) | 156 254.00 | 200 392.00 | - | 356 646.00 | 46 |
| Total | 625 021.00 | 1 404 379.00 | 71 763.00 | 2 101 163.00 | 42 |

Source: Op Cit

Total Expenditure in 2016 and 2017

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Year | Budget – US $[[70]](#footnote-71) | Receipts – US $[[71]](#footnote-72) | Expenditure – US $[[72]](#footnote-73) | % [[73]](#footnote-74) |
| 2016 | 6 283 451 | 8 202 755 | 3 562 510 | 57 |
| 2017 | 8 121 128 | 2 380 146 | 2 101 163 | 42 |
| Total | 14 404 579 | 10 582 901 | 5 663 673 | 54 |

 Annual Report, 2016; calculations from Project Board presentation, 19 June 2017

The discussion following is based upon the information available to the evaluation and based upon the information extracted from the ATLAS system.

Figs.21. 22, 23 , below, set out the total resources, AWPs and total expenditures by output for the project period to 30 June 2017[[74]](#footnote-75).

Fig. 21: Resources, Work Plan and Expenditure, 2016

Source: ibid

However optimistic, that AWP targets across all Outputs exceeded the available resources is reflective of budgetary commitments received from donors. However, prudence ensured that expenditure through 2016 fell below both the total resources available and the AWP targets[[75]](#footnote-76). As is to be expected, this is reflected in the total figures as well.

Regardless of plans based on commitments and associated disbursements, a similar prudence characterised underpinned resource utilisation to date in 2017., expenditures having been contained within available resource levels. The Figures 22 and 23 below, clearly show expenditure matching the resources available but falling well below AWP levels.

Fig. 22: Resources, Work plan and Expenditure by Output, 2017

Source: ibid

Fig. 23: Total Resources, Work Plan and Expenditure, 2017

Source: ibid

In essence, the resources identified as available within the ATLAS system were paralleled by expenditure. As indicated above, this was only a partial picture of the project’s finances and may only reflect expenditure of MPTF resources (81.3% of the total budget). However, even if this is the case, the fact that the MPTF comprised the overwhelming majority of available resources strongly suggests that conclusions based upon the available data are, at the very worst, strongly indicative of utilisation trends.

Activities to Outputs

Figs 24 and 25 reflect the delivery ratio with the resources available and the two AWPs. As is evident, delivery closely followed the available resources and the 2016 AWP.

Fig. 24 : Delivery by Output, 2016

Source: ibid

Fig. 25: Delivery by Output, 2017

Source: ibid

In 2017, delivery fell well behind the AWP targets set. This clearly reflects the fact that the data reflect the period ending June 2017 and a full six months remains to improve delivery performance. Furthermore, the interventions of political elections and the formation of new administrations (between three and six months) also affected possibilities for expenditure. The evaluation believes that delivery will recover to levels approaching those achieved in 2016.

Whether this is adequate performance, given the scale of the tasks, is a moot point. However, from the evaluation’s perspective, FGS and FMS absorptive capacity is limited; overburdening it will not result in improving their very limited performance capability. In the evaluation’s view, therefore, if StEFS achieves delivery levels in the region of those achieved in 2016 (65% of AWP targets), this is probably the most efficient level of resource utilisation.

Outputs 2, 4 and 5 all sought to enhance partner federal and state ministries’ and commissions’ effectiveness by making available human resources. StEFS human resource support was intended to be short-term, essentially bridging the gap until the World Bank’s CIM (Capacity Injection Mechanism) would step in with long-term placements. In the event, to all intents and purposes, this did not occur and StEFS solely provided human resource expertise to emergent State administrations and key federal partners. The table below, provides an overview of StEFS’ financial contribution in this regard.

 International and Local Consultants – US $ costs

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2016 | %[[76]](#footnote-77) | 2017 | % | Total | % |
| International Consultants | 245 006.07 | 38 | 157 325.86 | 27 | 402 331.93 | 33 |
| Local Consultants | 408 576.91 | 63 | 423 556.64 | 73 | 832 133.55 | 67 |
| Total | 663 582.68 | 101 | 580 882.50 | 100 | 1 234 465.48 | 100 |

Source: Calculated from Atlas extract

Universally, the evaluation was informed that StEFS support through provision of local consultants was a success, enabling the new and emergent institutions to establish a degree of functionality that would have been impossible without them. Respondents emphasised the human resource short falls that individual ministries and commissions experienced:, BFC spokespersons, for example, reported the Commission’s intention to recruit the interns provided through StEFS to permanent positions. MOIFAR emphasised the considerable value-added achieved through the Technical Advisers, Officers and Interns embedded within the Ministry. In Jubaland, one TA was recruited as a Director General.

While all these point to the efficiency of the local consultant provision, there is little in the way of hard evidence that the appointments were a success and delivered the expectations. Consultants are required to report their activities on a monthly basis and stakeholder ministries and institutions indicate their satisfaction or not with the individual’s performance. However, there are no formalised performance assessments in place and performance judgement appears idiosyncratic and more to do with how well the individual and/or group has fitted into the organisational culture and perceived value to an individual.

While stakeholder partners appear to perceive the local consultants as ‘their’ business, the same cannot be said for the international cadre made available through the project. Comprising 33% of total consultant costs financed through StEFS, stakeholder partners’ preponderant view is that their oversight and quality assurance is UNDP’s responsibility. This is not necessarily problematic but such views frequently are associated with an absence of ownership of the tasks, which they are recruited to perform. The results are draft plans, strategies, structures and policies that have as yet failed to see the light of day as anything else than drafts.

A number of international consultant outputs fell into this area at the time of the evaluation. The evaluators acknowledge that it may be too early to expect anything else but it is an area of concern, which potentially undermines efficiency in a major way. An evaluation conducted after the completion of the project may have seen more of these documents translated into action.

# Conclusions

## Common Conclusions

The evaluators do not doubt that the government has been pleased with the support received from these two projects. Somalia has almost no public resources to use in building its federalist administration. The provision of offices, cars, computers, furniture, paid staff would be welcome assistance. The use of international consultants to generate technical reports and plans boosts the ability of these governments to access international assistance, and perhaps in a more effective manner. In addition, the October 2017 analysis from the Heritage Foundation identified the NDP and FMS formation as sound contributions to re-building the Somali state[[77]](#footnote-78).

Denigrating those achievements is not the point of this evaluation. The key point of the evaluation is to question the underlying assumption that a focus on improving the structure of public administration will lead to a more stable Somalia. The evaluators believe that this is incorrect (or, at the least, incomplete) and continuing to focus on building government capacity without emphasising on how that capacity will be utilized for the betterment of the population could result in a worse situation. The evaluators contend that an inclusive, facilitated dialogue approach aimed at building experience in problem solving will result in deeper, more sustainable transformation of the state/society relationship in Somalia than a continued focus on introducing formal rules and structures through international consultants. The project implementers have acknowledged this is an important shift that will need to be incorporated.

Therefore, the conclusions of this evaluation should be viewed as cautionary rather than reproachful. The evaluators acknowledged in the introductory section that there is no perfect design for working with an FCAS. But precisely for this reason we believe that a continued focus on replicating structures and functions that have proven effective in developed public administrations would be inappropriate. The assistance provided can be useful if (and we would argue, only if) these projects begin to place far greater emphasis on the quality of relations between these governments and their constituents. This would involve a shift away from a heavy use of international and diaspora consultants towards facilitating a more dialectical approach to public/private engagement. The evaluators provide specific suggestions along these lines in the Recommendations section below.

The very recent IDS review[[78]](#footnote-79) of governance interventions in FCAS showed that there is a scarcity of evidence on which governance reforms may work to reduce violence and conflict, and there remains much not understood about these complex processes. Unfortunately, both SIP and StEFS have have been built on designs that mirror the limitations of past experiences.

The fragmented nature of authority in conflict-affected countries has led to a policy emphasis on the need to build democracy, institutions and governance from the bottom up. Community Driven Development (CDD) programmes have become a popular form of intervention in these contexts, where development projects and aid are provided alongside localised training on participatory democracy. Neither SIP nor StEFS pursued a bottom-up approach. This is not to suggest that such an approach is a recipe for success as they are equally challenging, but building government capacity without enhancing participation is a recipe for failure.

The project implementers, reflecting on the draft of this report, argue that without bureaucracy you cannot have governance. The evaluators do not agree. Rules are needed, but it does not follow that a regulatory state is necessarily the best means of designing and enforceing such rules in FCAS. It appears to the evaluators that what the project implementors are arguing is that Somalis should ‘govern like us’[[79]](#footnote-80), which, as shown in Afghanistan, South Sudan, Yemen, other FCAS, and many developing countries is often not the most appropriate approach[[80]](#footnote-81). Other recent governance interventions have attempted to strengthen the reach of state institutions through improving the provision of public goods and services. Findings from a growing body of evidence show that cash transfer programmes and government-managed investments in infrastructure, both of which enable citizens to develop themeselves, may be useful tools to improve the social contract and avoid (or at least mitigate or reduce) violence and conflict. at. The current projects were not designed in this way, but future initiatives, following a PDIA model, should be designed to use the projects as policy experiments[[81]](#footnote-82) so that modifications in existing (whether customary or carried over from the Barre regime) rules, systems and processes grow out of learning rather than being introduced via external consultants. Assuming, since FMS are a new administrative layer, that all rules and systems must be introduced from the outside is an approach that has failed to achieve its objectives in many other FCAS. South Sudan is a pertinent case that deserves greater reflection by the project designers going forward[[82]](#footnote-83).

The evaluators’s summary conclusions are that the two projects were intended to produce conditions necessary to achieve their (intermediary) Outcomes[[83]](#footnote-84). However, as noted elsewhere, the projects were primarily oriented towards UNDP-directed inputs and activities and insufficiently demanding of government-generated outputs that would illustrate progress towards Outcomes to be measured and achieved. One possible way to address this would be inclusion of conditionality specifying expected results by governmant ministries within the LOAs. MOPIED, SWS and Puntland are clear exceptions representing processes that need to be fully understood, and built upon, in future programming.

All projects, but especially those operating in FCAS, need the flexibility to adapt and adjust to a changing environment. This requires serious attention to documenting and analyzing experience as the projects progressed. Unfortunately, the design and execution of these two emphasized delivery over learning. Documentation and analysis of project activities have been seriously limited. This is partly due to the heavy administrative load placed on the UNDP team as little of the project operations are allowed to be handled by the Somali government. In addition, attempts at using third party monitoring proved to be of little value.

The projects have sought to impart skills by providing a variety of trainings, both classroom and on-the-job. Some classroom- or workshop-based training may, in some limited cases, be necessary. Experience has shown that adults learn best when engaged in on-the-job training (actually putting learning into use). This learning approach is far more effective, results in much improved learning, and more importantly, application of the learning. There has been insufficient attention placed on follow up to the use of the skills and knowledge gained through either the training programs or most of the technical advisory notes.

Lastly, as of the end of the evaluation period, the projects had not yet moved to capacity development as UNDP understands it, *viz.* socialtransformation. Providing the identified inputs does not to transform the recipient institutions; that requires changes in behaviour and individual mindset. Providing inputs is can be useful in helping organizations to ‘transform’, however, providing the inputs does not necessarily lead to transformative change within the recipient institutions. The projects appear to have underestimated the importance of the link between inputs and results in the day-to-day management and more attention needs to be given to the translation of inputs into change. There are examples of where the Somali partners have made effective use of the UNDP inputs to foster internal change, as noted in the ‘Lessons Learned/Vignettes’ section above, but since the program leadership continually asked the evaluators to assess why some project interventions led to such outcomes while others did not, the evaluators conclude that facilitating such innovations has not been a significant part of the current projects’ theory of change. These innovations represent positive steps signifying internal reflection and growth. The fundamental conclusion of the evalutors is that the final stages of these two projects and the design of the next phase of support must build on these positive examples and avoid concentrating on the production of additional technical systems design. Suggestions on incorporating double-loop learning in follow-on projects is recommended below.

## SIP Conclusions

### Relevance

* In the view of the evaluators, the original objective of SIP, to establish a sound system of government, remains relevant, but the structure of the project has been focused at the activity level without a clear logic model tying the disparate elements together. The project logic model, as it stands, is neither appropriate nor feasible for structuring a future project.
* The original design of SIP was built in a participatory manner. However, this was often more focused on what partners at the time believed they needed in order to look like a modern state as opposed to what they needed to accomplish when delivering benefits to their citizens. This ‘give away’ orientation appears quite inappropriate to the evaluators today, but given the confused political situation at the time of the design effort perhaps this was the best arrangement that could have been brokered.
* Fortunately, the project management was able to recognize that the leadership in MoPIED and Puntland State grasped the value of using the UNDP inputs to build on the problems they themselves had already identified, with the end result being mutually beneficial. In order to optimize the benefits of additional assistance, the design of future assistance should be demand driven and inclusive of the expectations of non-state actors.

### Effectiveness

* Across most outputs, project implementation lagged far behind plan. Aside from the production of the National Development Plan and accompanying improvement in MOPIED capacity, improved aid management facilitation and progress in Puntland State, deliverables across the five substantive outputs simply were not achieved.
* Many issues restraining the project emerged from internal contradictions in the government. The clan-based system that has kept the government in place, and facilitated a peaceful transfer of power in 2017, undermines the potential for arbitrated decisions regarding the power and scope of individual elements of government. Thus, the issue of the CSC versus MoLSA over control of the civil servants, and the larger political displeasure with merit-based recruitment, will not go away easily and may still be a barrier to passage of the law or its subsequent implementation.
* However, the design of the project was a major factor that impeded the implementation of activities and the achievement of results to date. The project structure focused on the production of specified deliverables that did not always remain as a priority for the partner agencies during the politically turbulent period during which the project was implemented. This stymied progress in most areas of the project.
* As noted above in the Lessons Learned section, the project was most useful when it focused its resouces on what Somali teams thought would be useful. Thus the NDP process had a positive outcome because, as the project leadership has emphasized, this was not an important consideration in the original design, but took on importance as the Planning Ministry pushed it forward as integral to the overall development of their agency and the country as a whole.
* This focus on technical interventions can also be questioned as it potentially sets up a vicious circle by creating the continual desire for recruitment of more diaspora technocrats to make effective use of the technical guidance from the international consultants. Introducing more participatory interventions can be a good way to bring the existing public servants and new entrants from the local setting more completely into the picture, as has been the case in Puntland and Somaliland. In many instances, this would require a much slower process, reducing the utilization of funds, which is a situation that neither UNDP nor its donors anywhere in the world find attractive.
* The initial assumption that higher level rules and guidelines, such as the civil service law, needed to be in place before engaging with lower level administrative reform processes apparently stymied progress in Outputs 2, 3, 4 & 5. Minimal improvement in the capacity of these partners could be attributed to project interventions. In each of these areas, progress could have been made by using participatory methods to build awareness of why current processes work the way they do and what could be done to improve them.
* Distinguishing the supply of paid advisors as a discrete output (#1) generated confusion in many cases over whether the advisors’ performance should be tied to specifically identified deliverables, or whether they had been assigned for whatever purpose the recipient agency desired.
* The Letter of Agreement mechanism was useful for structuring the partner relationships, but, in many cases, did not go far enough in defining an agreed level of effort by the government partner agency. Perhaps this can be attributed to the nascent level of development in many partner agencies at the time, but still needs to be raised as a means of improving performance in the future
* The oversight structure established at the start of the project with a high-level steering committee combining World Bank and UNDP projects and chaired by the Deputy PM did not work, and has not met for over one year. Although UNDP pressed for project boards meetings, the lack of opportunity for donors to meet directly with government in a formal project oversight context reduced their ability to incentivize progress and press bilaterally for policy reform. Hopefully, the current government will facilitate stronger interaction with the project..
* The use of TPM for input verification did not prove appropriate for creating a basis for reflection and learning and needs to be upgraded.
* Overall effectiveness was reduced due to the lack of communications between the Puntland and Federal components. Many lessons in capacity building have been learned in Puntand that could be shared in a open manner with the federal level, not to mention the other FMS.

### Efficiency

* The SIP project funds were used in line with the original plan, with the exception of project management costs that increased steadily while substantive expenditures lagged.
* Although high by global standards, these costs are generally in line with donor standards for Somalia, but better management of costs is called for nonetheless.
* The cost of running the international assistance business in Somalia is expensive. Transport, security, office space and staff remuneration packages are all clearly higher than other countries.
* Nevertheless, the cost of SIP management, equalling 40% of expenditure to date, points to the need for a serious reassessment of how UNDP technical assistance projects should be managed in the future. Despite this high cost, the project could not achieve more than 20% of its outputs as calculated by the production of discrete deliverables itemized in the annual workplans.
* The evaluators cannot state whether the project managers were efficient in their use of project funds as itemized project management cost breakdowns tied to deliverables were not made available, except for Puntland, and even here it was limited to the funds spent locally. The new financial management tool created in July 2017 still looks only at ATLAS budget lines and does not provide a means of comparing deliverable costs across the projects, particularly in different parts of the country.
* From a rough estimation, Puntland appears to represent the best value for money.
* The continued payment of salaries to individuals who are using their position to complain to government about UNDP programming decisions represents a potential moral hazard.
* Although some output budgets have been reallocated when progress slowed, particularly civil service reform to planning, substantial funds have remained unused in several output budgets at the end of December 2017, retaining funds that could have been utilized more efficiently in other areas, particularly Puntland.
* Having a functional Steering Committee could have either put pressure on lagging units to respond appropriately or formally closing out areas of the project that were not productive.
* There is mention of renewed efforts underway in three of these outputs that may yet generate tangible results before the end of the project. Nevertheless, given the slow pace at the federal level, it is unclear why SIP did not allocate more funds to Puntland as they had a 94% delivery rate on LOA expenditures in 2016 and had achieved 66% by September 2017, with the expectation to reach 90% by December. All units in Puntland complained the assistance provided could not meet demand. .
* If funds has been shifted to expand the program in Puntland, it is quite likely the management percentage of expenditure at the end of the project evaluation period would have been lower due to a more rapid utilization of the funds as there are many fixed costs in project administration and a stronger basis for expansion in future programming could have been achieved through the accumulation of more substantial lessons learned.

### Gender Equality

* Women have not played an especially significant role in the SIP project.
* Trainings have typically been quite small, meaning that female participants have numbered around 3 or 4. The work on the design, discussion and roll out of the NDP where women’s participation in SIP activities can be seen as significant.
* The Gender Mainstreaming Toolkit produced in Puntland has the potential to be used as a national framework for fostering more equitable relations between men and women in the pubic workplaces across the country, but this needs to be re-assessed considering the national gender policy brought out in May 2017.
* The presence of UNICEF, UNWOMEN, UNDP Gender Programme and UNSOS Gender team bring into question why SIP was requested to recruit international consultants to develop an additional set of technical gender guidelines without having any in-house technical expertise. SIP could possibly have been more effective in gender mainstreaming by supporting work being initiated by individual partners, such as CSC and MOLSA, rather than focusing on the development of technical guidelines prepared by international consultants. Ensuring that gender awareness and sensitivity considerations are fully integrated into all project activities would have been an important place to start.

### Networks / Partnerships

* It is fair to say that many government stakeholders have participated in many of the project activities. However, this participation has not always been positive, as with the case of the inconclusive attempts to produce a reformed Civil Service Law. In the case of the OPM and OOP, the evaluators cannot determine whether there was real participation as the project reports that nothing was able to be accomplished other than the provision of paid advisors and facilities upgrades.
* Again, the most positive areas of the project at building networking at the federal level have been with MoPIED and ACU. Facilitating the institutionalization of the NDC as a national dialogue platform helped to deepen the national ownership of the NDP across nearly all of the FMS. Continuation of this process through the National Development Council (NDC) has real potential for building a sustainable dialogue between States and FGS.
* The participation of the partners in the State of Puntland appears to be significant, going beyond a typical response to project incentives. The level of ownership of the projects, seen as a catalytic support to what many of the partners are already doing for themselves, is readily apparent.
* The best example of information produced with project assistance that has been of direct value to the partner is the NDP, which was able to be used by FGS to initiate modifications in the International Community’s approach to aid management, replacing the Somalia Compact, thereby contributing to enhancing the broader partnership between FGS and the International Community. Shifting the local of development leadership from the international community to the FGS a significant outcome.

### Sustainability and Impact

* The NDP is an example of a project supported initiative that has the potential to foster sustainability as it has generated significant local ownership in both the product and the processes of design and implementation. This has also led to an improved relationship with the International Community and visible improvement in the operational capacity of the MoPIED.
* Support to the passage of policies and laws pertaining to M&E and Statistics at federal and state levels has the potential to significantly enhance the quality of future planning and plan implementation.
* Passage of both federal and state Civil Service laws should have a significant impact once approved by their respective legislatures, but they remained under review at the end of the evaluation period.
* The Strategic Plan for the Puntland GG&AC Bureau has the potential to foster sustained progress on accountability to citizens as long as the State Government seriously supports the work of the Bureau. Working out the most appropriate means to showcase this achievement for emulation by other states is advised.
* The sustainability of the ACU operations continuing at its present level of operations is in question. All 23 of the ACU staff have been paid by UNDP/SIP. Some are now being shifted to WB financed civil service remuneration packages. It remains to be seen what affect this shift will have on the performance of the Unit.
* The National Development Council, although certainly not yet sustianable, has gained momentum In facilitating Somali-Somali dialogue.
* Many of the partner agencies commented they needed more local advisors to do their work. This approach to capacity substitution may easily turn into a trap that could forestall sustained improvement in the government’s capacity when funds begin to dry up for paying permanent advisors’ salaries.
* The two areas of success in SIP that can reasonably be used as a platform for expansion into a new project are MoPIED and Puntland State.
* Sustainability is heavily dependant upon a full analysis of lessons throughout a project’s live in order to facilitate corrective actions and to propose improved designs for the future. The evaluators had difficulty digging deeply into many aspects of the project as documentation was incomplete. Much of the nuanced understanding of the project’s accomplishments and constraints had to come through interviews with the players themselves. This is an acknowledged weakness that should be addressed in the follow on program.

## StEFS Conclusions

### Relevance

StEFS has supported the establishment of the necessary conditions for the creation of Federal Member States. As such, the project clearly is relevant to FMS needs. However, evidence, drawing on experience of six other FCAS countries, suggests service delivery does not establish governmental legitimacy; it is the ‘how’ that is critical

### Effectiveness

The project has been implemented in a timely manner. The project did contribute to the formation of several of the new states. The BFC acknowledges that its progress was heavily dependent on StEFS assistance. Having said this, reporting emphasis is on activities, not the results of those activities. Internal factors contributing to this include the design emphasis on supply of inputs and the absence of any reciprocal action required from partner.

Without question, StEFS has achieved considerable progress towards the delivery of the project outputs. It has contributed, *inter alia*, to the establishment of a more conducive working environment, supported efforts to reconcile destabilizing conflicts within the newly established FMS, and supported greater female engagement in the country’s formal political life through increased women’s representation in the House of the People and in State legislatures. However, it is important to emphasise that none of this success is sufficient to deliver the project’s outcome, or indeed, arguably, the identified intermediary outcomes.

The principal reason for this reality rests in the programme’s design, which contributes to the achievement of necessary conditions, *viz.*

* Buildings from which administrators can work;
* Furnished and equipped offices;
* Improved communications;
* Possibly, a clearer understanding of what their role, as administrators, is;
* A legislative environment that is more representative of the whole population; and
* Evidence of efforts to address destabilizing conflict situations, even if these are less than wholly, or even partially, successful.

As noted, these necessary conditions establish a scenario in which sufficient conditions – the effective delivery of core government and governance functions – can be achieved. But for this to happen requires clear statements of the results expected of federal and state actors because of the project’s interventions. In its absence, experience strongly suggests that it is highly unlikely that the foundations constructed through the project will convert into the outcome, efficient and effective government and governance. Without this, it is likely that Somalia will follow other, effectively failed, donor-financed, and largely nationally disowned, capacity development through the establishment of mirror image governmental systems. A successor project, therefore, must clearly identify shared outcomes at federal and state ministerial levels with at least as much emphasis on governance as government.

Achieving this will require more than the introduction of conditionality, even if commonly owned. It suggests the need to narrow the scope of the project, focusing particular attention on two, or at most three, Ministries[[84]](#footnote-85) at federal and state levels, an effective total of between 10 and 15 partners. Specific content of the support to be provided, based on agreed political functions, should emerge from participatory needs assessments and should be delivered through a combination of long-term mentoring, supported by training inputs as and when necessary.

Public servants benefitting from proposed mentoring should establish, jointly with superiors, annual performance targets and their achievements measured against these at year-end. It is critical that mentored staff receive their salaries regularly; as an incentive, the project might consider a 13th cheque subject to the outcome of the staff member’s performance appraisal. Finally, these ministries should serve as models for other federal and state ministries own development.

If public servants are to be subject to performance measurement, then so should the national and international consultants identified to support them. For both nationals and internationals, the assessment should be led by the beneficiaries with UNDP representation. And assessments should include quality assessments of their outputs; where these are specialized (e.g. legislation, technical aspects of policy, etc.), UNDP could usefully recruit a roster of technical expertise that can be drawn upon as the need arises.

### Efficiency

The project has been relatively efficient: resources have been disbursed in a timely manner (and exceptionally quickly in support of Reconciliation); inputs (human and equipment) have been delivered as scheduled and a more conducive environment established. StEFS has utilised 57% of available resources and achieved an overall aggregate delivery ratio of 42% with six months implementation remaining.

At the outset, it is necessary to identify a major challenge around data access that the evaluation experienced. As the following sections clearly show, financial data extracted from the ATLAS system is incomplete, in large part because of systemic vagaries (MPTF, for example, will not permit entry of non-MPTF resources). As a result, StEFS’ early stages were managed through as many as three different project accounts and extracting and consolidating these data in a single report is highly problematic. As a result, the section establishes a consolidated global income and expenditure (by Output) situation and, using the partial ATLAS data, discusses the trends in financial resource use.

According to the OECD’s DAC, efficiency is the measure of how economically resources/ inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results. As such, relevant questions are: Are the objectives achieved in a cost-efficient manner by the development intervention? and How big is the efficiency or utilisation ratio of the utilised resources?

There are clear indications that the project’s resource utilisation demonstrates efficiency. This is particularly the situation on the supply side of the equation: planning and logistic support has been a critical factor in ensuring that reconciliation events took place; the evaluation is inclined to agree that in its absence, these would not have taken place and such gains as have been achieved (see Effectiveness) would not have been recorded.

Second, the project’s sourcing of consultants has contributed to a less dysfunctional public service at both federal and state levels. Certainly, Ministers and senior public servants now find it more possible to process important aspects of their tasks. In this connection, the internship placements should be noted for their contribution to adding to a core of an increasingly experienced pool of (potential) public servants. [This remains a potential until such time as they can be sure of regular payment.]

Third, the project contributed to establishing a more conducive working environment for the country’s public service. Effective and efficient government is not achievable without decent office space and equipped, no matter how basically, offices. In other words, StEFS has contributed to establishing the necessary conditions for effective government and governance.

Having noted this important milestone, it is necessary to underline that the project’s emphasis on the supply side has not ensured any reciprocity on the part of partner stakeholders in return for fulfillment of their requests. Buildings, equipment, advisers, logistical support, on their own, do not translate into efficient and effective government and transparent and accountable governance. For this to occur, partners need to step up and use the materials and support received to this end. In FCAS, partners often need assistance in this regard and projects can provide guidance of the donors’ expectations.

Negotiated LOAs need to set these expectations out clearly in the expectation, over time, of inculcating norms of approach and practice that constitute good, accountable and transparent government that results in the production of goods and services expected by their constituents. International experience underlines the central role that such norms, when established through experience, play in establishing governmental legitimacy in the eyes of the nation, such legitimacy being a necessary component of stability and peace.

### Networking/Participation

Stakeholders have largely been recipients of project inputs. Nor is there any clear evidence that information/learning acquired through the project has been able to be put into practice. Universally, government partners have emphasised that they were not consulted although this has more to do with repeated government changes over the project’s (admittedly short) life. Again, an evaluation at a later date would likely have documented quite different perceptions. A TPM at this time would have served the project far better, enabling it to improve its productive potential well before its conclusion. An evaluation sets up more of an adversarial relationship than does a monitoring mission, generating a more defensive posture by the mangement.

As an outcome of the construction done in Southwest State, the Ministry of Planning has facilitated civil society and international NGOs to make use of the facilities. From the team’s brief visit, it seemed clear that there was a growing dialogue between government and non-state actors.

### Gender Considerations

Considerable efforts were made to be inclusive of women, particularly around the 2016/17 election periods. However, if one excludes four trainings in which women’s participation was 60% or more, the percentage of women trained through the project falls to 25% of the number of men underlining that training that could benefit several ministries instead targeted single institutions. This is reflective of silo approaches both by the responsible ministries and the project management team.

### Sustainability

The project has established necessary conditions for success; in the absence of this moving to the achievement of sufficient conditions through more inclusive engagement with citizens, there can be no sustainability. Furthermore, the implementation period is so brief that time is insufficient time to assess the impact and/or sustainability of political state formation exercises. Sustainability is further challenged by uncertainty around security and the effective absence of an independent resource base, as well as the possibility of political instability at federal and state levels.

# Prospective Recommendations

*n.b.* The Recommendations section has been prepared primarily as an advice for the design of a follow-on programme. However, the current projects, particularly StEFS, could benefit from incorporating many of these elements into their ongoing programming prior to the completion of the next design.

##  Programme Structure

### General Approach

SIP and StEFS are essentially two sides of the same coin. As such, future interactions of these projects should be designed and implemented as a whole, and rooted in the NDP and State Strategic Plans relevant to state capacity development. The future project should establish supporting the federalist relationship between centre and periphery as its core by provide a single, coherent framework of support that does not prioritize one part of the federalist relationship over others. Such an approach should be initiated though a Theory of Change and logic model based on identified Somali priorities for action. Such priorities should not exclusively be limited to those of government bodies as non-state actors should be seen as potential partners.

Somalia’s situation will remain fluid for at least the medium-term. This requires that the new project be developed in a manner that ensures flexibility, adaptation and the necessary resulting iteration in the project implementation in response to changed circumstances are central to the project design. It is self-evidently necessary that this demands a focus on the use of problem solving exercises that have direct impact on citizens.

The evaluation’s review has demonstrated that state building support to date has erred on the supply side of the equation. In part, this is due to the absence of any reciprocal expectations clearly set out in the Letters of Agreement (LOAs). Including reciprocal expectations and deliverables in the LOAs in the future will both build ownership and facilitate identification of outputs from the project’s investment. Future programming should prioritize support for catalysing the emergence of transparent and accountable governance above the creation of efficient and effective public administrations.

### Specific Points

#### UNDP should play the role of a catalyst

There is a need for a profound overhaul in the current way UNDP capacity development programming is designed and implemented in Somalia. The focus of future programming needs to shift from what a government should look like to what it needs to do. This would mean reducing the supply of generic assistance and concentrating on structured the role of UNDP as a catalyst, nudging the process of reform by engaging partners in practical exercises that centre on finding solutions to problems of their own choosing. Illustrations of the utility of this approach can be found in the outcomes in MoPIED, Puntland, and SWS. A continuation of interventions tied to the introduction of ‘best practice’ public administration principles would not be as helpful.

#### Complex local dynamics suggests a shift from pushing to nudging

As in most post-conflict states, the complex set of human interactions in Somalia suggests that the international community can contribute best by providing suggestions to improve immediate action rather than overly concentrating on extended analyses and the creation of formal rule structures. It was mentioned that UNDP will never be able to comprehend the political economy of Somalia, therefore it is best to focus down on smaller scale issues that are amenable to near-term resolution, and serve as learning opportunities for partner agencies to think for themselves how to improve their organizational dynamics.

#### Limit efforts at the federal level to 2 or 3 organizations at most

Practical considerations require that the project be focused. The evaluators suggest that the project design restrict the range of partnerships at the federal level to two, at most three, organisations but engage with all FMS, with attention to ensuring all state ministries benefit. Irrespective of the technical support that may be provided by specialized agencies, principles of governance should be introduced, on a demand driven basis, as common practice throughout a State administration. The best way to go about this is to shift from attempting to build fragmented capacity in individual units of the miniscule State bureaucracies towards building a State-wide approach to problem solving as a more cost-effective and resilient approach.

Continued work by UNDP on civil service reform beyond the completion of the law currently being finalised for Cabinet and Parliament review should depend greatly on the nature of support being provided by other international actors already engaged in similar work. Government will need to decide which international agency should be the primary support or and which should provide additional inputs.

#### State structures have been put in place, emphasis should now shift to practical engagement with citizens

At the State level, all cabinet ministries have undergone a functional analysis and restructuring. They all have, or soon will have, access to RCRF funding for key posts. Each State has an existing set of international support programs. The most useful role for a future UNDP project would be to build the capability of the individual States to facilitate collaborative action among government agencies, and co-production with civil society and business communities. The dual aim would be to engage the States (often together with the FGS) to create collaborative solutions to existing problems while identifying the most appropriate rules and structures that need to be put in place that can build bridging social capital among all stakeholders.

It will be important to engage all States, including Puntland. This means that all agencies of a State government should be potential partners. However, this does not mean that all interventions would be distributed equally to all units, but all units should have the opportunity to become engaged in one way or another as they are all a part of a single governance entity. By selecting certain agencies as per-determined partners, the program reduces its potential impact by not being able to facilitate sharing of lessons across a state administration and may miss assisting more proactive units. Demand driven, problem-oriented assistance should become the norm.

Ensure that Banadir Region is included in order to utilize it as a laboratory for successful federal – regional/state – district functions that can be more widely diffused and adapted in the FMS.

#### Focus attention on building government’s ability to collaborate with non-state actors

Given the paucity of resources available to the FGS, the focus on planning should be on building collaborative relationships with civil society and business to address problems of common concern. The use of participatory planning exercises involving a broad set of stakeholders, government and non-state (civil and business) is the best approach to identifying problems that can be resolved through joint efforts, supported by external assistance as and where necessary. A popular set of group facilitation tools is known as Technologies of Participation, of which one simple tool was used by the evaluators leader. They were developed by the Institute of Cultural Affairs. ICA has country offices in Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda and MENA/Egypt where Somalis could be trained. Philippines has made excellent use of TOP to develop tools to assist in reform and capacity building at national and local government levels.

#### Aid management requires the creation of a common spatial information system led by MoPIED

Aid Management processes will be supported by the OPM , while the detailed information base and analyses will need to be undertaken by MoPIED. This work can be greatly enhanced by supporting MoPIED in the creation of a common, nation-wide, spatial information system that brings together both development and humanitarian data on a common platform. The AIMS tool allegedly contain a geographic analysis element, but if this is slow in getting approved alternatives should be considered. Similar systems have been created with UNDP support for crisis management in Lebanon and Jordan.

#### Use the drought crisis to concentrate attention on building systems that can solve problems

Humanitarian crises are fundamentally based on a failure of government. The relatively better response to the current drought has been attributed to an improved government capacity to protect refugees and ensure equitable distribution of assistance. An underlying objective of future UNDP programming in governance capacity building could be placed on enhancing the capacity of both State and Federal governments to provide effectively coordinated support to the implementation of the early recovery plan following the recent drought and to identify developmental opportunities that can help mitigate the impact of future crises. The Drought Mitigation plan of SWS may be a useful tool to use in coordinating such efforts. It could actually be seen as rationale for reorienting a part of the current StEFS programme resources. Support to reconciliation can be melded into a drought oriented program as local management of common property resources will likely be a critical element of any long-term mitigation measures.

##  Programme Delivery

### General Approach

The basic approach to future project design and implementation must be one that is demand driven, focused on governance problems that are in line with NDP pillars. This would necessitate the use of a series of well-facilitated programme planning workshops in Mogadishu and all FMS locations. These workshops should be initiated with the development of a Theory of Change that is centred on the creation of a locally relevant problem tree/solution tree to concentrate the attention of the participants on the prioritization of collaborative actions rather than on receipt of tangible goods.

The specific design of each intervention must be accompanied by a partner agreement that contains detailed specification of result achievement and reciprocal partner contributions. An overall Letter of Agreement with an annual budget can be set out, but with the proviso that each specific intervention will require a separate detailed concept agreement nestled under the LOA. Laying out all of the activities of a LOA at the start of the year does not support a problem-driven iterative adaptation approach. It reverts the support to that of a supply chain that allows for limited, if any, incorporation of learning during the course of the year.

Using a problem-driven orientation necessitates a shift from standard individual skill training towards building the capacity to make effective use of multi-stakeholder teams. A team approach should be the building block of an institutionalized and sustainable reform effort.

The use of teams for problem solving engagement would foster an innovative approach to identifying solutions to locally-meaningful governance constraints. This diversity of solutions can then provide the basis for a peer-based sharing and alliance building approach that builds upon innate Somali capacity to learn. This shifts the emphasis from technical expert-driven interventions to improving communication and cooperation among diverse groups in Somali society. This learning process must be an integral part of all components of the project.

Finally, a regularized, high-level Third-Party Monitoring effort should be initiated to provide policy-level guidance for both the project and the partners. A notable think tank or university group, preferably of African origin, should be engaged to provide such advice on a quarterly basis.

The combination of an output-focused learning process with a policy-oriented TPM interventions can set up the next phase of UNDP support to Somali state-formation so that it can achieve the positive synergies of a project that has been designed as a policy experiment[[85]](#footnote-86).

### Specific Points

#### Shift from formal structures to improving capacity for direct action

Moving in the direction described above would necessitate a shift away from the dominance of expert-driven interventions aimed at producing strategies, policies and other written analyses towards a facilitation model that focuses on team efforts to solve immediate problems through direct action. This will potentially facilitate a greater role for non-diaspora entrants in public service.

#### Empower government partners to determine the problems to be addressed

This will mean allowing the government partner agencies to take the lead in identifying the problems to be addressed. By this we mean a substantive, outcome-oriented problem rather than the identification of a lack of expert staff, physical infrastructure or financial resources. This point has been criticized by arguing that a government unit may not have any staff or facilities to deploy. This does not alter the situation. The problem needs to be framed in the context of what problem is to be solved, what the agency can do (with its own resources and those contributed by civil society or business), and what assistance it needs to complete the task. This shifts the focus away from generic supply to reciprocal completion of an agreed result. The MoPIC of Puntland stated their relationship with SIP clearly: We figure out what we need to do, they we identify what assistance SIP can provide to help.

#### Encourage a diversity of solutions

Focusing on local problem identification implies facilitating the creation of local solutions. This also suggests the need for a shift from classroom training of individuals towards creating a conducive environment for working in teams. This approach would encourage the generation of diverse approaches to mitigating existing problems. To the extent possible, especially in the FMS, solutions need to emerge from broad coalitions of stakeholders. The government has limited resources of its own, so it should also avoid placing constraints on the participation of non-state actors in identifying and carrying out a development exercise.

#### Frequently share lessons across partners and celebrate success

An important part of building a team approach is the provision of frequent opportunities to celebrate success with peers in other parts of the country. Solutions that work in one part of Somalia have a greater chance of being adapted in other parts of the country than will ‘international best practices’ introduced by a consultant who has no ‘skin in the game’. A substantial part of future UNDP programming should be devoted to peer-based exchange of experiences, joint assessment of lessons and codification of those lessons in simple to use guides that can be widely disseminated. Such an approach provides a framework for double-loop learning to assist partners go institutionalize new learning by continually assessing it within the local socio-economic context.

#### Shift from analytical skills to communication skills

A focus on team-based efforts calls for the provision, and use, of communication tools and skills. Identification, provision and support for such tools should dominate UNDP assistance, replacing the current over-emphasis on the preparation of written technical analyses. There are enough of these in circulation that needs to become institutionalized already. Communication should be supported both for horizontal (including with non-state actors) and vertical (beginning at the level of the District Commission and ending with the FGS) linkages.

#### Build a base of information from the ground up

Concentrate on building a system of ground level data that can be used in identifying opportunities for citizen-government and business-government collaborations. One way to do this can be the joint collection and sharing of place-based data in a common information system linking district and state data collection with federal analyses. Such detailed data can tell the story of the constraints and opportunities of people in ways that aggregated sectoral analysis can never do. Localized information can become a part of a common national system, but they can also be developed explicitly for local problem solving.

#### Facilitate the creation of a diversity of alliances

Enhancing the capacity to communicate and collaborate will build the ability to identify what government at state and federal level can do to help people to get on with their own development. This would likely involve support to the creation of a diverse set of alliances, some formal some informal, that would be expected to continue such collaborative engagement after the end of the project period. Public-private partnerships in small towns for water distribution is one example of a localized alliance. The National Development Council is an example of one at the other end of the spectrum.

#### Require output achievement and reciprocal contributions in the LOA

A specific operational improvement would involve two changes in the LOA. First, the LOA should be structured so that a theoretical maximum of support would be made available to a partner, which would be an individual agency at the Federal level, but should be the State Government at the sub-national level. The utilization of such funds would be tied to the preparation of a series of specific requests for for joint action on a problem identified by the partner. Second, each request would require the specification of the output to be achieved and the level of the contributory obligation by the partner, which most likely would be in the form of committed staff time, facilities and equipment.

#### Measure and compare costs at the activity level as a means of enhancing financial efficiency

As noted, only Puntland management provided evidence of what it cost to deliver the outputs agreed in each LOA. This could have been more detailed, but it represents a good start. The budget prepared for the proposed AIMS program is broken down to the activity level. Resources budgeted for activity level use should always be fungible, but creating accounting codes at this level is a valuable step towards aiding efficient project management.

#### Create a high-level Third Party Monitoring mechanism

Any program that is operating in a FCAS needs continual feedback from a non-participant’s perspective. The TPM currently used by UNDP cannot provide the sort of policy-informing advice needed. The next program should incorporate a learning component that involves regular (perhaps quarterly) visits by a recognized academic body that has requisite understanding of FCAS development, federalism, and sub-Saharan Africa.

# Annexes

## Annex 1 Terms of Reference

Mogadishu, Somalia

The UNDP capacity development program’s main goal is to build the strength and capacities of the federal government of Somalia and federal member states through various means of support. The CD program consists of two main projects:

- Strengthening Institutional Performance (SIP).

- Support to Emerging Federal States Project (StEFS).

Whereas The SIP project works with core of govt. institutions in the federal government of Somalia as well Puntland, The StEFS project works with institutions in the FGS and the new federal member states: SWS, IJA, HirShabelle, and Galmudug, focusing on both initial establishment of the institutions and core of government functions.

The SIP project started on 1st July 2015 and will end on 31st December 2017. StEFS started on 1st April 2016 and will end on 31st March 2018. The total budget for The SIP project is $15 Million, while the budget for StEFS is around USD

$14 Million. The project budgets evolved over time, while the main funding came through the UN multi partner trust fund, both project equally received bilateral funding from different donors.

The objective of The SIP project is to enable the governments to fill critical capacity gaps in the civil service and to strengthen the capacity of key ministries and agencies to perform core government functions. The expected project outcomes are strengthened systems, processes and capabilities of the govt's to deliver on new deal compact.

The objective of The StEFS project implemented by UNDP in conjunction with UNSOM, and the Federal Ministry of Interior and Federal Affairs as the lead facilitator and partner. This project contributes to the Peace Building and State Building Goals (PSG) laid out in the Somali compact– particularly on PSG 1 “focused on inclusive politics”, while equally addressing PSG 5.

The overall objective of this evaluation is to assess how UNDP’s project results contributed, together with the assistance of partners, to a change in development conditions. The purpose of the evaluation is to measure UNDP’s contribution with a view to improve on the current and new UNDP capacity development program, providing the most optimal portfolio balance and structure for the next programming cycle (2018 - 2020).

The period covered by the present evaluation is as follows:

- The SIP project from 1st July 2015 till the 31st March 2017.

- The StEFS project from 1st April 2016 till 31st March 2017.

A team of consultants will be engaged to implement the evaluation under the leadership of the Team Leader. The evaluators consist of:

- The Team-Leader, who is responsible for the overall management of the team and will focus on the following technical areas: Planning, Aid Coordination, M&E and Statistics

- The Civil Service Management Specialist, who will focus on functional alignment, HR management, good governance, performance management.

- The State Building Specialist, who will focus on federalism, reconciliation, conflict resolution and state formation.

Based on the evaluation findings, the team leader will subsequently draft a set of recommendations concerning the future capacity development program structure. During this process, the team leader will be assisted by an expert in core of government functions from the UNDP.

The evaluation should determine the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the project. The findings and recommendations of the evaluation offer analytical insight in why results are or are not being achieved and the role UNDP has played. It is also intended to clarify underlying factors affecting the development situation, identify unintended consequences (positive and negative), generate lessons learned and recommend actions to improve performance in future programming and partnership development. In addition to evaluating the project implementation status, recommendations should be made in support of improving project implementation and sustainability. The evaluation will pave way for improving project execution for the remaining duration of the project and possible re-design of the capacity development portfolio.

The evaluation will be guided by the following criteria:

Relevance:

- Assess the appropriateness of the project activities and inputs in addressing the different needs of the different governments supported by the two projects. Determine whether the project objectives as outlined in the project document are still relevant, clear and feasible.

Effectiveness:

- Assess whether the two projects (SIP and StEFS) are being implemented per plan and the degree of achievement of the intended results. Identify the factors (internal/external) which may have facilitated/impeded the implementation of activities and the achievement of results thus far.

Efficiency:

- Determine whether the institutional structures at UNDP level are still adequate to support the implementation and coordination of the project activities timely and efficiently. - Assess the efficiency of the project management and supervision of activities. -

Determine whether funds are being utilized per the agreed financial plan.

Networks/Partnerships:

- Evaluate stakeholder participation in project implementation.

- Evaluate the communication and information dissemination to stakeholders.

- Evaluate the extent at which the government partners are involved in the project.

Sustainability and Impact:

- Assess whether the project will facilitate sustainability beyond the life span of the project. The sustainability assessment should consider, financial sustainability, socio-economic and political risks, stakeholder ownership and governance.

- Assess the sustainability of project interventions.

The Evaluators Leader will oversee and guide the work of the evaluators, while responsible for the following technical areas: Planning, Aid Coordination, M&E and Statistics.

While a detailed description of the implementation process of the present assignment is to be developed in the inception report, a rough outline is presented below:

- Desk reviews of relevant documentation – Project documents, LOAs, TORs of local advisers and international consultants as well as project reports.

- Review of the local advisers and international consultants’ contracts, work plans and deliverable's

- Interviews with stakeholders especially relevant govt. officials on the work carried out by local advisers and international consultants.

- Presentation of initial and final reports with a prominent section on key findings and recommendations as well as any challenges encountered or established from the assignment.

- Interviews with relevant FGS and regional govt. officials on federalism and capacity building interventions to measure progress/satisfaction.

Methodology:

- The evaluation will be conducted using different evaluation methodologies, a detailed evaluation plan will be developed during the inception period in close consultation with the UNDP and partner staff. The evaluation will begin with a meeting with project staff at the UNDP offices in Mogadishu and will end with debriefing of the same. The information will be collected from various sources including the government officials in various govt. institutions supported by the two projects. Findings will be based on appropriate quality and quantitative methods including: Desk review of project documents, monitoring reports, narrative and financial reports, statistics and minutes, interviews or focus group discussions with key stakeholders in the project including management, staff and clients attending the various institutions, CD Program Manager, SIP Team leaders, The StEFS project Managers, field visits to the different regional member states.

Other methods that are appropriate to evaluate the project and to answer the evaluation questions.

The Team Leader, supported by a Staff Member from the UNDP HQ in the field of core of govt. functions, will based on the evaluation report and recommendations, develop an outline for the future capacity development program for UNDP Somalia.

 Deliverables:

- An inception report defining the approach, methodology and timelines for the execution of this assignment – after 3 working days from start of assignment.

- Desk review report - after 5 working days from the inception report.

- Draft report submitted to UNDP and the national partners, validated in a workshop setting – after 20 working days from the presentation of the initial draft.

- Final report, including a set of recommendations – after 5 working days from the submission of the initial draft report.

- Based on the evaluation findings, the Team Leader will subsequently draft a set of recommendations concerning the future capacity development program structure – 7 days after the delivery of the final report.

## Annex 2 List of key informants

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Institution**  | **Full Names of the meeting participants**  | **Designations**  |
| FEDERAL LEVEL |  |  |
| Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development | Mr. Abdi Dirshe | Permanent Secretary |
| Mr Abdiqadir Adan | DG Planning |
| Mr Abdirahman Omar | DG Statistics |
| Mr Jimale Ahmed Yusuf | DG M&E |
| Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation (MOIFAR), FGS | H.E. Mr. Ali Sheikh Mohamed Nor | Deputy Minister |
| Mr. Abdullahi Mohamud Hassan | Permanent Secretary |
| Mr. Ali Mohamed Osman | Senior Technical Advisor  |
|  |  |
| Boundaries and Federalism Commission (BFC) | Mr. Khalif Mohamed Abdikarim | Chairman  |
| Mr. Liban Ali Sahal | Secretary General |
| Mr. Bashir Abdi | Technical Advisor |
| Mr. Abukar Ibrahim | Commissioner |
| Mr. Muse Wahgarad | Commissioner |
| Mr. Mohamed Muhiadin | Commission |
| Mr. Hussein Hashi | Commission |
| Mr. Hirey Roble | Commissioner |
| Mr. Zakariye Aware | Commission |
| Office of the Prime Minister | Dr. Yahye Ali Ibrahim | Senior Advisor |
| Mr Mustaqim Wahid | Technical Advisor |
| Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs | Mr Hassan Osman | Permanent Secretary |
| Mr Mohamed Adde | Director General |
| Civil Service Commission | Mr Ahmed Farah  | Secretary General |
| Mr Oman Mohamed Abdi | CIM Project Coordinator |
| Aid Coordination Unit | Mr Ahmed Ainte | Director |
| Mr Abu Bakar Osman | Advisor |
| STATE LEVEL |
| **Jubbaland State** |
| Ministry of Planning and international Cooperation, Jubbaland  | Hon. Mr. Osman Haji Hussein | Minister |
| Civil Service Commission, Jubbaland  | Mr. Mohamed Noor Salah  | Chairman |
| Office of the President, Jubbaland  | H.E. Mr. Mohamud Sayid Aden | Vice President |
| State Ministry for Presidency, Jubbaland | Mr. Ahmed Abdurahman Hassan | Minister |
| Office of the President, Jubbaland | Mr. Abshir Mohamed Abdi | Permanent Secretary  |
| Ministry of Interior, Jubbaland | Mr. Abdurrahman Abdi Ahmed  | Director General |
| Ministry of Women and Human Rights | Ms. Qamar Deeq Khalif   | Minister |
| Galmugug State |
| Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC), Galmudug | Mr. Abdirahman Mohamed Osman  | State Minister  |
| Office of the President, Galmudug | Mr. Ahmed Kheyre Gutale | ACU focal point  |
| **Hirshabelle State** |
| Minister of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC), Hirshabelle | Mr. Mohamed Abdi Abdullahi | Minister |
| **Southwest State** |
| Office of the president, Southwest | Hon. Mr. Hassan Elay  | Acting president/Minister of Security |
| Mr. Mohamed Mustaf | Coordination officer/LOA staff |
| Ministry of planning, investment and Economic Development (MOPIC), Southwest | Hon. Mr. Nasir Arush | Minister |
| Ministry of Health, Southwest | Hon. Mr. Isack Ali | Minister |
| Ministry of Education, Southwest | Hon. Mr. Mohamed Abukar | Minister |
| Ministry of Women & Human Rights, Southwest | Hon. Ms. Nadifa Haji | Minister |
| Ministry of mineral resources & Water, Southwest | Hon. Mr. Usama | Minister |
| Ministry of Resettlement, Southwest | Hon. Ms. Faduma | State minister Resettlement & Diaspora Affairs |
| SWS Civil Service Commission, Southwest | Ms. Shukri Abdinasir,  | Recruitment Director |
| Baidoa District Administration, Southwest | Hon. Ms. Abdullahi Ali | District Commissioner |
| MOPIED, Southwest | Mr. Yusuf Hassan | Admin/Finance Officer |
| Mr. Mohamud Mohamed | Planning Advisor |
| Mr Abdi Tawane | Reporting Officer |
| Office of the President, Southwest | Mr. Mohamed Abdi | Federalism Advisor |
| Mr. Jamila Mohamed | Gender Officer |
| Baidoa Women Development Organization, Southwest | Ms. Hawa Sokor,  | Chairperson, |
| Ms Saida Ibrahim | Member of BWDO |
| Bay University, Southwest | MR Adan Ali Mayow | Chairman |
| Mr Ali Adan Hassan | Student, Southwest |
| University of Southern Somalia, Southwest | Mr Ahmed Sidow | Chairman student Association |
| DRC | Mr. Abdulkadir Bulle  | Program Manager, Baidoa office, |
| NRC | Mr. Said Jabril | OIC, Baidoa office |
| GREDO | Mr. Alinor Foodade,  | Chairperson |
| COOPI | Mr. Hassan Bulle,  | Baidoa office, |
| JPLG Project | Mr. Khalif Nur,  | Project officer, Baidoa, |
| StEFS Project | Mr. Abdirahim Nor,  | Project officer, Baidoa |
| **PUNTLAND STATE** |
| Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation | Mr Hussein Abdi Jama | Director General |
| Good Governance and Anti Corruption Bureau  | Mr. Abdirahman Gureye | Director General |
| Civil Service Commission | Mr Mustafa Said Shabac | Chairman |
| Ministry of Youth Labor and Sports | Hon Mr. Abdirahman Ahmed Abdulle |  Minister |
| Ms Badri | Acting DG |
| Mr Idris | Advisor CIP |
| Ministry of Women’s Development and Family Affairs | Mr Abdul Ruzak | Director General |
| Mr Ahmad | Gender Mainstreaming |
| Mr Abdul Rezak | Administration |
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| SIDRA | Mr Guled Salah Barre | Executive Director |

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| **INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY** |
| UNSOM Kismayo | Dr. Magnus Bjarnason | Head of Regional Office |
| Mr. Robert Nelson OKOCHE | Human Rights Officer, Team Leader |
| Mr. Ahmed Abdulkadir Abdi | Political Affairs Analyst  |
| UNSOM Mogadishu | Mr. Tariq Chaudhry  | Head of Office |
| Mr. Khalil Osman | Sr. Political affairs officer  |
| Ms. Tomoko Kubota  | Political Affairs and Mediation Group Officer |
| Ms Shipra Bose | Gender Development Officer |
| UNSOM Garowe | Mr Abdi-Asis Mohamed | Political Affairs Officer |
| Ms Michiko Suzuki | Political Affairs Officer |
| UNSOM Baidoa | Mr. Usman | OIC - Head of Regional Office, Baidoa |
| Ms. Alexandra,  | Planning officer |
| Mr. Nur Ahmed,  | Political officer |
|  |  |  |
| Switzerland | Mr Siro Beltrametti | Head of Somalia Office |
| DFID | Mr Marieke Denissen | Stability Fund D. Director |
| EU | Ms Safia Abdi | SIP/StEFS Supervisor |
| International advisors | Mr Rommert Folkertsma | Planning Advisor |
| Mr Jens Rubner | Organizational Advisor |
| Mr Giulio de Tommaso | Civil Service Advisor |
| Mr Greg Wilson | Project Design Advisor |
| Mr Axel Koetz | Federalism Analyst |
| Mr Aues Scek | Federalism Analyst |
| UNDP | Mr George Conway | Country Director |
| Mr David Akopyan | Deputy Country Director |
| Mr Albert Soer | Programme Director |
| Mr. Atul Shekhar | StEFS Team Leader/Project Manager |
| Mr. Mohamud Haji | Programme Specialist  |
| Mr Philip Cooper | JPLG Director |
| Mr. Ahmed Guled | Project Officer |
| Mr. Abdirahim Nor | Project Officer |
| Mr. Abdiwahab Hussein | Technical Specialist on Federalism  |
| Mr. Isak Abdulahi | Programme Assistant  |
| Mr Francis Luwangwa | SIP Federal Team Leader |
| Mr Musa Duale Aden | SIP Puntland Team Leader |
| Mr Tendai Chabvuta | M&E Officer |
| Mr Omar Mohamed Isac | Program Specialist |
| Mr Gilbert Monjo | M&E Advisor to MOPIED |
| Mr Farah Abdessamah | Advisor to ACU |

1. Powell, Benjamin, Ryan Ford Alex Nowrasteh 2008, Somalia after state collapse: Chaos or improvement? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 67 (2008) 657–670. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. Larson, Greg Peter Biar Ajak Lant Pritchett 2013 South Sudan’s Capability Trap: Building a State with Disruptive Innovation. Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Working Paper.

Larson, Greg. 2013 The road from the Paris Declaration to the reality of Juba, UNU/ WIDER Working Paper No. 2013/141, December. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. MSI, 2010. Tribalism, Governance and Development, USAID & USIP Technical Paper. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. Nickson, Andrew & Joel Cutting, “The role of decentralisation in post-conflict reconstruction in Sierra Leone”, Third World Thematics: Post-conflict reconstruction and local government, published online: 28 Jul 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. Horn Observor, Workshop on Ending FGM in Somalia Concluded in Garowe, Horn of Africa News and Information Hub, 16 December 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. Originally, the team was to be 3 members, but the civil service expert failed to appear. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. The Puntland management did maintain ‘shadow budget’ giving item wise accounting of expenditures for all major activities in each of the Letters of Agreement with the State partner agencies. However, because this could not be perfectly matched with the aggregate output budget lines, it was not possible to accurately determine the precise amount spent by SIP on federal versus state interventions. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. The security situation in Somalia has improved slightly over the past five years, but remains critical. A massive bomb blast just days before the evaluators made its preliminary presentation killed several hundred people in Mogadishu, destroyed much of the upgrading done on the MoPIED premises and killed their Director of Gender Affairs. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. Powell, Benjamin, Ryan Ford Alex Nowrasteh 2008, Somalia after state collapse: Chaos or improvement? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 67 (2008) 657–670. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. According to UN estimates, the global Somali diaspora (people born in Solamia but living outside the country) had risen approximately 1.2 million people from 1990 (136%) to total 2 million in 2015. [http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/06/01/5-facts-about-the-global-somali-diaspora] [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. The constitution states: The Federal Government and Federal Member State governments shall ensure that meetings between the Presidents of the Federal Member States and high ranking officials be held regularly to discuss issues that affect their territories…[chapter 5 Article 52.1]. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. Al Shabab, a radical political Islamist split from the former Islamic Courts administration, continues to contest militarily for political authority despite the UNOSOM and AMISOM presence as well as the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. The specific approach known as PDIA was developed about five years ago by academics at Harvard and has grown into a global movement of practitioners. It must be recognized that the approach is based on a long history of development thinking going back to the 1950s with its origins in the writings of Peter Bauer, Robert Chambers and Dennis Rondinell. among othersi. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. Jubaland, for example, has refused to accept the NDP, arguing that its priorities were not included; it reports it is in the process of finalising its State Strategic Plan, which, if annexed to the NDP, will lead to it accepting the NDP. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. e.g. the Afghan and Iraqi US-led invasions or UN peacekeeping operations, as in DRC. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. See, for example, Verena Fritz and Alina Rocha Menocal, [State-Building from a Political Economy Perspective: An Analytical and Conceptual Paper on Processes, Embedded Tensions and Lessons for International Engagement](http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/details.asp?id=1340&title=understanding-state-building-political-economy-perspective-analytical-conceptual-paper-processes-embedded-tensions-lessons-international-engagement%7CUnderstanding), 2007; [Overseas Development Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overseas_Development_Institute) [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090118231836/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/State-in-Development-Wkg-Paper.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. In fact, many would argue that it is, at best, a work in progress. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. For a critical analyses of neotrusteeship, see, *inter alia*, Ford & Oppenheim, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. See, for example, Dahrendorf, (2003), The Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, (2003), Collier, (2003) Fukuyama, (2004), Paris, (2004), Samuels (2005). [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock: The Challenge of Building (Real) State Capability, CID Working Paper No. 306 December 2015 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. Note, this refers to the federal constitutional arrangements not the SIP nor the The StEFS projects. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. Whose motives were ascribed to desiring a weak Somali state because of past military defeats (Ethiopia) and greater-Somali irredentism. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. As documented by Afyare Abdi Elmi: Revisiting the UN Controlled Constitution Making Process for Somalia, E-International Relations, September 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. SWS, for example, has recruited, armed and trained 2000 Special Police for security duties and JSS maintains its own militia. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. SWS’s Planning Minister travels monthly to Nairobi to meet with the donor community; and SWS’s and Galmudug’s Presidents have both ignored the FGS neutral position in the Saudi – Qatar dispute, siding with the Saudis. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. UNDP 2009. Capacity Development: A UNDP Primer, UNDP Bureau for Development Policy. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-business-and-violence-driving-the-boom-in-mogadishu-a-1174243-amp.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. Meaning a significant reduction in violence and a more favorable environment for positive development. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. A particular challenge given the nature of clan-based politics in the country. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. The point is not that federalism is ‘a bad thing’ but that the understanding of it is contested and not widely dissemenitated. For a ‘new’ governmental system to be succesful both must be addressed and Governance lies at the core of this. Neither project seeks to do this. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium Synthesis Briefing: How to Support State Building, Service Delivery and Recovery in Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations: Lessons from Six years of SLRC Research, Synthesis Briefing #2, September 2017, ODI, London. “Since 2011, the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) has sought to understand how processes of post-conflict recovery and state-building play out in some of the world’s most challenging contexts-and to equip policy-makers and practitioners with better information on how to support these processes. At the heart of SLRC’s research is a longitudinal panel survey across five countries-in which more than 8,000 people were interviewed in 2012 and again in 2015—that has allowed us to directly track changes over time in how people make a living, access basic services and engage with the state (Sturga et al, 2017). Alongside this, qualitative work has allowed us to not only decipher what has happened, but to understand why”. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. Ibid, p 4 [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. Ibid, p 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. This is the origin of the phrase ‘isomorphic mimicry’ that denotes a siuation where a government looks like it if functional, but in fact only gives that impression in order to obtain continued development assistance without necessarily delivering better results for its citizens. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. Powell et al 2008 op cit [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. The evaluators readily acknowledge that a single project is unlikely to achieve this on its own; it obviously must act in collaboration with other interventions. However, for this to happen, the project must incentivise the development partners towards governance objectives. In the absence of such incentivisation, projects are like silos, seldom interacting with each other and, therefore, never achieving the collective objective of the interventions. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. Korten, David 1980 aLearning Process ApproachPublic Administration Review, September/October. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
39. MOPIED is the current acronym. Previously the ministry was known as MOPIC. Today this is the preferred acronym for state planning ministries. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
40. see [www.dhsprogram.com](http://www.dhsprogram.com) [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
41. This apparent prioritization of production over facilitating a learning by the international community appears worrisome and will be addressed in the Conclusions and Recommendations. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
42. There was a clear recognition that the project team lacked the requisite expertise to fulfil any other role; developing the requisite level of political, cultural and socioeconomic understanding would simply take too long and limited knowledge and understanding was too risky. Another part of the decision not to play an active political role was that this is clearly the mandate of UNSOM and having diversion in this within the UN did not seem a good idea. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
43. The evaluation was informed that at the start of providing this support, the project ‘didn’t have a clue’ about the level of possible financial commitment. Notwithstanding, it was decided that support for reconciliation was too important to prevent what were essentially open-ended undertakings in support of the process. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
44. The evaluation was informed that the project manager frequently received telephone requests between 22.00 and 24.00 pm with requests that he arrange flights for participants the following morning, in which he was mostly successful. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
45. For example, with regard to ex-combatants seeking to reintegrate in home communities. Having said this, in many post-conflict or ongoing conflict environments, ex-combatants choose not to seek reintegration in their communities of origin, fearing that this will prove impossible. As a result, they swell urbanized numbers, seeking the relative anonymity of urban areas. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
46. Abdul Kadir Nur Arale, former Minister of Reconciliation and Constitutional Affairs, Southwest State. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
47. Reports in November 2017 indicated that over 1 million people had fled the fighting in the region in the course of recent months, overwhelming the capacity of Mogadishu’s refugees camps. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
48. The TFG President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the TFG Prime Minister Abdiweli M. Ali, former TFG speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, Puntland President Abdirahman Mohamed Farole, Galmudug President Mohamed Ahmed Alim, and one of the leaders of the Ethiopian-supported Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jama’a, Abdulkadir Moallim Nur. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
49. The SRSG brought these six individuals together in Mogadishu and they (including Mahiga himself) signed an UNPOS-prepared Roadmap in 2011. The Roadmap had four components, of which security and constitution-making were the most important. They signed a protocol, “Establishing the Somali National Constituent Assembly”. In this protocol, the signatories created an 825-member ‘National Constituent Assembly’. Somalia’s traditional clan leaders select the members through the 4.5 tribal formula – such that the so-called four ‘major’ clans will get about 183 members of the NCA while the fifth clan would get 93 members. But, ironically, the signatories’ Technical Facilitation Committee managed the adoption process and the minister of the constitution (a proponent seeking a Yes vote) was the chair of the NCA. Moreover, the NCA voted on the following loaded question: “*Should this draft provisional constitution provisionally adopted to provide for a better Somalia, help reconstruct our country, and set us on the right path to justice and lasting peace, pending final adoption at the referendum?*” [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
50. The National Assembly, elected on the 4.5 ratio basis, was only allowed to approve or reject the draft before it. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
51. Afyare Abdi Elmi: Revisiting the UN Controlled Constitution Making Process for Somalia, E-International Relations, September 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
52. There were numerous references to the two military defeats at Somali hands of Ethiopian forces in earlier Ogaden border conflicts. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
53. While the constitution provides for the establishment of three tiers of government – central, state and district/municipal – only two had been established at the time of the evaluation. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
54. It may be that the Somali citizenry, having no experience of government, see little reason for it. Such services are exist are either private sector provided (electricity, (school) education), public-private partnerships (water), or NGO provision (Health). In this scenario, there is little space for government; even less, when the absence of reliable government access to resources is taken into account. Government clearly has to justify its existence if it is to be perceived as a necessary feature of Somali life if it is to be accepted as a legitimate actor. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
55. JSS’s establishment preceded the StEFS launch by approximately two years. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
56. Despite this potential existing in most FCAS benefitting from international state building/capacitating support, it is seldom a decisive factor in decisions to implement reforms. Rather, the crucial influence is the coincidence of decision-makers interests with the proposed reforms. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
57. The international consultant sourced for the federal Ministry of Women whose outputs, the Ministry deemed an unacceptable cut and paste of existing materials and not adjusted/adapted to Somali reality. The evaluation has briefly reviewed the Gender Mainstreaming Tool; it is obvious that significant portions have been cut and pasted from existing documentation, which is normal practice, there being, after all, no reason to re-invent the wheel. As it stands, the document has limited relevance to a Somali reality. In the evaluation’s opinion, it is open to question whether it would have been possible to achieve this within the timeframe (10 days) remaining to the consultant but no effort in this regard was possible because of the Ministry’s unilateral action. The second international consultant was terminated because of an unsatisfactory demeanour that undermined relations with the stakeholder. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
58. In JSS, for example, the StEFS’ TA was recruited to the public service as Director General in the state Ministry of Planning, taking office soon after the evaluation’s visit. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
59. Itself an indicator of general satisfaction with performance. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
60. The WB was expected to recruit and embed long-term TAs/TOs for both federal and state administrations through the Capacity Injection Mechanism (CIM); for whatever reason, this expectation was unrealized. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
61. The evaluation was informed that rostered public servants (i.e. those on the pay roll) could go for months without being paid, essentially meaning they were volunteers, with the accompanying attendance and productivity challenges. Furthermore, this only referred to a minority of the overall total; most were outsourced to projects and received payment only during the project’s implementation (In South-west, for example, 350 of the state’s reported 650 public servants in the Health department were dealt with in this way. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
62. Afghanistan, Liberia, and Yemen, for example. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
63. The sole exception to this was in South-west where communications training, focusing in report writing and letter drafting, reportedly resulted in a marginal improvement in the quality of reporting although ‘much more improvement was necessary’. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
64. Two events, totaling 23 days, significantly skew the average. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
65. The evaluation observed a training workshop for women in Kishmayo. The venue, despite possible alternative options, was arranged with rows upon rows of chairs behind each other for participants and the trainer was using an English PowerPoint, each slide of which he translated since very few, if any, of the audience were conversant with English. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
66. Some universities reportedly expressed the view that female students would not ‘represent their university appropriately.’ There is possibly a parallel in this regard with clan elders’ concerns that women’s divided loyalties (their fathers’ and husbands’ clans) meant that they would not represent the clan interests in the legislatures. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
67. Despite intensive internet searches, no listnership figures for Somalia’s radio stations were identified. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
68. The project failed to record the radio stations potential listenership and/or TV station’s viewership so even ballpark figures are not available. It is additionally worth noting that this outreach is not recorded in the activities’ matrix in the project reports; instead it is buried in the narrative reporting sections; yet, potentially a far wider audience was accessed than in any of the formal events. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
69. The evaluation was informed that, initially, the project’s finances were managed through four project accounts. Largely, this was due to the reality that recording MPTF data requires that only it be inputted; other donors’ financial data required other project account headings. The decidedly unsatisfactory result is that financial data must be searched for under different headings and the system is largely dysfunction, from a project financial management perspective, unless the project team has access to substantial expertise in the ATLAS system. The net result is that the project team separately records financial information (e.g. the budget and output expenditure presented) and LOA-linked expenditure) but pressure of work results in this often falling behind (e.g. as with the LOA expenditure tracking). [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
70. Rounded [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
71. Rounded [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
72. Rounded [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
73. Rounded [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
74. The 2017 third quarter report was under preparation at the time of the evaluation and the expectation was that it would only be available following the field work’s completion. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
75. It ias important to note that the 2016/7 elections negatively affected project implementation. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
76. Totals may exceed 100 due to rounding. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
77. Meservey, Joshua, U.S. Must Press Somalia to Deliver Competent Governance, Heritage Foundation, October 5, 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
78. Patricia Justino: Governance Interventions in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries, IDS WORKING PAPER, Volume **2017** No **496**, October 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
79. M. A. Thomas 2015. Govern Like Us: US Expectations of Poor Countries. Columbia University Press [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
80. Andrews, Matt 2013. The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
81. Rondinelli, Dennis 1983 Development Projects as Policy Experiments: An Adaptive Approach to Development Administration, Routledge [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
82. Larson, Greg. The road from the Paris Declaration to the reality of Juba, UNU/ WIDER Working Paper No. 2013/141, December 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
83. Arguably, given the timeframes of the two projects (SIP *c.* 20 months implementation and StEFS (even including the PIP), *c.* 18 months, even achieving intermediary Outcomes is highly unlikely. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
84. Ideally, since the underlying purpose of the investment it to support peace building and women have been shown to be key actors in this regard internationally, the Ministry of Women should be one of these. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
85. Rondinelli, Dennis. op cit [↑](#footnote-ref-86)