United Nations Development Assistance Framework
Afghanistan 2015-19

Mid-Term Review Report

November 2017

IF THE UN DID NOT EXISIT TODAY WE WOULD HAVE TO INVENT IT TO ADDRESS

THE DEMANDS OF OUR TIME

President Ashraf Ghani: The 72nd Session of The United Nations General Assembly

Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan with Provinces

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANPDF	Afghanistan National Peace & Development Framework
AWP	Annual Work Plan
CN	Counter Narcotics
CCA	Common Country Assessment
COAR	Country Office Annual Report
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CPD	Country Programme Document
CSO	Central Statistics Organization
DAD	Development Assistance Database
DAO	Delivering as One
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of Secretary General
EMIS	Education Management Information System
EMOP	Emergency Operations
EPHS	Essential Package of Health Services
EVAW	Elimination of Violence Against Women
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GoIRA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
H1N1	Hemagglutinin & Neuraminidase (Influenza A Virus)
HACT	Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfer
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
HRBPRA	Human Rights Based Programming Approach
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JUPSAY	Joint United Nations Programme of Support on Adolescents and Youth
JCMB	Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
MACCA	Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan
MAIL	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock
MCN	Ministry of Counter Narcotics
M&E WG	Monitoring & Evaluation Working Group
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MICS	Multi Indicator Cluster Survey
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoI	Ministry of Internal Affairs
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
MoPH	Ministry of Public Health
MoPW	Ministry of Public Works
MoWA	Ministry of Women's Affairs
MTPR	Mid-term Progress Report
MTR	Mid-term Report
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPPs	National Priority Programmes
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PAs	UNDAF Priority Areas
PMT	Programme Management Team
QCPR	Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review

RBM	Results Based Management
RCO	Resident Coordinator's Office
SEHAT	Systems Enhancing for Health Actions in Transition
T-MAF	Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan
UNAIDS	Joint United Nation Program on HIV and AIDS
UNCAC	United Nations Convention against Corruption
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Organization for Education, Science and Culture
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UN Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
VAW	Violence Against Women
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

Executive Summary

UN contributes to the development of Afghanistan as per the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) – an extendable five-year strategic agenda. After 30 months (January 2015 to July 2017), at mid-term, the UNDAF was reviewed by an independent consultant. This report is the presentation of the process and the findings of this Mid-Term Review (MTR).

The MTR was undertaken in a dynamic political and development environment. The government was keen that UN should have a clear focus on the results with an intent to achieve them so that the international assistance and its management could be measured and managed effectively. Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA) considers the UN to be a significant partner contributing to the political, development and humanitarian spheres, but has also begun to demand increased efficiency. This, according to the government, is possible only if the UN works as one holistic organisation rather than as disparate agencies. The UNCT (UN Country Team) has taken note of this and has been concentrating on aligning its results with the government's expectations as outlined in the newly designed Afghanistan National Peace & Development Framework (ANPDF) as well as by organizing itself to 'Deliver As One' (DAO) UN.

The review focused on both the issues of assessing the progress of UNDAF implementation as well as facilitating the changing model of the UN development support to Afghanistan. The MTR concentrated on collecting evidence on the status of the progress at the midpoint but also obtaining information on how to make UN more relevant in the changing circumstance. Most of the assumptions from the time of designing this UNDAF regarding security, operational challenges, political fluidity, and migration not only have continued but have become more complex. To address these UN, like any other contributor, must focus on the net development gains, which can only be achieved by focusing on results based management of the UN development support.

UNDAF is managed through five pillars each supporting specific outcomes. For their respective priorities, these pillars contribute technical assistance, services and required supplies. The pillars focus on economic development, basic services, social equity, law and order maintenance, and accountable governance in the context of human rights, gender equality, migration, etc. UNDAF has attempted to create enabling environment and developed capacity for sustainable development in Afghanistan. The relevance of UN support is seen in the fact that the UN is an objective interlocutor for Afghanistan in the international arena, mustering support from a vast range of donors besides offering its own development knowledge and practices. UN has integrated Afghanistan, though the international conventions (CRC, CEDAW) and agendas (MDGs, SDGs) so that the country can derive benefits from universal standards and experiences. Relevance of UNDAF was noticed *per se* as well as the starting point for any future collaborative framework.

On the lines of 'evaluation questions', the review sought evidence, in addition to, relevance, on effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and coherence. The review found out that, through UNDAF, the UN has achieved or is in the process of achieving several development results (effectiveness) and attempted to be as efficient as possible in the challenging circumstances. UNDAF has also provided coherence to the UN development assistance in Afghanistan through the coalition of UN agencies' assistance. The work through the pillars to address development priorities is also an attempt to bring coherence in the result areas of the UN programs and funds in Afghanistan. UNDAF's contribution to the government towards development results in Afghanistan are still nascent and need reinforcement to be sustainable.

In the context of management, the pillar system has proved to be of limited utility as their coordination can be further strengthened along with enhanced participation. The pillar participation is primarily about reporting and providing feedbacks. There are unmet opportunities for increased strategic planning.

Achievement of the development results can be made more efficient. There were feasible options for enhanced efficiency thorough joint programming. However, in a way, this may increase the collaboration efforts but would also support the move towards efficiency and coherence. Sustainability is a complex issue as it requires concerted approach from the UN as well as enhanced government capacities. It is expected that adoption of SDGs will also contribute towards sustainability. The MTR captured the status of UNDAF implementation by tracking the progress of the targets (with indicators) with the assumption that the targets comprised the UN contributions that were more easily measurable in the given time frame. The outcomes, on the other hand, are more about attributions. The report has detailed out the status and evidence of the 'performance' via targets and thereby obvious challenges, and lessons learned. However, a more robust analysis is possible though an independent evaluation later.

There were several challenges that constrained programme implementation. The challenges were in the areas of Results Based Management, security, human resources and capacity development, social norms, land acquisition (for projects) and data availability and usage. These constraints were further consolidated into lessons, which could mitigate the challenges in the future. The lessons were organised into: demand-supply coherence between the UN and the Government, systematic collaborative planning among the stakeholders, planning for feasible results, and ensuring concerted M&E. The government and the UN must work meticulously for the development objectives not only though the respective agencies but in a holistic manner. In bringing about coherence the review also considered the synergy among the political mandate of the UN for Afghanistan, and the humanitarian support considering possible ways to assimilate these three essential dimensions of the UN here in an effective manner.

The MTR report has made several recommendations, which are covered under: architecture of UNDAF, reorganization and alignment of development results, coherence, results management & monitoring, fiscal management, and communication of UN contributions. These recommendations intent to increase national ownership, effective results based management and communication of the UN development narrative for Afghanistan. The alignment of the projects and the activities of the projects were initiated at the time of the Mid Term Review. But there is a need for comprehensive alignment, which will go on until the UN support has transferred and consolidated into national ownership. This also brings the review process to suggest the need for focusing on mutual accountability between the UN and the government.

The report was limited by inadequate M&E for evidence generation on the progress made by UNDAF. Considering this review did not have much scope for additional primary data generation, the analysis relied on the available information from the documents produced before the consultant, interviews and consultations conducted for this purpose and the meetings with the M&E working groups and the Programme Management Team (PMT). Findings of the MTR were presented to the PMT and the UN Country Team (UNCT).

It is not overtly stated in the report, but the review considered the normal ethical issues for such projects including: informed consent of the participants, confidentiality and anonymity, and assessment of only relevant components. No separate gender and human rights analysis was done but these were essential part of the MTR in collecting and analysing the evidence.

1. OVERVIEW

A Mid Term Review (MTR) of Afghanistan United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), 2015-19 was conducted in August-October 2017. The MTR was supported by an independent consultant through wide-ranging interactions with the UN agencies and government stakeholders. The review covered the first 30 months of UNDADF implementation. The current Afghanistan UNDAF is, like other such country-level documents, a strategic, medium term (five years) results framework, which aimed to describe the collective vision and response of the UN system to the national development priorities and results based on normative programming principles. It captures how the UN Country Team in Afghanistan contributes to the achievement of the development results based on a common country analysis and the UN comparative advantage.

UNDAF outcomes are aligned with the National Priority Programmes (NPP), Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (T-MAF), and the five ministerial clusters proposed in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. [1] Of course, this was as per the context when UNDAF was designed in 2014-15.

Since then **the Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF)**, launched within two years of UNDAF, **has become the overarching government framework.** The ANPDF is developed as a five-year, 2017-21 plan for self-reliance but it recognises the fact that the challenge of attaining prosperity is unlikely in a generation. In the significance accorded to ANPDF the future development framework(s) will be grounded in the contents and orientation of this predominant national strategic proclamation. In this way ANPDF provides the elevated development perspective as well as the strategic direction.

Overview of the Context

- o Conflict scenario
- o Economic growth
- o Demographic dynamics – vulnerability, migration, refugees, youth and women
- o Government ownership
- o MDGs and transition to SDGs
- o Structure management of the UNDAF
- o UN leadership and directions

Stemming from the prevailing national strategies and programme priorities, Afghanistan UNDAF is a collaborative agenda of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA) and the United Nations Country Team. The beginning of this UNDAF also coincided with the global conclusion of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and the setting of the new, 2030 development agenda through Strategic Development Goals (SDG). Afghanistan has an extended opportunity to meet the MDGs by 2020. For SDGs Afghanistan has planned for nationalisation (March 2016-May 2017), alignment (July-December 2017 and implementation (Jan 2018-2030)[2]

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[1] Afghanistan National Development Strategy Prioritization and Implementation Plan (Mid 2010 – Mid 2013)

[2] Table1: Timeline and Development Context (2020 ±1)

Table 1: Timeline and Development Context (2020 ±1)

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2030
MDGs									
SDG			Nationalisation/Alignment				Implementation		
UNDAF				MTR			Extended		
Elections									
International Commitments			Warsaw and Brussels commitments					New commitments	
ANPDF									
Ex. Board/ new Strategic Plans									

Table 1, above visually shows the planning opportunity the UNCT has in the context of the major milestones.

UNDAF provided the UN agencies an edifice to collaborate for assisting development in Afghanistan. Through UNDAF, the UN system convened with the international community for their increased participation in the development of Afghanistan. Consequently, mustering resources for reinforcing Afghanistan's development agenda. Sovereignty and national leadership were the recognised mainstay of the UN support to Afghanistan.

2. MID TERM REVIEW

The Mid-term review assessed the UNDAF based on the feedback from the UN and national counterparts on how the UNDAF contributed to the development priorities of Afghanistan. The review analysed the progress through a set of questions pertaining to **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability** considering the wider context of the country.[3]

UNDAF continues in the belief that there will be an incremental ownership of the development discourse as well as the agenda by the people of Afghanistan through GoIRA. This will require a calibrated exit subsumed in the sustainability domain. UN's commitment to the development of Afghanistan is for as long and to the extent required and requested by the national government. It is therefore also the obligation of the GoIRA to make the best use of UN and its agencies collaborating with Afghanistan. The onus of accountability, mutuality and transparency are the responsibility of the UN as well as the GoIRA and UNDAF provided this opportunity.

A period of 30 months may not be sufficient to elicit tangible development impact, and it is likely that the development milieu may change. The Mid-Term Review (MTR), therefore, considered the various changes in the development circumstances of Afghanistan. It is obvious that development schemas are complex interrelated, and are driven by economics, politics, and, in case of Afghanistan, especially security and peace milieus. The national interests are the primary concerns, but the regional and international considerations tend to affect development in Afghanistan. For a landlocked country, the politics and economics of the neighbours can and do influence development scenario here. Some consequences have been observed in refugee/migration, polio, narcotics and besides underdeveloped trade, supply of essential items and stunted overall economic development. This MTR did not dwell into the political aspects of

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[3] Norms & Standards, UNEG, 2014-17

development. The UNDAF was designed before the National Unity Government (NUG) was in place and the security and economic outlooks appeared more positive. The general expectation at the time designing of the current UNDAF was that during this period the national economy as well as the security will improve making development promotion easier.

Internationally, the Warsaw Summit with NATO, and the Brussels conference co-hosted by GoIRA and EU in July and October 2016 respectively have significant implications for Afghanistan. These international engagements focused on the new/updated **National Priority Programmes** in key sectors, **Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework,** the adoption of the **Sustainable Development Goals** and the ongoing nationalization process to identify indicators and targets for Afghanistan. The global migration crisis also may impact Afghanistan in terms of reduced resources for humanitarian and development needs, along with the ongoing attempts at a peace process, and other ongoing security, political and economic challenges too have constrained the Government's ability to deliver on its development agenda.

These developments are happening at a time when the aid environment is changing because of which the UN is facing increased funding constraints. The UN Secretary General's report has also recommended on many **'new ways of working.'**[4] The New Way of Working is described as working over multiple years, based on the comparative advantage of a diverse range of actors, including those outside the UN system, towards collective outcomes. Wherever possible, those efforts should reinforce and strengthen the capacities that already exist at national and local levels. This is calling for greater integration among the development and humanitarian partners including UN agencies, international and local NGOs, private sector, civil society actors and governments. All things considered the development promotion in Afghanistan is entrenched in multifarious environment, which can act as a catalyst or a retarder of growth here.

In the global UN standpoint, the 'Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review' resolution (December 2016) continues to be reviewed. It is asserted that in future **UNDAFs would be repositioned and strengthened as the single most-important UN planning tool in all countries, with tangible implications for guiding UN support and presence and progressively taking precedence over individual entity country programmes and plans.** Rather than being a picture of all UN Country Teams' activities in each country, UNDAFs must become a system-wide response to national priorities; and this compact around results must be underpinned by a clear budget framework. It is obvious that the UN recognises the value of UNDAF but then it will be left to the country offices to take advantage of this framework in their country contexts.

Executive Boards of several Agencies will discuss their new Strategic Plans 2018-2021. Therefore, it is time for collaborations as well opportunities and most of all time for assigning clarity for strategic way forward. UNDAF is significant for coherent UN assistant to Afghanistan but not at the cost of the national ownership. Inherently, UN is the most neutral interlocutor and stakeholder of development. At the time of this review it became obvious that government was seeking a paradigm shift in UN's developmental role in Afghanistan and this rationale was incorporated in the MTR approach. The significant facts are that while UN is important partner but there are several other supporters of development here – bilateral as well multilateral, and Afghanistan government will like to recoup the development agenda for political, economic, and cultural reasons.

In this context, the UNDAF MTR for Afghanistan aimed to identify and support more than the routine mid-term 'adjustments' to the current UNDAF so that it remains relevant to the national context and responds to changing circumstances. These adjustments, modifications or substantive changes depended on the

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[4] Repositioning the UN development system to deliver on the 2030 Agenda – Ensuring a Better Future for All

collaborative conclusions drawn from the feedbacks obtained from the government as well as the UN stakeholders.

3. SCOPE OF WORK

The scope of MTR included analysing and consolidating results of available internal review processes besides obtaining additional feedback to complete the UN development assistance picture at the midpoint of UNDAF implementation. The review incorporated the assessed weaknesses, gaps, and opportunities per se as well as with the appraisal of the original UNDAF assumptions against the change in circumstances that have occurred since their drafting.

Pivotal to the scope of MTR was the overall assessment of progress and achievements made against the planned results. The MTR documented the constraints, challenges and lessons learnt over the first two and a half years of the UNDAF cycle. The issue of alignment of UNDAF results and national development priorities was a recurring concern of the government at the time of the MTR. The review therefore helped to envisage alignment issues *vis a vis* the UN support to national planning and priorities and generate possible recommendations for fine tuning the performance of the UNDAF for the remaining period of UNDAF cycle. The challenge of MTR was to look inwards but also consider the external environment. The review attempted to identify gaps in implementation and provide recommendations. The MTR was not able to substantively identify the UN contributions through this review.

The review examined the UNDAF Results Matrix. The contributions and gaps in the light of the SDG agenda were also considered for each of the five Pillars. Some of the essential development themes like inequity, resilience, urbanization, gender, climate change, returnees/internal displacement and DRR as well as how to deliver better "as one", considered by the UNCT Retreats (September 2016 and February 2017), were included in MTR documentations.

The Mid Term point is relevant to consider the existing systems, structures, and business processes for implementing the UNDAF results. The scope of MTR included the functioning of the Pillar management structures with focal agencies, working groups, the resource framework, and the joint programmes. The aim is to improve the functioning of the **One UN** opportunity and to achieve the UNDAF goals in sync with gender, capacity development, and environmental suitability and human rights considerations. It incorporated to assess funding gaps and resource constraints for UNDAF implementation and review the UNDAF resources framework as needed.

4. OBJECTIVES

The principal objective of the MTR was to collect, analyse and present the UNDAF progress in the two and half years since its launch. This MTR aimed to specify what the UNDAF has accomplished at its mid-point in terms of tenable development results in Afghanistan and suggests required programme adjustments.

The specific objectives were to:

o   Analyse the progress made against planned results, as well as assess challenges and lessons learnt through the implementation of UNDAF so far.
o   Assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and coherence in the delivery of the overall UN programme and recommend ways in which the UN may increase the significance of its programme.
o   Identify the gaps and inadvertences by assessing how the emerging issues and changing contexts influence the current UNDAF outcomes and make recommendations to strengthen alignment of UN assistance to national priorities.

- o Recognize options for the UN system to jointly and coherently support the government in key priority areas as well as towards 2030 agenda through SDG implementation.
- o Suggest improvement in the coherence of the pillars or certain sectors/thematic areas.
- o Review the existing 'Theory of Change' for the UNDAF identifying a common vision for UN support to Afghanistan.
- o Assess the potential role of UNAMA in the UNDAF and the possibilities of formalization of the two roles focusing on politics for peace and stability and development.[5]
- o Obtain feedback on the thematic issues like joint programming, cross-cutting issues: gender and human rights, humanitarian-recovery-development link, capacity development and communication, advocacy, climate change and DRR, urbanization, conflict analysis, civil society, and data management.

5. APPROACH

The UNCT led the overall MTR with the RCO providing the coordination support to the process. The Programme Management Team acted as the sounding board for the process and progress. Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) Working Group was requested to provide necessary monitoring framework and feedback. The methodological and programmatic guidance came from the combined sessions of the M&E WG and Programme PMT. Guidance from Operations Management Team (OMT) was sought on questions concerning management and efficiency. The responsibility for the overall coordination of the UNDAF in Afghanistan was shared between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the UNCT.

To address comprehensive as well specific questions for the review, the Afghanistan UNDAF MTR studied the country situation based on available information and wide consultations. It also took advantage of the recently conducted MTRs by UNICEF and UNHCR, two agencies with significant presence in Afghanistan, which informed the UNDAF.

The MTR engaged with relevant Government partners as well as national staff of the UN agencies to ensure national perspective and ownership.

The core methodological approaches for the MTR were obtaining feedback on principal review questions along with thematic analysis. The MTR followed the UNDG and UNEG Norms and Standards and Evaluation and Ethical standards, as well as OECD/DAC evaluation principles. Figure 2 below summarises the approach for the MTR.

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[5] UNAMA as a political mission is mandated to provide political good offices in Afghanistan; work with and supports the government. UNAMA supports the process of peace and reconciliation; monitors and promotes human rights and the protection of civilians in armed conflict; promotes good governance; and encourages regional cooperation

Figure 2: Overview of Approach

- ✓ **Analyze** the development strategy context
- ✓ **Review theory of change**/ results logic
- ✓ **Organize the progress** made against targeted results
- ✓ **Assess for** relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and coherence in the delivery
- ✓ **Identify implementation challenges**, opportunities and lessons
- ✓ **Recommend modifications in the UNDAF/Mutual Accountable Strategic Framework**

To ensure that the review was based on primary responses, in-person interviews and discussions were conducted by the consultant. These interviews and focused discussions were with key UN stakeholders and available government partners with the view to understand the challenges and lessons learned by the stakeholder(s) and verify the available data. This also helped in humanising the MTR extricating its templates and inert data. The responses were obtained from UN agencies in Kabul, UN programme staff, Working Groups/Pillar groups heads and members, and relevant government officials. Each of the five pillars are co-chaired by two designated lead UN agencies, these were established to oversee progress towards planned results and to offer opportunities for exchange and discussion between agencies and government partners involved in the specific. Structured meetings were held with the pillar heads and other pillar members to obtain their response on implementation of the UNDAF but also on the management coordination of the pillars themselves.

Owing to the scope and timing for the MTR, the feedback from other development partners, civil society, youth and women representatives was not possible. Also, there was already a movement towards a paradigm shift in strategic UN assistance for development in Afghanistan based on government 'will', perception of the UNDAF Pillars and changing contexts of Afghanistan.

Gender, human rights, inequity, resilience, urbanization, climate change, returnees/internal displacement and DRR as well as how to deliver better "as one were all constant themes during the MTR.

In the last two years there were Mid-Year and Annual Reviews of UNDAF, which were taken to serve as the building blocks for the MTR dialogues. These options and mechanisms were considered for the MTR analysis.

The approach of the MTR was to carry out a comprehensive review with feedback from those who had been involved in the implementation and coordination of the UNDAF processes. This was juxtaposed with the available data to analyse the progress and identify the gaps, constraints and lesson learned to give future recommendations.

6. METHODOLOGY

The MTR comprised two diagnostic feedback components, one via review questions, and other through the thematic analysis. A mixed methodology for data collection and analysis was used. The overall methodological approach and design was inclusive, participatory, and responsive to gender, human rights, and other cross-cutting concerns. The attempt was on collection and analysis of sufficient data to address all evaluation questions. To the *extent possible*, multiple methods (triangulation) was used. Both quantitative and qualitative data, with a range of UN agencies and government departments at distinct levels of responsibilities, was collected and utilized. Logical and explicit linkages were found between data sources, data collection and methods for analysis. The methodology considered the overall purpose of the evaluation, as well as the needs of the users and other stakeholders. It explicitly stated the limitations of the chosen methods. The evaluative approach, as stated in the approach, followed UNEG norms and standards for evaluations, as well as the ethical guidelines.

The consultant used the following methods and tools to collect and analyze data for the review:

(i)   Administered a semi-structured schedule to conduct the interviews with the Pillar members and the government partners. (Annex 2)
(ii)   Analysed data from the earlier annual and mid-year reviews.
(iii)   Obtained data on the progress by using a template, which was further analysed.

This supported the review to move beyond perceptions, especially the data collected on the progress from the agencies and its analyses. Despite this the collection of primary data was limited.

The original TOR did not have a standalone point on gender, which would have reinforced the commitment of the UN to the underlying cause of many of the issues the MTR was trying to address in Afghanistan. Therefore, the understanding about gender had to be addressed across the pillars.

6.1 Analytical Focus:
To comment on the midterm of UNADF, the analytical focus was on the following issues, which provided the context for the way forward.

o   **2030 Agenda**: the residual status of the MDGs and the implementation of the SDGs to achieve the 2030 Agenda
o   **Accountability**: Comments on inclusive, participatory and transparent implementation, that enables the stakeholders to hold the UN system accountable for results
o   **Risks and resilience**: assessment of likelihood that the UN interventions could be affected and the opportunity and possibility of retaining, returning to the status quo (resilience)
o   **Theory of change**: assumptions on how UN programmes affect development change are confirmed and revised considering changes in the context.
o   **Capacity Development**: Contributes to developing the capacity of duty-bearers to meet their obligations and rights-holders to claim their rights
o   **Development-humanitarian-peace nexus**: Enhances coherence between the development, humanitarian, human rights, peace and security, and environmental agendas;
o   **Partnerships**: Contributes to fostering new and effective partnerships between national stakeholders and international actors, including through South-South and triangular cooperation;
o   **Policy Advocacy**: Promotes integrated and coherent policy support to partners;
o   **Data Management**: Strengthening national capacities to collect and analyse data for policy-making and reporting

- o **Funding Scenarios: General economic outlook and funding** considering changes in donor environment
- o **Migration** (internal/external) and impacts on Afghanistan based on the desk review of available reports
- o **'Leave No One Behind'**: Issues social inclusion and exclusion, about inequality, inequity, marginalized, difficult to reach groups

An important theme for UNDAF in the current social, economic, and political context was the issues related to sustainability that will enable the exit process. While the UN, with its programmes and agencies, has decades of support to Afghanistan but this cannot be a permanent fixture at least in its current form. The need for UN development and humanitarian mandates will continue as needed but it is also necessary to think of the future of UN here. Afghanistan is striving towards self-reliance and the government will be incrementally owning the entire development agenda and UN will have to factor this in its support.   UN must facilitate the national ownership for the people of Afghanistan. This means greater government participation and mutual accountability of government as well as the UN with civil society participation. Accountability will be to mutually agreed results.

7. FINDINGS OF THE MTR

7.1 Context

Afghanistan embarked on the modernization and democratization process with resolute support from the international community after the December 2001 Bonn conference. By 2004, this process was perceptible: with *Loya Jirga* approving the constitution and the successful conclusion of elections. Although this is the third UNDAF through which the UN Country Team is assisting the national development agenda, yet the duration is limited for achieving substantial impacts. Development continues to be constrained because of overlooked opportunities affixed to Afghanistan's history of political instabilities and conflicts of decades. The lost economic chances, the lack of political cohesion and the cultural misalliances made the development goals more aloof.

Afghanistan adopted the MDGs development strategy in 2004, nearly five years after the Millennium Declaration was issued, to be to be achieved by 2020. To this, the country had included an additional Goal pertaining to security. This implies how before 2004 Afghanistan was secluded from the world development community. The additional peace goal is the marker of the fact that even when the country began to return to global development approach and oversight the fragile peace continued to be the single most constraining factor. This also indicates that in this reincarnation UN and the other donors only have had about a decade of implementation experience to learn lessons and to be effective.

The UNDAF glosses over political analysis, the regional context of Afghanistan development too is important. There is an emerging trend of violent radicalism. The Afghanistan government is asserting itself. The current UNDAF is functioning in a situation when the GoIRA is reclaiming the political discourse and expectations from the UN are firming up. However, the nascent political coalitions, unpredictable security and persisting international as well regional dynamics continue to be the reality of Afghanistan. In 2015, when this UNDAF was developed the economic prospects and transition to a post-conflict Afghanistan were optimistic. The slackening economy and persistent infirm peace have festered development opportunities; **the moot question is whether UNDAF in its present form will be of as much value as it was expected during its drafting?** This review primarily has tried to analyse the progress of UNDAF implementation. However,

considering the timing, the review assessed the inherent robustness of UNDAF and has also looked at enhanced contribution of the UN in future.[6]

The Table 2 below summarises how the context, in which UNDAF is implemented, requires understanding of the planning constraints.

Table 2: Overview of Contextual Dynamics

Context	Planning Focus
Security	Security deteriorating
Economic Growth	Uncertain growth (increase post 2017)
Demographic dynamics	Recognition of **youth and Migration** • 63% of the total population is below 25 years of age, and the youth (10-24 years) makes up 40% of the population. • IDPs, Returnees, diaspora
Political (will)	Government ownership of reclaiming of development strategic leadership focus on: accountability, efficiency
MDGs and transition to SDGs	Analysis, ownership, and achievements
Management structure of the UNDAF	Need for consistency/Results focused (considered Theory of Change)
UN leadership and directions	**QCPR 2017-20** alignment to UNDS, 2030 Agenda. Strengthening the Humanitarian, Development, Peace Nexus. **Strategic Review** **Deliver as One UN approach**

7.2 Pillar wise Response

7.2.3 Overview

The five pillars of UNDAF are:

Pillar I: Equitable economic development with reduced dependence on the illicit economy
Pillar II: Provision of quality and sustainable basic social services on an equitable basis
Pillar III: Securing social equity and investing in human capital especially for women, youth, and vulnerable minorities

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[6] The consultant arrived in Kabul on 16 August 2017 and soon after the President requested the UN to rationalize the UN approach in Afghanistan with a clear exit policy.

Pillar IV: Justice and accessible rule of law for all, and
Pillar V: Inclusive and accountable governance

Meetings and discussions were carried out with all the Pillar heads and members, agencies and government partners to obtain feedback on the structure and function of UNDAF. A schedule was used to obtain wide ranging responses (Annexed). The intent of these interviews was to contextualise the development in Afghanistan via UNDAF and alignment with the government and national priorities. The continued relevance or alternative to UNDAF was primary concern of the review.

Pillar I: Equitable Economic Development
Inclusive, more equitable and sustainable economic growth with reduced dependency on the illicit economy.

The pillar supports licit economy and expects reduced dependence on donor assistance. The pillar activities include designing policies and strategies for economic growth in agriculture for reducing unemployment and underemployment, risks from disasters, besides providing shelter and even construction of a road to improve access. The results aimed by the pillar are diverse as well as ambitious considering the economic base of Afghanistan. The pillar participants acknowledge the challenge of managing this portfolio. Urban development appears to be the catalyst that could support economic development of Afghanistan but considering the agrarian nature of the economy and low urbanisation it is a long-term goal. Pillar stakeholders do not work together because of the diverse nature of their, agency-specific, expected results and, they cannot identify any overlaps for common grounds. There are several crosscutting themes in play besides urban development, like, returnees, livelihood, normative and women participation. This requires cross-pillar engagements, which is limited. The summary conclusion was that while it is challenging to coordinate with the pillar members interacting with other pillars to understand and support common objectives was even more complex. The pillar management responsibility is not the most coveted job. This pillar has transferred the head from ILO to UNHABITAT.

Pillar II: Basic Social Services
The expected outcome for this pillar: 'All Afghans, especially the most marginalized and vulnerable, have equitable access to and use of quality health, nutrition, education, WASH, prevention and protection services that are appropriate and effectively address their rights and needs'

Pillar II is extensive spreading over several result areas. The pillar has about 62 percent of the annual UNDAF budget. This makes the pillar management a challenge considering that all UNDAF/Pillar management is considered additional task by the participants. It was reported during the consultation that meetings were infrequent and participation low. The Pillar managers opined that, for the ease of coordination, this pillar could be subcategorized into three groups (1) Education (2) Health, Nutrition, and WASH and (3) Legal and protective segment (Child protection, drugs, etc.)

The political importance of UNDAF is undoubted as this is the UN development narrative for the country and needs to be communicated as a holistic approach. In about 42 percent of the country, the governance is feeble as there are non-state influences. To carry out any programming in such areas the strategies must cater to the intricacies of the local situation. Some UN agencies use extenders, NGOs and third-party monitoring systems. Others reported to directly support government capacity building, besides the use of the third-party and local communities for implementing its activities. The general scenario of the country has changed since the current UNDAF was developed from being optimistic to cautious. As pillar II focuses on basic services to the vulnerable population it entails issues of access and outreach that are impacted by inadequate security, remoteness, and dispersed population all constraining access.

Pillar III: Social Equity and Investment in Human Capital

The expected outcome level result for this pillar is: 'Social equity of women, youth and minorities and vulnerable populations is increased through government's improved and consistent application of principles of inclusion in implementing existing and creating new policies and legislation'.

From the perspective of social equity and human capital Afghanistan is making a new beginning. As 16 years is rather short for strengthening the social fabric, which has been deprived of economic opportunities because of continuous strife. Considering the country demographics, the UN must focus its support to youth. However, this needs more data and greater analysis that was not done in the current UNDAF. Similarly, more understanding of the marginalised population of Afghanistan is necessary. In 1978-79, with the coming of revolution and war, field studies inside Afghanistan were constrained and therefore a clear picture of ethnicity and marginalised groups is opaque.[7] In the principle of 'leaving no one behind', the minorities and the marginalised will continue to need concerted development focus and social inclusion.

Pillar III has recognised the need for youth to be a special development focus in Afghanistan. Working with other UN agencies, UNFPA as the lead agency for youth programming, has supported the development of several youth related initiative in Afghanistan, e.g., 'National Youth Policy', 'National Youth Strategy', 'Adolescents Health Strategy' and 'National Action Plan for Eliminating Early and Child Marriage'. In addition, a 'Joint United Nations Programme of Support on Adolescents and Youth' (JUPSAY) that brings together nine United Nations agencies to work collaboratively for the implementation of this framework.

The results expected under pillar III are more normative in nature concerning advocacy, legal systems, conventions, policies, etc. Also, the pillar coordination because of the complex issues like gender and equity is challenging.

Pillar IV: Justice and Rule of Law

The outcome: Trust in and access to fair, effective, and accountable rule of law services is increased in accordance with applicable international human rights standards and the government's legal obligations.

UN's role for managing and promoting informal justice is constrained and this needs to be reconsidered. Afghanistan has a long tradition of informal justice systems and there is an opportunity to build upon it. However, this should be the role of the government who would have durable legitimacy. It must be developed through a bottom-up approach. The World Bank through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund provides legal aid but UN has demonstrated more comprehensive role towards security and governance. The UN focus is more on promoting national ownership. The Pillar focuses on formal justice and security issues through activities for anti-corruption, Gender Based Violence (GBV), and relative normative outputs, for instance, EVAW (End Violence Against Women) Law.

Another challenge to the results related to justice and rule of law is that it needs to be contextualised vis a vis the constitution of Afghanistan, which is based on the Koran and the Sharia law, this needs reconciliation with the Human Rights aspects promoted by the UNDAF.

Reorganisation of Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA), while major component is related to police payroll, it is also expected to be one of the examples of national ownership. Government is increasingly involved in planning and taking charge of delivery. However, for better and effective support indicators and targets will have to be more specific.

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[7] There are many communities who live at the peripheries, including Pashtuns in the mountains, and there are other aspects of marginalisation faced by Hazaras, Kuchis, Ujbeks, Pashai, Kyrgyz, Wakhi, Arabs, Jat (including Ghorbat and Sheikh Mohammadi), and Ismailis, et al.

For this pillar as well, the coordination is not regular but need-based, on issues that are to be addressed at any given time. This way coordination is utilised rather for urgent problem solving and not for long term strategic planning. The members felt there was more need for proactive planning rather than just responding to demands for reporting. In practice, the fact of no (lead or primary) counterpart also adds ambiguity to the coordination with the government for this pillar. It was suggested by some members that it may be more efficient to combine the Rule of Law and Justice and Governance under one structural category that will manage access to services, institution building and anti-corruption systems. The police payroll must be transferred to the government over a defined period.

Pillar V: Accountable Governance

The outcome: Improved legitimate, transparent, and inclusive governance at all levels that promotes progressive realization of human rights.

UNAMA's focus on governance is reflected through this pillar. Institution for governance in Afghanistan have become weak because of continuous conflicts, which has created a standoff. In the post-2001 era too institutions were established without providing sound foundations. Governance is a holistic concept and must be taken as such while conscious initiatives for capacity building with system development and strengthening is ongoing process. UN continues with the project approach, which needs to be made more comprehensive. In the National Unity Government of Afghanistan, the governance responsibilities are distributed between the President and the Chief Executive Officer. This has created an opportunity for effective and equitable governance but also poses its challenges because of allegiance. Changes in portfolios of the ministers bring in a veneer of instability. This also encourages the need for consistent capacity building. Worsening security is a challenge for governance besides the issues related to corruption. Different non-state actors are claiming parts of the country to be in their control. Susceptible security status does impact the access to programme areas. To resolve this the government has managed to create more local courts in areas under its control.

The pillar management suffers from inadequate participation from the government as counterparts' accountability is blurred. The pillar management agrees that it may be more efficient to merge accountable governance with the justice and rule of law because of the overlapping functions.

7.3 Inferences from Pillar findings

Table 3: Pillar Wise Progress at the MTR

Pillars	Number of Outputs	Number of Indicators	Number of Targets	Status of Progress of The Targets		
				Progress Reported/ Tracked	On track	Off track
I	8	25	24	7	6	1
II	13	56	56	32	27	5
III	8	14	34	6	6	0
IV	47	58	84	19	16	3
V	10	11	17	2	2	0
TOTAL	86	164	215	66	57	9

Table 3 summarises the number of outputs, indicators and targets for each pillar. It is obvious here that the progress at the time of MTR was not monitored and reported adequately, and from what was reported the apparent conclusion is that the reported targets were on track. However, since the progress for considerable number of targets were not reported it can not be to what extent the UNDAF was achieving its purpose. The pillars/agencies will have to ensure that these targets are reported and shown as being on or off track.

Relevance
- o Contextualized **international development perspective** MDGs, SDGs, conventions
- o Supported the government with technical assistance, policy development, and with **service delivery**
- o Human Rights, Gender, youth, and vulnerable population
- o To the donors for supporting UN in Afghanistan (interlocutor)/the UN picture: **Multilateral interface**
- o Formalization of **Country Programs**
- o Aligned with existing NPP and Tokyo Mutual Accountability/ Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework (SMAF)/ Brussels Framework /needs strengthening through alignment with ANPDF
- o Relevant per se as well as a **starting point** for the future collaboration

There was a consensus on the fragile security situation of Afghanistan, which is making programme outreach challenging. There is a need for realignment of UNDAF with the national priorities especially with the peace and nation/state building, which themselves are in a process of consolidation. The question of alignment is complex as it is multifaced. There is a lack of intrinsic as well as extrinsic integration. There are many occasions when pillars themselves need their results to be cohesive with those of other pillars and similarly there are several unpursued opportunities for integration with the government and other non-UN agencies because of the complexity of donor funding environment of Afghanistan. Integration is not only a question for the results at project or programme levels but also between development and humanitarian actors in the specific political context. While funding is manageable except in some intermittent cases; the cost of implementation is high making the overall scenario inefficient. However, the issue of efficiency here should not be compared with other countries. Joint programming approaches are trying to work towards greater collaboration with efficient results. While the donor driven, and international community support may not qualify as ideally efficient, but the jury is out on government's capacity to take over the responsibility in a sustainable way. The pillar system has managed to coordinate in a haphazard manner. The coordination is neither strategic nor proactive and veers more towards reporting as and when required. There is limited added value of such reflexive coordination, which is not geared to monitor results in any sustained manner. The coordination can only be improved if the UNDAF results are organised where the investment (mandate, funding, and efforts) of the participants are rewarding towards common agreed goals.

7.4 The Review Questions
The 'review questions' were used to analyse the UNDAF status at the Mid Term point. Due to time and data limitations it was not possible to get empirical robustness to the responses, but there is adequate indicative content to provide useful status description.

7.4.1 Relevance
The relevance of UNDAF is rooted in its five programming principles: 'Human Rights Based Approach', Gender Equality', 'Environmental Sustainability', 'Results-Based Management', and 'Capacity Development'. They together make the UN participation inimitable for

development in Afghanistan. These five themes run across all agency programmes and are significant for Afghanistan.[8]

Role of the woman recognised by the UN Security Council is vital in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.[9]

The planned UNDAF results continued to be relevant to Afghanistan over the past 30 months as these are aligned, along with the global development agenda of MDGs (2020), SDGs (2030), and several other conventions and treaties like CEDAW, CRC, etc. with the national priorities set at the time of development of UNDAF.

UNDAF has supported the government of Afghanistan with technical assistance, policy development, and service delivery. UN's role in providing service delivery especially in areas where government capacities require further strengthening is well demonstrated. UNDAF cross-cutting priorities are relevant to the existing and emerging needs of Afghanistan. UNDAF has planned results in the areas of gender equality, capacity development, environment, human rights, and migration as well as cross-cutting themes for other results. It is clear from the analytical comparison of programme implementation that agencies like IOM, UNESCO, UNODC, UNOPS and UNHCR have results across all the five pillars.

In 2017, the Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework was launched by H.E. President Ashraf Ghani for the National Unity Government. This necessitated realignment of the UN objects with the new national programme ensuring that Afghanistan's development is Afghan led and Afghan owned. ANPDF serves as the roadmap for achieving self-reliance, for bringing an end to poverty and ensuring security and stability. ANPDF admits that it "will take longer than a single generation" to reach its goal. The relevance of the future UN strategic framework is in close alignment with the government developmental goals and systems.

The relevance of the UNDAF in Afghanistan is more significantly noted in addressing the human rights and gender equality. Since Afghanistan is recognized as a country in conflict, it would be worth mentioning the need to develop a stabilization framework that would allow tailored expectation and results in a more pragmatic and realistic way. This would emphasize and refine the role of development actors in a peace building process.

Gender Equality

UNDAF recognized that addressing woman's rights is to contribute sustainably to the development challenges of Afghanistan. Women continue as the most marginalized segment of the Afghan population despite over 3 million girls in Afghanistan attending primary and secondary education and women constituting 28 per cent of Members of the National Parliament. Because of varied interpretation of formal law, religious sanctions and customary rules, Afghanistan represents one of the most extreme cases of gender inequality in the world, and ranks 147 out of 148 countries on the 2012 Gender Inequality Index. To improve the status of women and enhance gender equality, women's rights, and quality of life, including the right to life, property, justice, protection, and political and economic participation UNDAF is a step in the right direction. UNDAF Steering Committee was to implement the 'Accounting for Gender Equality

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[8] In addition, UNAMA strategic review has emphasized on the need to revise the strategic approach for promoting peace building.

[9] The Security Council adopted resolution (S/RES/1325) on women and peace and security on 31 October 2000.

Scorecard' to assess what the UN contributes to gender mainstreaming and the promotion of gender equality.[10] However, this could not be established.

Human Rights

The donors committed US$15.2 billion at the Brussels Conference to the Afghan government, and this was an opportunity to specify concrete human rights benchmarks for that assistance, which they did not. In this context UN's Human Rights Based Programming Approach (HRBPA) becomes an important fulcrum for human rights in development and, relevance of UNDAF is reiterated. There is no human rights caveat for funding to Afghanistan, but the UN agencies' work as embedded in the UNDAF ensures human rights through HRBPA.

In September 2016, there was a surge in the return of refugees and migrants from Pakistan. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees launched an emergency appeal for Afghanistan to provide humanitarian assistance to an unprecedented number of returnees, along with hundreds of thousands of those newly displaced by the expanding conflict.

According to Human Rights Watch there are many contexts in which Human Rights is stressed in Afghanistan including armed conflicts, women equality, Arbitrary Detention, Torture, and Discriminatory Practices and freedom of expression,[11] UNDAF is relevant in terms of promoting Human Rights as a cross cutting issue and through specific results through Rule of Law and Governance. (Pillars IV and V)

Sustainable Development Goals

The relevance of UNDAF is also in the contextualising and assuring the achieving of the SDGs. Afghanistan's efforts towards the achievement of the Agenda 2030 will require dedicated partnerships between the government, civil society organizations and private sector actors, in close cooperation with the United Nations and international partners[12]. Afghanistan has divided the 17 SDGs into 8-socio-economic sectors. This is to facilitate planning and implementation process through the line ministries and agencies. Government agencies are working to align all the 'A-SDGs' targets and indicators with their development plans and policies.

Implementation of the 2030 agenda has several challenges where the UN plays a significant role. Need for funding, implementing partners, localisation of SDGs, data management, M&E all challenges can be factored in the Government-UN development strategic framework of the future.

To highlight the relevance of UNDAF it is important to have a development mapping of Afghanistan – who does what and where. This will bring out the comparative significance of the UN and support efficient management of development.

7.4.2 Effectiveness

The five highest level development priorities for Afghanistan in UNDAF are (i) economic growth, (ii) social services, (iii) inclusion, (iv) rule of law and (v) accountable governance. These have corresponding results as outcomes managed through the pillars. UNDAF through these pillars enhance local and national government capabilities with explicit attention to relevant technical assistance and policy development and services delivered in an integrated, multi-sectoral approach. UNDAF has allocated a total UNDAF budget (2015-19) of USD 867,617,428 to manage results through these five pillars and organised around 17 outputs and over 215 specific targets.

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[10] UNDAF Steering Committee was not in place

[11] https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/afghanistan

[12] Voluntary National Review at the High-Level Political Forum: SDGs' Progress Report Afghanistan, 2017

Determining 'effectiveness' of the UN's contribution to UNDAF outcomes is dependent on the availability of credible evidence especially through independent evaluations. There were a few evaluations carried out and most of them were agency specific and not as a direct support for UNDAF. (Table 7 and Annex 9)

However, the line-up of the UN Programme Management Team, UNDAF Pillars and the M&E Working Group could not come together and missed opportunities to set out a comprehensive M&E matrix after two years of programming that could monitor results. There were regular reviews of UNDAF through Mid-Year and Annual Reviews, but these were more ritualistic that provided the overview of the situation but were not subjected to rigorous and continuous monitoring. For instance, during the reviews, focusing only on a few key achievements meant that all targets were not tracked and reported. The need for detailed record keeping and effective and coordinative follow up could be strengthened.   A systematic monitoring of the progress would have ensured measurement of the progress and indicated the gaps. This is because of lack of updated data or undefined targets. These have impeded the UN's ability to measure progress towards outcomes in Afghanistan and build a credible UN story around that.

In sheer financial sense the UNDAF was geared to contribute maximum through Pillars IV, II and I respectively. However, 93 percent of the budget for Pillar IV was meant, as per the agreed donor condition, for the Law and Order Trust Fund and most of this amount was spent through the police payroll. Police salaries in direct sense do not contribute to development efforts in Afghanistan but considering the significance of law and order here this expenditure cannot be undervalued or excluded. The UN agencies, through the UNDAF mechanism, underwrote a high proportion of basic services like health and nutrition, education, and WASH for Afghanistan. The contributions for economic growth is also substantial with the focus on the legitimate sectors.

Financially, the big four among the agencies were UNDP, WFP, UNICEF and UNHCR and in terms of participation in pillars: IOM, UNESCO, UNODC, UNHCR, and UNOPS reported results that were across all the pillars.

Table 4: Distribution of UNDAF Budgets

Pillars / Outputs	Equitable Economic Development	Basic Services	Social Equity & Investment in Human Capital	Justice & Rule of Law	Accountable Governance	Total
Output 1	8,111,488	235,241,633	4,219,706	1,178,360	4,094,867	
Output 2	63,730,850	52,265,208	6,265,131	21,771,339	326,956	
Output 3	8,722,324	8,938,410	27,919,000		61,200	
Output 4	4,630,230			2,021,278		
Output 5	32,119,449					
TOTAL	117,314,341	296,445,250	38,403,837	24,970,977	4,483,023	481,617,428
	24%	62%	8%	5%	1%	
				386,000,000		
				LOTFA Payroll		
TOTAL with Payroll	117,314,341	296,445,250	38,403,837	410,970,977	4,483,023	867,617,428
	14%	34%	4%	47%	1%	

Source: RCO

The budget distribution indicates the significance of UN role in supporting the basic services.

Table 5: Highest Expenditure in 2017[13]

Output	Amount	Percentage
2.1 Health, Nutrition, and WASH	235,241,633	49
1.2 Access to agricultural & livestock production and productivity, licit economic opportunities	63,730,850	13
1.5 Connectivity among economic actors, road access, private sector development	32,119,449	7
2.2 Education	52,265,208	5
3.3 Engagement of women, youth, minorities and vulnerable	27,919,000	6
4.2 Justice and rule of law services	21,771,339	5
Subtotal	433,047,479	85
Total all 5 Pillar AWPs	481,617,428	

Source: RCO

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[13] Without LOTFA

In basic services the maximum amount was for utilisation towards health, nutrition and WASH related services and systems.

Figure 3: Breakdown of Activity Categories (Joint AWP, 2017)

Source: RCO

Figure 3 clearly indicates that most allocations in 2017 were for provision of goods and services.

In summary, it can be said that the UN assistance has provided maximum budget for goods and service followed by capacity development and then creating enabling environment for development. This could be used as one indicator for how the development assistance is strategized in future.

The earlier reviews have identified that the UN agencies have come together in several results areas to make the UN assistance effective. Polio eradication efforts jointly managed by WHO and UNICEF in collaboration with MoPH is sterling cooperation for effective results. Noteworthy progress has been made towards polio eradication with just 9 cases of wild polio virus reported so far, this year compared with 13 in 2016 and 20 in 2015. Maintaining programme neutrality allows implementation of polio eradication activities and has been the cornerstone for reaching children with the vaccine in all parts of the country. Afghanistan continues to be one of the three countries with Polio cases, where the threats are enhanced by the mobile population that moves within the country in search of basic survival as well seeking economic opportunities. This is further aggravated by the returning population from Pakistan, which, too continues to be a Polio prevalent country. The UN has been working closely with the Government to ensure sufficient resource mobilization to effectively implement and monitor the quality of polio eradication activities in Afghanistan.

UN can be more effective by greater reliance on joint result focused programming. In 2002, the Secretary-General's Agenda for Further Change called for more joint programmes and pooling of resources at country level. There are several potential programmes that would yield results in the longer terms if developed and

implemented with concerted results focus. Some of the programmes, plans, strategies that are evolving in Afghanistan are:

- In September 2017 Afghanistan committed to join the 59 'Scaling Up Nutrition' (SUN) Countries and 3 Indian States that form the SUN Movement to increase the effectiveness of food and nutrition programming supported by WFP, UNICEF, WHO, and FAO
- The six agencies christened H6+, WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, WB, UNAIDS, UN Women focus on to achieve results for reproductive, maternal, new-born, child, and adolescent health (RMNCAH)
- SALAM (Support Afghans Livelihoods and Mobility) – Movement is a collaborative UNDP, ILO and UNHCR programme implemented with the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD). The programme supports the national policy and institutional frameworks for labour market.
- UNFPA has taken a lead in collaboration with UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO and UNDP) for developing a joint programme for youth, rationalised on the significant youth population in Afghanistan as well as ready political will to focus on results for youth.
- Safe Markets programme, led by UN Women, is a pilot initiative for improving the conditions that enable women to participate in the labour market by improving the physical environment and promoting positive social perceptions and attitudes towards women's role in the economic sphere, including creating a safer space.
- The Disaster Risk Reduction related activities managed by WFP, UNEP, FAO are important considering Afghanistan is prone to earthquakes, floods, droughts, landslides, sandstorms, and avalanches.
- Alternative community focused rural development programmes is for elimination or prevention of the production of opium. This is done by encompassing a broader conception of rural development aimed at improving the overall quality of life of the target population. This is through addressing not only income but also education, health, infrastructure, and social services. The programme partners UNODC and UNDP.

In addition to the mentioned joint programming approaches and structures, the earlier reviews of UNDAF have found that there are opportunities for collaboration for reintegration, gender issues like justice for women and gender based violence and, anti-corruption.

UNDAF has managed to introduce a 'culture' of considering joint programmes/programming but review of such initiatives shows that the options must be milled more to be effective. Joint programmes can make results effective and if organized efficient as well, but there is immense amount of strategic planning required for this.

The mechanisms for joint resource mobilization, developing standard formats for planning and reporting, distilling lessons learned, and maintaining a database of joint programmes are still not realized. Joint programmes or more appropriately joint programming have contributed to the UNDAF results-framework, but it is not possible to say if this approach is the most effective way to deliver results in absence of comprehensive reviews and evaluations of joint programme.

7.4.3 Efficiency

The issue concerning efficiency was taken up through developing joint programmes or at least, to begin with, adopting joint programming approach. The focus on joint programming attempted to reduce overlap, duplication, and transaction costs to ensure accountability. The establishment of the Outcome Working Groups (Pillars), with a chair and a co-chair, for monitoring interventions, supported through UNDAF aimed at increasing efficient management of UN programmes with strengthened coherence and focus on results. UNDAF, together with the contributing agency annual work plans and planned reviews, engages with the development stakeholders (predominantly GoIRA). UNDAF provides an opportunity to the government and the people to seize the ownership of their development by strengthening national institutions, utilization of service delivery support, setting the normative agenda, among many other facets of development. The

efforts towards developing joint programmes needs utilising comparative advantages of different partners rather than merely mustering collective participation.

The absence of systematic approaches concerning how to utilise results and lessons emerging from pilot interventions reduces the potential cost-effectiveness of its investments. Despite some efforts for the development of valuable joint programmes, these were often not accompanied by corresponding efficiency improvements, but rather led to additional efforts in planning and coordination, with few gains noticed by government partners. It may be early to comment on value for money aspect of UNDAF and it will require time before the joint programmes have been implemented and there is adequate data collected in this regard. It is true that in the development landscape like Afghanistan implementing activities are costlier than in a more stable country as security augments the cost of implementation manifold. The question of efficiency here while important will have to content with the priority accorded to reaching government results.

The UNDAF MTR identified limited value-for-money and efficiency gains and there is opportunity for additional efficiency gains through future harmonisation especially in procurement and operations. UN and its key stakeholders invested considerable time and resources in planning and reporting, however, there is less focus on analysing the results of UN investments and managing for results. UNDAF remained in the programming domain and operational involvement was at the agency levels – each agency managing the programme in their given operational space and systems. The new way of working suggests multi stakeholders and systemic approach, which must be considered in the new UNDAF process.

While UNDAF featured in UNCT and Programme Management Team meetings it was never on the agenda for the Operational Management Team. This is indicative of a lost opportunity for efficiency and lessons learned from each other. Participation for procurements, human resource management, and fiscal management for developing standards was not obvious. The accountability, for operational aspects of UNDAF, was to the agency HQ and not to the country level UN. The ministry of finance expected greater accountability for making the UN participation efficient for Afghanistan. This expectation was primarily in the areas under the purview of operational management, viz., budgets, human resources, and administrative integration. UNDAF was not on the agenda of the OMT ever, which met to plan and resolve routine operational issues concerning the UN team in Afghanistan. OMT, by increasing the cooperation in operations, can contribute to reduce the transaction costs by effective planning and developing standards. This will also answer the expectations of ensuring value for money, which is an ongoing concern of the GoIRA.

No major concerns for funding, other than from UNFPA, were raised by any of the pillars, and agencies and programmes reported adequate financial health.[14] However, the anxieties related more to mustering funds for the future programming. It is anticipated that while Afghanistan has the support of the donor community so far, but future scenario may be more constrained because of changing donor environment and humanitarian needs. The agencies also found peace not taking roots in Afghanistan and a large part of the country continued to be under instable and ineffective control of the government. This will strain the resources for development unless informed by a comprehensive theory of change and a development approach through a peace building and stabilization framework.

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[14] UNFPA annual budget for Afghanistan was cut in half largely due to defunding by the US government.

Figure 4: Integrating Political, Development and Humanitarian Assistance

Ensuring synergy between the humanitarian and development systems of the UN will make the UN support more efficient. DSRSG/RC/HC is the leadership link among the three types of UN support to Afghanistan, this is an opportunity to converge the three dimensions of the assistance under his leadership. The stabilization framework is a way to reinforce complementarity of those three mains type of action/interventions.

7.4.4 Sustainability

In the context of an assertive political will for a paradigm shift in the UN operations in Afghanistan, and that the UN should have a clear exit policy, the issues pertaining to sustainability acquired increased significance. There are several examples of outputs and results in place at the mid-term of Afghanistan UNDAF 2015-19, including efforts to support government engagements through proposed systems strengthening as well as efforts to developing capacities. UNHCR suggested to mention of durable solutions for refugees/IDPs. Finding sustainable solutions to forced displacement constitute a key aspect of any peace process and stability which are preconditions for any result on development objectives.

Pillar 1:
- supporting job oriented policies
- capacity development of Ministry of Public Works
- specifically targeting farmers capacity development
- transparent management of natural resources and access to energy
- disaster risk management and climate change and early warning
- illicit economy
- women business models
- skills assessment and certifications
- land assessment and management also at times including housing and other property

Pillar 2
- quality and effective health care (SEHAT/SEHATMANDI) including infant and young child feeding
- improving government and CSO capacity in provision of health services and addressing vulnerability
- align off-budget support with SEHAT and gradual integration in BPHS and EPHS
- strengthening sub national administrative and delivery systems

Pillar 3
- Gender sensitive policies in 15 ministries
- Data collection and monitoring for National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA)
- Implementing (national/international) commitments for women, youth, minorities, and vulnerable populations with improved monitoring and reporting
- Capacity of Project Implementation Unit of National Rural Action Plan (NRAP) and MoPW

Pillar 4
- Policy capacity at the provincial level for police, prosecution, and courts for land and family protection
- Enhanced capacity of enforcement bodies of Ministry of Interior (MoI), Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and Attorney General's Office (AGO) in 16 provinces
- Police response to Gender Based Violence (GBV)
- Assessment of Public Fiscal Management (PFM) by Ministry of Finance in MoI and MoJ

Pillar 5
- Inclusive governance capacity at national and sub-national levels
- Enhanced capacity for Human Rights management and government accountability
- Corruption and economic crimes
- Human Resource MIS for Capacity Building for Results

While capacity building was central to UNDAF programmes, the absence of a collective understanding and systematic approach to capacity building leads many stakeholders to question whether a clearer exit strategy in some programmes needs to be identified with the government and CSOs.

The two and half year of UNDADF is not adequate to definitively analyse sustainability. Sustainability will incorporate (i) a measurable contribution to the national development and (ii) and the added value of UNDAF for collaboration among individual UN agencies. The MTR focused on the capacity building and system strengthening results of MTR and identified the indicative opportunities for sustainability.

Joint programming, as given in the 'efficiency' section, has also build complementarities, collaboration and/ or synergies fostered by UNDAF contributed to greater sustainability of results of Country Programmes and projects of individual UN agencies. What percentage of the UNDAF intervention are likely to continue when UN support is withdrawn is an issue where the government and the respective agencies must dwell on to move forward with exit plans as exit and sustainability and enabling environment (including peace) are bound together.

Scaling up has been a challenge. An overt example of scaling has been seen in the nutrition programme. At the time of MTR, the government had committed itself to the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement

culminating in the policy framework: Afghanistan Food Security and Nutrition Agenda (AFSANA). Considering the national ownership, its sustainability has a high probability.[15]

For development programmes, which are inherently slow-building, focus on return of investment is imprudent expectation in the short and medium terms. Sustainability for development assistance in Afghanistan must be part of the strategic thinking, in the words of George Lakoff as 'what counts as a good or bad outcome of our actions.'[16] For Lakoff "Reframing is social change." Some of these frames that were considered in this review were:

The Resources Frame

Afghanistan has received significant support for development from the international community since the Bonn Conference in 2001. The resources available for development in Afghanistan were a priority for the donors and the UN and still continue to be, however, there is likely to be changes in how Afghanistan's development needs are met in future especially once the Brussels' commitment is reviewed in 2020. The competing priorities are getting obvious and there is anxiety that donors' will and ability both will diminish in near future. Simultaneously, Afghanistan's domestic economy isn't robust enough to take over the developmental responsibilities. The resource gap between requirement and availability is huge and because the international community will not want a relapse of Afghanistan in an insecure, underdeveloped, and hostile vortex it will continue to support the country but with specific qualifiers. This will stretch the sustainability facets of development assistance.

The Time Frame

For sustainability question the two obvious issues are medium or transitional term and a longer-term time frames. In the short term, the current UNDAF, if not extended will complete its term in 2019 and with extension it will coincide with ANPDF. The ANPDF is until 2021. Therefore, the short or medium time frame for development strategy is next 3-4 years. However, the perspective as per the ANPDF itself is a generation at least, which is roughly 30 years. Therefore, the results must be attained accordingly. The governmental demand for exit must be supported by its ability to take care of the supply side of sustainability.

The Value Frame

Afghanistan adopted the MDGs in 2004, five years after the Millennium Declaration. 'Enhance Security' was adopted as the 9th goal with six targets. Additionally, certain targets and indicators had to be customised to the realities in Afghanistan. The country has until 2020 to have a final report on MDGs, in that sense this is a period of transition for MDGs to be concluded and the SDGs to fully come into play. With the incremental implementation of SDGs, the value frame can be reinforced. In SDGs, the UN and the GoIRA share common developmental goals. There is a need to generate policy-relevant data intended to support the maximum achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in value-chain-led economic growth. There are linkages between value chains dynamics and SDGs, which will need to be explored.

The Design Frame

There were many questions on the design of the UNDAF per se. The enquiries on UNDAF were both from among the UN agencies but more so from the government. While the government had issues with the UNDAF in its totality; the in-house agencies' feedback was more on the structure and management of UNDAF especially the pillar based coordination apathy. The agencies do not have people dedicated to performing pillar work and the pillar management/participation becomes an additional responsibility. The

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[15] Afghanistan officially launched SUN on 16 October 2017

[16] Lakoff, George: *Don't Think of an Elephant: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate*

lack of time combined with limited attention from the participants makes it very challenging to plan and act strategically.

Pillar II (Basic Services) particularly considered itself to be too expansive and pillar V (Accountable Governance) requires greater government ownership. The pillar III (Human Capital) was challenged by a plethora of cultural, social norms and social behaviour constraints. The MTR reviewed the design of UNDAF and has extended solutions, which are principally in the realm of coherence. Inclusion, of course must be part of all the pillars.

7.4.5 Coherence

UNDAF coherence is maintained through the UNCT, which is primarily responsible for the coordination of UN development assistance to Afghanistan. The UN, with its funds and programmes, including the 'mission' (UNAMA) and OCHA, has played a multi-faceted role in Afghanistan with the RCO taking on some broader coordination efforts recognised by the ministries and departments of the GoIRA. UN with its comparative advantage has managed to balance service delivery, policy support and technical assistance to the government. However, majority of the results have been noted in service delivery and because of the security even the NGOs have constrained outreach.

Figure 5: UNDAF Coherence Perspective

The issue of coherence incorporates that results related to political processes, humanitarian assistance and development support provided by the UN in Afghanistan should be coordinated in a way to get optimum synergy. This should be the principle used when designing the collaborative and mutually accountable framework for development UN-GoIRA (Figure 5).

The UN has made some modest progress in harmonizing its work through joint programmes and efforts will continue in this regard. It has developed several internal coordination structures, although some of these are not seen to be functioning as well as they should be, and require adjustment to ensure relevance and coherence with national coordination structures. The UNDAF has seen mixed results in terms of generating increased support for its joint programmes over the two years. Weak communication on coherence through joint UNDAF results has been cited as a contributory factor in this regard, and it is noted that government partners need to be equal participants in communication of UNDAF results to mobilize resources in a crowded donor, constrained security, and fluid political environment.

The MTR found that there are great opportunities for coherence not only among the UN agencies but also across the thematic areas. The (programme and funds) UN agencies have functional relations with the line ministries but that is more specialised, with programmatic focus rather than as strategic UN focus. The UN (specialised agency) association with the line ministries is more in the project mode and is rather one to one basis (agency: line ministry) not for comprehensive UNDAF results. The UN to be more meaningful for Afghanistan will have to have a more cohesive approach. The coherence will have to be among the political, developmental, and humanitarian streams to be part of one discourse and, structurally, government with UN and the donors as one strategic unit to the extent feasible. This will require considerations at the strategy, programme, and project levels. Specific measurement indicators must be developed. The stabilization framework could be one model to reinforce coherence of action.

Figure 6: Improving Coherence

There is no conceptual coherence between the UNDAF and ANPDF. ANPDF is pitched at a very high level so is UNDAF. Coherence is needed at the level of deliverables and results through complementarity, capacity building and normative frameworks.

On the review of the institutional and systemic coherence it was observed that all the elements of the UNDAF come together in the UN Country team that takes stock of UNDAF from time to time. The technical support and solutions are sought through the Programme Management Team (PMT) and for review M&E Working Group ought to take the leadership. However, it appears that these ideal links are need based and opportunistic. Annual and mid-year reviews were conducted but these were not followed through and there was inadequate regular monitoring of UNDAF's expected results. There were 7 evaluations carried out during this UNDAF. Two evaluations covered the country programmes of UNHABITAT and UNODC and others were for specific agency programmes. UNICEF carried out 3 evaluations and WFP and WHO one each.

Table 6: Evaluations

#	Evaluations	Agency
1	Country Programme, 2012-2016	UN-Habitat
2	Evaluation of Child Centred Disaster Risk Reduction (CD-DRR)	UNICEF
3	Evaluation of Child Protection Action Network	UNICEF
4	Programme on Adolescents: Impact Evaluation Baseline	UNICEF
5	Country Programme Evaluation	UNODC
6	Operational Evaluation (OpEv)	WFP
7	Joint External Evaluation of International Health Regulations (IHR-2005)	WHO

To gather results for the specific agency or programme, these evaluations had their utility but there were no special efforts made or planned for evidence generation for UNDAF.

The interface with the government too needed closer ties for the UNDAF as a strategic convergence and not merely at a programmatic collaboration among the agencies and respective line ministries. There were several unutilised openings for results based management and monitoring, knowledge management besides advocacy and communications. Each of these areas will require specific considerations per se as well to support UN's strategic development assistance to Afghanistan.

8. CONSTRAINTS AND CHALLENGES

There were several constraints (limiting the results by delaying) and challenges (that were potential risks) that influenced effective implementation of UNDAF. There were some general constraints that make overall UNDAF management challenging and there were others that were specific to an output or to a target. The recurring challenges have been bunched here for ease of presentation.

i. **Results Based Management (RBM)** [17]: The ideal approach to UNDAF implementation is to focus on result-based management and the extent to which results were indeed conceived and managed in an integrated manner, and not agencies focusing only on their own accountabilities. Projects must be seen in this perspective, i.e., as a repository of results. The outcomes and programmes and outputs and projects helped facilitate the process towards reaching results.

Some of the recurring constraints in achieving results through the prevailing project management approach, were:

      o   definitional clarity of the goals/objectives

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[17] The agencies contributing to UNDAF focused on project management approach as seen from their responses instead of RBM

- o precision in delineation of the scope
- o availability of skills for managing the results
- o clarity of accountability of the stakeholders
- o absence of contingency plans
- o shifting deadlines causing delays and
- o stakeholder engagements with results

All these were recognised as constraints in UNDAF implementations by the pillar members/agencies. Sometimes these were nothing more than what could be termed as 'collaborative confusion'. Partners either were not on the same page of comprehension or did not own the 'project'. The constraints, if not addressed, were likely to turn into challenges for reaching the planned results and therefore a risk to UN contributions to Afghanistan.

ii.   **Security:** Much has been said about security in this report as being possibly the main challenge of development support to Afghanistan along with the constraints of governance. Varying estimates suggest that between 40 to almost 50 percent of country's area is not fully under the control of the government – national or provincial. However, areas that are peaceful have their insecure moments, too. In either situation security is the prime concern for development in Afghanistan. The uncertain security at the minimal makes results management inefficient, by time and cost over runs, but can also totally derail achievement of the results. Security situation has several fall outs: access (for both the duty bearers and the rights holders), escalated cost of managing results and time overruns. The uncertain security is compounded by difficult terrain together with remoteness and dispersed population in Afghanistan.

iii.   **Human Resources and Capacity issues:** There are several aspects of human resource management, which constrained UNDAF implementation. This ranged from organisational development and work processes, availability and utilisation of skills, and issues related to placements as transfers and vacant posts are hinderance to achieve the planned results. It was found that the government staff either had inadequate capacity or the skilled personnel were transferred often for them to be able to contribute significantly. UN also was unable to obtain, and place staff as required especially in field offices and the outposts.

iv.   **Culture and Social Norms:** The biggest cultural challenge affecting development in Afghanistan has to do with women participation because of the assigned role for women, which confines them to homes and domestic duties. Social norms are part of the way in which gendered power inequalities are maintained. Education of girls has improved but there are social norms making attendance and achievement challenging. Early marriages also impede individual development. Gender based violence is prevalent and accepted as normative. Sometimes immunisation is neglected because women can't travel alone. Nutrition and food in the family too has cultural prescriptions and proscriptions. Maternal mortality continues to be a challenge and the underlying causes of maternal deaths include poor antenatal care, low skilled attendance at birth, early child bearing, high fertility rate, low contraceptive prevalence rate, narrow gap between consecutive pregnancies and all these have roots in behavioural issues deeply entrenched in cultural norms. Social norms are not only connected with gender issues but also marginalises minority groups.

v.   **Land acquisition:** There are several projects requiring land, which is not easy to acquire. Afghanistan has a complex and unsettled land ownership and land management situation. Land rights are perceived to be highly insecure and disputes are widespread owing to perennial conflicts, population displacement, changes in national political and economic environment, and variable climatic conditions (including drought). In such a scenario even, limited acquisition takes time with government validations.

vi.   **Data availability, analyses, and use:** Last Census was conducted in 1979 and current population estimates are based on the 1979 baseline population. Since 2011, Socio-Demographic and Economic Survey (SDES), a rolling census, has been conducted and has so far covered 12 provinces. Demographic and Health survey (DHS) was last reported in 2015. Collecting any primary data in Afghanistan is a challenge because of remoteness, rugged terrain and persisting security issues. This has resulted in a lack of reliable, current, and disaggregated population data at provincial and district levels. The lack of disaggregation makes understanding and using women and diversity data complex and planning less effective. A major constraint of planning is that it is agency specific – each agency is on its own and there is no joint planning other than development of UNDAF, and there also it is collection of plans and not collective planning. Coordination at multiple levels as well as monitoring with weak reporting, and taking corrective actions are additional constraints. The question is not limited to contextual 'lack of data', but also a weak evidence culture in the UN here. This makes results based management challenging.

9. LESSONS LEARNED

The general perception among the stakeholders seems to be that UNDAF is peripheral when this must be the core of the UN developmental support to Afghanistan. UNDAF provides UN agencies to share their programmes and record them in this repository but it does not empower them to work in a cohesive manner. Once the UNDAF was developed agencies went about implementing as agencies and not as one programme laid out in the UNDAF.

There is a need for effective coordination with an increased harmonized approach. This perception was verified by the lack of participation in pillar meetings, limited contributions to strategic planning and inadequate focus on M&E. UNDAF accountability is an issue. The respective agency programmes even when they contribute to or stem from UNDAF tend to take precedence. Meetings have low participation sending signals that interagency engagement is a need based cursory compulsion that could be avoided for other agency specific priorities. Vertical collaboration is the norm and horizontal collaboration remains an ad hoc exception. A feasible way forward could be a thematic focus rather than pillar wise management as this is where the agencies can have greater buy in. PMT also did not approach the programmes as part of the pillars, a greater involvement of UNCT could have supported the UNDAF in general, and the pillars specifically. However, UNCT has a full agenda and can only provide important level leadership and oversight functions. This may allude to One UN approach, which requires greater analysis and consensus towards stabilization and peace building solution. The Government is keen for a One UN approach and the work towards this has already begun.

The structure for managing the UNDAF has a weak relational connect. The whole picture presented here comprises pieces that do not have strong oversight, evidence generation, reporting integration among them. To make UNDAF effective these pieces will have to be integrated for synergy. For instance, development of UNDAF is a derivative of national development priorities but to what extent this alignment is operationalised in the management context hangs loose. There could be a direct line of oversight, from UNCT to the UNDAF pillars and a reporting mechanism going upwards from the pillars to the UNCT (as UNDAF) and then informing the government as relevant but this also is unplanned. The ownership of UNDAF is hazy and more at a conceptual level, government is indifferent and UN agencies utilise the framework reluctantly and to check the boxes. Focus is more on their respective agency programmes except in some case where there have been genuine efforts for joint programming.

The critical lessons learned in these, over two years of UNDAF implementation, point to need for greater stakeholder involvement. UNDAF had not carried out a stakeholder analysis or even a comprehensive theory of change.

    i.   Demand-supply coherence – before starting a project the demand for that project should be assessed in the context of clear results management.
    ii.   Collaborative planning with government and civil society – UNDAF results should be planned closely with the government and the relevant departments, and CSOs
    iii.   Results feasibility/target fixation – the results should be feasible, and targets fixed after factoring in assumptions and risks
    iv.   Regular monitoring – M&E needs strengthening, and current system requires revamping. An incremental approach with realistic expectations needs to be in place so results can be successful against contextual constraints
    v.   Stakeholder analysis and inclusion – there are many collaborative and competitive stakeholders and investors in development and more effort is required in inclusion and collaboration
    vi.   Service integration and joint programming – despite the prohibitive cost of programming here efficiency gains can be made through service integration and joint programming

10.   CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARDS

Some of the recurring themes that emerged during the MTR were whether the Pillar structure of UNDAF is suitable for managing for results, whether the UNDAF was aligned with the national priorities and whether UNDAF is the true representation of UN coherence in Afghanistan? These themes were followed through all the review consultations and the observations were recorded.

The success of UNDAF will be in incremental national ownership and capacity to achieve planned results for basic services. The UN story is what the UN is doing overall and not what the pillars do, or work that the agencies accomplish. UNDAF must be recognised as greater than the sum of the pillar results to become a meaningful framework for Afghanistan. UNDAF alone cannot be successful in fragile country like Afghanistan without the complementarity of political and humanitarian engagement. UNDAF should be anchored within an overarching vision and theory of change. Stabilization and resilience framework should be used to reinforce complementarity of actions towards a common objective of peace, stability, and promotion of Human rights. How the comprehensive UN work can be reviewed, measured, and communicated? Can the UN consider 'flagships or headline results' to be reported in agreement with the government? How to increase more buy-in from the government and people? Progress can be made through reinforcing inclusion and bottom up approach. Top down and bottom up approach should be a complementary two-way model to progressively generate results and transformation.

10.1 UNDAF Assumptions and Risks

Table 7 below presents the risks and assumption identified at the time of designing the UNDAF. The MTR tried to state the consequences that will facilitate mitigation.

Table 7: Risks, Assumptions and Consequences

UNDAF Assumptions	Risks	Consequence
Operational space for development activities will remain sufficiently open	Unstable security increased conflict	Access, logistics, coordination restricted leading to issues related to efficiency

Government policies and priorities continue to provide a supportive framework for the UNDAF	Political fluidity/government outreach	Demand not supply, value for money – contributing to constraints of effectiveness
Sufficient financial resources available to implement the UNDAF	Global economic contexts	Moderate risk but with the modifications and extension need for more finances that will help effectiveness and sustainability
Appropriate and relevant expertise can be deployed in time	Capacity gaps and responsive public administration	Capacity gaps if filled will help sustainability

Considering the assumptions made at the time of the designing the UNDAF it appears much of it continues as risks to the UN assistance and there is continuous need for addressing these assumptions. Development programs have been narrowed down over the past two and half years to more accessible areas, mostly urban, because of lack of contact with rural, out of reach, and contested areas. In these changed contexts there is a need to review the benchmarks for engaging in development activities. Early recovery activities could although still be implemented more easily in the difficult to reach areas.

10.2 Pillar Structure

The five outcomes of UNDAF have been managed by a corresponding Pillar structures. At the time of the review the chairs for the pillars were respectively UNHABITAT (Pillar I), UNICEF (Pillar II), UNWOMEN (Pillar III), UNDP with UNAMA (Pillar IV) and UNDP (Pillar V).

Table 8: Agency Wise Programme Participation in the Pillars

UN agency	Equitable Economic Development	Basic Social Services	Social Equity and Investment in Human Capital	Justice and Rule of Law	Accountable Governance	Participation in # of Pillars
1. IOM						5
2. UNESCO						5
3. UNODC						5
4. UNOPS						5
5. UNMAS				(red)		4
6. UNHCR	(red)					4
7. UNFPA	(red)					4
8. UN Habitat				(red)		4
9. UNDP		(red)	(red)			3

10. WFP	green	green	green	red	red	3
11. UNICEF	red	green	green	green	red	3
12. ILO	green	red	red	green	red	2
13. UN Women	red	red	red	green	green	2
14. UNAMA	red	red	red	green	green	2
15. WHO	red	green	green	red	red	2
16. FAO	green	red	red	red	red	1
17. UNCTAD	green	red	red	red	red	1
18. UNIDO	green	red	red	red	red	1
Total	12	11	12	11	11	

Each pillar had participation ranging from 11 to 12 agencies. It is apparent from Table 8 above that there were four agencies that had wide-spread approach, i.e., participating in all the five pillars, and there were three that contributed to four pillars; whereas most others had 'focused' or limited participation in UNDAF pillars. There were four agencies that have a single pillar participation. There was an opportunity to assign secretarial functions to those who had participation in more pillars but did not chair them. Also, the first three Pillars had relatively greater agency participation. This is an unexplored aspect of agency participation and the development of the next strategic assistance framework the issue of focus must be discussed. For example, UNIDO and FAO could come together to formulate results based on agriculture based industries.

It is true that the agencies based on their mandates and the available budgets were contributing to the UNDAF pillars but when it came to participation in the pillar management there was an obvious apathy. Meetings were infrequent and participation rate was dismal. All pillar heads believed meetings were organised when needed and attendance was low. Coordination was reactive rather than strategic. The meetings were more to respond to queries and reporting rather than for planning and monitoring. This indicated either a need to strengthen the results based management through the pillars but better still to reorganise the UNDAF management that will be more cohesive and effective.

10.3 Alignment with national priorities

The issue of alignment with the national priorities has many facets extending from the development vision to strategic synergy to programmatic comparisons and of course the timeline to name a few. This is a comprehensive exercise and the UN agencies under the leadership of the Resident Coordinator have begun this in earnest as the MTR progressed. This will require close engagement with the government partners over a period of intensive planning.

The issue of alignment also translates into the future strategic framework being an unfussy document drawing upon national priorities, the overall National Peace and Development Framework of the government and any sectoral development plans.

To ensure a system-wide response to national priorities, there is an opportunity to revise the UNDAF in consultation with the government who must then endorse it. Agencies should increasingly consider joint programs as a preferred delivery option. Such an approach could significantly reduce parallel program implementation mechanisms to strengthen national capacities and reduce transaction costs.

Aligning the timeline of the UNDAF with that of the national development plans (ANPDF 2021) and the commitments of the international community such as the Brussels and Warsaw conferences (2020) will bring about greater coherence. The UNCT has agreed to make use of the opportunity to extend the UNDAF

for one year to end by 2020. It could also help ensure better synergy between development and humanitarian activities in Afghanistan as the next step.

10.4 Humanitarian-Development continuum

The UNDAF results generally are oriented to address developmental issues of the marginalised, vulnerable, and difficult to reach. Pillar III (Social Equity and Human Capital specifically) has two outputs focused on strengthening systems and capacity development of women, youth, minorities et al. Most results of Pillar II (Basic Services) are aimed at women and children. This positioning of UNDAF makes it amenable to amalgamate with humanitarian and lifesaving results. Working closely with humanitarian assistance and cognizant of the HRP will enable the UN Country Team to reach the most vulnerable in efforts to leave no one behind. This development-humanitarian continuum will serve the collective effort for sustainable development, economic growth, and resilience. There is a need to increase investments in prevention through synergies in humanitarian and development actions.

Indicators in UNDAF or at least the updated version of the Government UN collaborative framework should also include indicators that are lifesaving and humanitarian. There is limited dialogue between the two dimensions of the UN contributions at the donor, institutional and country project level, as well as between these levels themselves. No efforts to break down programmatic silos were noticed.

In consultations with OCHA and the Pillars it appeared that there was an opportunity for effective integration. This is possible if the mutual understanding between the two sectors regarding their distinct identities, values and comparative advantages are seamed out through constant communication under the leadership of RC/HC.

Table 9: Budgets, Expenditures and Targets (as on 30 July 2017)

Pillar	Budget	Expenditure 2016	Expenditure 2017	Targets (numbers)
Pillar I	117,314,341	66,201,058	53,085,392	24
Pillar II	296,445,250	226,499,031	132,750,415	56
Pillar III	38,403,837	206,306,498	6,455,326	34
Pillar IV	410,970,977	7,004,000	4,689,952	84
Pillar V	4,483,023	43,689,400	1,755,497	17
Total	867,617,428	549,699,987	198,736,582	215

10.5 Funding and Financing

The MTR also identified that government had concerns on how the UN spends its money. What would be the ideal modality of routing funds? This also raises issues about financing the development results in Afghanistan.

There is no UN government coordination forum for knowledge exchange regarding the fund flow. As per the government UN *per se* is not accountable because specific agencies are managing and implementing; therefore, the responsibility is also of the agency. In this scenario, the government feels, there is inadequate

transparency as no single format for reporting and tracking transactions exits. While there is awareness about need for alignment with the ANPDF and the NPP there are no utilization of opportunities for budget alignments. Two options discussed by the government (Aid Effectiveness) appear to be either fund flow through the government or developing a system of reporting through the budget. There is a need to discuss the financial issues with the Auditor General along with the capacity development of the government staff dealing with budgets. UN is not part of the Development Assistance Database (DAD) of the Ministry of Finance but it may be possible to consider this as part of the budget alignment discussions. Collaborative financial planning needs strengthening; planning is not process-owned but merely value informed. Agencies communicate their budgets, once prepared, to their respective line ministries. UNDAF budget is also presented to the government rather than planned with the government and this is, to the government, not transparent especially since government is even less aware of the expenditures. The integrative budgeting will have greater national ownership. UN concerns, as of most donors, has been the financial risks and deep-rooted corruption. A probable solution, to begin with, can be working with 'off budget' mechanism. This maybe time consuming in the initial stages but will move towards alignment.

UNDAF financing strategy must ensure that UN activities are appropriately costed and resourced as per the UNDAF guidance. This will help incentivize inter-agency collaboration. This is required so that the UN resources can catalyse larger financial flows to implement the 2030 Agenda. This strategy begins with the UNCT mapping the broad financial landscape of the country, including international and domestic: private, and public sources of finance, to enable the UNCT to assess its financing comparative advantages, and to identify where the UNDAF could play a strategic role to leverage broader financial flows towards supporting the SDGs.

UNCT has not conducted a mapping of overall financing flows as described above as part of the support to the national government in delivering the SDGs. There are plans to do so during the development of the next UNDAF. It would be very useful to get a mapping of development programme/project to ease synergy with humanitarian actions. A kind of 3W for development actors. This will support the financial coherence among the diverse types of assistance to Afghanistan.

10.6 Delivering as One in Afghanistan

"Afghanistan recognises UN as a genuine development partner; it is our responsibility to work together better"
Mr. Tadamichi Yamamoto Secretary- General's Special Representative for Afghanistan,

Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR) 2017-2020 reaffirmed that for development, "no one size fits all" thereby encouraging the voluntary adoption of the "Delivering as one (DAO)" for the countries who would prefer such an approach. The President of Afghanistan is keen to move towards the DAO system through the one UN approach. Afghanistan was encouraged towards the DAO during the 2010 Kabul conference by the UN Secretary General.[18] This was reportedly reiterated by Mr. Antonio Guterres, UNSG, in June 2017 in a meeting with the President. To follow up with a comprehensive approach it is

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[18] UNSC Resolutions 2145 in 2014, 2210 in 2015, 2274 in 2016 and 2344 in 2017 all indicating adoption of 'Delivering as One' Approach – based on these resolutions the President HE Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, via letter dated 9 September 2017, requested the UN leadership in Afghanistan to jointly, with GoIRA, work towards this mechanism.

necessary to extract the lessons learned in the UNDAF implementation and by assessing the programmatic and operational functions that intended to enhance coherence, effectiveness, and efficiency.

Afghanistan is in a distinctive situation of catching up on the residual MGDs achievements and simultaneously transiting to focus on the 2030 agenda through the SDGs. This compounded development setting will require greater coherence among the UN agencies, including consolidating joint-programming and working together, if not immediately, as one. Besides an increasingly assertive Government, represented by the President, for enhanced UN coherence along with the rationalized downsizing of international presence, impacting the available resources means the UN in Afghanistan will have to enhance its coordination internally, and seek opportunities for delivering together. A closer-knit UN is only possible with closer cooperation with the government at ministerial and development council levels. This calls for joint strategic planning for the future with a defined assistance horizon and exit modalities.

UNDAF is the first step of cohesive strategic intent of the UN for Afghanistan, it has served its purpose of getting the UN agencies together to serve the development interest of Afghanistan at normative as well towards specific grounded results.

President Ghani at the GA session September 2017, asserted the need for One UN for Afghanistan and this is the only way he feels that 'the inherited model of the UN agencies as instruments of technical assistance and capacity building should be subjected to the market test, namely value for money and sustainability of results in comparison to government, private sector and non-governmental modes of delivery.' He further stated that 'Mutual accountability is a proven mechanism of consolidation and expansion of partnerships, and trust-building'. As per the Presidential advice to move forward by establishing a comprehensive government-UN transition committee to oversee the drafting a joint Government and UN framework to replace the UNDAF.[19]

We must unlock ourselves from the shackles of doing business as usual. It's time to heed the SG's calls for reform and innovative ways of working".

Toby Lanzer
DSRSG/RC/HC

Table 10: Status of Delivering as One in Afghanistan:

One Team	Status
One Leader	o SRSG is the primary interlocutor for UN in Afghanistan o Government must appoint a principle counterpart
One Fund	Not attainable – highly complex with greater transaction costs
One Budget	Feasible but has its complexities (e.g. Vietnam, Mozambique).
One Programme	Already demonstrating this; need to communicate better
One Accountability	For working out accountability mechanism o Needs consultations for reframing and re-naming the UNDAF for accountability and result orientation o Government accountability mechanism to be assessed and how the UN can dovetail into this with due recognition for the ANPDF and NPPs, Development Councils, etc.

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[19] Presidential letter of 9 September 2017

11. LIMITATIONS OF THE REPORT

The report is based on two sources of information: one from the review of available documents and two from consultations with specific professionals associated with the UNDAF in distinct categories. Most of the document available were routine review documents either for UNDAF or for the agencies. Besides the reviews for UNDAF, the considered documents were of programmes and frameworks and there was also some additional Afghanistan literature. (Annex 10). The review was also guided by the UNCT and PMT by their acceptance of the approach and endorsing the findings. Considering the time constraints of the UN staff, extensive group consultations could not be held as planned. Also, the government participation could only be selective and some key government officials were met including the Deputy Minister for Financial Policy. The report benefitted from meeting with the Special Advisors of the President. In the context of expectation and the time frame as well as the timing of the MTR, there was divided commitment between the review and the way forward. The review had to extract from whatever information was available. More specific progress review could have been done to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the UNDAF if there was an opportunity to collect more primary information on the implementation of UNDAF activities and results achieved.

12. RECOMMENDATIONS

Taking into consideration the emerging development situations in the country and lessons learnt for implementation by the MTR this report suggests the direction for future programming. The discussion throughout the report indicates the way forward, but this section focuses on the key issues the MTR identified for adjusting the UNDAF as well as developing future strategic development framework.

12.1 Architecture of UNDAF

The most significant debate at the time of the MTR was whether the content management of the UNDAF should be changed through adjustments or there should be a radical structural change. The internal feedback was that the Pillar system was not effective as it was not able to provide a cohesive management to UNDAF. The Pillars per se were unmanageable because of their compositions (especially Pillar I) or it did not have a specific counterpart (Pillar V) or there was lack of political will fettered by social norms (Pillar III) and limited human resources. The government perspective was presented in no uncertain terms that UNDAF was not an effective tool for Afghanistan and there was a need for a complete overhaul. With this came the issue of structural functioning of the UN system in Afghanistan. Debates of one UN and Delivering as One (DAO) was not only an MTR scrutiny but had been discussed for a while during annual and mid-year reviews, government too has been keen for One-UN approach.

> The A-UNDAF (**Afghanistan UN Development *Accountability* Framework**) - a suggested working title - should be more about accountability rather than mere one-sided assistance. Both the government and the UN should be accountable for the development results for the people of Afghanistan. To be accountable, the UN needs to invest in approaches and tools that enhance accountability – i.e. evidence generation for performance and contribution to results. This accountability will ensure effective use of the One UN.

If the UN is to be more relevant to countries like mine, it must Deliver as One UN.

HE Ashraf Ghani, President, Afghanistan

12.2   Reorganization of UNDAF Results

The MTR has observed that the pillar structure the way it is functioning now is not effective in managing results. It is limited with inadequate participation and it is not based on strategic initiative; mostly confined to reporting. Expenditure analysis has indicated that five thematic areas consuming most of the budget were agriculture, health, education, return, reintegration and migration and returnees, and rule of law. These should be the focus of the future strategic accountability for development. However, UN development support is not only about short-term service delivery and procurements but long-term capacity development and system strengthening. UN must continue the normative support. This could be implanted in the thematic areas. For this kind of proposed structural changed to the next version of UNDAF the UNCT should consider the following issues:

- o Cross cutting programmatic issues like urbanisation, climate change, gender, equity, human rights, peacebuilding, youth, among others, should be incorporated and managed
- o The thematic areas should not become sectoral silos; it is recommended that to avoid this there should be regular consultations on programme management and identified programme overlaps. Joint programming will assist in building bridges among agencies, themes, and programmes
- o There should not be over emphasis on supplies and procurements, which should be reduced over the years
- o Emphasis should be on policy advocacy, system development and strengthening, institution building based on a well-articulated Right Based Approach
- o This UNDAF theory of change should include a conflict sensitivity analysis and a 'Do No Harm' approach. There is a need to focus on strategic results concerning migration and refugees because it could be a significant destabilizing factor on the fragile peace and stability. It is also an opportunity when it comes to economic growth and resilience capacity.   Issues related to return of refugees such as Housing, Land and Property (HLP) and documentation should be central to reinforce the human right component of the peace building process.

Figure 7: Strategic Shift

- Comparison, and linking are the first steps of alignment, but this is not the end of the alignment process.
- There must be a clear roadmap for alignment, based on the theory of change, as it requires understanding of what is being aligned (programmes, projects, results, activities, time frames, budgets, organisational structures, capacity; to name a few).
- There must be an agreement on an alignment process as well as the results.
- Alignment is the beginning of the national ownership of development support.

Figure 7 is the summary of the way forward with the constraints that need to be avoided. It depicts how the resources are utilised, which indicate future consolidation as this suggests where UN is effective. There are cross-cutting areas that require specific considerations for fuller development. And, most importantly, while the thematic approach may serve greater development purpose it should be ensured that it does not become limiting in a silo like approach but should focus on sharing, collaboration, and coordination for synergy and efficiency.

12.3 Alignment of Results

The process of concerted alignment of the UNDAF results with the (national) ANPDF as well (international) SDGs has already begun in earnest as a parallel exercise this should not be restricted as a one -time activity but facilitated by the UN until the national ownership of the process is complete.

It must be a collaborative goal oriented exercise among the stakeholders. Some factors that should be considered are:

- o Raison d'être of the organisations and programmes (organization's mission, programs, resources, and needed support areas)
- o Culture of the organisations (government department and UN agencies have distinct cultures)
- o Identify what's working well and what needs to be adjusted – all aspects of the programmes being aligned may not be working well or have the same priority)
- o Alignment process also provides opportunities to Identify how adjustments should be made and determine the best approach
- o Develop a roadmap with a stated alignment path
- o The adjustments will be incorporated as strategies for the collaboration between the government and the UN culminating in the 'A-UNDAF'

12.4 Coherence

The next version of the UNDAF must be a holistic strategic accountability framework based on principle of coherence reflected in delivering as one UN with government partnership in the unified strategy and, not in a piecemeal agency-line ministry corporation as is the practice. The UNDAF results should be above and not confined to programmes managed by agencies.

For coherence, the UNCT should look at integration of humanitarian, development, and political aspects of the UN contributions in Afghanistan with the stabilisation framework. This must be done at the country as well as programme levels. There must be increased participation of humanitarian actors (OCHA) in the UNCT and the political aspects should have specific development content. While OCHA has infrequent presence in the UNCT and rarely makes a presentation of its results other than in times of emergencies UNAMA provides the political brief but with limited development perspective. UNDAF or its newer version must include relevant development and humanitarian indicators, which must be identifiable and measurable.

Operations have been largely left out of the UNDAF proceedings. It is not possible to incorporate coherence without synergy in the operational aspects of the management. OMT neither participated in the UNDAF meetings nor went beyond supporting respective agencies or special coordination needs. OMT had a negligible role in the UNDAF and this indicated an absence of operational synergy. OMT must be engaged for ensuring increased efficiency in the future.

12.5 Results Management & Monitoring

As observed by the MTR, one of the essentials of the UNDAF supervision was pertaining to Results Based Management and Monitoring. It is true that UNDAF has a results chain (Outcome-outputs-activities) but this needs to be strengthened by not only looking at the results hierarchy and logic at the planning stage but throughout the implementation. The following are recommended:

- o UNCT to take a decision on developing a theory of change for UN-GoIRA development collaboration as part of the transition
- o There must be structures for management, monitoring and reporting with defined accountability. The current system is based more on a need based reporting and not systematic monitoring
- o Agencies monitor their programmes but UNDAF monitoring is limited. M&E framework should be strengthened and there is a need for target-progress status score card. Simple monthly monitoring will track the progress of results at the target level

- o Progress data (targets and expenditure) should be available at any time within an acceptable timeframe.
- o UNDAF coordination should change from information seeking and reporting to monitoring and results tracking
- o RCO must be strengthened vis a vis M&E functions. The current M&E Working group was not adequate for comprehensive monitoring of UNDAF because of transient participation. The need for at least one dedicated M&E professional needs planned consideration.
- o More investment is required for generating evaluative evidence in a systematic way (based on the M&E plan), to place UN in a better position to demonstrate its contribution to results.
- o The annual reviews and midyear reviews must be made more comprehensive and requires a streamlined follow up and accountability otherwise these reviews are reduced to a ceremonial status. Each review must have an 'action taken report' within a month of the review presented in the UNCT by the PMT/M&E group chairs.
- o RCO should consider dedicating additional resources and personnel, and take a leadership role within all pillars for the strategic purposes for enhancing the effectiveness of the UNDAF.

12.6 Fiscal Management

The Government has expressed greater transparency on the UN budgets. The programme budgets must be discussed with the government and publicised. The future A-UNDAF must work out mechanisms for being represented in the government budget and vice versa – UNDAF once it becomes the 'one UN'-GoIRA document will also incorporate government contributions or from other sources for the same results. It is not possible to have one fund and experience from other countries has shown that one UN budget is also complicated. More consultations are required on the feasible options including participation in DAD and on/off budget reporting.

12.7 Communications

UNDAF is not merely a strategic plan that needs effective planning and implementation but also an opportunity to communicate the UN work in Afghanistan.   Thus, it will require to develop an UNDAF specific communication plan.   The minimum required results for the communication plan will be:

- o Defined communications objectives and targets for UN assistance
- o Identified key staff for communication (in tandem with the Communications Working Group)
- o Demarcated target audiences (the communications should be at several levels: internal for UN, for the government, for the donors and for the public)
- o Selected messages to be communicated – the focus must be on results, but strategic intent can also be communicated if required
- o Dedicated resources to implement the communications plans

13.   ANNEX

Annex 1: Consultations/Meetings & Presentations

PMT meeting and introduction of MTR
Meeting with RCO team, provide briefing on i) country context (ii) UNDAF (iii) key priorities and adjustments to be considered.
Review of strategic documents and draft outlines for UNDAF MTR inception report
Meeting with RCO and agree on draft outline for UNDAF MTR
Meeting with deputy of RCO to discuss the outlines for UNDAF MTR
Inception Report Submitted
Meeting with PMT co-chair
Meeting with RC/HC. to provide overview about MTR inception report highlighting progress and achievements including challenges and lessons learned and assesses relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and, sustainability of delivery of the UNDAF; determine effectiveness and efficiency of the "Delivering as One.
MTR Inception report presentation to PMT and M&E WG
Meeting with M&E WG - discuss an interim M&E expert that can provide the critical guidance that is needed to provide for a quality review. An additional discussion note would request the M&E WG members to assist with providing an update on how far have we reached vis a vis the targets and our funding status/utilisation of budget that is not fully captured in the EYR and MYR reports.
Meeting with UNDAF Pillar I chair/Co chair. Discuss progress towards the outcomes, challenges and lesson learned. Get view on UNDAF alignment with national priorities and readjusting the UNDAF to better achieve the SDGs. Contacts: Manuel Vega-Cuberos manuel.vega-cuberos@unhabitat-afg.org Noorullah Farajid: noorullah.farajid@unhabitat-afg.org
Meeting with UNDAF Pillar II chair/Co chair. Discuss progress towards the outcomes, challenges and lesson learned. Get view on UNDAF alignment with national priorities and readjusting the UNDAF in order to better achieve the SDGs. Mona Korsgard mkorsgard@unicef.org Urs Nagel unagel@unicef.org
Meeting with UNDAF Pillar III chair/Co chair. Discuss progress towards the outcomes, challenges and lesson learned. Get view on UNDAF alignment with national priorities and readjusting the UNDAF in order to better achieve the SDGs. Shruti Upadhyay, Homayon Hashmi and Yanthe Cornelissen. shruti.upadhyay@unwomen.org homayon.hashimi@unwomen.org   yanthe.cornelissen@unwomen.org
Meeting with UNDAF Pillar IV chair/Co chair. Discuss progress towards the outcomes, challenges and lesson learned. Get view on UNDAF alignment with national priorities and readjusting the UNDAF to better achieve the SDGs. Contacts: Stephanie McPhail, Kioko Kamula, Fabian Schipper and Tuuli Hongisto shigeyuki.ito@undp.org ; kamula@un.org; fabian.schipper@undp.org; tuuli.hongisto@undp.org
Meeting with UNDAF Pillar V chair/Co chair. Discuss progress towards the outcomes, challenges and lesson learned. Get view on UNDAF alignment with national priorities and readjusting the UNDAF in order to better achieve the SDGs. Contacts: Claire van Loveren and Ghulam Rasoul Fariwar claire.van.loveren@undp.org ghulam.rasoul.fariwar@undp.org

Attend PMT meeting to provide an overall assessment of progress and achievements made against planned results; document challenges and lessons learned over the past two weeks and assess significant developments that have taken place in the programming environment including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Provide suggestions on the alignment with national priorities and assesses relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and, sustainability of delivery of the revised UNDAF.
Meeting with Toma Dursina - Humanitarian Affairs Officer To discuss the Humanitarian Development Nexus possibilities
Meeting with Pillar 1/UN HABITAT with Manuel Vega Cuberos (manuel.vega-cuberos@unhabitat-afg.org) and Noorullah Farajid (noorullah.farajid@unhabitat-afg.org)
Meeting with Trevor, Strategic Planning, UNAMA to obtain feedback on UNAMA and UNCT meeting points
UNCT Meeting
Meeting with Toby Lanzer (DSRSG), Jocelyn Mason(UNDP) and Brian Gray (WFP) on future strategic development assistance frameworks
Meeting with Ms Farkhunda Zahra Naderi, SAOP as part of the identified chairs of the Focus Areas for the future Strategic Framework along with DSSRG/RC
Meeting with Adele Khodr, Representative UNICEF
Special UNCT Meeting attended by Farkhunda Naderi
Receipt of Progress Report from the Pillar Heads
PMT meeting with Toby Lanzer, DSRSG/RCO
Discussions with Sarah and Siraj to plan the workshop to present the draft report
Meeting with Dominic Parker, Head of OCHA and Katherine Carey, Humanitarian Officer
Aid Coordination Management, Ministry of Finance, Meeting
Dr. Noor Muhammad Murad, the Inter Agency Network for Youth Development focal point
Meeting with Shakair Majeedi, UNIDO
Meeting with H.E Nahid Sarabi, Deputy Minister Ministry of Finance.
Debriefing with Marziya RC Office
Preparatory Meeting with Siraj and Marziya for the presentation
Mathew Leslie (Risk Management Unit, RCO) and Robert Foort, UNDP
Presentation of Draft Report/Validation workshop of MTR
Meeting with RMT (Annemarie Brolsma <brolsma@un.org>; mkang <mkang@unicef.org>)
Presentation to UNCT
Comments on the Draft MTR Report
Revised Draft Report/Final Report
Completion of the assignment

Annex 2: Checklist for Interviews with Key Informants

Name of the Pillar/agency/department: ---------------------------

Participants in the consultation: _____

Date and Time: _____

Issues	Response

Issue 1: What has changed in Afghanistan development context since the start of UNDAF in terms of:
  o Alignment with national priorities
  o Integration (intrinsic as well as extrinsic)
  o Development programming	

Issue 2: The pillar outcome status and what is working/not working and the reasons including resources and donor issues
  o Challenges to achieve the outputs
  o How can these be improved?
  o What adjustments must be made
  o What lessons are learned
  o If sufficient resources are available? (HR, Financial)
  o Donor views	

Issue 3: What adjustments to UNDAF coordination and implementation are expected to make the UNDAF more effective and efficient
  o Achievements
  o Joint programming
  o Cost cutting
  o Operations management	

Issue 3: What sustainability issues support or deter UNDAF and what could be the way forward?
  o Is it possible to continue like this?
  o What programs and development initiative can government takeover in future?	

Issue 4: What are UNDAF related coordination challenges?
  o The coherence mechanism (agencies)
  o The coordination meetings
  o Relationship of UNDAF with UNAMA and OCHA	

Issue 4: Any other specific challenges, lessons or suggestions	

Annex 3: Comparison of UNDAF and ANPDF

UNDAF 2015-19 Priority Areas/Outcomes	ANPDF 2017-21 /NPP
Pillar 1: Equitable Economic Development	1. Comprehensive Agriculture Development Programme 2. The Citizen's Charter 3. National Mineral and Resource Development Programme
Pillar 2: Basic Social Services	4. Infrastructure and Connectivity Programme 5. Women's Economic Empowerment Programme
Pillar 3: Social Equity and Human Capital	6. Infrastructure and Connectivity Programme 7. Women's Economic Empowerment Programme 8. Human Capital Development
Pillar 4: Justice and the Rule of Law	9. Effective Governance Programme 10. Justice Sector Reform Programme
Pillar 5: Accountable Governance	11. Effective Governance Programme 12. Justice Sector Reform Programme

Annex 4: Portfolio Initiatives Aligned with UNDAF

	Total Budgeted Value of Initiatives (USD)	UN AFPs Working on this Element	Government Counterparts for UN AFPs Working on this Element
Equitable Economic Development	**$ 1,778,087,942** B	FAO; ILO; IOM; UNCTAD; UNDP; UNESCO; UNIDO; UNMAS; UNODC; UNOPS; WFP	ANDMA; ANDMA/DMC; ANSA; CSO; DCDA; IDLG; Kabul Municipality; MAIL; MCN; MEW; MOCI; MOE; MOE/DMTVET; MOEc; MOF; MOF/ACD ; MOFA; MOHE; MOLSAMD; MOPH; MOPW; MORR; MOT/ACAA; MOWA; MRRD; NEPA; Private Sector Companies
Basic Social Services	**$ 783,443,735** B	IOM; UNESCO; UNFPA; UN Habitat; UNHCR; UNICEF; UNODC; UNOPs; WFP; WHO	ANDMA; CSO; IDLG; MAIL; MCN; MOE; MOI; MOI/CPD; MOIC; MOJ; MOLSAMD; MOMP; MOPH; MOPW; MORR; MOWA; MRRD; Municipalities
Social Equity and Investment in Human Capital	**$ 227,538,629** B	IOM; UNESCO; UNFPA; UN Habitat; UNHCR; UNICEF; UNODC; UNOPs; WFP; WHO	AMA; ANDMA; CSO; MAIL; MEW; MOE; MOFA; MOHE; MOIC; MOIC/YA; MOLSAMD; MOPH; MORR; MOWA; MRRD; NEPA
Justice and Rule of Law	**$ 139,262,348** C	ILO; IOM; UNDP; UNESCO; UNFPA, UNHCR; UNODC; UNOPS; UNWomen	AGO; HPC; MCN; MOE; MOF; MOFA; MOI; MOJ; MOLSAMD; MOPH; MORR; MOWA; Sup Aud Office
Accountable Governance	**$ 893,634,897**	IOM; UNDP; UNESCO; UNFPA; UN-Habitat; UNHCR; UNODC; UNOPS	Admin Off of Pres; Admin Off of VPs; APRP Secretariat; CSO; Dist Govs; ECC; IDLG; IEC; Kabul Municipality; MCN; MOCIT; MOE; MOEc; MOF; MOF/ACD; MOFA; MOI; MOI/ABP; MOI/CNPA; MOIC; MOLSAMD; MOPW; MORR; MOT/ACAA; MUDA; Municipalities; National Assembly; Office of Special Adv for Good Governance; Provincial Councils, Provincial Governments
Cross-cutting gender	**$ 51,141,732**	UNWomen	CSO; MOFA; MOWA; MRRD

Annex 5: Agency Wise Budget/Expenditure

Rank	Agency	Expenditure 2016	Budget 2017
1	UNDP	489,000,000	458,000,000
2	WFP	116,346,745	168,383,026
3	UNICEF	151,000,000	160,000,000
4	UNHCR	197,821,907	137,700,000
5	WHO	65,568,381	55,000,000
6	IOM	57,416,500	48,000,000
7	UNHABITAT	22,840,000	44,400,000
8	UNOPS	36,213,000	29,213,000
9	FAO	24,430,000	24,000,000
10	UNESCO	8,659,695	16,647,374
11	UNMAS	19,485,650	16,453,367
12	UNODC	8,425,242	16,437,802
13	UNFPA	23,382,280	12,193,755
14	UNWOMEN	10,213,460	9,040,418
15	OCHA	9,015,135	8,361,296
16	ILO	7,000,000	6,000,000
17	UNEP	2,100,000	1,800,000
18	UNIDO	133,300	400,615
19	OHCHR	259,000	289,000

Annex 6: List of National Priority Programs and Development Councils

	NPP/Council	Desired outcomes	Investment priorities
A	High Economic Council: Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce and Industries, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Public Health, Central Statistics Office, Da Afghanistan Bank, Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industries		
1	Private Sector Development Program	Increased foreign investment, growth in SMEs and export production, public-private partnerships, financial sector privatizations	Banking oversight, industrial energy, land administration, export promotion
2	The Citizens' Charter	All rural and urban communities benefit from basic development services. Increased trust in the state	The basic package for health, education, clean water, energy, irrigation, and farm-to-market roads
B	High Council for Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption: Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice, Attorney General's Office, Supreme Court, Independent Directorate of Local Governance, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission		
3	Effective Governance Program	Professionally staffed and managed ministries, consolidated budget and PFM reform process, capable provincial and municipal subnational governments, electoral reform, citizen identity register	Capacity building for results, PFMR3, municipal development fund, capacity building for results, e-tazkeera
4	Justice Sector Reform Program	Courts neutrally apply the law, are trusted and used by the population, and court decisions are enforced	Extending court presence to all provinces, justice ministry restructuring, expanding citizen access to the court, and information technology to improve case handling. A national program for land administration (ARAZI) is also included in this NPP
C	High Council on Reforms Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Commerce and Industries, Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, Ministry of Labour, Social Affair, Martyrs and disabled, Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, Independent, Independent Civil Service Commission This council will concentrate on reforms to the civil service, including devising appropriate rule and regulations; ensuring nationwide rollout of civil service management systems. establish a transparent system to process complaints made by members of the civil service, and the implementation of the CCR Capacity Building for Results (CBR) program		
D	High Council for Land and Water: Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Energy and Water, Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Water Management Cooperation, ARAZI (Afghanistan Land Authority)		
5	Comprehensive Agricultural	Rising productivity and HH incomes in rural areas; agricultural import	National Irrigation Plan, national wheat sector plan, national horticulture plan, national livestock development policy,

	Development Program	substitution and agro-industry; improved exports	livestock development, women in agriculture
E	**Infrastructure Development Council:** Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Urban Development, Ministry of Energy and Water, Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, Kabul Municipality, National Environment Protection Agency		
6	Infrastructure and Connectivity Program	Increases in transit and connectivity, including telecommunications	Cross-border water, energy, digital and transport infrastructure, Airports, telecoms, roads, rail, fibre-optic, logistics reform
7	Urban Development Program	Strengthened urban governance, improved urban economy, environment, and infrastructure, adequate housing, and improved urban-rural linkages	National urban priority program, urban land administration, municipal development authorities
8	Energy	Energy self-sufficiency, coordinated energy investment budgeting, and ensuring balanced regional access to energy	National energy plan proposes a three-tiered investment strategy focusing on energy supply, institutional development, and regional trade, partnerships, and climate change mitigation. Approx. 2,300 MW from new domestic generation. Int'l projects include CASA 1000, TAPI, TUTAP, oil and gas exploration
9	National Mineral and Resource Development Program	Afghanistan's natural resources are sustainably developed (EITI compliant) and public revenue collected in full	Ministry reform, exploration
F	**Human Development Council** Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Public Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Higher Education, Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled, Ministry of Women's Affairs, Ministry of Economy, Central Statistics Office		
10	Human capital development	Afghanistan's labour force is equipped with skills needed for jobs. Social protection prevents impoverishment of vulnerable groups	National programs for health, education, vocational education, women's economic empowerment, pension reform, and social safety nets
11	Women's Economic Empowerment Program	Large number of poor women gain agency and improve family welfare	6 component areas: financial literacy and inclusion, market agriculture, legal reform, gender statistics, SME access

Annex 7: UN Coordination mechanisms in Afghanistan as of August 2017

1.	UN Country Team
2.	Programme Management Team
3.	UNDAF Pillars/Results Groups
4.	Operations Management Team
5.	Monitoring and Evaluation Group
6.	UN Communications Group
7.	Gender Working Group
8.	Joint UN Team AIDS
9.	Youth - Inter-Agency Network on Youth Development
10.	Data for Development

Annex 8: A-SDGs and Development Plans Alignment

SDG #	Goals in Brief	ANPDF Programs	Status / Comments
SDG 1	End poverty	Citizen's Charter, Comprehensive Agriculture NPP, Jobs for Peace	Approx. 12,000 communities phase 1
SDG 2	Food security, end hunger	Comprehensive Agricultural NPP, National Saffron Programme, Construction of Green house and Cool Storages	2017 launched
SDG 3	Healthy lives	Human Capital NPP	Ongoing
SDG 4	Education for all	Human Capital NPP, Vocational and Technical Programs, National Skills Dev Programmes (NSDPs)	Ongoing
SDG 5	Achieve gender equality	Economic Empowerment of Women NPP, 1325 program	2017 launched
SDG 6	Water and Sanitation for all	Citizen's Charter, National Water Management Programme, National Infrastructure Implementation Plan (NIP)	2016 launched
SDG 7	Energy for all	Regional Economic Cooperation Programmes on Energy (CASA 1000, TUTAP, TAPI), Energy and Infrastructure Development, Advance Regional Integration	Ongoing
SDG 8	Promote growth and employment	National Economic Zones, Citizen Charter, IMF reforms, Mineral and Resource Development Programmes, Increasing labour productivity and investment in human capital, Urban Development Programme	ECF signed July, 2016
SDG 9	Build resilient infrastructure, promote industrialization	MUDH reform, WTO accession, NIP, National Water Management Programme, Railways Infrastructure programmes, New Initiative for Industrialization	2016
SDG 11	Make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable	Urban NPP, National Solidarity Programmes (NSPs), Citizen Charter, National Housing Programs	2017 launched
SDG 16	Reduce IDPs	"The Way Forward" IDPs/returnees' strategy	Ongoing
SDG 17	Total aid per capita	ANDPF fiscal strategy	2020 projections

Annex 9: List of AFP Major Survey, Research and Evaluation 2016/2017

Agency	Survey, research, evaluations
IOM	1. Post Return Monitoring (Kabul, Nangarhar, Herat, Kunduz) 1 May - 31 Dec 2016 (Monitoring) 2. Post Distribution Monitoring (Khost and Paktia), 05 Jun-21 Aug 2016 (Monitoring) 3. Socio-economic data collection (Nangarhar- Torkham border) 02 Nov 2016 onwards (Survey) 4. Research Study to enable better understanding of migration flows from Afghanistan and Pakistan towards Europe (Kabul, Balkh, Ghazni, Herat, Nengarhar) 24 Jul – 30 Nov 2016 (Survey) 5. HEAT Household Emergency Assessment Tool (Nangarhar) 26 Sep – 20 Oct 2016 (Assessment) 6. HEAT Household Emergency Assessment Tool (Kabul) 6-15 Nov 2016 (Assessment) 7. Population mobility and displacement tracking (DTM) (Nangarhar) 01 Jan-30 Apr 2017 8. Mapping out internal TIP situation in Afghanistan (national) Jul-Dec 2017 (Research) 9. Trends in Afghan Migration 2014 - 2016. REVISING THE AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY MIGRATION PROFILE (Kabul, Herat, Nimroz and Nengarhar) Aug-Nov 2016 (Survey) 10. Review of training curriculums and manuals on counter trafficking in Afghanistan (national) Dec 2016-Jan 2017 (Evaluation) 11. Multi-Hazard Mapping Exercise (Herat) Feb 2017-Feb 2018 (Assessment)
UN HABITAT	1. UN-Habitat is conducting a country programme evaluation targeting 2012-2016. The evaluation report is planned to be finalized in January 2017. TOR attached.
UNDP	1. National Human Development Report on extractive industries and human development (at initial stage, to complete in 2017). 2. Research and Survey on Climate Change Scenario on the impact of climate change on agriculture sector for last and next 30 years and prepare the action plan for the government to consider climate change in developing planning in future the report will be finished by August 2017 3. Out migration Country Case Review of international migration schemes in selected countries (Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Philippines & Bangladesh in support to develop a framework for a migration scheme specifically tailored to the needs of Afghanistan to support and regulate overseas labor migration with focus on Gulf States (still in the planning phase to be completed by mid-2017).

UNEP	1. TECHNICAL REPORT: Climate Change and Governance in Afghanistan (https://www.dropbox.com/s/jbtag8avpxz5kug/AFG_Climate_Change_and_Governance_FINAL.pdf?dl=0) 2. POLICY PAPER (BRUSSELS CONFERENCE): Building Afghanistan's Resilience: Natural Hazards, Climate Change, and Humanitarian Needs (http://web.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/news/afghanistan-resilience-consortium-advocates-eco-drr-and-climate-change-adaptation-brussels) 3. TECHNICAL REPORT: Climate Change in Afghanistan: What does it Mean for Rural Livelihoods and Food Security? (http://web.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/news/what-does-climate-change-mean-rural-livelihoods-and-food-security) 4. BASELINE ASSESSMENT: Building Adaptive Capacity and Resilience to Climate Change in Afghanistan (http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/Afghanistan/Building_adaptive_capacity_and_resilience_baseline_report_2014_English.pdf) 5. TECHNICAL REPORT: An Introductory Guide to Sources of Traditional Fodder and Forage and Usage (http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/Afghanistan/Introductory_guide_sources_traditional_fodder_forage_usage_Afghanistan_2015.pdf) 6. GUIDANCE CHART: Climate Change Threats and Vulnerabilities in Afghanistan (http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/Afghanistan/CC_vulnerabilities_guidance_chart.pdf) 7. BASELINE ASSESSMENT: Strengthening the Resilience of Vulnerable Communities Against Natural Disasters (SCARAD) (https://www.dropbox.com/s/kbtjf2obe1ubzxf/SRACAD_Baseline%20Assessment_2015.pdf?dl=0) 8. BASELINE ASSESSMENT: SRACAD Preliminary Findings Infographic (https://www.dropbox.com/s/n2do23xk493pnhv/SRACAD%20Preliminary%20Findings%20Infographic.pdf?dl=0)
UNESCO	1. UNESCO has a Quality Review of the Ministry of Labor's Vocational Training Centres approaching publication. Can be shared with Pillar One colleagues when ready (this should be ready in a couple of weeks).
UNFPA	1. Comprehensive Family Planning Capacity Need Assessment 2. Baseline Assessment of KAP on Gender-based violence in six provinces in Afghanistan 3. Socio-Economic and Demographic Survey (SDES)- Herat 4. Socio-Economic and Demographic Survey (SDES)- Nimroz 5. Socio-Economic and Demographic Survey (SDES)- Khost 6. Socio-Economic and Demographic Survey (SDES)- Baghlan 7. Socio-Economic and Demographic Survey (SDES)- Paktya 8. Family Planning Behaviour Study on Use and Non-Use of Contraceptives

UNICEF	UNICEF's recently completed Evaluations, major surveys, studies, research (a full list as well as copies of the report if available)
	    <u>Field work is completed for the following</u>:
	    1. Evaluation of Child Centred Disaster Risk Reduction (CD-DRR).
	    2. Study on "Child labour in Carpet Weaving" by Child Protection Section.
	    3. "Formative research on weekly iron folic acid supplementation for out of school adolescent girls" by Nutrition Programme Section.
	    4. WASH in School for Girls Menstrual Hygiene Management (MHM) research (formative study) (carried over from 2015) by WASH Programme Section.
	    5. Study on "Gender review of UNICEF Afghanistan WASH programme"
	
	Evaluations/research/surveys/ studies ongoing or planned for 2017 (with indication of expected completion date) (full list, and please share final report as it becomes available)
	    <u>List of major ongoing activities</u>:
	    1. EPI/MNCH KAP Study - Q4, 2016
	    2. Vaccine Wastage Study – Q4, 2016
	    3. Evaluation of CPAN –January 2017
	    4. Evaluation of WinS –January 2017
	    5. Impact evaluation of the project on street working children in Kabul - Q1, 2017
	    6. Joint survey on drug use in adolescents (with UNODC) - Q1, 2017
	    7. Programme on Adolescents: Impact Evaluation Baseline - Q1, 2017
	    8. Baseline Survey for Social Cash Transfer Project - Q1 2017
	    9. A compendium of best practices and lessons learned on bottleneck analysis for Integrated Management of Acute malnutrition (IMAM) - A case study of Afghanistan - Q2, 2017
	    10. EmONC needs assessment-December 2017
	
	    UNICEF is planning to conduct its MTR in Sept. 2017

UNODC	1. Afghanistan Opium Survey - Executive Summary. Full report is expected to be formally released by the end of December 2016. The executive summary could be accessed through the following link: https://www.unodc.org/documents/press/releases/AfghanistanOpiumSurvey2016.pdf 2. UNODC plans to carry out final in-depth evaluation of its Country Programme during the first and second quarter of 2017. 3. UNODC will carry out a research study on Smuggling of Migrants in 2017. Specific date TBD.
WFP	1. WFP Operational Evaluation (OpEv) finalised earlier this year, this is a public document which can be shared – attached. 2. OpEv Inception report, may support the preparation of the UNDAF Mid-Term Review TOR, <u>this however is not a public document, thus not for wider circulation.</u> 3. *Climate Change in Afghanistan: What Does It Mean for Rural Livelihoods and Food Security?*, WFP, UNEP, NEPA, November 2016
WHO	1. Joint External Evaluation of International Health Regulations (IHR-2005), completed on 7th December 2016. 2. Health Facility Survey on quality of outpatient child health services (IMCI) in Afghanistan, 2015. 3. Midterm review of Afghanistan TB control programme (MTR-TB) and Malaria Programme (MTR-MP) 19-27 November 2016. Report expected to be published in February 2017. 4. Stepwise approach to Surveillance (STEPS) of risk factors for non-communicable diseases in urban settings, 2015. The same STEPS survey in rural settings is planned to be conducted in 2017. WHO is currently conducting programme MTR to be completed by 20th December.

Annex 10: Partial List of References

1. Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF), Senior Officials Meeting, Joint Report, 3rd July 2013
2. Afghanistan National Development Strategy Prioritization and Implementation Plan Mid 2010 – Mid 2013
3. Humanitarian Needs Overview, OCHA, 2017
4. Humanitarian Response Plan, OCHA 2017
5. Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF) 2017 To 2021
6. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2344 (2017), 17 March 2017
7. Sustainable Development Goals – Progress Report: Voluntary National Review at the High Level Political Forum SDGs' Progress Report Afghanistan, July 2017
8. Bleuer, Christian, The Study and Understudy of Afghanistan's Ethnic Groups: What we know – and don't know, 2014, Afghanistan Analyst Network
9. Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework (SMAF), Brussels, 2016
10. Lakoff, George: Don't Think of an Elephant: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate, 2004