EVALUATION REPORT

5 April 2018

Richard Mahachi Chiwara, PhD……………………………………………………………International Evaluation Consultant

Hussein Yusuf Ali…………………………………………………………………………………………………….National Consultant

A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This represents the final report of the mid-term evaluation of the Joint Programme Youth Employment Somalia (YES) that was undertaken by a team of two independent consultants during the period 10 November 2017 – 28 February 2018, covering the implementation period from September 2015 to December 2017. The overall objective of the mid-term evaluation was to find out the **outcome and impact of the programme and to asses if the programme objectives were being achieved, using its resources and provide recommendations for modification, further development and improvement.** In addition, examine the changes that resulted from the programme implementation and provide inputs to guide the decision making for the upcoming renewal and extension of the programme including funding requirements.

This mid-term evaluation had the following **specific objectives**:

1. To discover the programme's **design quality and internal coherence** (needs and problems it seeks to solve) and its external coherence with the UNDAF, the NDP and the **Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)**, and find out the degree of national ownership of the programme.
2. To understand how the joint programme **operates** and assess the **efficiency of its management model** in planning, coordinating, managing and executing resources allocated for its implementation, through an analysis of its procedures and institutional mechanisms. This analysis will seek to uncover the factors for success and limitations in inter-agency tasks as envisaged in the programme.
3. To identify the programme's **degree of effectiveness** among its participants, its contribution to the objectives of the Youth Employment in the country including resource mobilization and effective use of resources in line with the aid effectiveness principals, and value for money.

The criteria for the evaluation are consistent with United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) guidelines: Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency Sustainability and Impact.

Methodology

A mixed approach of quantitative and qualitative methods was used in assessing the programme's interventions based on the evaluation criteria. Field visits were undertaken to three of the targeted regions – Benadir, Puntland and South West; where interviews and focus group discussions were conducted with a cross section of key national and international stakeholders. Two of the major limitations encountered included movement restrictions and language barriers, which were mitigated through assigning some of the tasks to the national consultant.

Background

The JP was developed in 2015 with planned implementation period of 36 months from June 2015 to June 2018. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) represented by Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA), is the lead national counterpart, with five Participating United Nations Organisations (PUNOs) - Food and Agriculture organization (FAO), International Labour Organization (ILO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN Habitat) and United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), which joined the programme in April 2017 under an associated project funded by the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). Out of the initial planned budget of US$54 million, $23.65 million was funded by the governments of Denmark, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland, as well as Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and UNDP core resources.

The programme strategy was to contribute to sustainable employment creation while also providing immediate livelihood opportunities for the young men and women through the implementation of three interlinked programme components: value chain development, capacity development through vocational and skills training, and developing productive infrastructure through cash for work.

Evaluation Findings

Programme is aligned with relevant national and international development frameworks

Widely considered to be among the key push factors that drive youth migration as well as recruitment of youth into extremists groups such as Al Shabab, youth unemployment is among the high priorities outlined in the National Development Plan (NDP), the New Partnership for Somalia (NPS) and the United Nations Strategic Framework (UNSF). The JP is therefore well aligned with the national and international development frameworks for Somalia, and also addresses one of the key challenges and push factors that drive instability and youth migration in Somalia.

Programme strategy lacked critical enabling multipliers

The programme approach was anchored on value chain development to identify both supply and demand side factors constraining employment creation opportunities in targeted value chains. These constraints would then be addressed through combination of skills development interventions as well as infrastructure development through short-term cash-for work jobs. However, the programme strategy did not include targeted interventions to address enabling multipliers such as private sector development and institutional capacity development.

Programme model was not fully implemented in all locations

Many activities and interventions were carried out in line with the programme's three components. However, in the exception of the interventions undertaken in the dry fish sector in Bossaso, in most other locations visited, the interventions appeared fragmented and not necessarily structured around a unified value chain analysis, thereby losing the key benefit of joint programming.

There is no consensus among JP partners on which value chains to target

Three value chains were initially targeted – fisheries, livestock and sesame; with construction, information technology and renewable energy agreed later on. However, only the fisheries value chain has been implemented fully in Bossaso. Based on the apparent duplication and fragmented implementation, it appeared that PUNOs lacked coordinated approach on sectors or value chains with the greatest potential to create jobs.

There are mixed views among stakeholders about the skills development component

Most of the PUNOs were engaged in skills development in one way or another. There was a good gender balance among youth beneficiaries, and they all valued very highly the training that they were getting. However, there appeared to be less buy-in from other stakeholders who tended to see the training packages as traditional and short term to make an impact on long term employment. In addition, while some agencies had mechanisms to follow up on the youth after completion of training, this was not institutionalised in the joint programme.

Cash-for-work was sometimes used as social safety net

Some infrastructure was developed through cash-for work, including rehabilitation of roads and bridges. However, some stakeholders observed that some of the infrastructure did not have much economic value, while in some cases, the cash-for-work activities were used for emergency response as a social safety net for vulnerable communities.

Inconsistent monitoring of indicators

The programme provided quarterly and annual reports covering the activities undertaken during respective quarters. However, the reporting was inconsistent and varied from quarter to quarter. In particular, not all output indicators were covered in all the quarterly reports consistently, and very rarely were outcome indicators reported on. Consequently, it was difficult to get an overview of the programme's progress over time.

Delayed delivery by PUNOs on the Daldhis project

Most of the PUNOs received funding from the PBF aimed at building synergies with other joint programmes through an area-based approach. As at the time of the evaluation, UNDP had delivery of 55%, UN Habitat – 17%, and UNIDO - 26%. The Daldhis project provides an opportunity for the UN to leverage on its collective comparative advantage and contribute to a bigger outcome to extend state authority to other districts beyond the state capitals in collaboration with other joint programmes.

Programme lacks visibility among stakeholders

The JP provided 3% of available funding to government, which funds were used to engage Technical Advisors and regional focal points. The focal point position was abolished after a few months due to lack of clarity about their roles and responsibilities. However, at federal Member State (FMS) level, there was lack of coordination among key line Ministries, and in some cases no knowledge about the programme.

Planned programme management arrangements were not fully implemented

At its formulation, the programme envisaged a four-tier structure including the Programme Steering Committee (PSC), Technical Committee, Regional Implementation Units (RIUs), and Programme Management Unit (PMU). The PSC was established and was fully functional, while the Technical Committee had stopped functioning after some time. However the RIUs were not established as per plan. Furthermore, there is no PMU, but only a JP Coordinator with an Assistant. Some of the PUNOs do not have staff directly dedicated to the JP due to their capacity and low staffing levels. The JP Coordinator does not have decision-making authority over the PUNO staff, which presents difficulties in terms of day-to-day management of activities from a 'big picture' perspective.

Weak information sharing

The up-down flow of information within some of the PUNOs appeared to be weak, with field-based staff sometimes not familiar with the JP document or activities happening in their areas. Lateral communication between field-based staff was also weak, and in some cases staff did not even know each other, let alone share information about the joint programme.

Overall low delivery rate

From initial planned budget of $54 million, the programme received $23 million (42%) in available funds. The overall delivery rate as at December 2017 was 64% with $8.2 million remaining to be delivered in the remaining six months of the planned implementation period.

Sustainability risk is high

The major risk to sustainability is the weak institutional capacity at FMS level. For example, the State MOLSA in one of the states did not have any staff, thereby making it difficult to engage the Ministry in any meaningful way, let alone to coordinate implementation at the state level. The second risk is about engaging the private sector. Ultimately employment creation has to be done by private sector, including small and medium enterprises (SMEs). ILO has started to engage through the employability eco-system approach led by the consortium Africa Working. However, there is also need to have more targeted private sector development strategy to ensure long term sustainability.

This chapter contains a review of the programme processes, from its design, implementation, coordination, monitoring and reporting in order to draw out any good practices and lessons learnt that may inform the programme's implementation during the remainder of its life cycle as well as future programming.

Good Practices and Lessons Learnt

Establishment of an inclusive national steering committee

The design had provision for of an inclusive national PSC with membership of key line Ministries at federal and regional level, donors and PUNOs at Head of Agency level ensured quick decision-making as well as mutual accountability.

Support to the Federal MOLSA in its coordination function

The allocation of 3% of available funds to the government enhances their capacity for programme planning, monitoring and coordination.

Applying the programme strategy in the fisheries sector

Full implementation of the programme strategy in Bossaso provided a good case study the efficacy of the strategy as well as for joint programming. Also, positive results were achieved through private sector engagement in Bossaso.

Lessons Learnt

Fragmented implementation of programme components

Lack of a broad consensus on the programme approach and strategy, can result in fragmented implementation and discourages collaboration among partner UN agencies.

Duplication of roles among JP partners

Lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities at design level can lead to duplication and reduces the benefits of joint programming.

Lack of enabling environment, including national institutional capacity
Employment creation cannot happen in a vacuum, it requires investment of resources to develop conducive enabling environment as well as institutional capacity development.

Lack of targeted private sector engagement
Key success factors and programme risks should be managed and integrated in the programme design, such as for example targeted private sector engagement and development strategies.

All players should play at the same level
Effective implementation requires 'all hands on deck', which requires deliberate and programmed institutional capacity development of the key players, particularly government capacity at subnational level.

CONCLUSIONS

Youth unemployment is a critical problem in Somalia, and also one of the push factors driving extremist-based political instability and conflict as well as youth migration. The YES programme is therefore appropriate and timely; and is well aligned to the key national and international frameworks that underlie the country's response strategies for combating instability and economic stagnation.

The problem analysis and design identified a sound strategy and model, although its implementation has been fragmented leading to weak results achievement. There is also lack of consensus among key JP partners on the approach, which also contributed to weak results as well as difficulties in implementation coordination.

There have consequently been missed opportunities, not only for better collaboration, but also in terms of leveraging on the UN's collective comparative advantage. The level of engagement at subnational level has been weak, which impacted on the programme's effectiveness and also presents a sustainability risk. This is due in part to weak institutional capacity at that level, but also due to lack of investment in capacity development and creation of enabling environment.

Recommendations

- Recommit to the programme approach based on value chain development in order to build a strong consensus among all JP partners.
- Develop government institutional capacity at all levels in order to enable national and local leadership and ownership, especially at sub-national level.

- Promote effective engagement with private sector by investing resources towards private sector development, especially through SME development strategy and facilitating access to finance, especially for targeted value chains.
- Government should consider establishing an e-information management system with programme support, in order to enable integrated data collection, analysis, documentation, dissemination and lessons learned on employment creation, as well as decentralised M&E systems.
- The PSC should consider extending the programme for a further 6 months to December 2018 through a no-cost extension.
- Donors should consider funding second phase of the programme, including providing specific funding for a micro-credit revolving fund to facilitate the development of a small and medium enterprise (SME) sector; while also the government, with support of relevant PUNOs, should develop relevant legislative instruments, including for example, (a) SME policy and strategy, (b) micro-finance policy and strategy, and (c) TVET capacity development.
- Clearly defined roles and responsibilities for PUNOs to reduce duplication and enhance collaboration, including leveraging on their collective comparative advantages.
- The PSC should revive and reconstitute the programme Technical Committee to provide timely support to the PMU, while also being held accountable to the PSC.
- The PSC should consider re-establishing the planned Regional Implementation Units, which mirror the PSC at the FMS level in order to ensure adequate coordination and information flow among key stakeholders at that level.
- Given the number staff in individual PUNOs that are dedicated to the YES programme, the PSC should consider bringing them together under a unified Programme Management Unit in order to facilitate better accountability and implementation coordination.
- The JP Coordinator (or PMU, if and when established) should strengthen monitoring and reporting based on the indicators, and also consider revising the programme targets in line with available funding and resources.
- PUNOs should accelerate implementation of the Daldhis project's components under JP YES in order to avail the opportunity to strengthen synergies with other joint programmes and contribute towards a bigger outcome.

B. CONTENTS

C. ACRONYMS

AA	Administrative Agent
AoC	Agreement of Cooperation
CBO(s)	Community Based Organisation(s)
CRESTA/A	Community Recovery and Extension of State Authority/Accountability
CSO(s)	Civil Society Organisation(s)
ERG	Evaluation Reference Group
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FAD	Fish Aggregating Device
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMS	Federal Member State(s)
GAP	Good Agricultural Practices
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IDP(s)	Internally Displaced Person(s)
ILO	International Labour Organisation
ISF	Integrated Strategic Framework
IT	Information Technology
JP	Joint Programme
JPLG	Joint Programme on Local Governance
JPROL	Joint Programme on Rule of Law
JPYES	Joint Programme on Youth Employment Somalia
LMA	Labour Market Assessment
MOC	Ministry of Commerce
MOLSA	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
MOYS	Ministry of Youth and Sports
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO(s)	Non-Governmental Organisation(s)
NPS	New Partnership for Somalia
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PMU	Programme Management Unit
PPP(s)	Public Private Partnership(s)
PSC	Project Steering Committee
PSG(s)	Peace-building and State-building Goal(s)
PUNO(s)	Participating United Nations Organization(s)
RIU	Regional Implementation Unit

SDG(s)	Sustainable Development Goal(s)
SIDRA	Somali Institute for Development and Research Analysis
SME(s)	Small and Medium Enterprise(s)
TC	Technical Committee
TOT	Training of Trainers
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UN Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
UNSF	United Nations Strategic Framework
WARDO	Warshiikh Rural Development Organisation

1. INTRODUCTION

The Joint Programme on Youth Employment Somalia (JP-YES) is a frontline intervention of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to achieve rapid results under its former priorities for Peace-building and State-building Goal (PSG) 4: Economic Foundations, and the National Development Plan (NDP) for Economic Growth, which identifies youth employment through job creation and skills development as one of the most important priority projects.

The JP was signed on 17 June 2015, with effective implementation starting in September 2015 for an overall implementation period of three years. Although not mandatory, the JP partners decided to undertake a mid-term evaluation in order to inform learning, decision-making and provide guidance for the remaining period of its implementation and potential second phase of the programme.

1.1. Scope, Purpose and Objectives

The evaluation covered the implementation period from September 2015 to December 2017. The purpose of the evaluation was **to generate knowledge, identify best practices and lessons learned, and improve implementation during its remaining period as well as provide a guide for the design of the next phase of the joint programme**.

The specific objectives of the evaluation were:

1) To discover the programme's design quality and internal coherence (needs and problems it seeks to solve) and its external coherence with the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) 2014-2016, the National Development Plan (NDP) and United Nations the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and find out the degree of national ownership of the programme;
2) To understand how the joint programme operates and assess the efficiency of its management model in planning, coordinating, managing and executing resources allocated for its implementation, through an analysis of its procedures and institutional mechanisms. This analysis will seek to uncover the factors for success and limitations in inter-agency tasks as envisaged in the programme; and
3) To identify the programme's degree of effectiveness among its participants, its contribution to the objectives of the Youth Employment in the country including resource mobilization and effective use of resources in line with the aid effectiveness principals, and value for money.

1.2. Methodology

The evaluation was undertaken by a team of two independent consultants over a period of forty-five days during the period 10 November 2017 to 28 February 2018 with administration and logistical support by UNDP as the JP's Lead Agency.

The evaluation was based on analysis of secondary and primary data collected from various sources, including relevant joint programme documents and reports, interviews with key informants, including UN agency management and programme staff, national stakeholders, civil society groups and beneficiaries. The list of individuals interviewed is in Annex 2. A mixed approach of quantitative and qualitative methods was used in assessing the extent to which the programme's interventions were consistent with, and contributed to the overall objective to create sustainable employment. In assessing the programme's relevance and effectiveness, the central question was to determine the extent to which the programme's strategy model was applied, and if so, whether or not it contributed to the overall objective.

The data collection tools included:

a) **Review of background documents**. The list of documents reviewed is at Annex 1 to this report.
b) **Individual interviews**. A total of 67 individuals were interviewed representing a cross section of stakeholders, including government officials at federal, regional and local levels, UN agencies, development partners, civil society organisations (CSOs) and community based organisations (CBOs). The list of individuals interviewed is in Annex 2 of this report.
c) **Focus group discussions**. Six focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted with beneficiaries and community stakeholders in four locations: Baidoa, Bossaso, Garowe and Mogadishu. These included one women's association and two youth groups.
d) **Project site visits**. Site visits were undertaken to selected project sites for direct observation of the status of various projects. The following sites were visited:
    i. Dry fish processing – Bossaso,
    ii. Youth Center – Baidoa
    iii. Africa Working – Mogadishu.
    iv. Youth Center – Mogadishu.
e) **Validation**. A debrief was conducted with the evaluation reference group (ERG) comprising members of the Programme Steering Committee (PSC) in order to validate the findings and conclusions of the evaluation prior to drafting. The draft report was also submitted to the PUNOs and other stakeholders for their review and comments. The final version of this report incorporates their comments.

1.3. Limitations

One major limitation was the restriction on movement due to security considerations. To mitigate this imitation the evaluation team assigned the national consultant to visit some of the sites where the team leader could not visit.[1]

There was also a language limitation, as some of the key informants, particularly beneficiaries and community-level stakeholders did not speak English. In mitigation, the national consultant conducted the interviews in the Somali language based on the questionnaires provided in the Inception Report; and then translated the informants' responses for the benefit of the team leader.

1.4. Organisation and Structure of the Report

This report represents the final output and deliverable of the evaluation. The report is presented in 6 chapters as detailed below.

- Chapter 1 introduces the evaluation, including its purpose scope and objectives, as well as methodology and limitations.
- Chapter 2 provides a description of the country context of Somalia focusing particularly on youth employment. It also includes a description of the national and international response plans and frameworks.
- Chapter 3 contains a background of the JP, including the Results and M&E framework.
- Chapter 4 presents the findings of the evaluation. This chapter is structured around the evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability as defined by the United Nations Evaluation group (UNEG).[2]
- Chapter 5 contains the best practices that were identified, including emerging lessons to inform future programming.
- Chapter 6 presents the evaluation conclusions and recommendations.

The report also contains 5 Annexes as detailed below.

- Annex 1 – Documents reviewed.
- Annex 2 – Individuals interviewed.
- Annex 3a – Number of youth trained disaggregated by year.
- Annex 3b – Number of short-term cash-for-work jobs created, disaggregated by year.
- Annex 4 – Financial data: disaggregated by PUNO and component
- Annex 5 – Evaluation Terms of Reference.

---

[1] The national consultant interviewed youth beneficiaries at the youth centre in Baidoa; and visited Somali Working in Mogadishu

[2] http://www.uneval.org/document/guidance-documents

2. SOMALIA COUNTRY CONTEXT

This chapter contains a description of Somalia's development context, including particularly youth employment. The chapter focuses first on the overall development context of Somalia and then zeroes in on the situation of youth employment.

2.1. Development Context

The most recent history of Somalia has been marked by poverty, famine and recurring violence, which manifested through the downfall of the government and outbreak of civil war. The socio-economic situation of the country is very poor and Somalia has some of the lowest socio-economic indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa[3].

The socio-economic challenges in Somalia are multifaceted and differ according to various political, social and regional contexts. Most of the country is characterized by inequitable access to the means of production (land and capital), skewed distribution of wealth, reduced access to economic goods and services and remunerative employment. This adversely affects the population's capacity and ability to participate in social and political processes, particularly in the context of the complex clan dynamics in Somalia.

While the causes of poverty vary, it cuts across sectors, regions, cultural groups and gender. At regional level, the Southern part of Somalia is comparatively poorer and suffers from unstable economic conditions and fragile security conditions; with high prevalence of conflict, food shortages and a lack of proper infrastructure. Somaliland, in the North-West and Puntland, in the North East, experience more stability greater stability and more favourable with regard to socio economic conditions.

The World Bank Group (2016 data on Somalia - Agricultural sector survey) estimated that agriculture provides 60 percent of Somalia's gross domestic product (GDP), 80 percent of its employment and 90 percent of its exports. The economic contribution of livestock production surpasses crop production and accounts for more than 60 percent of the GDP and about three-fifths of Somalia's foreign exchange earnings, while crop production contributes less than 20 percent of the GDP.[4]

Other socio-cultural factors and norms also contribute to inequality between men and women in Somalia. The country is traditionally characterized by male dominance, resulting in low social

[3] Results of the High Frequency Survey (2016) indicated that on average 69% of the Somali live below the poverty line of $1.9 per day

[4] Somalia National Development Plan, page 4

status of women; yet, women who are largely illiterate and powerless bear heavy responsibilities, including raising children, housekeeping and domestic care work. According to a UNDP report, although women are benefiting from increased economic opportunities, many women still work in menial positions, involving *sacrifice, risk and humiliation*, and often only making enough money to sustain themselves and their families. In addition, women experience higher unemployment than men (74% for women and 61% for men).[5] In the case of nomadic communities, housekeeping usually includes caring for small animals, fetching firewood, water and building and dismantling the portable houses (Munduls) when the family moves from one grazing area to another. In settled agricultural communities, women undertake most of the farming activities, such as planting and cultivating crops and marketing produces.

The UNDP report also notes that the Gender Inequality Index for Somalia is 0.776 (with a maximum of 1 denoting complete inequality), placing Somalia at the fourth highest position globally.[6]

- Few women are active in the areas of the economy where high profits are seen through exports and imports; in livestock export and in the fishing industries, women are hardly represented.
- A 2002 socio-economic survey estimates that 14% of households are headed by women in urban areas, and 12% in rural areas, adding a critical element of hardship as women increasingly take on roles as providers of basic needs – particularly as these are often extracted from scarce natural resources (land, water, vegetation, etc).
- Most Somali women are either excluded from decision making and asset ownership or operate through a patriarchal filter in these areas – women are also often the first to suffer when natural resource access/attainment comes under pressure, due to cultural restrictions on movement, ownership.
- This can also be seen, for example, in times of drought when men migrate with their camels to find water, while women and children are expected to stay at home and care for the other livestock.

2.2. Youth Employment Context

According to the 2016 High Frequency Survey results, Somalia has a very young population, with approximately 50 percent of the population below the age of 15 years. Two-thirds of the youth population (age 15-24 years) are unemployed, making Somalia one of the highest rates of unemployment in the world.

[5] http://www.undp.org/content/dam/rbas/doc/Women's%20Empowerment/Gender_Somalia.pdf
[6] Ibid

The employment situation is bleak for Somali youth, as young people (15-24) struggle to find work, especially in the formal sector. The country does not have effective government social protection programmes, and the youth engage in menial and survival activities such as self-employment or as unpaid family workers. With these limited options, they also often engage in low-productive and poor quality jobs mostly in the informal economy. One of the underlying causes of low employment is absence of a competitive private sector. Some studies have concluded that the main cause of youth unemployment in Somalia is a result of "demand side" factors, i.e. low demand for jobs by companies[7].

However, experiences from Somalia and elsewhere show that when large members of young people are jobless and have few opportunities for positive engagement, they become a ready pool of recruits for violent extremists. The major push factors underlying youth engagement in violent conflict in Somalia are high youth unemployment and lack of livelihood opportunities, including insufficient, unequal and inappropriate education and skills combined with poor governance and weak political participation from the legacy of past conflicts.

2.3. National and International Frameworks

This section describes the national and international frameworks developed in response to the complex challenges in Somalia, and highlights particularly the strategies and plans most relevant to economic recovery in general, and youth employment in particular.

2.3.1. National Development Plan

The Somali National Development Plan (NDP) 2017 – 2019 articulates the nation's long term vision as "*A sovereign people working together to lay the foundation of future growth*", including a number of national values and principles, among which is a "*Gradual shift from humanitarian interventions to planning for long term sustainable and equitable development*"[8].

The NDP 2017 – 2019 also provides 12 policy priorities, three of which are:

- Reduce abject poverty – we hope to reduce the poverty incidence by 2% annually;
- Stimulate a vibrant economic sector, with particular focus on agriculture, livestock and fishing – we hope to achieve a stable growth of 3 -5 % annually;

[7] UNDP(2014); Trade and Private Sector Development: Project annual Report, p1
[8] National Development Plan, 2017 – 2019; p 11

- Increase employment opportunities and decent work particularly for the youth – we hope to create through steady economic growth at least 500,000 stable jobs.

The NDP notes that '*the country has relatively high vulnerable unemployment estimated at 59%, and a considerable unemployment rates (sic) for persons with upper primary level of education at 20.9% and those with secondary level of education an unemployment rate of 34.6%.*[9] It further notes '…*an urgent need (for) the government and the international community to work towards enabling the nation's workforce to gain employment opportunities through employment intensive investment programmes and support for the provision of small and medium-sized grants and or loans to encourage entrepreneurship'*.

The NDP also outlined, among others, the following specific priorities to guide the government and international partners in addressing the employment challenges in Somalia:

a) Employment creation through increased productivity, economic growth and national competitiveness, including by putting in place a strategic framework to reduce the cost of doing business to promote the growth and development of the small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs); as well as adopting a cluster development strategy to promote balanced regional growth and industrial competitiveness in strategic areas.
b) Skills development, including reform and revamping the technical, vocational education training system; and promotion of entrepreneurship, especially for the youth; as well as enhancing linkages between industry and education and training institutions.

Other measures include, establishment of robust social protection system, and labour market information system. The FGS has consistently stressed the importance of addressing the youth employment challenge, since the time of the New Deal and the Economic Recovery Plan to the present. However, the employment sector did not appear to have received as much emphasis as other sectors, where sub-sector working groups were established to provide a platform for line Ministries and development partners to share information.

2.3.2. New Deal Compact and New Partnership for Somalia

At the time of programme formulation, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the international community had developed the Somali New Deal Compact based on the Busan New

[9] Ibid, p 122

Deal principles[10], to provide the framework principles, priorities and strategies to effectively lead Somalia on a path of recovery, development and durable peace.

The Compact had five Peace and State-building Goals (PSGs), of which PSG 4 is on Economic Foundations, whose strategic objective is to "Revitalize and expand the Somali economy with a focus on livelihood enhancement, employment generation, and broad-based inclusive growth".[11] Six priority areas were identified to achieve this strategic objective, of which the following two are particularly relevant:

> **Priority 1**: Enhance the productivity of high priority sectors and related value chains, including through the rehabilitation and expansion of critical infrastructure for transport, market access, trade, and energy.
>
> **Priority 2**: Expand opportunities for youth employment through job creation and skills development.

In recognition of the progress made towards peace and stability, including in particular the election of a new national leadership, the New Partnership for Somalia (NPS) was developed at the London Conference in May 2017, setting out 'how Somalia and the international community will work together to meet Somalia's most pressing political, security and economic needs and aspirations, as set out in the National Development Plan (NDP)'[12].

The NPS outlines the key themes, shared goals and objectives, including the following on youth empowerment:

1) A sustained increase in support for youth engagement and political participation at all levels of government.
2) Measurable improvement in the quality of education and increased access to technical and vocational training opportunities for young people.
3) Comprehensive support to youth entrepreneurship including the removal of legal barriers and increased access to capital.
4) Sustained support to youth rehabilitation and reintegration programmes and initiatives that foster young people's well-being and development

[10] The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States developed through the forum of the International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding was presented and widely endorsed at the 4th High level Forum on Aid Effectiveness on 30 November 2011.

[11] Somali Compact, p 8

[12] New Partnership for Somalia: A framework for Mutual Accountability and Accelerated Progress

2.3.3. United Nations Strategic Framework (UNSF)

The evaluation of the JP-YES spans across two overarching strategic frameworks for the UN system in Somalia: Somalia Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) 2014 – 2016; and United Nations Strategic Framework (UNSF) 2017 – 2020. The ISF was structured around the PSGs of the Compact, and in that regard, also included a goal for Economic Foundations (PSG 4), with similar priorities.

The UNSF (2017 – 2020) adopted a slightly different structure based on five Strategic Priorities (SP) that are aligned to the NDP and Sustainable development Goals (SDGs). **SP 5: Supporting socio-economic opportunities for Somalis, leading to meaningful poverty reduction, access to basic social services and sustainable, inclusive and equitable development** has two outcomes, of which the following is particularly relevant:

> **Outcome 5.2. Productive sectors strengthened to promote inclusive growth, employment opportunities and sustainable development.**

The UNSF also prioritizes three cross-cutting issues: (i) Gender equality and women's empowerment, (ii) Human rights, and (iii) **Youth empowerment**.

3. JOINT PROGRAMME DESCRIPTION

The JP on Youth Employment Somalia (YES) was developed in 2015 by five JP partners – FGS (represented by Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA)[13], Food and Agriculture organization (FAO), International Labour Organization (ILO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN Habitat). The JP had planned budget of US$54 million, of which the initial $8.9 million was funded by the governments of Denmark, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland over a period of 36 months from June 2015 – June 2018. The United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) joined the programme in April 2017 as part of the Daldhis project discussed in page 31 below.

The total approved budget of $8,900,500 million was available for the period September June 2015 to December 2016. In May 2017, the Programme Steering Committee (PSC) decided to revise the programme document, extending its implementation to December 2017, based on additional funding of $14 million which increased the total funded budget to $23,651,888,

[13] Although the JP Document was subsequently signed by MoLSA, at the time of its development the main government counterpart was the Office of the Prime Minister

including UNDP contribution.[14] In the broader context of the Somalia Peacebuilding Priority Plan, the JP YES also received funding from the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), together with the Joint Programme for Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery (JPLG) and the Joint Programme for Rule of Law (JPROL). The aim was to establish synergy among the three JPs through an 'area based approach' to support legitimacy and state authority in targeted local jurisdictions. The total funding contribution by donor is in Annex 4.

3.1. JP Objectives and Results Framework

The overall objective and expected outcome of the JP is to contribute to PSG 4: Economic Foundations - Somali economy revitalized and expanded with a focus on livelihood enhancement, employment generation, and broad-based inclusive growth; and specifically targeting the two priority areas of:

- ***PSG 4, Priority 2****: "Expand opportunities for youth employment through job creation and skills development;"*
- ***PSG 4, Priority 1****: "Enhance the productivity of high priority sectors and related value chains, including through the rehabilitation and expansion of critical infrastructure for transport, market access, trade, and energy;"*

The JP has three sub-outcomes:

Sub-Outcome 1: Improved long-term potential for growth, productivity and inclusive employment through six value chains implementation plans.

Sub-Outcome 2: Enhanced longer-term employability of youth in sectors with high growth and employment potential.

Sub-Outcome 3: Productive infrastructure rehabilitated through labour-intensive methods.

3.2. JP Strategy and Theory of Change

The overall strategy was to address both demand-side and supply-side measures by focusing on identifying and removing competitiveness constraints for companies, sectors, and value chains that have the potential for future growth and employment, while at the same time creating immediate employment opportunities in the targeted local communities and areas.

Based on the JP document, the programme would be rolled out to all seven States/administrations: Benadir Region, Interim Jubaland administration, Puntland, Interim South West administration, Mudug and Galgadud regions, Hiiran & Middle Shabelle, with the

[14] Joint Programme on Youth Employment; Amendment 1

final list of target districts to be decided by government. The PSC also decided to extend implementation to Somaliland. A further review of JP quarterly reports shows that interventions were carried out in the following mainly urban districts: Mogadishu, Abudwak, Belatweyn, Kismayo, Jowhar, Bosaso, and Baidoa, as well as Berbera and Caynabo in Somaliland.

The programme strategy comprised of three components – value chain development, capacity development through vocational and skills training, and developing productive infrastructure through cash for work. The value chain analysis will inform the design of the youth employment programme, in particular interventions under Components 2 and 3.[15] Interventions under the value-chain development component would be aimed at addressing generic or sector-specific specific enabling environment issues, such as access to finance for youth and businesses, as well technology for value addition. Under the second component for skill development, the strategy was to develop a comprehensive youth skills package for youth from different socio-economic backgrounds in order to deliver competency-based training programmes which respond to the needs of Somali employers, as identified during the value chain study. The focus for the third component was to rehabilitate productive infrastructure identified through the detailed value chain analyses in selected sectors in the target locations. The programme strategy model is illustrated in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. JP Strategy and theory of change



[15] JP document, page 25

4. EVALUATION FINDINGS

This chapter presents the evaluation findings based on analysis of data and information obtained from multiple sources. The evaluation was also cognisant of the fact that only 43.7% ($23.65 million) of the initial programme budget of $54 million was funded. In order to present the findings in a user-friendly and useful manner, while also responding to the evaluation terms of reference comprehensively, the findings are structured around the evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.

4.1. JP Relevance

A. Alignment with needs and priorities of all stakeholders

Youth unemployment is widely considered to be among the key push factors that drives youth migration as well as recruitment of youth into extremist groups such as Al Shabab. The FGS notes in the NDP that "*Approximately 50% of the population is below the age 15 years. This situation is unlikely to change in the near future due to a high fertility rate. It has been and probably will continue to be the major source of conflict in Somalia, where two-thirds of youth are unemployed – one of the highest rates of unemployment in the world. This is among the factors fuelling Al-Shabaab's appeal.*"[16]

The international community also recognises the creation of economic opportunities, and particularly employment creation as one of the major cornerstones for stability in Somalia. This was aptly reflected in the Somali Compact, which states that:

> *"The economy has a critical role to play in Somalia's state-building and peacebuilding processes. Employment generation can help build trust in government and encourage social cohesion. A growing economy can generate critical revenue to support public service delivery and build the legitimacy of public institutions. An improved economy, with a vibrant private sector, can also increase opportunities for peace and reduce conflict. This is achieved through broad-based and inclusive engagement of the population, including the diaspora, in productive activities, and the generation of employment"* (page 8).

The JP objective to provide employment opportunities for youth is therefore consistent with the needs of the country as well as priorities of government and its development partners as illustrated in Figure 2 below.

[16] Somalia NDP 2017 – 2019; p 1

Figure 2. Alignment of JP outcomes with national and international frameworks

JP Outcome	NDP Policy Priorities	New Partnership for Somalia	ISF/UNSF Priorities	SDGs
Sub-Outcome 1: Improved long-term potential for growth, productivity and inclusive employment through six value chains implementation plans.	V. Stimulate a vibrant economic sector, with particular focus on agriculture, livestock and fishing – we hope to achieve a stable growth of 3 -5 % annually.	- Engage private sector and civil society leaders at the local, regional and national level on priority areas of development, including inclusive growth, investment and job creation through structured mechanisms and other coordination efforts.	**Strategic Priority 5:** Supporting socioeconomic opportunities for Somalis, leading to meaningful poverty reduction, access to basic social services and sustainable, inclusive and equitable development.	1) Ending Poverty; 2) Zero hunger; 5) Gender Equality; 8) Decent work and Economic growth; 9) Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure; 10) Reduced Inequalities; 12) Responsible Consumption and Production;
Sub-Outcome 2: Enhanced longer-term employability of youth in sectors with high growth and employment potential.	VI. Increase employment opportunities and decent work particularly for the youth; and create through steady economic growth at least 500,000 stable jobs.	-Measurable improvement in the quality of education and increased access to technical and vocational training opportunities for young people. -Comprehensive support to youth entrepreneurship including the removal of legal barriers and increased access to capital. -Sustained support to youth rehabilitation and reintegration programmes and initiatives that foster young people's well-being and development	Strategic Priority 5	8) Decent work and Economic growth; 9) Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure; 10) Reduced Inequalities;
Sub-Outcome 3: Productive infrastructure rehabilitated through labour-intensive methods.	V. Stimulate a vibrant economic sector, with particular focus on agriculture, livestock and fishing – we hope to achieve a stable growth of 3 -5 % annually.	- Alignment of Somali and international efforts behind the mutually agreed priorities for economic recovery and resilience in the NDP.	Strategic Priority 5	8) Decent work and Economic growth; 9) Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure; 11) Sustainable cities and Communities;

Various stakeholders, including government officials interviewed noted that the JP was not only critical, but that it was also the only initiative where Government and local authorities are involved and have a role to jointly, with the United Nations, address the critical challenge of youth unemployment nationally. Other key informants also noted that it was the only UN joint programme although much smaller than the bilateral efforts such as the USAID funded Growth, Enterprise, Employment and Livelihoods (GEEL) programme; or the DfID funded Promoting Inclusive Markets in Somalia (PIMS).

The JP is therefore well aligned with the national and international development frameworks for Somalia, and also addresses one of the key challenges and push factors that drive instability and youth migration in Somalia.

B. Coherence of programme design in enabling multiplier effects

A more rigorous interrogation of relevance leads to two other issues that should be considered beyond alignment with national and partner priorities. These include: *whether or not the JP's interventions, and the sequencing of their implementation could generate large multiplier effects[17], while providing solutions to issues that may be peripheral to the underlying problem.*

At the level of its design, the JP was based on comprehensive analysis of the diverse solutions that have been previously implemented in Somalia to address the problem. This approach culminated with selection of an approach based on value-chain development, to provide technical assistance to sub-sectors with high job-creation potential. In formulating the programme, the joint programme partners drew on relevant lessons, and noted that past approaches to employment creation in Somalia typically involved "supply side" interventions that sought to address active labour market policies (ALMP), including, (1) Short-term job creation through injecting cash into the local economy targeting rehabilitation of basic infrastructure; (2) Livelihoods projects focusing on access to inputs and grants; and (3) Skills training, through mostly vocational training. However, these interventions did not create sustainable long term jobs, because they did not simultaneously address "demand side" factors for employment creation.[18]

Besides issues relating to security and state-building, the major causes of youth unemployment in Somalia also includes macroeconomic dimensions such as low levels of investment, lack of sound macroeconomic policies, weak financial sector, fragmented labour markets, inadequate infrastructure and low labour productivity. All these have an impact on the demand for labour by the private sector.

[17] Understood here to mean the ripple effects from the indirect creation of other jobs arising from programme interventions

[18] Joint Programme Document, page 12

The JP adopted the approach for 'value chain development' and identified three entry points, namely, (a) value chain analyses to identify sectors with growth and employment potential, (b) skills development to address skills gaps that constrain youth entry in those sectors/sub-sectors, and (c) cash for work to build enabling infrastructure for the value chains, while also providing immediate livelihood needs for the youth. The logic of the approach was to address the critical bottlenecks in the value chain, in a context where the market systems are either very weak or non-existent.

> The ILO defines value chains as "activities needed to bring a product from the initial idea and conception to its final market, including design, production, marketing, distribution and support services, up to the final consumer".
>
> **Sustainable Enterprise Programme: Value Chain Development for more and better jobs**

However, many key informants noted that the design lacked some of the key enabling parameters and multipliers, including particularly a component for '**private sector development'**. As noted in the joint programme document, *"…the main cause of youth unemployment in Somalia appears to be a result of "demand side" factors. Reasons for low demand by companies for jobs include* ***low levels of investment****, lack of sound* ***macroeconomic policies****, lack of a well-functioning* ***financial sector****, fragmented* ***labour markets****, inadequate* ***infrastructure*** *and, finally, overall low* ***labour productivity***". Clearly therefore, sustainable employment cannot be created in a vacuum; given the gaps identified in the enabling environment. A key success factor for the programme is therefore to ensure that the private sector has the requisite capacity to create sustainable, long-term jobs, while also government and other national institutions have relevant capacity to develop and sustain a conducive environment for employment creation. Since this is a major risk for success, it would be incumbent upon the 'Programme' to create minimum enabling environment (policies, strategies, procedures) and facilitate institutional capacity development, including, but not limited to (a) establishing policy and institutional infrastructure, (b) business linkages and value chain development, (c) business development services, (d) local economic development, and (e) access to finance. These enablers and multipliers are critical to the efficacy of the strategy, but as shall be discussed in section 4.2 below, they were implemented in a piecemeal manner, thereby reducing the impact of the programme. Some of these factors may be addressed through other projects. However, such synergies should be purposefully integrated in the programme design so that their implementation is monitored and associated risks managed.

While the programme components are essential for attaining long term sustainable employment, the programme lacks other critical components that would trigger multiplier effects, such as private sector development, enabling environment and institutional capacity development.

4.2. Effectiveness

In line with the evaluation terms of reference, effectiveness focuses on the JP's efficacy and assesses the extent to which its overall objectives have been met or are expected to be met, taking into account their relative importance. In this regard, the reader's attention is drawn to the overall objective, which is creation of sustainable long term jobs for the youth. By definition, employment creation is 'the process of providing new jobs, especially for people who are unemployed'.

C. Implementation of the strategy model

As illustrated in Figure 1 above, the JP strategy was to create sustainable employment while also providing immediate jobs and relief to the large pool of unemployed youth. To quote directly from the JP document, *"…the Programme will shift from a traditional "livelihood perspective" towards a "competitiveness perspective". This means that we will focus less on individuals – though they will be the ultimate beneficiaries - and focus more on identifying and removing the binding constraints for companies, sectors, and value chains that have the potential for future growth and employment (page 15)"*.

However, documentary evidence from JP reports, as well direct observation in the field visits and key informant interviews suggests that the model has not been put to the test in its totality. Based on documentary evidence, as at end of 2016, a total of 112 public, private and academic actors had received training on value chain methods. Three value chains were identified, although only one for the fisheries sector had been approved by the time of this evaluation.

Key informants noted that the most comprehensive case study of the model so far implemented was for the dry fish sector in Bossaso, Puntland. The other two value chains – dairy and sesame - were not pursued after realisation that available funding was not sufficient to cover implementation of all three value chains nationally. Besides, it was also observed that there were other value-chain programmes focusing on the sesame sector.[19]

Based on review of the value chain analysis undertaken by UNDP in 2016, specific constraints were identified (Figure 3). Some key informants noted however that the value chain analysis was done by UNDP rather than FAO, given the latter's comparative advantages in fisheries. This is an

[19] For example; the USAID funded Growth, Enterprise, Employment and Livelihoods (GEEL) programme

indication of how Participating United Nations Organisations (PUNOs) did not leverage on their collective comparative advantages as discussed below in Section 4.3.

Figure 3. Main activities and constraints on the various fishery actors



Source: Adopted from illustrations in Somalia Sector Profile: Fisheries; pages 21 and 26

An analysis of Figure 3 shows that the key constraints affecting almost all levels of the value chain are; (i) lack of access to finance, (ii) lack of skills and knowledge, and (iii) inadequate policy and regulatory framework. It is logical to assume therefore, that these three constraints would have been identified as 'key success factors', without which the strategy would not be able to realise the intended outcomes. Figure 4 below shows the interventions that were undertaken by PUNOs to address the above constraints.

Figure 4. JP Interventions to address market constraints in the value chain

CONSTRAINTS	• **Access to finance** • **Transportation** • **Market distribution** • **Skill and Knowledge**	• **Access to Finance** • **Input cost** • **Illegal fishing** • **Processing/cold storage**	• **Access to finance** • **Transportation** • **Knowledge** • **Energy** • **Policy and regulation**	• **Infrastructure** • **Taxation** • **Technology** • **Access to finance** • **Quality standards**
Value chain	Input supply	Production	Collection / trade	Processing / Exporting
Interventions by JP PUNOs	- Skills gap analysis - Skills straining, including training of trainers - Construction of 3km road	- Equipment and tools for small pelagic fish species: (a) locally moulded boat, (b) aggregated fishing device, (c) low cost lifting platform - On board handling training	- Skills training in dry fish processing and packaging - Small grants to IDP communities	- Skills training and tool kits for dry fish processing - Market awareness and information, including on nutrition - Trial to export markets

The above case study illustrates important lessons. Firstly, it shows that a value chain approach should take a complete view of the system from start to finish. If other links in the value chain are not addressed, they can impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the whole chain. Secondly, it illustrates the opportunities that can be available for interagency collaboration based on their individual mandates and comparative advantages in the context of a joint programme. Thirdly, it also illustrates how the programme's components [value chain development; infrastructure development; and skills training] are all linked towards the desired outcome.

UNDP undertook the initial value chain analysis to identify the systemic constraints. UNDP also constructed dry fish processing facilities in the IDP camps to benefit disadvantaged youth as well as rehabilitation of Bulsho gravel road in Ga'ate through cash for work resulting in creation of 150 short term jobs for the youth in Bosasso. ILO did a skills gap analysis to identify the knowledge gaps in the industry, including identification of local TVET institutions capable of providing the required training. In collaboration with UNDP, 'training of trainers' (TOT) workshop on dry fish processing using minimal resources available at community level was undertaken. FAO provided tools and equipment for harvesting of small pelagic fish species, as well skills training for IDP youth in dry fish processing and packaging, and other specialised training such as on-board handling, nutrition and market awareness. FAO also supported trial shipments to selected export markets to assess market availability, and at the time of drafting, was also engaged in developing quality standards with relevant government institutions and the Ministry of Fisheries.

UN Habitat received the funding for 2017 in June and had engaged the required support staff in August, with implementation starting the following month. In line with its planned activities for 2017, UN Habitat provided life skills training to youth who did not finish or qualify for the apprenticeship scheme undertaken earlier by ILO. However, the life skills training activities are not directly related to the fisheries value chain; for example, **youth speakers' corner,** which provides a forum for youth to air out their views on multiple issues including political participation.[20] They also did a **city clean-up campaign** whereby youth are involved in activities to clean up the city. The evaluators noted however that this activity does not fit in with the 'cash for work' model because UN Habitat does not pay for such services, other than providing them with protective clothing and meals.

Other than as exemplified in Bossaso, the programme strategy has not been comprehensively implemented, with its interventions seemingly fragmented and therefore losing the key advantage that should be provided by joint programming.

[20] Other key informants noted that this life skills training aimed to build the confidence and self-esteem of youth, particularly young women and girls who lacked formal education and training

D. Contribution to the programme objective and expected outcomes

Various 'cash for work' activities were implemented in Benadir, Jubbaland and South West regions, creating varying numbers of short term jobs for youth in respective locations, but these were not particularly anchored on a specific value chain analysis. Some of the 'cash for work' activities were much more inclined to social protection interventions, than employment creation, such as for example the cash-for-work in response to the 2016 drought. Similarly, various trainings on life skills and skills development were undertaken in all the regions; but again some of them were not driven by the strategy logic to link them to a specific value chain.

4.2.1. Component 1. Value chain development

According to the JP strategy model, the creation of sustainable long term jobs would come about through the combined effects of implementing the three components as outlined in page 14 above. As also previously noted, the model has not yet been fully tested, and consequently progress on the indicators is limited (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Component 1 outcome and output assessment[21]

JP Sub-Outcome 1. Improved long-term potential for growth, productivity and employment through six value chains implementation plans.				
Indicator	**Baseline**	**Target**	**Progress achieved**	**Evaluation Assessment***
Number of government-agreed interventions for upgrading value chains.	0	10	3 **(fisheries value chain)**	Satisfactory
Number of new long-term jobs	0	Total: 2,000 Women: 30%	Total: 76 Women: No data	Unsatisfactory
Number of youth start-up companies created	0	Total: 1,000 Women: 30%	Data not available	
Number and percentage of startup businesses still operating after 12 months	0	Total: 500	Data not available	
Output 1.1. Capacities of public, private and academic institutions built to undertake value chain analysis and key interventions identified.				
Number of public, private and academic actors trained on value chain methods.	0	Total: 30 Women: 30% (9)	Institution: 1 Individuals: 23	Unsatisfactory
Number of value chain analyses in selected sectors and locations	0	6	5	**On track**
Number of value chain implementation strategies approved.	0	6	1	Unsatisfactory
Output 1.2. Key interventions implemented to improve their long-term potential for growth, productivity and employment.				
Number of generic or sector specific constraints in selected value chains addressed as identified by government	0	10	5	**Satisfactory**

Note: Assessment scale >70% is ; 50 – 69% is ; and < 50% is . {Other assessments may be qualitative}.

[21] Data compiled from JP Annual Progress Report 2016 and Quarterly Reports Q1 and Q2 2017

One of the major issues that seems to have impacted on effectiveness towards expected results was a seeming lack of consensus among stakeholders, including notably among the PUNOs on the efficacy of the strategy. For example, in 2016 second quarter report noted that:

> ***Output 2.1**: Labour market assessments were concluded to understand the employment opportunities and inform the design of vocational training programmes for unemployed and underemployed young men and women. These assessments were conducted in Jowhar, Abudwaq, Beledweyn, Baidoa, Kismayo, Galkayo, Bosaso and Berbera. The focus shifted from undertaking skills gap analysis for the three Value Chains (VC's) to District level labour market assessments (inclusive of consumer survey and enterprise survey). The changes in type of studies were due to findings carried out by other programmes in early 2016, of which results revealed that the value chains initially targeted by the Youth Employment Programme offer minimum potential for employment opportunity. Thus a labour market assessment (LMA) was more suitable as it aimed at providing a snapshot of what goods and services were available and how satisfied consumers were with goods and services offered in a local market. Moreover, the LMA identified key areas where there is demand for specific goods or services as well as areas where there is limited or no demand.*

Clearly, one of the PUNOs had taken a different view and approach from the one initially agreed in the JP document. Following on this assertion, ILO partnered with an international consortium - Africa Working to develop 'employability eco-system' in Somalia. The premise of the eco-system approach is that skills training interventions are not sufficient to prepare youth in the labour market for the needs of employers. In that regard, Africa Working undertook a comprehensive market scan of institutions in Mogadishu, including government departments, private sector employers, training institutions and job-seekers; and based on that, developed a training programme for 400 youths to undertake skills development in the specific areas determined by employers, such as for example, project management, entrepreneurship, graphic design and information technology (IT).

ILO also supported the establishment of a Private Sector Leaders' Council to bring together leaders from the private sector to dialogue on relevant topics to do with labour policy and regulations. The Africa Working approach has been tried in other countries, including Tanzania and Uganda where it has worked well. An example of how this may work was demonstrated in 2017, when in collaboration with the Puntland Chamber of Commerce, the JP undertook a youth forum attended by business leaders, members of the local community, government representatives and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to discuss the challenges facing the fisheries sector, particularly focusing on the skills gap. An apprenticeship scheme was developed with initial intake of 150 youths in 29 enterprises. The business leaders committed to employ 45 youths (out of which 18 were women) on a full-time basis. The evaluators were unable to independently verify the existence of these jobs due to movement constraints.

However, other key informants, notably all donors that were interviewed felt that the initial design concept based on value chain development was very relevant and appropriate for creating long term sustainable employment. They noted that the strategy has not been implemented, with the PUNOs siting issues of limited access to rural areas in order to fully implement the value chain approach especially for the agriculture sector. The sesame sector was also dropped on realisation that there were other development partners who were active in that sector, including the Growth, Enterprise, Employment and Livelihoods (GEEL) Project funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Promoting Inclusive Markets in Somalia (PIMS), funded by the Department for International Development (DfID). The PSC approved the addition of three value chains – renewable energy, information technology and construction. However, all donors that were consulted said they still had not seen any progress in these sectors, and overall they would like to see the UN return to implementing the initial design concept. Moreover, no comprehensive value chain analyses were undertaken for these newly proposed sectors, which also contributed to the perception of partial or fragment approaches as discussed above.

The donors also expressed concerns about the duplication that seems to be happening without due regard to the comparative advantages of individual UN agencies. Specifically, they felt that ILO should increase its focus on strengthening the enabling legislative and policy environment for the employment sector, and UNDP on institutional capacity development.[22]

A key success factor for joint programming therefore is to build initial consensus on which sectors or value chains to target and agree on specific roles and responsibilities of the JP partners. In the absence of this, duplication and fragmentation may occur leading to dilution of results.

4.2.2. Component 2. Vocational and skills training

Component 2 of the joint programme aimed at addressing the skills gap in enterprises through market-driven skills training, with a target to train 20,000 youths[23]. Available evidence, including observations from the field indicate that most of the PUNOs were involved in life skills and/or

---

[22] Some UN programme staff noted that these had not been given high priority in the original programme design, although some UN agencies, notably UNDP were undertaking capacity building through other projects.
[23] These targets were based on a fully funded programme with planned budget of $54 million

vocational skills development. It was also evident that there was gender parity in the selection of participants, with almost all those that were directly observed having fifty percent female participants. Some of the training providers noted that selection is done by local community elders, who are given specific and pre-determined number of female participants as part of the selection criteria. In the case of UNIDO, beneficiary selection was based on surveys of enterprises in the light industrial areas of Kismayo and Baidoa to identify potential trainees who had requisite skills and familiarity with the equipment, technology and tools that would be used for training.

However, some of the indicators were not monitored, while those that were monitored, modest progress was achieved (Figure 6). The number of youth trained by year is in annex 3a.

Figure 6. Component 2 outcome and output assessment

JP Sub-Outcome 2. Enhanced longer term employability of youth in sectors with high growth and employment potential.				
Indicator	**Baseline**	**Target**	**Progress achieved**	**Evaluation Assessment***
Number of youth who have received training (basic literacy, numeracy, life-skills, vocational and business training).	0	Total: 20,000 Urban: 13,000 Rural: 7,000 Women: 30%	Total: 5,234 Urban: Rural: Women: 1,705 (32%)	**Satisfactory**
Percentage of trained youth employed within 6 six months	0	Total: 65% Women: 30%	Data not available	
Output 2.1. Curricula developed for occupations identified by value chain analyses and prioritized by Federal government and regional states.				
Number of curricula developed	0	6	4	**Satisfactory**
Output 2.2. Programmes of vocational, business and life skills training provided for at least 20,000 youth.				
Number of Somali youth trained (disaggregated by type and gender)	0	Total: 20,000 Vocational: 4,500 Life skills: 3,500 Other: 12,000 Women: 30%	Total: 5,487 Vocational: 820 Life skills: 290 Other: 3,894 Women: 38 (2017)	Unsatisfactory
Output 2.3. Capacity of ministries and institutions for the collections, analysis and storage of labour market data and youth employment programming developed.				
Number of public, private and academic actors trained on labour market analysis	0	Total: 40 Women: 30%	2 MOLSA staff	Unsatisfactory
Number of ministries and local authorities trained to develop youth employment programmes	0	5	1 local authority (Benadir Region)	Unsatisfactory

Note: Assessment scale >70% is ; 50 – 69% is ; and < 50% is . {Other assessments may be qualitative}.

While the planned targets for vocational and skills development are unlikely to be achieved; taking into account that the available resources were US$23.65 million out of an initial total planned budget of US$ 54 million, the number of youth trained is considered proportionate.

However, based on information obtained from key informants at national and regional levels, the content of the training was not satisfactory as elaborated below.

Key informants noted that most of the training followed the traditional model of skills training focusing on such skills as carpentry, masonry, plumbing, tailoring, and hospitality. Although some key informants noted that these skills are linked to the construction value chain, there was however no value chain analysis undertaken for the construction sector/subsector. In Baidoa however, stakeholders noted that the training skills were not market relevant. They also observed that the training packages were usually for a duration of 3 to 4 months, which was hardly sufficient to impart meaningful skills, especially if the training was targeting the most disadvantaged youth who will likely have very limited formal education or illiterate. The evaluation team also noted that the JP missed opportunities for developing strategic partnerships with established training providers in the regions. For example, in Garowe, SIDRA Institute was an established private institution with capacity to undertake both research and training within the Puntland region and nationally.[24]

> "Vocational skills are generally good because an individual can use them for a lifetime. But this is like tackling a macro-level problem with micro-level interventions. It would be more effective to resuscitate the factories that were functional in Baidoa before collapse of the State".
>
> **South West Regional Chamber of Commerce**

In addition, there are missed opportunities for strategic long term and sustainable engagement through institutional capacity development. Key informants in Baidoa observed for example, that there is no TVET institution in the region[25]. Supporting the establishment of such an institution would be more strategic to provide sustainable skills development. Furthermore, such an institution could provide accredited and certified qualifications, which would be more useful and marketable for the youth.

The evaluation team also noted that UNIDO had a different approach in which they target youth that are already in employment. UNIDO staff noted that their interventions were mainly for the construction value chain, and aimed at 'increasing the number of productive working hours, income generation, and strengthening the productive capacity of workshops'. While this improves productivity, and may in the long term contribute to make companies more competitive thereby helping to secure sustainable jobs. However, as also noted earlier, some of the training was outside the selected value chains, or lacked explicit reference to initiatives

[24] It is noteworthy that UN programme staff generally disagree with the views expressed by the various key informants. However, as they constitute the national stakeholders, the UN should attempt to address these concerns, including through broader stakeholder engagement rather than ignore them as uninformed.
[25] This information was disputed by some UN agency programme staff who noted that there were four TVET institutions in Baidoa.

addressed to other value chain constraints. The trainees are given $6 a day as an incentive to participate, personal protective equipment, first aid and work safety and nutritional support. In addition, on completion of training, the best 35 percent are given tool kits to use when they return to their jobs.

UNIDO also provides training for inmates in Baidoa Central Prison, including convicted Al Shabab. The training covers basic vocational skills, which enables them to do useful work while inside, such as repairs and painting of prison infrastructure. This also enables their reintegration into the community upon release. The impact of this approach, i.e. whether or not this will effectively discourage them from rejoining Al Shabab is not yet known, but if lack of opportunity and skills was the only factor, that assumption would be logical. One inmate who undertook brickmaking training while in prison was released on 5 January, and was already engaged in brickmaking using the tool kit provided. The ex-inmate also helped to establish a farming plot and chicken coop at the prison in collaboration with other Al Shabab inmates as a 'champion' of the programme

In 2016, FAO also undertook training of 210 youth in good agricultural practices (GAP) and modern farming techniques in the sesame sector in Baidoa, Beletweyn and Jowhar. The project combined GAP training with agribusiness training to promote the idea of agriculture as a profitable business opportunity and not just "farming" – which is more in line with the JP strategy model.

In some cases, the youth were provided with starter kits upon completion of training in order to provide them with productive capital assets and tools to start and own small enterprises. There is no evidence however, that the JP had institutionalised a formal monitoring mechanism to follow up on these youths to check if indeed they were establishing such enterprises and if so, whether or not they were sustainable. The evaluation team noted that such information, if available was only anecdotal and not formally monitored or reported. Some PUNO programme staff noted that while the JP may not have such a monitoring mechanism, individual UN agencies do. Other programme staff also agreed that lack of effective tracking for individual training beneficiaries was a challenge; and the practical difficulties of following up individual trainees – often in remote rural areas – and the costs of doing so were prohibitive.

Social rehabilitation programme in Baidoa

According to youth groups interviewed in Bossaso and Garowe, the major challenge they faced was lack of capital. The programme has provided small grants in some cases, but this aspect is generally lacking from the implementation model. The programme has an opportunity to introduce a micro finance model based on a revolving fund, which has been tested in other countries such as Bangladesh and Ethiopia.

There was also high level of duplication by UN agencies, with all of them engaged in skills training of one form or another with little or no coordination. The evaluation team noted that the JP missed opportunities to build synergies, such as ensuring that the youth that are trained by one agency are offered preference on opportunities arising from the activities of partner agencies. In the regions visited by the evaluation team, PUNOs generally had no idea what the other agencies were doing. In some cases, project officers did not even know each other or had never formally talked to each other about their JP activities.

Overall however, while there was high level of satisfaction among youth beneficiaries of the training programmes, there appeared to be rather mixed views among other stakeholders who tended to see the training packages as too traditional or short term to make an impact on long-term employment.

4.2.3. Component 3. Infrastructure development

Component 3 of the joint programme focused on infrastructure development through 'cash for work' interventions, both as enablers for value chains and also as immediate relief for unemployed youth. Data for most of the indicators for this component was not available at the time of this evaluation (Figure 7). The number of short term 'cash for work' jobs disaggregated by year is in annex 3b.

Figure 7. Component 3 outcome and output assessment

JP Sub-Outcome 3. Productive infrastructure rehabilitated through labour-intensive methods.				
Indicator	**Baseline**	**Target**	**Progress achieved**	**Evaluation Assessment***
Number of work-months created	0	Total: 124,000	Data not available	
Number of productive infrastructure rehabilitated	0	TBD	Data not available	
Output 3.1. Rural productive infrastructure projects implemented (feeder roads, canals, water catchments, erosion control and flood control etc.).				
Number of short-term rural jobs created	0	Total: 16,000	Total: 4880 Women: 2,479 (51%)	Unsatisfactory
Number of rural productive infrastructure projects implemented	TBD	TBD	38	No baseline and target

JP Sub-Outcome 3. Productive infrastructure rehabilitated through labour-intensive methods.				
Output 3.2. Urban infrastructure projects implemented (roads, environmental works, storage facilities, markets, etc.).				
Number of short-term urban jobs created	0	14,000 30% women	Total: 6,680 Women: 3,651 (55%)	Satisfactory
Amount injected into the local economy (through wages)	0	Total: US$ 2.9 mil	$2,325,008	On track
Number of urban infrastructure projects implemented	0	TBD	10	No target defined
Output 3.3. Capacity of ministries and institutions for the collections, analysis and storage of labour market data and youth employment programming developed.				
Number of ministries and local authorities trained	0	Total: 5	Data not available	

Note: Assessment scale >70% is ; 50 – 69% is ; and < 50% is . {Other assessments may be qualitative}.

Some of the output indicators for this component have not been monitored or reported as evident from the lack of data in Figure 7 above. This is rather counter intuitive because this is the component that appears to have been the most visible to majority of stakeholders.

Most stakeholders that were interviewed were familiar with one or more infrastructure developed through the joint programme. In Baidoa, the programme rehabilitated a bridge as well several secondary gravel roads and a youth center. These are all useful infrastructure, and in Baidoa particularly, a senior public official noted that the construction of a three kilometer stretch of road had made huge impact, reducing the cost of commuting for the community from 60,000 Somali Shillings to 5,000 Somali shillings. However, the same official struggled to link the infrastructure developed to specific employment creation other than the short-term jobs that were created. Admittedly however, there may well be some indirect impacts in terms of business competitiveness in the long term.

Cash for work and infrastructure development in Baidoa

The evaluation team also noted that this component sometimes assumed characteristics of a contingency fund for social protection. For example, in the second quarter of 2017, UNDP responded to the draught situation by implementing ‘cash for work’ activities in Somaliland and South West State and reported creating short-term employment for 1,290 drought-affected people by constructing three water catchments in Ainabo, Somaliland and clean-up activities in

Baidoa. While these are important interventions, they represent more of emergence response and social protection than employment creation.[26]

E. Programme monitoring and reporting

The programme quarterly and annual progress reports are the major tools through which the PSC and other stakeholders monitor the performance of the programme, and based on that make informed decisions to accelerate progress or bring it back on track in the event of any deviation. This implies that reporting should be comprehensive and should not be done in a selective manner, whereby only those indicators with positive progress are reported on.

An analysis of the programme's quarterly reports shows that reporting of the outcome and output indicators varies from time to time. In some reports some of the indicators are omitted, only to reappear in subsequent quarter reports. The following examples illustrate the inconsistences in reporting (Figure 8).

Figure 8. Inconsistent reporting on indicators

Sub-outcome 1: No indicators reported in the 2016 and 2017 quarterly and annual reports.
Sub-outcome 2: No indicators reported in 2016; but 2 indicators reported in 2017 reports.
Sub-outcome 3: No indicators reported in the 2016 and 2017 quarterly and annual reports.
Output 1.1: Only two indicators reported in Q1 2016; then all 3 indicators reported in 2017.
Output 1.2: No indicators reported in 2016; then 4 indicators appeared in 2017 reports.
Output 2.1: Only one indicator reported instead of two as per the JP results framework.
Output 2.2: Two indicators reported in Q2 2016; and only one reported thereafter.

Source: Compiled from JP quarterly and annual progress reports

As illustrated above, reporting on indicators varies from time to time. Not all of the indicators as contained in the programme results framework were consistently shown in the quarterly and annual reports. However, even when no activities are carried out during any given quarter, all the indicators should be reported and shown in the reporting matrix. For quantitative indicators, a zero should be reported if/where no activities are results were achieved, because this information will be useful for management decision-making. Although some programme staff noted that this was a directive from the Multi-partner Trust Fund to omit indicators for which no substantial progress had been made during the project reporting period, the evaluators' opinion is that this defeats the whole purpose of reporting.

[26] Some PUNO programme staff noted that this was in direct response to a donor request with the aim of expediting their draught response, and was mandated by the Project Steering Committee

F. Implementation of commitments under PBF funding

In November 2016, the FGS and four YES PUNOs (ILO, UNDP, UN Habitat and UNIDO) committed to accept funding of US$5.3 million from the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) towards implementation of the Midnimo and Daldhis (Build Your Country) project - An integrated approach to re-establish the State-Citizen link in Jubbaland and South West State of Somalia. The project has planned duration of 18 months from January 2017 to June 2018.

The objectives of the Daldhis Project are to enhance the legitimacy and state authority of regional governments beyond the regional capitals. To achieve this, the YES programme was to work in collaboration with the JPLG and JPROL through an area based approach; with the YES programme supporting targeted district and local authorities to provide a peace dividend through enhanced youth employment. The approach is not in conflict with the strategy model for the YES programme, but would enable the UN system to leverage on its collective comparative advantages and contribute towards a bigger outcome.

Based on information obtained from key informants, the project had a slow start due to factors beyond the YES programme control. For example, under the Wadajir Framework, some of the YES (Daldhis) activities could only start after district councils have been formed, and they have identified their priorities through local development plans.

Despite the slow start, the 2017 Daldhis Annual progress report noted some local authorities in South West and Jubbaland States have developed District Community Action Plans and identified the public infrastructure that need rehabilitation, which will be implemented in 2018. In addition, 985 short-term jobs were created in 51 new IDP camps in Baidoa district, through cash-for-work cleaning activities by local youth, while also job opportunities for additional 200 youth were implemented in Kismayo.

The Daldhis project is therefore an appropriate addition to the YES programme and provides an opportunity for UN agencies to showcase their collective comparative advantage and demonstrate its capacity to provide (a) a package of comprehensive support, including establishing and building capacity of local authorities in districts that had no civil administration – JPLG component; (b) establishing rule of law and justice institutions – JPROL component; and (c) re-establishing a functioning local economy that can provide employment and livelihoods for citizens, and in particular youth employment – JPYES component.

4.2.4. Implementation and coordination

G. Programme visibility among key stakeholders

After its approval and signing in June 2015, the joint programme experienced a delayed start with fund release in September and actual activity implementation starting thereafter. Some members of the Steering Committee noted that there was not much progress during the first year because many of the national institutions were seized with the issues and uncertainties associated with elections, which were held in October and November 2016.

> "There is universal consensus among entities in the United Nations system that new alliances and partnerships will be critical to achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and increasing recognition that the private sector is one of the most critical partners in boosting United Nations capacity to deliver on Sustainable Development Goals".
> **A/72/310 page 3**

The national Programme Steering Committee (PSC) was established as per programme design, and the Federal Chamber of Commerce was also invited to join the steering committee in order to improve cooperation with the private sector. This is a good practice and in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.[27] However, further evidence suggests that the Chamber of Commerce has not participated in any meetings of the PSC.

The JP plan was to establish a four-tier management and coordination structure comprising of PSC, Technical Committee (TC), Programme Management Unit (PMU) and Regional Implementation Unit (RIU).

[27] Report of the Secretary-General: Enhanced cooperation between the United Nations and relevant partners in particular the private sector

Figure 10. Programme management and Coordination Structure



Source: JP Document, page 44

The RIU "*will be responsible for the program implementation at the regional level. It will mirror the PMU at the regional level, and will work directly with contractors/NGOs working on the ground submitting progress reports to the programme secretariat. The Regional Implementation Unit will participate in the TC meeting to maintain horizontal program transparency and accountability*". [28]

The Regional Implementation Unit was not established as per the programme plan, and this appears to have affected coordination at that level. In Puntland, the evaluation team noted that the JP had no visibility among stakeholders and generally people were not talking about it, not even the staff of PUNOs among themselves. As already noted in page 20 above, in Garowe, the field programme officers for ILO and UNDP had never shared any information or held discussions about the programme even though they are co-located in the same compound. The UN Habitat Programme Officer had never met with, and didn't recognise the FAO Programme Officer although both are based in Bossaso.

The field officers attributed this lack of visibility and coordination to the limited programme budget. For example, according to UNDP field staff, the annual budget for Puntland region was $350,000 compared to $10 million for the Joint Programme on Local Governance (JPLG). With its large budget, the JPLG naturally attracts more focus and excitement as it delivers more resources

[28] JP document, page 45

such as vehicles and office equipment. The Puntland Regional Ministry of Labour and Youth also noted that the programme has coordination challenges. They said that the Ministry was not involved in the programme planning and design and there was no inception meeting at the start of implementation.

In South West Region, the lead national counterpart is the Ministry of Youth and Sports (MOYS). However, the Ministry said they assumed the role of lead Ministry in the last quarter of 2017, as previously there was lack of clarity about their role and that of the Regional Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA). According to some members of the Youth Association and Women Association consulted in Garowe, "*the programme was shrouded in secrecy, and there was no transparency by line Ministries about its activities*".

The FGS is allocated 3 percent of the total budget funds available for coordination. Three Technical Advisors, one Finance Officer and 4 Interns who are paid by the JP have been seconded to the Federal MOLSA since September 2017. In all target five regions, two professional positions of Technical Advisor and YES Focal Point were established and paid for by the JP also from September 2017. However, the Focal Point position had since been abolished by the time of this evaluation, ostensibly due to lack of clarity about their specific roles and responsibilities. This will likely further affect coordination due to already weak coordination among line Ministries. The Regional MOLSA also felt that lack of engagement of line Ministries affects not only coordination, but long term sustainability.

H. Management structure and mutual accountability among PUNOs

The Technical Committee was intended to provide day-to-day decision making support and oversight on JP interventions. However, the committee had since stopped meeting in part due to staffing constraints among the UN agencies. This seems to have left a void in the management of the JP, although the PSC has consistently provided governance support.

Coordination of the JP is vested in the JP Coordinator, who sits in UNDP as the Lead Agency. In addition each of the PUNOs may at its discretion engage a Project Manager for the JP. Available evidence suggests that all PUNOs have a designated project staff for the YES Programme, although they do not work collectively. With a staff complement of 8 international and 45 national staff, there is scope to establish a strong Programme Management Unit capable of joint

Staff dedicated to YES		
PUNO	**International**	**National**
FAO	4	27
ILO	1	2
UNDP	1	3
UNHabitat	1.5	7
UNIDO	1	6
Total	8.5	45

delivery at national level. In a practical sense, this will engender undivided attention whereby a staff member is managing a portfolio of activities, while their accountability lies elsewhere. The position for the JP Coordinator which has been vacant since June 2017 and has been recently filled could in this regard, be re-profiled as JP Portfolio Manager.

In contrast, the JPLG has a full time Project Manager who leads the Programme Management Unit composed of project staff from its partner UN agencies sitting under one roof. The advantages of such a structure are plain to see. Firstly, the JP Manager has decision-making authority over the project staff, which enhances their accountability. Secondly, since all project staff sit under one roof, there is scope for joint planning, implementation and monitoring; unlike the case for the YES programme where PUNOs develop their work plans separately and pass on to the JP Coordinator for collation and compilation.

I. Information sharing and communication

The up-down flow of information within some of the PUNOs seems to be weak. For example, In Puntland, field-based staff were only aware that ILO had undertaken a skills gap analysis for the fisheries value chain, but had not seen the report. They noted that programme planning, implementation and monitoring was done from the head office in Nairobi, while their role was just to pass on information to and from Nairobi upon request. In fact, the field officer based in Garowe said he had not been to Bossaso on work related to this joint programme.

Lateral communication and information-sharing between PUNOs at the field level has already been highlighted in page 22 above. The impact is that field-based staff have generally limited understanding of the 'big picture'. The evaluation team observed that field-based staff were not familiar with the JP document, nor its strategy for sustainable employment creation. Most of them were conversant with respective components, for example 'cash for work' but could not coherently explain how this was intended to contribute to the overall objective.

One example of lack of appreciation of the 'big picture': FAO staff were requested to show some of the project beneficiaries in Bossaso. A visit was quickly arranged to meet three beneficiaries of dried fish processing in one of the IDP camps. A conservative estimation of the beneficiaries' ages put them in the range of 55 – 65 years (see photo). It was surprising that a programme officer for a youth employment programme would not even see the irony of it, and even went on to share the photos of the visit with other stakeholders.

Targeting beneficiaries in Bossaso who are not youth

The flow of information is also weak among national partners, especially at regional level. In South West Region, the evaluation consulted with the MOLSA and Ministry of Commerce (MOC) and State Chamber of Commerce at high level, and they all said they were not formally aware of the programme, except through informal hearsay. According to the MOC, "*it is unwise that the MOYS should have a programme where individuals are provided inputs and resources to start small businesses without the involvement of the Ministry (of Commerce)*" *as we have the mandate for business creation*." Interestingly, the head of the State Chamber of Commerce is also the Deputy Chairperson of the Federal Chamber, which was earlier noted to be a member of the PSC.

As will be discussed later in the section on sustainability, the government, especially at Federal Member State (FMS) level should have required capacity to put together appropriate institutional mechanisms for coordination of programme activities. In fact, as is the case in other countries, such programmes should be embedded within government offices as part of capacity building, and also more importantly, to enable the government have a better handle on monitoring development activities. Admittedly, security considerations and other such salient factors may render this impractical in the context of Somalia, but suffice to note that efforts to institutionalise capacity building is desirable for sustainability.

4.3. Joint Programme Efficiency

The section contains an assessment of the programme's utilisation of available resources, including the extent to which PUNOs have collaborated to deliver results cost effectively. As already noted earlier, there has been minimal coordination among PUNOs, and weak information sharing. In addition, the analysis will also show that the cost of creating a single job was high.

J. Collaboration among PUNOs to leverage their respective comparative advantages

According to United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Guidelines, a joint programme is appropriate if "*its components build on each other, there is clarity on the roles and responsibilities of each partner, and mutual accountability on the delivery of development results*".[29] By definition therefore, the case study on page 16 illustrates a typical joint programming model in which three UN organisations and government undertook activities contained in a joint work plan and related common budgetary framework to achieve a common result.

In other activities, PUNOs have been undertaking stand-alone interventions that were not directly linked to the activities of any of the other JP partners. The following extracts from the third quarterly report (2017) illustrates the fragmented nature of PUNO interventions undertaken independently of each other:

- *FAO mobilized and supported 2,000 youth farmers and agro-pastoralists (897 being women) with 240 grams of assorted vegetable kits (Capsicum, Carrots, Tomatoes, Onions, Amaranthus and Watermelon);*
- *ILO engaged private sector companies in the Somalia Working skills programme…including telecommunications, ICT, garment making, banking, media/printing, energy, construction, hospitality, retail and logistics;*
- *UN-Habitat has finalized the Agreement of Cooperation (AoC) with the local administration in Mogadishu for Shaqeyso III training 120 hours of comprehensive life skills training, 120 hours of vocational (construction) training, 20 hours of 'build your own business' entrepreneurial training, and 240 hours of community works activities;*
- *UNIDO's vocational training technical assistance focused on trades based skills training…producing agricultural implements and tools for farmers, welding and metalwork trainings are producing goods for the construction sector as well as items to enhance local schools.*

As noted earlier, the 'joint work plan' is done separately by each UN agency and then collated by the JP coordinator into the annual work plan. Similarly, at the field level, there is no joint implementation or joint monitoring; in fact, field-based project staff do not share information even when they are co-located. When asked how they collaborated with other UN agencies, some of the responses by UN agency senior management and programme staff included the following:

[29] UNDG Guidance Note on Joint Programming; May 2014, p 7

"…there is no joint programming, we are joined in one programme"
"…we would still be doing what we are doing even if there was no joint programme"
"…there is competition for funding among UN agencies, and therefore very little incentive to work together"

One of the lessons from evaluations in other countries, including 'delivering as one' countries is that inter-agency collaboration is stronger when the government is directly involved in coordination of implementation. The need for developing and strengthening institutional capacity of government counterparts, especially at subnational level cannot be overemphasised. As was noted elsewhere in this report, the State MOLSA in South West for example has no staff, with the Minister working alone as at the time of the evaluation.

K. Delivery of available funds within the initially planned period

From initial planned budget of $54 million, the programme had received $23 million in available funds since its signing in 2015, of which $14 million was approved in May 2017 for the period January – December 2017. Based on current delivery rates, the programme is unlikely to be able to deliver the available funds within the planned period ending June 2018 (Figure 10).

In addition to the delayed start, delivery is also affected by slow administrative procedures both within the UN system and government. For example, UN Habitat was required by the authorities in Puntland to sign an Agreement of Cooperation despite the fact that other PUNOs were already operating under an agreement signed with UNDP as the Lead Agency. This takes away some of the efficiency gains that are expected to be generated from joint programming. Recruitment procedures are also lengthy among UN agencies, although in some cases this is beyond their control; as for example when a positioned is filled and the selected individual changes their mind before taking up the position.



Financial data, including funds received and expenditures by year is in Annex 3. The combined average delivery rate as at the end of 2017 stands at 64% of available funds with $8.2 million remaining. Since the programme had a delayed start as discussed in page 26 above, there may be a justifiable case for a no-cost extension to December 2018. However, if that is the case, there is also need for UN agencies to recommit to the value chain development approach in order to realise the intended results for sustainable employment creation.

L. Cost effectiveness and value for money

Based on financial data reported by the PUNOs, it appears that until end of 2017, all of them except FAO were involved in skills development; while also all except UN Habitat were involved in cash for work activities (Figure 10).

The data also shows that comparatively, most of the expenditures were on skills development (42.3%), followed by value chain development (41.9%), while 15.8% of the funding expenditure was on infrastructure development through cash for work. It is however, noteworthy that the programme was formulated against a backdrop where UN agencies had specific intention to move away from ‘traditional approaches to employment generation in Somalia.

However, given the number of sustainable long term jobs created – 76 – as reported in the programme progress reports, then the cost of creating a single job is too high at $193,315/job created. On the other hand however, since 12,560 short-term jobs were created, the cost of creating one short-term job is $185 which is cost-effective value for money.[30]





* The data contains some inconsistencies. For example, it shows that FAO did not undertake any skills training; however, in the 2nd Quarter (2017) the programme reported that "FAO trained 15 youth (out of whom eight were women) in the preparation of fish products, quality standards and benefits of fish processing in three IDP camps in Bula Mingis A, Bula Eelaay and Ajuuraan. The training included proper handling of fish at sea and on shore as well as value addition in dried fish preparation"(page 7).

4.4. Sustainability

As programme implementation progresses through its various stages, sustainability often also changes in both form and content. During early stages of implementation, sustainability is concerned about the probability that activities/processes will continue after initial funding ends. Towards the end of implementation, the concern shifts towards the programme's potential to self-replicate and upscale its target beneficiaries. This implies that programme sustainability should be planned and monitored through specific sustainability indicators over its life cycle. This analysis is based on assessment of the key sustainability indicators in both stages of the programme – early implementation and end of programme.

M. Institutional capacity development and national ownership

The joint programme partners use different implementation modalities. Some of them use direct implementation, while others use national implementation through non-governmental organisations (NGOs). For example the joint implementation partner for ILO and UNDP in Baidoa

[30] Anecdotal information suggests that the cost of creating a semi-skilled job is about $900 without toolkit and $1,450 with toolkit.

is a local NGO known as Warshiikh Rural Development Organization (WARDO). However, none of the PUNOs have any government-led interventions. This is mainly because in some regions, government does not have the requisite institutional capacity to implement the projects. For example as noted earlier, the South West State MOLSA does not have any staff.

While this is a genuine limitation for PUNOs to engage government as an implementing partner (IP), it also impacts on the programme's sustainability. This is further compounded by the absence of relevant legislative and policy framework for the employment and labour sector. Among some of the lessons that informed the formulation of this joint programme, the authors noted that '*Capacity development of relevant government institutions is necessary if programmes are to be sustainable in the future. Capacity development has been mainstreamed across all components of this programme and it is in line with the partner's needs'*[31]. In that regard, the programme provided salaries for technical staff in the federal MOLSA, but these efforts have not been sufficient, especially at FMS level. In South West state, for example, UNIDO had plans to provide institutional support to the State MOLSA, but as at the time of the evaluation, no action plan for this activity had been developed yet[32].

Furthermore, the linkages that were meant to be established with the JPLG through the PBF funding were not yet apparent. In theory, the area based approach would enable the JPs to provide their respective support in a specific locality, whereby the JPLG would provide support to extend state authority, while the JPYES focuses on employment creation. This is not yet happening in practice. This therefore means that when the joint programme exits at the end of funding, it will not leave government with capacity to continue with the programme's processes nor ability to upscale or replicate to other regions. Some key informants noted that in an ideal situation, the responsibility for monitoring development programmes should rest with the government. This means that the government has to be involved in the planning and implementation of the programme in order to engender a sense of ownership. When asked about the probability of the programme's sustainability, one key informant in Baidoa summed it up by saying: "*UN projects leave no trace*".

The evaluators did not visit Kismayo (Jubbaland) but got the following written inputs from the MOYS, the lead Ministry for the programme.

1) Consider to use existing local institutions, including Kismayo Vocational Training Institute in order to institutionalize programme activities.
2) Use existing local experts in selecting the areas of life skills training, and involve them in training of youth in order to improve their capacity.
3) Use existing regional/district coordination forum.

[31] Joint Programme Document, page 13

[32] The plans were suspended when the Government official that had been sponsored to attend a study tour in Europe decided not to return home

In Puntland Region, the Ministry of Labour and Youth informed the evaluators that they were not involved in the planning, implementation or monitoring of activities "but only get invited to give speeches at official events." In plain language, this means that there is no sense of 'local ownership' of programme processes and results.

N. Strategic interventions for business development

By definition, the concept of "sustainability" implies the ability to create a perpetual enjoyment of the programme's benefits for an extended period of time despite changes in funding sources, program models, service providers, community demographics and other factors. Long-term sustainability is about ensuring that the positive results that are achieved today are continued for years to come despite any changes that may occur in future.

For this to happen, visible champions must be identified, capacitated and involved in the programme processes. In the case of youth employment, this means working closely with the private sector, including developing the necessary conditions for the private sector to thrive. This entails that the programme should consider including supporting enabling interventions such as (a) microfinance and revolving fund schemes to improve access to finance for youth and businesses, (b) investing in innovation and value addition, and (c) business development services. These activities are provided for in the JP document (page 21), but their implementation has been limited.

Alternative perspectives from private sector

"These projects that the UN is doing do not have much impact in the economy. Employment creation is about a thriving private sector. If the UN wants to do livelihoods and income generation, then they should just call it that. South West Region used to be the bread basket of Somalia and could produce surplus even for export. There were two firms that were based here in Baidoa, one was a food factory that employed 350 workers; and the other was a tomato factory employing about 1,200 people. If the UN can help to resuscitate them, this would have a huge impact on employment, and there would be upstream and downstream effects, including livelihoods for small scale enterprises"[33].

The selection processes should also be undertaken in a strategic manner. For example, target beneficiaries are broadly defined as 'youth at risk' – this has to be adhered to in all programme activities. For example in Bossaso the beneficiaries whose ages were above that of youth (see

[33] As noted earlier, these are the views of national stakeholders, which may need to be addressed through wider engagement and awareness raising

photo in page 24 above), said they stopped dry fish processing when the training ended as they were no longer able to get the fresh fish which they were given for free during the skills training. The project also gave participants cash for the dried fish and when that stopped, they had no other source of income.

The 'selection of infrastructure for 'cash for work' should also be strategic, and capable of addressing the critical constraints in the value chain, or in any event be capable of providing benefits to a greater number of beneficiaries in the target communities (see box). As noted earlier, the programme has sometimes been used as a vehicle for emergency response by providing cash for work for cleaning the city and garbage disposal, which are all very important activities but can hardly be expected to generate lasting and sustainable employment opportunities for the youth. It is therefore misplaced to talk about sustainability when a good portion of programme resources are used for activities that are inclined towards social protection.

> "Construction projects and investments in infrastructure should have maximum impact on a greater number of people. The UN should not construct roads with no economic value just for the sake of construction"
>
> **Key informant perspective on sustainability**

5. GOOD PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED

This chapter contains a review of the programme processes, from its design, implementation, coordination, monitoring and reporting in order to draw out any good practices and lessons learnt that may inform the programme's implementation during the remainder of its life cycle as well as future programming.

5.1. Good Practices

Establishment of an inclusive national steering committee

The programme design established an inclusive National Steering Committee (NSC) whose members included "Ministers from various line ministries (Finance, Planning and International Cooperation, Education, Labour, Youth and Sports, Public Works and Reconstruction, Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, Commerce and Industry, and OPM-SSU), regional representatives, donors and the participating UN agencies at Head of Agency level"[34]. This represented a wide cross section of stakeholders to ensure effective information flow and decision making. In 2016, the Steering Committee decided to invite a representative of Federal

[34] Programme Document, page 44

Chamber of Commerce in order to improve the cooperation with the private sector.[35] Unfortunately these two good practices were not continued, and impacted negatively on the programme's performance and effectiveness.

Support to the Federal MOLSA in its coordination function

According to key informants, an allocation of 3% of available funds is made to the Federal Government for programme coordination. This funding enabled the federal and regional governments to engage Technical Advisers (TAs), including office equipment and funding for coordination meetings to support their coordination roles. The TAs should have the critical role to advise the Minister with respect to ensuring the appropriate institutional framework, i.e. legislative, policy and organisational structures required to support sustainable employment creation. The Steering Committee also used the funding to establish Regional Focal Points to support programme coordination in the FMS, although these positions have since been abolished.

Applying the programme strategy in the fisheries sector

The implementation of the programme strategy in Bossaso provides a good case study on joint programming, in which three UN agencies partnered based on their respective comparative advantages to work towards a common result. Available evidence indicates that the 14 trainers that initially took the TOT training in 2016 have now been deployed to upscale the programme in Beerbera and Kismayo.

Good results seem to have been achieved whenever private sector companies have been directly engaged in programme processes. Two examples are particularly illustrative. FAO engaged with a local private sector company to design and mould a bigger fishing boat suitable for small pelagic species. The company is now producing these boats for the market. In the second example, private sector companies were invited through the Puntland Chamber of Commerce, to attend a youth forum which culminated with establishment of an apprenticeship scheme and eventual full time employment of 45 youths out of the total 150 youth participants (see page 21 above).

[35] JP Annual Progress Report, 2016; page 2

5.2. Lessons Learnt

Fragmented implementation of programme components

This section highlights some of the key lessons that were discussed in the main body above. The first critical lesson arises from the fragmented nature of programme implementation whereby the PUNOs appear to have implemented their usual activities without regard to the value chain analyses. This was further underscored by the decision by one of the PUNOs to shift its focus from the targeted value chains. The key lesson from this is that unless there is consensus on the strategy and approach, it is difficult to get UN agencies to work together and collaborate in a joint programme.

Duplication of roles among JP partners

This also leads into the second key lesson, which arises out of the duplication that has been apparent in the programme implementation. The roles and responsibilities of partner UN agencies should be clearly defined and agreed at the beginning in order to avoid duplication. As noted in the analysis above, and also reflected in the financial data, all the PUNOs were involved in skills development to a certain extent. However, in most cases, these skills development interventions have not been linked to any of the targeted value chains, and have also been regarded as insignificant by stakeholders in FMS.

Lack of enabling environment, including national institutional capacity

One of the most critical gaps that was highlighted in the evaluation is lack of enabling environment for sustainable employment creation, including weak institutional capacity at FMS level. Some key informants observed that the programme did not have sufficient resources to intervene at upstream (regulatory and policy) level and private sector development; adding that these were areas in which other actors such as the World Bank were already engaged. While these are persuasive arguments, it is still a fact that employment creation does not happen in a vacuum, much less in the absence of an enabling environment, particularly critical frameworks such as Labour Policy, Employment Strategy, Entrepreneurship Development Policy and Strategy. These are issues that were identified at programme formulation (see box), and if they were not implemented, this an issue for effectiveness rather than design.

> *'…we need to improve the competitiveness of the sectors and companies, enhance the business environment, open the economy to trade, foster investment and growth, increase productivity, and – as a final outcome-- create sustainable jobs'.*
>
> ***JP Document, page 22***

Lack of targeted private sector engagement

Closely linked with the above, is another lesson on engaging the private sector. At the end of day, the institutions that will create sustainable jobs are private sector companies and firms. They need to be at the centre of the programme's focus, to understand their constraints, their needs and their vision for the future.

Effective implementation also requires 'all hands on deck'. In this regard, one of the key lessons is on developing institutional capacities of the key players, particularly government capacity at subnational level. There is need establish coordination mechanisms that includes government at federal and regional and district levels, as well as developing their capacities by engaging them throughout the project cycle – from planning, implementation and monitoring. Also linked to that, is the issue of 'mutual accountability' among the JP partners. The programme management arrangements should be designed to ensure that there is mutual accountability by empowering the Programme Management Unit with decision-making authority to manage day-to-day activity implementation.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In this chapter, the authors provide an independent interpretation of the evidence provided in the foregoing analysis, including their response and recommendations based on the evaluation questions agreed in the terms of reference.

6.2. Conclusions

Youth unemployment is generally regarded as one of the most critical challenges in Somalia, and contributes considerably to other problems such as extremist-based political instability and conflict, youth migration and general lack of economic growth. The joint programme is therefore highly considered as an appropriate and timely intervention that addresses the needs and interest of people and the country. The programme is also well aligned to the key national and international frameworks that underlie the country's response strategies for combating instability and economic stagnation.

The programme was based on a sound problem analysis, and its design was appropriately informed by comprehensive assessment of the interventions of other state and non-state actors, as well as lessons from prior interventions. Based on this analysis, the programme strategy was developed, which clearly laid out the boundaries and specific areas - both programmatic and geographic - in which the UN system in Somalia in would intervene in partnership with the FGS. However, it would appear that some of the JP partners, in particular participating UN agencies may not have adequately appreciated the full import of collaboration through a joint programme modality. Based on the evaluators' past experience from multiple similar evaluations, UN agencies often sign on to joint programmes on the incentive of getting funding, and eventually realise that the specific areas of intervention may not be quite consistent with their mandate, or at the very least, that they lack adequate and appropriate capacity to contribute effectively.

In the evaluators' opinion, PUNOs missed opportunities for collaborating and leveraging on their collective advantages to make a bigger impact. This has manifest itself through a fragmented approach in which it has been 'business as usual' for the JP partner UN agencies. Other than in the one instance where FAO, ILO and UNDP collaborated in the fisheries sector in Bossaso, there is no other evidence of targeted collaboration in terms of interlocking or even mutually dependent activities. Consequently, reporting has been rather activity oriented, consisting mainly of descriptive outline of activities undertaken in a specific period, but very thin in terms of measuring the contribution to results at output and outcome level.

The Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO) developed and mobilised resources for the Daldhis project, to further enhance inter-agency collaboration through an area-based approach, but this also experienced delayed start, in part due to slow establishment of local authorities at the district level.

The level of engagement at subnational level has been weak. For most of the implementation period, there was lack of clarity among line Ministries at regional level about their roles and responsibility. Part of this is because of weak institutional capacity at that level, but also partly because the programme did not have targeted interventions for institutional capacity development. This is a problem that will impact on the sustainability of the programme. Based on the evaluators' prior experience, one effective approach for institutional capacity development is to co-locate project staff within government offices. For example, in South Sudan, civil servants from neighbouring Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member countries are seconded to line Ministries for a period of two months to provide mentorship and on-the-job training to their local counterparts in a process known as 'twinning'. In this way, the expert civil servants work to provide public services, and also mentor their local "twins".

Also in the context of sustainability, the programme missed opportunities to engage effectively with the private sector. The consequence has been weak performance and results in terms of number of long term jobs created. Short-term jobs were created, but they fall short of the planned targets, and for the most part some of the interventions fell within the domain of social protection.

The programme appears to have faced a challenge of weak coordination. This was partly due to absence of JP Coordinator for an extended period of time. However, the programme management structure also deviated from the planned structure as outlined in the JP document. For example, the planned Regional Implementation Units were not established as planned, while also the Technical Committee has not been functional. This left a gap in terms of an authoritative body outside of the PSC to drive and manage day-to-day activities through effective decision making based on the 'big picture' perspective. Individual UN agencies have their own project managers, who naturally tend to look at activities from a narrower perspective in the context of the respective UN agency role rather than an overall programme perspective. In addition, some may not feel obliged to prioritise information sharing and joint activities since there is no accountability line relationship with the JP Coordinator.

6.3. Recommendations

Based on the foregoing analysis and evaluation findings, 12 recommendations are proposed to enable the programme to refocus and enhance its performance towards expected results. Four of the recommendations address critical strategic considerations, with the remaining eight focusing on operational issues.

Strategic-level recommendations

Recommendation 1 Recommit to the programme approach based on value chain development Government's employment strategy

Programme implementation has been fragmented with evidence suggesting lack of consensus on the efficacy of the strategy and its potential to create sustainable employment. This was further compounded by the absence of a national employment strategy and associated policy instruments. For the programme to move forward with all its partners contributing towards a common result, it is imperative that all key partners, including government, donors and PUNOs, should agree and recommit to the original strategy based on value chain development approach.

Recommendation 2 Develop government institutional capacity at all levels

Job creation requires the right policies as well as adequate capacity to enforce implementation of those policies. The programme should aim to develop government capacity in these three critical areas:

a) Capacity to coordinate all actors in the employment sector, including development partners to ensure coherence and avoid duplication,

b) Capacity to develop and monitor implementation of its employment policies and strategies, and
c) Capacity to develop, implement and coordinate programmes.

Recommendation 3 Promote effective engagement with private sector

The private sector is the main driver for employment creation. The private sector's capacity and ability to create employment is not only critical to the programme's success, but its participation, or lack thereof, could also be a risk to programme success. The programme should therefore invest some of its resources towards managing this risk, by engaging the private sector and demonstrating added value for its participation. As 'private sector' covers a wide range of actors and sectors; engagement should include (a) business development policy, strategy and services, (b) business linkages and value chain development, and (c) access to finance and credit.

Recommendation 4 Establish an e-information management system

Considering the finding of weak of information flow at all levels, the Government with support of the PUNOs should consider establishing an e-information management system to enable integrated data collection, analysis, documentation, dissemination and lessons learned on employment creation. The e-platform should be based within Government and linked to M&E systems, as well as decentralised and integrated to FMS level.

Operational-level recommendations

Recommendation 5 Extend programme to December 2018 through no-cost extension

In light of Recommendation 1 above, programme implementation may have to be stalled for a month or two. It will therefore be unlikely that available funds can be exhausted by June 2018. The PSC should therefore consider a no-cost extension to extend the programme timeline to December 2018.

Recommendation 6 Donors should consider funding second phase of the programme

In light of the strategic recommendations above, and given the overall relevance and importance of youth employment in the broader context of stability and economic development, donors should consider funding a second phase of the programme. In the second phase, donors should also consider providing specific funding for a micro-credit revolving fund to facilitate the development of a small and medium enterprise (SME) sector. On the other hand, the government, with support of relevant PUNOs, should develop relevant legislative instruments, including for example, (a) SME policy and strategy, (b) micro-finance policy and strategy, and (c) TVET capacity development.

Recommendation 7 Clearly defined roles and responsibilities for PUNOs

Joint programming entails inter-agency collaboration as well as efficiency gains arising from the collective comparative advantages of more than one UN agency working together. The programme should clearly define the roles and responsibilities of individual UN agencies such that their respective activities have mutual dependability and are demonstrably linked to and contribute to the expected outcomes.

Recommendation 8 Revive the programme Technical Committee

As the programme intends to work across multiple sectors and value chains, it is imperative that there is an institutional mechanism to drive the programme daily activities with a broad-picture lens. The PSC should therefore consider reviving the Technical Committee with clear terms of reference, and performance indicators for accountability. The Technical Committee should be accountable to the PSC and be required to report at every PSC meeting.

Recommendation 9 Establish Regional Implementation Units

As programme implementation is based in the respective FMS, the PSC should consider establishing or strengthening the existing RIU as per the planned management arrangements. In addition, the PSC may also consider establishing an Extended PSC which includes the chairpersons of the RIUs and would meet at least biannually or on an ad hoc basis particularly if/when there are major changes and/or decisions to be made about the programme strategy, funding or activities.

Recommendation 10 Establish a Programme Management Unit

According to the JP document, the PSC is the highest body for strategic guidance, which meets quarterly to '*provide strategic direction and oversight, set allocation criteria, allocate resources, review implementation progress and address problems, review and approve progress reports budget revisions/reallocations, and evaluation reports, notes audit reports, and if needed initiate investigations*'. Activity implementation is vested in individual UN agencies, with programme coordination vested in the JP Coordinator. The PSC should consider establishing a Programme

Management Unit headed by a Programme Manager with delegated decision-making authority to drive and coordinate activity implementation on a day-to-day basis.

Recommendation 11 Progress reporting should be consistently based on the programme results, monitoring and evaluation framework

The JP Coordinator (or PMU, when it is established) should ensure that the programme monitoring and evaluation framework is consistently used for all quarterly and annual progress reports. This includes the disaggregation of data by rural/urban or men/women as stipulated in the M&E framework. In addition, all the indicators should be reflected in the progress reports, even if there were no activities undertaken during the reporting period, in order to provide clarity and inform appropriate management decisions. In addition, the targets should be revised to reflect the available funding.

Recommendation 12 Accelerate implementation of the Daldhis project

One of the major efficiency gains of joint programming is enhanced effectiveness arising from the synergy of different UN agency mandates. The Daldhis project presents an opportunity for PUNOs to contribute towards a larger outcome of expanding state authority in new districts. The PSC should accelerate implementation of the YES component of the Daldhis programme. This may entail convening a joint Steering Committee meeting with the other JPs – JPLG and JPROL – to develop a common strategy to accelerate implementation.

LIST OF ANNEXES:

Annex 1. Documents reviewed

1. Joint Programme Document, June 2015.
2. Joint Programme Document: Amendment 1; May 2017.
3. Joint Programme Annual Progress Report: January – December 2016.
4. Joint Programme Quarterly Progress Report: Q4 2015.
5. Joint Programme Quarterly Progress Report: Q2 2016
6. Joint programme Quarterly Progress Report: Q3 2016.
7. Joint Programme Quarterly Progress Report: Q1 2017.
8. Joint Programme Quarterly Progress Report: Q2 2017.
9. Joint Programme Quarterly Progress Report: Q3 2017.
10. Somalia National Development Plan; 2017 – 2019.
11. Daldhis Project Quarterly Progress Report: Q3 2017.
12. Somalia Integrated Strategic Framework Review: October 2016.
13. The Somali Compact, July 2013.
14. United Nations Integrated Strategic framework for Somalia; 2014 – 2016.
15. United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)/ Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) PRF Project Document; November 2016.
16. United Nations Strategic Framework for Somalia; 2017 – 2019.
17. Somalia Sector Profile: Fisheries; February 20116
18. Fisheries Skills Gap analysis: Bossaso District, Bari Region; Sepember 2016.
19. National Youth Policy of the Federal Government of Somalia, June 2017.

Annex 2. Individuals interviewed

#	Name	Title	Institution
Government: Federal Government of Somalia			
1.	H.E. Salah Jama	Minister for Labour and Social Affairs (PSC Co-Chair)	MOLSA - FGS
2.	Dahir Hassan Gutala	Staff	MOLSA
3.	Rage Ismail Ali	Staff	MOLSA
4.	Fardosa Abdullahi	Staff	MOLSA
Government: Federal Member States			
5.	Mohamed Muse Mohamud	Technical Advisor	MOLYS - Puntland
6.	Abdullahi Osman Aden	M&E Manager	MOLYS - Puntland
7.	Barni isse Ahmed	Head of Human Resource	MOLYS - Puntland
8.	Ahmed Abdalla	Director General	MOLYS - Puntland
9.	Abdiweli Mohamed Yusuf	Planning Director	MOLYS - Puntland
10.	Abdiqadir Saciid Dahir	Director of Commerce	Puntland
11.	Mohamed Osman Ore	Director General, MOYS	MOYS - South West
12.	Osman Nuur Adam	Secretary General	MOYS - South West
13.	Roble Sheikh Hassan Abdirahman	Minister	MOYS - South West
14.	Bashir Abdi Iyow	Director, Chamber of Commerce	South West
15.	Abdullahi Sheikh Hussein Mohamed	A/Director General	MOLSA – South West
Participating United Nations Organisations (PUNOs)			
16.	Jonathan Brooks	Policy and Programme Officer	FAO
17.	George Conway	Country Director (PSC Co-Chair)	UNDP
18.	Sean Paterson	Chief Technical Advisor	UNIDO
19.	Faadumo Ahmed	Programme Specialist (PREP)	UNDP
20.	Sukumar Mishra	Project Manager - JPYES	UNDP
21.	Ahmed Mohamoud	Head of Area Office - Puntland	UNDP
22.	Sayed Saibzada	Area Manager	UNDP
23.	Osman Mohamud Osman	National Programme Officer	UN Habitat
24.	Franco Sanchez	Head of Office	UNRCO
25.	Omar Ibrahim	Programme Officer	JPLG
26.	Ali Fidow	National Youth Officer	UN Habitat
27.	Liban Malin	Team Leader, National Programme Officer	UN Habitat
28.	Halima Yusuf	Programme Officer	FAO
29.	Abdirizak Mohamoud Ali	National Programme Associate	UN Habitat
30.	Mohamoud Awad	National Programme Officer	ILO

31.	Michael Savins	Head of Unit Fish Consumption and Fleet Renewal	FAO
32.	Falastin Omar	Socio-economic and Livelihood Expert	UN Habitat
33.	Ilias Dirie	Head of Office	ILO
34.	Asha Sawyer	Cash-base Project Coordinator	FAO
Development Partners/Donors			
35.	Christine Uyoga	Economic Growth and Employment	Denmark
36.	Per Karlsson	Head of Development Cooperation	Sweden
37.	Liam Perret	Peacebuilding Fund Coordinator	PBF
38.	Giordano Guglielmo	Head,	Italian Agency for Development Cooperation
Other Stakeholders: National Institutions, Private Sector and Beneficiaries			
39.	Mohamed Barre	Team Leader, Promoting Inclusive Markets in Somalia (PIMS)	PIMS
40.	Bentley D. Wilson	Director	Africa Working
41.	Sachin Bharti	Employability Ecosystem Manager	Africa Working
42.	Fahtima Abdula	Ecosystem Coordinator	Africa Working
43.	Abdirahman Mohamed Ali	Employabilty Ecosystem Admin	Africa Working
44.	Abdiwali Ali	Executive Director	Garowe TVET
45.	Osman Jamac	Admin Finance Officer	Garowe TVET
46.	Mohamed Abdulkadir Farah	Program Coordinator	Garowe TVET
47.	Hassan Ahmed Aided	Project Manager	SIRDA
48.	Feysal Mohamud Muuse	Executive Director	Horumar Relief and Development Association
49.	Amina Mohamed	Logistics Officer	Puntland Youth and Social Development Association
50.	Abdurahman Nur Yusuf	Chairperson	Nahda Youth Association
51.	Abdikarim Mohamed Ali	Youth Training Beneficiary	UN Habitat (Bossaso)
52.	Iftin Aadan cabdi	Supervisor	WARDO
53.	Abdullahi Adam Abubakar	Instructor	WARDO
54.	Mustafe Hassan Ali	Mentor	WARDO
55.	Abdulkadir Mohamed Adan		WARDO
56.	Jeylani Ukash Abukar	Programme Coordinator	WARDO
57.	Fatumo Bashir Mohamed	Finance Officer	WARDO
58.	Soido Hassan Aadan	Secretary	WARDO
59.	Abdullahi	Civic Education Officer	WARDO
60.	Sadia Abdullahi Ali	Admin/Finance Officer	WARDO

61.	Jamila Mohamed Hassan	Chairperson	Mis Hurty Arlaadi
62.	Saido Ibrahim Mohamed	Deputy Chair	Mis Hurty Arlaadi
63.	Hawa Sokor Ali	Chairperson	Baidabo Women Association
64.	Mohamed Adan Mohamed Dhosey	Chairperson	Baidoa Youth Association
65.	Binta Omar	Skills Training Beneficiary - Fisheries	IDP (Bossaso)
66.	Fadumo mocw Adbi	Skills Training Beneficiary - Fisheries	IDP (Bossaso)
67.	Mohamed Nur	Skills Training Beneficiary - Fisheries	IDP (Bossaso)

Annex 3a. Number of youth trained in life skills and vocational skills training

Source Period	Number of youth trained		Total
	Men	Women	
2015/2016 Q1	103	9	112
Cumulative 2016 annual report	3,061	1,508	4,569
Cumulative to Q3 2017	227	187	414
Totals	**3,391**	**1,704**	**5,095**
Women as % of total		**33.4%**	

Annex 3b. Number of short-term jobs created through 'cash for work'

Source Period	Rural jobs			Urban jobs			Combined Total
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	
2016 Annual report	1,441	2,049	3,490	1,898	2,320	4,218	**7,708**
Cumulative to Q3 2017	970*	420*	1,390	812	1,265	2,077	3,467
Total as of Q3 2017	**2,411**	**2,469**	**4,880**	**2,710**	**3,585**	**6,295**	**11,175**
Women as % of total		51%			57%		54%

Notes: * data not disaggregated; estimated 30% as per planned targets

Annex 4 Financial data

(All data provided by the JP Coordination team)

Total Funding Received by Donor				
Donor	**2015 (US$)**	**2016 (US$)**	**2017 (US$)**	**Total (US$)**
Denmark	689,039	1,459,829	1,459,829	**3,600,697**
Italy	0	2,192,982	1,050,475	**3,243,457**
Sweden	2,371,218	2,869,174	7,706,459	**12,946,851**
Switzerland	0	3,333,647	0	**3,333,647**
PBF	0	0	2,213,697	**2,213,697**
UNDP Trac	0	0	500,000	**500,000**
Total	**3,060,257**	**9,855,632**	**12,930,460**	**25,846,349**

FUNDS UTILISATION BY AGENCY								
Agency	2015 Received	2015 Expenditure	2016 Received	2016 Expenditure	2017 Received	2017* Expenditure	Total Received	Total Expenditure
FAO	1,400,000	-	1,974,673	2,215,840	5,628,666	3,089,609	9,003,339	5,305,449
ILO	742,588	20,875	1,373,610	1,597,032	1,865,000	1,544,309	3,981,198	3,162,215
Habitat	497,803	-	932,996	1,155,103	2,514,000	1,085,685	3,944,800	2,240,788
UNDP	978,893	781,139	1,599,675	820,330	3,107,237	2,036,220	5,685,805	3,637,689
UNIDO	-	-	-	-	1,036,747	345,802	1,036,747	345,802
TOTAL	**3,619,284**	**802,014**	**5,880,955**	**5,788,305**	**14,151,649**	**8,101,625**	**23,651,888**	**14,691,944**

FUNDS UTILISATION BY COMPONENT				
	Component 1	**Component 2**	**Component 3**	**Total**
FAO	4,522,825	-	782,624	5,305,449
ILO		3,057,840	104,375	3,162,215
Habitat		2,240,788		2,240,788
UNDP	1,628,277	571,403	1,438,009	3,637,689
UNIDO		345,802		345,802
TOTAL	**6,151,102**	**6,215,834**	**2,325,008**	**14,691,944**
	41.90%	42.30%	15.80%	

Annex 5. Evaluation Terms of Reference

BACKGROUND

The Joint FGS-UN Programme aims to capitalise on security, governance and reconciliation achievements by expanding employment opportunities for young men and women in Somalia. As highlighted in the Economic Recovery Plan for Somalia, youth unemployment is one of the greatest obstacles to the country's economic recovery. The plan states the aim of the government is to provide youth with employment opportunities so as to avoid the latter joining militia groups. This is to be achieved through vocational training, enterprise training and creation and rehabilitation of infrastructure through labour intensive employment methods. The programme recognizes the centrality of youth in fostering stability in the country and outlines specific interventions that can be taken within the next 18 months to begin to generate decent work opportunities for young people that will serve as positive alternatives to participation in violence and conflict. This will also contribute to the revitalization of the local economy. The employment generating interventions from this programme also aim to augment the credibility of the FGS and build trust and confidence in local governance and security sector institutions while providing immediate peace dividends to vulnerable sub-sections of the population.

As encouraged in the New Deal Compact, this joint youth employment programme is a frontline intervention of the FGS to achieve rapid results under Peace and State-building Goal (PSG) 4 (Economic Foundations), which identifies youth employment through job creation and skills development as one of the most important priority projects over the next two years. The idea of a high-visibility, government-led campaign to mobilize young people in an effort to rebuild (or build anew) critical economic infrastructure remains highly attractive from the perspectives of economic recovery and state building.
The programme aims at creating sustainable job opportunities for youth by addressing the below challenges affecting the labour supply and demand factors.

- The employment situation is bleak for Somali youth, as young people (15-24) struggle to find work, especially in the formal sector. Young Somalis cannot afford unemployment because of the absence of social protection and therefore face underemployed and are occupied in survival activities such as self-employment or as unpaid family workers. They often engage in low-productive and poor quality jobs mostly in the informal economy.
- Somalia's private sector has a serious competitiveness problem, which translates among others into important youth unemployment and a weak export performance. In fact, the main cause of youth unemployment in Somalia appears to be a result of "demand side" factors, i.e. low demand for jobs by companies.

The joint programme was signed on 17 June 2015 for an overall period of three years (mid 2015 – mid 2018) and funded period of 18 months. Actuals funds transferred to the participating UN Organizations (FAO, HABITAT, ILO and UNDP) was on 29 September 2015. The programme was amended until 31 December 2017 upon availability of additional funds. In terms of funding, the overall project is $54m, and current approved budget until end 2017 is $22.9m ($8.9m + $14m).

The overall outcome of the project that supports PSG 4: Economic Foundations is Somali economy revitalized and expanded with a focus on livelihood enhancement, employment generation, and broad-based inclusive growth with the following sub outcomes:

Sub-Outcome 1: Improved long-term potential for growth, productivity and inclusive employment through six value chains implementation plans.

Sub-Outcome 2: Enhanced longer-term employability of youth in sectors with high growth and employment potential.

Sub-Outcome 3: Productive infrastructure rehabilitated through labour-intensive methods.

Relationship to Somalia's Peace-building and State-building Goals (PSG) and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)/Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

The Youth Employment Programme is in line with the New Deal processes culminating in the Somali Compact, which puts youth at the forefront of the agenda for employment creation. The Compact aims to foster confidence between people, communities, the state and international partners through: transparency; risk sharing; use and strengthening of country systems; strengthening government capacity; and timely and predictable aid.

The plan assumes that improving the conditions for youth –e.g. access to employment and to basic services– will significantly contribute to establishing peace and maintaining stability. More specifically, the proposed programme will contribute to several targets:

- PSG 4, Priority 2: "*Expand opportunities for youth employment through job creation and skills development*;"
- PSG 4, Priority 1: "*Enhance the productivity of high priority sectors and related value chains, including through the rehabilitation and expansion of critical infrastructure for transport, market access, trade, and energy*;"
- Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Goal 1: "*Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger*," in particular Target 1b, "*Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and youth*."

OVERALL GOAL OF THE EVALUATION

As per the project document, the Joint Programme will be evaluated to inform learning, decision-making and guidance on how to implement the programme. The evaluation aims to determine the **relevance** and fulfilment of objectives as well as the **efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and the impact** of the Joint Programme.

Evaluation of a Joint Programme should be undertaken in accordance with the guidance from the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) (e.g., relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability) with an emphasis on impact at outcome level, sustainability of the results.

Mid-term evaluations are formative in nature and seek **to generate knowledge, identifying best practices and lessons learned and improve implementation of the programmes during their remaining implementation and will guide the design of the next phase of the programme**. As a result, the conclusions and recommendations generated by this evaluation will be addressed to its main users: the Programme Management Committee and the Project Steering Committee.

SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION AND SPECIFIC GOALS

The mid-term evaluation will use an expedited process to carry out a systematic, fast-paced analysis of the design, process and results or results trends of the **joint programme**, based on the scope and criteria included in these terms of reference. This will enable conclusions and recommendations for the joint programme to be formed within a period of approximately three months.

The unit of analysis or object of study for this mid-term evaluation is the joint programme, understood to be the set of components, outcomes, outputs, activities and inputs that were detailed in the joint programme document and amendments made during implementation.
The overall objective of the mid-term evaluation is to find out the **outcome and impact of the programme project and to asses if the programme objectives are being achieved, using its resources and provide recommendations for project modification, further development and improvement.** In addition, examine the changes that resulted from the project implementation and provide inputs to guide the decision making for the upcoming renewal and extension of the project including funding requirements.

This mid-term evaluation has the following **specific objectives**:

4. To discover the programme's **design quality and internal coherence** (needs and problems it seeks to solve) and its external coherence with the UNDAF, the NDP and the **Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)**, and find out the degree of national ownership of the programme.
5. To understand how the joint programme **operates** and assess the **efficiency of its management model** in planning, coordinating, managing and executing resources allocated for its implementation, through an analysis of its procedures and institutional mechanisms. This analysis will seek to uncover the factors for success and limitations in inter-agency tasks as envisaged in the programme.
6. To identify the programme's **degree of effectiveness** among its participants, its contribution to the objectives of the Youth Employment in the country including resource mobilization and effective use of resources in line with the aid effectiveness principals, and value for money.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS, LEVELS AND CRITERIA

The evaluation questions define the information that must be generated as a result of the evaluation process. The questions are grouped according to the criteria to be used in assessing and answering them. These criteria are, in turn, grouped according to the three levels of the programme.

Design level

- **Relevance: The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with the needs and interest of the people, the needs of the country, the Sustainable Development Goals and the policies of associates and donors.**

a) Is the identification of the problems, inequalities and gaps, with their respective causes, clear in the joint programme?
b) Does the Joint Programme take into account the particularities and specific interests of women, minorities and ethnic groups in the areas of intervention?

c) To what extent has the intervention strategy been adapted to the areas of intervention in which it is being implemented? What actions does the programme envisage, to respond to obstacles that may arise from the political and socio-cultural context?
d) Are the monitoring indicators relevant and do they meet the quality needed to measure the outputs and outcomes of the joint programme?
e) To what extent has the Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO) Secretariat for Joint Programmes contributed to raising the quality of the design of the joint programmes?

- **Ownership in the design: national social actors' effective exercise of leadership in the development interventions**

a) To what extent do the intervention objectives and strategies of the Joint Programme respond to national and regional plans?

b) To what extent have the country's national and local authorities and social stakeholders been taken into consideration, participated, or have become involved, at the design stage of the development intervention?

Process level

- **Efficiency: The extent to which the resources/inputs (funds, time etc.) have been turned into results**

a) How well does the joint programme's management model – that is, its tools, financial resources, human resources, technical resources, organizational structure, information flows and management decision-making – contribute to generating the expected outputs and outcomes?
    a. How resources are managed i.e. human resources as well as financing (how resources are managed, allocated amongst partners and expended.)
b) To what extent are the participating agencies coordinating with each other and with the government and civil society? Is there a methodology underpinning the work and internal communications that contributes to the joint implementation?
c) Are there efficient mechanisms for coordination that prevent counterparts and beneficiaries from becoming overloaded?
d) Does the pace of implementing programme outputs ensure the completeness of the joint programme's results? How do the different components of the joint programme interrelate? What are the interlinkages between the three components of the programme?
e) Are work methodologies, financial tools etc. shared among agencies and among joint programmes?
f) Have more efficient (sensitive) and appropriate measures been adopted to respond to the political and socio-cultural context identified?
g) How conducive are current UN agency procedures to joint programming? How can existing bottlenecks be overcome and procedures further harmonized?

h) Are some of the participating agencies not undertaking similar employment creation activities? How can existing overlaps be minimized and intervention areas are assigned to agencies with comparative advantage which includes presence in project target areas and capacity to deliver.
i) How efficiently are the UN participating organization mitigating the risks?

- Ownership in the process: National social actors' effective exercise of leadership in the development interventions

a) To what extent have the target population and the participants taken ownership of the programme, assuming an active role in it?
b) To what extent have national public/private resources and/or counterparts been mobilized to contribute to the programme's goals and impacts?

Results level

- Efficacy: Extent to which the objectives of the development intervention have been met or are expected to be met, taking into account their relative importance.

a) Is the programme making progress towards achieving the stipulated results?

    a. To what extent and in what ways is the joint programme contributing to the Sustainable Development Goals (previously Peace-building and State-building Goals – PSGs) at the local and national levels?

b) Is the stipulated timeline of outputs being met? What factors are contributing to progress or delay in the achievement of the outputs and outcomes?
c) Do the outputs produced meet the required high quality?
d) Does the programme have follow-up mechanisms (to verify the quality of the products, punctuality of delivery, etc.) to measure progress in the achievement of the envisaged results?
e) Is the programme providing coverage to beneficiaries as planned?
f) In what way has the programme come up with innovative measures for problem-solving?

g) Have any good practices, success stories, or transferable examples been identified?
h) In what ways has the joint programme contributed to the issue of youth employment?

i) What types of differentiated effects are resulting from the joint programme in accordance with the sex, race, ethnic group, rural or urban setting of the beneficiary population, and to what extent?

Sustainability: The probability that the benefits of the intervention will continue in the long term.

a) Are the necessary premises occurring to ensure the sustainability of the impacts of the joint programme?
   At local and national level:

i. Is the programme supported by national and/or local institutions?
ii. Are these institutions showing technical capacity and leadership commitment to keep working with the programme and to repeat it?
iii. Have operating capacities been created and/or reinforced in national and local partners?
iv. Do the partners have sufficient financial capacity to keep up the benefits produced by the programme?
v. Is the duration of the programme sufficient to ensure a cycle that will ensure the sustainability of the interventions?
vi. Have networks or network institutions been created or strengthened to carry out the roles that the joint programme is performing?
vii. Has the geographical coverage of the programme been effective? Were there consultations with the relevant stakeholders?
viii. Is the programme and its activities contributing to the environmental protection and climate change?
ix. How does the programme create solidarity and develop better relations amongst the beneficiaries and communities?

b) To what extent are the visions and actions of partners consistent with or different from those of the joint programme?
c) In what ways can governance of the joint programme be improved so as to increase the chances of achieving sustainability in the future?

Country level

d) During the analysis of the evaluation, what lessons have been learned, and what best practices can be transferred to other programmes or countries?
e) To what extent and in what way is the joint programme contributing to progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals in the country?
f) To what extent and in which ways are the joint programmes helping make progress towards United Nations reform? One UN
g) How have the principles for aid effectiveness (ownership, alignment, managing for development results and mutual accountability) been developed in the joint programmes?
h) To what extent is the joint programme helping to influence the country's public policy framework?

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

The mid-term evaluation will use an international consultant, hired by UNDP, as the Evaluator to conduct the evaluation and a locally hired consultant who will support the Evaluator by providing information about local context such as institutions, protocol, traditions, etc. and assist with translation of key meetings/ interviews during the mission as needed. It is the sole responsibility of the Evaluator to deliver the inception, draft final and final reports.

The Evaluator will use methodologies and techniques as determined by the specific needs for information, the questions set out in the TOR, the availability of resources and the priorities of stakeholders. In all cases, the Evaluator is expected to analyse all relevant information sources, such as annual reports, programme documents, internal review reports, programme files, strategic country development documents and any other documents that may provide evidence on which to form opinions. The Evaluator should also to use interviews, field visits, meetings with stakeholders and focus group discussions as a means to collect relevant data for the evaluation and use triangular method for validation and analysis of data and information collected. The stakeholders *inter alia* include donors, UN participating organizations and its project teams, donors, and government counterparts.

The methodology and techniques to be used in the evaluation should be described in detail in the inception report and the final evaluation report, and should contain, at a minimum, information on the instruments used for data collection and analysis, whether these be documents, interviews, field visits, questionnaires or participatory techniques.

Required Qualifications Competencies, Skills and Experience of the Evaluator

Sound knowledge about results-based management (especially results-oriented monitoring and evaluation).

Full computer literacy.

Academic Qualifications for the Evaluator:

A master degree or equivalent on international development, public policy, social science, business administration or related field is a requirement. Further education or a concentration in monitoring and/or evaluation would be an asset.

Years of experience:

A combination of 5 years of recognized expertise in:

Conducting or managing evaluations, assessments, audits, research or review of development projects, programmes, countries or thematic areas and

Having thematic expertise in youth and employment, international development programmes and or assessing or evaluating one or more of the economic and private sector development; conflict prevention and peace building; cultural diversity and development, economic governance, gender and women's empowerment).

Having experience in fragile or conflict countries particularly in Africa

Having experience with UN is advantageous

Language Requirements:

Knowledge of English is required.

EVALUATION DELIVERABLES

The Evaluator is responsible for submitting the following deliverables to the UNDP Country Director (on behalf of all participating UN Organizations):

- **Inception Report** (to be submitted within seven days of the submission of all programme documentation to the Evaluator)

This report will be 5 to 10 pages in length and will propose the methods, sources and procedures to be used for data collection. It will also include a proposed timeline of activities and submission of deliverables. The inception report will propose an initial theory of change to the joint programme that will be used for comparative purposes during the evaluation and will serve as an initial point of agreement and understanding between the Evaluator and the evaluation managers. The Evaluator will also share the inception report with the evaluation reference group to seek their comments and suggestions.

- **Draft Final Report** (to be submitted within 10 days of completion of the field visit)

The draft final report will contain the same sections as the final report (described in the next paragraph) and will be 40 to 50 pages in length. This report will be shared among the key Project Steering Committee (PSC) members – government lead, donors and participating UN organizations). It will also contain an executive report of no more than 5 pages that includes a brief description of the joint programme, its context and current situation, the purpose of the evaluation, its methodology and its main findings, conclusions and recommendations. UNDP Somalia will share the draft final report with the PSC members to seek their comments and suggestions.

- **Final Evaluation Report** (to be submitted within seven days of receipt of the draft final report with comments)

The final report will be 30 to 40 pages in length. It will also contain an executive report of no more than 5 pages that includes a brief description of the joint programme, its context and current situation, the purpose of the evaluation, its methodology and its major findings, conclusions and recommendations. UNDP Somalia will send the final report to the PSC members. This report will contain the following sections at a minimum:

1. Cover Page

2. Introduction
   - Background, goal and methodological approach
   - Purpose of the evaluation
   - Methodology used in the evaluation
   - Constraints and limitations on the study conducted

3. Description of interventions carried out
   - - Initial concept
   - - Detailed description of its development: description of the hypothesis of change in the programme.

4. Levels of Analysis: Evaluation criteria and questions

5. Conclusions and lessons learned (prioritized, structured and clear)

6. Recommendations

7. Annexes

ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND PREMISES OF THE EVALUATION

The mid-term evaluation of the joint programme is to be carried out according to ethical principles and standards established by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG).

• **Anonymity and confidentiality**. The evaluation must respect the rights of individuals who provide information, ensuring their anonymity and confidentiality.

• **Responsibility**. The report must mention any dispute or difference of opinion that may have arisen among the consultants or between the Evaluator and the reference group of the Joint Programme in connection with the findings and/or recommendations. The Evaluator must corroborate all assertions, and note any disagreement with them.

• **Integrity.** The Evaluator will be responsible for highlighting issues not specifically mentioned in the TOR, if this is needed to obtain a more complete analysis of the intervention.

• **Independence**. The Evaluator should ensure his or her independence from the intervention under review, and he or she must not be associated with its management or any element thereof.

• **Incidents**. If problems arise during the fieldwork, or at any other stage of the evaluation, the Evaluator must report these immediately to UNDP Somalia. If this is not done, the existence of such problems may in no case be used by the Evaluator to justify the failure to obtain the results stipulated by UNDP Somalia in these terms of reference.

• **Validation of information.** The Evaluator will be responsible for ensuring the accuracy of the information collected while preparing the reports and will be ultimately responsible for the information presented in the evaluation report.

• **Intellectual property.** In handling information sources, the Evaluator shall respect the intellectual property rights of the institutions and communities that are under review.

• **Delivery of reports.** If delivery of the reports is delayed, or in the event that the quality of the reports delivered is clearly lower than what was agreed, the penalties stipulated in these terms of reference will be applicable.

ROLES OF ACTORS IN THE EVALUATION

The main actors in the mid-term evaluation are the Programme Management Unit of the joint programme, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs –FGS, participating UN organizations and donors of the programme. The Programme Management Unit, PSC Co-Chairs, and the RC Office will serve as the evaluation reference group. The role of the evaluation reference group will extend to all phases of the evaluation, including:

- Facilitating the participation of those involved in the evaluation design.
- Identifying information needs, defining objectives and delimiting the scope of the evaluation.
- Providing input on the evaluation planning documents (Work Plan and Communication, Dissemination and Improvement Plan).
- Providing input and participating in the drafting of the Terms of Reference.
- Facilitating the evaluation team's access to all information and documentation relevant to the intervention, as well as to key actors and informants who should participate in interviews, focus groups or other information-gathering methods.
- Monitoring the quality of the process and the documents and reports that are generated, so as to enrich these with their input and ensure that they address their interests and needs for information about the intervention.
- Disseminating the results of the evaluation, especially among the organizations and entities within their interest group.

UNDP Somalia shall manage the mid-term evaluation in its role as proponent of the evaluation, fulfilling the mandate to conduct and finance the mid-term evaluation from the programme resources. As manager of the mid-term evaluation, UNDP Somalia will be responsible for ensuring that the evaluation process is conducted as stipulated; promoting and leading the evaluation design; coordinating and monitoring progress and development in the evaluation study and the quality of the process. It shall also disseminate evaluation findings and recommendations.

TIMELINE FOR THE EVALUATION PROCESS

A. Design phase (15 days total)

1. UNDP Somalia shall send the generic TOR for independent mid-term evaluation of the programme to the reference group for any inputs and feedback.

2. UNDP will use the TOR as the basis to recruit the Evaluator and share the TOR with the selected Evaluator.

3. From this point on, the UNDP Portfolio Manager is responsible for managing the execution of the evaluation, with three main functions: to facilitate the work of the Evaluator, to serve as interlocutor between the parties (Evaluator, reference group in the country, etc.), and to review the deliverables that are produced.

4. UNDP will arrange travel, accommodation, security clearance and field visits of the Evaluator.

B. Execution phase of the evaluation study (55-58 days total)

Desk study (15 days total)

1. The Portfolio Manager will brief the Evaluator **(1 day).** He/she will hand over a checklist of activities and documents to review, and explain the evaluation process. Discussion will take place over what the evaluation should entail.
2. The Evaluator will review the documents according to the standard list (see TOR annexes; programme document, financial, monitoring reports etc.).
3. The Evaluator will submit the inception report to the Portfolio Manager in UNDP; the report will include the findings from the document review and will specify how the evaluation will be conducted. The Evaluator will share the inception report with the evaluation reference group for comments and suggestions (within **seven days of delivery of all programme documentation to the consultant**).
4. The focal points for the evaluation (PSC Co-Chairs) and the Evaluator will prepare an agenda to conduct the field visit of the evaluation. (e.g. Interview with programme participants, stakeholders, focus groups, etc.) (Within **seven days of delivery of the desk study report**).

Field visit (9-12 days)

1. In-country, the Evaluator will observe and contrast the preliminary conclusions reached through the study of the document review. The planned agenda will be carried out. To accomplish this, UNDP's Portfolio Manager may need to facilitate the Evaluator's visit by means of phone calls and emails to the reference group.

2. The Evaluator will be responsible for conducting a debriefing with the key actors he or she has interacted with.

Final Report (31 days total)

1. The Evaluator will deliver a draft final report, which UNDP's Portfolio Manager shall be responsible for sharing with the evaluation reference group **(within 10 days of the completion of the field visit).**

2. The evaluation reference group may ask that data or facts that it believes are incorrect be changed, as long as it provides data or evidence that supports its request. The Evaluator will have the final say over whether to accept or reject such changes. For the sake of evaluation quality, the UNDP's Portfolio Manager can and should intervene so that erroneous data, and opinions based on erroneous data or not based on evidence, are changed **(within 14 days of delivery of the draft final report).**

   The evaluation reference group may also comment on the value judgements contained in the report, but these do not affect the Evaluator's freedom to express the conclusions and recommendations he or she deems appropriate, based on the evidence and criteria established.

3. UNDP's Portfolio Manager shall assess the quality of the final version of the evaluation report presented, using the criteria stipulated in the annex to this TOR **(within seven days of delivery of the draft final report).**

4. Upon receipt of input from the reference group, the Evaluator shall decide which input to incorporate and which to omit. UNDP's Portfolio Manager shall review the final copy of the report, and this phase will conclude with the delivery of this report by the UNDP Portfolio Manager to the evaluation reference group **(within seven days of delivery of the draft final report with comments).**

C. Phase of incorporating recommendations and improvement plan (within 21 days of delivery of the final report):

1. UNDP's Portfolio Manager, as representative of UNDP Somalia, shall engage in a dialogue with the reference group to establish an improvement plan that includes recommendations from the evaluation.
2. UNDP's Portfolio Manager will hold a dialogue with the reference group to develop a simple plan to disseminate and report the results to the various interested parties.

ANNEXES

a) Document Review

New Deal and PSG Context

- The Somali Compact
- Summary of the M&E frameworks and common indicators
- SDRF and PSG Work Group Guidelines/TORs

Specific Documents for Joint Programme

- Joint Programme Document
- Amendment 1 to the Joint Programme
- Progress Reports by the joint programme
- Studies/Knowledge Products

- Assessments conducted by the joint programme
- Relevant documents or reports on the Peace-Building and State-Building Goals
- Relevant documents or reports on One UN, Delivering as One

b) File for the Joint Programme Improvement Plan

After the mid-term evaluation is complete, the phase of incorporating its recommendations shall begin. This file is to be used as the basis for establishing an improvement plan for the joint programme, which will bring together all the recommendations, actions to be carried out by programme management.

Evaluation Recommendation No. 1				
Response from the Joint Programme Management				
Key actions	**Time frame**	**Person responsible**	**Follow-up**	
1.1			**Comments**	**Status**
1.2				
1.3				
Evaluation Recommendation No. 2				
Response from the Joint Programme Management				
Key actions	**Time frame**	**Person responsible**	**Follow-up**	
2.1			Comments	Status
2.2				
2.3				
Evaluation Recommendation No. 3				
Response from the Joint Programme Management				
Key actions	**Time frame**	**Person responsible**	**Follow-up**	
3.1			Comments	Status
3.2				
3.3				