

UNDP Haiti

Support to the Electoral Process in Haiti Project

Final Evaluation

Final Evaluation Report

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Abbreviations

AFIS	Automated Fingerprint Identification System
BCEC	Communal Office for Electoral Disputes
BCED	Departmental Office for Electoral Disputes
BCEN	National Office for Electoral Disputes
BEC	Communal Electoral Office
BED	Departmental Electoral Office
BRIDGE	Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections
CEP	Provisional/Permanent Electoral Council
CIEVE	Independent Electoral Evaluation and Verification Commission
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CTA	Chief Technical Advisor
CTV	Centre of Voting Tabulation
DIM	Direct Implementation Modality
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EAD	Electoral Assistance Division
EAS	Electoral Assistance Section
EDR	Electoral Dispute Resolution
EMB	Electoral Management Body
EU	European Union
GOH	Government of Haiti
HNP	Haitian National Police
HTG	Haitian Gourdes
IC	Independent Consultant
ID	Identity
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Services
ISF	United Nations Integrated Strategic Framework for Haiti
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
KAP	Knowledge, Attitude and Practices
LOA	Letter of Agreement
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MINUJUSTH	United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti
NAM	Needs Assessment Mission
NDI	National Democratic Institute
OAS	Organisation of American States
OCID	Citizen Observers for the Institutionalisation of Democracy
ONI	National Identification Agency
PMU	Project Management Unit
PV	Tally sheets
PWD	Persons with Disabilities
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
TA	Technical Assistance
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	US Dollar

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

The *Support to the Electoral Process in Haiti Project* was originally designed as a USD 36,744,053 22-month project to strengthen the Permanent Electoral Council (Permanent CEP) and the 2013 – 2014 electoral process in Haiti. The project included support for the National Office of Identification (ONI) for the printing and distribution of national ID cards through an agreement with the Organization of American States (OAS). The project was extended to September 2017 and the budget increased to USD 68,906,579 because of election-related political crises which interrupted the electoral processes. Activities were expanded in a 2015 amendment to include direct project support to ONI and the National Archives and to increase project activities related to women and youth. These additional activities were never implemented due to the decision to focus on elections support. The cycle of direct elections was eventually completed in early 2017.

The project was funded by the Governments of Haiti (GOH), the United States of America, Canada, European Union (EU), Japan, Brazil, Trinidad and Tobago, Norway, Mexico and Argentina. It was fully funded. The project used a direct implementation modality (DIM) and was managed by a Chief Technical Adviser (CTA) under the guidance of a Steering Committee with UNDP quality control.

Findings

Relevance. The project design was relevant to the 2013 context, GOH and UNDP objectives and included the mechanisms needed to support the administration of elections. It used an electoral cycle and capacity building approach which are best practices. It did not address the issue of the reforms needed in the context to stabilize and solidify Haiti's political and electoral processes and institutions.

The project remained relevant despite the disruptions in the electoral process but its electoral cycle nature was lost during implementation as it focused mainly on holding the elections. The issue of "ownership" of election administration, and by extension control over the use of the basket funds, was raised by the 2015 and 2016 CEPs interviewed. The international community had been active in Haiti for decades, led during the project period by the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) which had an electoral mandate since 2004. The 2016 CEP felt it had more ownership once it negotiated with UNDP a split in the responsibilities for the use of the GOH funds intended for election operations, with the majority of GOH funds deposited directly into its account for use under its own workplan.

Relevance was reduced in 2017 as the project did not continue its assistance long enough into the post-electoral period to help consolidate the gains made by the CEP or to support the reform discussions which were just getting underway.

Effectiveness. Many factors affected UNDP's ability to function effectively and shaped the nature of its response. These also directly affected its relevance, efficiency and sustainability aspects. These included: the UN mission context that defined the parameters for UNDP support; UNDP's long-time relationship and position of trust with the GOH and other actors which provided access and ability to work in the difficult context; the protracted electoral cycle which was continually interrupted by political problems, delayed decisions, and changes in election dates and counterparts; the provisional nature of the CEP and the frequent change of councils that required the continual re-building of relationships and trust; the highly politicized nature of the electoral process and its administration which shaped the perceptions of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and UNDP of where and how it should engage; the lack of a clear division of responsibilities between the MINUSTAH electoral support section (EAS) and the UNDP project; and the nature of the personal relations and communications between the myriad of actors at individual and institutional levels and the project. Some of these facilitated the efforts while others constrained its actions.

The monitoring and evaluation (M&E) elements of the project were not sufficient to capture project performance beyond the provision of outputs. However, it appears that the project's efforts helped the CEPs to better manage their institutions, communicate with stakeholders and the public, and in the end to organize more credible and better accepted elections. This was done in particular through the interaction of the technical experts and the CEP, support for the development of procedures, regulations and training, and through the provision of appropriate tools and technology. In particular, the support for the registration of candidates, poll workers and poll watchers (mandataires) which standardized the processes and brought the party agent and poll worker systems under better control. The cloud based system introduced also allowed for late changes to be reflected in the printing of ballots and credentials.

The project also procured highly securitized ballots for all of the elections which helped to increase trust and deter ballot-related fraud. Capacity building activities needed considerable strengthening. Support to the ONI was limited but strengthened the ONI's capacity to register an additional one million persons who would have been otherwise ineligible to vote in the 2015-2017 elections.

Efficiency. UNDP was directly engaged in the implementation of the project along with the Project Management Unit (PMU). The DIM mechanism was appropriate in the country context as it provided security for the use of funds for donors, but it also provided the CEP with a sense of ownership over the process once it was able to directly manage a portion of the funds. UNDP was a good steward of the basket fund, saving the funds for election support until the election dates were set and delivering its outputs and commodities in time for each election. However, project management issues affected its efficiency and increased the management burden for UNDP. There were not enough PMU staff to manage a project of this size and complexity and not all PMU staff had the type of contracts needed to use UNDP's computerized administration and financial systems (ATLAS). Project partners also noted the need for more frequent and open information sharing. Project management issues, such as payments for temporary workers, were raised in tense CEP technical meetings on election administration rather than being resolved in project or Steering Committee meetings. This politicized perceptions of the project and UNDP. Partnerships with other agencies, such as UN Women and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to deliver parts of the participation and gender equity components, would have increased efficiency had they been part of the original design (so were more integral elements of the project) and been funded earlier in the cycle.

Sustainability. This remains a critical issue given the lack of a permanent CEP, needed electoral reforms and electoral/political stability. There is the beginning of consolidation of the CEP as an institution and foundations to build on. The level of GOH commitment and funding increased after the 2015 problems which are preconditions for the sustainability of the gains made in the 2016-2017 process. The databases, systems, and manuals are expected to remain for the near to medium term even if councils change as they were proven to have been effective and were appreciated by the CEP staff and electoral participants. The cost of the elections remains a concern and requires analysis at the policy and technical levels in the near term for Haiti to be able to develop an electoral system and process that it can afford and sustain.

Conclusions

The Support to the Electoral Process Project in Haiti was needed and highly relevant for the 2013-2017 electoral process. The project provided needed technical assistance (TA), services and funding that supported the provisional CEPs to better manage the elections in the midst of a prolonged and contentious electoral process. The engagement and improvements supported increased the credibility of the CEP and the validity of the election results, something that would have been difficult for the CEP to achieve alone in the highly politicized context and climate of pervasive mistrust.

The project remained relevant and largely effective in the volatile and complex environment by adjusting its programme to the changing circumstances, and by providing reliable support while still maintaining its standards. The policy support provided by the SRS and others at the political level to the electoral process and project was essential to its success.

The project was most effective in strengthening the quality and reliability of electoral administration. This helped to increase the credibility of the CEP and the transparency of its efforts. Project support to standardize systems and procedures, develop innovative IT and database solutions reduced the room for human error and malfeasance and helped to depoliticize some of the technical aspects of electoral administration. This in turn helped to increase trust in the CEP and in its dependability.

The electoral cycle nature of the project design was a best practice but this aspect was lost in the context and manner of project implementation. The lack of distinction between budget support and the developmental aspects of the project contributed as did the mission context which defined the scope for UNDP assistance. A more programmatic approach to the process as a whole could have strengthened efforts for capacity building, mainstreaming gender, increasing women's and youth's participation and the e-governance aspects of electoral administration.

UNDP as a whole and the project in particular coped with the large volume of work required, but its management burden could have been eased considerably by a better organization of staff, experts, tasks and reporting lines, along with the appropriate types of contracts for the different terms of references (TOR). Written project communications were good but more regular Steering Committee meetings and informal information sharing on project management and implementation would have improved relations and partner perceptions of the project. The M&E framework was insufficient to adequately assess UNDP's performance and capture its results.

Outcome level results are the cumulative effects of the Haitian efforts and assistance provided to the processes. However, *the project directly contributed to the peaceful and successful conclusion of the 2013-2017 electoral process and the acceptance of the results.* The technical assistance, services and funding provided were indispensable to this achievement. The positive results are also due to the commitment of the transitional government to complete the electoral cycle and the significant level of funding from the GOH as the project's largest donor, along with the dedication of the CEP, UNDP, project staff, partners and the other persons and institutions that worked to strengthen the electoral processes in Haiti.

The cost of elections remains a serious issue that needs to be addressed at the electoral framework level as well as the election administration level. The current system is not sustainable for Haiti or for donors.

More emphasis was needed on the issue of electoral reform. This is needed to develop more sustainable and stable electoral and political processes and institutions. Most of the gains made under this project will not be sustainable if there are similar interruptions in the next electoral cycle or if the CEP does not consolidate into a permanent and independent institution.

UNDP remains a valued partner by the GOH and international community. The reform discussion is ongoing and there is a window of opportunity to support and build on this effort for genuine change that UNDP, as a multilateral development agency with an electoral assistance mandate and global experience, is uniquely placed to assist.

Recommendations

Continued support to strengthen the electoral processes in Haiti through immediate support to the reform process and to consolidate the gains made within the CEP, and to develop a follow-on longer-term electoral cycle project. Goals should be raised beyond electoral administration to developing sustainable and stable electoral and democratic political processes and institutions and ensuring they address key issues such as electoral management body (EMB) independence, accountability of actors,

transparency of the processes, electoral justice, inclusive participation (women, youth, persons with disabilities-PWD and others), civic education and the cost of elections. Consider phasing and benchmarking assistance based on commonly agreed goals that demonstrate progress in the processes and electoral climate.

Link the policy dialogue and advocacy efforts for electoral reforms to the objectives of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the national discussions on how to achieve these goals. In particular, for SDG 5 (Gender Equality) and SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions) which have the same objectives as an electoral cycle project.

Adopt a programmatic approach for project implementation and ensure synergies of efforts to increase project effectiveness and efficiencies with other efforts that cover the broader spectrum of democratic governance, including strengthening the rule of law, democratic principles, advocacy for reforms, equal rights, and civic education.

Continue use of a common basket fund to fund essential items not covered by the GOH, but with a clear distinction in the project document, meetings and reporting between the development-focused activities and the use of funds for budget support. Increase national ownership of the process through the continued transfer of funds to GOH agencies receiving budget support. Strengthen their capacity to better administer the funds to ensure their proper use.¹ Embed technical experts in the institutions to ensure transfer of knowledge and skills to their counterparts.

Build on the efforts made to develop the cloud-based data systems and consider how interactive e-governance systems could further improve the voter registration and electoral administration processes. UNDP could use its experience from other countries to help Haiti through institutional exchanges. Continue efforts to support electoral dispute resolution (EDR) mechanisms and capacities within the process.

Resume UNDP's donor coordination role at the end of MINUSTAH and hold regular donor coordination and project steering committee meetings. Increase the sharing of information between projects and partners between meetings and reporting.

Strengthen project management and M&E efforts. Add an experienced deputy project manager for large and complex projects as well as a full time M&E person to monitor and report on project performance and to respond to partner requests for information. Ensure the results framework is fleshed out early in the project with well-defined objectives, measurable indicators and targets as well as with the methods to be used to collect the data. Consider regular survey research for the voter information, civic education and participation components to better target efforts and measure results. Use the M&E plan to monitor project progress and performance.

Ensure future capacity building efforts are based on participatory needs assessments of the CEP and other relevant institutions including their management and organizational structures, staffing levels and internal regulations and procedures. Address the cost of elections issue by undertaking a comprehensive assessment that looks at the complete costs of the elections, including the costs incurred through delays, EMB structures, electoral security and voter information, to better understand the situation and to identify the systemic and technical changes needed to make the system more effective and affordable for Haiti.

¹ This could be through a certified public accounting firm that could also provide oversight and certify the proper use of, and reporting on, for each tranche.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1 Final Evaluation of the Support to the Electoral Cycle Project in Haiti

UNDP Haiti commissioned this final evaluation of the Support to the Electoral Cycle Project. It is intended to provide UNDP and its project partners with an independent assessment of the project that is expected to be used to strengthen future programming.

In particular, the evaluation was asked to:

1. Assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the project interventions based on the project's intended outcomes as well as the national and UNDP development objectives²;
2. Assess the project design and quality of indicators in measuring project performance; and
3. Provide lessons learned and recommendations that can be used for future programming.

The final evaluation took place in September - October 2017 with the field work in Haiti done from 14 – 22 September 2017. The evaluation was conducted by Sue Nelson, Evaluation Team Leader and Stephanie Vergniault, Election Expert, both experts in democratic governance and electoral assistance. It undertook a qualitative assessment of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the project's assistance and results and the factors that affected project performance. It used a triangulation methodology and mixed methods of analysis to draw conclusions and make recommendations based on stakeholder perceptions and the information available. In particular it:

- Collected information and perceptions of the project through interviews with UNDP, project staff and technical advisors, current and former CEP members and staff, GOH officials, development partners, implementing partners, civil society organizations (CSOs), electoral observers and other relevant actors and institutions. The interviews were done in Port-au-Prince in person and people in other locations were reached by Skype, phone and email (Annex 1);
- Reviewed project documents and other relevant documentation on the project, and on the electoral and political processes in Haiti (Annex 2); and,
- Validated information through interviews and document reviews as well as through the use of additional data sources and third-party interviews.

The methodology for the evaluation is provided in the Evaluation Inception Report (Annex 3). The final evaluation's Terms of Reference are provided in Annex 4. The evaluation was limited by the time available for the review and reporting, and the availability of project documentation and project staff, partners and stakeholders for interviews. The project was also over during the final evaluation so the evaluators were not able to see the project in action and had to rely on the recollections of those interviewed and the information provided in reporting. It was also difficult to have a regular reference group to validate findings. To address this, UNDP ensured the participation of key persons beyond the interview process, such as sharing the draft report for comments and follow-up.

² Assessment of impact was not part of the evaluation's terms of reference. Per UNDP evaluation guidance, "*impacts – describing changes in people's lives and development conditions at global, regional and national levels- are usually beyond the scope of UNDP evaluations*" which focus on the outcome levels, especially for decentralized project-level evaluations (which is the case for this evaluation). UNDP, *Outcome-Level Evaluation Guide*, p 17

The evaluation findings are organized in this evaluation report according to the four criteria stipulated in the terms of reference: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability and include discussions of the project's contribution towards the achievement of the key outputs as intended in the project documents which are covered in effectiveness. It also includes issues of project design, management and implementation. The evaluation report closes with the evaluation's conclusions and recommendations.

2.2 Political and electoral context

The Support to the Electoral Process Project was implemented in the context of a prolonged and problematic cycle of elections marked by recurrent political crises and negotiations on the way forward (Table 1). These differences resulted in delays in holding the elections, the ending of local and legislative mandates without elected replacements, and a rule by executive decree.

Anticipations that the Permanent Electoral Council would be created in 2012 gave way to a continuing cycle of crises over the composition of the CEPs and negotiations which also resulted in the continued slipping of the electoral cycle.

Elections in 2015 were only held after the president and opposition parties agreed in the El Rancho Accord to form a government of consensus, name a new provisional electoral council and adopt a new electoral law.

The August and October 2015 elections led to the resumption of Haiti's legislature and elected local governments, but the presidential election process, held at the same time, was disrupted by the refusal of eight candidates to accept the results of the first round, claiming fraud. The second round intended for January 2016 was cancelled amidst rising insecurity and demonstrations, raising concerns about a vacuum in the presidency when President Martelly's term of office ended in February.

Table 1: Election Timeline			
Election	Due Date	Actual Date	Comments
One third Senate	November 2007	19 April 2009 2 nd R: 21 June 2009	
One third Senate and all Deputies	November 2009	28 Nov 2010 2 nd R: 20 Mar 2011	Earthquake 12 January 2010 disrupted election calendar
Presidential	November 2010	28 Nov 2010 2 nd R: 20 Mar 2011	Candidates charged fraud, OAS verification mission, CEP accepted recommendations, President Michel Martelly elected 2 nd round.
Municipal and Local	November 2009	Mayors. Delegates 25 October 2015	Political appointees replaced elected officials in 2012 after their mandate expired in 2011
One third Senate	2012	9 August 2015 2 nd R: 25 Oct 2015	New CEP April 2013 New CEP May 2014
One third Senate and all Deputies	End 2014	9 August 2015 2 nd R: 29 Jan 2017	Resolving issue of end dates for terms for senators elected 2009 took time; October 2015 presidential election results canceled by CIEVE; new CEP installed June 2015
Presidential	2015	25 October 2015 (results cancelled) 20 November 2016	Elections scheduled for 9 Oct 2016 postponed after hurricane; Privert elected by Senate as Interim President after President Martelly's mandate expired in Feb 2016
Local elections		29 January 2017	
Indirect Elections		11 – 14 July, 2017	For Municipal Assemblies. Other elections not held as results not yet published

This was ultimately resolved through a political accord to create an interim government for six months which would organize the second round for the cancelled January elections. As noted by the OAS Special Envoy, Ambassador Sanders, who helped to facilitate the accord, *"the interests of the nation had to be put above all other consideration. That is why a political compact was necessary to*

*allow for a rapid return to some degree of constitutional normality and the installation of an elected leader. The moment was critical, the cost of failure too great.”*³

Senate President Jocelerme Privert was installed as the Interim President by a vote in the National Assembly, however the elections were not scheduled as agreed as it took time for parliament to agree to the composition of the interim government, for a new CEP to be named, and for a commission of electoral inquiry commissioned by Privert (the Independent Electoral Evaluation and Verification Commission or CIEVE) to investigate and make its findings. The CIEVE recommended re-running the first round of the presidential elections because of the level of problems found. The results of the legislative and local elections held at the same time were still considered valid.⁴ This decision was not supported by the findings of national and international observers (EU and OAS) which felt that the problems observed in October had not affected the outcome of the presidential race.⁵

The elections were eventually scheduled for October 2016 but were postponed until a month later (November) because of Hurricane Matthew which ravaged the southern peninsula and the north-western department. These elections were held successfully and Jovenel Moïse won the presidential race in the first round. The second round for the remaining elections and one-round local elections were also held successfully in January 2017 resulting in all directly elected offices being filled by elected officials.

Haiti's 1987 constitution calls for a permanent electoral body, the Permanent CEP. This has not yet been created and all the elections to date have been managed by provisional CEPs. The composition and capacities of the different CEPs are regularly challenged by different political actors and CSOs and are changed frequently as a consequence. As noted in the MINUSTAH reports, the *“issue of the composition of the Electoral Commission continued to divide the executive, key opposition political parties, and opposition parliamentarians.... The impasse stemmed from the widely held perception that influence over the members of the Electoral Council is a key determinant of the electoral outcome.”*⁶

There have been more than a dozen CEPs each with differing levels of perceived independence and capacity according to observer reports. The frequency of the changes has directly affected the ability of the CEP to develop institutionally and sustain the administrative gains made in each election. The CEP was also affected by the 2010 earthquake that destroyed infrastructure and government records and killed many civil servants.⁷

The 1987 Constitution guarantees basic civil and political rights for Haitians. Constitutional amendments in 2012 added a gender quota for 30 percent women in all elected and appointed positions at national level, recognized dual citizenship and some rights for dual citizens including the right to vote and run for some offices. It also streamlined the nomination process for the members of a permanent electoral council which before required the establishment of the indirectly elected assemblies, which had yet to be done. Instead it provides for the nomination of candidates for the permanent CEP by the three powers (executive, legislative and judicial). Not all Haitians recognize these constitutional amendments as valid, especially the provision that simplified the nomination process for the permanent CEP. The gender quota was applied for the first time to the local elections held in 2015 where candidates ran on a “cartel” (slate) of three persons, guaranteeing at

³ OAS, *Report to the Permanent Council of the Special Mission to Haiti*, p 2

⁴ CIEVE, *Report of the Independent Evaluation and Verification Commission*, p 31

⁵ OAS, *Report to the Permanent Council, Electoral Observation Mission – Haiti, General Elections*, p 12

⁶ UN, *Report of the Secretary General on MINUSTAH 29 August 2014*, pps 1-2

⁷ The 2010 earthquake killed more than 200,000 persons and injured another 300,000. More than 1.5 million persons were displaced and more than 80,000 buildings destroyed, many of these government buildings.

least one woman candidate per cartel. Only 8% of the candidates in 2015 for parliament were women and none were elected.⁸

Haiti's socio-economic development has been affected by the political instability, electoral crises, and natural disasters. Haiti is 163 out of 187 countries on UNDP's *Human Development Index*, with 72% of its population in or near multidimensional poverty.⁹ It is the only least developed country in the western hemisphere. More than two million Haitians have moved abroad. This provides Haiti with high levels of remittances, but has resulted in a serious brain drain and a persistently small middle class. Democratic values in the country have been decreasing according to surveys done by Americas Barometer. In 2014, 69% of the respondents felt democracy was the preferable form of government, down from 83% in 2010, and almost 21% thought dictatorship was preferable in some circumstances, compared to 7.8% in 2010.¹⁰ Haiti also has the lowest level of interpersonal trust in the hemisphere, at 48%.¹¹ Election observers note the low levels of voter participation in the elections (18% in August 2015), and practices such as vote buying, improper use of state funds for party use, and acts of violence.¹²

2.3 Electoral Cycle Support Project

The *Support to the Electoral Cycle Project in Haiti* was originally a USD 36,744,053 22-month project (1 October 2013 to 31 July 2015). It was primarily intended to strengthen the institutional capacity of a permanent CEP and to support the 2013 – 2014 electoral processes (legislative, municipal and local elections).¹³ It was based on the findings of an electoral review mission of the 2010-2011 UNDP elections project and that project's lessons learned.

The project document was amended in June 2015 after the local and legislative elections expected for 2013 – 2014 slipped into 2015 due to the on-going elections-related political crises, and to include support to the presidential elections.

The project name was changed from *Support to the Electoral Process in Haiti* to *Support to the Electoral Cycle in Haiti* and its completion date was extended to 31 December 2016. The amendment also added two objectives as noted below and its budget was increased to USD 65,817,895. The project was amended again in November 2016 to extend the project end date to 30 June 2017 following the passage of Hurricane Matthew which pushed the second round of the elections into 2017.¹⁴ The project budget was also increased to USD

Box 1: Expected Outcomes

ISF Outcome:

Strengthened national institution able to carry out public administration functions and provide basic services.

CPAP Outcome:

The political environment is sufficiently stable and democratic to guarantee the continuity of national institutions and a respect for human rights.

CPAP Output:

The (permanent) CEP has effective and reliable operational procedures for better management of the elections in 2013, 2014, and 2015.

⁸ InterParliamentary Union, *Database for Haiti*

⁹ UNDP, *Human Development Report, Haiti*

¹⁰ LAPOP, *The Political Culture of Democracy in Haiti, 2014*, p 83

¹¹ Ibid, p 173

¹² OAS, *EOM Report, Electoral Observation Mission Haiti, General Elections* shortened to "OAS EOM Report" for future references

¹³ UNDP, *Support for the 2013 – 2014 Electoral Process in Haiti, Project Document* (shortened to "Project Document 2013 in future references), p 2

¹⁴ The decision to extend the project was made at a Steering Committee meeting in August 2016 following the publication of the new electoral calendar which fixed the dates for the elections at 9 October 2016 and 8 January 2017. This was to allow the project to continue its support and prepare for project closure. The GOH signed the amendment in November 2016.

68,906,679.¹⁵ The project end date was subsequently extended to 30 September 2017 in order to support the indirect elections.


The overarching goal of the project was to strengthen the electoral process in Haiti. To accomplish this objective, the project targeted strengthening the capacity of the CEP and the distribution of national identity (ID) cards required for voting; supporting the holding of the elections themselves; and, increasing the participation of women, youth and vulnerable groups.

The outputs listed in the original and amended project documents were:

1. *Strengthened capacity of the permanent CEP.* This was revised to *Strengthened institutional capacities of the CEP* in 2015.
2. *Support to the ONI through the OAS.*
3. *Support for the electoral process.* This was revised to *Support for electoral operations* in 2015.
4. *Technical assistance targeted at other stakeholders* (added in 2015).
5. *Strengthened participation of women, youth and other vulnerable groups* (added in 2015).

The project was also intended to contribute to the outcomes in the *United Nations Integrated Strategic Framework for Haiti (ISF) 2013 – 2016* (Box 1). The ISF replaced the *United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)* after the 2010 earthquake. The project also intended to contribute to the GOH goal of “*strengthening national democratic institutions,*” most notably the CEP and ONI, and its outcomes of “*credible elections*” and “*respecting the constitutional calendar for elections.*”¹⁶

The project used a basket fund/cost-sharing model with contributions from the Governments of Haiti (USD 36,967,187, United States (USD 8,039,336), Canada (USD 8,948,360), EU (USD 6,748,918), Japan (USD 4,477,612), Brazil (USD 1,990,000), Trinidad and Tobago (USD 1,000,000), Norway (USD 385,154), Mexico (USD 300,000) and Argentina (USD 50,000). The project was fully funded.¹⁷ After the decision to redo the 2015 presidential election, the U.S. stopped its support and withdrew the unused portion of its contribution (USD 1,649,075).¹⁸



The basket fund was intended to cover the costs to achieve the five outputs as illustrated in Table 2.¹⁹ The activities intended for Outputs 4 and 5 were never funded as a decision was made by a joint

¹⁵ UNDP, *Support for the Electoral Cycle in Haiti, Amended Project Document* (shortened to “Project Document 2015” in future references), p 1

¹⁶ GOH, *Plan Stratégique de Développement d’Haïti, Pays Emergent en 2030, Volume 1*, p 248

¹⁷ Op Cit p 1


¹⁸ UNDP, *USAID Letter of Credit, Expenditures*, April 11, 2017

¹⁹ The estimated budget tables used in the report are for illustrative purposes only and may differ from the actual project budget as the project evolved. It is based on the project documents and reflects the estimated budget, not actual levels of expenditure.

Electoral Assistance Department (EAD) – Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) – UNDP Electoral Mission in 2015 to concentrate efforts on Output 3 for election support.²⁰

The project is executed through a direct implementation modality. According to the project document, the Project Steering Committee was to be headed jointly by UNDP and MINUSTAH and was to meet bi-monthly in the periods between elections, and monthly in the electoral period. This was changed in the 2015 revision to being headed by UNDP with meetings scheduled on an ad hoc or on demand basis. The Steering Committee was to be responsible for decision-making and overseeing the implementation of project activities. UNDP was responsible for quality assurance and serving as the technical secretariat for the Steering Committee (Box 2).²¹

A Project Chief (CTA) was hired to manage project implementation and oversee the technical assistance, with support provided by a Project Management Unit. The PMU was originally intended to be composed of the CTA, an electoral systems technical advisor and an unspecified number of support personnel (administrative assistants, IT and drivers). UNDP intended to provide administrative and financial support to project as well as oversight. International and national technical consultants were to be fielded as needed and the project eventually ended up with a contingent of about 33 staff and consultants. There was no midterm evaluation foreseen in the project document, only a lessons learned exercise and a final project evaluation.



2.4 Other assistance to electoral processes

The international community has supported the electoral processes in Haiti since 1987. The earliest technical assistance was provided through the different peacekeeping missions or bilaterally by donors. UNDP started its support in 2004 through a series of projects that provided basket funding to support the process:

- 2004: *Support to the organization of local, legislative and presidential elections in Haiti*, a USD 38.6 million project funded by the Government of Haiti (USD 35.7 million) and international community (USD 2.9 million).
- 2008: *Support to the electoral process in Haiti- Senatorial elections 2009*, a USD 20.8 million project funded by the GOH (USD 5.5 million) and the international community (USD 15.3 million).
- 2010 - 2012: *Support to the electoral process in Haiti (2010-2012) project*, a USD 28.9 million project funded by the GOH (USD 7 million) and the international community (USD 21.9 million). This supported the organization of the presidential and legislative elections that were anticipated for that timeframe and included technical assistance.

²⁰ Recommended by the UN Electoral Mission to Haiti which saw them as “*not considered critical to these polls*” (UN Report of the Electoral Mission to Haiti, 27 – 29 April 2015 p 5) and adopted by the Steering Committee as a means to reduce the funding gap anticipated for the 2015 electoral process.

²¹ UNDP, *Project Document 2015*, p 71

- 2013-2017: *Support to the Electoral Process in Haiti 2013-2014 Project*, a USD 68,906,575 project which is the project under evaluation.

MINUSTAH had a Security Council mandate from 2006 – October 2017 to support “*free and fair municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections*.” This included support to the Haitian political process, promoting inclusive political dialogue and coordinating electoral assistance in cooperation with other international stakeholders including the OAS.²² Election coordination was led at the policy level by the SRSG. MINUSTAH provided a large range of technical, logistical and security support for election administration and the elections. It had an Electoral Assistance Section headed by a Chief of the Electoral Section with advisors at the departmental levels. MINUSTAH logistical support included transport of the ballots and sensitive materials to the departmental level (and to the communal level before it started to downsize) and provided support to the Haitian National Police (HNP) in the development and implementation of joint integrated security plans for all of the elections. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) also provided logistical support for the CEP since 2015 by distributing and recuperating the sensitive materials from the departmental level to the communal level.

The OAS has also been very active in the electoral processes in Haiti. It has provided mediation of political accords at the request of the GOH and helped to create ONI and the national ID card system. It also sent observers from the OAS region to observe the 2015-2017 electoral cycle. The European Union is a major donor for the democratic and electoral processes, and also fielded an international observer mission of 80 observers from July 2015 – June 2016, and a mission of technical experts to assess and monitor the process from September 2016 to December 2016. Other bilateral donors, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)²³ and Canada, have financed large democratic governance projects focused on strengthening the electoral and political processes, including increasing women’s and youth’s political participation and increasing voter information efforts. Other countries have provided punctual peer-to-peer support for the administration of the elections, such as Mexico’s electoral management body.

The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) has provided some technical assistance and support to the CEP, most notably for its voter information efforts at the departmental levels. The National Democratic Institute (NDI) has supported domestic election observation including the Citizen Observers for the Institutionalisation of Democracy (OCID). International IDEA also works with political parties.

3. EVALUATION FINDINGS

3.1 Relevance

This section starts by looking at the project design and its relevance to the best practices of electoral assistance and the method of project delivery. It then looks at its relevance to UNDP’s mandate and role, issues of national ownership and priorities, relevance of the outputs for the ONI and the addition of the outputs for the National Archives and civic participation (of women, youth and other vulnerable groups) in the 2015 project amendment.

The original project document was designed as a follow on to the 2010 UNDP project “*Support to the electoral process in Haiti 2010*”. It targeted the same areas supported by the 2010 project and anticipated a 22-month time frame based on the electoral cycle with five months of support to be provided before the elections to strengthen CEP capacity, 12 months of electoral support for the

²² MINUSTAH, *Mandate*

²³ More information can be found for USAID assistance at: <https://www.usaid.gov/haiti/fact-sheets/elections-support-2012-2017> and for Canada at: <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2016/11/canada-announces-humanitarian-development-assistance-haiti.html>

2013-2015 presidential, legislative and municipal elections, and five months of support after the elections to consolidate gains and strengthen the CEP for the next elections.²⁴ This was relevant to the continuing needs in Haiti which had not yet fully developed its electoral administration capacity and was still operating under a series of provisional CEPs. However, the time frame allowed for only an abbreviated version of an electoral cycle project. Electoral cycle projects usually allow for more time to follow and support the process so that the project can help the EMB to take stock of the lessons learned, review the electoral framework and support needed reforms. This helps to consolidate the gains made and strengthen the EMB's institutional capacity before it starts to gear up for the next electoral event.

The project document primarily targeted the CEP and its electoral administration which corresponded with the UNDAF goal of *"A permanent CEP with effective and reliable operational procedures to better organize the 2013, 2014 and 2015 elections."*²⁵ This also corresponded to the Country Programme and ISF Outcome 1.1 *National institutions are strengthened in order to carry out public administration functions and to provide basic services*, and the national goal of *rebuilding of state institutions*.²⁶ The focus on the CEP and electoral administration continued in the 2015 project document revisions and was maintained during project implementation, although the notion of supporting a "permanent" CEP was put aside as the electoral processes continued with provisional councils.

The mechanisms used to support the process, including the basket fund to channel assistance to the electoral process, providing technical assistance, procurement support, the use of the DIM implementation and UNDP's quality control, were appropriate and needed in the context. The electoral process in Haiti is politicized and contested and characterized by high levels of distrust. The use of a multinational basket fund, managed by a UN agency that was widely seen as impartial, and which included GOH contributions, added credibility to the process that the government could not achieve on its own in the highly divisive context. Although there has been a background of calls for more Haitian 'ownership' of the process since international assistance began, including by the different CEPs, the consensus in interviews was that Haiti is still dependent on external support and validation (through observer missions) for successful and credible elections. As an example, where the international community withdrew its support and observers in the past, only about 5 – 10% of the voters turned out for the elections and the results were not accepted by opposition parties or many citizens.²⁷

UNDP and the project were able to adapt to the constantly changing circumstances and remain responsive to the needs of the elections, which allowed them to keep their relevance during the prolonged electoral process. However, at the same time, the electoral cycle nature of the project was lost during implementation as the focus was on ensuring that the electoral events took place, while the other cycle elements, such as capacity building, fell largely by the wayside.

The evaluation found that relevance was reduced in 2017 as the project did not continue its assistance far enough into the post-electoral period. In the interim, Haiti's new president initiated a process to nominate the members of a permanent CEP and other stakeholders called for electoral and political reforms. Some of the project's staff and the CTA remained until June 2017, but the focus was on supporting the municipal elections and with the project effectively ending with their

²⁴ The original document was entitled support for the 2013-2014 electoral process, but according to the project document, the intention for the project's results was to support the improved management of the elections of 2013, 2014 and 2015 (with the presidential elections listed along with the municipal elections for 2015). *Project Document 2013*, pps 2 and 6

²⁵ UNDP, *Project Document 2015*, p 2

²⁶ UNDP, *CPAP, Results and resources framework for Haiti (2013 – 2014)*, p 7

²⁷ For instance, the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2000. *UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary General on Haiti, SC/2004/300*, p 3

departure. Other actors filled the space in 2017, such as IFES that was funded by USAID to support a dialogue process for electoral reform, and UNOPS that was also funded by bilateral donors earlier in the year to field an electoral reform expert. The deputy head of the OAS election observation mission (2015-2017) was also in the country during the evaluation field work to discuss the observers' recommendations for electoral reform with the government. Given UNDP's mandate and experience, these are areas where it could already be deeply engaged.

The issue of electoral reform was missing in the project's design. This has consistently been identified by national and international observers as a critical factor, needed to stabilize the electoral and political systems and to build permanent, independent and credible electoral institutions. As a multinational institution with global experience, networks and tools in the sector, UNDP is ideally suited to support reform and national dialogue efforts and has done this in the past in Haiti. The inclusion of this element could have strengthened the project design and increased its relevance.

UNDP's role. UNDP's ability to design a cohesive electoral cycle project was directly affected by the UN mission context of Haiti. This was an issue discussed in several joint international assessments in 2010 and 2011.²⁸ UN policy guidance (2010) states that UNDP assistance was to be a *"complement to Security Council electoral assistance mandates undertaken with electoral components in peace missions led by DPKO or Department of Political Affairs (DPA)."*²⁹ The division of responsibilities between UNDP and the project, and the SRSG/EAS was raised in evaluation interviews as each had their respective chief advisor and a team of experts/advisors. Most UN missions today use an integrated model of assistance where there is one assistance team, usually headed by a mission-contracted Chief Electoral Officer, with a UNDP CTA as the deputy and staffed by both mission and project electoral staff. MINUSTAH still used the older model of separate structures. Nevertheless, this final evaluation found that UNDP was still able to design a more holistic effort for this project than it was for its earlier project, but that clarity of roles remained an issue during implementation. This directly affected UNDP's relevance in some cases as well as its efficacy and efficiency. This model was expected to be replaced by an integrated model of assistance in the follow-on mission, the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH). MINUJUSTH does not have an electoral mandate, which should help to alleviate many of these issues for the next phase of assistance, although reportedly it may have an electoral person.³⁰

National ownership. This project was directly relevant to Haiti's strategic development goal No. 4.2 to *"strengthen national democratic institutions."* This included strengthening the CEP and ONI, *"ensuring the credibility of the elections"*, and the *"ability to respect the electoral calendar."* However, the issue of Haitian 'ownership' of the process is an important one, and is greater than any one project, international donor or agency. For this project, the issue stems from how the MINUSTAH mandate framed its electoral assistance when it started. As the *"2000 elections had played a large part in the political crisis that led to the creation of MINUSTAH, the conduct of free and fair elections at all levels"* was seen by the UN Security Council as one of MINUSTAH's key objectives and necessary to restore Haiti's political and constitutional process.³¹ The CEP at that time was new, provisional and without any institutional memory or materials left from earlier international assistance. This resulted in MINUSTAH doing much of the logistical and operational work for the CEPs. Gains made in 2006 were then lost in the 2010 earthquake which left another provisional CEP without much institutional memory or assets remaining and the cycle continued of MINUSTAH and others providing substantial levels of assistance.

²⁸ UNDP, *Review mission of UNDP Elections Project 2010 – 2011* and UNDP, *Joint Electoral Assessment 2010*


²⁹ UN, *SG Policy Committee Decision from October 2010 on Electoral Assistance* (2010/23)

³⁰ Security Council Resolution 2350 creates MINUJUSTH as a follow-on mission starting 15 October 2017 with a mandate to assist the GOH to strengthen rule of law institutions further support and develop the HNP; and to engage in human rights monitoring, reporting, and analysis.

³¹ UN, *Security Council Report of the Secretary General on Haiti, SC/2004/300*, p 5

This project worked with six CEPs, two of these more substantially in the past two years. Both raised the issue of Haitian ownership in the evaluation interviews. In terms of this project, this was primarily linked to control over the use of the basket funds. The current CEP felt it had more ownership over the project after it negotiated with UNDP a split of the responsibilities for the use of the GOH funds intended for electoral operations. The majority of GOH funds were deposited directly into the CEP account for use under its own management. This appears to be a good practice especially within the context of a cycle approach which ultimately seeks to build institutional capacity and transfer skills and knowledge to the partner institutions. This also increased the relevance of the project for the Haitians themselves and reduced institutional administrative risk for UNDP.

The substantial financial participation by the Haitian government provided through the project for the administration of these elections raises expectations that this level of support will continue and that this will further solidify Haitian ownership over the administration and financing for the CEP and elections.



ONI and voter registration. The project targeted support to the voters list through the ONI which was relevant to the UNDAF and national development goals for rebuilding “*key central institutions*”³² Haitian voters need an identity card issued by the ONI to be placed on the voters list and to vote. Many Haitians had lost their cards during the earthquake and/or come of age and needed to register. ONI operations itself had been badly affected by the earthquake and it needed assistance to continue its operations and issue new or replacement ID cards. The relevance of the project assistance for this output however was reduced through the limited nature of the assistance foreseen. This focused on the immediate needs for the elections (printing and distributing cards) rather than taking a more holistic (and cycle) approach that looked at the quality of the ID system and databank, and issues such as how to remove the names of voters who had died or moved away. The lists themselves had not been cleaned since the database was created in 2005, and the millions of ID cards issued in 2005 were set to expire in 2015.³³

Output 4, added in 2015, intended to continue assistance to the ONI beyond the OAS activities and address some of these issues directly through a needs assessment and targeted TA. However, this was also likely too limited in scope given the state of the list and the scale of the needs by then. In addition, the project did not implement Output 4 because of the decision to focus project resources on Output 3 (elections). The issue of the ID cards and the development of a reliable and sustainable system remains a critical issue that needs to be addressed and should be a priority for future assistance.

National Archives. The National Archives are relevant to the electoral process as it has the civil registry that maintains the birth and death records as well as other records required for participation as a citizen or a candidate. Its addition in 2015 to the project targeted a definite need. The National Archives system is still primarily a ledger book system and it has an enormous backlog of ledgers to digitalize. However, although the addition of the Archives was relevant to the needs of the process, its addition and intended activities were unrealistic given the timeframe, level of anticipated funding and to have had results in time to improve the 2015 elections.

³² Ibid

³³ Expiration date for cards was subsequently extended for two years.

Support to the National Archives remains an important issue for future assistance, but will require a more substantial, holistic effort that looks at its processes, the best ways to modernize the civil registry system, its e-governance interface with ONI and to digitalize the existing documents as well as how to build its institutional capacity to manage this system.³⁴

Participation. The addition of Output 5 pulled out the issue of citizen participation, and, the participation of women candidates, youth, and civic education volunteers, and allocated an estimated budget of USD 2.4 million. Increasing the participation of these groups was directly relevant to the needs to strengthen civic participation. As illustrated in Box 3,³⁵ voter turnout for Haiti has decreased over time, with the highest levels of turnout experienced in the initial 1990 elections and in the mid-1990 and -2000 elections which were returns to elected governance. In between the voter turnout has been extremely low.

Increasing the emphasis on women's participation was also directly relevant to the needs. Haiti was 123 out of 146 countries on the *Gender Inequality Index* in 2013 and only 3.3% of the Senators and 4.2% of the Deputies at the time were women.³⁶ At the same time, the original project design made no reference to supporting the implementation of the constitutional amendment requiring the 30% quota for women in elected and appointed positions at national levels. This would have been a natural focal point and target for an electoral cycle project. The 2015 revisions included a needed section on how the project could support the promotion of women and youth which helped to increase the design's relevance.

In practice, the project's efforts to strengthen the CEP's IT databases allowed for the development of disaggregated data and the ability for the CEP to ensure that the gender quota for female candidates was met for the municipal elections in 2015. The additions to the participation aspects of the project however were not clear about how the UNDP support in these areas could add value to existing efforts outside of the provision of TA to the CEP, and did not discuss the potential programmatic synergies that could be developed with these other efforts to increase the relevance and effectiveness of the overall effort. Some of these were substantial programmes, such as NDI which had a women's leadership academy to train women candidates, and IFES which fielded voter education agents in every department to supplement the CEP's voter education efforts.

The use of UN Women and the UNESCO to implement part of the activities for women and most of the efforts for youth was relevant to their institutional mandates and networks but the programmatic relevance of their efforts was reduced by the late starts which were too close to the elections to be able to develop an effective programme and show results, as well as the limited amount of funding allotted, especially for the gender and women's activities.

3.2 Effectiveness

This section starts by identifying some of the key factors found that affected project effectiveness, and continues with the findings on project performance for each of its main output areas (CEP institution building, ONI support, election support, support to other partners and participation).

Key factors

The ability of UNDP and this project to function in the complex and volatile context of the 2013-2017 electoral cycle was affected by many factors. These shaped the nature of its response and its

³⁴ This should be done based on a complete institutional needs assessment and user survey and is likely to take a three-year effort.

³⁵ Voter turnout figures taken from various sources including International IDEA's *Voter Turnout Database*.

³⁶ IPU, *Database, Haiti, Archives*

effectiveness. Many of these factors also directly affected project efficiency, relevance and sustainability. Some of these were:

- *Mission context.* UNDP worked within the framework and mandate of the UN mission in Haiti as defined by Security Council resolutions and under the leadership of the SRSG. MINUSTAH's electoral mandate meant that its civilian and military personnel also directly supported the electoral processes in the areas of political affairs, electoral planning and logistics, election security, technical assistance and operations. The synergistic efforts of a peacekeeping mission with an electoral mandate helped to increase the project's effectiveness in some areas, such as planning and operations, along with the policy support provided by the SRSG. At the same time, the mission context and lack of an integrated elections assistance team directly limited the scope of UNDP's assistance and nature of its relationships. This affected not only its relevance as discussed, but its effectiveness as well.
- *UNDP's long-time relationships and position of trust.* UNDP has worked in Haiti for decades and has developed a position of trust with the GOH and other actors. These relationships provided access and allowed it to work in the difficult context. Despite the tensions caused by the protracted cycle and relations among actors, UNDP expertise was valued overall and it was widely acknowledged that the elections would not have been successful in the context without the UNDP project, the financial support provided through the basket fund, and the credibility that the international assistance provided. In addition, UNDP's positioning enabled it to mobilize funds when needed that ensured that support was available despite challenges presented by the context.
- *Protracted nature of the electoral cycle.* The process was continually interrupted by political uncertainty and contestations, delayed decisions, and changes of election dates and counterparts. This more than doubled the life of the project and made planning and providing assistance extremely difficult. The flexibility of the UNDP country office and the dedication of UNDP management and project staff as well as of its counterparts enabled the project to meet most of the challenges and provide timely and useful assistance.
- *Provisional nature of counterparts.* Instead of working with a permanent council and stable governments as expected in the project document, the project worked with six provisional CEPs and as many governments. At a minimum, this required re-explaining the project, its purpose and operating methods and re-visiting decisions that had already been made with previous counterparts, and building new relationships, rapport and trust. This directly affected the continuity of activities, decisions related to project governance, project costs and the ability to build on progress made, all of which negatively impacted on the potential for project performance.
- *Highly politicized nature of the electoral processes.* The electoral process and its administration were highly politicized, with procedural errors and messiness used by some as grounds to reject the CEP as partisan or to reject the election results entirely. This made support to the process, and to the key actors, such as political parties, highly sensitive. In addition to becoming a convenient target for some actors and by the media over issues related to the use of the funds (such as for the procurement of ballots and payments for poll workers), this affected how MINUSTAH and UNDP saw UNDP's role, where it should engage and limited its visibility. For instance, the project did not engage with political parties in its activities which under other circumstances would be a common element for a cycle project. Political parties are an integral actor in the electoral and political processes and engaging them in issues related to improving electoral administration, increasing the participation of women, youth and vulnerable groups, and the other areas of project focus could have helped increase the efficacy of the project efforts.

- *Lack of clear division of responsibilities among UN agencies.* As noted in the section on relevance, problems stemming from the lack of a clear division of responsibilities in relation to UNDP and MINUSTAH were raised in interviews, and to a lesser degree, UNOPS. At the same time, some of the individuals from the different agencies seemed to have worked well together at the individual levels on some issues, such as for developing the electoral calendar and in electoral logistical planning.
- *Active role of UNDP.* The project could not have succeeded without the active role of the UNDP Country Office and its Senior Country Director to facilitate its efforts at the policy level and to directly support project implementation and management. Although the project had a PMU, the nature of the process and the project management arrangements and sensitive relationships required the active engagement of UNDP's senior management at all levels in many aspects of the project.
- *Interpersonal skills and communications.* In addition to the differing perceptions of mandates and roles among institutions, there were some tense relationships reported among various actors, at individual and institutional levels, and the project over its life. These adversely affected perceptions of the project, its ability to communicate with others, and ultimately its potential effectiveness.


3.2.1 Strengthened institutional capacity of the CEP

The objective for Output 1 was *strengthening the capacities of the (permanent) electoral council*. The project intended to strengthen the CEP through *better trained staff and strengthened technical capacity* (Output 1.1), *strengthened civic participation*, (Output 1.2), *introducing new technologies, tools and methods* (Output 1.3), and *project management and coordination* (Output 1.4). In the 2015 project revision, the civic participation sub-output was given its own output (Output 5) and replaced by *better trained poll workers*. However, project financial reporting continued to use the original sub-outputs, and for the purposes of this report the issue of poll worker strengthening is discussed in Output 3 with the rest of the elections-specific discussions.

To achieve Output 1, the project intended to provide technical assistance, training, commodities, international exposure, meeting facilitation and IT support. Project management support was also foreseen under this output and was the largest element in the Output 1 budget.

The original expected project results were a number of modest products and outputs, mostly the development of procedural manuals, a BRIDGE (Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections) training on *Access to the Electoral Process*, and trainings for a limited number of CEP voter registry and IT staff on information systems, voter registration and other parts of the process. The 2015 amendment added in the organization of meetings between the CEP and stakeholders, international exchanges and the development of a first compendium on Haitian elections.³⁷

The anticipated budget for this Output was USD 1,945,067. Actual expenditures were USD 904,153 (Table 3). Most of the funds were spent in the project's first few years and the expenditures for the remainder of the project were allocated against similar



³⁷ UNDP, *Project Document*, 2015, p 16

activities grouped under Output 3.

The efforts for CEP capacity building and election support were intertwined, especially in the Haitian context where the elections were pending for the duration of the project. The limited results expected reflect the narrow project scope. Even though the original design referred to a permanent institution as its counterpart, the project did not foresee capacity building based on a systematic approach of doing an institutional needs assessment, developing a strategic institutional development plan or helping the institution to implement such a plan. As noted in a 2012 UN report, *“in the absence of the designated members of the Permanent Electoral Council, institutional support from MINUSTAH, assisted by the United Nations Development Programme, was inevitably limited, focusing mainly on strengthening the capacity of key technical staff, delimiting electoral constituencies and reviewing election logistics plans and an electoral bill.”*³⁸

Overall, the evaluation found that project’s capacity building elements needed to have been strengthened considerably to have been able to transfer the knowledge and skills needed by the CEPs to do their work without assistance. However, the project’s efforts had helped the CEPs to better manage their institution, communicate with stakeholders and the public, and in the end to organize more credible and better accepted elections. This was done in particular through the interaction of the technical experts with the CEP on specific parts of the process, their hands-on support for the development of procedures and regulations, and through the provision of appropriate tools and technology.

The project worked with CEP staff across departments in the first years of the project to help them prepare for when the elections were scheduled. There was also an effort to integrate the concept of gender mainstreaming into elections administration, planning and training. With others, the project supported a BRIDGE course on elections administration and gender, and launched a discussion on gender based electoral violence. This effort was strongly supported by the CEP and its female Director General at the time and aided by the GOH’s adoption of a *National Gender and Elections Strategy* in 2014 supported by IFES and the Ministry of Women. As part of the gender mainstreaming of the project, it also helped to develop the candidate databases to enable the disaggregation of electoral statistics by gender and other variables and the publishing of this data on the CEP website.

The project also initially worked with the CEPs training department to develop a training plan using BRIDGE in order to use the skills of some of the CEP trainers who were semi-accredited BRIDGE trainers. However according to project reporting, these plans were never implemented because of the “CEP prioritizing the electoral calendar.”³⁹

The continuous presence of UNDP project assistance after the earthquake allowed for the CEPs to build on the accomplishments of each other. The CEP in 2015 was led by an experienced electoral administrator who helped to ensure that institutional systems were improved and/or put into place. This work was continued with the 2016 CEP. Its new executive director had recently helped the Prime Minister’s Office with civil service reform, and the new CEP council included the former head of a national domestic election observation group, and the former head of the Haitian Bar Association among other professionals. Their efforts to better organize and professionalize their election administration provided a more conducive environment for capacity building than had existed under some previous CEPs. This also helped to ensure that the systems and procedures assisted by the project were institutionalized through their adoption by the CEP council, and the publishing of some in the official gazette (Le Moniteur). This support resulted in a more

³⁸ UN, *Report of the Secretary General on Haiti, August 2012*, p 16

³⁹ UNDP, *Interim narrative and financial report to the EU 2013 – 2015*, p 13.

standardized administration and processes by the November 2016 and January 2017 elections, which decreased the number of complaints and contributed to the acceptance of the results.⁴⁰

At the same time, both CEPs worked with in the past two years raised the question of capacity replacement by TA (and others) rather than capacity building. Many TA were seen as largely as doing their work off site and then coming with their products or solutions to discuss with the CEP instead of doing the work together. This perception of separateness also contributed to the issues of national ownership raised by the two CEPs.

The current CEP is interested in obtaining International Organization for Standardization (ISO) certification for some of its systems. This is something that would help to increase the professional capacity for an EMB as the ISO process has rigorous standards that the CEP would need to meet. Obtaining ISO certification is also a recognizable sign of technical competence and adherence to international rules and standards for the areas accredited (such as databank management). These are tools that can help to increase political actors' and public confidence in the quality of the EMB's work and its impartiality which is important in a context of pervasive distrust, and something which the next project should support.⁴²

There were only a few study tours and overseas trips funded by the project (Table 4). For instance, the training in Burundi provided the experience needed for a CEP trainer to receive full BRIDGE accreditation through supporting the facilitation for that course.

It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the different types of training undertaken as there is not enough data available on pre-post levels of skills/knowledge/practices or to know how many of the persons trained were still working at the CEP during the different elections. Opportunities for peer-peer training and exchanges were raised in several evaluation interviews in the context of potential South-South cooperation and is an area that a follow-on project should explore.

Date	Location	Participants	Purpose
July 2013	Mexico	CEP	Exchange with Federal Electoral Institute and Electoral Tribunal of Mexico
October 2013	Seoul	CTA and CEP	Participation in the Association of World Election Bodies and Global Electoral Organization Conference
November 2013	Kenya	CTA	Training on "Political Approach to Preventing and Responding to Electoral Violence"
7 – 11 April 2014	Jordan	Electoral Advisor in PM Office	Joint EC-UNDP thematic workshop on "The role of electoral stakeholders and electoral administrations"
21-25 July 2014	Burundi	1 CEP staff as trainer	BRIDGE training: Strategic planning and election administration.
22- 28 June 2015	Dubai	CEP/UNDP/ MINUSTAH delegation	Approval of the sensitive ⁴¹ and training materials including the security features
Sept – Oct 2015	Dubai	CEO and UNDP delegation	Approval of sensitive material and monitoring its printing & packaging
December 2015	Dubai	CEP/UNDP	Monitoring of printing and packing of sensitive material for elections initially scheduled for 27 Dec 2015
August 2016	Dubai	CEP /UNDP delegation	Monitoring the printing and packaging of the sensitive material
4-18 Jan 2017	Dubai	CEP/UNDP	Monitoring the printing and packaging of sensitive material

⁴⁰ According to observer reports and interviews.

⁴¹ Ballots papers, voter lists

⁴² Similar efforts have been supported by UNDP projects on other countries. For instance, the UNDP *Parliamentary and Electoral Support Programme in Moldova* worked on e-governance and cloud based technologies for the EMB and election-related institutions, and provided support for the EMB's ISO certification for its data and information management. Arranging for exchange of experience between the two EMBs and UNDP projects could be useful.

Support for the adoption of new techniques, tools and procedures related to IT showed some visible results in the areas of the systems used to check voter registration, register candidates, political party agents (mandataires) and to transmit election results as discussed in Output 3. This also strengthened the CEP's internal capacity to manage and disseminate information through postings on its website and social media. User statistics for the general use of the CEP website were not available, but its Facebook page lists 23,839 followers and 1,302 visits.⁴³ It also has a Twitter account with 26,800 followers and has issued 710 tweets, with its first tweet done in April 2014.⁴⁴

These efforts directly increased the availability and timeliness of information on the process and provided practical and useful information for the voters, parties and observers. This helped to increase the transparency and credibility of the processes, improve perceptions of the CEP as a more professional and credible electoral institution, and increase trust in the reliability of the election results, with the most visible results apparent in the November 2016 and January 2017 elections.⁴⁵


3.2.2 Support to ONI

The original support for ONI was intended to be done through the OAS for the 2013-2014 elections (Output 2). This assistance was based on a 2013 OAS proposal that formed part of the project document. It intended to strengthen the ONI so that it could meet the increased demands for registration and cards expected during the election period. For 2013 this was expected to be 500,000 cards.⁴⁶ Assistance to the ONI was expected to continue in the 2015 amendment through direct support by the project under Output 4 (support to other partners).

The stated objectives were to *strengthen the capacity of ONI offices and mobile units to provide ID services* (Output 2.1) *ID cards are printed and distributed and the data transmitted to the CEP for the voters lists* (Output 2.2) and *strengthen ONI technological skills and infrastructure* (Output 4.1). The OAS intended to do this through the provision of technical assistance, training, providing staff and registration materials for ONI offices, and support for the printing and distribution of ID cards. It also intended to strengthen its IT systems, most notably through the development of an internet service for registration, strengthened networking and increased data security.

The anticipated budget was USD 1,763,110 for Output 2 (including OAS and UNDP costs), and USD 332,000 for Output 4.1, for a total of USD 2,095,110 (Table 5). Actual expenditures were USD 1,653,895, all expended under Output 2. Output 4.1 was not undertaken due to the decision to focus on election support (Output 3) The OAS intended to do this through the provision of technical assistance, training, providing staff and registration materials for ONI offices, and support for the printing and distribution of ID cards. However, the project provided ad hoc technical assistance to ONI through the project staff and experts working on the voter registry and IT areas throughout the life of the project.

ONI has had significant budgetary issues since the end of the PetroCaribe funding that was supporting it and its staff. This affected its ability to register citizens, and to produce and distribute ID cards, as well



⁴³ CEP Facebook, *About us*, accessed 3 October 2017

⁴⁴ CEP Twitter page, accessed 3 October 2017

⁴⁵ According to interviews and observation reports. Survey data was not available.

⁴⁶ UNDP, *Project Document 2013, Annex, OAS Proposal*, p 6

as to maintain its database. ONI has also not been able to remove the names of deceased voters from the lists since they were created as this data is not easily accessible from the civil registry. This situation was further aggravated by the large number of deaths from the earthquake, resulting in an inflated voters' list. This affects the voter turnout figures which are determined on the inflated lists as well as increases the overall cost of the elections.

The UNDP project was effective in this context and helped to mitigate the impact of these issues for the elections through its work with ONI and CEP on the voter registry and electoral planning. The efforts between the OAS, ONI and UNDP seemed to be well coordinated and a team effort. This was facilitated in great part by the fact that one of the project's key staff members had worked for the OAS to help create the ONI and the national ID card system and had worked with ONI until the OAS assistance ended in 2012. Thus, he already knew the ONI systems and requirements and had a long-standing relationship with the institution and its partners which facilitated the work.

The evaluation found that project efforts did strengthen ONI capacity to register citizens and distribute cards for the 2015 elections. It addressed the problems found during an IT needs assessment which had identified problems with the ONI server and the comparison of fingerprints through the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) by providing equipment, software licenses and TA that helped to develop a more secure foundation for the national ID database and the registration of new voters. According to project reporting and interviews, this assistance allowed for a timely update of the voters list and the addition of more than one million new voters.⁴⁷ The project supported the printing of 587,088 cards by the end of June 2015, almost 80% of these for new registrations.⁴⁸ According to the EU observation reports, 89% of the citizens reportedly had their ID cards before the 2015 elections which allowed for the majority of citizens to vote without problems.⁴⁹ ONI still has significant issues that need to be addressed as discussed in Section 3.2.4.

Youth remain significantly under-represented on the voters lists which remains an issue of concern noted by election observers.⁵⁰ Youth under 24 make up almost 55% of the population and was a particular target group of the project.⁵¹ Project efforts though did not focus on registration and targeted the peaceful participation of youth and the need to vote.

3.2.3 Support to the electoral process

The original objective for this output was to *support the electoral process*. In 2015, this was amended to *support for electoral operations*. The project intended to do this through support for nine areas of the process: *strengthened CEP organizational structure* (Output 3.1), *procurement of electoral material* (Output 3.2), *updated, printed and available voters list* (Output 3.3), *candidate management, lottery and accreditation* (Output 3.4), *readiness of voting centres and poll workers* (Output 3.5), *strengthened voter information campaign* (Output 3.6), *functional centre of voting tabulation (CTV)* (Output 3.7), *provision of technical assistance* (Output 3.8), and *coordination and project management* (Output 3.9).

UNDP expected to achieve these intended results by providing international and national experts; procuring IT and election specific and other materials; supporting the payments for temporary election staff and covering other election specific costs through the electoral basket fund.

⁴⁷ According to the EU report *Mission d'observation électorale 2015* (shortened to "EOM 2015" Report for future reference), a total of 5,871,450 voters were registered in 2015. An additional 318,000 voters were registered in 2016 according to the OAS *EOM Report*, p 19

⁴⁸ OAS, *Final Narrative Report*, pps 8 - 9

⁴⁹ EU, *EOM Report 2015*, p 25

⁵⁰ EU, *EOM Report Presidential and Partial Legislative Elections 2016* (shortened to "EOM Report 2016" for easier reference), p 11

⁵¹ Index Mundi, *Haiti Demographics Profile 2016*

The estimated budget for Output 3 was USD 31,995,879. This was increased to USD 57,827,488 in the 2015 amendment (Table 6). Actual expenditures were USD 64,500,020 (Table 7). Elections support made up 95% of the overall project expenditures. More than half of this was spent on electoral materials and the costs associated with the voting centres and poll workers (43% and 22% respectively). Most of the expenditures were done in the years of the elections (2015 - 2017) with 60.3% of the funds spent in 2015 and another 38% spent in 2016 - 2017.⁵²

The performance indicators as listed in the results framework for this output were:



- the electoral list published 30 days before election day;
- the preliminary electoral results available within the requirements of the electoral law and electoral calendar; and,
- trained personnel.

The monitoring and evaluation section of the project document used five additional indicators which covered some of the project's activity areas: CEP attributes; quality of the voters' lists; participation of national actors in decisions related to the electoral process; mechanisms for the adjudication of electoral complaints; and inventory and storage systems for the control of project purchased equipment. The baseline was that the electoral calendar had not yet been published, and gender was not mainstreamed in the electoral process.⁵³

The evaluation found that as objectives most of these were largely met by the elections held in January 2017 and that progress was made compared to the baseline. But these 'indicators' alone are insufficient to be able to measure the performance of the project. There are either too many other factors that contributed to results in those areas or the indicators were not adequately defined or qualified and lacked targets.

In general, project results were notable in several areas. In particular: the procurement of the large amount of items needed within very tight timelines; the standardization of systems through the development of procedures and IT solutions; improvements to the accreditation and registration processes, databases and their cloud links; increases to the transparency and credibility of the CEP, and, improvements in the adjudication of electoral complaints. These efforts, along with the contributions of others, supported the CEP to deliver a relatively seamless process for late 2016 and 2017 elections compared to earlier elections and with acceptance of the results. This allowed for all of the directly elected offices to be filled and for these representatives to start their work.

The specific findings on UNDP's performance for the main areas assisted for this output are provided below. Some of these areas are grouped for ease of discussion purposes.



⁵² Financial data provided by project reporting and UNDP.

⁵³ UNDP, *Project Document 2013*

Strengthened CEP organizational structure. In this element, the project expected to strengthen the operational capacity of the CEP and its Departmental Electoral Offices (BEDs) and Communal Electoral Office (BECs) for election administration. UNDP intended to do this through technical assistance, the provision of equipment to the BEDs and the BECs, and the purchase of a server to secure the voter registry. The original budget of USD 646,029 was increased considerably in the 2015 project amendment to USD 3,322,666. The additional funding went for vehicles for the BEDs, generators and motorcycles for the BECs, and payments for voter registration technicians.

The funding for temporary workers, transportation and commodities helped the EMB to strengthen the electoral administration structures during the electoral periods. Most of its structure is not permanent, requiring the CEP to hire and train additional operational staff and to reconstitute the BEDs and BECs for each election. The BEDs and BECs also need the basic conditions for work including being able to visit their areas of responsibility. In many cases, equipment and materials needed to be re-provided. The lack of permanent structures, and the accountability that comes with these structures, are key constraints to more effective assistance and sustainable results.

The project was able to procure the needed commodities and equipment, but did not seem to uniformly follow their distribution and continued use. The project turned over much of this equipment directly to the CEP for distribution and use. The evaluators heard scattered accounts of some of the equipment being used for personal or other purposes, such as some of the vehicles intended for BEDs seen circulating in Port-au-Prince after delivery, but these were all anecdotal. There were some monitoring visits done by project staff, but the project was based at the Port-au-Prince level and most departmental level activities were covered by the MINUSTAH EAS advisors. Better coordination between the project and MINUSTAH could have increased the efficacy of monitoring the use of the project-funded equipment (and trainings). The BEDs interviewed noted operating difficulties, most of these related to the lack of an adequate budget and transport especially for the indirect elections held in July 2017.

Project effectiveness was also directly affected by the level of CEP engagement in project-supported efforts and the quality of CEP administration since this output targeted their institutional efforts. This differed between the CEPs assisted by the project. Some were more receptive than others which thereby facilitated the efforts. Those with a clear institutional vision for what they wanted to accomplish were also able to use the assistance more effectively to strengthen the areas they wanted addressed. The CEPs and the project learned lessons during each round and improved their administration and assistance respectively. This was noted by the election observers who reported the “*consolidation of the achievements made*” by the November 2016 elections.⁵⁴

Procurement of electoral material. For this component, the project expected to procure a large amount of electoral materials (ballots, tally sheets, indelible ink, etc.). The budget for this element was increased by more than 50% in the 2015 amendment and actual expenditures were more than a third higher than this (Table 8). Some of this was due to the unplanned re-running of the presidential election and the cancellation of the 24 January 2016 elections after the material had already been printed. In addition, the project procured 1,200 tents to serve as polling stations for the areas hit by hurricane Matthew for the November 2016 elections.

⁵⁴ OAS, *EOM Report*, p 17

This element was fraught with tension and controversy created by the context, delayed decisions and changes in elections and dates, and the strong lobbying by CEPs for the use of national printing companies. These issues were not unique to this project. Tension over the procurement of ballots has existed since the 1990s when the GOH did not have the funds to procure the ballots itself and the costs were covered by international donors who require open and competitive bidding.

With the exception of 2006 and 2010, where the electoral law required national procurement of ballots, and which generated high levels of suspicion over potential partisan manipulation of the ballots (2006) and reportedly the most expensive ballots in the world at the time (2010), the tenders were won by international firms. Haiti's electoral system and the number of elections, parties and candidates result in a complex printing process and tight timelines that are difficult for national firms to meet. For instance, the four elections held in October 2015 required 264 different ballots⁵⁵ and the legislative run-off and local elections in January 2017 required 1,200 different ballots with more than 31,000 candidates.⁵⁶ There is also an enormous volume of material procured. As examples, 17.7 million ballots were printed and shipped for the November 2016 elections and 22 million for the January 2017 elections, and almost 60,000 voting booths, 27,000 training kits and 95,792 ballot boxes were purchased for the elections in 2016 and 2017.⁵⁷

Overall, UNDP was able to navigate the problems and acquire large quantities of highly secured sensitive and other material in time for them to be distributed before the elections (Table 9). The firm selected was also flexible and able to accommodate last-minute changes. National observers noted that 99.8 % of the polling stations had the needed electoral materials in the January 2017 elections, which was up from 96% in the October 2015 election, and that 95.3% had the needed electoral documents (January 2017) up from 88.2% in 2015.⁵⁹

The procurement process used after the August 2015 elections allowed for Haitian firms to compete but also for the most responsive and competitive bid to win. This process also met UNDP's stringent procurement regulations which are designed to ensure accountability for its use of donor funds, especially for such high value procurements.⁶⁰

The project's technical advisors helped the CEPs and their technical teams with the design and specifications for the ballots, and the CEP was an integral part of the procurement committee that reviewed the bids and selected the winner. The project also funded several trips to Dubai for the CEP to inspect the printing site and approve the ballot proofs (Table 4).

Table 8: Budget & Expenditures Materials




Table 9: Delivery of Sensitive Materials

Delivery Date ⁵⁸	Election Date
26-27 July 2015	9 August 2017
10, 12, 17 October 2015	25 October 2015
22, 24 December 2015	27 December 2015
16 Sept - 2 October 2016	20 November 2016
19-24 January 2017	29 January 2017

⁵⁵ Ibid, p 6

⁵⁶ Ibid p 17

⁵⁷ UNDP, *Electoral Operations in Numbers fact sheets for the 20 November 2016 and 29 January 2017 elections*. More specific information on project outputs are provided in the different project reports.

⁵⁸ UNDP, *Interim report to EU 2014-2015* p 21 for 2015 and *Interim report to EU 2016-2017* for 2016-2017

⁵⁹ UNDP, *Annual Report on the Haiti Reconstruction Fund Project 2016*, p 9

⁶⁰ UNDP, *Audits of UNDP Haiti Support to Electoral Project* dated 9 November 2016 and 27 July 2017 and the provisions of the Administrative and Financial Procedures Manual of the CEP 2016

These ballots had a redundancy of security mechanisms. Although this increases the cost, they are an important mechanism in an atmosphere of pervasive mistrust. The security features help deter and detect fraud⁶¹ and the pre-packaging of the materials at the printing site eases the distribution process and avoids the possible manipulation of the sensitive materials during their dispatching to the polling stations.

Strengthened registrations and accreditation. The project supported the registration and accreditation process for voters, candidates, party agents and observers. For voter registration, in addition to the support provided directly to ONI as discussed in Section 3.2.2, the project intended to provide technical assistance to the CEP, to update its software for data management and to support the input of data from the ONI and the printing of the voter registration lists. For candidate registration, the project intended to support the training of BEDs and BECs for registration, develop an on-line registration system for candidate registration, fund the printing of the candidate lists and the credentials for their agents as well as for election observers and the temporary staff (poll workers, supervisors and others).

The evaluation found that the project's efforts in these areas had helped improve the quality of election administration and increased the overall credibility and transparency of the process. In particular, this helped the CEP to ensure that most citizens were registered and able to vote if they wanted in the elections. The on-line application allowed voters to check their registration and polling sites, reducing confusion at the polling stations and a source of election-day tension. This site had 2.72 million hits by December 2015.⁶² The web-based registration systems standardized the procedures and reduced the space for preferential treatment, fraud and graft. This contributed to a more level playing field as all of the applicants had to use the same systems and rules for registration. This also reduced the amount of time and effort needed by the CEP to process the data, design the ballots and print the lists. The use of a cloud-based system allowed for the changes to be transmitted directly to the printer in Dubai which allowed for the last minutes changes to be included.

The accreditation process was one of the areas that showed the most improvement in observer reports. In 2015 the CEP issued blank cards to the political parties for each of the candidate's mandataires in every polling station. This was around 900,000 cards as every party with a candidate had a right to an agent in the voting sites. There was no control over their use or sale, raising many issues as to who actually used the cards, where they voted and how many times, as well as voters feeling intimidated by the number of party agents inside the polling stations.⁶³ For 2016, the CEP, with the project assistance, adopted a regulation that reduced the number of mandataires present inside a polling station at any one time, from ten to five, and implemented the online registration system. This system allowed the CEP to check the lists for duplicate registrations, not only among the mandataires but with the candidate and observer lists, enabling them to address the issue of multiple accreditations. As a result, there were about 240,000 mandataires in 2016 each with pre-printed badges that showed their names, pictures and had security features. This resulted in a more orderly and controlled process and eliminated the possibility for someone to use multiple cards for fraudulent purposes.

This database also allowed for the easy disaggregation of data by gender. This enabled the CEP to ensure that the party lists competing in the local elections included the required 30% of women

⁶¹ Such as counterfeiting and stuffing of ballot boxes.

⁶² UNDP, *Interim Report to EU, 2015*, p 22

⁶³ OAS, *EOM Report*, pps 7-8

candidates as required by the 2015 electoral decree. This resulted in the election of 12 women as mayors and a woman delegate in all local governments.⁶⁴

One of the indicators for this output was the publication of the voters lists 30 days before election day. The voters list was updated twice during the project, once before the 9 August 2015 election and again before the 2016 elections. Voter registration closed on 11 May 2015 for the 2 August 2015 elections, giving enough time for the CEP to check the lists and publish them within the 30-day target. The project subsequently helped the CEP to print almost 12,000 voters lists for posting outside of the polling sites. This was also done for the 2016/2017 elections.

Training and payments for electoral workers. Separate from the institutional capacity building efforts done under Output 1, the project supported the training and payments for the temporary workers hired by the CEP during election periods who served as poll workers, supervisors, electoral judges, and others. This was done under the different sub-outputs for election support but are combined here for ease of discussion purposes.

This was largely accomplished and the results improved considerably over the life of the project. This was due in large part to the preparations and support provided through the project, but also from the increased political will for better elections in 2016. As an indicator, the number of polling count sheets (PVs) that needed to be put aside for errors at the CTV decreased consistently from 5.3% in the August 2015 elections to 1.99% in January 2017 (notwithstanding a spike in November 2016 to 7.41%).⁶⁵

The recruitment, training and payments of electoral workers was an enormous logistical effort for the CEP. It required the development of procedures and training manuals for all of the different tasks, the training of trainers, and the delivery of the training. It also required the renting of premises for the trainings/events, the transport to get to/from the trainings and the payments for all of the temporary workers.

The efficacy of the effort was directly affected by the larger context including the patronage nature of electoral recruitments. As an example, reportedly 80% of the polling staff was replaced days before the elections in 2015 and after the originally identified poll workers had already been trained. This also affected those recruited as supervisors. Although the intent might have been to improve the quality of the poll workers, it meant that most of the workers at the polls were not trained and that the trained persons were not used. This created problems on polling day of procedures not being implemented uniformly, especially in relationship to the count,⁶⁶ and massive confusion for UNDP over who worked and needed to be paid and who did not. In addition, some of the lists of personnel provided to UNDP to be paid were visibly inflated requiring post-election investigations on who had actually worked. This led to delays in payments and resentment on all sides. There were still allegations in some of the evaluation interviews that not everyone from 2015 had yet been paid although the project reported that 94% of that personnel had been paid.⁶⁷ Still, the CEP noted the project's last Steering Committee meeting that it could use the savings from the unneeded second presidential round to cover the USD 800,000 in back salaries owed since 2015.⁶⁸

UNDP was a convenient scapegoat for some of these issues and was attacked often in the press, including by the CEPs. Unpaid workers protested at UNDP's office and at one point threatened

⁶⁴ NDI, *New Generation of Women Leaders Take Local Office in Haiti*. Specifically, 143 women for municipal council (including principal and deputy mayors), 1,244 women (41.3%) for ASEC, 577 women (34.1%) for CASEC, and 321 (40.89%) for City Delegates. (CEP website) <https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B56RZ3-JtuHxMWNnT2N1RVIYS28/view>

⁶⁵ UNDP, *Project Narrative Report, December 2016 – February 2017*, p 5

⁶⁶ OAS, *EOM Report*, p 16

⁶⁷ UNDP, *Project Narrative Report, December 2016 – February 2017*, p 14

⁶⁸ UNDP, *Project Steering Committee Meeting notes*, 16 May 2017

project staff. Some felt this had tainted the 2016 CEP's initial relationship with UNDP as it was appointed in the midst of this "hostile environment". UNDP maintained a low profile throughout and upon advice from its headquarters did not defend itself in the press to avoid escalating the issue. However, the national observers felt this had generated a perception that UNDP (with the international community) had a hidden agenda and were intervening illegally in Haitian affairs. The evaluators are not in a position to be able to determine if this was an appropriate tack, but it is definitely an issue for UNDP reflection for the future as effective communications and timely information to the public are some of the best ways to combat misinformation and having a technical project being used as a political football by national actors.

The situation improved significantly in 2016, with the CEP changing the regulations to prevent last minute personnel changes and the development of a poll worker data base supported by the project. The IT improvements supported by the project also allowed for the comparison of the different registration lists, allowing for the removal of poll workers who had also registered as party agents, depoliticizing to some extent, the poll worker pool. According to the observers, the 2016 poll workers were better trained and continued to improve for the January 2017 elections.⁶⁹

For the 29 January 2017 second round and commune and municipal elections, UNDP arranged for the CEP to transmit the information for poll workers directly to Sogebank which organized the payments, and a presence sheet was introduced for all poll workers to sign, eliminating questions about who had worked. These were good steps as it increased Haitian ownership and accountability for that part of the process, and significantly reduced UNDP's management burden.

Electoral dispute resolution. The need for better-trained electoral judges has been noted consistently in observer reports, as well as by the 2016 CEP Council, which includes a former Bar Association president. The CEP is responsible for the resolution of all electoral disputes and there is no appeal outside of the CEP, which for many countries would be a constitutional court.⁷⁰

A project-provided legal advisor supported the CEP's legal department for two years to help it analyse the coherence between the different legal instruments (electoral decree and Constitution) and with international standards for legal matters and electoral justice; to update some of the CEP's rules and procedures; and, to provide training for its legal department. This resulted in the elaboration of a *Handbook on Electoral Disputes* released in November 2016.⁷¹ The handbook was used by the Communal Offices for Electoral Disputes (BCEC), Departmental Offices for Electoral Disputes (BCED) and the National Office for Electoral Disputes (BCEN) during the handling of the disputes for the November 2016 and 2017 elections.

The project also supported the CEP trainings for the electoral judges and clerks in all 10 geographical departments in September 2016 for the BCEDs, and in January - February 2017 for the BCECs for the local elections. In all, more than 600 electoral judges and clerks received training on handling the complaints filed after the publication of the preliminary results.⁷² Observers noted the improvements in the dispute resolution process, most notably in the more efficient and standardized handling of the complaints. This in turn resulted to a timelier publishing of the final

⁶⁹ According to the International Lawyers Guild, for the 20 November 2016 election: "*Voting on November 20 was generally calm and orderly. Polls are required to open at 6 a.m., and according to observers, 90 percent of the 1,534 voting centres opened by 7 a.m. (98 percent by 8 a.m.).*"²¹ Poll workers were professional, knowledgeable and organized."

⁷⁰ According to Article 197 of the Constitution: *The CEP is solely responsible of all the disputes raised on the elections, or of the application or the violation of the voter.* Article 18.1 of the electoral decree states that "*the decisions of the National Electoral Disputes Office shall be the last resort*".


⁷¹ According to the project this was the first handbook on electoral disputes.

⁷² Project report, *Formation des juges électoraux de BCEC, 9 janvier – 18 février 2017*, p 1. Note : This number is below what was reported in the project's narrative report for December 2016- February 2017 which listed 714 judges trained. p 13

results. In the September 2015 elections, the final results were issued 18 days after the date anticipated in the electoral calendar.⁷³ In 2016, both the preliminary and final results were announced before the dates in the electoral calendar.⁷⁴ There was also a decrease in the number of electoral complaints. In 2015 the observers had noted an “unprecedented” number of complaints at the BCED (204) and the BCEN (120).⁷⁵ The observers also questioned the judgements of the BCED in at least one case that did not follow the same calculations for determining if a candidate had been elected in the first round.⁷⁶ These issues contributed to the findings of the CIEVE’s review. In 2017, the observers noted only four complaints were made for the senate race.⁷⁷

Strengthened voter information. The intention for this area of assistance was to strengthen the voter information efforts targeting women and youth and to increase their turnout during the elections. This was broadened in the 2015 amendment to include information for men as well as women.

As noted in Table 10, 93% of the project’s expenditures for this output were spent for the 2015 elections. For the 2015 elections, the project directly supported some of the CEP information efforts and outreach as well as activities implemented by UN Women to strengthen the engagement of women in the elections, and by UNESCO to work with youth and other vulnerable groups to increase their participation and support peaceful elections. Some of these activities continued into 2016. According to UNDP, it reallocated funds to ensure funding for voter information for the 2016 elections, however, these funds dissipated with the reimbursement of unused USAID funds after their termination in the project. The CEP also agreed to take charge of the execution of this output in July 2016 and received the funds directly from the GOH. This left only a small amount available for the project to support voter education for the elections held in 2016 and 2017.



There was limited outcome level data available during the evaluation to be able to determine the effectiveness of these efforts or of the various methods and messages used, and most of the reporting done by observers and others is anecdotal. Yet, the importance of the efforts cannot be understated given the low participation rates, the level of misinformation that circulates around the elections, the climate of elections-related violence, and the pervasive corrupting practices such as vote buying.

However, from the information available, the efforts assisted by the project appear to have had good reach. According to project reporting 97% of the population was covered by the CEP radio spots and 65% covered by the TV spots funded by the project for the elections in August 2015.⁷⁸ One of the issues noted by MediaCom, the firm contracted to diffuse the messages to different radio and TV stations, was the number of actors promoting messages (UNDP, IFES, MINUSTAH) and the

⁷³ OAS EOM Report, p 4

⁷⁴ Ibid, p 6

⁷⁵ Ibid, p 1

⁷⁶ Ibid, p 5

⁷⁷ Ibid

⁷⁸ UNDP, *Interim Progress Report to EU 2015*, p 27

lack of coordination and a common broadcasting plan for all of these efforts.⁷⁹ It recommended an assessment of the voter education effort to see which messages worked and to better target messages to areas with specific needs (such as areas with high levels of election fraud or violence). It also recommended starting the voter information campaign earlier as well as better adaptation of the messages to the Haitian culture, information on the roles of parties, poll workers, mandataires and more specifics on the how-tos of voting.⁸⁰ It does not appear that the recommended assessment was made, and this is still a need for future voter information efforts. However, the CEP and its partners, including the project, did make an effort to reach out to Haitian artists in later elections and focus on the how and where to vote.⁸¹

The project also funded some face-to-face efforts done by women's networks and the youth volunteer network as well as other activities such as a mobile theatre and the distribution of posters, T-shirts and other promotional/informational items.

Although observers continue to note the need for more civic education, project assistance to the CEP efforts likely helped to ensure that the voters knew the date of the elections, the offices being competed, and the location of their polling site. It also increased access to the CEP and media understanding of the process with the establishment of the media center for CEP briefings, and a few trainings for journalists. This helped to increase transparency and the flow of information which was noted by the observers who felt this had facilitated their work.⁸²

Project reporting noted that it was difficult to determine the impact of its efforts when the elections were not held as planned as the project indicator was voter turnout. Even if the elections had been held as planned, turnout is not a good indicator for civic education as it is affected by too many variables.⁸³ Some targeted survey and/or audience research pre- and post- assistance would be better able to indicate if the project's messages were received by the population and were effective in changing knowledge, attitudes, and practices (KAP).

UN Women's efforts to mobilize women for a "*massive participation in the elections*"⁸⁴ as voters, observers, representatives, and agents of peace were needed but the efforts supported by the project were too limited to be able to deliver this type of an outcome. However, their support of the women's networks to sensitize communities likely strengthened those networks and their grassroots efforts.⁸⁵ The work to support women candidates for the legislative elections by providing cards was too limited to make much of a difference although the moral support and recognition provided was likely invaluable to many of the candidates. Haiti still places at a dismal 186 out of 189 countries on the 2017 InterParliamentary Union list for women in national parliaments, although this is better than in 2015 when it was tied for last place at 185.⁸⁶ The project supported two two-day forums in hotspots for female candidates for local office in 2016, with MINUSTAH radio coverage. Without outcome level data, the efficacy of the effort is unknown, but according to project reporting, a

⁷⁹ According to the project there was a consolidated plan with the role of each partner developed and there were efforts to coordinate the diffusion of the broadcasting spots and other activities. However, frequent changes of CEP strategies and plans required changes to their contracts with Mediacom.

⁸⁰ MediaCom, *Rapport final, Communication pour la production et la diffusion de messages d'éducation civique et de sensibilisation des électeurs en Haïti*, pps 39 - 40

⁸¹ UNDP notes to the Evaluators, November 2017

⁸² EU, *EOM Report* and evaluation interviews with national observers.

⁸³ Older surveys done systematically during electoral cycles by bilateral donors showed turnout affected by voter fatigue from the number of elections and re-run elections, lack of expectations that the elections would change anything and fear of violence during polling.

⁸⁴ UNDP, *UN Agency to Agency Contribution Agreement between UNDP and UN Women 2015*, p 2

⁸⁵ Ibid


⁸⁶ InterParliamentary Union, *Women in National Parliaments*

lesson was that the women had different levels of technical skills which needed to be taken into account for future efforts.⁸⁷

It is also difficult to assess the efficacy of the efforts done through the youth network COHAIV which was supported through UNESCO in 2015 and directly by the project in 2016. However, the use of a network of youth-focused CSOs to undertake voter education activities at the grass roots level is commendable. It engages young adults in constructive civic engagement, promotes youth-youth exchanges and the dissemination of important messages of peaceful participation and change through voting. The creation of a WhatsApp Youth and Election Group by UNESCO for COHAIV and its trainers to send photos of their activities likely fostered a sense of common purpose and networking among the different youth.

Strengthened tabulation process. The project intended to help with the establishment and functioning of the voting tabulation center through technical assistance, IT assistance, the procurement of IT equipment and smartphones to take, transmit and post photos of the tally sheets along with the funding and training of temporary CTV staff including the data input agents. The purpose for the assistance was to support the CEP to strengthen the efficiency, integrity and security of the count consolidation process. This an area that is critical to a credible electoral process and acceptance of the results.

The project helped the CEP to set up, staff and manage this centre for each round of the elections held. This process showed improvement in every round. The project even supported the production of a documentary on the CTV to increase public information on the centre and to reassure voters and actors after some observers had raised concerns about the lack of transparency at voting centres and the tabulation centre.⁸⁸



The evaluation found that the innovative technology acquired and configured with the technical support of the project, along with the training and strengthening of the CEP's information and communications staff reduced the time to needed to tally the vote, and provided an easily accessible mechanism for parties, citizens and observers to double check the results by polling station. This in turn increased the transparency and credibility of the results. Almost all the PVs were received by the tally centre in the January 2017 elections (99.49%) compared to 81.99% in the August 2015 elections. Only 1.99% of the PVs had to be put aside for errors, while this was 5.30% for 2015.⁸⁹ Citizens and others could also check polling site level results through the publishing of the PV photos on the CEP's website. In the August 2015 pilot, PVs were posted 12 days after polling.⁹⁰ The efficacy of the pilot was undermined by the last-minute replacements of the polling staff and the supervisors who worked without training and had difficulties transmitting the data back to the centre, according to the project reporting. To address this, the project TA worked to simplify the app to send the photos, increased training and set up a call centre where supervisors could call in for assistance in using the app.

⁸⁷ UNDP, *Interim Report to EU 2016-2017* p 30

⁸⁸ Human Rights Watch, *Haiti Events of 2015*

⁸⁹ CEP reporting on progress in project's Steering Committee Meeting 16 May 2017

⁹⁰ OAS report, p 4

More photos of PVs were received for the four elections held in October 2015, with the preliminary results for president issued within 11 days.⁹¹ For the November 2016 elections, the CTV received 25,380 photos of PVs within 24 hours of closing, and published 13,790 photos within 5 days.⁹²

The use of smartphones to capture and send the PVs helped to increase the transparency and credibility of the tabulation process and speed up the release of the preliminary results. The EU observers reported that the access provided by the CEP and the data posted had enabled them to check the results for the presidential elections and rule out the likelihood of fraud or irregularities altering the results.⁹³ The level of interest in the posted PVs also increased as more PVs were posted. The CEP website, received 814,360 hits for the PVs posted for the August 2015 elections and 4.35 million for the presidential, legislative and local elections in October 2015.⁹⁴

Technical assistance. The UNDP project was the main provider of technical assistance to the CEP at the national level. The project had a small team of experts until 2015, primarily the CTA and two experts (IT and gender). The number and scope of the TA increased in 2015 and 2016 to include experts in training, legal issues, procurement, logistics, finance and participation.

Project experts supported the CEPs to develop and improve their systems, procedures, communications and training. The overall quality of the technical assistance appeared to have been good and their efforts helped the CEPs to standardize its electoral management and increase the professionalism of their temporary staff. These efforts helped to depoliticize some of the technical aspects of electoral administration to some degree, which in turn helped to increase the credibility of the CEP's administration of the process for each round of the elections as noted in the observer reports.

The effectiveness of this effort was affected by the context and by all the factors already identified. The project's technical assistance experts worked under considerable time pressures with tight and shifting deadlines, last minute changes that required the reworking of plans and changes to the composition of the CEPs requiring them to adapt to new partners in the middle of a difficult and long electoral cycle. This did not always result in easy working relations. The CTA was also attacked in the press and identified as the person responsible for the nonpayment of workers which in the volatile context jeopardized his personal safety for several weeks. Nevertheless, the experts continued to provide assistance and their dedication and pride in their work was still evident in most of the final evaluations interviews.

Project TA were not embedded in the CEP and worked at several different locations throughout Port-au-Prince, including the project office. This reduced their ability to provide on-the-job mentoring and training for their CEP counterparts. Although a few experts, such as the legal and IT experts, were frequently at the CEP premises, the current CEP requested embedded advisors for the future as they are looking for a counterpart system where the TA trains his/her counterparts at the same time as assisting the CEP to do its work so that the counterpart is able to take over the work after the expert leaves. This is the next logical step for any subsequent UNDP project, as the Haitian electoral management bodies will have to step up their administration of the entire process with the end of MINUSTAH support. Peer-to-peer and twinning arrangements should also be considered for technical assistance and capacity building in a next phase.

⁹¹ OAS report p 8

⁹² UNDP, *Intermediary report for EU 2016 - 2017*

⁹³ Extract of the *EU EOM Report 2015* "Thanks to the transparency demonstrated by the CEP, which allowed the EU EOM to observe in detail and without restrictions not only the voting and counting operations - assessed in a positive or very positive way in the vast majority of but also the tabulation of results, that the Mission was able to carry out several checks on the results of the presidential election which excluded the possibility that fraud or irregularities likely to alter these results would have occurred."

⁹⁴ UNDP, *Narrative Project Report*

3.2.4. Support to the National Archives

This output was added in the 2015 amendment and intended to support the National Archives to strengthen its ability to provide the timely documents to its citizens that are needed to obtain their national ID card and subsequently to vote. This was intended to be done through limited TA, updating of Archive software and IT equipment and supporting the scanning the different civil registries. The estimated budget was USD 775,000.

This output was not implemented due to the decision to focus funds and attention on election support. However, had it been funded, the effectiveness of the effort for the elections held in 2015 and 2016 was doubtful. The entire civil registry system requires modernization. It has decades of civil registry ledgers that need to be digitalized. There was not enough time or funds allocated in the design to address this issue. Nevertheless, the system still was able to provide the needed documents to citizens for their ID cards, although according to the Archives, this took about three weeks per document.

The project's IT expert did have some discussions with the National Archives on possible assistance and its needs. This might have resulted in an internal report for the project's use, however the Archive staff interviewed did not realize that the project was over and that they would not be assisted. This is another example of the need for better communications between the project and stakeholders, especially for potential beneficiaries.

Strengthening the civil registry remains a pressing need for Haiti's modernization, but likely merits a project in itself, in addition to the development of an integrated e-governance system that includes the interface with ONI and the national ID card system.

3.2.5 Strengthened participation of women, youth and other vulnerable groups

This output added in 2015 was also not funded. The intended budget was USD 3,175,230. This was substantial enough to have covered a significant level of activities. The project did some limited work in 2016 with women candidates for local offices in two urban areas prone to electoral violence as discussed in Section 3.2.3. It also directly supported the efforts of the youth network COHAIV in 2017 to help the CEP reach more youth with its voter information messages through door-to-door and other fora as also discussed in that section.

The issue of civic and voter participation remains a critical area of need for future democratic governance and electoral cycle projects. It could benefit from a more programmatic approach with synergies developed with other GOH institutions such as the Ministry of Education and other internationally assisted programmes and networks.

3.3 Efficiency

As with the other elements assessed, the efficiency of project management and implementation was directly affected by the country context. Delayed decisions reduced lead time, affected planning, increased costs and reduced efficiencies even though UNDP was able to mitigate this to some extent through its Fast Track mechanisms that were put into place at the start of the project, and its existing corporate agreements with electoral vendors.


UNDP management and core staff were directly engaged in the implementation of this project along with the PMU and project experts. The prolonged cycle more than doubled the intended life of the project, resulting in three CTAs⁹⁵ and changes in various experts. The project had only a few staff at the start, gearing up in 2015 and eventually ending up with more than 30 staff and experts in 2016.

⁹⁵ One as acting

The quality of project management was an issue raised throughout the interviews by different partners and UNDP. Separating out the actual problems from the perceptions of problems and the project issues from the larger contextual problems is difficult at this point in time. The elections are over, and the project was effectively closed. However, it was apparent that there were issues that UNDP will need to address for its next project.

This included the design of the project management structures and the way they were organized. This was done on very broad lines in the project document (Box 2). The PMU positions and reporting lines were not identified other than having a project head. How the project staff was organized internally, interfaced with UNDP operations units and staff and whether the project reported to the UNDP Governance Unit or to the Deputy or Country Director make a difference in project efficiency and effectiveness and making the best use of UNDP and project staff. The UNDP Senior Country Director reported spending more than 50 percent of her time in the past two years on this project. The UNDP Governance Unit seemed understaffed the past few years and its substantive engagement in the project minimal after the departure of the governance programme manager who had worked on the issue of election support for several years.

Over time, the PMU developed into the relatively ad hoc structure illustrated in Box 5. It was largely centralized to the CTA who served the dual roles of chief technical advisor advising the CEP (leading the TA effort, participating in all of the technical and policy meetings, coordinating with the MINUSTAH EAS and other assistance partners), and as project manager of a USD 69 million project, supervising a large staff, its operations, implementation, monitoring and reporting. This is too much for any one person for a project of this size and complexity, especially in the context. He was supported significantly by others, but they also had full TORs, such as the project management specialist who did all of the project reporting and other management tasks as well as serve as the gender advisor. At a minimum, a senior level experienced deputy project manager was needed to help to carry the load and ensure more efficient reporting lines and use of the staff.



Only a few persons were hired as staff (internationally: the CTAs, two TA and the management/gender specialist). The rest were hired as independent consultants (IC). Only staff can access UNDP's financial and administrative system (ATLAS). This meant that the IC procurement and budget experts and other administrative staff were unable to access UNDP's administrative and finance system. This required UNDP's own procurement and finance staff to do all of their entry and ATLAS work. This added significantly to the workload of core UNDP (non-project) staff and slowed the project's work. Some, including the CEP, also noted that the IC persons were paid by deliverables, which they felt shifted the focus of their attention from helping the CEP to do its work as services, to producing a deliverable (such as a plan).

The issues of personalities, management styles and clarity of roles between UNDP and MINUSTAH EAS also affected efficiency as mentioned in effectiveness. One of the donors was concerned enough to raise the issues at the NY UN headquarters level in 2015. This resulted in the deployment of an electoral mission comprised of the EAD, DPKO and UNDP in April 2015 to assess the level of preparations for the August elections and the UN's response. The mission noted improvements in working relationships and collaboration between MINUSTAH and UNDP but also the essential need to continue strengthening coordination and communications given the lack of an integrated team,

as well as the need to fast track the recruitment of project experts in the areas of procurement, administration/budget/planning, good practices/procedures, gender and youth participation, and legal affairs.⁹⁶ It also recommended a review of the electoral budget and funding sources to ensure that all the needs were covered and to avoid duplications. This was all done but frustrations over project management issues, and a widespread perception of a lack of adequate information sharing by the project remained, and were still visible during this evaluation.⁹⁷

The project was to be overseen by a policy-level Steering Committee chaired by MINUSTAH and UNDP and include the GOH and project donors. This was to meet monthly in the non-election times and bi-monthly in the lead up to the elections to discuss project progress, issues and make decisions.⁹⁸ The Steering Committee was set up and met regularly at the start of the project along with a separate UNDP-coordinated donors group, but by the end of the project this donor coordination meeting had stopped and there were very few Steering Committee meetings. One of the reasons suggested by the project and UNDP for this was the overlapping meetings and fora organized by others.

The project document was also amended in 2015 to schedule the Steering Committee meetings on an ad hoc basis based on partner request. This is not adequate for a project of this size and complexity. Many of the issues raised in relation to management during this evaluation were about the lack of regularly shared information and the lack of regular project meetings. The technical meetings held at the CEP on election administration were not an adequate substitute for project management meetings.⁹⁹ Holding regular Steering Committee meetings, with a well-established agenda based on project progress and emerging issues could have helped to improve perceptions of the project and UNDP as issues could be resolved during the project meetings, instead of continually being raised and politicized in other venues. The setting up of an early warning system that would trigger an emergency session of the Steering Committee could have also been useful to discuss the emerging problem and to agree on a common way forward for the project.¹⁰⁰

UNDP was a good steward of the basket funds. The DIM mechanism allowed for UNDP to apply its administrative and financial controls, providing contributors with assurances that their funds were to be used to further the objectives of the project and in accordance with the terms in the project document. This is important in the political, institutional and socio-economic context. UNDP was

⁹⁶ UN, *Electoral Mission Report*, p 6

⁹⁷ The project representative for the review of this evaluation report did not agree with this finding, stating the project had “systematically shared information to partners through various technical meetings held on a regular basis. For some thematic areas, for example, civic education, in which the project organized weekly or bi-weekly meetings with partners, some partners decided not to participate despite the project’s invitation.” He also noted that “in the PV of one of the last Steering Committees, the project was praised by the donors for its information sharing” and “the project staff ... participated in IFES meetings as well as in bilateral meetings... emails were always and promptly answered” (Comments to evaluators, 21 November 2017). However, the evaluators found the finding validated throughout the range of interviews held within the project/UNDP, partners and other institutions and kept the finding.

⁹⁸ UNDP, *Project Document 2013*

⁹⁹ According to the interviews, project issues related to the use of the basket funds were often discussed in the CEP’s technical steering committee meetings or other venues held on the different areas of the process, especially on issues related to the payments of temporary workers. These often became heated exchanges and the issue dominated the meetings, especially in 2015. Noting outstanding issues that affect electoral operations are valid areas to raise in a technical committee, but a technical EMB committee is not the appropriate place to hash out and resolve project management or basket fund issues. Mixing project management issues with EMB-led technical discussions on electoral operations and administration on a regular basis politicized the issues and affected the project’s effectiveness and efficiency as well as the perceptions of partners on UNDP’s management capacity.

¹⁰⁰ According to the project, its main concerns were the lack of funding, international bid for the ballots, and the payments of temporary workers which it raised as the SRSG and Core Group levels.

also flexible enough that the donors could earmark their funds against certain aspects of the process which was important to many of them. UNDP also conserved the funds allocated for election support in the years waiting for the elections to be scheduled which left the election-specific funds intact and ready to be used when the dates were finally set.

The budget expert recruited in 2015 conducted the review of the basket fund budget requested by the elections review mission. She was able to tighten up the budget estimates considerably between line items as by then the project had already incurred costs that could be used as reference. UNDP was also able to mobilize funds so that the project was fully funded for the 2015 elections. However, the unexpected cancellation of the January 2016 elections, and the re-running of the presidential elections, cost the project an estimated additional USD 4 million according to interviews.

According to interviews, UNDP was able to cope with the large-scale procurement processes because of the long hours put in by its staff and the PMU, and because of its long-term agreements with suppliers who they found were flexible enough to adjust to last-minute changes. Most of the large procurement processes went through UNDP's specialized procurement unit in Copenhagen that has pre-competed mechanisms and existing arrangements with suppliers. This sped up the procurement time and helped reduce costs. UNDP also reportedly came under a lot of pressure from the different CEPs to relax its procurement regulations, especially in relation to suppliers. Those who worked on procurement thought they had been able to maintain UNDP's accountability and integrity standards despite the pressure and late changes and notice. This was borne out by the audits; the one in 2015 only had minor findings, and there were no major findings for 2016.¹⁰¹ The issue of the basket fund and who could spend what was a festering issue between UNDP and the CEPs. Much of this stemmed from the continuing change of CEPs as a partner and the lack of understanding at the start that not all of the funds in the basket fund were intended for electoral administration costs. Future projects need to more clearly differentiate between the funding intended to cover a budget gap for the holding of an election and the running costs for an EMB structure, and the funding provided for a development project intended to strengthen the electoral processes and its institutions. This project attempted to do this somewhat through separating the election-related costs into Output 3, but that output still contained the mixture of development and budget support funds and activities.

Box 6: Best Practices

- Taking a cycle approach to addresses process issues, such as women's/youth/vulnerable group participation, mainstreaming gender, voter education. Many of these are systemic issues that require the cycle's longer-term approach and programmatic synergies with other projects dealing with these issues.
- Introducing appropriate, cost-effective technologies and IT systems to manage the electoral process which increase efficiencies and the reliability of election administration, can help to deter fraud and increase the credibility of the EMB and electoral process.
- Supporting the EMB to establish regulations in the absence of a specific legal framework to provide standard guidelines can help to increase the predictability of the process and the reliability of the results, in turn increasing stakeholder trust in the EMB and process.
- Remaining flexible in the face of constantly changing circumstances and dates and adjusting the project to cover the emerging needs during project implementation.
- Using a common basket fund and project to support the process, which still allows for donors to earmark their funds against certain priorities in the process, but also reduces the burden on the GOH for reporting and meeting separately with each donor.
- Increasing attention on the problem of gender-based elections violence in a context of political instability and elections-related conflict.
- Use of UNDP's Copenhagen Procurement Services Unit that specializes in the purchase of electoral commodities, has pre-competed mechanisms and arrangements with suppliers to decrease procurement time and help reduce costs.

UNDP provided some of the funds directly to the CEP to administer. In a May 2015 Letter of Agreement (LOA), the project provided 147,714,847 Gourdes (HTG) to cover some of its costs to update the voters' lists, register candidates and train judges among other activities. UNDP provided an LOA advance of HTG 37,588,100. However, the CEP was unable to provide all of the verifications needed by UNDP to account for the use of the advance, which accounted for the findings of the project's 2015 audit. One of the reasons cited was that the financial staff in the CEP was unaware that the funds were provided through the LOA and that this documentation was required. Helping the CEP to obtain receipts and track and report on the expenditures retroactively took a substantial level of project effort, and exacerbated tensions, but resulted in 95% of the advance being validated by receipts by the end of February 2017.¹⁰² UNDP then switched to reimbursing the CEP based on submittal of receipts for the remainder of the LOA.

The 2016 CEP renegotiated this agreement and the decision was made to divide the GOH funds intended for electoral operations between UNDP, CEP and UNOPS, and for the CEP to receive its portion directly for its own administration. In this division, UNDP managed USD 20,185,574, the CEP USD 30,014,425 and UNOPS USD 4,800,000. This reduced the management burden for UNDP and increased CEP ownership over the use of these funds. Managing the funds also directly increased the CEP's accountability for delivering the desired outcomes with the GOH and allowed the TA to support their efforts, rather than vice versa.

UNDP worked in partnership with a large number of actors for the implementation of this project.

The project document was signed with the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation. This allowed the project to partner with a range of actors beyond the EMB, including ONI, the National Archives (even if it did not materialize) and with CSOs for other aspects of the electoral process. It is important for an electoral cycle project to have this flexibility so that it can maintain focus on the broader process and achieving the outcome level objectives of the project. UNDP provided funds to a number of partners to implement certain parts of the project activities directly as outlined in Table 11. These were done through the appropriate UNDP partnership agreements with all of the agencies except for COHAIV which UNDP paid through the reimbursement of expenses.

The partnerships with MINUSTAH and UNOPS were based on daily interaction between the three organizations and technical experts. The UNDP Country Directors interviewed noted the substantial policy level support provided by the SRSG for the project and the close coordination between the UN

Date	Organization	Purpose	Amount USD
Feb 2014 – Dec 2014	OAS	Support to ONI for the 2013 partial senatorial, municipal and local elections	1,400,177
15 June 2015 – 15 Jan 2016	UN Women	Support to the political participation of women and the integration of gender in 2015 elections	160,500 + 51,142
Aug 2015 – 30 April 2016	UNESCO	Support to youth participation in the 2015 national elections and promotion of a culture of peace and nonviolence in Haiti	309,779
7 July 2015 – 31 Jan 2016	UNOPS	Transport of sensitive materials for 2015 elections	250,000 ¹⁰³
9 July 2015 – 15 Jan 2016	MINUSTAH	Operational Support Facilitation Funds for MINUSTAH logistics and field operations for the 2015 presidential, legislative and local elections	150,000 ¹⁰⁴
May 2015 – 31 December 2015	CEP	Support to the Electoral Process (37,588,100 advanced, remainder on reimbursement basis 105,126,747)	HTG 142,714,847
January 2017	COHAIV	Support to the CEP's voter information effort through deploying civic educators January 2017	24,754 (reimbursement)

¹⁰² Ibid, p 9

¹⁰³ Not all funds were spent. USD 50,000 was to be reimbursed to UNDP.

¹⁰⁴ According to the project, very little was expended, with close to USD 140,000 reimbursed to UNDP.

mission and UNDP at that level. The operations experts also worked very closely with MINUSTAH and UNOPS on the electoral operational planning and calendar. The funds provided to MINUSTAH and UNOPS were to directly support their costs for election logistics. UNDP also coordinated within the UN system through the meetings organized by MINUSTAH and the SRSG, with other organizations on specific areas through the weekly CEP technical meetings, and with organizations such as IFES through its regular meeting of USAID-funded organizations mostly focusing on voter information.

The partnerships with UN Women and UNESCO were useful given the mandate of each organization, contributing towards the ONE UN model. However, these were after-thoughts rather than part of the original design and tended to split the project efforts, particularly for those focused on women's participation and mainstreaming gender in the electoral process. UNESCO's efforts ended up carrying much of the project's focus for youth and the media for the 2015 elections. Although UN Women and the project staff reportedly worked as a team on some activities, and the project picked up UNESCO's CSO group (COHAIV) to support youth in the 2017 elections, a more purposefully designed component for information targeting women, youth and vulnerable groups could have resulted in a more efficient, timely and effective programme.

The funding for both UNESCO and UN Women was provided late, leaving very little time before the elections to get organized and implement the activities. They both noted the need to start at least six months before elections for informational and educational activities. COHAIV also stated that its reimbursement for activities was slow and they were only able to do the activities because one of their board members was a banker who arranged for a letter of credit.

The project collected a large volume of information on its activities and provided all of the required written and financial reports. Some of these were quite comprehensive, reporting against the anticipated outputs as outlined in the project's results and resources framework.

Different reporting formats were required by different donors which significantly increased the level of effort required for reporting. For the future, it would be more efficient for the project to produce one main report that covers all of the activities and reports against targets according to the results framework in the Project Document, and cover specific donor needs with short supplemental annexes. All of the reports appeared to have been provided on a timely basis with donors satisfied with their content. The final project report was not yet completed at the time of this evaluation.

The monitoring and evaluation aspects of the project needed considerable strengthening. There was no mid-term evaluation foreseen in the project document, only this final evaluation and a lessons learned exercise which the project staff undertook before the project ended. The project collected a lot of data, but this is almost completely at the output level and was not aggregated at an outcome level. The PMU made efforts to monitor and assess some efforts, such as trainings with teams sent out to various locations. Each team made a report noting the numbers of persons attending and some quality of training issues, but these also did not appear to be aggregated into an outcome level report that could be used to track issues and improvements in training performance. MINUSTAH also collected some data from their departmental level electoral staff on trainings and other project funded efforts. Some of this information was shared with the project. This could have been developed into a more systemic effort with commonly agreed indicators which could have helped the project to assess and better monitor and measure some of its performance.

For the future a more complete results framework including targets and measurable indicators for each output and sub-output is needed. A project of this size should also have a full time M&E person to collect the data, monitor progress, do the reporting and be available to answer questions from donors and partners on the project's activities and results.

Box 7: Lessons Learned

- Highly dedicated and flexible experts can help to ensure that this type of a project is a success even in a volatile context where planning is difficult and deadlines are tight and ever changing.
- Importance of stability in partners for a development project.
- Need to address the systemic issues that impact the efficacy of electoral assistance and the sustainability of its efforts through the promotion of needed constitutional and legal reforms (as identified by election observers and experts) and to establish permanent institutions.
- Ensuring a realistic timeframe and level of effort in project design and implementation for the scope of activities envisioned under the project.
- Addressing problems holistically, such as the development of the candidate registration system, may take more time and effort, but result in more durable and effective institutional solutions than piece meal efforts.
- Importance of a regular steering committee mechanism to share information and address the problems inherent in the management of an electoral project. Technical election administration committees provide ad hoc solutions and are not appropriate structures to deal with project management and implementation issues.
- Importance of embedding technical advisors into the EMB to strengthen relationships, provide on the job mentoring, facilitate the transfer of skills, build counterpart capacity and increase national ownership and mutual accountability.
- Ensuring a clear division of responsibilities throughout the electoral processes between United Nations agencies to avoid misunderstandings, reduce friction and duplication of efforts.
- Need for adequate PMU staffing relative to the size and complexity of the project and ensuring that PMU staff have the type of contracts that allow them to use UNDP's financial and administrative systems

3.4 Sustainability

The sustainability of the improvements made in this past electoral cycle remain a critical issue given the lack of a permanent and independent CEP, the need for electoral reform, and the lack of political stability. This is an issue that surpasses this project and has hindered the institutionalization of the gains made by all of the assistance projects over the past 25 years.¹⁰⁵

The basic assumption in the project design was that the project would support the development of the permanent CEP, and use the cycle approach to build institutional capacity within the permanent CEP that would last beyond the election events assisted. The permanent CEP was not created, and the political context and prolonged electoral process resulted in an almost permanent focus instead on the electoral events, getting them scheduled and the preparations done.

At the end of this project, there is a foundation on which to build within the CEP and the beginnings of an institutional consolidation. There is a small core group of CEP staff that have remained at the CEP despite the turnover who have grown professionally over time from the cumulation of experience and assistance. The 2016 CEP was also able to build on the institutional gains made by the 2015 CEP which further improved and consolidated the systems and procedures, which also provides a good foundation for the future.

UNDP said it invested heavily in archiving the process so that the information and assets could be available for the next election. For instance, the project developed a compendium of the legal texts for the 2015 -2017 elections which includes copies of all of the presidential decrees, rules and procedures from the elections from 2015 - 2017. This places all of the important documents from this electoral cycle in one document for easy reference for the next elections and CEP.

¹⁰⁵ UNDP, *Review of the 2010-2011 election support project*, p 16

The databases, systems, manuals and procedures supported by the project can be expected to remain in place for the near to medium term even if there is a change of councils. Some of the good practices in IT, and such things as cross checking the databases of poll workers for party agents or sending results in by smartphone photos, can also be expected to remain assuming the council is able to remain independent. These were shown to have been effective and appreciated by the CEP staff and electoral participants. They also set a precedent that domestic observers and most parties would expect to see replicated for future elections. Given past experience however there is always the risk that delays in the establishment of the permanent or next provisional CEP, or the appointment of a politicized or partisan council that replaces experienced staff, could result the loss of institutional memory and the need to redo these tools and systems in the future.

The GOH stepped up its funding for these elections when they were extended, and the CEP took over more of an ownership approach to its administration of the process. Both of these are essential for sustainable outcomes and need to continue for the gains to remain within the institution, which also needs some stability in its composition.

The cost of elections remains an issue of concern. It is affected by many factors and goes beyond the cost of ballots or other materials to the nature of the electoral system, the number of elected offices, and the frequency of elections. It also goes to issues related to the credibility of the process and the acceptance of the results. These are key issues that need to be addressed at the policy and technical levels in the near term for Haiti to be able to move on and consolidate its democratic transition.

4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Conclusions

1. *The Support to the Electoral Process Project in Haiti was needed and highly relevant for the 2013-2017 electoral process.* The project provided needed technical assistance, services and funding that supported the provisional CEPs to better manage the elections in the midst of a prolonged and contentious electoral process. The engagement and improvements supported increased the credibility of the CEP and the validity of the election results. The CEPs would have had difficulties in achieving this alone in the highly politicized context and climate of pervasive mistrust.
2. *The project was able to remain relevant and largely effective in the volatile and complex environment by adjusting its programme to the changing circumstances, and by providing reliable support while still maintaining its standards.* The policy support provided by the SRSB and others at the political level to the electoral process was essential to this technical-level project to be successful in the context.
3. *The project was most effective in strengthening the quality and reliability of electoral administration. This helped to increase the credibility of the CEP and the transparency of its efforts.* Project support to standardize systems and procedures, develop innovative IT and database solutions reduced the room for human error and malfeasance and helped to depoliticize some of the technical aspects of electoral administration. This in turn helped to increase trust in the CEP and the dependability of its efforts.
4. *The electoral cycle nature of the project design was a best practice, but this aspect was lost in the context and in the manner of project implementation.* The lack of distinction between budget support and the developmental aspects of the project was a contributing factor as was the mission context which defined the areas for UNDP assistance. A more programmatic approach to the process as a whole could have strengthened project efforts for capacity building, mainstreaming gender, increasing women's and youth's participation and the e-governance aspects of administration.

5. *UNDP as a whole and the project in particular coped with the large volume of work required, but its management burden could have been eased considerably by a better organization of staff, experts, tasks and reporting lines, along with the appropriate types of contracts for the different terms of references.* Written project communications were good but more regular Steering Committee meetings and informal information sharing on project management and implementation would have improved relations and partner perceptions of the project. The M&E framework and monitoring needed strengthening to be able to adequately assess UNDP's performance and capture its results.
6. *Outcome level results are the cumulative effects of Haitian efforts and assistance provided to the processes the past decades. However, the project directly contributed to the peaceful and successful conclusion of the 2013-2017 electoral process and the acceptance of the results.* The technical assistance, services and funding channeled through the project were indispensable to this achievement. The positive results are also due to the commitment of the transitional government to complete the electoral cycle and the significant level of funding from the GOH as the project's largest donor along with the dedication the CEP, UNDP and the project staff, partners and the other persons and institutions that worked to strengthen the electoral processes in Haiti. It was a collective effort that successfully concluded these elections.
7. *The cost of elections remains a serious issue that needs to be addressed at the electoral framework level as well as the election administration level.* The current system is not sustainable for Haiti or for donors.
8. *More emphasis was needed on the issue of electoral reform. Electoral and constitutional reforms are needed to develop more sustainable and stable electoral and political processes and institutions. Most of the gains made under this project will not be sustainable if there are similar interruptions in the next electoral cycle or if the CEP does not consolidate into a permanent and independent institution.*
9. *UNDP remains a valued partner by the GOH and international community.* The reform discussion is ongoing and there is a window of opportunity to support this effort and build momentum for genuine change that UNDP, as a multilateral development agency with an electoral assistance mandate and global experience is uniquely placed to assist.

4.2. Recommendations

1. *Continued support to strengthen the electoral processes in Haiti through the immediate support to the reform process and to consolidate the gains made within the CEP, and the development of a follow-on longer-term electoral cycle project.* Future projects should raise their goals beyond electoral administration to developing sustainable and stable electoral and democratic political processes and institutions and ensure they address key issues such as EMB independence, accountability of actors, transparency of the processes, electoral justice, inclusive participation (women, youth, PWD and others), civic education and the cost of elections.¹⁰⁶ Consider phasing and benchmarking assistance based on commonly agreed goals that demonstrate progress in the processes and electoral climate.

¹⁰⁶ For costs, a comprehensive review needs to be done of the constitutional and legal framework for the elections with a view to developing a more efficient and effective electoral system (one that eliminates the need for almost annual elections) and of its technical administration, including the institutional set ups and their operating costs, and the costs for the elections, including the types of technologies, materials and systems used. There is no one-size fits-all answer to this issue in the context and finding a

2. *Link the policy dialogue and advocacy efforts for electoral reforms to the objectives of the Sustainable Development Goals and the national discussions on how to achieve these goals. In particular, for SDG 5 (Gender Equality) and SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions) which have the same objectives as an electoral cycle project.*
3. *Adopt a programmatic approach for project implementation and ensure synergies of efforts to increase project effectiveness and efficiencies with other efforts that cover the broader spectrum of democratic governance, including strengthening the rule of law, democratic principles, advocacy for reforms, equal rights, and civic education.*
4. *Continue use of a common basket fund mechanism to fund essential items not covered by the GOH, but make a clear distinction in the project document, meetings and reporting between the development-focused activities and the use of the funds for budget support. Increase national ownership of the process through the continued transfer of funds to GOH agencies receiving budget support. Strengthen their capacity to better administer the funds to ensure their proper use.¹⁰⁷ Embed technical experts in the institution to ensure transfer of knowledge and skills to their counterparts.*
5. *Build on the efforts made to develop the cloud-based data systems and consider how interactive e-governance systems could further improve the voter registration and electoral administration processes. UNDP has supported this in other countries and could use that experience to help Haiti through institutional exchanges. Continue efforts to support the electoral dispute resolution mechanisms within the process and to build the capacities of those responsible for EDR.*
6. *Resume UNDP's donor coordination role with the departure of MINUSTAH and hold regular donor coordination and project steering committee meetings. Increase the sharing of information between projects and partners between meetings and reporting.*
7. *Strengthen project management and M&E efforts.* For large and complex projects, add an experienced deputy project manager as well as a full time M&E person to monitor and report on project performance and to respond to partner requests for information. Ensure the results framework is fleshed out early in the project with well-defined objectives, measurable indicators and targets as well as with the methods to be used to collect the needed data. Consider regular survey research for efforts targeting voter information, civic education and participation to better target efforts and to measure results. Use the M&E plan to monitor project progress and performance and hold a mid-term evaluation for projects of more than two years.
8. *Ensure future capacity building efforts are based on participatory needs assessments of the CEP and other relevant institutions, including their management and organizational structures, staffing levels and internal regulations and procedures. Address the cost of elections issue by undertaking a comprehensive assessment that looks at the complete costs of the elections, including the costs incurred through delays, the EMB structures, electoral security and voter information, to better understand the situation and to identify the systemic and technical changes needed to make the system more effective and affordable for Haiti.*

sustainable solution for the election-related issues which contribute to the high level of elections will likely take a GOH-led national dialogue and consultation process.

¹⁰⁷ This could be through a certified public accounting firm that could also oversee the use and certify proper use and reports for each tranche.

Annex 1: Persons met

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

Coalition of Haitian Volunteers (COHAIV)

Junior Mercier, Coordinator

Roselene Pierre, Administrative Assistant and Secretary

Experts

Dr. Yves François Pierre, Political Scientist

Reginald Salomon, Economic Researcher and Businessman

National Episcopal Commission for Justice and Peace

Jocelyne Colas, National Director

Citizen Observatory for the Institutionalization of Democracy (OCID)

Rosny Desroches, Executive Director, Civil Society Initiative, OCID Member

GOVERNMENT OF HAITI

Ministry of Economy and Finance

Harold Etienne, Director General

Romain Bastien, Former Minister of Economy and Finance (2016 -2017)

Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation

Aviol Fleurant, Minister

Yves Robert Jean, Special Advisor to the Cabinet of Ministers

Price Pady, Percial Advisor to the Ministry

Smith Gerbier, Director of External Cooperation

National Archives

Paul Queru Dalencourt, Administrative Director

Volvick Noel, IT Services

Jean Kern Belizaire, Technical Director

National Office for Identification (ONI)

Mildrède Beliard, Director of Communications and External Relations

Provisional Electoral Council

Leopold Berlanger Fils, President

Carlos Hercule, Vice President

Dr. Finel Joseph, Treasurer

Jean Simon Sain Hubert, Member, Training

Marie-Frantz Joachim, Secretary General

Uder Antoine, Executive Director

Marquiline P.L. Rosemond, Director for Logistics and Transport

Derby Guerrier, Director for Security

Antoine Saint Louis, Acting Director Administration

Carria Pognon, Director Planning

Luc Dominique, Deputy Director

Lemarie Honorat, Director for Electoral Operations

Richardson V. Dumel, Director for Communications
Edouard Pierrot, Head Finances
Philippe Augustin, Director of Electoral Registry
Jean Musset Daniel, President BED North
Petion Quesnel, President BED South-East
Thermidor Henrillot, President BED Center
Pierre Louis Opont, Former CEP President (2015 -2016)

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Delegation of the European Union

Murielle Guillemois Sanchez, Head of Programmes, Governance
Matt Woods, Head Department of Political Affairs

Embassy of Argentina

Alejandro. G. Deimundo Escobal, Ambassador

Embassy of Brazil

Claudio Leopoldino, Minister Advisor

Embassy of Canada

Marie-Hélène Côté, Deputy Head of Cooperation

International Foundation for Electoral Systems

Lesley Richards, Operations Manager and Acting Chief of Party by skype
Lourdes Gonzalez, Acting Chief of Party (2016) by skype
Jean Baptiste Azolin, Senior Programme Officer
Dong Nguyen, Electoral Adviser by phone

MINUSTAH

Carmina Sanchez, Chief Electoral Section, (2016 – 2017) by skype
Felix Ulloa, Chief Electoral Section, (2016) by skype

National Democratic Institute

Leo Spaans, Senior Resident Director

Organization of American States

Nino Karamaoun, Principal Advisor, OAS Office in Haiti

Support to the Electoral Cycle in Haiti Project

Philippe de Bard, Chief Technical Adviser (2015 – 2017)
Lourdes Gonzalez, Chief Technical Adviser (2013-2014) by skype
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Atsuko Hirakawa, Specialist in Project Management (2013-2017) by skype
Amadine Roche, Women's Participation Expert (2015) by email
Amor Boubakri, Legal Expert (2015-2017) by skype
Antoine Jehu, Procurement Expert (2015 – 2017) by email
Cesar Acuna, Specialist in Electoral Technology (2013-2017) by skype
Jonas Laurence, National Communications Advisor (2016 – 2017) by skype
Pierre Jaha, Technology Assistant (2010-2016) by skype
Scott McTagart, Electoral Logistics expert (2015-2016) by phone
Shqipe Hebibi, Expert for Good Practices and Training (2016) by skype

Sondes Tili, Expert in Budget and Planning (2015-2016) by skype

United Nations Development Programme

Yvonne Helle, Country Director

Sophie de Caen, former Country Director by email

Martine Therer, Deputy Country Director, Programmes

Stephanie Ziebell, Assistant Resident Representative, Head of Management Support Unit

Joachim Olivier Nzengue-Dappa, Operations Manager a.i. Support to Electoral Process in Haiti Project (2017)

Betty Jean, Assistant, Governance Unit

Florence Lalanne, Finance Assistant, Finance Unit

Janie Compas, Finance responsible

Raould Espinoza, Procurement Specialist

Gonzalo Guerra, Regional Monitoring and Planning Advisor, UNDP Regional Office, Panama, by skype

Aledia Ferreyra, Policy Analyst, Elections, BPPS, UNDP NY by skype

Fernanda Lopes, UNDP Regional Office, Panama and member 2017 NAM, by skype

UNESCO

Paul Gomis, Representative

Jeffrey Clark Lochard, Specialist in Communications and Information

UNOPS

Nathalie Angibeau, Project Manager, by skype

UN Women

Nadege Beauvil, Programme Specialist

USAID

Alexious Butler, Deputy Director and former Head Democracy and Governance, USAID Haiti

W. Christopher Shihelds, Senior Elections and Political Process Advisor, Democracy and Governance

Annex 2: Documents

CEP

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Annex 3: Evaluation methodology

1. Introduction

This Evaluation Inception Plan was developed based on: the Terms of Reference (TOR) prepared by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Haiti for this independent final evaluation of the UNDP Support to the Electoral Process in Haiti Project (also referred to as the “Project”); information provided by UNDP Haiti; UNDP evaluation guidelines; and, an initial review of the project documents and reporting. This was a four and a half year (2013-2017) USD 68,906,579 project intended to support the electoral cycle in Haiti.

1.1. Purpose for the Final Evaluation

The purpose for this final evaluation was to provide UNDP with a final evaluation report on the Project that assesses its performance and identifies the lessons learned that can be used to inform future electoral assistance. Specifically this evaluation:

1. Assessed the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the Project interventions based on the Project’s intended outcomes as well as the national and UNDP development objectives;
2. Assessed the project design and quality of indicators in measuring project performance; and
3. Provided lessons learned and recommendations that may be used for future programming.

1.1 Background and context

The Project was developed in 2012 as a follow on to UNDP support for the 2010-2011 presidential and legislative elections. It was initially intended to “Support the 2013-2014 Electoral Process” (legislative, municipal and local elections) however election-related political crises pushed these elections into 2015. The Project was amended in June 2015 to extend its completion date to December 2016 and it was renamed “Support to the Electoral Cycle in Haiti.” The 2015 amendment also added two objectives as noted below. The legislative and presidential elections in 2015 were also disrupted by a political crisis, and slipped into 2016. First round elections were held in 2016 but the second rounds were pushed into 2017 following the destruction of Hurricane Mathew. The Project was amended in November 2016 to extend the project end date to 30 June 2017.

Financial support for the Project was provided by the Governments of Haiti (GOH) (USD 36,967,187), the United States of America (US) (USD 8,039,336), Canada (USD 8,948,360), European Union (EU) (USD 6,748,918), Japan (USD 4,477,612), Brazil (USD 1,990,000), Trinidad and Tobago (USD 1,000,000), Norway (USD 385,154), Mexico (USD 300,000) and Argentina (USD 50,000). The project was fully funded.¹⁰⁸

The overarching goal of the Project was to support the Permanent Electoral Council (CEP) to manage and coordinate transparent, fair and credible elections with external support and limited security, technical and logistical support provided by the United Nations (2013-2014).¹⁰⁹ This goal was amended in 2015 to a CEP with effective and reliable procedures to better administer the 2015 elections. To accomplish this goal, the Project focused its support on strengthening the CEP, National Identification Office (ONI) and by providing operational support for the CEP. The objectives were expanded in the 2015 amendment to include support to the National Archives for preservation of the voters lists and to increase the participation of youth and women.

The objectives listed in the original *Project Document* were¹¹⁰:

¹⁰⁸ UNDP, Project Document, Support to the Electoral Cycle in Haiti, 2016 Amendment, p 1

¹⁰⁹ UNDP, Project Document, Support to the Support to the Electoral Process in Haiti 2013 – 2014, p 15

¹¹⁰ UNDP, Project Document, Support to the Electoral Process in Haiti 2013 – 2014, p 15

1. Strengthen the capacity of the Permanent Electoral Council (organizational and technical).
2. Support the National Identification Office in agreement with the Organization of American States (OAS) (to process/deliver national identity cards for voting).
3. Support to the electoral process (election administration and the holding of elections). This was changed to Support to electoral operations in the 2015 amendment.

The two additional objectives added in the 2015 *Project Document Amendment* were¹¹¹:

4. Technical assistance targeted towards other stakeholders (ONI and National Archives).
5. Strengthened participation of women, youth and of other vulnerable groups (including delivering targeted civic education).

The project is executed through a direct implementation modality. The agreement is signed with the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation. The Project is managed by a Project Board comprised of the GOH, UNDP, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and Project donors, a Project Management Unit (PMU) and Chief Technical Advisor (CTA). UNDP provided quality control. Only a final evaluation was anticipated in the project documents and no mid-term evaluation was done. An internal lessons learned exercise was done before the project ended.

1.2 Scope of the final evaluation

This independent evaluation:

- Undertook a review of relevant documents, including the Project Documents, progress reports, project products, letters of agreements with other implementing agencies and electoral observation mission reports.
- Undertook discussions with project partners, Government and non-government agencies, project stakeholders and others working in the sector on the project design, implementation, performance, challenges, lessons learned, best practices and results.
- Assessed the relevance, effectiveness and sustainability of the project design and interventions taking into consideration the project objectives as well as national and UNDP development goals and roles.
- Assessed the efficiency of Project implementation and management and the factors that affected efficiency.
- Assessed the quality and usefulness of the performance indicators used by the project to measure project results.
- Assessed qualitative and quantitative data available on the results achieved and progress made, especially in terms of its contribution to the strengthening of the CEP, ONI, the National Archives, election operations and the participation of women, youth and other vulnerable groups.
- Identified the factors that facilitated or hindered the achievement of results and the lessons learned during implementation.
- Validated preliminary evaluation findings through discussions, interviews and the evaluation debriefing.
- Provided recommendations for future programming and strengthening electoral assistance.

¹¹¹ UNDP, Project Document, Support to the Electoral Cycle in Haiti, p 58

The evaluation focused primarily on the 2015-2017 period given the large scope of those efforts. However, where information was available on the initial years of the Project, it was included in the reporting and findings.

2 Methodology

2.1 Evaluation criteria and questions

With the evaluations scope detailed in Section 1.2 in mind, the evaluation team sought to answer the following questions. These were in addition to the questions on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability outlined in the terms of reference:

Outcome	Main Questions	Sub- Questions
Strengthened CEP organizational and technical capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did the project strengthen the CEP's institutional systems and procedures for electoral management? In what ways? Did this have the desired results (improved administration, increased trust and participation)? • Was the technical capacity of the CEP improved as a result of this project? What were the factors that affected this result? • Was the capacity of poll workers improved as a result of this project? What impact did this have? • What was the quality of technical assistance provided? Was it timely and relevant? How did this impact the CEP and the electoral process? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Which staff were trained by the project and how relevant was the training to their needs and those of the electoral process? • How effective was the technical assistance provided to the CEP? What were the main factors for this? • How sustainable are the improvements in electoral management, procedures, skills, etc? Why? What was done to prevent loss of institutional memory, assets and staff given the provisional nature of the councils? • Has the logistical capacity of the CEP increased? Is it better able to handle election logistics without external support? • What was the role of the project in providing technological solutions for the CEP/BEDs/BECs? Were these solutions appropriate to the context, effective and cost-effective? Can they be used for the next election? • Were the different CEPs assisted by the Project receptive to technical assistance and used the advice provided? Was it all needed? • Was an electoral mapping unit created in the CEP? Did it function effectively? What was the impact of this on the electoral process? Is it still functioning? • Were all poll workers trained and certified? Why or why not? • Was there an increased participation of women and youth as poll workers? Why or why not?
Support to the ONI through the OAS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Was the ONI better able to register and deliver national identity (ID) cards as a result of the project assistance? In what ways? What were the factors enabling/ hindering this? • What was the effect of the ONI strengthening on the electoral process? • What is the status of the registration and delivery of the national ID cards? • Are the improvements sustainable? Why or 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How effective was the OAS assistance to the ONI? Why? • Were the electoral lists strengthened and more accurate as a result of this assistance? • What was the quality of technical assistance provided to the ONI? Was it timely, relevant and effective? • Were the key constraints to having a reliable and sustainable electoral list addressed through this component? If not, were they

Outcome	Main Questions	Sub- Questions
	why not?	addressed by Output 4 or others?
Support to the electoral process/operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What was the role of the basket fund for the electoral process and CEP? Was it appropriate and did it fulfil this role? Was this strategic? • How were the capacities of the CEP and departmental/communal election offices (BEDs/BECs) strengthened as a result of the efforts funded through the basket fund? Were these funds appropriately targeted? • Did the project's financial and technical assistance help improve the quality of election administration and key parts of the process? In what ways? • How appropriate and useful were the IT solutions supported by the Project? • How effective was the training for judges and on electoral dispute resolution? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Was there timely and effective management of the basket fund? Why or why not? • Were decisions on its use and procurements done in a timely manner? What factors affected this? • What were stakeholder and partner perceptions on the use of the basket fund and issues of value for money? • Where are the assets purchased by the fund and are they expected to be available for the next election? Does the recipient/UNDP have adequate systems in place to ensure this? • What was the relationship between UNDP and MINUSTAH for technical and operational electoral support? Was there good coordination and clearly identified roles? With other implementers? • Were there other issues related to the use of the basket fund?
Technical assistance for other stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How did UNDP supplement OAS efforts at strengthening ONI? How well were the two efforts coordinated? What was the impact of this? • What was the role of the project in providing technological solutions for the ONI? Were these solutions appropriate to the context, effective and cost-effective? • What was the role of the project in providing technological solutions for the National Archives for the preservation of the voter registry? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Was a needs assessment done for ONI and were measures taken to address those needs? • To what extent is the ONI and National Archive able to sustain and use the IT solutions established with the support of the Project? • Who was trained by the project and are they still with the institutions? • What was the status of the voter registry during the elections and now?
Strengthened participation of women, youth and other vulnerable groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did this effort increase the participation of women, youth and vulnerable groups in the electoral process? • What youth networks were strengthened as a result of the project and what was their role during the electoral process? • Did these visibility efforts increase the transparency and confidence in the electoral process? In what ways? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What type of civic education campaigns were carried out by targeted groups? Were they effective and why? • How many women candidates, youth and others received training through this component? What did they do with this training? • How many women candidates received funding for their pollwatchers and did they think this assistance helped them to ensure the polling and counting were accurately done? • How were these efforts coordinated with other actors? Was this coordination effective?
Project design and management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Was the design relevant to the needs? Did it prioritize the key constraints to a 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How timely were project interventions? What were the factors enabling/inhibiting

Outcome	Main Questions	Sub- Questions
	<p>credible, effective election administration?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What was the theory of change? Was it well grounded in the context and did it prove to be effective? • Did the project design and its implementation take advantage of UNDP's comparative advantages in electoral and development assistance? Was it an appropriate role for a UNDP/basket fund project? • What was the quality of project management? Was it timely? Were there any major issues? What and Why? • Were project activities well-coordinated with those of other donors/actors? • Were the project donors satisfied with the coordination mechanisms put into place? 	<p>this?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What were the main constraints faced by the project? How were they overcome (or not)? • Were the underlying project assumptions valid? • Were the risks adequately identified and addressed by the project? • Were there management/monitoring/reporting issues with the components implemented through Letters of Agreement (LOAs)? • What was the quality of project reporting and was it adequate for the needs of UNDP, partners and donors? • What were the lessons learned and best practices of the Project?

2.2. Approach

In answering the evaluation questions, the evaluation team used mixed methods for analysis, synthesis and drawing conclusions. These included: trend analysis of key outcomes, analysis of associations between observed outcome and the Project-funded efforts, assessment of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of Project assistance and validation through triangulation (validation discussions with UNDP, CEP, development partners, Project staff and other partners/beneficiaries, by information provided in the documents reviewed and by the quality of the electoral processes as reported by impartial national/international observers). As a result, based on the information available and stakeholder perceptions, the evaluation team made judgments on their value and the extent that these outputs contributed towards the achievement of the Project's intended outcomes.

The questions outlined in Section 1.2 were specific yet general enough to allow for flexibility in questioning as well as to allow for flexibility in responses. This enabled the responders to voice their own issues and concerns. The team started by asking brief general questions before going into the specific evaluation questions. Sensitive questions were asked at the end of the interview after a rapport had developed between the interviewer and person(s) being interviewed. Issues identified in discussions were followed up with additional questions to that individual/group, as well as by questions to other informants to corroborate the information as needed.

The evaluation team interviewed available partners, stakeholders and Project staff. This included:

- CEP President, Vice President, Members, Secretary General, Director General, key directors and staff (former and current from the project period), and representatives of BED/BECs;
- Government representatives from the Ministry of Plan and Foreign Cooperation;
- Project staff (former and remaining) including the CTAs and key PMU members, technical experts, consultants and trainers;
- Key staff from agencies that received project funding or coordinated activities through Letters of Agreement with the Project/UNDP (UN Women, OAS, UNESCO, UNOPS, UN Women);
- UNDP country management, Governance Unit, Evaluation Specialist, Finance and Administrative Officers who backstopped the project;
- Project donors and GOH members of the Steering Committee;

- Relevant staff at the National Identification Office;
- Relevant staff of the National Archives;
- Youth and women's groups associated with the project (Haitian Coalition of Volunteers – COHAIV and others);
- Representatives from the SRSG, MINUSTAH Electoral Department and other MINUSTAH departments that coordinated with the Project;
- Other implementers; and,
- National observers.

Evaluation questions were tailored to the different institutions, their mandate and their role in the project and/or sector. Particular attention was given to the management challenges, time/political constraints, causes for delays in recruitments and procurement, the possible remedial actions that were undertaken, and the structural questions on partnerships and management structures emerging from these management challenges. Lessons learned from the management of other UNDP electoral support projects will be considered as additional references.

2.3 Measuring results

The evaluation team used its professional judgment to assess the information collected and to answer the evaluation questions. Results were measured in terms of the expected results outlined in the Project Documents and their Results and Resources Frameworks, as well as by the participants' perceptions of the project and the team's assessment of the results found. Attribution of results directly to the Project was not possible in some cases due to the time available for the evaluation, and the amount of work that has been done in the sector outside of this Project and/or by other organizations that were likely to have contributed to the same outcomes. However, where a direct correlation seems evident, it was noted in the Evaluation Report. It was also difficult to assess cost-effectiveness of specific interventions or value for money within the timeframe. However, stakeholder perceptions of efficiency and cost-effectiveness formed part of the evaluation.

2.4 Data sources and processing

The evaluation used both primary and secondary data and a variety of data collection methods to gather the information needed to conduct the work. This included: desk review and analysis of the Project and secondary data; in person interviews in Port-au-Prince; Skype and e-mail interviews for key actors or former Project staff who were in other locations. The team reviewed available documents before, during and after the field work as needed. It spent time in country as a team to discuss findings and to review the data collected from the field.

The persons interviewed were the main project partners, staff and stakeholders as noted in Section 2.2. Statistical data, public opinion surveys and analytical reports was used where available to gain supplemental information on electoral and political attitudes, practices and knowledge.

The team reviewed the most pertinent documents related to the electoral process and administration in Haiti, which is expected to include the observer reports from recent elections; political analyses; public opinion polling data on electoral processes and voter participation; CEP strategic plan; Government development plan; UNDAF; and available project evaluation and progress reports. A list of pertinent and available documents was developed by UNDP and was provided to the evaluators.

The data collected through interviews, observation and review of documents was processed in team discussions, and the main findings extrapolated and listed against the intended outcome areas of the Project. The team synthesized those findings into the main points that are discussed in the Evaluation Report. The evaluation team maintained an impartial and professional view towards developing its findings, and based them on the evidence found and against the anticipated outcomes according to the Project Document. The team arrived at its findings through consensus.

The evaluation team treated all information gathered as confidential and the Evaluation Report does not identify individual responses unless it had consent from that individual to use the information publicly. The Evaluation Report follows UNDP's standards for independent evaluation reporting.

Annex 4: Terms of Reference

Évaluation du Projet

Appui au Processus Électoral en Haïti mis en œuvre par le PNUD

1. HISTORIQUE ET CONTEXTE

L'engagement récent du Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement (PNUD) dans le processus électoral en Haïti a débuté en 2010 avec la mise en place, par le PNUD, d'un projet visant à appuyer les autorités haïtiennes dans l'organisation des élections présidentielle et législatives de 2010-2011. La logique sous-jacente à ce projet était de renforcer les capacités nationales tout au long du cycle électoral et de soutenir un certain nombre d'activités concrètes avant, pendant et après les élections. Le PNUD a tiré parti des leçons apprises et de la mémoire institutionnelle héritée du projet de 2010-2011 dans le soutien qu'il a ultérieurement accordé au processus électoral en Haïti.

C'est ainsi que le PNUD fournit, depuis 2010, une assistance technique en continu aux autorités électorales, en s'adaptant toutes les fois aux défis émergents et aux multiples changements intervenus aussi bien au niveau du calendrier électoral qu'au sein des autorités électorales. Les élections législatives, locales et municipales étaient initialement prévues en novembre 2011, mais la crise politique que traversait le pays a exigé la mise en place d'un nouveau calendrier électoral. En juin 2012, plusieurs amendements constitutionnels ont été publiés, stipulant de nouvelles règles relatives à la procédure de nomination des membres du Conseil électoral permanent (CEP). Compte tenu de cette nouvelle dynamique, le PNUD a élaboré et signé, fin 2012, conjointement avec les autorités nationales et les partenaires techniques et financiers, un nouveau document de projet intitulé « Appui au processus électoral 2013-2014 » pour soutenir l'organisation des élections législatives, municipales et locales. Cependant, Haïti a connu par la suite deux nouvelles crises politiques et électorales, en 2014 et 2015, qui ont été respectivement résolues par l'Accord d'El Rancho et l'Accord du Kinam.

Adopté le 11 janvier 2015, ce dernier accord de sortie de crise stipulait notamment : a) la réalisation de toutes les élections avant la fin de l'année 2015, en l'occurrence les élections présidentielles, législatives, municipales et locales ; b) la constitution d'un Conseil électoral selon l'esprit de l'article 289 de la Constitution, en vue de rétablir la confiance dans le processus électoral. Suite à cet accord, le nouveau Conseil électoral a été nommé et confirmé dans ses fonctions par décret présidentiel le 21 janvier 2015. Le calendrier du processus électoral a été adopté et publié le 16 mars 2015, fixant les dates des divers tours des élections législatives, municipales et présidentielles respectivement au 9 août, au 25 octobre et au 27 décembre 2015. La liste des investitures pour la participation aux élections comportait initialement 165 partis politiques agréés, dont le nombre final a été réduit à 126 inscrits suite à la fusion de certains partis.

Compte tenu de l'évolution de la situation politique et électorale, le PNUD a entrepris de revoir le projet de 2013-2014 afin d'y inclure l'organisation de l'élection présidentielle prévue pour 2015 et d'élargir les composantes et les activités du projet, ainsi que le budget et les ressources y afférents. Le projet révisé a été renommé « Appui au processus électoral en Haïti 2013-2016 ». Il s'articulait principalement autour de cinq composantes complémentaires (les trois premières composantes faisaient partie du projet révisé de 2015 et les deux dernières ont été ultérieurement ajoutées en 2016) :

1. Renforcement des capacités institutionnelles du CEP sur la base de l'assistance technique apportée au quotidien à ses différentes divisions et de la production de manuels de procédures et de modules de formation à l'intention du personnel électoral du CEP et de ses structures décentralisées (les bureaux électoraux départementaux (BED) et les bureaux électoraux communaux (BEC)).

2. Appui à l'Office National d'Identification (ONI) par l'intermédiaire de l'Organisation des États américains (OEA) pour assurer un processus d'inscription inclusif.
3. Appui aux Opérations Électorales, notamment en ce qui concerne l'acquisition de documents électoraux et du matériel électoral sensible et non-sensible, le paiement du personnel électoral temporaire, la fourniture d'outils technologiques pour l'inscription des candidats, la transmission des résultats et l'inventaire du matériel.
4. Assistance technique fournie aux Archives Nationales d'Haïti (ANH) et à l'ONI, pour assurer la cohérence du registre civil à partir duquel la Liste électorale générale (LEG) est extraite.
5. Appui à la promotion de la participation des jeunes, des femmes et d'autres groupes vulnérables (y compris les personnes handicapées et les personnes âgées) en collaboration avec les Volontaires des Nations Unies (VNU) sur le terrain. Ainsi, en ce qui a trait aux synergies, l'appui à la composante 1 visant à faciliter la collaboration entre le CEP et l'ONI, pour explorer les possibilités de produire des données ventilées selon le genre à différents niveaux géographiques et démographiques, devrait permettre de générer des statistiques reflétant la participation des femmes aux élections.

Les composantes 4 et 5 ont été introduites en 2016 pour les raisons suivantes :

- Composante 4 : le droit fondamental lié à la citoyenneté en Haïti et le droit de vote dépendent de la capacité de l'ONI et de l'ANH à fournir des services efficaces sur une base permanente et en temps opportun. L'ONI est responsable de l'inscription des citoyens sur les listes électorales et de la délivrance de la carte nationale d'identité (CIN), le seul document accepté par le CEP le jour du scrutin, alors que l'ANH délivre les certificats de naissance requis pour l'enregistrement auprès des services de l'ONI.
- Composante 5 : la démocratie ne peut être renforcée que par la participation inclusive et l'engagement civique soutenu des citoyens, en particulier les femmes et les jeunes qui sont souvent sous-représentés dans la vie politique. En ce sens, en appuyant l'engagement civique des femmes et des jeunes par le travail bénévole, cette composante vise à promouvoir et consolider les compétences de ces groupes de population, ainsi qu'à renforcer l'appropriation nationale du processus électoral et en accroître la durabilité.

En Haïti, l'environnement politique est fragile et se trouve souvent soumis à des situations de crise alors que le système électoral est, de son côté, assez complexe. De 2011 à 2017, le calendrier électoral a prévu la tenue d'élections tous les ans. Toutes les élections annoncées ont effectivement eu lieu, mais avec de multiples retards :

Haïti							
Cours régulier du calendrier électoral sur une période de six ans							
	2011	2012*	2013*	2014*	2015	2016**	2017
Élections présidentielles	X						
Élections législatives	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Élections municipales		X			X		
Élections locales		X			X	X	X

À quelques exceptions près, la participation électorale en Haïti a été très faible et les événements électoraux ont été marqués par des tensions et des violences qui ont entraîné une perte de crédibilité du conseil électoral et du processus électoral. Ces événements ont eu comme conséquence de démotiver d'autant plus les électeurs, notamment les femmes et les jeunes. Les femmes ont souvent été découragées de participer au processus électoral, en tant qu'électrices ou en tant que candidates, en partie en raison des violences associées aux élections. Les jeunes (âgés de 15 à 24 ans) se sentaient souvent exclus des processus décisionnels et certains étaient impliqués

dans des manifestations politiques violentes. Malgré les efforts déployés au cours des décennies et en dépit d'un regain récent de crédibilité à ce niveau, Haïti ne dispose pas encore d'un organe de gestion des élections (OGE) qui soit considéré comme une structure permanente. La situation s'est trouvée compliquée davantage encore par les catastrophes naturelles dévastatrices qui ont frappé Haïti ces dernières années, dont le tremblement de terre de janvier 2010 et l'ouragan Mathieu en octobre 2016, lesquels sont tous deux survenus juste avant les dates prévues pour la tenue du vote, rendant ainsi l'organisation des élections encore plus difficile.

Le premier tour des élections législatives a eu lieu le 9 août 2015 ouvrant la voie à un deuxième tour qui devait se dérouler le 25 octobre 2015. Cependant, les résultats du scrutin ont été contestés par les candidats et par les partis politiques, ce qui a suscité une nouvelle crise électorale accompagnée de violences et d'émeutes. L'escalade de la violence a contraint les autorités à reporter, en dernière minute, le deuxième tour de l'élection présidentielle. Entretemps, le mandat de l'ancien président de la République avait expiré en février 2016 et un président intérimaire avait été nommé par le Parlement. Un nouveau CEP a été constitué en mars 2016 et suite à la vérification des résultats des élections d'octobre 2015, le CEP a annoncé un nouveau calendrier électoral fixant les élections pour les mois d'octobre 2016 et de janvier 2017.

Compte tenu de ces changements, un nouveau budget électoral a été établi conjointement par le CEP et le PNUD pour couvrir les élections prévues en 2016 et 2017. Les activités ont été réorientées de manière à inclure uniquement les opérations électorales, et les lignes budgétaires ont été réparties entre le CEP et le PNUD afin de mieux refléter le rôle du Gouvernement en tant que donateur principal au titre du nouveau budget révisé. Ces modifications ont été intégrées à la révision substantielle dont le projet devait faire l'objet en vertu de l'accord signé avec le Gouvernement en novembre 2016.

À la suite du passage de l'ouragan Mathieu en octobre 2016, soit six jours avant la date du scrutin, les élections ont encore une fois été reportées jusqu'aux dates du 20 novembre 2016 et du 29 janvier 2017. Malgré le calendrier très serré et les défis émergeants issus d'un contexte politique et humanitaire extrêmement volatil, le CEP, avec le soutien du PNUD et d'autres acteurs nationaux et internationaux, a pu organiser les élections conformément au calendrier prévu. L'appui actuel du PNUD au cycle électoral prendra fin le 30 juin 2017 à la clôture du projet.

Ressources et coordination du projet

Au plus fort de ses activités, le projet était composé d'une équipe d'une quarantaine de personnes comprenant un personnel international, un personnel national et des consultants chargés d'apporter une assistance technique au CEP et à d'autres institutions nationales.

Aperçu des financements des donateurs (accords signés et fonds reçus entre 2012 et 2017)	
Haïti	37 929 069,06 USD
USAID	8 050 924,72 USD
Canada	8 948 360,49 USD
Union européenne	6 748 918 USD
Japon	4 477 612 USD
Brésil	1 900 000 USD
Trinité-et-Tobago	1 000 000 USD
Norvège	385 154,06 USD
Mexique	300 000 USD
Argentine	50 000 USD
Total	69 880 038,33 USD

Le partenaire principal du projet était le CEP, auquel le projet a fourni une assistance technique et opérationnelle dans divers domaines, comme suit :

- Renforcement structurel du CEP et de ses bureaux décentralisés.
- Acquisition du matériel électoral et soutien à la logistique et aux opérations électorales.
- Mise à jour des listes électorales.
- Enregistrement des candidats, des observateurs nationaux et des agents représentant les partis.
- Élaboration des règlements, des règles et des procédures.
- Formation des juges et des avocats impliqués dans les conflits électoraux.
- Formation du personnel électoral, gestion des états de paie du personnel temporaire du CEP.
- Appui à l'exécution d'opérations liées aux états de paie du personnel temporaire du CEP.
- Communication, sensibilisation et éducation civique.
- Dépouillement du scrutin, transmission des feuilles de scrutin par smartphone.
- Autre appui à long terme par le biais de la technologie électorale et promotion de la participation inclusive.

La valeur ajoutée apportée par le PNUD à l'appui du CEP comprenait la technologie électorale et l'assistance juridique, deux aspects éminemment transversaux, qui touchent à toute une série de disciplines. L'expertise du PNUD a été également appliquée à d'autres domaines spécifiques, notamment : l'acquisition de matériel électoral, la mise à jour des listes électorales, la formation des juges et du personnel électoral, le dépouillement des votes et la transmission des photographies des feuilles de scrutin par smartphone.

Le PNUD a également travaillé en étroite collaboration avec la Section d'Assistance Électorale (EAS) de la MINUSTAH, l'UNOPS, ainsi que d'autres organisations internationales telles que l'International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) qui fournissent une assistance électorale. Conformément au mandat que lui a été confié par le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, la MINUSTAH a apporté son soutien au processus électoral en Haïti. Toute l'assistance assurée par les Nations Unies a été mise en place suivant les orientations stratégiques données par le Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général. L'EAS de la MINUSTAH a fourni un appui technique et consultatif en matière de logistique et de sécurité au CEP et à ses structures décentralisées. L'UNOPS a assuré au CEP un appui technique et opérationnel au niveau de la logistique, en particulier en ce qui concerne le déploiement et la récupération de matériaux électoraux dans les bureaux de vote. L'IFES et le Bureau d'Information Publique (PIO) de la MINUSTAH ont offert au CEP un soutien technique et opérationnel, notamment en matière de communication, de sensibilisation et d'éducation civique. En ce sens, le PNUD a assuré la coordination et la collaboration avec les partenaires techniques à l'appui du CEP pour optimiser l'utilisation des ressources et de l'expertise disponibles.

Le PNUD a également œuvré avec des organisations de la société civile pour promouvoir l'éducation civique et d'autres activités ciblant les jeunes et les femmes. En 2015, le projet s'est associé à l'UNESCO, à ONU Femmes et à différentes organisations de jeunes et de femmes dans le but de renforcer leur participation au processus électoral et, en même temps d'habiliter ces groupes de population en tant qu'acteurs de la société civile. Le PNUD et le CEP ont organisé des formations de formateurs en éducation civique à l'intention de plus d'un millier de jeunes leaders et de membres d'organisations de femmes. Le projet a recommandé que les éducateurs civiques soient certifiés par le CEP et répertoriés au sein d'une liste afin qu'ils puissent être sollicités lors des prochaines élections.

Résultats

À l'issue du présent cycle électoral appuyé par le PNUD, le nombre des représentants élus se présentent comme suit :

- 1) 119 députés, dont 94 députés élus suite aux élections du 9 août et du 25 octobre 2015 et 25 députés élus au titre des élections du 20 novembre 2016 et du 29 janvier 2017.
- 2) 20 sénateurs, dont 14 sénateurs élus suite aux élections du 9 août et du 25 octobre 2015 et 6 sénateurs élus au titre des élections du 20 novembre 2016.
- 3) 10 sénateurs (à l'occasion du renouvellement d'un tiers du Sénat) dont 2 sénateurs élus suite aux élections du 20 novembre 2016, et 8 sénateurs élus au titre des élections du 29 janvier 2017.
- 4) 140 conseillers municipaux, dont 139 élus suite aux élections du 25 octobre 2015 et 1 conseiller municipal élu au titre des élections du 20 novembre 2016.
- 5) 564^[1] Assemblées des Sections Communales (ASEC) constituées à l'issue des élections du 29 janvier 2017.
- 6) 564^{112[2]} Conseils d'Administration des Sections Communales (CASEC) constitués suite aux élections du 29 janvier 2017.
- 7) 139^[3] Délégués de Ville (DV) élus suite aux élections du 29 janvier 2017.

2. OBJET DE L'ÉVALUATION

L'évaluation a pour objet d'apprécier les résultats du projet « Appui au cycle électoral en Haïti », tels que prévus dans le descriptif de projet. Basée sur l'analyse, cette évaluation vise à cerner et synthétiser les leçons susceptibles d'aider à améliorer la sélection, la conception et la mise en œuvre de projets similaires dans le futur. Cela permettrait au PNUD de réfléchir au travail réalisé, aux défis identifiés et aux solutions proposées. L'évaluation est destinée à favoriser la responsabilité et la transparence, et jauger et divulguer l'étendue des réalisations du projet. Elle permettrait également de dresser un portrait global des résultats accomplis dans la réalisation des objectifs stratégiques en matière de développement humain tant au niveau national qu'au niveau du PNUD. Enfin, elle serait à même de mesurer l'ampleur de la convergence des projets avec les priorités du PNUD, y compris l'harmonisation avec le Plan-cadre des Nations Unies pour l'aide au développement (UNDAF), le descriptif de programme de pays du PNUD (DPP) et le Plan stratégique du PNUD.

3. PORTÉE ET OBJECTIFS DE L'ÉVALUATION

L'évaluation doit aborder la manière dont le projet a atteint l'objectif de mise en place d'un Organe de gestion des élections (OGE) doté de procédures opérationnelles efficaces pour mieux administrer l'organisation des élections, en tenant compte de l'ensemble des domaines d'intervention du projet. La période couverte comprend les élections qui ont eu lieu entre 2015 et 2017. Conformément aux principes d'évaluation du PNUD, l'évaluation doit tenir compte de la manière dont l'intervention visait à renforcer l'application d'une approche fondée sur les droits et l'intégration de la dimension de genre.

Critères d'évaluation :

^[1] Communiqué de Presse #35 : <https://www.cephaiti.ht/Information-electorale/>

Sur un total de 570 postes de ASEC, les élections doivent être reprises dans 4 sections communales à cause des actes de vandalisme ; il s'agit de : i) Berly, Carrefour, Ouest, ii) 7^e Beauséjour, Léogane, Ouest, iii) 6^e Section Jamais Vu, et iv) 7^e Section Grande Rivière de Jacmel, Jacmel, Sud-est). Dans 2 sections communales, les élections n'ont pas eu lieu, en raison de l'absence de candidature ; il s'agit de i) 7^e Savane au Lait, Ouanaminthe, Nord-est, et ii) 6^e Lafague, St. Louis du Nord, Nord-Ouest.

^[2] Sur un total de 570 postes de CASEC, les élections doivent être reprises dans 5 sections communales à cause des actes de vandalisme ; il s'agit de : i) Berly, Carrefour, Ouest, ii) 7^e Beauséjour, Léogane, Ouest, iii) 5^e Sect. Coupe à David, Acul du Nord, Nord, iv) 6^e Section Jamais Vu, et v) 7^e Section Grande Rivière de Jacmel, Jacmel, Sud-est). Par ailleurs, les deux cartels se trouvant en première position dans la section communale de la 3^e Section Maribahoux, Ferrier, Nord sont à égalité de voix.

^[3] Sur un total de 140 postes de délégués de ville, l'élection ne s'est pas déroulée dans une section, qui est celle de Pestel, dans la Grand'Anse, en raison de l'absence de candidature.

Lors de l'évaluation du projet, l'exercice tiendra compte des aspects suivants :

- 3.1 **Pertinence** : ce critère s'applique à la conceptualisation et à la conception du projet. Il évalue le degré de conformité d'une initiative de développement et de ses produits ou effets escomptés aux politiques et priorités nationales et locales et aux besoins des bénéficiaires visés. La pertinence tient également compte de la mesure dans laquelle l'initiative en question répond au plan institutionnel du PNUD et aux priorités de développement humain en matière d'autonomisation et d'égalité des genres. Qui plus est, la pertinence concerne la concordance entre la perception de ce qui est nécessaire selon les planificateurs de l'initiative et la réalité de ce qui est indispensable du point de vue des bénéficiaires cibles. Ce critère englobe également la notion de réactivité, c'est-à-dire la capacité de riposte adéquate du PNUD aux priorités et aux besoins évolutifs et émergents en matière de développement. Un autre aspect important consiste à déterminer si les défis auxquels le projet était censé apporter des réponses étaient clairement définis, si ses objectifs étaient réalisables et si la relation entre les objectifs, les produits, les activités et les apports liés au projet était manifeste, logique et proportionnée compte tenu du contexte, des ressources disponibles et des délais fixés.
- 3.2 **Efficacité** : ce critère mesure le degré de réalisation des résultats escomptés (produits ou effets) de l'initiative ou l'importance des avancées enregistrées au titre de la réalisation des produits et des effets souhaités. Un autre aspect à prendre en compte au titre de ce critère est la mise en œuvre et la performance opérationnelle du projet, une attention spéciale devant être accordée aux apports des donateurs en termes de qualité, de quantité et de respect des délais impartis ainsi qu'à l'incidence de ces facteurs sur le calendrier d'exécution du plan de travail et sur les modalités de gestion globale du projet.
- 3.3 **Efficiences** : ce critère mesure la manière dont les ressources ou les apports (tels que les fonds, les compétences et les délais impartis) sont convertis en résultats de façon rentable. Une initiative est efficiente lorsqu'elle utilise les ressources de manière appropriée et économiquement viable pour générer les produits souhaités. L'efficacité est importante pour s'assurer que les ressources disponibles ont été utilisées à bon escient et mettre en évidence des usages plus efficaces de ces mêmes ressources. Certains aspects doivent être pris en considération à cet égard : (i) le rapport qualité-prix de certaines dépenses considérables envisagé selon une perspective comparative en tenant compte du contexte, des résultats escomptés et des options disponibles ; (ii) la qualité de la mise en œuvre et son exécution dans les délais impartis ainsi que la réactivité du projet compte tenu des objectifs, des produits, des activités et des risques ; (iii) le rôle de l'assistance internationale dans le processus électoral, notamment en termes de financement, de communication stratégique et de coordination générale.
- 3.4 **Durabilité** : ce critère évalue dans quelle mesure les avantages liés à l'initiative perdurent après l'arrêt de l'aide extérieure au développement. L'évaluation de la durabilité exige d'appréhender la présence de conditions sociales, économiques, politiques, institutionnelles et autres favorables et d'effectuer, sur la base de cette évaluation, des projections sur les capacités nationales à maintenir, gérer et garantir les résultats du développement à l'avenir.

4. QUESTIONS SOUMISES DANS LE CADRE DE L'ÉVALUATION

L'évaluation cherchera à répondre à une série de questions liées aux critères d'évaluation ainsi qu'à des questions plus spécifiques au descriptif de projet.

En évaluant la **pertinence**, l'équipe d'évaluation tentera de répondre aux questions suivantes :

- Dans quelle mesure le projet est-il conforme au mandat du PNUD, aux priorités nationales et aux exigences des femmes et des hommes ciblés ?
- Dans quelle mesure l'engagement du PNUD reflète-t-il les considérations stratégiques, y compris le rôle du PNUD dans un contexte de développement particulier et son avantage comparatif ?

- Dans quelle mesure la méthode de livraison choisie par le PNUD était-elle adaptée au contexte de développement ?
- Dans quelle mesure la théorie du changement présentée dans le modèle de résultats offre-t-elle une vision pertinente et appropriée, susceptible de servir de base à d'autres initiatives ?

En évaluant l'**efficacité**, l'équipe d'évaluation tentera de répondre aux questions suivantes :

- Dans quelle mesure les résultats escomptés du projet ont-ils été réalisés ou des progrès ont-ils été accomplis en vue de la réalisation des effets souhaités ?
- Comment les produits correspondants fournis par le PNUD ont-ils impacté les effets et de quelle manière ne se sont-ils pas révélés efficaces ?

En évaluant l'**efficience**, l'équipe d'évaluation tentera de répondre aux questions suivantes :

- Dans quelle mesure les produits du projet ont-ils résulté de l'utilisation économique des ressources ?
- Dans quelle mesure des produits qualitatifs ont-ils été livrés dans les temps impartis ?
- Dans quelle mesure les modalités de partenariat ont-elles été propices à la réalisation des produits ?
- Dans quelle mesure les systèmes de surveillance ont-ils fourni aux gestionnaires un flux de données susceptibles de renseigner leur prise de décision de sorte qu'ils puissent ajuster la mise en œuvre en conséquence ?
- Comment le PNUD a-t-il promu l'égalité entre les genres, les droits de l'homme et le développement humain dans la réalisation des produits ?

En évaluant la **durabilité**, l'équipe d'évaluation tentera de répondre aux questions suivantes :

- Quelles sont les indications qui tentent à démontrer la durabilité des résultats obtenus, par exemple, grâce au développement des capacités nécessaires (en termes de systèmes, de structures, de personnel, etc.) ?
- Dans quelle mesure une stratégie de durabilité, notamment en matière de renforcement des capacités des principaux acteurs nationaux, a-t-elle été élaborée ou mise en œuvre ?
- Dans quelle mesure les cadres stratégiques et réglementaires en place sont-ils susceptibles d'assurer la continuité des avantages ?
- Dans quelle mesure les partenaires se sont-ils engagés à fournir un soutien continu ?

L'évaluation peut également permettre d'apprécier dans quelle mesure les indicateurs détaillés ci-dessous et précédemment identifiés comme reflétant les bonnes pratiques internationales, ont été respectés (stipulés à la page 78 du ProDoc) :

- Évaluation du mandat du CEP.
- Évaluation de la qualité des listes électorales.
- Participation des acteurs nationaux aux décisions relatives au processus électoral.
- Mécanisme de résolution des conflits électoraux.
- Mécanisme de maintenance, de stockage et de contrôle des matériel et équipements acquis dans le cadre du projet.
- Évaluation des diverses consultations internationales (respect des délais impartis, impact de leurs activités respectives sur le processus électoral) ;

Les questions soumises dans le cadre de l'évaluation doivent être convenues entre les utilisateurs et les autres parties prenantes, et acceptées ou affinées en consultation avec l'équipe d'évaluation.

5. MÉTHODOLOGIE

Sur la base des lignes directrices du PNUD en matière d'évaluation, et en consultation avec le Bureau de pays du PNUD en Haïti, l'équipe d'évaluation devrait élaborer une méthodologie appropriée pour que l'exercice puisse atteindre ses buts et objectifs et répondre aux questions soumises dans le cadre de l'évaluation. L'évaluation doit être inclusive et participative, impliquant toutes les parties prenantes dans l'analyse. Elle tiendra compte du contexte social, politique et économique qui affecte la performance globale des résultats obtenus. Au cours de l'évaluation, l'équipe d'évaluation devrait appliquer les approches suivantes pour la collecte et l'analyse des données :

- Examen approfondi des documents pertinents, y compris les différents rapports produits au titre du projet.
- Entretiens avec des informateurs clés au sein de la direction du CEP, de l'équipe dirigeante et du personnel de programme du Bureau de pays du PNUD en Haïti.
- Séances d'information et de briefing avec le CEP et le PNUD, ainsi qu'avec d'autres bailleurs de fonds et partenaires, si l'équipe dirigeante du PNUD en indique le besoin.
- Entretiens avec des partenaires et des parties prenantes, des représentants du gouvernement, des fournisseurs de services, des organisations de la société civile (OSC) partenaires, des responsables de partis politiques, des commissaires et du personnel du CEP, des partenaires de développement (tant au sein du panier de fonds qu'à l'extérieur), des partenaires stratégiques (ceux qui fournissent un appui électoral en dehors du panier de fonds), des experts, entre autres.
- Détails du cadre de résultats et du cadre de suivi et d'évaluation, notamment au niveau des indicateurs et des cibles liés aux effets et aux produits pour mesurer les performances et l'état de mise en œuvre, les forces et les faiblesses de la conception originale de la conception initiale du cadre de suivi et d'évaluation et de la qualité des produits générés.

6. ÉTHIQUE DE L'ÉVALUATION

Cette évaluation sera menée conformément aux principes énoncés dans le manuel intitulé *Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation* qui explicite les directives éthiques pour l'évaluation définies par le Groupe des Nations Unies pour l'évaluation (GNUE). Elle décrira les problèmes critiques que l'équipe d'évaluation sera amené à aborder dans la conception et la mise en œuvre de l'évaluation, y compris au niveau de l'éthique de l'évaluation et des procédures destinées à préserver les droits et la confidentialité des fournisseurs d'informations.

7. MODALITÉS DE MISE EN ŒUVRE

Le PNUD et le CEP sont chargés de la mise en place des réunions avec les différentes parties prenantes, y compris les responsables du CEP, la direction du PNUD, les partenaires donateurs et d'autres parties prenantes.

Les documents clés du projet seront envoyés par le PNUD avant le début du travail de terrain et seront examinés par l'équipe avant le début de la mission. Lors de la signature du contrat, le PNUD informera le consultant sur les objectifs, les buts et les produits de l'évaluation. Le consultant est tenu de faire un compte rendu oral sur le plan de travail et la méthodologie d'évaluation proposés qui devra être approuvé avant le début du processus d'évaluation. L'équipe d'évaluation appréciera le projet en fonction des entretiens, des discussions et des consultations avec toutes les parties prenantes concernées ou les parties intéressées. Le PNUD et le CEP fourniront au consultant des conseils pour identifier, contacter et organiser des discussions et des rencontres avec les parties prenantes.

Un groupe de réviseurs composé (le cas échéant) de représentants des donateurs, du CEP et du PNUD examinera le rapport préliminaire ainsi que les projets de rapports et partagera ses commentaires avec l'équipe d'évaluation.

L'équipe d'évaluation soumettra le rapport final à la Directrice principale du PNUD en Haïti et au président du CEP. Le PNUD communiquera le rapport aux parties prenantes concernées.

8. CALENDRIER D'EXÉCUTION DU PROCESSUS D'ÉVALUATION

Les consultants seront engagés par le PNUD. Les candidats doivent soumettre une proposition financière. La rémunération sera basée sur les prestations à fournir en vertu du contrat :

- Approbation Rapport initial
- Soumission du Projet de rapport final
- Approbation du rapport final.