Support to the Electoral Process in Haiti: Efficiency

The evaluation found that the country context directly affected the efficiency of project management and implementation. Delayed decisions reduced lead time, affected planning, increased costs and reduced efficiencies even though UNDP was able to mitigate this to some extent through its Fast Track mechanisms. The use of the direct implementation modality was appropriate in the context as it provided security for the use of funds for donors but also ensured CEP ownership when it was agreed for the CEP to directly manage its portion of the GOH funds intended for electoral operations. The project was large and complex and needed more staff and better communications beyond formal reporting.

**Findings**

- UNDP was a good steward of the basket fund, saving funds intended for elections until dates were set. UNDP also had good audits of the project for 2015 and 2016. Large scale procurements were done in time for elections despite short notice and timelines.
- Provisions of funds directly to CEP in 2016 for electoral administration costs increased CEP ownership in the project, decreasing tensions and reducing the management burden for UNDP.
- Quality of project management was raised consistently in evaluation interviews, mostly in relation to perceptions of management styles and limited information sharing beyond formal written reporting.
- Written reporting was good but the project needed a more fleshed out results framework with indicators and targets against which it could report.
- Project staff was insufficient for a project of its size and complexity.
- Project issues were consistently raised in electoral administration meetings instead of project-specific meetings which politicized project support and affected the perception of the project by its partners and donors.
- The lack of distinction in the project design and reporting between funds for budget support vs development efforts created tensions and politicized the project with the different CEPs.
- Other implementers were added to project without ensuring programmatic integration and value added.
- Dedication of the CEP, UNDP, project staff and its partners and donors made the project work despite the difficult context.

**Delivery of Sensitive Materials**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delivery Date</th>
<th>Election Date</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26-27 July 2015</td>
<td>9 August 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10, 12, 17 October 2015</td>
<td>25 October 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>22, 24 December 2015</td>
<td>27 December 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 Sept – 2 October 2016</td>
<td>20 November 2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>19-24 January 2017</td>
<td>29 January 2017</td>
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**Efficiency factors**

- DIM project mechanism allowed for direct execution by UNDP.
- Use of UNDP’s Fast-Track mechanisms and pre-competitive corporate agreements with suppliers of electoral materials.
- Small PMU staff, some without the type of contract needed to use UNDP’s computerized financial/administrative system (ATLAS). No deputy project manager or full time M&E person.
- Use of other UN agencies to implement portions of the participation elements (UN Women/UNESCO) and UNOPS for operations but lack of clarity on the value added to existing efforts.
- Country context of delayed and changing decisions. Last minute replacements of temporary electoral staff after training in 2015. Politicization of technical electoral administration and elections as a flash point.
- No permanent partners, all CEPs provisional.
- Different reporting requirements of the different donors.