

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

**Samar Island Biodiversity Project**

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**Final Report of the Terminal Evaluation Mission**

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## ACRONYMS AND TERMS

Exchange rate at the time of the TPE was US\$1 to 51 pesos

BMS	Biodiversity Monitoring System
CBFMA	Community-based Forest Management Agreement
CENRO	Community Environment and Natural Resources Office/Officer
CPM	Co-Project Manager
DAO	Department Administrative Order
DEd-8	Department of Education Region 8
DENR	Department of Environment and Natural Resources
DENR-8	Department of Environment and Natural Resources Region 8 (Eastern Visayas)
FASPO	Foreign Assisted Special Project Office
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GIS	Geographic Information System
GOP	Government of the Philippines
KAPPAS	Katatapurán Pederasyon han Parag-uma ha Samar
LGU	Local Government Unit
MTE	Mid-term Evaluation
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NIPAS	National Integrated Protected Areas System
NPD	National Project Director
NRDC	Natural Resources Development Corporation
PACBRMA	Protected Area Community-based Resource Management Agreement
PASu	Protected Area Superintendent
PAWB	Protected Area and Wildlife Bureau
PAWCZMS	Protected Area, Wildlife and Coastal Zone and Marine Service
PENRO	Provincial Environment and Natural Resource Office/Officer
PM	Project Manager
PMO	Project Management Office
PO	Peoples' Organisation <sup>1</sup>
PSC	Project Steering Committee
SIBF	Samar Island Biodiversity Foundation
SIBP	Samar Island Biodiversity Project
TESDA	Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
TET	Terminal Evaluation Team
TLA	Timber License Agreement
TPE	Terminal Project Evaluation
TPR	Tri-partite Review
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

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<sup>1</sup> Philippine equivalent of a Community-based Organisation (CBO).

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### KEY POINTS

- Project evaluated as successful – but with reservations.
- Implementation on the ground particularly successful – strong link made between conservation objectives and development activities and the way they were implemented.
- Key problem areas – low level of country ownership; external factors; complex management chains.

The Final Project Evaluation (FPE) was conducted between 27<sup>th</sup> February and 21<sup>st</sup> March 2005 (24 days) by a team of one international and two national consultants. The FPE occurred nine months before termination of the extended period to allow development for a contiguous second phase of the Project.

### PROJECT DESIGN

Despite the STAP reviewer considered it “an almost perfect GEF project ... exemplary in every way”, the project design has proved weak in a number of ways – i) the timeframe was overly ambitious and not enough credence was given to the difficulties that could have been foreseen given the number of local government units that would be involved (3 provinces, 37 Municipalities, one City, and 278 Barangays) and the complexity that that would engender, the physical difficulties that the terrain imparts on fieldwork, and the insurgency on the island; ii) the costs of the livelihood components were under-estimated; iii) the risk assessment was inadequate in not taking account of the vast mineral reserves under the land where the Samar island natural Park (SINP) was to be established, or in mentioning the communist-backed insurgency which has a stronghold in the forest on Samar Island. Also, unbeknown to the project designers, some 200,000 people were subsequently found to be living within the Park boundaries.

Implementation was to be shared between the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the Samar Island NGOs (through an umbrella organisation the Samar Island Biodiversity Foundation (SIBF)). Despite extensive involvement of the NGOs in writing the Project Brief, it appears that they never had sight of the final Brief and never signed off on it<sup>2</sup>. It is inexcusable to expect one or more organisations to be included in co-implementing a project of this nature but not to have been given sight of the final documentation detailing what they were becoming involved with.

### RESULTS

Output 1: Adaptive management framework for conservation management – successful. The SINP, at c. 453,000 ha the largest terrestrial protected area in the Philippines – has been formed by Presidential proclamation. Its protection has been reinforced by three Provincial Ordinances banning logging and mining. The Congressional Act is still awaited. A protected Area Management Board and Executive Committee have been formed and are functioning. A PA Management Plan is due in April 2006, complete with zoning plans. A biological Resource Assessment has been completed.

Output 2: Conservation functions and infrastructure – marginally successful. Some Park staff have been recruited by the DENR and several Project staff are holding dual functions in the Project and the Park. Park infrastructure is being constructed and is expected to be complete by December 2006. Costs are greater than anticipated so signage has suffered as a result. The functions of the park staff

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<sup>2</sup> UNDP comments: “The final project brief was presented to the SIBF and other NGOs involved in the inception of the project”.

and the DENR District offices have not yet been properly formulated<sup>3</sup>. Park boundaries are delineated on a map, but await passage of the Congressional Act before they can be demarcated on the ground.

Output 3: Community-based conservation framework – marginally successful. A community outreach programme (COP) is operating in 62 barangays, mostly in the buffer zone, in place of Community Forestry Programme originally envisaged. Community profiles have been established for all barangays. The framework of Bufferzone Management Units with Village conservation Committees was replaced unsuccessfully by a watershed management approach<sup>4</sup>. Forest guards have been partially identified but not yet appointed.

Output 4: Awareness of conservation values and threats – highly successful<sup>5</sup>. Communications strategy, awareness programme and awareness materials have all been completed. In addition, significant awareness-raising and advocacy activities have unified the people of Samar and their civic and religious leaders like never before. A protest caravan with the theme of “Yes to SINP, No to mining” and involving over 15,000 people was held on 8th August 2003 and five days later the SINP Proclamation was signed by the President. The Samar Island Council for Sustainable Development has been formed.

Output 5: Conservation objectives in LGU development planning – marginally successful. The results from the resource valuation study are not yet available. Provincial workshops on integrated conservation and development were merged with the workshops undertaken for the watershed management planning approach.

Output 6: Alternative conservation-enabling sustainable livelihoods promoted – marginally successful. The feasibility study for NTFP harvest was completed for some products, but provisional harvest quotas have still not been set. A community consensus has been reached for ecotourism priorities but no ecotourism management plan has yet been drafted<sup>6</sup>, nor activities undertaken. The Farming Systems review failed but five demonstration farms were established and a market study into priority crops undertaken.

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<sup>3</sup> FASPO comments: “Please be informed that FASPO has made a series of consultations with the Project Management in 2004 to revise the organizational set-up of the SIBP and to be able to clarify the roles and responsibilities of each project partner and stakeholder. A new organizational and functional structure for the SIBP was developed with due considerations of the issues and problems encountered during the course of Project implementation. This includes the flow of Project documents and signatories. Unfortunately, it was overtaken by the DBM National Budget Circular No. 485 and DENR DAO 2004-56, which mandates the integration of all Project Management Office under the DENR structures and operation. It is hoped then that the Project Document being prepared for Phase 2 would indicate a clear implementation arrangements between and among partners and stakeholders”.

<sup>4</sup> FASPO comments: “As we understand, the framework of BMUs was replaced by the Community Outreach Program (COP) framework and not by the Watershed Management Approach (WMA). The COP in 62 barangays was implemented by the Project as early as CY2002 while the WMA was introduced only in CY2004. The objective of the BMUs is to build conservation-enabling institutions within communities similar to COP, which aimed at promoting, strengthening and sustaining the community-based management regime envisioned for SINP through the Community Development and Resource Management Framework (refer to COP framework). WMA is intended only to facilitate the preparation of the SINP Management Plan. The Project, during CY2005 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter planning and assessment, discussed that they are not going to tap the Watershed Management Council in place of the VCC because there are already a lot of organization created for SINP (i.e., POs, BDC, PAMB, PAO, SICSD, etc.)”.

<sup>5</sup> FASPO comments: “We support the TET rating of highly successful on Output 4 (Awareness and Conservation Values and Threats) but the project needs to further improve its IEC activities at the community level. The level of biodiversity conservation awareness is apparently high among government organizations, academe, NGOs, religious and civic organizations but relatively low in the upland communities. As discussed in the report, illegal activities (farming and timber poaching) are still rampant in the area. We have noted the same observation during our assessment in CY2004 wherein the upland communities have low appreciation on the project objectives. The involvement of the upland communities in project activities have been limited to participating members of the Peoples Organizations or the Barangay Development Councils (under COP), which represent only a handful of persons in the whole community”.

<sup>6</sup> UNDP comments: “Feasibility studies for the Pinipiskan Falls and Borogan-LLorante Sohohon were already undertaken, that served as a basis in the implementation of some ecotourism related activities in the area”.

*Output 7: Sustainable financing for recurrent costs of conservation activities – marginally successful. Few activities were planned under Phase one, but initial action have led to some finance being pledged, most notably with DENR paying 16 regular Park staff and 13 others on a contract basis.*

## **KEY ISSUES**

*The major issues are external to the Project. Two Mineral Sharing Production Agreements overlapping the Park's boundaries were issued in December 2002. In addition, a Timber Licence Agreement including 95,000 ha of the Park, suspended under the moratorium on logging placed on the island in 1989 has been lifted. These two issues have provided significant political opposition and delay to the passage of the Congressional Bill. Although there are considerable legal obstacles to extraction taking place within the Park, and almost total civil opposition to it, political accommodation remains a real threat.*

*To comply with the provisions of the NIPAS Act, the Protected Area Management Board must include a member from each of the barangays within the territory of a protected area. The result is that the SINP PAMB numbers 298 members – larger than the Philippine Congress or the United Nations General Assembly!. This is clearly too large a number to act as an efficient or cost-effective decision-making body for a protected area. Furthermore, the cost of ground-working and convening such a large assembly, not to mention providing them with the background material to study for purposes of their decision-making, is too great to be sustained and will be much too heavy a burden for the meagre resources meant for more important Park operations, even when the PAMB is set to meet just once a year. A protected area like SINP is a dynamic entity, needing a flexible advisory and decision-making entity to respond to the numerous issues and threats that it faces. Instead, the NIPAS Act has lumbered it with a dinosaur. The PMO has already recognised this by setting up an Executive Committee (according to the NIPAS rules), as well as three sub-PAMBs with their own Executive Committees. Nonetheless, an alternative means of constituting the PAMB needs to be found.*

*It is estimated that the SINP will require about 10 million pesos (US\$ 196,078) to cover operational costs in 2006, rising to just over 14 million pesos (US\$ 274,500) in 2013 (assuming 5% p.a. inflation). The PMO estimates the SINP will derive 1,928,650 pesos (US\$ 37,817) in 2006 increasing to 3,156,995 pesos (US\$ 61,902) by 2010. These figures indicate that the SINP will be operating an annual deficit of 8-11 million pesos (US\$ 156,863-215,686). Means of sustainable finance have to be found to fund operational costs. Some moves have been made to begin to recover monies associated with confiscated lumber and other resources arising from successful prosecutions of the illegal timber trade. Development of trust funds, and disengaging the SINP from the NIPAS system to make it operate as a business unit separate from DENR<sup>7</sup> so that it has full accountability for its own funds and their disbursement are likely to help it successfully fund itself<sup>8</sup>.*

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<sup>7</sup> PAWB comments: "PAWB retains reservations about "disengaging SINP from the NIPAS". Under the NIPAS Act, protected areas are placed under the control and administration of DENR. Other NIPAS support policies prescribe management arrangements and administration of the areas. Since the establishment of SINP is only through a Proclamation, we are 'tied' to the NIPAS Law. The Congressional Act would give more leeway in management arrangements for SINP. Maybe the exact context needs to be clarified in proposing the SINP would operate as a separate unit from DENR so as not to "ruffle some feathers" in DENR and PAWB, who have been tasked to manage the overall NIPAS program". The key point that the TET is making is that the NIPAS appears to be a "one size fits all" system. The SINP clearly does not fit within this (the gross size of the PAMB is an excellent illustration) and the main area that needs to be examined is the financing of the Park – see paragraphs 83-84.

<sup>8</sup> FASPO comments: "The TET recommendation to disengage the SINP from the NIPAS and DENR may not be necessary as there are already current efforts to address the three major concerns highlighted in the report (i.e., IPAF, conflict of interest, and autonomy to run the Park). DENR through PAWB are now reviewing the processes involved in the NIPAS System particularly on accessing the IPAF. PAWB will surely be discussing this in their comments on TET report. While the TET recognized that their recommendation would need legislative action, the steps of doing it should have been explained in the report. It seemed to us that such an action would only complicate the present set up of the SINP having been proclaimed as Natural Park through NIPAS System". The TET understood that there would be an opportunity to add amendments to the bill currently before congress.

*The Project Steering Committee appears to have taken on the role of supervisory body for the Project rather than the more usual oversight functions and advisory role<sup>9</sup>. In doing so, though it met on average only once a year – inadequate to fulfil the role which it had taken on for itself. More frequent meetings may have prevented some of the more serious problems encountered on the Project, e.g. project creep.*

*The Project has been dogged by a high turnover of management staff which has inevitably been detrimental to the smooth-running of the Project. From DENR's side, three Project Managers in five years would seem unwarranted if the initial selection procedure had been effective. The selection procedure seems to have been anything but transparent and does not appear to have taken sufficient account of personalities. On the NGO side, four Co-Project Managers also seems unreasonable and has also led to disjointed implementation. This has come about from a misplaced strategy of rotating the position of Co-Project Manager amongst the various chapters of the SIBF – perhaps appropriate for a political appointment but not for a management position. Wholly predictable problems and inefficiencies ensued with none of the CPMs feeling that they were able to contribute effectively to the Project as a result. Notwithstanding these, and early tensions between the Project partners, the joint implementation appears to have worked well and a steady and largely successful working relationship has developed, with levels of trust and goodwill also increasing as the Project has progressed.*

*The key problem besetting the Project has been that of “strategic or project creep”. A sequence of seemingly unrelated events has been allowed to transpire that has resulted in a change of strategic direction that has diluted the delivery of project resources to priority areas and produced outputs that are of dubious value. Unfortunately this has detracted from the Project's considerable successes in other areas. In brief, there were considerable tensions within the Project between the NGOs whose focus was on providing a livelihood-based response to biodiversity conservation across the island, and the DENR management which was focussed on the SINP as per the Project Brief. These tensions can be accorded to the fact that the NGOs, or their representatives, were never given the opportunity to sign off on the Project Brief submitted to GEF, even though they had been included as co-implementers<sup>10</sup>.*

*These tensions and pressures permeated the Project to such an extent that they were picked up by the Mid-term Evaluation who assessed them as being valid and recommended “expanding the purpose of*

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<sup>9</sup> FASPO comments: “We agree with the observation that the Project Steering Committee (PSC) did not perform its oversight and advisory functions but we would like to emphasize that the Project Management has a critical role in facilitating the active role of the PSC. PSC members comprised mostly of high ranking officials from different offices (GOs and NGAs) and are attending to several concerns aside from SIBP matters. Hence, the Project Management has to make the first move to facilitate decision-making at the PSC level (particularly PAWB and DENR-8 for administrative and technical matters)”. The TET respectfully disagrees – it is not the Project Management's role to make the first moves regarding project direction. Yes, it can facilitate decision-making by providing information and opinions and reporting problems, but the role of the PSC or TPR is to identify problems/opportunities and make the decisions. It is no use making the “excuse” that the PSC is composed of “high ranking officials [who] are attending to several concerns aside from SIBP matters” – if they have a role on the PSC then they should ensure that they are properly briefed in order to carry out their function effectively. If they can not do that, they should not be sitting on the PSC. [See also PAWB comment footnote # 59 to paragraph 90.]

<sup>10</sup> PAWB comments: “The NGOs were actively involved during the preparatory phase and in the preparation of the Project Brief. They had also participated in several workshops particularly in the threshing out of the co-management arrangements. Although they did not sign on to the Project Brief, they clearly had a good picture of how the full project was suppose to run as well as what their role would be. They already had a good understanding of what the project was suppose to deliver back then. This tension had probably come about because some of the NGOs who were involved during the preparation of the project document were no longer around during the implementation phase”. The TET recognises the lengths to which the NGO community was involved in the project design and the understanding that they “should” have had regarding what the project was supposed to deliver – however, key representatives of the NGOs interviewed, who also played a major part in the implementation as CPMs, dispute that the project that was presented to them at the start of implementation was what they thought they had agreed to. That PAWB (and UNDP see footnote #2) contend one thing and the NGOs another shows that the tension identified by the TET still exists. Two key points need to be stressed: 1) the NGOs should have been required to sign the project document then there could have been no dispute over expectations within the partnership; and 2) despite the tension described, the partnership between PAWB and the NGOs has largely been successful and has contributed significantly to the success of the project; and it should be used as a basis for developing future projects.



the SIBP towards development of a natural resource management system for conservation and ecologically sustainable development across the whole of Samar Island” *without any further resources being made available. The PSC agreed. As a result, the PMO moved to attempt to extend its resources to provide a more island-wide approach. This appears to have focussed on re-directing the PA management planning exercise in which there was a dearth of national expertise (including the CTA) to that of watershed management planning (in which the overly-influential CTA had experience) on the basis that such an exercise would provide an island-wide framework for livelihood interventions as well as providing sufficient basic material which could be stitched together easily to form the PA management plan. Unfortunately it did neither, and this decision represents the culmination of strategic creep with significant subsequent effects. The end result of this strategic creep has been:*

- a) *a PA management plan that has been delivered so late that it has had a major detrimental impact on the effectiveness of the livelihood programme and other components of the Project;*
- b) *a series of plans to add to the already burgeoning planning framework for Samar and another layer of councils which have no money to meet, no resources or skills to implement the plans, and which will not be updated once the Project ends;*
- c) *the abandonment of a key part of the community-based conservation framework; and*
- d) *a supposed saving of money which instead has represented an extra workload diverting resources away from the central tasks, provided a false sense of progress, and provided no appreciable benefit in terms of the Project’s objectives.*

*The issue of strategic creep leads to a number of related issues that are discussed.*

*Technically, the livelihood component has tended to concentrate too much on agriculture-based alternatives in an attempt to raise people’s standards of living and therefore take pressure off the forest, but they have done so without providing sufficient links to biodiversity conservation, nor with providing alternatives to other needs currently met from the forest – fuel, building materials, medicines. In particular, the established demonstration farms are inappropriate and do not showcase improved technologies that link livelihoods to biodiversity conservation. Most of the COP activities have been concentrated in the buffer zone, not in those communities residing in the core zone. There has been very little effort expended on finding ways to restore kaingined (slash-and burn) forest areas.*

*The COPs have been very successful in linking the local communities effectively with the local NGO service providers. Local communities have been organised effectively, capacitated, and provided with alternative livelihood opportunities. The Project has been successful in changing perceptions of the villagers about the forest and its biodiversity from that of viewing resources in a solely exploitative way to ones of resource conservation and protection with the consequence of persuading people away from timber poaching and other illegal forest harvesting activities. However, the Project’s degree of intervention is not yet sufficient enough to instill the principle of biodiversity conservation and protection permanently among the minds and actions of the local people. Further awareness-raising is needed to inculcate in the minds of the local people that sustainable farming is something adoptable, economical. and with clear ecological potential to conserve biodiversity.*

## **PHASE TWO**

*The five conditions attached to the Project for it to be eligible for a Phase Two have been effectively met, bar one – the roles of the PA Superintendent, the PENRO and CENRO remain undefined on Samar. Formal recognition of these roles and their inter-relationships **needs to be completed by December 2006 for this condition to be met.** In answer to the question “Should Phase Two of the Project take place?”, the Terminal Evaluation Team recommends unanimously and without ambiguity that GEF supports the second phase of the SIBP to consolidate the considerable gains achieved by the first phase, subject to:*

- a) *the above condition being in place by December 2006,*

- b) *Phase Two being re-designed to take account certain issues; and*
- c) *subject to GEF accepting the risks that certain external issues pose to its success.*

*These risks and their mitigation strategies are discussed and the residual risks assessed as – i) mining – medium; ii) logging – low; iii) insurgency – low; iv) weak management – low.*

*Recommendations and Lessons Learned are listed on pages 46-50.*

## APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

1. The Final Project Evaluation (FPE) was conducted over the period 27<sup>th</sup> February to 21<sup>st</sup> March 2006 (24 days) by a team of one international and two national consultants. It was carried out nine months in advance of the revised termination date of phase one of the project (31<sup>st</sup> December 2006) in order to provide information regarding conditions for phase two, sufficient to allow GEF to make a decision regarding funding the proposed second phase, and to allow such decision to be timed so as to enable the transition between the two phases to be seamless. The approach was determined by the terms of reference (Annex I) which were closely followed, via the itinerary detailed in Annex II. Throughout the evaluation particular attention was paid to carefully explaining the importance of listening to stakeholders' views and in reassuring staff and stakeholders that the purpose of the evaluation was not to judge performance in order to apportion credit or blame but to learn lessons for the wider GEF context. Wherever possible, information collected was cross-checked between various sources to ascertain its veracity, but in some cases time limited this.

2. The Mid-term Evaluation (MTE) undertaken in June 2004<sup>11</sup> was fairly heavily critical of project performance and made a number of recommendations that significantly changed the strategy of the Project. Since the issues involved in the MTE were evaluated at that time, this FPE has taken the MTE as its baseline and has concentrated on evaluating subsequent actions particularly those relating to the recommendations made in the MTE. It deals with events occurring before this time only in so far as they impinge upon these later issues.

3. The overall objectives of the Final Evaluation are to:

- identify and evaluate the effectiveness and outcome of strategies and activities of the Project;
- identify and evaluate the constraints and problems, which have been or are being encountered, the effectiveness of resource utilisation and the delivery of Project outputs;
- assess progress towards attaining the Project's global environmental objectives per GEF Operational Programmes concerned (OP Nos. 3 and 4);
- assess policy, institutional and financial instruments which have been identified and developed both at the national and local levels to ensure long-term sustainability of project-initiated activities beyond the life of the programme;
- identify the manner and extent to which the Project has leveraged co-financing and policy changes;
- assess the level of public involvement in the Project and recommend on whether public involvement has been appropriate to the goals of the project;
- review and evaluate the extent to which Project impacts have reached the intended beneficiaries, both within and outside project sites; and
- assess the likelihood of continuation of Project outcomes and benefits after completion of GEF funding.

4. Verbal presentations of the results were made to the Project Team on 12<sup>th</sup> March, UNDP on 15<sup>th</sup> March, and to PAWB and other stakeholders on 21<sup>st</sup> March. Lists of attendees are given in Appendix VIII.

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<sup>11</sup> Although this was ostensibly the end of Phase One, it had already been anticipated that Phase One would be expended because of the slow disbursement of funds. This extension was officially agreed on 12<sup>th</sup> October 2004 at the fifth meeting of the project Steering Committee.

## PROJECT CONCEPT AND DESIGN

5. The project concept arose from ideas proposed by local Samar Island NGOs to link biodiversity conservation with livelihood programmes covering the whole of Samar Island. During the design process, undertaken from 1997 to 2000 using Project Development Facility funds, this was gradually changed to combine five small existing protected areas on the island into one large one<sup>12</sup> to conserve the largest un-fragmented tract of rainforest remaining in the Philippines and to provide some livelihood support around the outside. The STAP reviewer considered it “*an almost perfect GEF project ... exemplary in every way*”, and the proposal was approved in July 2000 .

6. The concept was to “*establish the Samar Island Natural Park (SINP), a new protected area zoned for multiple uses centering on protection, but providing for sustainable harvests of non-timber forest products, and institute a comprehensive range of ancillary conservation measures to insulate the Park from human pressures. Park management would be operationalised in partnership with forest edge communities with the aim of establishing a ‘social fence’ against threats. Interventions will strengthen participatory planning, process-response monitoring, surveillance and enforcement functions, enhance the conservation capacities of communities, impart conservation values to wider Samareño society, backstop advocacy operations, and abet development of conservation-compatible village livelihoods*”. It was envisaged that implementation would be broken into two phases, each of four years, “*to provide time for the nascent conservation framework to mature*”.

7. The following key objectives were formulated:

### Project Goal

*A representative sample of the forest biodiversity of the Philippine archipelago is protected.*

### Purpose

*The Samar Island Natural Park is established and managed with broad-based stakeholder participation.*

8. Although an initial reading of the project brief produces similar reactions to those expressed by the STAP reviewer, unfortunately the project design has proved weak in a number of ways:

- The timeframe was overly ambitious in attempting to establish the largest wholly terrestrial protected area in the Philippines. Although it was envisaged that the Project would be implemented in two phases, not enough credence was given to the difficulties that could have been foreseen given the number of local government units (including barangays<sup>13</sup>) that would be involved and the complexity that that would engender<sup>14</sup>, the physical difficulties that the terrain imparts on fieldwork, and the political instability on the island. As such, more time and budget should have been allocated to the preparatory phase – something that ultimately occurred through the 20-month extension granted to the project because of slow implementation, but with no increased budget.
- The costs were under-estimated for the livelihood components of the Project and this is one of the main factors leading to those outputs having being ineffective in a number of areas.
- The risk assessment was inadequate in two areas. Firstly, while it rightly cited that there might be a delay in obtaining congressional approval of PA status, it is surprising that there was no mention of the massive mineral reserves known to exist on Samar nor of the recognition of the valuable timber resources that such a large forest area would contain. While it would be easy

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<sup>12</sup> The proclaimed area covers 330,300ha of forest and 125,400 ha in a 2km-wide buffer zone.

<sup>13</sup> This is the smallest unit of local government in the Philippines, equating approximately to a village and its surroundings.

<sup>14</sup> The SINP encompasses 3 provinces, 37 Municipalities, one City, and 278 Barangays. About 200,000 people live within its boundaries.

for the TET with the benefit of hindsight to criticise that the lifting of the moratorium on logging could have been foreseen, when in fact it probably could not, it is pertinent to raise the issue that at the time of project design the moratorium on logging was still in place for political reasons and political climates are notoriously open to change thereby presenting a risk to the project. Similarly, the TET is not criticising the design for not being able to foresee the two Mineral Production Sharing Agreements granted in 2002<sup>15</sup> within the current boundaries of the SINP (when even PAWB overlooked them during the drafting of the Presidential Proclamation declaring the SINP – see paragraph 62), but the area was established as a Bauxite Mining Reservation under Presidential Proclamation 1615 (1977) under the Mineral Resources Development Decree 1974 (even though no rights were awarded) and hence political/economic opposition to the legislative process could and should have been envisaged and risk management strategies developed, especially since a legal review of the Samar Island Forest Reserve was undertaken as part of the project preparation<sup>16</sup>.

- Secondly, no mention is made in the Project Brief or Document of the communist-led insurgency by the New People’s Army (NPA) active at various levels across the Philippines but which is known to have always had a stronghold on Samar Island. No risks were evaluated as arising from this to the Project. While this may have been an omission of the designers, or more probably a deliberate omission because of political/military sensitivity, the presence and activities of the NPA have proved to be one of the main causes hampering Project progress and, again, this could have, and should have, been discussed and allowed for and strategies devised to counter or accommodate it – not least providing an adequate timeframe for the first part of the project.
- Unbeknown to the project designers, 200,000 were found to be living within the SINP. At the time of the design, it was known that some people must be living in the forest but not until the boundaries were originally defined was it discovered just how many were present there. The original design believed most people would be living around the forest edge and activities were largely aimed (and budgeted for) in this “buffer zone”. Discovery of the true situation (which the designers could not have known about since the boundaries of the Park were also unknown at that time) changed implementation radically.

9. The project was designed to have implementation responsibilities shared between the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (Protected Areas and Wildlife Bureau (PAWB) and DENR Regional Office 8) and the Samar Island NGOs (which actually formed an umbrella organisation the Samar Island Biodiversity Foundation (SIBF) in 1998 to meet these responsibilities). Despite extensive consultations with stakeholders and involvement of the NGOs in writing the Project Brief, it appears that the NGOs never had sight of the final Brief and never signed off on it. Detailed interviews with senior SIBF members<sup>17</sup> confirm this. While this may have occurred because of the fragmentary nature of the NGOs on Samar Island prior to the formation of SIBF<sup>18</sup>, it is inexcusable to expect one or more organisations to be included in co-implementing a project of this nature but not to have been given sight of the final documentation<sup>19</sup> detailing what they were becoming involved with, especially when there was considerable mistrust between the implementation partners, as there was

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<sup>15</sup> At least 37 more applications are pending

<sup>16</sup> SIBP Management Planner comments: “During the designing, existing resource use permits were not properly considered as a basis in determining the appropriate PA category for the area. From the very start, the idea of establishing a Natural Park category was already firmed up when, in fact, other options may also have been explored to provide management flexibility especially on the aspect of sustainable resource use. Categories such as forest managed reserve or landscape for the whole island could have been part of early discussions”.

<sup>17</sup> Presidents of the SIBF and its three constituent chapters, some of whom were involved in the design phase under the aegis of other NGOs.

<sup>18</sup> The SIBF was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on 15<sup>th</sup> July 1999 under Registration No.A199911043, so it is not apparent to the TET whether it was in existence at the time of submission to the Project Brief to GEF or not. Even if it was in existence, there may still have been no one charged with the authority to sign on its behalf.

<sup>19</sup> NGOs claim they never saw the final version of the Project Brief; UNDP dispute this (see footnote #2). Nonetheless, there is no signature of the NGOs on the Project Brief.

here at least at the beginning. As it turns out, this is the key to unravelling a whole string of problems that have beset the Project and, with other events and influences, have caused it to be less successful than it could have otherwise have been.

10. As indicated in paragraph 5, the original concept of the NGOs was to focus on providing a livelihood-based response to biodiversity conservation across the island, not just focussed on what was to become the SINP. This is reflected in the ambiguity in the design pointed out by the Mid-term Evaluation Team in the extent to which the Project should be confined to the SINP – “*The stated purpose suggests a narrow focus on SINP establishment but the output statements can be interpreted as being more broadly at conservation across the island as a whole*”. The MTE goes on to point out that “*There is also a mismatch between project purpose and the overall goal. An argument raised throughout the first phase has been that establishing the SINP is not an adequate strategy to protect the biodiversity of Samar Island*”. These tensions within the project design and between the project partners can all be accorded to the fact that the NGOs had not had sight of the final Project Brief and the first time they understood exactly what they had become involved with was when they commenced the implementation process. It appears that nobody interviewed holds contrary views. As a result throughout the Project, the SIBF were pushing for a greater focus on livelihoods and on a more “island-wide” approach. This has had significant implications – see paragraph 103 *et seq.*

## PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

### PARTICIPATING AGENCIES

11. The Project has been executed following UNDP requirement for nationally-executed projects (NEX) by the Government of the Philippines (GOP) through the **Department of Environment and Natural Resources** (DENR) which has overall responsibility for the establishment and management of the Philippines’ National Integrated Protected Area System (NIPAS). A Project Steering Committee (PSC) was established to oversee project operations, work plans and progress reports, to ensure implementation of the recommendations of the independent evaluators, and coordinate advocacy functions to ensure the smooth passage of the legislation for the SINP. The Project was implemented through the **Protected Areas and Wildlife Bureau** (PAWB) and the DENR Regional Office 8 (responsible for Eastern Visayas) and shared with the **Samar Island Biodiversity Foundation**.

12. Financing contributions have come from UNDP-GEF (US\$ 5.76 million), GOP (US\$ 4.25 million), UNDP (US\$ 1.52 million), Foundation for the Philippine Environment (US\$ 0.94 million), USAID (0.35 million), and the NGOS/Church groups (US\$ 0.06 million).

### 13. Two key other agencies involved in the Project are:

- the **Local Government Units** (LGUs) organised in descending order as Provinces governed by a Governor, Vice Governor and a Provincial Board; Municipalities (or Cities) governed by a Mayor, a Vice-mayor and a Municipal Council, and Barangays governed by a Barangay Captain and a Barangay Council; and
- the **Catholic Church** organised into three autonomous dioceses on Samar each headed by a Bishop.

## NATIONAL LEVEL ARRANGEMENTS

### Project Direction

14. Overall direction of the project was the responsibility of the **National Project Director** (NPD), a part-time position attached to the role of Assistant Director of PAWB with the NPD spending no

more than 50% of their time with the project. Dr Theresa Mundita Lim held this position from the start of the Project until November 2004 when she was designated as Officer in Charge, PAWB, but returned as NPD in December 2005 and remains current. In between, Mr. Lorenzo Agaloos automatically became the NPD (as per the Project Document) because of his designation as OIC Assistant Director of PAWB when Dr. Lim was OIC Director, but Dr. Lim continued to maintain close oversight. The NPD is responsible for achieving the Project's objectives and is accountable to the GOP and UNDP for the use of Project resources. The position holds the ultimate authority to expend funds from the Project budget. The NPD was assisted by a **Regional Project Coordinator** (the Regional Executive Director of DENR RO-8) and a **Project Focal Point** – a Senior Ecosystems Management Specialist with PAWB.

## Project Management

15. Day-to-day implementation was the responsibility of a Project Management Office (PMO) located in Catbalogan, Western Samar<sup>20</sup> and comprising a full-time **National Project Manager** (NPM) and a counterpart **Co-Project Manager** (CPM) appointed from the NGO community. This full-time position was responsible for delivering the community-based outputs (community engagement and social organisation (Output 3), conservation awareness raising and advocacy functions (Output 4 and Activity 5.4), and demonstration of alternative livelihoods (Output 6)). Both of these positions changed hands during the Projects' lifetime as follows:

The NPM:

- Mr. George Guillermo – March 2001-November 2003.
- Mr. Herminigildo Jocson – November 2003 to December 2004.
- Mr. Manolito Ragub – December 2004 to present.

The CPM:

- Ms. Charo Cabardo – March 2001-July 2003.
- Ms. Evelyn Corado – July 2003-July 2004
- Mr. Jose Lim – July 2004-July 2005
- Mr. Jose (Don) Mabulay – July 2005-July 2006

The Project Management Office also comprised a **Chief Technical Adviser** (Dr. Marcelino Dalmacio) from March 2001 to April 2005, and a total of 33 staff and administrative personnel.

16. The Project's direction strategy changed as it progressed but these changes were not formally included into the logframe despite the Mid-term Evaluation's recommendation to the contrary. This is discussed further in paragraph 109b.

## Project Progress and Financial Assessment


17. Lack of progress was a particular problem during the early part of the Project and was the main reason for the grant of an extension. Assuming that disbursement of finances is in some way representative of project progress<sup>21</sup>, Figure 1 shows the relative disbursement of monies by Output and project management for each year. It is clear that progress on most Outputs showed significant increases in 2003 and 2004, beginning to tail off in 2005 as they move towards completion, except for Output 2. Table 1 provides details of total funds spent to 31<sup>st</sup> December 2005. A complete financial assessment, prepared by the Project, is attached as Annex V. The overspend on project management represents the results of extending the project past its initial end date, and this is set to increase with another 12 months of the Project still to run. That on Output 1 represents the considerable efforts expended to obtain legislative recognition of the SINP, including having to file the Congressional Bill twice because of elections and in providing three Provincial Ordinances to provide a greater level of protection in the face of external threats posed by economic interests (see paragraphs ??).

<sup>20</sup> The Province of "Western" Samar is known more generally as Samar, but since this report uses Samar as shorthand for Samar Island, we have called Samar Province by its less common name of Western Samar throughout the text.

<sup>21</sup> Not completely true but the best estimate the TET could obtain

Underspends on remaining items are largely the result of there still being another year of project activities to be undertaken. Figures produced at project completion in December 2006 are forecast to be close to complete disbursement of funds.

**FIGURE 1: RELATIVE DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS BY OUTPUT DURING THE COURSE OF THE PROJECT**



**TABLE 1: TOTAL DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS BY OUTPUT TO 31<sup>ST</sup> DECEMBER 2005 (US\$) (FIGURES ROUNDED)**

	Total disbursement	% of budget	Balance
Project Management	1,300,000	118%	- 200,000
Output 1	850,000	148%	- 270,000
Output 2	630,000	89%	+ 80,000
Output 3	670,000	70%	+ 260,000
Output 4	300,000	75%	+ 100,000
Output 5	190,000	60%	+ 130,000
Output 6	430,000	39%	+ 680,000
Output 7	20,000	20%	+ 80,000

## MONITORING AND EVALUATION

### Internal Project M&E

18. Monitoring and evaluation of project activities have been undertaken at three levels:

- i. Progress monitoring
- ii. Internal activity monitoring
- iii. Impact monitoring

19. Progress monitoring against the quarterly and annual work plans has been undertaken in both quarterly and annual reports since the project inception. These have been submitted to UNDP and the DENR-8, Foreign Assisted Special Project Office (FASPO) and PAWB offices of DENR. The reports presented a clear summary of work-in-progress in terms of measuring performance against both project implementation and the corresponding set of impact indicators. The reports also provided information on the problems and issues encountered by the project over time. The information therein has served as a guide in determining the successes and shortfalls, as well as the major variations made



from the approved quarterly and annual work plans. Since the Project is community-based and focuses on the active participation of local communities, it is essential that these, particularly the LGUs, be furnished with the reports that will help them feel part of the Project and acquire a deeper understanding of its goals and activities. Copies of the summary project document, together with the work plan should be furnished to identified key stakeholders and potential working partners to provide them with a practical overview of the Project.

20. Internal activity monitoring was undertaken in 2005 to assess project implementation and accomplishments for the period 2000-2005 and to serve as guide for the project management team. However, the monitoring report has not been able to present clearly the problems incurred, the key issues and concerns identified, and the lessons learned from the implementation of the project<sup>22</sup>. The TET suggests that such internal project monitoring would have been beneficial midway between project start-up and the Mid-term Evaluation, and again midway between the MTE and the TPE. Such a schedule would bring benefits to any second phase of the Project.

21. Impact monitoring to assess the impacts of project activities on biodiversity conservation and sustainable livelihoods has not yet been introduced in the Project<sup>23</sup>. Identification of simple and verifiable impact indicators to measure on-the-ground improvements realised due directly to project interventions is inherently an indispensable tool for managing any development project and should be employed as standard.

### **Other Monitoring Activities**

22. The project has also undertaken specific monitoring activities for biodiversity conservation. A Biodiversity Monitoring System (BMS) has been designed and introduced in ten sites. The sites have been established within closed-canopy forest areas in five established watersheds. Eight of these are within, and two are outside of the SINP. The BMS was designed to monitor habitat and ecosystems

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<sup>22</sup> FASPO comments: "As indicated in the Project Document, DENR through PAWB and Region 8 would be the executing agency responsible for the oversight and monitoring of all project activities. Nevertheless, FASPO (as an internal oversight to all DENR FASPs) monitored the Project through reports received from the PMO (mostly in draft form), field visit (in CY2004), and participation in the quarterly assessment and planning workshop during the last two years of Phase I. FASPO findings and recommendations were officially feedback to PMO through PAWB and DENR Region 8 (see attached Performance Evaluation Reports or PER and memoranda to Project). Some of the major points discussed by the TET were already raised in said PER, which include the following:

- review of the livelihood assistance relative to its market viability, economic benefits and relevance to biodiversity conservation;
- development of internal Monitoring and Evaluation System (MES) that will be responsive to the needs of all project actors at all levels/components of the Project;
- intensification of IEC at the community level;
- streamlining of the flow of documents;
- concentration on the completion of the Project commitments under Phase I instead of expanding the Project purpose and area coverage (as recommended by the MTE);
- advance planning for PA Management Plan while waiting for the passage of the SINP Bill;
- formulation by PAWB of policy recommendations that would enhance existing policy issuances and their ground validation;
- adoption of a wholistic approach or complementation and harmonization in applying results of various studies conducted that are interrelated (i.e., inventory of NTFPs, demo farms, feasibility studies of ecotourism sites, etc.);
- coordination with other PA-related projects such as the National Ecotourism Programme, NIPAP, and ARCBC for possible complementation of activities;
- assessment of the outcome/results of activities undertaken pertaining to forest protection, livelihood, farming system, etc. for better appreciation

On Biodiversity Monitoring System (BMS), species indicators and its trends has not been developed since data collection was not regularly undertaken".

<sup>23</sup> PAWB comments: "Agree we should have an impact assessment of project activities particularly on biodiversity and livelihood. There were instances during implementation when PAWB had argued that although the intent of the livelihood was good as it provided alternative income, it did not do much for biodiversity conservation. Our arguments just fell on deaf ears".

degradation and restoration, population loss of threatened species of flora and fauna, and the effectiveness of management interventions in addressing biodiversity conservation. Monitoring in the BMS sites is conducted on a quarterly basis where the field staff, with the participation of selected individuals in communities, record their sightings. Narrative reports on biodiversity have been presented as part of the project annual reports. The database, however, on biodiversity within the BMS sites is not available yet nor a GIS database developed that will facilitate management and conservation of biodiversity.

23. A Community Outreach Program (COP) database has been developed and maintained by the Project. The database contains information on the 62 COP barangays that were consolidated from the community profiling activity of the Project and contains information on the socio-economic and political profiles of barangays, existing local situations and problems, land use, resources, plans and priority projects, among others. The Project also conducted the Survey and Registration of Protected Area Occupants (SRPAO) in the 296 barangays present in the core and buffer zones of the Park. Details of this are held on the SRPAO database.

## PROJECT RESULTS

### SUMMARY EVALUATION

24. Overall, the TET evaluates the Samar Island Biodiversity Project to have been **successful – but with reservations**. It is important to understand that the relative weighting given by the TET to the various components is not equal and that the key deliverables under Outputs 1 and 4 – i.e. the establishment of a new protected area on land containing an estimated 21+ billion US dollars worth of bauxite and unmeasured timber resources, and consequently in the face of considerable powerful political opposition; and the creation of a vocal, supportive and active society, united at all levels and across the spectrum of its leaders in support of the Park and against the extractive industries – are considered to be absolutely central to the Project's success. Even the presence of some 200,000 people living within the proposed SINP boundaries (see paragraph 8, last bullet) was overcome and the vocal opposition commonly expressed by people to being included in a protected area<sup>24</sup> was absent in this Project. The other Project components – largely those concerned with facilitating operations within the Park and providing interventions to boost alternative livelihoods to reduce pressure on the forest can continue to be developed in time. Without the former, it is unlikely that there would be significant amounts of forest to conserve through livelihood interventions in ten years time. The reservations expressed arise mainly from the “strategic creep” that has developed to the detriment of the planning and community-based conservation framework, and to poor delivery of various products which has led to delays or cancellations and has particularly affected the livelihood aspects of the Project.

25. A summary evaluation by Project Output is given in Table 2 and a more detailed summary of the level of achievements made against the indicators of success contained in the logframe is given in Annex IV. Results are discussed below by Project Output and key sectoral or cross-cutting issues are then discussed in the ensuing section.

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<sup>24</sup> For example the WB-GEF funded Conservation of Priority Protected Area Project Phase One (site selection phase) had to drop an initially identified site of Mindoro because of the strong opposition displayed by residents within the boundaries of the proposed protected area.

**TABLE 2: EVALUATION OF THE EXPECTED END OF PROJECT SITUATION AS PER THE LOGFRAME**

Output		Evaluation			
		HS	S	MS	U
Goal	A representative sample of the forest biodiversity of the Philippine archipelago is protected	■			
Purpose	The Samar Island Natural Park is established and managed with broad-based stakeholder participation		■		
Output 1:	An adaptive management framework for conservation management is established and operational		■		
Output 2:	Conservation functions are fully operationalised			■	
Output 3:	A community-based conservation framework is tested and effective			■	
Output 4:	Broad-based awareness of conservation values and management needs is imparted to forest-edge communities and other key Samareño stakeholders	■			
Output 5:	Conservation objectives are internalized in sectoral development planning, budgeting and activity delivery at the provincial and municipal levels			■	
Output 6:	Alternative, conservation enabling livelihoods are in place, and the sustainability of wild resource use is assured			■	
Output 7:	Mechanism for financing the recurrent costs of conservation activities is in place			■	

Note: \* HS = Highly satisfactory; S = Satisfactory; MS = Marginally satisfactory; U =Unsatisfactory.

## PROJECT OUTPUTS

### Output 1: Adaptive management framework for conservation management

26. The Project has made major accomplishments under Output 1 including
- the establishment of the SINP by Presidential Proclamation 442 in August 2003;
  - the creation of the Protected Area Management Board (PAMB) with its first General Assembly in November 2004 which subsequently approved the framework of the management plan;
  - a ten-year Management Plan;
  - a biological resource assessment study and
  - a biodiversity monitoring system in place.

#### *Legislative Enactment*

27. The SINP was proclaimed a protected area under the National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) Act by the President on 13<sup>th</sup> August 2003 after considerable vocal support by the communities on Samar Island and representations by the Bishops of the three Catholic dioceses on the island. The Congressional Act to secure the establishment of the SINP has not been passed within the Project term. The proposed bill, first filed with the 12th Congress in 2003 failed to pass the Committee on Natural Resources in the House of Representatives because the Chair of the Committee (one of the sponsors of the SINP Bill) is a strong advocate of mining and wanted to excise around 54,000 hectares (the Mineral Reservation Area) from the proposed Natural Park. The Bill never got out of that Committee. National elections then intervened. The bill was re-filed in both the House and Senate after in 16th September 2004. Six days later, the Chamber of Mines filed an opposition with the Congressional Committee on Natural Resources of the House of Representatives and requested that 54,000 ha of the proclaimed Park be excised for the mining of bauxite. The DENR was instructed by Congress to come up with a compromise provision. PAWB and the Mines and Geosciences Bureau endorsed this compromise to the DENR Secretary who submitted it to the Congressional Committee. After hearing the comments of stakeholders, the Committee endorsed the bill with minor amendments and it was subjected to plenary discussions. In March 2006, it was passed on its second

reading, and now requires a third reading from the House, three readings from the Senate and a bicameral committee meeting to harmonise the versions. After this both houses need to pass it again on plenary sessions.

28. In view of the legislative delays which were outside of the Project's control, the Project catalysed and facilitated the passage of local government legislation adopting the SINP and incorporating it into their land use and development plans. In addition, the SIBP assisted with the drafting and passage of other Provincial Ordinances prohibiting large scale exploration or extraction of minerals and timber. By the end of 2005, 95% of the Park's territory was covered by parallel local legislation strengthening the protected area's status and addressing emerging threats.

### ***Protected Area Management Board***

29. The Protected Area Management Board is a 298-member body. Of these, 188 members have been appointed officially by the DENR Secretary and the remainder are pending. The Presidential Proclamation establishing the SINP provided for sub-PAMBs to be created for each of the three provinces. Sub-PAMB Executive Committees were elected for each of the provinces because the Sub-PAMBs are themselves large bodies composed of 40, 147 and 112 members for Northern Samar, Western Samar and Eastern Samar respectively. The General Assembly also created a 20-member SINP PAMB Executive Committee composed of the Provincial Governors as co-chairs, the three Provincial Agriculturists, and three representatives each from the municipal LGUs, barangay LGUs, the NGOs, and the Pos, and one representative each from the 8<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division of the Philippine Army and the Philippine National Police. The PAMB Executive Committee approved its Manual of Operations designating Committees, established the Integrated Protected Area Sub-Fund, and adopted interim fees and charges for SINP. While the Committees have not yet met, the Sub-PAMB's have each passed resolutions addressing issues affecting the Park.

### ***Management Plan***

30. The PA Management Plan is still pending, expected to be produced by April 2006. This is four years late and has caused considerable difficulties for the management of other outputs. In part, the reason for the delay accrues from the delayed Biological Resource Assessment, itself delayed by insurgency activity, and by the fact that the Project opted to produce Watershed Management Plans in a misguided attempt to deal with planning for such a large PA<sup>25</sup>.

31. It took some time for the Project to decide on the methodology it would use for management planning. It eventually settled on watershed management planning, setting up Technical Working Groups that produced plans in each of eight major watersheds. Taken together, the resulting plans cover about 80% of the SINP as well as other lowland areas outside of the Park but covered by the watersheds. Representatives from the Technical Working Groups were then convened to harmonise the Watershed Management Plans into an integrated ten-year PA Management Plan, the time frame of as envisioned by the logframe but now applicable to the period 2006-2016 instead of the 2002-2006

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<sup>25</sup> FASPO comments: "*The TET is right in saying that the Project had difficulties deciding on the methodology to be used in management planning. It is because the Project did not undertake an advance planning on how to prepare the Management Plan. It should be noted that during the first two years of SIBP implementation, the Project focused more on activities related to legislative enactment of the SINP and establishing the PAO and PAMB. Other factors contributed to delayed preparation of the Management Plan are the following: (a) SINP proclamation obtained only in August 2003 and (b) BRA, SRPAO and ground delineation of SINP boundaries completed only in 2004. In fairness to the CTA, we believe that the option to adopt the watershed management approach had the approval of PAWB since they are the ones providing technical advice when it comes to PA matters and are involved in the conduct of said activity. Besides, the Project has hired a Planning Specialist/Expert whose main TOR is the preparation of the Management Plan*". The TET agrees that other factors caused delays to production of the management plan, particularly the BRA and SPRAO, but significant amounts of work could have been done prior to the Proclamation being passed (e.g. goals, objectives, zoning concepts, key management activities, permitted/prohibited activities) and without the boundaries being known – see FASPO's own comment: sixth bullet point of footnote #22. Hiring of a Planning Specialist/Expert to prepare the Management Plan occurred as a last gasp effort to get the Plan prepared within the Project timeframe – if this decision had been taken at the time of, and instead of, the decision to do watershed management planning, the Management Plan could have been produced within a much more acceptable timeframe and with many less resources spent.

and 2007-2011 as originally planned. This integrated plan was approved by each of the Sub-PAMBs and on 23<sup>rd</sup> November 2005 by the PAMB Executive Committee for endorsement by the PAMB.

### ***Biological Resource Assessment***

32. The Biological Resources Assessment (BRA), making an inventory and determining ecological trends of flora and fauna within the intact forests in the Park, was completed in December 2004, one year late. The BRA was held up partly because of NPA activity in the Park. Although supposed to cover flora and fauna, the BRA concentrated on fauna. The sampling areas BRA concentrated on closed canopy forest and used watershed areas instead of ecosystem or habitat types, and this, together with the lack of botanical data, particularly that on habitat characterisation (crucial for determining the zoning in the Management Plan and to justify the protection of the PA from logging and mining), exacerbated the effects of the delayed report and all have led to knock-on delays in producing the Management Plan. Details of the Biodiversity Monitoring System also carried out under this Output are given in paragraph 22.

## **Output 2: Conservation functions and infrastructure**

### ***Staffing the Protected Area Office***

33. DENR-8 has committed itself to the provision of human resources for the Protected Area Office (PAO) until the Congressional allocation of funds that will accompany passage of the Bill. The number of personnel committed, however, does not match with the personnel required. While the Project operated the SINP with 31 personnel, 11 of these were still paid for by the Project. The DENR personnel that were detailed to Park operations undertook both Project and Park responsibilities and struggled to fulfil both – as the Project Manager, who doubles as the Park Superintendent says “*Undertaking the roles of Park Superintendent and Project Manager is a Herculean task*”. While this in the short-term is a good means of institutionalising the project gains in terms of staff, it requires dedication and understanding amongst those staff being tasked with dual roles. It is to the Project’s credit that it has, and has largely managed to keep, such a dedicated group of people.

**The TET recommends** that the dedication of the staff holding dual roles should be recognised formally, if possible.

### ***Staff Development***

34. The extension term to the first phase of the Project has allowed the PMO to fulfil some activities which the logframe identified for Phase Two, specifically:

- the establishment of a PAMB Executive Committee,
- documentations of their experiences thus far and
- other support services for the PAMB;

but it has done so without any additional budget for which it must be congratulated. Some Municipalities have provided funds to host meetings. While a full PAMB training programme has not yet been designed, a training needs assessment survey was undertaken. The results of this guided the basis for those initial inputs provided at technical session given prior to the PAMB business meetings. A cross visit to Mt. Isarog Natural Park in Southern Luzon covered the remaining topics. Because the SINP has a PAMB with an Executive Committee along with three sub-PAMBs each with its own Executive Committee, and the Project is also setting up eight Watershed Management Councils, the secretariat functions of servicing these alone will keep Park personnel extremely busy.

35. PA staff development appears to have been adequate. In the later stages of the Project, few problems were apparently encountered in the delineation of functions between DENR district personnel (CENRO and PENRO) and the PASu, and this may be attributed to the third PM/PASu having been a Regional Technical Director previously. Although this PASu’s authority is currently

recognised by the District Offices, this may not carry over to a subsequent a PASu who does not enjoy the privilege of being a former superior. Even in the current relationship, certain resource uses such as Rattan Cutting Concessions (RCCs) are still being renewed by the PENRO despite the clear terms of Department Administrative Order 2000 #45 giving the PASus full authority to charge fees for those resources within their protected areas. For example, in 2006, 40,000 ha of RCCs were still awarded to non-park residents without PAMB clearance<sup>26</sup>. Therefore, the institutional relationship between the Park authorities and the PENROs and CENROs needs still to be more formally delineated and complied with (see paragraph 125).

**The TET recommends** that immediate steps be taken, within Phase One if possible, to ensure that no other permits over areas covered by the SINP be given without PAMB authorisation. A rigorous system will have to be designed in order to ensure that the PAMB makes its decisions according to recent stock estimates and a system of collective approvals would ensure efficiency<sup>27</sup>.

### ***Protected Area Office Infrastructure***

36. The PAO infrastructure was budgeted at 12 million pesos but given inflation in the period between design and implementation, this actually cost up to 20 million pesos. Nevertheless, the PMO was able to ensure that the required infrastructure was built on donated land. At the time of the visit of the TET, the buildings were in various stages of construction – between 30% and 80% complete. Ironically, the HQ and staff residences are in a forested area at the centre of the Park with a panoramic view of the forests threatened by the lifting of the suspension on logging operations by the San Jose Timber Corporation (see paragraph 66). Communications will be by satellite dish and radio. In order to stretch the budget to help with the overrun on buildings, the original ideas for signs were reduced to painted plywood boards produced by project staff. Unfortunately those seen by the TET were already in such a deteriorated condition as to be hardly readable.

### ***Boundary demarcation***

37. While the boundaries have been reviewed and located on a map and further clarified by DAO 2004 #17, boundary marking has not commenced on the ground since this needs to await the passage of the Congressional legislation which will set the final boundaries of the Park. However, there is a problem since delineation and demarcation of boundaries have not been funded realistically under the Project. Using natural features and installing signs instead of permanent boundary markers would still entail much more than has been allocated to this task.

## **Output 3: Community-based conservation framework**

### ***Community Outreach***

38. The Project's Community Outreach Program (COP) was implemented in July, 2003 covering 62 barangays with the aim of organising and capacitating forest-edge communities for livelihood development and biodiversity conservation. With the assistance of service providers specialising in community development work contracted from the NGOs, the Project has been able to relieve pressure on the forests, particularly timber poaching, by introducing alternative livelihood opportunities such as vegetable production, pili<sup>28</sup> production, abaca (hemp) production, and agroforestry. Provision of material and technical support has encouraged farmers to adopt improved farming technologies. In interviews with the TET, farmers who claimed they were former timber poachers are now engaged actively in improved farming and indicated that their farm income has increased two or threefold over that prior to the Project. The SIBP has also been able to obtain the support and commitment of the local communities, especially the POs and Barangay Councils, for the protection and conservation of

<sup>26</sup> This is also unfortunate because the annual allowable cuts for these concessions should be based on resource inventories verifiable by the PAMB, and not based on CENRO figures alone.

<sup>27</sup> SIBP Management Planner comments: "I suggest that permits issued by the DENR prior to the declaration of SINP shall be evaluated while those permits issued after the proclamation without PAMB endorsement shall be cancelled".

<sup>28</sup> A tree endemic to the Philippines which produces a nut rich in oils much loved by Filipinos.

the forest and its biodiversity. This is exemplified by the formation of Community Forest Guards through the concerted efforts of both the POs and barangay officials, and made up of volunteers from local community members.

39. The TET notes several concerns from its field observations. Support to livelihood must be expanded to include not only farm production but also to adding value or processing and marketing. Sufficient training packages, both in time and content, need to be given to the COP communities to ensure that the knowledge imparted changes the behaviours of the beneficiaries. Identification and on-farm domestication of forest plant species with economic value and their suitability to specific sites is necessary and would fit well with the biodiversity aim of the Project. For example, tree farming and agroforestry using native forest plant species with high economic value such as dipterocarps should have a good chance of being adopted by farmers.

***Contractual responsibilities for the DENR, LGUs and Community Actors negotiated***

40. The specific roles of the PASu and the District Offices of DENR-8 have not yet been properly defined – partly complicated by the fact that the Park overlaps three such offices. Local government units have commenced various actions in support of Park ecotourism and forest land use planning but these actions have not yet been integrated in the Park nor the LGU's roles formally defined. Probably the best mechanism to provide legal definition to the contractual responsibilities of stakeholders will be to have these, and the interactions between them, both inside and outside of the Park, agreed within the PA Management Plan, and to have stakeholders sign off on it. This would integrate all roles and initiatives and should be disseminated in a popular format indicating the tasks and duties of each stakeholder. While commitments have not yet been made on specific duties, the plan itself has had substantial support and has already been endorsed by the Executive Committee to the PAMB *en banc*. The SIBP plans to hold a donor's forum to secure financial support but other material support would be necessary from stakeholders.

41. The DENR, through the RED of DENR-8, committed to continue staffing the Protected Area Office and to maintaining the equipment, infrastructure and facilities provided by the Project until the appropriations that will accompany passage of the Congressional legislation become available. DENR-8 also committed to ensure that, as part of its compliance with the rationalisation of DENR's organisational structure, District Office personnel with functions overlapping those of PA staff will be transferred to the PASu, if and when requested by the latter.

42. Tenure for occupants of the Park can be granted through Community-based Forest Management Agreements – 23 of which were issued in Samar island prior to the proclamation of the SINP and most of which fell within its boundaries – or through Protected Area Community-based Resource Management Agreements (PACBRMA) – instruments that are used which comply with the NIPAS Act 1992 once a PA has been designated. No PACB RMAs have yet been issued for the SINP. These agreements state the responsibilities of the agreement holders who are legally entitled to stay inside the boundaries of the SINP as tenured migrants, if they had been living inside it for five years prior to the declaration of the site as protected area. The Project considers delivery of this output under the delineation of the roles of the key stakeholders in the management of the protected area. So far, 55 barangays under the COPs have completed their requirements for tenurial recognition which have been approved by the PAMB Executive Committee<sup>29</sup>. They are awaiting the award of their PACBRMAs. Determining legal tenure will not only make partners out of local communities but also fix the rights of current occupants and discourage further settlements for migrants who would not be entitled to tenure.

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<sup>29</sup> The Executive Committee appears to have approved for endorsement to Region 8 the applications of 55 barangays (page 17 of the 2005 Annual Report), however, in paragraph 134 of the Project Self-assessment Report (produced prior to the Annual Report), only 2 communities were stated as having submitted their application documents for PACBRMAs. Paragraph 135 of the Self-assessment Report, states that "*the awarding of the PACBRMA/CBFMA thus becomes a formality since the actual negotiations occur during community orientation and acceptance of the concept of tenurial agreement.*"

43. Negotiations for the activation of forest protection mechanisms called the Multi-sectoral Forest Protection Councils, set up in the early 1990s but which became dormant, were also undertaken, resulting in the re-activation of six such Councils, each with sustainability plans. Finally, negotiations with the 8<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade of the Armed Forces of the Philippines resulted in the formation of quick reaction teams for law enforcement.

**The TET recommends** that the Project clearly identifies remaining communities without tenurial security, prioritises among them, and provides a system of assistance for communities who wish to gain tenure with their own resources<sup>30</sup>.

#### *Formation of the Watershed Management Councils*

44. The original project design conceptualised a community-based conservation framework whereby the villages in the buffer zone were to be divided into ten Bufferzone Management Units (BMU), each governed by a Village Conservation Committee (VCC) comprising representatives from each of the constituent barangays. The VCCs would be accountable to the Protected Area Management Board for enforcing conservation regulations in the buffer zone and other sustainable use areas of the Park. However, during the course of project implementation, the discovery of some 240 barangays in the core zone of the Park led to the abandonment of this concept. However, rather than try to adapt the concept or re-design it to provide a link between the SINP and the barangays inside it, it became the main casualty of an ill-advised move<sup>31</sup> to watershed management plans put forward by the CTA and approved by the Project Steering Committee (PSC). The adoption of this watershed management approach was based on eight Watershed Management Units (WMU) and led to the formation of eight Watershed Management Councils which, it is claimed, replace the VCCs as conceptualized. The TET disputes this since the WMCs do not act at a village level as the VCCs had been conceptualized to do. Instead, the WMCs are the mechanism through which the Watershed Management Plans are expected to be implemented.

### **Output 4: Awareness of conservation values and threats**

#### *Awareness-raising*

45. The Project has implemented effective strategies to raise awareness and concerns among the local constituents on matters and issues related to Samar Island's environment and biodiversity conservation, especially among the leaders in the provincial and municipal governments, and the church. The SIBF, who took the lead in this activity, have achieved considerable success in uniting people and their leaders across the island in support of the SINP and against the extractive industries which threatens it and their communities. Long years of experience on advocacy work in the island combined with high capacity in this area appear to have paid dividends.

46. Awareness-building has been carried out through various advocacy activities such as sectoral orientations and training among local government officials, church leaders, students, and local communities. The culmination of the success of this work was the holding of the island-wide motorcade-rally, the "Save Samar Island" Caravan on 8<sup>th</sup> August 2003, a unified initiative and action of leaders and society from all three provinces on Samar to campaign in support of the SINP and against logging and mining. Estimates of the participants and the crowds that lined the streets and signed petitions to stop logging and establish the Park, ranged from 4,000 to 15,000 people. Five days later, and after representations by the three bishops, the President proclaimed the SINP. The date of the caravan was marked in Samareños calendars as Samar Day, and has now become Environment

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<sup>30</sup> SIBP Management Planner comments: "In the management plan, there are three major concerns on community organizing: (a) strengthening of the existing POs; (b) identification of priority areas for the expansion/implementation of community organizing; and (c) mainstreaming the CBFMA POs to PA context including the land tenure agreements and resource plans already formulated".

<sup>31</sup> PAWB comments: "It was not really an ill-advised move but rather it wasn't studied very well nor carefully thought of particularly in the context of protected area management". To the TET, that is a good definition of "ill-advised".



Day on the island, showing how much the island considers its identity to be inextricably linked with the SINP.

47. Information dissemination through radio and the production and dissemination of Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials on livelihood and biodiversity conservation, has also enabled the Project to heighten awareness of the island's populace on a wider scale. Awareness-raising with the local communities has been successful, especially in those COP sites where well-trained and high-performing NGO Service Providers have been working, e.g. Barangay Caisawan, Balangkayan, Eastern Samar. This success has contributed to building vigilance among the local populace in protecting the forest and its biodiversity, and in decisions by villagers to stop timber poaching and to engage in alternative livelihood opportunities. However, field observations made by the TET revealed that some of the provincial and municipal LGU officials, and church leaders are aware of the existence of the Project, but do not have a good knowledge and understanding of its activities and achievements.

48. The Project has also garnered the support of the Department of Education Region 8 (DepEd-8) to integrate biodiversity conservation into the formal school curricula of elementary and high school students. A Memorandum of Agreement between the SIBP-DENR and the DepEd-8 was signed on 6<sup>th</sup> October 2004 to formally launch this partnership project. In addition, the Project signed another MOA with the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) to provide training, a scholarship programme, and formulate occupational standards for training vocational students at the level between secondary and tertiary education<sup>32</sup>.

#### ***Communication strategy***

49. The final version of the Project's Communication Plan was completed in 2003 with its goals and objectives framed under the Project's twin-goal of conserving biodiversity resources and reducing poverty, especially in the upland communities. The development of the plan was based on the findings of the Samar Biodiversity Study in SINP areas, the Perception Survey conducted by the Project in 2002, and the over-riding consideration of informing, educating, and motivating communities to act in support of SINP management and the conservation of biodiversity. The Project's communication strategy is focused on conveying effectively to people the importance of biodiversity conservation to their livelihood.

50. The Project has implemented its communication activities effectively. Communication strategies of the Project include integration of communication in the COP and advocacy programmes, an information campaign through the mass media, conduct of entertainment-education activities, and environmental education. A number of IEC materials have been produced by the Project in support of its information and education programme which includes lobbying for the passage of the SINP Bill and parallel local legislations, increasing community awareness about the SINP and promoting its global and national biodiversity values, and supporting education and training activities in schools and communities<sup>33</sup>. Communication materials and facilities produced include videos, an SIBP website, newsletters, community billboards, radio plugs, a weekly radio programme, and handbooks and primers.

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<sup>32</sup> SIBP Management Planner comments: "As a strategy, the Project could probably design a handbook or manual for teachers on teaching biodiversity".

<sup>33</sup> PAWB comments: "Can we highlight here the "Dalaw-Turo" Programme of the DENR which the Project also used their environmental education campaign? The programme is an informal education campaign using games, skits and plays as a medium. The Programme caters mainly to school children. Some Barangay members have already been trained by DENR regional staff to replicate the methods to other barangays. Wondering why this didn't come out during the evaluation, although these are in the Project reports?" It appears that the TET overlooked this – apologies.

## **Output 5: Conservation objectives in LGU development planning**

### ***Resource valuation study***

51. The project was not able to accomplish the resource valuation study since the first contract with an expert to do the job was cancelled by UNDP in June 2004 due to poor performance. The Terms of Reference (TOR) for the identified replacement, a trust-fund specialist who will conduct the valuation study, were being prepared by UNDP at the time of the TPE. The study is expected to be completed by July, 2006, and the results used as a basis for the determination of future resource use fees for the Park.

### ***Provincial workshops on integrated conservation and development***

52. Provincial workshops on integrated conservation and development needs for the Park did not take place. The PMO claimed that these were integrated into a series of watershed management planning workshops conducted in 2005, as well as in the Forest Land Use Planning in two municipalities outside the identified watershed areas. Fact sheets have been prepared for each watershed management unit as part of the watershed profiling conducted in 2005.

## **Output 6: Alternative conservation-enabling sustainable livelihoods promoted**

### ***Provisional harvest quotas for NTFPs***

53. The Project was not able to produce provisional harvest quotas for the sustainable harvesting of non-timber forest products (NTFPs) for the Park despite undertaking a feasibility study on the sustainable harvesting and utilization of rattan and almaciga that was completed by the Environmental Research and Development Bureau (ERDB) in March 2003. The study was even augmented with the identification of potential forest products during the biodiversity assessment study in December 2003. The mid-2004 resignation of the staff member who was assigned to the job hindered the accomplishment of the task. No replacement has been appointed to continue the job<sup>34</sup>.

54. Provisional harvest quotas for rattan, however, have been produced in four CBFM areas within the Park, namely: Hinabangan, Western Samar (2 sites); Paranas, Western Samar; and Borongan, Eastern Samar, based on the inventory of rattan conducted by project staff in these areas in 2004. The Project needs to pursue park-wide inventory of NTFPs other than rattan and almaciga so that annual harvest quotas for these forest products can be set. Determination of harvest quotas for firewood and charcoal production and timber for domestic use of tenured migrants should also be undertaken.

### ***Eco-Tourism***

55. The SIBP obtained consensus from the LGUs, local communities, and other key stakeholders over the potential eco-tourism sites within the SINP, and to include strategies to be undertaken to develop and manage ecotourism in the island. For example, the key participants during the scoping workshop held in June 2002 agreed and identified three priority eco-tourism sites to be subjected to feasibility study. This workshop has encouraged support and active participation of the LGUs, NGOs, the local communities and other support agencies such as the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA). A successful working partnership has been established between the Project and the LGUs of Lawaan in Eastern Samar and Calbiga in Western Samar demonstrating clear indications of acceptance and support for the SINP's eco-tourism activities. The training of local guides for the LGU's ecotourism site in Lawaan also provides a good example of small step taken by the Project with substantial effects in encouraging community participation and commitment to SINP's eco-tourism activities.

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<sup>34</sup> SIBP Management Planner comments: "This is a very important concern especially so that the management plan explores the possibility of awarding permits for NTFP utilization to local communities for livelihood instead of providing to current holders of rattan permits".

56. However, the Project has failed to achieve the development and approval of the SINP eco-tourism management plan which would have provided the best means to direct the development of eco-tourism sites, and implement and manage promotional activities for eco-tourism within the Park. The project has also not been able to implement promotional activities for eco-tourism especially in the regional, national and even international markets.

#### ***Farming systems review and market study***

57. The Farming Systems Review that was intended to analyse existing farming practices of farmers in the buffer and core zones of the SINP in terms of looking at fallow dynamics in shifting cultivation and other farming attributes was not accomplished by the Project. The review was sub-contracted to the SIBF in part as a capacity-building exercise. Unfortunately the professional researcher hired by SIBF to assist them meet the required methodology and timeframe did not deliver. Although the SIBF Co-Project Manager recognised the problems early on and gave them time to turn things around, it became clear that the study would not be delivered, and the CPM and UNDP agreed reluctantly to cancel it.

58. *In lieu* of the Farming Systems Review, a site characterisation study was undertaken to facilitate the establishment of five demonstration farms showcasing vegetable farming, abaca production, pili production, establishment of fruit tree plantations, and coconut-based multiple cropping system. Unfortunately in the absence of the Farming Systems Review the demonstration farms have failed to capture the Project's aim of showcasing conservation-compatible farming systems.

59. The market assessment and development study on priority crops was carried out late and is now due for completion in April 2006. The information from this study is supposed to serve as guide for developing marketing strategies and plans for priority crops in Phase One, but there is little chance of implementing these strategies and plans in the time remaining in Phase One. Unfortunately, selection of the priority crops for the market study did not consider rattan, almaciga resin, or other economic non-timber forest products known to the local communities<sup>35</sup>. Market information on these forest products, if made available, would encourage on-farm domestication of them, which in turn would lead to development of farms that are conservation compatible.

### **Output 7: Sustainable financing for recurrent costs of conservation activities**

60. The original design envisaged few activities for this Output in Phase One of the Project, delaying most until Phase Two. The overall budget for this output was consequently the lowest of all – see Table 1, page 6. Amongst the key requirements was to undertake a review of the results of the Resource Valuation Study and to determine user fees and fiscal instruments for water and transportation use, but this study was cancelled by UNDP (see paragraph 51) and its replacement commenced during the TPE. With respect to explorations for debt-for-nature swaps, a debt reduction agreement was signed between the Philippines and the US to set up a fund for tropical forest conservation in September 2002. Work towards setting up a Foundation to handle the fund

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<sup>35</sup> SIBP-PMO comments: *“The original plan included four non-timber forest products: rattan, almaciga resin, bird's nest, and honeybee based on two criteria: a) these commodities are being or can be produced in the farms/communities near or within the SINP b) their markets are still underdeveloped, at least with regard to those produced or to be produced in Samar. Later, we produced a third criterion: that the commodities should or can also be widely produced or harvested. After all, the impact and usefulness of the market study will ultimately depend on how many will benefit from its results. Because of this criterion, three (almaciga resin, bird's nest, and honeybee) were dropped:*

- *Almaciga trees are known to thrive in significant numbers only in the Municipalities of Giporlos, San Julian, Taft, and Hinabangan. Because of its long gestation period, we will have to depend on the wilds for producing almaciga resins.*
- *Bird's nest are found so far, only in the Municipalities of San Jose de Buan, and Can-avid. Besides, its main market, Binondo, is reported to be controlled by a cartel.*
- *Honeybee farming has still an underdeveloped technology in Samar, and our projects regarding this have not had promising results. Moreover, the volume of nectar available in an area limits the scale of bee farming in one place.*

*Only rattan was retained then. Much later, however, it was observed that this commodity has been so over-harvested that in the next six or so years, the projected harvests would still be limited, hence the applicability of the results of the market study on this would also be limited. By the way, cultured rattan takes about fifteen years before they become harvestable”.*

commenced straight afterwards, but due to approvals needed from both governments to the incorporation papers, it was established officially as the Philippine Tropical Forest Conservation Foundation (PTFCF) only in April, 2005. The Project's second Co-PM Evelyn Corado was elected to the Board of the PTFCF as the representative for the Visayas. While the coverage of the fund was country-wide, in November 2005 the PTFCF Board decided to focus on lowland dipterocarp forests, of which SINP is the largest contiguous example. The SIBP intends to access these funds for the SINP through a proposal to be filed when the PTFCF releases a call for proposals in 2006. A donor's meeting, set to be conducted in December 2005 to collect pledges from different agencies and entities for the funding of specific areas of SINP operations, did not take place because of the delay in producing the PA Management Plan<sup>36</sup>. It is now set as a priority activity for 2006, to be scheduled when the Work and Financial Plan section of the Management Plan will have been completed.

61. The NIPAS Act provides that protected area funding derived from taxes, permits and other fees should all accrue to an Integrated Protected Area Fund (IPAF)<sup>37</sup>, 75% of which should be used for the protected area where they were collected (called a sub-fund) and 25% of which should go to a Central IPAF for use in other protected areas unable to generate revenues. The PAMB approved the establishment of the sub-fund of the on 29<sup>th</sup> April 2005, as well as adopted an interim fee schedule on 10<sup>th</sup> August 2005 which is still awaiting approval by the DENR Secretary prior to full implementation. Monies placed in the sub-IPAF are subject to release after a minimum of six months upon meeting a ream of bureaucratic requirements, chief amongst which is a work plan approved by the Secretary of the DENR for the use of the funds.

## **KEY ISSUES**

### **THE POLICY CONTEXT**

#### **Extractive Industries**

##### ***Mining***

62. One of the most significant issues directly affecting the SINP are two Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSAs), both of which overlap with the Park boundaries. They were issued by the DENR on 5<sup>th</sup> December 2002 on the basis of a Bauxite Mining Reservation established on 4<sup>th</sup> February 1977 (Presidential Proclamation No. 1615), covering 230,791.5 hectares. About 27% of the SINP overlaps the Bauxite Mining Reservation. Prior to the SINP proclamation, the DENR's Mines and Geosciences Bureau proposed that about 54,064 ha with the highest geologic potential for bauxite deposits comprising less than 12% of the Park be excluded from the SINP. The President nevertheless issued the Proclamation without excising any areas for mining. However, the Proclamation also stated that any valid contract, permit or license for the extraction or utilization of natural resources previously granted were to be respected, subject to national interest and existing laws.

63. There is solid opposition among the Samar Island public to the mines. In response to a strong statement by the Catholic Bishop's Conference of the Philippines, the President declared that no new mining permits will be allowed nationwide. The SINP Proclamation also respects only those permits already issued previously. As such, only the two existing MPSAs need to be addressed by the Project.

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<sup>36</sup> The PA Management Plan forms the basis for the pledges.

<sup>37</sup> The NIPAS Act enumerates the sources of IPAF as follows: taxes from the permitted sale and export of flora and fauna and other resources from protected areas, proceeds from lease of multiple-use areas, contributions from industries and facilities directly benefiting from the protected area and other fees and incomes derived from the operation of the protected area.

64. Although the NIPAS Act does not expressly prohibit mining in protected areas, it effectively disallows extraction since it expressly prohibits mineral locating – the essential step prior to extraction of resources. The Mining Act of 1995 states that areas closed to mining applications (MPSA and FTAA) include old growth forests and areas expressly prohibited under the NIPAS Law. A substantial part of two MPSAs are in old growth forests as determined by the Project and attested to by the Regional Executive Director DENR-8. The two MPSAs cannot be operated without an Environmental Compliance Certificate required by Presidential Decree 1586. In compliance, the owner of both MPSA's is currently drafting a joint EIA based on a scoping agreement signed off by DENR's Environmental Management Bureau personnel but no apparent participation seems to have come from the public. Other laws such as the Clean Water Act 2004, the Water Code 1976, the NIPAS Act (that requires PAMB clearance), and the Management Plan also require additional legal compliance.

65. The issue poses substantial but manageable risks to the Park, foremost among which is that it could deadlock the legislative action needed to fix the final boundaries. If and when the Project's proposed bill passes both Houses of Congress, insertions can still be made in the Bicameral Committee that would excise portions of the Park for mining. However, such manipulations will almost certainly meet with substantial public opposition. Furthermore, the character of the forests as old growth would still close the areas off to mining as provided for in the Mining Act, even in the event that they are excised from the Park.

**The TET recommends** that the Project and the SIBF as project partner participate fully in the Scoping and any stage in the EIA process that is open to the public, particularly in providing technical details from the results of the BRA, on the biodiversity value and sensitivity of the proposed areas, and allowing the EIA Review Committee to use maps of old growth forest areas for determination of the legality and viability of the mines.

### **Logging**

66. Another extractive activity that may threaten the Park is commercial logging. The island has been under a logging moratorium since 1989 after flash floods devastated parts of Northern and Eastern Samar. Timber License Agreements (TLA), including 95,000 ha issued to the San Jose Timber Corporation (SJTC), operating prior to the floods were suspended by the moratorium. In August 2005, an order issued by the previous DENR Secretary lifted the suspension of the SJTC licence and further ruled that the suspension should have been lifted three months after it was issued, thereby depriving SJTC of the time to which it was entitled. As such, instead of expiring in 2007 as the original terms of the concession stated, another 16 years were granted to SJTC to log the concession. If the SJTC is eventually allowed to operate within the SINP, road networks and increased settlements will inevitably follow opening areas to illegal hunting and settlement thereby increasing park operational costs to impossible levels. Public support for the Park would also substantially erode as the spectre of national government eventually allowing large-scale logging would encourage small-scale loggers to obtain "their share" of the timber before the large companies do.

67. SIBF has filed a complaint before the present Secretary of DENR citing constitutional and legal grounds for the cancellation of the TLA. Before being able to operate, SJTC would need to secure an Annual Allowable Cut based on a Timber Inventory and an Environmental Compliance Certificate. Social acceptability is a requirement for the latter. Furthermore, most of the area in question is old growth forest and DAO 1991 #24 closed all old growth forests to logging. Local Ordinances of the three provinces and four cities prohibit large-scale extraction, defined as extraction in areas over five hectares, within their jurisdictions and particularly within the Park. The SINP proclamation states that "*all existing sustainable utilization of natural resources within the SINP not contrary to law nor incompatible with the Management Plan, shall be respected*". The PAMB-approved Management Plan zones all old growth forests as strict protection zones. A PAMB permit would still be needed for any logging to commence. A permit for such a large-scale operation can be said to be outside the delegated powers of the Executive Committee, and the full PAMB would have to be convened. If all the laws are complied with, areas zoned for strict protection would have to remain closed to logging.

Thus, while there may legally be a license in existence, actual logging operations still have substantial legal obstacles to overcome.

**The TET recommends** that the Project determines how critical the areas covered by the extractive activities are, and focuses advocacy on gaining consensus on the bounds of old growth forests.

### ***Illegal Logging***

68. Small-scale illegal logging continues to pose a threat to the SINP. In 2004, the Project crafted a Five-Year Integrated Forest Protection Plan for Samar Island which aimed to reduce illegal logging by 80%, kaingin (slash-and-burn) by 50%, and illegal hunting of wildlife by 50%. In 2004, over 156,000 board feet of lumber valued at over 3 million pesos (US\$ 58,800) and assorted vehicles and equipment valued at 4.5 million pesos (US\$ 88,235) were confiscated. The next year, only 50,000 board feet with a value of 1.5 million pesos (US\$ 29,412) were confiscated along with 1 million pesos (US\$ 19,600) worth of vehicles and implements. The Project attributed the decline either to a reduction in occurrence of illegal logging or less initiative from the DENR during the year. The Project must be congratulated for its strategic response to the problem by conducting a raid and closure of a sawmill in Buray, Paranas in 2004. Twenty illegal logging hotspots were also identified and monitored. However, TET's field observation confirmed that firewood harvesting and logging for building houses inside the Park continue largely unchecked. As such, while residents estimate an 80% decline in the illicit trade since the sawmill was closed due to the absence of buyers, there seems to be a mass acceptance that small-scale illegal logging could not be stopped. This is alarming because nearly 200,000 people live in the Park and need firewood and houses, and hence still pose an enormous threat if no systematic approach is taken to ensure law enforcement coupled with the provision of alternatives.

**The TET recommends** that in order to reduce illegal tree-felling, activities need to be undertaken to a) improve appraisals of the extent of the problem by estimating the remaining timber stock against firewood and shelter needs of the current residents of the Park; b) provision within the livelihood focus of alternatives for firewood and building needs as well as food and economic improvements; and c) extending advocacy to make the link between small-scale logging and floods/landslides also prevalent in the public mind<sup>38</sup>.

## **THE PLANNING CONTEXT**

### **Regional Planning**

#### ***Land use conflict***

69. From the foregoing discussion (paragraph 62 *et seq.*), it is clear that the biggest threats to the integrity of the SINP are those posed not by the local people but by powerful outside interests in the extractive industries. These industries demonstrably bring little if any benefit to local communities, instead resulting in severe long-term environmental degradation – witness the pollution from mine tailings along the Taft River in Eastern Samar. Although they pose a threat to the Project's gains, more importantly they pose significant negative impacts for the globally-important species that the SINP was established to protect and for which the GEF and UNDP (as well as the GOP itself) targeted money towards conserving. Major economic development projects are always a sensitive issue in developing countries when they clash with environmental priorities. It is not within the mandate of this TPE to solve these arguments or to evaluate their relative merits. However, given that the mining

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<sup>38</sup> SIBP Management planner comments: "Please note that essentially, SINP is the primary source of lumber/timber not only of SINP communities but the entire Samar Island. In fact, in most municipalities there are no legal lumber traders and dealers. The forest resource assessment claimed that tree plantation for production purposes is feasible, which can be undertaken in the buffer zone. If the lumber requirements of Samar Island can not be addressed, the threat to SINP shall continue to prevail".

and timber industries pose a risk to the continuation of the Project under Phase Two (see paragraphs 127-132), it is pertinent to comment upon this here.

70. It is fully acknowledged by the TET that the GOP is genuinely committed to nature conservation, after all, it has agreed through this Project to establish the largest terrestrial protected area in the country. In many developing countries, protected areas have been established on mineral reserves and valuable timber land, but the rights to these reserves have been foresworn in recognition of the environmental importance that these areas have to national and global communities. In the case of SINP, given that half of the animal species protected by the Park are endemic (i.e. occurs in the Philippines (and in some cases just on Samar) and nowhere else), the value of this site to the international community is huge, hence the large-scale investment that GEF has already made and is thinking of adding to. The point that the TET wishes to stress to the GOP is that their genuine commitment to nature conservation will be significantly undermined if extractive industries of this scale and nature are allowed to progress in such a globally sensitive site. For the GOP to propose allowing powerful private sector interests to undertake not one but two major extractive processes within a Protected Area proclaimed by the President, if not yet conferred with full legal protection, and which will significantly degrade the site and negatively impact its priority species, sends completely the wrong signals to the international donor community and will seriously damage the credibility of the GOP in the eyes of the global conservation community. Protected areas are designated because they are the best areas for biodiversity; they are designated to be protected for all time – not to be protected until it is expedient for them to be exploited.

71. The irony is not lost on the TET that the DENR is home to the Protected Areas and Wildlife Bureau as well as to the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) and the Forest Management Bureau, and that the MGB of which is an outright supporter of the current Mineral Sharing Agreements within SINP. In DENR-8, these single sector interests are even more pronounced (witness the continuing willingness of the PENRO and CENRO to grant Rattan Cutting Concessions without reference to the PASu – see paragraph 35) and for projects such as this to have concentrated awareness-raising on local communities and their governmental and civic leaders has led to the bureaucrats who often heavily influence decisions to have been ignored. The current state of affairs within DENR needs to be rectified urgently so as to raise the cross-sectoral awareness of the need for biodiversity conservation within the Government. After all, biodiversity issues and climate change are inextricably linked and the latter threatens to cost governments much more in the long-term than short-term tax gains from private industries.

**The TET recommends** that the awareness raising programme be extended to include the civil servants within the other Bureaux of the DENR at both national and Region 8, particularly those who have a decision-making function, in order to explain a) the global value of the SINP (endemics, globally-threatened species) and the interest and involvement of the international community; and b) the facts that the integrity of the forest as a whole is important to its survival and the areas of second growth have a vital function in buffering the key old growth areas from external influences<sup>39</sup>.

#### ***Liaison with LGUs***

72. Considering that there are 36 municipalities and one City, three Provinces and over 300 barangays within the Park, one of the main challenges is the coordination of, and dissemination of information to these units in order to integrate Park objectives and management effectively into their plans and programmes and to secure their support. Despite the dedication of those civic leaders interviewed by the TET, familiarity with the specific processes and goals and issues of the Project is known to be lacking in some instances. In Northern Samar, the Province participated in the review of the Comprehensive Land Use Plans of each Municipality and noted to the TET the previous active participation of SIBP staff in such reviews, but this ceased after particular project staff resigned.

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<sup>39</sup> The SIBP Management Planner comments: “It may also be helpful that one of the priorities of the phase 2 is the integration of the General Management Plan to regional and national development agenda. In particular, the General Management Plan shall be adopted by the Regional Development Council”.

Several leaders noted that the number of councils and boards that they have to sit on is great, and even where these leaders gave high priority to the SINP, they could not guarantee full attendance at all related meetings. Creating a Park Liaison Officer whose sole task is to keep local chief executives and other local officials briefed on developments, needs, status and other issues relating to park management would provide one means of securing greater LGU participation and coordination<sup>40</sup>. Such an officer could also ensure that PAMB members/representatives are fully informed of upcoming issues at the PAMB meeting and that representatives provide proper feedback to their principals on the discussions leading to meetings' decisions.

**The TET recommends** that a staff position be assigned with the sole function of ensuring comprehensive coordination of the Project with LGU's with the goal of seamless integration of purpose and resources to reach Park objectives<sup>41</sup>.

#### *Integration of conservation objectives in LGU development plans*

73. During the course of Project implementation, various plans have been produced in order to integrate conservation objectives to LGUs' development plans. In some cases, e.g. Mondragon, Northern Samar, an estimated half million peso Forest Land Use Plan has been integrated into the development planning process, but has not been able to be implemented because the LGU lacks the finances and human resource capacity

**The TET recommends** that the Project simplifies its planning system and concentrates on producing plans that can be adopted easily and implemented realistically by the LGUs<sup>42</sup>.

#### *Proliferation of Plans*

74. The Project has crafted a proliferation of overlapping plans with varying timeframes, the implementation of all of which would be a monumental challenge. Among these are eight Watershed Management Plans, three Forest Land Use Plans (one of which doubles as a Watershed Management Plan) and the Ten-Year PA Management Plan. More specific plans were also drafted such as the Barangay Development Plans for 55 COP Barangays, the Five-Year Integrated Forest Protection Plan, the Advocacy Plan, Communications Plan and Community Resource Management and Development Plans (CRMDPs). Other plans were envisaged but not produced e.g. the ecotourism plan. Aside from the plans for Project deliverables and the LGU plans, none of the other plans have implementation funding. All these would have to be integrated with each other and with plans of the Municipalities, Provinces and the Regional Development Plans.

75. For the purposes of Park management, it is imperative that all actors are working out of one Plan for the SINP which is simple and easy to understand. This would necessarily be the PA Management Plan which should be the one integrated with the Comprehensive Land Use Plans and Regional Development Plans. While the Watershed Management Plans might have helped as input to the Management Plan, attempting to implement them without funding would only cause demoralization or lack of interest among actors. For the PA Management Plan, it may be necessary to craft a short version enumerating the major items and make it available to the public in English and the local language to be sure that it is widely understood and adopted. Every effort should be made to integrate plans with each other but due to different formats, timeframes and uses, it might be sufficient to determine the potential points of divergence of other plans with the PA Management Plan and work on reducing them.

<sup>40</sup> PAWB comments: "Fully agree with this recommendation. In fact, we might suggest the same to other PAs under NIPAS".

<sup>41</sup> SIBP Management Planner comments: "In addition, the staff shall be responsible in developing partnership mechanism with LGUs and other stakeholders. Given the huge area of SINP, there is no way to go but to venture in massive partnership with interested groups".

<sup>42</sup> SIBP Management Planner comments: "Probably the project should explore co-management system, which can be undertaken through execution of memorandum of agreement between the PAMB and LGU. For a start, this scheme can be undertaken on pilot municipalities: where LGUs are willing and have corresponding resources".



**The TET recommends** that a summary version of the 10-year PA Management Plan be disseminated widely and integrated with other Plans, and that all necessary means are taken to ensure that activities therein are accomplished<sup>43, 44, 45</sup>.

## Park Management

76. To comply with the provisions of the NIPAS Act on the composition of the Protected Area Management Board, each of the barangays within the territory of a protected area must be represented. This one-size-fits-all legislation was clearly not intended to cope with a park the size of the SINP. The result is that the SINP PAMB numbers 298 members – larger than the Philippine Congress or the United Nations General Assembly!. This is clearly too large a number to act as an efficient or effective decision-making body for a protected area. Furthermore, the cost of ground-working and convening such a large assembly, not to mention providing them with the background material to study for purposes of their decision-making, is too great to be sustained and will be much too heavy a burden for the meagre resources meant for more important Park operations, even when the PAMB is set to meet just once a year. A protected area like SINP is a dynamic entity, needing a flexible advisory and decision-making entity to respond to the numerous issues and threats that it faces. Instead, the NIPAS Act has lumbered it with a dinosaur. The PMO has already recognised this by setting up an Executive Committee (according to the NIPAS rules), as well as three sub-PAMBs with their own Executive Committees.

77. As an initial stop-gap measure to try to bring some degree of effectiveness to the decision-making process, this approach makes perfect sense, but a host of other problems accrue. Since each sub-PAMB has its own Executive Committee, separating out the functions and duties of each as well as the entitlements will be an impossible and wholly unnecessary task. If these divisions remain, three PASus and three IPAFs will be the next logical step, thereby negating both the establishment of a large Park as well as the feeling of unity that the SINP has engendered on the island and which in turn has been so powerful a force for biodiversity conservation. Furthermore, fragmenting the Park in this way can work only in favour of those entities most threatening it – the mining and logging interests will merely exert undue influence on the sub-PAMBs in a divide and conquer strategy.

78. While the intent of the NIPAS Act is to ensure proper representation and participation in a decision-making process, having such an unwieldy, costly and largely ineffective PAMB does not achieve this. Perhaps the only effective act that such a large decision-making body can accomplish practically is to delegate all of its functions to an Executive Committee – an act that the PAMB has already carried out. The PA Management Plan, which needs PAMB approval, has passed through the Executive Committee ready for endorsement by the PAMB. However, the TET seriously doubts whether endorsement and presentation to the PAMB and the subsequent decision-making could be anything more than a cosmetic exercise of participation. As such:

**the TET recommends** that there is a pressing need to re-examine the mechanisms that are available to providing acceptable levels of representation to stakeholders in the decision-making process for the SINP while reducing significantly the number of persons involved in the executive body. Since it is clear that any such mechanism will lie outside of the provisions of the NIPAS Act, it will be important

<sup>43</sup> UNDP comments: “*The planning horizon of the LGUs needs to be considered for this recommendation*”.

<sup>44</sup> PAWB comments: “*Well noted. Already recommended this as one of the activities for Phase 2*”.

<sup>45</sup> SIBP Management Planner comments “*Popular summaries of the General Management Plan should also be prepared for local communities. Staff should take time to review the GMP in detail. As a policy direction, the PAWB also needs to review/update and modify the GMP Strategy because the procedures are intimidating to local stakeholders. The GMPS should come into two levels: (a) NIPAS-wide planning; and (b) PA level planning, the guidelines for which should be developed by the PAMB*”.

to ensure that the recommended approach can be supported through appropriate existing or new legislation<sup>46</sup>.

## Sustainability

### *Sustainable Finance*

79. The PMO estimates that the SINP will require about 10 million pesos (US\$ 196,078) to cover operational costs in 2006, rising to just over 14 million pesos (US\$ 274,500) in 2013 (assuming 5% p.a. inflation). Similarly, the PMO estimates the SINP will derive 1,928,650 pesos (US\$ 37,817) in 2006 increasing to 3,156,995 pesos (US\$ 61,902) by 2010 (see details in Annex VI.) This cost projection does not include the costs of running programmes such as visitor management, CBFM/Protected Area Community Based Forest Management Agreement (PACBRMA) monitoring, or restoration activities although it does cover ecotourism monitoring and quarterly biodiversity monitoring. These figures indicate that Park operations' deficits are expected to rise from c.8 million pesos (US\$ 156,863) a year in 2006 to nearly 11 million pesos (US\$ 215,686) in 2013 (assuming revenues remain constant from 2010 and 2013). On the request of the TET, the PMO submitted a revenue projection table that included over 33 million pesos in grants, from proposals submitted by the Project as well as various partners (see Annex VII). If approved, these would fund some of the programmes but would not make up the deficit in the operational costs of the Park.

80. Departmental Administrative Order 2000 #51 lists the possible fees that could be charged in protected areas as entrance fees, facilities user fees, resource user fees, concession fees, development fees, and royalty. Among these, the PMO has taken initial steps in setting up collection of facilities user fees and ecotourism fees. Concession fees are still being collected by the CENRO (see paragraph 35) One resource that continues to go to waste but that should be taken advantage of to support SINP operations is the proceeds from the sale of confiscated products, especially timber. Currently, if confiscated in the context of an arrest, the timber is required as evidence and is placed *in custodia legis* or in the custody of the courts. Courts do not usually have storage space, so such timber frequently ends up in the DENR compound, rotting away until the wheels of justice turn and eventually reach a conclusion. By the time it is free to be disposed of, most of its inherent value has been lost. If a conviction is reached, the timber is converted into cash resources and these automatically revert to the national treasury.

81. The Regional Technical Director of Protected Area, Wildlife and Coastal Zone and Marine Service (PAWCZMS) in DENR-8 indicated that, in response to concerned citizens groups, they are working to get agreements with the courts for the timber, having been turned into documentary evidence for the purposes of the case at hand, to be sold at the earliest opportunity and for the proceeds to be deposited in a trust fund, also in the custody of the court, to be paid to an accused once acquitted or to the government if proven to have been illegally sourced or cut. The TET recognises the progress that this represents but urges the DENR to take steps to go even further. Since the damage is borne by the protected area, it should be the protected area that is allowed to use these confiscated resources directly for park operations, particularly the long term requirements of day-to-day management, protection and monitoring. In order to ensure sustainable continuous funding of these recurrent operational costs, proceeds from past confiscations (still stored) and all future confiscations should be placed in an endowment fund, as opposed to being placed into the sub-Integrated Protected Areas Fund<sup>47</sup> where they will be used up on a short-term basis. Interest earned from the endowment fund

<sup>46</sup> SIBP Management Planner comments: "My suggestion in the General Management Plan is to abolish the Provincial Execom and instead reduce the number of members of the Provincial PAMB in the absence of enabling law to amend the PAMB membership as required in the NIPAS Act".

<sup>47</sup> PAWB comments: "The IPAF was really set up as a separate account from where all income generated from the each protected area (including donations, endowments, royalties, etc.) would be retained as a special account intended for the management of the PA. Problems regarding the sub-IPAF (of each protected area) were basically the long and tedious process of accessing the fund. However, this has already been streamlined in the revised guidelines. The proceeds from timber and other products confiscated from the SINP can be deposited in the sub-IPAF of SINP, no need to set up a separate

would then be available to help fund day-to-day operations and reduce the deficits projected in paragraph 79.

82. With respect to forest products with no court cases pending, such as abandoned timber, or resources turned over to DENR as covered by *Road Right of Way* permits, disposal can be by public auction or donation for public works. The proceeds are then required to be turned over to the Natural Resources Development Corporation (NRDC)<sup>48</sup>, an agency attached to the DENR, which performs its marketing and timber disposal functions. Steps should also be taken so that NRDC allocates and disburses the funds it receives from abandoned resources<sup>49</sup> from the SINP towards the endowment fund for park operations. Thus:

**the TET recommends** that the SIBP takes the necessary legal steps to ensure that all the proceeds from timber and other products confiscated from the SINP, whether from sales of products confiscated in convictions over illegal use or forfeiture of abandoned products and equipment and vehicles, are used to establish a separate endowment for the SINP, interest from which can be used to sustain day-to-day park operations, including increased operations against the illegal timber and other trades.

83. While more options can be explored to increase the sources of and collections for the IPAF, the TET believes that a better objective would be to make the SINP and its finances independent of the protected area system and the DENR altogether, thereby promoting the principle of treating Protected Areas as businesses as recommended by IUCN<sup>50</sup>. Numerous examples from other countries have shown that protected areas are better managed and ultimately more successful in conserving biodiversity if they are independently managed and financed. Disengaging SINP from the NIPAS and the DENR will accomplish three things<sup>51</sup>:

- it will provide park personnel with an incentive to increase park revenues and keep a better handle and its own budgetary requirements of park operations thereby promoting efficiency and cost-effectiveness (a leaner and meaner park);
- it will prevent any conflict of interest when the DENR Secretary's approval is sought for the park's operational budgets while mining or logging applications (also under his jurisdiction) are simultaneously seeking approval; and
- it can increase public support island-wide as a means of granting Samareños more autonomy to run "their park".

84. The TET realises that this suggestion will need legislative action. However, as the largest protected area in the country, Samar is the best site for pilot-testing a park system that is not tied down

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*endowment fund. Right now, all proceeds from timber and other forest products, whether within NIPAS areas or outside are handled by a government corporation, which was set up so that the funds could be easily accessed. What just needs to be done is to come up with a clear policy that proceeds from confiscated timber and other forest products from the PA be included in its IPAF".*

<sup>48</sup> PAWB comments: "Technically, this is ideal. However, I doubt if NRDC would want to allocate its funds for SINP operations. NRDC has also very little funds of its own". This may be the case, but the point the TET is making is that funds raised from disposing of confiscated timber should not be considered as anything other than belonging to the protected area from where the timber came from – certainly not to run another agency.

<sup>49</sup> Disposal of abandoned resources is referred to in DENR's Forestry Rule and Regulations as disposition of confiscated resources even though such resources are actually forfeited rather than confiscated.

<sup>50</sup> **Financing Protected Areas Task Force of the World Commission on Protected Areas (WCPA) of IUCN, in collaboration with the Economics Unit of IUCN (2000). *Financing Protected Areas*. IUCN, Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, UK. viii + 58pp.**

<sup>51</sup> SIBP Management Planner comments: "While this may be a good option, it requires further assessments and evaluations as to its application in the Philippine context. This would also provide opportunity for resource extractive industries to offer financing in lieu of the resources that shall be exploited. This would further prolong the legislative process. Instead of total disengagement to the NIPAS, why don't certain provisions of the proposed SINP Act will carry this suggestion even it would mean refilling a new version of the SINP Bill".

to bureaucratic approvals, is able to generate its own revenues<sup>52</sup>, and is able to protect itself from commercial extractive interests. As a matter of fact, the 13<sup>th</sup> step of the NIPAS process is precisely legislative action in order to keep the options open for strategies that would ensure success. In the interim, steps should be taken by the Project to identify the specific obstacles to accessing IPAF funds<sup>53</sup> and work on overcoming these in order to make the IPAF system responsive to the funding needs of the Park.

### *Social Sustainability*

85. The gains in advocacy and the unifying force that the SINP represents for the island needs to be taken to a higher level in order to respond to threats that are yet emerging or are more difficult to address. While the advocacy for SINP has partially bridged long-standing rifts among political factions, between civil society and government entities, and among NGO's previously at odds with each other, small-scale illegal logging has continued and the gains in Park protection are threatened by a burgeoning population.

86. A clear advantage of advocacy strategy was the prevalent fear of floods and landslides among Samareños. Samar suffered flash floods in 1989 and frequent natural disasters in neighbouring Leyte that followed<sup>54</sup> have kept the spectre of tragedy caused by deforestation fresh. That a protected SINP would mean security against these disasters is a line that advocates within the Project used to maximum effect. Despite this, most efforts seem to have focused on preventing the removal of Samar's natural resources to benefit non-Samareños. Residents seem to think that only large-scale extraction poses the threat. Firewood gathering and sale of timber for houses built inside the Protected Area have not been a cause for much public alarm. Up to 20 flitches of wood at a time are still being sold without comment in the weekly *tabo-tabo* (roadside farmer's markets). The tremendous potential benefits of mass awareness that has been raised by the Project have not yet been used for encouraging public efforts at restoration and rehabilitation.

87. There is also little understanding or concern among the public that the population of many towns inside the Park are growing exponentially, doubling every twenty-five years<sup>55</sup>. The Mayor of Calbayog City believes population growth within the SINP is not an issue because it is really the urban areas that are absorbing most of the population increases. Nonetheless, one barangay in the SINP visited by the TET had a population increase from just over 200 in 2003 to over 500 in 2006 because it provided a housing programme that attracted new migrants.

88. SIBF's watchdog function seems to have been exercised mostly in guarding against large-scale extraction. Having been so engaged, SIBF has not responded to forest destruction through small-scale illegal felling for firewood and shelter. As such, public awareness cannot be said to be focussed on the biodiversity value, nor the other environmental services, provided by the SINP. The changing nature of the threats also need to be highlighted so that gains are not overrun by new or overlooked threats.

**The TET recommends** that the obvious successes of the Project's advocacy programme be extended to encompass a second stage of advocacy to generate material as well as political support for park operations and to focus on the dimensions of emerging threats<sup>56, 57, 58</sup>.

<sup>52</sup> PAWB comments: "This can be worked out with the PAMB to come up with an IPAF that is responsive to the needs of the SINP. Once the revised guidelines of the IPAF is in place, it is actually the call of the PAMB on how "creative" they can be".

<sup>53</sup> PAWB comments: "The Project can help strengthen the PAMB to be more active in their role as policy and decision makers of the PA".

<sup>54</sup> A flash flood in Ormoc City, Leyte in November 1991 killed over 4,000 people and 2,000 more were missing. In December 2003, three towns in Panaon Island, Leyte suffered successive landslides within two days resulting in 154 deaths and 37 persons injured. More recently, in February 2006, a massive landslide hit barangay Guinsaigon in St. Bernard, Southern Leyte. 139 were reported dead and 973 people missing and presumed dead. Seven road workers died in a landslide in Sogod town five days before the Guinsaigon tragedy.

<sup>55</sup> from population figures given in the Northern Samar Provincial Physical Framework Plan.

<sup>56</sup> PAWB comments: "Totally agree. Advocacy work should be a continuing process".

## THE MANAGEMENT CONTEXT

### Country Driven-ness

89. There appears to have been strong country buy-in to the Project within DENR-8 but little ownership beyond themselves and PAWB. The main basis of support has come from the Provincial Governments and from some (but not all) of the Municipal Governments on Samar. Strong support has also been provided by the Bishops of the three Catholic dioceses on the island – but this mostly because of the benefits the Project can bring to the poor communities in and around the SINP, as well as for the reasons of conserving the integrity creation.

90. The Project Steering Committee appears to have taken on the role of supervisory body for the Project rather than the more usual oversight functions and advisory role. The MTE provided strong criticism of this role and recommended changes to engage the TPR more fully and to re-direct the PSC into more of a coordinating role<sup>59</sup>. The PSC rejected this recommendation despite, according to the Project Brief, that one of the roles of the PSC is to “ensure implementation of the recommendations of independent evaluators”! In fact in picking and choosing which recommendations to accept and which to reject, it seems to the TET that PSC has exhibited poor judgement and has accepted those recommendations that have caused the Project problems (see paragraph 103 *et seq.*) and rejected those that would have improved it. While taking on more responsibilities for itself than the MTE thought it should, the TET is less critical of this since in some projects a PSC does play a supervisory role, but in doing so such PSCs meet three or four times a year. According to Annex 10 of the UNDP Project Document, the PSC was supposed to meet twice a year – a schedule that it failed to complete, with only six meetings in six years – the first on 16<sup>th</sup> July 2001 some 13 months after project commencement; then 28<sup>th</sup> January 2002; then a gap of 20 months to 12<sup>th</sup> September 2003; then more regularly 27<sup>th</sup> January 2004; 12<sup>th</sup> October 2004; and 24<sup>th</sup> February 2005 but again not in the 13 months since – certainly not enough to provide an effective role, supervisory or not. See also paragraph 109a)<sup>60</sup>.

### Project Management

#### *Project Manager*

91. The Project appears to have been dogged by a high turnover of management staff which has inevitably been detrimental to the smooth-running of the Project. From DENR’s side, three Project Managers in five years would seem unwarranted if the initial selection procedure had been effective. Performance and personality problems (details of which warrant no place in a Final Evaluation Report) have been given as the reason, but if an objective technical selection process had been invoked, these may have been avoided. Instead, the DENR-8 Regional Executive Director appointed one PM and in another case, strong personal recommendation from a highly-placed DENR official was allowed to take precedence with unfortunate consequences. The selection of DENR personnel from Region 8 is understandable with regards to their local knowledge and ability to speak the local language, but it is apparent that the selection system itself is too opaque.

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<sup>57</sup> SIBP Management Planner comments: “In addition, there is a need to advance community level advocacy campaigns. The COP framework shall be reviewed because the timeframe on CO is inadequate and project-driven. The COP framework shall be developed further as the CO/CD framework for SINP”.

<sup>58</sup> See also SIBP-PMO’s comment in footnote #82.

<sup>59</sup> PAWB comments: “Agree with this. Recommend that the PSC be more of a coordinating body than a supervisory one or trim down the membership into a manageable number that could meet more often”.

<sup>60</sup> PAWB comments: “The size of the PSC was also one of the factors that led to this. The PSC has 25 members who are mostly high-ranking officials of offices (DENR Undersecretary, Agency Directors), Governors and Mayors. Just getting a common time/schedule for a meeting is really a big task not to mention the groundwork that has to be put in for them to make decisions and recommendations on the Project”.

**The TET recommends** that the selection of the PM for any second phase of the Project should be undertaken in a completely transparent fashion with, as far as is possible, one PM serving for the entire period.

92. Furthermore, the relationship between the PM and the DENR-8 District Offices, particularly the PENROs who are responsible for implementing DENR activities across the board within a Province, needs to be properly formalised. In the early days, the PM had difficulty in getting the necessary support and cooperation from the PENROs because the latter thought they were the senior figure<sup>61</sup>. The MTE's suggestion (MTE paragraph 100) that the PM should be taken out of the line management structure of DENR might be worth looking at again. The present incumbent has no problems in this respect since he was formerly a Regional Technical Director of DENR-8, but this may not be the case for any successor. Certainly the role of Park Superintendent that the PM co-holds at present needs to be carefully thought through and that role formalised as well. This needs to be done by December 2006 to meet the second condition for Phase Two – see paragraph 125.

**The TET recommends** that the roles of Project Manager and Project Superintendent are formalised within the management structure of DENR-8 by December 2006<sup>62</sup>.

### *Co-Project Manager*

93. On the NGO side, four Co-Project Managers also seems unreasonable and has also led to disjointed implementation. While such a turnover was unfortunate from DENR's side, that from the SIBF was clearly a deliberate strategy. Given that SIBF represents an umbrella of NGOs, not all of whom have either the same aims or political strategy, and at the beginning not all of whom knew each other engendering various levels of mistrust, the inability of them to agree upon a single person to be CPM led almost inevitably to a compromise arrangement whereby the three provincial chapters agreed to rotate the position amongst themselves over the duration of the Project. While this may have been a suitable political solution, and one quite appropriate for say a political leadership position, it is inappropriate for a project manager, and the wholly predictable problems and inefficiencies ensued. As all three of the CPMs interviewed readily agreed, it took each one around six months to “get their legs under the desk” and to feel confident enough to contribute meaningfully to the Project – which they could do for only the remaining six months of their tenure. It is understood that the SIBF has independently scheduled a meeting to take place shortly after the Terminal Evaluation to review the continuing relevance of rotating the CPM, and while some quarters of SIBF favour simply extending the rotation period (to say two years):

**the TET recommends strongly** that, short of an event such as illness, resignation or incompetence, a single CPM is elected by the SIBF to the position for the entire period of any second phase of the Project.

### *Efficacy of Co-Project Management*

94. The concept of co-management of the Project by the Government and the NGOs had its roots in lessons learned from the World Bank-GEF *Conservation of Priority Protected Areas Project* where separate financial arrangements had been established for the Government and the NGOs, with Government being responsible for 33% of the funding and the NGOs for 67%. As a result of significant difficulties arising from a system whereby the NGOs, who were given complete autonomy with no monitoring or management input from the Government, failed to deliver on the livelihood components and had to return significant monies to the WB-GEF, but for which the Government was

<sup>61</sup> PAWB comments: “*The problem was more of personalities rather than the positions or seniority*”. The paragraph reflects the views of the PM interviewed.

<sup>62</sup> SIBP Management Planner comments: “*If the PM would be at the same time the PASu, the latter role should be given prominence. Some PAMB members are not even aware of the PASu position*”.

ultimately held accountable since it was the guarantor of the project, UNDP and DENR agreed to set up the co-management for the SIBP to be equal but with GOP being ultimately accountable.<sup>63, 64</sup>

95. In some ways this might have been expected to be somewhat ambitious for a new NGO comprising geographically disparate functions and aims. In many ways this was the case. The “growing pains” of the SIBF clearly resulted in inefficiencies leading to delays and failure to achieve certain deliverables, most notably the Farming Systems Review. It appears that the NGOs thought “co-management” was to be completely equal in all respects, e.g. co-signing everything including, say, travel orders, and had apparently requested this, but in reality they found the levels of administration burdensome and two of the CPMs interviewed complained that the amount of administration meant that they had too little time to be effective in leading on their allocated tasks of advocacy and livelihoods.

96. There appears to have been some degree of tension between the PMs and CPMs but given the number of people involved and the short time most of them worked together, such personality difficulties would be expected. Some of these meant that the levels of distrust between the NGOs and DENR (and vice versa) were prolonged or resurrected beyond what they should have been, but given the early levels of distrust amongst the NGO partners making up the SIBF itself, these seem about par for the course. Undoubtedly a clearer definition of roles and responsibilities would have made things easier. It is apparent to the TET that as the SIBF has matured as an organisation, and a steady and largely successful working relationship with DENR has developed, levels of trust and goodwill have also increased between both parties. It is also clear that some people will always be dissatisfied with their role in just the same way that some people will never make effective project managers and hence the selection procedures for both parties’ positions need to be improved, as above. As the ex-Regional Technical Advisor of GEF keenly observed, “*Project management is as much an art as a science*”.

97. The MTE recommended doing away with the co-project management arrangements, and that might well have been a logical step taken during a snapshot when tensions were high, but certainly since then the Project has made good progress and the current incumbents of the PM and CPM positions appear to make an excellent team. Relations on both sides are now very good and the roles are more clearly defined now than at any time during the Project.

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<sup>63</sup> The MTE paragraph 99 suggests a different reason – that the CPM position was created in response to increasing tensions over project direction (SINP-focussed v. island-wide focus) during project implementation, but the TET can find no evidence to support this.

<sup>64</sup> SIBP-PMO comments: “*The way we look at this is that the idea of a Co-Management arrangement for SIBP, evolved mainly from what the Project went through from its conception to its implementation.*”

- *The concept of a biodiversity project for Samar came from the civil society, at the advice and prodding of Mr. Julian Caldecot, a consultant of the EU-funded WESAMAR.*
- *The project concept was submitted to GEF in the name of the civil society, who was later informed that projects of that scale can be entertained only if it comes from a government agency.*
- *After some negotiations, the civil society agreed to have it submitted by DENR. During the project development stage however, the civil society felt that it was being left out, to the point of charging that the DENR has “hi-jacked” the project”.*
- *When the civil society was later consulted, it was agreed that the DENR will take charge of the “Park Management proper” while the civil society will be responsible for the livelihood and community development components in the buffer zones”. The TET notes again the differences in opinion between the NGOs and the UNDP/PAWB version given in paragraph 94 and highlights once again the tensions that continued to exist during project implementation that could have been largely eradicated had the NGOs been required to sign the Project Brief/Document – see also paragraphs 9, 10, 104 and footnotes #2 and 10.*

SIBP-PMO continues: “*On the “advocacy function”, it will be noted that one of the outputs contained in the Project Document is to “strengthen the advocacy function” of the SIBF. The impression being given, is that the SIBF will be “trained” by the Project. Two factors contributed to the SIBF’s taking greater responsibility for the advocacy function:*”

- *It was able to “outgrow its growing pains”.*
- *The DENR’s official support for mining and logging concerns practically inhibited the Project’s DENR personnel from responding to the challenge”.*

**The TET recommends** that the co-management arrangements for the Project are maintained, and with the proviso that selection procedures for the PM and CPM are changed, that they should continue for any Phase Two of the Project.

### *Chief Technical Advisor*

98. The CTA appointed was a Philippine national. While appointment of national experts as CTAs has become more commonplace in recent years, there are drawbacks to such appointments as well as the advantages posed by familiarity with the country's procedures, local knowledge of a project area, and the ability to draw people together and influence events. In the current Project, while these advantages could have been expected, it does not appear that the drawbacks were adequately considered or, if they were, then not enough attention was paid to resolving them once they had become apparent. The CTA selected had previously been both the Regional Executive Director of DENR-8, and briefly the Director of PAWB and therefore was seemingly ideally suited to the role. However, at one time or another prior to the Project he had been the boss of not only the PMs, but also the NPD. Such personal dynamics should have been assessed more closely since it could have been anticipated that the inversion of previous levels of authority may have led to the CTA having undue influence on the Project – a situation that transpired. It is understood that all the PMs felt it necessary to defer to him not just on technical issues but on the strategic direction of the Project as well. It is unsurprising then that his ideas were never robustly challenged<sup>65</sup>, even by the PSC, and even when there was a radical shift away from PA management planning (in which the CTA had no expertise) to watershed management planning (in which he did). This has resulted in deviations from the original project concept that have affected not just the ability of the Project to deliver successfully certain critical components on time, but to replace others with substitutes that do not fulfil the role envisaged for an effective community-based conservation framework.

**The TET recommends** that the CTA appointed for any second phase of the Project should be appointed by UNDP and DENR and have no previous connection with DENR-8 and either be a Philippine national from outside of the Visayas<sup>66</sup> or be a foreign national.

### *Adaptive Management*

99. The project has had to adapt to significant changes during its lifetime and in some instances has done so with aplomb. In fact, despite the problems accruing from the numerous changes of PM and CPM dealt with in a foregoing section, the ability of all the management and staff and Project partners to respond and adapt to changing circumstances and unfavourable events has to be viewed as one of the great successes of the Project and all concerned should be congratulated in bringing the SINP to fruition in the face of powerful contrary interests. In the main, this seems to have come about by there being a very clear target – establish the Park – and a huge sense of togetherness engendered by a common goal and external threats – mining and logging.

100. Unfortunately, where the tasks have not been so clearly defined, the choices broader, and the feeling of unity amongst the Project partners and staff not so strong, the adaptive management has been significantly poorer and the decisions made have been considerably less successful – see the section on Project Strategy below.

### *Innovation*

101. The Project appears to have suffered from a distinct lack of innovation particularly in the implementation of its technical components. While the advocacy programme has responded well to

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<sup>65</sup> The TET wishes to make it clear that under no circumstance whatsoever are they implying any malpractice on the part of the CTA nor in any way impugning his integrity and the comments should not be construed by any party to imply otherwise. The point that TET is making is solely in relation to natural deference and respect given to senior members of an organisation and particularly so in Asian cultures.

<sup>66</sup> PAWB comments: “Or DENR for that matter. However, given the culture in Samar, we might need some time for them to accept and adjust to someone who's not from Samar”.



local conditions and tried a wide range of approaches, mostly with success, to generate support, most noticeably with a careful approach to the Catholic church, the technical aspects of the livelihoods programme appear to have been implemented by rote<sup>67</sup>. It is difficult to understand why this maybe – factors may include the lack of international perspective normally acquired through a project having an international CTA; the NGOs not having had the chance or experience to have been exposed to ideas beyond Samar or the Philippines, project management always playing catch-up on a project badly behind schedule and concentrating on implementing “standardised” approaches rather than tailoring them specifically to the needs of SINP<sup>68</sup>. Provision of innovative approaches is often a role that UNDP can catalyse or facilitate, but it appears that staff were already too busy on other Project-related tasks to either identify the need or to respond to it.

102. Innovation is desperately required within the Project to link livelihood interventions with biodiversity needs. There is a huge range of experience catalogued from lessons learned on other projects to the experiences of individual staff within the UN/GEF/IUCN agencies but also on networks of NGOs worldwide.

**The TET recommends** that a) UNDP should facilitate the Project quickly to access innovative ideas for linking livelihoods with biodiversity conservation that could be introduced before the end of the current phase; and b) this aspect requires addressing under any second phase of the Project<sup>69</sup>.

### **Project Strategy**

103. The Project has suffered badly from “strategic creep” and this is perhaps the area that the TET is most critical of. A sequence of seemingly unrelated events has been allowed to transpire that has resulted in a change of strategic direction that has diluted the delivery of project resources to priority areas and produced outputs that are of dubious value. Unfortunately this has detracted from the Project’s considerable successes in other areas.

104. As discussed in paragraph 10, there were considerable tensions within the Project between the NGOs whose focus was on providing a livelihood-based response to biodiversity conservation across the island, and the DENR management which was focussed on the SINP as per the Project Brief. These tensions can be accorded to the fact that the NGOs, or their representatives, were never given the opportunity to sign off<sup>70</sup> on the Project Brief submitted to GEF, even though they had been included as co-implementers.

**Lesson Learned:** All partners involved directly in the implementation of a project should be required to sign off on the Project Brief prior to its submission to GEF in the same way as the GEF Country Focal Point signs signifying the agreement of the Government.

105. These tensions and pressures continued to permeate the Project to such an extent that they were picked up by the Mid-term Evaluation (MTE) and assessed as being valid. The MTE concluded that

<sup>67</sup> PAWB comments: “*The Project thought it best that the livelihood projects should be communities’ preference rather than imposed or selected by the SIBP. The SIBP may have taken the safe side and went along with the “standard approaches” which the communities identified with and would readily accept. In a way it was more of gaining their trust first on the what they are accustomed to and then slowly introducing new concepts*”.

<sup>68</sup> Three examples from projects known to the TET – a) in Vietnam the PARC project introduced new *varieties* of crops and animals already raised by villagers that produced higher yields in exchange for illegal guns used for hunting; b) in Malaysia, houses are constructed in urban and rural areas that are designed specifically for swiftlets to breed in, the nests of which are harvested at levels set by the owners’ but whose harvest no longer affects wild populations and hence is sustainable; c) in Yemen, a women’s-based cooperative provided and serviced small solar-powered lights to families living in protected areas so that the women could prepare, and the family eat, evening meals without the need for smoky, fire-based alternatives for light.

<sup>69</sup> SIBP Management Planner comments: “*The management plan carries a provision in developing a livelihood portfolio for SINP through mobilization of resources from various institutions. One strategy is to enter partnership with national NGOs that offer livelihood support projects*”.

<sup>70</sup> See footnote #10.

“a broader project purpose would be feasible and more appropriate” and, seizing upon the ambiguity in project design and the mismatch between the project purpose and the project goal, recommended “expanding the purpose of the SIBP towards development of a natural resource management system for conservation and ecologically sustainable development across the whole of Samar Island”. It is not within the TOR of the TET to evaluate the MTE, but in this particular recommendation, the TET believes the MTE to have been misguided, not least because a project that was already clearly having difficulties in disbursing its funds (see paragraph 17 and Figure 1) to meet its original commitments over a very large area was now being asked to cover an even larger area with no further resources to meet that task.

106. At its fifth meeting on 12<sup>th</sup> October 2004, the PSC agreed to accept an expanded project purpose, requesting that the goal and project purpose be amended to reflect this but then, perversely, making no formal response to another MTE recommendation to “review the logical framework in the light of recommendations from the MTE” (see paragraph 109b). In addition, there appears to have been significant support within the PSC, and from UNDP to, if not expand the geographic scope of the Project, certainly to increase support for economic livelihood activities. This is reflected in the minuted response when accepting the MTE recommendation to increase support for economic /livelihood activities of “Accepted. Our battle cry since Day 1”. This in itself begs the question that if this approach to the Project had such widespread support, why did the design not take more account of it. But then it may also reflect the commonly held misconception that GEF represents just another international donor package which can provide livelihood support rather than having its focus more exclusively on biodiversity conservation. UNDP appears to have recognised this by committing TRAC funds to the Project to finance direct livelihood interventions, and in the report of the 5<sup>th</sup> meeting of the TPR, it is clear that while the MTE recommendation was endorsed, concern was expressed as to “how to formalize these [new] objectives and activities without necessarily diluting the foremost objective of conservation, as set forth by GEF, and how these can be reflected in a practical way within a reasonable amount of time considering time and financial constraints”. Another very revealing minuted comment from the PSC meeting is that accepting the recommendation to extend the Project by three to four years – “Remaining budget may be *stretched* to finance extension of 2-2.5 years” – the emphasis added by the TET. This clearly shows that finances would be under considerable strain to extend the Project temporally, let alone geographically as well.

107. As a result of this guidance, the PMO moved to attempt to extend its “*stretched*” resources to provide a more island-wide approach. This appears to have focussed on re-directing the PA management planning exercise in which there was a dearth of national expertise (including the CTA) to that of watershed management planning (in which the CTA had experience) on the basis that such an exercise would provide an island-wide framework for livelihood interventions as well as providing sufficient basic material which could be stitched together easily to form the PA management plan.. Unfortunately it did neither, and this decision represents the culmination of strategic creep with significant subsequent effects.

108. Eight watershed<sup>71</sup> management plans were produced covering about 80% of the SINP and these were supplemented by two Forest Land Use Plans covering parts of the remainder of the SINP. They were not produced to a standardised design; had significant data missing, particularly biodiversity data because they had concentrated on water uses; had no habitat characterisation information (which was also missing from the BRA which was merely an inventory); included more habitat types than were necessary for the PA management plan; but were insufficient to stand-alone within the NIPAS requirements and therefore required considerable work from a PA management planning specialist who was finally contracted in August 2005 at the insistence of UNDP. They have required the establishment of eight Watershed Management Councils which, it is claimed, act as replacements for the proposed Village Conservation Councils (VCCs). They do not. The VCCs were conceptualised to act at the village level providing a mechanism for governing the Bufferzone Management Units into which the buffer zone was to be divided. The BMU concept was abandoned when it was discovered

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<sup>71</sup> These represent composites derived from 25 smaller watersheds present within the SINP.

during the Project that more people lived within the core zone than within the buffer zone (see paragraph 8, last bullet). However, rather than try to adapt the concept or re-design it to provide a link between the SINP and the barangays inside it, it became a casualty of the ill-advised move to watershed management plans. Therefore, the end result of this strategic creep has been:

- a) a PA management plan that has been delivered so late that it has had a major detrimental impact on the effectiveness of the livelihood programme and other components of the Project (as the Project Manager/Park Superintendent says, “*It’s really hard implementing without a management plan*”);
- b) a series of plans to add to the already burgeoning planning framework for Samar and another layer of councils which have no money to meet, no resources or skills to implement the plans, and which will not be updated once the Project ends;
- c) the abandonment of a key part of the community-based conservation framework; and
- d) a supposed saving of money which instead has represented an extra workload diverting resources away from the central tasks, provided a false sense of progress, and provided no appreciable benefit in terms of the Project’s objectives

109. This strategic creep raises a number of issues:

- a) Who is responsible?: Given that it came about through a number of decisions, no one group or individual can be expected to shoulder the blame. However, the TET is critical of the role played (or not played) by the PSC. The PSC has met on only six occasions during the almost six years that the Project has been extant – wholly inadequate supervision for a US\$ 12.9 million project<sup>72</sup> and yet what is worse is that perceptive recommendations made by the MTE to revise the structure and function of it and the TPR were rejected out of hand – the minutes from the fifth meeting record “*Not accepted. What we recommend: Maintain the present role of the TPR but add SIBF in the membership. [As per the MTE recommendation.] Status quo for PSC*”. No reasons are given for this decision, and no discussion is recorded<sup>73</sup>. Closer supervision through more frequent meetings of the PSC (three or even four PSC meetings a year is not unusual for GEF projects) and more rigour from the TPR (again as recommended by the MTE) would undoubtedly have reduced the opportunities for strategic creep to have occurred.
- b) Why was the logical framework not formally revised?: The MTE made another perceptive recommendation in that a “*The Project should review the logical framework in the light of the recommendations from the MTE. The planned outputs, targets and indicators should be revised to form a coherent structure that will deliver the three main recommended components. It is recommended that more regular and rigorous use of the logical framework as the principal tool for planning, steering, reporting, monitoring, and evaluation of the Project. The revised logframe should be used routinely to guide the work of the PMO, PSC, and TPR*”. The emphasis is by the TET because had this recommendation been followed it would have been obvious very early on that even if the MTE’s proposed recommendations for re-directing the Project strategy to a more island-wide approach could have been accommodated within the overall logframe, the move to watershed management planning could not do so without causing significant detriment to Output 3 – the community-based conservation framework. Had the formal review process recommended by the MTE been undertaken, then someone would

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<sup>72</sup> PAWB comments: “*This is the budget for the whole 8 years. We implemented only half of the project life – it should be less than 12.9M*”.

<sup>73</sup> PAWB comments: “*Just want to clarify things. I recall that the discussion centred on the MTE’s recommendation that the TPR be a supervisory body, providing directions for the Project. And to include the SIBF as member. TPR members are the signatories of the Project Document (DENR, NEDA and UNDP). However, UNDP reacted that its role is not to supervise the Project and that it was more concerned with outputs not how the way things are run in the Project. This recommendation of MTE was what was ‘not accepted’. Also discussed during that PSC meeting was the streamlining the PSC and creating an Executive Committee, a smaller committee composed of about 10 members who can really meet regularly and provide better supervision over the Project. This led to the decision that the PSC’s role and composition be ‘status quo’ and that it remain a collective consultative body*”. This helps to clarify the situation but accentuates the fact that the minutes of these meetings were wholly inadequate in recording the decision-making process for the Project.

undoubtedly have identified the weakness of this approach and halted it before the damage was done. It remains a mystery not only as to why the logframe was not revised (it does not even feature in the minutes of the 5<sup>th</sup> PSC meeting), but how a Project Director and Project Manager can manage a project without one.

- c) Given the role that the MTE played in re-designing the Project half way through, another issue is, what should evaluation teams evaluate against? At the time of the MTE in June 2004, GEF priorities have moved significantly from a focus on protected area management (current at the point of this Project's design in 1997-2000) to conservation through more broadly-based policy mainstreaming and an integrated livelihood approach. Although the MTE's recommendation may have been based on the clamour for an island-wide approach voiced by the SIBF, it is possible that it may also have been sub-consciously influenced by these changed GEF priorities. Certainly parts of the MTE's rationalisation of its recommendation points towards this – "*The current narrow strategy of trying to establish a conventional protected area over the central forest portion of the island will not be effective by itself. Surrounding land uses – agriculture, forestry, infrastructure, water extraction, tourism, urban development – must also be ecologically sustainable, i.e. they must also make allowance and provision for biodiversity conservation.*" – mainstreaming by any other name. In the light of this, it is unclear to the present TET as to whether the evaluation should be against the original project design or whether it should be influenced by current GEF thinking. It has decided to evaluate this Project solely against the original design aims because it takes the view that a project cannot be expected to alter its aims to accommodate shifts in wider GEF policy, only to provide adaptive management to changing circumstances within its own immediate environment. It is unclear as to whether the MTE shared this same view, and its strong criticism of the Project and its highly influential attempt to re-direct it midway through its implementation, suggests otherwise.

**The TET recommends** that the GEF Secretariat consider this point on evaluation criteria and issue guidance through the Regional Technical Advisors to be included in evaluation teams' TORs.

- d) This in turn leads to another broader set of issues regarding GEF's wider strategic approach. It is important to stress that the successes that this project has achieved – most notably the creation of a new protected area covering the largest remaining tract of lowland rainforest in the Philippines, uniting an island-wide community and its leadership in support of it and in vocal opposition to powerful and destructive extractive industries – could not have been achieved simply through the type of mainstreaming project currently favoured by GEF. Let us be clearer still – the successes of this Project have come about precisely because it had a narrow protected area focus, adequately funded (unlike a number of other PA-based projects carried out previously in the Philippines), that created a focus around which nascent biodiversity conservation interests could coalesce, and on which local government authorities could build to incorporate biodiversity into their planning processes.

**The TET recommends** that GEF recognise that this sort of protected area-focussed project still have an important role in conserving global biodiversity, and cautions that the current approaches championed by GEF may not always be the most appropriate and that a mixed portfolio may be more effective in achieving the aims of the CBD. Don't throw the baby out with the bathwater!

## Coordination

110. The Project was able to get support and active participation of LGUs at the provincial, municipal and barangay levels in the implementation of project activities. Working partnerships have been established successfully with the LGUs as part of the Project's adaptive management strategies for biodiversity conservation. Despite this success, the Project failed to establish the link in which the plans and activities of the provincial, municipal and barangay units are properly coordinated and consistent with the SINP objectives. Findings from the TET's field visits revealed that there have

been activities conducted by the Project in partnership with a Municipal government with minimal, knowledge and participation of the Provincial government. For example, in the north of the island SIBP implemented the development of a Forest Land Use Plan (FLUP) in partnership with the municipality of Mondragon, but Northern Samar Province had minimal knowledge of this and participated even less.. To ensure that the interest of the LGUs is encouraged and their support elicited, better coordination between the livelihood development activities is needed.

**The TET recommends** that the Project establishes a mechanism through which proper coordination among LGUs at various levels is ensured<sup>74, 75, 76</sup>.

111. Coordination with other donor or support agencies such as the Department of Agriculture, FPE and the CBRMP-World Bank Project which have existing activities within areas covered by the Project has not been established formally or informally. This is a pity since it has led to contradictions of approaches wasting time and resources, e.g. while SIBP promotes organic farming in the municipality of Calbiga as part of its livelihood activities, the DA continues to promote the use of inorganic fertilizers and pesticides in exactly the same area.

**The TET recommends** that the PSC takes on a more active role in coordinating the activities of the Project with those of other government agencies and donor groups working in the area.

### **Institutionalisation of Park Management**

112. Many of the Project staff are simultaneously holding dual roles within the Project and the embryonic Park Management Authority. The MTE criticised this recommending that a clear distinction be made the two on the basis that the “task of the former is to facilitate the establishment of the conservation system or PA for the latter to manage”. but PSC rejected this because they believed it to be a good way of institutionalising the Project. The TET agrees with this position but recognises that it entails a lot of work for those people holding dual roles, and assumes that such staff are both of high calibre and dedicated to a successful project outcome – something that seems to be the case here. However, such a position should not be taken for granted (see recommendation in paragraph 33) and the TET would not recommend this approach as a general rule.

### **Back-ups**

113. One somewhat shocking thing that the TET found was that there was no formal back-up procedure for the Project’s computers. Each department operated an ad-hoc system where at best parts of the system, databases, files, etc. were backed up onto CD/DVD or external hard drives, periodically when people remembered. These backed-up files were then mostly stored within the same office as the main computers, or where they were stored externally, only the person involved appeared to know where these were kept. In the event of a fire and/or death of key staff, most Project data would be lost. The only exception was Accounts which backed up their system each Friday and stored it externally to the office. The data that was considered most valuable was that which cost most to buy – not that which had taken longest to collect. The urgency of the following recommendation has been stressed during the TPE and undertakings that it would be instigated immediately were reluctantly obtained.

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<sup>74</sup> PAWB comments: “Actually, the PAMB when organized and functioning according to its mandate is a venue or mechanism where coordination within and among the LGUs and other stakeholders can be achieved”.

<sup>75</sup> SIBP-PMO comments: “Two levels of prioritization thus emerge. Prioritizing the zones and prioritizing the segments of the population in each zone. Conceivably, two or more zones can be considered as one management unit, or one or two zones will involve two or more LGUs. In the latter case, the TET’s Recommendation on establishing mechanisms for proper coordination among LGUs should be strictly observed”.

<sup>76</sup> SIBP Management Planner comments: “Coordination mechanism e is already established through the PAMB with representatives from barangay, municipal and provincial LGUs plus the creation of provincial PAMB. The project, however, did not focus very well in ensuring the active operation of the PAMB even at the execom and provincial PAMB levels. This should also be attended”.

**The TET recommends** that the Project Manager instigate a rigorous system of computer back up for each department to be undertaken at the end of each and every week, and that such back-ups are either stored safely but externally to the office, or within a fire-proof safe within the office. Similarly, back-up lists of passwords should be stored securely.

## THE TECHNICAL CONTEXT

### Livelihood Strategy

114. The Project's livelihood activities are mainly agriculture-based and have few if any links to biodiversity conservation. The reason for this seems to be that the identification and prioritisation of livelihood projects has been based solely on the suggestions given by the local communities within the COP sites during the process of participatory planning. Project staff have not provided suggestions to farmers about alternatives which could be more favourable to biodiversity conservation. Consistently, most of the capability-building activities (training, cross-visits for livelihood development) that the Project implemented within the COP sites were focused on agriculture with little concern for biodiversity conservation. The Project staff should provide guidance and suggestions to farmers during the participatory planning process to encourage biodiversity-compatible livelihood activities to be chosen and implemented. Repeat COP visits are necessary to sites where livelihood activities have been introduced before by the Project (e.g. vegetable and abaca production), to be able to suggest appropriate modifications and improvements on the activities to maximise the conservation effectiveness.

115. Most of the livelihood projects have been implemented in COP sites within the buffer zone areas, and very few if any in communities within the core zone. This is partly because the existing peace and order situation is unstable within the core zone communities due to the NPA and the military, and partly to the misperception that the buffer zone communities have a higher demand for livelihood from the forest, and therefore giving them alternative source of livelihood will minimize human pressure on the forest itself.

**The TET recommends** that the COP livelihood activities should be extended in areas or barangays located within the core zone of the SINP where communities are expected to have been highly dependent on forest resources for livelihood<sup>77, 78, 79</sup>.

### Land-use Planning and Forestry

116. Land-use in the Park is characterised by *kaingin* or swidden agriculture; collection of forest resources such as timber, rattan, bamboo, abaca; and other non-timber forest products; tapping of almaciga resins; limestone extraction; and hunting of wildlife and fishing for households' daily consumption needs, medicine, and trade. The Project has successfully introduced strategies that have encouraged upland dwellers in selected barangays to reduce forest utilisation practices and forest conversion for agriculture to more controlled farming using improved farming technologies. The

<sup>77</sup> PAWB comments: "Totally agree".

<sup>78</sup> SIBP-PMO comments: "As for the SIBF, it cannot be expected to have at once all the resources and capabilities for covering the whole SINP area or all of the populace. The SINP zones should thus be prioritized based on conservation considerations such as the threats on specific critical areas (strict protection zones or parts thereof). For one thing, the results of the prioritization should be the basis in selecting the areas and barangays for implementing the TET's Recommendation to extend the COP livelihood activities. After all, it would be tragically ironic if by the time the SIBF reaches areas affecting a strict protection zone, its biological resources would already be degraded beyond regeneration".

<sup>79</sup> SIBP Management Planner comments: "One of the livelihood projects that should be explored is the massive tree plantations in the buffer zone for production purposes to meet the lumber requirements of Samar. Based on the different livelihood studies of SIBP, a livelihood framework for SINP should be developed".

introduced production schemes, however, are distant from complementing the biodiversity conservation component of the Project<sup>80</sup>.

117. Quick restoration of kaingined forest areas may be achieved through enrichment planting using relatively fast-growing dipterocarp and other native species, while integration of abaca, rattan and fruit trees like pili and durian can also be introduced and to eventually arrive at more stable agro-forestry system with high biodiversity conservation and economic implications. Development of forest farming and tree-based agro-forestry, especially in open and abandoned areas would minimise human pressures on the forests brought about by collection of wood and other forest products. There has not yet been any forest restoration activity on-the-ground that directly complements the Project's biodiversity conservation objective.

**The TET recommends** the introduction and development of forest farming and tree-based agroforestry systems in existing kaingin farms and open areas to minimise human pressures on the forests brought about by continuing collection of wood and other forest products, and the promotion of biodiversity-compatible farming systems within communities.

### **Demonstration Sites**

118. The established demonstration farms are inappropriate and do not showcase improved technologies that link livelihood to biodiversity conservation. The technologies demonstrated are purely agricultural crop production such as abaca, pineapple, and fruit trees production which do not encourage biodiversity conservation. Improved abaca technology, when adopted by farmers within the Park, would have serious implications to forest restoration and protection, e.g. it would encourage farmers to establish abaca plantations in kaingin farms and open spaces in the forest wherever possible to the extent of losing the possibility of restoring these areas with trees. It may even lead to farmers opening up forested areas for abaca production. The project should showcase a tree-based abaca production system in kaingin and open areas, e.g. emphasising native tree species such as dipterocarps integrated with abaca.

119. The on-site demonstration of inorganic fertiliser application in Barangay Cansulabao in the municipality of Hinabangan, Western Samar and the use of plastic mulch to control weeds in vegetable production as practised in the municipalities of Calbiga, Paranas, and Hinabangan are contrary to the intention of the Project of promoting conservation-compatible livelihood opportunities in local communities. The two agroforestry demonstration farms in Barangays Cantongtong and Camaruboa-an, Jiabong, Samar demonstrating pineapple in hedgerows for soil and water conservation in hillside farming are not only inappropriate but also deliver wrong messages to the farming communities. The main purpose of hedgerow establishment in hillside farming is to establish an effective barrier across the hill to minimise soil erosion during heavy rains and serve as source of organic material (leaf litter) for the improvement of soil fertility in alleys where short rotation crops are raised. Pineapple is not suitable as a hedgerow material because it does not have the potential to control soil erosion and contribute organic matter to the soil. It is necessary that trees should be used as planting material for hedgerow establishment in the demonstration farms. Tree-food crop integration farming systems should be demonstrated in suitable agricultural production areas such as contour farming with trees serving as hedgerows, border planting with trees serving as borders, and wide-row intercropping where lines of trees spaced wide apart are established and short- and medium food crops (vegetables, fruit trees) are planted in wide spaces between trees. The trees serve as the source of fuelwood and in the longer-term of timber for household construction needs.

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<sup>80</sup> SIBP-PMO comments: *“To address the TET’s concern about making production schemes complement biodiversity conservation, the livelihood projects should be integral components of the zone-specific comprehensive plans. This means that there should be a comprehensive plan on how, for example, to protect each protection zone, or how to restore restoration zones, with the livelihood projects as just one component or tool. These plans should become the basis for prioritizing specific sections of the affected population for livelihood assistance, based on their role in the plan”*.

**The TET recommends** the rapid assessment and planning for the improvement of the established demonstration farms to showcase biodiversity-compatible farming systems<sup>81</sup>. On-the-ground improvements in the established demonstration sites and even establishment of more appropriate demonstration farms in other locations should be considered for Phase Two.

### **Impact on Beneficiaries**

120. The people living in and around the SINP have perceived a number of changes during the last five years from interventions by the Project which have impacted on their lives and their environment in various ways. The Project has been successful in changing perceptions of the villagers about the forest and its biodiversity from that of viewing resources in a solely exploitative way to ones of resource conservation and protection. Illegal timber harvesting was perhaps the most prominent livelihood activities of villagers prior to the Project, but in barangays where the COPs have been operating, and in particular those where access is easier and more visits have been made, timber poaching has decreased significantly with the villagers themselves attributing the change to higher awareness and better understanding of forest policies, combined with the availability of sound alternative sources of income such as improved farming. As further proof, confiscations of illegally harvested timber from the forest have decreased, despite the authorities maintaining the same level of vigilance.

121. The Project's COPs have encouraged active involvement of LGUs and local communities in biodiversity conservation and protection, e.g. the formation of forest protection groups called *Bantay Kalikasan* (environmental guards) and *Bantay Gubat* (forest guards) in barangays, and the creation of environmental resource management units in both the Provincial and Municipal Governments. Furthermore, the LGUs have integrated the SINP foci on biodiversity conservation and protection into their strategic development plans.

122. The COPs have been very successful in linking the local communities effectively with the local NGO service providers. Local communities have been organised effectively, capacitated, and provided with alternative livelihood opportunities and consequently persuaded away from timber poaching and other illegal forest harvesting activities. However, the Project's degree of intervention is not sufficient enough to instill the principle of biodiversity conservation and protection permanently among the minds and actions of the local people. The inappropriateness of introduced livelihood alternatives to support biodiversity conservation concerns has a long history in the Philippines and is being repeated yet again here, with the inevitable result that it will fail in due time. The Project must be able to inculcate in the minds of the local people that sustainable farming is something adoptable, economical. and with clear ecological potential to conserve biodiversity.

**The TET recommends** that the Project implements repeated and longer-term Information, Education, and Communication activities to ensure that communities are influenced to put the principles of community participation in biodiversity conservation and protection into action

123. Impact on local peoples' livelihoods has not yet become visible since the COPs have been active on the ground for just two years. There have been views, however, from the villagers that the Project's livelihood support is yet to be improved (e.g. more frequent community visitation and follow through). Others perceived that the livelihood support has been able to improve farming and farm production of the villagers (e.g. integration of economic crops in coconut areas), and that this, given time, would lead to an increase in incomes.

<sup>81</sup> PAWB comments: "Totally agree. Unfortunately, because of the immediate demand for livelihood support from the communities, the Project had to link up quickly with the Department of Agriculture with regard to livelihood projects. Most of DA's projects are concerned more on high production yields without taking into consideration biodiversity compatible approaches. Maybe better coordination with the DA and academe should be established towards this end".



**The TET recommends** that the Project has to coordinate with the LGUs and other existing support-agencies in the area to plan and implement a strategy that will ensure continuing visitation and provision of technical support to local communities

## PHASE TWO

124. The Project was originally designed to be implemented over a period of eight years, but was amended to run in two consecutive phases of four years each at the request of GEF Council in response to a period when resources were low. This enabled projects such as this, submitted at this time, to be initiated and to be continued at a later stage when resources had been replenished. However, since that time, GEF priorities have changed to favour mainstreaming projects over those focused on protected area conservation. There has also been a strategic move towards a greater assessment of risks and to find means to manage or mitigate them. It is therefore conducive upon the TET to provide an assessment of the chances of success for the proposed Phase Two and to indicate those issues that may have a bearing on its chance to deliver successfully and to appraise the level of risk that these issues pose.

125. The key question needing an answer is: Should Phase Two of the Project take place? The conditions set in the Project Brief/Document are:

Condition	Status
1. Legislative proclamation of SINP.	<b>Condition effectively met.</b> Presidential Proclamation #442 2003 declared the SINP established. Formal passage of the Congressional Act has been delayed. SIBP has facilitated the passage of 3 Provincial Ordinances to strengthen the terms of the Presidential Proclamation.
2. Strengthened PASu office by defining roles of PASu, PENRO and CENRO in the PA management and transfer of resources from PENRO/CENRO to PASu.	<b>Condition pending.</b> Roles have not been specifically defined for these positions on Samar – see paragraph 40. The situation is working clearly at present because the PASu is an ex-RTD of DENR-8. It is unclear what would happen if another PASu were assigned. Formal recognition of the roles and their inter-relationships <b>needs to be completed by December 2006 for this condition to be met.</b>
3. Commitment from DENR to absorb staff salaries, equipment replacement and maintenance.	<b>Condition met.</b> The Regional Executive Director of DENR-8 committed in a letter signed on 31 <sup>st</sup> August 2005 affirming DENR-8's willingness to fulfil its obligations regarding staffing, equipment and facilities, and the maintenance of these [Letter not seen first-hand by the TET.]
4. Contractual responsibilities for DENR, LGUs and community actors negotiated.	<b>Condition pending.</b> The responsibilities of the DENR, LGUs and community actors have been negotiated. The most appropriate formalization of these will be the signed endorsement of the Management Plan by the PAMB en banc. The PAMB Executive Committee has already endorsed a draft of the Management Plan which, although delayed, is due to be submitted as a final version in April 2006. PAMB endorsement is envisaged to follow shortly after.
5. PA boundaries delineated.	<b>Condition effectively met.</b> Boundaries are delineated on the map as agreed by the Presidential Proclamation #442 2003. Demarcation on the ground awaits passage of the Congressional Bill.

**The TET recommends unanimously and without ambiguity** that GEF supports the second phase of the SIBP to consolidate the considerable gains achieved by the first phase, subject to:

- a) the above conditions being in place by December 2006,
- b) Phase Two being re-designed to take account of the issues below; and
- c) subject to GEF accepting the risks that certain external issues pose to its success.

The first phase of the SIBP has delivered some considerable successes:

- the establishment of a new 453,000 ha forest protected area by Presidential Proclamation supporting some 38 species of mammal (50% endemic); 215 species of birds (55% endemic), 51 species of reptile (69% endemic), 26 species of amphibian (52% endemic) and over 1,000 species of plants (c. 53% endemic);
- produced a management plan and zoning plan for the protected area and the construction of necessary buildings (Park HQ and Ranger Stations) is well advanced;
- established a legally-recognised park management structure;
- raised awareness of biodiversity issues and united all levels of Samar society and its leaders in support of the Park; and
- facilitated the passing of three Provincial Ordinances banning logging and mining from all territories on Samar Island.

Without further support from the GEF to consolidate these achievements, the investment made by all parties to the first phase will not be able to be sustained. However, investment in such a Phase Two is not without risks. These are discussed below.

126. Beforehand, it should be stressed that the effects of continued GEF involvement will go far beyond just the financial investment. GEF's continued presence will send powerful political signals that the international community values the SINP and its biodiversity with high rates of endemism, and this will serve to lend support to those acting to conserve the Park (PAWB, Samar congressional representatives, LGU leaders, Bishops, and civil society as a whole) and against those whose economic and sectoral interests threaten it. Conversely, and in some ways more importantly, if GEF walks away from Phase Two, to which it is generally seen as already part committed, it will send an even more powerful political message that those responsible for the Convention of Biodiversity do not value the SINP highly enough to continue to fund it, so it cannot be that internationally important after all – perhaps not how the GEF will view such a decision, but one that will be perceived locally in such a light nonetheless.

## **RISKS TO PHASE TWO**

### **Mining**

127. **Risk: High.** Two Mineral Production Sharing Agreements have come to light within the SINP. These amount to 6,694 ha mostly in the old growth forest in the core or the north-west of the Park, and another of 5,519 ha straddling the western boundary of the core and buffer zones but also affecting old growth forest. Current efforts are being made during the passage of the Congressional Bill to excise these areas from the SINP. If successful, mining operations would denude this area of core forest and cause untold pollution to watercourses in both the west and east of the Park since one of the areas identified straddles the watershed. A compromise provision in the Bill before Congress allows geological and mineral assessments in parts of the Samar Bauxite Mineral Reserve area to undertake feasibility analyses for mineral development. The President may allow mining in these areas subject to complying with existing laws. The mining company that owns these MPSAs is already commencing work on an EIA.

128. **Mitigation strategy:** The compromise Bill currently before Congress allows for exploration for minerals but not mining. Successful passage of this Bill, anticipated to be by the end of 2006, would create a considerable barrier to mining. In addition, Provincial Ordinances banning mining, passed by all three Provinces on Samar as part of the SIBP activities, also present a formidable obstacle to mining operations being given consent. Furthermore, the Mining Act 1995 specifically bans mining in old growth forest, the type that the SIBP's Biological Resource Assessment classifies the forest in the MPSA areas as. This may require independent verification should DENR not accept the BRA<sup>82</sup> – the most thorough biological inventory and assessment ever carried out on Samar Island. Finally, there is massive, vocal, public opinion in favour of the SINP and against any mining on the island. The threat of a second anti-logging protest caravan in December 2005 successfully secured a political assurances regarding logging on Samar.

129. **Residual Risk: Medium.** In light of the mitigation factors, the TET believes the residual risk to be low. However, political accommodations and the discounting of public opinion by powerful politico-economic interests means that despite the strong legal barriers, mining cannot still be fully discounted. Another scenario is that the issue could deadlock the legislative action needed to a) fix the final boundaries of the SINP and demarcate them on the ground; and b) enable Congressional appropriation – currently proposed at 33.85 million pesos (US\$ 663,725) for the first year.

### **Logging**

130. **Risk: High.** A 95,700 hectare Timber License Agreement set to expire in 2007 but suspended in 1989 was revived in 2005 by the DENR Secretary. The area overlaps old growth forests. The order lifting the suspension also added 16 years to the term to compensate the licensee for unjust maintenance of the suspension.

131. **Mitigation strategy:** The Proclamation establishing the SINP provides that prior valid contracts for extraction of resources should be respected. A contract suspended at the time of the Proclamation cannot be said to be valid at that time. Even granting that it was valid, it will be allowed only if it qualifies as sustainable use and subject to the national interest and existing laws, rules, and regulations. Other obstacles to operating the TLA exist such as DAO 1991 #24 which bans logging in all old growth forests. These cover much of the TLA area. The license holder would also need to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment System and, as a prerequisite to that, secure a PAMB clearance by showing that the logging is compatible with the SINP Management Plan. The Management Plan zones old growth forests as strict protection zones, so such clearance from PAMB is unlikely. The ordinances passed by all three provinces on Samar prohibit large extractive activities, including logging. The SIBF has filed an opposition to the order lifting the suspension.

132. **Residual Risk: Low.** Considering the mitigation factors, the TET believes the residual risk to be low. However, at present, the TLA itself remains valid until the SIBF's petition is resolved in SIBF's favour. As with the mining, the license holder may try to secure all the legal requirements and engage in negotiations with a fragmented PAMB to legalise operations, thereby eroding public support to the SINP as a DENR-implemented project.

### **Insurgency**

133. **Risk: Medium.** The New People's Army, a country-wide armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines, remains a risk to project operations in the area since Samar is a known NPA stronghold. The TET is aware of at least two instances where SIBP staff and contractors were

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<sup>82</sup> PAWB comments: "If ever the DENR does not accept the BRA, although I doubt whether they can question a scientific institution, the area has been certified by the Forestry Sector of DENR Region 8 that the MPSA area is within the old-growth forest. This report was accepted by the RED and endorsed to the Secretary with the request for cancellation of the MPSA. Nobody has raised or questioned this certification issued by the Forestry Sector since they are the authority on such issues. The only question now is whether the new Secretary, unlike the former one who did not do anything about it, would act on the RED's request".

required to leave what were allegedly rebel-held areas to secure permission from the NPA before undertaking further activities. Project equipment and personal effects were confiscated. Ambushes of the military are occasional and at least one involved landmines. Furthermore, on the NPA's website, the NPA in Eastern Visayas declared: "that the longstanding policy of a total ban on commercial logging remains in force in the territories of the people's democratic government in Eastern Visayas". In the light of this, it can be said that while the Project is vulnerable to the conflict, such vulnerability is not direct and is merely in terms of possible crossfire – hence the assessment of medium risk.

134. **Mitigation strategy:** The Project has been operating successfully in Samar despite the Peace and Order situation, for six years. The Project now appears to be accepted as politically neutral and bringing benefits to poor forest communities. Providing Project personnel and strategy continue to remain neutral, no significant risk to staff is foreseen. Some delays to project activities can still be envisaged because of occasional confiscation of equipment and denied access to certain areas at certain times, but provided additional time is allocated to such activities, or a contingency time budget allowed for, Phase Two activities should still be brought to fruition within an acceptable period. Although the Project has signed an MOA with the 8<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade to act as a rapid reaction force against illegal loggers, the TET recommends that this should not be invoked since direct involvement of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on behalf of the Project would be perceived as violating the hard-won neutrality that the Project has attained, thereby rendering most proposed activities in the core zone impossible.

135. **Residual Risk:** Low. In light of the mitigation factors, the TET believes the residual risk to be low. Maintenance of the status quo should be pursued assiduously

### **Weak Management**

136. **Risk:** Medium. It is clear from the main body of the TPE Report that weak management has hampered project progress, strategy and direction during Phase One. If this is allowed to go unchecked, then similar problems will affect Phase Two, resulting in significant delays and missed delivery of products.

137. **Mitigation strategy:** Phase Two will require clearer and closer supervision which needs the respective roles of the TPR and PSC to be better defined. The frequency with which these bodies, at least the PSC, needs to be increased, preferably to three a year, and the schedule kept to. This will need monitoring by the TPR. The co-management arrangements between DENR and SIBF should be maintained. Careful definition and agreement of the scope of the second phase will be necessary to avoid a repeat of tensions between project partners. The selection procedures for the positions of PM and CPM need radical improvement on both sides. Careful definition of respective roles will also need to be undertaken and kept to. An "out-of-Visayas" national or international CTA needs to be hired to bring fresh insights to the second phase. The logframe needs to be adhered to more strongly to direct work programmes. Monitoring of the effects of project interventions needs to become standard practice.

138. **Residual Risk:** Low. If the mitigation strategy is agreed and adopted, project management will be much improved. There will remain a low risk that problem might still occur.

### **ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED BY PHASE TWO**

139. Assuming that GEF consider the risks discussed above to manageable, it will be imperative to re-design the proposed second phase since many events have occurred that were not foreseen during the original project preparation and the end of Phase One does not coincide completely with the situation envisaged in 2000. Therefore, although the original concept may still provide the foundations on which to build, the following are some of the major issues that the designers of Phase Two should address.

## Address Park Management Issues

140. **Prioritise sustainable finance**<sup>83</sup>: Current estimates of Park revenue against costs suggests an 8-11 million peso annual deficit. Phase Two needs to incorporate innovative means of deriving finance for the Park<sup>84</sup>. Issues to be looked at include disengaging the SINP from the National Integrated Protected Areas System<sup>85</sup> as a pilot trial to operate as an independent business unit; reviewing a wide range of financial options, e.g. debt swaps, carbon offsets, foundations, watershed protection, and obtaining the proceeds from confiscated resources and equipment from illegal operations within the Park (e.g. timber and vehicles). Policy revisions, both of DENR rules and the proposed bill for SINP might be required to make some of these happen

141. **Reduce the size of the PAMB**: The size of the PAMB, as reflected in the current proposed Congressional Bill, needs to be reduced. Establishment of sub-PAMBs is not a suitable mitigating measure. Phase two needs examine the issues involved in making the PAMB a more manageable PAMB size. This may mean making the PAMB just the three governors and the mayors of all the municipalities in the SINP<sup>86</sup>. Full-time liaison functions may need to be created to link the PASu with the PAMB members and within the Municipalities to coordinate with the barangays to ensure their participation despite losing PAMB membership.

142. **Incorporate plans into local development planning processes**: Phase Two needs to tackle the issue of getting the range of plans produced by the Project (particularly the PA Management Plan) fully integrated into LGU plans, particularly where insufficient technical capacity and finance are seen to be barriers.

143. **Abandon the watershed management planning approach**: Phase Two should abandon the watershed management plans and the proposed Watershed Management Councils<sup>87</sup>. It is better to

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<sup>83</sup> SIBP-PMO comments: “LGUs can share in the Park’s operating costs by assuming some of the functions in their respective jurisdictions by, for example, assigning forest wardens paid by them. In response to the TET’s recommendation to “prioritise sustainable finance” the SIBF agrees to the Recommendation on a “second stage of advocacy to generate material as well as political support for park operations” (see paragraph 88) from LGUs. In its view, this can be facilitated by reciprocal arrangements wherein the implementation of livelihood projects within the jurisdiction of an LGU is reciprocated with such support from the LGU”.

<sup>84</sup> SIBP-PMO comments: “It should also prepare the guys who are supposed to take on the job in the course of the Park’s existence after the project, to ensure that they can and will complete the task”.

<sup>85</sup> PAWB comments: “Again, there are apprehensions regarding this. If disengaging the SINP from the NIPAS would change it’s ‘configuration’, we might not get the same advantages that we have right now under NIPAS. Operating the SINP as a independent business unit might not allow us to get a slice from the government’s annual budget appropriations for personnel and operating expenses. Although is might be a meagre amount, this can still be added up to whatever amount we have collected for the IPAF. However, we will look into the possibility of how and if the SINP can operate as a business unit without violating or contradicting any law”.

<sup>86</sup> SIBP-PMO comments: “One of the issues raised by civil society under the current arrangement is that it is under-represented. The composition being proposed practically gives the local government units (LGUs) a monopoly of PAMB. Any new composition should give the civil society greater representation than the present set-up. Arguably, the LGUs are generally, though with few exceptions, the weakest link within the current local alliance supporting the SINP, in relation to the logging and mining issues. This becomes especially true as pressure from the national government mounts, which is generally expected. Again, a stronger presence of the civil society will have a balancing or compensating effect”.

<sup>87</sup> SIBP-PMO comments: “As a rule, we concur with the recommendation not to put in more resources in Phase 2 for the Watershed Management approach. While this approach was a mistake which had debilitating consequences, we can still see two residual benefits: the Watershed Management Plans and Councils.

- The Plans will be good starting points in complying with the TET’s recommendation for Phase 2 to “incorporate plans into local development planning processes”(paragraph 142).
- The Councils on the other hand can become platforms for collaborative actions among the parties (LGUs, NGOs, and Government Agencies) that went through the planning processes. For example, there are some NGOs who are considering making the plans and councils as frameworks for developing project proposals.
- Conceivably, because of the planning processes and the plans themselves, even downstream municipalities that do not have areas covered by the Park can now see the benefits of the park for them, hence could be approached to support the Park.

accept that a mistake<sup>88</sup> was made during Phase One and re-direct the Project to concentrate its resources effectively towards a community conservation framework for the PA Management Plan and the livelihood components rather than to continue to put resources into a concept that does not deliver the benefits required.

144. **Allow for re-filing the Bill:** The fate of the Bill currently before Congress will be unknown at the time of re-designing Phase Two. Resources should be made available to allow for the Bill to be re-filed should it fail to be passed during this Congressional session. This may include waiting for an administration more favourably disposed to the environment before re-filing.

### Address Livelihood Issues

145. **Improve the demonstration farms:** The established demonstration farms must be transformed in order to showcase biodiversity-compatible farming systems. Two major improvements are needed – a) increasing the link between farming methods and biodiversity conservation, and b) developing them so that they serve not just as a demonstration but are fully developed as training facilities for farmers so as to become useful to the Project’s community outreach programme.

146. **Anchor conservation gains within the livelihood strategic framework:** In addition to linking biodiversity conservation to farming practices, Phase Two needs to promote the development of farms not just for agriculture but as alternative sources of forest products<sup>89</sup> such as firewood, timber and medicines, especially for forest-dependent communities, not just for SINP but for the whole Samar Island. Building-up of forest-based farms in kaingin and open areas<sup>90</sup> will not only promote biodiversity conservation; it will also create a permanent alternative source of forest products that communities can rely on.

147. **Expand COP in core zone communities:** The COP has been implemented largely in the buffer zone of the SINP to date. It is important to find ways and resources to include communities within the core zone of the Park, since these are the communities that are most dependent on the forest for survival and serve as a threat to biodiversity therein. The Project has to address provision of alternative livelihoods and alternative sources of products necessary to reduce the dependence of these communities on the forest.

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*We therefore believe that while we should not initiate or try to revive anything in relation to this approach, we should still respond to and support initiatives by the other stakeholders in relation to the Watershed Management Plans. A rough description perhaps of any engagement should be “supportive, through low-cost counterparting”.*

<sup>88</sup> PAWB comments: “Totally agree here. No use continuing a mistake”.

<sup>89</sup> SIBP-PMO comments: “Given the prohibition of cultivating exotic species in the SINP area and buffer zones, this will entail to a large extent the “on-farm domestication of forest plant species with economic value” (see paragraph 39) and which are already being used today. This helps resolve the dilemma, for example, regarding wild medicinal or ornamental plants. Popularizing or even making them marketable by the communities will be helpful in illustrating the value of biodiversity, but could aggravate the pressure on their stocks in the wilds. However, having plants ordinarily thriving in forests, grown outside their natural habitats may have technical problems. Developing the technology for this at the community level should thus be a major task of Phase 2”.

<sup>90</sup> SIBP-PMO comments: “Since many of these areas are usually still claimed by the kaingineros and are just being left to fallow, this concern may be expanded to an issue on how to deal with them. They are so many, and their farming practices are so destructive to biodiversity, that this issue cannot be ignored. The traditional response of providing alternative livelihoods, tries to reduce the number of people engaged in this practice. This response may enable each kainginero beneficiary to reduce his environmental damage by maybe 80% - but the resources required per capita is such that maybe only 20% of them, can be reached. This should thus be complemented with a lower-input response to enable the remaining 80% to reduce their damage by maybe 20%. The traditional response, which can be considered as intensive interventions may take some time before it can reach a significant percentage of the them. Phase 2 should therefore complement these with more extensive interventions: lesser degree of impact but wider reach with lesser per capita input. An example is an IEC among kaingineros on how to reduce the damage of their farming practice and still enable them to earn more than their current incomes”.

## Address Project Management Issues

148. **Project Steering Committee:** If the PSC is going to take on the supervisory function for the Project, as it has done in Phase One, it has to meet more often than its current once a year. In phase Two, this should be increased to thrice yearly.

149. **Project managers:** Phase Two implementation needs to maintain the effective partnership that has been operating and growing more successful during Phase One, but needs to address certain aspects of the Project Manager and Co-Project Manager. Through consultations with the partners, selection procedures have to be adopted to bring greater stability to the posts, and also the degree to which the CPM is mired in administrative issues should be looked at to free the CPM's time to bring more effectiveness to the livelihood components of the Project.

150. **Improve impact monitoring:** Basic quantitative impact monitoring<sup>91</sup> of all interventions made by the Project needs to be introduced in order to provide feedback on their success or otherwise and to allow for modification to the actions. Phase Two will need to allow sufficient time and resources for this.

151. **Allow sufficient lag-time:** The first phase of the Project has been delayed by a number of factors including insurgency activity and national elections. While additional time has been added to the project (approved by the TPR), no additional resources were allocated, meaning that the additional staff and project management costs incurred had to be taken from budgets ear-marked for substantive activities. The design of Phase Two has to be realistic and cater for these inevitable delays, allowing both the time and general overhead resources to accommodate them<sup>92</sup>.

152. **Build the capacity of the SIBF and other partners:** Phase Two should look to further strengthen the institutional and technical capability of the SIBF to ensure the effectiveness of the co-management arrangements, to continue to support SIBF's advocacy, to assist them in developing a sustainable programme of finance<sup>93</sup>, and to harness the political involvement of LGU officials in the Samar Island Council for Sustainable Development.

## Adequately address threats of commercial extraction

153. **Provide support to counter commercial extraction:** To counter the threats that commercial extraction pose directly to the Park, a strong and informed response to the legal and political processes that would enable these interests to operate will need to be achieved in Phase Two. Such engagement will require the Project (and by corollary UNDP-GEF) to provide substantive political support<sup>94</sup> for the Park, to bolster the legal grounds for addressing these threats. Specifically, engagement in the EIA system, both through the technical and the social acceptability requirements, valuation and analysis of projected revenues, risk analyses of operating the activities and hazard mapping should be allowed for in Phase Two.

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<sup>91</sup> SIBP-PMO comments: "should cover the on-the-ground capability of the SIBF to generate ... livelihood activities".

<sup>92</sup> SIBP-PMO comments: "The Project's Livelihood Component is supposed to be part of the response to internal threats. In concrete figures, the job is to wean the 200,000 from their dependence on forest resources, so that the 333,300 has. of SINP territory is spared from further degradation. Besides the vastness of that area, and the size of the population, the high levels of poverty of the people compounds the problem by driving them to high degrees of dependence on forest resources. Among other things, this dimension should be another consideration in allowing sufficient lag-time".

<sup>93</sup> SIBP-PMO comments: "The Livelihood Component of Phase 2, if there is one, should thus focus on building the capability of the SIBF to continuously[sic] generate resources for and implement the type of livelihood projects described above. In this context, this should be the main capability that should be addressed by TET's recommendation. Whatever livelihood activities would be implemented in Phase 2, should thus be used as indicators of such capabilities, and to build SIBF's track record".

<sup>94</sup> Although the legal environment seems littered with obstacles to commercial extraction, it must be recognized that it was the political arrangements that allowed these threats to emerge to begin with and it will be the same political environment that may be manipulated to allow them to continue.

## **Address the introduction of technical innovation**

154. **Introduce innovation:** Phase Two needs to facilitate innovation within the Project. This may include an international CTA or help from UNDP in linking to various international technical networks. Areas requiring research and innovation include i) approaches to the livelihood components; ii) restoration of kaingin areas and open lands through forest farming and agroforestry using dipterocarps and other native species; and iii) research into why the density of animals is so low in the forest.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

Based on the evaluation carried out the following recommendations are made:

### **STRATEGIC**

- The dedication of the staff holding dual roles should be recognised formally, if possible.
- Immediate steps be taken, within Phase One if possible, to ensure that no other permits over areas covered by the SINP be given without PAMB authorisation. A rigorous system will have to be designed in order to ensure that the PAMB makes its decisions according to recent stock estimates and a system of collective approvals would ensure efficiency.
- The Project and the SIBF as project partner participate fully in the Scoping and any stage in the EIA process that is open to the public, particularly in providing technical details from the results of the BRA, on the biodiversity value and sensitivity of the proposed areas, and allowing the EIA Review Committee to use maps of old growth forest areas for determination of the legality and viability of the mines.
- The Project determines how critical the areas covered by the extractive activities are, and focuses advocacy on gaining consensus on the bounds of old growth forests.
- In order to reduce illegal tree-felling, activities need to be undertaken to a) improve appraisals of the extent of the problem by estimating the remaining timber stock against firewood and shelter needs of the current residents of the Park; b) provision within the livelihood focus of alternatives for firewood and building needs as well as food and economic improvements; and c) extending advocacy to make the link between small-scale logging and floods/landslides also prevalent in the public mind.
- The awareness raising programme be extended to include the civil servants within the other Bureaux of the DENR at both national and Region 8, particularly those who have a decision-making function, in order to explain a) the global value of the SINP (endemics, globally-threatened species) and the interest and involvement of the international community; and b) the facts that the integrity of the forest as a whole is important to its survival and the areas of second growth have a vital function in buffering the key old growth areas from external influences.
- A staff position be assigned with the sole function of ensuring comprehensive coordination of the Project with LGU's with the goal of seamless integration of purpose and resources to reach Park objectives.
- The Project simplifies its planning system and concentrates on producing plans that can be adopted easily and implemented realistically by the LGUs
- A summary version of the 10-year PA Management Plan be disseminated widely and integrated with other Plans, and that all necessary means are taken to ensure that activities therein are accomplished
- There is a pressing need to re-examine the mechanisms that are available to providing acceptable levels of representation to stakeholders in the decision-making process for the SINP while reducing significantly the number of persons involved in the executive body. Since it is clear that any such mechanism will lie outside of the provisions of the NIPAS Act, it will be



important to ensure that the recommended approach can be supported through appropriate existing or new legislation.

- The SIBP takes the necessary legal steps to ensure that all the proceeds from timber and other products confiscated from the SINP, whether from sales of products confiscated in convictions over illegal use or forfeiture of abandoned products and equipment and vehicles, are used to establish a separate endowment for the SINP, interest from which can be used to sustain day-to-day park operations, including increased operations against the illegal timber and other trades.
- The obvious successes of the Project's advocacy programme be extended to encompass a second stage of advocacy to generate material as well as political support for park operations and to focus on the dimensions of emerging threats.
- The selection of the PM for any second phase of the Project should be undertaken in a completely transparent fashion with, as far as is possible, one PM serving for the entire period.
- The roles of Project Manager and Project Superintendent are formalised within the management structure of DENR-8 prior to December 2006.
- Short of an event such as illness, resignation or incompetence, a single CPM is elected by the SIBF to the position for the entire period of any second phase of the Project.
- The co-management arrangements for the Project are maintained, and with the proviso that selection procedures for the PM and CPM are changed, that they should continue for any Phase Two of the Project.
- The CTA appointed for any second phase of the Project should be appointed by UNDP and DENR and have no previous connection with DENR-8 and either be a Philippine national from outside of the Visayas or be a foreign national.
- That a) UNDP should facilitate the Project quickly to access innovative ideas for linking livelihoods with biodiversity conservation that could be introduced before the end of the current phase; and b) this aspect requires addressing under any second phase of the Project.
- The GEF Secretariat consider this point on evaluation criteria [paragraph 109c] and issue guidance through the Regional Technical Advisors to be included in evaluation teams' TORs.
- The GEF recognise that this sort of protected area-focussed project still have an important role in conserving global biodiversity, and cautions that the current approaches championed by GEF may not always be the most appropriate and that a mixed portfolio may be more effective in achieving the aims of the CBD. Don't throw the baby out with the bathwater!
- The Project establishes a mechanism through which proper coordination among LGUs at various levels is ensured.
- The PSC takes on a more active role in coordinating the activities of the Project with those of other government agencies and donor groups working in the area.
- The Project Manager instigate a rigorous system of computer back up for each department to be undertaken at the end of each and every week, and that such back-ups are either stored safely but externally to the office, or within a fire-proof safe within the office. Similarly, back-up lists of passwords should be stored securely.

## **TECHNICAL**

- The COP livelihood activities should be extended in areas or barangays located within the core zone of the SINP where communities are expected to have been highly dependent on forest resources for livelihood.
- Introduce and develop forest farming and tree-based agroforestry systems in existing kaingin farms and open areas to minimise human pressures on the forests brought about by continuing collection of wood and other forest products, and promote biodiversity-compatible farming systems within communities.

- Introduce rapid assessment and planning for the improvement of the established demonstration farms to showcase biodiversity-compatible farming systems. On-the-ground improvements in the established demonstration sites and even establishment of more appropriate demonstration farms in other locations should be considered for Phase Two.
- The Project needs to implement repeated and longer-term Information, Education, and Communication activities to ensure that communities are influenced to put the principles of community participation in biodiversity conservation and protection into action
- The Project has to coordinate with the LGUs and other existing support-agencies in the area to plan and implement a strategy that will ensure continuing visitation and provision of technical support to local communities

## LESSONS LEARNED

### STRATEGIC

- All partners involved directly in the implementation of a project should be required to sign off on the Project Brief prior to its submission to GEF in the same way as the GEF Country Focal Point signs signifying the agreement of the Government.
- Projects under pressure to reach pre-planned targets have little freedom to adjust to changing needs, to allow for outcomes of necessary research to be incorporated into the implementation activities, and to co-operate meaningfully with other international partner organisations towards joint goals. Designers, particularly of ICDPs, should allow sufficient time to allow for flexibility and “organic” growth and development within a project.
- Experience in this and similar projects has been that nationals argue fiercely that knowing better about their environments and how their government and institutions operate, they are in a better position to implement projects than foreign consultants. That may be so but when this is assumed, consideration needs to be paid to the learning curve and how it affects the timeline and preparatory phase design of projects.
- To shorten the learning curve, project personnel should be encouraged, even required, to seek national and international exposure to broaden their knowledge base about Protected Area management experiences elsewhere. Local opportunities exist such as the annual Wildlife Conservation Society of the Philippines Conference and the Asean Regional Center for Biodiversity Conservation in Los Baños, Laguna<sup>95</sup>.
- Advantage should be taken of other initiatives happening within their own departments. For instance, the DENR has issued Criteria and Indicators for Sustainable Forest Management in the Philippines<sup>96</sup> by which to gauge the success of community-based forest managers, and the DENR has likewise identified appropriate forest-based livelihoods under its Community Based Livelihood Assistance Project (CLASP) project.
- Many developing countries are struggling with Protected Area models that are not completely applicable to their situations, since the people concerned have had to learn their profession abroad. While the Development Academy of the Philippines has established a course on Protected Area Management and more and more professors are teaching courses on it, much can be done by a country-wide organization of protected area professionals exchanging experiences on the web or in an annual or biennial national conference. Many of the mistakes made and

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<sup>95</sup> SIBP-PMO comments: *“Building long term institutional arrangements and partnerships for mutually beneficial collaborations and joint learning - bullets # 2 and 4 of the “Lessons Learned” led us to the observation that the challenges are of the type that require iterative and long term responses, which in turn require sets of skills of increasing complexity. Building long term partnerships for mutually beneficial collaborative actions becomes a challenge in itself. Moreover, as such actions increase in complexity, so will the demands be for the partners to learn together just to maintain the viability of their partnerships. Learning strategies will have to be developed to build “learning partnerships””.*

<sup>96</sup> This was done through a project supported by the International Tropical Timber Organization.

opportunities lost could have been avoided if such an interactive organisation existed and was relied upon by project staff to test ideas on and seek experiences.

- Without denigrating the professionals concerned, a characteristic of most bureaucratic institutions is that innovation is generally not rewarded. As such, projects should start with this assumption and provide ample opportunities for rewarding innovation and independent thinking. For example, the idea that the bureaucracy itself is hindering the progress of a project may have been arrived at, but rather than imagining the possibility of an entirely new arrangement not necessarily prescribed by law but made possible by it, such problems tend to be treated as inevitable and merely tinkering with the bureaucracy is deemed satisfactory.
- Adaptive management, while successfully employed in this project, should also be rigorous and fully documented. While this Project produced satisfactory data, databases and generally accessible information, it did not have a revised logframe on which to base its innovations, nor did it make full use of success indicators that required little effort to put down (e.g. estimates of crowd numbers at the caravan, entries in the photo exhibit logbooks, or list of recipients of advocacy materials).
- The TET encountered many instances when the culture of Samareños was used as a reason for doing things a certain way. However, such culture and other local practices was more often used as an excuse instead of as opportunities for project enhancement. For example, while a baseline for the biodiversity was studied (BRA), a social baseline to determine what were the driving factors that led to forest migration and how could this feed into the COP design would have been useful.
- Many local languages are dying out<sup>97</sup> and much local knowledge is passed on only by word of mouth in these languages. Many resource management methods and facts that are language-dependent will become lost. Greater emphasis should therefore be placed in projects to take better advantage of local knowledge, and wherever possible, this knowledge should be documented in a major language with the full nuances inherent in the local language taken account of. Despite emphasis in planning on local participation and broad stakeholdership, there is a danger that knowledge from the grassroots level may reach only as far as their community organisers. Protected area managers should take pains to gather local names of plants, animals and local appreciations of their relationships and uses to improve the management planning process.
- There is a paradox in forest projects which needs to be dealt with frontally – one that treats forest dwellers both as beneficiaries and as threats. Many have sidestepped this issue and operate on the assumption that because of the first, the second will be neutralized. When such assumption fails, there is no incentive to finding the reasons because one can easily use any of a number of factors to explain the failure.

## TECHNICAL

- Implementation of development activities for livelihood and biodiversity conservation in communities necessitates a well-coordinated effort across provincial, municipal and barangay government units. This would ensure that the government units act together harmoniously towards the common goal for livelihood development and biodiversity conservation.
- Training and education on biodiversity conservation and livelihood is not a one-shot deal. It necessitates a well-tailored plan and careful step-wise implementation so that the project will know where to begin, what to do next and where to end. The project's training activity lacks clear direction to support its goal for livelihood development and biodiversity conservation.
- The livelihood alternatives introduced to communities have been almost solely agriculture-based designed to improve farm production and as a result lead people away from dependence on the forest. However, they will be doomed to failure unless alternatives are provided for all

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<sup>97</sup> RAFI estimates that in 20 years, only 5% of the world's peoples will be speaking the language that developed in the place it is spoken.

- aspects of forest-dependence – energy, building materials, medicines. All alternatives should complement biodiversity conservation over and above reducing human pressure on the forest.
- Technical know-how among the project staff, NGO partners and service providers is wanting on forest resource management, agro-forestry, and biodiversity conservation. Improvement in these will help bring about appropriate knowledge and skills to partner communities.
  - The project’s initiative to integrate biodiversity conservation and the SINP in the elementary and high school curricula in partnership with the DEd-8 is an excellent innovation in raising awareness and understanding about biodiversity conservation building on the experience of other countries in that raising awareness amongst children raises awareness amongst their parents as well.
  - The failure of the project to accomplish the farming systems review which could have been the basis for identifying appropriate and biodiversity-friendly farming systems has created unfavourable effects to the kind of livelihood alternatives that have been introduced in the COP sites.
  - Dissemination of IEC materials in communities is not a guarantee to improving awareness and understanding of communities especially on the technical aspects of the project. It should be supported with a face-to-face extension approach through seminars, trainings and focus group discussions.
  - The approach of the project to the creation of development plans such as the FLUP has been complicated and costly. If plans are intended for adoption by the LGUs, they should have been made more simple and less costly to implement considering the limitations of LGUs in terms of technical capacity and funding.

# **ANNEX I: FINAL PROJECT EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE**

## **BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE**

The Samar Island Biodiversity Project (SIBP) is a special project of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) with funding from the Government of the Philippines and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) under the Global Environment Facility (GEF). It is expected to run for eight years divided into two phases of four years each. The project operation officially commenced in March 2001.

SIBP aims to establish the Samar Island Natural Park in order to conserve the rich biodiversity resources in the Island and to reduce poverty among the local communities. The SINP would cover approximately 333,300 hectares of natural forests and a buffer zone of about 125,400 hectares that spans across the three provinces, covering 36 municipalities and 1 city. The area serves as the upper catchments of 25 watersheds and a source of water for domestic, agricultural, commercial and industrial uses. It is home to almost 200,000 people, more than 90% of whom are dependent on the forest and other natural resources for food, medicines, fuel and livelihood.

The project is designed as a two-phase project. Phase I is implemented from January 1999-December 2006 (no cost extension was granted for the period January 2004-December 2006) since the project operationally started on the ground in March 2001). Phase II is planned to be implemented from January 2007-December 2008. The project will run for a total of eight (8) years as approved by GEF. The management of the SIBP is shared by the government and civil society. The Project Manager (appointed by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources) is also concurrently the Protected Area Superintendent of the Samar Island Natural Park. The NGO designated representative serves as Co-Project Manager in the management structure of the SIBP.

Presently, the Project rents two buildings inside the Catbalogan Comprehensive High School (formerly Samar Regional School of Fisheries) to house the SIBP-Project Management Office and the Protected Area Office of the Samar Island Natural Park. Within the year, construction of a central headquarters and ranger posts will commence in strategic locations within the SINP.

A team of thirty-three (33) national professionals, consultants and staff provide technical advice and implement the activities of the Phase One of SIBP. On the other hand, the SINP Protected Area Office has a complement of eleven regular DENR employees and twenty newly hired park conservation officers and community development officers. Many of these national staff are funded by the SIBP and their contracts are concurrent with the Phase One funds from UNDP-GEF.

SIBP has among its core staff a multidisciplinary team with expertise in natural and social sciences. It has specialists in forestry, biology, sociology, adult education and training, advocacy, communication, planning, law, policy development, agriculture, livelihood, financial management, GIS and community development. In addition to its in-house staff, the Project also engages the services of external experts for the conduct of studies and specialized consultancy work.

There are the seven strategic outputs that also represent the Programs and Services for which the Project is responsible.

- (a) Establishment of an adaptive management framework which includes the completion of the legal requirements leading to the establishment of the Samar Island Natural Park as a protected area, the preparation of the Five Year Management Plan, the conduct of biological resource assessment and management zoning.

- (b) Strengthening the Protected Area Institutions such as the Protected Area Management Board and the Protected Area Office
- (c) Operationalizing a community-based conservation system through the Survey and Registration of P.A. occupants and the Community Outreach Program.
- (d) Imparting awareness of conservation values and threats to key stakeholders which involves production of IEC materials and advocacy activities
- (e) Integration of conservation objectives in sectoral planning through assistance to local governments in land use planning and assistance to the Samar Island Biodiversity Foundation in strengthening its advocacy role.
- (f) Assistance in ensuring sustainable use of existing biodiversity resources through technical assistance in sustainable farming, non-timber forest products development and eco-tourism.
- (g) Fund-support generation

The Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) policy at the project level in UNDP-GEF has four objectives: i) to monitor and evaluate results and impacts; ii) to provide a basis for decision making on necessary amendments and improvements; iii) to promote accountability for resource use; and iii) to document, provide feedback on, and disseminate lessons learned. Final Evaluations are intended to assess the relevance, performance and success of the project. It will primarily look at the impact and sustainability of results, including contribution to capacity development and achievement of global environmental goals. It will also identify/document lessons learned and make recommendations that might improve design and implementation of other UNDP/GEF projects.

Like any project monitoring and evaluation activity, this final evaluation is conducted in accordance with established UNDP and GEF procedures and is to be undertaken by the project team and the UNDP CO, who will commission an independent consultant, with support from UNDP/GEF. The Logical Framework matrix provides performance and impact indicators for project implementation along with their corresponding means of verification. These, along with the objectives, procedures and tools described in the M&E plan presented in the project document will form the basis on which the proposed final evaluation of the first phase of the SIBP will be built.

The Final Evaluation aims to review the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of the activities and results within each component or desired outcome of the projects and recommend approaches to improve design, implementation and monitoring mechanisms for the succeeding years of project implementation (Phase II).

In addition to providing an independent in-depth review of the progress achieved so far under Phase I, this evaluation is responsive to GEF Council decisions on transparency and better access of information during implementation.

The final evaluation is a *systematic and participatory learning exercise*. Given this challenge, this exercise will be structured in such a way that it *generates relevant knowledge for project partners* while at the same time ensuring that this knowledge can and will be *applied in practical and immediate ways*. A consultative rather than an advisory process would dispel fears among some partners that evaluation is about finding fault and a proxy for measuring individual or institutional performance, rather than a sharing of knowledge and experiences amongst peers.

## **OBJECTIVES**

### **Main Purpose**

The main purpose of the evaluation is twofold – a) to evaluate the success or otherwise of Phase one of the Project and to ascertain whether the proposed second phase is justified; and b) to provide inputs to help guide the design of any second phase. To this end, the evaluation should analyze and assess the relevance, sustainability, impact and effectiveness of the strategies, project design, implementation

methodologies and resource allocations that have been adopted for the purpose of achieving the objectives stated in the project document.

The specific objectives of the evaluation are as follows:

- To identify and evaluate the effectiveness and outcome of strategies and activities of the project.
- To identify and evaluate the constraints and problems, which have been or are being encountered, the effectiveness of resource utilization and the delivery of project outputs.
- To assess progress towards attaining the project's global environmental objectives per GEF Operational Programme concerned (OP Nos. 3 and 4).
- To assess policy, institutional and financial instruments which have been identified and developed both at the national and local levels to ensure long-term sustainability of project-initiated activities beyond the life of the programme;
- To identify the manner and extent to which the project has leveraged co-financing and policy changes
- To assess the level of public involvement in the project and recommend on whether public involvement has been appropriate to the goals of the project;
- To review and evaluate the extent to which project impacts have reached the intended beneficiaries, both within and outside project sites;
- To assess the likelihood of continuation of project outcomes and benefits after completion of GEF funding;

In pursuit of the above, the following key issues should be carefully looked at:

- Changes in the enabling environment such as policy changes, increasing stakeholder involvement, alternations in institutional capacity
- Within the 5 years of implementation, how has the state of biodiversity changed? Proxy indicator to use changes in human behavior (i.e. changes in pressures and responses)
- What has been the contribution of UNDP & GEF to those changes?
- Impact: Aside from direct and obvious impacts, the project may have generated indirect or collateral impacts. These are difficult to quantify, but may be usefully illustrated according to types and examples and evaluated using narrative approaches, through case studies, evaluations, for example. A few examples of indirect or **collateral impacts** of GEF activities include:
  - *Political influence*: Contributing to an enhanced political profile for biodiversity and the CBD;
  - *Higher profile* of biodiversity concerns;
  - *Enhancement of information and access to it*: Generating and disseminating new data on biodiversity and its status that contributes to the global and regional information base
  - *Replication*: Promoting the adoption of successful GEF approaches in other locations and projects
  - *Catalytic effects*: Generating other positive steps, catalyzing state legislation that is outside the project's objectives
  - *Financial leverage*: Prompting the availability of new and additional resources and co-financing, but possibly causing a negative diversion of funds, as suggested by some NGOs (Further analysis is needed to explore this and identify solutions.)
  - *Synergy*: Fostering positive synergies across conventions and focal areas.
  - *Empowerment*: Boosting the stature and power of focal points and ministries through finance, information, and projects (not only in terms of resources, but a "place at the table")

### **Focus of Evaluation**

The Team Leader (International Consultant) shall focus on the following based on the Seven Strategic Project outputs:

- Output 1 : Establishment of an adaptive management framework which includes the completion of the legal requirements leading to the establishment of the Samar Island National Park as protected area, the preparation of the Five Year Management Plan, the conduct of biological resource assessment and management zoning
- Output 2 : Strengthening the Protected Area Institutions such as the Protected Area Management Board and the Protected Area Management Board and the Protected Area Office
- Output 3 : Operationalizing a community-based conservation system through the Survey and Registration of P.A. occupants and the Community Outreach Program.
- Output 4 : Imparting awareness of conservation values and threats to key stakeholders which involves production of IEC materials and advocacy activities
- Output 5 : Integration of conservation objectives in sectoral planning through assistance to local governments in land use planning and assistance to the Samar Island Biodiversity Foundation in strengthening its advocacy role.
- Output 6 : Assistance in ensuring sustainable use of existing biodiversity resources through technical assistance in sustainable farming, non-timber forest products development and eco-tourism.
- Output 7 : Fund – support generation

### **Expected Outputs**

The Evaluation Team, spearheaded by the Team Leader is expected to deliver the following outputs:

1. An Inception Report with a detailed work plan for the evaluation period indicating the schedules, specific roles and responsibilities of the two members of the evaluation team
2. A draft terminal evaluation report in the format following Section IV below, including a discussion on the special issues to be submitted to UNDP Manila, with copies furnished to DENR-PAWB and the PMO;
3. A final Terminal Evaluation Report addressing the comments and recommendations of GEF/UNDP and DENR-PAWB within 15 days from receipt thereof.

The draft Terminal Evaluation Report will be circulated to the other key stakeholders for comments to be consolidated by the PMO and, together with the comments of GEF/UNDP, shall be transmitted to the team leader. The Team Leader shall finalize the Terminal Evaluation Report addressing the comments of the key stakeholders. Any discrepancies between the impressions of the evaluators and findings of these parties should be explained in an annex attached to the final report.

### **Approaches and Methodology**

The approaches and methodology to be employed by the team in undertaking the evaluation will include:

1. Develop a work plan for the team indicating the schedules, specific roles and responsibilities of each member;
2. Brief and debrief UNDP, DENR-PAWB, PMO, and relevant key stakeholders if deemed necessary;
3. Complete a desk review of the relevant documents regarding the project;
4. Conduct interviews with relevant project management and staff, DENR and UNDP officers, and key stakeholders such as the Samar Island Biodiversity Foundation, partner NGOs and peoples' organizations in the field, local government unit (LGU) officials, church leaders, and other groups as necessary.
5. Conduct field visits in at least one site (barangay) in Eastern, Northern and Western Samar for on-site evaluation, field interviews and information gathering on project management and other related activities.



## **Evaluation Products**

A Final Evaluation Report (no more than 30 pages, excluding Executive Summary and Annexes) should be produced. The following structure is indicative only. The evaluation team may change it as necessary to meet the requirements of providing inputs to the design of the potential second phase.

- (i) Acronyms and Terms
- (ii) Executive Summary (no more than 4 pages)

The Executive Summary should briefly explain how the evaluation was conducted and provide the summary of contents of the report and its findings.

- (iii) Project Concept and Design Summary

This section should begin with the context of the problem that the project is addressing. It should describe how effectively the project concept and design could deal with the situation.

- (iv) Project Results

Progress towards attaining the project's regional and global environmental objectives and achievement of project outcomes. It should also try to answer the question: What has happened and why? The performance indicators in the logframe matrix are crucial to completing this section.

- (v) Project Management

This section covers the assessment of the project's adaptive management, partnerships, involvement of stakeholders, public participation, roles and responsibilities, monitoring plans, assistance from UNDP and IMO, etc.

- (vi) Recommendations

Here, the evaluators should be as specific as possible. To whom are the recommendations addressed and what exactly should that party do? Recommendations might include sets of options and alternatives.

- (vii) Lessons Learned

This is a list of lessons that may be useful to other projects.

List of Annexes (Terms of Reference, Itinerary, Persons Interviewed)

## **EVALUATION TEAM**

The Final Evaluation Team will be composed of one international consultant (with expertise on legal and policy environment, natural resource management and M & E) who will also function as the evaluation Team Leader, and two (2) national consultants of international caliber with similar specialization and with substantive knowledge of national policies on natural resources management (forestry, protected area, etc.). The national consultants will be composed of a field consultant and policy consultant.

Specific qualifications are as follows:

- At least ten years of proven experience with:
  - Legal and policy analysis in natural resource management

- Experience and training on M&E development and implementation and/or facilitating learning-oriented analysis sessions of M&E data with multiple stakeholders;
  - Data and information analysis
  - Report writing.
- She/he must also have:
    - A solid understanding of environmental management, with a focus on participatory processes, joint management, and gender issues;
    - Familiarity with and a supportive attitude towards processes of strengthening local organizations and building local capacities for self-management;
    - Willingness to undertake regular field visits and interact with different stakeholders, especially primary stakeholders;
    - Computer skills in word processing and other basic MS Word Office operations
    - Leadership qualities, personnel and team management (including mediation and conflict resolution);
    - Excellent writing and reporting skills in the English Language is required.
- Desirable:
    - Experience in the evaluation of technical assistance projects, preferably with UNDP or other United Nations development agencies and major donors. If possible, experience in the evaluation of GEF-funded biodiversity conservation projects or international waters projects.

### **SPECIAL ISSUES:**

The evaluation will consider and assess special issues related to the natural resources management policy environment in the Philippines in which the project operates. The evaluation shall be viewed in the context of a possible UNDP-GEF Phase Two taking into consideration the approved UNDP-GEF Project Document and the new and emerging UNDP-GEF strategic priorities and thrusts.

### **IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS**

UNDP Manila Office shall be the main operation point for the evaluation, which shall be responsible for liaising with the evaluation team and relevant persons to set-up the stakeholders interviews and meetings, arranging field visits in coordination with PAWB and SIBP-PMO. It shall ensure the timely provision of travel arrangements, DSA, professional fees in accordance with the contract.

PAWB and SIBP-PMO shall provide the necessary logistical support (for field arrangements and stakeholders interviews and meetings). It shall also provide all project information and documents for review by the evaluators.

The evaluation will be conducted for a period of three (3) weeks commencing on *27 February to 21 March 2006*.

## ANNEX II : ITINERARY OF ACTIVITIES OF THE FINAL PROJECT EVALUATION MISSION

Date		Activities
Sun	26 <sup>th</sup> Feb	pm: Evaluation team leader (PJE) arrives in Manila
Mon	27 <sup>th</sup> Feb	am: Initial team meeting and briefing by UNDP pm: Meeting with Protected Area and Wildlife Bureau
Tues	28 <sup>th</sup> Feb	am: Document review (PJE) pm: Document review (PJE) – non-work day for national consultants
Wed	1 <sup>st</sup> Mar	am: Meeting with Project’s Legal Expert (PJE & MPL) pm: Meeting with Project’s PA Management Planning Specialist and second Project Manager (PJE & MPL) – non-work day for EOM
Thurs	2 <sup>nd</sup> Mar	am: Document review (PJE) pm: Document review and telephone interview with UNDP-GEF Regional Technical Adviser (PJE) – non-work day for national consultants
Fri	3 <sup>rd</sup> Mar	am: Document review (PJE) pm: Travel to Samar Island and initial meeting with project staff (PJE) – non-work day for national consultants
Sat	4 <sup>th</sup> Mar	Non-work day
Sun	5 <sup>th</sup> Mar	Non-work day
Mon	6 <sup>th</sup> Mar	am: Travel to Samar Island (MPL & EOM). Team re-convenes. Meeting with Regional Executive Director and Regional Technical Directors and DENR Region VIII staff. pm: Travel to Catbalogan via Calbiga. Meetings with Local Government of Calbiga and community members
Tues	7 <sup>th</sup> Mar	Briefing with SIBP management and staff Meeting with 2 farmer beneficiaries from Cantongtong, Jiabong (MPL & EOM) and with Project Manager (PJE). Pm: Travel to Calbayog, dinner meeting with Calbayog Mayor
Wed	8 <sup>th</sup> Mar	am: Travel to Cararman, meeting with Northern Samar provincial officials pm: Lunch meeting with Mondragon Mayor, PENRO officials Meeting with SIBF Northern Samar Chapter, Northern Samar Bishop, third Co-Project Manager and former Project Livelihood Officer. Travel to Calbayog.
Thurs	9 <sup>th</sup> Mar	am: Travel to Catbalogan. Meetings with Project Staff pm: Meetings with Project Staff
Fri	10 <sup>th</sup> Mar	am: Meeting with Project staff (PJE). Visit to POs in Casandig and KAPPAS in Tenani, both Paranas (MPL & EOM). pm: Travel to Borongan. Meeting with Vice Governor (PJE). Visit San Rafael nursery and BMS site (MPL and EOM) Meeting with SIBF Eastern board. Meeting with Bishop Eastern Samar. Meeting with second Co-Project Manager (PJE).
Sat	11 <sup>th</sup> Mar	am: Travel to Catbalogan. Meeting with COP at Caisawan, Balangkayan (MPL & EOM). Travel to Lawaan. Meeting with Lawaan Mayor. pm: Travel to Catbalogan.
Sun	12 <sup>th</sup> Mar	am: Meetings with PAWB Project Focal Point, and first Project Manager (PJE). Debriefing with SIBP staff pm: Team Planning. Travel to Tacloban
Mon	13 <sup>th</sup> Mar	am: Travel to Manila (PJE & MPL). pm: Report writing
Tues	14 <sup>th</sup> -21 <sup>st</sup> Mar	am: Travel to Manila (EOM). pm: Report writing
Wed - Mon	15 <sup>th</sup>  -21 <sup>st</sup>	All day: Report writing
Tues	21 <sup>st</sup> Mar	Pm: De-briefing/Presentation to DENR-PAWB officials
Wed	22 <sup>nd</sup> Mar	Departure

## ANNEX III : PERSONS INTERVIEWED

### *Project Staff*

Manolito D. Ragub	Project Manager, SIBP
Jose Mabulay, Jr.	Co-Project Manager, SIBP
Georges Guillermo	Former Project Manager
Herminigildo Jocson	Former Project Manager
Crisostomo E. Badeo	Chief, Public Affairs and Resource Mobilization Unit
Felix Bernal	Chief, Biocondev
Zenaida R. Baisa	Chief, Planning and Policy Section
Myron O. Garcia	Chief, Comm Dev
Engr. Reynaldo de Guzman	Chief, Infra Unit
Rodrigo M. Marquez	Chief, Admin, Finance and Human Resource Development
Atty. Irwin Ambal	Legal Expert
Dr. Errol Gatumbato	PA Management Planning Specialist, Consultant
Daniel A. Abocot	OIC Accountant
Eldrid J. Madamba	GIS Specialist
David Nelson C. Petilla	Management Information System Specialist
Exequiel Cabrigas	Database Officer, Community Development Section
Dickson Q. Bernales	Communication Assistant
Eires M. Mate	Chief, Training Unit
Paquito P. Dabuet	Focal Person, Forest Protection
Allan C. Reyna	Focal Person, BMS
Elpidio V. Cabahit, Jr.	Ecotourism Focal Person
Angelito B. Villanueva	Ecotourism
Juliana A. Balogo	Protected Area Planning Assistant
Greg Sarmiento	Former SIBP Livelihood Specialist
Dr. Danilo Baldos	Marketing Consultant
Josephine Casem	Junior Sociologist
Aries Tizon,	Support staff

### *Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)*

Dr. Mundita Theresa Lim	Assistant Director, Protected Area and Wildlife Bureau and National Project Director
Ms. Janette Garcia	Senior Ecosystems Management Specialist & SIBP Focal Person for DENR
Arturo N. Salazar	Chief Administrative Division, Region 8
Felipe S. Calub	Regional Technical Director for Protected Areas and Wildlife and Coastal Zones Management Section
Ricardo C. Tomol	Regional Technical Director for Forestry
Corazon H. Makabenta	Officer in Charge, Division Chief, Protected Areas and Wildlife and Coastal Zones Management Section
Urbano B. Doydora	Division Chief, Research
Pastor C. Salazar	Legal Officer, Mines and Geosciences Bureau
Danilo A. Javier	Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office/Officer,

George F. Guillermo	Eastern Samar Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office/Officer, Western Samar
Ranulfo Q. Arbiol	Provincial Environment and Natural Resource Offices/Officer, Northern Samar
Elmer M. Gapay	Community Environment and Natural Resources Office/Officer, Pambujan, Catarman, Northern Samar
Ariel B. Macabare	Community Environment and Natural Resources Office/Officer, Pambujan, Catarman, Northern Samar
Moises B. de la Cruz	Community Environment and Natural Resources Office/Officer, Pambujan, Dolores, Eastern Samar
Marcelo O. Itaas	Forester III/ Rep. of Mario Tubania CENRO Borongan, Eastern Samar

#### ***Samar Island Biodiversity Foundation***

Dr. Jaime F. Sanico	President, SIBF Island-wide
Msgr. Walter a. Cerbito	Vicar General, Eco Desk, President, SIBF Northern Chapter
Evelyn Corado	President, Development Management and Consultancy Services and former SIBP Co-Project Manager
Jose C. Lim	President Bankaton, Former SIBP Co-Project Manager
Samson Nervaez	Board of Directors, SIBF, Eastern Samar
Benjamin Panaguiton, Jr.	Member, SIBF Northern Samar Chapter

#### ***UNDP***

Amelia Supertran	Portfolio Manager, Environment, UNDP Manila
Clarissa Arida	Programme Manager, Environment, UNDP Manila
Jay-Ann Arandia	Project Assistant, UNDP Manila
Edgardo Policarpio	Project Assistant, UNDP Manila
Rosita B. Lim-it	EC-UNDP Finance Officer

#### ***GEF***

Mr. Joseph D’Cruz	UNDP-GEF Regional Technical Advisor, Bangkok <sup>98</sup>
Mr. Tim Clairs	Former UNDP-GEF Regional Technical Advisor <sup>55, 99</sup>

#### ***Local Government Units, Eastern Samar***

Hon. Leander R. Geli	Vice Governor, Eastern Samar
Reynaldo C. Dorado	Executive Asst., Governor’s Office, Eastern Samar
Hon. Manuel Enciso	Municipal Mayor, Lawaan, Eastern Samar
Dionardo B. Canales	Barangay Captain, Brgy. Caisawan, Balangkayan, Eastern Samar
Artemio G. Rebato	Asst. Dept Head, Provincial Planning and Development Office/Officer, Eastern Samar
Pompei Garcia	Provincial Administrator, Tourism Division, Eastern Samar
Zenaida Caday	Barangay Secretary, Brgy. Caisawan, Balangkayan, Eastern

<sup>98</sup> By telephone

<sup>99</sup> Now GEF Regional Manager Arab States; Beruit.

Regina Abendanio	Samar Barangay Treasurer, Brgy, Caisawan, Balangkayan, Eastern Samar
Nenita Capito	Barangay Kagawad, Brgy. Caisawan, Balangkayan, Eastern Samar
Teresita Contado	Barangay Kagawad, Brgy. Caisawan, Balangkayan, Eastern Samar

***Local Government Units, Northern Samar***

Hon. Ismael C. Bugna	Municipal Mayor, Mondragon, Northern Samar
Neciforo A. Rubenecia	Provincial Planning and Development Office/Officer, Northern Samar
Moses Parial	Coordinator, Provincial Planning and Development Office/Officer, Northern Samar
Camille C. Sarmiento	Flesher, Provincial Planning and Development Office/Officer Northern Samar
Renzie Palejo	Member, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Northern Samar
Leisser F. Africa	Provincial Budget Officer, Catarman, Northern Samar

***Local Government Units, Western Samar***

Hon. Jesus B. Redaja	Vice Governor, Western Samar
Hon. Mel Senen Sarmiento	City Mayor, Calbayog City, Western Samar
Hon. Luzviminda L. Nacario	Municipal Mayor, Calbiga, Western Samar
Roberto B. Pacal	Barangay Captain, Brgy. Calayaan, Calbiga, Western Samar
Benedicto C. Ragay	Barangay Captain, Brgy. Rawis, Calbiga, Western Samar
Edencio A. Raffles	Barangay Captain, Brgy. Panayuran, Calbiga, Western Samar
Roberto M. Bobas	Barangay Captain, Brgy. Biri, Calbiga, Western Samar
Dominador S. Cabornay	Barangay Captain, Brgy. Polangi, Calbiga, Western Samar
Carlo N. Asistol	Barangay Captain, Brgy. Barobaybay, Calbiga, Western Samar
Amelito D. Jumagdao	Municipal Engineer, Calbiga, Western Samar
Alito D. Raffles	Municipal General Services Officer, Calbiga, Western Samar
Lourdes C. Solayao	Municipal Assessor, Calbiga, Western Samar
Leonor L. Jabonete	Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, Calbiga, Western Samar
Lota F. Cabongayon	Municipal Accountant, Calbiga, Western Samar
Raul A. de Guzman	Local Civil Registrar, Calbiga, Western Samar
Teresita Cabuenas	Environmental Management Specialist, Calbiga, Samar
Leo C. Aduana	Member, Sangguniang Bayan, Calbiga, Western Samar

***Catholic Church***

Leonardo Medroso	Bishop, Eastern Samar
Emmanuel C. Trance	Bishop, Catarman, Northern Samar
Fr. Cesar Aculan	Program Director, Social Action Center
Mario Ian N. Mosquesa	In-Charge, Catholic Social Service Centre

*NGOs/POs*

Aniceto J. Cabuenas	Coordinator, Community Based Resource Management, Sub-Project
Joselito G. Egargo	Coordinator, Community Based Resource Management, Sub-Project
Jorge E. Mendros	Demonstration Farm Technician / In-Charge
Melchor N. Nacario	President, Currents Foundation
Santiago B. Abelido	Member, Currents Foundation
Agustin B. Docena	Provincial Coordinator, Eastern Samar Development Foundation
Lito R. Gacusana	Secretary General, SAGUPA
Loise R. Horca	COS- SAGUPA
Ernie T. Redaja	President, Samar Peoples Economic Council Foundation, Inc.
Godofredo Ebias	Chairman, Casandig Farmers Multi-purpose Cooperative
Roman Ebias, Jr.	President, Casandig Farmers Multi-purpose Cooperative
Exequiel Candido	Member, Casandig Farmers Multi-purpose Cooperative
Antonio Quebec	Member, Casandig Farmers Multi-purpose Cooperative
Demetrio L. Irasga	Member, Casandig Farmers Multi-purpose Cooperative
Jose N. Gabia	Member, Casandig Farmers Multi-purpose Cooperative
Hernato S. Gabiana	Member, Casandig Farmers Multi-purpose Cooperative
Vilma L. Rivera	Member, Casandig Farmers Multi-purpose Cooperative
Silvino G. Bersala	Member, Casandig Farmers Multi-purpose Cooperative
Danilo Miralles	Chairman, Katatapurang Pederasyon han Parag-uma ha Samar (KAPPAS)
Jenna T. Igdalino	Program Coordinator, KAPPAS
Ricardo P. Bulfo	Vice Chairman, Board of Directors, KAPPAS
Roberto A. Barsana	Member, Board of Directors, KAPPAS
Jimmy Bueno	Member, Board of Directors, KAPPAS
Dolores M. Nadonza	Board of Directors Secretary, KAPPAS
Elizabeth J. Ladisla	Member, Board of Directors Livelihood Committee, KAPPAS
Cheryl B. Bacarra	Member, Livelihood Committee, KAPPAS
Vilma G. Ladeza	Bookkeeper, KAPPAS
Rosita Gutierrez	Member, KAPPAS
Nora I. Abalos	Member, KAPPAS
Beatriz Bulfa	Member, KAPPAS
Emelia P. Oben	Member, KAPPAS
Ma. Clara Cinco	Community Development Worker, Tenani Action for Progress
Roberto P. Oblino	Member, Board of Directors Tenani Action for Progress
Eugene Igdalino	Community Development Worker, Tenani Action for Progress
Abraham C. Abalos	President, Tenani Action for Progress
Andres Lodesa Jr.	Board of Directors, Basaranan nga Organisasyon han San Isidro
Dalia L. Amable	Community Development Worker, Basaranan nga Organisasyon han San Isidro
Roberto Millares	Member, Livelihood Committee, Basaranan nga Organisasyon han San Isidro
Manuel Cabacaba	Member, Tenani Action for Progress
Romualdo V. Capatoy	President, MFAFA Inc.
Beinvenido G. Silverio	President, Eastern Samar Coconut Producers Multipurpose Cooperative

Manuel Amengoli	Vice President, Caisawan Bantay Kalikasan, Eastern Samar
Esperanza Borja	Treasurer, Caisawan Bantay Kalikasan, Eastern Samar
Dionisio G. Borja	Member, Caisawan Farmers Association, Eastern Samar
Santiago Alabot	Receipient of Model Farmer Award
Nilo L. Laboc	Cantongtong, Jiabong, Western Samar
Rosa Maria A. Cabanero	VIDA - Volunteer

***Other Government Agencies***

Cleta Omega	Provincial Director, TESDA
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***Armed Forces of the Philippines***

Lt.Col. Manuel Felino Ramos	Chief of Staff, 8 <sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, Western Samar
Lt.Col. Mario G. Lacorum	Assistant Chief Staff, 8 <sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, Western Samar

***Other***

Sentay B. Quitarior	Media Representative, Free Zone
Laiminh S. Mabulay	Media Representative



## ANNEX IV : SUMMARY EVALUATION OF PROJECT ACHIEVEMENTS BY OUTPUTS

During the Project, changes were made to the overall strategy and activities but these were never documented into a revised logframe (see paragraph 2). As a result, this evaluation matrix uses the original logframe but since a number of additional indicators have become available, these have been added and evaluated accordingly. These are inserted at the end of each relevant Output.

Output description	Success Criteria <sup>¶</sup>	Status at Project Completion	Comments	Evaluation			
				HS	S	M S	U
Purpose: The Samar Island Natural Park is established and managed with broad-based stakeholder participation	Legislative approval of PA status obtained by yr. 2003 q4 (pre-requisite for graduation to Phase 2)	Presidential Proclamation issued in August 2003. Bill for Legislative Proclamation currently passed 2 <sup>nd</sup> reading in the House of Representatives but in the Senate remains at the level of the Committee on Environment and Natural Resources.	Excellent adaptive management has led to three Provincial Ordinances, banning logging and mining, being enacted in each of the three Provinces on the island. Although a Legislative Proclamation is not yet enacted, this is now outside the Project's control and is a political decision (see paragraphs 27). The Project has covered every angle available to it to provide as much legal protection to the SINP as possible.				
	No illegal new settlement within SINP core area and buffer zone beyond 2000 baseline	No new illegal settlement recorded within SINP since 2000.	Expansion of current settlements, however, has been observed but not documented since the baseline SRPAO was completed only in 2005.				
Output 1: An adaptive management framework for conservation management is established and operational	Operational Plans for phase 1 completed by first quarter of each year	All operational plans delivered on time for approval by UNDP.	Operational plans for each year have been prepared and submitted on time for approval by UNDP which has been the basis for the annual release of funds.				
	First 5 Year Management Plan developed and approved by yr. 2, q4	No. Endorsed by PAMB in November 2005. Subjected to revision, completed in March 2006. Expected to be delivered to Secretary of DENR in April 2006.	Delays in the Biodiversity Resource Assessment (itself in part delayed by NPA activity) has in part been responsible for delays in the PA Management Plan. A dearth of PA planning specialists has not helped. The idea to develop watershed management plans to break the task of planning for a big PA into smaller manageable areas has simply diverted resources away from the central task and proved given a false sense of progress.				
	PAMB established by yr. 1, q3	Late. Established in November 2004 along with 3 Sub-PAMBs and Executive Committees.	Could not be approved until a Presidential or Legislative Proclamation was passed. The NIPAS law requiring representation from each barangay has resulted in a PAMB of				

<sup>¶</sup> from Section D of the Project Document

Output description	Success Criteria <sup>¶</sup>	Status at Project Completion	Comments	Evaluation			
				HS	S	M S	U
			almost 300 members – too big to be effective or efficient. The sub-PAMBs are an attempt to overcome that.		■		
	Biological assessment completed by yr. 2, q2 and data base for monitoring established by yr. 2 q4	Late. Fieldwork completed in September 2002. Final report delivered in 2003. Raw data for establishment of database has still not been released by contractors (as at March 2006).	Fieldwork subject to delay by activities of New People's Army. Eight Biological Monitoring Stations have been installed for monitoring purposes – one in each watershed (see below). However, the BRA was undertaken in closed canopy forests only and not in representative habitat types			■	
	Land use map and zoning plan completed by yr. 2 q4	Due for approval in April 2006. Part of PA Management Plan – see above).	Late. Less participation by LGUs due to lack of awareness, understanding, and skills. Less or no coordination between provincial and municipal LGUs, and with other line agencies such as DA, DAR. Sustainability problem as the process requires large funds, e.g. GIS package		■		
	Legislative approvals for gazettal of SINP obtained by yr. 3, q3 (prerequisite for Phase 2)	Presidential Proclamation issued on 13 August 2003 enabling gazettal.	Current make up of legislative body as well as general government thrust to pursue mining has placed in doubt whether this could happen at all. In any case, the current version of the bill has some inconsistencies and still reflects an unwieldy decision-making set-up.		■		
<i>Indicators additional to original logframe</i>							
	Watershed Management Plans	8 plans produced for watersheds covering much of Samar Island and around 80% of the SINP. FLUPs produced for two Municipalities within the SINP not covered by watershed management plans	WMPs have been produced for the following eight watersheds, each containing a minimum of six municipalities except the last – Catubig, Pambujan, Gandara, Dolores, Taft, Can-avid, Suribao, and Basey. FLUPS have been produced for Basey, Calbiga, and Mondragon. Because Basey has only one municipality, a FLUP has been produced for it to supplement the WMP. However, the TET questions if this has been an efficient and effective strategy for management planning.			■	
	Provincial Ordinances banning logging and mining in provinces	3 Ordinances covering each of the Provinces within the SINP passed in 12 <sup>th</sup> December 2006 in Northern Samar, 16 <sup>th</sup> December 2005 in Eastern Samar and 13 <sup>th</sup> October 2005 in Samar	Great advocacy made by the project at the provincial level which may also be attributed to the support and influence of the church leaders (Bishops). The advocacy though should have been made at the earlier stage of the project.	■			
	Municipal Ordinances banning logging and mining in provinces	4 Ordinances covering Municipalities whose territory constitutes part of the SINP passed in 5 <sup>th</sup> December 2005 in Catubig, N. Samar, 12 <sup>th</sup> December 2005 in Lope de Vega, N. Samar, 12 <sup>th</sup> December 2006 in Mondragon,	Weak advocacy and IEC at the municipal level as there have been less understanding of the project especially by the Local Chief Executives resulting to less participation to project activities. Only 4 out of 37 municipalities covered by the project have been able to pass municipal ordinances.		■		

Output description	Success Criteria <sup>ii</sup>	Status at Project Completion	Comments	Evaluation			
				HS	S	M S	U
		N. Samar					
	Biodiversity Monitoring System	One station established in each watershed.	A total of 10 biodiversity monitoring stations have been established – the one in Pambujan Municipality has been decommissioned because of NPA activity . BMS is not distributed over different habitats but all in closed canopy forest.				
<b>Output 2:</b> Conservation functions are fully operationalised	Full complement of PA staff recruited by yr. 2 q4	16 regular DENR staff (including the SIBP Project Manager who is also the PASu) work for the PA Office. Remaining SIBP staff considered as SINP staff while no other funding for PA staff available.	The Philippine Government, due to a fiscal crisis, instituted a rationalization which placed a blanket ban on any staff recruitment by the government. PASu recommended that DENR staff working under the PENRO and CENRO whose areas overlap with the SINP should be transferred to the SINP Office so that no new positions have to be created. Recommendation is currently still with DENR-8.				
	Respective functions of PASu, CENRO and PENRO formalized by yr. 2 q3	Department Administrative Order 2000 #45 (DAO 2000 #45) formally delineates functions of PASu, PENRO and CENRO. However, it states that PASu should report to the PENRO but there are three PENRO's with jurisdiction over the area. SINP PASu currently reports to the RED directly	Streamlining should not merely be on paper but in practice. For example, DAO 2000 #45 gives the PASu the function to grant permits and collect fees within the SINP but in practice, the RED still renews and CENRO still collects fees for rattan cutting concessions with PAMB clearance.				
	Infrastructural designs completed by yr. 3 q1	Design on time – infrastructure not yet complete – due for completion by December 2006.	TET notes contradiction in indicator – Output says “fully operationalised” while indicator says only “design” needs to be completed.				
	Signage and interpretation materials designed by yr.4 q4	Signage contracted out to project staff – billboards used instead of signage.	Significant shortfall in budget for this activity and buildings (above) to which they are linked. Original budget at design was 12 million pesos, but four years later at time of implementation, costs for same design had jumped to 20 million pesos. Actions indicate a response to by management to still achieve objectives.				
	PA boundaries fully delineated by yr.4, q2 (pre requisite for Phase 2)	DAO 2004 #17 specified guidelines for delineation of SINP. Delineated on map on time in 2004, but not on ground.	Delineation on ground requires the passage of the Legislative Act, still before Congress. There is minimal fund allocated for ground delineation and demarcation using natural features.				
<b>Output 3:</b> A community-based conservation framework is tested	Social outreach team mobilized by yr. 1 q2; ongoing briefing and debriefing nurtures outreach	Late. Framework complete and COP service providers on ground in September 2003 for 62 barangays out of 307 (240 in the core zone and 67 in the buffer zone).	Phase 1 budgets were insufficient to extend COP to anything other than 62 barangays. Assistance to non-COP barangays who are holders of CBFMA is still needed. Poor peace and order situation (NPAs) has slowed down implementation of on-				

Output description	Success Criteria <sup>ii</sup>	Status at Project Completion	Comments	Evaluation			
				HS	S	M S	U
and effective	operations and ensures quality control	COP has provided cost-effective outreach resulting in gains for these groups.	the-ground development activities by service providers which is attributed to late accomplishment of COP activities and submission of reports, and therefore delays in fund releases.				
	Village files established by yr. 1 q3 documenting outreach	Late. Community profile completed in q1 2005.	Village files form part of an excellent COP database covering 62 of the 307 barangays (240 barangays in the core and 67 in the buffer zones).				
	Contractual responsibilities for DENR, LGUs and community actors negotiated by yr. 4 q1 (pre requisite for Phase 2)	Contractual responsibilities for DENR agreed to by RED of DENR-8 on 31 August 2005. Those for others have not been completed, although some budget allocations have been made. See tenurial security below.	Other related obligations remain unfulfilled such as deputization pending for Community Forest Guards in 31 barangays. Tenure issues have to be sorted out for the remaining barangays not covered by COP or CBFMA. Selected LGUs are willing to extend resources (manpower and finance) in support of project activities. Still others have to be convinced so they do the same.				
	Community Forestry Programme negotiated and in place for 40% BMUs	Programme changed. 62 Community Outreach Programmes initiated in barangays, mainly inside the SINP.	BMU concept not applicable to the SINP since there are communities present within the core area. Instead, the project secured the requirements for 55 people's organizations in COP barangays to apply for a PACBRMA. Community organisers face distrust as being either from the NPA or the military.				
	5 VCCs are created by yr. 4, q 2	Programme changed. Eight Watershed Plans produced with a Council for each. Five Councils in place by end of 2005; remaining three projected for end of 2006.	As above, the PSC approved the change of the VCC concept to that of Watershed Management Councils (WMC). TET does not consider WMCs to be operating at the village level. However, watershed management plans make some contribution to the community-based conservation framework. CDRMP in COP barangays were conducted in parallel and did not consider the watershed management plans drafted.				
	Annual SINP VCC forum convened by yr.4	Changed. Eight Management Planning Workshops (one for each watershed) were held in November 2005 to consolidate the PA Management Plan. Another is planned in 2006 to consolidate the membership of PAMB for the watershed interests.	Watershed Management Plans do not respond to success criteria despite PSC approval to change the concept to WMCs.				
	Community forestry guards designated by yr. 4 q1	No. Guards have been identified, given one training workshop on preparatory requirements in 28 of the 62 priority barangays, but have not been appointed.	On 7 July 2005, Secretary of DENR placed a freeze on deputisation of citizens as forest guards. Some identified guards feel that actual deputisation is not necessary for them to perform the expected function of reporting violations for the authorities to follow through with arrests and prosecution.				

Output description	Success Criteria <sup>ii</sup>	Status at Project Completion	Comments	Evaluation			
				HS	S	M S	U
			Threats of violence from the NPA also delays recruitment. Training of previously dormant Multi-sectoral Forest Protection Councils has been undertaken for the purpose of reactivation.				
	<i>Indicators additional to original logframe</i>						
	Tenurial security for barangays in the core zone	Requirements for securing tenure in 55 barangays in the core zone completed and endorsed by PAMB to DENR for granting of PACBRMA	Original concept was to provide tenurial security to buffer zone communities – remains pending in the light of the large number (240) of barangays present in the core zone to which priority has been accorded.				
<b>Output 4:</b> Broad-based awareness of conservation values and management needs is imparted to forest-edge communities and other key Samareño stakeholders	Communications strategy prepared and endorsed by yr. 1 q4	Final version completed in 2004.	Partnerships among different stakeholders, e.g. academe, media, religious groups, included provision of financial, material and personnel support reflecting their commitment to the environment.				
	Awareness programme for phase 1 prepared by yr. 1 q3; for Phase 2, by year 4 q3	Late. Completed in October 2004.	Programme for Phase 2 is included in the same plan, but are awaiting changes to the design of Phase 2 before programme is revised and finalised.				
	Awareness materials for community outreach available by yr. 2 q2	Completed on time in July 2003. See also caravan, below.	These materials were incorporated into the COPs for upland communities and LGUs.				
	<i>Indicators additional to original logframe</i>						
	Save Samar Island Caravan organised	Protest caravan with the theme of "Yes to SINP, No to mining" and involving over 15,000 people was held on 8 <sup>th</sup> August 2003	Caravan was instrumental in getting the Presidential Proclamation signed a few days later. 8 <sup>th</sup> August has now been declared Samar Island Biodiversity Day and activities have been held on each day since.				
	Samar Island Council for Sustainable Development	Council formed on 19 <sup>th</sup> October 2005, incorporation papers finalized and pending submission to the Securities and Exchange Commission for corporate identity	The Council has taken a firm stand against the threats to SINP and engages in multi-sectoral dialogue for island-wide development directions.				
	Biodiversity included in schools' curricula	Pilot test for final version of a manual for including biodiversity into schools is current	Will be expanded to include all elementary and secondary schools' curricula in Region 8 (Eastern Visayas), covered by a MOA with DepEd-8.				
<b>Output 5:</b> Conservation objectives are internalized in sectoral	Results of resource valuation study available by yr. 1 q4	Not yet available.	UNDP cancelled the first contract for the valuation in 1 <sup>st</sup> June 2004 because it was not producing effective results. The TOR for the second replacement study are currently being prepared by UNDP with the intention that the study should be completed by December 2006				

Output description	Success Criteria <sup>ii</sup>	Status at Project Completion	Comments	Evaluation			
				HS	S	M S	U
development planning, budgeting and activity delivery at the provincial and municipal levels	3 Provincial workshops on integrated conservation and development convened by yr. 4 q 3 and fact sheets on conservation needs prepared by yr. 3 q1	The PMO reports that these were integrated into a series of workshops undertaken for the watershed planning in q2 2005 as well as FLUPs in two municipalities outside the watershed areas. The fact sheets were prepared for each watershed as part of the profiling in q2 2005.	NEDA requires all provinces to formulate 10-year Provincial Physical Framework Plans. Participation in these exercises during 2004 would have fulfilled the Project's success criteria completely. The PMO failed to get the SINP included adequately in this exercise.				
<b>Output 6:</b> Alternative, conservation enabling livelihoods are in place, and the sustainability of wild resource use is assured	Provisional harvest quotas for sustainable use of NTFP's established by yr. 4 q3	NTFP feasibility study on sustainable harvesting for rattan and almaciga was completed in March 2003 and was augmented by identifying potential products during the biodiversity study in December 2003. No quotas have yet been set.	Harvest quotas for firewood and charcoal production, timber for houses of tenured migrants (currently a tolerated practice), and of NTFP's other than rattan and almaciga need to be set. Requires inventory data showing existing density or quantity of identified economic forest resource for setting-up harvest quotas.				
	Community consensus on ecotourism development and management strategies obtained by yr. 4 q3	Scoping workshop held in early 2002 set priorities for ecotourism sites.	Training of local guides was conducted in partnership with LGU's in priority ecotourism sites in Calbiga, Calbayog, Basey and Lawaan, reflecting a level of community consensus.				
	Ecotourism management plan drafted and approved by yr. 4 q3	No. Feasibility studies for Sohoton Caves, Pinipisakan Falls and Borongan-Llorente closed canopy forests complete with options undertaken, but no plan drafted or approved.	A complete ecotourism management plan was drafted only for Sohoton Caves.				
	Tourism promotion activities initiated by yr. 4 q 3	No tourism promotion, as opposed to preparatory activities, has been undertaken.	The PMO reports on accomplishments in feasibility studies and training, but actual promotion that would entice visitors as well as an ecotourism code of conduct and management plan that were in the original logframe have not been fulfilled.				
	Results of farming systems research and management recommendations available by yr. 4 q 3	Farming Systems Review failed and was cancelled in August 2003. No replacement study was commissioned.	To provide an alternative, a site characterisation study was undertaken leading to the establishment of five demonstration farms – see below.				
	<i>Indicators additional to original logframe</i>						
	Demonstration farms established	Five farms demonstrating different sustainable farming systems established.	These cover pili nuts, agroforestry, abaca (a fibre), and two different vegetable systems. Demonstration farms established has weak link to forest and biodiversity conservation				
	Market study into priority	Priorities determined during the Community	Criteria and procedure for selection of priority crops made the				

Output description	Success Criteria <sup>ii</sup>	Status at Project Completion	Comments	Evaluation			
				HS	S	M S	U
	crops	Outreach Programme. Study due to report in April 2006	subject of in-depth study does not seem to have been rigorous.				
<b>Output 7:</b>	<i>No indicators for phase 1 – progress made on those for the proposed Phase 2</i>						
Mechanism for financing the recurrent costs of conservation activities is in place	50% of additional staff salaries absorbed into DENR budget by year 5; by year 8 100%.	16 regular staff being paid by DENR (c.16%) and 13 people on a contract basis paid by DENR.	Proposed organizational chart drawn up but staffing dependent on how many the DENR can detail instead of an optimum number required to run the park.				
	By year 8, incremental costs of community management provided by the Foundation for Philippine Environment endowment.	Initial meeting with the FPE suggests that it is willing to fund capacity building of the PAMBs.	FPE continued to support a community project. Philippine Tropical Forest Conservation Foundation, a funding facility from debt reduction, has determined its priority for funding to be lowland dipterocarp, of which SINP is the largest and continuous remaining examples in the Philippines.				

## ANNEX V: PHASE ONE FINANCIAL ASSESSMENT<sup>100</sup>

### A. PROJECT COST, CO-FINANCING AND ALLOCATION

1. **Project Cost & Co-Financing.** The Project Document indicates a total funding of US\$12.88M for the two (2) phases of the SIBP. It is composed of GEF US\$5.76M (45%), GoP US\$4.25M (33%), TRAC US\$1.52M (12%) and the balance (10%) made up of US\$0.94M from FPE, US\$0.35M from USAID and US\$0.06M from NGOs
2. **Phase 1 vs. Phase 2 Budget.** The bulk of the funds were allocated to Phase 1 as follows: GEF US\$4.16M (72%), TRAC US\$1.13M (74%) and the GoP US\$2.10M (49%)
3. **Phase 1 Budget: Distribution Per Output (Budget Ratio).** (A) **Grant funds** (GEF & TRAC) are allocated (from biggest to lowest) into Output 6 US\$1.11M (21%), Project Management US\$1.11M (21%), Output 3 US\$0.96M (18%), Output 2 US\$0.70M (13%), Output 1 US\$0.57M (11%), Outputs 4 US\$0.41M (8%), Output 5 US\$0.32M (6%), and Output 7 US\$0.10M (2%). (B) **For GoP**, funds are distributed into Output 6 US\$1.16M (56%), Output 2 US\$0.51M (24%), Output 1 US\$0.28M (13%), Output 3 US\$0.10M (5%) and Output 7 US\$0.05M (2%).

### B. FUND UTILIZATION, ANALYSIS AND STATUS

1. **Phase 1 Overall Utilization-Grants (GEF & TRAC).** US\$4.41M (83%) of the Phase 1 budget had been spent at the end of 2005. Balance at the end of 2005 would be US\$0.88M (GEF US\$0.28M & TRAC US\$0.60M). There appears to be a bigger balance in TRAC funds in the sense that, compared to the Project Document budget, releases became lower starting in 2003 & 2004 (capped by UNDP at US\$0.15M each year) and 2005 (at US\$50,000) due to limited UNDP TRAC funds.
2. **Phase 1 Overall Utilization-GoP Cash Counterpart (to be verified/updated).** US\$0.36M (17%) of the Phase 1 budget had been spent at the end of 2004 and US\$0.41M (19%) would be spent at the end of 2005. Balance at the end of 2005 would be US\$1.70M. There appears to be a bigger balance in the sense that, compared to the annual budget in the Project Document, GoP releases are late, low and slow. The GoP committed significant counterpart contribution to SIBP, but this was apparently subject to the availability of funds. With low/slow GoP releases, some of the GoP-funded activities were supported from grant (GEF) fund (e.g. personnel cost for PCOs/CDOs, forest protection activities, BMS, etc.). Use of grant fund to finance supposedly GoP-funded activities were duly approved by UNDP. In addition to the annual allotments, the government provides in-kind contributions in the form of salaries of DENR personnel assigned/detailed to the project and other material support from DENR offices. (Note: indicate amounts of in-kind co-financing).
3. **Phase 1 Overall Financial Utilization vs. Physical Accomplishment (to be verified/updated).** The combined (grant and GoP funds) financial utilization at the end of 2005 was 52% while the physical accomplishment of the same period was 66%.
4. **Phase 1 Overall Utilization Per Output-Grant Funds (GEF & TRAC).** **Output 1:** US\$0.85M (148%) of the Phase 1 budget had been spent at the end of 2005. Balance at the end of 2005 would be US\$0.27M overrun. **Output 2:** US\$0.63M (89%) of the Phase 1 budget had been spent at the end of 2005. Balance at the end of 2005 would be US\$0.08M.

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<sup>100</sup> as of 31st December 2005



**Output 3:** US\$0.67M (70%) of the Phase 1 budget had been spent at the end of 2005. Balance at the end of 2005 would be US\$0.26M. **Output 4:** US\$0.30M (75%) of the Phase 1 budget had been spent at the end of 2005. Balance at the end of 2005 would be US\$0.10M. **Output 5:** US\$0.19M (60%) of the Phase 1 budget had been spent at the end of 2005. Balance at the end of 2005 would be US\$0.13M. **Output 6:** US\$0.43M (39%) of the Phase 1 budget had been spent at the end of 2005. Balance at the end of 2005 would be US\$0.68M. **Output 7:** US\$0.02 (1%) of the Phase 1 budget had been spent at the end of 2005. Balance at the end of 2005 would be US\$0.08M. **Project Management:** US\$1.30M (118%) of the Phase 1 budget had been spent at the end of 2005. Balance at the end of 2005 would be US\$0.20M overrun. If based on Project Document budgets (which are only indicative), expenditures for some Outputs will result to cost overruns. However, all Output expenditures were within budget if based on annual work and financial prepared by the Project and as approved by UNDP. To rectify the seemingly unrealistic budgets in the Project Document, a number of budget revisions (Revision K was the latest for both the GEF & TRAC funds issued by UNDP last 2003), were made during the course of phase 1 by realigning budget between and among line items and components. The revisions were made to reflect (a) annual work plans (and in-between revisions particularly the mandatory October Budget Rephasing) and (b) annual expenses.

5. **Phase 1 Overall Utilization per Output-GoP (to be updated).** **Output 1:** US\$0.11M (39%) of the Phase 1 budget had been spent at the end of 2004 and US\$0.12M (41%) would be spent at the end of 2005. Balance at the end of 2005 would be US\$0.17M. **Output 2:** US\$0.06M (13%) of the Phase 1 budget had been spent at the end of 2004 and US\$0.08M (16%) would be spent at the end of 2005. Balance at the end of 2005 would be US\$0.43M. **Output 3:** US\$0.004M (4%) of the Phase 1 budget had been spent at the end of 2004 and US\$0.006M (6%) would be spent at the end of 2005. Balance at the end of 2005 would be US\$0.10M. **Output 6:** US\$0.00 (0%) of the Phase 1 budget had been spent at the end of 2004 and of 2005. Balance at the end of 2005 would be US\$1.16M. **Output 7:** US\$0.004M (8%) of the Phase 1 budget had been spent at the end of 2004 and US\$0.004M (8%) would be spent at the end of 2005. Balance at the end of 2005 would be US\$0.05M. **Project Management:** US\$0.20M 2004 & 2005 allocations were temporarily “parked” under this component per report received subject to reclassification by GoP staff concerned. Should the reclassification be effected, it would also affect utilization rates and balances of other Outputs.
6. **Phase 1 Overall Financial Utilization (Grant & GoP Funds) vs. Physical Accomplishment-Per Output (to be updated).** Following are comparative financial and physical accomplishments at the end of 2005. **Output 1:** Financial utilization was 113% while physical accomplishment was ?%. **Output 2:** Financial utilization was 59% while physical accomplishment was ?%. **Output 3:** Financial utilization was 64% while physical accomplishment was ?%. **Output 4:** Financial utilization was 75% while physical accomplishment was ?%. **Output 5:** Financial utilization was 60% while physical accomplishment was ?%. **Output 6:** Financial utilization was 19% while physical accomplishment was ?%. **Output 7:** Financial utilization was 18% while physical accomplishment was ?%.
7. **Phase 1 Budget Analysis Per Fund-Grant Funds (GEF & TRAC).** The approved budget was US\$5.29M while actual expenditures was US\$4.41M, representing a utilization rate of 83%. Grant funds were biggest spent/to be spent in 2004 US\$1.20M (27%), 2003 US\$1.00M (23%), 2005M US\$0.92M (21%), 2002 US\$0.80M (18%), low(er) in 2001 US\$0.43M (10%) and 2000 US\$0.04M (1%). This means that the combined 89% of total expenditures were materially used for 2002-2005. This reflects that project implementation was late/low/slow in 2000 & 2001 (e.g. late project start, late hiring, delayed contracting, etc.) and goes full swing from 2002 to 2005.

8. **Phase 1 Budget Analysis Per Fund-GoP Funds (to be updated).** The approved budget was US\$2.10M while actual expenditures (2000-2004) plus current year allocation (2005) was US\$0.41M, representing a utilization rate of 19%. GoP funds were biggest released in 2004 US\$0.15M (36%), 2003 US\$0.14M (34%), low(er) in 2002 US\$0.06M (14%), 2005 US\$0.04M (11%), and 2001 US\$0.02M (5%), and none in 2000 (0%). This means that the combined 70% of funds were materially released for 2003 & 2004. This reflects that, compared to the annual budget in the Project Document, GoP releases are late, low and slow.
9. **Phase 1 Budget Analysis Per Output-Grant Funds (GEF & TRAC).**
- a. **Output 1.** The approved budget was US\$573,374 while actual expenditures was US\$847,415, representing a utilization rate of 148%. While the budget ratio is 11% (4<sup>th</sup> biggest budget), the expenditure ratio is high at 19% of total expenditures for the same period which has the 2<sup>nd</sup> biggest expenditures next to Project Management. Output 1 was spent (highest to lowest) in 2003 (28%), 2004 (23%), 2002 (22%), 2005 (16%), 2001 (10%), and 2000 (1%). This means that the combined 89% of total expenditures were materially used for 2002-2005.
  - b. **Output 2.** The approved budget was US\$702,917 while actual expenditures was US\$627,847, representing a utilization rate of 89%. While the budget ratio is 13% (3<sup>rd</sup> biggest budget), the expenditure ratio is 14% of total expenditures for the same period which is the 4<sup>th</sup> biggest expenditures. Output 2 was spent in 2005 (43%), 2004 (29%), 2003 (15%), 2002 (9%), 2001 (4%), and 2000 (0%). This means that the combined 87% of total expenditures were materially used for 2003-2005.
  - c. **Output 3.** The approved budget was US\$956,036 while actual expenditures was US\$670,493, representing a utilization rate of 70%. While the budget ratio is 18% (2<sup>nd</sup> biggest budget), the expenditure ratio is 15% of total expenditures for the same period which is the 3<sup>rd</sup> biggest expenditures next to Project Management and Output 1. Output 3 was spent in 2004 (35%), 2003 (31%), 2005 (26%), 2002 (7%), 2001 (2%), and 2000 (0%). This means that the combined 91% of total expenditures were materially used for 2003-2005.
  - d. **Output 4.** The approved budget was US\$407,190 while actual expenditures was US\$304,219, representing a utilization rate of 75%. While the budget ratio is 8% (3<sup>rd</sup> lowest budget), the expenditure ratio is 7% of total expenditures for the same period which is the 3<sup>rd</sup> smallest expenditures. Output 4 was spent in 2004 (27%), 2002, 2003, 2005 (21% each), 2001 (10%), and 2000 (0%). This means that the combined 90% of total expenditures were materially used for 2002-2005.
  - e. **Output 5.** The approved budget was US\$323,033 while actual expenditures was US\$193,517, representing a utilization rate of 60%. While the budget ratio is 6% (2<sup>nd</sup> lowest budget), the expenditure ratio is 4% of total expenditures for the same period which is the 2<sup>nd</sup> lowest expenditures next to Output 7. Output 5 was spent in 2002 (26%), 2004 (25%), 2003 (22%), 2001 (16%), 2005 (11%), and 2000 (0%). This means that the combined 100% of total expenditures were materially used for 2001-2005.
  - f. **Output 6.** The approved budget was US\$1,109,940 while actual expenditures was US\$431,632, representing a utilization rate of 39%. While the budget ratio is 21% (biggest budget), the expenditure ratio is (inconsistently low at) 10% of total expenditures for the same period which is the 4<sup>th</sup> lowest expenditures. Output 6 was spent in 2004 (35%), 2003 (30%), 2002 (20%), 2001 (9%), 2005 (6%), and 2000 (0%). This means that the combined 85% of total expenditures were materially used for 2002-2004.
  - g. **Output 7.** The approved budget for output 7 was US\$99,742 while actual expenditures was US\$22,375, representing a low allocation rate of 23%. While the budget ratio is 2% (lowest budget), the allocation ratio is 1% of total expenditures for the same period which is the lowest expenditures. Output 7 was spent in 2005 (100%).

- h. **Project Management.** The approved budget was US\$1,114,591 while actual expenditures was US\$1,311,135, representing a utilization rate of 118%. While the budget ratio is 21% (biggest budget same with Output 6), the expenditure ratio is 30% of total expenditures for the same period which has the biggest expenditures. Project Management was spent in 2002 & 2004 (24% each), 2003 (18%), 2005 (16%), 2001 (15%), and in 2000 (3%). This means that the combined 97% of total expenditures were materially used for 2001-2005.

#### **10. Phase 1 Budget Analysis Per Output-GoP (to be updated)**

- a. **Output 1.** The approved budget was US\$283,018 while actual expenditures (2003-2004) plus current year allocation (2005) was US\$116,230, representing a low utilization rate of 41%. While the budget ratio is 13% (3<sup>rd</sup> biggest budget), the expenditure ratio is 29% of total expenditures for the same period which has the 2<sup>nd</sup> biggest expenditures. Output 1 was spent/to be spent in 2004 (62%), 2003 (33%), 2005 (5%), 2000 to 2002 (0%). This means that the combined 95% of total expenditures were materially used for 2003-2004.
- b. **Output 2.** The approved budget was US\$509,333 while actual expenditures (2001,2003-2004) plus current year allocation (2005) was US\$81,804, representing a low utilization rate of 16%. While the budget ratio is 24% (2<sup>nd</sup> biggest budget), the expenditure ratio is 16% of total expenditures for the same period which has the 3<sup>rd</sup> biggest expenditures. Output 2 was spent/to be spent in 2003 (40%), 2004 (34%), 2005 (22%), 2001 (4%), 2000 & 2002 (0%). This means that the combined 96% of total expenditures were materially used for 2003-2005.
- c. **Output 3.** The approved budget was US\$102,451 while actual expenditures (2003-2004) plus current year allocation (2005) was US\$6,404, representing a low utilization rate of 6%. While the budget ratio is 5% (2<sup>nd</sup> lowest budget), the expenditure ratio is 2% of total expenditures for the same period which has the 2<sup>nd</sup> lowest expenditures. Output 3 was spent/to be spent in 2005 (39%), 2003 (32%), 2004 (28%), 2000 to 2002 (0%). This means that the combined 100% of total expenditures were materially used/to be used for 2003-2005.
- d. **Output 6.** The approved budget was US\$1,159,614 while actual expenditures (2004 only) was US\$909, representing a low utilization rate of almost 0%. While the budget ratio is 55% (biggest budget), the expenditure ratio is (inconsistent at) almost 0% of total expenditures for the same period which has the lowest expenditures. Output 6 was spent in 2004 (100%), 2000 to 2003 & 2005 (0%).
- e. **Output 7.** The approved budget was US\$50,000 while actual expenditures (2002 only) was US\$3,921, representing a low utilization rate of 8%. While the budget ratio is 2% (lowest budget), the expenditure ratio is 1% of total expenditures for the same period which has the 2<sup>nd</sup> lowest expenditures. Output 7 was spent 2002 (100%), 2000-2001 & 2003-2005 (0%).
- f. **Project Management:** No approved budget, the US\$0.20M 2004 & 2005 allocations were temporarily “parked” under this component per report received subject to reclassification by GoP staff concerned. Should the reclassification be effected, it would also affect utilization rates and balances of other Outputs.

#### **11. Phase 1 Cost-Sharing Analysis Between Grants and GoP per Output (to be updated)**

- a. **Output 1.** Total budget was US\$856,392 (US\$573,374 or 67% grants, US\$283,018 or 33% GoP) while expenditures (2000-2004 actual & 2005 allocation) was US\$939,518 (US\$823,288 or 88% grants, US\$116,230 or 12% GoP). In terms of amount and cost-sharing, grants had met/exceeded its commitments compared to GoP which were very low.
- b. **Output 2.** Total budget was US\$1,212,250 (US\$702,917 or 58% grants, US\$509,333 or 42% GoP) while expenditures (2000-2004 actual & 2005 allocation) was

US\$834,832 (US\$753,027 or 90% grants, US\$81,804 or 10% GoP. In terms of amount and cost-sharing, grants had met/exceeded its commitments compared to GoP which were very low.


- c. **Output 3.** Total budget was US\$1,058,487 (US\$956,036 or 90% grants, US\$102,451 or 10% GoP) while expenditures (2000-2004 actual & 2005 allocation) was US\$771,559 (US\$765,156 or 99% grants, US\$6,404 or 1% GoP). In terms of amount, grants had satisfactorily (80%) met its commitment while exceeding the cost-sharing (from 90 to 99%) compared to GoP which were very low.
- d. **Output 6.** Total budget was US\$2,269,554 (US\$1,109,940 or 49% grants, US\$1,159,614 or 51% GoP) while expenditures (2000-2004 actual & 2005 allocation) was US\$440,644 (US\$439,735 or 99% grants, US\$909 or 1% GoP). Although grants utilization was low at 40%, it still performed best compared to almost 0% GoP support.
- e. **Output 7.** Total budget was US\$149,742 (US\$99,742 or 67% grants, US\$50,000 or 33% GoP) while expenditures (2000-2004 actual & 2005 allocation) was US\$19,102 (US\$15,181 or 79% grants, US\$3,921 or 21% GoP). Although low in terms of fund utilization, grants still performed better in terms of cost-sharing (from 67% to 79%) compared to GoP which were very low both to fund support and cost-sharing.
- f. **Project Management:** No approved budget for GoP, the US\$0.20M 2004 & 2005 allocations were temporarily “parked” under this component per report received subject to reclassification by GoP staff concerned. Should the reclassification be effected, it would also affect utilization rates and balances of other Outputs.

12. **Other Co-financing (to be updated).** The funds from FPE, USAID and NGOs had been spent on activities significant to the Project. FPE funds were directly provided to KAPPAS (an NGO) operating in Samar Island. USAID funds were spent under SAMBIO (Samar Biodiversity Study) project undertaken in preparation for the SIBP. NGOs also made in-kind contributions. Refer to attached “Project Cost & Co-Financing Summary” for respective counterpart commitments and their corresponding actual contributions.

## ANNEX VI: PROJECTED INCOME AND BUDGET FOR SINP

Year	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Basic budget required	10.00	10.50	11.03	11.58	12.16	12.76	13.40	14.07
Projected Income	1.93	1.99	2.35	2.75	3.16	3.16	3.16	3.16

Defecit (8.07) (8.51) (8.68) (8.83) (9.00) (9.60) (10.24) (10.91)



### Assumptions:

1. Basic Budgetary Requirements is 10.M pesos per annum to include;
  - Basic Salary of Personnel
  - Basic wages of hired personnel
  - Fixed Expenditures for Operations
  - Operations Costs
2. No Capital Outlay (No rehabilitation/restoration)
3. No projects implemented (Livelihood)
4. Basic services on ecotourism offered
5. Basic activities on Biological Monitoring System implemented
6. Linkaging and continous partnership with LGUs, POs, NGO,s and other partners
7. Projected Income (IPAF generation & Project Dev't./proposal/Co-Mgt. With LGU's)
8. Other basic park services provided

## ANNEX VII: SOURCES OF INCOME FOR THE SINP

### SINP PROJECTED INCOME (IPAF) GENERATION

#### A. Projected Income ( Entrance fees, water resources, use/rental of special use zone)

Table 1. Projected Entrance fees Generation (PhP)

Year	Income Generation	75 % IPAF	75% IPAF (SNBNP)	Total IPAF Generation
2006	927,264.00	695,448.00	260,648.00	956,096.00
2007	1,280,032.00	960,024.00		960,024.00
2008	1,651,627.00	1,238,754.00		1,238,754.00
2009	2,167,840.00	1,625,880.00		1,625,880.00
2010	2,626,024.00	1,969,518.00		1,969,518.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>8,652,787.00</b>	<b>6,489,624.00</b>		<b>6,750,272.00</b>

Table 2. Projected income derived from domestic water consumption

Year	Projected Population	Projected Household	Projected 20% Domestic Water Consumers	Income Generation (Ave. of 120 cu.m. @ P180.00 minimum)	Total (10% IPAF Gneration)
2006	1603815	308426	61685	11103300	1,110,330.00
2007	1618813	311310	62262	11207160	1,120,716.00
2008	1633811	314194	62839	11311020	1,131,102.00
2009	1648809	317079	63416	11414880	1,141,488.00
2010	1663809	319693	63993	11518740	1,151,874.00
	<b>Total</b>				<b>5,655,510.00</b>

Table 3: Projected Income derived from Commercial Water Consumption

Year	No. of Establishments by major division	Projected 20% Commercial Water Consumers	Income Generation (Ave. of 10 cu.m. @P300.00 minimum)	Total (10% IPAF Gneration PhP)
2006	7,736.00	1,547.00	464,100.00	46,410.00
2007	8,123.00	1,625.00	487,500.00	48,750.00
2008	8,529.00	1,706.00	511,800.00	51,180.00
2009	8,955.00	1,791.00	537,300.00	53,730.00
2010	9,403.00	1,881.00	564,300.00	56,430.00
	<b>Total</b>			<b>256,500.00</b>

Table 4: Projected Income derived from special Use Zone

Year	Projected Telecommunications facilities Installations	Fees Charges per Installations (per PAMB Approval @ P 75,000/Annum)
2006	2	140,000.00
2007	3	210,000.00
2008	4	300,000.00
2009	4	300,000.00
2010	3	375,000.00
<b>Total</b>		<b>1,325,000.00</b>

<b>Summary of Income Generation</b>					
Year	(75% IPAF Entrance Fees Generation PhP)	(75% IPAF Domestic Water Generation (PhP))	(75% IPAF Commerical Water Generation (PhP))	(75% IPAF) Special Use Zone Income Generation (PhP)	TOTAL (75 IPAF GENERATION)
2006	956,096.00	832,747.00	34,807.00	105,000.00	1,928,650.00
2007	960,024.00	840,537.00	36,562.00	157,500.00	1,994,623.00
2008	1,238,754.00	848,326.00	38,385.00	225,000.00	2,350,465.00
2009	1,625,880.00	856,116.00	40,297.00	225,000.00	2,747,293.00
2010	1,969,518.00	863,905.00	42,322.00	281,250.00	3,156,995.00
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>6,750,272.00</b>	<b>4,241,631.00</b>	<b>192,373.00</b>	<b>993,750.00</b>	<b>12,178,026.00</b>

### Project Proposals

<i>Proponent</i>	<i>Project Title</i>	<i>Total Cost</i>	<i>Amount Requested</i>	<i>Counterpart</i>		
				<i>Beneficiary</i>	<i>Proponent</i>	<i>Other Donors</i>
1. SACRED	Development of Pinipisakan Falls as Eco-tourism Project	2,176,600.00	999,600.00	56,000.00	871,000.00	250,000.00
2. LACBRMD	Enhancement of Eco-tourism Services of the Lawaan Area	739,000.00	700,000.00	6,000.00	33,000.00	
3. ESADEF	Citrus Production	1,428,000.00	981,625.00	200,000.00	227,000.00	20,000.00
4. SSA	Enhancement of Eco-tourism Potential of Sohoton Natural Bridge National Park	3,000,000.00	3,000,000.00			
5. KAPPAS	Org'l Mngt. & Capacity Building	1,239,000.00	911,000.00		185,000.00	143,000.00

6. Calbiga LGU	SINP Replica	2,115,810.00	1,881,810.00		274,000.00	
7. SIBP	Site Establishment for Gathering of Bird Nest	1,170,000.00	1,170,000.00			
8. SIBP	Ethno Botanical Study	1,760,000.00	1,760,000.00			
9. SIBP	Fresh Water Assessment	2,970,000.00	2,970,000.00			
10. SACRED	Biodiversity Conservation through Agroforestry System	2,567,150.00	1,942,650.00	81,000.00	543,500.00	
11. LPWBAI	Restoration/ Rehab. Of Denuded Forest Cover of Basey Watershed	9,000,000.00	9,000,000.00			
12. SAGUPA-SB	Vegetable Production	617,760.00	514,760.00	71,025.00	13,120.00	18,675.00
13. SPECFI	Developing a Community Based Model for Resource Mngt.	2,462,000.00	2,462,000.00			
14. SIBF	Production of Module Guides on Env't for Samar Island Teachers	2,680,000.00	2,580,000.00		100,000.00	
<b>Total</b>		<b>33,925,320.00</b>	<b>30,873,445.00</b>	<b>414,025.00</b>	<b>2,246,620.00</b>	<b>431,675.00</b>



## **ANNEX VIII : LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AT DEBRIEFING MEETINGS**

### **Persons attending de-briefing for project staff held on 12<sup>th</sup> March**

1. Manolito D. Ragub, Project Manager
2. Jose (Don) Mabulay, Jr., Co-Project Manager
3. Zenaida R. Baisa, Chief of Planning and Policy Section
4. Juliana A. Balogo, Protected Area Planning Assistant
5. Myron Garcia, Chief of Community Development Section
6. Elpidio Cabahit Ecotourism Focal Person
7. Eldrid Madamba, GIS Specialist
8. Aries Tizon, Support staff
9. Ms. Janette Garcia, Senior Ecosystems Management Specialist, DENR & SIBP Focal Point for DENR

### **UNDP de-briefing held on 15<sup>th</sup> March**

1. Ms. Amelia Supertran, Portfolio Manager, Environment, UNDP
2. Ms. Clarissa Arida, Programme Manager, Environment UNDP
3. Ms. Jay Ann Arandia, Programme Assistant, UNDP
4. Mr. Edgardo Policarpio, Programme Assistant, UNDP
5. Dr. Phillip Edwards, Team Leader of Terminal Evaluation Team

### **Official de-briefing held on 21<sup>st</sup> March**

1. Ms. Belen Panganiban; Project Development Officer, FASPO
2. Ms. Lindy Gorospe, Head, Project Monitoring and Evaluation Unit FASPO
3. Ms. Janette Garcia, Senior Ecosystems Management Specialist, DENR & SIBP Focal Point for DENR
4. Ms. Nancy Corpuz, Senior Ecosystems Management Specialist, PAWB
5. Ms. Jay Ann Arandia, Programme Assistant, UNDP
6. Mr. Edgardo Policarpio, Programme Assistant, UNDP
7. Dr. Phillip Edwards, Team Leader of Terminal Evaluation
8. Atty. Maria Luna, Member of Terminal Evaluation Team
9. Dr. Eduardo Mangaoang, Member of Terminal Evaluation Team