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유엔개발계획대표부

'Strengthening the Resilience of Communities through Community-based Disaster Risk Management' Project (CBDRM)

Mid-term Review

Draft Final Report

Commissioned by UNDP DPRK

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Executive Summary

Overview

The mid-term review (MTR) of the 'Strengthening the Resilience of Communities through Community-based Disaster Risk Management' (CBDRM) project has been commissioned by UNDP in order to provide an independent assessment for the Project Steering Committee and UNDP on the progress of project at the mid-point of the project, as well as identifying any changes that need to be made to the project's strategy to ensure its continuing relevance, effectiveness and increased potential for sustainability. The MTR will further identify initial lessons learned that can be used to reinforce project activities going forward.

The project was developed in order to support vulnerable communities in DPRK to minimize the annual loss of life, and safeguard livelihoods and assets during quick onset disasters such as flooding and landslides and build local capacity to sustain the change created to improve the overall resilience of target communities. The intended outcome of this project is to enhance resilience of vulnerable communities to natural hazards. The project seeks to achieve this objective by imparting skills and guiding the appropriate use of resources necessary for managing risks over time at household and local (Ri) levels.

The MTR was carried out using both inductive and deductive approaches, through four phases: desk review, data collection, analysis and drafting/finalization. A number of challenges emerged throughout the MTR process, including the limited data availability related to community feedback given the geopolitical context of the country, and reduced access to community members due to poor weather. The MTR was also carried out simultaneously with the MTR for the SES project, which added some logistical and data collection challenges where target communities overlapped. However, these challenges were planned for and managed throughout the MTR process.

Findings

Overall, the MTR found that the project is on track to meet most of its targets, despite significant operational and geopolitical challenges. A brief overview of the achievements is provided in Table 1.

Table 1. MTR Ratings & Achievement Summary Table for the CBDRM Project

Measure	MTR Rating	Achievement Description
Project Strategy	N/A	As an initiative to introduce the concept and demonstrate CBDRM approaches to reduce threats to human life during disaster, it has proven to be – and continues to be even more so – a highly relevant initiative for the country. Site selection was therefore based on Ris which were at high risk and unlikely to receive support through other projects, given the increased cost in both time, human resources and money to implement activities in remote communities. This goes to the heart of disaster risk management and the importance of targeting the most vulnerable. The project RRF focuses heavily on quantitative indicators which do not provide space to analyse effectiveness and sustainability, and recommendations to improve the RRF have been made by the MTR.

Progress Towards Results	Output 1 Achievement Rating: 5	All of the targets under Output 1 have been achieved, however, as noted above, the absence of qualitative indicators has led to a lack of systematic monitoring on the knowledge retention and use, which questions the sustainability of the changes effected to date.
	Output 2 Achievement Rating: 4	All of the targets under Output 2 have been achieved or are likely to be achieved. However, questions of sustainability and impact related to the DLDD and CBDRM Framework activities come into question, as with Output 1, the absence of qualitative indicators to assess the wider change that the activities implemented create, mean that it is difficult to understand how sustainable any changes will be.
Project Implementation & Adaptive Management	Achievement Rating: 5	The project team should be lauded for its capacity to identify implementation efficiencies and adjust work plans according to opportunities and constraints present in the operational environment. Delayed procurement processes inadvertently increase project management costs as activity implementation can slow down, while project staffing remains the same. The project team has made significant effort to off-set slower implementation periods by focusing on knowledge-based activities, by delays do more harm to project finances as well as project morale. Partnerships with other UN agencies and organizations such as IFRC are informal at the information sharing level but are not sufficient to be considered having an impact on project efficiency and effectiveness.
Sustainability	Rating Scale: 2-3	Currently, the biggest risk to the sustainability of the changes effected to date is if the project or country office was to be closed due to operational constraints. With 17 months remaining in project implementation, there is sufficient time and resources to consolidate the gains made in knowledge and skills in the target communities, and to provide supplementary training and awareness sessions to deepen understanding of CBDRM and stimulate interest in the issue in surrounding communities. However, if viewed from the aspect of the communities, a major risk is the inability of UNDP to complete the procurement of materials for structural interventions for DRR and agro-forestry, which are highly regarded in the community and are important for both moral and demonstration effect.

The CBDRM project is making a vital contribution to the UN Strategic Framework 2017-2021 (for DPRK) in relation to outcome 3.1 and 3.3. Specifically, the awareness and knowledge tools imparted by the project to communities for DRM planning and, in particular, for early warning and preparedness will have a positive impact in the target communities (in particular vulnerable groups such as the elderly, pregnant women and young children who were not specifically catered for in the past). While capacities for response and recovery are important, it is the early warning and preparedness which will save lives and reduce the impact on livelihoods, particularly among the most vulnerable. The project's contribution to improved coordination on CBDRM across a number of government and UN agencies, among others, with the CBDRM Programme Framework, cannot be underestimated, although with the restrictions on working

with national level government institutions, it will be a slower moving process to improve the day-to-day coordination of this cross-cutting sector and integrate it with issues around environment and climate change.

Overall, the results achieved by the project to date are considered to be sustainable, particularly at the community level, with some initial quick wins/short term impact in relation to the provision of materials for risk monitoring and early warning, as well as the reduction in the loss of lives and livelihood assets where DRR interventions have taken place. Although impact will be limited to the communities where activities were implemented, from a humanitarian perspective, this is significant as the ability of a community to protect the lives of its members during times of crisis is truly the main objective.

Recommendations

Improved Monitoring. The MTR has frequently noted that limiting monitoring and data collection to quantitative approaches only undermines the ability of the project to capture the qualitative change created and the potential impact of the project in the short and medium term. Providing analysis of qualitative change can also demonstrate the importance of the project despite the significant operational challenges, not least procurement challenges, which have caused delay in the implementation of some activities. The MTR recommends including a number of qualitative indicators at the sub-output level.

Revised Output Targets. Although initial project targets were set within the previous sanctions regime and were highly likely to be achieved, given the fluidity of the current international environment regarding DPRK in mid-2018, it is difficult to determine whether or not the project will be able to achieve its present targets by end 2019 when the project is scheduled to close. Moreover, current targets are entirely quantitative in nature and do not provide the necessary evidence that the activities implemented have resulted in any meaningful change, they only reflect the activities completed. The MTR recommends sub-output targets for the supplementary qualitative indicators accordingly.

Standardized monitoring tools. A standardized quarterly monitoring report should be used to consolidate data from the BTORs on a quarterly basis only, providing ease in data analysis. The report should be completed by the project team (lead by the Project Manager), with quality assurance of the data and analysis undertaken by M&E Specialist. This also provides a clear delineation between the role of the project and programme in monitoring and reporting at the project level.

Communication of project results. With the inclusion of more qualitative indicators at the output level, it is hoped that more meaningful analysis of the humanitarian importance of the project will be captured, and it is recommended that the UNDP Country Office put significantly more effort into communicating these results within the wider UN system in order to reinforce why UNDP's presence in DPRK is essential.

Managing community expectations. While plans for structural interventions were agreed with target communities, delays in procurement undermine community commitment and ownership to the initiatives. The project needs to find a way to better manage community expectations related to structural interventions, perhaps by only discussing these plans once procurement is approved based on previous needs assessments.

Focus on soft interventions. Based on the on-going delays in procurement, it will be important for the CBDRM team to prepare a work plan which puts significant effort on soft-activities including technical assistance which consolidate knowledge transfer at the county level. The planning of these activities could

be guided by UNDP's Capacity Development toolkits/handbooks, particularly focusing on individuals and institutions, to understand where knowledge transfer gaps may take place, and target activities to address such gaps.

<u>Consolidating CBDRM commitment at the national level</u>. The sustainability of current results and possible future scale-up of CBDRM relies heavily on the capacity of SCEDM to take ownership of DRM coordination in the country. It is recommended that the project team facilitate more knowledge transfer and leadership skills to SCEDM, using the CBDRM Programme Framework as a launching point for improved coordination of the cross-cutting sector.

<u>Exit Strategy</u>. It is recommended that UNDP identify an agency to take over the responsibility for coordinating the CBDRM Programme Framework after the project is complete as it is unlikely that SCEDM capacity to take on that role will be sufficient by the time the project ends, as well as work closely with participating counties for the formal handover of products such as the DLDD and CBDRM Programme Framework for the improved ownership and continued learning of county officials related to risks, vulnerabilities and community-based disaster risk management.

Section 1: Introduction

Overview of the Project

The 'Strengthening the Resilience of Communities through Community-based Disaster Risk Management' (CBDRM) project was developed in order to support vulnerable communities in DPRK to minimize the annual loss of life, and safeguard livelihoods and assets during quick onset disasters such as flooding and landslides and build local capacity to sustain the change created to improve the overall resilience of target communities. The intended outcome of this project is to enhance resilience of vulnerable communities to of natural hazards. The project seeks to achieve this objective by imparting skills and guiding the appropriate use of resources necessary for managing risks over time at household and local (Ri) levels.

The CBDRM approach aims to promote and support actions that enhance local capacities so that community members, including women and youth, become important participants in risk reduction and recovery, including helping communities acquire knowledge of successful practices in CBDRM processes, timely and appropriate risk information and access to early warning.

The project has two outputs supported by a number of sub-outputs:

Output 1: Ri level communities are provided with skills and resources enabling them to implement community-based disaster risk management measures.

> Output 1.1: Communities in high risk areas with access to severe weather warning information, with involvement in local and indigenous early warning system and in community preparedness measures to undertake emergency response and early recovery

> Output 1.2: Communities in high risk areas have skills in hazard and vulnerability assessment, and involved in planning and implementing risk resilient agro-forestry and rural livelihood

Output 2: Mechanisms, Guidelines and Procedures for promoting CBDRM are developed and implemented at local (Ri) levels

> Output 2.1: UN stakeholders' CBDRM Programme Framework is developed an agreed with elements of strategy, priorities, targeting, roles and responsibilities, resource allocation and resources and partnerships including possible joint activities in training and project implementation

> Output 2.2: Comprehensive guidelines on CBDRM including training methodologies, materials and knowledge products

Although not originally planned, Output 2.3 was added in late 2016 with the approval of the Project Steering Committee (PSC) to channel emergency support for communities affected by flooding in the North Hamgyong Province. The sub-output states: Strengthened UNDP coordination, assessment and planning capacities for emergency response and early recovery.

Implemented through Direct Implementation Modality (DIM), the total budget for the project is USD 3.8 million of UNDP's own resources, to be implemented from 2016-2019. Project oversight is undertaken by UNDP with the guidance of the Project Steering Committee (PSC), chaired by the UNDP Deputy Resident Representative (DRR), co-chaired by the National Coordinating Committee (NCC), with participation by the following government counterparts: State Committee for Emergency and Disaster Management (SCEDM), State Hydro Meteorological Administration (SHMA) and the Ministry of Land and Environment Protection (MoLEP). For further information on the details of the project background and strategy, please refer to the Project Document.

Purpose and Scope of the Review

The mid-term review (MTR) of the CBDRM project has been commissioned by UNDP in order to provide an independent assessment for the Project Steering Committee and UNDP on the progress of project at the mid-point of the project, as well as identifying any changes that need to be made to the project's strategy to ensure its continuing relevance, effectiveness and increased potential for sustainability. The MTR will further identify initial lessons learned that can be used to reinforce project activities going forward. As such, one of the main objectives of the MTR, beyond the scope of the Terms of Reference (TORs) (See Annex 7), will be to identify lessons and recommendations that can help *consolidate* the evidence necessary to ensure that stakeholder ownership, particularly at the community level, and commitment to scale-up the interventions in the near term.

In line with the OECD's Development Assistance Criteria for evaluations, as well as the UNDP Guidance for Conducting Final Evaluations, this MTR will focus on the relevance, effectiveness, results and efficiency of the project to-date, as well as assess the likelihood of the sustainability and impact of the results in the medium and longer-term, within the political and operational context of DPRK. While focus will be placed on what has happened within the project to-date, as well as the challenges confronted, equal time will be spent on understanding where opportunities lie to improve effectiveness and the sustainability of project results. Lessons learned from a project-oriented development effectiveness lens will be assessed and presented. Although it was not part of MTR scope, this review also provides scenarios and way forward approach for UNDP programming in DPRK. Points of action deemed urgent and necessary to reinforce

ongoing activities to improve the likelihood of sustainability of results in the medium-term and impact in the longer-term will also be presented for consideration by the project and UNDP.

This MTR does not focus on activity-based challenges to the project which do not have an impact on overall implementation or effectiveness. While it is important to understand how certain activities can or should have been planned or implemented better, such a focus would detract from the overall purpose of this review and are best addressed through regular project monitoring and management.

Summary of the Contents of this MTR

This report is divided into five sections, not including the Executive Summary and Annexes. The Introductory Section (Section 1) focuses on providing a concise overview of the project and the scope of the review. Section 2 outlines the approach that the evaluator has taken during the review process, the challenges and limitations that were accounted for and accommodated during the review, as well as a special, detailed sub-section on the political and operational context which impacts the implementation of the project. Section 3 forms the bulk of the report, providing the analysis of the findings of the review, answering questions laid out in the evaluation matrix of proxy indicators (See Annex 6). Lessons learned – both programmatic and operational – are provided in Section 4, while Section 5 provides conclusions on the progress of the project to date, an analysis of the adaptive management capacities of both the UNDP Country Office and Project Management Team, details urgent points of action and provides broader, project-oriented and programmatic recommendations for consideration by UNDP.

Section 2: Approach and Limitations of the Review

Approach of the Review

The MTR applied both inductive (identifying recurring themes and developing hypotheses about the project) and deductive (content analysis and understanding those themes) approaches to data collection (both qualitative and quantitative) and analysis, keeping in mind data scarcity within the context of the country where the project is being implemented. Project documents were consulted, from which some themes were drawn, and hypotheses made, facilitating the slight adjustment of the guiding questionnaire for use in discussions with project beneficiaries, as well as providing support to the development of the evaluation matrix of proxy indicators used by the consultant. The interviews served to triangulate data harvested from the reports, and support the development of conclusions around hypotheses, or reconstruct hypotheses and result in recommendation as appropriate.

During the desk review stage, the consultant reviewed a number of project-specific documents, including field monitoring and progress reports. Documents from other on-going and recently closed projects in DPRK were also consulted to better understand synergies and efficiencies in project implementation.

During the interview/discussion stage, the consultant employed an open interview technique, using the questionnaire to guide the, complemented by questions which relate to community development and resilience, keeping the focus on the local (Ri) level. Despite limitations to the field visits (see below), these techniques, combined with direct observation of the communities visited, provided a fairly clear picture of the context in which the projects are operating, the overall progress of the project against its objectives, the apparent impacts and their likely sustainability, as well as potential longer-term impacts of the project as results are better consolidated.

Analysis of the information, including review of supplementary documentation requested by the consultant during the country visit, provided an opportunity to review evidence gathered against proxy indicators in a more methodological fashion, resulting in a number of findings with corresponding actionable recommendations, keeping in mind the programmatic and operational limitations in which UNDP implements projects in DPRK.

Challenges and Limitations to the Review

Data collection. During the desk review process, the difference between the field visit reports and field monitoring reports in terms of both purpose and information inhibited an initial assessment of how much progress against output targets had been made. Links to the quarterly progress reports by the project were are unclear, and it was difficult to ascertain what change was being created on the ground with the implementation of project activities. Significant time was spent with the project manager and M&E Specialist during the MTR country mission to clarify progress on activity implementation, as well as the purpose of various reports, and what they are used for.

Due to access issues (weather, some time constraints due to reviewing two projects at once), there was insufficient opportunity to discuss the quick impacts and potential longer-term change effected by the project with a statistically significant set of community members. In the three Ris visited, only one community member (a farmer) was given the opportunity to provide input/feedback on the project activities. Although in one Ri the evaluator could not reach the community due to flooding, it was not

made clear why community members were not present for discussion in the other communities (the one community member who was spoken to seemed to be passing by chance and was called into the meeting). From the perspective of the evaluator, there was sufficient time to have discussions with the community members. While the evaluator is fully cognizant that the opportunity to speak with even one community member is important, given the nature of evaluating a project which focuses on community-based activities, there will be limitation in ascertaining how sustainable the changes effected to date will be, as well as limiting any opportunity to ascertain if there are any unintended outcomes given that only one narrative (community manager) was provided.

Weather conditions limited the number of villages where direct observation of interventions could take place, although experience of similar structural interventions in other countries allows the evaluator to extrapolate *likely* impacts in the short and longer term.

Another challenge to this MTR was the need to frame the project intervention within the narrow scope of 'humanitarian' work. While globally UNDP is a development organization, it sits on the cusp of humanitarian work and development, particularly in relation to disaster management. Traditionally, what is considered to be 'humanitarian' work is defined by short-term interventions which emerge from quick on-set disasters. However, in light of climate change and the succession of quick on-set disasters such as flooding and landslides, as well as slow on-set disasters such as drought, all which result in loss of life, livelihoods and damages valuable infrastructure and increase the burden on traditional humanitarian agencies and cost to donors, it is past time that the international community understand that a traditional understanding of 'humanitarian' work cannot be so narrowly defined – and that a project does not need to be immediately life-saving to count as humanitarian, as long as its impacts – whether in the short or long term – lead to a reduction in the loss of life. It is through this lens that CBDRM is being reviewed as a 'humanitarian' intervention.

Finally, it is important to note that this MTR was undertaken simultaneously with the MTR for the SES[1] project. While the benefits of undertaking the MTRs in this way is important to understand the synergies between the projects, which have seven project sites in common, as well as to evaluate management efficiencies, in many cases data collection during the country mission was difficult, as respondents in key informant interviews would often switch back and forth in their observations of the projects, and extrapolating information specific to one project or another, or applicable to both, was time consuming and presented a challenge during the analysis phase of this MTR.

UNDP Operational Context in DPRK

Following the reopening of the UNDP DPRK Country Office in 2009, after its closure in 2007, the Country office restarted operations under a more stringent internal control framework (ICF) which limited the discretionary spending of the office and required significant oversight in the form of international M&E Specialist and the requirement for full verification of all materials procured and installed, as well as the participation of an international staff member in all project activities and field monitoring.

Moreover, the office was limited to implementing projects which fall within the parametres of humanitarian or lifesaving work, which is a challenge to UNDP's traditional development-oriented programming. However, given that UNDP sits on the cusp of the humanitarian-development nexus, there were many opportunities for programming which would reinforce or complement the ongoing

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[1] Sustainable Energy Solutions for Rural Livelihoods in DPRK

humanitarian work by other agencies, such as improving aspects of food security, energy access and disaster management.

Nonetheless, further challenges emerged in 2016 when it was revealed that the current Country Programme Document (CPD) would not be extended, nor would a new CPD be approved. This has meant that new projects cannot be developed, and changes to ongoing projects need to be approved at regional or headquarters level, which is time consuming and difficult if decision makers are not entirely familiar with the political, socio-economic and logistical challenges of projects implementation in DPRK. This restricts how well the Country Office can adjust ongoing projects to a programmatic perspective in changing situations in the country.

In 2017, banking channels was closed, leading to substantial cash shortages in the office, and nearly all procurement was moved to the China Country Office, incurring extra time and costs in procurement, when it was possible. This situation is still ongoing and puts significant operational pressure on the projects and programme staff.

Finally, DPRK has been under a sanctions regime for many years, and UNDP projects employed a consultant to verify that all goods to be procured are not on the list of goods under sanction, particularly materials that could serve the purpose of 'dual use' for military gains. However, in later half of 2017, additional sanctions were placed on the country by the Security Council, which limited not only international procurement but domestic procurement as well. This has had a significant impact on how the UNDP projects are managed, and the lengthy delay in the procurement of equipment and materials for structural interventions in the CBDRM project is an important example of the impact that sanctions have on project implementation – activities tend to be front loaded by soft measures, which may have an impact, but cannot be supplemented by structural measures to maximize project impact on ground as procurement is repeatedly delayed, incurring extra costs in verification, as well as management costs in terms of time spent in preparing and explaining documents at the project and programme level.

Section 3: Analysis of Findings based on the OECD DAC for Development Evaluations

Project Strategy: To what extent is the project strategy relevant to country priorities, country ownership and the best route towards expected results?

<u>Relevance of the project design.</u> Although one of the challenges faced by UNDP and all humanitarian actors in DPRK is a lack of concrete information on government priorities, recent policy and strategy developments related to disaster management in the country, as well as its commitment to international frameworks such as the Sendai Framework and the Paris Agreement, demonstrate that the government recognizes, at the very least, the impact that disaster and climate change are having on the country and the need to take action to reduce disaster and climate risks. Specifically, Chapter 4, page 93, Second National Communication on Climate Change 2012 states: "ensure investment for the work to minimize loss of life and property, and build the national capacity for prevention of disastrous events through establishment of the national real-time monitoring system, early warning system and enhancement of corresponding capacity of central and Government bodies to natural disasters such as flood, drought, forest fire, landslide, typhoon and tidal wave, etc., caused by climate change." In this respect, the CBDRM project is highly relevant to the needs of the country. Although the project refers to disaster risk management (DRM), in practice, the project focuses primarily on preparedness and coping, with some risk reduction measures included. It does not systematically address the entire cycle of DRM, so it is important to keep that in mind when assessing the project's results against its intended outcome related to improving community resilience. Nonetheless, as an initiative to introduce the concept and demonstrate CBDRM approaches to reduce threats to human life during disaster, it has proven to be – and continues to be even more so – a highly relevant initiative for the country.

Based on desk review and field visits, the selection of sites to pilot the CBDRM project was undertaken with due consideration to constraints of efficiency, but also with a commitment to inclusion and effectiveness in mind. With 80% of the population living in mountainous areas at risk of flooding and landslides (the two hazards initially covered by the project based on the impact of disasters over the past 10-15 years), it would have been easy and justifiable to select communities that were easy to access for the project team. However, sites visited were remote, and in some cases, inaccessible due to weather conditions. Site selection was therefore based on Ris which were at high risk and unlikely to receive support through other projects, given the increased cost in both time, human resources and money to implement activities in remote communities. This goes to the heart of disaster risk management and the importance of targeting the most vulnerable. With respect to effectiveness, a number of Ris were selected to maximize synergy with the SES project, which improved both management and implementation effectiveness, as well as providing synergies and increased benefits to the target communities.

That said, one of the challenges faced by the project was addressing issues of vulnerability and the differing needs of men, women and children (among others) in DRM. As iterated by other UN agencies and the IFRC during the MTR mission to DPRK, the concept of equality and equity ('what one person receives, all receive') colours perceptions of vulnerability (or lack thereof) within society. As also experienced during the MTR mission, collecting data or information on the varying needs of different groups in the community is challenging and often limited to the number of men and women, and number of school children. However, by using international good practice and information related to disaster planning (at the Ri level), early warning and evacuation, the project was able to ensure that elements of

targeting the most vulnerable (children, pregnant women, the elderly) were included as standard practice in the community without overstating the issue and undermining local ideology.

Appropriateness of the RRF. The original RRF was revised during the inception phase of the project in order to make it more relevant to the DPRK operating context. Based on the evaluator's experience in other countries, this is not uncommon in UNDP, where projects are developed by people unfamiliar with a specific country context and are attempting to replicate successful ideas from one country to another, or do not engage the appropriate UNDP staff members to develop an RRF that is in line with UNDP planning and monitoring requirements, thus making results management a risky and tricky undertaking. The CBDRM project team did well to revise the RRF to focus on what was reasonably achievable in the operating context of DPRK and the budget constraints of the project. However, the output indicators are entirely quantitative and are very input (activity) oriented, limiting capacity to analyse any change effected by the project in the target Ris at the output level. This MTR has attempted to evaluate the outputs from a qualitative perspective and provides suggestions for additional indicators and revised targets to improve the level and quality of monitoring by the project team.

The activities identified to support the achievement of the outputs are critical but will not necessarily result in the achievement of the stated outputs. This is a result of poor conceptualization of outputs at the planning stage and beyond the control of the project team. At most, the activities will result in a partial achievement of the outputs (see below in section on Progress Towards Results).

The targets which have been set in relation to the indicators focus heavily on the achievement of activities, and the number of people that would benefit from said activities. As noted above, because indicators are entirely quantitative, by default, so too are the targets. On the one hand, it would be easy to evaluate the project against such targets with a simple pass/fail approach, but changes in understanding and local capacity are not captured through numbers and thus fail to capture significant impacts made by the project to date. It is also difficult to determine how the project calculates the number of people who benefit from the project, beyond simply calculating the number of people in a village. Often, creating targets around the number of direct/indirect beneficiaries can be misleading, and provides no evidence of longer term impact or sustainability. The MTR provides recommendations on revising targets based on suggested new indicators (see below in Recommendations section).

However, the revision of the RRF by the project team during the inception phase was important in terms of ensuring that the type and number of activities that could be implemented was consistent with the logistical and local capacity challenges faced by the project and was an important factor in the effectiveness of project implementation to date.

Progress towards results: To what extent have the expected outputs and outcome of the project been achieved so far?

Assessment of progress towards targets. This MTR provides an assessment of progress towards *current* output targets based on monitoring data provided and supplementary qualitative information captured during the MTR country mission.

Output	Indicator	Target	Progress	Rating
1 Ri level communities	# of communities/Ris	15 communities	**These targets were achieved**, but the quantitative target does not reveal the	Achieved

are provided with skills and resources enabling them to implement community-based disaster risk management measures.	generating risk maps		change effected by the project to date, nor does it reflect the inability of the project to procure the necessary materials to complete structural interventions and support improved agro-forestry on sloping land to contribute to DRR in the target communities. During the MTR site visits, interviews with village managers provided excellent insight into the benefit of all of the mapping, needs assessment and training activities which were undertaken to developed using international good practice such as the PRNA (Participatory Risk Needs Assessment), the development of the integrated Disaster Risk Management Plans (DRM Plans) for the Ris and applying various protocols on early warning and evacuation (see below) as well as the introduction of agro-foresty on deforested land above 25 degrees to reduce the likelihood of landslides, provide income as well as a fast rotating renewable energy source (linked with SES project interventions). While it is important that Ris now have these tools in hand, the biggest impact observed by the evaluator was the change in awareness and understanding within the wider community, based on feedback from those interviewed, regarding taking more control of reactions to crises. Previously, disaster was viewed as something out of the control of communities, with people simply abandoning their homes and running to the mountains. Following these simple and introductory interventions by the project, **communities are more aware that there are aspects of disaster that they have control over and pay more attention to the hazards present in their communities, including the need to reverse deforestation that has led to increased landslides**. For example, there is awareness of protecting assets such as livestock and important documents, as well as an appreciation for the concept of evacuation centres where an assessment of the displaced and their needs can be more readily and accurately undertaken. While this is **not**	
	# of people trained on coping strategies	450 people		
	# of communities implementing risk resilient agro-forestry and rural livelihoods plans	10 communities		
	# of Sloping Land User Groups (SLUGs) benefit from skills in risk-resilient agro-forestry and reducing impact on rural livelihoods	10 SLUGs		

			evidence of increased resilience, but it is evidence of a move towards disaster risk reduction and the protection of lives and some livelihoods.	
2 Mechanisms, Guidelines and Procedures for promoting CBDRM are developed and implemented at local (Ri) levels	Level of progress of UN stakeholders' CBDRM Programme Framework	Finalization of Framework	Progress on developing the CBDRM Programme Framework is ongoing, with the current version circulated to UN, IFRC and government counterparts for their feedback and input. At face value, the Framework is cumbersome and does not present a strategic, phased approach to introducing CBDRM to the country. However, based on consultations with other UN agencies and IFRC, the actual value of the Framework is not so much the shopping list content, but the role the document plays in facilitating discussion with government and improving their knowledge of the issue, and stimulating action by the government to take ownership of the CBDRM process in the country. Therefore, despite having a finalized document at the output target, **it is the opinion of this MTR that the process of developing the Framework is far more valuable in terms of knowledge capture, awareness and appreciation for the need for CBDRM at the national level, which is likely to stimulate some independent action by the government to carry the CBDRM agenda forward.**	In progress, likely to be achieved
	Mapping of stakeholders	Mapping in two counties	Mapping of two counties on who is responsible for what in relation to CBDRM has been completed. **As a standalone document, its value is difficult to ascertain, however, it has served to guide the identification of CBDRM needs at the county level, which has been integral to informing the developing of the CBDRM Programme Framework.**	Achieved
	Level of progress of the comprehensive guidelines on CBDRM	Finalization of guidelines	A number of guidelines and protocols were developed as part of the DRM Plan development process (Output 1), trainings and simulations implemented by the project. These include: PRNA methodology, early warning and evacuation protocols and good practice templates, TOT materials and plans, disaster data card template for disaster loss and damage database. However,	Achieved

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			while each of these were developed based on international standards and good practice (and importantly the gender-sensitivity of these practices), they were done so in isolation from other partners such as IFRC and UN-OCHA. The project has used IFRC guidelines while developing evacuation and simulation training under the project. However, there are limitations for the involvement of UN-OCHA as their involvement is mainly to response, addressing post-disaster circumstances. Joint programming with other institutions such as IFRC was definitely as missed opportunity to leverage their technical capacity, regardless of whether partnerships with the organizations could not be formalized due to the lack of UNDP CPD. However, **despite the completion of these guidelines and protocols, it is difficult to conclude that they will be used beyond the target communities where they were initially implemented as there was no indication by national partners of drawing on these materials in their own work, so their impact can only be considered minimal at this time.** This can be linked with the limitations that UNDP has i.e. it can only work with counties and Ris.	
	Establish disaster damage and loss database as per international standards	2 counties report damage and loss as per international standards	**In progress, and likely to be achieved but unsustainable**. Currently, data cards were collected for 15 project Ris across three counties. CBS used DevInfo software to develop an initial database. There are limitations on the use of such software for disaster inventory purposes. The training provided in May 2017, requested Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) to use DesInventar, which requires significant technical assistance to the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) which the project cannot engage in. Moreover, while the idea of piloting the DDLD is welcomed, **CBS has noted that unless it is scaled up to the national level, it is not worth the government's time or effort to take on the initiative. Moreover, the achievement of this target is contingent**	<mark>In progress, likely to be achieved but unsustainable</mark>

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			upon two counties suffering from disaster significant enough to necessitate and D&L assessment within the lifetime of the project. Though this request from national institution is understandable, UNDP's limitations on engaging in technical assistance with government above the county level, the inclusion of this activity in the project should be questioned and needs to be a lesson for UNDP in the future.	
2.3 2,666 housing units covered with semi-permanent shelter solutions (as emergency response to flooding in North Hamgyong province in October-November 2016)	# of m^2 of CGI sheets procured and distributed through available channels (gov't, IFRC, etc)	200,000 m^2	200,437.56m^2 of CGI roofing received and verified by project staff Originally calculated for 75m^2/HH, but only needed 54m^2, so 2750 HH benefitted, and 85 essential public buildings also benefitted from CGI sheets. **The target was achieved and also had positive unintended outcomes of responding to the essential humanitarian need to ensure public buildings such as clinics and hospitals continue to provide services during flood emergency**.	`Achieved`
	# of individual beneficiaries benefitting from semi-permanent shelter	Male: 4,332 Female: 4,332 (Total 10,664)	Monitoring data only reported HH, not individuals. If the # of intended beneficiaries is divided by # of HH receiving CGI sheets, it is 3.8 pp/HH, which seems low, but **it is assumed that the target was likely reached, poor or inaccurate population data which the project would have had to rely on during the planning phase of the activities.**	`Likely achieved`

<u>Factors contributing to progress</u>. The primary factor contributing to the progress of the project to date has been the effectiveness and management capacity of the project team. In particular, the ability of the project team to continually readjust the work plan so as to take advantage of opportunities for activity implementation when they arise, and to identify and utilize efficiencies wherever possible. This includes taking advantage of international consultants for both training and knowledge management purposes. The secondary factor in implementation progress to date has been the commitment at the Ri level to improve understanding of disaster management and make use of the knowledge and materials provided through CBDRM. However, implementation progress has been severely impeded by the sanctions regime on DPRK, limiting the capacity of the UNDP Country Office to undertake procurement in a timely fashion, if at all, as well as the Country Office's Internal Control Framework (ICF) which requires the project and programme staff to spend significant amount of time on verification of activities and delivery of materials beyond normal monitoring processes, as well as requiring international staff members to be part of all monitoring activities, which is both expensive and time consuming. This increases the project management costs significantly and decreases the amount of time that can be allotted to the qualitative monitoring of the project at the output level.

Overall, these factors, both positive and negative, must be taken into consideration as key elements of the MTR. Sanctions and procurement issues undermine the relationship that the project team has built with target communities, and in some cases may be causing harm as earthworks prepared by the communities must no go unattended and create additional hazards with the upcoming rainy season due to the fact that procurement has been stalled by the Sanctions Committee. However, while the pending case-by-case exemption requests submission to the Sanctions Committee and the requirements of the ICF are beyond the control of the project team, improving the project's capacity to manage community expectations and sustain the commitment of target Ris with continued soft-measures, is not. Recommendations related to both are provided below in the Recommendations Section.

The most important lesson to take away from understanding what drives project implementation is that contingency planning (undertaken by the project regularly, to the benefit of both the target communities and the UNDP Country Office) is critical in an environment overwhelmed by international political and internal operational constraints. Subsequently, in these cases, managing the expectations of the beneficiaries is crucial, and guiding their independent efforts in relation to project activities is crucial to avoid unnecessary work on their part, and an undermining of community commitment to the project.

Barriers to achieving project outputs. It goes without saying that the Security Council Resolution 2397 (2017) is the biggest barrier to project implementation to date. Although the project was designed within the framework of the previous sanctions regime, building on proven concepts and the procurement of approved materials, the application of more stringent sanctions in 2017 has made project implementation near to impossible, if not for the management capacities and commitment of the project team and Country Office. Although initial project targets were set within the previous sanctions regime and were highly likely to be achieved, given the fluidity of the current international environment regarding DPRK in mid-2018, it is difficult to determine whether or not the project will be able to achieve its present targets by the end of 2019 when the project is scheduled to close. Recommendations related to how to make the most of the capacities of the project in the current environment in order to effect change on the ground that will have a sustainable humanitarian impact are provided below.

Project Implementation and Adaptive Management

Project efficiency. The CBDRM project is being implemented through the Direct Implementation Modality (DIM). In light of the geo-political context and the ICF for the Country Office, this is the most appropriate implementation arrangement. It also reduces the opportunity for misuse of funds and can, in the right context, improve the speed of implementation. Should there be an opportunity for sanctions exemptions to be granted for UNDP, and a review of the ICF towards easing some of the restrictions on the Country Office, ease of implementation and possibility of scale-up of the project will lead to significant impact in the target communities.

The project team should be lauded for its capacity to identify implementation efficiencies and adjust work plans according to opportunities and constraints present in the operational environment. Moreover, given that the CBDRM and SES projects share project staff, including the international project manager, project management costs are off-set to a large degree, and synergies between the projects is substantial, to the benefit of the communities where the projects are implemented. Further, community mobilization to support the implementation of structural interventions to reduce disaster risk are an important contribution to the project in terms of both time and financial resources. These contributions are will within the capacity of the community to undertake and are monitored by the project team to ensure that activities are being undertaken safely and by appropriate persons (ie: able bodied adults).

However, delayed procurement processes inadvertently increase project management costs as activity implementation can slow down, while project staffing remains the same. The project team has made significant effort to off-set slower implementation periods by focusing on knowledge-based activities, by delays do more harm to project finances as well as project morale.

Given UNDP's precarious operating circumstances – implementing projects without a Country Programme Document, which lapsed in 2016 – it is very difficult for the project to formalize partnerships with relevant agencies in order to capitalize on shared knowledge, community relationships and complementary activities. During the country mission for this MTR, it was suggested by FAO, WFP and IFRC that joint programming would be beneficial to each organization, to leverage the work being done at the community level to increase capacity for DRM, while simultaneously reducing the risk of landslides though agro-forestry and improving food security and nutrition. UNDP should give serious and immediate consideration to the development of a new CPD for UNDP DPRK, within the framework of longer-term humanitarian intervention detailed above, so as to leverage partnerships for improved project efficiency, effectiveness and impact in target communities.

In light of the need for more stringent oversight as a result of the country-specific ICF, it is expected that project management costs would be slightly higher than normal. However, the review noted that project management costs are exceptionally high but not due to the cost-sharing of the international M&E Specialist, and despite the fact that the costs for the international Project Manager are shared between the CBDRM and SES projects. Operations and maintenance of the country office premises, including senior management and programme staff costs, are incurred by the project.[2] As it stands, the percentage of the annual project budgets dedicated to project management (including extenuating office and staff costs) went from 10.6% in 2016 (acceptable level given the requirements of the ICF), to 29.2% in 2017 and 27.2% in 2018. Given the geopolitical situation at the time of this review, the lack of CPD for the Country Office and continuing questions surrounding the Country Office's continued operations, forcing individual projects to incur the costs of the management and operations of the Country Office at the programme level demonstrates a gross lack of commitment to UNDP's continued operations in the country, the principles which guide UNDP globally, and the SDGs in which UNDP, as a partner, committed to 'leave no one behind.'

Financial Controls and In-kind Contributions. As noted routinely in this report, the project team has been extremely capable at managing its resources and adjusting planning in order to ensure that the project makes the most efficient use of its time and money in light of the many procurement challenges it faces. There is excellent planning, and in a 'normal' operating context, this would result in excellent financial planning and management. However, the project team is faced with many constraints, not least the issue of the banking channel, which impact how quickly it can access funds. In the view of this MTR, the project team is doing an excellent job within the constraints that it is implementing activities and should not be reviewed against issues beyond its direct control. The project team also makes good use of the in-kind contributions of communities related to both structural and non-structural works. While it was not possible to assess the in-kind contribution of each community, it was evident from the communities which were visited that the structural interventions which have already been completed would not have been without community participation to make reasonable initial preparations for structural interventions (ie:

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[2] At the time of the MTR, these costs were being incurred by the four operating projects in the CO. However, two projects were planned for closure in mid-2018, leaving the costs to be carried by the two remaining projects, CBDRM and SES

contributions that would equate to less than 15% of total activity cost), or their enthusiastic participation in activities such as the PDRA or the simulations.

Project priority: value for money or quality and inclusion. As noted above, the project selected sites which were most in need of support, as opposed to ones that were easiest to reach for implementation and monitoring purposes. In light of the global trend driven by a number of influential donors to guarantee value for money, it is refreshing to see a project focus reaching the most vulnerable rather than reaching as many people as possible. While it is more expensive (time, logistics and human resources) to reach remote areas, in the spirit of the SDGs and 'leaving no one behind' this project, as well as the SES project, should be held up as an example of what that means in practice. Moreover, it is noted in this review that remoteness of implementation has not undermined the quality of implementation, or the timeliness when implementation was not constrained by procurement issues and is likely to have a far more meaningful impact in the target communities than in other communities where risks were lower, although more people would have been reached through the activities.

It is also important to note that the project team is very adept at determining when and how the project needs to adjust its work plan based on the local and international operating contexts so as to make use of the resources available and ensure that the quality of activities meets the requirements of international good practice in DRM. For example, given the difficulties in bringing in international experts in terms of visas, local travel and logistics, as well as time required from local communities, the project team made the decision to train a pool of national consultants through training of trainers workshops, and integrated PRNA and community Disaster Risk Management (DRM) planning process at the field level as well reporting in the form of a single document – the community Disaster Risk Management Plan – which ensured that communities received as much information as possible without interruption from the international technical experts, and in a streamlined, efficient way. In terms of procurement, annual procurements plans are updated regularly, as project context changes, but decisions are taken based on feedback from UNDP regional and headquarters offices. For example, in 2017, budget revisions reflected with the possible procurement that project could undertake in August 2017. In 2018, as procurement has not taken place to date, plans are on hold until September, which would leave only three months for the implementation of any additional soft measures that would compensate for the delay in implementation of structural measures to 2019. This is a high-risk strategy for a relatively risk adverse nature of the Country Office, in terms of assuming that weather and local travel and access constraints do not change. However, based on the experiences of the first two years of implementation, the evaluator is confident that the project team will be able to adjust quickly and move forward with activity implementation once a decision is taken.

Monitoring and Reporting. The Country Office has a comprehensive monitoring system at project and programme level, with guidelines on the roles and responsibilities of staff at both levels. Moreover, the ICF requires monitoring at both levels to be undertaken by international staff, in particular for verification of any materials procured through the projects. However, while guidelines for monitoring projects are in place, there are no specific tools to support standardized monitoring at the activity and output level. The issue of field visit reports and field monitoring reports was clarified during the country mission and understood by the evaluator to be the equivalent of Back to Office Reports (BTORs). However, because there is no standardized format and reports are not individualized as in other country offices, there is confusion related to purpose, content and follow-up. The Country Office needs to improve the tools used for monitoring, and who uses what tool, to clarify roles and responsibilities in monitoring, as well as monitoring for results.

In particular, the current monitoring system for the project does not encourage evidence-based analysis and reporting, despite the fact that it is obvious that there is more than enough capacity among project staff for this to be undertaken. Specifically, reports routinely conclude that change has been effected because quantitative targets have been achieved. Simply reporting that X number of people participating in a simulation exercise does not mean they have more capacity to evacuate and therefore have reduced some disaster risk. It only means that they participated in the simulation exercise. The project team needs to collect evidence that the simulation improved capacities – for example, speaking with a large sample of participants on what they learned, what the information means to them personally, what difference they think it will make in the future, and what they are unclear on. This is largely due to the absence of qualitative indicators in the project, which would add both depth and meaning to the data currently being collected by the project staff. As noted previously, given the technical resources available for M&E (international project manager, international M&E specialist) it will be important for the project to include some qualitative indicators where appropriate and feasible, to better understand the change effected by and likely sustainability of project activities. Recommendations for such are detailed below. However, limitations in data collection, as detailed above in the section on challenges and limitation for the MTR, do restrict how much the project team, particularly international staff responsible for M&E, is able to extrapolate from the data they collect as they are limited by local translations and access to a wide range of beneficiaries to support quantitative data. Such is the nature of project implementation in the context of the country, and ostensibly beyond the control of the project.

However, it is evident that the project team are systematic in using the information it has collected and observations made during activity implementation as well as during project monitoring to identify issues and challenges – and any changes in project risks – and preparing detailed follow-up actions which are tracked in the field monitoring reports. Based on the management responses to issues and changes in risks, the project team, supported by the Country Office, rely heavily on field monitoring to ensure that the project is being implemented to the greatest extent possible given the operating environment, and use the information to determine how any changes to the project need to be made and when. It would appear the project team has become quite adept at timing field monitoring in order to facilitate decision making, although questions related to the rigour of that data can be raised based on data collection limitations that the project team faces in a restrictive operating environment.

What is even more evident is that the rigourous activity implementation monitoring has allowed for excellent channels of communication between the project team and community stakeholders, and informal communications (if not formal) is very good, based on feedback from community leaders interviewed. The project strategy facilitating the use of international tools for disaster risk assessment and planning have resulted in a highly participatory decision-making process on what types of interventions were needed, where they were needed, and how they would be prioritized and implemented. This process has built trust between the communities and project team and leads to good information sharing when/where feasible in light of the restrictions on data collection mentioned above.

Normally, an MTR would assess how well a project uses monitoring data to communicate results to a wider audience, however, within the context of project implementation in DPRK limits what data can be used and where. As such, the MTR will not be evaluating this aspect of M&E within the project. However, with the potential implementation of more qualitative monitoring of results at the output level, it is recommended that more effort be put on internal communications of results within the wider UN system in order to support the justification for continued UNDP operations in DPRK, and to provide evidence for the need to ease procurement challenges for more effective project implementation.

Stakeholder engagement and partnership management. The project document provided a detailed plan on how and with whom the project would engage in order to facilitate efficient project implementation and leverage the knowledge resources of partners. In reality, the lapsing of the CPD in 2016 has meant that the partnership strategy is being implemented only in part, with government partners. Partnerships with other UN agencies and organizations such as IFRC are informal at the information sharing level but are not sufficient to be considered having an impact on project efficiency and effectiveness. Partnerships with the government are limited to information sharing only, with no decision-making authority on the part of government. CBDRM's government partners are SCEDM, SHMA, MoLEP and CBS, coordinated by the NCC. They participate in quarterly project steering committee (PSC) meetings, where progress to date, challenges and plans for the next quarter are presented and discussed, with final decisions taken by the UNDP DRR based on input and advice from project, programme and government stakeholders. SCEDM is the focal point for the project, despite being a new entity within the government created 13 November 2014. Compared to SHMA and MoLEP, which have a long history of involvement in UNDP projects, SCEDM does not possess the leadership and coordination capacities necessary to take ownership of DRM processes initiated by the project, once the project is complete. This can be viewed as a criticism but also an opportunity. The project can support SCEDM to improve its knowledge base and understanding of CBDRM as a concept and leverage the experiences of the target villages to improve its own planning and management across a number of agencies involved in DRM. Although UNDP is restricted from providing technical support to government, using the CBDRM Framework supported by the project as a way to help SCEDM to facilitate its leadership on DRM could be a possible action area for scale up if procurement issues surrounding structural interventions at the Ri level persist.

Nonetheless, all partners interviewed during the MTR country mission, be they UN agencies, village beneficiaries or PSC members, said that they felt the project team and UNDP more generally was effective at communicating progress and challenges, even if the persistence of challenges around procurement created some friction and feeling of unmet expectations at national and Ri level.

Sustainability. One of the most critical aspects of projects that focus on knowledge transfer, and to some extent skills transfer, is that knowledge is rarely lost. Even when it is not used, and can be recalled when necessary, even in parts. To that end, the results of the CBDRM project in relation to raising awareness of and changing attitudes towards disaster risk management at the community level is likely to be very sustainable. While most knowledge products and other tools have already been handed over to the beneficiaries, with the CBDRM Programme Framework still under discussion and somewhat less likely to be moved forward with the government if current SCEDM coordination capacities are not improved, the major challenge for the project will be to encourage the dissemination of the information and skills provided so that *organic roll-out* (as opposed to scale-up) can take place in surrounding counties. One option is the continuing support of national consultants by UNDP to continue to collect disaster data, including damage and loss, which would support the generation of lessons learned within and between counties. In light of the commitment shown to the CBDRM activities through community mobilization for structural measures and agro-forestry, incremental changes using community resources are possible, with the encouragement of SCEDM and other partners.

In terms of potential for scale-up, in light of the current geopolitical environment and precarious operational context for UNDP, it is unlikely that any large-scale funding for CBDRM (as an issue) will be forthcoming in the short and medium terms. Despite the fact that the project has already demonstrated impact in relation to attitudes towards disaster preparedness and (some aspects of) disaster reduction, which will lead to a reduction in the loss of life and livelihood assets during crises in the future, it is not an obvious choice to channel humanitarian funding at the moment. One option that UNDP may want to

consider supporting potential scale-up (or roll-out depending on the intensity) is to work with other development partners to have information and tools shared in counties where other disaster management and food security related projects are being implemented, in order to introduce concepts and potentially change mind sets on disaster management in the community.

Currently, the biggest risk to the sustainability of the changes effected to date is if the project or country office was to be closed due to operational constraints. With 17 months remaining in project implementation, there is sufficient time and resources to consolidate the gains made in knowledge and skills in the target communities, and to provide supplementary training and awareness sessions to deepen understanding of CBDRM and stimulate interest in the issue in surrounding communities. However, if viewed from the aspect of the communities, a major risk is the inability of UNDP to complete the procurement of materials for structural interventions for DRR and agro-forestry, which are highly regarded in the community and are important for both moral and demonstration effect. The gully check dams constructed in Chuma Ri which was built in 2016 (leading to a dramatic reduction in asset loss during the rainy season in 2017) is an excellent example. Increased moral leads to increased commitment to and ownership of a new idea. Further, with the onset of the rainy season, the delay in structural and agro-forestry interventions could lead to further environmental risks to the project should there be any severe flooding and resulting landslides, reversing the work already undertaken by the communities to prepare for those interventions.

One of the challenges for the project management team is to determine the way forward based on current levels of uncertainty in the operating environment. Should they cut their losses in relation to procurement and focus on soft interventions like capacity building and knowledge transfer through in-country study tours (the success of which was evidenced in the SERCARB project) or take a risk to see if procurement requests are approved, albeit very late in the season which impacts when structural interventions can be put in place. At the moment, the project is aiming to make a final decision by the end of Q3 2018 on where to place its emphasis in terms of consolidating gains already made during the final months of the project. Although risky in terms of planning and delivery, it is important to note that the project team has a firm 'red line' at which point it adapts to a new scenario for implementation. It demonstrates a responsible approach to adaptive management in a highly fluid and risk-prone implementation environment.

Assessment of Cross-cutting issues

The focus of capacity building assistance. The CBDRM project does not have a capacity building strategy per se, with activities more ad hoc in nature based on needs identified during the PRNA process, with a number of trainings to improve knowledge and skills around disaster preparedness and coping at the Ri level. The focus of these trainings is at the individual level, and by default at the Ri leadership. Unlike in other contexts where a heavy focus on capacity building of the individual, rather than the system or institution, undermines the effectiveness and sustainability of capacity building activities, in the DPRK context where there is far less movement of people within and between institutions and roles in the community, there is far more retention of knowledge and skills gained, although without in-depth qualitative monitoring, or the opportunity to monitor how the community uses its new tools and skills in a crisis, it is difficult to have a clear view of the impact of the training. However, a specific capacity development strategy, which clarifies why and how such activities will take place, would be beneficial to the project and also underscore the need for more qualitative monitoring in terms of tracking knowledge retention and use.

Nonetheless, as noted above and routinely throughout this MTR, the weakness of monitoring from a qualitative perspective limits the monitoring of capacity building to numbers of people trained and types of tools/skills provided. This does not lend itself to adequate analysis of the effectiveness of the activities, nor to the sustainability of the results, regardless of findings of the MTR. Keeping in mind possibilities for scale-up of CBDRM and other similar projects in the future, it is important that some qualitative monitoring of knowledge transfer and retention be undertaken in order to determine what works and what doesn't in the DPRK context.

The focus on inclusion. The project document did not detail a specific gender mainstreaming or social inclusion strategy, however, within the overall strategy of the project activities aim to promote the idea of targeting the most vulnerable in the community in preparedness and coping with disaster in line with the Sendai Framework. The main groups targeted including young children, pregnant women and the elderly. Despite the view that all community members are equal, and none are more or less vulnerable than others, the concept that perhaps some groups need more help than others in times of crises has taken hold in target Ris, which demonstrates impact at an awareness level.

No specific gender-based budgeting or dedicated budget to support gender mainstreaming in the project, which could add value if the project is required to focus on soft-activities for the remainder of the project. Similarly, the absence of specific gender mainstreaming tools in use by the project is notable, but with project activities being guided by the principles of the Sendai Framework and global good practice in CBDRM, the gap in gender-sensitive and inclusive planning and budgeting is not a wide as would be expected in the absence of the use of such tools. However, at the monitoring stage, gender and inclusion data collected is very weak, providing only sex disaggregated data and not digging deeper to understand the differing views and experiences of men and women in the implementation of project activities. If the project is able to implement additional qualitative indicators, as recommended above, it is anticipated that this gap can be partially filled.

Section 4: Lessons Learned

One challenge in identifying lessons learned is to avoid nit-picking over small mistakes or challenges to implementation that have been easily overcome through good project management. Lessons should instead focus on thematic or programmatic issues which can help to improve overall project implementation and sustainability of results, while also providing a guide to good practice – as well as poor practice. Through this framework, lessons for the CBDRM project are divided into what worked, what did not (and why), and what could be done better. These lessons are for consideration only and are not reflected in the recommendations section below.

What worked. The project's capacity for adaptive management is a demonstration of how important such skills are in complex implementation environments. Continual updating of the project's risk log, detailed tracking of challenges and management responses, as well as identifying time frames for when decisions regarding adjusting the project work plan must be taken in relation to ongoing procurement challenges have been essential to the project's ability to implement as many activities as it has, and to achieve the results and impacts it has to date.

What did not work. While the Disaster Damage and Loss Database was an excellent idea in theory, given UNDP's limitations in working with the national government, it is obvious that this was a superfluous exercise as such a database is only effective when implemented at scale – either regionally or nationally. While piloting the idea in two counties was a good idea in order to test processes, it was evident during the planning stages of the project that the Central Bureau of Statistics would not be able to scale this up to the national level without the direct technical support of UNDP. However, the DLDD process has allowed counties to better understand and take ownership of the risks present and their vulnerabilities to them, which is important in terms of capacity, if not scalability. This is an important lesson in programme planning – understanding the future needs of government and restrictions on helping the government must be considered for all activities to determine if activities are viable beyond the pilot phase.

What could be done better. While the project aims to adapt to the slow decision-making process at UNDP regional and HQ levels, it should be noted that unnecessary delays in decision making directly impact the relationship that the project has with its beneficiaries. While some decisions are beyond the control of UNDP, for example those decisions that sit with the Sanctions Committee, UNDP (regional and HQ) have been remiss in not prioritizing support for a country office which faces so many operational challenges. Unnecessarily slow decision making not only impacts project morale, but it also impacts how the project manages the expectation of beneficiaries and sustains commitment to and interest in the project. Further, the funds existing within the country will run out in December 2018. As there is no functional banking channel at the moment to cover in-country expenditures (including national staff salaries) of the project until December 2019, this may jeopardize the project continuity beyond December 2018. This may seriously undermine the results achieved by the project till date. UNDP needs to make more effort to understand where bottlenecks in decision making exist, and how to improve the speed at which decisions are taken on a project in which is already constrained by the operational and geopolitical context in which it is being implemented.

Section 5: Conclusions and Recommendations

Overall Assessment of the Project

Based on the detailed assessment of the project according the OECD Development Assistance criteria, it is the conclusion of the MTR that the CBDRM project is making considerable progress towards its intended results, in spite of geopolitical and operations constraints, and issues surrounding ownership of project results at the stakeholder level. Moreover, based on the experiences of UNDP implementing CBDRM in other countries, the change in knowledge and resulting commitment to DRM in target communities within only two years since the project began implementation is notable. While resilience – particularly towards disasters – is a complex subject to analyse, it goes without saying that knowledge is perhaps the most important tool at hand for communities to reduce their vulnerabilities and, over time, reduce the risks present in their communities.

While a snapshot of activity implementation suggests that a number of activity level targets will not be reached, at the output level, it is the bigger picture change that needs to be assessed. Although many structural interventions for DRR in the target communities are incomplete or significantly delayed due to procurement challenges beyond the control of both the project and the country office, the interventions which have been completed have resulted in a demonstration effect which proves to government how small interventions – such as the gully check dams, reinforcement of streams and riverbanks, or improved channelling and small footbridges – can have a dramatic impact on the lives and livelihoods of vulnerable households. Given that the CBDRM project was limited to only 15 communities, in the grand scheme, it matters not if all structural interventions are complete – it takes only one to prove to government the importance of rolling out or scaling up CBDRM in order to reduce the burden that disasters have on government budgets.

While issues around ownership and the sustainability of CBDRM as an approach in DPRK are linked to the rather low capacity of the newly formed SCEDM, as well as the cross-cutting nature of DRM within government more generally (a challenge in any country, regardless of how government is organized), it will be important for the project to (informally) guide SCEDM and other partners to take ownership of and improve coordination of CBDRM using the CBDRM Programme Framework as the main tool. Improving partnerships and information coordination with related agencies will also be important to ensure that the sustainability of commitment, at the very least, can be assured.

Beyond the programmatic results achieved by the project to date, it is important to note the quality of project management. The commitment of the team to see activities implemented to the benefit of target communities was evident both in interviews with the project team, as well as in the feedback and observations of the communities visited during this MTR. While both communities and government partners are frustrated in the lengthy delays in procurement, there is nonetheless a deep appreciation for what the project team has done to date. Moreover, given the significant operational constraints faced by the project in all aspects of implementation, capacities for adaptive management are well-developed and are one of the main reasons the project is able to move forward, even if movement is only incremental at times. The continual search for efficiencies, for example by creating comprehensive tools for communities to use, rather than a number of standalone yet overlapping tools or strategies, is one such example. Making implementation easier for communities (in terms of knowledge transfer and participation) has led to improved effectiveness and more sustainable results.

The project team, in coordination with the programme team in the Country Office, constantly monitor the changing environment for implementation, with a clear understanding of how much change the project can tolerate before the project must be adjusted to the new context. For example, procurement plans are prepared and approved, but when procurement is delayed, contingency plans are developed, and the project team determines at what point the project must change its course based on the minimum time they need to procure and install materials versus how long it takes to plan and implement capacity building activities.

At the outcome level, the project has made some contributions to enhancing the resilience of vulnerable communities to natural hazards, largely around issues of preparedness and reducing loss of life and critical livelihood assets such as livestock. It should be noted here that resilience is a very broad concept note easily defined – in fact, often defined differently between and within humanitarian and development agencies. Therefore, the project needs to be conscious of what its contribution is (increased capacity for preparedness) within the larger concept of resilience, and taking into consideration what other actors are doing, as well as the much more important issue of locally-grown resilience (that is, adaptation of communities over time to hazards and other changes based on historical knowledge and lessons they learn during crises). The project is playing an important role in terms of increasing awareness around the concept of CBDRM which an important step in the on-going process of increasing resilience at the community level as knowledge is agreed among expert practitioners to be one of the key drivers of this process.

In terms of the project's contribution to the UNDP DRR portfolio, it dovetails with the SERCARB project, targeting awareness raising of not just community-based early warning but also of early warning as part of the CBDRM cycle as a whole. While SERCARB is more technical-scientific in its approach, CBDRM complements this with a more participatory process of mapping, planning and community management of disaster preparedness and response. Between the two projects, ideas and concepts around DRR are slowly but surely being introduced using methods that work well in the target communities, mindful of the absorption capacities of local decision-makers and community members. UNDP will be able to learn from the approaches of both projects on what works well (and what doesn't), and where, to move ahead with DRR and DRM at the community level where it has the most impact.

Based on all of the above, it goes without saying that the CBDRM project is making a vital contribution to the UN Strategic Framework 2017-2021 (for DPRK) in relation to outcome 3.1 (Local communities, especially the most vulnerable groups including women, can better cope with and respond to impacts of disasters and climate change), as well as contributing somewhat to outcome 3.3 (Government agencies apply integrated and equitable approaches to environmental management, energy, climate change and disaster risk management). Specifically, the awareness and knowledge tools imparted by the project to communities for DRM planning and in particular for early warning and preparedness will have a positive impact in the target communities (in particular vulnerable groups such as the elderly, pregnant women and young children who were not specifically catered for in the past). While capacities for response and recovery are important, it is the early warning and preparedness which will save lives and reduce the impact on livelihoods, particularly among the most vulnerable. The project's contribution to improved coordination on CBDRM across a number of government and UN agencies, among others, with the CBDRM Programme Framework, cannot be underestimated, although with the restrictions on working with national level government institutions, it will be a slower moving process to improve the day-to-day coordination of this cross-cutting sector and integrate it with issues around environment and climate change.

Overall, the results achieved by the project to date are considered to be sustainable, particularly at the community level, with some initial quick wins/short term impact in relation to the provision of materials for risk monitoring and early warning, as well as the reduction in the loss of lives and livelihood assets where DRR interventions have taken place. Although impact will be limited to the communities where activities were implemented, from a humanitarian perspective, this is significant as the ability of a community to protect the lives of its members during times of crisis is truly the main objective.

Recommendations to Improve the Sustainability and Impact of Results

Improved Monitoring. The MTR has frequently noted that limiting monitoring and data collection to quantitative approaches only undermines the ability of the project to capture the qualitative change created and the potential impact of the project in the short and medium term. While it is understood by the consultant that opportunities for qualitative monitoring are limited, it is nonetheless important that some qualitative output indicators be included in the RRF to improve analysis of progress and to communicate results. Providing analysis of qualitative change can also demonstrate the importance of the project despite the significant operational challenges, not least procurement challenges, which have caused delay in the implementation of some activities. The MTR recommends including the following indicators at the sub-output level:

1.1 Extent to which target communities use risk maps and DRM Plans to support risk reduction in annual agricultural and infrastructure planning
And
Extent to which information on coping strategies reduces HH asset loss during crises
1.2 Area of deforested land (including sloping land used for agriculture) replaced by agro-forestry
And
Extent to which agro-forestry has reduced the number of landslides during heavy rain in target communities
2.1 Extent to which the CBDRM is used as a coordination tool by the government (assessed by proxy through other CBDRM actors such as IFRC, FAO, OCHA etc)

Revised Output Targets. Although initial project targets were set within the previous sanctions regime and were highly likely to be achieved, given the fluidity of the current international environment regarding DPRK in mid-2018, it is difficult to determine whether or not the project will be able to achieve its present targets by end 2019 when the project is scheduled to close. Moreover, current targets are entirely quantitative in nature and do not provide the necessary evidence that the activities implemented have resulted in any meaningful change. However, given that it is unlikely that the project will increase the number of target communities in which to implement activities, quantitative targets cannot easily be changed without completely revising all output indicators. With both issues in mind, and following from the suggested revised indicators in the previous recommendation, the MTR recommends sub-output targets for the supplementary indicators accordingly:

1.1 Risk maps inform agricultural and infrastructure planning to ensure that appropriate crops are planted in low risk areas and infrastructure is not built in immediate hazard areas.
And
Reduction in the number of HH experiencing complete asset and livelihood loss
1.2 At least 10% of deforested land replaced by agro-forestry in target communities (by end 2019)
And
The number of landslides negatively impacting dwellings and agricultural productivity is reduced

2.1 SCEDM and partners endorse the CBDRM Programme Framework as the main tool for the coordination of CBDRM activity implementation

Standardized monitoring tools. Based on documents reviewed and discussions with project and programme staff, it is evident that although there are comprehensive guidelines for project and programme monitoring in the Country Office, the lack of appropriate tools for data collection and analysis severely impacts what type of data is being collected and by whom. It is recommended that instead of having joint reports following field visits, whether or implementation and monitoring purposes, team members should submit individual BTORs, with project and programme aspects kept separate. A standardized quarterly monitoring report should be used to consolidate data from the BTORs on a quarterly basis only, providing ease in data analysis. Other country offices in the Asia-Pacific region have implemented a similar tool, an example of which is attached as Annex 10. The report should be completed by the project team (lead by the Project Manager), with quality assurance of the data and analysis undertaken by M&E Specialist. This process would improve the storage and analysis of information, both at activity level, and at output level, where analysis to date is weak. This also provides a clear delineation between the role of the project and programme in monitoring and reporting at the project level.

Communication of project results. Geo-political issues surrounding the relevance of the project in terms of its humanitarian role have created challenges in terms of how to communicate the results of the project. If results are communicated at the activity level through purely quantitative data, it is difficult to understand the longer-term, life-saving impact that the project has and will have. With the inclusion of more qualitative indicators at the output level, it is hoped that more meaningful analysis of the humanitarian importance of the project will be capture, and it is recommended that the UNDP Country Office put significantly more effort into communicating these results within the wider UN system in order to reinforce why UNDP's presence in DPRK is essential, as well as providing evidence for the need to ease some procurement challenges for more effective project implementation and the easing of the humanitarian burden on other agencies.

Managing community expectations. The most frequent negative feedback received by beneficiaries during the MTR country mission was that procurement of materials for structural interventions was routinely delayed. While plans for structural interventions were agreed with target communities, delays in procurement undermine community commitment and ownership to the initiatives. For example, if seedlings for transplant of fast rotation crops are not soon provided, it would be unsurprising if the community priorities were to change and they reverted to using sloping land for agriculture despite the risks posed by landslides. The project needs to find a way to better manage community expectations related to structural interventions, perhaps by only discussing these plans once procurement is approved based on previous needs assessments.

Focus on soft interventions. Based on the on-going delays in procurement, it will be important for the CBDRM team to prepare a work plan which puts significant effort on soft-activities which consolidate knowledge transfer at the county level and aim to put in place tools or informal systems whereby knowledge transfer or organic roll-out of activities could take place in the medium-term. For example, identifying county individuals who could act as trainers for other counties, or provide tools and guidance on how counties can improve data collection and document lessons and problem-solving processes. The planning of these activities could be guided by UNDP's Capacity Development toolkits/handbooks, particularly focusing on individuals and institutions, to understand where knowledge transfer gaps may take place, and target activities to address such gaps. Some examples include an annual review of the

DRM Plans, continued simulation trainings, moving from training on preparedness and recovery to mitigation and response, in-country study tours, and continued refinement of the CBDRM Framework.

Consolidating CBDRM commitment at the national level. Despite limitations in how UNDP can engage with national stakeholders, the sustainability of current results and possible future scale-up of CBDRM relies heavily on the capacity of SCEDM to take ownership of DRM coordination in the country. It is recommended that the project team facilitate more knowledge transfer and leadership skills to SCEDM, using the CBDRM Programme Framework as a launching point for improved coordination of the cross-cutting sector. Potential avenues for communication are joint workshops with other agencies involved in (CB)DRM, as well as using the PSC meetings as a venue for one-on-one knowledge transfer and question/answer opportunities with SCEDM beyond issues of project implementation.

Exit Strategy. Considering the ongoing absence of a CPD for the Country Office, one option that UNDP may want to consider as a potential exit strategy for the project beyond 2019 is to coordinate with other UN agencies and IFRC to transfer the knowledge products, protocols and guidelines for roll-out to other communities where these agencies are doing CBDRM-related work. Moreover, it is recommended that UNDP identify an agency to take over the responsibility for coordinating the CBDRM Programme Framework after the project is complete as it is unlikely that SCEDM capacity to take on that role will be sufficient by the time the project ends, and it would be a waste of time and effort if the coordination of CBDRM programming was interrupted. Further, UNDP should work closely with participating counties for the formal handover of products such as the DLDD and CBDRM for the improved ownership and continued learning of county officials related to risks, vulnerabilities and community-based disaster risk management.

Going Forward: Programming Scenarios

Office closure. In the case where decisions are taken by UNDP HQ to close the DPRK Country Office due to the reasons that are geopolitical or lack of financial resources available within the country for continued operation of office as there is no existing banking channel or any internal legal reasons, it is advised that the project team must have a contingency plan ready similar to that of above recommendation on exit strategy, whereby knowledge products, protocols and guidelines for CBDRM can be easily transferred to a relevant UN agency and/or IFRC engaged in DRM, which can engage informally with government partners, in order to ensure that a) the knowledge products available to other interested parties, such as surrounding counties of target communities, and b) UN agencies are able to use the materials in their own work to support the possible roll-out of CBDRM concepts at the most basic level of awareness.

Complete projects. Similar approach as with office closure, but with a more formal handover of materials to a nominated UN agency(ies), as well as identifying a focal agency to continue support to SCEDM for the finalization of the CBDRM Programme Framework and utilization of the framework as a coordination tool.

Small scale up. Should UNDP decide to develop a new CPD for the country office, a second phase of the CBDRM project would be appropriate, replicating the original model in new target communities based on the availability of funds (potentially 5-10 communities), and scaling-up the intervention to address additional hazards and improved DRR and disaster recovery capacities in the original 15 communities. If the opportunity is presented, the project should aim to target SCEDM with regularized knowledge transfer and leadership capacities.

Large scale up. Although highly unlikely, in an ideal situation, large scale-up of the CBDRM project based on a new CPD would require formalized partnerships with concerned ministries and departments at the national level, and with other UN agencies engaged in DRM related activities, targeting communities where other agencies currently work in order to leverage structural and non-structural measures for DRR and improved food security, as well as improve coordination with the SES project so that rural energy access targets installations critical in DRR and disaster recovery. Large scale-up would necessitate a greater focus on the resilience of communities and HH than on DRM as a process which is managed at the community level. In this scenario, it is assumed that sanctions were lifted. Further, it assumes that UNDP makes significant changes to its existing country specific ICF that has limitations on the procurement.

Annexes

1. Table of Urgent Points of Action and Recommendations

No.	Issue/Point of Action	Recommendation	Suggested Responsible Party/Time Frame
1	Improved monitoring	The MTR recommends including the following indicators at the sub-output level: 1.3 Extent to which target communities use risk maps and DRM Plans to support risk reduction in annual agricultural and infrastructure planning And Extent to which information on coping strategies reduces HH asset loss during crises 1.4 Area of deforested land (including sloping land used for agriculture) replaced by agro-forestry And Extent to which agro-forestry has reduced the number of landslides during heavy rain in target communities 2.1 Extent to which the CBDRM is used as a coordination tool by the government (assessed by proxy through other CBDRM actors such as IFRC, FAO, OCHA etc)	Project Manager Q4 2018
2	Revised sub-output targets	The MTR recommends sub-output targets for the supplementary indicators accordingly: 1.2 Risk maps inform agricultural and infrastructure planning to ensure that appropriate crops are planted in low risk areas and infrastructure is not built in immediate hazard areas. And Reduction in the number of HH experiencing complete asset and livelihood loss 1.2 At least 10% of deforested land replaced by agro-forestry in target communities (by end 2019) And The number of landslides negatively impacting dwellings and agricultural productivity is reduced 2.1 SCEDM and partners endorse the CBDRM Programme Framework as the main tool for the coordination of CBDRM activity implementation	Project Manager Q4 2018
3	Standardized monitoring tools	It is recommended that instead of having joint reports following field visits, whether or implementation and monitoring purposes, team members should submit individual BTORs, with project and programme aspects kept separate. A standardized quarterly monitoring report should be used to consolidate data from the BTORs on a quarterly basis only, providing ease in data analysis. Other	M&E Specialist Q4 2018

		country offices in the Asia-Pacific region have implemented a similar tool, an example of which is attached as Annex 10.	
4	Communication of project results	With the inclusion of more qualitative indicators at the output level, it is hoped that more meaningful analysis of the humanitarian importance of the project will be capture, and it is recommended that the UNDP Country Office put significantly more effort into communicating these results within the wider UN system in order to reinforce why UNDP's presence in DPRK is essential, as well as providing evidence for the need to ease some procurement challenges for more effective project implementation and the easing of the humanitarian burden on other agencies.	Project Manager and M&E Specialist Q1 2019
5	Managing community expectations	The project needs to find a way to better manage community expectations related to structural interventions, perhaps by only discussing these plans once procurement is approved based on previous needs assessments.	Programme Analyst Immediate
6	Focus on soft interventions	Based on the on-going delays in procurement, it will be important for the CBDRM team to prepare a work plan which puts significant effort on soft-activities which consolidate knowledge transfer at the county level. The planning of these activities could be guided by UNDP's Capacity Development toolkits/handbooks, particularly focusing on individuals and institutions, to understand where knowledge transfer gaps may take place, and target activities to address such gaps. Some examples include an annual review of the DRM Plans, continued simulation trainings, moving from training on preparedness and recovery to mitigation and response, in-country study tours, and continued refinement of the CBDRM Framework.	Project Manager Immediate
7	Consolidating CBDRM commitment at the national level	It is recommended that the project team facilitate more knowledge transfer and leadership skills to SCEDM, using the CBDRM Programme Framework as a launching point for improved coordination of the cross-cutting sector.	Project Manager, Programme Analyst 2019
8	Exit strategy	Among other issues, it is recommended that UNDP identify an agency to take over the responsibility for coordinating the CBDRM Programme Framework after the project is complete as it is unlikely that SCEDM capacity to take on that role will be sufficient by the time the project ends	Project Manager, DRR Q3-4 2019

2. Glossary and Acronyms

BTOR	Back-to-Office Report
CBDRM	Community-based Disaster Risk Management
CBS	Central Bureau of Statistics
CPD	Country Programme Document (for UNDP)
DDLD	Disaster Damage and Loss Database
DIM	Direct Implementation Modality
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRR	(UNDP) Deputy Resident Representative
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization (of the UN)
IFC	(UNDP) Internal Control Framework
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
MoLEP	Ministry of Land and Environment Protection
MTR	Mid-term Review
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
NCC	National Coordinating Committee
OCHA	(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PRNA	Participatory Risk Needs Assessment
PSC	Project Steering Committee
Ri	county/local level
RRF	Results and Resources Framework
SCEDM	State Committee for Emergency and Disaster Management
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SERCARB	Strengthening Ecosystem Resilience and Community Adaptive Capacity in Climate Affected River Basins in DPRK Project
SES	Sustainable Energy Solutions for Rural Livelihoods in DPRK Project
SHMA	State Hydro Meteorological Administration
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WFP	World Food Programme (of the UN)

3. Documents reviewed

CBDRM Project Document

Project Annual Work Plans (AWPs) 2016, 2017, 2018 (and revisions)

Project Quarterly Progress Reports (Q4 2016, Q1-3 2017)

Annual Progress Reports (2016, 2017)

Field Visit Reports, 2016, 2017, 2018

Field Monitoring Reports 2016, 2017, 2018

Project Steering Committee Meeting Presentations (1-10)

Detailed List of Procurement – 18 June 2018 version

PRNA and DRM Plan in Chuma-Ri

PRNA-DRMP Methodology

Framework for CBDRM in DPRK (8 May 2018 version)

4. Sites Visited, Interviews Conducted

(Conducted during the MTR Country Mission 18-30 June 2018)

a. <u>Sites Visited</u>

Yangdok County
> Specific sites in Ryongam Ri: Site for entry of community
> Specific sites in Sagi Ri: Site for flood marker and evacuation route map installed; and Warehouse (early warning and evacuation materials are kept)
> Specific sites in Sagi Ri: Site for flood marker and evacuation route map installed; Warehouse (early warning and evacuation materials are kept); and One ravine (gully check dams and retention walls constructed)

b. <u>Beneficiaries Interviewed</u>

Yangdok County
> Mr. Kim Hyok Chol, Director, Dept. of External Affairs, Yangdok County People's Committee
> Mr. Kim Chang Gil, Chairman of Ryongam Ri Cooperative Farm Management Board
> Ms. Hong Jong Sil, Chairwoman of Sagi Ri Cooperative Farm Management Board
> Mr. Jon Song Hyon, Farmer of Sagi Ri Cooperative Farm
> Mr. Kim Kwang Chol, Chairman of Chuma Ri Cooperative Farm Management Board
> Mr. Ri Jong Chol, Farmer of Chuma Ri Cooperative Farm
> Ms. Jo Un Ha, Lecturer, Grand People's Study House, CBDRM National Consultant

c. <u>Stakeholders Interviewed</u>

Mr. Kim Yong Chol, Director, Dept. of External Affairs, State Committee for Emergency and Disaster Management (SCEDM)
Mr. Kim Song Il, Senior Officer, Dept. of External Affairs, SCEDM
Mr. Song Yong Chol, Dept. of External Affairs, State Hydro-Meteorological Administration (SHMA)
Ms. Kim Jong Ok, Senior Officer, Dept. of External Affairs, Ministry of Land and Environment Protection (MOLEP)
Mr. Paek Yong Nam, Senior Officer, Dept. of External Affairs, Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS)

d. <u>Partners Interviewed</u>

Mr Joseph Muyambo, National Society Development and Programme Coordinator, IFRC
Mr Bir Mandal, Deputy Representative, FAO
Mr Kencho Namgyal, WASH Specialist, UNICEF
Mr Robert Dekker, Head of Programme, WFP

e. <u>UNDP Staff Interviewed</u>

Mr. Tapan Mishra, Resident Representative

Mr. Stephen Kinloch-Pichat, (then) Deputy Resident Representative
Mr. Butchaiah Gadde, Project Manager
Mr. Choe Sung Chol, Programme Officer
Mr. Hyok Chol Ri, National Technical Coordinator
Mr. Hua Yu, Project Manager for SED and SERCARB
Ms. Le Le Lan, M&E Specialist

5. Final Questionnaire

Meeting with NCC
Does the project fit with national priorities?
In your opinion, what is the primary factor that has influenced how the project is being implemented?
In the case of negative influencing factors, in your opinion, what could be done to mitigate them in the future?
Do you feel that project has the appropriate management arrangements in place?
Do you feel that the project manages risk well?
In your opinion, how well does the project adapt to changes in operating context?
What would you recommend to improve project capacity to adapt to change?
What do you feel is more important in the project: value for money or quality of results?
Do you feel that the project is targeting the most appropriate beneficiaries?
Does the project communicate its results well?
Is the project able to communicate its results across sectors?
Does the project engage non-project partners to improve efficiency in implementation and overcome challenges?
In your opinion, what has been the most important result of the project to date? Why?
Do you feel the project has an appropriate strategy to potentially scale-up the project?
Do you feel that UNDP has an appropriate exit strategy in place for the project if the operating context changes?
Do you feel the government would be in a position to take over the interventions if the UNDP had to close the project? Please explain.

Meetings with Government Stakeholders
Does the project continue to align with national priorities?
What is the level of satisfaction (1 low, 5 high) with how the project is being implemented?
What is the level of satisfaction (1 low, 5 high) with the results of the project to date?
Do you feel that the project is using resources efficiently?
Do you feel that the government and beneficiaries are appropriately consulted (1 poorly consulted, 5 properly consulted) at all stages of project implementation?
Do you feel that the project staff are able to effectively respond to the challenges within and affecting (1 not at all, 5 effective response) the project?
Do you feel that the results of the project will be sustainable in the 1) short term, 2) medium term and 3) long term?
Do you believe that the project activities will have any negative impacts?
Do you feel that UNDP is providing sufficient opportunities for the government to take ownership of the project and eventual results?
What would you like to change about the project?
Do you have any other information/observations you would like to add?

Beneficiary Meetings – Community Leaders
How confident are you that you are able to quickly recover from flooding, landslides or drought (1 not at all; 5 extremely confident)?
Before the project began, what did you normally do following a flood, landslide or drought?
How did you cope?
How long did it take you to recover to pre-disaster conditions?

What have you learned from the project to allow you to respond better?

What is the most important benefit of the project for you so far?

Do you think the project benefits men and women differently? Please explain.

Do you think this will make a difference in the quality of your livelihood? Please explain.

What is your opinion of the early warning system?

Do you think the early warning system benefits everyone in the community, or only certain groups?

Do you feel that you have enough information to prepare for a potential disaster?

Do you feel that the information targets the different needs of men and women? Please explain.

Do you adjust your work/livelihood to reduce the impact of disasters? If yes, how?

Have you been involved in the planning process to reduce the impacts of disasters on agriculture and forestry livelihoods? If yes, how? (Disaggregate by sex)

Did you feel that the training provided to improve agriculture and forestry livelihoods to reduce disaster risk was helpful (1 not at all helpful, 5 very helpful)? Why? (Disaggregate by sex)

What else do you think is necessary to reduce the impact of flooding, landslides and droughts on your livelihoods and HH income? (Disaggregate by sex)

Do you think EW will help to reduce the type/amount of assets you lose in a disaster?

Do you share information/knowledge you have learned? If yes, with who?

6. Analytical Framework with Proxy Indicators

Evaluation Topic	Proxy Indicators Used
Project Strategy: To what extent is the project strategy relevant to country priorities, country ownership, and the best route towards expected results?	
Relevance of Project Design	Does the project align with national priorities
	Were target areas selected to fit the project strategy or to
	How does the strategy fit the different needs of men, women and children?
Appropriateness of RRF	Are activities and outputs consisted with the overall objective of the project?
	Is there a direct link between activities and outputs?
	Do output indicators measure inputs or results contributing to the project goal?
	Are targets for the outputs appropriate for the context?
	Related to activities and capacity level, was the project timeframe (including each result) reasonable to achieve the outputs and outcomes
Progress Towards Results: To what extent have the expected outputs and outcome of the project been achieved thus far?	
What are the primary factors contributing to progress to date?	What has been the primary factor influencing how the project has been implemented?
	What has been the secondary factor?
	Have these factors been positive or negative?
	What can be done to learn from positive/negative factors?
	What could be done to mitigate against negative factors in the future?
Barriers to achieve project outputs	Challenges encountered which have delayed or slowed project implementation
	Have targets been set as too ambitious/too low?
Project Implementation and Adaptive Management	
Project Efficiency	Management arrangements
	Cost-effectiveness/challenges to planning, implementation and procurement
	How were partnerships used to improve the efficiency of activity implementation?
	What is the ratio of programme management vs output costs? Is technical assistance considered an activity or management cost?
	Project priority: value for money or quality?
	Outputs achieved on time?
	What level of uncertainty in project context is acceptable before project adapts to change?
M&E	Is the monitoring and reporting system appropriate?
	Is the monitoring and reporting system sufficient?
	How is monitoring data used for project management?
	In terms of adaptive management, is there a balance between the rigour of monitoring data, or the timeliness of it?
	How is monitoring data used for communication?
	How is monitoring data used for knowledge management?
Stakeholder engagement and partnership management	Is there a partnership strategy? If so, is it being implemented and how?
	How effective is communication between various partners?
	How are non-implementing partners involved in the project?
	Are coordination mechanisms used to inform project implementation?
	How involved are other sectoral stakeholders in improving project efficiency and effectiveness?
Sustainability	To what extent are the benefits of the project likely to continue after its completion
	Identify a strategy approach for a gradual handover of project implementation responsibilities from UNDP to government
	Is there potential for government to scale up the intervention using own funds?

	Is there potential for international funds to support the scale-up of the intervention?
	What are the financial risks to sustainability? What level of uncertainty is acceptable to the project?
	What are the socio-economic risks to sustainability?
	What are the institutional/sanctions risk to sustainability? What level of uncertainty is acceptable to the project?
	What are the environmental risks to sustainability?
Cross-cutting	
What is the focus on capacity building assistance?	Does is target institutional arrangements, leadership, knowledge, accountability within the framework of enabling environment, organization and individuals?
	How is capacity being measured by the project?
Has the project ensured that it has delivered an inclusive approach?	Does the project have a gender mainstreaming strategy in line with UNDP gender mainstreaming guidelines?
	Does the project have a budget to support gender mainstreaming activities?
	How are gender mainstreaming tools utilized in project planning, budgeting, implementation, monitoring and reporting?
	Does project monitoring go beyond sex disaggregated data to account for the different views and experiences of men and women?
	How is gender mainstreaming undertaken in relation to the various project interventions: policy and planning support, capacity building and project management?

Terms of Reference

Mid-term Review of the projects:

"Strengthening the Resilience of Communities through Community-Based Disaster Risk Management" (CBDRM) and

"Sustainable Energy Solutions for Rural Livelihoods in DPRK" (SES)

1. INTRODUCTION

The present Terms of Reference (ToR) for the Midterm Review (MTR), to be undertaken in 2018, of the UNDP TRAC funded projects directly implemented by the UNDP:

1) **Strengthening the Resilience of Communities through Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM)** (Award ID: 00091747; Project ID: 00096791) – See Annex G.

2) "**Sustainable Energy Solutions for Rural Livelihoods in DPRK" (SES)** (Award ID: 00090996; Project ID: 00096469) – See Annex H.

3. OBJECTIVES OF THE MTR

The MTR will assess progress towards the achievement of the project objectives and outcomes as specified in the Project Document and assess early signs of project success or failure with the goal of identifying the necessary changes to be made in order to set the project on-track to achieve its intended results. The MTR will also review the project's strategy, its risks to sustainability.

4. MTR APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

The MTR must provide evidence-based information that is credible, reliable and useful. The MTR team will review all relevant sources of information including documents prepared during the preparation phase (i.e. UNDP Environmental & Social Safeguard Policy, the Project Document, project reports including Annual Project Review (APR), project budget revisions, lesson learned reports, national strategy documents in the area of disaster prevention, relief and recovery; risk management, and any other materials that the team considers useful for this evidence-based review).

The MTR team is expected to follow a collaborative and participatory approach[3] ensuring close engagement with the UNDP Country Office, Project Team, counterparts (at the County and Ri level), and other key stakeholders.

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[3] For ideas on innovative and participatory Monitoring and Evaluation strategies and techniques, see UNDP Discussion Paper: Innovations in Monitoring & Evaluating Results, 05 Nov 2013.

Engagement of stakeholders is vital to a successful MTR.[4] Stakeholder involvement should include interviews with stakeholders who have project responsibilities, including but not limited to other line ministries; officials at National Coordination Committee (NCC), key experts and consultants who provided services in the project implementation, members of Project Steering Committee (PSC), academia etc. Additionally, the MTR team is expected to conduct field missions to any of the CBDRM project sites i.e. 15 Ris in 3 Counties; and SES project sites i.e. 15 Ris (Including 3 Oups and 1 Dong) in 6 Counties.

The final MTR report should describe the full MTR approach taken and the rationale for the approach making explicit the underlying assumptions, challenges, strengths and weaknesses about the methods and approach of the review.

5. DETAILED SCOPE OF THE MTR

The MTR team will assess the following four categories of project progress.

i. Project Strategy

Project design:
- Review the problem addressed by the project and the underlying assumptions. Review the effect of any incorrect assumptions or changes to the context to achieving the project results as outlined in the Project Document.
- Review the relevance of the project strategy and assess whether it provides the most effective route towards expected/intended results. Were lessons from other relevant projects properly incorporated into the project design?
- Review how the project addresses country priorities and United Nations Strategic Framework 2017 to 2021. Was the project concept in line with the national sector development priorities and plans of the country? Review the project results that are being mainstreamed at national level.
- Review decision-making processes: were perspectives of those who would be affected by project decisions, those who could affect the outcomes, and those who could contribute information or other resources to the process, taken into account during project design processes?
- Review the extent to which relevant gender issues were raised in the project design.
- If there are major areas of concern, recommend areas for improvement.

Results Framework/Log frame:
- Undertake a critical analysis of the project's log frame indicators and targets, assess how "SMART" the midterm and end-of-project targets are (Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, Time-bound), and suggest specific amendments/revisions to the targets and indicators as necessary.
- Are the project's objectives and outcomes or components clear, practical, and feasible within its time frame?
- Examine if progress so far has led to or could in the future catalyse beneficial development effects (i.e. income generation, gender equality and women's empowerment, etc...) that should be included in the project results framework and monitored on an annual basis.
- Ensure broader development and gender aspects of the project are being monitored effectively. Develop and recommend SMART 'development' indicators, including sex-disaggregated indicators and indicators that capture development benefits.

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[4] For more stakeholder engagement in the M&E process, see the UNDP Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results, Chapter 3, pg. 93.

ii. Progress Towards Results

<u>Progress Towards Outcomes Analysis:</u>
- Review the log frame indicators against progress made towards the end-of-project targets using the Progress Towards Results Matrix and following the colour code progress in a "traffic light system" based on the level of progress achieved; assign a rating on progress for each outcome; make recommendations from the areas marked as "Not on target to be achieved" (red).

Table. Progress Towards Results Matrix (Achievement of outcomes against End-of-project Targets)

Project Strategy	Indicator[5]	Baseline Level[6]	Midterm Target[7]	End-of-project Target	Midterm Level & Assessment[8]	Achievement Rating[9]	Justification for Rating
Objective:	Indicator (if applicable):						
Outcome 1:	Indicator 1:						
	Indicator 2:						
Outcome 2:	Indicator 3:						
	Indicator 4:						
	Etc.						
Etc.							

Indicator Assessment Key

Green= Achieved	Yellow= On target to be achieved	Red= Not on target to be achieved

In addition to the progress towards outcomes analysis:
- Identify remaining barriers to achieving the project objective in the remainder of the project.
- By reviewing the aspects of the project that have already been successful, identify ways in which the project can further expand these benefits.

iii. Project Implementation and Adaptive Management

<u>Management Arrangements:</u>
- Review overall effectiveness of project management as outlined in the Project Document. Have changes been made and are they effective? Are responsibilities and reporting lines clear? Is decision-making transparent and undertaken in a timely manner? Recommend areas for improvement.
- Review the quality of execution of the project by UNDP and recommend areas for improvement.
- Review the quality of oversight support provided by the Senior Management at the Country Office, BRH and recommend areas for improvement.

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[5] Populate with data from the Logframe and scorecards
[6] Populate with data from the Project Document
[7] If available
[8] Colour code this column only
[9] Use the 6 point Progress Towards Results Rating Scale: HS, S, MS, MU, U, HU

Work Planning:
- Review any delays in project start-up and implementation, identify the causes and examine if they have been resolved.
- Are work-planning processes results-based? If not, suggest ways to re-orientate work planning to focus on results?
- Examine the use of the project's results framework/ logframe as a management tool and review any changes made to it since project start.

Finance and in-kind contribution:
- Consider the financial management of the project, with specific reference to the cost-effectiveness of interventions.
- Review the changes to fund allocations as a result of budget revisions and assess the appropriateness and relevance of such revisions.
- Does the project have the appropriate financial controls, including reporting and planning, that allow management to make informed decisions regarding the budget and allow for timely flow of funds?
- Informed by the co-financing monitoring table to be filled out, provide commentary on co-financing: is there a commitment from local communities and beneficiaries? Is their in-kind contribution as assessed properly?

Project-level Monitoring and Evaluation Systems:
- Review the monitoring tools currently being used: Did the project team provided all the necessary information to all stakeholders? Do they involve Ri and County committees in decision making? How could they be made more participatory and inclusive if there is a gap?
- Examine the financial management of the project monitoring and evaluation budget. Are sufficient resources being allocated to monitoring and evaluation? Are these resources being allocated effectively?

Stakeholder Engagement:
- Project management: Has the project developed and leveraged the necessary and appropriate partnerships with direct and tangential stakeholders?
- Participation and country-driven processes: Do local County and Ri level stakeholders support the objectives of the project? Do they continue to have an active role in project decision-making that supports efficient and effective project implementation?
- Participation and public awareness: To what extent has stakeholder involvement and public awareness contributed to the progress towards achievement of project objectives?

Reporting:
- Assess how adaptive management changes have been reported by the project management and shared with the Project Steering Committee (PSC).
- Assess how well the Project Team and partners undertake and fulfil UNDP reporting requirements (i.e. how have they addressed poorly-rated APRs, if applicable?)
- Assess how lessons derived from the adaptive management process have been documented, shared with key partners and internalized by partners.

Communications:

- Review internal project communication with stakeholders: Is communication regular and effective? Are there key stakeholders left out of communication? Are there feedback mechanisms when communication is received? Does this communication with stakeholders contribute to their awareness of project outcomes and activities and investment in the sustainability of project results?
- Review external project communication: Are proper means of communication established or being established to express the project progress and intended impact to the local beneficiaries.
- For reporting purposes, write one half-page paragraph that summarizes the project's progress towards results in terms of contribution to sustainable development benefits linking SDGs, as well as global environmental benefits.

iv. Sustainability

- Validate whether the risks identified in the Project Document, Annual Project Review (APR) and the ATLAS Risk Management Module are the most important and whether the risk ratings applied are appropriate and up to date. If not, explain why.
- In addition, assess the following risks to sustainability:

Financial risks to sustainability:
- What is the likelihood of financial and economic resources not being available once the UNDP assistance ends (consider potential resources can be from multiple sources, such as the public and income generating activities, communities' ownership in operation and maintenance and other funding that will be adequate financial resources for sustaining project's outcomes)?

Socio-economic risks to sustainability:
- Are there any social or geopolitical risks that may jeopardize sustainability of project outcomes? What is the risk that the level of stakeholder ownership (including key stakeholders) will be insufficient to allow for the project outcomes/benefits to be sustained? Do the various key stakeholders see that it is in their interest that the project benefits continue to flow? Is there sufficient public / stakeholder awareness in support of the long-term objectives of the project? Are lessons learned being documented by the Project Team on a continual basis and shared/ transferred to appropriate parties who could learn from the project and potentially replicate and/or scale it in the future?

Institutional Framework including sanctions risks to sustainability:
- Do the legal frameworks, policies and processes pose risks that may jeopardize sustenance of project benefits? What is the impact of CPD on the project? In case if there is no extension of current CPD or no new CPD is in place, what could be a suggested scenario to continue the activities that are successful and are making a difference in peoples' lives on humanitarian grounds? While assessing this parameter, also consider if the required systems/ mechanisms for accountability, transparency, and technical knowledge transfer are in place.
- What are the impact of Sanctions and suggested approach to mitigate the future risks in delivering the humanitarian assistance by the project? This includes the approach to be followed with 1718 committee.

Environmental risks to sustainability:
- Are there any environmental risks that may jeopardize sustenance of project outcomes?

Conclusions & Recommendations

The MTR team will include a section of the report setting out the MTR's evidence-based conclusions, in light of the findings.[10]

Recommendations should be succinct suggestions for critical intervention that are specific, measurable, achievable, and relevant. A recommendation table should be put in the report's executive summary.

The MTR team should make no more than 15 recommendations total.

Ratings

The MTR team will include its ratings of the project's results and brief descriptions of the associated achievements in a *MTR Ratings & Achievement Summary Table* in the Executive Summary of the MTR report. See Annex E for ratings scales. No rating on Project Strategy and no overall project rating is required.

Table. MTR Ratings & Achievement Summary Table for Project X

Measure	MTR Rating	Achievement Description
Project Strategy	N/A	
Progress Towards Results	Objective Achievement Rating: (rate 6 pt. scale)	
	Outcome 1 Achievement Rating: (rate 6 pt. scale)	
	Outcome 2 Achievement Rating: (rate 6 pt. scale)	
	Outcome 3 Achievement Rating: (rate 6 pt. scale)	
	Outcome 3 Achievement Rating: (rate 6 pt. scale)	
Project Implementation & Adaptive Management	(rate 6 pt. scale)	
Sustainability	(rate 4 pt. scale)	

6. MIDTERM REVIEW DELIVERABLES

The total duration of the MTR shall not exceed a total of 30 days, starting 28th March 2018, and shall be completed within three months from when the consultant(s) is(are) hired.

#	Deliverable	Description	Duration	Timing	Responsibilities
1	**MTR Inception Report**	MTR team clarifies objectives and	7 Days	No later than 2 weeks before	MTR team submits to the Commissioning Unit

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[10] Alternatively, MTR conclusions may be integrated into the body of the report.

		methods of Midterm Review		the MTR mission	and project management
2	**In-country mission concluded by a Presentation**	Initial Findings	13 Days	End of MTR mission	MTR Team presents to project management and the Commissioning Unit
3	**Draft Final Report**	Full report (using guidelines on content outlined in Annex B) with annexes	7 Days	Within 3 weeks of the MTR mission	Sent to the Commissioning Unit, reviewed by DRR, MES, Project Manager, PA
4	**Final Report***	Revised report with audit trail detailing how all received comments have (and have not) been addressed in the final MTR report	3 Days	Within 1 week of receiving UNDP comments on draft	Sent to the Commissioning Unit

*The final MTR report must be in English. If applicable, the Commissioning Unit may choose to arrange for a translation of the report into a language more widely shared by national stakeholders.

7. MTR ARRANGEMENTS

The principal responsibility for managing this MTR resides with the Commissioning Unit. The Commissioning Unit for this project's MTR is UNDP DPRK Country Office.

The commissioning unit will contract the consultants and ensure the timely provision of per diems and travel arrangements within the country for the MTR team. The Project Team will be responsible for liaising with the MTR team to provide all relevant documents, set up stakeholder interviews, and arrange field visits.

8. TEAM COMPOSITION

One independent consultant will conduct the MTR supported by National Technical Coordinator (NTC). The consultant cannot have participated in the project preparation, formulation, and/or implementation (including the writing of the Project Document) and should not have a conflict of interest with project's related activities.

The selection of consultant will be aimed at maximizing the overall qualities in the following areas:

- Recent experience with result-based management evaluation methodologies (10%);
- Experience applying SMART indicators and reconstructing or validating baseline scenarios (10%);
- Competence in adaptive management, as applied to disaster risk management, and climate change mitigation (5%);
- Experience working with the UNDP evaluations (10%);
- Experience working in South East Asia (5%);

- Good understanding about delivering humanitarian assistance under sanctions, and its impact (10%);
- Demonstrated understanding of issues related to gender and disaster risk management & community-based approaches; energy access; experience in gender sensitive evaluation and analysis (2%).
- Excellent communication skills (5%);
- Demonstrable analytical skills (4%);
- Project evaluation/review experiences within United Nations system will be considered an asset (4%);
- A Master's degree in disaster risk management or Engineering or Management or other closely related fields (5%).

9. PAYMENT MODALITIES AND SPECIFICATIONS

10% of payment upon approval of the final MTR Inception Report
40% upon submission of the draft MTR report
50% upon finalization of the MTR report

Denika Blacklock (Karim)

Phone: +66948125777 (Thailand)

Email: djbkarim@gmail.com

Nationality: Canadian

Professional Skills

Development professional focusing on results-based strategic planning/theory of change development, monitoring and evaluation and with extensive experience in the Asia and Pacific regions.

Specialization in applying methodologies for capturing change in 'soft' areas, such as policy dialogue/change, participatory development and capacity building. Sectoral specialization in (local) governance, gender, conflict, environment, climate resilience and food security. Cross-cutting areas of expertise include capacity development, policy and conflict analysis, vulnerability analysis and risk management.

Numerous monitoring frameworks designed, monitoring and evaluation tools and trainings designed and implemented, including developing programme and project theory of change, training and advisory/mentoring services provided. Evaluation focus on results and knowledge management. Strategic planning work has focused on position papers, developing theories of change and knowledge products for organizational or programme positioning.

Experience working with a range of institutions, including UNDP, ILO, WFP, the Commonwealth Forum, American Bar Association and Asia Foundation. Recent work has taken place in Asia and the Pacific, including multi-country programming in the Pacific. Extensive networks within UN organizations, NGOs and governments across both regions.

Significant writing and advocacy work as the facilitator of the learning and advocacy initiative 'Pacific Risk Management and Resilience' (www.facebook.com/PacificSDGAdvocacy), focusing on volunteerism and community empowerment to increase resilience in the face of climate change and disaster. Lead contributor

to "Theory in Practice" (www.theory-in-practice.net) assessing the gaps between development theory and practical implementation through case studies and commentary.

Professional Experience

Evaluation and Lessons Learned

- **Team Leader, Mid Term Evaluation of the Clearing for Results Phase III Programme: Mine Action for Human Development** (UNDP Cambodia, Phnom Penh, December 2017-January 2018)
- **Editor, Lessons Learned in Climate Public Expenditure Reviews** (*UNDP Asia-Pacific Regional Bureau, Bangkok, May-June 2015*)
- **Lessons Learned in Disaster Risk Reduction in Aceh, Indonesia** (*UNDP Indonesia, Banda Aceh, April-May 2012*)
- **Report on Best Practices from the Papua Development Programme** (*UNDP Indonesia; Jakarta, December 2011*)
- **Revision of Outcome Evaluation – Crisis Prevention and Recovery Programme 2006-2010** (*UNDP Indonesia; November 2011*)
- **Outcome Evaluation - Environment Programme 2006-2010** (*UNDP Indonesia; Jakarta, July 2011*)
- **Final Evaluation - Post-Conflict Fund** (*World Bank Indonesia; Jakarta, June 2011*)
- **Mid-Term Review - Nias Islands Transition Project** *(UNDP Indonesia; Nias/Jakarta, May 2011)*

Monitoring and Evaluation - Framework Design, Capacity Building, Advisory Support

- **Team Leader, M&E Framework and Inclusion Action Plan Development** (UNDP/UNCDF Laos, April-May 2018)
- **M&E Specialist – Monitoring and Evaluation Plan Design, Integrated Flood Management and Resilience Project** (*UNDP-GCF Samoa, January-February 2018*)
- **Consultant – Monitoring and Evaluation Framework Design** (*ILO Thailand, Bangkok, June-September 2016*)
  - Revised the theory of change and designed the monitoring and evaluation framework for the project 'Combatting Forced Labour in the Fishing Sector in Thailand', including providing advisory support on technical issues pertaining to legal sensitivities in monitoring in this sector in Thailand
- **Results-based Monitoring and Evaluation Trainer** (*ARC Innovation, Bangkok Thailand, May 2014*)
  - Designed and implemented a training programme on infrastructure development for Government of Afghanistan, including understanding results, indicator development, target setting, preparing for baseline studies, monitoring implementation plan and accompanying tools
- **Planning, Monitoring and Reporting Advisor** *(UNDP Indonesia, November-December 2013)*
  - Support to planning, monitoring and evaluation activities for governance and poverty reduction programmes, including proposal review, drafting results frameworks, reviewing reports and evaluations from a results-based management perspective
- **Consultant - Monitoring Framework Design and Baseline Study, JURIS Project** *(The Asia Foundation and American Bar Association China Programs, December 2012-January 2013)*
- **Retainer Strategic Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor, Pacific Region** (*Commonwealth Local Government Forum; home based/Fiji, August 2011-December 2014*)
  - Provision of technical support and capacity building for the development of the monitoring and evaluation framework including a Quality Assurance system and mentoring of staff for its implementation; Drafting of the regional and country baseline analysis and reports; Development of a new strategic vision in line with the post-2015 development agenda, including theory of change, a transition plan, capacity building for knowledge management, networking and advocacy.
  - Co-facilitator of the 3rd Pacific Local Government Forum, including facilitation of the Pacific Capital Cities Forum and development of the PCCF Strategic Plan in line with the post-2015 development agenda process
- **Programme Analyst – Planning, Monitoring and Reporting** (*UNDP Indonesia, Jakarta, July 2008 – December 2010*)
  - Development of the monitoring framework and tools for recovery, conflict prevention and disaster risk reduction and governance programmes (annual delivery for the programme USD 30 million for 10 projects ranging in size from USD 400,000 to USD 15 million). Included capacity building (training, mentoring and on-the-job coaching) of all project monitoring officers, project managers and programme officers to implement the framework, including capturing and analysing project data; developing, managing and

analysing the impact of partnerships; implementing gender mainstreaming action plans; identifying and evaluating risks and risk mitigation plans; and capturing and disseminating lessons learned.
- o Design and oversight of programme and project evaluations.
- o Reporting, quality assurance and donor relations for all programmes and projects.
- o Project development and planning. Consultation and identification of strategic areas of intervention for Crisis Prevention and Recovery and Democratic Governance. Defining strategic approach, partnership strategies and applying lessons learned and good/innovative practices from previous projects and programmes.

Policy Analysis and Strategic Planning

- **Consultant – Pacific Food Security** (*WFP Asia-Pacific Office, Bangkok, September-December 2016*)
  - o Developed the 'Atlas' on food security vulnerabilities and scenarios in the Pacific islands, with a focus on Samoa, Tonga, Fiji, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands, including analysis of income and expenditure data, and food production and consumption trends and coping mechanisms
- **Consultant - Strategic Plan for the Commonwealth Local Government Forum Pacific Programme 2015-2020** (*Commonwealth Local Government Programme, Fiji/Papua New Guinea, May-June 2014*)
- **Consultant - Strategic Planning and Design of Monitoring Framework – Solomon Islands NGO Partnership Agreement/SINPA Program** (*Oxfam Australia Solomon Islands Program, October 2012*)
- **Intern** (*Slovak Institute for International Studies, Bratislava, June 2002-September 2002*)
  - o Support to research on trends in racism in Slovakia and Eastern Europe, particularly against the Roma community

Programme Management

- **Interim Program Director, Trafficking in Persons Project** (*American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative, Solomon Islands, May-September 2012*)
  - o Revise the project log frame, identify partnerships with local organizations for activity implementation, organize and manage training implementation, supervise data and information gathering for knowledge product development, work closely with government counterparts to raise awareness on trafficking in persons, initiate awareness campaigns and advocacy to increase knowledge on trafficking among the general public and encourage government to include trafficking in persons within the Family Protection bill under preparation at that time
- **Programme Analyst - Local Governance and Decentralisation** (*UNDP Kosovo, Pristina, April 2006-June 2008*)
  - o Programme and project development and implementation.
  - o Capacity building/Advisory support to Kosovo Government institutions. Preparation of policy/issue papers, advisory support on work flow management and organizational development, and the design and of a medium-long term Government programme to implement the decentralization component of the Status Proposal for Kosovo.
  - o Partnership development and management.
- **Programme Officer - South East Europe and Caucasus** (*European Centre for Minority Issues, Flensburg, Germany, September 2004-April 2006*)
  - o Oversight, monitoring and reporting of project implementation.
  - o Project management of two multi-country research projects on the Meshketian Turks and developing minority inclusion indicators

Lectures/Presentation

- 'Inter-Religious Riots and the Perpetuation of Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Myanmar,' guest lecture at University of Winchester, UK, 6 December 2017
- 'Accelerated Development: Who Benefits?' At the Pacific Local Government Research Roundtable, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, 19 May 2014
- 'Decentralization in the Context of Conflict Prevention and Resolution: Examples from Post-Communist States,' with Ben Lloyd-James, (Territorial Politics in Perspective, Belfast, Northern Ireland, 11-13 January 2006)

Publications

- '[An Arms Embargo on Myanmar Would Not Save the Rohingya](#),' Al Jazeera, 24 September 2017
- 'The 'Asia-Pacific' Concept is Ridiculous,' in AidLeap, April 2015, www.aidleap.org/2015/04/
- 'Disaster Resilience: Why We're Not Reaching the Most Vulnerable,' in Theory in Practice, April 2015, www.theory-in-practice.net
- 'The 10 Year Cycle: Peace Agreements and Conflict Resolution,' in Theory in Practice, January 2015, www.theory-in-practice.net
- 'Whose Development? The Need for Conflict Sensitive Development in Papua, Indonesia,' Denika Blacklock Karim (Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, October 2012)
- 'The Protection on Minorities in the Wider Europe.' Co-editor with Marc Weller and Katherine Nobbs (Palgrave MacMillan, October 2008)
- 'Securing Implementation of the Ohrid Agreement.' Marija Nasokovska and Denika Blacklock, ECMI Report 58 (March 2006) www.ecmi.de
- 'Finding Durable Solutions for the Meskhetians.' Denika Blacklock, ECMI Report 56 (August 2005) www.ecmi.de

Educational Background and Continuing Education

MA International Conflict Analysis, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK (November 2004)

BA (Honours) Political Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada (June 2002)

Quantitative Research Methods (University of Amsterdam, March 2018)

Qualitative Research Methods (University of Amsterdam, December 2017)

The Age of Sustainable Development (Columbia University, January 2015)

The Changing Global Order (Universiteit Leiden, 17 December 2014)

Risk and Opportunity: Managing Risk for Development (World Bank, 4 August 2014)

Language Skills

English (mother tongue)

French (fluent)

Bahasa Indonesia (working knowledge)

8. Signed UNEG Code of Conduct Form

Evaluators/Consultants:
1. Must present information that is complete and fair in its assessment of strengths and weaknesses so that decisions or actions taken are well founded.
2. Must disclose the full set of evaluation findings along with information on their limitations and have this accessible to all affected by the evaluations with expressed legal rights to receive results.
3. Should protect the anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants. They should provide maximum notice, minimize demands on time, and respect people's right not to engage. Evaluators must respect people's right to provide information in confidence and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. Evaluators are not expected to evaluate individuals and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this general principle.
4. Sometimes uncover evidence of wrongdoing while conducting evaluations. Such cases must be reported discreetly to the appropriate investigative body. Evaluators should consult with other relevant oversight entities when there is any doubt about if and how issues should be reported.
5. Should be sensitive to beliefs, manners and customs and act with integrity and honesty in their relations with all stakeholders. In line with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, evaluators must be sensitive to and address issues of discrimination and gender equality. They should avoid offending the dignity and self-respect of those persons with whom they come in contact in the course of the evaluation. Knowing that evaluation might negatively affect the interests of some stakeholders, evaluators should conduct the evaluation and communicate its purpose and results in a way that clearly respects the stakeholders' dignity and self-worth.
6. Are responsible for their performance and their product(s). They are responsible for the clear, accurate and fair written and/or oral presentation of study limitations, findings and recommendations.
7. Should reflect sound accounting procedures and be prudent in using the resources of the evaluation.

MTR Consultant Agreement Form

Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System:

Name of Consultants: ___ Denika Blacklock _____

Name of Consultancy Organization: __ N/A _____

I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.

Signed at ___ Bangkok, Thailand _____ (place) on ___ 28 May 2018 _____ (date)

Signature: _[signature]_

9. Signed MTR final report clearance form

Midterm Review Report Reviewed and Cleared By:

Commissioning Unit:

Name: _____

Signature: _____   Date: _____

UNDP Project Manager

Name: _____

Signature: _____   Date: _____

Quarterly Monitoring Report for <<Programme/Project>>

Reporting Period:

Section 1 – Activities Implemented

Output #	Activity Implemented	Date of Activity	Location of Activity	Budget Used	# Participants		Summary of Activity Results	Problems or Challenges Noted *Record in Issues Log
					M	F		

Section 2 - Output Monitoring

Output	Indicator	Scheduled for Monitoring	Current Data for Indicator	Data Source	Data Gaps Identified
Output 1	1.1				
	1.2				
	1.3				
	1.4				
Output 2	2.1				
	2.2				
	2.3				

Output 3	3.1				
	3.2				
	3.3				
	3.4				

Section 3 – Analysis of Output Results

Output	Analysis of Change Effected based on monitoring data	Issues emerging requiring attention *note in Issues Log below
Output 1		
Output 2		
Output 3		

Section 4 - Good Practices and Lessons Learned

	Detail the Good Practice or Lesson	Date Identified	Recorded by
Good Practice/Lesson (delete as appropriate)			
Good Practice/Lesson			
Good Practice/Lesson			
Good Practice/Lesson			

Section 5 – Updated Issues Log

Issue Identified	Identified by/Date	Response	Resolved (Yes/On-going)

Section 6 – Updated Risks Log

Description	Date Identified	Type	Probability/ Impact	Countermeasure/ Management Response	Owner	Status	Last Update/ By

Section 7 – Approval

Prepared by: Date: Signature:	Approved by: Date: Signature	Comment: