



## TERMINAL EVALUATION REPORT

OF THE PROJECT ENHANCING RESILIENCE OF TOURISM  
RELIANT COMMUNITIES TO CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS IN  
SAMOA (ICCRITS)

FOR UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (UNDP)

PIMS 4566, GEF ID 4585

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This project was undertaken by Simon McArthur, Director at SMA Tourism

## **About SMA**

SMA is an international tourism consulting firm, specialising in innovative product development for cultural tourism, ecotourism, adventure tourism and culinary (food and wine) tourism. What sets us apart from most of our competitors, is our large amount of experience in implementation – we have been tourism developers and operators. We understand the challenges, risks and opportunities associated with creating and consistently delivering tourism that is differentiated, competitive and sustainable.

## **Acknowledgements**

This evaluation conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG 'Ethical Guidelines for Evaluations'.

The author would like to acknowledge the time and inputs of the stakeholders listed in Section 5 of this Report. The author would particularly like to highlight the support of Tessa Tafua (UNDP), the input of Isamaeli Time (former PMU Project Manager), and the input and support of Ropeta Lei Sam (former PMU Technical Officer).

## **Disclaimer**

Specific investment decisions addressing recommendations in this report require further planning, engineering, environmental and heritage advice, and costing by an estimator. Costings should not be used for construction.

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## Executive Summary

### Project Description

The project titled *Enhancing Resilience of tourism-reliant communities to climate change risks* (PIMS#4566) was designed to enhance the resilience of tourism-reliant communities to climate change risks by integrating climate change into development policy and instruments and investing in adaptation actions supporting tourism reliant communities. The Project was designed to achieve two outcomes:

1. Climate change adaptation mainstreamed into tourism-related policy instruments and public-private partnerships
2. Increased adaptive capacity to climate change and disaster risks of tourism-reliant communities

The Project commenced on 29 May 2013 and had a forecast completion date of 30<sup>th</sup> June 2017. A Mid Term Evaluation was conducted in March 2016 and recommended a project extension to the end of 2017. An extension of six months was granted in May 2017 to 30<sup>th</sup> December 2017 (a 'no-cost' extension). The Project was officially closed on the 30<sup>th</sup> December 2017 as the due date for implementation. However, there are some minor outstanding works to be completed and reconciled (forecast completion is February 2018).

A Terminal Evaluation of the Project was conducted between late December 2017 and January 2018. The objectives of the evaluation were to assess the achievement of project results, draw lessons that can both improve the sustainability of benefits from this project, and aid in the overall enhancement of UNDP programming.

### Project Summary Table

The Evaluators assessment of the LFA Results Framework suggested some good, some fair and some below target performances:

- The strongest Project performance was in the number of tourism operators that gained access to financial products for climate resilient actions (following significant improvements to the Small Grants Program (post MTR))
- The weakest results were operationalisation of Management Plans and the proportion of targeted tourism-reliant communities that have adopted climate resilient livelihoods.

#### Evaluation of LFA Results Framework

Outcome 1: Climate change adaptation mainstreamed into tourism-related policy instruments and public-private partnerships			
Indicators	Target	End Project	Comment
# of Management Plans developed and operationalised	6	6 (100%)	6 were developed but few operationalised
% of tourism operators in targeted TDA's apply new guidelines for climate resilient actions	75%+	75%	Round 1 + 2 Small grant recipients only
# of tourism operators that gain access to financial products for climate resilient actions	15+	28	15 operators in Round 1, 13 operators Round 2 4 attractions Round 2
Outcome 2: Increased adaptive capacity to climate change and disaster risks of tourism-reliant communities			
Indicators	Target	End Project	Comment
Number and type of risk reduction activities introduced in tourism-reliant communities	5+ in each of 6 TDA's	3	Average no. of small grant recipients
% of women and men in tourism reliant communities trained in climate risk reduction	50%+	60%	Training participant data, favouring community over operators
% of targeted tourism-reliant communities that have adopted climate resilient livelihoods	80%+	20%	Participation in training and small grants program

## Evaluation Rating Table

The effectiveness and efficiency of the Project was very low in the first phase. Phase One performance was constrained from the onset by a scope that was too broad, too ambitious and too disconnected with the commercial needs of the tourism industry, to be effective. At the commencement of the MTR, the Project was forecast to have most of its outcomes not achieved, and the majority of its funding returned to donors.

However, the MTR proposed a range of recommendations to enhance expertise, improve efficiency and effectiveness, as well as a six month extension. The extension was approved, and the Project Steering Committee and PMU focussed on the MTR recommendations, and subsequently delivered a significantly more effective and efficient Phase Two of the Project.

The constructive MTR and rallying of the PSC and MPU was the turning point of the Project. Any of this Report's critical comment about the second phase of the Project must take this incredible turn of effectiveness and efficiency into account.

The evaluation ratings for the Project indicated:

- Average results for Monitoring and Evaluation;
- Strong results for IA & EA Execution – particularly the excellent quality of UNDP implementation;
- Average results for the achievement of outcomes (which is a vast improvement from the MTR assessment); and
- Average results for sustainability.

## Evaluation ratings for the Project

1. Monitoring and evaluation		Rating
M&E design at entry		2/6
M&E Plan implementation		3/6
Overall quality of M&E		3/6
2. IA&EA Execution		Rating
Quality of UNDP Implementation		5/6
Quality of Execution of Executing Agency		4/6
Overall quality of Implementation / Execution		4/6
3. Assessment of outcomes		Rating
Relevance		1/2
Effectiveness		3/6
Efficiency		3/6
Overall Project Outcome Rating		3/6
4. Sustainability		Rating
Financial resources		3/4
Socio-political		2/4
Institutional framework and governance		3/4
Environmental		2/4
Overall likelihood of sustainability		2/4

- Ratings for Outcomes, Effectiveness, Efficiency, M&E, Implementation and Execution use a 6-point scale (6=Highly Satisfactory, 5=Satisfactory, 4=Moderately Satisfactory, 3=Moderately Unsatisfactory, 2=Unsatisfactory, 1 = Highly Unsatisfactory).
- Ratings for sustainability use a 4-point scale (4=Likely, 3=Moderately Likely, 2=Moderately, 1=Unlikely)
- Ratings for Relevance use a 2-point scale (2=Relevant, 1=Not relevant)

A more interesting evaluation of the Project is to examine the effectiveness of the major tasks.

### *The Management Plans*

It is entirely logical to plan for an area before introducing physical works. The idea to create models of areas to show the potential impact of climate change was excellent. However, the models have not been used further, and the stakeholders interviewed by the consultant were not sure where they were (the P3D models are located at TATTE building with MNRE). Individual Management Plans were prepared for individual TDA's. This could have generated more local ownership, but without implementation budgets set up same time, this benefit wasn't achieved – there is minimal awareness and ownership. Had the Plans been prepared as sections of one plan, there would have been greater opportunity for comparison and integration of common strategies, which could have set up stronger cases for donor funding for implementation.

### *Manase Beach Replenishment*

The Manase Beach Replenishment Project proposed a capital intensive, engineering solution to long term beach erosion in front of several fale operators. The Project scope was trimmed to the available budget, but proceeded anyway without a strategic evaluation. The results were a highly successful beach replenishment in front of one fale operator, but the transfer of impact to the

adjacent fale operator. The fale operator that benefitted has minimal capital to invest in further adaptation or product development.

### *Alternative product to beach tourism*

The investment in developing tourism product that is less dependent on beaches and fine weather was a strategically valuable approach. This initiative fits the National Tourism Plan and STA priorities. The PMU and STA Planning and Product development worked together to prioritise attractions and their investment. In this respect, this project element can be considered as one that achieved greater mainstreaming than most. The focus on upgrading basic visitor infrastructure at key visitor attractions is a start, but the investment at each site should have been larger, to finish creating the experience and ideally, create experiences that generated employment through interpretation and guiding, rather than making it easier to visit independently.

### *Strengthening resilience of beach fale operations*

This initiative was achieved through two rounds of a Small Grants Program. The MTR identified a flaw in the Program was giving out too small amounts to too many applicants, resulting in very high administration and management costs, and too small a benefit. The MTR's recommendations for larger grants to fewer recipients helped address this issue, but the average project was still too small to make a significant difference to an individual operator. The incorporation of MTR recommendation to use the Project's Technical Guidelines and an architect to design better fales worked well, and the average fale produced in Phase Two was much better. These shifts should be further expanded on in any future program.

There were two fale operators that can be considered a major success from this Project:

- Aganoa Surf Resort, because the operator co-invested to finish off the building with landscaping and detailed fitout, and is now inspired to continue to build more; and
- Taufua Beach fales, because the operator more than matched the grant investment, to establish new fales well set back from the beach but with their own competitive advantages, and because the operator created a scale of change that will make the business genuinely resilient to climate change impacts.

**The two most successful small grant projects – Aganoa Surf Resort (Savaii) and Taufua Beach fales (Upolu)**



**CLEWS**

The Climate Early Warning and Information System was a practical, cost effective component of the Project that has long term potential to assist all tourism operators be slightly more prepared to handle the impacts of climate change. More could be done to expand services and application to other parts of the Pacific.

**Project documentary**

It is essential that projects like this leave behind information for stakeholders to continue to learn, get inspired and increase their resilience to climate change. A landing page on the STA website should have been built and continuously added

to and refreshed, as the Project generated outputs. Hopefully the STA will get this done soon. The major opportunity to educate and inspire now relies on the MTR recommendation for a 15 minute documentary about the Project that is currently being finalised. In addition to a launch and distribution of the documentary, it would be ideal if the STA can continuously drive interest to view the product among those that have not and should see it.

**Summary of Conclusions and lessons learnt**

1. The Project Design needed to establish a narrower focus, with a view to solid performance setting the case for a second Project to cover other aspects. Instead, the PD was overly ambitious, trying to tackle almost every angle of climate change adaptation. There were two major implications of this:
  - There were many short-term consultants and Technical Officers brought in for short periods. Consequently, there was insufficient retainment of intellectual property though the Project, and now insufficient transfer / mainstreaming of expertise and experience at the end of the Project.
  - The limited budget was thinly spread across the project elements. Consequently, very few projects achieved a scale or full completion that could make a material, long term difference.
2. The Project Steering Committee needed to apply more strategic analysis to assess alternative ways to maximise the impact of each project element. This strategic analysis should have considered:
  - comparing alternative ideas or locations before committing to one
  - a return on investment principle with each project element
  - the professionalism and financial resources of partners / grant applicants to make the most of their project
3. The PMU needed commercially orientated tourism development expertise throughout the Project period. This limited the ability to tune the project initiatives to fit commercial needs of businesses. This significantly reduced

tourism sector interest in engaging in the Project, and setting up ongoing implementation.

4. The establishment of a specialised unit to address climate change within the STA was done with the credible goal of mainstreaming, but this was not entirely achieved to the preferred standard. The PMU did not sufficiently integrate into the STA Planning and Development Unit. Consequently, there is insufficient ownership and transfer of expertise and experience to properly mainstream the Project outputs.
5. The Project's financial management by the UNDP was excellent, with continuous tracking and regular, clear reporting.
6. The Project Steering Committee and PMU worked very hard in the second phase of the Project, and managed to accelerate spending while improving the quality of the Project outcomes. The Project spent more money in its final year than the previous four years, and this spending delivered much better outcomes.

### Summary of Recommendations

The following outstanding actions should be addressed to complete the Project:

1. Get building defects fixed while contracts current
2. Finish documentary and short clips, launch and post on STA website & social media platforms
3. Create a Climate and Disaster Resilience "landing page on STA website:
  - home page explanation of climate change impacts on tourism
  - load documentary for viewing
  - explanation of Foundation for a Sustainable Samoa (Travel Philanthropy Fund)
  - list of projects funded by small grants

- list of TDA management plans
  - explanation of CLEWS
  - contact for more information within STA
4. Ensure consistent communication between the MET division & STA regarding the continuation of the CLEWS system

A more detailed Table of actions has been presented as an Exit Strategy in **Section 4.3**.

Beyond this Project, two major recommendations are proposed.

1. Strengthening the Samoan tourism capability
2. A second ICCRITS Project

#### *Strengthening the Samoan tourism capability*

Sustainable business growth is critical not only to business success, and to delivering economic benefits to local communities and the country overall, but also to implementing environmental initiatives like climate change adaptation. Healthy businesses create investment pools from which to take up environmental and social initiatives, such as climate change adaptation. The more of these investment pools, the more the tourism industry can partner in projects like ICCRITS, rather than be totally dependent on grants to partially solve their issues.

This evaluation uncovered several significant constraints to achieving sustainable tourism growth in Samoa. If these constraints were addressed, then there would be a much more fertile ground from which to implement adaptation measures addressing potential impacts of climate change, as well as other environmental and social objectives that the UNDP and other organisations wish to assist with. To address these issues, it is therefore recommended to create a short-term project that scopes:

1. What rules and regulations are missing, or more commonly, what ones are poorly formed, and stifle innovation and entrepreneurialism


2. What finance and tax incentives could be refined and geared up to grow sustainable tourism in Samoa
3. What commercially provided experiences, could be designed for delivery by the private sector, that would significantly increase the competitiveness of the destination
4. What institutional strengthening of the STA (particularly in planning and product development) and what cultural change and incentivisation could be introduced to stretch the organisation to deliver greater outcomes
5. What sort of communications could be generated to increase public awareness of the value that tourism plays in the Samoan economy, and what the community could do to further strengthen tourism opportunities and benefits of tourism for Samoans

It is recommended that this work be undertaken quickly and efficiently, as a scanning exercise that generates a short and concise set of opportunities, from which donors could then structure programs around.

#### *A second / new ICCRITS Project*

Accepting the above recommendations are needed, this evaluation also concludes that there is sufficient solid work done to design a new ICCRITS. This would start with a detailed Project Design. The remainder of this final section presents ideas for the design. The figure below presents the key principles and key components of a new ICCRITS.

#### Key principles and elements of a new ICCRITS Project



The seven key outcomes of a new ICCRITS Project would be:

1. A significant number of Beachside accommodation properties that have a Masterplan for the long-term conversion of their property to be largely resilient to the main potential impacts of climate change
2. A significant number of Beachside accommodation properties that have been made resilient to the main potential impacts of climate change
3. A sample of distinctive attractions that offer a highly differentiated experience that can be undertaken in poor weather
4. A sample of strong tourism businesses offering several highly differentiated experiences that can be undertaken in poor weather
5. The large majority of participants in the above initiatives are largely aware of what climate change is, what it could do to their business, and how they are making themselves resilient, and are sharing this with their customers, staff and leaders of their local community
6. Marketing identifies accommodation and other visitor experiences that are making themselves climate change resilient

7. Operators provide information to customers that explains what climate change is, what it could do to their business, and how they are making themselves resilient

Additional detail around this recommendation is provided in **Section 4.3**.

## Acronyms

AF Adaptation Fund

CAM Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Methodology

CC Climate Change

CEO Chief Executive Officer

CIM Coastal Infrastructure Management (Plan)

CLEWS Climate Early Warning System

GEF Global Environment Facility

ICEM International Centre for Environmental Management

ICCRIFS Integration of Climate Change Risks and Resilience into Forestry Management in Samoa

IEC Information Education and Communication

LDCF Least Developing Country Fund

MAF Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries

MNRE Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment

MoF Ministry of Finance

MTE Mid Term Evaluation

MWCSD Ministry of Women, Community and Social Development

MWTI Ministry of Works, Transport and Infrastructure

NAPA National Adaptation Program of Action

NGO Non-Government Organisation

NPD National Project Director

NPM National Project Manager

NTCCASS National Tourism Climate Change Adaptation Strategy for Samoa

NZAP New Zealand Aid Programme

PA Project Assistant

PCCSP Pacific Climate Change Science Program

PIR Project Implementation Reporting

PM Project Manager

PPCR Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience

PPDU Planning and Development Unit of the STA

PSC Project Steering Committee

PSSF Private Sector Support Facility

SGO Small Grants Officer

SHA Samoa Hotel Association

SSTA Savaii Samoa Tourism Association

STA Samoa Tourism Authority (the Project implementing partner)

STDP Samoa Tourism Development Plan

STDE Sustainable Tourism Development Expert

STSP Samoa Tourism Support Program

SWA Samoa Water Authority

TCCPU Tourism Climate Change Project Unit

TCCTF Tourism Climate Change Task Force

TCRP Tourism Cyclone Recovery Programme

TDA Tourism Development Area

UNDP United Nations Development Programme (the Project implementing agency)

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Purpose of the evaluation

The objectives of the evaluation are to assess the achievement of project results, and to draw lessons that can both improve the sustainability of benefits from this project, and aid in the overall enhancement of UNDP programming.

The evaluation was undertaken in accordance with the Terms of Reference (see **Section 6.1**). The focus of the evaluation is to apply the criteria of **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact**, as defined and explained in the UNDP Guidance for Conducting Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-supported, GEF-financed Projects.

### 1.2 Scope and methodology

This Terminal Evaluation has been conducted according to the guidance, rules and procedures established by the UNDP. The key steps on the Terminal Evaluation were:

1. Review relevant documents (see **Section 6.2**)
2. Plan Mission (involving site visits and stakeholder consultation, see **Section 6.3**)
3. Mission – visit sites where the project conducted key business (see **Section 6.4**)
4. Mission – consult with stakeholders (see **Section 6.5**) and ask them key questions relating to the evaluation (see **Section 6.6**)
5. Debrief Project Management Group
6. Prepare Draft Evaluation Report
7. Project Management Group Review Draft Report and provide comment

8. Draft Report amended to Final and Audit Trail report prepared and added to Final Report (**Section 6.6**)

### 1.3 Structure of the Evaluation Report

The structure of the Report is based on:

- **Executive Summary** providing a high-level summary of the evaluation and featuring recommendations
- **Section 1** providing a brief background
- **Section 2** describing the project problems, objectives and desired outcomes
- **Section 3** outline the key outcomes of the Project, based on the structure required from UNDP
- **Section 4** featuring conclusions, lessons learnt and recommendations for the future applicable to this sector
- **Section 5** providing background information referred to in the main report

## 2. Project description and development context

### 2.1 Project start and duration

The Project commenced on 29 May 2013 and had a forecast completion date of 30<sup>th</sup> June 2017. A Mid Term Evaluation was conducted in March 2016 and recommended a project extension to the end of 2017. An extension of six months was granted in May 2017 to 30<sup>th</sup> December 2017. The Project officially finished on the 30<sup>th</sup> December 2017, but some minor works are still to be completed and reconciled (forecast completion is February 2018).

A Terminal Evaluation of the Project was requested in November 2017 and commenced in December 2017. The evaluation period from which activity and financial status is measure is January 2018. It is accepted that some minor works and reconciliation will occur after this, for a further month.

### 2.2 Problems that the Project sought to address

Climate change includes gradual sea level and temperature rise, increasing frequency and intensity of storm surges and cyclones, and changing precipitation patterns, including high intensity rainfall events and droughts. These forms of change pose a threat to community-based tourism operators and their vital assets located in highly vulnerable coastal areas. Beach tourism is a highly climate-dependent activity, relying heavily on vulnerable natural coastal resources. Tourism is a major economic sector in Samoa, driven by small scale and family-owned businesses as integral part of village areas and key income-generating supplement of mainly subsistence rural livelihoods. The effects of climate change and climate

variability on tourism are both direct and indirect. Direct effects include the erosion and loss of beaches, inundation and degradation of coastal ecosystems, saline intrusion and damage to critical infrastructure, reduced reliability of water and food supply. Indirect impacts include the diminished beauty of natural resources, for example bleached coral and destroyed forests, curtailment of some outdoor activities, dangerous swimming and diving conditions. As a consequence, livelihood source of families in rural coastal areas is jeopardized along the complex tourism value chain, involving small beach accommodation, catering, recreational activities, associated jobs and local supply of goods and services (food, handicrafts, cultural performances, transport, etc).

Climate change is likely to result in more frequent and extreme rainfall events, longer dry spells and drought events, rising sea levels, extreme winds and extreme high air and water temperatures. The focus of climate change scenarios for Samoa is overwhelmingly on the nature and frequency of extreme events (e.g. tropical cyclones, drought) and how their impacts may be exacerbated by sea-level rise. Over a medium time frame, sea-level rise will incrementally impact upon Samoa through events such as flooding, coastal erosion and damage to coastal infrastructure. While low islands (e.g. atolls) are often judged to be more vulnerable to sea-level rise than high (e.g. volcanic) islands, the propensity for communities to be located along the coastal margins results in similar risks and vulnerabilities for all small island groups. In Samoa 70% of the population is reported to live within 1 km of the coast and critical infrastructure (e.g. hospitals, schools, port facilities, power plants, airports, tourism infrastructure) is also located in this zone.

**Figure 2.1 Beach erosion, failed attempts to stop it with rocks and a retaining wall, and the vulnerable beach fale on the north coast of Savaii**



Climate change can affect tourism destinations through both direct climatic impacts and indirect environmental and socio-economic change impact. Tourism operators and associated communities in Samoa are very heavily dependent on the countries natural resource base. Samoan's prime tourist attractions are its tropical climate and pristine beaches, its tropical coastal and inland ecosystems and landscapes, and the traditional culture very closely attached to the use of land-based, coastal and marine environmental resources. Tourism is a major economic sector in Samoa and most tourism areas are located within vulnerable coastal areas. Current and expected climate change trends are highly relevant to the tourism sector.

Long-term solutions at the national level are needed to enhance the capacity of the Samoan Tourism Authority in coordination with related government institutions and private sector associations to create a suitable enabling environment for climate resilient tourism businesses. The Project Identification Form (UNDP-GEF 2013 Project document) proposed taking the following actions:

- Integration of climate change and climate-induced disaster risks in the Samoa Tourism Development Plan and related policy instruments (e.g. Environmental Impact Assessment, Tourism Standards, Tourism Fale Operational Guidelines);
- Integration of Climate Change risks into local destination-level planning and management processes at the designated Tourism Development Areas;
- Disaster preparedness and response plans covering both tourists and local populations in an integrated way;
- Climate early warning and information services tailored to tourism sector needs;
- Financial and investment support schemes integrating climate and disaster risk criteria;
- Insurance scheme as climate risk transfer mechanism.

The Project Identification Form (UNDP-GEF 2013 Project document) recommended developing the capacity of local tourism dependent communities and their operators in the following areas:

- Preparedness and response measures to climate-induced extreme events and disasters, including climate proofing of both public infrastructure and tourism establishments;
- Integrated coastal management and shoreline protection that is adapted to climate-induced effects;
- Management of water resources that is adapted to climate-induced disturbances in water supply;
- Ensuring adequate food supply satisfying combined need of tourists and host under climate-induced stresses;
- Adjustment of seasonal tourism operational planning and recreational activities management under changing seasonal weather patterns;

- Use of climate early warning and information services to inform decisions on the above.

## 2.3 Immediate and development objectives of the Project

The project titled *Enhancing Resilience of tourism-reliant communities to climate change risks* (PIMS#4566) is designed to enhance the resilience of tourism-reliant communities to climate change risks by integrating climate change into development policy and instruments and investing in adaptation actions supporting tourism reliant communities. These were priorities identified under Samoa's National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA).

The Project is to focus on six Tourism Development Areas (TDA's), as identified in **Table 2.2**.

**Table 2.2 Tourism Development Areas and villages targeted for Project focus**

Tourism Development Areas	Code	Villages
South-East Upolu	TDA1	Saleapaga and Lalomanu
South Upolu	TDA2	Safata – Sataoa and Saanapu
North-west Upolu - Manono	TDA3	Leppuiai and Faleu
Eastern Savaii	TDA4	Lano and Manase
North-west Savaii	TDA5	Falealupo and Satuiatua
South-east Savaii	TDA6	Palauli

## 2.4 Baseline indicators established

**Table 2.4** summarises the desired outputs and baseline indicators for the Project.

The UNDP-GEF (2013:25) Project document indicated that three UNDAF outcomes relate to the Project as follows:

- UNDAF Outcome 1: Equitable economic growth and poverty reduction “The nationally validated Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS) carried out under the Integrated Framework (IF) for Trade project in 2010. It has identified several areas of priority focus in the tourism sector one of them being on developing integrated climate change adaptation measures in tourism. This tourism adaptation project would address this priority area directly”
- UNDAF Outcome 2: Good governance and human rights (“A rights-based approach to climate change adaptation initiatives by UNDP is extremely important particularly in ensuring gender equality in decision-making and leadership at community levels”
- UNDAF Outcome 4: Sustainable Environmental Management “The environment-economic-governance nexus demonstrated through community-based natural resource management and use that supports implementation of gender-sensitive national policies as well as the mainstreaming of environment into national plans; CPD Output 4.2.2.1. Engendered MDG-based village and local level sustainable development plans developed and implemented by communities). Under this UNDAF outcome, UNDP has been supporting the Government of Samoa through a number of key initiatives, such as the Community-Centred Sustainable Development Programme, focusing on disaster preparedness and response to long term environmental threats, which makes it ideal to link with climate change adaptation efforts that address both immediate climate-induced extreme events and long-term creeping effects of climate change”

**Table 2.4 Desired outputs and baseline indicators for the Project (at Project Inception)**

Desired outcomes / outputs	Indicators
<p>1. Management plans integrating climate risks are developed in 6 Tourism Development Areas involving 12 villages</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Number of TDA's with a completed Management Plan</li> <li>▪ Number of Management Plans whose tourism vision includes climate change adaptation</li> <li>▪ Number of Management Plans with an implementation plan containing high priority actions that all have a budget allocation</li> <li>▪ Number of Management Plans with an implementation plan containing medium priority actions that all have a budget allocation</li> <li>▪ Number of Management Plans whose scheduled High Priority actions have commenced on time</li> <li>▪ Number of Management Plans whose scheduled High Priority actions have commenced\</li> </ul>
<p>2. Technical guidelines developed on climate resilient beach tourism management practices</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Number of operators and / or village tourism representatives within the 6 TDAs that have been trained on how to use the Technical Guidelines</li> <li>▪ Proportion of small grant recipients that have applied the Technical Guidelines as part of their project</li> </ul>
<p>3. Recommendations developed to internalise climate change considerations into existing micro-finance, grant and loan schemes to the tourism sector and feasibility of a climate risk transfer (insurance) mechanism (undertaken as part of a separate program to this project)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Number of tourism operators within 6 TDAs who have gained access to the Small Grants Program and have started to use properly (see below)</li> <li>▪ Number of tourism operators within 6 TDAs who have gained access to other financial products and/or insurance that address climate resilient actions</li> </ul>
<p>4. Concrete adaptation actions that help tourism resilient communities become more resilient to localised climate change risks (eg. Strengthening coastal infrastructure, enhancing water resource security, shoreline protection and development of alternative tourism experiences that reduce reliance on fine weather and beach experiences. Initiatives to ensure that both women and men participate in and benefit from these investments</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Number of woman and men involved into community project management plans (participation in activities, training, awareness campaign, workshops, etc.)</li> <li>▪ Proportion of concrete adaptation community projects that have been identified in the Management Plans (currently 4 projects)</li> <li>▪ Proportion of concrete adaptation community projects completed</li> </ul>
<p>5. Concrete adaptation actions that help tourism operators become more resilient to localised climate change risks (eg. Water shortage, storm damage, coastal erosion to tourism facilities) through a small grants program</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Number of compliant applicant tourism operators that gain access to small grants for climate resilient actions</li> <li>▪ Proportion of successful applicants that deliver a compliant outcome</li> <li>▪ Proportion of successful applicants whose contribution is double or more than the minimum required</li> </ul>
<p>6. Coastal tourism operators are connected to Climate Early Warning and Information System (CLEWS)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Number of TDAs that have access to a continuous stream of up to date information about climate warnings and how to use them (eg. continuous radio, TV, mobile phone app and website updates)</li> <li>▪ Total number of women and men in tourism reliant communities trained in climate risk reduction</li> <li>▪ Proportion of trainees that can demonstrate an adequate level of understanding of how to use the CLEWs available in their TDA</li> </ul>
<p>7. South-South transfer of tourism adaptation case studies between operators in Samoan TDAs, and counterparts in other SIDS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Number of case studies that can demonstrate more than two adaptive responses to climate change</li> <li>▪ Number of TDA operators in Samoa that are exposed to the case studies</li> </ul>

## 2.5 Main stakeholders

The project was designed in close consultation with key stakeholders and has benefitted from the full support of the Government of Samoa.

### Project Steering Committee

The Project Steering Committee (PSC) was the TCCTF. The PSC was responsible for making decisions for the project, including high-level strategic direction for the project, approval of major revisions in project strategy or implementation approach. PSC has a key role in project monitoring and evaluations by quality assuring these processes and products, and using evaluations for performance improvement, accountability and learning. It ensured that required resources are committed and arbitrates on any conflicts within the project or negotiates a solution to any problems with external bodies.

The PSC comprised of representatives from:

- Samoa Tourism Authority (STA);
- Ministry of Finance (MoF);
- Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE);
- Ministry of Women, Community and Social Development (MWCSD);
- Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF);
- Samoa Water Authority (SWA);
- Samoa Hotel Association (SHA);
- Savaii Samoa Tourism Association (SSTA);
- Electric Power Corporation (EPC); and

- UNDP
- Attorney General
- Ministry of Works Transport & Infrastructure

The PSC generally met quarterly or when required.

The PSC was the strategic decision-making body of the project. It provided overall guidance and direction to the project manager. The PSC was also responsible for making decisions on a consensus basis, when high-level strategic guidance is required, including the approval of major revisions in project strategy or implementation approach. In addition, it approved the appointment and responsibilities of the Project Manager and any delegation of its Project Assurance responsibilities. Based on the approved Annual Work Plan, the PSC also considered and approved the quarterly plans (if applicable) and also approved any essential deviations from the original plans.

### Project Management Unit

The Project was managed on a day to day basis by a Project Management Unit (PMU), located within STA. The PMU was responsible for the implementation of the Project. During the duration of the Project, the PMU was made up of:

1. Project Manager (PM)
2. Project Assistant
3. Climate Change Technical Officer
4. Sustainable Tourism Development Expert

The 10 central stakeholders critical for project delivery have been:

1. STA – Implementing partner, Project Management, Project support services, in kind budget support for Project Assistant and other support staff, tourism advice.
2. UNDP – Project Implementing Agency through GEF, Procurement, Project Oversight/Management and quality control
3. SHA Samoa Hotels Association (SHA) – Project Steering Committee
4. SSTA Savaii Samoa Tourism Association (SSTA) – Project Steering Committee
5. Operators and Communities within the TDAs – Identification of issues, vision, strategy, implementation of small grants, major beneficiaries
6. MNRE – Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment – Tech Advice
7. MWTI – Ministry of Works - Assets and Infrastructure Division – Tech Advice
8. MoF – Ministry of Finance – Financial Management Advice and procurement
9. MWCSA – Ministry of Women, Community and Social Development – Community gateway – appropriate protocol with communities
10. AG – Attorney General Office – Legal advice

## 2.6 Mid-Term Review

In March 2017, a Mid-Term Review was undertaken of the Project (Simon McArthur and Associates (2017). The MTE Consultant undertook a brief analysis of the Samoan tourism environment (see **Attachment 5.4**) and found:

1. An over supply of simple budget accommodation products (Fales)
2. Products needing to be developed (small fashionable accommodation and innovative cultural experiences) that could in turn reduce demand on beaches and continuous good weather);
3. An opportunity to create products that are climate resilient AND authentic AND in line with unmet target market needs; and

4. Through delivering the new products, an opportunity to create a new competitive advantage and position this into the National tourism brand.

The MTE found that Project Design and implementation phases needed more sustainable tourism development industry expertise at the strategic level.

The focus on the most vulnerable communities within this area required additional capacity building, time and resources to generate a significant result, which was beyond that available within the Project resources. Had the Project targeted districts and operators with skills and leverage potential, it could then use these as case studies to target the next up and coming stakeholders, in a second Project.

### *Project structure and monitoring*

The Project Results Framework included a number of indicators that failed the SMART test at the MTE stage. Many indicators could not be measured until after all of the works had been completed. Consequently, during the MTE the Consultant and Project Team replaced the poor performing indicators, rebuilt the Project Results Framework, re-tested it using the SMART assessment, reinserted performance levels for the base line and annual reporting made against the framework to date, and forecast results to the end of the Project.

While financial monitoring was strong, there was found to be inadequate project management time tracking.

### *Progress towards results*

At the point of the MTE, the Project had reached a critical transition point – it was well behind where it should be. What had been completed was sitting in isolation, and was yet to achieve the essence of the Project objective to integrate climate change adaptation policy and planning into mainstream tourism policy and planning.

### *Project implementation and adaptation – Sustainability*

The most frequently and strongly reported risk was insufficient technical staff to undertake the work required in the timeframe available, and a subsequent over-reliance on short term consultants.

### *Recommendations*

The MTE presented a bold attempt to realign the Project to its original objectives and strengthen Samoa's tourism offering. The Report proposed an opportunity for the Project to better achieve its objective within its remaining resources and timeframe via the insertion of highly targeted tourism and design expertise and the re-scoping of the Small Grants Program.

The MTE recommended to:

1. To extend the Project period 6 to 12 months, in order to complete the tasks and achieve the outcomes
2. Increase the funding pool of the Small Grants Program and offer more funds to each applicant, so as to incentivise greater industry leverage, and create a higher and more measurable degree of resilience to climate change among participating tourism businesses.
3. Recruit an integrated team of sustainable tourism development, architect, local fale builder(s), building engineering, landscape architecture and government approval expertise, to provide product and environmental design solutions to the project – firstly through the creation of improved designs for beach fales, and then for shortlisted applicants of the revised Small Grants Program.

### 3. Findings

#### 3.1 Project Design / Formulation

##### Analysis of LFA/Results Framework (Project logic /strategy; Indicators)

Table 3.1 presents the Evaluators assessment of the LFA Results Framework.

Table 3.1 presents some good, some fair and some below target performances.

- The strongest performance was in the number of tourism operators that gained access to financial products for climate resilient actions. This was the result of the Small Grants Program.
- The weakest results were operationalisation of Management Plans and the proportion of targeted tourism-reliant communities that have adopted climate resilient livelihoods

Table 3.1 Evaluation of LFA Results Framework

Outcome 1: Climate change adaptation mainstreamed into tourism-related policy instruments and public-private partnerships			
Indicators	Target	End Project	Comment
# of Management Plans developed and operationalised	6	6 (100%)	6 were developed but few operationalised
% of tourism operators in targeted TDA's apply new guidelines for climate resilient actions	75%+	75%	Round 1 + 2 Small grant recipients only
# of tourism operators that gain access to financial products for climate resilient actions	15+	28	15 operators in Round 1, 13 operators Round 2 4 attractions Round 2
Outcome 2: Increased adaptive capacity to climate change and disaster risks of tourism-reliant communities			
Indicators	Target	End Project	Comment
Number and type of risk reduction activities introduced in tourism-reliant communities	5+ in each of 6 TDA's	3 <sup>1</sup>	Average no. of small grant recipients
% of women and men in tourism reliant communities trained in climate risk reduction	50%+	60%	Training participant data, favouring community over operators
% of targeted tourism-reliant communities that have adopted climate resilient livelihoods	80%+	20%	Participation in training and small grants program

<sup>1</sup> Note 4/6 TDA's have an average of 3 businesses currently operational

## Assumptions and Risks

The Project faced a number of risks, largely because much of the tourism orientated work was new to government and the tourism industry<sup>2</sup>, so needed to be piloted, sometimes adapted. Nonetheless, an audit of the Project was undertaken in 2016, which found the overall risk level to be low.

At the time of the Mid Term Review, the greatest risk facing the Project was that it would not be completed in the available time, nor would it achieve its desired outcomes. After implementing the recommendations from the MTR, the risk was averted.

Smaller ongoing risks facing the Project included:

- political intervention – sometimes politicians are lobbied by stakeholders wanting to access benefits, and sometimes this can create political directives that percolate down to government department / Ministry<sup>3</sup>;
- to integrate the Project into the STA structure and business focus, because climate change adaptation was not part of its core business.<sup>4</sup> There was a real risk that the Project would not be completed in time, and that the funds would have to be returned to the donor(s);
- that qualified people could easily be procured from within Samoa. This became a clear risk when procuring staff to run day to day project operations. The Project also assumed that staff would continue through the majority of the Project, so that there was minimal leakage of intellectual property, relationship building and general inertia. This became a risk with some turnover, particularly the Project Manager (replaced twice).

<sup>2</sup> The STO believe that the exception to this is the NAPA 5 project, which they believe was not new to the government. Previous NAPA (NAPA 4 & 1 were also implemented directly by STA and in partnership with other Ministries and CSO

- maintaining and utilising intellectual property and systems, when files were not clearly documented and easily accessible;
- there was an assumption that stakeholders would be available at the times that they were needed for feedback and input. This proved a risk for some meetings and deadlines;
- that the project could be effectively integrated into STA and that the niche work could be mainstreamed into the organisation. The ultimate moment that this becomes a risk, is this point in the Project, when commitments are transferred from the PMU to STA staff; and
- that Samoan government procedures and protocols would not delay or complication the Project processes.

The ongoing risk to the Project is the ability of the STA to integrate ongoing legacy tasks from the Project.

## Lessons from other relevant projects (e.g. same focal area) incorporated into project design

Some of the principles that the UNDP reported were incorporated into project design included:

- sourcing as much suitable technical expertise as possible from in-country, and when sourcing internationally, facilitating knowledge and skill transfer;
- building capacity among people, businesses and organisations;
- sequencing developing plans to set context and strategy, then guidelines as a frame of reference, and then projects that use the plans and guidelines;
- integrating niche work into mainstream government and tourism practices, at every opportunity;

<sup>3</sup> Evidence driving this point was verbally provided to the consultant from multiple sources that had worked for STA or were external to the STA, on the proviso that they were not named  
<sup>4</sup> The STA believe that climate change adaptation was considered a vital component. As reflected in the STSP 2014-19. Also, the NAPA 4 was part of the STA

- integrating guidelines and designs into mainstream government systems, so they continue to be used;
- administering grants that are large enough to make a material, long term difference, and ensuring that the cost of their administration is reasonable;
- transferring responsibilities for design from owner operators (with limited knowledge) to professional contractors.

### Planned stakeholder participation

Stakeholder participation occurred at the right time and in the right way.

Participation was used to:

- Introduce ideas and refine them into concepts (for example the Project Management Unit and the Planning and Development Division of STA conducted awareness programs for tourism operators in relation to the Small Grants Program);
- Gather technical input and refinement (for example, for monitoring potential issues, a Technical Team monitored activity and reported back on progress and recommended improvements to the Project Steering Committee);
- Choose between alternative concepts and proposals, for example, a Sub-Committee reviewed Small Grant Proposals and made recommendations on budgets and applications to approve, to the Project Steering Committee; and
- Recommendations were considered and then approved, using a Project Steering Committee that represented stakeholder interests.

### Replication approach

Some Project tasks were designed to be replicable and some not. A desired replicable task with desired replication is design guidelines to build more fales the same way. A task that should not be replicated the same way was the preparation of TDA Tourism Management Plans (because each area is unique). Moving

forward, there is an opportunity to the replicate CLEWS (tailored for tourism) for other countries.

### UNDP comparative advantage

Some of the comparative advantages of the UNDP were:

- strong financial monitoring and reporting, ensuring it was always possible to gain an accurate idea of the Project's financial status;
- clear and easy to use reporting system, ensuring the PMU delivered regular project reporting;
- efficient procurement capability, required by the time poor project, to engage expertise quickly and objectively;
- access to training, used for project and media management; and
- flexibility, required when the Mid Term Review recommended significant changes, and when the Samoan government modified its priorities and requested an additional task (toolkit for sustainability and establishment of a travel philanthropy fund); and
- UNDP's presence in Samoa and the region, along with its experience with helping Samoa and other countries develop and implement CCA initiatives.

### Linkages between project and other interventions within the sector

There are significant linkages between the Project and other response mechanisms for disaster management. For example, moving fales back from the ocean edge, and strengthening fales, also relates to the need to reduce the impact of cyclones and tsunamis.

The Project's development of a tourism orientated CLEWS inter-relates with general disaster management education and public awareness programs.

A linkage was also created with the STA product development / improvement being undertaken with the STA. The Project helped improve visitor facilities at several natural attractions, reducing potential visitor impacts and improving the quality of the visitor experience. This work could also assist a new tourism product development program being commissioned by the New Zealand High Commission. Project work on training a kayak operator could also integrate with the New Zealand Program.

A linkage is also available to be made with the Samoa Hotels Association's efforts in sustainable tourism, via the establishing of a tool kit based on a sustainability charter, developed to guide the tourism sector.

The Project established a travel philanthropy fund that would integrate tourists with sustainable tourism projects being run in Samoa (through them helping fund the projects). There was a linkage between the project and SSTA, who were heavily involved throughout every component of the project that dealt with operations in Savaii. SSTA did the tedious job of consulting the village communities responsible for the management of attraction sites to assist in the preparation of their proposals under the Small Grants Scheme.

### Management arrangements

**Figure 3.1** presents the structure used to manage the Project, which essentially was based on a Project Management Unit for day to day operations, a Technical Advisory Group and a Project Steering Committee.

At the end of the Project, one member of the STA Climate Change Unit (Project Assistant) was integrated into the STA Planning Team. However, the evaluator finds this transfer rather unjustified<sup>5</sup>. No evidence could be found evaluating the

<sup>5</sup> It is noted that this human resource is a government contribution to the project therefore remains the right of government to transfer personnel accordingly.

team member's performance and justifying the transfer as a valuable addition to the team or a valuable way to transfer expertise and experience.

**Figure 3.1 Project management structure**



## 3.2 Project implementation

### Partnership arrangements (with relevant stakeholders involved in the country/region)

The two central partnerships for this Project are between the:

- GEF and the UNDP, establishing the project scope and budget, and highlighting key deliverables against milestone payments; and

- the UNDP and STA, documented as an MoU but effectively a sub-contract, and highlighting the roles of the STA in assisting to deliver the Project.

The partnerships have worked well, with both parties comfortable that it was productive and mutually beneficial – they become extinguished with the full completion of tasks and full spend of budget.

### UNDP and Implementing Partner (STA) implementation, coordination, and operational issues

The most influential operational issue was insufficient time to get the Project completed. This was caused by several issues, including:

- delays by some contractors – particularly the project design and construction consultants;
- changes in consultant availability (eg. Project Designer / Architect);
- periods of time when the Ministry of Finance shut down its processing of accounts payable, preventing activation of some suppliers;
- difficulty securing three suitable bids, needed to satisfy procurement; followed by several negotiations as bids were usually outside the project budgets for each component under the Small Grants Scheme and
- an extended period of time and the associated uncertainty over whether the project would receive a time extension.

The second most influential issue was some Small Grant Applicants changing their scope and / or refusing to fund agreed in kind components of the agreement.

The third most influential issue was accommodating additional costs from project elements not directly managed by the Project Management Unit, such as ancillary costs associated with the sustainable tourism toolkit and Sustainable Travel Philanthropy Fund, and ancillary costs triggered by the Project Designer / Architect.

### Adaptive management (changes to the project design and project outputs during implementation)

The largest changes to the project design and outputs happened as a result of the MTR (see **Section 2.6**). These changes were made within the desired Project Outcomes, but were designed to give the project more time and concurrently fast track progress, make the outputs more relevant to the tourism sector, and leave more empowering tools to continue on after the Project was complete.

In addition to implementing recommendations from the MTR, to further support Outcome 1 and a changing project need from STA, the Project Steering Committee agreed in one of its meetings to establish the Sustainable Travel International Component. This was made up of two elements:

1. Travel Philanthropy Fund called the Foundation for a Sustainable Samoa
2. Development of a Toolkit based on a sustainability charter to aid the tourism sector in sustainability practices

### Project Finance

#### *Budget at Inception of Project*

In 2013 the Government of Samoa was given a budget of USD1.95M, with the assistance of funding from the Global Environment Facility / Least Development Countries Fund through the UNDP. **Table 3.2** shows the original budget breakdown across Outcomes – revealing that the majority of the total Project Budget was allocated to achieve Outcome 2 (\$829,569).

#### *Co-financing arrangements*

**Table 3.3** presents the co-financing for UNDP supported GEF financed projects. UNDP funded PSSF with approximately US\$500,000 in 2008, at the beginning of their five year operational cycle. The coordination between the project and PSSF should have happened during the delivery of the small grants, but due to various

circumstances the project team decided to use their existing facilities in STA to deliver them, instead of the PSSF. This part of the co-financing therefore might no longer be considered as a contribution.

**Table 3.2 Original Budget and status at time of MTR**

	Total budget	Budget at time of MTE (Jan 2016)
Outcome 1:	330,758	137,025
Outcome 2	1,437,605	1,258,963
Monitoring & Evaluation	64,960	56,322
Project Management	116,677	47,811
<b>TOTAL BUDGET</b>	<b>1,950,000</b>	<b>1,500,121</b>

**Table 3.3 Co-financing table for UNDP supported GEF financed projects**

Sources of co-financing	Type of co-financing	Amount Confirmed at CEO endorsement (US\$)	Actual Amount Contributed at stage of Midterm Evaluation (US\$)	Actual % of Expected Amount
Government of Samoa	In kind	88,500	50,000	56%
Vertical Fund (Adaptation Fund)	Cash	507,497	0	0%
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>595,997</b>	<b>50,000</b>	<b>8%</b>

*Proposed changes to Budget from MTR*

**Table 3.4** presents proposed revisions to the Budget by the MTR.

**Table 3.4 Revised budget proposed in the MTR (\$US)**

Outcome 1 Budget	Jan 2016 Budget <sup>6</sup>	Proposed Budget	Change	%
Outcome 1.1 Management Plans		20,000		
Outcome 1.2 Technical Guidelines		103,200		
Outcome 1.3 Micro Finance/insurance		15,000		
<b>Sub-Total Outcome 1</b>	<b>137,025</b>	<b>150,700</b>	<b>+13,675</b>	<b>+9.8%</b>
Outcome 2 Budget	Current Budget	Proposed Budget		
Outcome 2.1.1 Community Projects	796,818	149,838		
Outcome 2.1.2 Small Grants	300,000	872,000		
Outcome 2.2 CLEWS	120,056	120,056		
Outcome 2.3 Case Studies	42,089	46,000		
<b>Sub-Total Outcome 2</b>	<b>1,258,963</b>	<b>1,187,894</b>	<b>-71,069</b>	<b>-6%</b>
M&E Budget	Current Budget	Proposed Budget		
Project monitoring and evaluation	56,322	56,322	-	-
PMC Budget	Current Budget	Proposed Budget		
Project management	47,811	47,811	-	-
TOTAL	Current Budget	Proposed Budget		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,500,121</b>	<b>1,442,727</b>	<b>-57,394</b>	<b>-4%</b>

The major changes proposed by the MTR that affected the Project Budget (in order of scale) were:

1. Shifting funds within Outcome 2, from community-based resilience projects to a revised Small Grants Program
2. Changing funding in Outcome 1 from consultants to conduct workshops for the Management Plans, Technical Guidelines and Financial Risk Report, to the engagement of a Sustainable Tourism Development Expert to assist the

<sup>6</sup> This Budget was the balance in January when the MTE was conducted. It is recognised that the 2016 AWP budget was prepared afterwards, in February 2016.

Project Team integrate the initiatives into mainstream policy and planning, and the engagement of a Specialist Team to co-design new fare options for operators to use in the Small Grants Program

3. Adding more funds to Outcome 4, to cover six additional months employment of the Project Manager and the Small Grants Officer

The proposed MTR changes to the Budget represented a 4% decrease in total forecast expenditure and can be summarised as:

- Outcome 1 revised represents a \$13,675 increase (+9.8%)
- Outcome 2 revised represents a \$71,069 decrease (-6%)
- Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) revised has no change
- Project Management (PMC) revised has no change

All the variations proposed were inside the 10% maximum GEF guideline for transferring between outcomes. It was recommended to use the \$57,394 in savings as a reserve to fund an additional six months of time for the Project Manager (approx. \$16,000) and Small Grants Officer (approximately \$10,600).

#### *Financial Status at 23 January 2018*

**Table 3.5** presents the Financial Statement of Project Finance for 2013 – 2017 as at 23 January 2018. **Table 3.5** indicates that budget management has been a real strength of this Project. Even allowing for committed but not yet spent expenditure, Table 3.5 shows a projected spend variation of just \$456 (0.0002% of the total budget). However, it may have been more prudent to keep the Project Manager employed another month and draw on the underspent Project Management, to complete the live tasks.

Table 3.5 Financial Statement of Project Finance for 2013 – 2017 as at 23 January 2018 (prepared by UNDP)

		Year 1 - 2013	Year 2 -2014	Year 3 - 2015	Year 4 - 2016	Total Acc Expenditure	Year 5 - 2017 Budget	Commitment s (Contracts)	Returned Funds (MoF)	Variation
SOF Outcome/ ATLAS Activity	Approved GEF Grant/ Budget Allocation	Amount (\$) USD	Amount (\$) USD	Amount (\$) USD	Amount (\$) USD	Amount (\$) USD	Amount (\$) USD	Amount (\$) USD	Amount (\$) USD	
<b>Outcome 1</b> - Climate Change Adaptation	<b>330,759.00</b>	5,635.97	50,737.21	197,061.69	58,213.98	311,648.85	25,547.70	-	-	(6,437.55)
<b>Outcome 2</b> - Disaster Risks Management	<b>1,437,605.00</b>	-	3,914.69	91,072.93	300,461.35	395,448.97	1,042,090.66	9,390.52	456.54	(9,325.15)
<b>Outcome 3</b> - Monitoring and Evaluation	<b>64,960.00</b>	-	7,050.93	216.54	19,740.82	27,008.29	3,169.02	35,782.69	-	(1,000.00)
Project Management	<b>116,676.00</b>	3,227.51	3,167.23	20,394.76	44,185.52	70,975.02	30,152.80	-	-	15,548.18
<b>Unrealised Gains &amp; Losses in Foreign Exchange Rates</b>	-	(70.26)	540.79	4,322.00	(6,078.19)	(1,285.66)	(385.40)	-	-	<b>1,671.06</b>
<b>PROJECT TOTAL</b>	<b>1,950,000.00</b>	<b>8,793.22</b>	<b>65,410.85</b>	<b>313,067.92</b>	<b>416,523.48</b>	<b>803,795.47</b>	<b>1,100,574.78</b>	<b>45,173.21</b>	<b>456.54</b>	<b>456.54</b>

Putting the variation into further context, it can be seen that more than 50% of the Project was spent in the final year of a five year term (Years 1 to 4 spent \$803,795 while Year 5 spent \$1,100, 574). This is testament to the profound shift in productivity and subsequent project outputs after the MTR.

It is quite an achievement to accelerate a Project to this degree and only end up with a variation of 2 to 4%.

The Project included strong financial controls and was there due diligence in the management of funds.

**Table 3.6** presents the evaluation ratings for the Project indicating:

- Average results for Monitoring and Evaluation
- Strong results for IA & EA Execution – particularly the quality of UNDP implementation, which was excellent;
- Average results for the achievement of outcomes (which is a vast improvement from the MTR assessment)
- Average results for sustainability

The following sub-sections explore each of these areas in more detail, justifying the scores from evidence collected via site visits, stakeholder interviews and review of documents produced.

**Table 3.6 Evaluation ratings for the Project**

1. Monitoring and evaluation		Rating
M&E design at entry		2/6
M&E Plan implementation		3/6
Overall quality of M&E		3/6
2. IA&EA Execution		Rating
Quality of UNDP Implementation		5/6
Quality of Execution of Executing Agency		4/6
Overall quality of Implementation / Execution		4/6
3. Assessment of outcomes		Rating
Relevance		1/2
Effectiveness		3/6
Efficiency		3/6
Overall Project Outcome Rating		3/6
4. Sustainability		Rating
Financial resources		3/4
Socio-political		2/4
Institutional framework and governance		3/4
Environmental		2/4
Overall likelihood of sustainability		2/4

- Ratings for Outcomes, Effectiveness, Efficiency, M&E, Implementation and Execution use a 6-point scale (6=Highly Satisfactory, 5=Satisfactory, 4=Moderately Satisfactory, 3=Moderately Unsatisfactory, 2=Unsatisfactory, 1 = Highly Unsatisfactory).
- Ratings for sustainability use a 4-point scale (4=Likely, 3=Moderately Likely, 2=Moderately Unlikely, 1=Unlikely)
- Ratings for Relevance use a 2-point scale (2=Relevant, 1=Not relevant)

## Monitoring and evaluation

The Monitoring and evaluation at entry was poor, due to an overly ambitious Project Design that could not be implemented in the available time. Project monitoring by the PMU and UNDP was found to be reasonable, with particularly good efforts at financial monitoring.

Throughout the Project, it was clear that progress was too slow to achieve the outcomes within the available time, but the Project continued regardless. The turning point was the MTR, which evaluated projected successes and failures and reconstructed the scope that outcomes could be achieved in time. The Project Steering Committee and PMU improved their continuous monitoring and reflection, but approved additional scope when the Project team had insufficient time and the Project needed the funds to adequately complete committed tasks<sup>7</sup>. The Project Management funding ran out before the Project activities were completed, compromising the final Outcomes.

In Phase 1 the MTR identified the need to pre-set the tasks against pre-set deadlines, then track and evaluate progress using this tool. The MTR recommended the adoption of simple project management software to forecast and track tasks, but no evidence of implementation was found.

The Project Design reasonably articulated the roles and responsibilities regarding monitoring, but evaluation had poorer articulation and the impacts of this could be seen in ongoing project management. Project management meetings struggled to fully analyse project management issues to a point where options were evaluated

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<sup>7</sup> The Sustainable Travel International Component, made up of a Travel Philanthropy Fund (called the Foundation for a Sustainable Samoa) and the development of a Toolkit based on a sustainability

and the best one implemented. There was a constant expectation that all changes in direction would be managed by the Project Manager, sometimes there was a need for Project Management Group involvement.

There was insufficient funding for the Monitoring and Evaluation plan to be sufficiently implemented. There should have been funds kept to continue the engagement of the PMU after project completion, during terminal evaluation, and to finish off late tidying up activities, such as building defects.

Meeting records suggest sound compliance with and timeliness of progress and financial reporting requirement.

Most actions and adaptive management from PIRs were followed up, though the Mid Term Review actions should have been transferred into an implementation plan that was part of regular reporting and evaluation.

The MTR ratings were lower than the TE ratings, and generally lower than the PIR ratings. The consultant views the PIR ratings and generous, and some STA and PMU stakeholders view the evaluation consultant ratings as a little tough.

## IA&EA Execution

### *UNDP execution*

The UNDP conducted a very good execution of the Project. Specifically:

- there was a fair to average focus on results, which were limited by the UNDP lacking expertise in the tourism sector to properly engage in the results being generated, to ask 'could we do this better'?

- The UNDP provided adequate and timely support to the Implementing Partner and project team, but it was limited in its ability to contribute due to its lack of expertise in tourism and destination management
- The UNDP were very responsive and entirely candid and realistic in reporting the project's timeliness and budget management, but lacked the ability to critique the evolving constraints and effectiveness of the project, and whether there might be a better way to achieve the overall outcomes
- The UNDP quality of risk management was excellent in budget and time management, but struggled to resolve ways to assist the project address a lack of support from STA on some tasks

#### *Implementing partner (STA) execution*

The PMU performed well in difficult circumstances.

Locating the PMU within the STA was done in attempt to assist in mainstreaming climate change adaptation work into day to day tourism management of the STA. The PMU to some extent, was not fully operating in parallel to the STA Planning and Product Development Unit (PPDU). The positioning was not entirely successful causing limited Project execution. This is considered crucial as only by working alongside one another is it then possible to create solutions that cause full ownership.

The PMU had direct reporting to the STA CEO, financial management was not shared and monitored by the STA and procurement was mainly executed through the UNDP to avoid the lengthy government procurement processes considering the limited timeframe given to complete remaining project activities. This was a crucial decision approved by the Project Board although from a government perspective is not an ideal decision, in the desperate attempt to avoid any further delays, the project board agreed to utilise the UNDP support services which were available to the project.

Delays were also as a result procurement processes and evaluations as well as payment systems. Also supplies for works from major suppliers were also delayed from overseas.

These factors contributed to the poor positioning of the PMU in STA that flawed the full effectiveness of the Project throughout and is likely to limit the Project's legacies. The PMU should have been entirely positioned inside the PPDU or positioned in an alternative organisation.

The implementing partner could have done better in its:

- focus on results and timeliness, with significant delays in the first half of the project, and even in providing feedback on the draft Mid Term Review and Terminal Evaluation reports;
- provision of senior management inputs and processes, particularly in relation to tourism industry alignment, but also budgeting and procurement;
- quality of risk management – particularly in relation to how to overcome delays or reinvest funding to expedite the Project completion; and
- candor and realism in reporting, particularly in relation to late and under-performing activities.

#### **Assessment of outcomes**

The first phase of the Project, as documented by the MTR, was continuously delayed, problematic and under productive. The second phase of the Project followed the MTR recommendations, demonstrated an improved focus, higher level of productivity and much greater achievement of the Project outcomes.

The following sub-sections review what was and wasn't achieved from each of the Project's proposed outcomes.

*Management plans integrating climate risks are developed in 6 Tourism Development Areas involving 12 villages*

This outcome was achieved – all 6 TDA's have Management Plans. However, there were several flaws with the quality and utility of these plans:

- Two Plans lacked any content related to climate change, and several others only contained indirect reference
- Budget allocations were not provided for all actions (some high priority, no medium priority), which limits the ability to secure the resources needed for implementation;
- No evidence was found of any implementation of the Plans
- Stakeholder awareness of the plans in the respective TDA's was found to be low, with uncertainty of who was responsible for their implementation

*Technical guidelines developed on climate resilient beach tourism management practices*

This outcome was achieved – the Technical guidelines were produced and training sessions were provided. None of the small grant recipients that were interviewed for this Terminal Evaluation could recall seeing or using the Guidelines. The Guidelines have not been uploaded to the STA website for wider access and use.

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<sup>8</sup> The selection of the target area for this project by international consultant Tonkin & Taylor was based on the identified most vulnerable area in Manase following the destruction by cyclone. The Tonkins and Taylor reports indicate that Regina BF was located on the most vulnerable area along the Manase beach stretch. Not only was it near the stream but also the identified area river but also strong currents during the easterlies and westerlies affecting the littoral drift of sedimentation along the Manase beach. It was not only for Regina, but nearby operators.

*Recommendations developed to internalise climate change considerations into existing micro-finance, grant and loan schemes to the tourism sector and feasibility of a climate risk transfer (insurance) mechanism (undertaken as part of a separate program to this project)*

This outcome was achieved – a report was produced containing the recommendations. However, none of the stakeholders interviewed could recall seeing or using the report. The Report has not been uploaded to the STA website for wider access and use. There was no micro-finance offered to small grant applicants. Had micro-finance been adopted, the small grant projects could have been made larger, creating greater outcomes.

*Concrete adaptation actions that help tourism resilient communities become more resilient to localised climate change risks (eg. Strengthening coastal infrastructure, enhancing water resource security, shoreline protection and development of alternative tourism experiences that reduce reliance on fine weather and beach experiences. Initiatives to ensure that both women and men participate in and benefit from these investments*

The largest single initiative supporting this outcome was the **Manase Beach Replenishment Project**<sup>8</sup>. This project has been completed through the construction of two wave breakers in front of Reginas Beach Fales<sup>9</sup> (see **Figure 3.2**). This work has stabilised the immediate beachfront and is permitting the return of sand accretion, with beachfront now partially reinstated and progressing towards full reinstatement. The PMU and owner of Reginas are happy with this outcome. However, due to cost escalation, a decision was made to reduce the scale of the

<sup>9</sup> Regina BF was located on the most vulnerable area along the Manase beach stretch. Not only it was near the stream but also the identified area river but also strong currents during the easterlies and westerlies affecting the littoral drift of sedimentation along the Manase beach. STA report that it was not only for Regina, but nearby operators

project from three to two wave breakers. This has permitted the displacement of erosion generating waves to the west, concentrating impact on the retaining wall (built by the Project) in front of the neighbouring accommodation Beach Vacation Fales (see **Figure 3.23**). This flow on negative impact raises issues about the choice to scale back the scope, because the overall problem is not fixed. The evaluation could find no evidence of evaluation of options (such as Cost Benefit Analysis or Opportunity Cost considerations<sup>10</sup>). This evaluation also questions the return on such a large investment. An enormous amount of money has been spent to protect one operator, and this operator currently lacks enough quality fales to convert the benefit of a secured beachfront into economic returns to the local area.

**Figure 3.2** The good news – replenished beach in front of Reginas Fales, Manase



<sup>10</sup> The selection of the target area for this project by international consultant Tonkin & Taylor was based on the identified most vulnerable area in Manase following the destruction by cyclone Evan.

**Figure 3.3** The bad news – displaced impact to the neighbouring fale operator at Manase



The second way that the Project addressed the outcome was through the **installation of water tanks at various fales** across Samoa, through the Small Grants Fund (see **Figure 3.4** for an example of this type of project). This simple technology has been successfully implemented, and operators report the tanks have filled and are providing greater water security for their operation. However, there is no evidence to suggest that any of the fales have completely secured their water needs. In most instances, only a portion of buildings have received water tanks. The Project could have undertaken a water demand audit for each property, and it could have fully secured a smaller number of properties, rather than partially secured a larger number of properties (as was the approach).

**Figure 3.4** Water tanks installed at Manono Fales, Manono Island



The third way that the Project addressed the outcome was through the addition of **visitor infrastructure development at attractions**, as second dimension to the Small Grants Program. Strengthening the value proposition of these visitor experiences was a means of reducing visitor reliance on fine weather and beach experiences. This initiative was a recommendation from the MTR, so was implemented in Phase Two. Specific deliverables were seats, viewing platforms, , interpretation signs and toilet facilities (see **Figure 3.5** for an example). This work has particularly enhanced the functionality of the sites, and to some extent, improved the visitor experience. The designs are robust and do not overbear the sites. The materials used are visually consistent with the settings. Much more could be done to enrich the experience, particularly through capacity building and the

development of guided interpretive experiences, as these generate far higher economic and social benefits than toilets, platforms and signs.

**Figure 3.5** Example of a viewing platform installed to expand the visitor experience at Salaaula lava ruins on Savaii, and far right, a visitor seat



*Concrete adaptation actions that help tourism operators become more resilient to localised climate change risks (eg. Water shortage, storm damage, coastal erosion to tourism facilities) through a small grants program*

The main way that the Project addressed the outcome was through the Small Grants Program (SGP). The MTR identified major issues with the SGP and provided major recommendations to rectify these. The Project Steering Committee and the PMU implemented these recommendations, and this represents one of the most profound efforts and achievements of the Project. **Figure 3.6** demonstrates

the significant evolution of the Program to incorporate design that enhanced resilience and increased functionality and attractiveness of the accommodation.

**Figure 3.6 The progression of fale improvement delivered by the Project’s Small Grants Program: Top Left – at risk light build beach front fales, Top Right – Phase One response that delivered resilient but less authentic buildings, Bottom right – the introduction of design and larger fales containing ensuites, Bottom Left – large scale relocation and replacement of fales with inbuilt design**



This Project outcome was significantly improved in Phase Two, as a result of incorporating MTR recommendations that included:

- incorporation of an architect to create a suite of alternative fale designs for use in the Small Grants Program and by other operators beyond the life of the Program; and
- increasing the funding per project to support improved fales, and to support more fales per applicant.

Samoa now has a collection of fales that are more resilient, distinctive and attractive, as champions for the tourism industry to replicate or adapt their own ideas from.

Phase Two still encountered a number of issues that reduced the achievement of the outcome. These issues included:

- no strategic planning at the time that the application was conceived, preventing the application from looking at solutions for the whole site, or options for what to apply for in the grant versus what to stage for later;
- not enough time, for the architect to test and refine every design, and for the PMU to oversee full completion and rectify any defects;
- not enough time for some applicants to adequately consult their family / community to get input and approval, before having to commit to their application;
- some operators not implementing their part of the agreement (such as connecting the building to power and water), resulting in some buildings not being finished when forecast.

Had applicants used tourism planning and development expertise, they could have been introduced to, and contemplated options for becoming climate change resilient, such as:

1. Strengthening beach front fales (the standard approach adopted)
2. Strengthening the kitchen dining building
3. Removing beach front fales

4. Building superior accommodation set back from the beach, and building two storey fale to capture views and sea breezes
5. Replacing accommodation beach front fale with easier to rebuild day use beach fale
6. Rehabilitating beach front space to natural vegetation (to hold the sand together)

The evaluation also found that all but one applicant did not deliver a significant scale of change. Replacing one or two of 15 fale / accommodation buildings does not make the business resilient to climate change. The Taufua Beach Fales secured a loan to more than match the Project grant. The result is this project managed to introduce nine resilient and highly appealing accommodation, set well back from the beach front (see **Figure 3.7**).

**Figure 3.7** The Taufua Beach Fales raised matching capital to the grant, and achieved a scale of change that will make them resilient to climate change.



The operator of Taufua Beach Fales added value by designing the buildings to meet the needs of people with limited mobility; thereby keeping their aging customers, who wanted to keep coming but could not manage the traditional fale stairs, and needed an ensuite.

The evaluation also found that the focus was on the building, and that there was generally insufficient money or focus on developing a richer accommodation experience (see **Figure 3.8**). This experience can be integrated into the building through:

- Developing decks with shaded areas, so that customers have more area to relax and socialise
- Fitting out the fale with mood lighting, attractive furniture, rugs, throws on the beds, bedside tables and lights and artworks inspired by the local area; and
- Landscaping the surrounds to create atmosphere and privacy.

**Figure 3.9** presents two successful projects that implemented this principal in Samoa.

Competing destinations across Asia have mastered these elements, which in turn has increased the price they can charge and the range of markets that come (see **Figure 3.10**).

Figure 3.8 Unfinished products: Top– Buildings missing sufficient outdoor amenity spaces, Below – fitouts that drain the building of character and comfort



Figure 3.9 Some operators spent time and their own funds to deliver fitout; making a significant difference to the final product




Figure 3.10 Example of creating accommodation spaces that welcome customers and celebrate the culture of the destination



On a smaller issue, the evaluation also found that at least one builder left building works on Savaii below standard (see **Figure 3.11**). These building defects should be addressed before the contract defects period is extinguished.

**Figure 3.11 Building defects: Left – inadequate footings being eroded by the sea, a timber shower base that will rot, and natural roofing material not dried out and subsequently eaten by ants and leaking**



*Coastal tourism operators are connected to Climate Early Warning and Information System (CLEWS)*

The scope this initiative was reshaped as part of the MTR to provide a more cost effective approach that was more likely to be completed within the remaining project period. The CLEWS has been completed and made operational. It provides useful information on weather conditions to operators. There is potential for CLEWS to be expanded in the content it delivers across Samoa. The Clews could also be applied to other countries in the Pacific.

*South-South transfer of tourism adaptation case studies between operators in Samoan TDAs, and counterparts in other SIDS*

The Project Design did not adequately scope initiatives to deliver this outcome. The MTR generated a specific initiative to address this. The MTR recommended producing a 15 minute documentary and several shorter sub-set clips about climate change and the successful small grant projects. Late in Phase 2 (when there were sufficient projects to film) the project was initiated. The scope was widened to

capture other parts of the Project. A draft of the production was viewed, and looked on track to achieve the Project outcome. The evaluator offered suggestions directly to the Producers that included reducing the amount of content, featuring 4 -5 key messages, increasing the footage of tourism activity, and providing a 'Go To' information source at the end, for stakeholders to access more information on climate change and the Project elements. The Project ran out of time for the PMU to complete the documentary. This responsibility appears loosely distributed between the STA and UNDP. None of the stakeholders could confirm how the documentary would be launched and distributed.

**Relevance**

Relevance is the extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies.

**Section 2.2** outlined the potential impacts of climate change on tourism, and in particular, tourism reliant communities. The project was designed to enhance the resilience of tourism-reliant communities to climate change risks by integrating climate change into development policy and instruments and investing in adaptation actions supporting tourism reliant communities. These were priorities identified under Samoa's National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA).

The Samoa Tourism Sector Plan 2014-19 proposes growth targets for increased expenditure by 2.5% and arrivals by 5%, and length of stay by 0.5 days. This growth relies on the industry being able to withstand the impacts of climate change, so that it can confidently market and reinvest in product reinvigoration and development. Some of the ways that the Project is relevant to addressing this are:

Strengthening the performance of beach Fale's. The Plan seeks to increase Fale occupancy, but they cannot match this because they lack comfort and floor space

that these markets are seeking – they need product refinement and improved marketing.

Satisfaction with cultural activity experiences is only average – so product needs work

The ramification for this Project: Great opportunity to blend climate resilience with Fale product improvement, new boutique accommodation and better cultural experiences.

### Impact

Impact, for a UNDP Terminal Evaluation, examines the extent to which the Project has generated positive impacts, or is progressing towards the achievement of impacts.

The UNDP Guidelines for a Terminal Evaluation require an assessment of whether the project has demonstrated:

- a) verifiable improvements in ecological status;
- b) verifiable reductions in stress on ecological systems; and/or
- c) demonstrated progress towards these impact achievements.

These objectives were not written into the Project Design, so the Project never sought to achieve them. So unsurprisingly, the Terminal Evaluation found no evidence that the Project had achieved verifiable evidence of either objective, nor demonstrated progress towards achieving them.

Nonetheless, a wider consideration of relevance results in identification of a number of positive impacts generated by the Project that include:

1. As a result of the CLEWS being fully implemented and made operational, operators are now being advised of risky weather conditions, and are empowered to respond and adapt their operations accordingly. Half of the

operators interviewed for this Terminal Evaluation had awareness of the CLEWS system.

2. As a result of the formulation of designs for a fale that is climate change impact resilient, operators can now construct fales with a frame of reference to achieve resilience, and operators can visit several fale operators to view the completed fale and talk to the operator about its performance. Evidence of this impact could be measured by the number of hits and downloads of this information, once the STA upload it to their website.
3. As a result of a significant scaled development at Taufua Beach Fale (featuring eight new fales with designs that are climate change resilient and in line with tourism market needs), Samoa has a 'champion case study' to visit, understand and emulate. This impact could be measured by the number of operators that visit / talk with the Taufua operator.
4. As a result of a documentary about the Project, there is a long-term communication tool that can disseminate information and inspiration to the tourism sector to prepare themselves to be more climate resilient. This impact could be measured through the number of downloads / viewings from the STA website.

Nonetheless, this Terminal Evaluation found several negative influences on relevance that include:

1. Questionable relevance to the stated Project Outcomes and tourism generally, of establishing a Foundation for a Sustainable Samoa
2. Minimal relevance of small grants to fale operators that create one or two climate resilient fales, because this does not represent a strategic response or sufficient scale to make a difference
3. Minimal Project elements that generate stakeholder awareness of climate change (such as briefings in situ and the production of printed collateral, displays / signage or digital content that explains what climate change is, how

it might affect operators, why they should care and what they could do about it)<sup>11</sup>. Consequently, the evaluation only found patchy evidence of stakeholder awareness of climate change. Positive impact only occurred with stakeholders already interested in wider issues beyond day to day survival.

4. Insufficient Project elements that generate capacity building with operators, as part of project tasks – this should have been achieved as part of the process of generating proposals for the Small Grants Program. Consequently, the evaluation only found patchy evidence of stakeholder growth in their capacity to deal with climate change, largely with stakeholders already interested in wider issues beyond day to day survival.
5. Minimal elements connecting the Project to the consumer, such as printed collateral, displays / signage or digital content that explains what climate change is, how it might affect tourism, why tourists should care and what they could do about it. Connecting the consumer is critical to connecting a commercial reason for operators to adopt adaptive measures (because consumers want them to).
6. No designated funding to implement TDA Management Plans. Consequently, the evaluation found no evidence to suggest that the proposed actions in the Plans would be funded, and this implemented. Without funding, the Plans could quickly become irrelevant to stakeholders.
7. Incomplete false constructions (the Project had constructed all buildings, but some operators had not undertaken their part of the deal, such as connecting power and water). no landscaping, decking or fitout.
8. Scoping of single initiatives beyond the funding available under the UNDP strict segmented rules. Specifically, following a separate piece of research, the Manase beach replenishment project was found to be more expensive than project funds, so its scope needed to be trimmed back. The result was

that the problem area was only partially addressed, and the impact was transferred to the adjacent area to the west. Moreover, only one of the two operators affected by the problem was properly addressed.

### Effectiveness & Efficiency

Effectiveness is the extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.

Efficiency is a measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results.

#### Effectiveness

Both the effectiveness and efficiency of the Project were very low in the first phase, but significantly improved in the second phase (after the Mid Term Review).

The effectiveness of the Project was prejudiced from the start by a design scope that was too broad, too ambitious and too disconnected with the commercial needs of the tourism industry, to ever be effective. At the commencement of the MTR, the Project was on a collision course to have the majority of its outcomes not achieved, and the majority of its funding returned to donors.

However, the MTR accurately diagnosed the Phase One issues, and constructively proposed a rational way forward. Moreover, the Project Steering Committee and PMU rallied behind the MTR recommendations, and delivered a significantly more effective Phase Two of the Project.

The constructive MTR and rallying of the PSC and MPU was the turning point of the Project.

products and ideas along with extracted segments from the TDA management plans and technical guidelines in efforts to expand the creativity of operators.

<sup>11</sup> PMU efforts to aid in the preparation of proposals by operators included frequent visits before deadline submission to individual businesses with print outs of new possible tourism

Any critical comment about the second phase of the Project must take this incredible turn of effectiveness into account.

Nonetheless, the Terminal Evaluation found challenges to the effectiveness Phase Two, and for the benefit of future projects, or a new version of this project, they have been identified.

### *Efficiency*

Phase One was inefficient, but Phase Two was very efficient in its economic conversion of resources to results.

Phase One took a too long to get started and build momentum. This was caused by protracted procurement and some unfortunate contracting mistakes. Phase Two was much more efficient, but its efficiency was still challenged by a lack of time to deliver the scope. With limited time, the leading flow on impacts to efficiency were:

- Changes from some successful applicants of the Small Grants Program to the agreed scope and subsequent budget;
- Unforeseen scope changes critical to some Small Grants Program projects, resulting in variations that needed to be costed and managed; and
- The STA induced addition in scope of a Foundation for Sustainable Samoa, which drew almost \$100,000 of expenditure and significant PMU time to implement at a time when there was no time.

If Phase One had not taken so long, these issues could have been efficiently managed, leaving some contingency time to address inevitable unforeseen issues, such as builder defects.

### **Country ownership**

As outlined in the earlier sub-section Relevance, the project concept was in line with Samoa's development priorities.

Relevant country representatives from government and civil society were involved in project implementation.

This was the first project in Samoa addressing climate resilience and linking it to the tourism sector. There was no tool established to measure ownership, and so a view on this is subjective. To give further insight into this section, the following rates how much the idea of fully adapting tourism to prepare for climate change is considered or mainstreamed into our day to day operations, policies and decision making. This particular section was developed through asking operators "How much do you feel that you understand, and feel a part of this initiative", and the interpretation is subject to the true evaluation by the evaluator after enough consultation is conducted. After asking various stakeholders about various sectors, the evaluation summarises that ownership of the idea of tourism adapting to prepare for climate change is:

- **significant** among the operators and their communities that participated in the Small Grants Program, and among the members of the Savaii Samoa Tourism Association and participating staff of the UNDP Samoa;
- **modest** among the Product and Development Unit of STA, among planners in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (Planning, Urban Management Agency), Aid Coordinators in the Ministry of Finance
- **low** among the rest of STA, Samoa Hotels Association, sitting Samoan government and operators that were engaged in the ICCRITS (but did not gain a Small Grant)
- **minimal** among other Samoan tourism operators, business and the wider community.

## Mainstreaming

The Project Design did not create tasks, processes and procedures to mainstream UNDP priorities of poverty alleviation, improved governance and gender. Consequently, there was minimal mainstreaming of these priorities.

While the Project Design did not specifically set out to mainstream the UNDP priority of the prevention and recovery from natural disasters, this area is intimately connected with climate change, so there is an indirect mainstreaming that has occurred. Interestingly, it is natural disasters that create stakeholder attention on climate change, because their frequency and ferocity is associated with climate change. Minor mainstreaming could be associated with the benefits of the Manase beach replenishment project, since the wave breakers will reduce the impact of cyclone induced waves and tsunami impacts, and will assist the area recover sand afterwards.

Though not a requirement of a Terminal Evaluation, the UNDP requested that the report mention how this project addresses the relevant SDG targets/indicators. None of the previous reporting by UNDP identified which SDG targets were relevant. The consultant has chosen one field – Goal 13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts, and **Table 3.7** presents a response to the this.

## Sustainability

Sustainability has been built into the Project by putting strong emphasis on institutional and individual capacity development. A key factor for ensuring financial sustainability of the project beyond the LDCF grant is related to the facilitation of private investments by the tourism sector to implement adaptation activities within the six Tourism Development Areas (TDAs), through the ICCRITS Small Grants Scheme.

A number of project Activities have been institutionalised to support sustainability; the Small Grants Projects have been integrated into the private sectors business operations, the Sustainable Samoa Foundation is now managed by the Samoa Hotels Association, the CLEWS project is now an activity undertaken by MNRE and STA will take an ongoing role in communication and education of tourism stakeholders in regard to adaptation best practice and enhanced resilience to climate change.

In order to further facilitate sustainability of the project outcomes and activities a Sustainable Exit Strategy has been developed and is outlined in **Section 4.3**. This Strategy includes actions to support the integration of capacity developed under the PMU into STA, as well as already endorsed commitments from the Project partners to facilitate on-going activities required to sustain the outcomes. The funding required to implement this Strategy is summarised in **Table 3.8**.

**Table 3.8 Funding required to implement Sustainable Exit Strategy (Source: Trip Consultants 2017)**

Activity	Stakeholder Responsible	Funds Required	Source of Funds
CLEWS Implementation	STA and MNRE	STA 35,000 \$ pa MNRE 30,000 \$ pa	Government of Samoa
Integration of PMU capacity into STA	STA	400,000 \$ pa	Government of Samoa

**Table 3.9** presents the scoring for sustainability. Financial resources were scored 3/4, with a point being deducted because the Project spread its financial resources over too many projects. The Project would have worked better if more resources were invested in fewer projects – this was particularly evident with the Small Grants, which lacked sufficient funds to achieve significant and sustainable reform with the majority of projects.

**Table 3.7 Response to how the Project addresses the SDG targets and indicators for Goal 13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts (from the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development)**

Goal 13 targets	Indicators	Consultant response
13.1 Strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters in all countries	13.1.1 Number of deaths, missing persons and directly affected persons attributed to disasters per 100,000 population	No data available
	13.1.2 Number of countries that adopt and implement national disaster risk reduction strategies in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030	No data available
	13.1.3 Proportion of local governments that adopt and implement local disaster risk reduction strategies in line with national disaster risk reduction strategies	All local governments targeted receive climate change management plans
13.2 Integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning	13.2.1 Number of countries that have communicated the establishment or operationalization of an integrated policy/strategy/plan which increases their ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change, and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development in a manner that does not threaten food production (including a national adaptation plan, nationally determined contribution, national communication, biennial update report or other)	Project applied to one country – Samoa. Management plans document but no evidence of integration into mainstream tourism plans and poolicy
13.3 Improve education, awareness-raising and human and institutional capacity on climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and early warning	13.3.1 Number of countries that have integrated mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and early warning into primary, secondary and tertiary curricula	Project applied to one country – Samoa. This has been achieved
	13.3.2 Number of countries that have communicated the strengthening of institutional, systemic and individual capacity-building to implement adaptation, mitigation and technology transfer, and development actions	Project applied to one country – Samoa. Modest improvement but no ongoing mechanisms to maintain
13.a Implement the commitment undertaken by developed-country parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to a goal of mobilizing jointly \$100 billion annually by 2020 from all sources to address the needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation and fully operationalize the Green Climate Fund through its capitalization as soon as possible	13.a.1 Mobilized amount of United States dollars per year between 2020 and 2025 accountable towards the \$100 billion commitment	This Project was delivered prior to the indicator date range. Approximately 1,500,121 was spent
13.b Promote mechanisms for raising capacity for effective climate change-related planning and management in least developed countries and small island developing States, including focusing on women, youth and local and marginalized communities	13.b.1 Number of least developed countries and small island developing States that are receiving specialized support, and amount of support, including finance, technology and capacity-building, for mechanisms for raising capacities for effective climate change-related planning and management, including focusing on women, youth and local and marginalized communities	Project applied to one country – Samoa. Approximately 1,500,121 was spent in specialised support.

Socio-political received a score of just 2/4. Deductions were made because there was insufficient capacity building achieved within the Samoa Tourism Authority and most of the Small Grant recipients.

Institutional framework and governance received a score of 3/4. One point was deducted because the Institutional Framework for hosting the Project was weak, with the department within the host organisation of Samoa Tourism Authority not effectively fused with the PMU to maximise implementation during the project period, and into the future.

Environmental was given a score of 2/4, with two points deducted for insufficient scale on small grant projects to achieve significant environmental improvement (eg. two out of 10 fales being improved, and the main dining and kitchen area remaining at risk).

The overall likelihood of sustainability received a score of 2/4, with two points deducted because of the lack of scaled implementation and that there is no significant financial or human resources allocated to ongoing implementation

**Table 3.9 Rating of sustainability elements for the Project**

4. Sustainability	Rating
Financial resources	3/4
Socio-political	2/4
Institutional framework and governance	3/4
Environmental	2/4
Overall likelihood of sustainability	2/4

## 4. Conclusions, recommendations, lessons

### 4.1 Best and worst practices in addressing issues relating to relevance, performance and success

#### Best practices

This evaluation identified evidence of the following best practices within the Project:

1. Ability to attract PMU team members that were passionate to deliver the project outcomes
2. Engagement of a professional designer to enhance the quality of designs for beachside accommodation
3. Engagement of a Sustainability Tourism Consultant to strengthen tourism development activity
4. Attendance and level of assistance from the Project Management Committee
5. Transparent accounting processes and reporting of budget spending
6. Significant implementation of recommendations from the MTR, demonstrating commitment and ability to adapt the project to maximise outcomes
7. Incorporation of launches of project outputs within STA and tourism industry events, to maximise exposure
8. Incorporation of the Project within relevant conferences, workshops and events to develop the team and increase project exposure
9. Full utilisation of the funds in accordance with project objectives

#### Practices needing improvement

This evaluation identified evidence of the following weak practices within the Project:

1. Better communication between STA management and the PMU<sup>12</sup>
2. An asset register, to ensure assets were managed and passed on to a suitable recipient at the end of the Project
3. Internal control by STA over the PMU that it hosted
4. Financial monitoring of the Project by STA
5. Teamwork and general integration of the PMU with the STA and its Planning and Product Development Unit specifically
6. Performance reviews of PMU team
7. Continuous reflection, evaluation and improvement actions, documented in PMU meeting records
8. Transfer of intellectual property from PMU to STA, and its activation for ongoing use

## 4.2 Corrective actions for the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the project

### Project Design

This evaluation supports the recommended improvements to the Project Design documented in the MTR:

1. Greater analysis of the tourism sector's strengths and limitations in addressing climate change
2. Greater reference to the National Tourism Plan and its priorities
3. Benchmarking of what other countries have done / are doing in the same field

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<sup>12</sup> Multiple stakeholders interviewed, stated that just placing the PMU inside the STA was not enough. They stated that more needed to be done at senior levels to integrate / mainstream the PMU with other units, and with the top management levels of the STA

4. A scope that reflects the time and supporting in country resources

### Monitoring

The following recommendations are made to improve monitoring in future projects:

1. Carrying forward MTR recommendations into PMU reports, confirming they are implemented, adjusted or rejected
2. Financial monitoring of the Project by STA

### Evaluation

The following recommendations are made to improve evaluation in future projects:

1. Strategic assessment of the likely return on investment of alternative approaches, and subsequent documented decisions made
2. Performance reviews of PMU team

## 4.3 Outstanding actions to complete the Project

The following outstanding actions should be addressed to complete the Project:

1. Get building defects fixed while contracts current
2. Finish documentary and small clips, launch and post on STA website and social media platforms
3. Create a Climate Change Adaptation landing page on STA website:
  - home page explanation of climate change impacts on tourism
  - load documentary for viewing

- explanation of Foundation for a Sustainable Samoa (Travel Philanthropy Fund)
- list of projects funded by small grants
- list of TDA management plans
- explanation of CLEWS
- contact for more information within STA

#### 4.4 Actions to follow up or reinforce initial benefits from the project

The proposed Exit Strategy (Trip Consultants 2017) produced by the Sustainable Tourism Expert engaged in the Project recommended that the following elements needed to be sustained:

1. The CLEWS system needs to be maintained and communicated to stakeholders
2. The Manase beach replenishment components need to be monitored and maintained
3. The Small Grants Scheme Investments need to be maintained with some additional finishing and business support provided (eg. E.g. furnishing which was originally planned but due to budget constraints was unable to be completed)
4. The Foundation for Sustainable Samoa website needs to be maintained and updated and any contributions managed<sup>13</sup>
5. The capacity needs to be developed within the Tourism Sector operators to undertake adaptive climate change activities and sustainable business practices

<sup>13</sup> The SHA is usually short staffed so an additional officer who can fully promote and manage this foundation is crucial to ensure the continuation of this great initiative

6. The capacity within STA to develop and implement climate change policy for the sector needs to be maintained and institutionalised
7. Ongoing communications regarding climate change adaptation to tourism stakeholders needs to be institutionalised

The Exit Strategy also recommended the following training and capacity building and/or resources:

1. Training for private sector operators in Business Management and Marketing
2. Ongoing advice to operators in relation to Project completion and furnishing/fit out/landscaping
3. Recurrent budget funding for STA Tourism and Climate Change Unit
4. Recurrent budget allocation from MNRE for the CLEWS component
5. Ongoing resourcing from the Samoa Hotels Association to maintain the Sustainable Samoa Foundation website and management of any projects
6. Ongoing support by STA in communication of project outcomes and climate change impacts to tourism stakeholders

Table 4.1 presents the proposed Exit Strategy actions and timelines

Table 4.1 Proposed Exit Strategy, Source: Trip Consultants 2017

Actions for Clews Project	Timing
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ MNRE and STA to sign MOU for joint CLEWS maintenance/operations</li> <li>▪ STA to continue to distribute Climate Bulletin to stakeholders</li> <li>▪ MNRE to include operational costs of CLEWS in recurrent budget</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ STA and MNRE - October 2017 – nil cost</li> <li>▪ STA - Ongoing – 5,000 \$ pa</li> <li>▪ MNRE and STA – Ongoing – 30,000 \$ each</li> </ul>
Actions for Manase Beach Replenishment	Timing
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ MNRE to inspect and conduct maintenance on components under the Manase Beach Replenishment Project</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ MNRE – Annually – Within existing budget</li> </ul>

Actions for Small Grants project	Timing
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ PMU to identify additional funding requirements for Round One and Round Two projects as part of final inspection (finishing, furnishings etc)</li> <li>▪ PMU to document estimates of additional funding requirements for use in future project design</li> <li>▪ Communicate estimates to operators to facilitate their own future investments</li> <li>▪ STA to deliver training (possibly through MFAT Tourism Programme) for operators in business management and marketing as well as operational aspects of new products not covered by ICCRITS</li> <li>▪ STA to provide advice to operators on finishing including landscaping and furnishing requirements</li> <li>▪ STA particularly the P&amp;D standards team with the support of SHA should take action to advise operators on this accordingly</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ PMU – October 2017 – Within Project budget</li>   <li>▪ STA – 2018 - \$ 200,000 (training budget)</li> </ul>
Actions for communication to stakeholders	Timing
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Load onto STA website and distribute and launch documentary on Project to media and PR outlets and on line</li> <li>▪ Present on project outcomes at National Tourism Conference</li> <li>▪ Prepare and present Concept Paper for ICCRITS Stage Two to Cabinet and subject to endorsement and donor approval design Stage Two.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ STA – November 2017 – Within existing budget</li> <li>▪ STA – 2018 – Within existing budget</li> <li>▪ STA – September 2017 – Within existing resources</li> </ul>
Actions for integration of PMU with STA	Timing
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Budget proposal and revised structure to be presented to Cabinet for additional recurrent funding</li> <li>▪ Job descriptions to be developed and PMU positions integrated into STA structure</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ STA – September 2017 – Estimated 400,000 \$ pa additional recurrent budget requirement</li> <li>▪ STA – November 2017 – As above</li> <li>▪ STA /PSC– November 2017 – As above</li> </ul>
Actions for Foundation for Sustainable Samoa	Timing
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ SHA to maintain Foundation website and manage contributions and potential projects</li> <li>▪ Conduct an independent evaluation of the Foundation programme and determine any lessons learned and effectiveness to determine any future financial support</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ SHA – Ongoing – Additional annual budget allocation needed</li> </ul>

## 4.5 Proposals for future directions underlining main objectives

### Strengthening Samoan tourism capability

#### *Commercially orientated tourism development expertise throughout the project*

This project has proven that to achieve effective environmental outcomes for the tourism sector (climate change resilience), it is critical to inject cutting edge tourism expertise throughout. This expertise ensures that environmental objectives are fitted into commercial objectives, and that the needs of the tourism market is continuously integrated into the design. The Project sourced this expertise twice, first via the MTR expert and second through the Sustainable tourism expert. Had this expertise been available throughout, the Project would have achieved its outcomes more profoundly.

#### *Optimising sustainable growth of tourism to optimise environmental and social objectives*

Sustainable business growth is critical not only to business success, and to delivering economic benefits to local communities and the country overall, but also to implementing environmental initiatives like climate change adaptation. Healthy businesses create investment pools from which to take up environmental and social initiatives, such as climate change adaptation. The more of these investment pools, the more the tourism industry can partner in projects like ICCRITS, rather be totally dependent on grants to partially solve their issues.

This evaluation uncovered several significant constraints to achieving sustainable tourism growth in Samoa. If these constraints were addressed, then there would be a much more fertile ground from which to implement adaptation measures addressing potential impacts of climate change, as well as other environmental and social objectives that the UNDP and other organisations wish to assist with. To

address these issues, it is therefore recommended to create a short-term project that scopes:


1. What rules and regulations are missing, or more commonly, what ones are poorly formed, and stifle innovation and entrepreneurialism
2. What finance and tax incentives could be refined and geared up to grow sustainable tourism in Samoa
3. What commercially provided experiences, could be designed for delivery by the private sector, that would significantly increase the competitiveness of the destination
4. What institutional strengthening of the STA (particularly in planning and product development) and what cultural change and incentivisation could be introduced to stretch the organisation to deliver greater outcomes
5. What sort of communications could be generated to increase public awareness of the value that tourism plays in the Samoan economy, and what the community could do to further strengthen tourism opportunities and benefits of tourism for Samoans

It is recommended that this work be undertaken quickly and efficiently, as a scanning exercise that generates a short and concise set of opportunities, from which donors could then structure programs around.

### Stage Two – ICCRITS

Accepting the above recommendations are needed, this evaluation also concludes that there is sufficient solid work done to design a new ICCRITS. This would start with a detailed Project Design. The remainder of this final section presents ideas for the design. **Figure 4.1** presents the key principles and key components of a new ICCRITS.

Figure 4.1 Key principles and elements of a new ICCRITS Project




The seven key outcomes of a new ICCRITS Program would be:

1. A significant number of Beachside accommodation properties that have a Masterplan for the long-term conversion of their property to be largely resilient to the main potential impacts of climate change
2. A significant number of Beachside accommodation properties that have been made resilient to the main potential impacts of climate change
3. A sample of distinctive attractions that offer a highly differentiated experience that can be undertaken in poor weather
4. A sample of strong tourism businesses offering several highly differentiated experiences that can be undertaken in poor weather
5. The large majority of participants in the above initiatives are largely aware of what climate change is, what it could do to their business, and how they are making themselves resilient, and are sharing this with their customers, staff and leaders of their local community
6. Marketing identifies accommodation and other visitor experiences that are making themselves climate change resilient

- Operators provide information to customers that explains what climate change is, what it could do to their business, and how they are making themselves resilient

**Figure 4.2** identifies a revised process for educating the operator and consumer.

**Figure 4.2** Key steps for participants accessing new ICCRIS set of grants and micro-finance



### Beachfront accommodation stream

The first stream of a new ICCRITS would be focussed on beachfront accommodation across all TDA's. It could build into the process two stages of applications for financial support. The first stage would be to engage a small team of expertise to prepare a Masterplan for their property. The expertise could comprise commercial tourism development, master planner and an architect. The

small team would visit the properties of the winning applicants, to visit the site and talk and work with the owners and their stakeholders to:

- Understand the current business, product and markets, constraints and opportunities
- Identify the likely impacts of climate change on the property
- Design high level options to strengthen the product and its resilience to climate change impacts
- Choose the best option, and stage its implementation
- Generate a 'mud map' version of the Masterplan

Back in the office, the team would produce the Masterplan, and laminate copies so that one could be pinned up in the properties dining area, for guests and stakeholders to look at. **Figure 4.3** presents a Masterplan and expertise working with an applicant to refine it.

The owner could elect to start a donations fund, so that customers inspired by the initiative could make a financial contribution to deliver the Plan.

Concurrently, the owner would begin investigating their own financial reserves and ability to borrow money to scale up their grant application.

**Figure 4.3** A Masterplan and expertise working with an applicant to refine it



The second Stage would invite applicants to apply for either:

- a grant to implement the priority first stage(s) of their Masterplan; or
- a grant and microfinance to implement the majority of the Masterplan.

The grant amount would be larger than the second round of ICCRITS, so that a larger proportion of work could be undertaken that brings the property closer to becoming climate change resilient and more commercially appealing to customers.

The grant and microfinance could also be used to create leisure space and accommodation fitout, landscaping and education materials to display to their customers about climate change and their involvement in it.

#### *Labelling of successful projects*

Applications evaluated as successful would then be given access to a labelling program that identifies them as an operator that is committed to adapting to climate change. The labelling would be integrated into major marketing so that consumers could identify it.

#### *Experience development stream*

The experience development stream could apply to attractions, tours and activity businesses targeting visitors. The aim would be to strengthen the range and appeal of alternatives to weather dependent beach tourism. The scope could apply to enriching:

- attractions to provide chargeable interpretive experiences that involve a guide host delivering richer interpretation and interactive activities; and
- promising tour operator businesses to reinvigorate or create new product in niche areas such as adventure, ecotourism, cultural tourism and food / culinary tourism.

Like the beachfront accommodation, the grants would be applied in two stages:

1. Access to a tourism product development expert to assist develop the idea into a concept and prepare the elements from which a grant could apply to get support for
2. Development, testing and refinement of the product, including
  - capacity building in interpretation and guiding;
  - models, props and other interpretation related facilities that the host would operate; and
  - on site infrastructure that is critical to make the experience work, such as a zip line, kitchen fitout.

**Figure 4.4** Examples of niche sectors where experiences could be developed



#### *Other recommendations for a new ICCRITS*

Other recommended elements of a new ICCRITS could include:

1. Design the Project to run for at least four years, so there is time to run two rounds of the proposed grants and microfinance.

2. At the earliest point possible, determine whether to more fully embed a new PMU within the STA Planning and Development Unit, or within an alternative donor structure, through full and frank discussions with STA. If fully embedded into the STA, integrate ICCRITS funding into STA financial reporting
3. Establish a new PMU (similar structure) that includes a Sustainable Tourism Expert throughout
4. Appoint an additional SHA officer to manage climate change initiatives supported through the Foundation for a Sustainable Samoa (travel philanthropy fund)
5. Extract from TDA Management Plans the top priorities to go into a revised Tourism Development Plan
6. Towards the end of the Project, produce a second documentary to replace the first one, designed to highlight alternative strategies implemented and inspire others to consider them.

## 5. Attachments

### 5.1 Terms of Reference

#### **TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE TERMINAL EVALUATION OF THE ENHANCING RESILIENCE OF TOURISM-RELIANT COMMUNITIES TO CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS IN SAMOA (ICCRITS) PROJECT**

This is the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the UNDP-GEF Terminal evaluation (TE) of the full-sized project titled *Enhancing Resilience of Tourism-reliant Communities to Climate Change risks in Samoa (ICCRITS) project* (PIMS 4858) implemented through the Samoa Tourism Authority, which is to be undertaken in 2017. The project started on 29<sup>th</sup> May 2013 and is in its final year of implementation. In line with the UNDP-GEF M&E policies and procedures, all full and medium sized UNDP support GEF financed projects are required to undergo a terminal evaluation upon completion of implementation. This ToR sets out the expectations for this TE. The TE process must follow the guidance outlined in the document Guidance for conducting Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-supported, GEF-Financed Projects

#### PROJECT SUMMARY TABLE

Project Title:	Enhancing Resilience of Tourism-reliant Communities to Climate Change risks in Samoa			
GEF Project ID:	00064910			<i>at completion (Million US\$)</i>
UNDP Project ID:	000864654858	GEF financing:	1,950,000.00	
Country:	Samoa	IA/EA own:	3,600,000	
Region:	Pacific	Government:	13,688,500	
Focal Area:	Climate Change Adaptation	Other:		
FA Objectives, (OP/SP):		Total co-financing:	17,288,500	
Executing Agency:	Samoa Tourism Authority (STA)	Total Project Cost:	19,238,500	
Other Partners involved:	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE)	ProDoc Signature (date project began):		29 <sup>th</sup> May 2013
		(Operational) Closing Date:	Proposed: 31 January 2017	Actual: 31 December 2017

#### B. Project Description or Context and Background:

The project was designed to enhance the resilience of tourism-reliant communities to climate change risks. This will be achieved by integrating climate change into development policy and instruments, and investing in adaptation actions supporting tourism reliant communities. These are priorities identified under Samoa's National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA). LDCF resources will be used to integrate climate change aspects into the Samoa Tourism Development Plan and management of Tourism Development Areas (TDAs). Resources will be used to establish financial support schemes and risk transfer mechanisms, develop a sector-tailored early warning system, and implement concrete adaptation measures in high priority tourism-reliant communities and tourism sites targeting the management of coastal infrastructure, water resources, shore line and tourism resources including recreational activities. Project outcomes are as follows:

1. Climate change adaptation mainstreamed into tourism-related policy instruments and public-private partnerships
2. Increased adaptive capacity to climate change and disaster risks of tourism-reliant communities

The total grant funding for this project is US\$1,950,000 from the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) with in kind and parallel co-financing of US\$17,288,500. The project document was signed on the 29<sup>th</sup> May 2013. The executing agency for this project is the Samoa Tourism Authority.

The TE will be conducted according to the guidance, rules and procedures established by UNDP and GEF as reflected in the UNDP Evaluation Guidance for GEF Financed Projects. The objectives of the evaluation are to assess the achievement of project results, and to draw lessons that can both improve the sustainability of benefits from this project, and aid in the overall enhancement of UNDP programming

#### C. Scope of Work:

The objective of this consultancy is to undertake the Terminal Evaluation of the ICCRITS project.

#### EVALUATION APPROACH AND METHOD

An overall approach and method for conducting project terminal evaluations of UNDP supported GEF financed projects has developed over time. The evaluator is expected to frame the evaluation effort using the criteria of **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact**, as defined and explained in the UNDP Guidance for Conducting Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-supported, GEF-financed Projects. A set of questions covering each of these criteria have been drafted and are included with this TOR (**Annex C**) The evaluator is expected to amend, complete and submit this matrix as part of an evaluation inception report, and shall include it as an annex to the final report.

The evaluation must provide evidence based information that is credible, reliable and useful. The evaluator is expected to follow a participatory and consultative approach ensuring close

engagement with government counterparts, in particular the GEF operational focal point, UNDP Country Office, project team, UNDP GEF Technical Adviser based in the region and key stakeholders. The evaluator is expected to conduct a field mission to Samoa, including the following project sites Manase beach replenishment, Laloifi Beach Fales, Manusina Beach Fales, Faofao Beach Fales, Gogosiva Beach Fales, Jaymy Beach Fales, Taufua Beach Fales, Litia Sini Resort Sunset View Fales, Saleaula Lava Ruin, Reginas Beach Fales, Vacations Beach Fales, Janes Beach Fales, Falealupo Canopy Walkway, Falealupo Beach Fales, Satuiatua Beach Fales, Alofaaga Blowholes, Afu Aau Waterfall, Aganoa Lodge, Sweet Escape Fales, and Joelan Beach Fales. Interviews will be held with the following organizations and individuals at a minimum: Samoa Tourism Authority, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment and selected/all small tourism operators from 21 project sites mentioned above

The evaluator will review all relevant sources of information, such as the project document, project reports – incl. Annual APR/PIR and other Reports, project budget revisions, midterm review, progress reports, GEF focal area tracking tools, project files, national strategic and legal documents, and any other material that the evaluator considers useful for this evidence-based assessment. A list of documents that the project team will provide to the evaluator for review is included in **Annex B** of this Terms of Reference.

The TE will be conducted according to the guidance, rules and procedures established by UNDP and the GEF as reflected in the UNDP Evaluation Guidance for GEF Financed Projects.

#### EVALUATION CRITERIA & RATINGS

An assessment of project performance will be carried out, based against expectations set out in the Project Logical Framework/Results Framework (see **Annex A**), which provides performance and impact indicators for project implementation along with their corresponding means of verification. The evaluation will at a minimum cover the criteria of: **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact**. Ratings must be provided on the following performance criteria. The completed table must be included in the evaluation executive summary. The obligatory rating scales are included in **Annex D**.

#### PROJECT FINANCE/ CO FINANCE

The Evaluation will assess the key financial aspects of the project, including the extent of co-financing planned and realized. Project cost and funding data will be required, including annual expenditures. Variances between planned and actual expenditures will need to be assessed and explained. Results from recent financial audits, as available, should be taken into consideration. The evaluator will receive assistance from the Multi-Country Office (MCO) and Project Team to obtain financial data in order to complete the co-financing table below, which will be included in the terminal evaluation report.

#### MAINSTREAMING

UNDP supported GEF financed projects are key components in UNDP country programming, as well as regional and global programmes. The evaluation will assess the extent to which the project was successfully mainstreamed with other UNDP priorities, including poverty

alleviation, improved governance, the prevention and recovery from natural disasters, and gender.

#### IMPACT

The evaluator will assess the extent to which the project is achieving impacts or progressing towards the achievement of impacts. Key findings that should be brought out in the evaluations include whether the project has demonstrated: a) verifiable improvements in ecological status, b) verifiable reductions in stress on ecological systems, and/or c) demonstrated progress towards these impact achievements.<sup>1</sup>

#### CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS & LESSONS

The evaluation report must include a chapter providing a set of **conclusions, recommendations** and **lessons**.

Conclusions should build on findings and be based in evidence. Recommendations should be prioritized, specific, relevant, and targeted, with suggested implementers of the recommendations. Lessons should have wider applicability to other initiatives across the region, the area of intervention, and for the future.

#### D. Expected Outcomes and Deliverables:

The evaluation consultant is expected to deliver the following:

Deliverable	Content	Timing	Responsibilities
Inception Report	Evaluator provides clarifications on timing and method	No later than 2 weeks before the evaluation mission	Evaluator submits to UNDP CO
Presentation	Initial Findings	End of evaluation mission	To project management, UNDP CO
Draft Final Report	Full report, (per annexed template) with annexes	Within 3 weeks of the evaluation mission	Sent to CO, reviewed by RTA, PCU, AF/GEF OFPs
Final Report*	Revised report	Within 1 week of receiving UNDP comments on draft	Sent to CO for uploading to UNDP ERC

\*When submitting the final evaluation report, the evaluator is required also to provide an 'audit trail', detailing how all received comments have (and have not) been addressed in the final evaluation report. (see **Annex H**)

#### E. Institutional Arrangement:

The principal responsibility for managing this evaluation resides with the UNDP MCO in Samoa. The UNDP Samoa MCO will contract the evaluators and ensure the timely provision of per diems and travel arrangements within the country for the evaluator. The Project Team will

be responsible for liaising with the Evaluators team to set up stakeholder interviews, arrange field visits, coordinate with the Government etc.

#### F. Duration of the Work:

The total duration of the evaluation will be 25 days over a two-month period\* according to the following plan:

- Preparation: 4 working days
- Evaluation Mission Draft: 10 working days
- Evaluation Report Final: 9 working days
- Report: 2 working days

\* *The indicated max duration takes into account consultant's initial desk review and quality check of the final report from UNDP MCO, as well as potential delays due to unforeseen circumstances, not included as deliverables in the table above*

#### G. Duty Station:

Home-based with travel to Samoa. It is expected that the consultant will spend 10 (working) days on mission in Samoa.

#### H. Competencies:

- Demonstrates commitment to the Gov. of Samoa mission, vision and values.
- Displays cultural, gender, religion, race, nationality and age sensitivity and adaptability
- Focuses on result for the client and responds positively to feedback
- Consistently approaches work with energy and a positive, constructive attitude
- Demonstrates openness to change and ability to manage complexities
- Good inter-personal and teamwork skills, networking aptitude, ability to work in multicultural environment

#### I. Qualifications of the Successful Contractor:

The evaluation team will be composed of 1 independent evaluator. The consultant shall have prior experience in evaluating GEF or GEF/LDCF projects. The evaluator selected should not have participated in the project preparation and/or implementation and should not have conflict of interest with project related activities. The selected candidate must be equipped with his/her own computing equipment.

Evaluation consultants will be held to the highest ethical standards and are required to sign a Code of Conduct (**Annex E**) upon acceptance of the assignment. UNDP evaluations are conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG 'Ethical Guidelines for Evaluations'.

- Post-graduate degree in environmental/climate science, tourism or other closely related field
- Minimum 8 years of relevant professional experience in climate change adaptation and sustainable tourism
- Minimum of 5 years' experience with evaluations, results-based monitoring, and/or evaluation methodologies

- Experience working with the GEF/ programs and in the targeted focal areas: Climate Change Adaptation
- Experience working in the Pacific region
- Fluency in English (oral and written) is a requirement

#### Evaluation criteria: 70% Technical, 30% financial combined weight:

Technical Evaluation Criteria (based on the information provided in the CV and the relevant documents must be submitted as evidence to support possession of below required criteria):

- Post-graduate degree in environmental/climate science, tourism sciences, or other closely related field (25%)
- Minimum 8 years of relevant professional experience in climate change adaptation and sustainable tourism (30%)
- Minimum of 5 years' experience with evaluations, results-based monitoring, and/or evaluation methodologies (30%)
- Experience working with the GEF/GEF-LDCF programs and in the targeted focal areas: climate change adaptation (5%)
- Experience working in the Pacific region (5%)
- Fluency in English (oral and written) is a requirement (5%)

#### K. Recommended Presentation of Proposal:

Given below is the recommended format for submitting your proposal. The following headings with the required details are important. Please use the template available (Letter of Offer to complete financial proposal)

CVs with a proposed methodology addressing the elements mentioned under deliverables must be submitted by **17<sup>th</sup> Nov 2017** electronically via email: [procurement.ws@undp.org](mailto:procurement.ws@undp.org). Incomplete applications will not be considered and only candidates for whom there is further interest will be contacted. Proposals must include:

- **CV** or P11 form addressing the evaluation criteria and why you consider yourself the most suitable for this assignment. The selected candidate must submit a signed P11 prior to contract award.
- 3 professional references most recent
- **A brief methodology** on how you will approach and conduct the work,
- **Financial Proposal** specifying the daily rate and other expenses, if any
- **Letter of interest and availability specifying the available date to start and other details**

Queries about the consultancy can be directed to the UNDP Procurement Unit [procurement.ws@undp.org](mailto:procurement.ws@undp.org)

## 5.2 Methodology

The Methodology was not ideal to complete a thorough Terminal Evaluation. The primary issue was that the entire PMU were allowed to finish their employment before the Evaluation Consultant was brought in. The Project Manager was not available to arrange a full range of stakeholders to consult, nor to arrange the most appropriate project sites to inspect. The STA staff did not have a lot to say about the Project, and 4 – 5 interview bookings to interview STO CEO Papali'i Sonja Hunter were all cancelled, so she was never interviewed.

To try and compensate:

- prior to the Mission, the Evaluation Consultant made a special visit to Melbourne to meet and interview the Project Manager, at his own cost); and
- the UNDP seconded one of the PMU to arrange consultation and site visits (and did a good job, considering she had not been involved for some time).

Towards the end of the Mission, the consultant struggled to find anyone in the STA or UNDP that had the time or inclination to work with the evolving recommendations and ensure they were tailored to the country. So rather than providing a detailed:

- rationale for selecting the listed sources of information and how the information obtained addresses the evaluation questions;
- identification of deviations from planned data collection methods that were outlined in the Inception Report; or
- information on how the assessments were made and cross-referenced with the sources of information;
- the consultant instead focussed on trying to create really practical solutions to moving forward with the Project, to maximise its legacy.

## 5.3 List of documents reviewed

1. PIF

2. UNDP Initiation Plan

3. UNDP Project Document

4. Project Inception Report

5. All Project Implementation Reports (PIR's)

6. Quarterly progress reports

7. Mid-term Review (MTR) Report

8. Mid-term Review (MTR) Report Management Response

9. All AWP's (annual work plans);

10. All annual financial project reports (CDRs);

11. Consultancy products (report, technical studies, etc.);

12. Board Meeting minutes;

13. All communication products;

14. Community consultations minutes, if available

15. Audit reports

16. Finalized GEF focal area Tracking Tools at CEO endorsement, midterm and at end of project (*fill in specific TTs for this project's focal area*)

17. Oversight mission reports

18. All monitoring reports prepared by the project

19. UNDP country/countries programme document(s)

20. Minutes of the (*Project Title*) Board Meetings and other meetings (i.e. Project Appraisal Committee meetings)

21. Project site location maps

## 5.4 Itinerary for Mission

### 13 Jan 2018 – Melbourne, Australia

- Interview with Isamaeli Time (ICCRITS Project Manager)

### Day 1: 21 Jan 2018 - Travel

- Travel Australia to Samoa

### Day 2: 22 Jan 2018 - Apia

- Briefing Meeting with UNDP (Mr Notonegoro, Ms Anne Trveor, Tessa Tafua)
- Briefing Meeting with Project Management Team (Ms Ropeta Lei Sam and Naomi)
- Interview with NRME / PUMA (Kirisimasi Seumanutafa)
- Interview with STA Planning Staff (Faamatuainu Suifua Faamatuainu and Marita Ah Sam)
- Interview with New Zealand High Commission (Situfu Salea)

### Day 3: 23 Jan 2018 - Apia

- Interview with Video Production Company (Laufa Lesa)
- Interview with UNDP Environment & Climate Change Programme Manager (Yvette Kerlake)
- Interview with ICCRITS Project RTA (Reios Lopez Rello)
- in Apia with UNDPO, local contractors

### Day 4: 24 Jan 2018 - Upolo

- Site visit to project sites on Upolo and Manono, and associated stakeholder consultation

### Day 5: 25 Jan 2018 - Savaii

- Site visit to project sites, and associated stakeholder consultation

### Day 6: 26 Jan 2018

- Prepare and present initial findings to Project Management Group

### Day 7: 26 Jan 2018

- Travel Samoa to Australia

## 5.5 Summary of field visits

Field visits were undertaken to view sites that represented: major project expenditure and a representative sample of the diversity of projects undertaken. Care was taken to visit sites perceived as being particularly successful, and problematic. The sites visited were:

1. Manusina Beach Fales (Upolu)
2. Faofao Beach Fales (Upolu)
3. Jaymy Beach Fales (Upolu)
4. Taufua Beach Fales (Upolu)
5. Manono Fales (Manono Island)
6. Manase Beach (replenishment site) (Savaii)
7. Saleaula Lava Ruin (Savaii)
8. Reginas Beach Fales (Savaii)
9. Vacations Beach Fales (Savaii)
10. Falealupo Canopy Walkway (Savaii)
11. Falealupo Beach Fales (Savaii)
12. Alofaaga Blowholes (Savaii)
13. Aganoa Lodge (Savaii)

## 5.6 List of persons interviewed

- Kanjeng Notonegoro (Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP)
- Faamatuainu Suifua Faamatuainu (Planning and Development Manager, Samoa Tourism Authority)
- Marita Ah Sam, Sheena Ng Lam, Jade Eli, Anthony McCarthy, Robert Ah Sam, Naomi Tofilau, Muliipu (Product and Development Team, Samoa Tourism Authority)
- Kirisimasi Seumanutafa (Principal Strategic Planner, Planning Urban Management Agency, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment)
- Situfu Salesa (Grants Manager, New Zealand High Commission)
- Yvette Kerlake (UNDP Environment & Climate Change Programme Manager)
- Laufa Lesa (Project Video Consultant, One Look Communications)
- Isamaeli Time (Project Manager, ICCRITS)
- Ropeta Lei Sam (Project Officer ICCRITS Post Mid Term Review)
- Reis Lopez, Regional Technical Advisor/Regional Pacific Manager, (UNDP, Bangkok)
- Taleo Vaaiga (Manusina Beach Fales, Upolu)
- Sili Apelu (Taufua Beach Fales, Upolu)
- Leota Leiataua (Sunset View Fales, Manono)
- Jacinta Gaono Reginas Beach Fales, Savaii)
- Leota Lu (Vacations Beach Fales, Savaii)
- Womens Committee President (Saleaula Lava Ruins, Savaii)
- Mens Committee (Falealupo Canopy Walkway, Savaii)
- Save Lesa (Falealupo Beach Fales, Savaii)
- Village Committee (Alofaaga Blowholes, Savaii)
- Keith Martin (Aganoa Lodge, Savaii)

## 5.7 Stakeholder questionnaire used

Questions used in consultation and the stakeholders they were asked to	UNDP	STA	Project Team	Participating operators	Other
To what extent do you believe that this Project was successfully mainstreamed with other UNDP priorities, including poverty alleviation, improved governance, the prevention and recovery from natural disasters, and gender?					
To what extent do you believe that the project has demonstrated:					MNRE / PUMA
a) verifiable improvements in ecological status					
b) verifiable reductions in stress on ecological systems, and/or					
c) demonstrated progress towards these impact achievements					
What shortcomings (if any) do you believe that the project had in terms of:					Sub-contractors
a) Relevance (to GEF, Samoan and local priorities)					
b) Effectiveness (extent project objectives have been achieved)					
c) Efficiency of implementation					
d) Sustainability (financial, institutional, socio-economic and or environmental risks to sustaining long-term project results)					
e) Impact (reduced environmental stress, and or improved ecological status)					
What assumptions and risks do you think that the Project faced?					
Could you comment on the variances in expenditure between what was planned and what happened?					
What lessons were incorporated from other relevant projects (e.g., same focal area) incorporated into project design					
What was the planned stakeholder participation for the Project?					
What linkages were established between the Project and other interventions within the sector?					
What partnership arrangements were established for the Project (with relevant stakeholders involved in the country/region)					
What operational issues occurred during the Project?					
What corrective actions can you suggest for the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the project?					
What actions can you suggest to follow up or reinforce initial benefits from the project?					MNRE / PUMA
What proposals can you suggest for future directions underlining the main Project objectives					
What were the best practices in addressing issues relating to relevance, performance and success?					
What were the worst practices in addressing issues relating to relevance, performance and success?					

Questions used in consultation to derive Logical Performance Framework	UNDP	STA	Project Team	Participating operators	Other
What do you believe is the STA capacity to increase the resilience of the tourism sector of Samoa through mainstreaming climate risks into tourism-related policy processes?  (1=no capacity built 2=initial awareness raised 3=substantial training in practical application 4=knowledge effectively transferred 5=ability to apply or disseminate knowledge demonstrated)					
What do you think is the proportion of tourism operators who invest and implement sustainable adaptation measures to enhance their resilience?					
How many of the 6 TDA's have Management Plans?					
How many Management Plans across the 6 TDA's have been operationalised (have actions implemented)					
What proportion of operators in the TDA's have used the Guidelines for climate change adaptation?					
How many operators have accessed the Small Grants Fund?					
How many operators do you think have implemented risk reduction activities across the 6 TDA's?					
What proportion of women in tourism reliant communities do you believe have been trained in climate risk reduction?					
How many of the six TDA's have adopted climate resilient livelihoods?					

## 5.8.1 Signed Evaluation Consultant Agreement form



UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

Contract for the services of  
an Individual Contractor

No: IC.2017\_29

This Contract is entered into on 14<sup>th</sup> December 2017 the United Nations Development Programme (hereinafter referred to as "UNDP") Mr Simon McArthur, TESS TE consultant whose address is 112 Cleary Street, Hamilton NSW 2303, Australia.

WHEREAS UNDP desires to engage the services of the Individual Contractor on the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, and:

WHEREAS the Individual Contractor is ready and willing to accept this Contract with UNDP on the said terms and conditions,

NOW, THEREFORE, the Parties hereby agree as follows:

### 1. Nature of services

The Individual Contractor shall perform the services as described in the Terms of References which form an integral part of this Contract and are attached hereto as Annex I in the following Duty Station(s): SAMOA & HOME BASED

### Duration

This Individual Contract shall commence on 14<sup>th</sup> December 2017 and shall expire upon satisfactory completion of the services described in the Terms of Reference mentioned above, but not later than 30<sup>th</sup> March 2018, sooner terminated in accordance with the terms of this Contract. This Contract is subject to the General Conditions of Contract for Individual contractors which are available on UNDP website at www.undp.org/procurement and are attached hereto as Annex II.

### 2. Consideration

As full consideration for the services performed by the Individual Contractor under the terms of this Contract, including, unless otherwise specified, his/her travel to and from the Duty Station(s), any other travel required in the fulfilment of the Terms of Reference in Annex I, and living expenses in the Duty Station(s), UNDP shall pay the Individual Contractor a lump sum amount of USD 25,450.00 in accordance with the table set forth below<sup>1</sup>. Payments shall be made following certification by UNDP that the services related to each Deliverable, as described below, have been satisfactorily performed and the Deliverables have been achieved by or before the due dates specified below, if any.

DELIVERABLES	DUE DATE AND WEIGHTING (%)	AMOUNT IN USD TO BE PAID AFTER CERTIFICATION BY UNDP OF THE SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF DELIVERABLES
Travel costs & preparation of mission	14 <sup>th</sup> December 2017	2,545.00
Upon certification and approval by STA and UNDP of 1 <sup>st</sup> draft terminal evaluation report	12 <sup>th</sup> January 2017	10,180.00
Upon certification and approval by STA and UNDP/ RTA of the final terminal evaluation report	25 <sup>th</sup> January 2017	12,725.00
TOTAL VALUE		25,450.00

<sup>1</sup> For payments which are not output-based lump sum, indicate the maximum number of working days/hours/units, any out of pocket expense (travel, per diem...) and the corresponding fee/cost in the Deliverable (s) table.

If unforeseen travel outside the Duty Station not required by the Terms of Reference is requested by UNDP, and upon prior written agreement, such travel shall be at UNDP's expense and the Individual Contractor shall receive a per diem not to exceed United Nations daily subsistence allowance rate in such other location(s).

Where two currencies are involved, the rate of exchange shall be the official rate applied by the United Nations on the day the UNDP instructs its bank to affect the payment(s).

### 3. Rights and Obligations of the Individual contractor

The rights and obligations of the Individual Contractor are strictly limited to the terms and conditions of this Contract, including its Annexes. Accordingly, the Individual Contractor shall not be entitled to any benefit, payment, subsidy, compensation or entitlement, except as expressly provided in this Contract. The Individual Contractor shall be solely liable for claims by third parties arising from the Individual Contractor's own acts or omissions in the course of performing this Contract, and under no circumstances shall UNDP be held liable for such claims by third parties.

### 4. Beneficiary

The Individual Contractor selects beneficiary Jane Louise McArthur of any amounts owed under this Contract in the event of death of the Individual Contractor while performing services hereunder. This includes the payment of any service-incurred liability insurance attributable to the performance of the services for UNDP.

Mailing address, email address and phone number of beneficiary:

112 Cleary Street  
Hamilton, NSW Australia

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties hereto have executed this Contract.

By signing below, I, the Individual Contractor, acknowledge and agree that I have read and accept the terms of this Contract, including the General Conditions of Contracts for Individual contractors available on UNDP website at www.undp.org/procurement and attached hereto in Annex II which form an integral part of this Contract, and that I have read and understood, and agree to abide by the standards of conduct set forth in the Secretary-General's bulletins ST/SGB/2003/13 of 9 October 2003, entitled "Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse" and ST/SGB/2002/9 of 18 June 2002, entitled "Regulations Governing the Status, Basic Rights and Duties of Officials other than Secretariat Officials, and Experts on Mission".

The Individual Contractor has submitted a Statement of Good Health and confirmation of immunization.

AUTHORIZING OFFICER: Deputy Resident Representative  
United Nations Development Programme

INDIVIDUAL CONTRACTOR:

Name: Mr. Notarigo

Name: Mr. Simon McArthur

Signature: [Signature]

Signature: [Signature]

Date: 14 / Dec / 2017

Date: 18 / 12 / 17

## 5.9 Evaluation Consultant Code of Conduct and Agreement Form

### Evaluators:

1. Must present information that is complete and fair in its assessment of strengths and weaknesses so that decisions or actions taken are well founded.
2. Must disclose the full set of evaluation findings along with information on their limitations and have this accessible to all affected by the evaluation with expressed legal rights to receive results.
3. Should protect the anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants. They should provide maximum notice, minimize demands on time, and respect people's right not to engage. Evaluators must respect people's right to provide information in confidence, and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. Evaluators are not expected to evaluate individuals, and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this general principle.
4. Sometimes uncover evidence of wrongdoing while conducting evaluations. Such cases must be reported discreetly to the appropriate investigative body. Evaluators should consult with other relevant oversight entities when there is any doubt about if and how issues should be reported.
5. Should be sensitive to beliefs, manners and customs and act with integrity and honesty in their relations with all stakeholders. In line with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, evaluators must be sensitive to and address issues of discrimination and gender equality. They should avoid offending the dignity and self-respect of those persons with whom they come in contact in the course of the evaluation. Knowing that evaluation might negatively affect the interests of some stakeholders, evaluators should conduct the evaluation and communicate its purpose and results in a way that clearly respects the stakeholders' dignity and self-worth.

6. Are responsible for their performance and their product(s). They are responsible for the clear, accurate and fair written and/or oral presentation of study imitations, findings and recommendations.
7. Should reflect sound accounting procedures and be prudent in using the resources of the evaluation.

<b>Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form<sup>14</sup></b>
<b>Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System</b>
<b>Name of Consultant:</b> <u>Simon McArthur</u>
<b>Name of Consultancy Organization</b> (where relevant): SMA Tourism
<b>I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.</b>
Signed at <i>Newcastle (Australia)</i> on 16/5/2018
Signature: 

<sup>14</sup>[www.unevaluation.org/unegcodeofconduct](http://www.unevaluation.org/unegcodeofconduct)

6.10 Signed Evaluation Report Clearance  
Form

(to be completed by MCO and UNDP GEF Technical Adviser based in the region)

Evaluation Report Reviewed and Cleared by	
UNDP Multi-Country Office	
Name: Yvette Kerslake-Project Manager	
Signature: 	Date: <u>25/01/2018</u>
UNDP GEF RTA	
Name: Reis Lopez Rello	
Signature: 	Date: <u>04/20/2018</u>