Project Title: Conflict Prevention and Peace Preservation
Implementation timeframe: July 2015 – December 2017
Evaluation type: End of Project Evaluation

FINAL REPORT
(20 September 2018)

Richard M Chiwara, PhD
A. Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Sierra Leone, in particular the Governance Cluster for the support provided, including access to project documents, arranging meetings with key informants, as well as facilitating the visits to the provinces and districts.

In particular, the author would like to acknowledge the support given by Ms. Josephine Scott-Manga for her undivided focus and attention in arranging and coordinating the meetings with beneficiaries at the field level – Provincial Security Committees (PROSEC) and District Security Committees (DISEC) in all four provinces, including facilitating the author’s attendance as observer in some of the DISEC meetings. The author also wishes to express special thanks to Mr. Beamie-Moses Seiwoh, the former Project Manager, who although no longer with UNDP Sierra Leone, provided invaluable information and support, including comments to the draft report.

Disclaimer

Although the author based much of his conclusions and opinions on interviews and secondary information from project files and reports, the views expressed in this report are those of the evaluator and do not necessarily represent those of UNDP or its partners. The author takes full responsibility for any errors and inaccuracies.
B. Executive Summary

In line with its corporate policy to evaluate its development cooperation with the host government on a regular basis, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) commissioned the Final Evaluation of the project “Conflict Prevention and Peace Preservation” which was undertaken by an independent consultant over a period of 23 working days starting on 16 July to 22 August 2018.

The purpose of the evaluation is to generate lessons to deepen understanding of how the project was designed, managed and implemented, as well as identifying its results. And had the following specific objectives:

(a) Assess the performance of the project in achieving planned results and contribution to achievement of UNDP Country Programme Document (CPD), UNDP Strategic Plan and Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) development goals and results;

(b) Identify and assess the strengths, weaknesses, constraints and opportunities of the Conflict Prevention and Peace Preservation (CPPP) Project to recommend any necessary changes or course correction measures in the implementation and design of future similar development initiatives;

(c) Look at (the) peace infrastructure and draw out potential advantages it may bring to the Sierra Leone as formal infrastructure for conflict resolution and prevention; and

(d) Draw, based on above objectives, lessons and recommendations for sustaining the CPPP project results, and providing guidance for the future strategic direction of the CPPP in Sierra Leone.

The evaluation was based on analysis of secondary and primary data collected from various sources, including project quarterly reports, implementing partners’ (IPs) reports, interviews with key informants, minutes of project board meetings and focus group discussions (FGDs) with project beneficiaries. A major limitation was the loss of institutional memory among the key project stakeholders, as some officials and staff involved during the project formulation and implementation were no longer available due to staff turnover.

Summary of key findings

The overall project objective “to strengthen conflict resolution mechanisms in Sierra Leone by supporting national stakeholders in institutionalising systems for preserving peace through (i) an early warning and response system, and (ii) creating a culture of dialogues with a particular focus on engaging youth at risk”, is considered to be highly relevant and aligned to the country context as well as the needs and priorities of the government.
However, the project had some design weaknesses in the results, monitoring and evaluation framework, including output statements which describe activities that will be carried out, rather than the expected result of the activity; thereby making it difficult to frame relevant and appropriate indicators for the outputs.

Some of the project implementing partners (IPs) identified in the project document did not participate in its implementation, such as for example the Attorney General shown in the Project Document as part of the management structure.

All the planned project activities were implemented and completed, although the extent of contribution to the expected results was limited due to the scale of the interventions. The project supported deployment of conflict monitors in all 149 chiefdoms, but due to limited resources did not plan to support expansion of the CHISECs beyond the 15 border districts. However, the national early warning system (NEWS) established with UNDP support continued to produce early warning reports, including: weekly highlights of incidents as they occurred; situation tracking on current, potential or emerging threats to peace and human security with recommendations; quick updates on incidents and/or eminent threats to peace and human security at the local and national levels.

All four (4) milestones were achieved:

- 20 Chiefdom-level early warning systems and structures established by Nov 2015 – achieved;
- Communication structures for national early warning and response system reviewed by Dec 2014 – achieved;
- 20 early warning and response systems supported by Dec 2015 – achieved;
- 20 potential conflicts brought to attention of the national network of mediators by Dec 2015 – achieved.

With regards to the establishment and training of conflict mediators and dialogue facilitators, UNDP partnered with a local NGO – Advocate Plus-Sierra Leone. A network of 149 men and women were trained in conflict mediation and dialogue facilitation and deployed in all the chiefdoms as peace ambassadors. Some key informants noted however that there has been no follow up since the project ended in December 2015 due to lack of resources to provide the mediators with transport to travel outside of their communities to facilitate dialogue or mediate conflicts.
After the project ended in December 2015, UNDP continued implementing and refocused its interventions to civic education. However, some corporate programming principles were not followed, including:

(i) **Closing the project after its completion in December 2015 and conduct final project evaluation,**

(ii) **Obtaining a no-cost extension in order to continue project implementation after funding ended,**

(iii) **Seeking a project (and budget) revision to amend the project document.**

With regards to timely implementation and budget delivery, the components contained in the signed project document were completed on time and within budget. However, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) stopped funding the project in December 2015, after which all activities in 2016 and 2017 were funded only by UNDP.

The evaluation also found that the project the fundamental institutional infrastructure for early warning and response, in particular the CHISEC and DISEC structures were already in existence in the border chiefdoms and districts. These structures would likely continue beyond the project’s lifecycle, although the government lacked resources to expand this infrastructure beyond the border districts, and the project had not contributed to establishment of any additional CHISECs.

**Emerging lessons**

**Selection of appropriate IPs.** UNDP formulated the project based on continuation of United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Mission in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) previous roles in support to the security sector in promoting dialogue between political parties. However, the Office of National Security (ONS) was fundamentally an intelligence organisation, whose mandate and operation included an implied threat for the use of force, which would not be consistent with UNDP’s values of ‘doing no harm’ and human rights-based approaches.

**Engagement of national institutions.** Some of the project’s implementing partners (IPs) such as Attorney General (AG) did not participate in the project’s governance and implementation; and may have negatively affected beneficiaries’ access to justice as observed by some of the key beneficiaries.

**Revision of project objectives.** When UNDP continued the project in 2016 and 2017, and redirected its focus to civic education, some stakeholders had reservations as to the appropriateness of having the security sector institutions having governance oversight role over civic education activities.
Baseline data to benchmark end line performance. The project included a ‘capacity building’ component, and without a comprehensive capacity needs assessment, it was difficult to establish appropriate indicators and baseline data.

Impact as a long-term effect. While all planned activities under the project’s outcome 1 were completed, lack of follow up by IPs, with regards to the trained community monitors and conflict mediators may affect their effectiveness at the community level.

Induction training of IPs on UNDP procedures. Some of the early reports produced by IPs narrated the activities that had been undertaken without linking them to the expected results due to lack of familiarity with UNDP’s procedures about the required thresholds for micro-grants.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1. UNDP should strengthen RBM capacity and ensure that project design, including formulation of indicators adheres to basic standards.

Recommendation 2. UNDP should always base its project planning and design on comprehensive situation analysis, including analysis of its Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT), in order to ensure that its interventions are fully aligned with its core values and principles.

Recommendation 3. UNDP should ensure that its capacity building interventions are based on a comprehensive capacity needs assessment. This will establish a baseline that can then be used to assess the project’s achievement at the end of the interventions.

Recommendation 4. UNDP should ensure that all proposed partners are engaged and involved from the beginning, including in project design, implementation and monitoring.

Recommendation 5. UNDP should ensure that project management adheres to its corporate programming principles, including:
   a) Seeking extension of project timeframe through either no-cost or with-cost extension if the project is to be continued beyond its planned timeframe;
   b) Revision of project document if the project has to refocus its activities and outputs.

Recommendation 6. UNDP should strengthen local institutions, including targeted capacity building for local community-based organisations by involving them in the planning and implementation phase of the project in their localities.
**Recommendation 7.** UNDP should ensure that the project design includes support for monitoring and follow up as part of the sustainability plan and exit strategy.

**Recommendation 8.** UNDP should explore ways to expand its partnership and collaboration with other key stakeholders within the UN system as well as development partners and donors.

**Recommendation 9.** UNDP should continue supporting the initiatives for civic education, especially through:

a) Advocacy work leading to enactment of legislation and attendant policies and regulations for implementation of the national Civic Education Strategy;

b) Collaboration with NCD and other relevant partners to ensure smooth roll-out and implementation of the Civic Education Curriculum, both in the formal school education system and informal sector.

**Recommendation 10.** UNDP should strengthen its collaboration with NCD and continue supporting civic education initiatives already underway, including scaling up; to ensure that civic education is continuous and not only important in the short period around election cycles.
C. Table of Contents

A. Acknowledgements........................................................................................................... ii
B. Executive Summary.......................................................................................................... iii
C. Table of Contents............................................................................................................. viii
D. Acronyms ........................................................................................................................ ix
I. INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................. 1
   1.1. Evaluation Purpose and Objectives .............................................................................. 2
   1.2. Evaluation Methodology............................................................................................. 2
   1.3. Limitations.................................................................................................................. 3
II. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT.................................................................................... 3
III. PROJECT DESCRIPTION.................................................................................................. 6
IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS................................................................................................. 8
   4.1. Relevance .................................................................................................................. 8
      4.1.1. Relevance of project objectives ......................................................................... 8
      4.1.2. Relevance of the design .................................................................................... 10
      4.1.3. Project theory of change .................................................................................. 10
      4.1.4. Results, monitoring and evaluation framework .................................................. 11
      4.1.5. Selection of implementing partners .................................................................... 11
      4.1.6. Relevance of the governance structure ............................................................... 12
      4.1.7. Relevance of project activities .......................................................................... 13
   4.2. Effectiveness .............................................................................................................. 15
   4.3. Efficiency .................................................................................................................. 25
   4.4. Sustainability ............................................................................................................ 27
V. CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................................... 29
VI. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................... 31
   6.1. Lessons learned......................................................................................................... 31
   6.2. Recommendations ..................................................................................................... 32
ANNEX 1: DOCUMENTS REVIEWED..................................................................................... 35
ANNEX 2: INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED............................................................................... 36
ANNEX 3: EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE .............................................................. 38
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AfP</td>
<td>Agenda for Prosperity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWP(s)</td>
<td>Annual Workplan(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHISEC</td>
<td>Chiefdom Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPD</td>
<td>Country Programme Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPPP</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention and Peace Preservation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCoord</td>
<td>Chiefdom Security Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO(s)</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCCMC(s)</td>
<td>District Code of Conduct Monitoring Committee(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCD-P</td>
<td>Deputy Country Director Programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEX</td>
<td>Direct Execution (modality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISEC</td>
<td>District Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVD</td>
<td>Ebola Virus Disease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoSL</td>
<td>Government of Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSCoord</td>
<td>District Security Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Commission for West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPPB(s)</td>
<td>Local Police Partnership Board(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoEST</td>
<td>Ministry of Education, Science and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoYS</td>
<td>Ministry of Youth and Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAYCOM</td>
<td>National Youth Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCD</td>
<td>National Commission for Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEWS</td>
<td>National Early Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO(s)</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONS</td>
<td>Office of National Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>Peace and Development Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMSU</td>
<td>Programme Management Support Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPRC</td>
<td>Political Parties Registration Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROSEC</td>
<td>Provincial Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSCoord</td>
<td>Provincial Security Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBM</td>
<td>Results Based Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUNO</td>
<td>Receiving United Nations Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLP</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ToC</td>
<td>Theory of Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TORs</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ToT(s)</td>
<td>Training of Trainer(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDG</td>
<td>United Nations Development Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIOSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated office in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIPSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Peacebuilding Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRC</td>
<td>United Nations Resident Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRCO</td>
<td>United Nations Resident Coordinator’s Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAWG</td>
<td>Violence Against Women and Girls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WANEP</td>
<td>West Africa Network for Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WANEP-SL</td>
<td>West Africa Network for Peacebuilding – Sierra Leone (Chapter)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) corporate policy is to evaluate its development cooperation with the host government on a regular basis in order to assess whether and how UNDP interventions contribute to the achievement of agreed outcomes, i.e. changes in the development situation and ultimately in people’s lives. UNDP defines an outcome-level result as “the intended changes in development conditions that result from the interventions of governments and other stakeholders, including international development agencies. They are medium-term development results created through the delivery of outputs and the contributions of various partners and non-partners. Outcomes provide a clear vision of what has changed or will change in the country, a particular region, or community within a period of time. They normally relate to changes in institutional performance or behaviour among individuals or groups”.

UNDP commissioned the Final Evaluation of the project “Conflict Prevention and Peace Preservation” which was undertaken by an independent consultant over a period of 23 working days starting on 16 July to 22 August 2018. This report presents the findings and conclusions of the evaluation. The final version of the report will incorporate any comments made by UNDP after review of the draft.

The report is presented in five chapters as outlined below.

- Chapter 1 introduces the evaluation, including a description of the methodology.
- Chapter 2 describes the country context and nature of the development challenges in Sierra Leone, including Government’s strategies and plan for addressing the challenges.
- Chapter 3 contains a description of the project, highlight particularly the project strategy and theory of change model, as well as the results, monitoring and evaluation framework.
- Chapter 4 presents the findings of the evaluation and provides an analysis of UNDP’s contribution to the outcomes in the context of the agreed evaluation criteria.
- Chapter 5 contains the evaluator’s conclusions based on available evidence.
- Chapter 6 wraps up the report with a discussion of the emerging lessons the evaluator’s recommendations.

---

1 UNDP (2011); Outcome-level Evaluation: A companion guide to the handbook on planning monitoring and evaluating for development results for programme units and evaluators, p 3.
1.1. Evaluation Purpose and Objectives

The purpose of the evaluation is to generate lessons to deepen understanding of how the project was designed, managed and implemented, as well as identifying its results, whether intended or unintended. The evaluation is aimed at providing a perspective of the peace infrastructure and assess what advantages it has as a formal mechanism for conflict resolution and prevention.

As a final evaluation therefore, and specifically since the purpose is to generate lessons, this evaluation will be summative (Box 1). The evaluation will therefore assess all related processes, including work planning, implementation and management, delivery of outputs, and effectiveness of monitoring systems, in order to determine whether UNDP appropriately leveraged on its resources and capacity to contribute to the achievement of desired results.

Based on review of the evaluation terms of reference (TOR), the specific objectives of the evaluation are to:

(a) Assess the performance of the project in achieving planned results and contribution to achievement of UNDP Country Programme Document (CPD), UNDP Strategic Plan, and Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) development goals and results;
(b) Identify and assess the strengths, weaknesses, constraints and opportunities of the CPPP Project to recommend any necessary changes or course correction measures in the implementation and design of future similar development initiatives;
(c) Look at (the) peace infrastructure and draw out potential advantages it may bring to Sierra Leone as a formal infrastructure for conflict resolution and prevention; and
(d) Draw, based on above objectives, lessons and recommendations for sustaining the CPPP Project results, and providing guidance for the future strategic direction of the CPPP Project in Sierra Leone.

1.2. Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation was based on the five criteria laid out in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance,\(^2\) as defined in the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) guidelines.

\(^2\) The five evaluation criteria are: Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability and Impact.
The evaluation was based on analysis of secondary and primary data collected from various sources, including project quarterly reports, implementing partners’ (IPs) reports, minutes of project board meetings, interviews with key informants and focus group discussions (FGDs) with project beneficiaries.

The data collection tools included:

a) Desk review of project files and reports. The list of documents reviewed is in Annex 1.

b) Individual interviews with a total of 62 key informants, representing a cross section of stakeholders, including government officials, IPs and representatives of civil society organisations (CSOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community based organisations (CBOs). The list of individuals interviewed is in Annex 2.

c) Field visits to all four provinces and focus group discussions with (IPs) and beneficiaries as shown below:
   o FGD with District Security Committee (DISEC) members in Kenema town (Eastern Province);
   o FGD with IPs (Advocate Plus and SERVE - Sierra Leone) and Beneficiaries in Bo town.
   o FGD with DISEC members in Kambia town (Northern Province) and a representative from the Chiefdom Security Committee (CHISEC).
   o FGD with DISEC members in Makeni town (Northern Province).
   o FGD with staff of the National Commission for Democracy (NCD) in Freetown and Bo town.

d) A draft report of the evaluation was shared with UNDP and relevant stakeholder to validate the evaluation findings. The final version of this report incorporates their comments.

1.3. Limitations

The major limitation was the loss of institutional memory among the key project stakeholders. Some of the key informants had limited recollection of the project’s activities and were more familiar with a more recent related UNDP project “Conflict prevention and mitigation during the electoral cycle in Sierra Leone.”

II. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

This chapter contains a description of the development context in Sierra Leone, and focuses specifically on describing (a) the country context, and (b) the national response strategy as articulated in official Government of Sierra Leone strategies and plans.
There has been a United Nations peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone for the greater part of the 15 years from 1999 to 2014 due to the country’s civil war and political instability that is widely linked to its abundant diamond resources. After gaining its independence from the United Kingdom in 1961, the country’s politics were increasingly characterized by corruption, mismanagement, and electoral violence that led to a weak civil society and weak national governance institutions.

In October 1999, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1270 which established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) with a Chapter VII mandate to support implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement, support the government in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), establish a troop presence in key parts of the country, support humanitarian access, and enable secure and free movement for UN personnel.

UNAMSIL wound down its operations in December 2005 three years after the civil was declared officially over following successful elections in 2002. UNAMSIL was succeeded by the United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), which was authorized by resolution 1620 (31 August 2005) and began work in January 2006. This was later followed in October 2008 by the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), authorized by resolution 1829 (4 August 2008) and lasting until March 2014.

According to a 2015 study undertaken by the United Nations Country Team, many of the conflict dynamics that spurred the civil war were still present in Sierra Leone. The underlying causes and dynamics of conflict are summarised below:

**SECURITY AND JUSTICE**

- **Cross-border vulnerabilities**: The porous borders, and the influence of outside forces and conflicts in neighbouring countries, especially Liberia, was historically a major conflict driver in Sierra Leone.

**POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE**

- **Weak governance**: Patrimonial and corrupt government systems in which power and access to resources depend on personal connections contributed to an overall perception of injustice. A lack of transparency in government decision-making further impaired trust and confidence between the State and its citizens. Children and youth cited the confusing system of tertiary education scholarships for girls as an example where the education system lacks transparency and was not properly communicated.

---

3 Sierra Leone Conflict Analysis Summary, March 2015
to potential recipients. Widespread illiteracy disempowered women and men from various forms of economic, social and political inclusion.

- **Tribal and regional sectarianism**: Marginalization in rural areas and between regions created tensions and weakened the development of national unity. The curriculum prior to the conflict failed to contribute to social cohesion and did not allow for patriotic attachment or the celebration of tribal diversity.

- **Inequitable distribution of social services**: Massive regional disparities in social services, particularly education, created an imbalance of power in Sierra Leonean society. The elitist and exclusive nature of education, rooted in the colonial system, combined with the uneven provision of resources and services that favoured Freetown and the western part of the country, had been a key factor in driving conflict. Continued inequality in access to and quality of education for poor people, as well as a curriculum that did not reflect the country’s needs, was a source of resentment. Increasing concerns included the lack of access to services for children and young people with disabilities, and the growth of private schooling that marginalized those that cannot afford to pay.

**ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

- **Poverty and inequitable economic development**: Low levels of systematic vocational and skills training, and a mismatch between the education system and local economic needs resulted in large numbers of dropouts and left many young people unemployed. This was exacerbated by large populations of ex-combatants, many without jobs or education, who fell prey to divisive political groups. Many young people in the conflict analysis workshops called for diversified educational opportunities that could prepare them to become engineers, to develop skills in diamond cutting and polishing, and to be able to attend local tertiary institutions.

**SOCIAL ISSUES**

- **Youth alienation**: The inability to meet the educational needs and aspirations of young people, including involving them meaningfully in political processes and decision making and preparing them for employment, resulted in the feeling that they had no stake in the system. Alienated and uneducated youth were potentially drawn to violence, constituting an ongoing threat to security. Through consultations, young people explicitly linked their transition to adulthood, independence, self-esteem and peaceful citizenship to opportunities for education.

- **Poor quality and relevance of education**: An overly academic curriculum, centrally driven and with insufficient regional flexibility, was a source of frustration. The absence of civic, peace, human rights education and political literacy underpinned exclusion and prevented individuals and communities from taking ownership of their environment and exercising peaceful citizenship.
Social norms related to violence: Sierra Leonean society was permeated by a culture of violence, including high rates of gender-based violence. Despite new laws and the Code of Conduct for Teachers, violence also permeated the school system, and corporal punishment remained commonplace. The prevalence of violence on sports days and an emerging gang culture within secondary schools and higher education were also a concern.

Marginalization of women and girls: Women were marginalized by structural injustices that denied them access to education, land ownership, credit and marketable skills. As a result, women resorted to petty trading activities with low earnings potential. Gender inequities in access to education excluded girls from developing the skills and values to challenge exclusion and discrimination in civic, social and economic domains.

III. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

It is against the foregoing background that UNDP decided to develop the project ‘Conflict Prevention and Peace Preservation’ (CPPP) with the aim to support the strengthening of conflict resolution mechanism in Sierra Leone by building on existing systems and to fill potential gaps in the post-UNIPSIL operations.

The project was formulated in 2014 with planned implementation over a period of 18 months from August 2014 to February 2016. Seventy-five percent ($1,515,000) of the approved budget of $2,015,000 was funded by the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), while UNDP funded the remaining 25% ($500,000).

The project supported national institutions including the National Commission for Democracy (NCD), Political Parties Registration Commission (PPRC), Office of National Security (ONS), National Youth Commission (NAYCOM), and selected civil society organisations (CSOs) in institutionalizing systems for preserving peace through:

(i) Strengthening the national early warning and response system,
(ii) Creating a culture of dialogue with a focus on engaging with youth at risk, and
(iii) Reintroduction of civic education in formal and informal sectors.

The project strategy was to identify and train a network of chiefdom and insider-mediators and dialogue facilitators, as well as establishing an early warning and response mechanism at all levels of the administrative governance system in Sierra Leone. The project formulation articulated a specific theory of change (ToC) to guide activity design and implementation as illustrated below.
As reflected in the Project Document, UNDP planned to deliver four outputs and contribute to two outcomes as illustrated below.

**Figure 2. Project Theory of Change**

IF culture of open and constructive dialogue on issues of national concern is fostered, and citizens are empowered to participate in solutions; and actively interact with Enhanced National Early Warning and Response System, THEN they will identify causes of tension and coordinate their responses.

**Outcome 1.** Office of National Security (ONS) with the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) is able to monitor risks and threats to sustainable peace through an Early Warning and Response system and respond appropriately through a network of active insider mediators at national and local levels.

**UNDP Output 1.1.** National and local efforts for identifying and resolving tensions and threats of potential conflict through a National Early Warning and Response System (NEWRS) supported.

**Indicators.**
1.1a Number of threats identified by the conflict Early Warning and Response System.
1.1b Number of Chiefdom level early warning systems and structures established.
1.1c Number of new initiatives and youth engaged in the early warning and response activities.

**UNDP Output 1.2.** National Early Warning and Response System supported through a network of trained insider mediators.

**Indicators:**
1.2a. Number of coordinated responses by the insider mediators at the national and local levels.
1.2b. Number of insider mediators actively responding to conflict threats.
1.2c. Number of young men and women identified and mapped based on criteria established.

**Outcome 2.** A culture of dialogue established in which issues of national concern are discussed across political party lines and particularly amongst high-risk groups.

**UNDP Output 2.1.** A series of dialogues held across party lines and within targeted marginalized groups on issues of national concern.

**Indicators.**
2.1a Number of dialogues organized on issues of national concern.
2.1b Number of participants in the dialogues; 2.1c Number of dialogues across party lines.

Source: Adaptation from Project Document, p 9
IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS

This chapter addresses the evaluator’s findings based on analysis of the evidence obtained from desk research, interviews of key informants and stakeholders, as well as direct observation during visits fielded to four districts. The findings are grouped in accordance with the evaluation criteria as stipulated in the TORs.

The overall project’s performance is mixed, with some notable results achieved as per the planned objectives, while there were some shortcomings in some areas. In particular, the project’s engagement with relevant national institutions had some notable weakness, while also its implementation management may not have strictly adhered to UNDP’s corporate programming principles. Notwithstanding, the project contributed to strengthen national conflict management systems and mechanisms in Sierra Leone.

4.1. Relevance

As articulated in the TOR, UNDP requested the evaluation to consider ‘Relevance and coherence of CPPP Project objectives and design (including its theory of change, governance structure and delivery model) and activities towards realizing the desired results’.\(^4\) This section therefore discusses these aspects of the project in that specific order so that a comprehensive assessment is given for each one.

4.1.1. Relevance of project objectives

The project was formulated in a context when UNIPSIL had fully withdrawn its operations, which also meant that for the first time in 15 years, the UN Security Council had no direct focus on Sierra

\(^4\) Evaluation TOR, p3
Leone.\textsuperscript{5} Up to the time of its withdrawal, UNIPSIL had provided technical advice to District Code of Conduct Monitoring Committees (DCMCs) and District Security Coordinating Committees (DISECs) in managing political disputes and addressing security issues.

The fragility assessment undertaken in 2013\textsuperscript{6} showed that Sierra Leone was in the ‘transition’ phase, and it identified several gaps in governance processes, capacity constraints and disparities between the capital (Freetown) and provinces as key factors hindering the country’s full transformation.\textsuperscript{7} The report further noted the following priorities for improving the social contract between the state and its citizens:

\begin{quote}
“…support constructive cooperation and health democratic challenge between political parties,
“…conflict sensitive political reporting in the media,
“…effective capacity (of) local government and active involvement of local communities,
“…fostering(ing) harmony between different local actors and enhancing the authority of traditional leaders”.
\end{quote}

The 2012 report on the youth in Sierra Leone also noted direct correlation between past conflicts and the large pool of marginalised young people, particularly from rural areas.\textsuperscript{8} Subsequently, the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) noted that “one of the major challenges Sierra Leone faces is the high level of poverty and unemployment, especially among the youth, women and vulnerable groups. Youth issues remain critical for maintaining peace and promoting pro-poor growth”.\textsuperscript{9}

In light of the above, the overall project objective “to strengthen conflict resolution mechanisms in Sierra Leone by supporting national stakeholders in institutionalising systems for preserving peace through (i) an early warning and response system, and (ii) creating a culture of dialogue with a particular focus on engaging youth at risk”, is considered to be highly relevant and aligned to the country context as well as the needs and priorities of the government (Figure 4).

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{5} Project Document, p5
\textsuperscript{6} According to the Project document, the fragility assessment process in Sierra Leone was carried out with support from the G+7 Secretariat, ODI’s Budget Strengthening Initiative, DfID and UNDP
\textsuperscript{7} Fragility Assessment Summary of Results, 18 March 2013
\textsuperscript{8} Sierra Leone Youth report, 2012; National Commission for Youth and Ministry of Youth Employment and Sport
\textsuperscript{9} Agenda for Prosperity, p 100
\end{flushleft}
Figure 4. Alignment and relevance of project objectives to national needs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project objective</th>
<th>Government strategic objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 1.</strong> Office of National Security (ONS) with the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) is able to monitor risks and threats to sustainable peace through an Early Warning and Response system and respond appropriately through a network of active insider mediators at national and local levels.</td>
<td><strong>Pillar 7.</strong> Maintain the sustainability of peace, security and development in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 2.</strong> A culture of dialogue established in which issues of national concern are discussed across political party lines and particularly amongst high-risk groups</td>
<td><strong>Pillar 7.</strong> To increase confidence by citizens in the political system's ability to deliver inclusivity and effective representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pillar 7.</strong> To increase confidence by citizens in the political system's ability to deliver inclusivity and effective representation</td>
<td><strong>Pillar 8.</strong> To increase women’s participation and representation in decision making and leadership in the public sector, including security and local councils, and private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pillar 8.</strong> To increase women’s participation and representation in decision making and leadership in the public sector, including security and local councils, and private sector</td>
<td><strong>Pillar 8.</strong> To strengthen prevention and response mechanisms to violence against women and girls (VAWG)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.1.2. Relevance of the design

In assessing the relevance of the design, the evaluator relied on UNDP guidelines on programming, monitoring and evaluation; as well as principles of results-based management. In that regard, the evaluation noted some good practices as well as some weaknesses as elaborated below.

### 4.1.3. Project theory of change

The project strategy was to expand and strengthen capacity of the national early warning and response system in Sierra Leone and establish a network of chiefdom and insider-mediators and dialogue facilitators. The strategy was in sync with the project objectives as articulated in theory of change (ToC) – see also Figure 2 on page 7 above.

According to the United Nations Development Group (UNDG), a theory of change ‘is a method that explains how a given intervention or set of interventions is expected to lead to specific development change, drawing on a causal analysis based on available evidence’\(^\text{10}\). It is therefore

---

10 UNDG; UNDAF Companion Guidance: Theory of Change, p 4
a good practice that the project included a ToC in its design. The specific benefits for articulating a ToC are outlined in the UNDG guidelines, and include the following:

- It helps project management to systematically think through the many underlying root causes of the development challenge;
- It is useful as a tool for building consensus among stakeholders on how to tackle the development challenge.

4.1.4. Results, monitoring and evaluation framework

Some design weaknesses were noted in the results, monitoring and evaluation framework. UNDG guidelines on results-based management (RBM) define outputs as ‘the products and services which result from the completion of activities within a development intervention’\(^\text{11}\). The project formulation presented the UNDP outputs as a set of activities; for example:

*Output 2.1: A series of dialogues held across party lines and within targeted marginalized groups on issues of national concern.*

This statement describes the activity that will be carried out, rather than the expected result of the activity. This is not just an academic argument, because the problem with this kind of formulation is that it then becomes difficult to frame a relevant and appropriate set of indicators for the output. Outputs by their nature are results that should have their own indicators, baselines, targets and means of verification. The evaluator noted that the project design had only one set of indicators, which were labelled outcome indicators, and thereby leaving outputs without their own attendant indicators. It is therefore difficult to make direct attribution, or establish a causal linkage between the project’s outputs and outcomes\(^\text{12}\).

4.1.5. Selection of implementing partners

The project document identified its key implementing partners (IPs) as (i) Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA), (ii) Ministry of Youth and Sport (MoYS), (iii) Office of National Security (ONS), and (iv) National Youth Commission (NAYCOM), as well as (v) selected civil society partners.

These IPs were relevant basing on that the project was continuing on what UNIPSIL’s was doing prior to its withdrawal. However, as will be argued later (page 29), it seems counter intuitive to

\(^{11}\) UNDG; Results Based Management Handbook: strengthening RBM harmonisation for improved development results, p15

\(^{12}\) Project staff noted that output indicators were detailed out in the Annual Work Plans, which is the key project implementation document and in a CPAP Country Office is also considered as a project document in itself.
have security sector institutions as principal national counterpart for conflict mediation and later civic education. While UNIPSIL may have approached this from a broader mandate perspective that included security sector reform, UNDP may have required to do more introspection of its own comparative advantages and core principles (such as ‘do no harm’) in order to select more amenable national counterparts. In addition, as it later turned out, some activities required engagement with other line ministries and commissions which were not involved in the original design. For example, The Political Parties Registration Commission (PPRC) noted that they were not involved in the planning of the project and therefore were not familiar with the project, even though project reports show that some activities were undertaken with their collaboration.

Furthermore, as will be discussed in a latter section, some activities were implemented outside of the project document, which further required engagement of other IPs such as the National Commission for Democracy (NCD).

### 4.1.6. Relevance of the governance structure

While on paper the project seemed to have a representative and inclusive governance structure (Figure 5), there seem to have some inconsistencies in implementation. Based on review of available Board minutes, and oral evidence from key informants, some of the institutions did not participate in any of the Board meetings, such as for example the Attorney General.

---

13 Some of the staff involved at the time noted that UNDP made a decision at the time to assume that responsibility post-UNIPSIL

14 Project staff involved at the time noted that the PPRC was experiencing internal challenges at the time such that their staff consulted during project design may have left by the time of the evaluation

15 Key informants noted that all activities implemented in 2016 and 2017 were not planned for in the project document
Furthermore, as noted earlier, the project implementation diverted from its planned activities, and at that point we begin to see representation of institutions in the Board that were not in the original design. This will be discussed in greater detail in section 4.2 below, but for now suffice to say that the changes seem to have had a negative effect whereby key stakeholders had different expectations for the project. For example, some key informants felt that the project did not effectively support the electoral process leading to elections in March/April 2018\textsuperscript{16}.

As illustrated in Figure 5 above, the project was initially embedded in the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office (UNRCO), with direct oversight by the Peace and Development Advisor (PDA). However, the incumbent PDA left for personal reasons and the project was moved to the Governance Cluster of UNDP.

4.1.7. Relevance of project activities

Based on review of the annual work plans (AWPs) for 2015 as well as project board minutes, the project activities were in sync with its planned objectives. As illustrated below (Figure 6), the causal association between planned activities and UNDP is quite apparent.

Figure 6. 2015 planned activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Planned activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Supporting 40% female participation in Local Police Partnership Boards (LPPBs) to increase trust and gender sensitivity of emergency regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening the security architecture at the local level, including Provincial Security Coordination Committees (PROSEC) and District Security Coordination Committees (DISEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supporting and facilitating regular security sector meetings on the Ebola virus disease (EVD) response at local, district and national levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Establish network of 50 insider mediators in six districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capacitate 20 national level insider mediators to respond to EVD and related security threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identifying and mapping of 5,000 young men and women to participate in EVD training mapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Six dialogues held at national level with regional and local level representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>100 youths and women trained in mediation and dialogue facilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identify viable interest groups for inclusion in national dialogue processes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, based on information from key informants, ‘all the activities that were implemented in 2016 and 2017 were not part of the signed project document’.\textsuperscript{17} When asked why UNDP decided

\textsuperscript{16} While UNDP programme staff maintain that ‘elections was not a key output or focus of the project’, the evaluator makes the point to reflect different expectations as expressed by stakeholders
\textsuperscript{17} Telephone interview with key informant involved in the project during 2016 and 2017.
to implement activities that were not part of the signed project document, the same source responded as follows:

“The CPPP project ended on 31 Dec 2015 and no additional funds were provided by PBF, but there was an increase in Ebola related conflict between locals, security personnel and health workers who were in quarantined homes. UNDP saw the need to continue to strengthen the conflict resolution mechanism in Sierra Leone because it was a commitment made in the Country Programme Document (CPD)”.

Based on review of the 2016 AWP, the additional activities were intended to produce the following outputs, which were also different from the outputs in the project document:

- Output 1: Increased understanding of youth in civic right and their duties as citizens in promoting democracy;
- Output 2: A national policy developed that support(s) strengthened coordination of peace infrastructure for social cohesion;
- Output 3: Key national and international instruments including laws, policies, mechanisms and procedures for prevention of conflict/violence against women instituted at community levels.

However, according to the documentation provided to the evaluator, the AWP for 2017 introduced yet another output which was also different from the previous year:


Some key informants noted that the project design prescribed collaboration with the security sector, with MIA and ONS as the principal IPs. It was therefore counter-productive and inconsistent with UNDP’s norms and standards for security sector institutions to have oversight for civic education activities. However, project staff involved at the time noted that ONS project board membership ended after the PBF project cycle and did not participate in project board meetings after that.

Project staff involved at the time also noted that civic education was added post CPPP project document and that the ‘AWPs were signed with the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) as the line ministry responsible for Peace and Tranquility’. In addition, they also noted that the planned comprehensive conflict analysis was not done due to the sudden outbreak of the Ebola Virus, and consequently subsequent revision of the project were informed by decisions of the Project Board members.
4.2. Effectiveness

In this section, the evaluator provides an independent assessment of the project’s progress towards the expected outcomes as articulated in the project document. The assessment of outcomes was based on comparative analysis of the baseline data against planned targets for each of the outcome indicators. The second section of the assessment will focus on the additional activities in 2016 and 2017 that were outside of the project document.

At the time that the project was signed in August 2014, the country was grappling with the Ebola crisis, which affected implementation across most UNDP projects, and the project therefore suffered a delayed start. According to Project Board Minutes reviewed, ‘implementation was behind by a quarter due to circumstances beyond anyone’s control’. In that context, UNDP planned to contextualise the project by developing the 2015 annual work plan to respond to the crisis, while also contributing to the overall objective to preserve peace in Sierra Leone by proactively managing conflict through strengthened national early warning and response system to potential conflicts. In this regard, the project provided support to the Independent Radio Network (IRN) Sierra Leone in promoting the EVD campaign.

**Outcome 1. Office of National Security (ONS) with the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) is able to monitor risks and threats to sustainable peace through an Early Warning and Response system and respond appropriately through a network of active insider mediators at national and local levels.**

All the planned project activities were implemented and completed, although the extent of contribution to the expected results was limited due to the scale of the interventions. UNDP’s planned output (4.4) in its CPD was “national and local level efforts for identifying and resolving tensions and threats of potential conflict supported”. A review of the 2015 project AWP shows that UNDP planned to deliver this output from two project-level outputs:

- Increased cooperation and trust between security personnel and communities prevents conflict and contributes to halt of EVD;
- National early warning and response system supported through a network of trained insider mediators.

In that regard, a series of regional workshops were undertaken to sensitize members of targeted security sector institutions, including Local Police Partnership Boards (LPPBs,), PROSEC, DISEC,

---

18 Minutes of Project Board Meeting held on 2 April 2015, p2
19 IRN is a national membership network of 40 radio stations, with a multimedia studio at its Secretariat in Freetown and correspondents in every administrative district in Sierra Leone
CHISEC as well as community leaders, of their responsibilities and duty to uphold peace and conflict resolution. UNDP partnered with the local chapter of the regional non-governmental organisation (NGO) - West Africa Network for Peacebuilding – Sierra Leone (WANEP-SL). The NGO organised and conducted the workshops and training of security sector personnel. In the interviews conducted with members of the DISEC in the Eastern Provincial town of Kenema, the evaluator was informed that the project provided them with communication equipment such as IPADs and laptops, as well as several training workshops in which key stakeholders, including local and traditional leaders, chiefs, religious leaders, women and youth participated. Two IPADs were given to the Provincial Security Coordinator (PSCoord) and District Security Coordinator (DSCoord) to facilitate communications and relay of information up and down the security information chain.

Modules for training of Community Early Warning Monitors were reviewed by the WANEP Peace Monitoring Centre and used in the training of a total 153 community monitors who were subsequently deployed in all the 149 Chiefdoms (at the time). Based on information from key informants, these community monitors were still active at the time of this evaluation.

In that sense therefore, it can be said that ‘national and local level efforts for identifying and resolving conflicts were supported’ as per the country programme planned outputs. However, the project did not have resources to increase the number of CHISECs from the already existing 15 out of a total 149 Chiefdoms (now 169) in Sierra Leone. In the Southern Province for example, there are only 3 CHISECs, all of them in the border areas, while the province has 49 Chiefdoms. This means that the other 46 Chiefdoms that do not have their own CHISECs have to be covered by the four (4) DSCoord.

In addition, coordination between the DISEC and CHISEC also seems to be facing challenges even in those areas with established CHISECs. The CHISEC is chaired by the Paramount Chief, and its membership comprises, Chiefdom Speaker, all Section Chiefs, Youth Group Leader, Women’s Group Leader, 2 community elders, heads of security institutions, and civil society representatives. This is an inclusive and representative institution, which on

---

**Box 2. Key activities completed**

- 4 regional induction workshops with 240 participants (105 women; 135 men).
- Meetings with the 15 existing CHISECs in 4 districts to discuss inclusive security and the EBOLA threat with 80 participants (30 women; 50 men).
- Stakeholder workshops with 150 participants per district (76 women; 104 men).
- 8 open community dialogue sessions (2 per region) with 160 participants (72 women; 88 men).

---

**Box 3. Key informant’s perspective**

A key informant in Kambia noted ‘that the structures are out there on the ground but they are not being used’.
the face of it should be capable of generating broad based consensus for resolving conflict at the local level. However, as noted above, the CHISECs may not always function effectively. In Kambia district (Northern Province), it was found that some members of the DISEC were not aware that there were community monitors and mediators deployed as part of the early warning and response information flow. The DCoord was not aware that there were community monitors and conflict mediators in any of the Chiefdoms. Some of the key informants attributed this to turnover of staff and poor hand-over systems within their respective institutions.

The police commander in Kambia district confirmed that they had received 3 motor cycles, a laptop and printer, as well as office furniture for use by the trained members of their LPPBs. However, all the five members that had undergone the LPPB training had since been transferred although the LPPB in Kambia district was still functional, there was need for continuing training.

When asked about the key challenges hindering effective function of the CHISEC, key informants noted the following key constraints:

1. The outreach messaging was weak; it positioned the DISEC as the most relevant and effective conflict resolution institution. As a result, community members do not consider the CHISEC to have the capacity and authority to solve their problems, so they bypass it and go straight to DISEC.

2. CHISEC accountability had waned over time. During the early days when the project was providing support, there were quarterly feedbacks to the communities presided over by the District Officer. This practice has not been done for over a year now, and community members feel that the CHISECs are no longer useful structures.

3. The project had also created some expectations among CHISEC members which were not continued when the project ended. For example, refreshments were served at all CHISEC meetings, and members were given a stipend to cover their travel costs. These benefits are no longer available due to resource constraints, which has resulted in participation declining, especially for members coming from far distances.

The establishment, capacity and effective functioning of CHISECs is therefore critical to the project’s overall objective to strengthen national early warning and response capacity. The national security early warning and response architecture (Figure 7) is appropriate, inclusive and decentralised but currently inadequate to provide early warning and response nationwide.

---

21 While the decentralised security committees were functional, the point being made here is that the project support included deployment of community monitors as part of the early warning system. Key members of DISECs were not always aware of their presence and therefore were not using them to obtain information.
The project document also outlined some specific milestones, which were to be used to measure progress during the project’s life cycle. All four milestones were achieved.

- 20 Chiefdom-level early warning systems and structures established by Nov 2015 – achieved;
- Communication structures for national early warning and response system reviewed by Dec 2014 – achieved;
- 20 early warning and response systems supported by Dec 2015 – achieved;
- 20 potential conflicts brought to attention of the national network of mediators by Dec 2015 – achieved.

According to the project document, the evaluator noted that the full title of the project was ‘Developing national mechanisms and capacities for conflict prevention and peace preservation in Sierra Leone’. This means that the project design had a significant ‘capacity building’ component. However, a comprehensive capacity evaluation was not undertaken prior to project implementation. Based on available evidence, WANEP undertook workshops to identify existing gaps and map out conflict hotspots, as well as identify stakeholders prior to launching its activities. However, this fell short of a comprehensive capacity assessment as evidenced by the ongoing challenges that were expressed by members of the DISEC interviewed in Kenema town. Among the key challenges identified by all members of the DISEC representing a cross section of the security sector institutions were:
a) Mobility was generally weak across all institutions,
b) Inadequate communication equipment,
c) Inadequate conflict prevention procedures, due to lack of resources to do community outreach,
d) Non participation of the judiciary sector in the PROSEC/DISEC, thereby leaving a gap with regards to access to justice.

These are issues which should have been picked up through a comprehensive capacity needs assessment, and integrated into the project design. Based on the foregoing analysis, the evaluation found that the project’s contribution to expected results was mixed (Figure 8).

Figure 8. Assessment of outputs and contribution to outcome 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome 1. Office of National Security (ONS) with the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) is able to monitor risks and threats to sustainable peace through an Early Warning and Response system and respond appropriately through a network of active insider mediators at national and local levels.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicators:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1a. Number of threats identified by the conflict Early Warning and Response System;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1b Number of Chiefdom level early warning systems and structures established;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1c Number of new initiatives and youth engaged in the early warning and response activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baseline:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A National Early Warning System (NEWS) in place linked to the ECOWAS Early Warning System (ECOWARN) but not able to actively identify conflict threats or coordinate appropriate responses to these threats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Targets:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A national Early Warning and Response system in place and functional, and able to effectively coordinate responses to the identified threats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluator's Assessment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This outcome was achieved. Although not national, the NEWS is functional.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNDP Output 1.1. National and local efforts for identifying and resolving tensions and threats of potential conflict through a National Early Warning and Response System (NEWRS) supported.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicators:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1a. Number of threats identified by the conflict Early Warning and Response System;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1b Number of Chiefdom level early warning systems and structures established;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1c Number of new initiatives and youth engaged in the early warning and response activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baseline:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A National Early Warning System (NEWS) in place linked to the ECOWAS Early Warning System (ECOWARN) but not able to actively identify conflict threats or coordinate appropriate responses to these threats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Targets:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A national Early Warning and Response system in place and functional, and able to effectively coordinate responses to the identified threats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluator's Assessment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This outcome was achieved. Although not national, the NEWS is functional.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNDP Output 1.2. National Early Warning and Response System supported through a network of trained insider mediators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicators:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2a. Number of coordinated responses by the insider mediators at the national and local levels;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2b Number of insider mediators actively responding to conflict threats;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2c. Number of young men and women identified and mapped based on criteria established;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baseline:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No active insider mediators currently supporting the early warning capacity in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Targets:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A network of 50 insider mediators developed and deployed across the country. 30 trained youth engaged with the network of mediators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluator's Assessment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace teams were established in target districts and community conflict monitors in all chiefdoms.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The NEWS was established by UNDP through WANEP, however it was not funded during the March 2018 elections.

While the project supported deployment of conflict monitors in all 149 chiefdoms, it had no resources to support expansion of the CHISEC beyond the 15 border districts. However, the NEWS
system established with UNDP support continues to produce early warning reports, including:
weekly highlights of incidents as they occur; situation tracking on current, potential or emerging
threats to peace and human security with recommendations; quick updates on incidents and/or
eminent threats to peace and human security at the local and national levels. Other notable and
key outputs of the project include22:

- Monthly bulletins of qualitative and quantitative analysis on prevailing threats, and
  actionable recommendations directed at relevant state and non-state actors for early
  response,
- Policy briefs through a periodic publication on peace and security threats targeting policy
decision-makers for early response to conflict threats.

**Outcome 2.** A culture of dialogue established in which issues of national concern are discussed
across political party lines and particularly amongst high-risk groups.

As articulated in the project’s theory of change (Figure 2, p 7), UNDP based its strategy on the
assumption that citizens will be better able to manage conflict if they are empowered to
participate in developing solutions through open and constructive dialogue. Accordingly, UNDP
planned to actualise these assumptions by supporting a series of dialogues targeting specific
groups as well as providing training to and establishing a network of conflict mediators and
dialogue facilitators.

The attendant activities were implemented and completed as per the project plan in December
2015. However, available evidence suggests that there was no concerted follow up to ensure that
the project’s achievements have been sustained up to the time of this evaluation.

With regards to the establishment and training of conflict mediators and
dialogue facilitators, UNDP partnered with a local NGO – Advocate Plus and
SERVE-Sierra Leone. A network of 149 men and women were trained in conflict
mediation and dialogue facilitation and deployed in all the chiefdoms as peace
ambassadors. Some of the beneficiaries interviewed in Bo town (Southern Province) confirmed that they undertook training for a total of

---

20 hours divided into 4-hour sessions over five days (not continuously). Among the group of beneficiaries interviewed were a woman paramount chief, two section chiefs, and several youth including women and men. One of the young women conflict mediator said that after observing a high potential threat of conflict among market women, she went on a fundraising campaign to raise funds within the community. Using those funds, she purchased tee-shirts, banners and posters and organised a peace march for the women.

Key informants from Advocate Plus said that all the trained mediators were still active in their communities. However, they also noted that there was limited follow up since the project ended in December 2015. In Kambia town (Northern Province), for example, the DISEC members interviewed (including the DSCoord) were not aware of the work of these conflict mediators in the district. Advocate Plus officials also confirmed that due to lack of resources, they were unable to continue support to the network, especially in providing the mediators with transport to travel outside of their communities to facilitate dialogue or mediate conflicts.

With regards to the project’s support for dialogue on issues of national importance, UNDP partnered with HOPE Sierra Leone, a local NGO. The NGO held initial consultative workshops in all the country’s four provinces, with participants numbering 50 per district. In this connection, it is noteworthy that the key conflict driver at the time was around the national response to the EBOLA crisis. As narrated by one key informant:

“There was a lot of tension between citizens on the one hand, and Emergency Response Teams on the other. Citizens considered the deaths of their family members as negligence on the part of the emergency response teams, and this was creating conflict. The dialogue platforms helped to diffuse these tensions by raising community awareness about the Ebola virus, as well as educating them on prevention measures and interpreting the Community By-laws jointly established and enforced by traditional leaders and local administration authorities to contain the spread of the disease”.

Some officials of the NGOs that undertook the training as dialogue facilitators were interviewed in Makeni city. According to some of them, the project had not provided follow up support to enable them continue working. For example, one of them observed that ‘they required transport and logistical support in order to access some of the chiefdoms, which are 20-30 km away’. On further prodding, the beneficiaries also confirmed that they had also undertaken various other trainings, including participating in various workshops in addition to participating as members of the DISEC. The evaluator noted that the project had high risk of engaging the same community beneficiaries over and over again, perhaps because of unavailability of broad base of community based organisations.
Overall therefore, without adequate follow up, as will be subject to further analysis in section 4.4 below, the evaluation found that UNDP’s planned results were partially achieved, only to the extent that the indicators were formulated to measure numbers (Figure 9).

**Figure 9. Assessment of outputs and contribution to outcome 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Outcome 2.</strong> A culture of dialogue established in which issues of national concern are discussed across political party lines and particularly amongst high-risk groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDIP Output 2.1.</strong> A series of dialogues held across party lines and within targeted marginalized groups on issues of national concern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1a Number of dialogues organized on issues of national concern;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1b Number of participants in the dialogues;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1c Number of dialogues across party lines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1d Number of interest groups represented in the dialogues;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1e Number of recommendations made to the National Early Warning and Response System and to the network of insider mediators;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>UNDIP Output 2.2:</strong> A network of mediators and dialogue facilitators trained and established</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicators:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2a Number of youth trained in mediation and dialogue facilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2b Number of women trained in mediation and dialogue facilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2c Number of interest groups identified and mapped at the community, district and national levels for inclusion in dialogues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2016 and 2017 Annual Work Plans**

This section presents an assessment of UNDP’s performance and results achieved in 2016 and 2017. It is important from the onset to underline the fact that all activities that were implemented during this period were not in the original signed project document (see also page 14 above) and therefore could not be included as part of the preceding analysis and assessment based on the project document’s results framework. The following documents were reviewed by the author:

- 2016 Annual Work Plan,
- 2017 Annual Work Plan,
- Revised 2017 Annual Work Plan,
- Minutes of Project Board meeting held on 29 June 2016,
- Minutes of Project Board meeting held on 3 October 2017,
2016 Output 1: Increased understanding of the youth in civic rights and their duties as citizens in promoting democracy

As mentioned earlier, at this point planned activities as outlined in the project document had been completed in December 2015, and UNDP decided to continue the project by way of annual work plans. The planned activities for 2016 and 2017 are shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWP activities for 2016</th>
<th>AWP activities for 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Strengthening capacity of 14 youth-led groups (one per district) in promoting</td>
<td>1) Identify and map out 14 ToT facilitators for non-formal civic education as well as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democratic processes within and across political parties,</td>
<td>map out community interest group to benefit from the ToT,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Select and train 14-youth-led groups in civic knowledge, civic skills, and civic</td>
<td>2) Engage national institutions, including educationists, CSOs, women’s groups,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disposition,</td>
<td>media, curriculum developers etc., to participate and update the national non-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Mobilise the media in promoting active political participation of the youth and</td>
<td>formal civic education curriculum,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>produce dedicated TV and radio talk shows,</td>
<td>3) Facilitate the completion of the background research on the non-formal civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Supporting the National Youth Forum to campaign for political tolerance, voter</td>
<td>education curriculum to cover all regions,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education and good governance.</td>
<td>4) Holding of a national validation for the draft national non-formal civic education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>curriculum.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on review of the minutes of Board meeting of June 2016, UNDP awarded a micro capital grant for the implementation of activities associated with this output to Advocate Plus in March 2016. Advocate Plus then recruited a civic education consultant, and in May 2016 the consultant conducted a consultative workshop in preparation for the civic education needs assessment, and based on that, produced the National Civic Education Strategy. Advocate Plus undertook training of trainers (ToTs) for 14 youth groups (Activity 1 and 2 for 2016).

As was confirmed by key informants and evident from the attendance of the Project Board meeting, it is noteworthy that at this point UNDP had not yet engaged the NCD to fully participate.

---

23 Minutes of Project Board meeting held on 29 June 2016.
in the process for civic education due to the reason that it (NCD) had not gone through the assessment for Harmonised Approaches to Cash Transfers (HACT). However, based on review of the Civic Education Strategy, a number of recommendations were made, including *inter alia:* 24

- Developing and mainstreaming of civic education curriculum
- Implementation of civic education in all primary and secondary schools,
- Community engagement through informal and non-formal civic awareness,
- Development of training manuals and text books for civic education.

In 2017, UNDP then engaged the NCD, being the national institution with the mandate for civic education, to lead implementation of the planned activities for 2017. Based on key informant interviews, as well as review of the minutes of 2017 Project Board meeting, the first three activities (2017) were completed. 25 However, NCD proposed that the planned training be cancelled, and the funds be redirected towards completing the background research for non-formal civic education as the allocated resources had only covered 3 districts: 26

“NCD is requesting to re-direct the funds already allocated for the remaining activities (Conduct of a National Training of Trainers on Civic knowledge, Skills and Disposition that includes good citizenship, voter education, development education, education in democracy, and peace education) to cover the extension of the background research to include (sic) the whole country, and to hold a national validation meeting for the draft National Non-Formal Civic Education Curriculum”.

UNDP agreed to the request, and the background research was completed and validated leading to the production of the Non-Formal Civic Education Curriculum. It is again noteworthy that at this point, based on the attendance list of the Board meeting, the Ministry of Education was not yet engaged. This indicates the weakness arising out of an *ad hoc* approach to implementing activities without a formal project document. Key informants from NCD also observed that had they been involved in the planning from the start, they would have ensured a more comprehensive approach.

**Output 2:** A national policy developed that support(s) strengthened coordination of peace infrastructure for social cohesion;

**Output 3:** Key national and international instruments including laws, policies, mechanisms and procedures for prevention of conflict/violence against women instituted at community levels.

24 National Civic Education Strategy for Sierra Leone, p 23 - 26
25 Minutes of Project Board Meeting held on 3 October 2017, p 1
26 Ibid, p 2
There two outputs and their associated activities were not implemented\textsuperscript{27}. Accordingly, based on the foregoing analysis, the evaluation found that in 2016 and 2017, UNDP’s implementation focused primarily on civic education, which results were partially achieved. However, the outputs and their attendant activities were not in the signed project document, and therefore the Country Office did not follow its corporate procedures of:

- (iv) Closing the project after its completion in December 2015,
- (v) Obtaining an extension in order to continue implementation activities beyond the planned timeframes,
- (vi) Seeking a project (and budget) revision to amend the project document.

\textbf{4.3. Efficiency}

According to UNEG guidelines, efficiency measures how economically resources or inputs (such as funds, expertise and time) are converted to results. The evaluation TOR also specifically require the assessment to look at “efficiency of the support to CPPP project in its design, institutional arrangements, and strategies used to achieve expected and unintended results”\textsuperscript{28}.

With regards to timely implementation and budget delivery, the components contained in the signed project document were completed on time and within budget. Based on review of the PBF bi-annual reports, as of December 2015, the project activities had been successfully implemented within budget. It is also noteworthy that the Peacebuilding Fund stopped funding the project in December 2015, after which all activities in 2016 and 2017 were funded only by UNDP.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Outputs} & \textbf{BUDGET (US$)} & \\
\hline
Output 1.1 & 347,899 & 347,899 \\
Output 2.1 & 389,372 & 389,372 \\
Output 3.1 & 407,897 & 407,897 \\
Output 4.1 & 369,933 & 369,933 \\
Total & 1,515,100 & 1,515,100 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{PBF budget expenditure}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{27} Project staff involved at the time noted that these two outputs were not implemented due to lack of funds.

\textsuperscript{28} TOR p 3
However, it also appears that the project had challenges with regards to some of the efficiency benchmarks as outlined in the TOR. One of the major weaknesses was in the identification of IPs in the design. For example some of the key national partners were concerned that since they were not involved in the project planning and design, there had no institutional memory of the project. This also appears to have been the case in 2016 and 2017. Initially, the NCD not being HACT assessed, was not engaged as can be seen from the attendance list of the Project Board meeting in April 2016. Also in 2017, even after the project had completed the National Civic Education Strategy, which clearly indicated the need for formal civic education in both primary and secondary schools, the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, which has the mandate for formal education was not engaged, although they were later invited and participated in the consultative workshops.

Furthermore, UNDP could have leveraged on the expertise of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), who have better comparative advantage curriculum development and education policy.

Secondly, some IPs did not undertake the initial Micro Capital Grant inception training to give them an understanding of UNDP’s management approach and requirements in terms of result-based monitoring and reporting. As a result, the IP’s implementation progress reports for the first quarter of 2015 were of more of activity-based instead of result based reports. One of the IPs also noted that:

“We have challenges with UNDP disbursement of funds. At times we had to use our own resources for project activities, in order not to slow down the pace of implementation. However, even after we have used our resources from other projects, still UNDP has not reimbursed those funds because they require 70% expenditure of budget before they disburse the next tranche. This is a problem, because it means we have to keep digging into other resources in order to reach that 70%”

The project also faced efficiency challenges with respect to monitoring of activities, although some of these challenges were beyond UNDP’s control as noted by one key informant:

“During the Ebola outbreak, implementation of project activities was slow and then later put on hold because most of the activities were training/workshops and there was a ban on public travel”.

Box 5. “Some of the national partners like the PPRC complained that they were not part of the Prodoc design, so they decided not to participate initially, but that was resolved later”. Statement by Project Manager about challenges
In the final analysis, the question to be asked is – could the same results have been achieved at a lower cost, or did UNDP get ‘value for money’ as it is usually called? The answer cannot be determined with certainty. However, what has been provided by the evidence is that the project gave iPAD tablets and cellphones to various beneficiaries. When asked whether these were useful and being used effectively, the evaluator got surprisingly mixed responses. All the PSCoords and DSCoords said that the tablets had been very useful in enabling them to input, process and send data timeously. On the other hand, all DISEC members that were consulted were not aware that there were community monitors and conflict mediators out there who had been given mobile phones in order to feedback information. Furthermore, one of the key informants interviewed in Makeni town confirmed that she was given an iPAD tablet ‘which I still have, although I do not use it much’.

Furthermore, there were quite a number of activities which were initiated and not fully completed, such that they would not have produced the desired effect. For example, as noted in page 23 above, the 2017 activities to ‘identify and map out ToT facilitators for civic education as well as identifying community interest groups to benefit from the training’ were initiated and completed. However, the activities were left hanging as resources were re-directed elsewhere. This also raises questions about ‘value for money’.

4.4. Sustainability

Sustainability refers to the likelihood that the project’s processes and benefits will continue after the end of project funding. The assessment of sustainability is here examined from two perspectives – firstly, with respect to the project processes and results in the signed project document; and secondly with regards to the 2016/2017 activities.

The key project processes and benefits in the signed project document concerned the strengthening of a national early warning and response system, and promoting a culture of dialogue for peace preservation. With regards to processes for early warning and response, the evaluation found that the project interventions were an add-on to what already existed. The fundamental institutional infrastructure for early warning and response, in particular the CHISEC and DISEC structures were already in existence in the border chiefdoms and districts. In that regard therefore, these structures will likely continue beyond the project’s lifecycle. Clearly, the government lacks resources to expand this infrastructure beyond the border districts, but the project did not have resources to support establishment of any additional CHISECs.

It is however, not likely that the project’s specific interventions, including deployment of trained community monitors and conflict mediators will be sustainable. According to one DSCoord that was interviewed, “since assuming responsibility in this district in 2016, we have always relied on,
and used the systems that are in our standard procedures. I am not aware of any additional mechanisms such as community monitors and conflict mediators”

In Bo city, the IP that was responsible for training and deploying the conflict mediators also said that they lacked resources for constant follow up and monitoring to see whether or not the deployed mediators were still functional.

Nonetheless, it is also noteworthy that these interventions were not exclusive to UNDP. The evaluation noted that WANEP was also implementing similar interventions with support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In that connection therefore, the process will continue to the extent that development partners continue to prioritise conflict prevention. In addition, early warning is integral to any security architecture, and will therefore always continue, albeit with a different form and content.

With regards to the component on civic education, which was added in 2016, the evaluation noted two concrete outputs that were produced – the National Civic Education Strategy and the Non-Formal Civic Education Curriculum. Although implementation of both these outputs was yet to be done, these are still concrete products which will be there even beyond the project’s funding.

Some key informants said that the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology had indicated that civic education would be introduced in the formal school system at the beginning of the 2019 school year. With regards to non-formal civic education however, NCD officials noted that there was still a need for further advocacy work in order to get the government buy-in as well as support of the legislature so that the strategy and curriculum can be legislated into the national laws and policies. This would also help to ensure that civic education is harmonized across all non-state actors that may have interest in implementing the strategy.

The evaluation also noted that the NCD was already implementing some aspects of civic education, albeit in the context of support to the 2018 national elections. In that regard, some of the key civic education activities already started by the NCD include:
- Launching of the Peace Platform during which all political parties pledged their commitment to peaceful elections,
- Production and publication of various peace messaging tools and materials, including:
  - Print and broadcast media outreach messages on peace,
  - Town hall meetings,
  - Peace tours by various artists and celebrities,
  - Production of Sierra Leone National Symbols pamphlet in five languages,
• Production of the Sierra Leone national anthem and national pledge brochure.

The evaluation therefore finds that the component on civic education has likelihood of continuing after the end of project funding.

V. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter contains the evaluator’s independent interpretation of issues based on the foregoing evidence and analysis. It is not necessarily a summary of the issues already alluded to; but rather an interpretation of their meaning and implications for UNDP from the evaluator’s perspective. In essence therefore, the following conclusions are based on the evaluator’s impressions based on analysis of the evidence obtained.

Based on the foregoing analysis, there are two fundamental issues about the CPPP project. The first is about the project’s conceptualisation and design, including selection of national institutions as IPs. The second issue is about UNDP’s implementation modalities, particularly with regards to the period during 2016 and 2017 when project activities were implemented on the basis of AWPs only, without a signed project document.

In the evaluator’s opinion, UNDP may have put itself in an untenable position in which its activities were in conflict with some of its core values and principles.

When the project was initially conceptualized, it was mainly informed by a desire to fill the void left by the withdrawal of UNIPSIL in March 2014. According to the project document:

“Through the Peacebuilding Fund, assistance was provided for facilitating dialogue between political parties and promoting democratic governance in the country. At the local level, UNIPSIL provided technical advice to District Code of Conduct Monitoring Committees (DCMCs) and District Security Committees (DISECs) in managing political disputes and addressing security issues”

In this connection, following UNIPSIL’s withdrawal, UNDP identified the gap that was created, particularly with respect to the aspects of ‘dialogue between political parties’ and ‘promoting good governance’. Naturally, UNDP saw this as a good fit with its own core mandate for democratic governance. However, to continue the role of UNIPSIL, UNDP had also to adopt the

---

29 Project document, p5
partnership already established with the ONS who oversee the DISEC infrastructure; and this was even more compelling as the Peacebuilding Fund was going to continue funding the initiatives.

A review of the ONS mandate shows that it is fundamentally an intelligence organisation:

**ONS Mandate.** To coordinate the activities of security sector institutions with the view of ensuring that a concerted government approach is adopted in addressing issues relating to the security of the state and its people. Furthermore, the ONS has the mandate to coordinate the prevention and response to all national emergencies both natural and human-made.

**ONS Mission:** To effectively coordinate national security and intelligence architecture with the aim of creating an enabling environment for sustainable national development, poverty reduction and conflict prevention.30

UNIPSIL would have been operating with a much broader mandate, and most probably with dedicated expertise for civil-military relations through its integral structures such as Civil Affairs Division. Therein lay the dilemma as UNDP would now find itself in support of the national intelligence network, albeit with a secondary mandate for disaster management. This may not cast a positive light on UNDP’s values of impartiality and neutrality as was also observed by some of the key informants that were consulted.

The dilemma of working with and through the security and intelligence sector to promote dialogue and conflict resolution is twofold. Firstly, good governance concerns the relationship between the state and civil society, and specifically the way in which state power is exercised, with emphasis on dialogue between the government and citizens. On the other hand, the security sector is focused on ensuring security of the state, and most of the institutions that are charged with that duty are authorized to use or threaten the use of force, if necessary in order to fulfill this function. There is therefore a lingering and implied threat of force, which is counter-productive to the project’s overall objective of conflict resolution through dialogue.

Secondly, there is a salient presumption of secrecy in intelligence work, which limits the amount of information that the service is willing to share about its activities. For the project to adopt the ONS as its principal IP would therefore always present a dichotomy.

30 www.ons.gov.sl/
In the evaluator’s opinion therefore, when the project refocused its support to civic education and engaged the NCD as principal IP, this was more in sync with UNDP’s core values and principles. However, for UNDP to have continued implementing the project, firstly without seeking an extension of the project timeline after it ended in December 2015; and secondly without revising the project document to accommodate these new activities was also not in line with its corporate programming guidelines. Overall however, the shift towards support for civic education, including engaging the NCD as principal IP was a positive adjustment, and much more strategic in terms of potential long-term impact.

VI. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter is based on further in-depth review of the project’s processes, from its design, implementation, monitoring and reporting, and based on that, identifies the emerging lessons and proposes eight specific recommendations for consideration by UNDP in its future programming.

6.1. Lessons learned

**Lesson 1. The selection of appropriate IPs requires a comprehensive situation review, including inward-looking analysis of UNDP’s Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT).**

UNDP formulated the project based on continuation of UNIPSIL previous roles in support to the security sector in promoting dialogue between political parties (page 9). However, the ONS is fundamentally an intelligence organisation, whose principal mandate is the coordination of the security and intelligence sectors. The implied threat for the use of force that underlies the core function of security organisations therefore places UNDP in a difficult position to reconcile its principles of ‘doing no harm’ and human rights-based approaches. A comprehensive SWOT analysis should have helped UNDP to identify more amenable national institutions to partner with in terms of promoting and facilitating broad-based dialogue and conflict resolution.

**Lesson 2. Participation of national institutions cannot be guaranteed if they are not engaged and involved from the beginning, including in project design, implementation and monitoring.**

The project document indicates the Attorney General (AG) as member of the project governance structure. However, a review of project board minutes shows that the AG did not participate in any of the meetings (page 12). In addition, DISEC members in Kenema observed the absence of the judiciary sector negatively affected beneficiaries’ access to justice (page 19). Also, as at the time of this evaluation, the PPRC said they were not aware of the project, even though UNDP lists it among its IPs and beneficiaries.
Lesson 3. The consensus of key stakeholders can be lost if the project focus is changed without following due process.

UNDP continued the project in 2016 and 2017, and redirected its focus to civic education without seeking either an extension of the project or revising the project document (page 14). As a result, some stakeholders had reservations as to the appropriateness of having the security sector institutions having governance oversight role over civic education activities.

Lesson 4. Without a comprehensive capacity needs assessment, the project design cannot establish appropriate baseline data against which to benchmark end line performance.

Although the project focus was essentially on ‘capacity building’, there was no evidence of a comprehensive capacity needs assessment (page 18). This has effect on the project design in terms of identifying appropriate results and performance indicators.

Lesson 5. Intended impact is a long-term effect which cannot be presumed only on the basis of completion of activities.

While all planned activities under the project’s outcome 1 were completed (page 15), there was no follow up by IPs, with regards to the trained community monitors and conflict mediators (pages 17-19). As a result, their direct impact at the community level remained a matter of conjecture.

Lesson 6. Effective management of the project, especially with regards to grant disbursement, can be affected if IPs are not given adequate training on UNDP procedures.

Most of the reports produced by IPs narrated the activities that had been undertaken without linking them to the expected outputs/results (page 25). Some IPs were not familiar with UNDP procedures about the required thresholds for micro-grants.

6.2. Recommendations

In view of the foregoing conclusions and lessons learned, the author proposes ten specific recommendations for UNDP’s consideration in its future programming.

Evaluation issue. The project had weak design of its results, monitoring and evaluation framework, including for example the output statement which were articulated as statements of activities, thereby making it difficult to derive appropriate result indicators (page 11).
**Recommendation 1.** UNDP should strengthen RBM capacity and ensure that project design, including formulation of indicators adheres to basic standards.

**Evaluation Issue.** There was a dilemma of working with and through the security and intelligence sector to promote dialogue and conflict resolution given the security sector’s implied potential to use or threaten the use of force (pages 12 and 29).

**Recommendation 2.** UNDP should always base its project planning and design on comprehensive situation analysis, including analysis of its Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT), in order to ensure that its interventions are fully aligned with its core values and principles.

**Evaluation issue.** The project focus was essentially on capacity building, but there was no evidence that a comprehensive capacity evaluation was undertaken prior to project implementation, other than a series of workshops undertaken by WANEP prior to launching its activities (page 18).

**Recommendation 3.** UNDP should ensure that its capacity building interventions are based on a comprehensive capacity needs assessment. This will establish a baseline that can then be used to assess the project’s achievement at the end of the interventions.

**Evaluation issue.** Some of the institutions proposed in the project design as project board members did not participate in any of the Board meetings (page 12). Consequently, their field level staff did not participate in project activities, such as for example the justice sector (page 19).

**Recommendation 4.** UNDP should ensure that all proposed partners are engaged and involved from the beginning, including in project design, implementation and monitoring.

**Evaluation issue.** The initial project was designed to end in December 2015, and all its planned activities were implemented and completed within that timeframe. However, UNDP continued funding and implementing different activities under the project up to December 2017 (pages 14-15 and 22-24).

**Recommendation 5.** UNDP should ensure that project management adheres to its corporate programming principles, including:

- c) Seeking extension of project timeframe through either no-cost or with-cost extension if the project is to be continued beyond its planned timeframe;
- d) Revision of project document if the project has to refocus its activities and outputs.
**Evaluation issue.** Some NGOs that undertook the training as dialogue facilitators noted that the project had not provided follow up support to enable them continue working, and some of them had also undertaken various other trainings, including participating in various workshops in addition to participating as members of the DISEC. The project had high risk of engaging the same community beneficiaries over and over again (page 21).

**Recommendation 6.** UNDP should strengthen local institutions, including targeted capacity building for local community-based organisations by involving them in the planning and implementation phase of the project in their localities.

**Recommendation 7.** UNDP should ensure that the project design includes support for monitoring and follow up as part of the sustainability plan and exit strategy.

**Evaluation issue.** The evaluation noted that WANEP was also implementing similar interventions with support from the USAID (page 27), and UNDP did not leverage on the expertise of other UN agencies such as UNESCO, who have better comparative advantage curriculum development and education policy (page 25).

**Recommendation 8.** UNDP should explore ways to expand its partnership and collaboration with other key stakeholders within the UN system as well as development partners and donors.

**Evaluation issue.** There was still a need for further advocacy work around civic educations in order to get the government buy-in as well as support of the legislature so that the strategy and curriculum can be legislated into the national laws and policies. This would also help to ensure that civic education is harmonized across all non-state actors that may have interest in implementing the strategy (page 28).

**Recommendation 9.** UNDP should continue supporting the initiatives for civic education, especially through:

- (e) Advocacy work leading to enactment of legislation and attendant policies and regulations for implementation of the national Civic Education Strategy;
- (f) Collaboration with NCD and other relevant partners to ensure smooth roll-out and implementation of the Civic Education Curriculum, both in the formal school education system and informal sector.

**Evaluation issue.** NCD was already implementing some aspects of civic education, albeit in the context of support to the 2018 national elections (page 28).

**Recommendation 10.** UNDP should strengthen its collaboration with NCD and continue supporting civic education initiatives already underway, including scaling up; to ensure that civic education is continuous and not only important in the short period around election cycles.
ANNEX 1: DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

7. DEX Quarterly Report, Q1-2015.
8. DEX Quarterly Report, Q2-2015.
10. List of Chiefdom Monitors.
15. Policy Brief on Constitutional Crisis in Sierra Leone, April 2015.
17. Minutes of Project Board Meeting, April 2015.
22. WANEP Project Progress Report, Q3-2015.
27. Non-Formal Civic Education Curriculum for Sierra Leone.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>DESIGNATION</th>
<th>ORGANISATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caulker, A.</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>ONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daurd, O.</td>
<td>Mediation and Programs Officer</td>
<td>PPRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jombla, E.</td>
<td>Regional Conflict Analyst</td>
<td>WANEP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keili, F.</td>
<td>Director, Planning</td>
<td>ONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahoi, I.</td>
<td>National Coordinator</td>
<td>WANEP-SL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moseray, Z.</td>
<td>Acting Registrar, a.i.</td>
<td>PPRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nalwoga, A.</td>
<td>Head, Governance Cluster</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pratt, M. (Dr.)</td>
<td>Minister, Tourism and Culture</td>
<td>GoSL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rossi, S.</td>
<td>Peace and Development Advisor</td>
<td>UNRCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott-Manga, J.</td>
<td>Programme Specialist</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seiwoh, M.</td>
<td>Former Project Officer</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wandi, A.</td>
<td>Project Manager, CPM project</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamara, A.</td>
<td>District Security Coordinator (Kenama)</td>
<td>ONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will, A.</td>
<td>Provincial Security Coordinator (Eastern)</td>
<td>ONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sannol, A.</td>
<td>Regional Head, Civil Society Movement</td>
<td>Eastern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sevresie, G.</td>
<td>Admin Officer, National Fire Force</td>
<td>Kenama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sularay, A.</td>
<td>Imam, Inter Religious Council</td>
<td>Kenama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pewa, A.</td>
<td>Local Security Assistant</td>
<td>UNDSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansarey, P.</td>
<td>Regional Support Officer, East</td>
<td>SLCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seffe, J.</td>
<td>Regional Operations Officer, East</td>
<td>SLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bockane, G.</td>
<td>Officer in Charge, Eastern</td>
<td>MLSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu, J. (Maj)</td>
<td>Operations Officer, 2 Bn.</td>
<td>RSLAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bundu, D. (Lt.)</td>
<td>Intelligence Officer, 2 Bn.</td>
<td>RSLAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangura, M.</td>
<td>Regional Security Coordinator, Southern</td>
<td>ONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M’bayo, A.</td>
<td>District Security Coordinator, Bo</td>
<td>ONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamara, A.</td>
<td>District Security Coordinator, Kambia</td>
<td>ONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samura, O.</td>
<td>District Officer, Kambia</td>
<td>MLG&amp;RD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangura, A.</td>
<td>Local Unit Commander, Kambia</td>
<td>SLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayiah, M. (Maj)</td>
<td>Second in Command, Kambia</td>
<td>RSLAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamin, F.</td>
<td>Police Intelligence Officer, Kambia</td>
<td>SLCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jusu, E.</td>
<td>Officer in Charge, Kambia</td>
<td>SLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foganah, I.</td>
<td>Coordinator, Kambia</td>
<td>WANEP-SL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangbo, E.</td>
<td>Operations Officer, Kambia</td>
<td>SLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamela, S.</td>
<td>Chairperson, CSOs</td>
<td>Kambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>DESIGNATION</td>
<td>ORGANISATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Sesay, A.</td>
<td>Trained Conflict Mediator</td>
<td>Bo District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Monserrey, A.</td>
<td>Trained Conflict Mediator</td>
<td>Kenema</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Sherrif, M.</td>
<td>Trained Conflict Mediator</td>
<td>Pujhun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Bangali, Z.</td>
<td>Trained Conflict Mediator</td>
<td>Benthal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Sillah, M.</td>
<td>Trained Conflict Mediator</td>
<td>Pejehun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Kallay, Y.</td>
<td>Trained Conflict Mediator</td>
<td>Bo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. Bangura, Z.</td>
<td>Trained Conflict Mediator</td>
<td>Ngoyamba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. Bockarie, F.</td>
<td>Trained Conflict Mediator</td>
<td>Kailahun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. Gandi, S.</td>
<td>District Sec Coordinator, Bombali</td>
<td>ONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. Kamara, A.</td>
<td>Provincial Sec Coordinator, North</td>
<td>ONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. Samu, M.</td>
<td>Commissioner, South</td>
<td>NCD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. Kamara, M.</td>
<td>Monitoring Officer, South</td>
<td>NCD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. Abdulai, M.</td>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>NaCSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. Kamara, M.</td>
<td>National Coordinator</td>
<td>LIFT-SL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49. Kargbo, P.</td>
<td>Chief Executive</td>
<td>Serve-SL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. Sedric, M.</td>
<td>Administration Secretary</td>
<td>Serve-SL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51. Moriba, C.</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
<td>Serve-SL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52. Gbia, A.</td>
<td>Office Secretary</td>
<td>Serve-SL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53. Lonsama, A.</td>
<td>M&amp;E Officer</td>
<td>Serve-SL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54. Sesay, M.</td>
<td>Procurement Officer</td>
<td>Serve-SL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55. Jingo, E.</td>
<td>Chairperson, Human Rights</td>
<td>Bombali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56. Sesay, J.</td>
<td>Representative, North</td>
<td>WANEP-SL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57. Sesay, B.</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
<td>WAHD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58. Kargbo, A</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>NCD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59. Conteh, B.</td>
<td>Commissioner, North</td>
<td>NCD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60. Gabrsi, I.</td>
<td>Research and Monitoring Manager</td>
<td>NCD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61. Bah, I.</td>
<td>Senior M&amp;E Officer</td>
<td>NCD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62. Macfoy, B.</td>
<td>Commissioner, West</td>
<td>NCD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX 3: EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE

Conflict Prevention and Peace Preservation end of Project Evaluation

1. Background

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Preservation (CPPP) effectively commenced in July 2014 following the complete closure of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), UNDP continued to strengthening national and local efforts for identifying and resolving tensions and threats of potential conflict, especially over political affiliation, ethnicity, and natural resources to avoid the eruption of violence and assisting the country to achieve its long term development objectives as articulated in the country’s Agenda for Prosperity (2013-2018) and United Nations Development Assistant Framework (UNDAF 2015-2018).

The project aimed to strengthen conflict resolutions mechanism in Sierra Leone by building on existing systems and to fill potential gaps in the post UNIPSIL operations. The project supported national institutions including the National Commission for Democracy (NCD), Political Parties Registration Commission(PPRC), Office of National Security (ONS), National Youth Commission (NaYCOM), and selected civil society partners like the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), HOPE Sierra Leone and Advocate Plus in institutionalizing systems for preserving peace through i) an early warning and response system, ii) creating a culture of dialogue with a focus on engaging with youth at risk, and iii) reintroduction of civic education in formal and informal sectors.

In addition, the project identified and trained a network of chiefdom and insider-mediators/dialogue facilitators; established an early warning and response mechanisms; and established chiefdom, district, regional and national dialogue sessions where issues of national concern were discussed across political party lines and particularly amongst high-risk groups.

2. Purpose of Evaluation

The evaluation is expected to look at all aspects of the Conflict Prevention and Peace Preservation Project from inception up to the time of the evaluation. The evaluation will also provide an important input into the formulation of future UNDP’s support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding initiatives, especially in the light of changes Sierra Leone has undergone in peace consolidation and national cohesion since the closure of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL).

The evaluation will focus on learning for improving and adjusting the support to CPPP Project design, governance and operations. The evaluation focus will also be guided by the standard evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. It will also capture leveraged and unintended support and results to Conflict Prevention and Peace Preservation development project (if any), as well as other pertinent evaluation criteria such as equity, gender equality, south-south collaboration and human rights.
The end of project evaluation is aimed at:

- Learning lessons and deepening the understanding of how the CPPP project was designed, set up, managed and delivered. The evaluation will generate useful lessons especially on the design, management and quality of results generated by the project for improving the quality of similar and future initiatives;
- Accounting for various investment in terms of the intended and unintended results; the end of project evaluation will also provide essential information on intended and unintended results to donors and partners to account for all investments to CPPP Project;
- Look at peace infrastructure component and draw out potential advantages it may bring to the country as formal infrastructure for conflict resolution and prevention. Informing decisions on the way forward and possible correction measures, as well as the sustainability, scalability and replicability of the CPPP Project interventions.

Objective of the Evaluation

The main objective of this end of project evaluation is to assess the progress in terms of achieving the projects stated objectives and results. The evaluation will also assess UNDP’s contribution to CPPP processes in Sierra Leone as well as to inform the design of the new project document for the Support to CPPP Project (2014–2017). The specific objectives of the evaluation are as follows:

- Assess the performance of the project in achieving planned results and contribution to achievement of UNDP Country Programme Document (CPD), UNDP Strategic Plan and Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) development goals and results;
- Identify and assess the strengths, weaknesses, constraints and opportunities of the CPPP Project to recommend any necessary changes or course correction measures in the implementation and design of future similar development initiatives;
- Look at peace infrastructure and draw out potential advantages it may bring to the Sierra Leone as formal infrastructure for conflict resolution and prevention, and
- Draw, based on above objectives, lessons and recommendations for sustaining the CPPP project results, and providing guidance for the future strategic direction of the CPPP in Sierra Leone.

3. Scope of the Evaluation

The evaluation will cover all activities undertaken in the project and the period from inception to the time of the evaluation. It is expected to meet International and United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) standards and guidelines, and at a minimum, apply the following review criteria:

- Effectiveness of the CPPP Project in achieving or likely achieving expected and unintended results;
- Relevance and coherence of CPPP Project objectives and design (including its theory of change, governance structure and delivery model) and activities towards realizing the desired results;
- Efficiency of the Support to CPPP Project in its design, institutional arrangements, and strategies used to achieve expected and unintended results;
- Sustainability of the support to CPPP Project activities and results including the focus on scalability and replicability;
To the extent possible, the evaluation is also expected to capture and highlight initial impacts and provide recommendations to ensure the project continues its trajectory to deliver the intended impact.

Within the above criteria and as appropriate, the evaluation is also expected to cover the following:

- An assessment of whether programme’s partnership strategy was adequate and effective including the range and quality of partnerships and collaboration developed with government, civil society, donors, the private sector and whether these contributed to improved programme delivery and attainment of results. The evaluation is also expected to assess how synergies were built with other state and non-state programmes/projects that contribute to CPPP.
- An assessment of how the cross-cutting themes and UN programme design attributes such as Human Rights, Equity, Gender Equality etc. were integrated in the programme design and implementation, as well as results and social effects of these interventions.
- Integrate capacity assessments of supported institutions to include but not be limited to assessment of changes in capacities for evidence based policy, legal framework, strategy and programme development, systems and in other areas.

4. Methodology of the Assignment

Based on UNDP guidelines for end of project evaluation, and in consultations with UNDP Sierra Leone, the evaluation will be inclusive and participatory, involving all principal stakeholders. The evaluation will consider the social, political and economic context which have affected the overall performance of the project considering EVD related factors. The review methods will include, but will not be limited to the following provided they are agreed at the inception phase: During the evaluation, the consultant is expected to apply but is not limited to the following approaches for data collection and analysis:

- Key informant interviews with UNDP Senior Management and Project Staff;
- Desk review of relevant documents including policy frameworks, legal frameworks, national strategies, evaluation reports, project progress reports and any other necessary references including related reports on CPPP in Sierra Leone;
- Interviews with partners and stakeholders, government officials, service providers including CSO partners, Development Partners and/or Donors, strategic partners on CPPP;
- Field visits;
- Case studies for comprehensive examination and cross comparison of cases to obtain in-depth information.

The consultant is expected to develop a detailed evaluation plan and an evaluation design matrix showing methods of addressing key evaluation criteria and objectives as part of the inception report. He/she will submit a short inception report that will also describe:

- How he/she understood the programme theory of change in developing the evaluation plan
- The detailed evaluation plan, indicating the methods to be used and information sources to be looked at for each evaluation question.
The evaluation will be carried out in accordance with UN Evaluation Group evaluation standards which emphasize the need for: Independence, Credibility, Utility, Impartiality, Transparency, Disclosure, Ethics, and Participation

5. **Management Arrangements**

The presence of an international consultant would be an added advantage given the safeguard independence and impartiality of the evaluation. The consultant will have the support of the Programme Management Support Unit and Governance Cluster in the country office will provide the evaluator an overview of the project, as well as the results of preliminary data collection and analysis, which will include contextual information, project and outcome monitoring data, and relevant documents including project documents, progress reports and evaluation reports.

The Head of PMSU will be the evaluation manager. The Consultant will report to the evaluation manager and the Project Manager, CPPP Project. A reference group will be established to provide additional support and quality assurance to the evaluation, as well as working closely with the evaluation manager in reviewing the terms-of-reference, the inception report, the draft report. The reference group will be made up of the Project Manager, the Governance Team Leader, Evaluation Manager and representatives of another key stakeholder organisations.

UNDP Sierra Leone and the Consulting Team shall be responsible for setting up meetings with all key stakeholders of the project, both government and non-governmental organizations.

6. **Expected Deliverables**

The key deliverables of the Evaluation Consultant will include the following outputs:

- Inception report which will include a detailed evaluation plan and evaluation design matrix and its presentation (before the commencement of field work);
- Evidence set (analyzed data) used for writing the report and for the presentation – the analyzed data will be included in the technical annexes;
- Draft report and its presentation to the Evaluation Reference Group and for peer review. The evaluation report will include: the executive summary, evaluation purpose, objectives and questions, social and environmental considerations of the project, sustainability, scalability and replicability of the project, key aspects of the methodological approach and limitations, findings, conclusions, lessons and recommendations, and annexes;
- Final report including an executive summary of up to three pages and essential annexes
- Technical annexes including the methodology and its instruments and evidences.

7. **Skills and Experience of the Consultant**

The Consultant shall have a minimum of a Master’s degree or equivalent in Social, Political Science or in Conflict Prevention, Law, Human Rights or other relevant fields;

- Excellent spoken and written communication skills in English
- At least 10 years of professional experience.
Experience in the design and evaluation of conflict prevention and peace building programs, including an awareness regarding specific approaches and techniques for the evaluation of such initiatives;

Experience of evaluating gender aspects of conflict prevention.

Experience working with UN/UNDP and understanding UNDP’s mandate and role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Extensive knowledge of result-based management evaluation, UNDP policies, procedures, as well as participatory monitoring and evaluation methodologies and approaches.

Experience in working with donors;

Strong ability in managing confidential and politically sensitive issues, in a responsible way, and in accordance with protocols.

Exhibiting experience of working within politically sensitive environments, exhibiting a high level of diplomatic discretion when dealing with national authorities;

Sound understanding of UN mandate and role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding more broadly, prior working/consultancy experience with UNDP/UN a strong asset;

Strong communication skills and demonstrates openness to change and ability to manage complexities.

8. **Timeframe**

The detailed schedule of the evaluation and length of the assignment will be discussed with the Consultant prior to the assignment. The estimated duration of the assignment is up to 20 days and the tentative schedule is as follows:

- Desk review, inception report (5 days);
- Fieldwork, de-briefing and preparation of draft report (5 days);
- Feedback from key stakeholders and UNDP (5 days);
- Submission of final evaluation report (5 days).

**Annex B: DOCUMENTS FOR STUDY BY THE EVALUATORS**

- UNDP Handbook on Planning Monitoring and Evaluation for development Results
- UNDP Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators
- Ethical Code of Conduct for Evaluation in UNDP
- UNDG Result-Based Management Handbook
- UN Transitional Joint Vision 2013-14
- UNDP CPAP 2008-2012 and 2013-14
- GoSL PRSP II, Agenda for Change, 2008-2012 and Agenda for Prosperity 2013-17
- Millennium Development Goals Reports 2011
- CPPP Project document
- Progress and Field Visit Reports
- Project Board and Programme Review Meeting Minutes