EXTERNAL INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF LIVE LEBANON for the 2009-2018 period

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

- **AWP**: Annual Work Plan
- **CPD**: Country Programme Document
- **GoL**: Government of Lebanon
- **GWA**: Goodwill Ambassadors
- **LL**: Live Lebanon
- **M&E**: Monitoring and Evaluation
- **MoFAE**: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants
- **SDGs**: Sustainable Development Goals
- **ToC**: Theory of Change
- **ToRs**: Terms of Reference
- **UNV**: United Nations Volunteer

LIST Of Documents Reviewed

- Call for proposals 2017
- Annual work plans 2012-2018
- Progress reports 2017-2018
- Project document 2009
- Implemented projects 2010-2018
- MOUs with partners
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United Nations Development Programme jointly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants (MoFAE) launched in 2009 the “Lebanese Expatriate Project – Live Lebanon Initiative” as a platform connecting Lebanese living abroad and the private sector with local communities to support the development of the unprivileged areas of Lebanon through the implementation of fast impact development projects. The project document was signed on 29 October 2009 for an initial period of 5 years and extended 3 times, the latest being in November 2017 extending LL until the end of December 2019. The cumulative budget of LL until the end of 2018 was around 4.22 million USD.

The objective of the evaluation was to provide an independent external review of LL’s implementation and the main results achieved, along a backward-looking approach (to assess the past performance of LL) as well as a forward-looking approach that accounts for the ambitions and expectations of the main LL stakeholders.

The overall methodological approach of this evaluation falls broadly under the “Developmental Evaluation” (DE) realm, since DE is best suited for projects and programs that are in a state of continuous development and adaptation, and who unfold in a changing and unpredictable environment.

Two main limitations influenced significantly the evaluation approach and methodology: i) the fact that LL was operating for nine years on a project document that was never reviewed, amended or updated and ii) the fact that LL did not undergo any evaluation during its nine years of existence, nor collected systematic M&E data despite rather explicit provisions in the project document. Taken together, these two factors would have influenced (negatively) the evaluability of LL and should have been clearly reflected in the ToRs (both in terms of scope and ambitions), especially that the ToRs capped the resources available for the evaluation at 14 days including desk research, field phase and report drafting.

The evaluation team reviewed the implementation history of LL since its inception. Some nine points emerge that have a direct incidence on the evaluation findings:

- Live Lebanon respects a sound Project Cycle Management (PCM) approach in the implementation of its projects.
- The Human Capital of Live Lebanon is its biggest strength.
- Live Lebanon was operating under a stagnant growth model the past seven years.
- The partnership agreement of Live Lebanon with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in need of revision and re-alignment.
- Live Lebanon needs to account for the emergence of new actors in order to maintain (or possibly re-invent) its niche.
• The time might be ripe to re-brand Live Lebanon.
• Live Lebanon has a deep diaspora reservoir to tap from.
• Live Lebanon should re-visit its fundraising tools and online presence.
• Live Lebanon needs a new project document that re-aligns it with the CPD, SDGs, GoL priorities and the UN Global Compact among others.

The evaluation confirms that LL managed to constantly re-invent itself over the past 9 years and maintained its capacity to deliver, largely through the commitment of its key stakeholders (GWA, UNDP and the LL team), even in the absence of an updated project document. However this arrangement appears to be nearing exhaustion and hence this evaluation calls for an “LL plus” or an “LL 2.0”. The strategic guidelines that Live Lebanon is set to take in the future should be revised and embedded in an over-arching Theory of Change that sets the boundaries for the intervention, and its coherence with national policies but most importantly what is LL’s stand vis-à-vis these policies.

The four thematic areas/campaigns along which LL structures its activities (health, environment, youth, prosperity) remain largely valid, yet the past two years demonstrated that a higher impact/engagement can be achieved by investing in campaigns that align citizen engagement + innovative solutions. In summary, and in order to maintain its relevance, a Live Lebanon 2.0 should be guided by a clear vision and a proprietary ToC while maintaining some of its “street smart” adaptive management.

Effective, timely and professional delivery of activities is a strong asset of Live Lebanon, largely thanks to UNDP’s commitment and know-how, and to the availability of a wide array of in-house expertise that is made available to the LL team through the different UNDP units and programmes. This mainly applies to the 65 projects that were identified, financed and executed by LL over the past 9 years. There is however a significant caveat to effectiveness at the programme level due to the fact that the annual programming and the activities of LL were developed based on a project document drafted in 2009 and extended continuously up until December 2019, but without revisiting and/or updating targets, milestones and indicators, at least from 2011 onwards. This – in turn – led to a quasi-absence of M&E data, whether ex-ante (baselines, output/outcome/impact level indicators), or ex-post (linking reporting to indicators and reporting beyond the output level).

As such, LL seems to have been operating along a “permanent emergence” model rather than a PCM-compliant forward-looking and backward-looking planning approach, with emergent activities and priorities incorporated in its Annual Work Plans (AWP) together with the associated funding sources. While permanent emergence (with proper and timely assessment/approval by UNDP and buy-in/support by Goodwill Ambassadors) can be a valid management approach for a small project like LL that enables it to remain responsive and agile, it bears the systemic risk of Live Lebanon becoming predominantly activity-driven. Many of the innovations initiated by LL remain open-ended without a clear evaluative stance regarding their utility, their potential for up-
scaling, their contribution to fundraising beyond the money raised from the Goodwill Ambassadors as well as their sustainability and/or longer-term policy implications.

Central to the dynamism of LL is its “lean” project team, where the project manager and the project assistant are virtually wearing all possible LL hats and performing a wide range of multi-disciplinary tasks. The limitations within the team structure – who is operating at 100% capacity – could be also another explanation to the stagnant growth of LL over the past period. Any additional initiatives or an expansion of the current programme size will imperatively need additional human resources.

With regards to efficiency, the Annual Work Plans (2012-2018) reveal that the bulk of LL spending is on project implementation (63%) while management and coordination accounts for 28% of the spending. Communication and marketing, both of whom are instrumental to achieve Live Lebanon’s objectives account for 9% of the spending, with significant variation from year to year. The above ratios appear to be fit-for-purpose under the present flat-growth scenario, but need to be revisited in case of an increase in risk appetite for Live Lebanon 2.0. Similarly, a change in the vocation of LL from an implementing body to a facilitation platform or innovation hub would entail re-adjustments in these overall patterns.

Although it was not possible to conduct a proper value-for-money analysis, the examination of secondary data coupled with the observation of the LL dynamics within UNDP, field beneficiaries, contractors and key partners all point to significant cost-sharing or in kind contributions by partners and local communities. The evaluation estimates the multiplier effect for the different projects implemented by LL at around 1.5 to 2, meaning that every dollar invested in Live Lebanon triggers 50% to 100% additional funding, whether through free advice and support from UNDP staff, top-up contribution from local communities and/or contractors, pro-bono media/advertisement as well as voluntary work.

Looking at the funding sources of Live Lebanon over the past 9 years and their possible sustainability, it appears clearly that Goodwill Ambassadors are the rock bottom on which the project was able to build most of its achievements, as well as two thirds of its total funding. Assuming that all five current Ambassadors are interested and willing to continue over the short to medium term, this puts the predicted size of LL under a conservative scenario is around 560k USD. Any increase in “risk appetite” would entail identifying additional funding opportunities and/or reviewing the current operational model of Live Lebanon. Any increase in “risk appetite” would entail identifying additional funding opportunities and/or reviewing the current operational model of Live Lebanon. In that regard, several avenues can be considered, such as expanding the number of Goodwill Ambassadors, turning Live Lebanon into an Impact Investing platform, exploring new means of alternative financing such as block-chain funding and click-funding, or transitioning Live Lebanon from a project-based model into a platform-based model centred on
innovation. The exploration of these avenues is well beyond the resources made available for this evaluation.

The time and resources allocated to this evaluation did not allow to conduct an extensive impact analysis, however all field and institutional partners that were met during the evaluation were highly appreciative to LL and to the Goodwill Ambassadors who supported the project. It is interesting to note the smooth transition from mainly local-type of projects during the beginnings of LL, to regional but also to national projects. Regional and national types of projects normally tend to have a wider impact than local level ones.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations that are geared towards shaping the future of LL:

1. Conduct an “ecosystem mapping” study (preferably in the first quarter of 2019) in order to identify priority issues and emerging opportunities that can shape the revised design of LL and feed into its new project document
2. Develop a new Live Lebanon project document for 2020-2023 (Live Lebanon 2.0)
   2.1 Ensure that the new project document is aligned with the CPD, SDGs, GoL priorities and the UN Global Compact among others.
   2.2 Ensure that the new project document revisits the partnership with MoFAE and defines clear roles and responsibilities for both partners.
   2.3 Ensure that the new project document revisits the assumption that the Lebanese diaspora will be interested to contribute to rural development spontaneously and/or along an exclusively philanthropic model.
   2.4 Ensure that the new project document embeds a Theory of Change that guides LL programming and highlights LL’s contribution towards improving emerging social, economic and environmental problems in Lebanon.
3. Determine jointly with all concerned stakeholders (UNDP, GWAs, LL team, strategic partners) the “level of ambition” of LL for the coming phase and ensure that resource mobilisation and staffing levels are commensurate with this level of ambition.
4. Explore alternative fundraising modalities to increase the available resources to LL and ensure its sustainability.
**Recommendations that are geared towards improving LL’s current and future performance:**

5. Develop (for the 2019 programming and beyond) an updated results framework that defines the inputs/outputs/outcomes/impact chain, together with targets, milestones and indicators.

6. Ensure that reporting takes place an updated results framework.

7. Ensure that every programme or major activity implemented by LL, especially those with a clear innovation component are analysed evaluatively (such as self-assessment, after-action review, etc.).

8. Revisit the online presence and social media tools currently in place and ensure that these not only inform about LL activities but also stimulate interest and catalyse a desire to support and get involved in the activities of LL.

9. Highlight the multiplier effect of LL activities and its ability to raise matching support and funding through free advice and support from UNDP staff, top-up contribution from local communities and/or contractors, pro-bono media support as well as the work of volunteers.
1. INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) jointly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants launched the "Lebanese Expatriate Project – Live Lebanon Initiative " in 2009 as a platform connecting Lebanese living abroad and the private sector with local communities to support the development of the unprivileged areas of Lebanon through the implementation of fast impact development projects.

The aim of Live Lebanon is to mobilize a critical mass of the more than 10 million Lebanese living abroad in support of local development in the most deprived areas of Lebanon, and hereby to contribute to the elimination of poverty and regional disparities in Lebanon.

Being also one of the first crowd-funding experiences supported by UNDP, Live Lebanon presents an opportunity to understand what worked and what still needs to be improved in order to bring more tangible results. Given the speed of development in the alternative finance world and emerging new crowd-funding models there is also a vast range of opportunities to tap in; making sure Live Lebanon project is growing with the development of technologies.

The contribution of the Live Lebanon to the overall development of Lebanon and to the eradication of regional disparities is therefore based on a fourfold strategy:

   i) Strengthen the link between Lebanese abroad on one hand and the Lebanese government and local communities in the poorest areas on the other hand.
   ii) Engage the private sector in development projects as part of their CSR.
   iii) Set up a mechanism for channeling financial support from expatriates to local development and community projects and hereby support the elimination of regional disparities.
   iv) Strengthen the local capacities and decision-making structures through the engagement of local representatives in the project development and management.

The project document of LL was signed on 29 October 2009 for an initial period of 5 years (ending in October 2014) and was extended 3 times, the latest being in November 2017 where LL was extended until the end of December 2019. None of the extensions included an evaluative exercise (such as a self-assessment or similar) nor an evaluation per se. The cumulative budget of LL until the end of 2018 was around 4.22 million USD.
2. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

The scope of the evaluation is determined in the Terms of Reference (ToRs) annexed to this report and foresees an evaluation along the five OEC-DAC criteria\(^1\) which examine the overall relevance & design of the LL, the effectiveness of implementation, the efficiency in converting inputs into results, the potential impact of LL as well as its potential sustainability. This analysis is provided in Section 5 of the report (evaluation findings).

It also foresees joint work and cross-fertilization of ideas between an evaluation expert and an alternative finance expert, both of whom contributed to the elaboration of the present report.

The objective of the evaluation was to provide an independent external review of LL’s implementation and the main results achieved, along a backward-looking approach (to assess the past performance of LL) as well as a forward-looking approach that accounts for the ambitions and expectations of the main LL stakeholders, namely UNDP, the Goodwill Ambassadors (GWAs) who provided more than two-third of LL’s funding over the past nine years as well as the LL management team. This was complemented by in-depth discussion with a sample of LL beneficiaries and strategic partners.

*The bold ambitions expressed in the ToRs were not matched with commensurate resources*, as the entire resources allocated to the evaluation where caped at 14 days that were supposed to cover secondary data review, a field phase as well as report drafting. As such, *the limited resources allocated to this evaluation were mainly used to examine LL’s performance from a macro perspective and to develop strategic insights that could guide the thinking around LL’s future for 2019 and beyond.*

In order to optimize the available resources for this evaluation and overcome observed limitations (detailed further in section 3 below), the evaluation followed the evaluation matrix listed in Table 1.

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<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Inquiry questions</th>
<th>Caveats</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>If and how LL managed to remain relevant to local context/problems despite the absence of an updated project document and/or evaluation.</td>
<td>Relevance to CPD, SDGs and GoL strategies are tacit rather than explicit as all are tied to 2009. Examining these <em>ex ante</em> against the</td>
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| Effectiveness | - The added value of LL being hosted by UNDP (including if/how UNDP contributes actively to LL)  
- If and how LL is still aligned (one decade later) to the initial objectives foreseen in the project document.  
- Appropriateness of the 4 pillars approach framing the current approach.  
- Existing and emerging best practices that can be incorporated in a LL 2.0 | observed performance for 2016-2018 is not possible either due to the absence of planning narratives associated to the AWP. |
|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Effectiveness | - Current programming priorities of LL and how LL is delivering against them, with a focus on 2016-2018 when the current management team took office.  
- LL’s ability to identify and address community needs, particularly the poor and the vulnerable.  
- LL’s strategies in engaging with the diaspora and if these are fit for purpose.  
- Human resources availability and utilization (and possible scenarios going forward)  
Assumption: LL follows UNDP’s procurement and implementation procedures, the evaluation will not dwell into these. | - Assessing how the project delivered against the results (designed in 2009) is irrelevant in 2018 as resources do not allow for a comprehensive deep-dive.  
- No ToC, policy documents, or evaluative reports to be used as a baseline or benchmark  
- Narrative Progress reports not tied to a results framework |
| Efficiency | - How funds, expertise and time were converted into results.  
- Reasons for the stagnant growth of LL and how to address this going forward.  
- Current governance structure of LL and how to improve it going forward | - Results are either tied to 2009 or loosely defined in the AWP. Focus will be mostly on observable outputs/outcomes. |
| Sustainability | - The evolution of the LL model through time and the elements/best practices that can contribute to its sustainability.  
- The partnerships (particularly those of 2016-2018) and how to capitalize on these.  
- The role of MoFAE and how it can potentially contribute to sustainability.  
- Prospects for the institutionalization of LL | - Sustainability is linked organically to a ToC (i.e. what do we sustain in LL beyond the output level). |
| Impact | - Narratives on social, environmental or economic improvements introduced through LL | - Resources available to the evaluation as well as the absence of M&E data makes it difficult to go beyond anecdotal evidence derived from narratives. |
3. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

3.1 Conceptual framework and tools

The overall methodological approach of this evaluation falls broadly under the “Developmental Evaluation” (DE) realm, since DE is best suited for projects and programs that are in a state of continuous development and adaptation, and who unfold in a changing and unpredictable environment\(^2\), which is particularly suitable and appropriate for a programme like Live Lebanon operating along a “constant emergence” model with an out-dated project document and without a systematic results framework or similar.

As such, the evaluation team did not approach this evaluation purely as distant judges of Live Lebanon’s performance, but as facilitators of a collectively owned process that reviews critically implementation, and facilitate the thinking around the way forward for the design of a Live Lebanon 2.0

The evaluation team spent the first 3 weeks of August 2018 observing LL’s performance, brainstorming with the different stakeholders, meeting institutional actors and beneficiaries but also reflecting with the LL team and the UNDP management on possible avenues for the future. The focus hence was less on the “prove” aspects of LL versus the “improve” aspects.

A key moment was the collective brainstorming around the preliminary findings of the Evaluation with the Goodwill Ambassadors, the UNDP top management and the LL team, after which the present version of the report was developed.

With respect to evaluation tools, the evaluation applied a “mixed methods” approach looking at “change stories” shared by the participants (inspired by Most Significant Change), A-Ha moments at various points of the LL’s life (inspired by Appreciative Inquiry) and “contribution rather than attribution and shared credit for the attainment of the objectives” (inspired by Outcome Mapping). These qualitative insights were triangulated with a rigorous examination of all program outputs and a random sample of secondary data, as well as a set of semi-structured interviews and focus group meetings. The full list of interviewees included:

- Ghaleb Farha, LL’s longest serving Goodwill Ambassador

\(^2\) More on Developmental Evaluation on [http://betterevaluation.org/plan/approach/developmental_evaluation](http://betterevaluation.org/plan/approach/developmental_evaluation)
- Celine Moyroud - UNDP Country Director
- Ragheed Assi, Local and Social Development Programme Manager
- Saada Fakhry, Fadi Salameh and Farid Chedid (current Goodwill Ambassadors, met during the discussion of the preliminary findings of the evaluation)
- Pierre El Khoury – General Director at LCEC, Lebanese Center for Energy Conservation
- Maj. Michel Moutran – Secretary General of the National Road Safety Council in Lebanon
- Eddie Bitar and the Live Love Beirut crew (Focus Group)
- Douma souk restoration project (meeting with all stakeholders including the President of the Municipality, contractors, architects and a sample of beneficiaries)
- Maya Nehme, Lebanon Reforestation Initiative.
- Members of Live Lebanon team.
- Various UNDP colleagues

3.2 Methodological and implementation limitations

Two main limitations influenced significantly the evaluation approach and methodology:

i) **The fact that LL was operating for nine years on a project document that was never reviewed, amended or updated:** Nine years is a significantly long period in the development world. For example, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) replaced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2015 while the project document was still referring to these. The implications on the methodology were whether LL should be held accountable for results to be achieved in the 2009 – 2011 timeframe (as stated in the project document) or whether to **approach LL’s performance from a pragmatic angle looking at immediate past performance.** The evaluation chose the latter option as its intended uses by the intended users of the evaluation outweigh the added value of a purely summative approach.

ii) **The fact that LL did not undergo any evaluation during its nine years of existence, nor collected systematic M&E data** despite rather explicit provisions in the project document (section 6 M&E) such as a quarterly quality assessment, monitoring schedule plan, issue log and risk log (to be updated on rolling basis) and a lessons learned log. The same section foresees an annual project review together with a review report. A possible caveat would have been to develop strategic documents associated to the intended activities for each AWP and monitor/report performance along these; yet this was not implemented in practice. The methodological implication was the **impossibility to establish a counter-factual along which the achievements of LL can be assessed.** The choice of (and adapted) Developmental Evaluation approach is by-and-large dictated by the absence of M&E data. The evaluation team tried – within the constraint imposed by the resources made available in the ToRs – to observe LL “in action” and
engage if formal and informal dialogue with key stakeholders to try and determine the
broad lines of a possible counterfactual.

Taken together, these two factors would have influenced (negatively) the evaluability\(^3\) of LL and
should have been clearly reflected in the ToRs (both in terms of scope and ambitions). For example
the ToRs (page 6) state that “…The evaluator will also review the extent to which the project
design requires an update, and it will assess the link between activities and expected results, and
between results and objectives to be achieved…” while it should have highlighted upfront that the
project was designed in 2009 and not amended since, and that all M&E provisions – which are
among the first documents that an evaluation should examine – do not exist.

The ToRs capped the resources available for the evaluation at 14 days including desk research,
field phase and report drafting. The UNEG Norms and Standards for evaluation\(^4\) (standard 5.2
Quality Control during the evaluation design) recommends clearly that “the scope and
methodology (of the evaluation design should) fit within the allocated budget and time”. As such,
the following areas in the ToRs were not covered in this evaluation in order to prioritise resources
for other “burning” matters as described in Table 2 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ToR Requirement</th>
<th>Why</th>
<th>Mitigation measure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Review all the work from 2009 until now: projects, campaigns, financials, methodology, operation and efficiency</td>
<td>Assuming 3 days/year of operation this task alone entails 21 working days</td>
<td>A random sample of documentation was consulted and analysed for a level of effort of 3 days out the allocated 14 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide a comprehensive overall assessment of the LL implemented projects against the outputs and outcomes defined in the project document.</td>
<td>LL implemented 65 projects in 9 years. Their documentation is mostly narrative (ie not linked to a strategic document or measurable indicators)</td>
<td>The evaluation focused on the outputs and outcomes of the LL portfolio for 2016-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assess LL’s promotional strategy</td>
<td>No strategy document exists</td>
<td>Promotion of LL was tackled as part of the implementation review based on narrative evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Describe and analyse current challenges to implementing development interventions in rural areas, and Live Lebanon activities in particular.</td>
<td>Too broad and cannot be related to any LL narrative.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\(^3\) See [http://bit.do/eziCg](http://bit.do/eziCg) for an evaluability assessment checklist
4. IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW

The evaluation team reviewed the implementation history of LL since its inception. **The two recurring limitations highlighted in section 3.2 above, namely the absence of an updated project document and absence of systematic M&E processes are not repeated across the implementation review** and will be further discussed in the evaluation findings section. In light of the above, some nine points emerge that have a direct incidence on the evaluation findings:

4.1 Live Lebanon respects a sound Project Cycle Management (PCM) approach in the implementation of its projects

According to the LL team, the management model of LL follows the guidelines of UNDP throughout the PCM chain, including full compliance with the accountability, oversight and quality assurance systems implemented by UNDP. Since these systems appear to be followed consistently across inception, execution and follow-up, the evaluation could focus on the macro picture of LL rather than the micro examination of projects.

As demonstrated by the map in Figure 1, LL achieved an impressive nation-wide coverage despite its relatively small size. The coverage would become even more extensive if we add the volunteering events and the national campaigns carried from 2016 onwards.

Throughout the examined period, LL has been consistent to its four pillars with a total portfolio of 65 projects implemented across the country: Green Lebanon (8 projects implemented in addition to several volunteering campaigns), Healthy Lebanon (18 projects), Prosperous Lebanon (17 projects) and Youthful Lebanon (22 projects). The total value of executed projects is close to 1.53 million USD.

Number of beneficiaries: 1,923,266 Men: 964,795 Women:95,847

Proposals for projects are collected through multiple avenues and channels, including an open call for proposals which is disseminated widely across Lebanon through a directive from the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities as well as the Live Lebanon website, social media and TV. In other instances, some beneficiary communities contact LL directly.
4.2 The Human Capital of Live Lebanon is its biggest strength

Three pillars constitute the rock-bottom of LL:

a) A small dedicated and active team in charge of the management of all activities. The team is currently composed of a project manager, a project assistant, a project officer (working on a new large-scale project with the Municipality of Beirut) and a driver. A UNV will be joining the team from October 2018 to help with communication and social media.

b) An equally small but deeply committed group of Goodwill Ambassadors (currently 5 Ambassadors) who embeds the very DNA of LL aiming at catalysing diaspora support for rural and human development in Lebanon. The Goodwill Ambassadors provide intellectual leadership as well as significant financial support to LL to carry its activities and projects. Known artistic figures (for example pop superstar Rami Ayyach or comedian/director George Khabbaz) also provide support to LL for specific campaigns.

c) Strong support and ownership by UNDP especially at top-management level, as it could be clearly observed during the different stages of the evaluation.

These pillars are complemented by a wide array of partnerships with leading TV stations (MTV, LBC, NTV, etc…), institutional stakeholders (National Council for Road Safety, Civil Defence, Municipality of Beirut, etc…), social change enterprises (Live Love Beirut) in addition to a broad range of civil society actors, corporate business, etc…

It is interesting to note that the identification and development of these partnerships would qualify as “Street Smart” rather than the result of a deliberate forward-looking planning, which constitutes both a strength in terms of adaptive and responsive programming of LL but also a weakness due to the absence of a clear ecosystem mapping and strategic directions that frame these partnerships.
4.3 Live Lebanon was operating under a stagnant growth model the past seven years

A look at the evolution of the LL budget between 2012 and 2018 reveals a relatively stagnant growth, especially from 2015 onwards.

![Figure 2: Evolution of the LL budget (2012 – 2018)]

The growth of LL is a function of the “risk appetite” of its key stakeholders. As such, a flat growth scenario can be acceptable if deemed commensurate with the ambitions of these stakeholders (Goodwill Ambassadors, UNDP and the LL Team).

It appears clearly though from the discussions that these stakeholders have much bolder ambitions for LL, however these ambitions need to be matched with commensurate resources (both human and financial). It is also interesting to note that despite the fluctuation in budget from one year to another, LL managed to maintain a relatively stable delivery.

4.4 The partnership agreement of Live Lebanon with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in need of revision and re-alignment

The project document of LL specified that “… The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFAE), Department for Emigrants, will provide a direct link to the Lebanese Embassies and the Lebanese expatriates. The main role of the Department for Emigrants is hence to facilitate communication of the project and its achievements to the Lebanese Communities abroad. The Directorate-General for Emigrants will therefore be the main counterpart for the project, but will not provide any financial contribution to its implementation…”
Little empirical evidence exists that enables the evaluation team to trace with certainty how the relationship with MoFAE evolved during the lifetime of LL, however we note the following points:

i) The Department for Emigrants, who has been the main LL counterpart at MoFAE is currently in a zone of turbulence (for example, its portal www.emigrants.gov.lb has gone offline).

ii) Based on the triangulation of interviews with MoFAE staff and the LL team, the relationship with MoFAE appear to have witnessed ups and downs, yet the supporting role of MoFAE is positively acknowledged (support during the Lebanese Diaspora Energy conferences, honouring the pioneering role of GWA, etc…).

iii) In 2018 new channels with the Minister’s Office were opened, including the possibility of stronger and bolder support from the Ministry. These revolve broadly around three points: 1) Securing a partnership with the Central Bank and the Middle East Airlines (Lebanon’s national airline) which will expand LL’s fundraising and outreach possibilities exponentially, 2) approaching donors jointly to implement mutually agreed-upon projects and programmes, 3) offering LL a permanent office at MoFAE.

iv) On the other hand, MoFAE is requesting to develop a new project document for LL in lieu of the original project document that was developed back in 2009 and which expires in December 2019. According to the MoFAE senior representative, the Ministry is proposing a high-level dialogue with UNDP to define and align expectations on one hand and to clearly determine roles and responsibilities but also resource mobilization on the other.

The above can be considered by-and-large as a positive development and a launch-pad for a Live Lebanon 2.0 programme but would require a carefully planned and inclusive preparation process with strong endorsement and commitments by MoFAE and UNDP and the full buy-in of GWA. Such process requires – obviously – dedicated financial and human resources to lead it to safe shores.
4.5 Live Lebanon needs to account for the emergence of new actors in order to maintain (or possibly re-invent) its niche.

While LL was the first structured initiative of its kind to harness the contribution of the Lebanese diaspora and put it at the service of sustainable human development in Lebanon, other initiatives have emerged over the past five years and might represent a competition/threat or at the contrary networking/synergy opportunities for LL.

For example, the Lebanese Diaspora Energy – LDE (which has now “graduated” to become an independent NGO hosted at MoFAE according to MoFAE representative) organizes large-scale diaspora conferences across the globe with the declared aim of catalysing economic investments by the diaspora in Lebanon. Live Lebanon was a regular participant in most of the LDE conferences, but the synergies could grow even stronger.

Other organizations (mainly NGOs and/or Social Enterprises) are positioning themselves on specific market segments aimed at fundraising diaspora money for planting trees, marketing the products of rural cooperatives amongst diaspora clients in addition to humanitarian purposes since the beginning of the Syria crisis. There is value for LL in learning from these emerging experiences, particularly with regards to what works and what does not in order to calibrate its approach accordingly.

Also LL has been working increasingly since 2016 as a platform that brings relevant actors together, while keeping a direct implementation component as well as part of its operation. Devolving tree planting for example to a specialized institution like Jouzour Lebanon, while keeping quality assurance and technical oversight could provide an opportunity for LL to upscale or to do activities differently. Jouzour Lebanon is completely open to this possibility according to its Director. This has also been an observed strength in the volunteering activities of LL which will be discussed in a subsequent section.

4.6 Maybe the time is ripe to re-brand Live Lebanon?

While Live Lebanon first coined the concept of “Living” Lebanon, a “Live Love” wave has taken the social media by storm, mainly through “Live Love Beirut” (a socially responsible enterprise). Live Love Beirut has gained considerable following and engagement on social media, which is at least five to ten times bigger than LL.
Live Lebanon is collaborating actively with Live Love Beirut, but the branding of the programme is getting increasingly blurred, especially when “live”, “live love”, “Lebanon” and “Beirut” come together side-by-side (like on Figure 4 during an activity organized jointly by LL and Live Love Beirut). The idea of merging LL and Live Love Beirut was even mentioned during the focus group held with the Live Love Beirut team.

The decision to re-brand Live Lebanon can be considered, depending on the strategic directions that will emerge after this evaluation. On one hand “Live Lebanon” existed as a brand since 2009 and one option could be to keep the original name but improve the engagement around it. Another option would be to re-brand based on the new strategic positioning of LL which will be defined in the new project document.

Figure 4: when “living” and “loving” come together

4.7 Live Lebanon has a deep diaspora reservoir to tap from

A comparative look across the global fundraising presence of LL across the map of the world reveals that LL managed to raise around 3 million USD since 2009 from 11 Goodwill ambassadors. The geographic disaggregation of the goodwill ambassadors shows that around two third of the funds came from ambassadors established in the GCA countries, followed by Africa (15%), Europe (12%) and just 7.5% for the rest of the world as it can be visualized in Figure 5 below.

Countries with significant Diaspora presence including the entire American Continent (USA, Canada, Central and Latin America) in addition to Australia remain largely untapped.
A forward-looking strategy for LL should hence take into account the immense potential of this diaspora reservoir, and develop tools and approaches to mobilize it accordingly.

4.8 Live Lebanon should re-visit its fundraising tools and online presence

Although LL was (far) ahead the curve in launching a fundraising app and a crowd funding platform, the money raised through these two avenues is negligible compared to its overall budget. The “donate” icon on the website re-directs to outdated projects and the Live Lebanon App is not available anymore for download (at least for Android on google play).

The assumption that the Lebanese diaspora would be intuitively interested to contribute to the development of rural areas through LL needs to be revisited, especially in light of the massive changes in the fundraising ecosystem over the past 10 years and the emergence of crowd-funding, impact investing, crypto-currencies directed towards social change, just to name a few. A dedicated section in the evaluation explores these in more details and provides some ideas which can be used by LL to embed some of the most promising new approaches that are fit-for-purpose and can be tailored to the Lebanese context.
On a more general note, any fundraising endeavor needs to embed the four elements of the AIDA approach (figure 6) in order to increase its chances of attracting funding namely:

i) Raise awareness about LL, its added value and its unique selling point(s) compared to other actors on the circuit;
ii) Create interest in what LL is doing or planning to do with a clear description of the intended impacts and how LL is planning on achieving them;
iii) Trigger a genuine desire to contribute to LL and;
iv) Take action by actively supporting LL.

Interestingly, the above is true whether LL is planning on approaching a bank, a company, a TV station but also a new Goodwill Ambassador.

It is also useful to note that Live Lebanon entertains a relatively strong presence on Facebook (around 20k followers) and Twitter (around 8k followers) but engagement around the posts and feeds remains well below its possible potential.

4.9 Live Lebanon needs a new project document

The legal basis around which LL currently operates has been drafted and endorsed in 2009. The design did not embrace the changes that occurred in Lebanon, the MENA region but also the global development landscape over the past decade.

For example the LL project document was written at a time when the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were still in place, while these were replaced in 2015 by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and introduced a paradigm shift in human development along the five P’s (People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace and Partnerships). This should be imperatively reflected in the LL conceptual approach and its (new) project document.

The outputs, outcomes and indicators in the initial project document also need a thorough revision to reflect the (current) approach of LL. As highlighted in point 4.2 above, LL knew how to remain relevant and useful through a “street smart” approach, and this seemed to have mitigated the absence of a more incisive guidance in the project document. However LL cannot grow and expand further without developing an updated vision and mission statement, as well as an over-arching Theory of Change (ToC) that can guide its work going forward.
5. EVALUATION FINDINGS

This section provides an analysis of the five DAC criteria as requested by the ToRs and dives more evaluatively in the insights raised in the section around implementation review.

5.1 Relevance

The implementation review section confirms that LL managed to constantly re-invent itself over the past 9 years and maintained its capacity to deliver, despite operating based on a project document drafted in 2009. This has been made possible largely through the commitment of its key stakeholders (Goodwill Ambassadors, UNDP and the LL team), yet this arrangement appears to be nearing exhaustion and hence this evaluation calls for an “LL plus” or an “LL 2.0”.

The profound changes on the Lebanese developmental scene such as:

- The Syria crisis and the humanitarian response it triggered, the relief to development nexus championed by UNDP particularly vis-à-vis the host communities, the rise of new vulnerability patterns across the Lebanese territory as a result of the Syria crisis, etc…;

- The new policies in engaging with the diaspora by the Government of Lebanon, such as granting expatriates voting rights, the championing of Lebanon’s right to reclaim nationality for 2nd and 3rd generation expatriates, the Lebanese Diaspora Energy conferences, and the momentum around them, etc…and;

- The changes in global development trends, the most important of whom being the transition from Northern-led Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to the universally encompassing Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and its Agenda2030, the rise of impact investing, the development of crowd-funding and social media based fundraising approaches, etc…

All call for an in-depth revision of the strategic guidelines that Live Lebanon is set to take in the future, and embed these in an over-arching Theory of Change that makes a stronger case for the relevance of Live Lebanon in the coming years.

The four thematic areas/campaigns along which LL structures its activities (health, environment, youth, prosperity) remain largely valid, yet the past two years demonstrated that a higher impact/engagement can be achieved by investing in campaigns that align citizen engagement + innovative solutions (Ensa Joura, Haki Ousal, recycling of hunting cartridges, with Moto Ambulance and Warak Beirut in the pipeline). More “classical” projects (irrigation canals, health equipment, public gardens, etc…) have a faster and more intuitive impact at the local level, but lesser opportunities for engagement at the national level.
In order to nurture a virtuous awareness/interest/desire/action cycle (the AIDA model), the planned activities of LL must be aligned with its ToC and linked to a solid narrative for change. For example, LL is engaged in a volunteer activity aiming at collecting empty hunting cartridges from sites with heavy bird hunting activity, and is supporting a group of university students in developing a machine that separates the copper and plastic components of the cartridge in order to make their recycling easier. It is also planning on giving an incentive to hunters who return the used cartridges on voluntary basis.

The Theory of Change should be able to tell us why LL is engaged in this activity and whether it is for esthetic purposes (cleaner nature), for awareness purposes (hunters should not litter), for economic purposes (recycling cartridges can be a source of revenue) or for more fundamental environmental purposes (lobby to ban uncontrolled hunting). The answer could be very well a mix of all four but unless this is embedded in a ToC, its potential to attract proactive support to the cause it intends to serve remains limited.

The Theory of Change will also set the boundaries for the intervention, its coherence with national policies (strict enforcement of the hunting season, obligation to acquire a hunting license, respect of the species and number of preys to be hunted, etc…) but most importantly what is LL’s stand vis-à-vis this policy (neutral observer, passive compliant or proactive supporter). Environmental purists might also question why collect cartridges but not other kinds of litter, why not promote bird-watching as an alternative to hunting, whether this is a one-off event or part of a comprehensive multi-annual strategy with complementary activities, etc… Last but not least, this action should be benchmarked against its ability to trigger desire for action and subsequently its ability to raise additional funding to LL, and its design defined and/or adapted accordingly.
The same reasoning would apply to the initiatives on road safety initiated by LL namely “Haki Ousal” for road safety in and around schools and Ensa Joura for fixing potholes based on real-time geo-tagged reporting by citizens. While the activities associated with these initiatives were designed and implemented in a timely and professional manner and generated significant media attention and citizen engagement, there is a very strong potential to link them to a broader policy dimension related to road safety and responsible driving, both of whom are at the core of the concerns of citizens of Lebanon (and their relatives abroad).

In summary, and in order to maintain its relevance, a Live Lebanon 2.0 should be guided by a clear vision and a proprietary ToC while maintaining some of its “street smart” adaptive management. This should guarantee that output-level activities contribute to a broader outcome/impact level in order to “seduce” additional supporters and funders alike.

5.2 Effectiveness

Effective, timely and professional delivery of activities is a strong asset of Live Lebanon, largely thanks to UNDP’s commitment and know-how, and to the availability of a wide array of in-house expertise that is made available to the LL team through the different UNDP units and programmes. This mainly applies to the 65 projects that were identified, financed and executed by LL over the past 9 years (indicated on the map in Figure 1).

There is however a significant caveat at the programme level due to the fact that the annual programming and the activities of LL were developed based on a project document drafted in 2009 and extended continuously up until December 2019, but without revisiting and/or updating targets, milestones and indicators, at least from 2011 onwards. This – in turn – led to a quasi-absence of M&E data, whether ex-ante (baselines, output/outcome/impact level indicators), or ex-post (linking reporting to indicators and reporting beyond the output level).

As such, LL seems to have been operating along a “permanent emergence” model rather than a PCM-compliant forward-looking and backward-looking planning approach, with emergent activities and priorities incorporated in its Annual Work Plans (AWP) together with the associated funding sources.
While permanent emergence (with proper and timely assessment/approval by UNDP and buy-in/support by Goodwill Ambassadors) can be a valid management approach for a small project like LL that enables it to remain responsive and agile, it bears the systemic risk of Live Lebanon becoming predominantly activity-driven, as discussed in the relevance section. It could also explain the stagnant growth of LL along the past implementation period in the absence of a longer-term strategic direction.

The evaluation also notes that many of the activities of LL fall broadly under an “innovation” rubric along a basic Ideas/Evolve/Build/Play continuum (Figure 7). This process has been somehow a “signature” of LL especially in the past 3 years, yet many of the innovations initiated by LL remain open-ended without a clear evaluative stance regarding their utility, their potential for upscaling, their contribution to fundraising beyond the money raised from the Goodwill Ambassadors as well as their sustainability and/or longer-term policy implications.

For example, LL was the first initiative in Lebanon to develop an online fundraising strategy, including a fundraising app (available for Android and Apple operating systems) as well as the possibility to contribute to LL projects through the LL website. However the money generated through this strategy remained insignificant compared to both its potential and the efforts invested in making it happen.

Similarly, LL was among the first initiatives within the development sphere to tap on the potential of crowd-funding by establishing an agreement with the Zoomaal crowd-funding platform, but with very limited success in actually attracting funding for its projects.

One should question hence why these two very promising ideas did not actually deliver according to expectations:

- Did LL need additional in-house expertise to lift them off the ground?
- Did LL need to invest more in the Evolve/Build aspect in these two ideas?
- Were both ideas promoted in an optimal manner to their intended users?
- Was there enough resources earmarked for a sustained follow-up beyond the technical solution itself?
- Should LL discontinue these ideas? Otherwise what should be done differently or better?
The answer to the above questions is made even more complex in the absence of clear goals and specific objectives associated to measurable indicators against which success can be benchmarked. For example, LL could decide to raise 20% of its annual budget from crowd-funding within a 2 year timeframe, and commit the needed human and financial resources towards making it happen, as well as a roadmap for implementation. If this proves to be difficult to achieve within the foreseen timeframe, then trade-offs are needed, such as dedicating more resources to the process, experimenting different technical solutions, investing more in communication and outreach or even discontinuing the whole idea.

Central to the dynamism of LL is its “lean” project team, where the project manager and the project assistant are virtually wearing all possible LL hats and performing a wide range of multi-disciplinary tasks ranging from fundraising to tendering and monitoring of the works, from social media to public relations across the LL ecosystem and from liaising with goodwill ambassadors and other stakeholders to the actual facilitation of the activities on the ground, let alone reporting and all the administrative tasks that are required for a smooth unfolding of LL. The team will be soon expanded by an international UNV who will be in charge of communication, which is a stand-alone task in need of urgent attention. Some short-term interns also give a hand in some specific LL tasks, but the relatively high turn-over in these interns who spend an average of 1-3 months within the LL team makes it difficult to rely on these interns beyond specific ad-hoc tasks.

The limitations within the team structure – who is operating at 100% capacity – could be also another explanation to the stagnant growth of LL over the past period. It must be clear that any additional initiatives (such as sustaining an office at MoFAE or establishing an innovation hub) or an expansion of the current programme size will imperatively need additional human resources.

5.3 Efficiency

The Annual Work Plans (2012-2018) reveal that the bulk of LL spending is on project implementation (63%) while management and coordination accounts for 28% of the spending. Communication and marketing, both of whom are instrumental to achieve Live Lebanon’s objectives account for 9% of the spending, with significant variation from year to year, mainly because these costs were covered during some years through in-kind contribution by a media or corporate partner.
The above ratios (30% management & coordination, 10% communication & marketing, 60% implementation) appear to be fit-for-purpose under the present flat-growth scenario, but need to be revisited in case of an increase in risk appetite for Live Lebanon 2.0. Similarly, a change in the vocation of LL from an implementing body to a facilitation platform or innovation hub would entail re-adjustments in these overall patterns. In practice, playing around with these ratios will lead to different configurations for LL, yet three possible scenarios emerge as the most plausible alternatives going forward:

5.3.1 Keep the design of LL unchanged: this would mean a volume of more or less 500k/year and “business as usual” activities along the presently established ratios. This formula appears to be less privileged by the Goodwill Ambassadors who have bolder ambitions for LL.

5.3.2 Re-work the design of LL within the existing annual volume: this would mean that part of the 63% dedicated to project implementation should be directed to other activities, such as establishing an innovation hub and/or exploring ways for further engagement with MoFAE. It is worth mentioning that LL submitted a proposal to the UNDP innovation facility for 80k in 2019 which could cover the additional costs for the innovation hub if the proposal is successful. As such, this alternative emerges as the most realistic option for 2019 and until a new LL project document is developed, especially if the innovation facility proposal is successful.

5.3.3 Double the annual volume of LL over 2020-2022 and re-work its design: this would be the ideal case scenario that reflects the ambitions of all LL stakeholders. It should be based on a comprehensive mapping of the ecosystem within which LL operates and a Theory of Change that addresses the Live Lebanon contribution towards some of the
emerging issues within this ecosystem, and link these to the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Lebanon, the Agenda2030 for Lebanon and the UN Global Compact among others…

Although it was not possible to conduct a proper value-for-money analysis, the examination of secondary data coupled with the observation of the LL dynamics within UNDP, field beneficiaries, contractors and key partners all point to significant cost-sharing or in-kind contributions by partners and local communities. For example, the Ensa Joura campaign received considerable coverage and airtime from MTV (including an award-winning spot rewarding the best strategic thinking in the marketing industry across the MENA region) and definitely matching the total value of the campaign estimated at around 250k USD. Similarly, MoUs were signed with several partner municipalities for around 400k USD to perform additional works to those foreseen by the campaign.

The evaluation estimates the multiplier effect for the different projects implemented by LL at around 1.5 to 2, meaning that every dollar invested in Live Lebanon triggers 50% to 100% additional funding, whether through free advice and support from UNDP staff, top-up contribution from local communities and/or contractors, pro-bono media/advertisement as well as voluntary work. This is worth building a communication strategy around it.

5.4 Sustainability

Looking at the funding sources of Live Lebanon over the past 9 years, it appears clearly that Goodwill Ambassadors are the rock bottom on which the project was able to build most of its achievements. There are currently five Goodwill Ambassadors supporting LL, alone account for 77% of the total Goodwill Ambassadors contribution, with a yearly average of 86,000 USD per Ambassador, but with significant annual variances as it can be visualized in Figure 9 below.
The “predictability” of the contribution of Goodwill Ambassadors has been raised as an issue impacting the yearly planning of Live Lebanon and the irregularity of its pattern clearly shows on Figure 9.

Assuming that all five current Ambassadors are interested and willing to continue over the short to medium term, this puts the expected annual income from the Goodwill Ambassadors contribution at around 430k USD and fundraising from other sources (excluding in-kind contributions) at around 130k USD. This — in turn — means that the predicted size of LL under a conservative scenario is around 560k USD.
Any increase in “risk appetite” would entail identifying additional funding opportunities and/or reviewing the current operational model of Live Lebanon as detailed in the efficiency section. In that regard, several avenues can be considered:

5.4.1 **Expanding the number of Goodwill Ambassadors**

This appears as an intuitive solution taking into consideration the immense institutional and financial added value that Goodwill Ambassadors bring to LL, as it narrows down the “10 million Lebanese in diaspora” assumption to a handful of inspired and highly successful women and men who believe in the mission of Live Lebanon and would contribute to its institutionalization and growth. As highlighted in section 4.7, a largely untapped potential exists in North and Latin America, Africa and Australia to bring new Goodwill Ambassadors on board.

5.4.2 **Turning Live Lebanon into an Impact Investing platform**

Impact Investing is an investment approach with the intention to generate financial returns alongside measurable positive social and/or environmental impact. Impact investors vary in their financial return expectations. While some seek competitive or market-rate returns, others may be willing to accept below market-rate returns to maximize impact. The approach appears to match the entrepreneurial spirit of the Lebanese population, while adding to it a social and/or environmental concern. It could complement (or ultimately replace) the philanthropy-based model around which LL is constructed.

As such, LL could become the backbone for UNDP operations and financing SDG goals as a country support platform as defined according to UNDP Strategic Plan 2018-2021.

For example, Lebanon is already experiencing significant problems with reliability of electricity supply and opportunities for investing in solar energy are still rather limited despite 300 days of sunshine per year. UNDP is carrying a similar experience for a 1 MW solar plant in Moldova in
partnership with the “Sun Exchange” platform based on crowd-funding, with an expected return on investment at around 4-5%. The experience could be replicated and adapted to the Lebanese context and would give a new impetus to the crowd-funding.

5.4.3 Exploring new means of alternative financing

Alternative financing differs to traditional banking or capital market finance through technology-enabled “disintermediation”, which means utilising third party capital by connecting fundraisers directly with funders, reducing hence transactional costs and improving market efficiency. Two promising options emerged while conducting this evaluation: click-funding and block-chain funding.

a) Block-chain funding: basically through the creation of a socially-responsible crypto-currency to be called CedarCoin. It builds on experiences championed by the “Tree Credits Foundation” and its TreeCoin, which fundraised successfully for combating desertification in Kenya and for protecting the mangrove in Myanmar. The block-chain technique allows to track and verify that trees are actually planted in a transparent way that is embedded in the TreeCoin algorithm (blocks in the chain). TreeCoins can be then used and exchanged like any other crypto-currency (such as the bitcoin) and can potentially grow in value. One can imagine the multiple uses of CedarCoins in reforestation and/or environmental campaigns in Lebanon, provided that technical and regulatory hurdles are addressed.

b) Click-funding is a platform that creates public awareness through social media to create social impact. They do so by creating online awareness campaigns that are then presented to sponsors, who pledge to provide a fixed amount of capital when the campaign reaches a certain number of likes, shares, views and comments. The method used by Click-funding is considered an alternative finance mechanism as it enables NGOs, projects and various causes to acquire funds through the private sector, whilst also engaging the public. The more the public visibility is achieved – campaigns get more financing from its sponsors (based on previously agreed benchmarks). Campaigns are based on simple and direct storytelling and short videos that are easy to share and have to potential to grow viral. This has an immense added value and business potential to the work that LL is doing.
5.4.4 Transitioning Live Lebanon from a project-based model into a platform-based model centred on innovation

At present the LL stakeholders (Goodwill Ambassadors, UNDP and the LL team) are the driving force behind the generation of ideas that are funded and executed by LL. Under a platform-based model, LL would further strengthen its capacities in human-centred design (co-designing) and serve as a catalyst for new innovations and ideas (generated outside the LL circles) and as a facilitator for putting these ideas into practice, rather than the primary implementer of these ideas as it is the case under the present model.

This would make implementation less resource consuming and would allow diverting part of the implementation budget to the co-design processes. As such LL would initiate innovation camps, innovation challenges, hackathons and similar to harness collective thinking and innovative solutions to the problem(s) it is trying to address, incubate and coach some of the most promising ideas and fund the implementation of one or more ideas that emerge from the lot.

Another step might be to support the establishment of a special Innovation Hub with other partners in Lebanon (hackers-makers space, co-working space focused on innovation and social entrepreneurship).

A platform-based approach would also allow LL to address its Theory of Change from a more holistic perspective, by linking activities to higher-level outcomes and focusing more on the desired impact, and by focusing on quality assurance and systematization of the learning from activities rather than the implementation of these activities.

The exploration of these avenues in further depth is well beyond the resources made available for this evaluation and should be part of the development of the new LL project document, as they entail a fundamental shift in the design of LL, as well as dedicated human and financial resources beyond what is currently available, at least for the start-up phase.
5.5 Impact

The time and resources allocated to this evaluation did not allow to conduct an extensive impact analysis, however all field and institutional partners that were met during the evaluation were highly appreciative to LL and to the Goodwill Ambassadors who supported the project.

It is interesting to note the smooth transition from mainly local-type of projects during the beginnings of LL, to regional (for example Warak Beirut) but also to national projects (Ensa Joura, Haki Ousal, Moto Ambulance, etc…). **Regional and national types of projects normally tend to have a wider impact than local level ones.**

For example, with more than 6,000 potholes repaired and archived before and after the intervention, Ensa Joura was by all means a game-changer and provides a good example on the potential that Live Lebanon can achieve. Not only it managed to raise awareness on road safety in an out-of-the-box manner and introduced a new technology to Lebanon (Velocity Road Repair Machine), it also compelled several municipalities across Lebanon to give more proactive attention to the complaints of their citizens and use their own funds to finance potholes repair using the same approach and technique put forward by Live Lebanon.

As mentioned repeatedly in this evaluation report, a missed opportunity is the predominant focus on the activities level and overlooking the broader societal and policy change potential that these activities could possibly trigger. Hopefully Live Lebanon 2.0 can be more incisive on that front.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

The ToRs request to articulate recommendations directed to Live Lebanon, MoFAE, UNDP and donors. The findings of the evaluation (in light of the constraints discussed in section 3.2) can be rather clustered into two sets:

- **Recommendations that are geared towards shaping the future of LL** (Table 3), including key considerations to be incorporated into the new project document which should be developed following the expiry of the current one in 2019. These are predominantly addressed to UNDP together with all other stakeholders involved in LL.

- **Recommendations that are geared towards improving LL’s current and future performance** (Table 4) and that are valid for the last year of operations under the current project document (2019) but are also essential in shaping the new project document. These are predominantly addressed to LL’s management.
Each recommendation is associated with a level of priority ranging from medium to critical.

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<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
<th>Priority</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Conduct an “ecosystem mapping” study (preferably in the first quarter of 2019) in order to identify priority issues and emerging opportunities that can shape the revised design of LL and feed into its new project document</td>
<td>Live Lebanon was designed in 2009 when the development landscape of Lebanon was significantly different than how it is one decade later (new elements such as the Syria crisis, the SDGs and the new impetus of the Government of Lebanon towards the diaspora just to name a few). A comprehensive mapping of the current ecosystem in which LL operates and how it can address some priority issues and/or emerging opportunities within this ecosystem would be instrumental in informing and shaping its new design.</td>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Develop a new Live Lebanon project document for 2020-2023 (Live Lebanon 2.0)</td>
<td>The current project document runs until December 2019. The next 14 months should be used to establish the building blocks of the new project document and build consensus around them.</td>
<td>Critical</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Ensure that the new project document is aligned with the CPD, SDGs, GoL priorities and the UN Global Compact among others.</td>
<td>Alignment of the new project document with the CPD, SDGs, GoL priorities is key to ensure that LL 2.0 maintains its relevance to the country needs and to UNDP programming priorities.</td>
<td>Critical</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Ensure that the new project document revisits the partnership with MoFAE and defines clear roles and responsibilities for both partners.</td>
<td>MoFAE is proposing bold possibilities for LL over the coming period (securing a partnership with the Central Bank and MEA, approaching donors jointly, offering LL a permanent office at MoFAE, …). This could be a significant opportunity for up-scaling LL and broadening its outreach horizons, but could lead to unmet expectations if not addressed properly.</td>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Ensure that the new project document revisits the assumption that the Lebanese diaspora will be interested to contribute to rural development spontaneously and/or along an exclusively philanthropic model.</td>
<td>The potential contribution of the “10 million Lebanese in diaspora” assumption in the initial project document was largely unmet, apart from the highly valued contribution and engagement of a handful of Goodwill Ambassadors. The new project document should determine new creative ways of engagement with the diaspora (including a clearer/more proactive role through the partnership with MoFAE) and establish mechanisms, resources and tools to operationalize this engagement. It should explore new fundraising models (in line with recommendation 4 below).</td>
<td>Critical</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Ensure that the new project document embeds a Theory of Change that guides LL programing and highlights LL’s contribution towards improving emerging social, economic and environmental problems in Lebanon.</td>
<td>The “permanent emergence” model along which LL was operating over the past years focused mostly at the output level without clear (and measurable) linkages to the broader policy environment. The Theory of Change would be also instrumental in shaping the design but also the outreach strategy of LL.</td>
<td>Critical</td>
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| 3 | Determine jointly with all concerned stakeholders (UNDP, GWAs, LL team, strategic partners) the “level of ambition” of LL for the coming phase, and ensure that resource mobilization and staffing levels are commensurate with this level of ambition. | There are different thresholds to the level of ambition, each with implications on the human and financial resources. Three scenarios can be retained:  
- **Keep the design of LL unchanged**: This option is not privileged by LL stakeholders.  
- **Re-work the design of LL within the existing annual financial volume**: This alternative emerges as the most realistic option for 2019 and until a new LL project document is developed.  
- **Double the annual volume of LL over 2020-2022 and re-work its design**: this would be the ideal case scenario that reflects the ambitions of all LL stakeholders but would also mean twice as much budget, staff and activities. | Critical |

| 4 | Explore alternative fundraising modalities to increase the available resources to LL and ensure its sustainability. | The past 10 years witnessed massive changes in the fundraising ecosystem and the emergence of several alternatives to “classical” philanthropy such as crowd-funding, impact investing, crypto-currencies directed towards social change, just to name a few. These could constitute an interesting niche for LL, especially if adapted and contextualized, based on the lessons learned from electronic fundraising and crowd-funding pilots of the current phase. Among the options to consider:  
- **Turning Live Lebanon into an impact investing platform** especially that this approach matches the entrepreneurial spirit of the Lebanese population, while adding to it a social and/or environmental concern.  
- **Exploring new means of alternative financing** that connects LL directly with funders, reducing hence transactional costs and improving market efficiency. Two promising options emerged while conducting this evaluation: click-funding and block-chain funding.  
- **Transitioning Live Lebanon from a project-based model into a platform-based model centred on innovation**: at present the LL is the primary implementer of ideas and programmes. Under a platform-based model, LL would serve as a catalyst for new innovations and ideas (generated outside the LL circles) and as a facilitator for putting these ideas into practice. This would make implementation less resource consuming and would allow diverting part of the implementation budget to the co-design processes. | High |
### Table 4: Recommendations geared towards improving LL’s current and future performance

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<th>#</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
<th>Priority</th>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Develop (for the 2019 programming and beyond) an updated results framework that defines the inputs/outputs/outcomes/impact chain, together with targets, milestones and indicators.</td>
<td>The planning of LL is based on AWPs that determine primarily the financial resource allocation and the associated administrative arrangements. This should be imperatively associated with an updated results framework (especially in the absence of an updated project document) and monitoring data should be collected along this results framework.</td>
<td>Critical</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ensure that reporting takes place an updated results framework</td>
<td>The current LL reporting is mostly narrative and focused on the output/activities level as determined in the AWPs. It misses a standard evaluative approach that links the monitoring of activities and the reporting to pre-determined targets, milestones and indicators (let alone a baseline or a Theory of Change)</td>
<td>Critical</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Ensure that every programme or major activity implemented by LL, especially those with a clear innovation component are analysed evaluatively (such as self-assessment, after-action review, etc..)</td>
<td>Many of the innovations initiated by LL remain open-ended without a clear evaluative stance regarding their utility, their potential for up-scaling, their contribution to fundraising beyond the money raised from the Goodwill Ambassadors as well as their sustainability and/or longer-term policy implications.</td>
<td>Critical</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Revisit the online presence and social media tools currently in place and ensure that these not only inform about LL activities but also stimulate interest and catalyse a desire to support and get involved in the activities of LL.</td>
<td>Live Lebanon entertains a relatively strong presence on Facebook and Twitter but engagement around the posts and feeds remains well below its possible potential. The online presence of LL should be re-structured along an awareness/interest/desire/action cycle that reflects the ToC of LL and harnesses support around it.</td>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Highlight the multiplier effect of LL activities and its ability to raise matching support and funding through free advice and support from UNDP staff, top-up contribution from local communities and/or contractors, pro-bono media support as well as the work of volunteers.</td>
<td>The evaluation estimates the multiplier effect for the different projects implemented by LL at around 1.5 to 2, meaning that every dollar invested in Live Lebanon triggers 50% to 100% additional funding, whether through free advice and support from UNDP staff, top-up contribution from local communities and/or contractors, pro-bono media/advertisement as well as the contribution of volunteers.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>