EVALUATION REPORT

Evaluation of UNDP CPD 2016-2010 Outcome 1:

O.1: State Institutions, including in the areas of defence, security, and justice, consolidate stability and the rule of law, democratic participation, and equitable access to opportunities for all

Evaluation commissioner: UNDP Guinea Bissau

Christian Bugnion de Moreta, Evaluation Team Leader, focus on Outcome 1

12 December 2018
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<td>Access to Justice Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENFOJ</td>
<td>Judicial Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Local currency in Guinea Bissau</td>
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<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>GB</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
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<tr>
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<td>LGDH</td>
<td>Human-Rights League</td>
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<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>MoJ</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
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<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Electoral Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIM</td>
<td>National Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBF</td>
<td>Peace Building Fund</td>
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<td>RBM</td>
<td>Results-Based Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Results Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROAR</td>
<td>Results-Oriented Annual Report</td>
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<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Framework</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNEG</td>
<td>United Nations Evaluation Group</td>
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<td>UNIOGBIS</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The UNDP CO has commissioned a mid-term evaluation of the CPD Outcomes 1,2,3 to a team of three individual consultants participating in a joint mission under the leadership of a designated team leader and evaluator for Outcome 1. The current report covers outcome 1 only.

Description of the outcome

CPD Outcome 1 reads as follows: “State Institutions, including in the areas of defence, security, and justice, consolidate stability and the rule of law, democratic participation, and equitable access to opportunities for all”. The outcome statement feeds on four outputs that contribute to the stated outcome, as follows:

1.1. The NPA’s capacities are strengthened in the areas of representation, legislation, control, and supervision of the government’s actions that take into account a gender perspective;
1.2. Electoral management bodies have the capacities to ensure effective, transparent, credible and participatory electoral processes that are gender-sensitive
1.3. The legal system has the institutional framework and the operational capacities and abilities required to combat impunity and respond to the community in terms of compliance with human rights
1.4. Public institutions and civil society organisations have the capacity to budget, define a gender-responsive management framework, and implement policies that address the public’s priorities

The evaluator re-created a theory of change for the development of the outcome statement as requested to show the linkages and how the different UNDP interventions were linked to the outputs and contributed to the outcome 1.

Evaluation purpose, scope and objectives

The purpose of this CPD outcome 1 evaluation is to capture and demonstrate evaluative evidence of its contributions to outcome results as articulated both in the UNDAF and the CPD under Outcome 1. It is carried out in line with the UNDP guidance on outcome-level evaluation, of the UNDP PME Handbook, the UNDG Result-Based Management Handbook, and following the provisions of the UNDP evaluation policy. The scope of the evaluation is the first two years of CPD implementation, 2016-2017.

The evaluation serves an important accountability function, providing national stakeholders and partners in Guinea Bissau with an impartial assessment of the results including gender equality results of the areas of intervention. The evaluation also outlines lessons learned and recommendations which may feed into the upcoming CPD evaluation in 2019. However, as only two years of the five-year cycle are being appraised, and the CPD is still being implemented, it is expected that most outcomes will not yet be achieved. Rather the evaluation will focus on the elements and the processes developed during these two years as building blocks towards the realisation of the outcome.
Evaluation approach and methods

The evaluation team prepared an inception report which detailed the methodology used for the evaluation. A brief summary of the methodology is reproduced here, but the full details are in the inception report.

The evaluation has undertaken an analysis at three different levels:

1) At the output level, based on the reports and documentation and data available from the UNDP and partners on the projects that are part of the CPD outcome 1 during years 2016-2017;

2) At the outcome level, with two different but complementary lines of inquiry: a) through the projects’ national institutions and counterparts, in order to identify and capture change in capacity development, and b) from documentary evidence (ROAR and evaluation reports).

3) Contribution analysis was applied to the findings under points 1) and 2) to appraise the links to CPD outcomes. Since attribution is not possible, the evaluation also identified the enabling factors, direct or indirect, expected or unexpected, that contributed or impeded the achievements in support of Outcome 1.

The evaluation used a mixed-methods approach that included quantitative and qualitative data. The evaluation criteria were relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability. The evaluation focused on intended or unintended changes and effects that can be appraised through the various methods of data collection and through contribution analysis. Where the outcomes have not yet been achieved, the evaluation assessed the likelihood of their achievement. UN core programming principles (Gender Equality, Human Rights Based Approach) are equally covered in the analysis as these key transversal themes are critical aspects of the analysis.
Main findings

Relevance of outcome 1
The outcome is judged highly relevant to the needs of the various stakeholders. From the Government’s perspective, the outcome is directly aligned with the Terra Ranka document, which defines the national development priorities.
For the United Nations System, the outcome is fully relevant, as it is the same outcome as described in the UNDAF which is the overarching Programming Framework in Guinea Bissau for the work of all UN agencies and institutions over the 2016-2020 cycle.

Progress towards outcome 1
For Output one, there were mixed results given that the work with the NPA suffered by the political instability and the blockage of Parliament until December 2016 and therefore affected the planned interventions. Nonetheless some important results were achieved despite the difficulties, and UNDP is seen as on-track for this output.

For Output 2, the lack of implementation of the Conakry agreement meant that the elections were not going to take place during the first two-years of the CPD implementation. As a result, a number of expected results are not yet fully achieved, in line with the current electoral process. However, evidence of results was also obtained from the electoral management bodies, showing effective UNDP support in capacity development, in financial and technical support, and in infrastructure with the construction of the Regional Electoral Commission in Bafatá, as well as anecdotal evidence of gender responsiveness.

Output 3 was the most successful in achieving its planned objective, as support to the justice sector had also been on-going for several years and used a substantial amount of funding for outcome 1. The access to justice component was particularly strong and, despite some shortcomings, was reaching the stated objectives with a number of important achievements that should be maintained. Justice sector coordination also experienced an exponential improvement and support to the construction of district courts, along with the training of magistrates and other capacity building interventions and awareness raising campaigns, contributed to obtaining some positive results.

Output 4 also developed some potentially interesting processes linked to oversight of the state budget and the monitoring of public policies. Two particular examples seem to have a good potential for becoming good practices: the monitoring reports produced by CSOs after training from an UNDP intervention, that allows Civil Society to enter the debate regarding public policy, and the capacity of the Court of Auditors to review and perform a critical analysis of the State Budget.

The relevance and strategic positioning of UNDP is therefore relatively well aligned to the identified needs. Overall UNDP obtained mixed results regarding the effectiveness of its interventions, regarding its efficiency, resource mobilisation, and UN programming principles (HRBA and gender), as detailed in the report. This is due in part to the constraining operational environment linked to the political crisis.
Conclusions

UNDP has showed flexibility and adaptability in view of changing conditions during the first part of the CPD implementation. The positive assumptions that were used to develop the CPD did not materialize and further political conflicts and crises have occurred, affecting directly most, if not all, the components of the governance interventions under outcome 1. Despite an overly ambitious outcome statement and a highly challenging operating environment, UNDP has been able to find some critical entry points, identify potentially significant improvements in oversight by public institutions and civil society participation in monitoring of public policies, together with constructive interventions that have also shown significant results (Access to Justice, capacity development of electoral management bodies as well as some NPA actors). Overall, the results are mixed, since all interventions have suffered from detrimental operational conditions linked to the political situation, the lack of coordination among development partners (with the exception of the Justice sector which is now a good practice example) and the limited staff and human resource capacity of the CO and that of its government partners, the latter linked to absorption capacity issues.

The relevance of the interventions is clearly established, though the degree to which the partial results were achieved has been less than that initially foreseen. But UNDP did seize the existing opportunities to capitalize on early gains and should ensure that its support is able to consolidate the promising initial results that were achieved in some critical areas.

Recommendations

1. UNDP should review its office structure in terms of human resources as it appears to be currently understaffed with key posts left vacant (Gender specialist, M&E specialist, Justice Program Analyst…)
2. Consider the possibility of obtaining a P-4 or P-5 level post for ensuring programme design and coordination in the areas of Rule of Law, Security, Defence, Mediation and Conflict resolution, in line with the possible closure of the UNIOGBIS mission
3. Multiply efforts to ensure coordination among the UN system actors
4. Provide a sustained support to the promising developments and results obtained in relation to oversight of public accounts and CSO monitoring of government policies in order to ensure the proper mechanisms are in place
5. In the justice sector, review the strategic positioning: CAJ have now been financially supported for eight years, but UNDP should review the whole criminal justice chain to identify where bottlenecks are found in order to define its future interventions in support to MoJ. Construction of infrastructure is a means to an end, but not an objective, that must be strategically designed to add value.
6. UNDP should develop specific strategies for Capacity Development, Gender Mainstreaming, Human Rights, Awareness Raising, each with an implementation plan and a results framework, to ensure it is incorporating the technical expertise required in each of its interventions.

7. UNDP should consider investing in developing a stronger M&E system, including a dedicated knowledge management function, through the recruitment of specialized staff, training of UNDP managers in RBM and M&E, to ensure a common understanding and language is used in the CO, including for developing Theories of Change which explain the logic of the chain of results that lead to the outcome statements.

8. UNDP should review its internal guidance on the formulation of outcomes and outputs as some are too ambitious, not achievable in the CPD time-frame and not fully aligned with the recommended technical specifications.
INTRODUCTION

❖ Evaluation context

UNDP’s corporate policy is to evaluate its development cooperation with the host government on a regular basis in order to assess whether and how UNDP interventions contribute to the achievement of agreed outcomes, i.e. changes in the development situation and ultimately in people’s lives. UNDP defines an outcome-level result as “the intended changes in development conditions that result from the interventions of governments and other stakeholders, including international development agencies. They are medium-term development results created through the delivery of outputs and the contributions of various partners and non-partners. Outcomes provide a clear vision of what has changed or will change in the country, a particular region, or community within a period of time. They normally relate to changes in institutional performance or behaviour among individuals or groups”.

Evaluating UNDP Guinea Bissau Support to CPD Outcomes 1, 2, and 3 therefore involves ascertaining whether and how UNDP has assisted in improving human development conditions, including for individuals, institutions and systems. Evaluation also helps to clarify underlying factors affecting development, to identify unintended consequences (positive and negative), to generate lessons learned and to recommend actions to improve performance in future programming. UNDP has commissioned an evaluation team composed of three external consultants who have not previously worked together and were recruited separately (one evaluation team leader with expertise for Outcome 1, two evaluation experts with subject matter expertise for Outcome 2 and Outcome 3) for this mid-term formative evaluation of the CPD outcomes 1, 2. All have worked previously in Guinea Bissau and are knowledgeable about the country context.

As an outcome-level evaluation therefore, the primary focus of this evaluation will be on the programme outcomes as defined above. However, in order to understand whether everything was done to contribute to the achievement of outcomes, the evaluation will also assess how well the interventions were designed and planned; what activities were carried out; what outputs were delivered; how processes were managed; what monitoring systems were put in place; how UNDP interacted with its partners, and, above all, what changes have taken place at the outcome level.

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1 UNDP (2011); Outcome-level Evaluation: A companion guide to the handbook on planning monitoring and evaluating for development results for programme units and evaluators, p 3.
This mid-term evaluation of the three CPD outcomes 1,2,3, is commissioned by the UNDP Country Office at the end of 2018 in order to appraise the progress towards the outcomes during the period 2016-2017. The learning from this evaluation exercise will be particularly important to inform both the final CPD evaluation at the end of the programming cycle (2016-2020) as well as the UNDAF mid-term evaluation (which should have been commissioned after this outcome evaluation but was undertaken earlier).

The evaluation report is structured according to the approved reporting format developed by the evaluation team and accepted by the CO. Each outcome is therefore subject to a stand-alone evaluation report, as each consultant was responsible for one outcome statement. The structure of the evaluation report is described in the table of contents.

❖ Evaluation scope and objectives

The purpose of this UNDP mid-term CPD 1 evaluation is to capture and demonstrate evaluative evidence of its contributions to outcome results referred on the evaluation cover as articulated both in the UNDAF and the CPD. It is carried out in line with the UNDP guidance on outcome-level evaluation, of the UNDP PME Handbook, the UNDG Result-Based Management Handbook, and following the provisions of the UNDP evaluation policy.

The CPD Outcome 1 “State Institutions, including in the areas of defence, security, and justice, consolidate stability and the rule of law, democratic participation, and equitable access to opportunities for all” which is included in the CPD encompasses the following 4 outputs: Since UNDP is one, but not the only, UN agency contributing to Outcome 1, the specific roles and key actions of UNDP are also specified:

Table 1: CPD Outputs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output Nr</th>
<th>CPD Outputs</th>
<th>UNDP role and key action</th>
<th>Spatial Coverage</th>
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</table>

2 Note that the Outcomes 1 and 2 are the same in the UNDAF and the CPD, while Outcome 4 in the UNDAF is Outcome 3 in the CPD, with the same statement.

3 UNDP, Outcome-level evaluation, a companion guide to the Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and evaluation for development results for programme units and evaluators, December 2011

4 UNDP, Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results, 2009

5 UNDG, Results-Based Management Handbook, Harmonizing RBM concepts and approaches for improved development results at country level, October 2011
1.1 The NPA’s capacities are strengthened in the areas of representation, legislation, control, and supervision of the government’s actions that take into account a gender perspective.

Gender presentation in NPA through political platform of women and Women Parliamentarians (2 groups of CSO) through reinforcing advocacy capacity of both groups. (training and networking/conference participation in other countries/region). For legislation the NPA has been closed so no legislation passed for three years.

Central level BISSAU

1.2 Electoral management bodies have the capacities to ensure effective, transparent, credible and participatory electoral processes that are gender-sensitive.

Reinforcement of operational capacity and management of the electoral process and voter registry – also construction of regional HQ for NEC in Bafata (infrastructure). Also trainings on management, RBM, etc.

CENTRAL and Bafata GTAPE/NEC

1.3 The legal system has the institutional framework and the operational capacities and abilities required to combat impunity and respond to the community in terms of compliance with human rights.

Support to CAJ, CENFOJ, coordination, and construction of sector tribunals (Mansoa, Canchungo, Bubaque, Gabu in construction) and provision of equipment in the provinces. Also exchanges South-South and between PALOP countries.

Cacheu, Oio, Gabu, Bolama/Bijagos

1.4 Public institutions and civil society organisations have the capacity to budget, define a gender-responsive management framework, and implement policies that address the public’s priorities.

Training to CSO to monitor public policies, information exchange to Brazil, also grant to a network of CSO to exert oversight of public policies.

Central and regional levels

UNDP is implementing five projects under the above-referred CPD outputs under Outcome 1 of which three were operational during the period 2016-2017 (the two projects in italic font are not operational in 2016-2017 but are mentioned since they indicate the type of support that UNDP provides under the CPD). The evaluation scope therefore includes the contribution (or lack thereof) of UNDP through the following projects to CPD Outcome 1:

Table 2: list of UNDP projects under CPD Outcome 1 and its outputs according to CPD RF:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title and output</th>
<th>Budget US$ and utilisation</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Expected results</th>
<th>Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Support to the electoral cycle of GB (NIM)</td>
<td>3,990,275 2,536,673</td>
<td>2018-2019 CPD 1.2</td>
<td>1.Credible voter registration created/update for parliamentary and presidential elections 2.Transparent and credible elections are organised in line with</td>
<td>CNE, GTAPE Min. of territorial admin, Min of Finance, MFA</td>
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(NEX) Support for the creation of sustainable conditions for consolidation of the Rule of Law and democratic governance founded on citizenry participation, strengthening responsibility and accountability of republican institutions and the Civil Society (PACID).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NPA, NEC, CSOs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,421,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,304,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02.2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPD 1.1</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
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<td>1.4</td>
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**domestic legislation and international standards**

Effect of the Program (CPD): Democratic institutions are strengthened and public administration is modernized

1. Members of the NPA have the capacity to prepare legislative texts and to control governmental action.
2. National institutions have normative frameworks in accordance with international standards and functional coordination mechanisms to effectively carry out their duties
3. The NPA considers questions of gender equality and human rights in national debates and national policies of development
4. A national infrastructure of peace and institutional framework of citizenry consultation are functional for promoting a democratic dialogue
5. The NPA has tools and mechanisms of communication to improve its image
6. NEC has the legal framework, functional coordination mechanisms, adequate financial resources and human resources for organization of free, fair and transparent elections.
7. Institutions responsible for organization of elections and the organizations of civil society have the capacity to manage election resources, to coordinate and supervise implementation of the civic education program to promote electoral participation
8. Institutions responsible for organization of elections and the organizations of the civil society have the capacity to manage election resources, coordinate and supervise implementation of the program of civic education to promote electoral participation.
9. The NEC has institutional communication capacity and the ability to implement information sharing online.
10. Organizations of the civil society (OCSs) have a normative framework consistent with international standards, functional institutional mechanisms and the capacity for planning, implementing analysis and monitoring an evaluation of public policies to ensure better control of public action, including at a local level
11. Organizations of civil society have the capacity for communication and advocacy to promote good governance and political dialogue
12. Organizations of the civil society (OCSs) have functional institutional and organizational mechanisms
13. PMU established

| Supporting political and institutional stabilisation of the justice sector for peace consolidation in GB | 628,786 67,713 | 01.2018 – 06.2019 | The population benefits from enhanced access to justice through strengthened alternative dispute resolution systems within formal and informal justice systems, and a strengthened interface between both, in line with international standards of administration of justice and human rights | PBF Joint UNDP/UNICEF EF MoJ, Min. Público, CSM, MINT, Inst. Criança e Mulher |
| Rule of Law and Justice (DCAF evaluated Feb. 2017) | 1,839,468 986,124 | 01.2014 – 31.12.2016 CPD 1.3 | **Project Output 1:** Access to justice and justice service delivery at the community level improved  
**Project Output 2:** Skill and competencies of Justice Sector Actors Enhanced  
**Project Output 3:** Justice sector coordination and governance enhanced | Ministry of Justice, Supreme Court, Attorney General’s Office, BAR Association, CSOs |
The outcome evaluation is expected to demonstrate whether, why and how the outcomes have been accomplished and the contribution of the UNDP to a change in the development conditions of the country, after two years of project and actions. **The outcome evaluation covers the period 2016-2017** as defined in the terms of reference. The evaluation serves an important accountability function, providing national stakeholders and partners in Guinea Bissau with an impartial assessment of the results including gender equality results of the areas of intervention. The evaluation also outlines lessons learned and recommendations which may feed into the upcoming CPD evaluation in 2019. However, as only two years of the five-year cycle are being appraised, and the CPD is still being implemented, it is expected that most outcomes will not yet be achieved. Rather the evaluation will focus on the elements and the processes developed during these two years as building blocks towards the realisation of the outcomes. As such, the evaluation will have a prospective nature given its timing as a mid-term formative evaluation.

❖ **Methodological approach**

The evaluation team prepared an inception report which detailed the methodology used for the evaluation. A summary of the methodology is described hereunder, but the full methodology is detailed in the final inception report of 30th October 2018.

This section presents the evaluation’s approach and methodology based on the outline of UNDP’s programming under CPD outcome 1, as well as on the documentary review and analysis of the documentation provided to the evaluation team. The figure below summarises the evaluation design through a diagram that shows the different levels of analysis.
The evaluation has undertaken an analysis at three different levels:

4) At the output level, based on the reports and documentation and data available from the UNDP and partners on the projects that are part of the CPD outcome 1 during years 2016-2017;
5) At the outcome level, with two different but complementary lines of inquiry: a) through the projects’ national institutions and counterparts, in order to identify and capture change in capacity development, and b) to the extent possible, with a sample of direct beneficiaries, to identify and capture changes for the affected population, c) from documentary evidence (ROAR and evaluation reports).
6) Contribution analysis was applied to the findings under points 1) and 2) to appraise the links to CPD outcomes. Since attribution is not possible, the evaluation also identified the enabling factors, direct or indirect, expected or unexpected, that contributed or impeded the achievements in support of Outcome 1.

The approach to the evaluation was participatory following the recommendations of the “utilization-focused evaluation” approach that is described by M. Q. Patton in his book of the same name that continues to be a good practice reference material for the conduct of development evaluations. In order to ensure stakeholder participation, the evaluation team had prepared an initial power point presentation of the evaluation process to all evaluation stakeholders. Given agenda constraints, this initial meeting could not be held. On 8th November 2018 afternoon, the evaluation team held a debriefing workshop in which the preliminary findings and conclusions were discussed with the various evaluation stakeholders. The power point presentation is included as annex.

The evaluation used a mix of methods, taking into consideration that an outcome evaluation is necessarily focused on the results achieved at the CPD Outcome 1 statement level, which forms the basis of the evaluation and against which the programme performance must be appraised.

As defined in the UNDP Outcome-level evaluation companion guide, the main objective is to appraise the changes in institutional performance and/or behaviour as a result of the programme undertaken, which is not the sole contributor to the outcome, since an outcome is by essence the result of the contributions of various partners and non-partners. Therefore, in addition to interviewing the direct counterpart and partners for each of the projects, the evaluation team also interviewed other UN agencies, government institutions and CSOs that contributed to the

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outcome 1 to gain a broader understanding of the dynamics that may have contributed or impeded the achievement of the outcome.

The evaluation followed the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) evaluation norms and standards, as well as the UNDP PM&E guidance documents, including the companion guide to outcome-level evaluations. The evaluation team also adheres to and is a signatory of the UNEG ethical standards for evaluation.

The four criteria for undertaking the assessment are mentioned in the ToR and are the standard criteria used for project evaluations: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability. The evaluation focused on intended or unintended changes and effects that can be appraised through the various methods of data collection and through contribution analysis. Where the outcomes have not yet been achieved, the evaluation assessed the likelihood of their achievement. UN core programming principles (Gender Equality, Human Rights Based Approach) are equally covered in the analysis as these key transversal themes are critical aspects of the analysis.

The evaluation mixed-methods approach consisted of the following phases, which are described hereunder:

Phase 1.
**Documentary review and analysis phase**: obtention of documentation, development of the evaluation matrix, theory of change, interview tools, data collection instruments, division of labour in the team, roles and responsibilities, initial findings and limitations. Presentation of an inception report – draft by 26th October 2018 – finalized 30th October 2018 and accepted as final on 31st October 2018 by UNDP

Phase 2.
**Field data collection in Guinea Bissau** from 22nd October 2018 to 8th November 2018 inclusive. The evaluation team held during this time interviews both at central level and in identified provinces and local communities (see enclosed mission agenda for details).

The main source of qualitative data collection for Outcome 1 was based on Key Informant Interviews (KII) or group interviews. A total of 28 KII and/or group interviews were held during the mission, for a total of 1,490 minutes of continuous interview, corresponding to almost 25 hours of data collection. The total number of respondents was 39 of which 9 were women and 30 were men. The average interview time was slightly over 53 minutes.

Another source of data collection was **on-site observation** (particularly during field visits).

Phase 3.
Data analysis of notes and evaluative evidence, preparation of the draft evaluation report.
This is done with the evaluation team based at home. Draft report due on 26.11.2018 for each team member.

Phase 4.
Finalisation of the evaluation report. A final evaluation report will be submitted to UNDP within five working days of the receipt of the consolidated comments from the evaluation manager to the team leader, but in any case, not later than fifteen working days after the receipt of the draft evaluation report.

The outcome evaluation will contribute to identifying and reporting on the results of the CPD Outcome 1.

Given that an outcome evaluation necessarily analyses results at various levels, the lines of inquiry of the evaluation will be addressing the following areas:
1) Project specific: is each UNDP project achieving or on track toward achieving its intended results, if so how, and is it supporting the achievement of the specific CPD Output. Is the CPD output supporting the corresponding outcome, and, if so, how;
2) Did the various outputs achieved over 2016 and 2017 contribute to (or are the processes in place to achieve the outputs likely to contribute to) the CPD Outcome 1 statement, to what extent and why;
3) Major barriers to implementation and achievement of expected results;
4) Logic, strategy and linkages between UNDP’s achieved outputs and their contribution to the outcome statements;
5) UNDP’s partnership and capacity development strategies;
6) Outstanding opportunities that UNDP can use to guide future programming.

❖ Constraints and limitations of the evaluation

The evaluation team encountered several constraints which negatively affected the evaluation mission and the extent to which consultations with key stakeholders could be held. Initial e-mail request on 4th October 2018 by the team leader to obtain all relevant documentary materials before the fielding of the evaluation mission in order to prepare the inception report went unanswered. As a result, the first week of the consultants’ mission to Bissau was spent trying to collect the necessary documentation to prepare the inception report. Despite e-mail requests from the team leader to obtain a single share drive or SharePoint with all relevant documentation, a repository of all evaluation documents was not created within the CO. Despite the cooperation from the team put in place (as ERG Evaluation Reference Group) by the Country Office, the mission faced difficulties to get all the required information in a timely manner.
Evaluation team members arrived in the country on different dates. Agendas for the meetings had to be prepared at short-notice and the partners for the field work undertaken in the regions of Cacheu, Mansoa, Bafatá and Gabu had not been informed in advance. The efficiency of the evaluation process was thus reduced through these constraints and additional administrative and financial impediments that did not create the most enabling conditions for the evaluation mission. A stakeholder power point presentation of the evaluation mission was prepared by the evaluation team for presentation on 30th October 2018, as discussed with the UNDP DRR on 23.10.18, but the presentation could not take place due to conflicting agendas. The final ToR of the evaluation team members were not attached to their contracts and the version provided at the end of the evaluation field mission showed inconsistencies with the ToR that were posted for the application. This led to expectations from the CO that an additional workshop would be held based on the evaluation report, although this was not included as deliverables in the inception report. An outcome evaluation requires a significantly higher level of attention and support than a project evaluation, and the lesson learnt for the CO is that a higher level of participation is required to ensure a smooth and efficient outcome evaluation mission.

❖ Report structure

The report structure was shared and discussed with the CO. Each of the three stand-alone evaluation reports will adhere to the same structure, which is the following:

Executive Summary

Introduction
❖ Evaluation context
❖ Evaluation scope and objectives
❖ Methodological approach
❖ Evaluation constraints and limitation
❖ Evaluation report structure

I. National context
II. Analysis of the outcome (baseline CPD)
   ❖ Description of the outcomes and outputs that contribute to the outcome (evaluability)
   ❖ Theory of change and risks and hypotheses (external factors having influenced progress towards the outcome)
III. Evaluation Outcome findings
   III.1 – Expected outcomes (three levels – Outcome – CPD outputs – project outputs)
UNDP contribution towards the Outcome

❖ Relevance of the outcome
❖ Degree of achievement of the outcome as per CPD results (risks and hypotheses)
❖ Relevance of the interventions and strategic positioning
❖ Effectiveness of the interventions
❖ Partnership strategy
❖ Efficiency
❖ Strategy for resource mobilization
❖ Sustainability
❖ Gender equality and Human Rights

III.2 – Unexpected outcomes (not caused by UNDP but linked to outcome 1)

❖ Outcome observed (description, evidence, factors – contribution analysis)
❖ Relative importance of unexpected outcomes and links to UNDP interventions
❖ Lessons learnt (partnership, inclusiveness, etc.)

IV. Effectiveness of the institutional framework for monitoring and evaluation

V. Lessons learnt, conclusions and recommendations

Annexes:
- TOR
- Interview guide
- Bibliography
- List of respondents
- Mission agenda
- Power point presentation (debriefing on preliminary findings)
- Inception report

I. Country Context

❖ Political context

Guinea Bissau is a country that is subject to a high level of political instability since it achieved independence. A timeline of the major events is included as annex to highly the high level of instability that characterizes the operating environment. Presidents, prime ministers, presidential candidates have all suffered unexpected deaths, imprisonment or similar fate, thereby instilling a culture of high volatility since the end of the independence war. This underlines the frailty of the democratic processes in place and is an overarching disabling factor
that UNDP has no control over. At the time of the evaluation mission, a new set of elections are planned: legislative elections are expected to take place in December 2018 and presidential elections are to be held in 2019, in line with the provisions of the Lomé Agreement signed on 13 April 2018. The years 2016-2017 were marked by continued cyclical political instability. Key partners such as the World Bank, African Development Bank and the European Union suspended direct budget support to the government as a result of the crisis, thus reducing available resources for the government. The current government is in function since May 2018 and is legitimate. Its programme and budget were approved by the Parliament in June 2018. These new developments are the result of Lomé Agreement signed on 13 April 2018 that enable the appointment of a consensual Prime-Minister and Government, and enabled the opening of the parliament that had been closed since 2016.

An important element is the presence of a UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office, UNIOGBIS, which is responsible for the peace and stabilization agenda in the country and is expected to be gradually downsizing over the coming months with a possible closure in 2020, thereby leading de facto UNDP to assume an inherited mandate for political conflict resolution, rule of law, and security and defence. While the relationship between the Mission and the UNDP has not always been easy, there have been venues for collaboration and exchanges that continue to date. When UNIOGBIS leaves, UNDP will therefore have to do more with its currently exiguous staff office structure.

Fred Social, economic and environmental context

Guinea Bissau has been doing well during 2016-2017 on the economic front, primarily due to the good revenues from its primary export crop, cashew nuts. With an increase in volume of 12% from 2015 to 2016, and a price increase of 16%, and a continued increase in 2017 of the international price per ton (+ 39%) despite a 9% decrease in volume, the economic outlook has been positive, fuelled by a sustained GDP growth initially foreseen at 4.8% in 2016 and 5.5% in 2017. Domestic cashew price in 2017 were exceptionally high with a 29% increase over 2016 prices. This combined with the stable prices of oil and rice is expected to have a positive effect on the purchasing power of the poor. Despite economic growth, the country remains ranked 178 in terms of its human development index, with 0.42, reflecting a low human development.

Fred There is no official decision taken as of yet regarding the UNIOGBIS date of withdrawal. According to the Security Council Resolution 2404 (2018), the mandate of UNIOGBIS has been extended for 12 months until 28 February 2019. It will primarily have three responsibilities: 1) support to the implementation of the Conakry Agreement, 2) support to the electoral process to ensure free and fair legislative elections in 2018, 3) support the review of Guinea-Bissau’s Constitution, as mentioned on page 5 of the SCR 2404 (2018).
Political instability permeates all efforts to implement programmes and affects the quality and volume of programme delivery in general.

Guinea Bissau has a huge potential linked to its environmental resources. This aspect is developed further in the Outcome 3 evaluation report, as it focuses on environment and climate change.

Within the UNDP country office, a profiling exercise has been undertaken and several posts have been cut. One such post was mentioned in the CPD document in support of the M&E function. At the time of the evaluation, certain key posts such as a that of M&E expert, or a gender expert, are vacant. This also indicates that the necessary technical skills and knowledge may not be found in-house for essential functions that support management decision-making, given lack of resources⁸.

II. DESCRIPTION OF THE UNDP CPD/UNDAF OUTCOME 1

“State Institutions, including in the areas of defence, security, and justice, consolidate stability and the rule of law, democratic participation, and equitable access to opportunities for all”. This outcome statement is very broad and ambitious, and covers all State Institutions, in a context of chronic political instability. It could be argued that the five-year timeframe of the CPD is not sufficient to achieve this outcome, which is likely a longer-term outcome, arguably what could be considered as an impact as described by the UNDG RBM 2012 Handbook, since functioning State Institutions that consolidate stability, rule of law, democratic participation and equitable access to opportunities for all entail major changes in people’s lives.⁹ As this broad outcome objective requires the contribution of all actors, a whole-of-government approach from all State Institutions, the entire UN System, UNIOGBIS, plus the support of all development partners, as well as that of civil society, the outcome would have benefitted from an intermediary outcome statement that could show what UNDP, within the remit of the CPD, could accomplish during its current CPD cycle¹⁰.

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⁸ As mentioned by the CO, the CO financial sustainability scorecard doesn’t allow for filling the posts

⁹ UNDG RMB Handbook 2012, Box 2, p. 7, definition of key UN programming terms

¹⁰ UNDP management indicates that there is no flexibility to develop intermediate outcomes. It is however the view of the evaluator that there is too much distance between the broad outcome statement and the output statements to retrace the pathway that establishes how the processes initiated by the various outputs may contribute to the desired outcome. Since outputs are technically supposed to be to a significant extent the results of UNDP’s interventions, and the outcome level is a wider level of results where attribution is not possible, it would be desirable for UNDP to identify intermediate outcomes, e.g. those outcomes that are more directly aligned to
The lack of an articulated CPD specific outcome statement achievable within the five-year programming cycle means that the evaluation must establish the linkages between the broad Outcome 1 statement and the four CPD outputs:

1. The NPA’s capacities are strengthened in the areas of representation, legislation, control, and supervision of the government’s actions that take into account a gender perspective
2. Electoral management bodies have the capacities to ensure effective, transparent, credible and participatory electoral processes that are gender-sensitive
3. The legal system has the institutional framework and the operational capacities and abilities required to combat impunity and respond to the community in terms of compliance with human rights
4. Public institutions and civil society organisations have the capacity to budget, define a gender-responsive management framework, and implement policies that address the public’s priorities

These outputs in turn guide the type of interventions and projects that UNDP is (and will) fund during the CPD cycle 2016-2020. It is clear that UNDP interventions in turn must have a direct linkage with one or more of the CPD outputs as a result of the intervention logic.

It is important to mention that during the time of formulation of the CPD, there were very positive expectations that a new country would emerge from the results of the 2014 elections. This was also reflected in the large amount of funding pledged by development partners of 1.2 billion US Dollars in March 2015 in Brussels for Guinea Bissau. Unfortunately, the positive dynamics did not continue and by mid-2015 a new political crisis brought the country to a political stand-still, in which NPA plenaries could not be held, and therefore, legislative activity could not be performed.

It is important to identify the logic which led to the development and establishment of the UNDAF/CPD results framework, as the TOR require the evaluation team to develop a theory of change (TOC) for the rationale used by UNDP to inform CPD outcome statement 1.

❖ Evaluability Assessment

the four outputs on the way to achieving the overall outcome statement, as an intermediate step in the hierarchy of results, simply because the leap from outputs to outcome is so great.
The CPD results framework has identified specific indicators, baselines and targets for both the outcomes and the outputs\textsuperscript{11}. Three outcome indicators, each with its baseline and target for 2020, are identified for Outcome 1:

1.1. Proportion of women in Parliament and government, including defence and security
1.2. Voters turnout (disaggregated by sex and geographic location)
1.3. Number of persons with access to the justice system (disaggregated by gender, social status and geographic location)

Since the mid-term evaluation focuses on the period 2016-2017, it is very unlikely that significant changes at outcome level will have happened so quickly over a two-year period, particularly given the continued political instability, so evidence of change is not readily available. Indicators 1.1. and 1.2. therefore show no change at the end of 2017. For indicator 1.3, the target for 2020 was 10,000 cases, of which 7,500 men and 2,500 women having access to the justice system. Based on the data received from the GICJU/CAJ and covering the period from September 2011 (date when the Access to Justice Centres were opened) to September 2018, the total number of cases from the 6 CAJ established has been 8,185 men and 2,161 women, bringing the total to 10,346 cases. Thus the target for indicator 1.3. is already exceeded for men in 2018 and on track to being achieved for women, as 339 more women should have access to CAJ over the next two years.

These indicators however are proxy indicators, as they do not measure directly the outcome 1 statement.

As mentioned earlier, the development of short or intermediate-term outcomes (achievable within the CPD time-frame) would have provided an easier understanding of what can realistically be accomplished during this period. Intermediate level results are missing to allow to provide benchmarks on whether the UNDP interventions and the CPD outputs are on track towards contributing to the outcome statement. There is also no indication of the geographic coverage of the outcome, giving the impression that the outcome is being pursued throughout the country, when in reality some interventions have a clearly defined geographical focus\textsuperscript{12}. Some are essentially targeting the central level of government in the capital Bissau (example the National People’s Assembly – e.g. Parliament, output 1) while others are geographically defined (CAJ established in Mansoa, Cachungo, Buba, Bafatá, Bissau-Velho, Bairro-Militar, under output 3). Since the scope of this mid-term evaluation is 2016-2017, it is understood that the outcomes

\textsuperscript{11} UNDP, CPD Guinea Bissau 2016-2020, p. 8 to 12

\textsuperscript{12} UNDP CO comment: The Outcome did not mention the geographical coverage as mentioned. It could not be possible at this level because the agencies are intervening in different regions and level. But these components of the indicators are well stated either in the output CPD indicators or in project documents and annual work plans.
may not yet be achieved, and therefore the evaluation attempted to identify whether adequate processes have been initiated in order to contribute to the accomplishment of both outputs and outcomes. It should be therefore understood that a mid-term outcome evaluation may lack concrete evidence of outcomes half-way through the programming cycle, since the outcomes are to be achieved at the end of the CPD cycle.

In addition to the available data linked to the CPD results framework, the evaluation used an adaptation of the Most Significant Change (MSC)\textsuperscript{13} method, in order to obtain some qualitative evidence directly from the national counterparts and other stakeholders, regarding the changes that UNDP interventions have brought, or are likely to bring by the end of the CPD, to the higher-level objective of CPD outcomes 1. Substantial effort was placed in obtaining main stakeholder’s perceptions regarding the projects’ achievements and views regarding CPD Outcome 1. The linkages and possible connections between the individual project results, where available, and the statement under Outcomes 1 of the CPD were established using contribution analysis, which informs about the relationship between the lower-level results (outputs) and the CPD Outcome 1. As always in the cases of contribution analysis, it is not possible to define attribution (e.g. the extent to which UNDP is responsible for the results), so there is no quantitative measurement that can be used to establish that relationship.

In summary, the CPD results framework shows a high level of evaluability that will be useful for the final CPD evaluation at the end of the cycle. But for a mid-term outcome evaluation, the evaluability is more difficult to ascertain as the pathway towards the results has not been very clearly defined in the CPD document.\textsuperscript{14} As a result, the evaluation needs to reconstruct the logic of the intervention through the reconstruction of the underlying theory of change for Outcome 1.

❖ Constructing a Theory of Change (ToC) for UNDAF Outcome 1.

The UNDAF/CPD Outcome 1 statement is:
“State Institutions, including in the areas of defence, security, and justice, consolidate stability and the rule of law, democratic participation, and equitable access to opportunities for all”.

\textsuperscript{13} The ‘Most Significant Change’ (MSC) Technique, A Guide to Its Use by Rick Davies and Jess Dart, version 1.00 April 2005, pdf version from google.

\textsuperscript{14} There are different views between the CO and the evaluator. It is the view of the evaluator that there is a results-gap going from the CPD outputs to the CPD outcome to explain the chain of results. This view appears not to be shared by the CO.
On the one hand, the statement is broad enough to allow a wide range of different interventions to contribute to this outcome, thereby lending flexibility to all the UN agencies involved in the achievement of the outcome. It is also the view of the present evaluation team that the Outcome 1 statement is too wide to be easily articulated into a set of operational programmes that would give reasonable guarantee to its achievement. However, to develop a ToC to support the Outcome 1, the evaluation team has looked at the expected results of each of the three projects that were operational during 2016-2017, to ensure that they at least are on the way to contributing or are likely to contribute to the Outcome 1 statement, through one or more of the four CPD outputs, albeit with different levels of success.

A theory of change is defined by UNDG as “a method that explains how a given intervention, or set of interventions, are expected to lead to a specific development change, drawing on a causal analysis based on available evidence. In the UNDAF context, a thorough theory of change helps guide the development of sound and evidence-based programme strategies, with assumptions and risks clearly analysed and spelled out.”

An overall schematic representation of the TOC for the CPD was prepared by the CO and is presented in the inception report. However, it is a schematic representation that does not fully incorporate all the required elements, particularly the assumptions and risks which must be considered when developing the TOC.

Similarly, the question for the evaluation was therefore to identify how and under what assumptions the set of interventions were formulated to contribute to the achievement of the outcome statement.

The CPD Outcome 1 statement “State Institutions, including in the areas of defence, security, and justice, consolidate stability and the rule of law, democratic participation, and equitable access to opportunities for all” is divided into four outputs 1) The NPA’s capacities are strengthened in the areas of representation, legislation, control, and supervision of the government’s actions that take into account a gender perspective 2) Electoral management bodies have the capacities to ensure effective,  

15 UNDG, Theory of Change UNDAF Companion Guidance, 2017, point 1. Introduction

16 The CO does not agree with this finding, “as the CPD limitation did not enable a full writing of the ToC. However, if one reads through the Rationale of The Programme and proposed intervention, it is possible to identify the problems, the root and intermediate causes and the proposed solutions, which explain the ToC. The risks and assumptions are spelled under the Risks section”. Evaluator comment: It is not as clearly readable as the presentation made hereunder.
transparent, credible and participatory electoral processes that are gender-sensitive 3) The legal system has the institutional framework and the operational capacities and abilities required to combat impunity and respond to the community in terms of compliance with human rights 4) Public institutions and civil society organisations have the capacity to budget, define a gender-responsive management framework, and implement policies that address the public’s priorities.

From the analysis of the interventions and from the global ToC established for the CPD, which is shown hereunder, the following theory of change can be articulated for Outcome 1, provided it is understood that:

1) The Outcome 1 is the result of the overall contribution of government and development actors (as included in the UNDAF) and does not result essentially from the UNDP programming;
2) The four outputs under O.1. show that UNDP has identified four critical areas in which its support is being brought: 1. Parliament (NPA), 2) Electoral bodies 3) Access to Justice 4) CSOs and capacity development for oversight of public policies
3) UNIOGBIS has the mandate and responsibility for the Rule of Law component (e.g. defence and security), which is not included in the four UNDP CPD outputs for 2016-2020

“Provided there is political stability and the current government stays in power and is committed to the achievement of the results as mentioned in the Terra Ranka reference document, without further political deadlocks or crises,

IF

• UNDP is able to provide effective strategic support to and develop capacity of targeted sectors and key institutions, namely the National People’s Assembly (Parliament), the National Electoral Commission, the Justice Sector through Access to Justice, and other public institutions, and IF
• UNDP is able to provide effective support to and develop capacity of oversight institutions, namely the Court of Auditors and Supreme Court, as well as other actors and Civil Society Organisations that play a fundamental role in the process of oversight, transparency and accountability, and IF
• UNDP is able to ensure that effective support and capacity development to local level institutions and decentralised government services has been provided, particularly in the Justice Sector and in support of Electoral management bodies,

AND Considering that all are expected to decisively increase good governance through increased public awareness and enhanced service delivery,

THEN

• a more equitable, stable and participatory governance system that will service the needs of the population in a gender-sensitive manner, including that of the most vulnerable groups will be achieved nation-wide thanks to the interventions linked to the CPD as well as those of all other stakeholders.”
III. Outcome 1 findings

This chapter deals with the findings regarding the outcome 1. The first part starts by identifying the UNDP contribution to the outcome through the three levels of analysis – projects – CPD outputs – outcome and makes the linkages with the evaluation criteria. The second part addresses the unexpected outcome to which UNDP appears not to have contributed, but which contribute to the outcome statement).

III.1. UNDP contribution towards the expected outcome based on traffic light system

❖ Relevance of outcome 1

The outcome is judged highly relevant to the needs of the various stakeholders. From the Government’s perspective, the outcome is directly aligned with the Terra Ranka document, which defines the national development priorities.

For the United Nations System, the outcome is fully relevant, as it is the same outcome as described in the UNDAF which is the overarching Programming Framework in Guinea Bissau for the work of all UN agencies and institutions over the 2016-2020 cycle. It is further a document that is shared and validated with the government partners to ensure its alignment with national priorities.

For CPD Output 1, the support and capacity development to Parliament (NPA) was an essential aspect required to contribute to capacity development of the mandated representatives of the people. The extent to which the support could be provided was severely constrained by the political crisis, but the need for supporting NPA capacity development was high and remains high to this date. UNDP also managed to collaborate with two specific groups in order to address gender equality in this output. Firstly, it supported the work of the Specialised Commission for Children and Women, belonging to the NPA. Secondly, it also contributed to the capacity development of the informal Network of Women Parliamentarians. Another significant achievement was the work with the Specialized Commission for Budget and Economic Affairs through the ProPALOP-TL project in support of oversight institutions, through which capacity for budget analysis and monitoring was strengthened. Through this work, for the first time the State General Account was debated in the NPA. UNDP also supported the administrative apparatus of the NPA through training of its Secretariat staff, strategic planning and provision of management systems (e.g. financial management and accounting software and operations manual).

For CPD Output 2, it was also a major necessity to ensure that the electoral management bodies (NEC and GTAPE) possessed the necessary capacities to enable free and fair elections to take place. Despite previous support and earlier training, such as BRIDGE accreditation, there was a need to reinforce capacity both at national level and in the regions. UNDP was therefore responsive in providing support to both the NEC
and the REC. The statistics on the 2014 general elections showed regional disparities in the percentage of women participation, but in a majority of the regions and in the overall voters’ numbers, women’s participation was higher than men’s with an overall participation of 51.6% of women voters versus 48.3% of men.\(^{17}\)

CPD output 3 is largely, but not exclusively, linked to the UNDP support to the MoJ for Access to Justice through the work of the GICJU/CAJ, which include 6 locations throughout the country where ordinary citizens can come to receive legal assistance through the CAJ specialized staff (TAJ). In 2017 UNDP also contracted a CTA based in the MoJ in order to support the Justice Reform Programme (which was foreseen in the Terra Ranka document). On both accounts, Access to Justice and Justice Reform, existing gaps were identified which justified the support to the CAJ and MoJ. The output also included capacity development through the training of magistrates (CENFOJ), as well as the construction of district courts.

CPD output 4 is mainly centred on the capacity development of Civil Society Organisations to ensure oversight of public policies with a gender sensitive focus. This was established in order to provide more participation and democratic space for CSOs as they did not traditionally engage in public policy debates or monitoring of public policies. Technical capacity development was therefore an important component to empower CSOs to participate in public debates and policy discussions.

❖ Progress achieved to date according to the CPD results framework

The CPD results framework (RF) for outcome 1 identifies 4 indicators for output 1.1, 2 indicators for output 1.2, two indicators for output 1.3, and four indicators for output 1.4. The CO is not monitoring the CPD RF indicators as established but is using the UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017 Integrated Results and Resources Framework (IRRF)\(^{18}\). Under this framework the indicators provided by the CO are in some cases similar to the CPD results framework, but not all are the same as the architecture of the RF is also different. The relative alignment between the CPD RF and the IRRF contributes to a degree of confusion as it is not clear why CPD RF indicators are not being monitored\(^{19}\).

Output 1: NPA’s capacities are strengthened

\(^{17}\) CNE, Eleiçoes Gerais de 2014, Estatistica de votantes por sexo

\(^{18}\) UNDP CO: this is a corporate guideline. For this reason, when developing the CPD, we were advised to use as much as possible the strategic plan IRRF indicators

\(^{19}\) UNDP CO comment: the alignment between the two RF was controlled and approved by UNDP regional office and rate of alignment was considered above 95%. Furthermore, most of CPD indicators are derived from SP indicators. We would like to inform that those indicators are informed and the accumulated results of them are used for ROAR. Evaluator comment: It is unclear why the CPD has to include a specific RF if it has to use the SP IRRF RF and indicators anyway. What is then the purpose of the CPD RF if it is not used as a monitoring tool to show progress?
Indicator 1.1.1. Extent to which Parliament has improved its administrative and human resource capacities required to discharge its mandates in relation to law-making, oversight and representation, on a scale of 0 to 4. (both in CPD RF and IRRF)

The CO indicator for 2016 is 2 (capacity very partially improved) and 3 (capacity partially improved) for 2017. In terms of achievements, the NPA Strategic plan was updated in 2015. An internal regulation of the NPA Board of Directors was prepared in 2017, as well as a report on training of Accounting technicians of the NPA accounting Department in Analysis of the State General Budget, as well as training in other areas, hence the 3 rating. UNDP also provided accounting/management software.

Over and beyond the quantitative information, qualitative evidence from interviews indicate that the support of the UNDP proved critical to maintain a functioning Parliament, after the crisis erupted in 2015 and the NPA was practically stopped during August and September 2015 as the funds were blocked by government. During this period UNDP was the only support to NPA and allowed basic functions to be maintained, through the provision of equipment and transportation and logistical support. Although the amount was not large, UNDP was seen as being very flexible and responsive to a very difficult situation for the NPA. Further requests for enhancing information exchange to/from Guinea Bissau with other Parliaments were expressed.

UNDP worked with the NPA on the State Budget to support the respective Parliamentary Commission in the analysis of the Audit Court regarding the State Budget. This proved an important achievement because it was done for the first time in the country, demonstrating an improvement in Public Finance Management accountability. UNDP also supported the specialized Parliamentary Commissions, and in particular the Children and Women Specialised Commission, but the president was not available for interview during the evaluation. Support in capacity development was also extended to the Network for Women Parliamentarians who indicated that they benefitted from institutional support and equipment. All support to NPA was provided through the PACID project, which was aligned with CPD outputs 1, 2 and 4. (cf. table 2 above).

Indicators 1.1.2 Number of laws that nationalize international conventions on human rights. This is not reflected in the IRRF. As confirmed by the CO, this was not done because the blockage of Parliament did not allow this kind of work to take place.

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20 Comment from UNDP CO: With the women affairs commission and the women network, we are missing an important contribution related with Gender Based Violence, where UNDP supported the dissemination of the law against GBV
Indicators 1.1.3 Percentage of women parliamentarian with the capacity required to discharge law-making, oversight and representation mandates, and indicator 1.1.4 percentage of elected women in municipal elections, are not relevant at the time of the evaluation as municipal elections have not yet been held and the decentralisation law has not yet been enacted. Furthermore, the work of NPA has been inconsistent due to the political struggles which limited the level of results that could be obtained. However, some work was done under the ProPALOP TL project which trained women parliamentarians on gender budgeting, thereby equipping them with capacity to analyse the budget with a gender perspective.

Output 2. Electoral management bodies have the capacities to ensure effective, transparent, credible and participatory electoral processes that are gender-sensitive.

Indicator 1.2.1. is the number of registered electors. At the time of the evaluation there was no update on the number.

Indicator 1.2.2. Is the extent to which output 2. Is achieved. According to the IRRF in 2016 capacity was partially improved, with a rating of 3, and was largely improved in 2017, with a rating of 4. This is evidenced in the quality of the preparatory report for the 2018 legislative elections prepared in November 2017.

When looking at the qualitative aspects of capacity development, UNDP training was considered as the most valuable aspect of the support received, which also included material and equipment, as well as the construction of the Regional Electoral Commission in Bafatá (visited by the evaluator) under UNDP funding. But the training was instrumental in ensuring the quality of the staff’s skills, and further request for support in the regions is warranted, as well as at central level as more follow-up on capacity development should be provided. UNDP is also the only support that continues even after elections are held, when no one else is supporting electoral management bodies. Since the government only pays staff salaries, all support provided allows to obtain training and exchange information to develop knowledge and skills. Evidence of gender-sensitivity in the capacity development of electoral bodies was provided, as 2014 election results counts showed gender disaggregation data and an overall higher participation of women voters (51.6% versus 48.3% of men).

The construction of the REC in Bafatá ensures a better space and conditions as the old building that was rented didn’t offer safe physical conditions nor good storage capacity. The new construction therefore contributes to the REC’s capacity but some material is still missing and some upgrading of the facilities is needed. Nonetheless the building is a clear improvement over the formerly rented premise and guarantees a more professional working capacity for the NEC.
Output 3: The legal system has the institutional framework and the operational capacities and abilities required to combat impunity and respond to the community in terms of compliance with human rights.

Indicator 1.3.1. Number of persons who have accessed or benefited from legal aid services, disaggregated by sex and age

According to the CO IRRF the figures are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>6,546</td>
<td>1,808</td>
<td>8,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>7,951</td>
<td>2,146</td>
<td>10,097</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indicator 1.3.2. Number of additional unresolved crimes and cases of human rights violations, including gender-based violence, that are reported, prosecuted and resolved

According to the IRRF there is currently no data available on court records.

The qualitative aspects of the legal assistance are particularly important, as they have generated some unintended positive effects. The legal assistance provided through the six CAJ are essential in order to make access to justice more visible and easier for the ordinary citizen. Qualitative interviews in five of the CAJ show that the assistance provided is highly valuable and plays an important role in terms of equity and fairness for the population. The certificate of indigence, which the CAJ sometimes establishes for the poorest and most vulnerable, allows to waive the different court charges when taking the case to court. As such, the CAJ plays an important social role as its services are provided free of charge and the TAJ (specialized staff) has the authority to deliver this certificate of indigence that frees the beneficiary from the payment of court charges21.

Discussions indicate that the presence of the CAJ have had several positive multiplier effects: one is that the sensitization campaigns have allowed the rural communities to be more aware of their rights and of human rights, including women equality. Although the percentage of women users remains low given cultural reasons, the role played by the CAJ is essential for facilitating access to justice. The other positive aspect is that undue collection of fees and payments which were leveraged by the Courts or the Police are no longer being charged to the citizens. The intervention of the CAJ in these cases has resulted in written complaints to the national level with the money being returned to its rightful owner. The CAJ therefore also has an oversight function over other public institutions, ensuring that citizen’s rights are being respected.

21 Although in one case the CAJ reported that the court judge did not accept the document
Other results that contributed to increase the access to justice were the training of magistrates, with the collaboration of CENFOJ, the construction of district courts, the creation of the Justice sector information system to inform decision-making on backlog cases, and the (re-)establishment of the Justice Sector Thematic Group that was mentioned as a model for coordination of all interventions in the sector and is reportedly being replicated to other sectors given the positive results achieved. Interviews indicate that all projects in the Justice sector must be vetted by the Thematic Group in order to be implemented, thereby avoiding duplication and overlap.

Projects such as the Rule of Law and Justice and Strengthening Public Confidence the Justice Sector (see table 2) are the two UNDP interventions that support output 3.

Output 4. Public institutions and civil society organisations have the capacity to budget, define a gender-responsive management framework, and implement policies that address the public’s priorities.

Indicator 1.4.1. Number of ministries fully applying national public administration policy priorities and principles

Indicator 1.4.2. Extent to which human resources management systems and controls are effective and transparent

Indicator 1.4.3. Number of proposals by CSOs including women’s organisations, that feed development policy debates and formulation

Indicator 1.4.4. Number of local governments that develop gender-responsive plan, budgeting and monitoring delivery of basic services.

The IRRF does not report information on indicators 1.4.1, 1.4.2, and 1.4.4.

The two indicators in the IRRF which relate to the indicator 1.4.3. are:

a) The degree of effectiveness of legal/regulatory framework for women’s groups to function in the public sphere and contribute to development and,

b) The degree of effectiveness of mechanisms/platforms to engage women’s groups

While the wording is somewhat different, both indicators obtain a rating of 2 (medium). Regarding the support provided by UNDP interventions, UNDP carried out a study on the legal framework for CSOs, developed the strategic plan of the National Movement of Civil Society in 2016, as well as a manual of administrative and financial procedures. Monitoring reports in the areas of health and agriculture were produced by CSOs in 2017.
Interviews held by the evaluator indicate that the final publication of the monitoring report has not yet been made and presented publicly, although it was expected to take place in 2018. This initiative was undertaken through the PACID project and training was provided by a Brazilian consultancy firm, which allowed civil society members to gain the technical skills to undertake the diagnosis of public policy. This appears to be the first time such a process to empower CSO in the area of public policy monitoring was undertaken. While the partners were not trained about how to deal with the management response (from the government sectors), it is an essential achievement that has given CSOs an example of how they can contribute in the area of public policy-making. In addition to the NMCS, which is an overarching umbrella of Civil Society Organisations in Guinea Bissau, the intervention created a spin-off CSO which is called Civil Forum for Monitoring of Public Policies and was legally registered on 18.10.18. It is also a network organization that includes women’s groups (one of the Forum members interviewed is also the president of the Rural Women Forum) and is highly motivated by the work done in health and agriculture. Their wish is to continue the process to reinforce and empower CSO capacities to engage further in advocacy of public policies and in raising awareness. The intervention appears to have created a high level of interest and motivation for CSOs which can constitute an important pathway to contribute to the outcome 1 statement.

Another achievement resulting from UNDP support is linked to the capacity development of oversight institutions. While interviews with the Supreme Court could not be held, discussion with the Court of Auditors (CA) showed that previous efforts under another UNDP intervention funded by the EU (Pro-Palop) in 2015-2016 allowed the CA to develop a strategic and operational plan for 2016-2020 which generated a positive internal dynamic for training and capacity development in order to really start the CA mission: oversight of the Government Budget. The CA for the first time produced an audit opinion of the General State Account that was submitted to the parliament and fueled the first informed debate on public finance management accountability. The usefulness of the CA audits appears to have been recognized by the government as in 2018, for the first time, CA received 100 million CFA from government.22 As a means to combat corruption and ensure transparency, the initial progress of the CA appear to be a step in the right direction.

❖ Relevance of the interventions and strategic positioning

The three interventions operational in 2016-2017 (PACID, Rule of law and justice, Strengthening Confidence in the Justice Sector) all contribute to the CPD output statements and to Outcome 1. While the first intervention addresses outputs 1.1, 1.2 and 1.4, the two other interventions address output 1.3.

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22 According to the information obtained from government ministries, the current government budget only covers staff salaries, but there are no funds covering operational costs, rents or other expenditures, which depend on development partners and institutions' resource mobilization capacity.
Each intervention is relevant by itself to support the output statements. However, the PACID was also designed during the optimistic scenario of the CPD and the amount of funding it leveraged was much lower than the initial projections, leading UNDP to having to focus on certain components of the project (which contains no less than 13 identified outputs). The RoLaJ project has been supporting the CAJ and other related activities (CENFOJ, sensibilization campaigns on human rights and gender equality with the LGDH in the rural communities and through the media). The PBF funded intervention of Strengthening Confidence in the Justice Sector had to be revised given the changes in the leadership of the MoJ. Initially foreseen to enhance justice services delivery through the design and installation of a database and monitoring system, the project was re-designed in order to cover the costs of a consultancy to define and design an adequate information system, the costs of building a pilot House of Justice in Gabu, and the third component is to reinforce knowledge of the population on access to justice. Annual progress reports of the PBF funded project were not available and therefore the evaluator is not able to appraise to what extent progress has been achieved under this project. Furthermore, the Head of the PBF was out of the country at the time of the evaluation and could not be interviewed.

The strategic positioning of the three interventions therefore is strong, but the extent to which the two projects that supported justice reform collaborated or coordinated among themselves is not known.  

❖ Effectiveness of interventions

The PACID project was designed as a far-reaching programme that should be able to leverage US$ 15 million of funds. In practice however, only a tenth of that amount was obtained, and from UNDP core resources, as it was not possible to mobilize donors to fund the project. This naturally obliged UNDP to focus its interventions on specific aspects with less resources than initially anticipated. For output 1, despite the continuing political crisis, which eventually led to having the NPA suspend its plenary and incapacitated some of the key functions of the NPA, the responsiveness of UNDP and its flexibility allowed for some progress to take place in terms of capacity development and material support, including in issues such as travel/transportation/logistics. It is difficult to link the support to a specific product, but these apparently minor aspects, at a time when a number of development actors were withdrawing their support to government institutions, was highly appreciated by the NPA members, and contributed to creating a certain level of credibility for the work of UNDP with NPA. The Specialised Commission for Children and Women concluded its work in dissemination domestic violence legislation in the Cacheu and Oio regions (2016), while financial support to the Network of Women Parliamentarian allowed to hold a conference regarding women participation and empowerment. In 2017, 13 women Parliamentarian were skilled on integration of a gender perspective in the National Assembly’s organizational capacity and

23 Comment from UNDP CO: the collaboration and synergy are there: these projects have the same IP and are managed by the same team. There are no signs of overlap among them.
oversight role. According to the ROAR, in 2017 the subsequent blockage of the Parliament function impeded the revision of the Statutes of Parliamentarians. For output 2, the support to the electoral management bodies appears to have been essential in the development of the capacities of the NEC and GTAPE. In addition, support for the construction of a Regional Electoral Commission (REC) in Bafatá also contributed to creating enabling conditions for the upcoming elections, together with the trainings realized in the regions. The degree to which gender-sensitivity has been developed is unclear. It is expected that the upcoming elections (legislative 2018 and presidential 2019) should be able to present gender-disaggregated data, unlike for the 2014 general election report. For output 4, the capacity development of targeted CSOs in monitoring of public policies appears to have a high potential and has certainly been received with enthusiasm and high motivation by CSO participants. Unfortunately, the final report is yet to be presented publicly but this appears to be a venue where further efforts could be deployed as it directly relates to the outcome 1.

The Rule of Law and Justice project has achieved its primary objective of facilitating access to justice. The project evaluation undertaken in February 2017 indicates that the project achieved “bounded effectiveness, with the best performing component being the enhancement of justice sector actor’s skills and competencies”\(^2\). The level of execution was evaluated as low, indicating a more limited contribution to outcomes than set out in the project design. The evaluation also recognized the project contribution to raising awareness on issues of access to justice, human rights and gender equality. However, from the perspective of the targets set by the project in terms of access to justice, the number of cases is already being achieved for men, and is likely to be on track for women. The construction of district courts in Mansoa and Cachungo in the logic of complementarity with the work of the CAJ also contributed to improved access to justice by local communities. The ISSAT evaluation also pointed out to another important outcome, namely an improved procedural and substantive performance by the attorney general delegates and judges in certain cases, given the heightened awareness that other legal professionals were scrutinising their work. In addition, the TAJ adopted the practice of supporting the citizens to report unethical and illicit conduct by the delegates of the Attorney General Office and by the judges to their respective hierarchies”\(^2\). The support to CENFOJ for the training of magistrate and judicial staff is another essential aspect of the intervention. As identified in the ISSAT evaluation report, “the thematic trainings carried out by the CENFOJ for magistrates are also inclusive of law enforcement personnel (PoP, GN, Judiciary Police, and Prison Guards) promoting trust, knowledge of each other’s competencies and limits, and improvement of coordination at an operational level”.\(^2\) This is an example of good practice that should be continued in the future.

For the Strengthening confidence in the Justice sector project, in absence of annual project reports, the 2017 ROAR confirms that the establishment and operation of the Justice Information Management


\(^{25}\) Ibid., p. 16

\(^{26}\) Ibid., p. 20
System has not been achieved as planned and an independent assessment was conducted to recommend the most suitable structure.  

 ❖ Partnership strategy

No rating

UNDP had already established a partnership strategy with most of its current partners, dating back from earlier interventions. With few exceptions (such as the development of CSO monitoring capacity or the formal agreement with the BAR association) the partners have therefore already been working with UNDP and there is no major change in the partnerships that have been established in the governance institutions, as the key institutions are those with which UNDP is already working. UNDP has identified some entry points which may be leveraging added value to the outcome (CSO monitoring, legislative capacity development, gender equality sensitization, oversight capacity development) but requires a sustained support in order to achieve its objective.

The CO indicates there is a partnership within the UN family through the Joint Program on Police, Justice and Corrections which is led by UNDP. This program enables collaboration and synergies among UN agencies and UNIOGBIS. However it does not form a part of the projects documents made available to the evaluator for this outcome evaluation, possibly having started after 2017.

 ❖ Efficiency

In terms of delivery the three interventions show an execution level which stands at 74.2% as per the following table:

Table 3. Delivery Outcome 1 interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delivery Outcome 1</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Budget US$</td>
<td>Combined delivery</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACID</td>
<td>$1,421,554.00</td>
<td>$1,304,443.00</td>
<td>91.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening MoJ</td>
<td>$687,850.00</td>
<td>$639,726.00</td>
<td>93.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RoLaJ</td>
<td>$1,839,468.00</td>
<td>$986,124.00</td>
<td>53.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>$3,948,872.00</td>
<td>$2,930,293.00</td>
<td>74.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP CO data

27 UNDP CO indicates that the initial and main outcome of this project has been changed with the re-designing of the project. However, an intermediate result has been achieved with the same funds, namely the successful installation of the database for criminal records, which may be catalytic for the entire sector.
In terms of management efficiency, it is important to note that the CO went through a period of diminishing resources (with a profiling exercise suppressing various key posts in the CO, such as the gender advisor, a dedicated M&E specialist, and others) which has negatively affected its administrative and financial capacity.

When appraising the satisfaction level from the national counterparts, partners were generally satisfied with the support from UNDP. The evaluation used a five-point scale to obtain partner satisfaction and all interviewees provided a 4 (good) rating, with one exception that provided a 3 rating (average). The responsiveness and flexibility of UNDP in a difficult context were mentioned as a strength, while the recurrent criticism was about UNDP’s high level of bureaucracy and administrative inefficiency and delays.

It is also important to recall that a number of development partners suspended direct budget support to the government during this period as a result of the political deadlock. UNDP remained in some cases as one of the rare development actors that continued its support to state and democratic institutions where others had in fact suspended its cooperation. This created both constraints and opportunities. Opportunities could not however be fully exploited given limited funding availability, although in some cases new partnerships, such as with the ADB, were developed.

Another challenge linked to efficiency is the absorption capacity of the national partners and counterparts. Given the changes linked to the political situation with key government posts, and the high staff turn-over, it is particularly difficult to identify enabling conditions and motivated and skilled senior staff within the government services who maintain the position long enough to be able to bring about the positive change that is sought with the capacity development efforts. Noteworthy is the posting of a CTA within the MoJ as an example of good practice to increase capacity development (e.g. postings within Ministries and not in separate offices, in line with UNDP capacity development guide). MoJ reported it had re-established the thematic working group and had now achieved excellent coordination with all actors in the justice sector. Individual projects dealing with the justice sector must now be presented to the working group and must be vetted in order to be implemented. This has rationalized the support and the interventions in the justice sector.

Efficiency may also be affected by the high fiduciary risk identified in the HACT assessment that does not allow cash advance for a more accelerated delivery and transaction costs reduction for UNDP.

❖ Resource mobilization

UNDP has developed a resource mobilization strategy for the period. As early as 2014 it has developed this IRRF against its strategic plan 2014-2017. Initial funding expectations as a result of the Brussels round-table in 2015 which followed the 2014 elections did not materialize and negatively affected funding for
the governance sector. While the CO has been working with a yearly budget of between US$ 23.7 and 25 million over 2016 and 2017 according to the ROAR, the resources mobilized for the governance sector do not reflect in volume, the strategic importance of the UNDP positioning. From the CO perspective, the resource mobilisation over 2.5 years of CPD implementation has been over 60% for outcome one, consisting of the four outputs. However, there are concerns with outputs 1.1. and 1.4. that have been unable to attract donors and requires CO attention.

CO interviews indicated the concern was not so much about the volume of resources mobilization as it was about the achievement of meaningful results. However, in a context of high volatility it is difficult to plan over the long-term, as unforeseen changes affect the resource mobilization capacity. The CO should track the assumptions and risks that are explicitly mentioned in the ToC in order to be able to better respond to sudden changes in its funding flows.

❖ Sustainability

Sustainability in the context of governance requires a minimum of stability within key state institutions. The current context is not a contributing factor towards the sustainability of the interventions. Some donors have in fact opted for a short-term, quick-gain approach to avoid long-term programmes that have been derailed in the past because of political struggles and blockages. The risk is therefore to have only short-term interventions because the returns on the investments of long-term programmes did not materialize. On the one hand, it is understood that capacity development cannot be an unending process for both government and CSO partners. But in a context where democratic and institutional stability are missing, the risks to focus only on short-term quick-gains undermines the longer-term coordinated development approach nationally owned as defended by the Paris Declaration. Sustainability will only come gradually, and some signs may be apparent next year’s Government Budget. For one, the CAJ salaries, after having been paid (as well as their equipment, operational costs, transport and communication costs) by UNDP for the past eight years, should hopefully be incorporated in the Government budget, something that the MoJ appears to have already requested.

Other aspects, such as the 100 million CFA funding to the CA in order to carry out proper audits of public accounts, shows an initial commitment by the government to support the work of oversight institutions. The conditions of the outcome statement can only be achieved over the long-term, and it is too early to expect in the given context to reach a level of sustainability that would allow UNDP to disengage from its current positioning. Certainly some interventions have the potential to develop some elements of sustainability, but only if the Government has the will, commitment and capacity to pursue the efforts started.

❖ Gender Equality and Human Rights
Gender is mentioned in all four CPD outputs for outcome 1 and appears as a fundamental aspect of the UNDP positioning and programming. However, UNDP does not have a gender expert, and the way gender is to be mainstreamed in the interventions is not guided by technical expertise. As mentioned by some respondents, UNDP staff are gender-friendly and gender-sensitive. Another question is to what extent UNDP interventions are gender-responsive. While there have been numerous activities with various partners on the issue of gender equality, across all four CPD outputs, it would be useful for UNDP to establish a gender strategy that would lead to an operationalization of gender mainstreaming in all UNDP-supported interventions. This requires a level of technical expertise that is currently not available in the CO. The human rights have also been the focus of various sensibilization campaigns, notably under output 3. There is no doubt that the work of the CAJ is reinforcing and contributing to HRBA. Human rights and gender mainstreaming are two transversal programming principles for UNDP that would benefit each from the development of an implementation strategy reflecting the challenges and limitations of the operational context.

III.2 – Unexpected outcomes (not caused by UNDP but linked to outcome 1)

❖ Outcome observed (description, evidence, factors – contribution analysis)

• Lack of coordination among development actors

The political instability which is pervasive has led some development actors to adopt a short-term approach to supporting the country, with short-term activities and products, almost as a humanitarian short-term intervention. Most develop actors have modified their programming on account of the political instability. This has contributed to a lack of cohesion in development partners’ coordination, and undermines the efforts to rebuild, establish and promote proper and sustainable governance institutions. The lack of coordination among development partners may lead to a duplication of some efforts, while the (re-)establishment of the Justice Sector Thematic Group has proved effective in ensuring a coordinated sector approach.

• National ownership and government budget

It is well known that development actors have traditionally played a key role in supporting the costs of development including through direct budget support. It has been confirmed by various sectors that the government budget is currently only covering staff salaries, without any budget for operational costs, equipment, logistics, or even to pay rent (as in the case of the Regional
Electoral Commissions). As a result, the development partners have been *de facto* covering expenses which are normally borne by government. This has created a dependency on international support and has undermined the level of national ownership. Linked to the political instability and high turn-over of government managers, the promotion of national ownership remains a challenge for all development actors.

- Conflict analysis management and planning

Development planning in Guinea Bissau is contingent upon a thorough analysis of conflict drivers. At present the level of technical competency in conflict analysis appears to be limited in the country, leading to planning without assuming the high risks linked to the instability caused by the political crises. Apart from the high-level diplomatic efforts aimed at finding a political solution to the recurrent crises, there is a dearth of conflict mediation and transformation capacities that target the drivers of conflict for planning critical interventions. Planning of development actors is thus often frustrated as the basic hypotheses and risk analysis are not being monitored or used to adjust their on-going interventions. Nonetheless, there are efforts towards political dialogue and reconciliation led by UNIOGBIS. UNDP also indicates that there was a good conflict analysis conducted in 2012 and reviewed in 2015 and 2017 which was the basis for the PBF Priority Plans, we well as for the UNDAF and CPD rating. The evaluator has not seen this conflict analysis which was not included in the documentation provided nor is it referenced in the February 2017 ISAAT evaluation of the Rule of Law and Justice Project which recommended to “include a conflict transformation and social change based approach in the design of the theory of change of the upcoming phase of support and factor-in a more realistic and ambitious-levelled intent”.

- Relative importance of unexpected outcomes and links to UNDP interventions

The above findings indicate that UNDP may be ill-equipped to face the challenges ahead of the second half of the CPD. The possible closure of UNIOGBIS after the elections as a result of a transition process that may take place by the end of 2020, just when the CPD ends, will place additional pressure on UNDP to assume those areas related to Rule of Law, Security, Defence, for which it currently lacks the technical capacities and the human resources with conflict analysis and management skills. UNDP should review its profile in line with the challenges it will be facing until the end of the CPD and beyond to ensure it has the full staff required to pursue the outcome statement28.

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28 UNDP CO indicates that there are discussions going on thinking on the future role of UNDP and DPKO is willing to collocate Police and Corrections experts to continue the work of the mission in these areas. BPPS is ready available
Lessons learnt

- Capacity development – how do trainings, international exchange visits, attending conferences, contribute to a change in the way government partners do business?

While all government and CSO partners valued the capacity development support provided by UNDP, capacity development of government partners has not been defined to the extent that it can be properly evaluated. Proxy indicators of questionable relevance are used to assess capacity development in the CPD RF, but there are no tools in place to systematically appraise what capacity was built, by whom, for what and how it will be applied to lead to positive institutional change. Given that capacity development is a cornerstone of UNDP support in governance, it would be advisable to develop a proper capacity development strategy to identify the gaps for which capacity has to be developed.

Several respondents from government provided examples of how, in their view, the capacities were developed through the trainings, exchange programmes, international visits and attendance to conferences and workshops. But there is yet no systematic monitoring mechanism for capacity development provided or even a close focus on the level of capacity development achieved.

Instability and political changes are undermining factors for capacity development, but some evidence of results have been achieved in different institutions; in other cases, process appear to be in place but are as of yet untested. UNDP should better capture the essence of their capacity development approach so it can provide stronger evidence of results. The development of a specific governance capacity development strategy would provide a road-map on how to address the identified gaps in capacity development in state institutions and CSOs.

- Building infrastructure

There is a widespread expectation among government counterparts that UNDP will continue to provide infrastructure support as part of its programming strategy. Thus far, infrastructure has been supplied for outputs 2 (with the construction of the regional electoral commissions) and for output 3 (with the construction of the sector courts). Further requests are expressed notably for the construction of a training school for CENFOJ, and generally all government counterparts have mentioned infrastructure support as part of the expectations. It should be clear that UNDP’s comparative advantage is not in infrastructure building, but that it may do so strategically when,
but only when, such an intervention is directly addressing identified bottlenecks in the chain of government service delivery and may serve as catalyst for other partners to invest in this area, despite the reiterated hopes of many government partners that UNDP will increase the funding it provides to infrastructure.

- Awareness raising in basic programming principles (gender, HRBA) and CSO participation in policy making

Awareness raising is a process that must be continued during several years in order to create a critical mass of people who have come to change their understanding and attitude regarding issues such as gender equality or human rights. Traditional justice in rural communities is not aligned with the UN approach towards gender equality and HR, hence the need to carry out sustained campaigns over several years, including refresher campaigns in the same communities, to achieve the change process. Support to sensitization campaigns should be undertaken over the longer-term and include a monitoring of the change process regarding awareness and attitude of gender equality and human rights. At present the focus is more on the activities undertaken than on the result of the campaigns.

❖ Effectiveness of the institutional framework for monitoring and evaluation

- Notable efforts have been made in order to enter ATLAS the information required for the ROAR, the IRRF, and other reporting requirements. However, at present the CO does not have a dedicated M&E specialist, although a staff member has been playing that role in addition to the responsibilities linked to his regular functions, and the actual institutional framework has several weaknesses that undermine its effectiveness. Knowledge management is weak in the CO and appears to be allocated to a single individual, without senior management staff being invested as key assets for knowledge management in the organization. Some of the limitations regarding knowledge management were evidenced during the evaluation, as even obtaining an updated list of on-going projects over the 2016-2017 period proved a challenge. As mentioned, there is no repository for evaluation materials or knowledge management materials in the CO. Between the lack of a trained M&E specialist and the absence of an integration information/knowledge management system that is shared across the CO management staff, it is very difficult to expect a high degree of effectiveness for the M&E function. A better understanding of the results hierarchy, of outcome evaluation processes, and generally of RBM would certainly benefit the CO staff.

❖ Conclusions and recommendations
Conclusions

- UNDP has showed flexibility and adaptability in view of changing conditions during the first part of the CPD implementation. The positive assumptions that were used to develop the CPD did not materialize and further political conflicts and crises have occurred, affecting directly most, if not all, the components of the governance interventions under outcome 1. Despite an overly ambitious outcome statement and a highly challenging operating environment, UNDP has been able to find some critical entry points, identify potentially significant improvements in oversight by public institutions and civil society participation in monitoring of public policies, together with constructive interventions that have also shown significant results (Access to Justice, capacity development of electoral management bodies as well as some NPA actors). Overall, the results are mixed, since all interventions have suffered from detrimental operational conditions linked to the political situation, the lack of coordination among development partners (with the exception of the Justice sector which is now a good practice example) and the limited staff and human resource capacity of the CO and that of its government partners, the latter linked to absorption capacity issues.

- The relevance of the interventions is clearly established, though the degree to which the partial results were achieved has been less than that initially foreseen. But UNDP did seize the existing opportunities to capitalize on early gains and should ensure that its support is able to consolidate the promising initial results that were achieved in some critical areas. At the same time, a clearer understanding of the CO strategic positioning, with a written strategy for capacity development, for gender mainstreaming and HRBA and for awareness raising and attitudinal change may also facilitate the identification of the technical linkages between the output statements and the contents of the individual interventions, ensuring that the latter contain the required technical inputs to achieve the outputs.

- Finally, the CO should invest more resources in developing a robust M&E system that is able to provide evidence-based recommendations for management decision-making, based on the incorporation of a knowledge management function as an integral part of the Project Cycle Management and with increased knowledge about RBM and M&E amongst management staff.

The use of the reconstructed theory of change for every cluster undertaken during this evaluation should allow facilitate the strategic positioning of future interventions under the CPD until its completion in 2020.

Recommendations
9. UNDP should review its office structure in terms of human resources as it appears to be currently understaffed with key posts left vacant (Gender specialist, M&E specialist, Justice Program Analyst...)

10. Consider the possibility of obtaining a P-4 or P-5 level post for ensuring programme design and coordination in the areas of Rule of Law, Security, Defence, Mediation and Conflict resolution, in line with the possible closure of the UNIOGBIS mission

11. Multiply efforts to ensure coordination among the UN system actors

12. Provide a sustained support to the promising developments and results obtained in relation to oversight of public accounts and CSO monitoring of government policies in order to ensure the proper mechanisms are in place

13. In the justice sector, review the strategic positioning: CAJ have now been financially supported for eight years, but UNDP should review the whole criminal justice chain to identify where bottlenecks are found in order to define its future interventions in support to MoJ. Construction of infrastructure is a means to an end, but not an objective, that must be strategically designed to add value.

14. UNDP should develop specific strategies for Capacity Development, Gender Mainstreaming, Human Rights, Awareness Raising, each with an implementation plan and a results framework, to ensure it is incorporating the technical expertise required in each of its interventions.

15. UNDP should consider investing in developing a stronger M&E system, including a dedicated knowledge management function, through the recruitment of specialized staff, training of UNDP managers in RBM and M&E, to ensure a common understanding and language is used in the CO, including for developing Theories of Change which explain the logic of the chain of results that lead to the outcome statements.

16. UNDP should review its internal guidance on the formulation of outcomes and outputs as some are too ambitious, not achievable in the CPD time-frame and not fully aligned with the recommended technical specifications.