Evaluation of the Security Sector Reform Programme - UNDP Iraq

PROGRAMME PERIOD: AUGUST 2015 – DECEMBER 2018

Contents

Acronyms

ANCSS	Al-Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies
CIP	Critical Infrastructure Protection
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve
CJWG	Criminal Justice Working Group
CSO	Civil society organisation
DDR	Demobilisation, Demilitarisation and Rehabilitation
DNSA	Deputy National Security Advisor
EUAM	European Union Assistance Mission
FIIA	Federal Investigations and Intelligence Agency
GoI	Government of Iraq
HJC	Higher Judicial Council
HRs	Human Rights
HRBA	Human Rights Based Approach
IELP	Improving Effectiveness of Local Police
IP	International Partner
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
KRI	Kurdistan Region of Iraq
MLM	Mid-Level Management
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MoI	Ministry of Interior
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NSA	National Security Advisor
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
ONSA	Office of the National Security Advisor
PM	Prime Minister
PMF	Popular Mobilisation Forces
QIP	Quick Impact Project
SDC	Security and Defence Committee
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SSRP	Security Sector Reform Programme
ToR	Terms of Reference
ToT	Training of the Trainer
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UPR	Universal Periodic Review

Executive Summary

This is a mid-term evaluation of UNDP Iraq's Security Sector Reform (SSR) Programme, covering the period from August 2015 to December 2018. There are two programme periods within this time-frame, with two separate Programme Documents. The first period runs from 2015 to December 2017; the second period runs from January to December 2018. Both periods are referred to as 'Phase II' of the SSR Programme. Both the first and the second periods had similar, but distinct objectives, although broadly speaking, there was a transition from policy elaboration in the first period to policy implementation in the second. A field mission took place for this evaluation from 30th November to 6th December 2018.

This is an Outcomes-based assessment, focusing on three 'Outputs' for each of the two periods. It should be noted that the terminology of 'Output' is used in the Programme, when it might be more appropriate to use the term 'Outcome', with activities below these being referred to as Outputs. In order to avoid confusion, this evaluation uses the terminology in the Programme Documents, although this is an outcome-based assessment. The objectives of the evaluation are, *inter alia*, to determine if the project has achieved its stated objectives and explain why / why not, to provide recommendations and document lessons learned.

Weaknesses in Iraq's security forces (ISF) were dramatically highlighted when Mosul fell to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in June 2014. Following a military campaign led by the Government of Iraq (GoI) and assisted by the Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve ('CJTF', or 'the Coalition'), Mosul was liberated in July 2017, with liberation of other ISIL-held areas following. However, counter-ISIL operations put into sharp relief the endemic challenges in Iraq's security (and justice) sector system that have been pervasive for decades, including poor professionalism and lack of identity. On-going problems also include political instability, lack of national capacity, a crowded donor landscape that has engendered a 'gift-giving' culture, and sectarian tensions.

UNDP had been supporting the GoI since 2012 under UNDP's Rule of Law / SSR Programme. Prior to Phase II commencing, this included discussions surrounding the development of a National Security Strategy (NSS). The Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) requested UNDP advice and assistance to elaborate the NSS in 2014. In April 2015, ONSA requested the support of UNDP to develop the GoI Security Sector Reform Strategy (now referred to as the Security Sector Reform Programme). The SSRP outlines 15 security sector problems, and includes seven strategic system priorities.

A new Programme Document has been approved for 2019 – 2021. The Programme aims to continue on-going work, largely mirroring the Outputs of Phase II, but also with a wider focus on the overall implementation of the SSRP. There is an exponential budget increase going forward, amounting to an estimated $128 million of resources required for these three years.

Key successes generic to all Programme Outputs include the common assertion regarding the relevance and effectiveness of the Programme. The reputation of UNDP as an honest broker and facilitator was also voiced. UNDP was referenced as

responding well to national priorities. UNDP Advisors are based in the premises of the Office of National Security Advisor reflecting their key and critical position in the SSR process. The Programme reflects a long-term view of reforms; it builds upon existing projects, thereby maximising the sustainability of interventions.

Key weaknesses common to all Programme Outputs include the lack of clarity on the part of stakeholders of the exact nature of UNDP's role in the SSR sphere. In addition, UNDP has limited access to the regions, yet at the time of writing, the Area Coordinators' role was uncertain, despite the significant scale-up of the Programme going forward. Monitoring and evaluation of the Programme is weak; this is the first external evaluation the Programme has commissioned since its inception in 2015. Similarly, the risk log has not been updated since 2015, which is notable given the high-risk nature of both the context and the sector being engaged with. Lessons learned are not being clearly articulated, as no mechanism is being used for the Programme to gather, digest and reflect upon how things can be improved; Quarterly Reports were inadequate in this respect. This runs the risk of creating an insular attitude where the Programme has no space for open and transparent self-reflection or external input. The Programme team is too small. There was a common perception across stakeholders of a mismatch between the responsibilities taken on by the Programme, compared with staffing resources available. National ownership could also be better articulated and emphasised by the Programme.

Key weaknesses regarding cross-cutting issues include the fact there is little evidence to demonstrate they are being properly and pro-actively addressed in the Programme; both Programme Documents omit to mention human rights (save for under gender) and corruption as cross-cutting themes. This is significant given that security sector agencies have arguably the greatest capacity to inflict the worst human rights abuses as State agents. Corruption was stated by almost every stakeholder as being the greatest challenge the country is facing.

Key successes relating to the **creation and implementation of Iraq's SSR architecture** (Output 1, both periods) include: UNDP has a presence at the Support Committee level; the Programme has supported the Al-Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies (ANCSS) so it can be a credible research entity specialising in SSR in Iraq; and police engagement was sustainable and strategic in that it focused on long-term goals. The critical **weakness** under these Outputs concerns the Programme's lack of coordination of international partners (IPs), as well as at the national level, and inter-UN. No IP said they felt coordinated, and it was almost unilaterally stated that UNDP is failing in fulfilling this function. The donor space is crowded, and co-ordination is a necessary core plank that can enable reforms, therefore it should not be viewed by the Programme as only constituting a minor component of its work. This is a lost opportunity; the Programme has the potential to convene stakeholders as an honest broker in a way that no other IP is able to do. Similarly, national coordination would benefit from UNDP support, and inter-UN coordination on SSR appears to be lacking, with no evident collaboration between UNAMI and the Programme. The latter therefore runs the risk of setting itself up as (or at least being perceived to be) a competitor to other IPs, as opposed to being a neutral convening power.

Key successes relating to the **democratic oversight** component of the Programme (Output 2 and Output 3 respectively) include the passing of the parliamentary

Security and Defence Committee (SDC) by-laws, which has contributed to the overarching SSR accountability policy framework. In addition, joint activities with civil society have taken place, the likes of which has never happened before. **Key weaknesses** include the conflating of engagement with the SDC with civil society engagement into one Output in the second tranche of the Programme, as these target groups have different needs. This may have contributed to the de-prioritisation of the SDC in the second period of the Programme. Linked to this, there was a lack of emphasis in the Programme afforded to the importance of the SDC in the SSR context, reflecting a lack of strategic oversight about how it fits into the overall SSR system.

Key successes relating to **civil society** engagement (Outputs 3, both periods) include facilitating citizen-State trust-building activities, some of which are on-going, despite the project period ending. Bridges were also built between the ANCSS and civil society, facilitating the generation of baseline data. **Key weaknesses** included the limited time-frame of activities, as they were Quick Impact Projects. Also that more work could have been done to sensitise CSOs about SSR and how civil society can shape reforms at the local and national levels, before they are invited to place bids.

Key successes relating to the **Local Policing Road Map** and **criminal justice requirements** (Output 2, second tranche) include agreement of the Road Map Implementation Plan as well as the Standard Operating Procedures on complex criminal investigations. Community-oriented police training has also been developed and carried out, which incorporates training on the Road Map. All these interventions are strategic in that they are aimed at long-term and sustainable reforms. **Key weaknesses** include the Programme's relationship with key senior MoI national stakeholders, who reflected that the consultation process for the police Road Map was poor, and that the document itself was too broad. It was further stated that progress on the Road Map would be temporarily suspended due to these issues. Proper communication protocol also needs to be observed, as well as communicating UNDP activities such as the outcome of missions to regional police stations, as it was said that communication was not adequate on these issues. Repeated trainings in expensive hotels are not good value for money, and national training facilities could be used more (depending on security issues).

Recommendations that will improve strategic outlook and maximise impact include that the Programme should adapt its 2019 - 2021 Programme Document in line with this evaluation. It also needs to ensure it properly fulfils its role as a convenor, and should clearly communicate this to all stakeholders. The IP meeting would be a forum in which the Programme can convey to IPs what it does and hopes to achieve in the SSR sphere, and how the UN as a whole is contributing to reforms. There is a high turnover of staff in IP entities, and clear and consistent messaging on this is essential. Given its unique position in the SSR context, the Programme should ensure that existing cross-entity SSR meetings are more effective and inclusive, and convene meetings that have not yet taken place but which are needed. The latter includes a meeting that would bring together all of the 'Seven Systems' in the SSR architecture, as the Support Committee has historically related to each of the Systems separately. The Programme should support a mapping exercise that will identify the overlaps and synergies across the Seven Systems. This will help

facilitate de-confliction, and act as a vector that can aid sequencing of activities. One of the aims of the mapping exercise should also be to define (or propose) roles and responsibilities of all entities in the SSR context. UNDP can enhance its role in supporting the proposed NSS review. It can liaise with the NSC, NSA and DNSA to ensure the agreement of the SSR Action Plan process. Emphasis should be given to having an increased UNDP presence across the country, maintaining the role of the Area Coordinators and broadening it to facilitate continued constructive partnerships with civil society.

Recommendations on cross-cutting issues include UNDP reformulating the 2019 – 2021 Work Plan to adequately reflect and mainstream human rights and corruption. An assessment should be carried out on cross-cutting themes and how the Programme can adopt a gender, human rights and corruption lens.

Recommendations that will strengthen **UNDP capacity and processes** include recruiting a dedicated coordinator (who could also be a technical SSR expert), and recruiting additional technical support to bolster SSR capacity and criminal justice expertise. Risks need to be properly assessed and updated. Monitoring and evaluation needs to be strengthened, with another outcome-based evaluation taking place in 12 months which should also focus on UNDP's coordination role.

Recommendations that will enhance **police and criminal justice** engagement include the Programme ensuring the correct communication protocol is utilised with national stakeholders at the MoI. The Programme also needs to agree the communication of all police-related activities, especially the outcomes of field visits. The Programme should support the creation of a clear Action Plan for the Road Map, or ensure that the existing Implementation plan is better articulated from an operational perspective, in order to go beyond being aspirational. This should be clearly communicated to all stakeholders. The Programme should continue its good work in the criminal justice space, broadening its work to support detention capacity-building, or facilitating and / or coordinating other entities to do the same.

Recommendations regarding the **democratic oversight** component include re-visualising the Working Methods document to ensure the parliamentary Security and Defence Committee is accurately reflected. More importantly, the Programme should emphasise the SDC's critical role to all stakeholders. The Programme should encourage other entities to invite senior SDC representatives to attend relevant high-level meetings. The Programme should also capitalise on its previous good work (i.e. the SDC by-laws) to facilitate the creation of an SDC Strategy and Action Plan. UNDP should support continued collaboration between the SDC and civil society.

Recommendations regarding **civil society** engagement include moving away from Quick Impact projects to longer term engagement that will likely be more sustainable. The Programme should identify the most successful previous projects and ascertain whether it is possible to build on these going forward. It should also invite a wide array of CSOs to a forum to sensitise them to broader SSR issues. Those invited should include CSOs that do not currently work on SSR, but who are nonetheless ideally placed to develop in this area. The Programme needs to ensure that corruption is focused upon in any CSO forums, as well as other cross-cutting issues.

1. Introduction to the evaluation

This is a mid-term evaluation of UNDP Iraq's Security Sector Reform Programme, covering the period from August 2015 to December 2018. There are two programme periods within this time-frame, with two separate Programme Documents. The first period runs from 2015 to December 2017; the second period runs from January to December 2018. Both periods are referred to as 'Phase II' of the SSR Programme. In order to avoid confusion, the two-year period of the Programme from 2015- 2017 will be referred to as the *first tranche* or *first period* of the Programme under Phase II, and the one-year period covering January – December 2018 will be referred to as the *second tranche or second period*. Both the first and the second periods had similar, but distinct objectives, although broadly speaking, there was a transition from policy elaboration in the first period to policy implementation in the second. This is further outlined below.

A field mission took place for this evaluation from 30th November to 6th December 2018, and stakeholders were interviewed from the Government of Iraq (GoI), UNDP and the international community (see **Annex 2** for a list of entities engaged with).

1.1 Evaluation scope and objectives

Given the short time-frame, it was agreed that this evaluation would focus on outcomes, as opposed to project activities. It should be noted that the SSR Programme Documents reference three 'Outputs' for each of the two periods. This is slightly confusing for evaluation purposes, as it might be more fitting to use the terminology of 'Outcomes' at this level (even if there is an over-arching generic Programme 'Outcome'), with the individual project activities under those Outcomes being referred to as 'Outputs'. For the avoidance of doubt, this evaluation uses the language that is reflected in the Programme Documents, although it should be emphasised that this is an outcome-based evaluation.

The evaluation focuses on the following criteria as set out in the Terms of Reference (ToR):[1]

> **Relevance:** How important is the relevance or significance of the intervention regarding local and national priorities / is the project on the right track?
>
> **Effectiveness:** Did the project achieve its set outputs? How significant / big is the impact or effectiveness of the project compared to its expected outputs?
>
> **Efficiency:** Did the project achieve its outputs / implement project activities economically?
>
> **Impact:** Does the overall intervention contribute to longer term outcomes / results? What is the impact or effect of the intervention in proportion to the overall situation of the target groups or the beneficiary population?

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[1] As already mentioned, the evaluation differs from the ToR, as it was agreed that it would be at strategic, Outcome level, not project level.

Sustainability: Are the positive impacts effective and sustainable? How is the sustainability of the intervention or its effects assessed?

Cross-cutting issues such as gender, human rights, civil society engagement, Do No Harm and conflict sensitivity principles are taken into consideration, although most of these are not referenced in the Programme Documents. The **intervention logic** was also analysed.

There is inevitable overlap and interdependence between effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability, with many of the observations and recommendations in this evaluation significant to several of these headings.

The **objectives** of the evaluation are to:

- Determine if the project has achieved its stated objectives and explain why / why not;
- Determine the project's results in terms of sustaining the project's achievements;
- Provide recommendations to build on the project's achievements and sustainability;
- Document lessons learned and best practice from the overall project implementation in order to consider for future programming;
- Appraise project achievements against its expected outputs and recommend ways to improve future partnerships with the project's implementing partners / target groups;
- The evaluation should take into consideration the project duration, overall budget / project resources and political environmental constraints and challenges.

This evaluation was carried out by Independent Consultant Francesca Del Mese, who is an international lawyer specialising in capacity-building rule of law institutions in conflict affected and fragile States, and conducting independent reviews and evaluations.

The consultant would like to express her thanks to UNDP staff who orchestrated and supported the carrying out of this evaluation. She would also like to thank those who gave their time to be interviewed and answer many questions, some of which involve complex and sensitive political issues.

1.2 Methodology
The methodology used for data collection was as follows:

- o Desk review of all Programme and relevant documents and open source research;
- o Field visit to Baghdad from 30th November to 6th December 2018, during which semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions took place with key stakeholders. (See **Annex 2**).

Data collected was triangulated as much as was possible, either through separate discussions with key stakeholders and / or document checking and research.

The geographical scope of the evaluation does not include the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), as the Programme does not cover that region.

1.3 Limitations

The temporal scope of this evaluation was limited, due to the short time spent in Baghdad. It was also limited in geographical terms, as it did not include field visits beyond Baghdad. The findings set out herein are therefore largely not represented as first-hand observations of activities.

In addition, it was only possible to meet with one NGO representative in Baghdad, and so the information relating to civil society engagement has not been properly triangulated.

1.4. Report structure

The Outputs for both periods largely involve working with the same entities; with the second period under Phase II moving towards policy implementation from policy formation. This report reflects that continuation of work by setting out findings according to target group, as opposed to disaggregating the findings into six separate sections to reflect the six Outputs.[2] This is less formulaic and allows for easier holistic analysis of the Programme's engagement with beneficiaries for the whole period under Phase II, as well as avoiding unnecessary repetition. The report is therefore structured as follows (thematic focus of each section in bold):

Section 1 introduces the evaluation background, purpose and objectives, research methodology and limitations.

Section 2 summarises the contextual background and the history of UNDP Iraq's SSR Programme.

Section 3 summarises:
- o Key findings that are **common to all Programme Outputs**;

- o Key findings specific to Output 1 (first tranche): '*The **GoI Plan for SSR** is developed and the cooperation and coordination mechanisms required for its implementation are established and implemented under **one central framework'**,* and Output 1 (second tranche): '*Implementation model for Iraq's SSRP is established and implemented under one central GoI framework'.*

- o Key findings specific to Outputs 2 (first tranche): '*Democratic oversight capacity of the **Security and Defence Committee** is strengthened, and the Committee plays a more active role in SSR*', and Output 3 (second tranche): '*Security and Defence Committee….[plays] an active role in the oversight of security sector governance in Iraq'.*

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[2] The latter option would not lend itself to ease of reference, due to the inevitable cross-referencing across the Outputs if focusing on the same target group.

- o Key findings specific for Output 3 (first tranche): '*The GoI engagement with **CSOs** in the field of SSR is increased and civil society capacity on SSR is enhanced',* and Output 3 (second tranche): '*Civil society plays an active role in the oversight of security sector governance in Iraq'.*

- o Key findings specific to Output 2 (second tranche): '*Civilian and Local **Policing Road Map** is developed and implemented to address public security and **criminal justice** requirements at national and local levels'.*

Section 4 assesses **cross-cutting issues**.

Section 5 sets out the evaluation **conclusion** and **recommendations**.

Annex 1 sets out an abbreviated Terms of Reference

Annex 2 sets out a list of entities interviewed

Annex 3 sets out the Working Methods diagram of Iraq's SSR architecture

2. Contextual background

2.1 Iraq's security sector

Weaknesses in Iraq's security forces (ISF) were dramatically highlighted when Mosul fell to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in June 2014. Following a military campaign led by the Government of Iraq (GoI) and assisted by the Combined Joint Task Force, Operation Inherent Resolve ('CJTF', or 'the Coalition'), Mosul was liberated in July 2017. Liberation of other ISIL-held areas followed, including Tal Afar in Ninewa Province, and Hawija in Kirkuk Province. However, counter-ISIL operations put into sharp relief the endemic challenges in Iraq's security (and justice) sector system that have been pervasive for decades, including:

- **Poor professionalism**: sub-standard recruitment processes, forces being badly trained and under-equipped;

- **Lack of good governance**: there is a high degree of centralisation and an absence of transparency across the sector. Security sector entities generally had a reputation as the tool of the political elite holding sectarian biases; and

- **Lack of identity**: characterised by poor morale, and fragmented units holding diverse loyalties.

On-going broader challenges in the Iraqi SSR landscape are complex and can be further summarised as follows:

Firstly, the context has been politically unstable for several years. The May 2018 parliamentary election resulted in a hiatus in progress of the reforms, e.g. meetings of the High Committee on SSR, and the delay in the formation of the Parliamentary

Security and Defence Committee (SDC), which is the focus of Outputs across both Programme tranches. At the time of the field visit, the National Security Advisor (NSA), Deputy National Security Advisor (DNSA) and the MoI and MoD Ministerial appointments were pending;

Secondly, the donor context is crowded with bi-lateral and multi-lateral agencies. This can result in duplication of work and the challenge of how to coordinate multiple entities. Some of these international entities are not ordinarily present in other UN contexts, i.e. the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Assistance Mission (EUAM), and the Coalition Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF);

Thirdly, the GoI lacks capacity, which inevitably affects SSR. For example, weak financial infrastructures in the government to manage and disburse funds effectively, issues surrounding the sustainability of interventions, and lack of clarity concerning overlapping entities' roles and responsibilities. There is also some 'double-hatting' of roles of national counterparts.[3] Whilst the latter can be helpful to ensure synergy and prevent silo-ism, it also runs the risk that some individuals are overloaded with responsibility, with a consequent lack of focus on key priorities;

Fourthly, the resources that have been poured into the country in recent years have resulted in a 'gifting culture', which risks marginalising international partners that are offering technical assistance as opposed to physical military hardware or assets;

Fifthly, despite the threat of ISIL now being in decline across Iraq, underlying sectarian threats nonetheless pose on-going challenges. These include Sunni and Shia tensions and Kurdish aspirations for independence. Some of these tensions have been brought to the fore in the fight against ISIL. For example, the Shia dominated Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) that were utilised to combat ISIL and is still functioning, reporting directly to the Prime Minister instead of the MoI or MoD. The future of the PMF remains unresolved and provides an unsettling backdrop for Defence Reforms within broader SSR efforts; and

Lastly, there are on-going difficulties accessing areas that harbour pockets of ISIL resistance, making it challenging to initiate, implement and monitor activities effectively.

2.2 Background to the UNDP SSR Programme

UNDP had been supporting the GoI since 2012 under UNDP's Rule of Law / SSR Programme. Prior to Phase II commencing, this included discussions surrounding the development of a National Security Strategy (NSS). The Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) requested UNDP advice and assistance to elaborate the NSS in 2014. In April 2015, ONSA requested the support of UNDP to develop the GoI Security Sector Reform Strategy (now referred to as the Security Sector Reform Programme).

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[3] For example, the National SSR Coordinator also holds another government job.

The nationally-owned SSRP outlines 15 security sector problems, and includes seven strategic system priorities that require attention within GoI SSR efforts. They include: Defence and Internal Security Strategy, Intelligence, Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Democratic and Institutional Oversight and Accountability, National Security Legislation, and National Security Architecture. The 'Working Methods' diagram outlines the seven Systems (see **Annex 3**). Each system / component is supported by an identified lead IP. UNDP is the lead IP for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice and, Democratic and Institutional Oversight.[4]

The **first tranche** of UNDP's Phase II SSR Programme spanned the period August 2015 – December 2017. During this period, the NSS was endorsed by the NSC and the Cabinet of Representatives in March 2016, providing a firm foundation for the Security Sector Reform Programme (SSRP) elaboration work.

The aim of the Programme was to develop GoI security sector reform under one government framework, whilst also supporting the capacity of relevant institutions of research and analysis, specifically the Al Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies (ANCSS), and capacity-building oversight and accountability mechanisms. The first tranche of the Programme had the following three Outputs:

1. **The GoI Plan for Security Sector Reform is developed, and the cooperation and coordination mechanisms required for its implementation are established, in line with the measures set out in the NSS;**

2. **The democratic oversight capacity of the Security and Defence Committee (SDC) is strengthened, and the Committee plays a more active role in SSR; and**

3. **The GoI engagement with civil society in the field of SSR is increased and civil society capacity on SSR is enhanced.**

The two-year budget for this period was USD 4,792,320.94.

The **second tranche** of UNDP's SSR Programme under Phase II supported Iraq's SSR efforts where the focus rests on providing advice and assistance to the implementation of the SSRP. The overall advice and assistance covered three Outputs, from January to December 2018:

1. **Implementation model for Iraq's SSRP is established and implemented under one central GoI framework;**

2. **Civilian and Local Policing Road Map is developed and implemented to address public security and criminal justice requirements at national and local levels; and**

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[4] UNDP is also leading the coordination of the Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) component, which does not fall within the remit of UNDP Rule of Law/SSR Programme and is not within the scope of this evaluation. UNDP's Disaster Risk Reduction Programme leads the CIP system priority, in close coordination with Rule of Law/SSR Programme.

3. **Parliamentary SDC and civil society play an active role in the oversight of security sector governance in Iraq.**

The budget of the second tranche of the Programme was USD 6,360,506.

The overall project cycle of the two periods covered 31st August 2015 to 31st December 2018, totalling 39 months. The main difference in the Outputs between the first and second tranches is the elaboration of the Local Police Service Road Map, and the Standard Operating Procedure in Criminal Investigations. The accountability component, working with the SDC and civil society, was conflated into one Output in the second phase, whereas it was previously separated into two Outputs to correspond to the two different target groups.

A new Programme Document has been approved for 2019 – 2021. The Programme aims to continue on-going work, largely mirroring the Outputs of Phase II, but also with a wider focus on the overall implementation of the SSRP. There is an exponential budget increase going forward, amounting to an estimated $128 million of resources required for these three years.

3. Evaluation key findings

3.1 Key findings common to all Outputs

This section sets out key findings that are common to, and effect **all** Programme Outputs, taking into consideration the themes of *relevance*, *effectiveness*, *efficiency*, *impact,* and *sustainability*.

Findings - key successes common to all Outputs:

- The *relevance* and *effectiveness* of UNDP's support was voiced by national stakeholders. Almost every national participant pro-actively mentioned the importance of UNDP's role in the SSR process, with UNDP being singled out for its 'distinguished' experts and assistance it provides. The good reputation and perception of UNDP as an honest broker and facilitator was commonly voiced, by national and international stakeholders.

- UNDP was almost unilaterally referenced by national stakeholders as providing very good consultation processes and was said to respond well to national priorities. UNDP holds a unique position in the SSR sphere in this respect, and can therefore play a critical convening role in the ongoing SSR process (e.g. the review of the NSS and continued support in on-going assistance to ONSA).

- Whilst at present there is no cost-sharing model with GoI, there are some elements of programme in-kind support that is provided by beneficiary entities such as the MoI and ONSA. For example, UNDP Advisors are based in the ONSA offices, and conference facilities are provided by them so that UNDP sometimes does not have to pay for venue hire. This engenders a sense of

national ownership, thereby helping to facilitate a degree of *sustainability* of interventions.

- The Programme continues to build on its on-going activities as opposed to generating new projects. This reflects the fact that UNDP is supporting long-term goals. Similarly, the Programme involves not only providing advice and assistance to elaborate key policies, but also advice on how to implement the same.

- Synergies across activities in the Programme are evident, contributing towards the *effectiveness* and *impact* of interventions. For example, the Standard Operating Procedures on complex criminal investigations (SoPs) that were developed with UNDP support are directly relevant to the work of the Local Policing Road Map, and police training supported by the Programme references the Road Map.

Findings - key weaknesses common to all Outputs:

- Critical weaknesses were observed regarding the **lack of perceived strength and clarity of the exact nature of UNDP's role in the SSR sphere**. Almost all stakeholders said they would like to have more information from UNDP regarding its work on SSR, i.e. what are its activities, plans, and how it is working with the GoI. This was seen as particularly relevant given there is a high turnover of staff in international entities, therefore UNDP messaging on the above to IPs needs to be adaptive and responsive to this, and ensure it is constant and consistent in how it communicates.

- One of the added values of UNDP was said to be that it has 'eyes and ears' on the ground, particularly in areas where some IPs have no access. However, security challenges mean that in reality **UNDP has limited access to the regions.** Despite this, at the time of writing the Area Coordinators' future role had not been determined, and it was being considered to reduce their presence in the region. This does not appear to correlate with the significant proposed scale-up of the Programme going forward, and it was not clear how such a scale-up could be adequately supported by diminishing staff levels.

- **Monitoring and Evaluation** functions within the UNDP Country Office are weak, with external accountability mechanisms or processes not being engaged with sufficiently. **This evaluation is the first external evaluation of the Programme since 2015**, which is not sufficient given the high risk of the context as well as the sector engaged with. It is understood that M&E missions took place in 2016 and 2017, but these were undertaken by UNDP Programme Unit staff. Related to this, there is a paucity of comprehensive baseline data regarding both the community's perception of security and security service providers, as well as transformative behavioural changes of police officers and those in security functions. Whilst it previously might be too early to assess the latter, going forward UNDP needs to focus on evaluating the behavioural changes and public attitudes towards policing, as well as of

police officers themselves, as this will create better baseline information for monitoring purposes.

- The **risk log** has not been updated since 2015, although there is a live risk log that was said to be reviewed periodically. The issue of risk is therefore not given due prominence in the Programme. This is a risk in itself given the work focuses on a high-risk sector in what is a volatile environment. There needs to be much clearer articulation of risks and associated mitigation measures across the Programme, e.g. creating an early warning system that can better protect the Programme. Risks include (but are not limited to) issues relating to overall de-confliction between IP support, future ramifications of an absence of a DDR Programme, how the Federal Police and Local Police services are likely to interact in the medium to long-term because of territorialism and lack of clarity about roles and jurisdiction. These risks need active management and should be constantly articulated and documented, both within the team and also with stakeholders.

- **Lessons learned** are not currently being given due weight in the Programme. There is no formal or effective mechanism that is being used where the Programme can gather, digest and reflect upon any lessons learned, aside from what is written in the Quarterly Reports. A mechanism could include, for example, a database or even a document that consolidates lessons learned across the Programme. This is notable given the lack of a robust risk assessment process, volatility of the Iraqi context, and consequent inevitability that many activities will have lessons learned aspects that can help inform and improve future engagement. The Quarterly Reports are not sufficient for these purposes; they largely set out project successes and activities, without balancing this against comprehensive narrative about what could have been done better. The 2015 – 2017 Project End Report is also inadequate, stating under '*Lessons learned and Future Plans*': '*flexibility to adapt to project design and activities based on regular meetings with project partners is vital….require a high degree of strategic and operational flexibility as well as careful planning to reflect changes…*'. This is not broken down any further. Under '*Future Plans*' for lessons learned it goes on to simply state '*N/A*'. This runs the risk of creating and fortifying an insular team attitude, where the Programme has no space or platform for open and transparent self-reflection and external input which can facilitate consequent improvement.

- The **Programme team is too small**. There was a perception amongst some stakeholders of a mismatch between the responsibility and breadth of work that the Programme is undertaking, compared with the reality of its staffing levels. For example, there is only one long-term consultant Criminal Justice Advisor, which was said by several IPs to be inadequate given the broad nature of work, proposed scale-up of criminal justice activities and level of stakeholder relationships that need to be managed. Similarly, there is only one international SSR Advisor, which is not sufficient to carry the weight of technical assistance, as well as SSR coordination. It was said by several stakeholders that when someone goes on leave it causes some activities to be put on hold. There are some advantages of having fewer team members, including financial savings, and the fact that individuals develop deep

relationships with national counterparts. However, the opportunity to delegate and pass on knowledge is limited if there is only one specialist working in each thematic area. Engagement and progress can become more personality-centric as opposed to being systems-based, and the prospects of building a broad base of institutional memory becomes undermined, which risks the Programme's sustainability. If the Programme is to maximise its impact it should take advantage of the unique leverage it has by employing more personnel to divide responsibilities and ensure smooth continuation of work when individuals are not in-country. If this is not possible then it calls into question the proposed scale-up of activities, and the broad ambit and scale of the work needs to be reduced going forward, as it will be too ambitious for the resources available. Consequent inefficiencies, risk of criticism and reputational damage may flow from inadequate staffing levels and lack of back-stop arrangements when staff are absent. At present there is a gender imbalance in the Programme in favour of men, albeit the Programme Manager is female.

- A weakness was observed with regard to the **logic of interventions and theory of change** in the 2015 – 2017 Programme Document, which was approved immediately prior to a change in UNDP senior staff. The Programme Document for 2019 – 21 evidences more robust intervention logic, theory of change and expected results, as well as better articulating the balancing of long and short-term goals and immediate needs.

- There was little evidence that **relevant cross-cutting issues** are being properly and pro-actively addressed by the Programme. This is a significant omission in both Programme Documents, particularly regarding **human rights**. The fact that human rights is not explicitly outlined as a cross-cutting issue for security sector reform work (aside from it being mentioned briefly under gender), demonstrates a lack of foresight about how intrinsically important they are for a UN programme. Iraq is a volatile country, and security sector agencies have arguably the greatest capacity to inflict the worst human rights abuses as State representatives. Whilst UNDP asserted that human rights is the preserve of UNAMI, there was no evidence that joint work is currently being undertaken on this issue. Further, it should not be assumed that human rights will be properly addressed as a by-product of Programme activities. It is critical they are mainstreamed at the outset of any reform process so that they can be adequately reflected in the creation of policies, as well as ensuring a cultural norm of human rights adherence is cultivated. Similarly, **corruption** was mentioned by almost every stakeholder as a major challenge, and is also articulated in the SSRP as such. Despite this, corruption is not prioritised in either of the Programme Documents, or mentioned as a cross-cutting issue. This is expanded upon further in the section on cross-cutting issues.

- **National ownership** could be better articulated and emphasised by the Programme. For example, the Working Methods diagram was referred to as a UNDP document, although it is not. Similarly, staff stated they were 'chairing' a Working Group, whereas it is actually being co-chaired by UNDP, alongside an Iraqi counterpart. Although subtle, these assertions pose the risk that there

might be an imbalance (even if only perceived) in who is leading reform efforts.

3.2. Key findings for Output 1: *'The GoI Plan for SSR is developed and the cooperation and coordination mechanisms required for its implementation are established and implemented under one central framework' (first tranche) and 'Implementation model for Iraq's SSRP is established and implemented under one central GoI framework' (second tranche).*

This section assesses Output 1 of the Programme for both periods under Phase II. The work in the second period develops the policy formation that was focused on the first period, and progresses it towards policy implementation. The Security Sector Reform Strategy (now referred to as a 'Programme' since it is to be implemented) was formally adopted on 16th July 2017 by the NSC.

Key successes:

- The Programme is a response to requests made by national counterparts for assistance, which reflects the fact it shows a high degree of *relevance*. To this end, the Programme complements the Iraqi SSRP, with the 2019 – 2021 Programme Document setting out plans to ensure its implementation. UNDP has provided technical advice and assistance to the SSR Support Committee and the High Committee, with additional direct support to the democratic oversight system.

- UNDP is the only international presence represented at GoI SSR Support Committee level. It is also the only entity that has office space in the ONSA. This reflects the strong partnership UNDP enjoys with its national counterparts, reflecting its added value to the SSR process. It also provides an opportunity for UNDP to gain an overarching view over the SSR process and, indicates its potential to increase its convening capacity to ensure the SSRP is implemented under one central framework led by ONSA.

- UNDP has supported the Al Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies (ANCSS), which is a semi-government think-thank (its Board of Management is the NSC) under the ONSA. Capacity-building activities included helping to develop its organisational strategy and supporting the research team to upskill its research capacities so it can be a credible research entity specialising in security sector governance in Iraq.

- Police engagement was *sustainable* and strategic in that it focused on longer-term goals, helping to facilitate the transition from a military-minded Iraqi police force to a civilian, community-centric service; commonly referred to as going from 'green to blue'. Police training on Improving Effectiveness of Local Policing (IELP) was designed, and twenty mid-level police officers from Anbar, Ninewa, Salah-Al-Din and Baghdad underwent the 'test' training and mentoring. Programme engagement with the police developed into supporting the creation of the Local Policing Road Map (see below). The Programme commenced with the IELP work to create good connections between citizens

and the police, and also to control data and intelligence; focusing on how this can be used effectively in an operational context.

Key weaknesses:

- **National coordination** of the SSRP is weak, and was generally said to lack the capacity to drive such a complicated SSR programme. There appears to be good-will across IPs regarding information-sharing (although effective coordination is not happening), but nonetheless this is generally seen as problematic against the back-drop of weak national capacity. In addition, the fact that there is only UNDP presence at a high national (Higher Committee) level appears to have caused fatigue and frustration with some IPs who see themselves as being side-lined, not being coordinated well at the strategic level by UNDP, and unable to progress their work without access to senior decision-makers. Whilst UNDP states it does not specifically support national coordination, there are opportunities to strengthen it, given UNDP's unique access to the Higher Committee. This can be, for example, in the form of better facilitating access to IPs, so they can also support by way of technical assistance where appropriate.

- Aside from national coordination, **international and joint (national / international) co-ordination** by UNDP was said by almost all IPs to be severely lacking. This is the biggest weakness of the Programme. As already mentioned, the donor space is crowded, and co-ordination is a necessary core plank that can enable the SSR process, reflected in the aims of this Output. No IP said they felt coordinated, either by the Programme or the Iraqis. There was resistance from UNDP to the notion that it needs to focus more on this, stating that coordination only constitutes a small part of its work. This is a lost opportunity and avoidance of its responsibility as the key UN entity working within the SSR sphere; the Programme has the potential to convene stakeholders as an honest broker in a way that no other IP is able to do.

- There are considerable overlaps between the Programme and the work of IPs, and **de-confliction** is necessary. UNAMI, NATO and the EUAM are all working on SSR issues. Whilst in theory IP mandates might appear to be clearly delineated, this may not be the case in practice. The focus of NATO is on defence reforms (not SSRP implementation), and the EUAM's focus is on broader MoI coordination. However, many of the target beneficiary entities are the same across IPs, and the main focus common to all IPs is that they are working with the security sector. There is therefore a risk of duplication of efforts or competing interests working at cross-purposes if poor coordination and IP mandates are not properly navigated. This was echoed by stakeholders. The work of one IP can directly impact on another, and IP mandates and aspirations can change over time (eg the EUAM is due to double its staffing levels in the early part of 2019, which may lead to an increase in activities). The Programme therefore runs the risk of setting itself up as, or at least being perceived to be, a competitor to other IPs, as opposed to the neutral convening power it needs to be. Every IP stated they would

welcome UNDP being more muscular and pro-active about its role, and that it needs to communicate very clearly to other IPs whether it is undertaking the role of coordinating, and if so, how.

- **UNDP can better facilitate an effective communication and co-ordination platform for the seven Systems.** International Partner meetings used to take place every quarter, but it has not met for about eight months due to prolonged formation of the new government and pending appointments of the Deputy National Security Advisor (DNSA), as the DNSA co-chairs the meetings for ONSA. Neither has there ever been a meeting that brings together all stakeholders across the seven Systems. There was strong consensus that the space exists for a pro-active convenor to call a meeting where national and IP representatives from each of the seven Systems is present. This aim of this would be to coordinate Iraqi efforts and requests, and then piece this information together within the broader IP context. Further discussions across the seven Systems might also include sequencing of activities, e.g. ensuring the correct legislation is in place before any work is undertaken to strengthen national intelligence capacity-building. Some IPs stated that they did not see it as their role to coordinate with other Working Groups; and that there needs to be an overarching system that is an effective platform for communication across all entities, as what is currently in place is not functional. Whilst it is acknowledged that delays have been caused by the elections, there was some resistance from IPs to the idea that UNDP can only move as fast as the Iraqis; the UN is the designated coordinator and can increase momentum for progress (e.g. the NSS review).

- **Inter-UN coordination:** There are significant SSR synergies and overlaps across various UNDP departments (e.g. Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)), as well as across the broader UN. It was not clear to other stakeholders to what extent the UN is operating as a cohesive whole in the SSR context, and several said this needed to be better understood and articulated to non-UN entities. The Country Programme Document 2016-2010[5] asserts that UNDP will coordinate activities closely with UNAMI. However, this was not evident. UNDP described UNAMI as being 'not relevant' to the SSR Programme, despite the latter undertaking some work on SSR. This demonstrates a dislocation between the two entities which needs to be rectified to ensure synchronicity and complementarity, and to also ensure the impact of the UN's work as a whole is maximised in Iraq (see recommendations section, and section on cross-cutting issues, specifically human rights). From a UNDP perspective, any overlaps - inter or intra UNDP - will need active management in order to ensure de-confliction and to maximise impact of efforts, particularly regarding UNAMI's role in the SSR space.

- **A strategic approach to delineating and de-conflicting national roles and responsibilities of entities needs to be agreed and disseminated**. This is highlighted in the Iraqi SSRP, but was not adequately reflected in the Programme. The SSRP states the lack of clarity both across, and within,

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[5] DP/DCP/IRQ/2, 23 November 2015, page

security sector institutions, referring to '*Incompleteness of job structures and descriptions*',[6] '*overlap and intersection among some tasks and specialisations of security sector establishments*',[7] and '*weakness, multiplicity and task overlap*'.[8] The SSRP also cites corruption as a challenge, acknowledging implicitly that addressing corruption is a multi-faceted task that can be addressed by clarifying human resource processes and introducing transparency about roles. Clarity should be at all levels and should include clarification about roles and responsibilities:

- o at **system level**,
- o mandates and jurisdiction of the **Iraqi institutions** themselves.[9], and
- o the various **sub-committees** that feed into the seven Systems (as per the Working Methods diagram, see **Annex 3**).

3.3. Key findings for Output 2 (tranche 1): '*The Democratic oversight capacity of the Security and Defence Committee is strengthened, and the Committee plays a more active role in SSR*' and Output 3 (tranche 2): '*Parliamentary Security and Defence Committee plays an active role in the oversight of security sector governance in Iraq*'.

This section sets out key findings relating to Output 2 (tranche 1) and Output 3 (tranche 2), as both Outputs focus on engagement with the SDC; moving from strengthening its framework in the first period, to helping it play an active role in security sector oversight. There was some delay in activities taking place in the second period of the Programme due to elections, as this caused a hiatus in members being appointed. Public hearings that had been planned could not take place because of this. However, there was positive consensus from national stakeholders that the newly appointed SDC members are a stronger complement than its previous incarnation. There are now two Ministers and three Generals as representatives, with 22 SDC members in total.

Key successes:

- The Programme supported the drafting of the by-laws of the SDC, passed in February 2018, following a series of meetings and seminars in Baghdad and a workshop in Tunis in 2017[10]. The by-laws will help guide the work of the SDC, making it more *effective* and helping to ensure its work is *sustainable*. This is a key milestone in contributing to the relevant Outputs, as the Programme has contributed to creating the overarching policy framework of a critical parliamentary accountability mechanism. It also paves the way for further good governance capacity-building, e.g. creation of an SDC strategy.

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[6] Page 6, national SSRP

[7] Page 7, as above.

[8] As above.

[9] For example, the PMF report to the Prime Minister, going outside of the MoI. Some policing units report to the Commander that is not in the relevant province, which creates differing hierarchical structures, and thus leads to confusion over remit and command structures.

[10] Held from 30th April – 2nd May.

- Project activities during the first period of Phase II directly contributed to the Output, including, *inter alia*, a Regional Parliamentary Conference on SSR in Cairo which facilitated peer-to-peer engagement. In addition, a Parliamentary SDC and Civil Society Working Group was formed, following which a series of SDC and civil society consultations took place to develop a joint action plan. This was the first time such a collaboration has taken place. These forums allowed for an open discussion on issues related to SSR, including challenges and gaps in the current system.

Key weaknesses:

- Conflating the SDC and civil society work into one Output for the second tranche under Phase II undermined the importance of the differing approach needed for developing these two distinct stakeholder groups. It also ran the risk of de-prioritising one or both groups, as the way in which they operate and engage (including with the public) differs significantly.

- There was a lack of due emphasis in the Programme afforded to the importance of the SDC in the whole SSR process, and delays caused by the elections may have contributed to the Programme's de-prioritisation of the SDC in the second period. In addition, the SDC was described by the Programme as being 'completely separate' to the SSR architecture, which it is not. Parliamentary oversight forms a critical component of a democratic reform process; a representative from the SDC is included on the Working Methods diagram because of this. However, the diagram does little to dispel the notion that the SDC is separate (or at least not critical) to the whole SSR process, as it references SDC presence at sub-committee level, whereas its role as an accountability mechanism is actually overarching and therefore it should be much more prominent.

3.4. Key findings for Output 3 (tranche 1): '*The GoI engagement with civil society in the field of SSR is increased and civil society capacity on SSR is enhanced*' and Output 3 (tranche 2): '*Civil society plays an active role in the oversight of security sector governance in Iraq*'.

UNDP CSO engagement has involved building on long-standing relationships with organisations (due to previous engagement through the Rule of Law Programme), as well as creating new relationships with different CSO organisations. In the first period of under Phase II, Programme activities included grants to six CSOs to undertake quick impact projects in Anbar, Salah-Al-Din, Karbala and Baghdad. These led to community-led activities to build bridges between citizens and the police, for example, football matches between teams made up of officers and local citizens.

Key successes

- Activities conducted under Phase II facilitated communities to become more sensitised to the role of the police, laying the ground for improved citizen-State relationships that can help prevent instability and quell tensions at local levels. This was reflected by the one NGO representative met with, who said

that for many years, communities were aware of people that were working with ISIL, but the authorities were not informed because the latter were not trusted. Some of these activities are still continuing beyond the project, e.g. open meetings conducted by police in Karbala to ascertain what the security concerns of the public are. This demonstrates the *relevance* and *impact* of the interventions.

- Civil society supported the ANCSS in conducting a public perception survey to assess safety and security trends across Baghdad, Diyala, Salah-Al-Din, Anbar and Erbil. The report was published in December 2017. This is a key success because baseline information is lacking across Iraq on these issues. The report not only can be used to inform future targeted activities, but it also strengthens UNDP relationship with CSOs, laying the ground for future engagement.

Key Weaknesses

- CSO engagement is challenging to monitor as it takes place in the regions where UNDP has limited presence.

- The implementation time-span of the CSO projects was also quite short, as they were Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). This consequently means that long-term sustainability or *impact* of the projects is questionable.

- To improve *effectiveness*, it was mentioned by several national stakeholders that more work could be done by the Programme to educate and sensitise more CSO regarding why they need to engage on SSR, before inviting them to place bids for SSR-related work. Many CSOs do not know what SSR in its broader sense entails, even if some aspects of their work involves engaging with security sector entities.

3.5. Key findings for Output 2 (second tranche): '*Local Policing Road Map is Developed and Implemented to address public security and criminal justice requirements at national and local levels*'

The development of the Local Policing Road Map in the second period of Phase II built on existing Programme engagement and relationships with the Iraqi police (see above).

After UNDP field visits, assessments and work-shops had taken place to better understand the needs of police, the development of a strategic Road Map was identified as a priority. The Road Map Committee was established in April 2017 (in the first period of the Programme), identifying five core functions of police that need support: security and protection management; crime management; traffic enforcement management; improving effectiveness of local police (IELP); and community policing. These core functions will be supported by operational specialisms including finance, human resources, training, equipment, infrastructure and IT and communications. The model of the referral pathway was incorporated into the Road Map and used to identify gaps and abuse of authority, from arrest to rehabilitation. The first draft of the Road Map was submitted at the end of the first

period of the Programme, and the Road Map Implementation Plan was endorsed by the MoI Minister in August 2018. Two committees have been officially appointed by the MoI to oversee implementation of the Road Map: the Road Map Committee that will sit at Baghdad level, and a central committee that will oversee the implementation at governorate level. Governorate committees have been appointed, headed by the chief of police of each province.

The other component of this Output relates to the criminal justice system. Again, the work in this second period built upon engagement in the prior period. Iraq's SSRP articulates that the security sector comprises two branches of institutions and entities: those that are concerned with security management and law enforcement (i.e. military, security services and police) and those that implement justice (eg Supreme Judicial Council and MoJ). The GoI is taking a comprehensive approach to SSR efforts in Iraq by also including Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement with specific focus on local policing. UNDP is supporting this, by co-chairing the Criminal Justice Working Group (CJWG). Members of the WG include representatives from the MoI, Higher Judicial Council (HJC), MoJ and ONSA. The focus of the group has been the introduction of best practice for complex criminal investigations. Other thematic areas are also discussed, e.g. the referral pathway of an offender through the criminal justice system, as well as police detention.

Key successes:

- Development of the Local Policing Road Map and agreement of the Implementation Plan is a key milestone in the SSR process, and is therefore highly *relevant.* It contributes to Outputs in both periods of Phase II, as it helps facilitate security sector reforms involving the police are delivered under one framework, thereby contributing towards a strategic and logical consistency of activities. Model Road Maps from other countries were used as comparative examples, and extensive consultations were conducted with national counterparts to ensure the product was Iraqi-owned, thereby engendering *sustainability*.

- UNDP helped to support the development of Standard Operating Procedures on complex criminal investigations (SoPs), which involves elements of the judiciary and police working together for the first time. In order to facilitate this work, a visit was organised by UNDP to Germany for WG members, for them to observe and learn about practices in German police stations, the work of prosecutors and the functioning of the MoJ. The agreement of the SOPs marks the beginning of a major step forward in a *relevant* and *efficient* unified approach to working in the criminal justice system. It will hopefully facilitate better working, specifically between the MoI and HJC, and aims to streamline investigation procedures.

- Police training (IELP basic training and ToT) courses are *relevant*, as they were first identified by the MoI as an important management tool to prevent and manage rime in post ISIL Iraq. They have been *efficiently* designed, incorporating consultations and feedback from beneficiaries, with considerable quality assurance from UNDP. Danish and Norwegian police officers assisted in delivering IELP and Training of the Trainer (ToT) courses,

with the aim of training about 300 mid-level officers. There was a high degree of flexibility by UNDP in responding to feedback and technical input. The original course has been changed and the manual edited, as the latter was previously not properly contextualised. The current manual now utilises national crime statistics and various models have been adapted to the Iraqi context.[11] Furthermore, a pilot course was created for the MLM course, ensuring the balance of theoretical knowledge versus practical exercises was carefully monitored, and feedback forms evaluated and used to improve the training. This demonstrates good receptivity and adaptability to national needs and opinions.

- *Sustainability* of the police training is factored into the project's delivery. After the training, visits are conducted to duty stations to see what is being implemented by participants. It was said that the majority of participants have implemented what they had learned in some way. The target is to train a group of Iraqi police trainers; to date 72 participants have been trained. Looking forward, UNDP will coordinate with the MoI to deliver basic IELP trainings with the trained Iraqi police trainers as the lead trainers, with UNDP and Danish national police instructors as mentors. In this way the TOT trainers will start delivering the IELP basic courses while also embedding the course into their overall training plan across the organisation.
It should also be noted that the Road Map is focused upon as a topic in the trainings, with a day in the MLM course discussing change management.

- All recommendations in the five core police functions of the Road Map are going to be incorporated in the MoI's five-year strategic plan (2018- 2023) and its annual plans, which demonstrates the *sustainability* and *impact* of the work.

Key weaknesses:

- The Police Road Map underwent considerable consultation, but national stakeholders stated that work on it has been temporarily suspended whilst further discussions take place amongst national counterparts. Whilst UNDP disputed this, at the very least it reflects issues regarding communication and national buy-in that need to be improved. Issues were raised by several national counterparts regarding the Road Map document and process of consultation, i.e. the extent to which the Road Map encompasses the broader criminal justice system as opposed to focusing only on the police. National counterparts thereby asserted that the document was too broad. The wording was also said to be too essay-like, and not practical enough. This demonstrates a divergence of opinion that should have been discussed more comprehensively between UNDP and national counterparts prior to the document's final agreement. Whilst it is recognised that the national environment can be problematic to navigate, it also illustrates the need for UNDP to ensure buy-in across all stakeholders in order to avoid a situation

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[11] For example, the SARA model: Scan, Analysis, Respond and Assess.

where a project is temporarily stalled – or at least where dissatisfaction is strongly felt - after a document is thought to have been finalised.

- It was mentioned that sharing of information and ensuring the correct communication channels in the MoI, could be improved, as UNDP was said not be doing this as requested. For example, sharing the results of mentoring visits to police stations in the regions with the correct personnel in the MoI was said to not be taking place. UNDP was compared favourably with other IPs regarding the use of email communications, but did not fare as positively regarding consultation about field visits, or regarding communication concerning approval of training curricula.

- Broadening into other areas of work that feature in the Road Map's referral pathway would maximise UNDP's *impact*. This is particularly relevant regarding building on the Programme's good work supporting the criminal justice process. One of the Police Road Map core functions mentions detention, but there is no specific focus on this in the Programme as this was not a previous priority. Components of the criminal justice referral pathway are interdependent; therefore, effective reform depends on all entities and institutions in that system being strengthened. Detention centres were mentioned by several stakeholders as a 'problem', with associated issues such as the disregarding of custody time limits, adherence to a confessions-based system and general poor conditions cited as the norm. If the Programme is going to retain strategic foresight in the SSR context, going forward, detention conditions and procedures will need input and attention, even if it only involves the Programme coordinating other entities that focus on related issues.

- At the time of writing, strategic decisions had not been made regarding how the Policing Road Map is going to be rolled out across the forces. There was a lack of clarity amongst stakeholders as to how practical and operational the Road Map Implementation Plan actually is. It was asserted that the latter might need to be bolstered by way of an Action Plan, or at least more practical directions. Whilst this might be remedied as the Implementation Plan gets underway, a risk currently exists that would render the good achievement of the Road Map merely aspirational in nature. Once the Road Map is rolled out and starts to be implemented in a practical way, it will focus the forces around a single set of objectives that will act as a common vector, thereby helping focus reform efforts.

- A future challenge for the Programme's support to improve local police in Iraq will be to ensure that the Programme is alive to developments within the Federal Police (e.g. number of officers, strategic plans, jurisdiction and overlapping remits) in order to avoid major political tensions and territorialism between agencies. The absence of a robust risk log is relevant here (see above). Whilst it is acknowledged that the Programme's remit is not to work on the 'green' side of the security sector reform, it can nonetheless assist in negotiating any potential tensions, given the Programme's strong working relationships with national counterparts.

- Some police trainings have been taking place in hotels, which do not necessarily offer good value for money. It was said that the Police Internal Training Unit has 42 training centres that could be used, although it is acknowledged that many of these may not be suitable for logistical and security reasons. Some of the police training facilities in Baghdad were visited by the evaluator. Previous UNDP-supported trainings were held at this national training centre, although it was reported that there were issues regarding poor air conditioning and electricity cuts. This will pose fewer problems during Winter time. Holding trainings in police training centres would also ensure national ownership is strengthened, and avoid difficulties of access for senior police officers attending to give certificates, which was raised as being an issue with hotels.

- Geographical roll-out of the Programme is an on-going challenge due to the security situation in some areas of the country. The role of the Area Coordinators is being reviewed, and it is also not known to what extent senior police officers will allow the mid-level officers attending the training to deliver the courses in their own districts.

4. Cross-cutting issues

Cross-cutting issues in the ToR do not correspond with the cross-cutting issues in the Programme Documents. There was little evidence that all relevant cross-cutting issues are being properly and pro-actively addressed in the Programme, as well as in Iraq's SSRP.

4.1 Gender

Issues surrounding gender and SSR in Iraq are multiple, and mostly relate to the under-representation of women working in the relevant entities and taking part in decision-making in the MoI, ONSA, NSC and Iraqi Police. UNDP asserts that there remains a lack of understanding of gender issues among national counterparts, with a common perception that gender issues are being addressed adequately if there is female participation in workshops or events. The Programme also asserts that whilst IPs recognise the need to improve gender equality in the SSR process, they only focus on training national counterparts on gender, with no follow up or further strategic-level engagement to help national entities to define a clear gender policy.

The existence of female police officers is a relatively new (post-2003) feature of Iraqi society. Cultural norms result in challenges attracting female recruits into the various security agencies. Even if women are recruited, further challenges arise regarding their engagement in operational contexts, which means they are often relegated to duties such as passport services, the juvenile protection department, and working in police training centres. It was said by some national counterparts that there are women servicing in the traffic unit. However, there was divergence in opinion regarding how accurate this is and / or how visible these officers are. Because of the aforementioned reasons, the most senior rank of female police officers at the current

time is Captain. This makes realising gender equality in police recruitment and retention very challenging for the Programme.[12]

National police academies train women and men separately, and one female participant stated the UNDP police training course was the first course she had attended that was mixed. UNDP requested national police counterparts to invite females to the police trainings, and one per course attended. However, there are no women due to attend the next course. It is not sufficient to merely enable women to attend the trainings, but also that they are respected and can play a significant role in the Iraqi police force. This is a perennial challenge and needs to be further addressed in a sustainable and impactful way.

It is also important to consider gender issues relating to men in the SSR process. Men of fighting age and who lack employment are less likely to want to go from 'green to blue' (military to civilian-centred security) if they gain legitimacy from remaining in a fighting group. UNDP will need to work with relevant sectors in order to effectively address these issues.

The 2015 – 2017 Programme Document outlines gender equality and social inclusion, setting out ways in which a gender perspective can be integrated into the SSR process. This is further broken down into, *inter alia*, developing gender responsive security laws and policies, supporting equality in recruitment, retention and advancement, and strengthening collaboration with women's organisations. This is not repeated in the 2018 Programme Document, which references gender under Output 3 (focusing on Programme support to the SDC and civil society): '*Establishing the rule of law that deliver reasonable security and justice services to all Iraqis irrespective of their gender, ethnicity, religion and political affiliation is both a pre-condition and a necessity in implementing the SSRP successfully'.* Gender is also referenced in the 2018 Programme Document, but only as a topic that was part of training on SSR in the first period under Phase II. As already mentioned, the Programme has attempted to facilitate the attendance of more female police officers as training participants. However, there is no evident emphasis or clear or cohesive narrative on how gender issues that are outlined in the first Programme Document are considered strategically, and translate into activities, as there is no follow-up or consolidated review of cross-cutting issues in the Programme. The fact that the 2018 Programme Document does not explicitly reference gender in the same way as the first Programme Document indicates that it was de-prioritised as a cross-cutting issue.

The proposed 2019 – 2021 Programme Document states that '*gender equality, women and youth empowerment considerations will cut across all areas of the project intervention*'. The logic is not clear as to why 'youth empowerment' appears as a cross-cutting issue in the next phase of the Programme when other prominent issues such as human rights and corruption do not feature alongside it.

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[12] Canadians are supporting for more gender responsive policing in Iraq, through the Coalition.

4.2 Human rights

The UN Country Programme Document 2016 – 2020 states that the 2015 strategic assessment mission, deployed in April 2015, recommended a focus on, *inter alia,* human rights.[13] Human rights is specifically mentioned in the ToR for this evaluation, although it is not referenced as a distinct cross-cutting issue in either of the two Programme Documents. This is surprising given the multiple human rights issues inherent in both security sector engagement, and working in such a high-risk context.

Iraq's SSRP states '*Ensuring security and peace is a tough challenge for all nations because security, development and human rights are interconnected, and they promote one another to establish security and peace'*.[14] It goes on to state that one of the bases of the SSR Programme is '*To follow a comprehensive and consistent SSR approach to ensure a general reform framework that is transparent and based on international standards and human rights'*.[15]

Whilst the Programme certainly reflects human rights-related themes (as it is primarily concerned with the promotion of rule of law and enhancing citizens' safety and security), the 2015 – 2017 Programme Document only references human rights under gender equality and social inclusion. It states: '*Promoting respect for human rights / combating gender-based violence and sexual misconducts…..security personnel in the police, penitentiary and army sectors, if not trained and aware on human rights respect and violations in general, are consequently not able to respond adequately and efficiently to such violations. It creates a lack of trust, legitimacy and efficiency of those institutions for the populations they seek to serve'.* This is not elucidated on further. Therefore, whilst there are references to human rights, in the first Programme Document in particular, the design of the Programme as a whole has failed to adopt a human rights-based approach.

Human rights promotion was said by almost all stakeholders to be something that is expected to 'fall out of other things' rather than being focused upon in its own right. The Programme stated that the 'Do No Harm' principle is inherent in its work, and that Iraqis have a degree of fatigue about human rights, as there has been a saturation of human rights courses given to police officers. Despite the apparent saturation of HRs training, there is little evidence to demonstrate transformative changes that have resulted from this type of intervention. Rather than seeking to rectify this, there is a lack of innovative thinking in the Programme about how to promote human rights in a way that is accessible and appropriate to the context.

The Programme needs to ensure that human rights is not incidental to the Outputs, but rather at the forefront of all activities and approached in a strategic manner. Human rights issues should be embedded at the strategic level and across all activities from the outset of any SSR process. It should be given due prominence during policy formation and the creation of national security institutional architecture, which both tranches of this Programme is heavily involved in.[16] Conversely, if human

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[13] Country Programme Document for Iraq 2016 – 2010. DP/DCP/IRQ/2, 23 November 2015, p.4.
[14] Page 2, national SSRP.
[15] Page 3, national SSRP.
[16] Notably, several IPs stressed that providing a pro-active human rights narrative would also help in attracting donors, and it would also provide common ground upon which to focus strategically.

rights is not going to be a cross-cutting issue, the Programme should have clearly articulated this in the Programme Documents, and stated why. Going forwards, the issue of youth empowerment is articulate in the 2019 – 2021 Programme Document as one of the cross-cutting issues. This evaluation does not seek to undermine interventions that empower youth, but it is not clear why that should take precedence over the other pertinent issues within the security sector reform context.

Lastly, it was noted that there was no reference to Iraq's Universal Periodic Review (UPR) recommendations from 2014 in the Programme Documents. Nor does it refer to the UPR's mid-term reporting in 2017. This was a lost opportunity to work collaboratively with other UN entities and / or the GoI on promoting SSR and human rights issues.

4.3 Corruption

Corruption is not listed as a cross-cutting issue in the ToR, although this evaluation has nonetheless considered it, as it is a critical and omnipresent challenge for the security sector. Corruption is an endemic problem in Iraq,[17] and most stakeholders pro-actively highlighted corruption as being the 'biggest challenge' they are facing that is not being addressed. Corruption can take many forms, including nepotism, bribery and State capture. The Iraqi-drafted SSRP also recognises this, articulating corruption as being both '*Administrative and Financial*,' and listing it as one of the 15 weaknesses that need to be addressed. The SSRP sets out aims to '*limit political interference, nepotism and favouritism…..enhancing capacities in combating administrative and financial corruption….activating the role of…civil society in combating administrative and financial corruption……enforcing the law*'. Corruption is also implicitly addressed in the SSRP when it talks about ensuring clarity regarding entity and individual roles and responsibilities.[18]

Whilst there are project components that will help to combat corruption, there is a lack of strategic oversight regarding how these components can be better utilised to leverage significant systemic and behavioural change. There was resistance from the Programme to introducing corruption as a cross-cutting theme that needs to be focused on, as it does not fit in with the forward-looking Work Plan. This constitutes a risk that UNDP is avoiding a highly relevant but difficult topic, in order to ensure shorter-term gains, which might be at the expense of longer term achievements. In addition, any future Work Plan should be adaptable and responsive to the situation and real challenges that need to be overcome. Future support needs to focus on enhancing citizens' trust, ensuring complaints are heard and appropriately dealt with, and actively monitoring behavioural and institutional changes, as well as citizens' perceptions and experiences. Some national stakeholders asserted that an entry point for this could be focusing on quality standards at the System level; appealing to

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[17] Transparency International's 2018 corruption perception index ranks Iraq as 18 out of 100. The index which ranks 180 countries and territories by their perceived levels of public sector corruption according to experts and businesspeople uses a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean. More than two-thirds of countries score below 50, with the average score being 43.

[18] pp. 6 and 7, national SSRP.

the sense of professionalism and integrity of key decision-makers and stakeholders, and pro-actively emphasising an anti-corruption message.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

Conclusion

UNDP has not only maintained its good standing in what is commonly referred to as a gift-giving international partner culture in Iraq, but it holds a central position in the SSR sphere. It has a notable and prominent role helping to design and shape the SSR process (as opposed to just equipping it with assets) and it enjoys excellent access to, and relationships with, Iraqi counterparts.

In order to capitalise on this and remain *relevant*, whilst also maximising its *sustainability* of efforts, the Programme must address various weaknesses, primarily regarding coordinating relevant stakeholders. This will be increasingly important at the strategic level as political dynamics continue to shift, both in terms of national politics as well as fluctuation in the presence of IPs in-country. Donor funds will continue to reduce given ISIL's decline, and therefore now is the opportune time for the Programme to consolidate, focus energies upon realisable objectives and relevant cross-cutting themes, whilst also ensuring that risks are properly articulated, assessed and mitigated. The GoI SSRP states as one of its bases that it should '*be closely related to the politically-agreed-upon national objectives*'.[19] The proposed review of the NSS creates an ideal opportunity for UNDP to revise its own future programming in line with this evaluation, and in consultation with national counterparts. The Programme also needs to assess to what extent it will continue to reflect the SSR 15 points of weakness identified in the Iraqi-drafted SSRP. This means ensuring that UNDP does not remain rigidly married to a Work Plan, but is flexible in order to absorb lessons learned and reflect real challenges on the ground.

Recommendations – strategic oversight and maximising impact

- The Programme needs to assess its forward-looking Programme in line with this evaluation.

- UNDP needs to take a much more decisive and pro-active role in **convening and coordinating** national and international stakeholders, as this is the Programme's biggest weakness. UNDP should consider recruiting a **dedicated coordination role** (that could also be an SSR technical expert) that would span all thematic areas within the SSR Programme, acting as the touchstone and motivator to push forward the SSR agenda. Further, UNDP's coordinating function needs to be communicated clearly to all stakeholders, preferably in a forum that already exists (e.g. an IP meeting).

- In order to **fully realise its convening and coordinating function**, UNDP needs to convene regular meetings that are effective, as set out below. It is not suggested that the Programme should create and add more meetings to what is already taking place, but rather to make the meetings that do take place relevant and useful, as most stakeholders stated that they were dissatisfied with what is currently taking place:

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[19] Page 3, national SSRP

- *The seven Systems.* The Support Committee has historically related with the seven Systems separately; not as a cohesive whole. A meeting convening all systems has never taken place. It is therefore critical that a more holistic approach is undertaken if the Programme is to maximise its strategic impact. These meetings need to have as their objective the proper coordination, implementation and sequencing of stated activities in line with national priorities. They can also help to articulate roles and responsibilities of each System (see recommendation below), as well as clarify the work of the Programme and the broader UN.

- *International Partners*; The meeting for IPs would be a good opportunity for UNDP to inform key partners about its work in the field of SSR, and how the support of the UN as a cohesive whole is contributing to SSR;

- *Joint meetings with national AND international partners.* These take place every quarter, although feedback stated that is not sufficient. Outstanding issues to discuss at any IP / Joint meeting include, *inter alia,* at what stage Iraq is at in the stabilisation to normalisation journey, what assistance is needed by which entity, and how capabilities can be strengthened in order to ensure implementation of the NSS. International coordination may also have the result of raising funds and being more holistically strategic about how they are spent.[20]

- *Support Committee meetings*. As well increasing Programme SSR expertise (see below recommendation on staffing), the Programme needs to facilitate easier access, where appropriate, for IPs to the Support Committee meetings, as this will maximise holistic SSR efforts. IPs will be able to input into strategic SSR issues, as well as be in a position to offer additional technical assistance where required and requested. It is acknowledged that allowing IPs to access this level will ultimately be at the behest of the Iraqis, although the Programme can still attempt to facilitate this. One way of building a bridge between Iraqis and IPs at this level could be to invite one IP representative to attend each meeting (alongside UNDP's Programme specialist) on a rotational basis, or inviting a non-Programme IP technical expert to speak on a specific topic. If this is not possible, then clearer and more consistent communication about these meetings with IPs needs to take place, e.g. by way of group email updates. This will not only go to improving UNDP's coordination function, but also move the Programme away from the risk it is perceived as a competitor to IPs in the SSR space.

- UNDP currently does not support **national coordination**, but given the weaknesses of coordination overall, consideration should now be given to

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[20] For example, donor money is currently largely focused on the Ninevah Plains and Mosul, not on Basra, despite the latter having suffered water shortages which could lead to a security crisis.

supporting such assistance. UNDP needs to consider funding or facilitating the provision of **additional one or two staff members at the SSR Secretariat and / or the ONSA**, which would ensure that the process remains nationally owned. Ideally the assistance would be Arabic speaking, and would serve a dual purpose as both capacity-building the ONSA staff on coordination issues, as well as facilitating national coordination in a way that would offer a high level of coherence to all stakeholders.

- UNDP should undertake, or commission ANCSS to undertake, **a mapping exercise of the overlap and synergies across different areas of work in the SSR context, specifically the Seven Systems**. This 'connecting the dots' exercise will facilitate de-confliction, and strengthen complementary areas (e.g. ensuring legislation is in place in order for all Systems to function effectively, such as security legislation and legislation empowering the intelligence community). It can act as a vector and platform in focusing stakeholder discussions, including regarding sequencing of activities. Part of this mapping exercise should include specifying (or suggesting for approval) roles and responsibilities / ToRs for all entities in the SSR context**,** including all stakeholders across the seven Systems, along with actions and deadlines for the various System Leads and functions.

- UNDP can enhance its role in **supporting the proposed NSS review**. This provides an ideal opportunity for UNDP to bolster its coordination efforts in line with the above recommendations and demonstrate to all stakeholders the added value UNDP brings to the SSR process. This includes its access to technical expertise and its existing and long-standing good relationships with national partners. Using its convening power, UNDP can liaise with the NSC, NSA and DNSA to ensure the agreement of the SSR Action Plan process. UNDP could instigate the review by liaising with stakeholders and providing clear options and advice. Within this, it is imperative that long and short-term goals are clearly articulated.

- Emphasis should be given to having an **increased UNDP presence across the country** as this will not only ensure UNDP can meet its targets, but it also enhances the added value of UNDP to IPs that do not have access to the provinces. The current Area Coordinators' roles are limited due to the fact that the MoI in Baghdad can link up with police across the regions. However, the role of the Area Coordinators needs to be maintained and broadened given the scale-up of the Programme, and if work with CSOs is going to continue.[21]

Recommendations – cross-cutting issues

- The Programme should **reformulate** the forward-looking Programme Document to **include critical cross-cutting issues**, and to adapt its activities accordingly. An innovative approach needs to be adopted at activity level, so

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[21] It is acknowledged that this will largely depend upon the security situation in any given province.

that human rights training is relevant to context and overcomes beneficiary fatigue.

- The Programme should either procure a consultant, or work with other UN entities, to conduct an assessment(s) on relevant cross-cutting issues and SSR; specifically, **human rights**, **gender**, **corruption**, and **youth empowerment[22].** Focus needs to be on how these issues can be strategically incorporated into the Programme and mainstreamed across activities. A review of human rights in the SSR process should be undertaken in order that it is not seen as a circumstantial by-product of SSR engagement. Human rights would ordinarily be the remit of UNAMI, although as already mentioned, there did not appear to be synchronicity between UNAMI and the UNDP SSR Programme. The adoption of the referral pathway model incorporated into the Policing Road Map provides a good entry point and framework for this type of assessment, as well as reflecting existing UNDP work. However, it should be noted that relevant human rights issues are broader than the criminal justice referral pathway, as they cover issues relating to work across the seven Systems. This review could then be shared with stakeholders, acting as a common narrative as well as a platform for convening resources and strategizing interventions.

- **Corruption** needs to be clearly articulated and given due prominence in the forward-looking Programme Document, as it is a critical challenge that cannot be ignored. The Programme should support a review, conducted either by an independent expert or the ANCSS, of how corruption affects each of the seven Systems. This would act as a touchstone to bring stakeholders together in order that they can better focus on the most appropriate interventions. Similarly, **gender issues[23]** need to be reinforced going forward, following a thorough gender assessment.

Recommendations - strengthening UNDP capacity and processes:

- In addition to bolstering support at the SSR Secretariat / and or the ONSA, UNDP's **core SSR team needs to be augmented**, in order to ensure continuity and sustainability are maximised. The SSR process needs continuous support, which means engaging more Advisors in existing areas (i.e. criminal justice and SSR). Lastly, serious consideration should be given to ensuring gender equality in future recruitment, especially given this is a cross-cutting theme in the Programme.

- **Monitoring and Evaluation within the Country Office needs to be improved.** This evaluation is the first external evaluation of the Programme since 2015. This is inadequate given the breadth, high risk and time-frame of the Programme. Going forward this needs to be rectified as a priority. This can include commissioning both project-based and outcome-based

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[22] Youth empowerment is stated in the proposed 2019 – 2021 Programme Document as a cross-cutting issue, and so has not been focused upon in this evaluation which is only concerned with 2015 – 2018.

[23] and youth empowerment, as this is already stated in the proposed Programme Document as a cross-cutting issue.

evaluations at regular intervals (e.g. every six months and one year respectively), and ensuring there is an adequate response and mechanism for lessons learned.

- It is strongly recommended that a future **outcome-based evaluation** is conducted in 12 months, that also **focuses on the efficacy of the coordination function** of UNDP. This is because of UNDP's critical and unique role in Iraq's SSR process, the need for coherent holistic coordination to achieve best results in order to meet the Programme's Outcomes, the complex nature of the seven Systems, and the obvious and inherent overlapping remits of multiple stakeholders.

- **Risks need to be properly scoped and assessed** given the volatile environment in which UNDP operates. Significant issues that might not be within the Programme's Outputs, but which still greatly affect SSR, need to be discussed further, remits clarified and contingency plans made. For example, the ramifications of the absence of any DDR Programme (although this is planned for in the 2019-21 Programme Document), the future role of the PMF, planning around resource-related crises (e.g. droughts), information-sharing and cooperation across borders (including with KRI), relations between the Federal and Local Police forces etc. IP dynamics also pose risks that need to be planned for and mitigated, e.g. how the drawdown of the Coalition might affect the 'green to blue' reforms, i.e. how remaining funds might be spent and what the legacy will be. Keeping alert to how these risks might develop and affect the Programme needs close and active management.

Recommendation – police engagement

- UNDP should **strengthen its work with the MoI and police.** This means clarifying means and lines of communication, specifically regarding communication through the MoI International Cooperation and Coordination Committee. It also includes clarifying with stakeholders whether an Action Plan is needed as well as the Implementation Plan for the Road Map**.** There was a lack of clarity amongst stakeholders as to how practical and operational the Implementation Plan currently is. The absence of a practical Action Plan risks rendering the good achievement of the Road Map merely aspirational and impossible to realise.

Recommendation – criminal justice

- UNDP needs to continue to enhance or **scale up its work on the broader justice component of SSR.** This can include focusing on detention issues (police cells, military and civilian prisons), or working alongside other entities that have this focus, e.g. UNODC, and border management. If some of this work does not fall into future programmatic plans, UNDP should at the least be convening others that can fulfil this role.

Recommendations – SDC engagement

- UNDP should prioritise and **strengthen its work with the SDC**. Investing more in the SDC will demonstrate to other stakeholders that the SDC is not separate to the SSR process, but instead forms an integral part of necessary democratic and accountability processes and oversight. There needs to be a significant reframing of the messaging of its role, both to counterparts and IPs. The **Working Methods document should be re-visualised**, as it has been shared with counterparts and IPs, and places the SDC at the sub-committee level, whereas its role is actually overarching and should be much more prominent. Encouragement can also be given by UNDP to other national agencies to for members of the SDC to attend various high-level meetings.[24] The SDC by-laws represent good progress in strengthening the SDC, but it is only a four-page document that outlines the basic functioning, remit and human resources hierarchy of the SDC. UNDP should capitalise on this previous good work by supporting the SDC to create its own **Strategy and Action Plan** as well as further policies, as directed by the SDC. A Strategy and Action Plan would assist the SDC to set goals for what entities and issues they would like to investigate or focus upon. Further policies may also be beneficial in setting out, for example, the methodology that will be applied to research that the SDC hopes to undertake.

- UNDP should support continued **collaboration between the SDC and civil society.** This can include joint presence at the proposed CSO sensitisation events mentioned below.

Recommendations – civil society engagement

- UNDP needs to **build more bridges with CSOs** and take a more pro-active approach to CSO engagement on SSR issues, moving away from Quick Impact Projects to longer-term activities. The latter have a better chance of being more sustainable, thereby also representing sound financial investment. UNDP should therefore plan and budget for longer-term CSO engagement, by:

    o *firstly,* seeking to build upon what CSOs have already been doing, and continuing to support the most successful activities;

    o *secondly,* by inviting a wide array of CSOs to a forum (or several forums by region, if more appropriate), and sensitising them to SSR. This would include discussing what SSR is, how SSR impacts local communities, how CSOs can work at the local community level (e.g. through community policing models, or advocating for the same), and at the higher national level by advocating for strengthening of accountability processes through the passing of legislation. This would hopefully cultivate interest from organisations that have historically been focused on other issues, but could in future be valuable SSR partners;

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[24] The Programme should also ensure from the SDC side that appropriate senior representatives attend any external meetings. It was said that junior representatives had in the past attended external meetings, which might have contributed to the SDC in general not being perceived as being a critical stakeholder.

- *Thirdly,* in order to ensure that corruption is a topic that remains in the public eye, there is a need to sensitise NGOs as to why and how they can focus on corruption, and how it undermines effective SSR. This includes awareness-raising on relevant accountability mechanisms, both within parliament and inter-entity. Similarly, SSR and gender, human rights and youth empowerment issues should be focused upon so that NGOs are better informed and able to support work in these areas; and

- *Fourthly*, increasing presence across the country as areas become more easily accessible.

Annex 1

Abbreviated Terms of Reference
(excluding competency requirements, time-frame and travel plans)

United Nation Development Programme

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INDIVIDUAL CONSULTANT PROCUREMENT NOTICE IRQ-IC-059/17 – Project Evaluator
SUPPORT TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM PHASE II - UNDP Iraq

Description of assignment:

Type of Consultancy:
Duty Station:
Period of assignment/services: Duration of Assignment:

1. Project Background:

Project Evaluator – Support to Security Sector Reform Phase II, UNDP Iraq;

Individual Contractor
Home Base and Baghdad, Iraq with Travel as needed. 25 Working Days, over a period of 1 1⁄2 months.

14 October 2018 to 30 November 2018

The overall programme of work of the project Support to Security Sector Reform - Phase II aims to address the short, medium and long-term priorities needed to enhance the efficiency, effectiveness and, accountability of the Iraqi security sector and, that future security sector reform (SSR) engagement in Iraq is coordinated constructively within one central framework. The action also involves improving civil society and parliamentary capacity and, collaboration in democratic governance and oversight of SSR. To this end, the programme of work has been implemented under the following the outputs:

From August 2015 to December 2017:
1: The GoI Plan for Security Sector Reform is developed, and the cooperation and coordination mechanisms required for its implementation are established, in-line with the measures set out in the National Security Strategy;
2: The democratic oversight capacity of the Security and Defense Committee is strengthened, and the Committee plays a more active role in SSR;
3: The GoI engagement with civil society in the field of SSR is increased and civil society capacity on SSR is enhanced.

From January - December 2018:
1: Implementation model for the National SSR Programme is established and implemented under one central GoI framework;
2: Civilian and Local Policing Road Map is developed and implemented to address public security and criminal justice requirements at national and local levels; and
3: Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee and Civil Society play an active role in oversight of Security Sector Governance in Iraq.

Overall project cycle covers the period from 31 August 2015 - 31 December 2018 (39 months).

In view of the anticipated project end on 31st December 2018, within the above-mentioned project cycle, UNDP Iraq Country Office (CO) has identified the need to undertake a project end external evaluation in line with UNDP Iraq CO rules and regulations corresponding to Country Office's Programme Unit Standard Operating Procedures (SoP).

In view of the above UNDP CO Programme Unit intends to hire a qualified independent consultant to undertake the above-mentioned project evaluation in October 2018 for a period of 1.5 Months.

IC-059/18: TOR-Project Evaluator 1

2. Scope of work:

Majority of the evaluation will be Baghdad -based with some- home based work where necessary. The evaluation will include both one-to-one interviews with project partners and, beneficiaries as well as desk- based review of project documents, quarterly narrative reports and other relevant documentation. The Programme Unit in consultation with the Project Team will develop a mutually agreed interview questioner and, a list of interviewees.

The overall evaluation will be facilitated and managed by the Programme Unit in close consultation with the Project Team.

Anticipated time frame for the evaluation will be from **15 October – 30 November 2018.**

The end of project evaluation will focus on the following criteria:

1. a) Relevance and fulfilment of its outputs, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.

   Relevance: How important is the relevance or significance of the intervention regarding local and national priorities / is the project on the right track?

   Effectiveness: Did the project achieve its set outputs? How significant/big is the impact or effectiveness of the project compared to its expected outputs? (i.e. comparison: result-planning)

Efficiency: Did the project achieve its outputs/implement project activities economically (i.e. value for money)? How big is the efficiency or the utilization ratio of project resources (i.e. comparison: invested resources - results/impact)

Impact: Does the overall intervention contribute to longer term outcomes/results? What is the impact or effect of the intervention in proportion to the overall situation of the target groups or the beneficiary population?

Sustainability: Are the positive impacts effective and sustainable? How is the sustainability of the intervention or its effects assessed?

2. b) Cross-cutting issues such as gender, human rights, civil society engagement and government - non-government partnerships, Do-No Harm and, conflict sensitivity principles are taken into consideration
3. c) Intervention logic (i.e. Log frame) is analyzed.

3. Outputs:

Outputs to be evaluated - In view of the nature of this evaluation, the project will be assessed against the following outputs:

3.1 From August 2015 to December 2017:

Output 1 - The GoI Plan for Security Sector Reform is developed and the cooperation and coordination mechanisms required for its implementation are established, in line with the measures set out in the National Security Strategy

Output 2 - The democratic oversight capacity of the Security and Defense Committee is strengthened and the Committee plays a more active role in SSR

Output 3 - GoI engagement with civil society in the field of SSR is increased and CSO capacity on SSR is enhanced.

3.2 From January - December 2018
IC-059/18: TOR-Project Evaluator 2

Output 1: Implementation model for the National SSR Programme is established and implemented under one central GoI framework.

Output 2: Civilian and Local Policing Road Map is developed and implemented to address public security and criminal justice requirements at national and local levels.

Output 3: Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee and Civil Society play an active role in oversight of Security Sector Governance in Iraq.

4. Objectives of the Evaluation:

The objectives of the evaluation are to:

- Determine if the project has achieved its stated objectives and explain why/why not.
- Determine project's results (i.e. mainly outputs and likelihood of their contribution to the

  outcome) in terms of sustaining the project's achievements.

- Provide recommendations to build on project's achievements and sustainability of the same.
- Document lessons learned and best practice from the overall project implementation in order to

  consider for future programming including approximately 3 success stories..

- Appraise project achievements against its expected outputs and recommend ways to improve

  future partnerships with project's implementing partners/ target groups.

- The evaluation should take into consideration the project duration, overall budget/project

  resources and, political and environmental constraints/ challenges.

5. Methodology:

Project evaluation methodology will include the following assessment tools:

1. 5.1. Desk review of relevant project documents.
2. 5.2. One- to-one interviews with target groups / beneficiary population.
3. 5.3. One- to-one interviews with the project team.
4. 5.4. Discussions with the UNDP CO senior management and, relevant programme staff.
5. 5.5. Consultations with relevant government representatives/implementing partners involved in the

   project both at national and provincial levels.

6. 5.6. Consultations with donors/ international partners and, national non-governmental organizations

   who were directly engaged in the project implementation.

Findings from the above assessment tools will be triangulated to appraise and conclude findings. Overall, the evaluation will be Baghdad based given the focus of the project target coverage.
The consultant will be assisted by the UNDP Project Manager - SSR/RoL where necessary and work under the overall guidance and oversight of the UNDP SSR/RoL Programme Manager.

Annex 2

List of stakeholder entities engaged with for the purposes of this evaluation:

Category of stakeholder	Entity
UN	UNDP Programme Staff
UNDP Programme implementers	UNDP international police training instructors from the Danish National Police
International Partner: multi-lateral	The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
International Partner: multi-lateral	The Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve ('the Coalition' or 'CJTF')
International Partner: multi-lateral	The European Union Assistance Mission in Iraq (EUAM)
International Partner: bi-lateral	The UK Embassy
International Partner: bi-lateral	The German Embassy
National partner	The Higher Judicial Council
National partner	Deputy Prosecutor
National partner	Parliamentary Security and Defence Committee (SDC)
National partner	Ministry of Interior (MoI), police
National partner	Office of National Security Advisor (ONSA),
National partner	GoI National SSR Coordinator
National partner	the Al-Nahrain Centre for Strategic Studies (ANCSS)
National partner	NGO: Mercy Hands

Annex 3
Working Methods Diagram
SSRP Working Methods dated 12 March 2018.

working methods
لجان برنامج اصلاح القطاع الامني
SSR Programme Committees
مناهج العمل

المستوى الوطني
National

مجلس الأمن الوطني
National Security Council

اللجنة العليا للاصلاح
High Committee on SSR

أمانة السر
SSR Secretariat

لجنة الدعم
Support Committee
خبراء الاصلاح العراقيين
(Iraqi SSR Experts)

إجتماع الشركاء الدوليين
International Partners
Meeting

ممثلي الشركاء الدوليون لدعم تنسيق أنشطة الأصلاح
Lead Partners for International
Coordination in support of SSR

مستوى الانظمة
Systems

إستراتيجية الدفاع والأمن الداخلي	المجتمع الاستخباري	العدالة الجنائية وإنفاذ القانون	البنى التحتية الحرجة	الرقابة والمساءلة الديمقراطية	تشريعات الأمن الوطني	هيكلية الأمن الوطني
Defence & Internal Security Strategy	Intelligence Community	Criminal Justice & Law Enforcement	Critical Infrastructure Protection	Democratic/Institutional Oversight & Accountability	National Security Legislation	National Security Architecture

المستوى المؤسسي
Institutions

PMC هيئة الحشد الشعبي	CTS جهاز مكافحة الإرهاب	MoD وزارة الدفاع	MoI وزارة الداخلية	NSS جهاز الأمن الوطني	INIS جهاز المخابرات الوطني	MoJ وزارة العدل	High Judicial Council مجلس القضاء الأعلى	Integrity Committee هيئة النزاهة	Federal Supreme Audit Board ديوان الرقابة المالية	CoR مجلس النواب	ONSA مستشارية الامن الوطني
Deputy Head نائب رئيس الهيئة	Deputy Commander نائب رئيس الجهاز	General Secretary الأمين العام	Deputy Minister وكيل الوزارة	Deputy Head نائب رئيس الجهاز	Deputy Head نائب رئيس الجهاز	Representative ممثل عن الوزارة	Deputy Prosecutor نائب المدعي العام	A Director General مدير عام	A Director General مدير عام	Deputy Chair SDC نائب رئيس لجنة الأمن والدفاع	Deputy DNSA نائب مستشار الأمن

لجان المتابعة والتقييم
Monitoring & Evaluation
Committees (MECs)