



IEO | INDEPENDENT
Evaluation Office
United Nations Development Programme

ANNEXES

INDEPENDENT COUNTRY PROGRAMME EVALUATION – IRAQ

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Annex 1. TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. INTRODUCTION

The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conducts country evaluations called “Independent Country Programme Evaluations (ICPEs)” to capture and demonstrate evaluative evidence of UNDP’s contributions to development results at the country level, as well as the effectiveness of UNDP’s strategy in facilitating and leveraging national effort for achieving development results. The purpose of an ICPE is to:

- Support the development of the next UNDP Country Programme Document
- Strengthen accountability of UNDP to national stakeholders
- Strengthen accountability of UNDP to the Executive Board

ICPEs are independent evaluations carried out within the overall provisions contained in the UNDP Evaluation Policy.¹ The IEO is independent of UNDP management and is headed by a Director who reports to the UNDP Executive Board. The responsibility of the IEO is two-fold: (a) provide the Executive Board with valid and credible information from evaluations for corporate accountability, decision-making and improvement; and (b) enhance the independence, credibility and utility of the evaluation function, and its coherence, harmonization and alignment in support of United Nations reform and national ownership.

Based on the principle of national ownership, IEO seeks to conduct ICPEs in collaboration with the national authorities where the country programme is implemented.

UNDP Iraq has been selected for an ICPE in 2019 since its country programme was intended to end at the end of 2020. However, the current schedule for submission of a new Country Programme Document (CPD) to the Executive Board has been anticipated to September 2019 and the ICPE will therefore be conducted at the beginning of 2019 to feed into the development of the new country programme. The ICPE will be conducted in close collaboration with the Government of Iraq, the regional government in Kurdistan, UNDP Iraq country office, and UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States (RBAS).

2. NATIONAL CONTEXT

As of 2012-2013, after years of dictatorship, the impact of sanctions and three major conflicts, Iraq was achieving notable gains. An Upper Middle Income Country which had made important progress towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, Iraq was the world’s third largest oil exporter, and it had the resources to increase its oil production significantly. Economic growth rate was projected to reach 9% on average over the period 2014-2018.

Challenges remained, including a significant disparity between urban and rural areas, lack of progress on income equality, less progress than expected on gender parity, access to potable water, and environmental problems, including the risk that the Tigris and Euphrates, the two major surface water sources, may dry up by 2040. However, overall, the country had reduced extreme poverty; child malnutrition, infant and early childhood mortality had decreased significantly. Food insecurity had been reduced. Net enrolment in primary education had increased and girls’ participation in school was improving. Women’s participation in parliament was above the 25% constitutional quota. Malaria had been completely eliminated.²

¹ See UNDP Evaluation Policy: www.undp.org/eo/documents/Evaluation-Policy.pdf. The ICPE is conducted in adherence to the Norms and the Standards and the ethical Code of Conduct established by the United Nations Evaluation Group (www.uneval.org).

² Iraq UNDAF 2015-2018

What gains had been achieved, had been reversed by the end of 2014 as a result of a resurgence in violence and the worsening of the economic environment due to the collapse of oil prices. For example, achievements in increasing literacy and reducing gender disparities were erased.³ By mid-2015, 2.9 million people had fled their homes reaching 5.8 million at the peak of the conflict. Over 8.2 million people required immediate humanitarian support as a direct consequence of violence and conflict linked to the take-over of Iraqi territory by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the counter-insurgency operation launched by the Government and its allied forces.

The ISIL insurgency was one of the most brutal in the world. Populations have been subjected to mass executions, systematic rape and horrendous acts of violence, including executions and torture. Children have been used as suicide bombers and human shields, sold at markets, killed by crucifixion and buried alive. Women and girls have been enslaved and subjected to grotesque sexual violence. To add to the already very serious situation, tens of thousands of refugees fled the intense fighting and destruction in Syria, seeking safety in Iraq reaching 250,000 mostly in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.⁴

By mid-2015, the Government was forced into pre-sales of Iraqi oil reserves. The Kurdistan Government was equally hard-hit, struggling to cope with denied and delayed oil transfers. Hosting close to one million displaced persons and refugees, the Kurdistan Government was forced to cut back on public services, delay salaries and halt development and investment projects.

The humanitarian crisis in Iraq has as of end 2018 entered a new phase. Combat operations against the ISIL ended as of December 2017 and hundreds of thousands of displaced people are returning to their homes and communities. Retaken areas are being cleared of explosive hazards⁵, and rubble and major efforts are underway to restore electricity, water and sewage grids, re-establish the Government's social protection floor, jump-start local economies and open schools and health centres. Displaced camps are being consolidated and decommissioned and modalities are being put in place for ensuring that the highly vulnerable families who are currently receiving assistance from humanitarian partners are covered under the Government's new Poverty Reduction Strategy.⁶

Damage and loss assessments conducted by the Ministry of Planning and analysed by the World Bank estimate that reconstruction will take at least 10 years and cost well over US\$88 billion. The health and education sectors have been particularly hard hit. For example, thirty-six per cent of health centres in Salah al-Din are damaged or destroyed and only half of health facilities in Ninewa are fully functional. In 2017 alone, more than 150 schools were damaged or destroyed. Agricultural production has declined 40 per cent compared to pre-conflict levels.⁷ Years of conflict and violence left chemical pollution and unexploded ordnances affecting the livelihoods and safety of many.

Economic decision-making has been dominated by short-term needs and rent-seeking. Fiscal institutions are weak and unequipped to deal with the complexities of an oil-dominated budget, which has made the Iraqi economy extremely vulnerable to a sudden decline in oil prices. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate the financial and non-financial sectors and enjoy significant privileges, thus crowding out private firms and impeding factor reallocation. Yet only one quarter of all SOEs are profitable. The costs of environmental degradation, particularly the degradation of water resources, are huge, amounting to over 6 percent of GDP

3 Iraq Systemic Country Diagnostic, World Bank, 2017

4 Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan, OCHA, 2015

5 albeit very high level of contamination requiring significant investment to clear

6 Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan, OCHA, 2018

7 Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan, OCHA, 2018

in some recent years.⁸

In general, Iraq's oil wealth makes it a country of considerable international interest and importance. Its geographic and political location make it a key player in the jockeying for power in the region. Many of the Middle East's major geopolitical struggles are being played out in Iraq. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq was part of the Sunni block of countries – alongside Turkey and Saudi Arabia – maintaining a balance with Shia Iran. Today, in January 2019 Iraq is governed by its majority Shia population, a vital shift in the region's balance of power. The role of Iran in Iraq is of consequence to Turkey, which has its own ties to the Sunni Turkmen in Northern Iraq around Mosul, and interest in the political evolution of Iraqi Kurdistan. ISIL's control over stretches of Iraqi territory and its involvement in the civil war in Syria have been a deep source of conflict and instability for Iraq, drawing in global powers and regional actors. These interests and conflicts in and around Iraq have made it difficult to achieve domestic political stability.⁹

3. UNDP PROGRAMME STRATEGY IN IRAQ

UNDP is present in Iraq since 1976, when the Standard Basic Assistance Agreement was signed. Since 2003, UNDP has operated as part of the United Nations assistance strategy coordinated by UNAMI, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, which was established at the request of the Government of Iraq via the 2003 Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1500.

The second National Development Plan (NDP) covered the period 2013-2017 and was based on the principles of diversity, decentralization, green investment, empowerment, equal opportunity and decent work. It stressed the importance of reducing the development gap between urban and rural areas, making more sustainable investments in natural resources, and exploiting the relative potential of each region and governorate. The NDP 2013-2017 was supposed to provide the guiding framework for the implementation of the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) in Iraq for the period 2015-2019. The UNDAF was signed in April 2014 and aimed at enhancing social cohesion, through two complementary human rights based outcomes, namely: A) Improving the performance and responsiveness of targeted national and sub-national institutions and B) Addressing acute vulnerability and participation gaps.

In parallel, the Kurdistan Government developed in 2013 a document called "Vision 2020", which set out the following priorities; •Health and social services that meet the needs of the population • An education system and labor market opportunities that will enable the population to achieve its potential and improve its standard of living • The necessary physical infrastructure •The development of a diversified economy relying on the private sector • Effective and honest government.

However, in response to the ongoing crisis, one of the most rapidly unfolding in world history, in June 2015, a Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) had to be developed by the Iraq Humanitarian Country Team, mid-way through the annual programming cycle. The crisis had, by then, displaced 2.9 million people. The Government was faced, for the first time in decades, with a massive fiscal gap resulting from the slump in oil prices and the high costs of the ISIL counterinsurgency. Since the development of the HRP, UNDP has been coordinating the Emergency Livelihoods Cluster.

As of 2018, Iraq has been launching new planning documents which respond to the current post liberation needs for stabilisation, poverty reduction and long-term development. In January 2018, the UN system developed a two-year Recovery and Resilience Programme (RRP) to fast-track the social dimensions of reconstruction, in line with the Government's commitment to multi-dimensional reconstruction. The table below provides a summary of current Government planning documents:

⁸ Iraq Systemic Country Diagnostic, World Bank, 2017

⁹ Iraq Systemic Country Diagnostic, World Bank, 2017

| Table 1: Current Iraq planning documents ¹⁰ | |
|---|---|
| Document | Scope |
| National Development Plan 2018 – 2022 | Launched in May 2018, the plan defines strategic development goals of Iraq in the post-ISIL phase and establishes the foundations of effective development with social responsibility |
| General Framework of National Plan for reconstruction of the damaged governorates by terrorism for period (2018-2027) | Reconstruction of the damaged governorates by terrorism for period (2018-2027) at a primary cost of 100 billion dollars. |
| Poverty Reduction Strategy 2018-2022 | Builds on previous Poverty Reduction Strategy and takes into impacts of ISIL conflict (e.g. increase in poverty rate etc.) |
| Private Sector Development Strategy 2014-2030 | Strategy for economic diversification, stems from the recognition that reliance on oil production is not viable nor sustainable in the long term |

The UNDP CPD 2016-2020 was formally adopted in January 2016 but had been developed during 2015, before the full blown crisis triggered by the conflict with ISIL. The crisis heavily impacted on CPD implementation and led to a focus on the stabilization pillar. The CPD intended to cover three areas: public institutional reform, effective devolution of administrative and fiscal powers and stabilization (Table 2). As far as the third area is concerned, under outcome 8A, UNDP intended to support government efforts to create safe conditions for the return of internally displaced persons to newly liberated areas, in close cooperation with other UN partners. The work was meant to include rehabilitation of infrastructure to enable provision of basic services, livelihood support (including emergency livelihood support through for example cash for work, cash grants) and capacity and technical support for Governorate and local governments, support for social cohesion and reconciliation, etc.

According to the management of the Country Office, the CPD did not anticipate the scale and significance of the stabilisation work. According to the Independent Evaluation Office analysis¹¹, the total budget for outcome 8A over the period 2015-2018 is 775,401,805 USD¹², amounting to just short of 90%¹³ of the total budget over the same period (864,387,293 USD). Outcome 8A includes the work being carried out by the Funding Facility for Stabilisation (FFS), which was launched by UNDP in May 2015 at the request of the Government of Iraq and grew exponentially since 2016. The facility aims to stabilise 31 areas, across 5 Governorates liberated from ISIL control by Iraqi authorities. Its budget for 2015 was estimated in the CPD to be around 7 million USD. The contribution mobilized (signed agreements) as of 27 November 2018 is 919,198,058 USD, around four times the entire resource base of the programme, which was estimated by the CPD to be around 235 million USD.¹⁴

It is therefore widely considered that the CPD did not offer a totally suitable guiding framework for the

¹⁰ The Kurdistan autonomous region current planning document remains the “Vision 2020” mentioned in section 2

¹¹ Data subject to validation with the CO

¹² Of this amount, 636,000,000 USD represent the budget for the Funding Facility for Stabilization for the period 2015-2018

¹³ It should be noted that the budgets of outcome 6A and 7A for the period 2015-2018 are 44 and 43.5 ml USD respectively, according to the initial IEO analysis. While these figures are low in percentage point, they are not negligible in absolute terms as UNDP manages several country programs which have lower budgets than of either of these two outcomes.

¹⁴ Based on the initial IEO analysis, the current total budget for the period 2016-2018 (latest available figures) amounts to approximately 798 ml USD

activities managed by the CO over the period it intended to cover¹⁵. Additionally, the CPD was not aligned to the UNDAF cycle, which was, however, in itself superseded by the HRP.

A Management Consulting Team mission took place in April 2017 to review the programme and the structure of the Office. This review proposed the creation of a new programme structure which included four pillars: Stabilization, Economic diversification and Employment; Governance and Reconciliation Programme, Environment and Energy. A transformation plan was also developed in May 2017.

| Table 2: Country Programme outcomes and indicative resources (2016-2020) | | | |
|--|--|---|--|
| Country Programme Outcome and Outputs | | Indicative resources (2016-2020) (USD million) | Expenditure to date (2016-2018) (USD million) |
| Outcome 6A (SP outcome 2) ¹⁶ | <p>Reformed legal and law enforcement institutions that are more transparent and accountable</p> <p>1.1.1 Technical support in place for the preparation of a detailed national security strategy implementation plan</p> <p>1.1.2 Proposals finalized on standards and mechanisms for recruitment and training of judges, prosecutors and police officers</p> <p>1.1.3 Detailed proposals developed on implementation of key aspects of the national anti-corruption strategy</p> <p>1.1.4 Legal audit of Iraqi legal framework conducted</p> <p>1.1.5 Skills developed and procedures introduced in Parliament on drafting, oversight, management and consultation</p> <p>1.1.6 Increased provision of legal services to internally displaced persons, refugees and host communities</p> | <p>Regular: \$3,456,000</p> <p>Other: \$64,375,000</p> <p>Total: \$67,831,000</p> | <p>Regular: \$635,569.62</p> <p>Other: \$20,531,765.97</p> <p>Total: \$21,167,335.59</p> |
| Outcome 7A (SP Outcome 3) | <p>Administrative and financial reform and devolution policies adopted and implemented at federal and governorate levels.</p> <p>2.1.1. Critical capacities developed for public financial management and development planning at governorate level</p> <p>2.1.2. Draft laws prepared on national revenue and resource sharing</p> <p>2.1.3. Performance management system for Federal Government finalized</p> <p>2.1.4. Monitoring and evaluation system for investment budget rolled out</p> <p>2.1.5. Merit-based recruitment mechanism developed for senior government officials</p> | <p>Regular: \$3,456,000</p> <p>Other: \$64,375,000</p> <p>Total: \$67,831,000</p> | <p>Regular: \$1,364,368.17</p> <p>Other: \$10,715,299.37</p> <p>Total: \$12,079,667.54</p> |
| Outcome 8A (SP Outcome 6) | <p>Conditions improved for the safe return of IDPs in Newly Liberated Areas</p> <p>3.1.1. Capacity of local administrations in targeted areas for planning, administrative and financial management restored</p> | <p>Regular: \$800,000</p> <p>Other: \$99,200,000</p> | <p>Regular: \$400,824.88</p> <p>Other: \$370,662,905.38</p> |

¹⁵ This view is not shared by all UNDP Departments concerned with the implementation of the Iraq programme.

¹⁶ UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017

| | | | |
|-------|---|---|--|
| | 3.1.2. Basic community infrastructure rehabilitated for water, electricity, health, education and administrative offices. 3.1.3. Livelihoods opportunities created 3.1.4. Local and provincial reconciliation processes established and functioning 3.1.5. Technical support provided at the governorate level in the Kurdistan region to improve crisis response 3.1.6. Improved participatory decentralized basic service delivery in Kurdistan region host communities and internally displaced persons/refugee camp ¹⁷ 3.1.7. Immediate livelihoods stabilization through emergency employment for host communities and vulnerable groups in the Kurdistan region of Iraq 3.1.8. Strengthened community solidarity through dialogue and capacity-building of local and national actors and communities in the Kurdistan region | Total: \$100,000,000 | Total: \$371,063,730.26 |
| Total | | Subtotal regular: \$7,712,000 Subtotal other: \$227,950,000 Grand total: \$235,662,000 | Subtotal regular: \$2,400,762.67 Subtotal other: \$401,909,970.72 Grand total: \$404,310,733.39 |

Source: UNDP Iraq Country Programme Document 2016-2020 (DP/DCP/IRQ/2, dated 23 Nov 2015, for the First Regular Session 2016 25-29 January 2016)

4. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

In principle, ICPEs are conducted in the penultimate year of the ongoing UNDP country programme in order to feed into the process of developing the new country programme. As the CPD (see section 3) was not considered a totally suitable guiding document for the period 2016-2020, as of December 2018, the Iraq Country Office, in consultation with relevant counter-parts, decided to shorten the cycle by one year (2016-2019) and present a new programme for approval by the Executive Board at the September 2019 session. This will ensure alignment to the new UNDAF and the new Government's planning documents.

The last Assessment of Development Results (ADR) was completed in 2015 and provided an account of UNDP contributions until January 2014. The sudden changes in the country's political and security context significantly affected the programmes that were ongoing when the evaluation was carried out.

This ICPE is therefore being conducted in the same year of submission to the Executive Board (not one year prior, as per standard approach), it will cover the implementation period 2014-2018 and follow up only on the ADR 2015 recommendations which remained applicable.

The interventions under review are funded by all sources, including from UNDP's regular resources, donors, and the Government. The efforts supported by UNDP's regional and global programmes will also be included, if applicable.

¹⁷ This covers the assistance provided by UNDP to Syrian Refugees in Iraq, which is part of the work coordinated by UNDP within the framework of the Emergency Livelihood Cluster. This evaluation will pay particular attention to this aspect in order to provide evaluative evidence for the thematic evaluation of the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)

The ICPE Iraq will examine UNDP's ongoing programme, 2016-2020, as formally approved by the Executive Board, in the areas defined in the Results and Resources Framework. The scope of the evaluation, at the same time, will take into account the evolution of the programme since 2014 (beginning of the crisis and end of coverage of the last ADR), the changing context UNDP has faced during its programme implementation, including the country's increasing insecurity and political and economic volatility. It will also reflect various changes taken place since the launch of the current country programme.

As with other ICPEs, the evaluation will attempt to measure the ***level of progress and achievements made thus far by UNDP against its initial programmatic objectives***. Given the programmatic and operational changes UNDP has undergone in response to the unfolding of the crisis, ***specifically in terms of adjusted scale and significance of the stabilisation work***, the evaluation will however place greater focus on assessing the relevance of ***UNDP's strategies for achieving programme effectiveness and responding to the country's needs during the crisis***. This will include identification of potential gaps in the approach adopted, as well as implications for the next country programme cycle. The evaluation will not attempt to assess the contributions made by the Funding Facility for Stabilisation that is undergoing an specific evaluation to be completed in the first quarter of 2019.

Areas of particular attention in this strategic analysis will include:

- programming strategies, including:
 - the extent to which management decisions on the prioritisation of work areas in response to the crisis led to the implementation of a coherent and coordinated programme responding to the emerging needs of the country
 - the extent to which the MCT review timely and adequately defined a new guiding framework for the effective implementation of the Programme, in line with the needs of the country and the UNDP mandate;
 - plans for sustainability and resilience and transition to a post conflict situation
- the role of partnerships, including with the Government, regional government, private sector and civil society, donors and their role in the delivery of the program
- the extent of coordination and joint delivery with other UN agencies and the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, as well as emerging lessons on the feasibility and results of an alignment of the humanitarian and development work, in line with the "New Way of Working"¹⁸
- the extent to which gender equality and women's empowerment has been integrated in programming, and civil society engagement.

Special efforts will be made to capture the role and contribution of UNV through undertaking joint work with UNDP. This information will be used for synthesis in order to provide corporate level evaluative evidence of performance of the associated fund and programme.

5. METHODOLOGY

The evaluation methodology will adhere to the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms & Standards.¹⁹

ICPEs typically address three standard evaluation questions and methodological approaches.²⁰ The evaluation

¹⁸ The "New Way of Working", OCHA, 2017 refers to the delivery of collective outcomes that reduce risk and vulnerability and serve as instalments toward the achievement of the SDGs

¹⁹ <http://www.uneval.org/document/detail/1914>

²⁰ The standard ICPE evaluation questions are: i) "What did the UNDP country programme intend to achieve during the period under

for Iraq will address the following key questions, reflecting changes in the country's programme context (Section 3). A specific design matrix will be developed to address the following questions:

1. To what extent has UNDP effectively positioned itself in a rapidly changing political, social, economic and security environment to address Iraq's critical issues through the delivery of its programme, while leveraging its own comparative advantage?
2. To what extent has UNDP been able to achieve its initial and adjusted programme objectives in contribution to each outcome?
3. What factors contributed to or hindered UNDP's performance and eventually, the sustainability of results?

The first question will address UNDP's effectiveness in achieving its 'specific areas of contributions' (or "outputs" as defined in the CPD designed to contribute to each outcome), as well as any programme objectives adjusted over time, on a sample basis. Due to the scope and complexity of the Iraq Programme, the evaluation will focus on the areas which are most relevant to the development of the new CPD 2020 – 2024. As mentioned under section 5. Scope, the evaluation will not assess the contributions made by the FFS because: 1. An in-depth evaluation of its results is planned for 2019; 2. The FFS is scheduled to close in 2020 and it is therefore not expected to feature in the new CPD; 3. This evaluation does not have the resources to carry out a comprehensive assessment of the results achieved by the FFS.

The analysis is conducted at the outcome level and the evaluation is expected to use:

- A theory of change (ToC) to understand the underlying programme intent and logic, by outcome, including the assumptions being made for desired changes and expected causal linkages.
- The Gender Marker and the Gender Results Effectiveness Scale (GRES) to assess the degree of consideration made for gender equality and women's empowerment during programming, and the results achieved, respectively.²¹
- An extensive desk review of documents, including evaluation reports, available internally and externally to facilitate the results validation process, which will be complemented by any other means of data collection available (Section 6).

As explained in Section 4 (Scope), the second question focuses on the relevance of various strategic choices made by UNDP during the cycle to strengthen its programme effectiveness and respond to the needs of the country, both at central and regional level, during the period. The question will examine how UNDP has exploited its added value and it will assess how well the programmatic and operational adjustments have worked and implications for strategically positioning UNDP in the next programme cycle.

The results of this ICPE are also intended to provide evidence for the thematic evaluation of the Regional

review?"; ii) "To what extent has the programme achieved (or is likely to achieve) its intended objectives?"; and iii) "What factors contributed to or hindered UNDP's performance and eventually, the sustainability of results?"

²¹ The Gender Marker is a corporate gender rating assigned to all UNDP projects during design phase. The rating is awarded as follows: "3" = Outputs that have gender equality as the main objective; "2" = Outputs that have gender equality as a significant objective; "1" = Outputs that will contribute in some way to gender equality, but not significantly; and "0" = Outputs that are not expected to contribute noticeably to gender equality. The Gender Marker is also used to track planned project expenditures related to gender efforts. The Gender Results Effectiveness Scale (GRES) is used to classify gender results into five groups: i) result had a negative outcome that aggravated or reinforced existing gender inequalities and norms ("gender negative"); ii) result had no attention to gender, failed to acknowledge the different needs of men, women, girls and boys, or marginalized populations ("gender blind"); iii) result focused on the number of equity (50/50) of women, men or marginalized populations that were targeted ("gender targeted"); iv) results addressed differential needs of men or women and address equitable distribution of benefits, resources, status, and rights, but did not address root causes of inequalities in their lives ("gender responsive"); and v) result contributes to changes in norms, cultural values, power structure and the roots of gender inequalities and discrimination ("gender transformative"). UNDP, IEO "ICPE How-To Note on Gender" (March 2016).

Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), which brings together the plans developed under the leadership of national authorities – namely, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Republic of Iraq, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Lebanese Republic, and the Republic of Turkey – to ensure protection, humanitarian assistance and strengthen resilience, within the framework of the Syrian crisis. The ICPE will therefore assess the extent of UNDPs support to the Syrian refugee crisis and implementation of the 3RP in Iraq.

6. DATA COLLECTION

Assessment of data collection constraints and existing data. An evaluability assessment was carried out to understand potential data collection constraints and opportunities. Some of the issues identified for Iraq include the following:

- **Very limited availability of evaluation evidence**²². An assessment was carried for each outcome to ascertain the available information and identify data constraints, to determine the data collection needs and method. The assessment indicates that one evaluation is being completed at the time of writing and three more are expected to be completed in Q1 and Q2 of 2019, including an evaluation of the FFS.
- **Security constrains and stakeholder availability:** Although the situation in Iraq is gradually returning to normal, most project sites can only be reached in armoured vehicles and with police escorts, therefore requiring significant time and budget. The evaluation will therefore identify up to three sites relevant to the scope of the evaluation, in coordination with the Country Office.
- **Programme and project information:** With the country office's support, all available programme- and project-related documents will be collected in an internal document portal (SharePoint) prior to the evaluation. A summary of the status of progress using the outcome indicators will be prepared by using the country office's annual self-assessment of its programmes (Results-Oriented Annual Reports, or "ROARs"), which are available for 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 and the Corporate Planning System associated with them
- **National statistical capacity:** Iraq's internal statistical capacity remains below the average among countries in Middle East and North Africa, according to the World Bank's Statistical Capacity Indicator.

Data collection methods. The evaluation will use data from primary and secondary sources, including desk review of documentation, surveys and information and interviews with key stakeholders, including beneficiaries, partners and managers. The evaluation questions mentioned above and the data collection methods will be further detailed and outlined in the outcome analysis. A multi-stakeholder approach will be followed and interviews will include government representatives, civil-society organizations, private-sector representatives, UN agencies, multilateral organizations, bilateral donors, and beneficiaries of the programme. Focus groups will be used to consult some groups of beneficiaries, as appropriate.

The criteria for selecting projects for field visits include:

- Programme coverage (projects covering the four pillars identified by the MCT review, and cross-cutting areas, projects of relevance to the development of the new CPD, projects covering the response to the Syrian Refugee crisis (see section 5 for links to 3RP thematic evaluation));
- Financial expenditure (projects of all sizes, both large and smaller pilot projects);
- Geographic coverage (specifically taking into account the geopolitical context of Iraq and the structure of UNDP);
- Maturity (covering both completed and active projects);

²² As highlighted by the World Bank Iraq Systemic Country Diagnostic (2017), this seems to be a trend for all the assistance provided to Iraq "Despite the volume of resources involved, the reconstruction process has not yet been comprehensively assessed so it is not clear what lessons can be learned about this assistance".

- Degree of “success” (coverage of successful projects, projects where lessons can be learned, etc.).

The IEO and the CO will identify an initial list of background and programme-related documents and post it on an ICPE SharePoint website. The following secondary data and others will be reviewed: background documents on the national context, documents prepared by international partners and other UN agencies during the period under review; programmatic documents such as workplans and frameworks; progress reports; monitoring self-assessments such as the yearly UNDP Results Oriented Annual Reports (ROARs); and evaluations conducted by the country office and partners, including the quality assurance reports.

All information and data collected from multiple sources will be triangulated to ensure its validity. The evaluation matrix will be used to organize the available evidence by key evaluation question. This will also facilitate the analysis process, and will support the evaluation team in drawing well substantiated conclusions and recommendations.

In line with UNDP’s gender mainstreaming strategy, the ICPE will examine the level of gender mainstreaming across all of UNDP Iraq programmes and operations. Gender disaggregated data will be collected, where available, and assessed against its programme outcomes. This information will be used to provide corporate level evidence on the performance of the associated fund and programme.

Stakeholder involvement: a participatory and transparent process will be followed to engage with multiple stakeholders at all stages of the evaluation process. During the initial phase a stakeholder analysis will be conducted to identify all relevant UNDP partners, including those that may have not worked with UNDP but play a key role in the outcomes to which UNDP contributes. This stakeholder analysis will serve to identify key informants for interviews during the main data collection phase of the evaluation, and to examine any potential partnerships that could further improve UNDP’s contribution to the country.

7. MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

Independent Evaluation Office of UNDP: The UNDP IEO will conduct the ICPE in consultation with the UNDP Iraq country office, the Regional Bureau for Arab States and the Government of Iraq, as well as the Kurdistan regional government. The IEO lead evaluator will lead the evaluation and coordinate the evaluation team. The IEO will meet all costs directly related to the conduct of the ICPE.

UNDP Country Office in Iraq: The country office will support the evaluation team to liaise with key partners and other stakeholders, make available to the team all necessary information regarding UNDP’s programmes, projects and activities in the country, and provide factual verifications of the draft report on a timely basis. The country office will provide the evaluation team support in kind (e.g. arranging meetings with project staff, stakeholders and beneficiaries; and assistance for the project site visits). To ensure the anonymity of the views expressed in interviews with stakeholders for data collection purposes, CO staff will not participate. The country office will jointly organize the final stakeholder debriefing, ensuring participation of key government counterparts, through a video-conference with the IEO, where findings and results of the evaluation will be presented. Additionally, the country office will prepare a management response in consultation with the regional bureau and will support the use and dissemination of the final outputs of the ICPE process.

UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States: The UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States will support the evaluation through information sharing and participate in discussing emerging conclusions and recommendations.

Evaluation Team: The IEO will constitute an evaluation team to undertake the ICPE. The IEO will ensure gender balance in the team which will include the following members:

- **Lead Evaluator (LE):** IEO staff member with overall responsibility for developing the evaluation design and terms of reference; managing the conduct of the ICPE, preparing/ finalizing the final report; and organizing the stakeholder workshop, as appropriate, with the country office.
- **Consultants:** Four external consultants (preferably national/regional but international consultants will also be considered, as needed) will be recruited to collect data and help assess the programme pillars: stabilisation, governance and reconciliation, economic reconciliation and development, environment and energy. Under the guidance of LE, they will conduct preliminary research and data collection activities, prepare outcome analysis, and contribute to the preparation of the final ICPE report.
- **Research Assistant (RA):** A research assistant based in the IEO will support the background research.

The roles of the different members of the evaluation team can be summarised in Table 2.

| Table 2: Data collection responsibilities by outcome | | |
|---|---------------|--|
| Outcome | Report | Data collection |
| Outcome 6A and 8A/ governance and reconciliation pillar | Consultant | Governance specialist |
| Outcome 7A/ governance and reconciliation pillar and economic diversification and employment pillar | Consultants | Governance and livelihoods specialist |
| Outcome 8A/ stabilisation pillar and economic diversification and employment pillar | Consultants | Stabilisations and livelihood specialist |
| Outcome 6A and 8A/ Environment and Energy Pillar | LE | LE |
| Gender mainstreaming and women's empowerment | All | All |
| Coordination with UN Agencies and UNAMI | LE | Stabilisation specialist |
| Programming strategies and partnerships | LE | LE and stabilisation specialist |

8. EVALUATION PROCESS

The ICPE will be conducted according to the approved IEO process²³. The following represents a summary of the five key phases of the process, which constitute framework for conducting the evaluation.

Phase 1: Preparatory work. The IEO prepares the TOR, evaluation design and recruits external evaluation team members, comprising international and/or national development professionals. They are recruited once the TOR is approved. The IEO start collecting data and documentation internally first and then filling data gaps with help from the UNDP country office, and external resources through various methods.

Phase 2: Desk analysis. Further in-depth data collection is conducted, by administering an “advance questionnaire” and interviews (via phone, Skype etc.) with key stakeholders, including country office staff. Based on these the key evaluation questions will guide the evaluation matrix containing detailed questions and means of data collection and verification to guide data collection based on an overall evaluation matrix for the ICPEs. Evaluation team members conduct desk reviews of reference material, prepare a summary of context and other evaluative evidence, and identify the outcome theory of change, specific evaluation questions, gaps and issues that will require validation during the field-based phase of data collection.

Phase 3: Field data collection. The phase will commence in February/March 2019. During this phase, the evaluation team undertakes an in-country mission to engage in data collection activities. The estimated duration of the mission is up to 3 calendar weeks. Data will be collected according to the approach outlined in Section 6 with responsibilities outlined in Section 8. The evaluation team will liaise with CO staff and

²³ The evaluation will be conducted according to the [ICPE Process Manual](#) and the [ICPE Methodology Manual](#)

management, key government stakeholders and other partners and beneficiaries. At the end of the mission, the evaluation team holds a formal debrief presentation of the key preliminary findings at the country office.

Phase 4: Analysis, report writing, quality review and debrief. Based on the analysis of data collected and triangulated, the LE will undertake a synthesis process to write the ICPE report. The first draft (“zero draft”) of the ICPE report will be subject to peer review by IEO and the Evaluation Advisory Panel (EAP). Once the first draft is quality cleared, it will be circulated to the country office and the UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States for factual corrections. The second draft, which takes into account any factual corrections, will be shared with national stakeholders for further comments. Any necessary additional corrections will be made and the UNDP Iraq country office will prepare the management response to the ICPE, under the overall oversight of the regional bureau. The report will then be shared at a final debriefing where the results of the evaluation are presented to key national stakeholders. Ways forward will be discussed with a view to creating greater ownership by national stakeholders in taking forward the recommendations and strengthening national accountability of UNDP. Taking into account the discussion at the stakeholder event, the evaluation report will be finalized.

Phase 5: Publication and dissemination. The ICPE report and brief summary will be widely distributed in hard and electronic versions. The evaluation report will be made available to UNDP Executive Board by the time of approving a new Country Programme Document. It will be distributed by the IEO within UNDP as well as to the evaluation units of other international organisations, evaluation societies/networks and research institutions in the region. The Iraq country office and the Government of Iraq will disseminate the report to stakeholders in the country. The report and the management response will be published on the UNDP website²⁴ as well as in the Evaluation Resource Centre (ERC). The regional bureau will be responsible for monitoring and overseeing the implementation of follow-up actions in the ERC.²⁵

9. TIMEFRAME FOR THE ICPE PROCESS

The timeframe and responsibilities for the evaluation process are tentatively²⁶ as follows in Table 3:

| Table 3: Timeframe for the ICPE process going to the Board in September 2019 | | |
|--|---------------------|----------------------------|
| Activity | Responsible party | Proposed timeframe |
| Phase 1: Preparatory work | | |
| TOR – approval by the Independent Evaluation Office | LE | December 2018 |
| Selection of other evaluation team members | LE | January 2019 |
| Phase 2: Desk analysis | | |
| Preliminary analysis of available data and context analysis | Evaluation team | February 2019 |
| Phase 3: Data Collection | | |
| Data collection and preliminary findings | Evaluation team | 24 February -14 March 2019 |
| Follow up activities (additional data collection) | | March-April 2019 |
| Phase 4: Analysis, report writing, quality review and debrief | | |
| Analysis and Synthesis | LE/ Evaluation team | April 2019 |
| Zero draft ICPE for clearance by IEO and EAP | LE | May 2019 |
| First draft ICPE for CO/RB review | CO/RB | June 2019 |
| Second draft ICPE shared with GOV | CO/GOV | June 2019 |

²⁴ web.undp.org/evaluation


²⁵ erc.undp.org

²⁶ The timeframe, indicative of process and deadlines, does not imply full-time engagement of evaluation team during the period.


| | | |
|---|---------|----------------|
| Draft management response | CO/RB | July 2019 |
| Final debriefing with national stakeholders | CO/LE | August 2019 |
| Phase 5: Production and Follow-up | | |
| Editing and formatting | IEO | September 2019 |
| Final report and Evaluation Brief | IEO | Sept- Oct 2019 |
| Dissemination of the final report | IEO/CO | October 2019 |
| Submission of the new CPD for EB Board approval ²⁷ | CO/RBAS | September 2019 |

²⁷ Due to the compressed timeframe (see section 4), it may not be possible to have a published report prior to Board approval, in that case an online report will be provided.

Annex 2. COUNTRY AT A GLANCE




Source: Human Development Data, 1990-2017



Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2018

Net ODA received


constant 2015 USD in millions



Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2019


Official Development Assistance Disbursements (2001-2017)

Millions USD




Source: OECD QWIDS, April 2019

Annex 3. COUNTRY OFFICE AT A GLANCE




Source: Atlas Project data, Power Bi, Feb 2019

Execution Rate by Year




Source: Atlas Project data, Power Bi, Feb 2019

Outcome 6A: Reformed legal and law enforcement institutions that are more transparent and accountable




Source: Atlas Project data, Power Bi, Feb 2019

Outcome 7A: Administrative and financial reform and devolution policies adopted and implemented at federal and governorate levels



Source: Atlas Project data, Power Bi, Feb 2019


Outcome 8A: Conditions improved for the safe return of IDPs in Newly Liberated Areas



Source: Atlas Project data, Power Bi, Feb 2019

Top 10 Donors in Iraq, 2016-2018

Millions



Source: Atlas Project data, Power Bi, Feb 2019

Total Expenditure by Fund Source and Year



Source: Atlas Project data, Power Bi, Feb 2019


Expenditure by Gender Marker

Millions




Source: Atlas Project data, Power Bi, Feb 2019

Expenditure by Gender Marker and Year




Source: Atlas Project data, Power Bi, Feb 2019

Programme Expenditure by Source, 2016-2018




Source: Atlas Project data, Power Bi, Feb 2019



Source: Data from UNDP Iraq

Gender Distribution by Grade

Number



Source: Data from UNDP Iraq

Annex 4. PROJECTS FOR IN-DEPTH REVIEW

| Project ID | Project Title | Output | Output Title | Pillar | Start Year | End Year | IMPLE. MODALITY | GENDER MARKER | 2016 BUDGET | 2016 EXPENDITURE | 2017 BUDGET | 2017 EXPENDITURE | 2018 BUDGET | 2018 EXPENDITURE | Total BUDGET | Total EXPENDITURE |
|---|--|----------|-------------------------------------|------------------------|------------|----------|-----------------|---------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|-------------------|
| OUTCOME6A: Reformed legal and law enforcement institutions that are more transparent and accountable | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 00059991 | Strengthening Participatory and Accountable Governance | 00075294 | Support and Capacity Building | Governance | 2010 | 2018 | DIM | GEN3 | \$1,075,062.00 | \$1,065,453.97 | \$989,927.62 | \$980,074.94 | \$9,702.00 | -\$2,619.96 | \$2,074,691.62 | \$2,042,908.95 |
| 00065578 | Family Protection Support | 00081992 | Family Protection Support | Stabilization | 2012 | 2016 | DIM | GEN3 | \$64,793.08 | \$13,625.66 | \$53,395.00 | \$12,439.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$118,188.08 | \$26,064.66 |
| 00065636 | Institutional Dev of Anti Corruption Academy | 00082046 | Institute Dev of ACAcademy | Governance | 2012 | 2016 | DIM | GEN1 | \$1,043,444.76 | \$945,359.78 | \$67,375.00 | \$34,480.94 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$1,110,819.76 | \$979,840.72 |
| 00067618 | Support to Security Sector Reform in Iraq | 00083300 | Support to Security Sector Ref | Governance | 2012 | 2017 | DIM | GEN1 | \$1.00 | -\$2,580.85 | \$59,600.00 | \$59,600.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$59,601.00 | \$57,019.15 |
| 00068138 | Enhancing Transparent Participatory Governance and Human | 00083517 | Enhancing Transparent Participatory | Governance | 2012 | 2017 | DIM | GEN1 | \$818.58 | \$364.46 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$818.58 | \$364.46 |
| 00068138 | Enhancing Transparent Participatory Governance and Human | 00083652 | Participatory Gov& HR | Governance | 2012 | 2017 | DIM | GEN1 | \$0.00 | \$46.17 | \$51,646.00 | -\$4,916.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$51,646.00 | -\$4,869.83 |
| 00068138 | Enhancing Transparent Participatory Governance and Human | 00083653 | ACCOUNT/ TRANS & ANTI-CORRUPT. | Governance | 2012 | 2017 | DIM | GEN1 | \$54,871.50 | \$39,260.44 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$54,871.50 | \$39,260.44 |
| 00073548 | Promoting Rule of Law in the Kurdistan | 00086307 | Citizens Access to Justice | Stabilization | 2013 | 2016 | DIM | GEN1 | \$16,562.87 | \$16,504.75 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$16,562.87 | \$16,504.75 |
| 00073548 | Promoting Rule of Law in the Kurdistan | 00087888 | Protection from SGBV | Stabilization | 2013 | 2017 | DIM | GEN1 | \$242,307.64 | \$140,877.32 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$242,307.64 | \$140,877.32 |
| 00073898 | Developing Disaster Risk Management Capacities in Iraq | 00086493 | Developing DRR Capacities | Environment and Energy | 2013 | 2018 | DIM | GEN1 | \$1,567,738.00 | \$1,567,835.79 | \$2,646,033.00 | \$1,794,163.35 | \$2,826,196.00 | \$2,328,785.47 | \$7,039,967.00 | \$5,690,784.61 |
| 00076861 | STRENGTHENING IRAQ'S CAPACITY | 00088020 | Capacity Building for NWC | Environment and Energy | 2013 | 2017 | DIM | GEN1 | \$0.00 | \$1,839.34 | \$184,278.00 | \$12,287.58 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$184,278.00 | \$14,126.92 |
| 00079907 | Catalysing the Use of Solar Photovoltaic Energy | 00089774 | Reduction of CO2 | Environment and Energy | 2014 | 2018 | DIM | GEN1 | \$732,850.00 | \$701,077.48 | \$744,191.98 | \$537,472.72 | \$398,275.00 | \$271,808.71 | \$1,875,316.98 | \$1,510,358.91 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|----------|--------------------------------|------------------------|------|------|-----|------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| 00081989 | Iraq's Nationally Determined Contributions UNFCCC 2015 | 00091095 | capacity building for UNFCCC | Governance | 2014 | 2015 | DIM | GEN1 | \$37,504.00 | \$34,721.84 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$37,504.00 | \$34,721.84 |
| 00082884 | KRG Scheme: National Youth UN Volunteers | 00091585 | KRG Youth UNV Scheme | Governance | 2014 | 2016 | DIM | GEN1 | \$216,190.00 | \$214,012.56 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$216,190.00 | \$214,012.56 |
| 00086812 | Local Area Development EU | 00094013 | Local Area Development EU | Inclusive Growth | 2015 | 2019 | DIM | GEN2 | \$6,775,471.44 | \$4,573,041.03 | \$4,570,880.20 | \$4,110,681.78 | \$1,010,206.95 | \$740,464.84 | \$12,356,558.59 | \$9,424,187.65 |
| 00088597 | Support to Security Sector Reform: Phase II | 00095175 | SSR Phase II | Governance | 2015 | 2018 | DIM | GEN1 | \$1,206,233.88 | \$1,237,121.44 | \$2,129,997.29 | \$1,987,720.99 | \$4,206,534.56 | \$2,967,927.55 | \$7,542,765.73 | \$6,192,769.98 |
| 00106699 | Inclusive Governance | 00107299 | Inclusive Governance | Governance | 2017 | 2021 | DIM | GEN0 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$100,000.00 | \$42,666.98 | \$337,159.66 | \$145,290.81 | \$437,159.66 | \$187,957.79 |
| 00109000 | Green Climate Fund (GCF) Readiness Programme in Iraq | 00108494 | Readiness and Preparatory Supp | Environment and Energy | 2018 | 2020 | DIM | GEN0 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$294,990.00 | \$203,154.00 | \$294,990.00 | \$203,154.00 |
| 00110406 | Support to Iraq's Electoral Process (SIEP) | 00109354 | Support to Electoral Process | Governance | 2018 | 2020 | DIM | GEN1 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$292,312.00 | \$277,756.09 | \$292,312.00 | \$277,756.09 |
| 00115890 | Support to Security & Justice Sector Governance in Iraq | 00113282 | Support to Security & Justice | Governance | 2019 | 2021 | DIM | GEN2 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 |
| Sub Total Outcome 6A | | | | | | | | | \$13,033,848.75 | \$10,548,561.18 | \$11,597,324.09 | \$9,566,672.28 | \$9,375,376.17 | \$6,932,567.51 | \$34,006,549.01 | \$27,047,800.97 |
| Outcome 7A: Administrative and financial reform and devolution policies adopted and implemented at federal and governorate levels | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 00034586 | Provision of technical expertise, capacity building | 00036842 | Provision of technical expert | Governance | 2004 | 2016 | DIM | GEN0 | \$613,968.68 | \$277,416.16 | \$28,174.19 | \$24,997.56 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$642,142.87 | \$302,413.72 |
| 00047321 | Support to National TB and HIV/AIDS control Programs | 00056801 | Support to TB and HIV Programs | Governance | 2007 | 2017 | DIM | GEN1 | \$4,303,512.28 | \$2,543,505.99 | \$356,251.00 | \$130,193.50 | \$0.00 | -\$125.65 | \$4,659,763.28 | \$2,673,573.84 |
| 00050223 | Kurdistan budget execution support | 00061923 | Budget Execution Support | Inclusive Growth | 2008 | 2017 | DIM | GEN0 | \$129,999.83 | \$113,309.65 | \$46,919.00 | \$45,708.73 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$176,918.83 | \$159,018.38 |
| 00051392 | Support to Decentralisation and Local Governance | 00063968 | Support to Decentralisation | Governance | 2008 | 2015 | DIM | GEN1 | \$286,027.23 | \$69,047.58 | \$186,699.79 | \$128,397.86 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$472,727.02 | \$197,445.44 |
| 00051414 | Improving the Housing Delivery System in Erbil | 00064010 | Improving the Housing Delivery | Governance | 2008 | 2015 | DIM | GEN1 | \$332,463.00 | -\$2,260.34 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$332,463.00 | -\$2,260.34 |
| 00051468 | Economic Reform & Diversification | 00064108 | Private Sector Development | Inclusive Growth | 2008 | 2015 | DIM | GEN1 | \$194,375.23 | \$1,168.44 | \$1,240.87 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$195,616.10 | \$1,168.44 |
| 00056620 | Electricity Sector Reconstruction Project in Kurdistan | 00069415 | Electricity Sector Reconstruct | | 2009 | 2019 | DIM | GEN1 | \$2,435,613.47 | \$1,654,321.04 | \$2,837,818.46 | \$1,808,268.50 | \$2,253,777.78 | \$1,964,910.41 | \$7,527,209.71 | \$5,427,499.95 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|----------|--------------------------------|------------------|------|------|-----|------|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| 00059992 | Iraq National Human Development Report | 00075295 | Iraq NHDR 2014 | Governance | 2010 | 2016 | DIM | GEN2 | \$50,594.29 | \$50,493.73 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$50,594.29 | \$50,493.73 |
| 00066351 | Vocational Training MSME Capacity Development in Basra | 00082551 | Private Sector Development | Inclusive Growth | 2012 | 2018 | DIM | GEN2 | \$147,000.00 | \$110,070.96 | \$682,016.09 | \$653,693.37 | \$28,322.72 | \$13,604.75 | \$857,338.81 | \$777,369.08 |
| 00066352 | Development Partnership Programme | 00082552 | Area Based Development Program | Inclusive Growth | 2012 | 2018 | DIM | GEN2 | \$614,329.03 | \$547,040.63 | \$620,564.61 | \$287,197.23 | \$315,294.45 | \$7,373.55 | \$1,550,188.09 | \$841,611.41 |
| 00075375 | Extractive Industries for Sustainable Development | 00087314 | Extractive Industries for Sust | | 2013 | 2017 | DIM | GEN0 | \$207,709.86 | \$50,340.00 | \$0.00 | \$498.00 | \$170,123.03 | \$967.17 | \$377,832.89 | \$51,805.17 |
| 00078876 | Asset Recovery & International Cooperation | 00088983 | Asset Recovery & Int | Governance | 2014 | 2016 | DIM | GEN1 | \$1,438,961.57 | \$25,756.54 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$1,438,961.57 | \$25,756.54 |
| 00082313 | Support to AS Region in time of crisis & transition | 00091297 | SUPPORT TO CRISIS COUNTRIES | | 2014 | 2018 | DIM | GEN1 | \$8,000.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$8,000.00 | \$0.00 |
| 00082912 | P1-IS-01 Safer Cities in Suli | 00091602 | P1-IS-01 Safer Cities in Suli | Stabilization | 2014 | 2015 | DIM | GEN1 | \$107,508.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$107,508.00 | \$0.00 |
| 00098460 | 175Funding Facility for Economic Reform in KRG (FFER) | 00101758 | FFER in KRG | Inclusive growth | 2016 | 2020 | DIM | GEN0 | \$178,256.00 | \$35,636.50 | \$438,158.80 | \$244,896.64 | \$1,591,129.28 | \$389,874.47 | \$2,207,544.08 | \$670,407.61 |
| 00103221 | E- Governance for Better Service Delivery (BESEDEL) KRG | 00105281 | E- Gov. (BESEDEL) KRG | Governance | 2017 | 2017 | DIM | GEN0 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$245,000.00 | \$174,713.88 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$245,000.00 | \$174,713.88 |
| 00112936 | Support Gov. of Iraq for Imp.&Monitoring of SDG | 00111226 | SDG Imp. & Monitoring - Iraq | Governance | 2018 | 2020 | NIM | GEN1 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$100,000.00 | \$30,088.35 | \$100,000.00 | \$30,088.35 |
| 00099767 | Funding Facility for Economic Reform- Federal | 00103034 | FFER - Federal | Inclusive growth | 2016 | 2018 | NIM | GEN2 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$1,044,729.33 | \$787,168.53 | \$1,293,207.70 | \$576,316.86 | \$2,337,937.03 | \$1,363,485.39 |
| 00058164 | Partnership Services forFiduciary Monitoring Agent/ Iraq | 00072135 | Partnership Services for FMA | Governance | 2009 | 2018 | DIM | GEN1 | \$1,770,601.69 | \$1,501,392.25 | \$1,667,095.88 | \$1,323,579.85 | \$1,597,010.11 | \$1,396,302.65 | \$5,034,707.68 | \$4,221,274.75 |
| 00059925 | Iraq Public Sector Modernisation Phase II | 00084254 | Iraqi Pubic Sector Moderniz II | Governance | 2012 | 2018 | DIM | GEN1 | \$1,270,344.00 | \$1,268,989.11 | \$1,200,000.00 | \$1,197,311.97 | \$2,360,000.00 | \$1,266,491.60 | \$4,830,344.00 | \$3,732,792.68 |
| Sub Total Outcome 7A | | | | | | | | | \$14,089,264.16 | \$8,246,228.24 | \$9,354,668.02 | \$6,806,625.62 | \$9,708,865.07 | \$5,645,804.16 | \$33,152,797.25 | \$20,698,658.02 |
| Outcome 8A: Conditions improved for the safe return of IDPs in Newly Liberated Areas | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 00033363 | Joint UNDP-DPA Programme on Conflict Prevention | 00101205 | Joint UNDP/DPA Prog Phase2 | | 2016 | 2021 | DIM | GEN2 | \$50,000.00 | \$0.00 | \$54,000.00 | \$4,000.00 | \$0.00 | -\$4,000.00 | \$104,000.00 | \$0.00 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------|---|----------|--------------------------------|---------------|------|------|-----|------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| 00080048 | Resilience Support for Syrian Refugees | 00089889 | Support for Syrian Refugee | Stabilization | 2014 | 2015 | DIM | GEN2 | \$79,780.13 | \$78,042.47 | \$202.27 | \$42.14 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$79,982.40 | \$78,084.61 |
| 00082814 | P1-IS-03 Rehab for Mine Victims | 00091556 | P1-IS-03 Rehab of Mine Victims | Stabilization | 2014 | 2015 | DIM | GEN2 | \$43,330.00 | \$43,329.42 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$43,330.00 | \$43,329.42 |
| 00082887 | Improvement of Basic Infrastructure for IDPs | 00091588 | Basic Infra for IDPs & Host Co | Stabilization | 2014 | 2016 | DIM | GEN1 | \$20,831.00 | \$20,773.92 | \$1,348.12 | \$1,348.12 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$22,179.12 | \$22,122.04 |
| 00085156 | Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience | 00092888 | Crisis Response & Resilience | Stabilization | 2014 | 2018 | DIM | GEN1 | \$1,178,860.24 | \$1,059,292.69 | \$2,295,646.00 | \$2,003,937.46 | \$2,998,569.00 | \$1,458,922.49 | \$6,473,075.24 | \$4,522,152.64 |
| 00085156 | Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience | 00095215 | Support for Syrian Refugees | Stabilization | 2015 | 2017 | DIM | GEN1 | \$510,500.00 | \$484,459.78 | \$8,002.26 | \$8,002.26 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$518,502.26 | \$492,462.04 |
| 00085156 | Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience | 00095225 | Recovery Support | Stabilization | 2015 | 2017 | DIM | GEN1 | \$7,807,575.69 | \$7,787,019.77 | \$1.00 | -\$22.66 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$7,807,576.69 | \$7,786,997.11 |
| 00085156 | Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience | 00097176 | Strengthen Crisis Management | Stabilization | 2015 | 2019 | DIM | GEN1 | \$1,372,985.00 | \$1,372,984.25 | \$1,458,643.00 | \$1,127,116.09 | \$1,641,420.00 | \$1,171,750.06 | \$4,473,048.00 | \$3,671,850.40 |
| 00085156 | Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience | 00100018 | Resilience Building in Iraq | Stabilization | 2016 | 2017 | DIM | GEN1 | \$5,241,608.00 | \$4,839,805.25 | \$1,688,601.00 | \$1,658,900.34 | \$93,325.57 | \$93,320.29 | \$7,023,534.57 | \$6,592,025.88 |
| 00085156 | Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience | 00100019 | Crisis Response & Resilience | Stabilization | 2016 | 2018 | DIM | GEN1 | \$11,687,804.00 | \$11,274,903.27 | \$10,628,420.00 | \$10,120,744.66 | \$1,575,324.00 | \$442,443.01 | \$23,891,548.00 | \$21,838,090.94 |
| 00085156 | Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience | 00105112 | Integrated Recovery Support | Stabilization | 2016 | 2019 | DIM | GEN2 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$14,124,911.16 | \$13,270,953.98 | \$32,138,319.00 | \$13,302,038.32 | \$46,263,230.16 | \$26,572,992.30 |
| 00085156 | Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience | 00105146 | Resilience Building in Iraq_II | Stabilization | 2016 | 2020 | DIM | GEN2 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$8,848,730.00 | \$5,294,063.63 | \$10,301,007.80 | \$8,453,215.81 | \$19,149,737.80 | \$13,747,279.44 |
| 00088685 | Protection, Empowerment and Recovery Support | 00095231 | Enhanced Protection of IDPs | Stabilization | 2015 | 2017 | DIM | GEN3 | \$973,339.06 | \$972,877.76 | \$0.00 | -\$30.88 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$973,339.06 | \$972,846.88 |
| 00088685 | Protection, Empowerment and Recovery Support | 00095232 | Enhanced Protection of refugee | Stabilization | 2015 | 2017 | DIM | GEN3 | \$406,496.55 | \$367,726.45 | \$0.00 | -\$41.70 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$406,496.55 | \$367,684.75 |
| 00088685 | Protection, Empowerment and Recovery Support | 00099756 | Increase Access To Justice | Stabilization | 2016 | 2018 | DIM | GEN3 | \$768,394.00 | \$641,863.99 | \$680,931.79 | \$611,268.67 | \$350,000.00 | \$117,373.22 | \$1,799,325.79 | \$1,370,505.88 |
| 00089459 | Funding Facility for Stabilization | 00095684 | Fund Facilityfor Stabilization | Stabilization | 2015 | 2020 | DIM | GEN2 | \$82,905,781.92 | \$65,845,745.66 | \$178,135,965.31 | \$160,957,481.72 | \$486,581,034.15 | \$215,548,864.73 | \$747,622,781.38 | \$442,352,092.11 |
| 00089459 | Funding Facility for Stabilization | 00102499 | Expanded Stabilization | Stabilization | 2016 | 2020 | DIM | GEN2 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 |
| 00092583 | Support for Social Cohesion in Iraq – Stage I | 00097205 | Support for Social Cohesion I | Governance | 2015 | 2017 | DIM | GEN0 | \$99,603.22 | \$68,834.13 | \$331,010.87 | \$289,440.10 | \$1.00 | \$6,552.26 | \$430,615.09 | \$364,826.49 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|----------|---------------------------------|------------------|------|------|-----|------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| 00097256 | Support to National Reconciliation | 00101062 | Support for NR in Iraq | Governance | 2016 | 2016 | DIM | GEN0 | \$220,000.00 | \$99,447.17 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$220,000.00 | \$99,447.17 |
| 00100485 | Support to Integrated Reconciliation in Iraq | 00103425 | Post-Conflict Recon. Iraq | Governance | 2017 | 2021 | DIM | GEN2 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$2,844,579.89 | \$2,257,887.20 | \$4,667,317.35 | \$3,326,368.94 | \$7,511,897.24 | \$5,584,256.14 |
| 00115956 | Addressing CRSV | 00113323 | CRSV Project | Stabilization | 2019 | 2019 | DIM | GEN2 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 |
| 00116195 | Supporting Stability and Recovery through Local Gov | 00113449 | Supporting recovery & stability | inclusive growth | 2019 | 2022 | DIM | GEN2 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 |
| Sub Total Outcome 8A | | | | | | | | | \$113,366,888.81 | \$94,957,105.98 | \$221,100,992.67 | \$197,605,091.13 | \$540,346,317.87 | \$243,916,849.13 | \$874,814,199.35 | \$536,479,046.24 |
| Regional Programmes (EUR_OUTCOME_01) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 00079881 | New World: Inclusive Development Initiatives | 00089751 | New World: Inclusive Solution | | 2014 | 2016 | DIM | GEN1 | \$18,360.00 | \$17,786.25 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$18,360.00 | \$17,786.25 |
| 00106017 | Sixth National Reports on Biodiversity in Several Regions | 00106963 | 6th National Reports in Mix Re | | 2017 | 2019 | DIM | GEN2 | \$0.00 | \$0.00 | \$5,500.00 | \$0.00 | \$88,000.00 | \$71,154.32 | \$93,500.00 | \$71,154.32 |
| Grand Total | | | | | | | | | \$140,508,361.72 | \$113,769,681.65 | \$242,058,484.78 | \$213,978,389.03 | \$559,518,559.11 | \$256,566,375.12 | \$942,085,405.61 | \$584,314,445.80 |

Source: Atlas Project data, Power Bi, Feb 2019

Annex 5. PEOPLE CONSULTED

Government of Iraq

Abid Ali Raheem, Advisor, Department of Judicial Supervision, High Judicial Council, Member, Security Sector Reform Committee, Baghdad

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Al Falahi Jassim Abdulaziz Humadi, Deputy Minister for Environment, Ministry of Health and Environment, Baghdad

Al Jabaar, Director Research and Development, Ministry of Higher Education

Al Jazaeri Falal, Governor of Baghdad

Al Jumaili Ibtisam, Chief. Engineering Dept., Mayor's Office

Al Kaabi Hassan Karim, First Deputy Speaker of the Council of Representatives, Baghdad

Al Saady Mohammed Salman, Prime Minister Adviser, National Reconciliation Committee, Baghdad

Al tamimi Mohammed T., Director General of NGO Directorate, Head of Operation Room, General Secretariat for the Council of Ministers, Baghdad

Al-Alaq Mahdi, Secretary General of the Council of Ministers, Baghdad

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Joey Hood, US Deputy Chief of Mission, Iraq

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Boneschasker, Robert, Junior Program Quality Manager, ZOA
Brwa Ab. Mahmud, Acting Programme Manager, REACH
Buttal, Project Manager, ZSVP
Cerny, Filip, Livelihoods, Relief International
Cimen Yuksel, Site Engineer, Sub-contractor, representative of implementing company
Fujimoto Shinsuke, Chief Executive Officer- Toyota Iraq
Hogr Ch. Shekha, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Public Aid Organization, Erbil
Khonar, Project Officer, ZSVP
Kusay Al Hamdan, Project Manager, Al Quba Water Project, West Mosul

Mohsin A. Mahmood, Project Assistant Manager, Iraqi Red Crescent Society

Tauqeer Ahmad, Cash Operation Coordinator, Oxfam

Zuhair Mohammed Ali Jeddoa, Vice President for Scientific Affairs, University of Kerbala, Kerbala

Site Visit – Beneficiaries

Fallujah: school teachers and volunteers

Erbil: Members of Ankawa community centre

Erbil: Darashakran refugee camp, farmers and ACF camp manager

Erbil: Housing estate residents

Karbala:

Duhok: ICRRP job training workshop participants

Mosul: returnees (housing project), contractors (cash for work), workers (factory)

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Annex 7. Summary of CPD outcome indicators and status as reported by the country office

| Outcome Indicators | Baseline | Target | Status (Progress/Regression) | | |
|---|---|-----------|--|--|--|
| | | | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
| OUTCOME6A - Reformed legal and law enforcement institutions that are more transparent and accountable. | | | | | |
| 1.1. National security strategy successfully implemented | <p>2016 Baseline: No</p> <p>Source: Security Sector reform phase II project reports</p> | 2020: Yes | <p>Significant progress</p> <p>Data: First Draft of the National Security Strategy has been completed and presented to the National Security Council and the National Security Sector Committee for their first round of input and this is expected in January 2017.</p> | <p>Target reached and surpassed</p> <p>Data: The Security Sector Reform Strategy (now referred to a 'programme' is endorsed and operational as a GoI approved document and the implementation of the same in progress.</p> | <p>Target reached and surpassed</p> <p>Data: yes</p> <p>source: Quarterly progress report/narrative reports</p> <p>Copy of the GoI endorsed Security Sector Reform Strategy Paper</p> <p>Copy of the ONSA approved working methods one pager</p> <p>Draft copy of the SSR programme's internal mid-term evaluation report hopefully ready by COB 31st Dec 2018</p> <p>Comment: The government's national security strategy and the corresponding GoI Security Sector Reform Programme (previously referred to as the Security Sector Reform Strategy) is in place and, is being implemented in order to reform the security and justice sector institutions so they are more responsive to the needs of the public they service and, are transparent and accountable. Overall GoI NSS and SSRP implementation is in progress initiating identified reforms within all key security and justice institutions and agencies</p> |

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| 1.2. Legislative consultation mechanism for civil society established and functioning | 2016 Baseline: 1 Source: 'Strengthening Participatory and Accountable Governance' (SPAG) project reports | 2020: 3 | Target reached or surpassed Data: Representatives from the Civil Society Committee; the Legal Committee; the Migrants and Displaced Persons Committee; the Women and Family Committee; the Media and Culture Committee; and the Human Rights Committee of the CoR all agreed to establish mechanisms for CSO consultation. These mechanisms have taken different forms in each committee. For example, the Civil Society Committee (which was designated by the other five committees as "a focal point for Parliament's agreed to host number of CSOs and meet them once every two months to discuss draft legislation, six meetings done in 2016. | Target reached or surpassed Data: • 193 parliamentarians and officials sensitized, including: 114 on strategic action planning, 47 on legislation and oversight mechanisms, 20 on financial processes for the CoR's Budget Office, and 12 on advanced principles and skills of legislative review; • Dozens of staff have improved skills in library services for parliamentarians, legislation impact, measurements of costs of enacting laws, legislation drafting, infographic for research marketing, and preparation of the CoR's annual reports; • Parliamentary measurement performance handbook produced, adopted by the General Secretariat of CoR, and circulated to all directorates and committees; • Civil Society, Human Rights, Legal Affairs, Women, and Reconciliation Committees have developed and adopted national strategic action plans and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), also endorsed by the Speaker; and • National Reconciliation Plan developed and presented to the Speaker. • 264 CSO representatives acquired new skills including 92 on civil society engagement in the legislation process, in addition to 89 were trained on proposal writing and fundraising and 83 on good governance and leadership; • 46 staff of NGOs Directorate have improved skills in civic engagement and the promotion of human rights, and participatory governance and customer service; • Pool of master trainers of representatives of local CSOs established in order to support the NGOs Directorate in training local NGOs on a voluntary basis; • The curriculum for three training courses produced and is being implemented, focusing on the role of local CSOs in influencing public policies, project proposals and fundraising, as well as governance and leadership; and • Electronic System for NGO Registration introduced to replace the NGOs Directorate's old bureaucratic system, and data transferred from hard copies, with technical advisory support from UNDP. • The capacity of six Provincial Councils of Baghdad, Basra, Kirkuk, Erbil, Duhok, and Al Sulaymaniya to engage minorities assessed; • Engagement mechanism for minority consultation established in six Provincial Councils; • 199 elected members from six Provincial Councils, and representatives of local NGOs have improved skills on strengthening their legislative role, the legal environment for minorities in Iraq, the role of minority women in reconciliation, and communications, negotiations and advocacy skills; • Human Rights Committee finalized draft anti-discrimination and diversity protection bill with technical advisory support from UNDP; • Grants disbursed to 10 NGOs for minority advocacy projects; and • Government-civil society dialogues on minority issues encouraged through six activities engaging 85 participants. | Some Progress Data: 2 Source: Strengthening Participatory and Accountable Governance (SPAG) project reports. |
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| 1.3. National anti-corruption strategy successfully implemented | 2016 Baseline: No | 2020: Yes | No change Data: None of the on-going projects being implemented under Anti-Corruption Portfolio is supporting this target | Some progress Data: The implementation of the current Anti-Corruption strategy is underway. UNDP has been supporting its component related to the engagement with CSOs/NGOs. However, a new strategy has been developed 2018-2022 which is now being reviewed by the council of minister for endorsement. | Target reached or surpassed Data: yes Source: Federal Commission of Integrity Comment: Pillar 1: In-depth analysis on corruption manifestations in Education sector; Pillar 4: Establishment of Anti-Corruption Supreme committee. Pillar 5: Conduct awareness campaign on Anti-corruption in public sector. Pillar 7: Establish National Committee for Assets recovery. Pillar 8: Engage with SCOs/NGOs on the awareness campaign. Pillar 10: Draft the Access to information Law which has been submitted to the COR. Pillar 15: Increase the number of financial information disclosure of the public officials who assume senior positions. pillar 17: Draft the conflict of interest law |
| 1.4. Percentage of people surveyed who perceive legal and law enforcement institutions as more transparent | 2016 Baseline: Perception survey to be undertaken in 1st year of second country programme Source: Perception survey | 2020: Increase in people surveyed who perceive legal and law enforcement institutions as more transparent (30%) | Some progress Data: 1200 citizens across 6 governorates have been interviewed and the survey data is currently being analysed therefore the outcome of the survey is yet to be finalized. It is expected that the key findings will be finalised by End December 2016 or Early January 2017. | Significant progress Data: The level of public trust in security service providers varies significantly between governorates and service providers. All responded highlighted that they trust at least one security provider except in Baghdad. The local police were the most trusted across all governorates with 54.9% survey respondents in agreement. However, a considerable proportion of survey respondents also mentioned that they trust Iraqi security forces and this includes 35% in Salah al-Din and 28% in Erbil. (Source: Public Safety and Security Perception Survey Report in Iraq - expected publication date of the report December 2017) | Data: 89% source: Perception Survey Frequency: Twice during country programme period 2016 Public Safety and Security Perception Survey - IRAQ (published in 2017) 2018 tracker survey to the above Public Safety and Security Perception. Comment: the survey work has just started, and we hope to have the field work completed by 31 Dec 2018 - hence while a final report with the triangulated data will not be available before Jan, we could get available raw data pending finalization of the data tabulations. For six governorates surveyed, survey results indicate that (89%) 1071 respondents have expressed trust in legal and law enforcement institutions. |

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| 1.5. Ranking of Iraq on the Transparency International Corruption Index. | 2016 Baseline: 171 out of 177 countries (2013) Source: Corruption Index | 2020: 172 | No change Data: 0 Comment: 161/167 (Corruption Perception Index - 2015) | Some progress Data: 166 Comment: 166/176 (Corruption perception index-2016). UNDP in collaboration with PM's office has developed time-bounded road map to tackle corruption in two sectors Health and Customs. This road map if implemented will lead to significant improvement in Iraq's ranking on the CPI. | Data: 169 Source: Corruption index |
| 1.6. Increased access to legal aid services at national and regional levels. | 2016 Baseline: 10 centers providing legal aid services at national and regional levels Source: Project and Ministry of Information reports | 2020: 15 centers providing legal aid services at national and regional levels | Some progress Data: Total number of Centres decreased from 10 to 6 based on emerging priorities, actual needs and the concentration locations of the beneficiary populations during 2016. However, the overall beneficiary population increased by number in total 5,300 displaced people. Out of which 80% of the beneficiaries were women. | Significant progress Data: During reporting period 6 legal aid centers inside the main IDPs and refugee camps in the three Governorates of the KRI continued to operate: one in Sulaymaniyah inside the Ashti IDPs camp, two in Erbil inside the Baharka (IDPs) and Kawrgosk (refugee) camps, and two in Duhok inside Shariya (IDP) and Domiz (refugee) camps. While the centers in Duhok and Erbil are run by NGO partners with support from DCVAW and IBHR, the center in Sulaymaniya is run by DCVAW to as pilot to test the gradual handing over of UNDP led centers to DCVAW in order to ensure long-term sustainability of the legal aid service provision. Additionally One legal aid center for IDPs in the Al Salam Camp in Baghdad, during the reporting period in Baghdad, UNDP supported Dar Al Khibra Organization (DKO) to operate legal aid center for internal displaced populations IDPs. The legal aid center is situated inside the Al Salam (Kasnizan) Camp. During the reporting period up to 7 November as per the latest available data in KR-I, total of 10, 850 IDPs and refugees (8,727 women and 2,132 men) received legal and social services such as legal support, legal representation, social counseling and referral to other service providers. Additionally, 211 awareness raising events on legal aid services for SGBV survivors were also held and total outreach from these include 4,314 target beneficiaries. During the same period in Baghdad 489 IDPs (435 women and 54 men) received legal and social services from the legal center and the most beneficiaries were women. Services provided include legal consultations, legal representation, and social counseling. Additionally, 303 awareness raising sessions on legal aid for SGBV survivors were held the total outreach from these events include 303 target beneficiaries. | Comment: During the reporting period the centers delivered legal aid services to a total of approximately 943 beneficiaries (800 women and 143 men). The majority of the cases dealt with by the centers primarily involved protection of women and girls from SGBV. There was also a small number of dispute settlement cases as well. |

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| OUTCOME7A - Administrative and financial reform and devolution policies adopted and implemented at federal and governorate levels. | | | | | |
| 2.1. Increase in % of federal investment budget allocation to governorates authorities. | <p>2016 Baseline: 18%</p> <p>Source: Federal Ministry of Planning.</p> | 2020: 40% | <p>Some progress</p> <p>Data: 0</p> <p>Comment: UNDP started to develop Provincial Development Strategies in four Iraqi Governorates, Basra, Missan, Muthana, and Qadisiya. improve of basic community services by Supporting KRI Ministry of Municipalities and Tourism. Develop Response Plans for Five Iraqi Governorates, Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Nineweh, and Salahddin, it is challenging to measure the impact of these activities due to crises situation in these areas.</p> | <p>Some progress</p> <p>Data: 0</p> <p>Comment: Developing Five response plans for the five central newly liberated governorates (Anbar,Salahaldin,Diyala ,Kirkuk & Nienawa) & four PDSs for the four southern governorates. Due to the political,security and military situation in the country and the budget challenges for the Iraqi government after the invasion of four governorates by ISIS,it is difficult to measure the impact of improved strategic planning on the budget excution ,as the budgeting/budget excution proccesses are based on crisis management.As the Gol liberated all the governorates late 2017, we can expect to see an impact for 2018 budgets .</p> | <p>16%</p> <p>source: Iraqi Federal budget Law 2018</p> |

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| 2.2. Increase in average % of budget execution at governorate level | <p>2016 Baseline: 2011 average: 54%</p> <p>Source: Government budget</p> | <p>2020: 65%</p> | <p>Some progress</p> <p>Data: 0</p> <p>Comment: UNDP formulated comprehensive Provincial Development Strategies for the three governorates of Kurdistan Region (Erbil, Sulaimaniya and Dohuk). Due to political, security and budget challenges for KR and Iraqi government, it is difficult to measure the impact of improved strategic planning on the budget execution, as the budgeting/budget execution processes are based on crises management.</p> | <p>Some progress</p> <p>Data: 0</p> <p>Comment: Since the formulation of Provincial Development Strategies for KRI governorates, the political and security conditions did not change due to the war with ISIS. The budgets remained to be managed by crises and therefore measuring the impact on public budgets is not feasible. As ISIS was defeated late 2017, we can aim to see an impact for 2018 budgets or beyond.</p> | |
| 2.3. Merit based appointment system in place. | <p>2016 Baseline: No</p> <p>Source: Iraq Public Sector Modernization Programme (IPSM) project reports.</p> | <p>2020: Yes</p> | <p>Some progress</p> <p>Data: With the technical support provided by an international consultancy firm a system on "Merit-Based Appointment" entitled "Senior Executive Service" was developed, system design presented to Government of Iraq, GoI comments received and incorporated into final system design, and piloting phase will commence during the year 2017 once UNDP related procurement processes finalized</p> | <p>Significant progress</p> <p>Data: Government of Iraq formulated a National Committee to develop and implement a merit-based mechanism to appoint senior executives at the government. The Committee has built further on the model developed with the technical assistance provided by UNDP, while guided by the tools, procedures and criteria found in the model.</p> | |

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| 2.4. Federal performance management system implemented | 2016 Baseline: No Source: IPSM project reports | 2020: Yes | Some progress Data: A number of familiarization sessions (3) and workshops (1) were implemented under UNDP-IPSM to build the capacity of Gol to establish Their Federal Performance Management System. This initiative will continue during the year 2017 by providing more technical support addressing the capacity of the National Committee for Performance Management and conducting exposure visits to regional models and international best practices in this regard. | Target reached or surpassed Data: “A Government-Wide Institutional Performance Management System” was developed in a participatory consultative manner while guided by the “European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM)” standards. It was developed by the Iraqi Council of Ministers Secretariat (CoMSEC) with the technical support provided by IPSM- UNDP International SME. The system was documented and shared with the “Higher Committee for Performance Management” for endorsement. The system was endorsed for piloting in three Public Sector Institutions; Ministry of Youth and Sports, Ministry of Electricity, and Ministry of Trade. Performance data for the three target ministries were gathered and analysed by the Iraqi Team of EFQM Certified Assessors, and the first draft of the assessment reports were developed and shared with the respective miniseries for discussion. The evaluation findings were also used to further develop the model and once evaluated by Gol as appropriate and effective will be scaled up across all federal Public Sector Institutions. A team of ten (10) Iraqi staff who will lead the “Institutional Performance Assessment” at the piloting and the subsequent phases have successfully completed and passed the EFQM Assessor Training (EAT), became EFQM Certified Assessors, and were equipped with the skills and knowledge required to effectively assess an organization as part of a high performing international assessment team. Twenty-eight (29) staff from CoMSEC and three target Ministries; Electricity, Youth & Sports and Trade), were successfully capacitated on “Institutional Performance Management”, through the implementation of three capacity development workshops, ranging in duration from three to five days, and in level from beginning and intermediary to advanced. In addition, they were also sensitized with the importance of POP studies as part of the operationalization of Institutional performance Management system through a five-day training workshop on the “Design and Management of Public Opinion Polling Studies”. | |
| OUTCOME8A - Conditions improved for the safe return of IDPs in Newly Liberated Areas | | | | | |
| 3.1. Public services available and functioning as measured by: 3.1.A. Number of hours per day with electricity | 2016 Baseline: Average of 2 hours per day Source: Ministry of Electricity | 2020: 16 hours per day | Some progress Data: 0 Comment: Electricity has increased to an average of 10 hours per day in newly liberated areas. | No change Data: 10 Comment: Number of hours with electricity has increased to (10) hours in the newly liberated area | |

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| 3.1. Public services available and functioning as measured by: 3.1.B. Number of schools and health centers operational | 2016 Baseline: 0 Source: Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization project | 2020: 48 (32 schools, 16 health centers) | Significant progress Data: 0 Comment: Quantitative indicator 14 schools are operating in 2016 71 schools are under rehabilitation 12 health centers are operating 39 health centers under rehabilitation 12 | Target reached or surpassed Data: 100 Comment: Based on the 2017 Quantitative Data: 50 schools operating; 200 schools being rehabilitated 50 health facilities operating; 30 health facilities being rehabilitated (Based on Funding Facility for Stabilization Project Results) | 159 Source: Funding Facility for Stabilization Project Results Tracking |
| 3.2. Number of small businesses restored | 2016 Baseline: 0 Source: Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization project reports | 2020: 1000 | Some progress Data: 0 Comment: Quantitative indicator, over 200 small businesses resume their operation during 2016 | Target reached or surpassed Data: 1457 | |
| 3.3. Number of programs successfully completed under the 'Vision 2020' strategy of the Kurdistan regional government. | 2016 Baseline: 0 Source: Multi-Partner Trust Fund | 2020: 4 | Significant progress Data: 0 Comment: Three out of four projects of Kurdistan vision 2020 were successfully completed their targets, while one project was suspended by agreement between UNDP and KRG-MoP due to lack of fund. | No change Data: 0 Comment: This programme has been closed since 2016. | |

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| 3.4. Increase in percentage of internally displaced persons returning to liberated areas | 2016 Baseline: 10% Source: Joint Coordination and Monitoring Center | 2020: 80% | Some progress Data: 0 Comment: The percentage of IDPs returning to newly liberated areas increased in 2016 compared to 2015. In December 2016, 573,612 IDPs returned to Anbar (+1350,05% compared to December 2015); 180,564 IDPs returned to Ninewa (+161,85% compared to December 2015); 193,176 IDPs returned to Diyala (+108,7% compared to December 2015); and 366,474 IDPs returned to Sala al-Din (+ 41,96% compared to December 2015). (Calculations based on IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix) | Significant progress Data: 87 Comment: As of end November 2017, overall 2,759,658 internally displaced persons returned to liberated areas. This included 1,202,652 to Anbar, 596,280 to Ninewah, 216,720 to Diyala and 449,052 to Salah-al-Din. In these locations, while this is an overall increase as compared with 2016 returnee information, it must be noted that new waves of displacement also took place during 2017. (Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix) | |
| 3.5. Percentage of host community individuals, refugees, and internally displaced persons able to consistently afford basic needs | 2016 Baseline: 60% (weighted average calculated from the World Bank Household SocioEconomic Survey, REACH refugee assessments, and the Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment, phase II) Source: World Bank Household Socio-Economic Survey, REACH refugee/internally displaced persons/host community assessments | 2020: 95% | Some progress Data: 0 Comment: Over 3,670,000 individuals in host communities, refugees and IDPs benefited from enhanced provision of basic services in 5 governorates. | Some progress Data: 60.5 Comment: Estimated 3,700,000 individuals in host communities, refugees and IDPs benefitted from enhanced provision of basic services (primarily through infrastructure reconstruction and renovation) across 8 Governorates (including 5 of which have been directly affected by the conflict). | |

Source: Data from Corporate Planning System

Annex 8. UNDP FFS MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

The special management arrangements under which the FFS has operated have been central to its success; they have provided support for the FFS's work and streamlined and speeded up administrative and financial procedures to raise efficiency while adding additional measures to mitigate risk and raise accountability. These measures are detailed in this annex as they can become a reference for other countries aiming to establish or currently running stabilisation programs.

Risk Management. One of the principal reasons that donors channel funds through UNDP for stabilisation is because it is prepared to take calculated risks where other agencies – especially bilateral ones - are not, in the fluid, relatively unpredictable conditions faced upon entry into newly liberated areas in the wake of a final assault by frontline troops.

The DSRSG/RC/RR ensured that UNDP was not entering into high risk programmes without additional, sometimes elaborate, risk mitigation measures. These include:

- **Joint ownership of the risk:** The UNDP under the DSRSG, openly acknowledged the level of risk, exposing it as a major concern to donors who were considering contributing to the FFS. Risk is also regularly discussed in the Steering Committee. The upshot is that all partners and stakeholders are fully aware of the level of risk being incurred and in a way jointly buy into it, knowing the measures that are being introduced to mitigate the risks identified.
- **Continuous risk assessment:** Conditions on the ground change regularly. Physical security, programmatic and financial exposure levels all vary continuously. UNDP has internalized field security so that costs are lowered, but also so that the network created through field security assistants and monitors can serve to inform decisions. Financial exposure and programmatic risks during implementation are all monitored on a continuous basis by FFS staff with a view to adjusting activities accordingly and implementing mitigation measures.
- **Project design:** Individual contracts under projects are all limited in size – generally under US\$100,000 – with a view to limiting and containing financial risk. In the event that a contractor is found to be unreliable, the risk is contained to a relatively small amount of money.
- **Special monitoring arrangements:** The monitoring arrangements under the FFS are regular and extremely intensive. Technical project personnel at the CO level as well as field monitors, continuously monitor implementation for standards, timeliness and financial and administrative probity. Reports are generated in each location on a weekly and then monthly basis and fed back to FFS management. The DSRSG/RC/RR has also in the past taken a first hand interest in the monitoring of progress.
- **Third party monitors and auditors:** The FFS is under tight scrutiny. Third party monitors have been deployed by some of the largest donors to undertake their own assessments of performance. UNDP has also contracted with external auditors to continuously visit project sites as well as the UNDP/FFS service centre to undertake financial and management audits.
- **Flexibility and Responsiveness:** According to donors interviewed by the ICPE team, the UNDP FFS project has shown considerable responsiveness and flexibility in correcting problems that have, perhaps inevitably, arisen. Some 27 instances are recorded of issues arising, all of which have been addressed with

a very short turnaround time. Where contractors or individuals have been found to be at fault, they have been dismissed. Where procedures have been found to be problematic, they have been corrected²⁸.

- **Transparency:** The FFS has maintained a considerable degree of transparency with all donors and the government. Progress and problems have been reported to, and discussed with, the Steering Committee in which all of the donors are members. Reports – both substantive progress reports and financial reports – are generally prepared in UNDP’s standard format and shared with donors and direct stakeholders. However, where certain donors require reports in their own formats, UNDP has been willing to accommodate their special requirements so that it is easier for them to justify their contributions in their capitals.

Special Arrangements to raise efficiency without compromising accountability. UNDP has accorded the CO with special delegated authority to raise its level of autonomy and speed of implementation:

- **Procurement:** Authority was delegated to the CO for procurement up to US\$ 1 million, with a micro-purchasing threshold of US\$ 10,000.
- **Financial:** The Country Office was authorized to approve payments with a single signature and maintain a petty cash fund up to the equivalent of US\$ 5,000.
- **Programme Implementation:** The Country Office was granted authority to use the direct implementation modality.
- **Partnership Management:** The Country Office was guaranteed predictable and fast turnaround times for support from BERA.

The FFS programme, which has internalised all administrative functions – most notably, procurement and recruitment, finance and information technology (IT) with a view to ensuring that all operations operate in support of jointly understood programme priorities.

Speed of implementation has not been achieved through streamlining in the normal sense. The impressive speed of implementation has been achieved instead by imposing very tight internal deadlines. For example, Table 1 itemises the steps for the recruitment of personnel on fixed term appointments and deadlines imposed internally by FFS management and implemented by the UNDP/FFS Service Centre in order to raise the level of efficiency in the recruitment of staff on fixed term appointments.

| TABLE: Internal ffs protocol for the recruitment of staff on fixed term appointments | |
|--|------------|
| Action | Turnaround |
| Submits to Service Center HR signed documents: (1) <u>Position Management Request Form</u> (2) <u>Request for Personnel Action Form</u> , (3) Job Description as per standard UNDP job description template), (4) An up-to-date organizational chart showing the placement of the new position, (5) <u>Classification Request Memo</u> ; (6) Signed Recruitment Strategy | 1 Day |
| Check for completeness and share feedback (if any) with requester | 1 Day |

²⁸ DFID, Funding Facility for Stabilisation: Lessons Learned Review, London, December 2018

| TABLE: Internal ffs protocol for the recruitment of staff on fixed term appointments | |
|---|------------|
| Action | Turnaround |
| Share signed documents with CO HR for processing | |
| Review Job Description and classification. Submit Position Management Request Form to Office of Budget and Planning (OPB) to create position in Atlas | 2 Days |
| Checks budget availability in Atlas, creates position in Atlas and provides Country Office with the Position number | 2 Days |
| Submits classification documents to OBDU OHR/BOM, HQ | 1 Day |
| Classifies the position, prepares and sends the classification memo to the CO | **2 Days |
| Prepare and submit the Vacancy Announcement to the Recruitment Unit, OHR for approval and posting on the job site | 2 Days |
| Approve and post the VA online. | 10 Days |
| The day after the Vacancy Announcement is posted, grants access to the long-list creator | ½ Day |
| Circulate the VA to UN sister agencies and on UNDP HR global network and practice networks and other job sites | ½ Day |
| Completion of long listing by Service Centre | 1 Day |
| The Grants access to staff who will perform short-listing in consultation with the hiring manager | ½ Day |
| Completion of Short Listing | 3 Days |
| Appoints the Interview Panel in coordination with the hiring manager | 1/2 Day |
| Request the shortlisted candidates to submit signed UNDP P11s and academic credentials | 1 Day |
| Time given to shortlisted candidates to submit the signed UNDP P11s and academic credentials | 3 Days |
| Verify shortlisted candidates academic credentials | 1/2 Day |
| Check availability of the Panel members. Invite candidates for interview | 1/2 Day |
| Decide on competencies in the JD to be assessed by the Interview panel and prepare the interview questions with assistance | ½ day |
| Conduct Interviews and take notes (draft report) | 1 day |
| Sends Reference Checks for Recommended Candidate(s) | ½ day |
| Time to collect Reference Checks | 3 Days |
| Finalize and sign the interview report and share with HR unit | 2 Days |
| Prepares the submission to the Compliance Review Board (CRB) and submits the recruitment case to HR for review and onward submission to the Country Director. | ½ day |
| Review recruitment document for quality and compliance and submit to Country Director | 2 Days |
| Approve or reject based on Interview panel recommendation | 2 Days |
| Submits the recruitment case to the Compliance Review Board (CRB) for endorsement | 1 Day |
| Approves or rejects the recruitment case and/or the Recommended Candidate(s) | 7 Days |
| Notify selected candidate and hiring manager upon receipt of CRB approval. | ½ day |
| Issue written notification to unsuccessful applicants | ½ day |
| Once selected candidate confirms interest in the position, informs RBAS OHR to initiate recruitment process. | ½ day |
| Submits case to Copenhagen for contract issuance (online using workbench) | 1 Day |
| Medical clearance by Medical Services Department (MSD) | 10 Days |
| Prepares the contract offer and finalize the contractual formalities | |

Roughly analogous procedures have been established for the recruitment of personnel on service contracts.

PROCEDURES INTRODUCED BY THE FFS TO MITIGATE THE RISK OF CORRUPTION²⁹

Protecting bidding Information. To ensure the authenticity of the documents submitted by a bidder, UNDP:

- Verifies each document submitted by a potential bidder including bid securities from issuing banks, government-issued certificates, etc.
- Reports immediately all forged documents to the UNDP Office of Audit and Investigation in New York and temporarily suspends bidders who have submitted these documents from UNDP tendering processes

Leakage of confidential bidding information, including cost estimates. To prevent leakage, UNDP:

- Ensures that only six staff have access to draft and the final bills of quantity with pricing, limiting the possibility that bills of quantity, or information linked to them, is leaked.
 - Rotates UNDP-contracted engineers between core functions; specifically, between preparing bills of quantity and project monitoring and supervision, limiting the possibility of establishing rapport with contractors
 - Reviews each bid to ensure there is no overlap between the original bill of quantity prepared with input from the relevant Government line directorate and the final UNDP-verified bill of quantity, limiting the possibility that Government officials leak information to specific companies
 - Hires predominantly international procurement staff, limiting the risk of conflicts of interest and shielding UNDP from pressures exerted on national staff by local authorities and vendors
 - Requires all bids to be submitted on-line using a dedicated email address, and as of June 2017, an e-tendering platform, which ensures that bids remain secret until the bidding period is closed, limits the number of staff with access to bids, and limits the amount of communication between staff and bidders.
- 30
- Ensures that Technical Evaluation (TE) panels are chaired, everywhere possible, by international staff, limiting the risk of conflicts of interest and shielding UNDP from pressures exerted on national staff by local authorities and vendors
 - Ensures that national engineers in Baghdad participate in Technical Evaluation panels for Ninewah projects and vice-versa, limiting the risk of conflicts of interest and shielding UNDP from pressures exerted on national staff by local authorities and vendors

Manipulation of the selection process by a contractor. To prevent manipulation of selection process, UNDP:

- Ensures that technical and financial evaluation reports which document the selection process for projects are reviewed by the Procurement Review Committee (PRC) composed of the Senior Procurement Specialist and the UNDP Operations Manager, adding a further layer of review, quality assurance, and detection

²⁹ Evaluation interviewees have consistently noted that the ability of the FFS to mitigate corruption while ensuring efficiency in the context of Iraq is a remarkable achievement.

³⁰ Based on the UNDP/FFS experience, as well as practices in other countries, UNDP has launched in April 2019 an eTendering module in Atlas, which will become mandatory in September 2019

Detecting possible corruption during implementation. To detect instances where companies are not strictly following the requirements in the bill of quantity, UNDP:

- Monitors implementation through four separate mechanisms including: a) a Government Oversight Committee for each project composed of engineers from the relevant line directorate which visits the project site multiple times during implementation; b) periodic unannounced site visits for each project by UNDP field engineers and staff; c) periodic announced site visits for each project by UNDP international staff; and d) unannounced site visits of selected projects by third party monitors
- Analyzes, triangulates, and documents all of the information generated through each monitoring mechanism and immediately addresses all suspected cases of corruption, breach of contract, fraud, etc. and reports these to the UNDP Office of Audit and Investigation
- Pays contractors, in most cases, only when the project is certified as completed by the Oversight Committee and separately by UNDP engineers (milestone payments are made only for contracts over USD 350,000)

Documentation of wages distribution to include the following. Attendance sheets for all workers include full names, contact details and clear fingerprints, to be submitted along with weekly report on Sundays. This is to be accompanied by:

- Double-faced copies of Iraqi IDs.
- Signed/ fingerprinted individual receipts from every worker on weekly bases.
- Photos and videotaping of weekly wage distribution, to be provided to UNDP's FFS Livelihoods Team.
- Allowing only one cash-for-work project at a time in a neighborhood or district
- Specifying the days wages will be paid and deploying additional UNDP core staff to oversee each distribution
- Requiring companies managing cash-for-work programmes to submit a video recording of each distribution
- Submission by companies of copies of each worker's ID, attendance sheets full name, contact details and fingerprints.

Furthermore:

- The rubble removal work is to be 5 days in a week (Saturday through Wednesday), for 8 hours daily.
- The distribution of daily wages shall take place every Thursday starting from 11:00 am.
- The payment of wages will take place only in presence of 3rd party field monitors hired by UNDP and UNDP Liaison Officer in charge of the project, as well as a UNDP staff member.
- Women and men workers are equally paid, each to receive US\$20 per day while work monitors to receive \$22 per day.
- None of the workers can be municipality workers, civil servants or security officers in the government.

Annex 9. UNDP CONTRIBUTION TO THE REGIONAL REFUGEE RESPONSE AND RESILIENCE PLAN IN IRAQ

Background

The Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP) in response to the Syria Crisis responds to the humanitarian, protection and assistance needs of refugees from Syria and other impacted persons, communities and institutions in the five hosting countries of Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt.


The 3RP is a broad partnership platform for planning, advocacy, fundraising, information management and monitoring that brings together Syrian refugees; impacted communities in host countries and their governments; donors; and more than 150 national and international development and humanitarian actors in the respective countries.

At a country level the UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators support national governments, in close coordination and partnership with the international community. UNHCR continues to guide the refugee response, while UNDP facilitates the coordination of the resilience component.

At the regional level an expanded Regional Steering Committee, including representatives from the five refugee hosting governments, UN Regional Directors and the RC/HCs meet under the co-leadership of UNDP and UNHCR.

Refugee Context in Iraq

The regional Syrian refugee crisis has impacted the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI) heavily. With 97% of Syrian refugees in Iraq residing in KRI and making up approximately 25% of the population of the region.³¹ Figure below shows the trends in refugee numbers in Iraq. The majority of registered refugees reside outside of camps amongst host communities. The scale and protracted nature of the refugee crisis has not subsided placing increased pressure on basic services and the ability of the host population to cope.



Source: UNHCR, 3RP plan, 2018

37% of the refugee population in Iraq is below the poverty line and 49% are unemployed.³²

³¹ UNHCR, 2016, Regional Refugee resilience Plan

³² RDDP, WFP, ILO, UNDP, 2017, Jobs Make the Difference: Expanding Economic Opportunities for Syrian Refugees and Host Communities.

Nonetheless, average employment rates for Syrian refugees in the KRI are higher than for displaced Iraqis and impacted host communities. For example, In Erbil governorate 80 per cent of male refugees aged between 15 and 64 are employed, while 53 and 70 per cent of male IDPs and men from the host community respectively have jobs. However, their employment is usually low-paying and insecure, or informal. Refugees do not benefit from more financial security as they do not receive Iraqi state support.

Unlike some other countries in the region, the Kurdish Regional Government granted residency permits to Syrian refugees that entail freedom of movement within the three Kurdish provinces, right to education free of charge in public schools on par with Iraqi nationals, as well as right to work. Refugees holding a residency permit are also granted free access to health services in the Kurdish region. Those without residency permits find free services in refugee camps.³³ Despite this, perceived disparities between IDP's, refugees and the host communities have increased social tensions.

UNDP's role and contribution in the Regional Refugee Response and Resilience Plan in Iraq

UNDP's role focussed on the resilience component of the 3RP which included three goals namely:

1. The most vulnerable impacted households and communities benefit from interventions that enhance their capacities and resources.
2. Refugees and members of impacted communities have opportunities to progressively build self-reliance.
3. The capacities of sub-national and national delivery systems are strengthened to meet the protection, assistance and social services needs of refugees and members of impacted communities.³⁴

UNDP's main contribution to refugee resilience efforts in Iraq was through the ICRRP which addressed refugee, IDP and host population needs in the KRI. The ICRRP had five components ranging from government crisis response capacity development through to basic infrastructure rehabilitation and construction. The ICRRP outputs were:

Output 1: Crisis response coordination, management, structures and mechanisms implemented and institutionalised

Output 2: Improved participatory decentralised basic service delivery, institutional responsiveness and accountability

Output 3: Displaced population groups and crisis-affected (host) communities benefit from livelihoods stabilisation and sustainable livelihood opportunities.

Output 4: Protection mechanisms strengthened for vulnerable communities, specifically women and youth.

Output 5: Strengthened Social cohesion through dialogue and capacity development of local and national stakeholders


Activities under the ICRRP targeted both in camp and out of camp Syrian refugee populations and the wider

³³ <http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/profile-iraq/>

³⁴ UNDP, 2017, Guidance Note 2, Refugee and resilience Components of the 3RP

host community. These included electricity for refugee camps as well as water supply for residential areas housing concentrations of refugees. The ICRRP livelihoods component included refugees in activities such as job placements as did the social cohesion component include refugees in activities that took place in community centres. Refugees were also supported through protection activities, specifically SGBV psychosocial support and legal address. For full details of ICRRP activities please refer to the Iraq ICPE evaluation.

In addition, UNDP assumed a role as Co-Lead with DRC of the Emergency Livelihoods and Social Cohesion working group under the 3RP. This was not included in the CPD 2016-2020. UNDP's efforts were closely aligned with the 3RP but funding for the livelihoods and Social Cohesion sectoral working group was low (see figure below).



Source: UNHCR Annual 3RP reports-2016-2018

Findings

Finding 1: UNDP has not substantively contributed to the overall coordination of the 3RP in Iraq. However, key informants suggested that this was not an issue of great concern because of the relatively low number of refugees in Iraq when compared to other countries in the region. Furthermore, the conducive legal and social context in which refugees have been granted freedom of movement within the three Kurdish provinces, right to education free of charge in public schools on par with Iraqi nationals, as well as right to work. Refugees holding a residency permit are also granted free access to health services in the Kurdish region. However, the protracted nature of the refugee crisis and the reported low likelihood of voluntary return of refugees suggests the need for continued efforts at ensuring resilience.

Finding 2: Coordination between UNHCR and UNDP in Iraq was weak. Key informants suggested that there was not the necessary awareness of the activities that UNDP was undertaking in support of refugees. However, the lack of awareness was addressed in 2018 through “get to know you” meetings organised by the two organisations to raise awareness of each others activities.

Finding 3: The quality of livelihoods programming was of concern in some instances and the sustainability of ICRRP components was precarious. Key informant interviews and site visits suggested that the quality of livelihoods programming with refugees was not always of high quality. For example, key informants reported

that green-houses supported under asset replacement activities of the ICRRP did not have adequate support. A site visit to one such greenhouse revealed that this particular project did not start well, with initial grey water capture being contaminated by blackwater limiting the use and sale of production from the greenhouses. Beneficiaries also reported that their requests were not being listened to or addressed. For example, a request to rotate fertilisers provided in order to replace different nutrients in the soil was not adopted. Similarly, they identified the need for different pesticides in order to rotate their use and prevent immunity to the repeated use of the same pesticide. These issues suggest that beneficiary participation was not adequate in decision making and that project quality could have been improved.

Issues of sustainability of UNDP's 3RP response are detailed in the Iraq ICPE. The legal aid programme has ceased to operate due to a lack of resources and the inability of the KRG to take on this role. Livelihoods activities remain grant based (with the exception of job placements) and infrastructure rehabilitation relies on the ability of the KRG to support operational costs, which it has not always been able to.

Conclusion

While UNDP did not contribute substantially to the overall coordination of the 3RP in Iraq this was not deemed a major issue. However, greater coordination of efforts with UNHCR is needed as UNDP's ICRRP programme is addressing refugee needs. Concerns were raised about the quality of some of the programming and these need to be addressed as do concerns about the sustainability.