Project Theory of Change:

IF

Essential service delivery is provided,

Through a) supporting municipalities in identifying, planning, leading and coordinating efforts to achieve resilience in local service delivery and socio-economic recovery, and b) improving access and quality of service delivery lines for socioeconomic resilience and recovery

AND

Capabilities for local authorities and rule of law institutions are strengthened,

Through a) providing technical support to the rule of law institutions, and b) establishing a “model police station”

AND

Ensuring that livelihoods capital is preserved with increased income-generation and livelihoods opportunities for the most vulnerable

Through a) supporting the creation of new MSMEs including businesses with a social impact in sectors with high LER/LED potential and b) Enhancing self-reliance and livelihood stabilisation for vulnerable and marginalised groups

THEN

The population groups can effectively cope with and mitigate the risks of irregular migration and be strong drivers of resilience-building and development efforts.

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List of acronyms and abbreviations

CO: Country Office
CP: Conflict Prevention
CPD: Country Programme Document
DAC: Development Assistance Committee
DoA: Description of the Action
EC: European Commission
EU: European Union
EUTF: European Union Trust Fund
FGD: Focus Group Discussion
GNA: Government of National Accord
KII: Key Information Interview
MoE: Ministry of Education
MoI: Ministry of Interior
MoLG: Ministry of Local Government
M&E: Monitoring and Evaluation
MSC: Most Significant Change
NOA: North Africa
OECD: Organisations for Economic Cooperation and Development
PB: Peacebuilding
PCI: Peaceful Change Initiative
RBM: Results-Based Management
RF: Results Framework
Acknowledgements: the evaluation team wishes to thank the UNDP Libya country office, in particular the former and present project managers, for the support received during the mission and also for facilitating the field data collection of the national evaluator. Thank you also to all the respondents who agreed to meet the mission in Tunis or discuss with the team the evaluation. Finally, our thanks go to the respondents in Libya who met with the national evaluator and provided essential feedback on the project performance and results.
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

UNDP is implementing the “Strengthening Local Capacity for Resilience and Recovery” project aiming at supporting local authorities in Libya to respond to the many conflict and human mobility induced challenges - by strengthening the local resilience and recovery mechanisms - that impact negatively people access to essential services, the sources of jobs and livelihoods, the social cohesion and security of communities. The project is funded by the EU with 18 MEUR from 6th June 2017 until 5th June 2020.

This formative project evaluation was commissioned by the UNDP Libya Country Office at the request of the EU as project donor as a learning experience designed to shed some light on the results obtained to date and the potential improvements for further phases of the project. The purpose of the Evaluation is to learn from the experience of the EU/UNDP funded programme – Strengthening Local Capacities for Resilience and Recovery with a forward-looking approach. The Evaluation is expected to clarify underlying factors affecting the situation, highlight unintended consequences (positive and negative) and better design UNDP-supported interventions at the next stage. The evaluation is conducted by a two-member team: an international consultant as evaluation team leader, and a national consultant as evaluation expert who was in charge of data collection in Libya.

The scope of the evaluation covers the project implementation period, from 6 June 2017 until July 2019. The summarised evaluation objectives are to a) provide an objective assessment of the project performance, b) evaluate the project using the following evaluation criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and, to the extent possible, sustainability, c) appraise the relevance of the project design and identify if cross-cutting issues were incorporated in the project design, and d) generate lessons learned to inform future programming and identify good practices.

The evaluation followed a standard project-evaluation methodology consisting of four phases: 1) desk review and analysis phase, home based. 2) scoping mission to Tunis and Key Informant Interviews with UNDP and primary stakeholders leading to the inception report and evaluation matrix. 3) data field collection by the national evaluation expert in four sites: Misrata, Sebratah, Benghazi and Tripoli. 4) data analysis and discussions of the notes from phase 3 and preparation of the draft evaluation report. Data collection was done through semi-structured interviews, either by phone or Skype or WhatsApp, or through face-to-face interviews, with key informants. Random beneficiary interviews with users of public services were also held to
collect external feedback. All primary evaluation stakeholders were interviewed as identified in the inception report.

UNDP was able to provide effective and relevant support to the target local municipalities. The main observable change brought about by the SLCRR was the restoration of essential public services, particularly in the health and education sector. Findings were triangulated with the municipality and public service users. The results contribute to the development of the community’s resilience and stability. Other key results include the conflict sensitivity assessments and workshops done by PCI, as well as the local grants under the “Social Accountability Mechanisms”, five of which were successful, and the progress in fomenting business development conditions to start-up companies, of which 30% of headed by women, under the Tatweer partnership for output 3, in addition to the work done in training and business incubators. Under the second output, the main results are the Rule of Law (RoL) assessments, which constitute reference materials for future projects in rule of law and in the justice sectors, and the construction of a “model” police station, which is to be completed by the end of the year.

The political and security context are extremely challenging, and UNDP has been recognized as a major actor in Libya that is able to work in an impartial manner in both GNA and non-GNA municipalities, based on identified needs, and to deliver timely results. UNDP has the potential to up-scale the good practices to create area-based programming around those municipalities covered with the first phase of this project in order to gradually expand into the regions by continuing working with a needs-based assessment approach, strengthening the conflict sensitive approach and programme design, with an improved risk management system for the investments made.

There is still room for improvement in the project design in particular in order to: a) incorporate a strong conflict analysis and understanding of the conflict dynamics, possibly based on tools adapted from other UNDP projects working in conflict environments; b) develop a Results- Based Management Results Framework and the corresponding monitoring matrix; c) establish clear criteria for selection of municipalities, so they are supported on the basis of the needs1.

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1 As indicated by UNDP, for phase 3, UNDP has developed clear criteria taking into consideration various aspects, including:

- Municipalities excluded from previous funding
- Newly elected municipalities, particularly those excluded from previous funding
- Municipalities identified in critical water and electricity situation as identified by relevant technical companies in Libya, Water Authority and Electricity Company.
- Municipalities on the migration routes and exhausted from overuse of its basic services
and always ensuring that UNDP works in both GNA and non-GNA municipalities; d) internal coordination and communication with procurement should be enhanced to facilitate project delivery and achievement of results.

Despite the challenging conditions the results of the project are satisfactory as already mentioned in the EU ROM mission of December 2018. UNDP has good staff in the field who understand how to engage with the municipalities, and this constitutes a huge asset. Given the variety of activities undertaken in Libya, coordination with local partners such as PCI or Tatweer on the ground should be strengthened, while communication at the project management level is reported to be quite good. Overall the evaluation notes a satisfactory performance of the SLCRR, particularly in terms of effectiveness and of relevance, with good responsiveness capacity. UNDP should improve its tracking of the coverage of project beneficiaries and agree with the EU on a common vision and Theory of Change that the project should achieve by its completion, and develop the corresponding results framework that is aligned with Results- Based Management practices and UN corporate guidelines.

The following recommendations are made:

1) Recruit a peace and conflict advisor to ensure conflict analysis and sensitivity is streamlined across the project and not as a separate component of one of the outputs, and closely guide and supervise the work of the PCI in line with UNDP conflict related guidance and DAC guidance.

2) Request support from the Regional Peace and Conflict advisor in Amman to review and improve the phase 3 design in line with the need to better integrate conflict dynamics and improve risk management.

3) Draw experience from other UNDP risk mapping tools and risk management strategies (such as in Lebanon), and consider developing a time-sensitive conflict map in Libya (example and link shared through an e-mail to the project manager).

4) Consider training all the UNDP staff (and EU staff if willing) on RBM and the development of RBM results hierarchies, in order to develop a joint vision at the higher level of the project outcome and the relevant indicators to measure the effects generated by the project (beyond output level).

- Fair geographical distribution (East, South, West) taking into consideration the needs as well as the number of population.

UNDP is recognised to be among the few agencies that has projects and interventions across all parts of the country. Through this project and other UNDP projects
5) Improve the reporting capacity of the outcome level results (higher level results) and identify the relevant approaches (including satisfaction survey, perception surveys, etc.) for the intangible elements of the project

6) Discuss with senior management the bottlenecks in the procurement process in order to facilitate delivery and results

7) It would be preferable for future evaluations to have all the relevant documents placed in a shared drive for the evaluation team to have access to the complete documentation at the onset of the evaluation

2 Object of Evaluation

2.1 Evaluation Background

This mid-term project evaluation of UNDP SLCRR has been commissioned by the UNDP Country Office (CO) as a decentralized evaluation. The CO has recruited an independent evaluation consultant with substantial experience in evaluations, peacebuilding, UN and UNDP evaluations, both at corporate and decentralized levels, as well as an experienced national evaluation expert, with previous experience in data collection in Libya, to form the evaluation team. Their CVs are included as annex. The evaluation is managed by an evaluation manager (also SLCRR Project Manager, Dawoud Almassri), who ensures the quality of the evaluation process and that the deliverables are in line with the requirements of the evaluation TOR as revised and adjusted in the evaluation inception report which is also included as annex2.

2.2 Logic model of the project (Theory of Change-ToC)

The Strengthening Local Capacities for Resilience and Recovery (SLCRR) project is a 3-year project funded by the EU for an amount of EUR 18,000,000 (estimated as 19,607,400 USD). It started on 6 June 2017 and will be ending on 5 June 2020. The project itself has been designed based on the following theory of change, which the evaluation team has reconstructed as it was incompletely developed in the description of the action at the time of its submission.

2 Although the UNDP Evaluation Guidelines of January 2019 indicate under point 4.1. that “evaluation management should be separate from programme/project management. Where a UNDP implementing office has a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) specialist or focal point in place, they should take the evaluation management role”, feedback received on the original inception report opted to have the programme manager as evaluation manager.
SLCRR Project Theory of Change (reconstructed by the evaluation team)

**IF**

*Essential service delivery is provided,*

Through

*Supporting municipalities in identifying, planning, leading and coordinating efforts to achieve resilience in local service delivery and socio-economic recovery, and*

*Improving access and quality of service delivery lines for socioeconomic resilience and recovery*

**Revised RF**

Indicator 1.2 Nr of coordination mechanisms in place (target 6 coordination mechanisms)

Indicator 1.2 % of Tier 1 and Tier 2 priorities infrastructure rehabilitation completed in each municipality (target 100% Tier 1 and 2 completed by 2019)

EUTF NOA Indicators

SOI Nr access to and effective provision of basic services: healthcare, education

IO indicator 1 % of municipal staff reporting an increase in skills and competencies to plan, coordinate and implement resilience and recovery measures

IO indicator 2: Number of people having improved access to basic services

Output indicator: Nr of socio economic and infrastructure projects per type and financial volume

AND IF

*Capabilities for local authorities and rule of law institutions strengthened,*

Through

*Providing technical support to the rule of law institutions and*

Establish a “Model Police Station”

**RRF**

Indicator 2.1 Nr of RoL staff who completed training (target 50 by 2019)

Indicator 2.2 % of RoL institutions identified during the needs assessment supported with equipment and other technical assistance (target 100% by 2019)

Indicator 2.3 Nr of “model police stations” established and operational (target 1)

EUTF NOA indicators

SO Indicator Nr Social cohesion

SO indicator: % of staff that demonstrate increase in knowledge after the training as compared to before the training
Output indicator: 1) Nr of participants by gender 2) Nr of model police stations established

AND IF

Ensuring that livelihoods capital is preserved with increased income-generation and livelihoods opportunities for the most vulnerable

Through

Supporting the creation of new MSMEs including businesses with a social impact in sectors with high LER/LED potential, and

Enhancing self-reliance and livelihood stabilisation for vulnerable and marginalised groups

RRF

Indicator 3.1. Nr of persons who complete an apprenticeship programme (target 60 cumulative by 2020)

Indicator 3.2 Nr of local business incubators and economic literacy centres established (target 3 by 2020 Benghazi, Tripoli, Sebha)

Indicator 3.3 Nr of vulnerable individuals earning income from temporary jobs (no target) –

EUTF NOA indicators

SO Indicator: employment rate

IO Indicator: Nr of people assisted to develop economic income-generating activities

Output Indicators: Nr of people benefiting from professional trainings (TVET) and/or skills development

Nr of jobs created

THEN

The population groups can effectively cope with and mitigate the risks of irregular migrant and be strong drivers of resilience-building and development efforts.

In line with the above theory of change, the project has been established based on three Outputs which are described as follows in the Results and Resource Framework:

Output 1: Ensure better provision of basic services at local level and increase access for most vulnerable groups from host communities, including internally displaced and returnees, as well as migrants and refugees;

Output 2: Support local authorities and administrations in fulfilling their role and responsibilities with a focus on enforcing local stability and community security;

Output 3: Support local economic recovery/development, including job creation and livelihoods.
Although the results and resources framework indicates the output targets and indicators (as well as the inputs from the EUTF NOA in grey), it does not contain any indicator or outcome statement on the anticipated change that the project is expected to contribute to (the outcome level)\(^3\). As such, the project architecture could more clearly express the higher-level results. More importantly, it leaves the expected outcome and the wording used for the project results in the ToC. The Project’s Theory of Change assumes that if essential service delivery is provided, ensuring that livelihoods capital is preserved with increased income-generation and livelihoods opportunities for the most vulnerable, with capacities for local authorities and rule of law institutions strengthened, the population groups can effectively cope with and mitigate the risks of irregular migration and be strong drivers of resilience-building and development efforts. This can be open to subjective interpretation in the absence of outcome level indicators, as the outcome level statement mentioned in the DoA p. 19 is aligned with the prevailing UNDP Strategic Plan (SP) which the project has outlasted. It is important to have a policy discussion about the monitoring of higher-level results.

2.3 Country Context

Irregular migrant challenge and Prolonged Instability in Libya

One of the main contributing factors for the rising influx of migrants through the Central Mediterranean route is the prolonged instability in Libya. Libya represents the departure point of 90% of those seeking to travel to Europe. Smugglers and traffickers exploit an unstable political situation and fragmented control over the territory and borders, especially in the South, where there is limited, if at all, control of central government institutions. The situation is complicated further by strong tribal structures and continued clashed on the ground. Various assessments, conducted to date, show the dramatic fragmentation of the Libyan internal and border security sectors, exacerbated by internal violent power struggles and a series of economic crises.

From March to September 2015, UNDP undertook an analysis of the structural drivers of insecurity and instability in Libya, identifying three conflict systems as root causes: a national level competition over political influence, control of resources and the nature of the Libyan state; the presence of armed extremist groups; and local level intercommunal tensions. While

\[^3\] Comment from the UNDP CO: “While we appreciate evaluator’s comments on potential areas of improvement in the design of the logical framework, it would be important to note that the results resource framework does contain outcome level indicators that have been designed in line with UNDP’s prevailing corporate planning frameworks whereby output indicators are nurtured by UNDP Country Programme Document and UNDP Strategic Plan IRRF.”
these conflict systems are driven by somewhat separate issues (each with its own complexity), they remain deeply interrelated.

Challenges linked to the project implementation are linked to a) security situation. As the lines of conflict move and vary in intensity, with periods of relative calm, and other periods of more intensive conflict, the situation is fluid and changes over time. This means that UNDP has on different occasions had to evacuate parts of the country or relocate for a certain length of time. b) Each municipality is subject to its own environment in GNA and non-GNA municipalities, which means that each municipality has its own nature and operating environment. It is important to point out that UNDP is one of the few actors able to operate in both GNA and non-GNA municipalities. c) The complex economic and financial situation of the country, the liquidity crunch in the banking sector, exchange rate, are additional challenges to deliver timely and efficient procurement in Libya under this and other projects.

3 Evaluation purpose and scope

The purpose of the Evaluation is to learn from the experience of the EU/UNDP funded programme – Strengthening Local Capacities for Resilience and Recovery with a forward-looking approach. The Evaluation is expected to clarify underlying factors affecting the situation, highlight unintended consequences (positive and negative) and better design UNDP-supported interventions at the next stage. The Country Office accordingly plans to make use of the evaluative exercise as a learning opportunity not only for the office but also for key partners and stakeholders, as inclusively and as practically possible.

The scope of the evaluation covers the project implementation period, e.g. 6 June 2017 until July 2019. The evaluation is a mid-term formative evaluation as the project is still on-going and is expected to end on 5 June 2020.

The objectives of the evaluation are summarised hereunder from the TOR. The evaluation has, in essence:

1. Provided an objective assessment of the project performance.
2. Evaluated the project using the following evaluation criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness. To the extent possible, the evaluation captured sustainability replication concerns.
3. Appraised the relevance of the project design and identified if cross-cutting issues were incorporated in the project design.
4. Generated lessons learned to inform future programming and identify good practices.
The evaluation captured and demonstrated evaluative evidence of the project performance and results achieved, particularly through field-based data collection visits in Sebratah, Benghazi, Tripoli, Misrata as well as through a scoping mission in Tunis. It is carried out in line with the UNDP Evaluation Guidelines of January 2019, UNDP guidance on Outcome-level evaluation, of the UNDP PME Handbook, the UNDG Result-Based Management Handbook, Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility: Improving Learning for Results, UNDG UNDAF Theory of Change Companion Guidance, and following the provisions of the UNDP evaluation policy.

4 Evaluation Methodology

This mid-term evaluation is undertaken by a team of two with distinct responsibilities: the international evaluator and team leader is responsible for the delivery of all evaluation products (e.g. inception report, draft and final evaluation report). The team leader did not undertake field data collection inside of Libya as per the security situation preventing him to travel to Libya. The national expert consultant worked under the supervision of the team leader and carried out independently the required data collection work in Libya (Sebratah, Tripoli, Misrata, Benghazi) as agreed with the UNDP Evaluation Manager. Also, given security limitations and restrictions of movement within Libya, it was decided that the national expert evaluation consultant would undertake data collection in the following municipalities:
1. A) Tripoli B) Sebratah C) Benghazi – through site visits to the partners and counterparts operating in the field. The field agenda was approved by the evaluation manager.
2. The other three municipalities (Sebha, Murzuq and Kufrah) were to be appraised through telephone and remote communication means with project partners, government counterparts and other actors, in order to obtain anecdotal evidence of results.

4 UNDP, Outcome-level evaluation, a companion guide to the Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and evaluation for development results for programme units and evaluators, December 2011

5 UNDP, Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results, 2009

6 UNDG, Results-Based Management Handbook, Harmonizing RBM concepts and approaches for improved development results at country level, October 2011


8 A stand-alone report of the field data collection in Libya is included as annex
The approach to the evaluation was participatory and followed the recommendations of the “utilization-focused evaluation” approach that is described by M. Q. Patton in his book of the same name that continues to be a good practice reference material for the conduct of evaluations.\(^9\) The evaluation team also held a scoping mission with key partners in Tunis to finalise the inception phase and obtain feedback from key partners and stakeholders.

The evaluation used a mix of methods but was essentially qualitative. It consisted of the following phases:

1) **Documentary review and analysis phase.**

This phase is based on the review and analysis of the documentation submitted by UNDP (included in the enclosed annex). The results of this analytical desk review together with the analysis of the Key Informant Interviews (KII) undertaken during the first scoping mission to Tunis (5th to 9\(^{th}\) August 2019, see the enclosed annex for details, with 14 Key Informant Interviews - KII) have provided the first level of evidence to appraise the project. The result of this process was the inception report, which provides the details regarding the evaluation approach, tools, timeframe and key questions, as well as the understanding of the evaluation team regarding the work to be performed. The accepted inception report has become the main reference document for the conduct of the evaluation process.

The national evaluation expert has also participated in the KII in Tunis since 6\(^{th}\) August 2019 and has contributed to the analysis and development of the inception report.

2) **In-country field data collection in Libya** from 18 to 22 August 2019:

During the in-country data collection phase, the national evaluation expert travelled to Misrata, Sebratah, Tripoli and Benghazi, to collect data from the project partners and counterparts (8 interviews as per enclosed report), obtain feedback on the project results regarding both the outputs achieved, but, to the extent possible, also the perception of the change that the project brought to the communities (positive or negative, direct or indirect effect or immediate outcome) and with direct beneficiaries.

**One key source of qualitative data collection were Key Informant Interviews (KII) and/or Focus Groups Discussions (FGD).** *Interviews are semi-structured using a questionnaire/interview protocol with key evaluation questions to ensure consistency*


https://www.betterevaluation.org/en/plan/approach/utilization_focused_evaluation
and comparability. In addition to KII, there may be group interviews (when more than one informant attends the meeting) and Focus Group Discussion (FGD), particularly for direct meetings with beneficiaries of the UNDP’s outputs to collect their perception on the effects generated by the outputs (e.g. Sebratah patients, Toyota apprentices).

Another source of data collection was on-site observation.

Findings were triangulated to the extent possible (e.g. having confirmation from three different sources) to ensure the credibility of the evaluation. Given that the evaluation is not using a statistical sampling method to identify project sites at field level (i.e. given limitations linked to access and security), the findings cannot be considered statistically representative.

3) Preparation of the draft evaluation report

Based on the data analysis of notes and evaluative evidence gathered during phases 1 and 2, the evaluation team has prepared the current draft evaluation report, home based. The evaluation manager will have two weeks to provide the consolidated comments to the evaluation team leader for the preparation of the final report.

4) Final evaluation report

A final evaluation report will be submitted to the UNDP evaluation manager within three working days from the date of receipt of the consolidated comments but in any case, not later than fifteen working days after the receipt of the draft evaluation report.

Data validation: A clear distinction is made between the interpretation of the data (subjective) versus the triangulated findings (objective and factual).

4.1 Evaluation criteria

The evaluation addressed the four standard criteria laid out in the OECD-DAC Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance, which defines the following:

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Relevance: The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies.

Effectiveness: The extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.

Efficiency: A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results.

Sustainability: The continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed.

While the initial TOR included impact as one of the evaluation criterion, the evaluation team has opted to drop this aspect which is not applicable to this evaluation, a) because the definition of impact as a “long-term effects” by the OECD/DAC glossary does not make it relevant to a mid-term evaluation undertaken two years after the start of the project, and b) because the evaluation team will focus on the identification of direct and indirect effects at the outcome level to the extent possible (as defined by the UNDP).

In addition, considering the conflict dynamics of the context in Libya, the evaluation will draw some insights from the “Evaluation of Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility: Improving Learning for Results”¹¹, that is regularly used when evaluating peacebuilding interventions. Issues related to coherence and coverage of the action will also be analysed.

The project has developed a revised Results and Resource Framework (RRF) which contains specific indicators for each of the outputs. The RRF has been revised in light of the evolving situation during the project implementation and the revised RRF has been used for the evaluation as agreed with the evaluation manager. However, as noted by the EU ROM mission, the outcome statements or indicators are not clearly defined, and this makes it difficult to appraise the desired change(s) the project contributed to. This limitation means that the evaluation was able to evaluate the outputs but encountered limitations in trying to assess the project outcome.

4.2 Evaluation constraints and limitations

The time allocated to the evaluation is short and does not allow for an in-depth evaluation. However, the EU has already officially committed to funding UNDP a next phase of the project, so the evaluation results are not critical to the funding decision for the second phase. Nonetheless, some aspects regarding potential improvements in the third phase and issues related to some potential gaps (e.g. regarding the project design, the results framework, the conflict analysis) are covered in the evaluation report.

Findings focused on the designated three project outputs and additional efforts were made to obtain evidence regarding the direct and indirect effects, positive or negative, generated by the project. The findings are not necessarily representative or generalizable since the sampling at field level cannot be done on statistically representative basis (e.g. given access and security limitations).

It is difficult to deeply elaborate on the conflict analysis dimension, while an understanding already exists, as there is no peace or conflict advisor or experienced conflict analyst to bring technical support to the project in order to mainstream conflict sensitivity. This is likely to have lessened the conflict sensitivity of the project approach. One organisation, PCI, seems to be the only player providing conflict analysis to international actors (not only UNDP) in Libya. UNDP should draw on its regional advisors when there is insufficient knowledge in-house for working in conflict environments.

The difficult security situation and the fact that UNDP project officers had limited opportunities to ensure a physical presence in all municipalities to divulge the project objectives and mechanisms, means that UNDP relied extensively on partners for the work undertaken. For the conflict management related results, UNDP entirely trusted PCI to undertake the necessary measures to obtain the expected results. Another important partnership was developed with Tatweer for the project output 3, with substantial support provided in economic development, but with a majority of the investment in the eastern part of the country.

Considering the division of the country in three separate regions, each with its own context and specificities, namely West, South and East regions, it is important to see how the investments made balance out in terms of the different regions, to ensure equity and fairness in the support provided. No field visit to the Southern region was possible given the security conditions and logistical constraints.

The challenge to clearly determine the change to be generated by the project means that efforts concentrated on targeting the output results. In these, a substantial effort was made in the supply visible and tangible outputs such as construction works, rehabilitation and equipment and in reporting on the actual use of the infrastructure and related services that are
being provided (service delivery capacity), while more efforts are needed to reflect the provision of soft skills and capabilities and their impact in the produced reports.

In the second output (Rule of Law – ROL) the company that started undertaking the ROL assessment for UNDP (Aktis research) has become bankrupt and as a result the ROL assessment was done for Tripoli and Sebha municipalities, but the Aktis consultant has been hired directly by UNDP to complete the assessment in Benghazi (using the same methodology) in order to complete the expected outputs.

The last progress report submitted is dated December 2018, but UNDP has provided additional information in the form of an Excel Matrix regarding progress in infrastructure, the latest weekly update (dated 5th August 2019) from the work of PCI (output 1), as well as a two-page summary of key results. It could be useful for UNDP to consider developing an integrated project monitoring tool for all elements and outputs implemented, in order to have the updated results of the project implementation (according to the RRF) and corresponding indicators all in one document, as there is a sense that project components could be better tied together in project reporting.

5 Findings

This section is structured along the evaluation criteria and in line with the key evaluation questions. Furthermore, the different outputs have been addressed individually, to the extent possible. Considering the security constraints linked to the field data collection phase, not all findings could be triangulated on the ground in Libya.

5.1 Relevance

KQ11. The project is fully relevant in responding to the needs of the Government of Libya. Both the transition linked to the end of the Khadafi regime and the ensuing conflicts have taken a heavy toll on the economy and the social situation in the country. The on-going conflict between the GNA and the Haftar supporters is still claiming high social and economic costs, as the country and the municipalities remain divided in their allegiance to the different sides and security conditions remain very volatile. According to the MoLG, the country is divided in 117 municipalities, of which 80 to 85 are under the influence of the GNA. The project comes as a welcome support to fill the needs in terms of reconstruction of essential damaged infrastructure and facilitate essential service provision for recovery and stability. UNDP is one of the few actors able to work in municipalities which are both in the Government of National Accord (GNA) and outside of the GNA area of influence, which indicates it is seen as neutral and impartial, and can operate in the West, the South and the East of the country. The MoLG is grateful for the support and is looking forward to the third phase of the project to work more closely with UNDP in the selection of the target municipalities to be covered. (The current
project covered the municipalities of Tripoli, Al Kufra, Murzuq, Sebratah, Sebha, and Benghazi as per the Description of the Action -DoA). MoLG indicated they have a limited budget which does not allow them to carry out close monitoring in the field and very high needs, so the support that UNDP is providing is essential to foster the recovery and stability in Libya. It was not clear, however, whether the MoLG has its own municipal priority plan, or whether the overall Libya 2020 Vision, produced by the Libyan Institute for Advanced Studies (LIAS) is still representing current government priorities. If so, the SLCRR project contributes directly to the LIBYA 2017–2020 recovery and growth vision, which gives continued focus on economic, human development, and governance reforms for recovery and growth by scaling transformation projects.12

Output 1: Ensure better provision of basic services at local level and increase access for most vulnerable groups from host communities, including internally displaced and returnees, as well as migrants and refugees.

The SLCRR output 1 fits directly in the recovery and growth vision of the Government as mentioned in the LIAS statement above. For municipalities and MoLG, the focus of the support is enabling the provision and basic services, regardless of the target groups, as many of the key essential infrastructures have been damaged by conflict and unrest.

Output 2: Support local authorities and administrations in fulfilling their role and responsibilities with a focus on enforcing local stability and community security.

Given the volatile environment and the absence of a strong central government that can ensure peace across the municipalities, the project undertook Rule of Law assessments in three municipalities and defined a “model” police station under construction in a Tripoli municipality. These assessments are important because they provide entry points for solving some of the structural issues related to the rule of law and justice sector. However, the project by itself it not in a position to do more than provide options on the way forward, but it may not be able to operationalise the output 2 with more than targeted recommendations based on the three ROL assessments and the development of the “model” police station. It does not directly support the views expressed in the Libya 2020 Vision and is not scaled to make a significant contribution beyond technical assessment and a pilot construction project for a “model” police station. Yet, the rule of law activities implemented under the SLCRR project have helped to shape UNDP’s dedicated project on Rule of Law and Policing, which will carry out more focused and specialized interventions, including capacity building activities to key justice institutions as well as conducting necessary rehabilitation works.

12 Libya 2020 Vision, a plan for transformative change by 2020, LIAS, p. 8

Output 3: Support local economic recovery/development, including job creation and livelihoods

Conflict exerts a strong toll in terms of economic and social costs, with population displacement, loss of assets, insecurity and lack of personal safety. The loss of assets and of formally steady jobs means that a number of citizens have had to resort to other forms of income to make ends meet. The efforts to develop economic activities and create jobs, through the partnership established with Tatweer Research, is an essential effort to attempt to address the needs, and in particular of the vulnerable population, in a context of high volatility and insecurity. The output 3 is fully aligned to the needs of the population, and in particular of the vulnerable groups who are most affected by the conflict and the declining standard of living.

KQ.12. In addition to responding to the needs of the Libyan authorities, the project is also directly aligned to the EU Trust Fund which is supporting various actors in Libya including the UNDP. As regards to the funding to the specific sectors, according to the EC Excel spreadsheet shared with the evaluation team, of a total of EUR 24.6 million for all actors, 12% was allocated to supporting municipal councils, 15% education (including TVET), 29% health, 16% water and sanitation. These sectors represent the bulk of the investments made by the SLCRR project which is therefore contributing to the objective of the EC funding. In addition, the EC already approved the second phase of the project, so the contents of this report are meant to inform phase 3 of the project. The SLCRR is directly relevant to the priorities of the EC, which funded phase 1 based on the contents of the DoA (annex 1). The project is therefore fully in line with the priority needs of the EC.

Regarding the needs of the vulnerable groups, the damage caused by war and strife over the past years in Libya has profoundly affected the social and economic fabric in the country. Divisions and fragmentation of the society among specific interest groups means that those who do not have a safety net will be most affected. In concrete terms, those vulnerable groups affected by the instability and the conflict, including IDPs, refugees, migrants and other vulnerable groups (such as female-headed households, widows, elderly, disabled) are hard pressed to maintain a dignified living. The provision of municipal services, in particular hospitals, schools, and water and sanitation services, as well as provision of electrical power, are essential needs that cannot be guaranteed in all target municipalities given the damages and breakdown, lack of maintenance, and insecurity, of some of the public infrastructures and services. The provision of improved public services directly fills a gap in the current situation in many of the target municipalities, in particular for the vulnerable groups. Similarly, the provision of support to develop employment and income-generating activities, including vocational training, comes as a priority to contribute to the development of the resilience of the population, and contributes to the restoration of a fragile stability in the country.

KQ.13. What gaps were filled by the project?

The project filled many gaps in terms of reconstruction of essential infrastructure in a number of key service areas (notably health, education, water and sanitation) as well as in the
development of an inclusive municipal platform that brought together the various groups living in the municipalities (through an agreement with PCI) to develop a conflict sensitive mechanism to identify municipal priorities. It also directly came to support the service delivery of municipalities, as well as developing income generation and livelihood opportunities for the vulnerable groups, in a context of high unemployment and insecurity related to the conflict. Specific training projects (such as the partnership with Toyota) also provided a limited, albeit welcome, support to vulnerable groups and offered them with a chance to find employment in the private sector. Through Tatweer Research, the project developed several opportunities for business development and income generation, as described in the effectiveness section hereunder.

KQ14. Were stakeholders consulted in the project design

The project was negotiated with the EU, and later the consultation process with MoLG took place. In the first phase of the project, the target municipalities were not selected together with the MoLG, which is requesting higher coordination in the targeting of the phase 3 municipalities. While municipalities themselves did not form part of the initial project discussion, once the project was being implemented on the ground, the UNDP staff in Libya had close contact with municipalities in order to define the priority projects that would be implemented under the SLCRR. It is not entirely clear, however, if for the partnership with PCI UNDP staff coordinated with municipalities bilaterally, or whether there were coordination relays through the municipal groups created by PCI (social peace partnerships) and the projects undertaken by PCI under the SAM (Social Accountability Mechanism). This indicates the need for a clearer coordination and enhanced communication between the UNDP and the PCI in Libya.

5.2 Efficiency
K.Q.2.1 Did communication amongst the different stakeholders (Libyan Authorities, UNDP, EU) contribute to project efficiency?

The SLCRR project was found to be highly efficient in communicating with the key stakeholders. Initially the project was in contact with the EU and developed the DoA in close collaboration with the EU. A few months later the communication and coordination were extended to the MoLG as initially the Ministry was also undergoing some structural changes and some 13 people were involved in the initial communication setup, which led to some bureaucratic delays. At present two people are the focal points for the project and are in close communication with UNDP. The EU indicated that the communication with UNDP was good, and they were delivering more quickly than some of the other partners (the total programme for the North Africa Window is EUR 90 million amongst five actors), and therefore the EU has been keen to provide additional funds to UNDP.

UNDP SLCRR project was mentioned as “an example to others”. Given the tight deadline to present the proposal to the donor, the DoA came first, and therefore the conflict analysis came
later into the document, which explains why the conflict analysis is not so strong. The EU is currently covering 49 municipalities in Libya and wants to extend its programme to cover another 50. The MoLG also commented the fact that only a part of the affected communities were covered by the project, and that those in which the project was not implemented were also complaining. The underlying reasons for this is limited availability of funds and security/access considerations. Also, it is important to acknowledge that UNDP is addressing these concerns through the second and intended third phase of the SLCRR project where the scope of the implementation is extended to new municipalities, subject to availability of funds. Furthermore, the project is coordinating with UNDP’s SFL project and projects implemented by other development partners to ensure complementarities in terms of coverage.

Furthermore, in some of the success stories (see effectiveness criterion hereunder), the successful achievements in public service delivery are exerting a pull factor for populations outside of the municipality to obtain the services in project municipalities. The main limitation that was observed during the field data collection in Libya is that the procurement procedures have sometimes led to delays and difficulties in completing the contracted works. It seemed at times as if the procurement services did not share the objective of the project management, so procurement should be aligned to the project management to enhance its capacity to achieve good results. Concrete examples are the fixing of the AC system in the House of Animals at the University of Benghazi, for which only USD 10,000 were contractually allocated, which caused the company to decline the contract, or the contracting of the corniche at the historical Benghazi city centre, for which the construction company didn’t complete the work and withdrew from the project due to financial considerations. These are just two examples that show that procurement needs to be more streamlined with SLCRR project management to ensure the timely delivery of the contracted works as per the required quality standards.

Another point regarding the efficiency of the UNDP project is the quality of the staff based in Libya, who are able to work in a very challenging environment. They are well accepted and respected by the municipal authorities and local groups and know how to achieve results under difficult conditions. The staff is a key asset of the UNDP SLCRR project.

K.Q.2.2. Has it been efficiently managed?

While the evaluation is no substitute to a financial audit, the project appears to have been efficiently managed as per the current administrative set-up which is detailed in the DoA along with the posts funded under the project (19). It needs to be recalled that UNDP is working with two key partners under responsible party agreements: with PCI for the aspect related to conflict sensitivity and streamlining of the do no harm approach, and with Tatweer Research for the output 3 related to business development and income generation. Each of the two partners submit progress reports to the UNDP, but given that the bulk of the UNDP services is placed in construction works under this project, under output 1 and output 2 (model police station), there is limited capacity to ensure oversight and monitoring of project partners. It was also recognized by PCI that more UNDP presence on the ground where they operate would lead to
enhanced coordination and efficiency in project implementation. The Social Peace and Local Development plans, and the small grants programme under “social peace” interventions were undertaken in five municipalities (Sebretha, Benghazi, Kufra, Murzuq, Sebha) and completed in Sebathed Benghazi and Kufra. However, during the field data collection, these interventions were not mentioned by the UNDP or the municipalities and the national consultant did not provide a visual confirmation of their achievement.

As regards to the financial disbursement, at the time of the second progress report in December 2018, UNDP had already a delivery rate of 92% representing USD 11,991,084 out of two advances totalling USD 12,985,549.19, from the overall contribution of EUR 18 million (USD 19,607,400) for project implementation until 5th June 2020. This high absorption capacity (61% of the total EU funding committed half-way through the life of the project) led to the submission of an early progress report and the decision to start the second phase ahead of schedule as the works and activities were advancing at a good pace.

K.Q.2.3. How well was the project designed?

The project made great efforts to include a complete and comprehensive assessment of the situation in the country. Part of the original design was based on the earlier “Rapid Diagnostic Assessment of Local Governance in Libya 2015” which presents detailed findings regarding local governance. At the same time, the deadline to present the project document was short and this means that the project development process had to be rushed. While some parts were able to include relevant information about the needs and develop a phased and gradual approach starting from six municipalities (Tripoli, Benghazi, Al Kufra, Murzuq, Sebathed, Sebha), other aspects were not fully developed. Two aspects in particular were not sufficiently elaborated at the project development stage, but they did not fully integrate at a later date the knowledge gained through the project implementation: one is related to conflict analysis, the other is related to the development of the results framework and more generally for the M&E system at the outcome level.

1. Conflict analysis could have been more developed in the original proposal. The interview with the EU confirmed that given time constraints the DoA had come first and the conflict analysis later. However, while the DoA does not contain a conflict analysis (which were done subsequently by target municipality by Atkins Strategy), it does not foresee in the staffing for the project the need for a peace and conflict advisor. This is in view of the evaluation team the single largest gap in the project development, as all conflict related matters were outsourced: A) to Atkins Strategy (which has gone bankrupt in the course of the assignment, so a former staff of Atkins Strategy had to be hired by UNDP to complete the Rule of Law Assessment in the municipalities). It could be argued that while these assessments are technically sound, they refer much more to the rule of law and justice component, rather than to a conflict analysis that identifies drivers, connectors, constraints and provides guidance to the project on how to work with conflict. In any case, the results of the RoL assessments come under output 2 but
have limited application to the implementation of outputs 1 and 3. B) PCI was selected by UNDP as the sole conflict management organisation to provide a conflict analysis and support in the implementation of the project output 1. While PCI started with very strong early results, the linkages between the work done by PCI in creating social cohesion and stability, first through the creation of “Social Peace Partnerships” and later with the small grants programme “Social accountability mechanisms” – up to USD 22,000 each) formed the thrust of the deliverables by PCI. The TOR used to establish the partnership with PCI mentions the need to provide updated conflict analysis, and the expected results were “i. Undertake continuous conflict analysis in the selected locations starting with an inception analysis during May 2016 in the selected locations, ii. Work together with the UNDP team to ensure that conflict analysis supports conflict sensitivity of interventions; iii. Support locally led conflict resolution initiatives led by civil society organisations”. The section on effectiveness analyses to what extend PCI has reached the intended objectives. But the gap is the technical capacity within the UNDP country office to ensure a proper oversight of the conflict analysis dimension. In other countries that operate in conflict environments UNDP has resorted to using maps of conflict and regular monitoring of conflict through monthly reports (e.g. in Lebanon), as a risk management measure to salvage the sustainability of the investments made. None of this has been built in the interventions in Libya, and giving the fluidity of the conflict and the resurgence during the project life of open warfare between the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Haftar faction, the UNDP has had to relocate its staff to Tunis, where they are currently based, and limitations on field access and deployment occurred on more than one occasion. The absence of a risk management tool linked to an analysis of conflict dynamics means that UNDP has limited means of appraising the sustainability of the investment, particularly for those activities undertaken near the conflict area (and several examples were provided to this effect).

2. A senior peace and conflict advisor is therefore urgently needed for the UNDP CO to support the steering of the project as regards to the conflict analysis and project implementation as well as in developing the necessary peace and analysis tools to ensure a more informed risk management strategy of the project. There is a strong risk with only one organisation providing conflict analysis that the international community may be putting itself at risk and UNDP should ensure it has the proper skills in-house to make its own conflict analysis to drive the agenda in line with UN values and its normative frameworks.

3. The project developed a succinct Theory of Change, which is reproduced as part of the evaluation title page. In line with UNDG and UNDP guidance, a results framework containing both outputs and outcome results, with the corresponding indicators, should be developed and used for the monitoring of the project. The initial framework under the DoA (p. 19 V. Results Framework) is confusing, as it mentions the intended outcome
as stated in the Programme Results and Resource Framework as: “support local authorities in Libya to respond to the many conflict and human mobility induced challenges by strengthening the local resilience and recovery mechanisms”. A first problem is that this statement is technically not an outcome statement. Furthermore, the outcome indicators referred to are SP Outcome 6: early recovery and rapid return to sustainable development pathways are achieved in post-conflict (sic) and post-disaster settings – indicators 6.1.1., 6.1.2, 6.2.1, 6.4.2. The focus of the Results Framework is therefore essentially focusing on the output level. It is understood and mentioned in the documentation provided that a refined results framework should have been developed during the project implementation, in line with the lessons learned. As a result of the ROM mission that was undertaken in December 2018, a Results and Resource Framework was established by the UNDP together with the EU, adding two columns with specific inputs, statements and indicators. However, the logframe remains at the output level for the UNDP, while it mentions EUTF NOA overall objective and the specific objective. This means that the project seems to align with the EU and to a lesser extent with the UN instruments and tools, such as the CPD (Country Programme Document) or wider planning frameworks\(^\text{13}\). The heading of the revised results framework reads as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EUTF NOA overall objectives:</th>
<th>To contribute to strengthening protection and resilience of those in need (StO 3 #)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUTF NOA overall objective indicator</td>
<td>Indicator for StO 1 Average degree of resilience of individuals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the ToC designed for the project, which was not revised along with the results framework, indicates an outcome that is mentioned as “The population groups can

\(^{13}\) Comment from the UNDP CO: “Regarding statements on the correlation between UNDP and the EU’s TF logical framework in section 5.2, K.Q.2.3, page 24 -25 - we would like to highlight that the development of UNDP’s logical framework was dictated by UNDP’s prevailing requirements whereby UNDP is required to align the outcomes with the CPD and SP and which were accordingly reflected in the Annex I-DoA, of course, the content of the results framework is always discussed and agreed with the EU as the donors; at the same time the “alignment process” with the EU’s own TF monitoring framework, as developed by ICMPD, was not intended to substitute UNDP’s own logical framework but intended to make a linkage between UNDP’s and EU TF frameworks to serve the EU’s own monitoring and reporting purposes on the overall EU TF programme that caters for numerous partners and projects funded by the EU.

We would appreciate if this was substantiated in the report to avoid misinterpretations on the project lacking of a clear vision of its overarching goal and the way it contributes to sustainable development in Libya, in line with the UNDP mandate, vision and objectives reflected in the mentioned UN/UNDP planning frameworks.” The evaluator notes that this is addressing the higher-level outcome results, not the project specific outcome.
effectively cope with and mitigate the risks of irregular migration and be strong drivers of resilience-building and development efforts”. While there is some similarity in the wording of the two statements (EUTF NOA overall objective and UNDP project ToC), there are also significant differences.

It would be very important for UNDP to discuss with the EU a revision of the project ToC and identify technically realistic and feasible indicators for the outcome level. From a technical M&E perspective, the suggested overall objective indicator does not appear to be very realistic: measuring the average degree of resilience of individuals requires a complicated set of data and should be a composite indicator which is unlikely to be applicable in the Libyan context.

Another cause of concern is that the definition of the UN system regarding an outcome appears to be different than the terminology used by the EU. It is also important that M&E experts from UNDP and EU discuss and clarify the concepts and definitions of “outcome”, “special objective”, and “overall objective”. It is equally critical to define what is the level of result that the project has to achieve: For the UN system a whole and all its agencies, the results now focus at the outcome level (hence the need to have a clear and coherent outcome statement and supporting indicators). Using the EU terminology, the special objective should be the equivalent of the outcome level for UNDP. Which means that this is the level of results that should be achieved by the end of the project. The overall objective is a higher-level result (impact level) which the project cannot reach by itself and will not be completed by the end of the project. It is also recognised by the UNDG and the UNDP that outcomes are normally about changes in institutional performance or behaviour among individuals and groups, and this is what the project is contributing to. Thus, the outcome statement and supporting indicators should be capturing that level of result, not the higher impact level.

This is not a semantic discussion about M&E. It is a fundamental necessity to state the level of progress (in results language) that the project is bound to achieve by the end of its implementation period. That outcome is the vision for the project success, and drives all outputs and activities under the project, over and beyond other planning frameworks which it may be supporting. A technical group of UNDP/EU M&E and RBM experts should be established to work on clarifying and agreeing on the use of the ToC and the results framework and the terminology used to avoid ambiguity and share a common vision of the expected results by the end of the project (something that can be used for all UNDP/EU funded projects). The correlation with the EUTF indicator framework endorsed in February 2019 which appears on p. 7 of the December 2018 progress report further introduces the concept of Immediate Outcomes (IOs), which should correspond to the project transformative results. However, the wording used in the formulation of the IOs is not aligned to the UNDG guidance on results-based management and therefore it retains some ambiguity about the change process involved. The UN and the EU need to come together on a common framework for the hierarchy of results under
its programming and agree on the correct formulation of a results hierarchy that is fully compliant with Results-Based Management practices.

5.3 Effectiveness

K.Q.3.1. What are the key results of the project?

The project was effective in achieving its outputs in a difficult context with limited security in many of the targeted areas. This means that results that may appear to be normal in a stable context are actually much more difficult to achieve in a conflict environment. Some municipalities, such as Tripoli, have seen recurrent conflict and armed strife, and this has led to many additional efforts by the staff and contractors to be able to provide the services and carry out the activities as planned, although in some cases work had to be reprogrammed given the persisting insecurity.

Despite very constraining working conditions, UNDP has been able to deliver significant results in Libya through the project. Not one of the interviewers met in Tunis or in Libya had negative remarks about UNDP, and many showed their understanding for some of the delays given the security conditions in the country. That said, UNDP achieved the following key results through the project, presented under the relevant outputs that made the outcome level results possible:

Output 1: Enhancing the quality of the services for women and men in the target localities by rehabilitating critical infrastructure and delivering equipment

The key result under output 1 has been the provision of critical infrastructure construction, rehabilitation, repair and equipment, with a prominent investment in health and educational infrastructure, that has allowed the local population and vulnerable groups to benefit from the health, education and other essential services in areas where public services were no longer available, damaged or deficient. As indicated in the December 2018 progress report, no less than 11 works sites were finalised, and 20 sets of equipment were delivered. The field data collection in target municipalities showed that the general public was very pleased with the access to health services and schools, and that the services were being used. Municipalities were equally grateful and supportive of the works undertaken by the UNDP under the project. There was clearly an increase in public service provision as a result of the project, which benefited the vulnerable groups and the general population, with an estimated 1.7 million people having improved access to basic services in the six target municipalities (Tripoli, Benghazi, Sebratah, Sebha, Al Kufra, Murzuq).

Output indicators show that the project is on track, with five (out of six) planned coordination mechanisms established (except for Tripoli), 100% of Tier 1 priorities completed in Benghazi and Murzuq, work tendered for Al Kufra, Sebratah and Ajdabiya, work on bill of quantities completed for Sebha, and prioritisation for six municipalities in
Tripoli pending.\textsuperscript{14} The work on capacity development for local municipalities was expected to unfold in 2019.

Under Output 1, PCI was hired as partner to provide support to municipalities for community mobilisation and conflict sensitivity. Social Peace and Local Development (SPLD) partnerships were established in five municipalities (all except in Tripoli) with a total of 159 members as of 15/8/2019.\textsuperscript{15} This work was coupled with 7 workshops of one-day community consultations with a total of 326 participants (of which 64 female and 262 male), five two-day training on conflict management in the same five municipalities for a total of 124 participants (40 female and 84 male), the development of Social Accountability Mechanisms (SAM) for six one-day training to develop inception meetings (with 152 participants and 53 female and 99 male), and five grants as follows, based on the information received from PCI:

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Area} & \textbf{Concept} & \textbf{Beneficiaries} & \textbf{Comments} \\
\hline
Benghazi & AC repair vocational training of unemployed & 29 males ages 20 to 30 & Completed \\
\hline
Kufra & Improving student transportation to/from university given insecurity & 68 students (31 female) & On-going, increased attendance \\
\hline
Sebratah & Enhancing human security through renovation of street lighting & 75\% of city population of 13,000 (woman particularly affected) & Completed Survey: 92\% believe improved lighting will contribute to making residents safer \\
\hline
Murzuq & Renovating bathroom facilities in 19 local schools & 8,000 pupils ages 6 - 18 & On-going, expected to improve health and hygiene \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Grants status (up to 22,000 USD/each)}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{14} SLCRR progress report 6 June 2018 to 31 December 2018, p. 6

\textsuperscript{15} PCI, Building local capacities to manage migration flows through needs assessment, participatory development conflict analysis, Summary of Beneficiaries, membership of Social Peace Partnerships as of 15/08/2019.
An interview with an advisor (and also PCI mentor) to the Sebha mayor in Tunis during the scoping mission provided further feedback on the process. According to him PCI started working successfully for six months and then stopped. The president or head of the Partnership (SPLD), who is elected, had to quit and the Partnership died. At the beginning there were 65 people in the SPLD, 3 from each of the 14 areas, including women. But after two or three meetings, attendance dropped to 25 as expectations did not materialize, and then the president left and the whole thing collapsed. Initially it was expected that the PCI partnership would be involved across all development issues in the community, and provide support between and amongst government bodies, even outside of the SLCRR project. At the same time, UNDP staff reportedly never went to Sebha, only a UNDP engineer once with the UN delegation, but there is no project officer in the municipality. The above information is from a single source and not triangulated.

The national expert did not travel to Sebha to verify the above, but there are some issues which need to be addressed, seeing some disconnect between the different key informants. Firstly, when conflict prevention mechanisms are operative, investments should be done on an improved risk management scenario. Armed militia are part of the operating environment, so they must be integrated in the negotiations (directly or indirectly) from the start in order to avoid losing the investments made in infrastructure repair. It is not clear how PCI assessed the feasibility of the grant which was later suspended given the militia’s occupation of the Centre, but it does raise some questions about the risk management capacity.

Secondly, it appears that PCI leveraged some expectations with the municipality, envisaging its role as local development partners that seemed to go beyond the SLCRR project. However, the apparent absence of a UNDP presence in the municipality means that the information flow on the objectives of the PCI partnership, the roles of the SPLD, and of the UNDP, were not streamlined, leading to a certain level of misunderstanding, or at least, of diverging

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16 PCI, Building local capacities to manage migration flows through needs assessment, participatory development conflict analysis, Sebha grant update, provided by e-mail by PCI
expectations. There is an important lesson here, as the PCI partnership was treated as a separate component under output 1, instead of being the basis of all programming under the project (e.g. using a conflict analysis to drive all project activities and outputs). Closer monitoring of the PCI component should have been made, and a clearer definition of roles and responsibilities should have been made publicly in the target municipalities to ensure a common understanding of each party’s functions, modus operandi and coordination procedures.

Thirdly, PCI seems to have initially developed quick gains in many of the target municipalities. But there does not seem to have been significant achievements beyond those reported by 31st December 2018, and the value-added of the PCI partnership is becoming more questionable. The national consultant who visited Sebratah, Benghazi and Tripoli did not have the opportunity to verify the works of the PCI grants in the municipalities, as the contacts with the UNDP and the municipalities did not seem to consider the PCI partnership as an integral part of the SLCRR project. This reinforces the impression that the PCI partnership with UNDP was treated as a separate component of output 1, instead of forming the backbone of a conflict sensitive programme involving all three outputs under a shared understanding of the conflict dynamics and informed risk management.

Output 2: Support local authorities and administrations in fulfilling their role and responsibilities with a focus on enforcing local stability and community security.

Under this output two key results were achieved, none of which can be considered “outcome” results in the sense that it has not yet contributed to a change of behaviour or of institutional capacity. Firstly, a total of 75 RoL staff were involved in the consultative workshops conducted by Aktis Strategy for Tripoli and Sebha. As the RoL assessment were expected to cover three municipalities, an additional RoL assessment was to be carried out by Aktis Strategy. However, the company went bankrupt and as a result there were delays in obtaining the RoL assessment for Benghazi. UNDP indicated that the consultant who is actually conducting the assessment in Benghazi is the same person that did the RoL assessment in Sebha. As the company was bankrupt, he was contracted on an individual basis to carry out the assessment using the same methodology.

The assessments are technically sound and can be useful for specific RoL projects and security and justice sector reform. The RoL component was reportedly absent from the original project design which contained two components, and it was included at the request of the EU. It is important to note that there is a RoL project outside of the SLCRR, and that the technical aspects of RoL under the SLCRR are guided by the RoL project team, since the SLCRR does not have specific RoL expertise. The results of the assessments are useful to guide future UNDP projects in RoL and justice reform, but do not directly operationalise or reinforce local authorities in enforcing local stability and community security.
The other main result is the on-going construction of a “model” police station which is supposed to be used as a reference for the construction of future police stations. The station is built in Hai Andalus police station (Tripoli), formerly occupied by militia. According to the ministry of interior interview with a member of the steering committee, the project is 40% completed. There is a civil engineer from MoI following up the construction and the quality is reported to be very good. The MoI indicates being very satisfied about the UNDP performance. Two concerns remain: 1) MoI wants the training to police officers to start before the construction is completed, not after in order to avoid losing time and 2) the issue of equipment and further is still to be solved. While there is no fighting in the area, the construction company is reportedly afraid of going there, which means that there are some delays in the construction (partly given clashes there in the second half of 2018), but with a completion foreseen by the end of the year.

This station is expected to be a replicable model for Libya, but the main issue that may be a source of problems is ensuring the functionality of the police station (maintenance, running costs, equipment, furniture, staff, etc.) so the ownership and commitment from the MoI is a necessary condition to obtaining a functional model police station in the future.

As regards to the revised EUTF Framework of February 2019, there are some contradictions between the formulation of the Specific Objective (which uses UNDP Output 2 statement) and the Immediate Outcome (IO) which is another level of results. From an RBM perspective a specific objective cannot be an output, it should be placed at the outcome level. As mentioned above a technical discussion about RBM is needed between UNDP and the EU to ensure consistency and coherence of the project results framework.

**Output 3: Support local economic recovery/development, including job creation and livelihoods.**

While for output 1 PCI was the key partner for conflict analysis through a responsible party agreement with UNDP, for output 3 it is Tatweer Research through the TEC (Tatweer Entrepreneurship Campus) that was the main actor in providing business development, implementing livelihood programmes, setting up business incubators, providing grant funding to start-up business community, through the impact fund. A substantial effort was undertaken, primarily in Benghazi where the TEC is located, to develop the business capacity through a series of concrete measures.

Key results obtained were the capacity through the TEC programme to actively contribute to solidifying the entrepreneurship culture in Libya through several activities and services. Up to June 2019, the Tatweer Entrepreneurship Campus community grew to 520 entrepreneurs who received training and over 240 start-up ideas from all over the country that applied to either TEC incubator or the Impact Fund. 49 start-ups applied to TEC Incubator in Benghazi. As for the Impact Fund, 198 start-ups applied for grant funding in two rounds. In the first round, out of 109 applications to the Impact Fund, six start-ups were selected and received grants from the
Impact Fund. In the second round, 83 start-ups applied for funding, out of which additional six start-ups started to receive grant funding for a total of over 400,000 Libyan Dinars.

Furthermore, despite security challenges, the TEC programme became operational and started implementing community programs in Sebha and Tripoli. There are currently 54 entrepreneurs participating in on-going trainings in business management and web and mobile app development. These entrepreneurs are the nucleus of TEC community in Tripoli and Sebha and TEC wants to make it grow. As for Benghazi, TEC continued to support entrepreneurs and solidify the entrepreneurship culture and ecosystem in the country through their community programs such as TEC Talks and TEC University Roadshows. Also, during a visit to Benghazi, Ghassan Salame, SRSG and the Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya, visited Tatweer’s office and got introduced to the work that Tatweer is doing on the ground and met with entrepreneurs in TEC Space.

During this period, TEC Incubator continued to provide its services to the incubated projects. However, the number of incubated start-ups in Benghazi dropped from 13 to 11 start-ups. Furthermore, TEC Incubator teams in Tripoli and Sebha started identifying potential start-ups to join the incubator. From January 2019, TEC started the second phase and recruited staff in Tripoli and Sebha until the end of the projects in March 2020. TEC does not possess physical facilities in Tripoli and Sebha for training, which is one of its limitations.

The partnership with Tatweer seems to be leveraging promising results based on the progress to date, particularly in three of the project municipalities (Benghazi, where Tatweer has its headquarters, Sebha, and Tripoli), while there are additional challenges, including lack of security, to extending the services to other municipalities. The applications for the Impact Fund were numerous, with 197 applications in the two rounds (including 31% of women led start-ups) and 48% from Benghazi, 26% from Tripoli, 7% from Sebha and the rest from other cities. However, the partnership is clearly serving its role to create enabling conditions for the development of business and livelihoods and is also mindful of the gender dimension and the need to support women led start-up businesses.

Another partnership was also established with Toyota Discover your Talent Programme, which allowed 20 participants to follow an apprenticeship programme, including five internally displaced persons. 17 of those participants graduated from the 3-months training programme. The programme is undertaken since 2012 as part of the company’s social responsibility programme and has trained 245 students so far. Two courses are run yearly with the Vocational Institutes (MoE) with 20 students each, and one course since 2018 with UNDP with some more flexibility on the admission requirements. All participants’ expenses, including accommodation, internet access and medical insurance are paid for by Toyota.

Originally an additional component was supposed to be developed with CSOs under output 3, in order to enhance self-reliance and livelihoods stabilization for vulnerable and marginalised
groups. According to UNDP’s December 2018 report, the livelihoods programme was to be fully launched in 2019. No updates on this component were obtained.

Beyond the useful activities and services developed under both partnerships (Tatweer and Toyota), UNDP should be mindful of the coverage of the activities it is providing, not only in terms of counting those who are selected and participate in the training and receive the grants. This is an important issue in terms of scaling: 198 start-ups applied for grant funding under the two rounds, but only 12 were able to receive a grant (e.g. 6% of the applicants). The question is to what extent these start-ups are providing a sustainable income to their staff, or how many staff are actually participating in the business, or what are the business plans and perspectives for further expansion and opportunities? UNDP is focusing on this aspect in the third phase of the project.

There is a clear interest in obtaining grant funds from start-ups, but could the total envelope of the grant be increased, and could UNDP provide funds to this end? This is one option that would contribute to a higher number of grantees if there is an agreement with the donor that the grant is deemed sufficiently critical to develop economic activity and generate income. Similarly, it would be useful to obtain some feedback from the entrepreneurs who were trained in the TEC but did not submit grant requests. To what extent is the training contributing to income creation and economic development?

The partnership with Toyota is also a good programme. However, in a context of economic difficulties for the firm, it does not appear viable to envisage an upscaling of the partnership, as the capacity for training apprentices is limited, and there are several stages (or levels) which can be completed with Toyota’s certification in the city of Misrata. Therefore, the sustainability of the programme is somewhat under strain and UNDP should review the investment, considering the limited number of beneficiaries who benefit (20 per year), the fact that all are men who only complete the basic three-months training, and that the apprenticeship is not located in any of the SLCRR target municipalities and its location may be a constraint to some potential participants.

There is not yet any evidence or indicators that show the economic impact of the business development under output 3, but it should be one of the indicators to be used at the end of the project to appraise success, along with the number of people assisted.

It also needs to be noted that the EU ROM mission of February 2019 provided a “green” rating to all questions relating to the effectiveness of the project.¹⁷ In fact from 32 questions contained in the ROM report, 28 have a green rating and 4 a yellow rating, thus showing a clearly positive assessment which was also used by the EU for attributing additional funds to the project.

¹⁷ The EU ROM mission uses a traffic light system of green, yellow and red, where green means “good or very good”. So SLCRR had full marks regarding its effectiveness, as well as full marks for efficiency.
K.Q.3.2. To what extent has the project contributed to enhancing resilience capacity in target municipalities?

The question requires a differentiated response as not all municipalities have been involved to the same degree in the project activities or its outputs, particularly for the activities undertaken by PCI and TEC and Aktis Strategy.

It is difficult to appraise the results of the project in terms of enhancing resilience when the term has not been defined in the project document. The term of resilience was first used in relation to the risk of disasters and has gradually become used in other contexts such as countries suffering from conflict. According to the United Nations, “Resilience is the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions.”

It can therefore be confirmed that the rebuilding of basic infrastructure and the restoration of public services, as undertaken under output 1 of the project, directly support the definition of resilience for the communities who benefitted from the project activities in the six municipalities. It is more difficult to appraise whether the partnership with PCI is found to support community resilience. While it appeared at the beginning of the project to be building towards such a result, the data collected during the field interviews seem to indicate otherwise. At present, the PCI partnership is run as a stand-alone component of output 1, with little coordination with UNDP in the field in Libya, and even municipal authorities interviewed did not make a clear connection between the work of the PCI and UNDP. This undermines the potential of the PCI partnership as it is a single component of a wider programme, with more funding targeting the construction and rehabilitation of essential public services.

For output 2, it is unlikely that the RoL assessment will be enough to develop the resilience of the community or restore essential functions of the rule of law. The construction of one “model” police station may serve such a purpose, provided the building is manned, equipped, and maintained fully functional with a commitment from the MoI to ensure all running costs.

Under output 3, the creation of business opportunities clearly has the potential to enhance the resilience of the target beneficiaries, if such opportunities are successful and are coupled with increased gains and income generation from the activities. Similarly, the vocational training can be useful (Toyota partnership) if the training leads to employment. According to a phone interview with Toyota, 18% of graduates work with dealers, 13% work in the government sector, 60% are unemployed and the rest are not reachable (9%). Applying a similar ratio to the 20 apprentices financed under the SLCRR brings a total of 6 persons employed from the

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number of initial participants, which may not be the most cost-effective manner to provide employment to the target beneficiaries.

K.Q.3.3. Is the project generating change at municipal level? If so, which one?

The possibility of first-hand data collection in the field allowed the national evaluation consultant to observe the changes at the municipal level, particularly in those municipalities where the coordination and ownership were stronger. Although only three municipalities were visited (Sebratah, Benghazi, Tripoli), clear evidence of change was observed.

While each municipality had some level of change, often limited by the constraining security conditions, all had some degree of success in showing how the project supported municipal priorities, contributed to the restoration of essential basic services and provided critical infrastructure support to the vulnerable population and service users. To give only one example, the rehabilitation of the health clinic in Sebratah, which can be considered as a good practice example of what UNDP can accomplish. The rehabilitation of the health clinic has allowed to restart service provision and the municipality and the health staff are very satisfied, indicating that the work is of excellent quality and the rehabilitation of the conflict damaged building included the walls, windows, doors, floors, air conditioning and painting, as well as the supply of medical equipment. The facility is now a standard-setter for the region, and it attends 6,000 cases per month according to the Director. Of these a significant number come from other municipalities, as they see Sebratah as a reference for health services. The national consultant also interviewed some of the patients in the health facility who confirmed that the services improved significantly after the rehabilitation, and that they are very happy with the services provided.

Similarly, the support to the Emergency Department of Sebratah Teaching Hospital provided key capacity enhancement to deal with the 100,000 annual cases and, out of the 4,244 admitted in-patients in the first half of 2019, some 75% were from outside of Sebratah. The negative aspect for the municipal authorities is that other municipalities that did not receive the support from the UNDP are now requesting similar support, and Sebratah municipality is experimenting a pull factor for those patients who are not residents of the municipality but come to Sebratah to access the health services.

K.Q.3.4. Have the outputs been used by MoLG or municipalities, and how?

All infrastructural works and rehabilitation undertaken by the project, as well as supply of equipment, are being used by the target municipalities when and where security issues do not impede their use. The PCI grants were also carried out in the municipalities, but no direct observation of their results was possible during the field data collection. Local economic development and job and income creation are largely placed with TEC partnership and the Toyota programme. It is not clear to what extent the municipalities actually contribute to the business development (except in Benghazi where the TEC is placed and the incubators are located) so UNDP should review the possibility of further involving target municipalities in the
economic development component of the project (for issues such as training, incubator, mentors and training instructors, amongst others).

K.Q.3.5. What has been the biggest change brought about by the project (Most Significant Change)?

The Most Significant Change is the restoration of critical infrastructure and the provision of essential basic services. Additionally, empowering the municipalities in the coordination and communication regarding the choice of projects and activities undertaken, leads to a good acceptance of UNDP in both GNA and non-GNA municipalities.

The example of Sebratah health services can be used to highlight the biggest change that the project has brought: a functioning public health service that serves the needs of the population and contributes to developing the resilience of the community. To some extent the work of PCI seems to have contributed to the selection of some of the projects approved by the municipality (Sebratah), although results differ from municipality to municipality. It is not evident that conflict sensitivity is mainstreamed across all project outputs and components.

K.Q.3.6. How can the project generate a greater impact?

The project needs to be developed based on a comprehensive conflict analysis and an understanding of the conflict dynamics in Libya. This should guide all activities under the project and should not constitute a component of one of the project outputs. To achieve this UNDP needs to recruit a peace and conflict advisor with previous experience in programming in conflict environments, to drive conflict sensitive programming at UNDP. At present conflict sensitivity is not fully included or understood by some actors, and it should be the backbone of the project. A better understanding of conflict dynamics and the development of a risk management strategy, articulated through a visual and timely mapping of conflict actors, could allow UNDP to have a greater impact in the work it does, while at the same time being more keenly aware of the risks involved in the selected locations. UNDP has a regional peace and conflict advisor based in Amman who could also provide support in the conflict analysis and the project design for phase 3.

Another aspect that may enhance impact is to have a clear vision of success for the project, that is able to be articulated, shared and communicated, through a properly designed RBM results framework, with coherent outcome and output statements, and relevant indicators that are SMART and show the expected results. Coverage is a key dimension when dealing in conflict environments, and it is important to see the percentage of the population that is benefitting of essential services, of income generating opportunities, and of other activities, in order to identify the gaps and the unmet needs.

The UNDP staff in Libya should have closer communication and coordination with its field partners, such as PCI, TEC, Toyota, in order to share a common vision of success and avoid some misunderstandings on their respective roles.
The SLCRR needs to be mindful of the selection of the municipalities, given the political environment and the shifting allegiances (linked to the funds municipalities receive) to concentrate its work on “good practices examples” and then gradually expand in the same region in order to cover the unmet needs (e.g. based on an appraisal of the coverage provided). A clearer strategy for the targeting of municipalities based on agreed selection criteria will contribute to a stronger implementation capability, particularly if the municipalities show an interest and commitment to cooperate with the SLCRR.

5.4 Sustainability

K.Q.4.1. How much of the project benefits are expected to continue beyond the period of implementation?

The sustainability of the project is very much linked to the funding allocated by the MoLG or the municipalities (which reportedly have limited funds) in order to ensure the continued provision of basic services and ensuring the running costs of the staff and facilities. It is not known whether UNDP has developed a formal agreement with municipalities that guarantee commitment from municipalities to fund essential services and the maintenance of equipment and infrastructure. What appears clear from the field visits to three municipalities is that there is a strong interest amongst the municipalities to preserve the achievements made under the output, particularly the infrastructure component undertaken by UNDP directly though tenders and construction service providers and suppliers. PCI has documented a number of grants under the Social Accountability Mechanism, some reportedly with clear success (Sebratah, Benghazi), other with different outcomes than those anticipated (Sebha).  

The two major constraints to sustainability are: 1) the shifting allegiance of municipalities. Depending where UNDP is working (GNA or non-GNA municipalities) the funding that is allocated to the municipalities differ. While MoLG logically wants most of the support to be targeting GNA municipalities, the field work in Libya has also shown that other municipalities can be good practice examples, regardless of their political alignment (such as Sebratah). This means that UNDP must ensure strong targeting criteria for all municipalities in phase 3 as they cannot solely be informed by the MoLG priorities but should reflect a needs-based approach. 2) Up-scaling capacity from the current phase. It is recommended that to gradually create a critical mass of functional public services in core municipalities, UNDP uses an area-based approach so

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19 Comment from the UNDP: “In a conflict setting, it’s not that easy to have a binding agreement with municipalities and ask them to guarantee something it’s not in their hand to continue protecting if the situation gets further escalated or a general financial crisis hit the country. UNDP as in other countries promote national ownership because at the end, it’s the responsibility of national institutions and local communities to protect their assets. That’s why UNDP requires direct engagement from communities in identifying their needs – things they’re urgently in need and also try to build local capacities, while taking all measures necessary to have these are running, including by coordinating with other UN agencies and through continuous discussion and dialogue with the government. UNDP signs after each completed intervention, a handover agreement with municipalities to transfer the responsibility of locations/equipment to the end user (municipality or local authority)2
that the neighbouring municipalities are gradually covered in the six regions where they operate. Obviously, security conditions remain the key limiting factor and a thorough risk analysis should also be part of the targeting process for phase 3.

K.Q.4.2. Are project partners committed to maintaining the benefits in the long run?

Two of the project components (conflict analysis and economic development) are undertaken through responsible party agreement (PCI and Tatweer). Those partnerships are based on contracts which will be expired before the end of the project. Neither Tatweer nor PCI are able to continue the work without additional funds. From the MoLG and municipality perspective, there is a willingness not only to maintain, but also to increase, the benefits under the next phases of the project. The EU also expressed its desire to cover more municipalities from phase 1, as coverage from the EU funding through the EUTF appears to be roughly 40% of the total number of municipalities in the country. Therefore, there is a keen interest to continue the support for a geographical expansion while maintaining the benefits over the longer-term, particularly regarding basic service provision. It is not known to what extent the economic development activities, most of which are run from Benghazi, can leverage support from other municipalities (as the TEC campus does not have physical infrastructures in other municipalities), something which should be further studied for phase 3, as the current scenario shows an incipient good result but with numbers that remain relatively limited compared to the needs of the population.

5.5 Cross-cutting themes

K.Q.5.1. To what extent was gender mainstreamed in the project?

The project did not contain a gender analysis as part of the Description of the Action. Despite the lack of gender analysis, the different components of the project and their outputs have been mindful to include a specific quota for women participation in all activities (including those of PCI, Tatweer, Atkis Strategy) and of course of UNDP. Although the percentages mentioned in the gender-disaggregated numbers are smaller than parity, this is due to cultural and contextual conditions. The important aspect here is that gender sensitivity is being implemented in the activities, although a gender streamlining strategy was not included in the project document.

K.Q.5.2. To what extent were human rights addressed within the project?

The project has a clear strategy targeting vulnerable groups. Activities under outputs 1 and 3 are clearly designed to support vulnerable groups. Evidence of the incorporation of vulnerable target groups is contained in PCI and Tatweer reports, particularly for those who are former combatants, women, IDPs. It is much more difficult to find evidence of human rights protection
of migrants, since the term “migrant” or “migration” is not used in Libya. To talk of migration is like opening the Pandora’s box given that human smuggling and trafficking is a big business that involves many people. While it is expected that migrants also benefit from basic services provision in the targeted municipalities, there is limited evidence showing to what extent the protection of human rights for migrants has increased under this project, and indeed whether it is capable of doing so.

6 Conclusions

UNDP has been a reliable and effective actor in implementing the SLCRR. Almost all results at the output level have been achieved, pending the updated information of the livelihoods creation for vulnerable groups by CSOs. It has been able to work in the six target municipalities in both GNA and non-GNA municipalities, and has implemented the project in the three regions (West, East, South). UNDP has made a substantial difference in basic service provision in municipalities through the first project output, and evidence of satisfaction from the population using the services was obtained. Municipalities, and the MoLG, are also satisfied with the work of the UNDP, as well as the EC. UNDP has been able to work in a very difficult environment plagued by armed conflict, often without the possibility of being physically present in the field given security conditions (including in the South, where the national evaluator was not able to go). Evidence was found that the provision of basic services contributed substantially to building the resilience of the vulnerable population in the target municipalities. The three partnerships that were established, one for output 1 (PCI for conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity), one for output 2 (Aktis Strategy ROL assessments) and one for output 3 (Tatweer for economic development) yielded initially very good progress. Some limitations were noted for PCI with a change in the key staff in the field and contradictory feedback from the different municipalities regarding the usefulness and operationalisation of the social peace partnerships. This could partly be due to insufficiently close monitoring by technically savvy conflict advisors from UNDP. Aktis Strategy went bankrupt during the project and the third ROL assessment (in Benghazi) had to be completed by hiring the consultant who worked with Aktis and using the same methodology. Other factors relate to the specific nature of each municipality, which has its own conditions in dealing with the conflict dynamics. In this UNDP showed its responsiveness capacity. However, the use of the assessment is more useful for informing a different project than for one dealing with conflict sensitivity, resilience and stability. Tatweer is obtaining some very interesting results, but these results need to be scaled and monitored in a way that the actual outcome of the activities and services can be measured. The RRF is lacking higher level results indicators and there remains the need to have a shared understanding of the technical requirements of an RBM RRF.
The most significant change to date is the efforts deployed under output 1 in restoration of essential public services. It is not possible to appraise the conflict sensitivity of the project, which is seen as low, as it was built-in later as a separate component. UNDP has to develop its technical capacity in conflict management and analysis in order to ensure that conflict sensitivity is streamlined across all components and that they are mutually reinforcing towards the project (agreed upon) outcome, instead of being run as separate and unrelated components. This also means that UNDP should reconsider field level postings. Although the site engineers have been generally praised for the work and their ability to get the job done, it may be necessary to consider posting staff with conflict sensitivity skills to ensure a better risk management and monitoring of the project across all its components and the local partners.

The evaluation recognises the challenges of working in Libya over the past three years and also considers the work of the UNDP to be relevant, effective, responsive, and to some degree efficient. However, field data collection indicated that procurement procedures have not always been streamlined to support project management decision making and some efforts are required in this field.

At the higher level, it is important for UNDP to agree with the EC on what is the project outcome (e.g. change) of the project in phase three, as all outputs and components should be feeding into this aspect. It could be useful to ensure an RBM workshop for UNDP staff (and EC staff as well) to understand the challenges and technical contradictions that stem from the ICMPD-led EUTF exercise and ensure its alignment with RBM practices in future projects (considering the amount of funding from the EU to the UNDP globally in conflict environments, this could include higher level discussions with a view to develop a conflict sensitive RF model for projects implemented in conflict environments).

UNDP was praised for its communication in coordination efforts amongst partners met in Tunis, and in the field. However, closer coordination and communication with PCI and other partners in Libya could be envisaged. The challenge is now for UNDP to up-scale its activities through a technically sound conflict sensitive project and in target areas that allow for a monitoring of the results at the higher level (project outcome level), and also to ensure that the livelihoods component is further developed and expanded in line with the unmet needs. Resilience and stability can only be achieved if UNDP projects work WITH conflict and not AROUND conflict in Libya. Finally, it is also difficult to provide evidence on the aspects related to protection to the migrants, something that is a politically incorrect discussion to have in the field in Libya. However, considering the funding window of the EUTF, there needs to be some connection made in regards to this vulnerable group.

7  Recommendations
UNDP should consider the following recommendations, in order of priority, to enhance its impact and ensure a more conflict-sensitive project design and implementation:

1) Recruit a peace and conflict advisor to ensure conflict analysis and sensitivity is streamlined across the project and not as a separate component of one of the outputs, and closely guide and supervise the work of the PCI in line with UNDP conflict related guidance and DAC guidance.

2) Request support from the Regional Peace and Conflict advisor in Amman to review and improve the phase 3 design in line with the need to better integrate conflict and improve risk management.

3) Draw experience from other UNDP risk mapping tools and risk management strategies (such as in Lebanon), and consider developing a dynamic conflict mapping in Libya.

4) Consider training all the UNDP staff (and EU staff if willing) on RBM and the development of RBM results hierarchies, in order to develop a joint vision at the higher level of the project outcome and the relevant indicators to measure the effects generated by the project (beyond output level).

5) Improve the reporting capacity of the outcome level results (higher level results) and identify the relevant approaches (including satisfaction survey, perception surveys, etc.) for the intangible elements of the project.

6) Discuss at senior management the bottlenecks in the procurement process in order to facilitate delivery and results.

7) It would be preferable for future evaluations to have all the relevant documents placed in a shared drive for the evaluation team to have access to the complete documentation at the onset of the evaluation.
### ANEXES

#### 1. TORS

**Country:** Libya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of the assignment:</th>
<th>Independent Evaluation of SLCRR Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Appointment:</strong></td>
<td>Individual Consultant (one international consultant, one national consultant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project:</strong></td>
<td>Strengthening Local Capacities for Resilience and Recovery Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Period of assignment:</strong></td>
<td>20 working days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Position(s):</strong></td>
<td>One (01) – International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>One (01) National Consultant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 1. BACKGROUND

**Irregular Migration Challenge and Prolonged Instability in Libya**

One of the main contributing factors for the rising influx of migrants through the Central Mediterranean route is the prolonged instability in Libya. Libya represents the departure point for 90% of those seeking to travel to Europe. Smugglers and traffickers exploit an unstable political situation and fragmented control over the territory and borders, especially in the South, where there is very limited, if at all, control of central government institutions. The situation is complicated even further by strong tribal structures and continued clashes on the ground. Various assessments, conducted to date, show the dramatic fragmentation of the Libyan internal and border security sectors, exacerbated by internal violent power struggles and a series of economic crises, while still combating the remnants of extremist forces both in the East and west.

From March to September 2015, UNDP undertook an analysis of the structural drivers of insecurity and instability in Libya, identifying three conflict systems as root causes: 1) a national level competition over political influence, control of resources and the nature of the Libyan state; 2) the presence of armed extremist groups; and 3) local level intercommunal tensions. While these conflict systems are driven by somewhat separate issues (each with their own complexity), they remain deeply interrelated.

Regarding intercommunal conflicts at the local level, one sees multiple disputes between communities in different parts of the country that result in sporadic spikes in violence. While often localised in nature, they have significant impact on local populations, and can influence broader instability in the country, as subnational identities, such as around geographic communities, tribes or ethnic groups. Communal groups have attempted to renegotiate regional balances in the post-revolutionary context, seeking to redress perceived exclusion, historic wrongs and to secure communal access to political influence or
economic opportunities. The growing autonomy of local communities, as well as their connection to armed groups, has provided some of those communities with the opportunity to use force to defend themselves and to pursue their interests.
One of the immediate and most dramatic consequences of the conflict has been significant displacement and re-displacement. An estimated 434,000 people have been displaced in the country, presenting rapidly increasing humanitarian needs and putting pressure on public services, livelihoods and social cohesion in host communities. Libya also hosts an estimated 100,000 refugees and asylum seekers and an estimated number of migrants which ranges between 700,000 and 1 million.

In the most affected areas, the delivery of basic social services is disrupted and the capacity of state institutions to maintain a safety net diminished. The impact of the conflict on sub-national governance system has been largely uniform in the sense that with an increasingly paralyzed centre for policy-making and public finance management, local institutions, and chief among them municipalities, are seen among the population as the main guarantors of their basic needs. Municipalities are making efforts to respond to these high expectations and try to strengthen local coping mechanisms against the debilitating effects of the conflict. This implies reinforcing local crisis response mechanisms (through Local Crisis Committees for example) and increasing partnerships with other local governance actors to face the immediate consequences of the national crisis and prevent further localized conflict.

**UNDP response (on-going action)**

To respond to the many challenges faced by people in Libya, UNDP approach is to help the country get on a more robust development path, by helping the local authorities to restore security, essential services delivery and livelihoods opportunities. It is generally accepted, that focusing at the community level would have the greatest potential for stabilization in post-revolution Libya.

UNDP works in key communities on the migration routes – from Sabha and Murzuq, to Kufra, and Sabratha, not least Benghazi and Tripoli - engaging local municipalities, identifying entry points to integrate key community members, enhancing local stability and community security, advancing municipality socio-economic development and providing income generation opportunities for communities, and especially young people.

Our approach is that if essential service delivery is provided, with increased income-generation and livelihoods opportunities for the most vulnerable, with capacities for local authorities and rule of law institutions strengthened, the population groups (host communities - including Internally Displaced Populations (IDPs) and returnees - as well as migrants and refugees) can effectively cope with and mitigate the risks of irregular migration and be strong drivers of resilience-building and development efforts.

With adequate support, municipalities in Libya can better plan, lead and coordinate efforts at achieving progress where people need it most - services, social cohesion and security, economic livelihoods.

Therefore, UNDP intervention is three-fold: 1) Enhance local capacity for service delivery and improve key infrastructure in target municipalities; 2) Support local governments to enhance local stability and
3) Identify areas of potential economic growth and support economic recovery strategies which will help to stabilize income generation, emergency employment, and the reintegration of migrants, IDPs, and returnees; as well as create sustainable and decent jobs.

UNDP’s project ‘Strengthening Local capacities for Resilience and Recovery’ is a three-year EU-funded initiative (EUR 18,000,000 (estimated as 19,607,400 USD). aiming at supporting local authorities in Libya to respond to the many conflict and human mobility induced challenges - by strengthening the local resilience and recovery mechanisms - that impact negatively people access to essential services, sources of jobs and livelihoods, the social cohesion and security of communities.

The project is built around 3 outputs:

1. Better provision of basic services at local level and increase access for most vulnerable groups from host communities - including Internally Displaced Populations (IDPs) and returnees - as well as migrants and refugees is ensured;

2. Local authorities and administrations are supported in fulfilling their role and responsibilities with a focus on enforcing local stability and community security;

3. Local economic recovery/development, including job creation and livelihoods are supported. Implemented in partnership with Tatweer Research.

It is implemented directly by UNDP with focus on the following targeted municipalities: Murzuq, Sabha, Al Kufrah, Benghazi, Tripoli and Sabratha, among others.

2. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The purpose of the Evaluation is to learn from the experience of the EU/UNDP funded programme – Strengthening Local Capacities for Resilience and Recovery with a forward-looking approach. The Evaluation is expected to clarify underlying factors affecting the situation, highlight unintended consequences (positive and negative) and better design UNDP-supported interventions at the next stage. The Country Office accordingly plans to make use of the evaluative exercise as a learning opportunity not only for the office but also for key partners and stakeholders, as inclusively and as practically possible.

The overall objectives of the evaluation are the following:

1. Review the performance of the Project in achieving the outputs as per the Project Document and their contributions to outcome level goals. By providing an objective
sustainability, including considering the link between short-term and long-term achievements.

2. Overall assessment of the intervention logic and coherence of the three components of the project

3. Generate lessons from experiences in the respective interventions achieved during 6 June 2017-30 June 2019 to inform current and future programming at the country level. Identify factors, which facilitated or hindered the results achievement, both in terms of the external environment and those related to internal factors. Document and record the lessons learned at various implementation stages. This should include but not be limited to assessing the strengths and weaknesses in different stages of the project, design, management, coordination, human resource, and financial resources;

4. Assess the appropriateness of the Project strategy to reach the intended outputs and outcomes;

5. Define the extent to which the Project addressed cross cutting issues including gender, human rights and conflict sensitivity;

6. Identify and assess UNDP’s efforts to ensure EU visibility and communication to the public;

7. Identify and assess the UNDP/project’s coordination efforts with other ongoing EU and international funded projects, international and national partners;

8. Identify and assess the UNDP/project’s coordination efforts with Libyan National actors (ie Ministry of Local Governance, Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education at central and local levels);

9. Identify whether results represent sufficient foundation for future progress and/or future replication of similar interventions responding to the three main components of the project, including the assessment of additional needs that may be covered with future interventions

10. Provide clear, focused and forward-looking recommendations in order to suggest effective and realistic new and adaptative strategies by UNDP and partners.

3. SCOPE OF EVALUATION:

In assessing the Project, the evaluation will take into consideration:

The validity of the Design and Relevance: the extent to which the Project activities matched the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor. The key questions will include:

- Did the Project respond to the needs of the beneficiaries? Were the planned project objectives and intended results (i.e. outputs and outcomes) relevant and realistic to the
ground? Were the problems and needs adequately analysed. The evaluators will be provided with priorities need assessment and corresponding working plans.

- How well did the Project design take into account local efforts and make use of existing capacity to address issues? Did the Project’s original design fill an existing gap that other ongoing interventions were not addressing?
- Were the objectives of the Project clear, realistic and likely to be achieved within the established time schedule and with the allocated resources (including human resources)?
- Was the Project design logical and coherent in terms of the roles, capacities and commitment of stakeholders to realistically achieve the planned outcomes?
- How appropriate and useful were the indicators described in the Project document for monitoring and measuring results? Were the means of verifying the indicators appropriate?
- To what extent were external factors and assumptions identified at the time of design?
- Was the Project designed in a flexible way to respond to changes / needs that could occur during the implementation? Was the Project able to respond to changes in the political, security and general operating environment?
- What was the level of stakeholder commitment to promote conflict sensitive, gender balanced and human rights-based approaches?
- Was the strategy for sustainability of impact clearly defined at the design stage of the Project? If yes, was the methodology / approach taken appropriate to the context?
- Recommend specific objectives that should be addressed in future if the project was continued regarding Achievements and Implementation and Development Effectiveness defined as “the extent to which the Project activities have attained its objectives”.
- What were the development results (i.e. against planned outputs and outcomes) of interventions, considering the institutional development of the local and relevant national partners?
- Which aspects of the Project had the greatest achievements? What were the supporting factors? What are the main lessons learned from the partnership strategies and what are the possibilities of replication and scaling-up? How can the Project build or expand on achievements?
- In which areas does the Project have the least achievements? What have been the constraining factors and why? How can they be overcome?
- How effective was the collaboration between the participating organizations and what has been the added value of this collaboration?
- How have Libyan stakeholders been involved in Project implementation? How effective has the Project been in establishing ownership especially with reference to the three components of the Project.
Effectiveness of management arrangements and efficiency of resource use: Efficiency will measure the Project outputs -- qualitative and quantitative -- in relation to the inputs. Key questions will include:

- Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise, etc) been allocated strategically to achieve the relevant outputs and outcomes? Have resources been used efficiently?
- Were Project funds and activities delivered in a timely manner?
- Were management capacities adequate?
- Assess the criteria and governance aspects related to the selection of Libyan beneficiaries and partners’ institutions, including NGOs.
- Did the Project receive adequate political, technical and administrative support from its local and national partners?
- How has the role of UNDP added value to the project? If found relevant, how and in what areas should it be improved?
- Has relevant gender expertise and Human rights approaches programming been sought? Have available gender mainstreaming tools been adapted and utilized? Have any Human Right’s programming initiation or toolkit been introduced to local planners?
- How effectively did the Project management monitor Project performance and results?
- What has been the quality of documentation and dissemination of knowledge within the Project?
- Were the work plans timely delivered? If delays are identified, was the project able to adapt accordingly?

Impact and Sustainability of the Project:
In assessing the impact and sustainability of the Project, the evaluation will look at the positive and negative changes produced by the Project’s development interventions, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. This will involve identifying the main impacts and effects resulting from the Project’s activities on the local social, economic, environmental and other development indicators. The focus will be on both intended and unintended results and will also include the positive and negative impact of external factors, such as changes in terms of economic, political and financial conditions. It is acknowledged, though, that more time may be needed for an impact to be seen, considering that the project is in its second year of implementation.

On sustainability, the evaluation will measure the likeliness of projects results continuity after donor funding has been withdrawn. Some of the key questions will include:

- To what extent did the Project contribute to the enhancing services at municipality level?
- To what extent were sustainability considerations taken into account in the execution and conduct of the Project’s activities?
4. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY

Based on UNDP guidelines for evaluations (UNDP Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for Results and the UNDP Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators), and in consultation with UNDP Libya Country Office, the evaluation will be inclusive and participatory, involving all principal stakeholders into the analysis. The evaluation will consider the social, political, security and economic context which affects the overall performance of the outcome achievements. During this evaluative exercise, the evaluation team is expected to apply the following approaches for data collection and analysis.

- Desk review of relevant documents (project documents with amendments made, review reports - midterm/final, donor-specific, etc);
- Discussions with the Senior Management and programme staff of UNDP Country Office;
- Briefing and debriefing sessions with UNDP, EU Delegation and the Government (Ministry of Local Government), as well as with other donors and partners
- Interviews with partners and stakeholders (including gathering the information on what the partners have achieved with regard to the outcome and what strategies they have used)
- Field visits to selected project sites and discussions with project teams, project beneficiaries (representatives of target municipalities, mayors, municipal council, representatives of sectoral authorities at municipality level (health, education, water and sanitation etc.), social peace partnerships, entrepreneurs, representatives of line ministries etc.);

COMPOSITION AND IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

Based on UNDP guidelines for evaluations and in consultation with UNDP Libya CO, the evaluation will be inclusive and participatory, involving all principal stakeholders into the analysis. The evaluation will consider the social, political, security and economic context which affects the overall performance of the outcome achievements. During this evaluative exercise, the evaluation team is expected to apply the following approaches for data collection and analysis.

- Desk review of relevant documents (project documents with amendments made, review reports - midterm/final, donor-specific, etc.);
- Discussions with the Senior Management and programme staff of UNDP Country Office;
- Briefing and debriefing sessions with UNDP;
- Interviews with partners and stakeholders (including gathering the information on what the partners have achieved on the outcome and what strategies they have used)
- Field visits to selected project sites and discussions with project teams, project partners, representatives of involved ministries etc.
The evaluation team will consist of one international and one national consultant. Specifically, the international consultant will perform the following tasks

- Lead and manage the evaluation mission;
- Design the detailed evaluation scope and methodology (including the methods for data collection and analysis) for the report;
- Decide the division of labor within the evaluation team;
It is expected that the outcome evaluation be conducted during April 2019, for a total of not more than 20 working days.

Activity Timeframe and responsible party:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Responsible Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inception report on proposed evaluation methodology, work plan and proposed structure of the report.</td>
<td>One day, by the evaluation team (home based)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desk review of existing documents</td>
<td>2 days, by the evaluation team (home based)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field visits, interviews with partners, and key stakeholders (international at least in Tunis, national in Tripoli and other municipalities)</td>
<td>6 days, by the evaluation team*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The national consultant is expected to perform the following tasks under the guidance of the International Consultant:

- Review documents;
- Participate in the design of the evaluation methodology;
- Conduct an analysis of the outcome, outputs and partnership strategy (as per the scope of the evaluation described above);
- Conduct the field missions, as per the developed methodology, engaging to the extent possible with project stakeholders across Libya,
- Draft related parts of the evaluation report; and,
- Assist Team leader in finalizing document through incorporating suggestions received on draft related to his/her assigned sections.

5. PROPOSED TIME FRAME

52
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drafting of the final evaluation reports</td>
<td>6.5 days, by the evaluation team (home based)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debriefing with UNDP and with the EU partners</td>
<td>One day, by the evaluation team (home based remotely)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(DG Near and the EU Delegation to Libya)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finalization of the final reports (incorporating comments received on first drafts)</td>
<td>2.5 days by the evaluation team (home based)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Up to 6 workdays in the field mission are foreseen (for the international and national in Tunis, Tunisia). An additional 5 workdays for the national in Libya, with travel to accessible areas, including Benghazi, Tripoli and Sabratha, and if feasible to the South (Sebha, Kufra and Murzuq). The division would be discussed and agreed between the evaluation team members. This would be reviewed in case of mobility issues.
6. EXPECTED DELIVERABLES

Together with the national consultant, the international consultant is expected to deliver the following outputs:

1. Submit Inception report on proposed evaluation methodology, work plan and proposed structure of the report.
2. Based on agreed work plan timeline, the consultant is expected to draft evaluation report.
3. Final report, including a 2-3-page executive summary, and with evidence-based conclusions on each of the evaluation objectives, as outlined above, lessons learned and key recommendations to inform future interventions in community stabilization and local governance support programmes. Opportunities to support priorities for municipalities development as outlined by the Minister of Local Governance and line Ministries, will need to be considered.
4. The consultant shall present the findings of draft report of the evaluation in a debriefing meeting to UNDP and its donors and project board members.
5. The consultant shall finalize the final report after incorporating the comments/input of the debriefing meeting.

The structure of the Evaluation Report should include at minimum:

- Executive summary;
- Introduction;
- Description of the evaluation methodology;
- Analysis of the situation with regard to the outcome, the outputs and the partnership strategy;
- Analysis of opportunities to provide guidance for the future programming;
- Key findings (including best practices and lessons learned)
- Conclusions and recommendations
- Annexes: ToRs, field visits, people interviewed, documents reviewed, etc.¹

2. An outline for the future UNDP intervention in support of community stabilization and local governance support programmes, based on the recommendations of the evaluation mission is to be produced. Opportunities to support priorities for municipalities development as outlined by the Minister of Local Governance, and Line Ministries will need to be considered.

7. REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPERIENCE AND QUALIFICATIONS

¹ See the UNDP Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators for a detailed guidance on the preparation of an outcome evaluation report.
### INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANT/TEAM LEADER:

**I. Academic Qualifications:**

- Master’s degree or equivalent in Management, Development Studies and / or International Affairs Advanced university.

**II. Years of experience:**

- At least 7 years of work experience in the field of community stabilization in fragile context, sound knowledge about results-based management (especially results-oriented monitoring and evaluation);
- Proven experience of participatory monitoring and evaluation processes;
- Proven working of working on similar assignments in MENA region;
- Strong written and spoken English. Working knowledge of Arabic is an asset.

### NATIONAL CONSULTANT

- Bachelor’s degree in social studies, Management, Development, or another relevant field.
- At least five years of work experience in in evaluating programs related to democratic governance, policy dialogue and advisory work, research and analysis and relationship with governments, promotion of stakeholder/community awareness of and participation in democratic governance, and fragile context.
- At least 1 year of work experience in conducting results-oriented monitoring and evaluation and participatory methods
- Fluency in English and Arabic required.

### 8. DUTY STATION

**INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANT/TEAM LEADER:**

Home Based with mission to Tunis, Tunisia and Libya. National consultant will be Libya based.

The division would be discussed and agreed between the evaluation team members. This would be reviewed in case of mobility issues.

### 9. COMPETENCIES
**Corporate competencies:**
- Demonstrates integrity by modeling the UN's values and ethical standards
- Promotes the vision, mission, and strategic goals of UNDP;
- Displays cultural, gender, religion, race, nationality and age sensitivity and adaptability
- Treats all people fairly without favoritism;
- Fulfills all obligations to gender sensitivity and zero tolerance for sexual harassment

**Functional competencies:**
- Strong interpersonal skills, communication and diplomatic skills, ability to work in a team
- Openness to change and ability to receive/integrate feedback
- Ability to work under pressure and stressful situations
- Strong analytical, reporting and writing abilities
- Excellent public speaking and presentation skills
10. EVALUATION ETHICS.

Evaluation consultants will be held to the highest ethical standards and are required to sign a code of conduct upon acceptance of the assignment. UNDP evaluations are conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) ‘Ethical Guidelines for Evaluations’

This evaluation will be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG ‘Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation’. The consultant must safeguard the rights and confidentiality of information providers, interviewees and stakeholders through measures to ensure compliance with legal and other relevant codes governing collection of data and reporting on data. The consultant must also ensure security of collected information before and after the evaluation and protocols to ensure anonymity and confidentiality of sources of information where that is expected. The information knowledge and data gathered in the evaluation process must also be solely used for the evaluation and not for other uses with the express authorization of UNDP and partners.

11. EVALUATION CRITERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance of degree and education</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technical Competencies</strong></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevant experience evaluating programs related to democratic governance, policy dialogue and advisory work, research and analysis and relationship with governments, promotion of stakeholder/community awareness of and participation in democratic governance, and fragile context</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrated ability to work in participatory methods.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of the evaluation and RBM approach</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Language</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fluency in English</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12. PROPOSAL REQUIREMENTS

Interested individual consultants must submit the following documents/information to demonstrate their qualifications:

1. **Letter of Interest** explaining why they are the most suitable for the work

2. **Technical Proposal:**
   - I. Provide a brief methodology on how they will approach and conduct the work
   - II. Confirmation of availability to provide services within the stipulated timeframe

3. **Financial proposal**
   - I. Specifying the daily fee, number of days of work required, travel expenses and per diems quoted in separate line items. Payments are made to the Individual Consultant based on the actual number of days worked.
   - II. **Travel:** All envisaged travel costs must be included in the financial proposal. This includes all travel to join duty station travel. In general, UNDP does not accept travel costs exceeding those of an economy class ticket. Should the IC wish to travel on a higher class he/she should do so using their own resources. In the case of unforeseeable travel, payment of travel costs including tickets, lodging and terminal expenses should be agreed upon, between the respective business unit and Individual Consultant, prior to travel and will be reimbursed.

4. **Personal CV including experience in similar activities and at least 3 references.**
### Intended Outcome as stated in the Programme Results and Resource Framework:

Primary Outcome: Support local authorities in Libya to respond to the many conflict and human mobility induced challenges by strengthening the local resilience and recovery mechanisms

UNSF outcome involving UNDP No. 3 By late 2020, relevant Libyan institutions improved their capacity to design, develop and implement social policies that focus on quality social services delivery for all women and girls, men and boys (including vulnerable groups, migrants and refugees) in Libya towards enhancing human security and reducing inequalities

### RELATED STRATEGIC PLAN Development Solutions: 1, 3

Project title and Atlas Project Number: Strengthening Local Capacities for Resilience and Recovery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXPECTED OUTPUTS</th>
<th>OUTPUT INDICATORS</th>
<th>DATA SOURCE</th>
<th>BASELINE</th>
<th>TARGETS (by frequency of data collection)</th>
<th>DATA COLLECTION METHODS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Year 1  2018  6  14  24 (FINAL – Aggregated data)</td>
<td>Project reporting and third-party monitoring</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Output: Enhanced provision of basic services at local level and increase

1.1.1. Number of municipalities with conflict mediation capacity strengthened
### 1.1. Strengthen the capacities of municipalities in providing basic and social services, in particular in municipalities most affected by migratory flows, for resilient local service delivery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>1.1.2.</strong> Number of people participating in conflict prevention and peace building activities, including percentage of women, and where feasible migrants, refugees, IDPs, returnees, host communities (EU TF indicator 4.3)</th>
<th>UNDP, partners reports</th>
<th>120 (18% women)</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>200 (20% women)</th>
<th>400 (20% women)</th>
<th>600 (20% women)</th>
<th>Project reporting, third-party monitoring and perception survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### 1.1.3. Number of Institutions (National and local) and Non-State actors directly supported through capacity building on migration management (EUTF indicator 3.6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNDP reports</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>UNDP reports, third-party monitoring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
access to quality of service services, in particular to the most vulnerable people living in the selected locations (including migrants, refugees, IDPs, returnees and host communities).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.2.1. Number of municipalities supported for public service delivery (CPD indicator)</th>
<th>UNDP</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>UNDP reports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.2.2. % of Tier 1 and Tier 2 priorities (as per needs assessment) infrastructure rehabilitation activities (civil works and/or equipment delivery) completed in each municipality.</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>50% Tier 1</td>
<td>100% Tier 1 40% Tier2</td>
<td>100% Tier 1 and Tier 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Risks: Procurement delays due to customs processes, Project reporting and third-party monitoring.

UNDP
| 1.2.3. Number of people receiving access to social services/ Number of people in new targeted municipalities with improved access to public services disaggregated by sex and where feasible (migrants, refugees, returnees, host communities) (EUTF Indicator 2.2/ CPD indicator) | UNDP | 0 | 2018 | 500,000 (including 49% women, 30% youth, 15% IDPs) | 1,700,000 | 2,700,000 | Project reporting and third-party monitoring Risks: |
### LIST OF INTERVIEWS

#### STRENGTHENING LOCAL CAPACITY FOR RESILIENCE AND RECOVERY

#### PROJECT EVALUATION

#### PROPOSED LIST OF MEETINGS

#### 5 – 9 AUGUST 2019

### MONDAY AUGUST 5TH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Interviewee/Interlocutor</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>09:15 - 10:30</td>
<td>Meeting with Acting Project Manager Dawoud Almassri</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:30 – 11:30</td>
<td>Meeting with Project Team: Mr. Thinley Penjore, Ms. Imen Ouesleti, and Mrs. Nouha Farhat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:30 - 12:30</td>
<td>Meeting with UNDP Libya Programme Coordinator Mr. Mohammed Salih</td>
<td>60 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:00 - 15:30</td>
<td>Meeting with UNDP M&amp;E Specialist – Mrs. Maria Eugenia Herrera Lara</td>
<td>Over skype – Melara Lara (Mexico) – 60 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:30 – 16:30</td>
<td>Meeting with UNDP Rule of Law and Policing - Dhia Ben Ali, Project Officer</td>
<td>In relation to output 2, community security and rule of law – 40 min.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TUESDAY AUGUST 6TH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Interviewee/Interlocutor</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>09:00 - 10:30</td>
<td>Discussion between National and International Evaluation Consultants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:30 – 12:00</td>
<td>Meeting with the EU Delegation in Tunis. Mr. Janis AIZSALNIEKS</td>
<td>90 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:30 - 16:30</td>
<td>Meeting with Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Local Governance – Mr. Abdulmajid Abugarara</td>
<td>75 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:30 – 17:00</td>
<td>Feedback/Discussion with M&amp;E specialist and PM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### WEDNESDAY AUGUST 7TH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Interviewee/Interlocutor</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>09:00 - 10:00</td>
<td>Further discussions between National and International Evaluation Consultants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00 – 12:00</td>
<td>Meeting with GIZ – Dr. Manfred van Eckert at GIZ</td>
<td>90 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:00 – 15:30</td>
<td>Meeting with Dr.Taybe Alkhialy from Sebha, in Tunis</td>
<td>community focal point - 60 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:30 – 16:30</td>
<td>Skype call with Peaceful Change Initiative based in London – Erika Atzori, Project Manager</td>
<td>50 minutes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### THURSDAY AUGUST 8TH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Interviewee/Interlocutor</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09:30 - 10:30</td>
<td>Skype/WhatsApp call with Mr. Suleiman Al Barouni (Ministry of Interior)</td>
<td>In relation to output 2, community security and rule of law – 45 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:30 – 12:00</td>
<td>Meeting with IOM - ANDERSON Charmaine – Programme manager community stabilization (4 people)</td>
<td>At IOM – 70 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:00 – 15:30</td>
<td>Call with Toyota Libya Mr. Abdulrahim Muftah –</td>
<td>for the apprenticeship program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:30 – 16:30</td>
<td>Call with UNICEF (Mrs. Narine Aslaynyan) - deputy representative and head of programmes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Friday August 9th**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Interviewee/Interlocutor</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>09:30 - 10:30</td>
<td>Meeting with the Italian Cooperation – Mr. Erminio Sacco and Nicola Loi</td>
<td>45 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:30 – 16:30</td>
<td>Meeting with UNDP Libya Resident Representative and DRR</td>
<td>50 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:30 – 17:30</td>
<td>End of mission discussion with acting PM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Field Data Collection Mission to Libya – 18 to 22nd August 2019

18th August 2019: Misrata, Toyota Training Centre
- Mr. Abdurahiem Muftah (General Manager)
- Mr. Mohamed Abutarukia (board member)
- Mr. Mahmoud Ghmaim (DYT coordinators)
- Mr. Ahmed Naim (Chief trainer)

19th August 2019: Sebratah municipality
- Mr. Muftah Elbreshni, Mayor
- Mr. Mahmoud Alzariok, Mayor’s advisor
- Mr. Tawfik Alganoudi, UNDP Engineer
- Mr. Aboubaker Alzaroki, Deputy Mayor
- Sebratah Health Facility
- Mr. Ismail Ali, GH of health facility
- Random patients interviewed on-site

Sebratah Teaching Hospital
- Dr. Fathi Omar Alkewash, DG of the hospital
- Mr. Ahmed Almezwagi, health regional services office
- Mr. Mohamed Fahat, Head of the emergency department
- Mr. Khalid Ftahly, head of the projects department at the hospital

20th August 2019: Tripoli
Mr. Mohamed Omar, municipal member, Murzuq

Hei Andalus
Modern Police Station
Abubaker Ali, Engineer and project manager

21st August 2020: Benghazi, Projects’ office at the municipality
Eng. Ala Alnewal, deputy director of the projects’ office

Tatweer
Mr. Ameer Nihoum, project manager, TEC program
THEORY OF CHANGE

*Project Theory of Change:*

**IF**

Essential service delivery is provided,

Through a) supporting municipalities in identifying, planning, leading and coordinating efforts to achieve resilience in local service delivery and socio-economic recovery, and b) improving access and quality of service delivery lines for socioeconomic resilience and recovery

**AND**

Capacities for local authorities and rule of law institutions are strengthened,

Through a) providing technical support to the rule of law institutions, and b) establishing a “model police station”

**AND**

Ensuring that livelihoods capital is preserved with increased income-generation and livelihoods opportunities for the most vulnerable

Through a) supporting the creation of new MSMEs including businesses with a social impact in sectors with high LER/LED potential and b) Enhancing self-reliance and livelihood stabilisation for vulnerable and marginalised groups

**THEN**

The population groups can effectively cope with and mitigate the risks of irregular migration and be strong drivers of resilience-building and development efforts.