

**Final Evaluation Report**



**Final Independent Evaluation of the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) project entitled:**

Preventing conflict and building peace through addressing the drivers of conflict and instability associated with forced displacement between Burundi and Tanzania







FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

of the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) project entitled “Preventing conflict and building peace through addressing the drivers of conflict and instability associated with forced displacement between Burundi and Tanzania”

The project was funded by the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and implemented by three UN Agencies both in Burundi and Tanzania (UNHCR Burundi and Tanzania, IOM Burundi and Tanzania, UNDP Burundi and Tanzania).

Evaluation commissioned by the UNDP Thematic Hub on Resilience in Nairobi, in-charge of cross-border project coordination

Data collection was undertaken in Burundi and Tanzania: 13th -22nd October 2019

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*Note: the contents of this report reflect the views of the evaluator and not necessarily those of the commissioning agency*

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**Acronyms and abbreviations**

CBCR: Community-Based Conflict Resolution

CRRF: Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework

DAC: Development Assistance Committee

FGD: Focus Group Discussion

GoB: Government of Burundi

GoT: Government of Tanzania

HA: Humanitarian Assistance

HBM: Humanitarian Border Management

HDP: Humanitarian-Development-Peace

IOM: International Organization for Migration

JRRP: Joint Refugee Response Plan

KII: Key Informant Interview

MOI: Ministry of Interior

MOJ: Ministry of Justice

MSC: Most Significant Change

M&E: Monitoring and Evaluation

OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

PB: Peacebuilding

PBF: Peacebuilding Fund

PBSO: Peacebuilding Support Office

RBM: Results-Based Management

RC: Resident Coordinator

ToC: Theory of Change

ToR : Terms of Reference

UNDG: United Nations Development Group

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNEG : United Nations Evaluation Group

#

# Executive Summary[[1]](#footnote-2)

This is one of the first independent evaluations on PBF cross-border projects. As such it will contribute to global lessons learning on cross-border projects, aiming to inform both future PBSO and wider peacebuilding programming. The overall project objective was to mitigate instability and conflict linked to displacement in the Burundian-Tanzanian cross-border areas, improve protection and support to displaced persons, and enhance the resilience of host communities, contributing to socio-economic revitalization and peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region. Three UN Agencies were funded: IOM, UNHCR, UNDP in both Burundi and Tanzania.

**Key findings**

The PBF project has brought an innovative modality by working cross-border with three agencies with different approaches including peacebuilding, humanitarian aid and development. The evaluation found that the project highlighted the need for enhanced coordination and communication between the two countries’ implementing agencies and provided a potential model of an integrated approach around the HDP nexus that could be further analyzed to identify different synergies that can stem from such an approach.

The support of the Government of Tanzania and the Government of Burundi to the project is ensured, and positive feedback on the project was received from the limited sample of government authorities interviewed. Head of Agencies (3) showed a keen interest in a continuation of the project, but at the same time a recognition that the project’s budget was too small and the duration of the project too short to achieve a significant impact. As a result, a strategic scaling-up is recommended in line with the detailed recommendations made at the end of the report.

On the ground in Burundi and Tanzania, the gradual rebuilding of trust and strengthening of social cohesion, coupled with small income generation through cash for work and agricultural activities, may in fact be the most significant change that the project contributed to achieving. The Community-Based Conflict Resolution (CBCR) approach has created venues for peaceful conflict resolution both between refugees and host communities, but also amongst communities themselves.

The cross-border project was divided into three outcomes. The findings for each outcome are presented hereunder.

**Outcome 1: The instability at the Tanzania-Burundi border is reduced, and the rights of stranded, vulnerable migrants, internally displaced persons, and asylum seekers are better protected by immigration officials and other relevant authorities.**

The outcome was only partially achieved given the changing context and shrinking protection space. Output 1 labelled as “*Humanitarian Border Management mechanisms on both sides of the border through direct support and training of immigration officers from Burundi and Tanzania (IOM Tanzania and Burundi)*” was achieved by IOM. Interviews with immigration officials in two border points in Burundi and two border points in Tanzania showed that the support and training led to increased and better communication between immigration authorities. Anecdotal evidence was shared that immigration officials would travel to the other country’s border post for problem solving, and that the joint trainings’ major result was to create direct communication channels. However, it is also evident that expectations regarding border management mechanisms are different on each side, particularly relating to the issue of documents when dealing with mixed migration flows, specifically for Burundians crossing into Tanzania.

Output 2 was “*Effective and efficient protection, monitoring and assessments are carried out on both sides of the border (UNHCR Burundi and Tanzania)*”. Access restriction to the border area hampered protection monitoring and impeded more complete data collection. The reported number of cases of refoulement in 2018 was recorded at 173, a decrease in relation to 2017, but thwarted by restricted access to border areas. This means that the actual number of cases is likely higher than the reported number, and therefore the decrease as related to 2017 figures should be taken with caution. The protection space has shrunk given the change in context since the beginning of the project.

**Outcome 2: “The resilience capacities of displaced persons and host communities are strengthened”.**

Social cohesion was enhanced by an approach that combined in the beneficiary groups; returnees, displaced and host communities, as well as a quota of minimum 50% women in productive schemes (cash for work, community rehabilitation, agricultural cooperatives creation). This was necessary to establish venues for communication and interaction between the different groups and to alleviate their immediate economic vulnerability. IOM reintegration snapshot monitoring shows that the percentage of returnees who felt strongly reintegrated or welcome by the host community increased by 10 percentage points (67% to 77%) as a result of the project activities. The wording used to define the outcome does not capture its importance in terms of preventing conflict and contributing to social cohesion, in addition to providing beneficiaries with some income. Two different approaches in terms of cash for work were used, a more humanitarian focus by IOM and more development-oriented interventions by UNDP. TheDirector-General of Repatriation, Resettlement and Reinstatement of Returnees and Displaced Persons by war showed great appreciation for the support provided but requested an expansion of the socio-economic reintegration to all ten communes with the highest returns. Performance indicators were all achieved or exceeded: UNDP undertook cash for work activities assisting 260 beneficiaries in Mabanda and 260 in Kayogoro communes, for a total of 520 beneficiaries, half of them women. IOM undertook cash for work activities with 105 beneficiaries, and 250 beneficiaries benefited from agricultural vocational training, including 50% women.

**Outcome 3: “Refugee and returnee populations and members of their respective host communities, supported by alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, engage in peaceful ways to resolve conflicts and address grievances.”**

An effective combination of legal assistance and community-based conflict resolution mechanisms were used to obtain very effective results.

Interviews with legal aid beneficiaries in Burundi showed the relevance and usefulness of the free legal assistance provided. Going to court can be costly and time-consuming. Therefore, receiving free legal assistance allows beneficiaries to keep their assets. The challenge is linked to sustainability of the legal assistance. It is important to consider sustainability mechanisms when the project finishes so that the beneficiaries are not left in a vulnerable situation. A total of 5,415 beneficiaries, of which 2,552 women, benefitted from legal support, information and sensitization workshops in Burundi. A similar component was also undertaken by UNDP in Tanzania, through the Community-Based Conflict Resolution (CBCR) committees were established in host communities and in the refugee camps. The approach showed to be very useful and effective. It is important to note that the conflict resolution skills can be used as much for inter as well as for intra-community conflicts, and for any type of conflict. DRC (Danish Refugee Council) is tasked with overseeing activities in two of the three refugee camps in Tanzania. They have also adopted the CBCR methodology for protection work, based on the materials and approach developed by the UNDP, thereby contributing to sustainability and ensuring a catalytic effect of this component of the project. The conflict resolution skills for peaceful dispute resolution is much appreciated, but there is no reliable monitoring system to collect and track data, although the performance indicators reportedly has been exceeded by 85.6% (2,784 conflicts solved of which 41% concerning men and 59% women versus a target of 1,500).

**The main recommendations for a scaled-up phase 2 is that the current environment is found to be conducive to a strategically focused and targeted upscaling of the project around two major axes:**

1. Protection of human rights (for both refugees and mixed migrants) through the development of enhanced socio-economic reintegration schemes with mixed population groups (returnees, IDPs and host communities) in Burundi. Develop socio-economic protection of host communities in Tanzania to ensure fair and equitable attention to socio-economically vulnerable individuals, regardless of their legal status, as conflict prevention measure.
2. Expand and consolidate the conflict resolution and CBCR approaches on both sides of the border. Increase the number of committees trained; Ensure a visible commitment to peace by the PBF, through construction of “peace houses” that can be built by community members themselves using cash for work modalities and equipped with the necessary material to hold meetings; Keep the statistics and ensure the necessary support in order to develop a strong data monitoring system that provides evidence about the usefulness of the conflict resolution approaches.

# 2. Object of the evaluation

The PBF project started on 15th December 2017 and was implemented until 31st March 2019. Three UN agencies, UNDP, IOM and UNHCR in the two countries received funding from the PBF to undertake project implementation in Burundi and in Tanzania. The total budget was USD 1,999,981 and the project title “*Preventing conflict and building peace through addressing the drivers of conflict and instability associated with forced displacement between Burundi and Tanzania*”.

## Intervention logic

The project’s intervention logic is expressed hereunder, with one overall objective, supported by three outcomes, articulated through a total of five different outputs:

Table 1 – from the initial IRF Results Framework PBF project document

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Overall Objective** | * Instability and conflict linked to displacement in the Burundian-Tanzanian cross-border areas are mitigated, displaced persons are better protected and supported in their progress toward durable solutions, and the resilience of host communities is enhanced contributing to socio-economic revitalization and peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region
 |
| **Outcome 1**  | 1. The instability at the Tanzania-Burundi border is reduced, and the rights of stranded, vulnerable migrants, internally displaced persons, and asylum seekers are better protected by immigration officials and other relevant authorities.
 |
| **Outputs** | * 1. Humanitarian Border Management (HBM) mechanisms on both sides of the border through direct support and training of national security forces (IOM Tanzania and Burundi)
	2. Effective and efficient protection, monitoring and assessments are carried out on both sides of the border (UNHCR Burundi and Tanzania)
 |
| **Outcome 2** | 1. The resilience capacities of displaced persons and host communities are strengthened
 |
| **Output** | * 1. Returnees, IDPs and vulnerable members of host communities, with specific attention to women and young people, have access to both short-term employment and long-term livelihood opportunities contributing to strengthen the resilience of the communities and to reinforce social cohesion (IOM and UNDP Burundi)
 |
| **Outcome 3** | 1. Refugee and returnee populations and members of their respective host communities, supported by alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, engage in peaceful ways to resolve conflicts and address grievances.
 |
| **Outputs** | * 1. Returnees and host communities have access to trust and efficient legal assistance, alternative resolution of conflicts to resolve displacement issues and disputes in a peaceful way (UNDP Burundi)
	2. Community-based conflict resolution mechanisms are developed and strengthened in places of return and return areas (UNDP Tanzania)
 |

A skeleton Theory of Change (ToC) is presented in the project document, but it does not meet the UN Guidance on the structure of a Theory of Change.

The evaluator has recreated the TOC based on the understanding of the documents reviewed as follows:

IF

* Improved protection monitoring is able to reduce cross-border instability,

PROVIDED

* The vulnerability of IDPs and host communities are addressed in a conflict-responsive manner,

AND

IF

* Resilience of local communities in areas of return is enhanced,

PROVIDED

* Local reintegration offers, such as dispute resolution mechanisms, income generation and livelihood development are strengthened in a conflict-responsive manner,

THEN
• Instability and conflict linked to displacement in the Burundian-Tanzanian cross-border areas are mitigated, displaced persons are better protected and supported in their progress toward durable solutions, and the resilience of host communities is enhanced contributing to socio-economic revitalization and peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region.

## Key social, political, economic and institutional factors

The project document was prepared in a different political context and the operating environment has changed since the project was designed. Two major changes that have taken place are; 1. The withdrawal of the Tanzanian Government from the CRRF, and its clear desire to support rapid repatriation of the Burundian refugees, and 2. the closure of refugee reception centers. According to the MoI in Burundi, 77,660 Burundians have been repatriated from Tanzania since August 1st, 2017 until early November 2019; The holding of presidential and legislative elections in Burundi foreseen for May 2020 are also seen as a factor that could affect population displacement. In the current context, the protection environment has been shrinking due to access limitations in border areas, meaning that not all the initially foreseen activities under outcome 1 were fully undertaken. The situation is quite volatile and unpredictable and contingency planning should be undertaken for the immediate post-election period. Regardless of the context, the project objective is directly aligned with the governmental priorities and the agencies’ corporate goals and priorities, even if donor attention seems to be dwindling, given the recurrent crises that have affected the region since 1993.

## Scale and complexity of the project

The project is a cross-border project in two countries: Burundi is a country that experienced an outflow of 400,000 Burundians in 2015, of which about 200,000 remain in Tanzania. There is further a displaced population in different provinces of Burundi, refugee camps in Burundi, host communities and returnees (77,660 since August 2017) along with refugees from the DRC, so the number and variety of vulnerable persons is high, and they have differing needs. In addition, there are mixed migration flows across the border. Tanzania has traditionally been hosting refugees since the early crises in the Great Lakes Regions (as early as 1959, but again after 1993 and 1994 with large population influx to Ngara/Benaco, and then in 2015). Burundi is a francophone country with a public administration very much in the style of the French, while Tanzania is an anglophone country with a public service aligned to the model used in the United Kingdom. There are therefore more differences in the way that public sector institutions and government agencies work in each country than, say, between Burundi and DRC, or between Tanzania and Kenya. This means that it may be more difficult to address expectations from the government agencies, as they may have different concerns on each side of the border (for example, regarding the issue of documentation of Burundian migrants). Language difference is also underpinning different mentalities and lifestyles, although the population on both sides of the border are quite vulnerable from a socio-economic perspective. Land pressure is particularly high in Burundi given its high population density, and almost all the rural population in Burundi survives on the basis of subsistence agriculture. Most Burundians excel at farming, the source of most of the livelihoods for those who do not benefit from formal employment.

The project is engaging three different UN agencies: UNHCR in line with its mandate for refugees and persons of concern, IOM for the mixed migration flows and in line with international migration law and socio-economic reintegration, and the UNDP for the socio-economic (re)integration, legal assistance, social cohesion and community-based conflict resolution approaches in line with the UN normative frameworks (Human Rights Based Approach – HRBA- assistance to vulnerable groups, gender considerations, etc.). Each agency is used to work with a number of projects in each country, but the PBF project is innovative as a cross-border initiative. Therefore, it requires enhanced coordination and communication both within agencies on both sides of the border, but also between the three agencies in each country.

The project is ambitious but, as a pilot, it only covers a very limited number of areas of return and communes in Burundi (three communes in two provinces of Makamba and Ruyigi), and a very limited number of villages in Tanzania for the CBCR component (10 in Kakonko and Kibondo districts) and in two refugee camps (Nduta and Mtendeli).

According to the project document, funding allocation per agency was divided as follows:

Table 2 from the PBF project documents, pages 56 to 63

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Agency** | **country** | **amount USD** | ***Burundi*** | ***Tanzania*** |
| UNDP | Burundi | 585697 | 585697 |   |
| UNDP | Burundi M&E, transferred to R-UNDG | 159344 | 159344 |   |
| UNDP | Tanzania | 100243 |   | 100243 |
| UNHCR | Burundi | 169359 | 169359 |   |
| UNHCR | Tanzania | 424908 |   | 424908 |
| IOM | Burundi | 140000 | 140000 |   |
| IOM | Tanzania | 420431 |   | 420431 |
| **total** |   | **1999982** | *1054400* | *945582* |

53% of the total budget was allocated for interventions in Burundi, and 47% for interventions in Tanzania. However, IOM Tanzania budget included activities linked to HBM in both countries, and the M&E and coordination costs allocated to Burundi as mentioned in the above table is cross-border in nature, so the exact allocation per country is not detailed

The evaluator could not obtain an indication regarding the contribution of the GoB or GoT to the project, particularly for outcome 2. Communes in Burundi now have funds and responsibilities to support cooperatives. Since the UNDP component of outcome two supported the creation of ten mixed agricultural cooperatives composed of returnees/IDPs/host population, it would have been useful to know if specific support from the communes had been granted. As part of the sustainability component the communal administration is also supposed to provide some support to ensure the success of the micro-finance scheme, which is something that could not be fully appraised during the evaluation given time constraints.

## Key stakeholders involved and audience of the evaluation report

The project was developed in the fall of 2017 for the PBF on the basis of a joint conflict and stakeholder analysis by UNDP, IOM, and UNHCR in Tanzania and Burundi, with the support of the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General for the Great Lakes (SESG-GL), Regional UN Sustainable Development Group for East and Southern Africa (R-UNSDG ESA), the UN Resident Coordinators (RCs) for Burundi and Tanzania, the co-champions of the UN Great Lakes Regional Strategic Framework, (the UNDP and WFP Regional Directors) (GLRSF) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). The aim of the project was to respond to the worsened humanitarian, developmental and peacebuilding crisis in the border areas, by applying a regional and cross-border analysis and solution to the protracted crises, combining approaches from the humanitarian, peacebuilding and developmental toolbox. While all the aforementioned actors may have an interest in the contents of the report, the evaluation commissioner and evaluation manager are the UNDP Resilience Platform, in Nairobi, which took over the cross-border coordination role of the project since October 2018, following the departure of the R UNDG dedicated coordinator. Other stakeholders such as the SESG-GL, the two Resident Coordinators, UNDP, IOM and UNHCR at Regional level in Nairobi, Burundi and Tanzania as well as country and field offices in Burundi and Tanzania may be interested in the evaluation contents, along with the ICGLR and the Governments of the two countries where the project was implemented. Local implementing partners of UNDP have also expressed their interest in the evaluation process. Other key audience include the PBF Secretariat and the Peacebuilding Support Office in New York (PBSO), especially as the funding window of the PBF dedicated for cross-border interventions is relatively new. PBF/PBSO is therefore currently interested in collecting lessons and evidence from concluded cross-border projects to further refine the funding tool. Finally, international donors are an audience as some have expressed increasing interest in applying integrated cross-border approaches in a range of contexts and some are looking in to doing so specifically in the Burundi – Tanzania context.

## Project implementation status

The project started on 1st January 2018 and was originally implemented for 12 months until 31st December 2018. A no-cost extension was given for three months until 31st March 2019, date on which the project was closed.

# Evaluation purpose, objectives and scope

## Purpose and objectives

The evaluation has three overall objectives:

1. Evaluate the results of joint analysis and programming on the ground for project beneficiaries in relation to peacebuilding, development and humanitarian relief activities as described in the project document, at outcome level;
2. Identify key lessons for the design of a scaled-up phase 2 of the project which can deepen UN-wide collaboration cross-border, focusing on those elements that are found to be most relevant and effective in the cross-border context of Burundi and Tanzania;
3. Identify action-oriented key learning messages that can be used to generate future inter-agency work across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus in cross-border settings or at regional level in Africa and beyond.

## Scope

The scope of the evaluation is the entire duration of project implementation since its start on 15th December 2017 until the end of the project on 31st March 2019.

This final evaluation has been contractually requested as per the 2018 PBF Guidelines that stipulates that an external independent evaluation shall take place towards the end of any supported project. The UNDP Resilience Platform in Nairobi therefore hired an independent consultant to carry out this evaluation, from the budget line in the project allocated for M&E managed by the R UNDG.

## Evaluation criteria

The five criteria for undertaking the assessment are mentioned in the ToR and are the standard criteria used for project evaluations: relevance, effectiveness, sustainability, impact, and coherence/coordination.

The definition of each of the evaluation criteria has been given by the OECD/DAC glossary of key terms in evaluation and results-based management in 2002 as follows[[2]](#footnote-3) :

“**Relevance**: The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies.

**Effectiveness**: The extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.

**Impact**: Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended

**Sustainability**: The continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed.

**Coherence[[3]](#footnote-4):** The need to assess security, developmental, trade and military policies, as well as humanitarian policies, to ensure that there is consistency and in particular that all policies take into account humanitarian and human-rights considerations”

In addition, and to the extent possible, the evaluation will also assess to what extent gender concerns were included in the project and appraise its partnership strategy.

# Evaluation Methodology

## Approach to the evaluation

The evaluation follows the PBF Guidelines from 2018 and the OECD/DAC quality standards for Development evaluation (2010). However, given the nature of the project the OECD/DAC publication *Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility, improving learning for results, 2012* seems more adequate for this exercise. Furthermore, the evaluation is aligned to “PME Handbook” established by the UNDP in 2009, which is compatible with the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) evaluation norms and standards (2017 revision) and the UNDG RBM guidance (2012). The final evaluation also adheres to the UNEG ethical guidelines for evaluation. The approach follows also a “utilization-focused evaluation” approach that is described by M. Q. Patton in his book “utilization-focused evaluation[[4]](#footnote-5)” that continues to be a good practice reference material for the conduct of evaluations.

Considering the above-mentioned DAC definitions, it would be technically incorrect to evaluate impact since not enough time has passed to appraise long-term results. Therefore, the evaluator focused on the **outcome** results (direct and indirect, positive and negative).[[5]](#footnote-6) UNDP defines an outcome-level result as “*the intended changes in development conditions that result from the interventions of governments and other stakeholders, including international development agencies. They are medium-term development results created through the delivery of outputs and the contributions of various partners and non-partners. Outcomes provide a clear vision of what has changed or will change in the country, a particular region, or community within a period of time. They normally relate to changes in institutional performance or behaviour among individuals or groups*”. [[6]](#footnote-7) It is through this perspective that the outcome-level results will be appraised and using in some cases with the direct beneficiary population an adaptation of the Most Significant Change (MSC) approach as described in the methodological section hereunder.

## Tools and methodology

The evaluation used a combination of methods that included:

1. Documentary review of project documentation shared by the evaluation manager (included in the bibliographical annex);
2. Field data collection including Individual Key Informant Interviews (KII) with key stakeholders: UN agencies (UNHCR, IOM, UNDP), government, partners and primary stakeholders, as well as Focus Group Discussions, as detailed hereafter;
3. On-site observation for triangulation/validation purposes.

 

Figure 1: List of Evaluation respondents. Source: evaluation notes and evaluation agenda. Note: average interview time over 40 minutes, totally 23 hours of interview time

The evaluator made a presentation to the project stakeholders upon arrival in the country, supported by a Power Point Presentation, to ensure all stakeholders were aware of the evaluation approach, process, methodology and tools (interview Nr 1). Similarly, on the last day of the field data collection mission, a validation/debriefing of preliminary findings and conclusions was held with the agencies’ technical focal points, GoB representatives from MOI and MOJ, and two implementing partners (COPED and ACCORD) in Bujumbura (interview Nr 33). Stakeholders from Tanzania also participated by skype, including both IOM, UNHCR and UNDP and the Kigoma Joint Programme / RCO. The aim was to present preliminary findings and conclusions and obtain stakeholders’ feedback, based on a Power Point Presentation. Similarly, a debrief was done for the Heads of Agencies on 29.10.19 through a skype call (interview Nr 34). The Power Point Presentation had been disseminated prior to the skype debrief.

Given the limited time available for the in-country data collection, (9 days) it was not possible to design a representative sample of beneficiaries to be interviewed. The evaluator focused on obtaining at least some good case results for components 2 and 3 (socio-economic (re)integration, social cohesion, legal aid, CBCR), as it was not possible to triangulate results for component 1 (Humanitarian Border Monitoring and Protection Monitoring). It was also advised that the evaluator should not enter the refugee camps in Tanzania to avoid any potentially negative perception from the authorities in Tanzania. However all four provinces covered by the project (Makamba/Ruyigi in Burundi and Kakonko/Kibondo in Tanzania) were visited and anecdotal evidence was collected from purposive sampling of cases (cooperative selected as good case scenarios), examples of community mediators (Burundi) and CBCR (Tanzania) that were able to solve conflicts, and obtaining feedback from the three agencies (IOM, UNHCR, UNDP) as well as from the authorities and some of the implementing partners.

The evaluator used personalized interview questions and probing during the discussions to ensure that the required information was obtained from the meeting, and that they were in line with the evaluation questions that are contained in the Evaluation Terms of Reference and further elaborated in the inception report.

The evaluator: Christian Bugnion de Moreta is bilingual (French-English) and has undertaken over one hundred evaluations for donors, UN agencies, NGOs and private sector organizations since 1995. He has worked in Burundi in 1994-5 and was the team leader of the Thematic Cluster evaluation of the Livelihoods and Economic Recovery interventions for BCPR New York in 2014 which included an analysis of the 3x6 approach in Burundi. He has undertaken many evaluations for each of the project partners: UNHCR, IOM and UNDP, and he is a vetted RBM trainer and M&E expert for UNDP Panama and Istanbul regional hubs. His CV appears as annex to the inception report.

## Risks and limitations

The main limitation was the compressed timeframe and limited evaluation budget. While the field dates were planned from 13 to 22nd of October, both 14th and 21st October were public holidays in Burundi, which limited the number of consultations that could be held on both dates. Except for the presentation of the evaluation with the focal points on 14th October, no other interview could take place that day. Similarly, on 21st October 2019, only an interview with the evaluation manager was possible, given the public holiday. In practice, this means that field data collection was undertaken from 15th October to 20th October 2019. Considering that the evaluation route covered over 1,000 km of travel during these days and the travel time to reach the different destinations, the number of interviews at field level was satisfactory. However, some respondents at field level were not available to meet with the evaluation team, and therefore no feedback was received for example from the authorities in Makamba at province or communal level. It is estimated that a better planning of the field activities could have somewhat enhanced the number of respondents met during the evaluation.

Exogenous constraints were linked to the current context leading to elections in Burundi in May 2020, and the political situation in Tanzania, which had impact on the refugee camps, affecting the environment in the border regions. The lack of access to the refugee camps in Tanzania also represented a major challenge and did not allow triangulation to take place.

The evaluation was composed of one international evaluator for the PBF project. However, a national consultant was recruited by the PBF apparently to support the evaluator. Neither the evaluation manager nor the international evaluator were aware of this. The consultant did not have any terms of reference to justify his participation in the evaluation mission, although he was introduced by the PBF in the initial presentation meeting, nor was his CV shared with the international evaluator. This shows that better planning and coordination is necessary when undertaking evaluations.

Another challenge was interpretation, as the interviews in Tanzania involved a mix of different languages. Sometimes the interpretation was ensured by the former UNDP Tanzania project staff into English, and at times other members of the evaluation mission translated in French the contents of the discussion. Apparently, there is more than one type of Swahili spoken in the border areas, such as Kiha. Therefore, future evaluations should be mindful of the need to ensure that the necessary language skills are included in the evaluation team to avoid any bias or incomplete data collection information at field level.

Finally, administrative readiness should be ensured for the support team accompanying the international evaluator, as in this case, there were difficulties linked to payment of DSA and incomplete preparation of lodging and administrative modalities for crossing the border into Tanzania. Because of this, the team lost many hours at the immigration post in Kibondo before being able to enter the country.

# Findings

This section is structured according to the evaluation criteria and along the key evaluation questions that were mentioned in the inception report.

## Relevance

**E.Q. 5.1. How relevant was the joint analysis and planning of the project in contributing to the New Way of Working?**

Extensive consultations were initially undertaken for the development of the project, although the rationale behind the budgetary allocations for each UN agency could have been explained further. This shows that actors working together in a peacebuilding context were aligned to the NWOW idea. Without a cross-border project, agencies would have been unlikely to position themselves in a similar manner or maintain the level of communication and coordination developed under the project. The two countries have wider programming instruments: in Tanzania the Kigoma Joint Programme, which links with the approach to the New Way of Working, while in Burundi the Joint Refugee Return and Reintegration Plan (JRRP) between UNHCR and UNDP also lead towards a more integrated approach between humanitarian and development agencies. Interviews at field level did not yield any feedback regarding the New Way of Working, something that apparently is discussed at the regional or national level but was not mentioned during the field interviews in either country. Even when discussing with UN staff on their planning framework, no reference was made to the New Way of Working, and it is not very clear how the project is expected to contribute to this. What is clear is that the need for a cross-border project remains fully justified in the current context and that the joint analysis and planning during the project design contributed to a common vision regarding the project objective, even if it did contain three different, albeit related, components.

**E.Q. 5.1.2. Has the project updated its conflict analysis, and how, during implementation in light of changing conditions?**

The initial conditions at the time of the project development have changed, and both in Tanzania and Burundi the context has changed. On the one hand, the political change in Tanzania with regards to the Burundian refugees, with the withdrawal of the country from the CRRF and the closure of refugee reception centers, has limited the access to border areas and protection monitoring. Nonetheless, under the Tripartite Agreement between UNHCR, GoB and GoT, since August 2017 a total of over 77,000 Burundians have repatriated to Burundi from Tanzania, with the support of the UNHCR and the logistical contribution of IOM. There remain 200,000 Burundian refugees in Tanzania at present in three refugee camps, and the upcoming presidential and legislative elections in six months in Burundi are factors which needs to be analyzed and a contingency plan should be prepared in view of the likelihood of future population movements[[7]](#footnote-8). The project did not undertake a review of the conflict analysis per say, but it did recognize the limitations stemming from the change of context regarding the activities under outcome 1 in its reporting. This led to a three-months no-cost extension of the project, to enable the agencies to complete its activities.

The other two components under the project outcomes 2 and 3 did not significantly suffer from the changes of the political situation and could still be undertaken within the project framework as foreseen. However, the small size and catchment area of the project (geographical coverage only in 3 communes in Makamba and Ruyigi in Burundi, and in five villages in each of the two districts in Tanzania – Kakonko and Kibondo) and the short timeframe for project implementation also means that a full update of the conflict analysis during the implementation was perhaps not entirely realistic. The project adapted to the changes in the conditions with the request for the extension of the implementation period, but it did not review its Theory of Change or results framework formally, to reflect the change in the conflict dynamics. At the same time, it is not clear what advantages an update on the conflict analysis during project implementation would have yielded. The main change would have been to review the indicators for the first outcome and at the overall objective levels, but considering the short implementation period, the overall objective cannot be reached in such a short time and the other two outcomes would not have been affected by the changing conditions, inasmuch as the activities are even more relevant and necessary in the changed context.

**E.Q.5.1.3. How relevant is the project’s intervention logic in terms of informing the humanitarian-development-peace nexus?**

The project intervention logic ties the three different types of intervention – humanitarian, peacebuilding, and development – into an integrated intervention that does indeed provide an added-value. The logic of the intervention is fully justified in the combination of the three types of support articulated into a single project. Development interventions take place in longer-term settings and one year is too short to appraise the likelihood of sustainability of the livelihoods/cooperative schemes (undertaken by UNDP Burundi), or even of aspects such as social cohesion, which is linked to the peacebuilding component but must be monitored over a longer period to determine its likely outcome. The size of the project and limited geographical scope means that, while it was conceived as a pilot cross-border project, the resources employed might not have been sufficient to create a critical mass in order to ensure the sustainability of the benefits, and there is limited evidence that it was actually embedded in larger programming frameworks from the UN agencies involved to maximize its potential synergies. One exception was the additional funding from UNDP Tanzania of USD 38,600 to complete the USD 100,234 allocation under the project. An expansion of the project in scope, budget size and length, is fully justified in the current context. Regarding social cohesion, the monitoring of returnee beneficiaries done by the IOM in Burundi provided evidence that the project components (in particular outcome 2) contributed to increasing social cohesion (Reintegration Snapshot of 230 Burundian returnees interview between April and June 2019, i.e. after the end of the PBF project).

From the perspective of the accountability to beneficiaries, the project is entirely responsive to the needs of the beneficiary population in both countries. Particularly in Burundi where host communities, returnees and IDPs have come together to undertake cash for work activities and rehabilitation of public spaces and address traditional sources of conflict. This is exemplified through activities such as bridge rehabilitation and water catchment protection, under the Quick Impact Projects undertaken by IOM. The approach is contributing to conflict prevention, as addressing community priorities through inclusive targeting of the different vulnerable groups, taking joint decisions and working together, is highly conducive to addressing conflict drivers (such as water sources). Kigoma is one of the poorest regions of the country, according to UNDP’s Tanzania Human Development Report 2017, with an HDI (Human Development Index) of 0.47, placing it in second position after the Kagera (0.44) and a Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) of 56, ranking as 8th lowest of the 27 regions surveyed. The CBCR approach is directly supportive of needs to address conflicts between refugees and economically vulnerable host communities. To strengthen the project in addressing intra-community and intra-refugee conflicts it would be relevant to include socio-economic activities for refugees as well as host communities in Tanzania in a future phase 2.

## Effectiveness

**E.Q. 5.2.1. To which degree have the performance targets of the results framework been achieved?**

Given the changing political and operational context during the project implementation, in particularly the closure of the refugee reception centers, the **first outcome** of reducing the instability along the Tanzania-Burundi border and enhancing protection of persons of concerns and stranded and vulnerable migrants, was only partly achieved. Three indicators were identified to measure the outcome:

* 1. % of trained personnel that can point to concrete cases that demonstrate that training information improved their efficacy and service delivery six months after the trainings: target 100%, result report in the final project report is 50%. There was some pushback from the GoT in border management-related activities. The GoT closed reception and transit centers at border points with Burundi and no new arrivals were recorded since May 2018. 2 Joint UNHCR/IOM trainings on Humanitarian Border Management (HBM) procedures for border officials took place on 5-9 November in Bujumbura and 12-16 November 2018 in Kigoma. In addition, UNHCR conducted 2 trainings with local authorities to strengthen working relations. Outcome level information is based on the PBF final report as no meetings were held with representatives of UNHCR Burundi or Tanzania during the evaluation, only with field staff on specific project activities. Considering the external project limitations, achieving half of the target can be considered acceptable.
	2. % of protection issues recorded in the border area. The initial baseline was 1,362 and the target a reduction by 50%. It is questionable if this indicator is actually measuring project results, as many other factors influence the achievements. Maybe a different indicator should be identified for measuring protection issues. The final project report indicates that the target was achieved. In 2018, the refoulement of a total of 173 individuals, of which 59 from Burundi, was recorded. While 2018 numbers constitute a significant decrease in relation to 2017, it must be stated that it was difficult to compile records of incidents of refoulement as border points remained closed. As indicated in the final PBF report, the restricted access to border areas hampered protection monitoring activities, therefore the reported cases are the ones UNHCR was aware of and the numbers are likely much higher. This means that speaking of a significant decrease is a bit misleading in the absence of more comprehensive data. UNHCR kept close collaboration with partners on the ground and intervened on occasions where there was information about arrivals from Burundi through unofficial border points and routes. UNHCR intervened in 96 cases.
	3. Number of vulnerable persons crossing the border who are identified and referred to assistance mechanisms per quarter. For this indicator, the lack of access to border areas due to official border points closure hampered protection activities. Nonetheless, 1774 asylum seekers were registered in Tanzania in 2018, 1773 from DRC and 1 from Burundi.

At the **output level**, the two expected results were 1) HBM mechanisms strengthened through training and support of national security forces (IOM) and 2) Effective and efficient protection monitoring on both sides of the border is ensured

For the first output (HBM), the two indicators in the project document were[[8]](#footnote-9):

* + 1. Number of HBM assessment conducted, with a baseline of one and a target of 2. IOM reported on its achievements in an HBM report on Mugina (Makamba) and Gisuru (Ruyigi) border points in Burundi. The target indicator was reached.
		2. Number of security committee members, immigration and police officers from both countries at the border demonstrated increased knowledge in protection sensitive HBM, including GBV. The baseline was 0 and the target indicator was 60, which was exceeded as 66 immigration officers from Gisuru, Mugina, Mabamba and Manvovu have been trained.

Beyond the numbers, interviews with immigration officials at two border points in Burundi (Mugina and Gisuru) as well as at two border points in Tanzania (Mabamba and Manvovu) confirm that the main effect of the support provided was to improve the communication and information flow between the immigration services on the two sides. Therefore, closer and more efficient communication venues have been established across the border for security forces in Burundi and Tanzania. Beyond the welcome material support provided, there remains however a certain amount of work to facilitate the understanding in the two countries about the documentation needs of the Burundian population and migrants that cross into Tanzania. While the PAFE (Police de l’Air, des Frontières et des Etrangers) in Burundi was very appreciative of the support received under the project by the IOM, in Tanzania the immigration services had mixed views of the effectiveness of the collaboration and criticized the lack of proper documentation of Burundian nationals entering Tanzania. In fact, one of the contentious issues is the provision of a paper Laisser-Passer (LP) which is delivered by the PAFE at border points and is only valid for 14 days in border regions, whereas the immigration services in Tanzania would like Burundians to carry one-year Laisser-Passer (requires payment) which is valid in the whole country for an entire year to minimize the number of migrants that do not possess valid documents. The issue of undocumented or inadequately documented migrants is still a concern for the immigration services in Tanzania. The structures of the immigration services in both countries are different and they have different public administration services.

For the **second outcome,** aiming at strengthening the resilience of displaced persons and host communities, results were aligned with the three performance indicators:

2.1. Number of cash for work beneficiaries working in the rehabilitation of communities’ infrastructure, with a baseline of 0 and a target of 105. The target of 105 was reached by IOM.

2.2. Number of vulnerable displaced, returnees and host communities in Mabanda and Kayogoro benefitting from strengthened livelihoods. The baseline was 0 and the aggregate target 520, attained. 520 workers (260 from each commune) worked over 75 days on Cash for Work schemes.

2.3. Number of community-based professional associations composed of 20-25 persons each created and provided with support through business incubators. The baseline was 0 and the target 10, which was reached.

The targets were fully reached, with a total of 625 beneficiaries under both types of activities (2.1 and 2.2), and an additional 250 persons under activity 2.3, bringing the overall total to 875 beneficiaries. On a quantitative note, it is difficult to appraise how this result alleviates the situation in the communities of return. Even if a household size of 6 persons is counted, the number of beneficiaries under this outcome can be estimated at 3,750, or some 4% of the returnee population since 2017. Coverage information is critical to understand how other projects and actors are contributing to this result and to what extent this component should be scaled-up in a future project.

 It is important to report on the coverage of the various actors who undertake socio-economic activities in the region (including the same UN agencies with other projects) to give a sense of what kind of gap coverage is being provided by the project as it is clearly only addressing a fraction of the socio-economic needs, while its entry point is set on contributing to social cohesion. The project should be able to provide information on how the vulnerable groups not covered by the activities under this project are being supported through other programmes and other actors so their needs are being met (for social cohesion through socio-economic reintegration, to ensure the inclusive approach of the different population groups is being applied by other actors as part of the process of rebuilding community cohesion). If the project’s inclusive approach is not being applied by other actors in Burundi, there should be a discussion at the UNCT level regarding where such an approach needs to be applied (specific geographical locations).

The GoB through the MoI expressed their full support for socio-economic (re)integration schemes and community cohesion, but also indicated that there are ten communes which receive the largest number of returns, so that an expansion from the PBF target of three communes to the ten communes would be particularly appreciated. In view of the evaluation, it is necessary that UNDP and IOM provide a comprehensive map of the coverage of the humanitarian and development actors in Burundi working on socio-economic (re)integration. This will be used to better target, design and implement a second phase of the project, and expand strategically in line with the identified gaps that are not being covered by other projects or other actors (using the inclusive approach of mixed beneficiary targeting to foment social cohesion).

This also raises the definition of resilience, a term that has been repeatedly used in the project design in defining the overall objective as well as defining outcome 2. Evidence from the evaluation has shown that activities undertaken by the project played a positive role for project beneficiaries, regardless of whether they are IOM short-term humanitarian beneficiaries or UNDP development 3x6 longer-term beneficiaries. But to be able to identify whether the short-term humanitarian approach, or the longer-term developmental approach is preferable to develop resilience, the term has to be defined (or the project overall objective and outcome statements changed to reflect another focus). According to the United Nations, “Resilience is the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and function”. This definition stems from the disaster risk reduction world and has been coined in May 2012 in a UN document “UN System Task Team on the post-2015 UN development agenda”, Disaster Risk and Resilience, Thematic Think Piece, UNISDR/WMO, May 2012. The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) has written in its working paper 245 on psychological resilience: “The term resilience has been conceptualized in various different but related ways, across a range of disciplines including engineering, ecology, economics and psychology. Psychological resilience has been defined as a dynamic psychosocial process through which individuals exposed to sustained adversity or potentially traumatic events experience positive psychological adaptation over time. Experts in the field have described psychological resilience as involving the interaction of protective mechanisms across levels, including factors such as supportive family and relationships, effective coping skills, culture and neurobiology.”[[9]](#footnote-10) Since there are different types of resilience, the United Nations should specify which resilience it is targeting – or rather, which discipline embodies better the UN objectives of “enhancing resilience”.

From an evaluative perspective it becomes therefore impossible, without any specific indicators to measure resilience, to identify which approach (humanitarian or developmental) is best suited to the stated objective.

Beneficiaries have clearly expressed their satisfaction with the money earned from the cash for work activities, which contributed to avoid further depletion of their already scant assets, as well as the structuring of beneficiaries into productive agricultural associations. Regarding the indicator 2.3, the evaluation was able to visit two cooperatives supported by the project in Makamba province: The first comprised only ten members (although according to the implementation modalities the size should be between 20 and 25 members) and was supported by the Scouts Association and the Dukuze micro-finance institution. A discussion with two women members of the cooperative showed that they were satisfied with the results of their work. The members included returnees, displaced and host communities, and they had been exploiting successfully the goat rearing and agricultural production, so that each member was able to obtain, on average some Fbu 4,000 per week for her/his own use (e.g. Fbu 16,000 per month per member equivalent to US$ 8, or Fbu 160,000 per month for the cooperative – US$ 80.--). The amount is not very high, but the two interviewees were quite satisfied with the results. One aspect on which they were not satisfied was with the micro-finance institution, and they did not deposit their earnings as planned on the account that was opened for them. Further discussions with the micro-finance institutions showed that the initial Fbu 50 million deposit that was provided to support the credit to the cooperatives had been fully withdrawn but no reimbursement had taken place (e.g. repayment rate 0%). This indicates that the micro-credit scheme is not working as envisaged. There was no time for the evaluation to further triangulate the data with the Scouts or the communal authorities. Micro-finance is always a challenging endeavor in the context of instability and cross-border returns, and in view of upcoming elections, the developmental approach should be better equipped to respond to the challenges on the ground. The second cooperative was interviewed in Kayogoro, Makamba, and supported by the implementing partner COPED. The cooperative was shown as a good example model, and the members (25) included returnees, displaced and host communities, in an effort to develop livestock activities (mainly goats and pigs). The cooperative has not yet made any declared profits, but each member has received a goat or piglet when the animals bred, which was their initial objective. The land on which the cooperative is located has been purchased and belongs to them. So far, they have not yet requested a credit from the Post Office (acting as micro-finance partner), but it is because the group is mixed, and it takes time to develop the level of trust necessary to jointly ask for a loan. However, they do plan an expansion and now they deem the level of trust amongst cooperative members is sufficiently strong to request a bank loan and make their cooperative more successful.

At the **output level,** there was one output and two indicators of success for the output, as follows:

2.1. Number of rehabilitated community infrastructures – baseline 0, target reached 3.

The three projects were selected by the communities in Munyinya, Niyabitaka and Rukobe hill. The first two prioritized the rehabilitation of the water sources (directly contributing to conflict reduction) and the third opted for the rehabilitation of an inter-communal bridge. Given time constraints, the evaluation was unable to visit the locations and interview the beneficiaries, but on-line videos, documented reports with photographs give evidence of a high level of satisfaction with the results achieved through this output. The video also explains how it has contributed to inter-community peace, as they do not fight over water any longer, which is a good result linked to the peacebuilding aspect.

2.2. Number of mixed associations (encompassing members from the different returnees, displaced, and host communities) created and supported to diversify livelihood opportunities in host communities. From a target of 15, the project was able to achieve 37 associations (UNDP and implementing partners). While this is certainly a positive result, the total number of registered cooperatives in Ruyigi province only is 250, according to the Governor’s office. Again, the issue of coverage provided by the project should be addressed to understand which gaps are being filled and where/how expansion should be considered. Since now communes have fund to support the cooperatives, it is particularly important to assess how the commune may contribute to the sustainability of the cooperatives created by the PBF project.

For the **third outcome** whereby refugees, returnees, host communities’ members are supported to use alternative dispute resolution mechanisms as a part of peaceful conflict resolution, the three performance indicators were as follows:

3.1. Number of cases peacefully solved by project-supported conflict resolution mechanisms. The baseline was 0 and the target was 300. The final project report mentions “TBC” because it proved extremely difficult to obtain reliable data. While evidence from field interview shows that this outcome has been in fact the most successful component carried out on both sides of the border under this project, the PBF project did not foresee development of a monitoring system to ensure reliable data collection. Thus, communities only mention the major conflicts that have been solved at ward/village level but forget the multiple smaller conflicts that were addressed at village or sub-village levels. Data availability is therefore not guaranteed, and a major gap in being able to document success of this component is the lack of evidence regarding the results achieved. This is both a lesson learned and a recommendation for the next phase of the project.

Most of the interviewees in Burundi and Tanzania indicated a low level of conflict when asked how many conflicts had been solved, but after probing it was apparent that only the “serious and large-scale” conflicts were considered. Those that could be solved at the village or sub-village level were not recorded clearly, because the need was not felt to document these results. Although the evaluation could not triangulate the findings in host communities with the refugee camp committees, given that the access to camps was not recommended in the current situation, there were clear examples provided of how agreements had been reached with the refugees on a number of conflicts (land, but also personal and family-related).

 An important element in understanding the success of the CBCR (term used here for conflict mediation activities in both Burundi and Tanzania) is that the process is much more transparent, open, participatory and free of charge. Traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution exist, but they come at a cost and are not always transparent. Therefore, the CBCR approach allows to address conflicts of both inter and intra-communal nature for free, which is highly appreciated by the community members. Examples have been given in both Burundi and Tanzania in which conflicts have been resolved without going to court, as a direct result of the presence of the project. Many conflicts relate to land issues, but many are also linked to family and private matters, particularly when dealing with refugees and host communities (Tanzania) or returnees, displaced and host communities (Burundi). The CBCR approach has shown to be a win/win mechanism that has contributed to a decrease in the number of court proceedings and cases referred to the court system, both in Burundi and Tanzania. Unfortunately the absence of a structured case monitoring system does not allow to have credible statistics about the results, but from interviews in Burundi (5 different mediators, 3 beneficiaries of CBCR services) and in Tanzania (13 CBCR committee members in Kasanda, 14 in Biturana) it is a major contributor to social cohesion and peaceful coexistence, while contributing to preserve the scant monetary earnings that project beneficiaries have. The training of conflict mediators within the population was also mentioned as an added value by the communities in Burundi. Two men involved in two cases of land disputes were interviewed and they indicated their cases were successfully solved outside the courts through the conflict mediators trained by the project.

A special mention must be made of Kasanda village CBCR committee in Tanzania, which showed a full understanding of the scope and uses of the CBCR approach and an impressive mastery of the tools and instruments for peaceful conflict resolution. During the FGD they were able to recreate a land conflict resolution through role-play and showed the maps and written agreement that were signed to end the conflict peacefully. Furthermore, several examples of conflicts with the refugees living in camps were mentioned (land use related, personal and family conflicts, firewood, etc.) and illustrations of how they were solved by working together with the refugee CBCR committees in the camps. Unfortunately, the lack of access to the refugee camps meant that the evaluation could not triangulate this information. However, anecdotal evidence from interviews with UNHCR camp partners indicate that conflicts between refugee camp populations and host communities are being solved peacefully through meetings of these committees. The project also supported and trained the creation of CBCR committee in the refugee camps of Nduta (56 leaders trained, including 25 female) and Mtendeli (51 leaders trained, including 19 female).

*3.2. Level of trust of displaced and returnees disaggregated by age and sex in legal aid mechanisms set in place, disaggregated by age and sex.*

No baseline was mentioned, but the target was 1,500. According to the final PBF report, 5,415 people received legal support, information and sensitization workshops in Burundi, of which 2,552 women. However, the project reports on a different type of indicator as the original indicator relates to the “level of trust”, something that the number of assisted legal aid beneficiaries does not reflect.

Legal aid and paralegal assistance have been important components in Burundi and have allowed to solve a high number of cases. Interviews with legal aid beneficiaries indicate that the process was extremely beneficial, as all the legal assistance was provided free of charge, unlike the court system which requires payment. A direct benefit to the beneficiaries of legal assistance is that free legal assistance contributes to fight asset depletion as no costs are involved in the proceedings. On the negative side, some of the court verdicts regarding legal aid beneficiaries have been appealed, and as the project is finished there is no longer a legal protection or assistance provided to the former project beneficiaries.

As a result, both the CBCR approach and the legal assistance are key in preserving the assets of vulnerable beneficiaries given that all services are provided free of charge, contrary to what would happen if court proceedings or traditional conflict resolution mechanisms were used. This indirectly plays an important protection role in the sense that beneficiaries do not have to resort to illegal or negative coping mechanisms to cover the costs related to the provision of services. Here again the issue of coverage remains, as only a small number of villages (5 in Kakonko district, 5 in Kibondo) were covered by the project activities. A strategic and targeted expansion should be able to contribute to a consolidation of the work of the mediators/committee members in Burundi and Tanzania and trigger a commitment by the international community to the cause of peace in both countries.

**E.Q. 5.2.2. How can the M&E framework be improved to support, monitor and document evidence of results?**

Insufficient time and resources have been devoted to the development of the M&E framework and the theory of change. The UN has guidance documents on developing a ToC, which has not been used in the PBF ToC statement, and on the establishment of a Results-Based Management (RBM) framework. The initial results-indicators identified are not SMART and were not developed from the perspective of the meaningful results of the activities. Some of the indicators are not peacebuilding oriented and lack means of verification, others are poor proxies for what is supposed to be measured. The wording of some of the outcome statements (such as for outcome three) is not in line with the UNDG guidance and does not show the change process that the peacebuilding project seeks to achieve. It seems as if the project M&E and results framework was hastily put together, without field validation or partnership meetings with implementing partners and agencies to refine it. While the initial project document indicates that “the results framework will be further developed and refined through the development of an M&E plan at the beginning of the project”[[10]](#footnote-11), the evaluator has not received any documented evidence showing the refining of the IRF or the development of an M&E plan. It is doubtless a challenging endeavor to coordinate and communicate across two countries and with three UN agencies, each using its own project framework for appraising and reporting on results. But the development of the PBF IRF and M&E plan should at least build on the existing tools used by the participating UN agencies, in order to ensure coherence and consistency between the PBF document and planning and implementation framework of each of the participating UN agencies, in both countries.

**E.Q. 5.2.3. Under which outcomes were the best results achieved, and why?**

As mentioned above, the shrinking protection space means that access to border areas was restricted, which constrained and delayed the protection monitoring under outcome one. The best results were achieved under outcomes 2 and 3, with the caveat that resilience has not been defined in the context of the project, which makes benchmarking extremely difficult. It is found that the outputs under outcome two; cash for work and income generating opportunities and structuring of cooperatives across the variety of vulnerable population (returnees, displaced and host communities) has been extremely useful and relevant for peacebuilding, in a context of high economic vulnerability. Both IOM and UNDP were largely successful in the development of social cohesion through joint projects that provided a much-needed source of income. It is too early to appraise whether the developmental approach used by UNDP with cooperatives provided “longer term livelihood opportunities” as mentioned in the RF. The issues relating to the micro-finance schemes should be closely reviewed and possibly revised, since the anecdotal evidence from the field and discussions with the micro-finance institutions shows that associations are not depositing their earnings as foreseen. This considering the fact that communes now can provide funding to cooperatives in Burundi, and that most of the rural population is engaged in agricultural cooperatives in one form or another.

The outcome three, through provision of free legal service and creation of conflict mediators/CBCR committees has also strongly contributed to solving conflicts peacefully and avoiding court proceedings. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the number of cases referred to the courts were on the decrease. Both free legal assistance and free conflict resolution contributed to preservation of economic assets of the vulnerable population, an important result in the current context.

E.Q.5.2.4. How effective was the coordination of peacebuilding, development and humanitarian activities at national and regional level?

A cross-border project that works in two countries with three UN agencies in both countries, requires a substantial effort of coordination and communication at national and regional level. Both Resident Coordinators in Burundi and Tanzania were empowered to engage in the strategic cross-border coordination of the project. They were supported by the Nairobi based programme coordination specialist of the GLRSF (40%) and two national officers (30%) posted in Burundi and Tanzania, as described in the project document. The programme coordination specialist changed during the implementation period, and substantial efforts of coordination between the new programme coordination specialist and the national coordinators in the two countries took place to ensure a continued smooth project implementation. Coordination of donor dialogue, quality assurance of deliverables and reports, communication and results dissemination, including a professional video production about the project targeted donors and the Peacebuilding Commission was done at the regional level in Nairobi. As a pilot project, the PBF was testing coordination approaches for a cross-border project. While the PBF project stated that the Resident Coordinators in Burundi and Tanzania were empowered to engage in the strategic cross-border coordination of the project, there was limited evidence to that effect available[[11]](#footnote-12). Despite the efforts deployed at regional and national level, the progress reports stated as recommendations to increase regular communication and information sharing between project implementors in Tanzania and Burundi, and a systematic skype call once a month between agency focal points and RCOs was done, during the last part of the project.

Evidence for in-country data collection suggests that even closer coordination and communication are required for future cross-border projects. Even though mechanisms existed as well as venues for collaboration and joint planning, including through the holding of joint cross-border activities, more ownership and commitment are required from the participating agencies. In part, reduced coordination happened as some activities were already budgeted in sub-projects of each agency and could be undertaken without necessarily stronger coordination. However, closer coordination would allow to generate greater synergies amongst the project components, something that the UN agencies field staff and regional programme coordinator readily recognized. In particular, the issue of vocational education and skills training for the Burundian refugees in Tanzania should be responding the demand side in the communities of return, and the tools and kits given should be as easily transportable as the skills they acquired. As an overriding majority of returnees are primarily engaged in agricultural activities, the skills development and vocational training should also be mindful of the conditions of return and be applicable to the areas of return. Hence the need for cross-border planning in the socio-economic reintegration component, and the development of business skills training for engaging in cooperatives and agricultural activities.

The evaluation did not have access to information regarding the coordination aspect from the perspective of the heads of agencies, so the feedback is mainly from the regional project coordinator and the national officers in Burundi and Tanzania. It was also challenging for the evaluator to be able to gauge on the strategic importance of this project for each UN agency, particularly as the funding amount and geographical coverage was limited, therefore it is difficult to comment on the level of ownership of the UN agencies to this project. During the debriefing with some of the Heads of Agencies, it appeared that there was a general consensus on the fact that the PBF project was filling strategic gaps (particularly on the outcomes 2 and 3) and that the results were encouraging and should be expanded, so as to consolidate the early gains and drive deeper into the communities the approaches towards social cohesion, socio-economic reintegration and conflict mediation.

## Outcome level results (instead of impact)

**E.Q. 5.3.1. What has been the biggest change brought about by the project (MSC)?**

**Outcome one**, about enhanced protection and stability in border areas, is particularly challenging as the change in the context and the operating conditions have constrained the results that could have been achieved under this outcome. In particular, field data revealed that the closing of the “common markets” where refugees and host population came together in Tanzania contributed to less social interaction and increased isolation of the refugee population. Conversely, this actually reinforced the linkages and communication through the CBCR committees in host communities and refugee camps, as the limited interaction between host communities and refugees became more important for creating venues for peaceful conflict solving. From the persons of concern and the mixed migrants’ protection perspective, the evaluation did not interview any beneficiary of these categories and is therefore unable to provide concrete direct evidence from the field regarding the international protection aspects (based on the UNHCR Refugee Convention or the International Migration Law for mixed migrant flows). Documentary evidence does indicate that protection monitoring continued even if it was constrained by the change in conditions and access limitation to border areas.

For the **second outcome**, regarding enhancing resilience capacity, the major change is that the interventions of the IOM were very useful in providing both an economic injection of cash during a short period (75 days) to alleviate the difficult economy of the beneficiaries, and that different groups of beneficiaries (returnees, displaced and host communities) were able to benefit from the interventions. In the case of the infrastructure rehabilitation identified by the communities in the IOM scheme, two were water sources, which often are a cause of conflict for the communities, and one inter-communal bridge. For the UNDP interventions, the economic injection of cash with the cash for work scheme was also appreciated, and the support to the articulation of the agricultural cooperatives, again using an inclusive approach with returnees, displaced and host population benefiting from the interventions. The gradual rebuilding of trust and strengthening of social cohesion, coupled with small income generation through cash for work and agricultural activities, may in fact be the most significant change that the project contributed to achieving. Anecdotal evidence of the development of trust was mentioned with examples from one cooperative, and the IOM reintegration snapshot provides further evidence about the contribution of the project towards social cohesion.

The most significant change for the **third outcome** may be that the CBCR approach has created venues for peaceful conflict resolution both between refugees and host communities, but also amongst communities themselves. Both the provision of free legal aid and of free conflict mediation mechanisms allows the communities to address all types of conflicts with a different perspective and an apparently high level of local resolution capacity. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the number of cases that are being brought to court for conflicts is diminishing in both countries, which should be seen as a positive trend of achievement. Conflict is found across all walks of life and is not defined by the category of people (resident, refugees, displaced) so the methodology developed by the UNDP is clearly used for all types of conflict, including family conflicts. Some examples in Kasanda village have evidenced the extent to which the committee owns the process and uses it regularly to address its conflict with serious commitment and motivation. The UNHCR camp manager for two of the Burundians refugee camps in Tanzania (Ntuda and Mtelendi) and the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) also incorporated the methodology from the UNDP toolkit for CBCR given its good results. It is important to note that all CBCR members participate voluntarily in the committees, and that the only material support that was given by UNDP in Tanzania is the distribution of a limited number of toolkits for CBCR. While in Burundi, UNDP’s partner ACCORD was responsible for the training of the conflict mediators. In both cases, work has been done on voluntary basis, although from interviews in Burundi two of the five conflict mediators were also beneficiaries of legal aid. The evaluator further considers the results of the CBCR in Tanzania as excellent in view of the very limited budget allocation.

At the global level, the PBF project has brought an innovative modality by working cross-border with three agencies with different approaches including peacebuilding, humanitarian aid and development. The project highlighted the need for enhanced coordination and communication between the two countries’ implementing agencies and provided a potential model of integrated approach around the HDP nexus that could be further analyzed to identify the different synergies that can stem from such an approach. At the same time, the financial allocation for each agency in each country should be more strategically formulated in line with the outcome results that the PBF seeks to achieve, and therefore more resources should be placed where the main positive changes are taking place.

**E.Q. 5.3.2. To what extent has the project achieved each of the three outcomes?**

The project was constrained by the changing scenarios, operational context and political situation regarding the achievement of the first outcome. For this reason, the PBF project received a three-months extension which allowed to achieve part of the anticipated result (hence the 50% for the first of three indicator ratings for outcome 1). The other two outcomes were achieved, although the size of the intervention and short timeframe did not necessarily create the conditions for the sustainability of the social cohesion and conflict management processes without some further support to consolidate the basis which has been established.

**E.Q. 5.3.3. To what extent has the project affected cross-border inter-agency work? And at regional level?**

The PBF cross-border project is a pilot given its cross-border nature and an approach encompassing the HDP nexus in one single project. It has reinforced the coordination and communication across the two countries as a cross-border project should, but at the same time it went through a lot of pressure to deliver because of its very short project life. The extent to which this project actually affected cross-border inter-agency work is not known, as there was no specific evidence or comments during the field data collection that informed such a finding. However, interviews with agencies at the field level indicated that they understood that unexploited synergies remained regarding the cross-border communication and coordination, particularly in profiling the vocational training for Burundian refugees in the camps in Tanzania ahead of their return. More joint training could be held with IOM/UNHCR with government institutions and security forces across both sides of the border as was done in November 2018 in the two workshops held in Bujumbura and Kigoma, something that could be achieved given the cross-border nature of the project. From a need’s perspective, greater interaction when planning the returns and the profiling of the beneficiaries in the camps in Tanzania could be undertaken in line with the idea of using transferable skills to the areas of return. UNHCR has invested substantially in hardware in the camps and the partners offer a range of services and support (including VET, skills development, language courses, etc.). However, the provision of services to camp’s refugees is not based on an analysis of the likely demand for services linked to their return. In other words, there is some disconnection between the skills and supplies that refugees receive in the camps and the conditions in which they will develop their livelihoods upon return in Burundi, which is mostly linked to agricultural sector production. There could be improved cross-border planning between the agencies to ensure that the support provided in Tanzania will be adapted to the situation in the communes of return. It would be desirable to increase cross-border collaboration for a profiling of refugees’ capabilities in order to focus on transportable and adapted skills acquisition that will help the reintegration of returnees in the communes of return. For this, UNHCR could facilitate cross-border meetings with the camp managers, and UNDP/IOM/implementing partners on the Burundi side, to ensure better provision of services suited to the conditions of return.

The evaluation did not meet or interview the regional instances involved in the project, so there is limited information apart from the documents supplied and in particular the soft launch of the project in February 2018 in Bujumbura, attended by both countries’ UN Resident Coordinators, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes region, GLRSSF co-champions and the ICGLR. There does not appear to have been a final regional workshop on the lessons learned from the PBF at the end of the project[[12]](#footnote-13), something which should be considered for a future cross-border project, as it is useful to identify the venues for sustainability or replication building on the dynamics of the project’s achievements.

## Sustainability

**E.Q.5.4.1. How sustainable are the new cooperation modalities and how can they be reinforced to strengthen New Way of Working (NWoW)?**

If the UN RCs in each country and head of agencies are committed to cross-border project implementation, the modalities can be embedded as a system for cross-border collaboration. However, the level of complexity in such a project requires a higher percentage of dedication from the regional project coordinator (40%) and the two national officers (30%). PBF progress reports mention the need to intensify communication and coordination, and possibly joint exercises cross-border, in order to develop a culture of regular cross-border communication. There are of course costs involved with an increased coordination and communication structure, but it is important that the Agency focal points, the national officers and the regional project coordinator maintain close contact and physically meet in each country alternatively every two months, until all the pending issues, joint planning, and workplan development, have been fully discussed amongst partners. This of course entails larger budgets for project implementation. Another question is to what extent it would be useful to create a functional project management board to oversee the steering in the implementation of the project. While such a board was to be created according to the PBF project document p. 35, composed of the UN RCs, UNDP, UNHCR, IOM, a member of the ICGLR, local authorities, implementing partners from both countries and CSOs, the evaluator did not receive documented evidence of any such meetings or minutes of any project management board meeting.

Ideally in the view of the evaluator, a cross-border integrated project working on the HDP nexus should be designed over a three-year timeframe, to allow sufficient time to design the project, recruit the staff, develop a baseline and a RBM-compliant monitoring and evaluation framework, informed by SMART indicators.

At present the most likely benefit, that appears to be sustainable, is the continuation of peaceful conflict resolution activities in Burundi and Tanzania even though the project has ended. In Kibondo district, the local administration social welfare officers shared their database in which they had 110 conflict reported cases from April to June 2019 of which 90 had been solved through the intervention of the CBCR committees. While the statistics may not be entirely reliable, it does show that more than 82% of the reported conflicts to the local administration were solved peacefully by CBCR committees, representing a major achievement.

At the same time, not all leaders and committee members have been trained or possess sufficient skills to mediate in conflicts, and a more structured and consolidated approach to the training would be conducive to longer-term sustainability, especially if all return communes in Burundi and the wards hosting refugee camps in Tanzania could be covered. Interviewees reported that neighboring communes (Burundi) or villages (Tanzania) would also be interested in possessing the tools for CBCR.

**E.Q.5.4.2. What are the project’s outputs that contributed to sustainable change?**

At this stage it is difficult to identify sustainable changes apart from the work in peaceful conflict resolution. The legal assistance component is not sustainable, as when the project finished the legal staff were no longer available to provide free legal aid services. The contribution of the project to the community social cohesion in areas of return is part of a dynamic process which should be accompanied further. The social fabric that is being rebuilt requires a longer timeframe, particularly with additional returns taking place. The enhanced communication between the immigration services (PAFE in Burundi and Tanzania Immigration) have led to a closer relationship and the establishment of direct contacts, which are useful to maintain a better cross-border communication amongst the security forces. Future joint trainings would contribute to furthering the improved communications.

**E.Q. 5.4.3. Are there lessons regarding coordination to sustain results for beneficiaries?**

This question relates to size and scope of the project. As a pilot, the amount of funding was very small for the two countries when looking at the uncovered peacebuilding needs, and the timeframe was excessively short to achieve sustainable results in any component. The first lesson should be therefore to have a clear and realistic timeline to achieve results – which given the nature of the project, should be no less than three years to ensure the creation of a critical mass in every component of the project. In Burundi, communes now have funding available for cooperatives, so a closer involvement of local/provincial authorities in the socio-economic reintegration scheme of UNDP should be assured to contribute to the sustainability of the efforts. In Tanzania, one of the reasons for the GoT’s desire for Burundians to repatriate is linked to the fact that the Kigoma region is one of the poorest of the country, and the perception is that refugees have all the necessary support from the international community, while host communities are largely overlooked by international assistance. It can be argued that to ensure the sustainability of the conflict resolution mechanisms the drivers of conflict be tackled. In this case the poverty level of the host communities could be addressed through socio-economic development schemes, the same as is being done in Burundi for returnees/displaced/host populations. The difference is that in Tanzania enabling conditions exist for a developmental approach to socio-economic development. This could support other on-going UN programmes or be supported by other UN programmes. (or at least ensuring that another UN intervention is providing this kind of support).

## Coherence and coordination

**E.Q.5.5.1. How can delivery of results be practically strengthened across the HDP nexus?**

The project needs to be upscaled in scope and size and have a clear indication of its coverage and that of other projects working with similar peacebuilding issues. The strongest results have been leveraged regarding social cohesion and socio-economic reintegration, peaceful conflict resolution and addressing conflict drivers through rehabilitation of community infrastructures such as water sources and bridge, and the provision of legal assistance. The approach is proven to generate positive results, but it must be scaled to needs and geographically expanded to avoid any gaps. This can be done by revising and dimensioning outcomes 2 and 3 with some rewording regarding the outcome statements, a technical review of the performance indicators, and a clarity about how the outputs support the achievement of the outcome, through a properly devised Theory of Change for the project.

Staff changes took place in the regional project coordination during the project implementation. Coordination with the PBF Secretariat in Burundi and the cross-border project coordination in Nairobi could be strengthened, as neither the evaluation manager nor the international evaluator was aware that a national consultant had been recruited to, *inter alia,* support the evaluation.

**E.Q.5.5.2. How effective is cross-border communication amongst the implementing partners?**

As evidenced from the interviews at field level, the implementing partners did have some level of cross-border communication, as some activities were undertaken jointly (for example, UNHCR/IOM with security forces from both countries). Nonetheless, it was also recognized that greater cross-border communication would be favorable, and more efforts could be deployed to that end. The level of communication was in part because some of the activities did not require cross-border coordination to be implemented. However, when perceived through a lens of maximizing synergies between the implementing partners, it appears that a more intensive communication effort could have contributed to higher synergies amongst the implementing partners. The lesson is that there is room for improvement in strengthening cross-border communication, and maybe it would be useful to develop a model communication structure for cross-border operations.

## Cross-cutting questions

**E.Q.5.6.1. What lessons can be drawn for cross-border inter-agency projects aiming at delivering across the HDP nexus?**

The PBF project has shown the relevance of an integrated approach across the HDP nexus. While in reality this is a conceptual discussion, the relevance of the results is grounded on the type of interventions that took place, more than per say on the fact that they addressed the HDP nexus. It is not possible to appraise, for example, what would have been the result if all the socio-economic reintegration support had been based on a humanitarian approach (short-term, IOM implemented) instead of applying the developmental 3x6 approach used by UNDP in Burundi. Only over the long-term can an evaluation inform of whether the developmental objectives have been reached, which was clearly impossible in the context of a short one-year project. The question may therefore not be currently targeted to the fact that the HDP nexus actors worked together, but rather on the composition and synergies between the interventions undertaken under the nexus. The activities were clearly in line with identified needs and agencies’ mandates and comparative advantages. The project is building upon the combination of skills and experience in attempt to provide comprehensive peacebuilding assistance to the vulnerable population on both sides of the border, in some cases facing important constraints.

A lesson for new cross-border projects is that they should not be considered as standard projects, as they are more intensive in planning, coordination and communication. Cross-border projects could be used to provide better mutual understanding between the needs of selected institutions of the two countries (e.g. for example regarding the issue of undocumented migrants in Tanzania), when this affects the level of protection of the target beneficiaries.

In the context of Burundi and Tanzania, the development of peacebuilding mechanisms that allow for conflict resolution through the CBCR approach is a strong winner that needs to be supported further and benefits equally the two countries. As PBF is a Peacebuilding Fund, it should naturally focus on this aspect and commit larger resources to this component, as other components may be funded from other projects or programmes.

**5.6.2. To what extent has the project applied a gender and age approach (UNHCR AGDM approach)?**

Interviews and observation during the field data collection indicate that the issue of gender was largely considered in the project implementation. All statistics are gender disaggregated, women quotas were insured for the committees that were formed (although apparently there is a legal requirement in Tanzania regarding women participation in public associations) and women were largely represented in the mediators interviewed (4 of 5 were women in Burundi) and in the two FGD with CBCR committees in Tanzania (10 women of 27 members of both committees). Women were also guaranteed to participate in the cash for work schemes, and cooperative members interviewed by the evaluation were also women. The PBF project was gender sensitive with regards to the specific protection aspects and from the needs-based approach to beneficiary assistance, although it could do more to be gender transformative. The activities in Burundi and Tanzania were also mindful to include youth and women as specific categories requiring support to be empowered, hence their inclusion in the criteria for selecting the CBCR trainees.

# Conclusions

The project was a pilot of applying a cross-border integrated HDP approach in a complex context compounded by changing conditions at political and field level during implementation. Despite many challenges and limitations, including a small budget, fragmented geographical scope of interventions, and a too short implementation timeframe that did not allow developmental approaches to reach objectives, the project was able to obtain concrete results. The evaluation finds the best results particularly linked to peaceful conflict resolution, social cohesion and reintegration. The cross-border activities were able to take place with some joint trainings in which both countries’ security sector institutions participated. Feedback from interviewees confirmed a positive appraisal of the GoB regarding the project, in particularly the socio-economic reintegration aspects. According to the UN agencies feedback, the GoT was also supportive of the approach and efforts undertaken. Because of its small size and timeframe, the project could not develop in a manner to become a general model for cross-border peacebuilding projects for other contexts. However, elements of the project design, in particular the HDP nexus approach to peacebuilding, is something that has a strong potential for expansion and consolidation. The desk review of documents, interviews held during the evaluation and videos produced in connection with the project demonstrate that important achievements have been made. However, it is too early and too little to establish a critical mass that will generate the dynamics towards longer-term sustainability of results, if further resources are not invested.

It is not clear to what extent, after the soft launch, the UN RCs and regional stakeholders contributed to the strategic piloting of the project. A closer supervision by the identified decision makers through a Project Board with clear ToR, roles and responsibilities could have contributed to more regular review and meetings around implementation, to enhance synergies between project components. It may be useful to develop a specific model for technical coordination and communication for cross-border projects, as the PBF project did not have a specific model that it could use to facilitate coordination and communication instruments and tools.

The upscaling of the current project to a wider area-based programme in the borderlands, that is also supporting and being supported by other projects would allow such an upscaling. The seeds of peaceful conflict resolution and social cohesion have been planted in Burundi and Tanzania, but the process remains fragile and plagued by a number of risks. Results obtained, particularly for outcome three, but also for outcome two, indicate that an expansion of the project based on the CBCR component as the key focus would be highly relevant. Such programme, complemented by legal assistance and supported by the social cohesion component through socio-economic reintegration and conflict mediation, can be developed as a trademark for cross-border HDP interventions in protracted crisis situations and fragile environments. This would allow PBF to coin a specific type of intervention, a kind of branding in which conflict prevention and resolution and social cohesion are the visible and measurable results of the project, which may also support other components, and can also be used to support other wider programmes. In any case the PBF project obtained sufficiently meaningful results to continue and expand its approach until it becomes rooted in the refugees, displaced, host communities as an integral part of their resilience toolbox.

#  Recommendations

Essentially based on the documentary review and the field data collection, the evaluator makes the following recommendations, in line with the stated project objective and mindful of the outcomes that are sought as per the Terms of Reference for this evaluation:

## *To the PBF:*

1. Hold a regional workshop with the three agencies, OSESG-GL, the GLRSF co-champions, the two RCs and ICGLR in order to strategically engage on the development of an expanded second phase; substantially larger in volume, in terms of geographical scope, and with a minimum implementation period of three years. It is not realistic to achieve peacebuilding and development objectives over a 12 months project period when population movements are expected to continue over the short to medium term (e.g. further returns from Tanzania).
2. Develop specific involvement of the PBF Secretariat in Burundi to support the expanded second phase of the PBF project, through definition of clear roles and responsibilities. While the PBF Secretariat is not even mentioned in the composition of the PBF project management board, the fact that Burundi hosts other PBF funded project makes it a necessary partner in the way in which projects are slotted to be mutually supportive in line with their expected outcomes. The project document does mention that “*this project is expected to be complemented by a national peacebuilding project also funded by PBSO focused on supporting community resilience building efforts and enhancing the protection environment in Burundi*”[[13]](#footnote-14). The brief meeting with the PBF Secretariat in Burundi did not yield any information regarding any complementary project funding.
3. Within the portfolio of projects, funded by the PBF, a higher percentage of time should be ensured for regional and cross-border communication and information exchange. This is needed to ensure stronger provision of data and statistics and address the issue of geographical coverage, in particular regarding the PBF funded projects and how they relate to the cross-border project. Considering resource limitations and PBF guidelines regarding the share of funding that can be allocated to staff, a larger overall budget would allow to consider a 100% post for the project coordinator.
4. Invest corporate resources in developing an RBM friendly M&E plan and results framework, with SMART indicators, and a theory of change that is developed along the lines of the UNDG corporate guidance.

## *To the UN R*esident Coordinators

1. *As decision-makers with full authority over the cross-border project, dedicate a percentage of time of the UNRCO in facilitating information exchange, communication and coordination cross-border and with the regional project coordinator.*
2. *Hold an end of project workshop in Kigoma or Burundi, with participation from all stakeholders and government representatives, to review the final project results based on* the *external evaluation and identify the lessons learnt from the cross-border project, and how it could be made more effective and efficient in reaching its objectives.*
3. *Ensure regular Project Board meetings* take place *every six months with a set agenda and provide minutes of the meetings*.

## *To the UN implementing agencies*

1. *Devote enough resources for information and communication across the organization, with other partners and on cross-border issues.*
2. *Intensify the level of joint planning and implementation to maximize synergies across the agencies and in cross-border operations*.
3. *Address protection to encompass the socio-economic vulnerability of target beneficiaries and consider income generation and livelihoods as part of the protection mandate of the UN.*

## Proposed content to an expanded phase 2 of the PBF cross-border project:

1. Articulate the theory of change to prevent conflict and build peace on two axes: 1) Community-Based Conflict Resolution (CBCR) on cross-border basis in both Burundi and Tanzania, and the provision of legal assistance, and 2) social cohesion through protection and socio-economic empowerment.
2. Project expansion should be financial and geographical to cover all high return communes in Burundi (10 according to the MoI instead of the current 3 communes) and in the wards of the districts where the two refugee camps of Nduta and Mtendeli are located in Tanzania (Kibondo and Kakonko) in the border area. The oldest camp in Tanzania is Nyarugusu which was not part of the PBF phase I but could be considered for a phase 2 expansion. The project should be implemented over a 36 months period (three years) to ensure the outcome of the HDP nexus is visible and can be evaluated. At minimum it should increase its funding to US$ 6 million to ensure an annual delivery of US$ 1 million in both countries, for both components.
3. Under component one, PBF should obtain buy-in from the different UN agencies to construct “peace houses” in Tanzania or “maison de la paix” in Burundi. This should be done in communes and villages where CBCR training has taken place and mediation committees have been structured in line with the UNDP toolkit and the CBCR approach that has yielded clear results in the first phase of the PBF project. The houses could be built by the committee members themselves using a cash for work approach, which would show that the international community (and the PBF) is committed to peaceful conflict resolution and willing to place resources in the construction of a house using local materials that would serve for holding the conflict resolution activities, meeting of the committee members, dissemination activities, and more importantly to collect and store the monitoring statistics regarding the conflicts solved through the work of the committee members. Committee members in both Burundi and Tanzania need to use the same training approach for CBCR. A joint meeting with ACCORD who was the NGO in charge of the training in Burundi together with UNDP Burundi and Tanzania should be undertaken to facilitate a single cross-border approach to CBCR based on the lessons from the current project. Basic identification (such as T-shirts indicating “conflict resolution committee member”, certificates of participation in CBCR training) should be ensured to all those who have been trained, and basic equipment and supplies should be provided (at least benches, chairs, one table and a cabinet to store files safely).
4. A major shortfall in the provision of evidence regarding the effectiveness of the CBCR activities is the lack of a structured monitoring system to collect conflict resolution statistics. As a result, committee members do not have the habit to systematically collect data and have statistics that allow to appraise the results obtained. This should be addressed together with the local authorities and the implementing NGO partners so that the UN system, the GoT and GoB, and IPs come together to develop a structured data collection and reporting system regarding CBCR activities. One computer per province/district should be provided to the local authorities as the focal point for centralizing the data collected. Given the transportation constraints and the fact that distances to conflict sites is sometimes long (for example for land conflicts which require a presence on the spot), the project could also consider investing in electrical bicycles that can be recharged with solar panel energy, for ward/commune focal points, in order to avoid addressing the issue of paying for fuel and maintenance of motorcycles. A fully rolled-out and structured monitoring system of conflict resolution cases would allow to confirm the anecdotal evidence received about the decreasing number of cases referred to courts, and also show the capacity of the population (hence their resilience) in solving peacefully conflicts which affect the refugee, host and displaced communities.
5. Under a new component two, the project could invest in social cohesion and protection through the different approaches for socio-economic integration. Both approaches (IOM short-term and UNDP long-term) should be maintained but specifically monitored in order to be able to draw the lessons regarding the effectiveness of each approach over the life of the project. A joint monitoring between IOM/UNDP and its implementing partners of the socio-economic reintegration should be ensured in Burundi. In Tanzania, the project should also consider developing socio-economic activities with the host communities, in order to further contribute to the development of social cohesion, and to offset the perception that Burundians are receiving more assistance than vulnerable Tanzanians, which leads to tensions and can become a source of conflict or influence the political agenda. One such socio-economic activity could be, for example, the construction of the “peace house” referred to under point C above. Alternatively working on issues which can be a source of conflict (land, firewood, water) between refugees and host communities in an inclusive approach should be studied. At the same time, closer planning between the UN agencies in the two countries to favor the support of transferable skills development for refugees, which can be used in their areas of return. There are currently several services offered in the refugee camps in terms of vocational and skills training and ensuring that the courses/services obtained are conducive to application in the areas of return requires strengthened coordination and communication amongst the cross-border actors.
6. Costing of the above activities (A. to E.) should be undertaken before the budget is allocated to specific agencies, in line with their contribution to expected results. In the current environment, where the protection space has been shrinking, and it may be preferable to have the protection component addressing more directly the project beneficiaries through economic empowerment than though capacity building of security forces on cross-border basis. This is unless the UN agencies have the capacity to solve some of the outstanding cross-border issues, such as ensuring that Burundians have proper documentation when entering Tanzania. The project is unable to cover all aspects of protection, and UNCHR should, given its mandate, necessarily carry out protection monitoring. It is unclear that the PBF project brought a clear added value to UNCHR in this aspect as the work done is part of its regular responsibilities and duties in line with its mandate. Therefore, it is suggested that the focus be placed more on the profiling of refugee repatriation (e.g. preparing them for transportable and transferable skills) as the main protection component.
7. A longer-term and upscaled PBF projects needs to have a dynamic Project Board or Steering Committee, that should meet at least twice per year, and ensure that regular monitoring visits and cross-border coordination and communications meetings (once every three months at least) take place. There will be a need to strengthen the M&E and results framework for the project to include SMART indicators – all of which should be vetted by RMB experts- , and to develop a proper theory of change to show the change process that the project seeks to achieve. There should also be a provision for a mid-term and final evaluation, encompassing both components and measuring results from both types of socio-economic reintegration approaches. The perception survey undertaken by the IOM after the end of the project with returnees (April to June 2019) is a good practice example which should be maintained as part of the tools to appraise the results of the second phase of the PBF project.
1. At the request of the evaluation manager, the executive summary does not follow the lay-out indicated in the UNEG quality proforma [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. OECD/DAC, glossary of key terms in evaluation and results-based management, Evaluation and Aid Effectiveness series, 2002 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. This definition is from ALNAP, Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria, An ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies, 2006 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. “Utilization-focused Evaluation”, Michael Quinn Patton, 3rd Edition, Sage publications, 1997 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm> [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. UNDP (2011); Outcome-level Evaluation: A companion guide to the handbook on planning monitoring and evaluating for development results for programme units and evaluators, p 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. Note that UNHCR Tanzania indicates having developed a contingency plan [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Comment from IOM: We need to add additional indicator which are not in this template, but in the project document and project report: Output Indicator 1.1.3

SOP produced and cross-border meetings held to increase its application by national and local security committees, immigration, police officers, and – where established- cross-border management committee. Baseline 0- Target 1.This activity has been achieved a final draft has been developed. Output indicator 1.1.4 At least 3 cross-border meetings between immigration officers at regional and district levels held, which result in enhanced coordination and information shared between both countries about cases to be assisted and cross-border flows. Baseline: 0 Target: 3 Target has been reached. 3 coordination meeting have been organized in November and December with immigration officers from Burundi and Tanzania, Bujumbura, Kigoma and Kibondo. Finally, electricity and IT equipment have been provided to Gisuru and Mugina border posts and equipment in Mabamba and Mayovu border post in Tanzania [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. ODI, Psychological Resilience, working paper 245, State of knowledge and future research agendas

Rebecca Graber, Florence Pichon and Elizabeth Carabine, October 2015 [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. PBF Project document template 2.1 signed, Annex B, IRF Results Framework, p. 48. Comments from UNDP Tanzania: At the kick-off meeting the outputs, activities and indicators were reviewed and some slight adjustments made. Comment from the evaluation manager: There was an attempt done in November 2018 by a consultant hired to do a solid M&E plan and tool, which was prepared and handed- over to the agencies, but not applied in practice. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. Comment from the evaluation manager: There were monthly calls which RCs took part in during the last 3 months of 2018, ahead of the no-cost extension [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. Comment from UNDP Tanzania : This is correct. However, under Output 3 (the component led by UNDP Tanzania) we had a review workshop only with project beneficiaries and then a final review workshop including other stakeholders, local government and also UNDP Burundi. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. PBF Project document p 20 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)