



INDEPENDENT COUNTRY PROGRAMME EVALUATION GUINEA-BISSAU



DEVELOPMENT effectiveness COORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP
sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness COORDINATION AND DEVELOPMENT responsiveness
COORDINATION HUMAN effectiveness COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability
COORDINATION relevance sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness
COORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP relevance MANAGING FOR RESULTS
effectiveness COORDINATION efficiency COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability
AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness
sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness COORDINATION AND DEVELOPMENT responsiveness
COORDINATION HUMAN effectiveness COORDINATION efficiency COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability
COORDINATION relevance sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness
COORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP relevance MANAGING FOR RESULTS
COORDINATION AND DEVELOPMENT responsiveness NATIONAL OWNERSHIP sustainability PARTNERSHIP



INDEPENDENT COUNTRY PROGRAMME EVALUATION GUINEA-BISSAU

DEVELOPMENT effectiveness COORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP relevance
sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness COORDINATION AND DEVELOPMENT responsiveness
COORDINATION HUMAN effectiveness COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability
TION relevance sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness
ss COORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP relevance MANAGING FOR RESULTS
RESULTS effectiveness COORDINATION efficiency COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability
AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness
sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness COORDINATION AND DEVELOPMENT responsiveness
INATION HUMAN effectiveness COORDINATION efficiency COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability
TION relevance sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness
ss COORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP relevance MANAGING FOR RESULTS



REPORTS PUBLISHED UNDER THE ICPE SERIES

Afghanistan	Croatia	Liberia	Senegal
Albania	Cuba	Libya	Serbia
Algeria	Djibouti	Malawi	Seychelles
Angola	Dominican Republic	Malaysia	Sierra Leone
Argentina	Ecuador	Maldives	Somalia
Armenia	Equatorial Guinea	Mauritania	Sri Lanka
Azerbaijan	Egypt	Mexico	Sudan
Bangladesh	El Salvador	Moldova (Republic of)	Syria
Barbados and OECS	Ethiopia	Mongolia	Tajikistan
Benin	Gabon	Montenegro	Tanzania
Bhutan	Georgia	Morocco	Thailand
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Ghana	Mozambique	Timor-Leste
Botswana	Guatemala	Namibia	Togo
Brazil	Guinea-Bissau	Nepal	Tunisia
Bulgaria	Guyana	Nicaragua	Turkey
Burkina Faso	Honduras	Niger	Uganda
Cambodia	India	Nigeria	Ukraine
Cameroon	Indonesia	Pacific Islands	United Arab Emirates
Chile	Iraq	Pakistan	Uruguay
China	Jamaica	Panama	Uzbekistan
Colombia	Jordan	Papua New Guinea	Viet Nam
Congo (Democratic Republic of)	Kenya	Paraguay	Yemen
Congo (Republic of)	Kuwait	Peru	Zambia
Costa Rica	Kyrgyzstan	Philippines	Zimbabwe
Côte d'Ivoire	Lao People's Democratic Republic	Rwanda	
		Sao Tome and Principe	

INDEPENDENT COUNTRY PROGRAMME EVALUATION: GUINEA-BISSAU

Copyright © UNDP February 2020

Manufactured in the United States of America.

The analysis and recommendations of this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Development Programme, its Executive Board or the United Nations Member States. This is an independent publication by the UNDP Independent Evaluation Office.

Acknowledgements

The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of UNDP would like to thank all those who have contributed to this evaluation.

IEO TEAM

Directorate:

Indran Naidoo (Director) and
Arild Hauge (Deputy Director)

ICPE Section Chief:

Fumika Ouchi

Lead and Associate Lead Evaluators:

Mar Guinot Aguado and Ana Rosa Soares

Research consultants:

Landry Fanou and Eduardo Gomez

Evaluation Advisory Panel member:

Osvaldo Feinstein and Zenda Ofir

IEO Internal Peer Review:

Elisa Calcaterra (Evaluation Specialist)

Evaluation consultants:

Carl de Faria (justice, governance and economic growth components) and Raul Mendes Fernandes (environment component)

Publishing and outreach:

Sasha Jahic and Nicki Mokhtari

Administrative support:

Antana Locs

IEO could not have completed the evaluation without the support of the following:

STAKEHOLDERS AND PARTNERS

UNDP Guinea-Bissau staff:

Tjark Egenhoff (Resident Representative), Gabriel Dava (Deputy Resident Representative), Amadu Bailo Camara (M&E Officer), Kanil Lopes (Governance Cluster Chief), Dauda Sau (Sustainable Development Cluster Chief) and Luca Monge Roffarello (Senior Economist).

Other stakeholders and partners:

Government of Guinea-Bissau, the United Nations country team, International NGOs, bilateral and multilateral development partners, civil society and communities consulted.

Foreword

I am pleased to present the first UNDP Independent Country Programme Evaluation (ICPE) of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. The Independent Evaluation Office of UNDP conducted the ICPE in 2019 and it covers the country programme for the period 2016-2020. The programme is structured in three pillars: governance and rule of law; inclusive economic growth; and biodiversity and disaster risk reduction.

The context, characterised by protracted political crisis and institutional fragility, has significantly limited human development results and challenged UNDP programme design and delivery of results.

Through its programme, UNDP has contributed to key building blocks for improved access to justice, biodiversity protection, elections and health, with promising prospects. The UNDP country office is well positioned in these sectors, with ample access to government institutions and other partners in the country. However, UNDP faced challenges to attract and retain staff and mobilise resources. UNDP has not been able to adapt its initiatives and pay adequate attention to poverty reduction and economic growth through an integrated sustainable development approach. Insufficient consideration to risk assessment and conflict analysis in the design, adaptation and resourcing of UNDP initiatives has limited sustainability. Furthermore, the evaluation found that UNDP lacked a systemic approach to human rights, youth and gender mainstreaming.

The evaluation identified a number of areas for improvement and presents recommendations for

UNDP consideration. UNDP should invest more strategically in inclusive growth, employment creation and sustainable livelihoods programmes to respond to the most critical needs of the population. This will require a better balance of upstream and downstream initiatives, short-term responsiveness to government requests with long-term development objectives. Adaptive management approaches, based on sound risk and conflict analysis, will help UNDP to achieve more effective and sustainable results and timely adaptation to a fragile context.

Attention should be paid to promote a coherent and integrated programme approach, explore new ways of working and ensure that evaluation recommendations are implemented. Considering limited donor engagement in the country, efforts should be prioritised towards strengthening the human and financial capacities of the country office, with the support of the UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa.

I would like to thank the Government of Guinea-Bissau and other stakeholders for their insights for the evaluation. I trust this report will be of use to UNDP, the Government and development partners in prompting discussions on how UNDP can further enhance its contribution to sustainable human development in Guinea-Bissau in the years to come.



Indran A. Naidoo
Director, Independent Evaluation Office

Contents

Acronyms and abbreviations	vii
Evaluation brief: ICPE Guinea-Bissau	1
CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION	3
1.1. Purpose, objectives and scope of the evaluation	4
1.2. Evaluation methodology	4
1.3. Overview of the national development context	6
1.4. UNDP Programme in Guinea-Bissau	8
CHAPTER 2. FINDINGS	11
2.1. Overall programme implementation	12
2.2. Governance and rule of law	14
2.3. Inclusive economic growth	21
2.4. Biodiversity and disaster risk reduction	26
2.5. Cross-cutting issues	31
CHAPTER 3. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE	37
3.1. Conclusions	38
3.2. Recommendations and management response	40
ANNEXES (available online)	49
FIGURES	
Figure 1. Total 2016-2018 programme expenditure by outcome (Million US\$)	1
Figure 2. Distribution of total 2016-2018 programme expenditure by fund source	1
Figure 3. IEO gender results effectiveness scale	5
Figure 4. Guinea-Bissau country programme document pillars	8
Figure 5. Evolution of total country office budget and expenditure, 2010-2018	9
Figure 6. Evolution of programme budget and expenditure by outcome, 2016-2018	10
Figure 7. Evolution of UNDP programme expenditure breakdown	13
Figure 8. UNDP core vs non-core funding, UNDP total, RBA average and Guinea-Bissau (2016-2018)	31
Figure 9. UNDP programme expenditure by gender marker	36
Figure 10. UNDP gender marker by outcomes and number of outputs (2016-2018)	36
Figure 11. UNDP country office gender distribution	36
BOXES	
Box 1. Main evaluation questions	4
Box 2. Development as a co-evolutionary complex process	12

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AfDB	African Development Bank
CAJ	Centre of Access to Justice
CENFOJ	National Judicial Training Centre
CPD	Country Programme Document
CRE	Regional Elections Commission
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CTA	Chief Technical Advisor
DIM	Direct implementation modality
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
GEF	Global Environment Fund
GRES	Gender Results Effectiveness Scale
IBAP	Institute for Protected Areas and Biodiversity
IEO	Independent Evaluation Office
INASA	National Public Health Institute
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAPS	Mainstreaming, Acceleration and Policy Support
NIM	National implementation modality
NPA	National Popular Assembly
PBF	United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
RBA	Regional Bureau for Africa
RBM	Results-based Management
ROAR	Results Oriented Annual Report
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIOGBIS	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau

Evaluation Brief: Guinea-Bissau

Guinea-Bissau has faced institutional fragility and protracted political crisis since its independence. This highly volatile context has significantly limited human development results, with no conducive environment for long-term planning and slow or postponed implementation of reforms, strategies and policies.

The UNDP country programme for 2016-2020 outlined three main priorities in the areas of governance and rule of law, inclusive economic growth, and biodiversity and disaster risk reduction. This ensured alignment with the Government's Terra Ranka 2015-2025 Operational Plan. Over the country programme period, the country office successfully mobilised non-core resources from vertical and pooled funds from the Global Environment Fund (GEF), the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF).

Methodology

The evaluation methodology is structured around the following overarching questions:

1. What did the UNDP country programme intend to achieve during the period under review?
2. To what extent has the programme achieved (or is likely to achieve) its intended objectives?
3. What factors contributed to or hindered UNDP performance and, eventually, the sustainability of results?

FIGURE 1: Total 2016-2018 programme expenditure by outcome (million US\$)



Source: Atlas/PowerBI, April 2019

FIGURE 2: Distribution of total 2016-2018 programme expenditure by fund source



Source: Atlas/PowerBI, April 2019

Findings and conclusions

For over nine years, the UNDP programme in Guinea-Bissau contributed to the operationalisation of centres for access to justice (CAJ) for the most vulnerable across the country. It expanded the protected areas

system and established an institutional framework for their management. The credibility and support of UNDP were considered fundamental to mobilise resources and effectively manage a donor basket fund for the organisation of the 2018 national elections. The country office also provided continuous investment in

capacity building and institutional strengthening of the judiciary system to improve service delivery and the rule of law.

However, UNDP was not able to adapt its projects and strategy to the context of protracted political instability and institutional crisis in Guinea-Bissau. This affected the relevance of its programmatic offer in the country and the sustainability of its initiatives. Its approaches and investments were not based on sound context- and conflict- analyses and risk assessments. In this context, oversight of the country office programme by the Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA) did not prove to be appropriate to support an effective response and adequate adaptation of the programme to the needs of the population.

UNDP did not pay adequate attention to poverty reduction and economic growth initiatives through an integrated sustainable development approach, an

area which lacked coherent strategy and sufficient investment. In the area of climate and disaster resilience, UNDP support was fragmented, with limited results.

UNDP had low capacity and commitment to mainstream gender, youth and human rights in its programme, and did not focus on promoting transformation to address the root causes of inequality. The country office did not engage strategically to raise awareness of human rights and gender issues for alternative dispute resolution methodologies with traditional justice actors at local level.

The UNDP country office faced significant challenges to attract and retain talent, generating inefficiencies, overburdening and limited synergy across thematic areas and units and resulting in projects being implemented largely in isolation. The country office did not establish an effective results-based management system across the programme portfolio.

Recommendations

- **RECOMMENDATION 1.** UNDP must ensure that its new country programme document (CPD) and initiatives in Guinea-Bissau are based on sound risk and conflict analysis. This will enable improved and more realistic entry points for programming, more effective and sustainable results and timely adaptation to the fragile context. It will require a better balance between upstream and downstream initiatives and between short-term responsiveness to government requests and long-term development objectives, until a more stable political environment is in place.
- **RECOMMENDATION 2.** UNDP should review its approach to programming through the lens of a complex systems approach and co-evolutionary processes. This requires an adaptive management approach to build long-term capabilities, moving the focus from form to function and from imitation to effective innovation, through an iterative process of localised solutions before scale-up.
- **RECOMMENDATION 3.** UNDP should prioritise efforts for poverty reduction and employment creation through an integrated sustainable development approach to ensure that the next programme responds adequately to the most critical needs of the population in alignment with the UNDP mandate.
- **RECOMMENDATION 4.** Country office senior management should promote a coherent and integrated programme approach and ensure that evaluation recommendations are implemented, lessons are incorporated into the programme and projects, and concrete steps are taken to ensure sustainability before completing projects and terminating assistance.
- **RECOMMENDATION 5.** RBA should help UNDP Guinea-Bissau to review its human resources and financial structures, to increase its capacity to adequately respond to the needs and challenges of the country. RBA should progressively shift its demand-driven, financial delivery-focused approach to one of continuous and systematic programmatic oversight to identify and respond to strategic guidance and support needs.
- **RECOMMENDATION 6.** UNDP Guinea-Bissau should seek to systematically mainstream gender, youth and human rights into its programming. This requires designing and investing in pilots to create opportunities for women and youth to more actively and effectively participate in economic life, and identifying approaches to effectively promote behaviour change, including on masculinity and cultural norms.

A decorative graphic consisting of a dotted line that starts vertically on the left, then turns horizontally to the right. Along this line are five colored circles: a yellow one at the top of the vertical segment, a teal one just below it, a light green one at the start of the horizontal segment, an orange one further along, a teal one next, and a light green one at the end.

CHAPTER 1

BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION

DEVELOPMENT effectiveness COORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP
sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness COORDINATION AND DEVELOPMENT responsiveness
COORDINATION HUMAN effectiveness COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability
ATION relevance sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness
ss COORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP relevance MANAGING FOR RESULTS
RESULTS effectiveness COORDINATION efficiency COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability
AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness
sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness COORDINATION AND DEVELOPMENT responsiveness
INATION HUMAN effectiveness COORDINATION efficiency COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability
ATION relevance sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness
ss COORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP relevance MANAGING FOR RESULTS
INATION AND DEVELOPMENT responsiveness NATIONAL OWNERSHIP sustainability PARTNERSHIP

1.1. Purpose, objectives and scope of the evaluation

The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conducted the first Independent Country Programme Evaluation (ICPE) in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau in 2019. An ICPE is an independent evaluation carried out to capture and demonstrate evidence of the UNDP contribution to development results in a country, and the effectiveness of the UNDP strategy in facilitating and leveraging national efforts to achieve development results. This evaluation had two main objectives:

- i. To support the development of the next UNDP country programme to be implemented starting in 2021, based on evaluative evidence of past performance; and
- ii. To strengthen UNDP accountability to national stakeholders and the Executive Board.

UNDP Guinea-Bissau was selected for an ICPE as the country programme is due to end in 2020. This ICPE covers the period of the 2016-2020 programme cycle, to April 2019, including all projects active during this period, a portfolio of 30 projects (see annex 4). The previous Country Programme Document (CPD) period was also considered when relevant to the sustainability of results.

Primary audiences for the evaluation are the UNDP Guinea-Bissau country office, the Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA), the UNDP Executive Board and the Government of Guinea-Bissau.

1.2. Evaluation methodology

The evaluation was guided by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and Standards¹ and ethical Code of Conduct.² It was carried out under the

overall provisions in the UNDP Evaluation Policy.³ In accordance with the terms of reference (see Annex 1), the evaluation was guided by three main evaluation questions, shown in box 1.

BOX 1. Main evaluation questions

1. What did the UNDP country programme intend to achieve during the period under review?
2. To what extent has the programme achieved (or is likely to achieve) its intended objectives?
3. What factors contributed to or hindered UNDP performance and eventually, the sustainability of results?

The evaluation mostly relied on qualitative methods and tools. Data and information collected from various sources and means were triangulated to ensure the validity of findings. Primary and secondary data were collected using various methods, including:

- An analysis of the programme portfolio and review of all programme and project documents, including project progress reports, information from UNDP corporate and country office monitoring and reporting systems, project and outcome evaluations,⁴ audit reports, self-assessment reports such as the yearly UNDP Results Oriented Annual Reports (ROARs), financial data, gender analytics and documents on the national context (see annex 6 for a full list of the documents consulted and annex 7 for information on the corporate indicators). The evaluation team covered all the projects under the current programme cycle, which represented a portfolio of 30 projects (see annex 4).
- A pre-mission self-assessment questionnaire completed by the country office, addressing key issues in terms of programme results and internal management;
- Consultation through semi-structured interviews⁵ and focus group discussions, with a total of 85

¹ See: <<http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/1914>>

² See: <<http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/100>>

³ See UNDP Evaluation Policy: <www.undp.org/eo/documents/Evaluation-Policy.pdf>

⁴ The quality of decentralised evaluations varies.

⁵ This included semi-structured interviews in person and by phone. A total of seven focus group discussions were held with communities and other stakeholders of projects in the field. The team was not able to meet with representatives from some UN agencies with no physical presence in the country; nor the AfDB which was not available during the field mission.

key informants from government counterparts, civil-society organisations (CSOs), academia, UN agencies, bilateral donors, UNDP staff at the country office and RBA, and communities participating in the projects (see annex 5 for a full list of people consulted);

- Direct observation of project activities in the regions of Gabú, Bafata and Cacheu, locations selected through a review of project documents and in discussion with programme managers, ensuring diverse geographical locations and coverage of all projects with field presence except two;⁶ and
- A presentation of preliminary findings at the end of the data collection mission in country, to validate initial findings with country office staff and collect additional information.


The effectiveness of the UNDP country programme was analysed through assessment of progress towards the achievement of expected outputs over the review period and the extent to which these outputs contributed to the intended CPD outcomes.

In this process positive, negative, direct, indirect and unintended results were considered.

To better understand UNDP performance and the potential sustainability of results, specific factors influencing or hindering results were examined. In assessing the evolution of the CPD, UNDP capacity to adapt to the changing context and respond to national development needs and priorities was examined. The evaluation also assessed the utilisation of resources to deliver results (including managerial practices), and the extent to which the country office fostered partnerships and synergies with other actors (i.e. through South-South or triangular cooperation).⁷

Special attention was given to integrate a gender-responsive evaluation approach to data collection methods. To assess gender across the portfolio, the review considered the UNDP gender marker⁸ and IEO gender results effectiveness scale (GRES), (see figure 3). GRES classifies gender results into five categories: gender negative, gender blind, gender targeted, gender responsive, and gender transformative.

FIGURE 3: IEO gender results effectiveness scale



⁶ This included field visits to projects focusing on elections, access to justice, protected areas, climate change and local governance. The only projects with field activities which were not visited were those of the Global Fund and Rural Youth, due to time constraints.

⁷ This information is extracted from analysis of the goals input into the enhanced results-based management platform, financial results in the Executive Snapshot, results in the Global Staff Survey, and interviews at the management/operations level in the country office.

⁸ A corporate tool to sensitise programme managers in advancing gender equity and women's empowerment by rating projects for their gender contribution at design phase and track planned (but not actual) programme expenditures on gender.

The main limitation faced in carrying out the evaluation was the availability of relevant documentation, which was shared very late despite recurrent requests over several months to obtain it before the field mission. Documentation was in three languages (Portuguese, English and French) which slowed down the desk review as not all team members were fluent in all three languages. Agendas for meetings were not prepared in advance despite several follow-ups and a lot of time had to be invested to finalise agendas during the mission. Meetings with partners during field work in the regions were not organised in advance, and interviewees were informed at short notice, sometimes on the same day, which impeded some meetings from taking place. These and other administrative and logistical challenges for the mission required the IEO team to invest a lot of time to fill gaps.

Preparation for the ICPE began in September 2018. The desk review was conducted between January and March 2019 and key informant interviews were carried out during a two week mission in April 2019. Outcome analysis papers were synthesised into a draft report in May, which was submitted for review by IEO and one IEO Evaluation Advisory Panel member in June 2019. The revised draft was shared with the country office and RBA in June 2019 and with the Government in August 2019 for comments. A final stakeholder debriefing was delivered via videoconference.

1.3. Overview of the national development context

Since its independence from Portugal in 1974, Guinea-Bissau has faced institutional fragility and protracted political crisis which has significantly limited its human development results. Although the constitution was promulgated in 1984, the first multi-party elections did not take place until 1994.⁹ Political and military upheavals and constant changes

in government have led to a highly volatile context with no conducive environment for long-term planning. Following the April 2012 coup d'état, the UN political mission (UNIOGBIS),¹⁰ the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and other international partners tried to promote dialogue and reconciliation.

The 2014 elections were expected to start the country on a political transition process, with the Government's Terra Ranka 2015-2025 Operational Plan¹¹ and the 2015 Brussels donors' round-table.¹² However, since August 2015, the political situation deteriorated with the removal of the Prime Minister, and the closure of the national Assembly for almost three years.¹³ ECOWAS defined a roadmap for resolution of the political crisis, the Conakry agreement, but this was not fully implemented. Without political and constitutional reforms, the 2019 legislative elections led once again to political stalemate and an institutional vacuum.

Public administration functioning has been impacted by high rotation, demotivation and strikes of civil servants. The implementation of reforms, strategies and policies has been delayed or postponed for many years and public service provision has been undermined by the lack of a professional civil service, corruption¹⁴ and weak state institutions, especially at local level. The stability of State institutions has been weakened as the government budget struggles to cover staff salaries, with even more limited resources for operational costs such as travel, internet, fuel, equipment, logistics, maintenance and rent. Development partners have occasionally assisted with such expenses. This decline is reflected in the World Bank government effectiveness index which has continuously worsened, from -1.03 in 2011 to -1.77 in 2017.¹⁵

The judicial system lacks independence, transparency and effectiveness. A very limited percentage of the population has access to formal justice, which is concentrated in the capital and a few provincial cities, and most seek 'traditional justice' mechanisms,

⁹ Elections were organised in 1994, 2000, 2004, 2009, 2014 and 2019.

¹⁰ A special political UN mission, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office for Guinea-Bissau or UNIOGBIS, was established in 1999 following a two-year civil war and is planned to phase out by 2020.

¹¹ See: <<http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/gbs176530.pdf>>

¹² In March 2015 international development partners pledged over 1 billion Euros to support Guinea-Bissau's Development Strategy Plan, Terra Ranka, for five years. See: <<https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2015/03/25/development-partners-renewfunding-for-guinea-bissau-.html>>

¹³ Since 2015, when the crisis began, successive changes of government (5 in 3 years) were followed by changes in government institution middle managers (key for UNDP programme implementation).

¹⁴ Guinea-Bissau ranks 172 out of 180 countries in the 2018 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. See: <<https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018>>

¹⁵ See: <<https://govdata360.worldbank.org/>>

which do not always consider human rights. Formal procedures are expensive and lengthy, and the judicial backlog is associated with high impunity rates. This does not facilitate the prosecution of drug trafficking and organised crime, which are of particular concern in the country.¹⁶

The lack of enabling environment led some donors, such as the World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB) and European Union (EU) to suspend direct budget support to the Government in 2012, while the EU diverted its funding to NGOs and CSOs. Although official development assistance started to increase again in 2013, the funding commitments of the 2015 Brussels donors' round-table did not materialise. As a consequence of the 2015 political stalemate, donors have been reticent to invest significantly in the country and some have adopted a 'wait and see' posture, refusing to fund government initiatives. Others have adopted a more short-term approach, as taken in humanitarian contexts. Guinea-Bissau is currently among the top five under-aided countries in the world.¹⁷

This protracted political instability has had a strong impact on socio-economic development. A low-income country, the Guinea-Bissau human development index is one of the lowest in the world (0.455 in 2017, falling to 0.276 when adjusted for inequality), positioning the country 177 out of 189 countries.¹⁸ The economic growth rate declined from 6.2 per cent in 2016 to 3.8 per cent in 2018;¹⁹ and growth has not been inclusive. Most estimations based on 2010 data suggest that the poverty rate gradually declined from 67.1 per cent in 2010 to 61.4 per cent in 2018.²⁰ The majority of the population and the economy are dependent on natural resources, particularly agriculture and fishing.²¹ The

agricultural sector is not diversified, and the country's economy is largely based on the monoculture of cashew nuts, making it vulnerable to price volatility. The rural population uses cashew nuts to trade for rice and other staple products, creating a significant risk to their livelihoods and the economy which depend on international cashew prices and good harvests, in a country also highly vulnerable to droughts and floods. Challenges in basic infrastructure, particularly transport and energy, are also evident, affecting social and economic development and preventing the growth of a more vibrant private sector.

Gender discrimination is perceived in all political, economic and social spheres. Forced and early marriage, early pregnancy, female genital mutilation, maternal mortality and gender-based violence are among the most common challenges affecting women.²² Some customary laws do not allow women to own land, inherit property or access bank loans. Women's participation in political life is very low, with only 14 per cent of seats in national parliament held by women in 2017.²³

Limited access to education, health, potable water and sanitation are also significant challenges in the country. More than half of the population is illiterate,²⁴ with significant disparities, especially when disaggregated by sex (the literacy rate is 62.4 for men vs. 30.7 for women). Guinea-Bissau remains one of the countries with the highest malaria mortality rate per capita in the world.²⁵ The burden of HIV in Guinea-Bissau is the highest in West Africa, and access to antiretrovirals is one of the lowest. Tuberculosis incidence is also high although the prevalence rate has remained stagnant.²⁶

¹⁶ <<https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16617&LangID=E>>

¹⁷ Countries defined as under-aided by the OECD are those which are "underfunded" by need relative to others. See: <<https://ourworldindata.org/leaving-no-one-behind#under-aided-countries>>

¹⁸ UNDP Human Development Report 2018 Statistical Update. See: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/GNB>. For more information about the country context, see annex 2.

¹⁹ World Bank data. See: <<http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/guineabissau>>

²⁰ Estimations using the \$1.9 PPP. World Bank data, "Poverty & Equity Brief: Guinea-Bissau", April 2019 <https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/poverty/33EF03BB-9722-4AE2-ABC7-AA2972D68AFE/Global_POVEQ_GNB.pdf>

²¹ According to the World Bank, in 2016 agriculture accounted for over 40 per cent of GDP and employed 80 per cent of workers.

²² AfDB, Guinea-Bissau Country Gender Profile, 2015.

²³ UNDP, Human Development Report 2018. This may change with the 2019 elections. However, the gender parity law does not ensure gender parity in electoral lists.

²⁴ World Bank data, 2014.

²⁵ In relation to "Death Rate per 100,000", a ranking made with WHO data put the country in 18th position. See: <<https://www.worldlifeexpectancy.com/cause-of-death/malaria/by-country/>>

²⁶ Relatório sobre direito à saúde na Guiné-Bissau – Liga Guineense dos Direitos humanos, 2018.

Life expectancy is low at 57.8,²⁷ but the country faces a huge population increase. Since 1990, the population has almost doubled to about 1.8 million,²⁸ and more than 60 per cent is under 25.²⁹ This youth bulge, coupled with high unemployment, puts pressure on natural resources on top of the effects of climate change, and social protection schemes are almost non-existent. It is estimated that 25 per cent of the population live in urban areas and 75 per cent in rural areas.³⁰

Guinea-Bissau consistently ranks among the countries most vulnerable to climate change, particularly sea-level rise and desertification. Increased flooding and saltwater intrusion are affecting coastal areas in the south, and water scarcity and droughts are affecting the north of the country. Most of the population is vulnerable to climate change as their subsistence and income depend directly or indirectly on agriculture and fishing. In addition, the country has limited capacities in terms of hydro-meteorological services, early warning systems and resources or legal frameworks to protect natural resources and stop illegal fishing and deforestation.


1.4. The UNDP programme in Guinea-Bissau

Relations between the Government of Guinea-Bissau and the United Nations system started in 1975, a year after independence. The current United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) was developed for the period 2016-2020 by the 15 agencies comprising the UN country team. The previous UNDP CPD, covering the period 2008-2012, was extended until 2015 due to the 2012 *coup d'état* and the 2014 elections, which limited the ability of UNDP to renegotiate programme priorities with institutional counterparts.

UNDP structured its CPD around three pillars (see figures 4 and 7), ensuring alignment with the Government's 2015-2025 Terra Ranka Operational Plan:

- i. Governance and rule of law;
- ii. Inclusive economic growth; and
- iii. Biodiversity and disaster risk reduction.

FIGURE 4: Guinea-Bissau country programme document pillars



²⁷ UNDP Human Development Report, 2017.

²⁸ World Bank data, 2017.


²⁹ UN Population Division, 2017. See: <<https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/index.asp>>

³⁰ UNDP Project 001079792, Project identification Form, 2016.

The donor landscape in Guinea-Bissau has not changed in recent years, and the most relevant donors are the EU, World Bank, AfDB, Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund), Global Environment Fund (GEF) and United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). In its CPD, the country office estimated that \$ 83 million would be required to implement its five-year programme. This did not include Global Fund projects, which were classified as management projects and therefore not linked to any specific outcomes at the time of the CPD design. This was later changed, and those resources were aligned to outcome 37.

Resources received for the programme period until end-2018 totalled \$ 62 million, and expenditure totalled \$ 47.3 million, making a 76.2 per cent financial execution rate. Figure 3 shows the evolution of programme budget and expenditure by year, and figure 4 shows a breakdown by outcome.³¹ During the 2016-2018 period, 21 per cent of resources were core UNDP resources and 79 per cent were non-core. Non-core resources from vertical and pooled funds included: the Global Fund (\$ 21.5 million in 2016-2018, representing 45.5 per cent of total expenditure for the programme cycle); GEF (\$ 1.8 million in 2016-2018); and PBF (\$ 3 million). Bilateral donor funds were important to support specific election activities but were otherwise limited.

FIGURE 5: Evolution of total country office budget and expenditure, 2010-2018



Source: UNDP Atlas 2019


³¹ UNDP Power BI/ Atlas.

Core funding expenditure amounted to \$ 10.1 million at the time of this evaluation and was the sole source of funding for some projects, such as the local development initiative. The country office faced challenges to effectively leverage core resources to generate additional non-core funding. There was practically no engagement with the private sector (including foundations), given the weakness of this sector in the country. In its partnership strategy, the country office envisaged “support to loan implementation approach” where, at the request of the Government, it would expedite the delivery of results and loaned resources received by the Government from an international financial institution or bilateral partner.

This approach was used on an ad hoc basis with the World Bank and the African Development Bank, though there was no engagement with the West Africa Development Bank. At the time of this evaluation, the country office had not met CPD resource mobilisation targets, except in the environment sector.³²

As of 2019, there were ten projects active, but only three with a duration beyond 2019. 17 projects used National Implementation Modality (NIM) with programme implementation being, in most cases, ‘country office full support to NIM’, and 12 projects were implemented through Direct Implementation Modality (DIM). More detailed information on the country programme is available in annex 3.

FIGURE 6: Evolution of programme budget and expenditure by outcome, 2016-2018



³² The country office envisages being able to meet the CPD target, and likely surpass it, particularly with projects related to the legislative elections.



CHAPTER 2

FINDINGS

DEVELOPMENT effectiveness COORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP
sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness COORDINATION AND DEVELOPMENT responsiveness
COORDINATION HUMAN effectiveness COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability
ATION relevance sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness
ss COORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP relevance MANAGING FOR RESULTS
RESULTS effectiveness COORDINATION efficiency COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability
AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness
sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness COORDINATION AND DEVELOPMENT responsiveness
INATION HUMAN effectiveness COORDINATION efficiency COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability
ATION relevance sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness
ss COORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP relevance MANAGING FOR RESULTS
INATION AND DEVELOPMENT responsiveness NATIONAL OWNERSHIP sustainability PARTNERSHIP sustainability

2.1. Overall programme implementation

Finding 1. UNDP has not been able to adapt its projects and strategy to the context of protracted political instability and institutional crisis in Guinea-Bissau, affecting the relevance of its programmatic offer in the country. Effective contributions to the achievement of expected outcomes were limited. UNDP approaches and investments have not been based on sound context- and conflict-analyses and risk assessments. RBA oversight has mostly focused on financial delivery instead of timely programmatic oversight to help the country office adapt its programme to the country's context.

The CPD was not underpinned by a sound risk assessment or deep understanding of the drivers of conflict. At the time of the CPD design, Guinea-Bissau was in the middle of a political transition following the 2014 elections, the establishment of a new government, the design of the Terra Ranka 2015-2025 national strategy and the 2015 Brussels round-table, with a 1 billion euro pledge from donors. GDP and the human development index had been slowly increasing. In this context, positive changes at national level seemed possible, to preserve development gains and make progress towards stabilisation and peace. UNIOGBIS had been in the country for nearly 20 years and, with donors, prioritised efforts to ensure lasting peace and stability, the transition to constitutional order, and the consolidation of democracy, justice reform and the provision of basic services.³³ According to UNDP, there was limited interest from donors to fund poverty reduction.

In this line, UNDP put institutional strengthening at the core of its programming, with ambitious financial targets and with national execution (NIM) as the default modality, with the expectation of building capacities and national ownership for results.³⁴ This followed the UNDP approach, building capacity and strong institutions as the foundation and engine of human development, under the premise that by getting the institutions right, the rest will follow. Analysis of complex systems (see box 2) did not underpin the

programmatic strategies of the country office.³⁵ In an historically volatile context, greater in depth strategic analysis of the political situation and conflict, and of changes to factors that drove the country to instability, would have allowed a broader understanding of risks and how different scenarios could evolve.

BOX 2. Development as a co-evolutionary complex process

Capacity building is at the center of the UNDP mandate and is expected to function as a core contribution to development. This linear thinking has been challenged by several authors who encourage an exploration of development through the lens of complexity and coevolutionary processes. Planning for fragile states is often premised on assumptions about the speed at which state capability can be built which are not empirically grounded. This is described as wishful thinking and has the risk of asking “too much of too little too soon too often” (Pritchett et al 2010). To overcome the capability trap of repeated cycles of poverty and failed reforms, the literature suggests building on complex adaptive processes and adaptive management, accepting practices and features that defy norms of good governance and create the right conditions for improvisation and localised problem-solving.

The country office did not consider the deployment of a Development-Peace Advisor to support country-level planning and develop updated scenarios for strategic guidance. They explained that this was due to the presence of UNIOGBIS in the country, although their role did not include provision of strategic guidance and planning support for UNDP. Interviews with the country office and RBA showed that support received and requested by the country office to design the CPD was directed at the development of the CPD results framework and the area of local development. In a context where crisis is a normality, a more realistic and pragmatic approach to CPD design, based on a sound conflict-related risk assessment, was missing.

The expectations in the CPD did not materialise. Parliament was closed in 2015 and the government budget was not approved in 2016 (see section 1.3), making the CPD outcomes challenging to achieve. The political situation was no longer conducive to bring about positive change through capacity development and institutional strengthening. These

³³ See: <<https://uniogbis.unmissions.org/en/brussels-round-table-bears-fruits>>

³⁴ UNDP Country Programme Document.

³⁵ Pritchett, Lant and de Weijer, Frauke (2010) “Fragile states: stuck in a capability trap?”; Yueng-Yueng Ang “How China escaped the poverty trap”.


major events should have pushed the country office to review their programme assumptions, risks and mitigation strategies to better respond to changes and stay relevant. Although risks were identified in the CPD and project risk logs, there was no effort to adapt the programme, redirect interventions to areas less affected by political instability or adopt a shorter-term approach, thus limiting the relevance of UNDP actions.

UNDP maintained its approach to work on government policies and strategies, but given the political instability this could not be advanced (see findings 9 and 12). The programme also provided training and study tours for government officials, but with high turnover and fragile institutions, the effectiveness of these investments, and sustainability of results, were limited (see finding 5). UNDP was often covering government budget gaps without being able to effectively bring initiatives to fruition (see finding 14).

Although UNDP financial delivery rates remained relatively high between 2016 and 2018 at 80 per cent (see figure 4), they were largely maintained with short-term investments in office equipment, vehicles, payment of government salaries and utilities, construction and maintenance of buildings and travel. Contributions were focused on short-term government functioning over strategic and sustainable activities.

A breakdown of programme expenditures for 2010-2018 (see figure 7) shows that the bulk were for project supplies and expenses, including purchase and rental of equipment, furniture, materials and goods (43 per cent of the total in 2018, increasing since 2014), while contractual services and consultants significantly decreased over the time period to 22 per cent in 2018. This was verified by the evaluation team through interviews.

FIGURE 7: Evolution of UNDP programme expenditure breakdown



Source: UNDP Atlas 2019

The country office found it a challenge to balance responses to Government requests with other programme priorities, while aware of their limited contribution to the country's sustainable development. This made UNDP a highly regarded partner by national partners, as observed in interviews with Government counterparts, but hindered its ability to deliver sustainable development results. UNDP support for government operational needs may have been essential for institutions to function and to enable the implementation of development interventions (see section 1.3), but created dependence of national partners and perpetuated the image of UNDP as a donor for the Government's operational needs, rather than a substantive development partner.³⁶ One 2016 mission report stated that: "For many institutions, UNDP seems to be the only support that they have for all kinds of support even including fueling of vehicles," recognising that "this might create the impression that the UN has taken over the responsibility of the state to finance the working of its institutions".³⁷

Capacity building efforts were part of previous CPDs, but with very limited sustainable results given the lack of a conducive political context. The 2013 mid-term evaluation recommended to integrate crisis-related risks into country office planning and anticipate the impact on its strategy. However, UNDP continued to invest in upstream work and training of government officials with no major changes to mitigate risks arising from the context (see finding 5).

These constraints to effectively contributing to sustainable development did not receive adequate attention from RBA. As evidenced by interviews with UNDP staff, RBA failed to identify and adequately address these issues, focusing on the country office's financial delivery and reporting through Results Oriented Annual Reports (ROARs), rather than its delivery of expected results. As RBA strategic and programmatic guidance and support is provided on demand, it was up to the country office to identify and cover the costs of its own support needs. This system does not ensure that the RBA oversight of progress on programmatic results is adequate or its guidance and support timely.

³⁶ 2016 Report of RSCA Mission to Guinea-Bissau.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ See UNDP outcome evaluation report (2018) for a detailed assessment of results chain.

2.2. Governance and rule of law

Outcome 37: State institutions, including in the areas of defense, security, and justice, consolidate stability and the rule of law, democratic participation, and equitable access to opportunities for all.

In the area of governance and rule of law, UNDP committed to contributing to the above outcome through:

- i. judicial reforms, including access to quality services;
- ii. supporting civil society participation in democratic processes and economic governance, including developing the capacity of the National People's Assembly to play its oversight and control role;
- iii. improving the effectiveness and efficiency of public administration, including extension of state services at the local level (covered under outcome 38);³⁸ and
- iv. strengthening electoral cycle systems to deliver on robust, transparent electoral exercises.

Health projects on malaria, tuberculosis and HIV were not initially linked to any outcome, but were included under this outcome at the end of 2018. They were linked to the output regarding the provision of state services at the local level, given the nature of the Global Fund projects.

Interventions targeted several national institutions: Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Public Administration and Ministry of the Interior, Parliament, Court of Audit, National Electoral Commission (CNE) and the Electoral Process Support Office.

During this programme cycle, 17 projects were implemented, of which five focused on justice (USD 7.1 million), one on elections (USD 7.2 million), seven on health (USD 34.6 million), and four on governance (USD 4.2 million). The total budget amounted to US\$ 53.1

million with expenditures of US\$ 39.6 million, a 74.5 per cent execution rate, representing 84 per cent of the total country office expenditure for the period. Resources came mainly from Global Fund (52 per cent), the Government of Guinea-Bissau (18 per cent), UNDP (12 per cent) and the European Commission (6 per cent).³⁹ Nine outputs used the national implementation modality (NIM) and eleven were directly implemented (DIM).

Based on the gender marker used at design stage, 12 outputs committed to contribute to gender equality in a limited way (GEN1), and seven committed to gender equality as a significant objective (GEN2).

Finding 2. UNDP provided continuous investments in capacity building and institutional strengthening of the judiciary system to improve service delivery and the rule of law. Given the political instability and institutional fragility of the country, and a lack of coordination in the justice sector, the planned UNDP support was overambitious, particularly to anti-corruption. Sustainability is not clear for any results. Given the limited human and financial resources of UNDP, it is highly unlikely that it could take over the work of UNIOGBIS after withdrawal.

UNDP support to the rule of law in Guinea-Bissau has been shaped by the UNIOGBIS mandate. UNIOGBIS was established in Guinea-Bissau to strengthen the capacities of national institutions to maintain the rule of law, establish efficient criminal justice systems and support an inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation process.⁴⁰ Despite recent advances in collaboration between the two institutions, joint projects have been very limited.⁴¹ UNDP documentation states that: "While many projects were complementary, they didn't result from strategic and concerted positions, but rather from a division of labour driven by inward objectives of each UNCT agency and UNIOGBIS, resulting in lack of integration of the various initiatives."⁴²

With the phase out of UNIOGBIS, there are strong expectations from UNIOGBIS and partner agencies that UNDP should expand its work on rule of law and take over this area of their work. The country office is expected to promptly identify the key programmatic areas where it can engage its limited human and financial resources, based on a coherent and timely strategy.

UNDP programming has so far focused on enhancing the skills and competencies of justice sector actors and institutions. Since its creation in 2011, the National Judicial Training Centre (CENFOJ) has been the channel for UNDP training activities for magistrates and judiciary staff, on ethics, transparency and deontology. UNDP provided financial support for the functioning of the CENFOJ, which has been strategic in enhancing the country's own capacity to provide judges and prosecutors with continuous training.⁴³ However, the sustainability of the institution remains fragile as it depends on international development partners to fund its operations and training programmes. For example, an agreement for the Government to take over from UNDP in financing CENFOJ staff costs in January 2019 has not yet been met, creating uncertainties about the capacity of the State to assume its responsibility (a similar situation is described in finding 6 below).

Several planned interventions from the UNDP rule of law and justice programme did not progress, for the most part due to political instability (see section 1.3), and in some cases from lack of interest of the Judiciary. For example, the country office had to stop its work to support the implementation of the National Justice Modernisation and Reform Programme (2015-2019) on judiciary ethics, transparency and anti-corruption. Similarly, activities of the "Justice System Monitoring Project (2016-2018)" were not implemented. The project aimed to contribute to the transparency of the judicial system, through the establishment of an

³⁹ Other more limited resources came from the PBF (3.3 per cent), ECOWAS (1.9 per cent), the West African Economic and Monetary Union (1.9 per cent), the US Department of State (1.8 per cent), the Government of Netherlands (1.5 per cent) and the AfDB (1.2 per cent). Source: Atlas/ PowerBi.

⁴⁰ UN document S/RES/1876 (2009).

⁴¹ UNDP Evaluation of Project n. 00105088 Rule of Law and Justice, 2017. A Joint Programme on Police, Justice and Corrections was developed and implemented with participation of UNDP, UNIOGBIS, UN WOMEN, UNICEF and UNODC.

⁴² UNDP Project n. 00105088 Rule of Law and Justice, 2017.

⁴³ UNDP ROAR 2016 p.12: "During the year of 2016, the National Center of Judiciary Training provided training sessions on themes related to women's rights tailored to judges and prosecutors, criminal police agents and border control agents. The thematic content of these trainings are gender equality, gender-based violence, domestic violence, sexual violence, forged and early marriage. These training courses aim at skill magistrates and judicial operators in general on issues related to women's rights".

information system to enable integrated management of cases throughout the justice chain.⁴⁴ While change is necessary in this area, the time required to build the different levels of State capability was not considered. As noted in box 2 above, this work started with an optimistic perspective on the speed at which state capability could be built (wishful thinking), and asked too much too soon for the context.

The country office tried to adapt to the context by redirecting some funds to finance the creation of an electronic database of criminal records, at the request of the Government. This database, still being finalised, is expected to allow justice sector officials to more effectively access the criminal records of people charged with a crime and give sentencing judges access to the criminal records of accused persons.⁴⁵

UNDP played a critical role in the establishment of the Justice Sector Technical Working Group, recently re-established by the Ministry of Justice to improve the coordination of interventions in the sector. This offers the potential to avoid duplication, since it vets all projects in the justice sector before they can be implemented. It should also help to promote dialogue between justice sector institutions on crucial issues and push forward those interventions which stalled due to lack of interest from the Judiciary.

However, the evaluation concludes that, during the period being evaluated, political instability limited the work of UNDP to enhance justice sector coordination and governance. Despite the persistence of political instability in Guinea-Bissau (see section 1.3), UNDP initiatives insisted on upstream work for the development of laws and policies and limited implementation of training for public administration and justice sector officials.

Finding 3. UNDP interventions contributed to a total of 12,000 vulnerable people benefiting from free legal aid services and access to formal justice over the past nine years. The construction of district

courts and centres for access to justice has allowed for justice services to be closer to citizens, but the focus has been on the construction of court buildings rather than their functioning.

Over the past nine years, UNDP supported the provision of free legal aid services and conflict mediation assistance through five existing Centres of Access to Justice (CAJ), located in the regions of Bissau (Bissau Velho and Bairro Militar), Canchungo, Bafata and Mansoa, and one new CAJ in Gabu region.

CAJs worked with the Bar Association to deliver formal legal services to vulnerable populations in all regions. The Bar Association oversaw payment of fees to a law firm handling court work for CAJ legal aid recipients and delivery of services. Evaluation respondents and the 2018 mid-term evaluation show that this legal assistance played an important role to facilitate access to justice for vulnerable populations,⁴⁶ and 12,000 people benefited from CAJs since they were established in 2011.⁴⁷ Although this is a small proportion of those requiring access to justice, it can be considered significant given the political instability which affected the functioning of the judiciary during this period.

In line with prevailing legislation, CAJs can issue certificates of indigency for the poorest and most vulnerable to receive exemption from court costs. Data from field interviews and the mid-term review show that this is a highly bureaucratic and costly process, and that many people give up before getting justice.⁴⁸ Given this situation, the availability of legal counselling has strengthened the population's ability to access justice.

CAJs worked with the NGO "Liga dos Direitos Humanos" to disseminate justice and human rights information at village level, targeting vulnerable groups and traditional leaders. With a strong network of focal points at region, sector and village levels, "Liga dos Direitos Humanos" was able to link CAJs to the population to raise

⁴⁴ This project planned to provide technical assistance and expertise to the Ministry of Justice for the design of a database of data in the justice chain from investigation to prosecution, trial, sentencing and corrections, as well as respective monitoring systems aimed at identifying backlog cases and bottlenecks. This would allow justice institutions such as the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor-General's Office and the Judiciary Police to be connected to the database.

⁴⁵ UNDP Project Progress Report on strengthening public confidence, 2018, p.3.

⁴⁶ According to the interviews conducted and 2018 UNDP mid-term evaluation of Outcome 37.

⁴⁷ UNDP ROAR 2018, p.3. Verified by evaluation interviews with government counterparts.

⁴⁸ Data triangulated with stakeholders interviewed and UNDP mid-term evaluation of Outcome 37.

awareness of justice, human rights and gender issues.⁴⁹

To improve the delivery of justice services, UNDP helped to build community courts in the regions of Mansoa and Canchungo where CAJ offices already existed. At the time of the evaluation mission, it was constructing and equipping three new courts to complete the justice chain at local level in the regions of Gabu, Quinara and Cacheu.⁵⁰ However, in field visits, the evaluation team observed issues with the construction of new buildings⁵¹ and limited maintenance provisions. Evaluation respondents stressed that the construction of new buildings was done without ensuring the financial capacity of the Government to adequately maintain the buildings and ensure value-for-money. The 2018 mid-term evaluation noted that “construction of infrastructure is a means to an end, but not an objective, that must be strategically designed to add value.”⁵²

The purpose of building courts was to bring justice closer to citizens, but progress was slow as, despite the new buildings, court functioning was sporadic and inefficient (form i.e. a building does not equal function). An iterative adaptation process would have allowed for structured learning about what works and the emergence of local solutions before scaling to other regions.

Finding 4. The country office did not engage strategically in raising the awareness of local traditional justice actors on human rights, gender and alternative dispute resolution methodologies. The UNDP exit strategy for CAJ was inadequately implemented and has put nine years of investment at risk.

The effectiveness of CAJs in providing access to justice for the poor is questionable. Despite the CAJ staff lawyers' significant work on conflict resolution, they received insufficient training from UNDP on mediation and reconciliation, and lacked psychosocial support or social services referral networks. For example, in cases of gender-based violence or children's rights,

there was no partnership or referral system with CSOs or other UN agencies. Settlements agreed through mediation services lacked enforceability as there was no link between formal and traditional justice systems.

The quality of services needs to improve, particularly for women, who can suffer from both sexual and gender-based violence, and discrimination in a male-dominated justice sector. The percentage of women users did not exceed 21.5 per cent,⁵³ and was significantly limited by cultural norms and language challenges.

The efforts of the country office focused on improving the formal legal system, and bringing it closer to the population in order to reduce violence (vigilantism and private vendettas) and raise public awareness. While there is no official data, it is estimated that only a very small percentage of the population uses the formal justice system, which could partially explain the small number of CAJ legal aid beneficiaries. Community leaders resolve the majority of disputes through customary law and practices, which do not always respect human rights. Most of the population lacks awareness of how the formal legal system functions and capacity (culturally, geographically, linguistically, financially or socially) to participate in it.

Although UNDP was an initial bridge between formal and informal justice, it did not follow up with targeted strategic interventions to integrate human rights and gender issues into alternative dispute resolution mechanisms at local level. There was insufficient investment in activities to bridge the formal and informal justice systems and strengthen alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Awareness raising campaigns on access to justice, human rights and gender equality were one-off activities and were discontinued at the end of 2014 due to UNDP budgetary constraints.⁵⁴

UNDP has been planning to hand over responsibility

⁴⁹ UNDP Evaluation Report 'UNDP Rule of Law and Justice Project in Guinea-Bissau', February 2017, p.2.

⁵⁰ The courthouse (and the CAJ) in Gabu was under construction during the evaluation team mission visit to Gabu in April 2019.

⁵¹ The courthouse under construction in Gabu does not have a generator enclosure, solar panels or adequate fencing.

⁵² UNDP mid-term evaluation of Outcome 37, 2018.

⁵³ Pre-mission questionnaire and UNDP Country Office Final Evaluation of Project 00051229, p.19.

⁵⁴ UNDP Evaluation on Rule of Law and Justice, Project 00105088, 2017.

for CAJs to the Government since 2015, without success. As of January 2019, UNDP ceased paying CAJ salaries, with a year's notice and agreement that the Government would take over these costs, as verified by the evaluation team in the interviews. However, at the time of the evaluation mission, the Government was three months in arrears for payment of CAJ salaries as it was unable to approve budget provisions due to the closure of Parliament.⁵⁵ Information shared during evaluation field visits suggested that this situation put the sustainability of results achieved with over nine years' investment at risk, as UNDP-trained CAJ staff sought alternative employment opportunities. This suggests that the country office started implementing its exit strategy before ensuring that all the necessary conditions and budget commitments were in place for a smooth and successful handover.

Finding 5. UNDP engagement in strengthening the capacities of oversight institutions and NGOs to oversee public policy, budget and government expenditure has produced very limited results. While these types of intervention are relevant to a stable context, UNDP should have refrained from investing in this area without a strategy that adequately considered the risks emerging from the country's chronic political instability.

At the time of the CPD design, following the 2014 elections, UNDP planned a series of capacity building interventions and study tours to strengthen the oversight capacities of various institutions. Through the Pro-Palop project (2014-2018), UNDP promoted South-South cooperation, funding study tours for parliamentarians to observe the oversight mechanisms of other parliaments. It also provided trainings on budget and expenditure oversight for members of special parliamentary commissions on the budget and economic affairs and funded workshops and study tours for court of audit personnel with the aim of strengthening capacity for control and audit of public finances.⁵⁶

Working with UN Women, in 2017-2018 UNDP supported the drafting of the Gender Parity Law, and advocated for its adoption, through trainings and financial support to the Women's Political Platform⁵⁷ and the Women Parliamentarian's Network. The law aimed to ensure a minimum quota of 36 per cent women's representation in elections and appointments to the National Assembly and local government, increasing from 14 per cent at the time of the evaluation.

However, with Parliament not sitting since 2015, the context was not conducive to continue to invest in such activities (see section 1.3). UNDP ceased support to the National Popular Assembly (NPA) to effectively function and monitor government actions, through support to develop its normative frameworks, functional coordination mechanisms and capacity, as well as developing a functional national infrastructure for peace and an institutional framework for citizen engagement. Work with women parliamentarians on policymaking, oversight and representation was also stopped.⁵⁸

Other activities were reduced or postponed, though the risk of the situation continuing, and the implications for sustainable results, were not adequately assessed. It is not clear to what extent these interventions led to changes or improved oversight. There is some evidence that the court produced audit opinions on the general accounts of the State and its agencies, but it is not clear whether this led to an improved system of checks and balances for transparency in government expenditures. Two planned outputs - a robust server to access the electronic oversight systems of government departments, and a database of finances and external audits - did not materialise. While these initiatives tried to reproduce norms of good governance, they did not enjoy the right conditions for adaptation.

Together with UN Women, UNDP undertook capacity building of the Women's Political Platform, a civil society platform, in advocacy techniques for budget transparency, oversight and mobilising public

⁵⁵ Payment delays are a sector-wide issue in the country.

⁵⁶ UNDP ROAR 2017 p. 37-38.

⁵⁷ The platform includes about 15 CSOs. It received two trainings on advocacy techniques and public opinion mobilisation (UNDP ROAR 2018, p.3).

⁵⁸ UNDP ROAR 2018: After the crisis erupted in 2015 the NPA was practically stopped. UNDP support only allowed basic functions to be maintained, through the provision of equipment, transportation and logistical support.

opinion. The aim was for the platform to more actively engage in public policy debate, monitoring and reporting. However, without an effective government since August 2015 and with no budget approved since January 2016 (see section 1.3), the results and relevance of this intervention were limited.

Finding 6. UNDP credibility and support were fundamental to mobilise resources and effectively manage a donor basket fund for the organisation of the 2018 national elections. UNDP support to elections did not, however, adequately consider a more sustainable approach to reduce the cost of elections and improve data reliability through an integrated registration system and/or a single citizenship identification and registration mechanism.

The organisation of the 2018-2019 elections was an important turning point, ending several years of political instability. In this context, the Government formally requested the UN to provide support for the preparation of the elections, particularly to update maps and voter registration.

The UNDP reputation for supporting electoral processes gave confidence to the international community to mobilise significant resources to support the elections. In 2014, UNDP played a key role in organising the elections through the management of an electoral basket fund, an approach which allowed donor coordination and flexibility in funding the elections, which was key given the high cost of elections in the country. This strategically positioned UNDP to manage and coordinate a new basket fund of US\$ 10 million for the 2018-2019 electoral process, exceeding expectations.⁵⁹ Evaluation respondents claimed that the credibility and reputation of UNDP as a transparent partner was key to the high and timely resource mobilisation.

Following a needs assessment mission from the UN Department of Political Affairs, UNDP provided technical,

material and financial support to electoral management bodies training 225 staff and officials, and supporting election logistics. This included engaging in the design, technical specifications and procurement strategy for voter registration equipment, development of the voter registration timeframe and preparation of polling station kits. The deployment of UN Volunteers helped with election logistics, and the counting and data entry of vote results.⁶⁰ Additional support was provided to the Electoral Process Support Office, the agency responsible for voter registration and civic education. This included the procurement of goods and services for voter registration and an update to the software; planning and budgeting, training for civic and voter education campaigns, and supervision of voter registration.

Delays to the UNDP procurement of biometric equipment for voter registration and electoral kits meant they were not available in time for the March 2019 elections. This delay was partially explained by lack of political consensus about the technical prerequisites for voter registration equipment, in the absence of a clear and adequate legal framework to establish the independence and respective competences of the electoral management bodies.⁶¹ The equipment will be available for subsequent elections planned for the end of 2019, and could help to create a more reliable electoral registry and a biometric database, key elements to establish a permanent register of voters.⁶² The lack of an integrated registration system and/or single citizenship ID card system results in an unreliable and non-permanent electoral database, requiring new electoral census and nationwide registration processes for each electoral cycle, increasing the cost of the elections. As currently many citizens do not possess a birth certificate or citizenship ID card, a completely new process of voter registration has to take place for every election cycle in Guinea-Bissau, rather than an update and cleaning of existing data, a costly and time-consuming endeavour.⁶³

⁵⁹ UNDP ROAR 2018 p.1. This exceeded expectations, as the total cost of electoral operations was approximately USD 9 million for both legislative and presidential elections (UNDP Project document n. 00099477).

⁶⁰ <<https://www.ec-undp-electoralassistance.org/national-elections-commission-and-partners-work-to-strengthen-electoral-dispute-resolution-process-in-liberia-2/>>

⁶¹ From the choice of voter registration equipment all the way to voting process.

⁶² UNDP supported the training of two people from the National Election Commission in the use of IT in electoral process management. UNDP ROAR 2018 p.4.

⁶³ Birth registration and issue of a citizenship ID card is a basic human right. Since many Guinea-Bissau citizens do not possess a citizenship ID card, many voters are registered on the basis of two other registered electors vouching for their citizenship. This approach is fraught with risks of registering non-citizens since there are thousands of migrants from neighbouring countries who speak one or more local ethnic languages and can be used to perpetrate electoral fraud in many regions of the country.

The country office strategy focused on short-term results related to the construction of Regional Election Commission (CRE) premises, rather than more long-term, complex solutions to reduce the cost of elections and improve data reliability. UNDP support to the construction of a building for the CRE in Bafata region, aimed at decreasing the high cost of renting CRE offices and improving warehouse conditions,⁶⁴ is questionable as, by law, the electoral process ends 15 days after the vote, resulting in the closure of CRE offices. No evidence was found that the construction of the building would generate cost savings to warrant the investment in an office which remains empty between elections while carrying recurrent costs. What's more the evaluation team observed that the building design was not fit for its purpose.⁶⁵ Such construction does not significantly improve the electoral process by helping staff to make better use of time between elections for cleaning and updating registries. Evaluation respondents confirmed that the employment of CRE election staff is discontinued and election kits and other sensitive documents are transported for storage in the capital, Bissau. As noted in finding 2, relating to the CAJ, the focus on form (what it looks like) over function (what it does), has not been an effective strategy for building long-term capabilities. It does not respond to the prevailing problem, but builds a system which appears to be more modern than it actually is (see box 2).

Finding 7. With the Global Fund, UNDP contributed to health outcomes through: enhanced monitoring of the medication supply chain; enhanced prevention, diagnostic and treatment capacity of health centres; and health sensitisation and information. Challenges remain to ensure coordination with partners and transfer capacities to national counterparts to promote behaviour change and avoid disruption of the timely availability and distribution of medication and supplies.

Guinea-Bissau has been a beneficiary of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund)

since 2004. In the programme cycle under review, this included a \$ 4 million grant for HIV managed by the National Secretariat to Fight AIDS, a \$ 1.4 million grant for tuberculosis managed by the Ministry of Health, and an \$ 18 million grant for malaria managed by UNDP. Total expenditure amounted to US\$ 26.9 million, an execution rate of 78 per cent. Between 2012 and 2014, Global Fund was the only donor contributing to the health sector in Guinea-Bissau.⁶⁶

UNDP work with the Global Fund was aligned to the governance outcome. Health initiatives were not initially included in the CPD, even though they were a significant part of country office delivery (57 per cent, see figure 5). They were classified in the corporate system as management, rather than development, projects, contrary to corporate practice. Global Fund projects were later aligned to the governance outcome and the results will be reported in the 2019 Results Oriented Annual Report. However, there is no integration between the Global Fund projects and team and the rest of the UNDP programme. The evaluation observed that the team working on Global Fund projects is perceived, treated and organised as a separate agency working in a silo within UNDP.⁶⁷

UNDP effectively contributed to the prevention and treatment of malaria, reducing prevalence, increasing rapid diagnostic tests and improving access to treatment and case management.⁶⁸ A multi-pronged delivery structure is in place, with partnerships across public and private sectors at central, regional and community levels, to advance prevention and curative interventions. Key implementing partners for UNDP were the National Health Development Programme Project Management Unit, the National Public Health Institute (INASA), the Bandim Health Project, and the Central Medical Stores. Together they worked to prevent malaria through distribution of long-lasting insecticidal nets, isoniazid prophylaxis treatment for pregnant women⁶⁹ and seasonal malaria chemo-

⁶⁴ Project Concept Note.

⁶⁵ Planning and needs assessment prior to the construction of the CRE structure did not seem to be adequate. The evaluation team observed that the building lacked adequate working and storage facilities resulting in offices full of ballot boxes and the generator enclosure full of discarded electoral remnants.

⁶⁶ See: <https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/2607/oig_gf-oig-14-014_report_en.pdf?u=636917015830000000>

⁶⁷ Even operationally, the Global Fund projects are managed separately and differently, and more efficiently. For example, some payments by the Global Fund unit operations team are made by wireless phone transactions for free, whereas the UNDP operations team still issues individual cheques and charges for each.

⁶⁸ INASA survey 2017. The decline in the prevalence of malaria in 2017 was significant compared to 2012. Prevalence among children < 5 years old improved from 9.9 per cent in 2012 to 0.7 per cent in 2017 (IC:0.5-1.1); among individuals > 5 years old from 7.6 per cent to 1.5 per cent (IC:1.0-2.0); and among children 5-14 years old from 1.7 per cent to 3.4 per cent. It is unclear why, and further studies are needed to consider the reasons and different strategies to address higher prevalence among 5-14 year old children.

⁶⁹ TPI-2= 56 per cent target 80 per cent; TPI-3= 9.5 per cent target 80 per cent.

prevention in two target regions, Bafata and Gabu. However, the 2017 INASA survey indicated that a significant number of users did not understand the need to replace long-lasting insecticidal nets every three years, as effectiveness of the insecticide declines. Partner communication strategies to promote behaviour change and ensure that pregnant women attend sufficient antenatal consultations to access prophylaxis treatment were not effective.⁷⁰

UNDP helped to improve detection rates for HIV/AIDS with access to testing, enhanced patient follow-up and community awareness raising on HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. Between 2010 and 2017, there was a 27 per cent decrease in new HIV infections, but an increase in adolescents living with HIV.⁷¹ To avoid shortages in tuberculosis medicines, UNDP supported rapid procurement mechanisms and inventory management services for medicines and supplies. With material and technical support from UNDP, community-based sensitisation campaigns increased popular awareness of HIV screening for tuberculosis patients and improved detection rates.

In 2018, UNDP started to conduct real-time monitoring of local health centres using mobile tablets to digitise data. This aimed to support INASA to map, track, prevent and treat malaria outbreaks in real time and coordinate rapid responses.⁷² The initiative was piloted in 45 health facilities and 1,936 villages, collecting data related to malaria, cholera, polio and yellow fever. This real-time tracking was a very relevant initiative to allow health professionals to improve national data collection, malaria case notification, treatment stocks and use of mosquito nets.

UNDP support to improve procurement and stock systems for malaria, HIV and tuberculosis medication and supplies was key to prevention and treatment, but not without challenges. Evaluation respondents pointed to difficulties in avoiding systemic disruption in the timely availability and distribution of medical supplies, and insufficient attention by UNDP. Interviewees suggested that lack of coordination between partners

and strategies could have been better mitigated in project design. Language and educational deficits, low motivation and high turnover of staff in national institutions created challenges for communication, capacity development and knowledge transfer.⁷³ Although these risks were identified in UNDP risk logs, mitigation strategies were repeated over the years, were of limited effectiveness and were not updated. Key counterparts interviewed for the evaluation considered that UNDP was substituting, rather than building or transferring, national capacity.

Political instability and insufficient income generation create barriers to effective exit strategies for development partners, but UNDP still needs to consider more effective and context-adapted ways to transfer capacity to ensure sustainable results.

2.3. Inclusive economic growth

Outcome 38: Economic growth is inclusive and sustainable, promoting poverty reduction, decent work, food security and the structural transformation of the economy.

In the area of inclusive economic growth, UNDP committed to contributing to the above outcome through:

- i. Supporting the Government to formulate, monitor and evaluate inclusive growth policies and strategies and reinforcing aid management capacity;
- ii. Increasing the capacity of public administrations at central and local levels to coordinate and implement participatory planning processes, and mainstream the sustainable development goals (SDGs) into national development planning processes;
- iii. Working with the National Institute of Statistics to improve data collection and dissemination systems to monitor development policies and plans; and

⁷⁰ INASA survey indicates the proportion of those having attended at least one antenatal consultation and that had taken at least two doses of (IPT) was 56 per cent, compared to 35 per cent in 2012 and 44 per cent in 2014. The number of women that took the third dose is still low with only 9.5 per cent in 2017 compared to 7.5 per cent in 2014, all well below the target of 80 per cent.

⁷¹ See: <<https://aidsinfo.unaids.org/>>

⁷² See: <<https://stories.undp.org/is-the-digital-divide-hampering-the-malaria-response-in-africa>>

⁷³ For example, staff in the Global Fund unit do not speak Portuguese or Creole.

- iv. Increasing economic opportunities and access to inclusive financing and markets for vulnerable populations, particularly young people and women.

Interventions targeted national and sectoral institutions, including the National Secretariat of Planning and Regional Integration, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and the Ministry of Commerce, local governments, civil society organisations, youth networks and associations and the media.

A total of four projects were implemented between 2013 and 2018, two for public sector reform, one for local planning and one for active citizen participation. Three started in the previous cycle, and only two were active in 2019. The budget amounted to US\$ 5.6 million, with expenditure of US\$ 4.8 million, a 74.5 per cent execution rate. Resources came mainly from the AfDB, at over \$ 1.7 million, PBF contributed \$ 0.4 million for the project “Rural Youth and Adolescents to Serve as Peace Leaders”, and UNDP funding for the project “Sustainable and Inclusive Economic Development”. Other funds were provided by the World Trade Organization, Government of Sudan and the West African Economic Monetary Fund. Three projects used the national implementation modality (NIM), covering 91 per cent of total expenditure.

Based on the gender marker used at design stage, two projects committed to contributing to gender equality in a limited way (GEN1), and the other two committed to having gender equality included as a significant objective (GEN2).

Finding 8. The country office did not invest in poverty reduction, developing economic opportunities, inclusive financing and the sustainable transformation of the economy, despite their relevance to development results and the UNDAF and UNDP core mandate. The country office did not follow the wider corporate shift towards an integrated sustainable development approach, instead focusing on poverty reduction and

environmental protection as two separate areas.

During the programme cycle, economic transformation and poverty reduction were identified as an UNDAF pillar and CPD outcome. However, none of the projects implemented under this outcome included outputs related to inclusive economic opportunities, decent work or access to inclusive financing and markets. Instead, they mainly contributed to the first output on strengthening the capacity of public institutions to budget and implement policies that address public priorities (see annex 8). Under this outcome, UNDP has implemented two projects on public administration reform, one on local planning and one on active citizen participation.

Despite the country’s youth bulge,⁷⁴ the lack of employment opportunities for young people, and the CPD commitment to “target women and youth, the part of the population most affected by poverty in both urban and rural areas”, no intervention was designed to address barriers to the economic empowerment of these groups.⁷⁵ Respondents confirmed that activities planned for 2018-2019 focused only on active citizen participation and did not contribute to the economic empowerment of youth and women. For example, a UNDP pilot initiative with SwissAid, funded by PBF, provided leadership skills and training to adolescents in rural and urban areas on development and the drivers of conflict.⁷⁶ However, no efforts were made to link peace-building activities targeting young people to economic development, poverty reduction and local development planning, limiting the strategic relevance of this work.

UNDP supported the creation of the Government Investment Agency, a one-stop-shop for investors, and a Business Incubation Centre. UNDP participated in a commission to define the agency’s structure, governance regulations and tools and supported the production and publication of macro-economic data forecast reports. Although the impact of the Investment

⁷⁴ According to 2017 UN DESA World Population Prospects, in 2015 61.8 per cent of the population were under 25.

⁷⁵ UNDP CPD 2016-2020, p.6.

⁷⁶ Trainings were provided to 180 young leaders on leadership, conflict management, rule of law, human rights, migration, gender and natural resource management. The project scope was significantly reduced from an initial plan to promote access of vulnerable groups to social services and civic participation and promote stability and reconciliation, through women’s and youth participation in decision making, strengthening the role of journalists, promoting constructive dialogue between political stakeholders and an institutional national reconciliation process. UNDP Project Document.

Agency on the number of enterprises registered is not clear, the time to register a business has fallen from 233 days to just one. However, at the time of the evaluation, the Business Incubator Centre was not yet operational due to lack of funding and premises.

Under other outcomes, three initiatives had elements related to economic development, with limited results: the GEF small grants programme; a one-off activity under the protected areas intervention; and a local economic development project. No work on environmental protection included sustainable livelihoods as a key entry point, and there was no initiative designed to develop full value chains (see finding 13).

Despite high levels of poverty and unemployment in the country, the country office did not invest in promoting decent work, employment creation and income generation initiatives in response to the country needs identified in the UNDAF. No evidence was found of work to promote employment and income generation. Although the enabling environment to work upstream was limited by political instability, the country office did not adapt or refocus its programmes and lacked a strategy to address poverty reduction in line with its core corporate mandate: “helping countries to achieve sustainable development by eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions”.⁷⁷

The UNDP poverty reduction strategy changed significantly with the UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017, putting strong emphasis on “sustainable development pathways”, an approach which integrates poverty reduction and environmental protection into a single area. As noted in the UNDP evaluation of poverty reduction in least developed countries, “it tackles the interconnected issues of poverty, inequality and exclusion while transforming productive capacities, avoiding the irreversible depletion of social and natural capital, and lowering risks arising from shocks.” The Guinea-Bissau country office has yet to incorporate this change of approach into its programming. Work has been fragmented, with separate outcomes for poverty reduction and

the environment reflected in projects and the office structure. The local economic development initiative has remained focused on governance, particularly support to local governance institutions, and has not transitioned to a focus on improving access to resources needed for employment, infrastructure development and basic services at the community level. The evaluation found no evidence that poverty reduction components were significantly integrated into on-going projects, or any strong focus on livelihoods in work on environmental protection.

Respondents stressed that resources and donor interest to invest in this area were limited, leading to insufficient consideration to the second CPD outcome. The work of the Strategic Policy Unit focused on research and economic governance (see finding 9), and did not consider downstream programmatic work. The sustainable development team had stronger expertise and focus on environment issues, and the country office did not have any staff specifically focused on the area of poverty reduction, who could advise on the required shift in approach towards integrated sustainable development.

Finding 9. For the past ten years, UNDP has worked to strengthen the capacity of the public administration in Guinea-Bissau to deliver basic services and coordinate development aid. Results have been limited by a fragmented and over-ambitious approach, which proved inadequate to operationalise the necessary mechanisms and systems for an effective public administration and economic governance.

Guinea-Bissau faces numerous challenges in terms of public administration and economic governance, exacerbated by political instability, an under-qualified civil service and weak coordination. In response, UNDP invested efforts over ten years to modernise and improve the functioning of the public administration and development aid coordination. UNDP implemented many activities and responded to numerous ad hoc requests from the Government.

The political situation, specifically the withdrawal of technical and financial partners in 2012 (see section

⁷⁷ UNDP Strategic Plan 2018-2021, p.10.

1.3), created an environment of operational constraints including lack of funding, low absorptive capacity and high turnover, leading UNDP to review and renegotiate several objectives and activities. The Aid Coordination project planned an estimated 100 activities from 2013 to 2017, of which 29 per cent were not implemented.⁷⁸ For example, UNDP supported development of a 6-month public administration training programme with the National School of Administration, but respondents indicated that it could not be held because of political instability. UNDP also supported the development of 12 public administration training courses for the National School of Administration in areas such as budgeting, notary services and accounting. However, there is no public administration career system to ensure the sustained professionalisation of the civil service, limiting the results of the initiative.

The country office approach to public sector reform was not built on complex adaptive processes and adaptive management, as explained in box 2 above. Rather than an incremental approach to reform, creating pockets of effectiveness and building on cumulative local successes over time, experiences from other countries were applied in a short time frame.

Despite UNDP efforts over several years, Guinea-Bissau does not have effective mechanisms to monitor and coordinate development aid at national or sectoral levels. In the programme cycle under review, UNDP informed the government approach for mobilisation of international aid through its contributions to the National Strategy for Development Partnership and the Aid Coordination Platform.⁷⁹ However, as reported in the 2018 ROAR, the Aid Coordination Platform has not been effective: “the political and institutional instability prevailing in the country since August 2015 have blocked the chance to work with a committed government body on Aid Coordination Mechanism, namely for the operationalisation of the Poverty Management Platform and the set-up of the recommended Guinea-Bissau’s Agency for Partnership and Development.”

In terms of economic governance, the country office

aimed to support the Government to formulate and monitor inclusive growth policies, providing technical assistance for studies on multi-dimensional poverty and state fragility, and policy advice on social protection and employment policies. However, these initiatives did not materialise under a specific project.

Despite political and administrative instability, which was not conducive to sustainable results, the country office continued to invest efforts in fragmented upstream strategies. The risk of delays and weak sustainability was often reported, but no successful mitigation strategies were identified. Detailed assessments and studies were produced, but their use was limited given the political situation. It is thus questionable whether it has been strategic or efficient to invest the limited country office resources in initiatives with proven limited potential for success in the current context. Despite the need to continuously support system and policy strengthening, given the fragile context of Guinea-Bissau, strategic entry points for engagement need to be based on a less ambitious strategy which considers different political scenarios and contemplates possible deterioration in the political situation.

Finding 10. UNDP supported mainstreaming of the SDGs into the national development strategy. However, strategies for SDG acceleration areas were based on a scenario which was not adequately sensitive to the fragile context and did not adequately analyse risk or contemplate possible deterioration in the country context.

To advance the SDG agenda, in 2018 the country office, together with the Resident Coordinator Office and with the support of RBA, supported the Government to mainstream the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and other key instruments into the national 2015-2020 strategic and operational plan “Terra Ranka”.⁸⁰ This exercise, which involved ministries, civil society, private sector and UN agencies, led to the identification of SDG-related baselines, indicators and targets and the approval of the Terra Ranka Results and Indicators Matrix.⁸¹ The poor availability of social

⁷⁸ UNDP Project 00073852 Final Evaluation “Renforcement des Capacités d’Analyse et de Formulation des Politiques et de Gestion de l’Aide”.

⁷⁹ This coordination mechanism for donors to check which areas other donors are investing in, is not yet operational.

⁸⁰ These included the 2063 Agenda, the SAMOA pathway for Small Island Development States and the results of the country’s Fragility Assessment.

⁸¹ UNDP SDG UNCT Retreat, February 2019; UNDP pre-mission questionnaire and UNDP country office TOR for Outcome Evaluation, p.4.

statistics and data on SDG indicators constituted a major constraint to planning, monitoring and evaluating policies at national and subnational levels. UNDP and the National Statistics Institute conducted a data ecosystem analysis to identify data availability and gaps, which concluded that very few SDGs were being monitored in Guinea-Bissau, only 40 per cent of the indicators were measurable and most of them did not have baseline information.⁸²

A pre-MAPS⁸³ mission, organised in 2018 in partnership with the Millennium Institute and with the support of RBA, paved the way to identify potential SDG accelerators.⁸⁴ Key national stakeholders and UN agencies cooperated to identify opportunities for financing, institutional coordination and activities to enable the implementation and monitoring of the SDGs. These included strengthening data and monitoring capacities, planning and budgeting systems and the public administration reform agenda. UNDP identified and planned for some of these areas in its current and previous programme cycles with no progress or limited results. For example, there was no progress in support to the National Statistics Institute for the production of statistical data to address the lack of national administrative and survey data. Increased collaboration with the World Bank could help to strengthen progress in this area. There was no evidence that the strategy developed to support and advance the SDGs was grounded in risk-informed and fragility-sensitive approaches to respond to the specificities of a crisis-affected country.⁸⁵

Finding 11. UNDP investments in local governance have contributed to participatory development planning processes. This has not translated into local economic development results, given the overambitious focus on replicating multiple planning processes before implementing plans. Given the

protracted political crisis, sustainability remains to be ensured with the approval of the legal framework for decentralisation and funding for implementation of the development plans.

In the framework of the local governance and decentralisation agenda, between 2016 and 2019 UNDP piloted initiatives to reinforce the capacity of local governance institutions to develop regional planning systems and formulate regional and local development plans in Cacheu, Gabu and Quinara.⁸⁶ Given continued political and institutional instability, and the lack of results from previous upstream efforts, during the programme cycle under review UNDP tried to shift to a bottom-up approach to engage in development planning at local level. From 2016, UNDP provided financial and technical support for the development and adoption of a local development planning methodology,⁸⁷ providing training for its implementation to 12 ministerial planning teams and three regional technical teams through the National School of Administration. This training built the capacity of national government actors to train the civil service, and was considered positive, particularly given high turnover rates.

This pilot initiative resulted in the formulation of three sectoral strategic development plans in the Cacheu region.⁸⁸ In this region, progress included the establishment of nine sectoral technical teams and training of 119 of its members, the production of comprehensive diagnostic studies, the establishment of 66 local community development committees,⁸⁹ 15 section consultative councils and three sectoral consultative councils and the training of some of their members, and the formulation and testing of a handbook for the local government fiscal revenue system. The preparation of local development plans is expected to open doors for the localisation of the

⁸² UNDP ROAR 2018.

⁸³ The UN Development Group adopted a common approach for SDG implementation support known as Mainstreaming, Acceleration and Policy Support (MAPS), to support countries on 2030 agenda implementation. UNDP Bureau for Policy and Programme Support initiated 'MAPS missions' in 2016 as a way to help countries operationalise an effective approach to integrated SDG implementation.

⁸⁴ Pre-MAPS mission report. December 2018.

⁸⁵ See UNDP Offer on SDG Implementation in Fragile States, 2016: <<https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/sustainable-development-goals/undp-offer-on-sdimplementation-in-fragile-states.html>>

⁸⁶ UNDP country office Local Economic Development Project n. 00084600: "Creating the conditions for local governance and local development in Guinea-Bissau".

⁸⁷ Approved in late 2016. UNDP ROAR 2017, E15.

⁸⁸ In Cacheu, Canchingo and Bula. At the time of the evaluation mission, it was still a draft.

⁸⁹ The country office reports that the local community development committees are composed by 1,558 persons, of which 34 per cent are female.

SDGs, and thereby of public policies.

The submission of the legislative bill for local government structures (“Lei Orgânica dos Órgãos Locais”) to the Council of Ministers was continuously postponed due to political instability, and the municipalities law (“Lei das Autarquias”) has not yet been enacted.⁹⁰ The lack of a legal framework for decentralisation, which would provide the structure for local governance, is an important sustainability risk for UNDP. Respondents highlighted that the absence of this overarching framework had constrained the effectiveness and sustainability of local governance efforts implemented by other development actors in the country. But despite this, UNDP decided to establish various technical planning structures in three regions, rather than fully piloting the approach in one location to demonstrate effectiveness before scaling-up.

Though local planning plays a major role in economic development, the programme paid little attention to this area, and the establishment of local participation governance structures has not yet enabled economic development results. Local government counterparts expressed frustration that, almost three years after the beginning of the project, no plans had been financed or implemented or value chains established, other than ad hoc activities funded by communities themselves. This has hindered UNDP capacity to demonstrate the project potential and build confidence of potential donors to invest in local plans, which was planned for mid-2019. As such, UNDP has had to continue implementation with very limited core funds and limited prospects for sustainability.

2.4. Biodiversity and disaster risk reduction

Outcome 39: Public institutions, civil society organisations and the private sector promote the preservation and development of biodiversity, and the prevention and management of disaster risks.

In the areas of biodiversity and disaster risk reduction, UNDP committed to contributing to the above outcome through:

- i. Capacity building of national institutions to formulate, plan and implement environmental and natural resource management policies;
- ii. Improving the techniques and technology used by communities for biodiversity conservation and sustainable natural resource management; and
- iii. Strengthening institutional and normative frameworks for disaster risk reduction to respond to national challenges and comply with international standards, with functional coordinating mechanisms and skilled human resources.

Interventions targeted a wide range of national counterparts, particularly the Secretary of State for Environment and Tourism, the General Directorate of the Environment, the Institute of Biodiversity and Protected Areas, the National Civil Protection Service and the Bio-Guiné Foundation.

A total of nine projects were implemented between 2016 and 2018. The budget amounted to US\$ 3.4 million, with funding from GEF and UNDP. Expenditures totalled US\$ 2.9 million, an 86 per cent execution rate. Almost all projects used the national implementation modality, covering 88 per cent of total expenditure.

Based on the gender marker at design stage, four projects committed to contributing to gender equality in a limited way (GEN1), two committed

⁹⁰ However, several laws exist in this regard: Lei Constitucional nº 1 / 95, de 04 de Dezembro; Lei Base das Autarquias Locais – Lei nº 5 / 96, de 16 de Setembro; Lei da Criação e Extinção da Autarquias Locais – Lei nº 5 / 97, de 2 de Dezembro; Lei da Tutela do Estado sobre as Autarquias Locais – Lei nº 3 / 97, de 7 de Abril; Lei da Autonomia financeira e Patrimonial das Autarquias Locais – Lei nº 7 / 96, de 9 de Dezembro; Lei - quadro da criação de Municípios – Lei nº 6 / 96, de 2 de Dezembro; Decreto - Lei da Criação de Municípios e estabelecimento dos respectivos limites – Decreto – Lei nº 4 / 96, de 9 de Dezembro; Lei eleitoral Autárquico – Lei nº 4 / 2008; Código Administrativo Autárquico – Lei nº 5 / 2018.

to having gender equality included as a significant objective (GEN2) and three did not commit to any gender-specific contributions.

Finding 12. The upstream work of UNDP on environmental and natural resource management was designed to respond to international commitments and improve national policy instruments and tools. However, it presented limited adaptation and consideration to the country's challenging institutional circumstances, compromising its sustainability.

UNDP planned to support the Government to improve its legal and policy frameworks for environmental and natural resource management. In response to Guinea-Bissau's National Adaptation Programme of Action,⁹¹ the country office provided technical support to integrate climate change risks and adaptation measures into key national policies, plans and programmes for water, agriculture and livestock management.⁹² Between 2011 and 2016, UNDP developed several activities to assess and strengthen national capacity for environmental management, including an evaluation of environmental governance in the country, support to the development of a draft national policy on the environment and sustainable development and six regulations on the environment, a handbook for awareness raising of policy makers, a guide to strategic environmental assessment and sectorial guides on environment impact assessments, and technical training on environmental issues and environmental impact assessments.

These upstream activities helped the country to comply with the policy and regulation requirements stemming from its international commitments. However, they remained at draft and development stage, as the context did not allow for them to be approved, enforced, and operationalised (see section 1.3). The Government continues to face significant challenges in terms of weak capacities and limited

resources to effectively implement the policy instruments on the ground. In addition, training provided to government officials was not aligned to their actual duties, limiting their motivation to apply the knowledge, and did not build upon tools existing in other countries.⁹³ The country office did not adapt and shift the focus according to the limited enabling environment, for example, strengthening the capacity and engagement of civil society instead.

UNDP planned to develop technical and institutional capacities to calculate the economic value of global environmental goods and services which could be impacted by proposed development policies, programmes, plans and projects.⁹⁴ UNDP hoped to explore options to incorporate environmental accounting statistics into the Guinea-Bissau national accounts system with the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, the Ministry of Economy and Planning, and the National Statistics Office. However, natural resource valuation is a very specialised area which requires highly trained experts to use and interpret the models and attach financial and economic value to ecosystem functions and services. The application of such tools requires strong institutions, good coordination across ministries, and availability and sharing of data. Interviews with national counterparts showed that the National Statistics Office has limited staff and skills, and out-dated technology to collect and manage such data and information.⁹⁵ Given all these constraints, and the governance challenges faced by Guinea-Bissau, the initiative seems to be designed to respond to international commitments (the Convention on Biological Diversity and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) which call for the introduction of green accounting, the evaluation of ecosystem services and environmental impact assessments, without adaptation to the country's institutional circumstances.

⁹¹ See: <<https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/gnb01.pdf>>

⁹² Charter of Agricultural Policy; Livestock Development Policy; Water and Sanitation Director Scheme; National Strategy for Poverty Reduction - DENARP II; National Agricultural Investment Plan; Policy documents for water and sanitation; Guinea-Bissau's Strategy and Financing Plan for Climate Change; Gabu Regional Development Plan; Manual and Literacy Guide.

⁹³ UNDP Project n. 00079611, Lessons learned report.

⁹⁴ Project on "strengthening natural resource valuation capacities for improved planning and decision-making to conserve the global environment".

⁹⁵ Guinea-Bissau Statistical Capacity Indicator is below the Sub-Saharan Africa average, at 47.8/100 in 2018 (See: <<http://datatopics.worldbank.org/statisticalcapacity/SCIdashboard.aspx>>).

Finding 13. UNDP contributed to the establishment of two terrestrial protected areas and three biological corridors in Guinea-Bissau and the related institutional framework. However, the sustainability and effectiveness of results is affected by the limited efforts to develop alternative sustainable livelihoods to adequately protect the areas. Sustainable financing and management of an expanded national protected area system remains a concern.

Guinea-Bissau has very rich and diverse ecosystems, but environmental protection efforts were historically only focused on coastal and marine regions, while terrestrial ecosystems suffered from rapid degradation, particularly deforestation. The Institute for Protected Areas and Biodiversity (IBAP) developed an ambitious long-term strategy to expand protected area coverage in terrestrial ecosystems. Between 2010 and 2019, with GEF funding, the country office supported efforts to strengthen and expand the Guinea-Bissau protected areas system to include, for the first time, a terrestrial protected area with growing threats to ecosystem integrity.

Although delays were incurred due to the 2012 coup d'état, two terrestrial protected areas and three biological corridors were officially established in June 2017, administered and managed by IBAP.⁹⁶ These make up 406,556 ha, 27 per cent more than was initially planned,⁹⁷ increasing protected territory from 15 per cent to 26 per cent of national territory.

UNDP supported IBAP to create an institutional framework for the management, monitoring and evaluation of protected areas. Through a participatory approach, cross-sectoral management groups at local and national levels approve management plans and regulation of protected areas. As evidenced in interviews and field visits, this has helped to establish a process for basic community consultation and provision of information to communities.

Protected areas were designed on a co-management model, with management regulations based on

well-defined areas which include some fully protected areas, some buffer zones and some reserved for community development. This approach recognises that protected areas are an integral part of their surrounding landscape, connected through corridors into a wider integrated network of protected areas. Interviews with stakeholders and field visits indicated that, in some areas, this has limited the expansion of human settlements.

This co-management approach aims to address the poverty-environment nexus, and trade-offs between biodiversity and human livelihoods, so that environmental management can contribute to poverty reduction. According to interviews and previous evaluations, awareness raising with communities who live in and around the protected areas increased local understanding and ownership of protected areas and their natural resources, and the sense of need to protect them for future generations.⁹⁸

However, field visits evidenced that sensitisation alone was not sufficient to effectively and sustainably protect areas and stop deforestation. Environmental education was not complemented by livelihood activities, to bring social and economic benefits, which could reduce pressure on natural resources, as communities dependent on natural resources in protected areas depended on prohibited destructive activities for their livelihoods. The development of alternative sustainable community livelihoods initiatives to decrease pressure on protected areas was very limited with insufficient funding. Field visits evidenced that the scale and resources of the small grants programme,⁹⁹ with a focus on protected areas, were insufficient to achieve sustainable livelihoods results and limited evidence was found of efforts to engage the private sector or NGOs. Important sustainability risks therefore remain, due to limited efforts to promote alternative livelihoods to ensure participatory conservation management and avoid pressure on natural resources. To identify favourable settings, positive deviance (see box 2) could have been used to find cases of success and determine

⁹⁶ Boé and Dulombi protected areas and Tcheche, Salifo and Cuntabani corridors which are part of the Dulombi-Boé-Tchetché Complex (DBT) in Guinea-Bissau's Forest Belt.

⁹⁷ UNDP Final Evaluation of Project n. 00059979, 2018.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ See: <<https://sgp.undp.org/component/countrypages/?view=countrypage&country=55&Itemid=271>>

which conditions enable them and guide the design and adaptation of interventions.

The protected areas operate under challenging circumstances, with notable financial, legal and policy constraints. Although officially created, the Government did not include their management or maintenance in the national budget.¹⁰⁰ There was no increase in protected area infrastructure or staff capacity, except from people recruited through the project. As observed in field visits, the protected areas are not patrolled by a permanent ranger team and effective coverage of the areas cannot be ensured due to the limited number of IBAP rangers who received limited training, and who have insufficient authority and equipment to fulfil their tasks.

Although the project has been implemented for over nine years, there is no robust monitoring and evaluation system to track changes in forest cover, wildlife abundance and other environmental outcomes. Monitoring of the impact of protected areas on deforestation and poaching is therefore limited and does not include a geographic information system. In April 2019, with the UNDP Office of Information Management and Technology, the country office started to explore how to identify the boundaries of the protected areas, as a first step to monitor its impact.

Protected areas are not sufficiently financially sustainable. In order to ensure that IBAP could absorb the management of a 73 per cent growth in protected areas into its system, UNDP designed a project to strengthen the “financial sustainability and management effectiveness of the National Protected Areas System in Guinea-Bissau”. The investment of USD 1.3 million of GEF resources into the BioGuinée Foundation, a private foundation with public utility, was expected to increase revenue generation and leverage funds towards its endowment.¹⁰¹ However, this process was delayed, as UNDP lacked internal corporate guidelines on how to transfer resources to a trust fund, discouraging other potential donors such as the MAVA Foundation which had pledged

EUR 1.3 Million. Given that initial GEF funding for protected area management has ended, there is substantial under-resourcing, which presents a major challenge to effective management of the protected areas. Further collaboration with the World Bank, who is also working in these areas, could have enhanced coordination and results.

Finding 14. UNDP support to climate and disaster resilience has been fragmented, with limited results. The country office did not attempt to scale up climate resilience, livelihoods and risk management initiatives to bring multiplier development effects.

Strengthening climate resilience and preparedness for natural disasters is key to achieve the SDGs and poverty reduction, the 2063 agenda of the African Union and the SAMOA pathways. Guinea-Bissau's National Adaptation Programme of Action identifies the need to address vulnerability to climate change of both the agrarian and the water sectors as a key national economic priority. In this regard, UNDP supported the piloting of small-scale climate change adaptation techniques for water, agriculture and livestock management in fourteen villages in the Gabu region, the semi-arid rural area of eastern Guinea-Bissau. Various sustainable environmental management techniques, resilient to climate change, were disseminated at community level for agricultural production (e.g. adapted seeds, use of the Zai technique, water management, transverse tillage, crop rotation) and livestock (e.g. adapted forage, water retention ponds, animal drinking fountains). This activity could have been strengthened through partnership with the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO).

Community interviewees pointed out that, although they were consulted, local knowledge was not adequately considered in the design of activities. Communities reported an increase in agricultural production thanks to some of the new agricultural techniques, but access to water did not increase and remains insufficient to respond to increasing desertification and water scarcity. The pilot did not manage to demonstrate efficient water use in crop

¹⁰⁰ UNDP Terminal Evaluation of Project n. 00059979, 2018.

¹⁰¹ It was estimated that an increase of the Bio-Guinée Foundation endowment, from 24 to 46 million USD, with an estimated return of 5.9 per cent, was to sustainably finance the recurrent costs of the country's existing protected areas and biodiversity conservation efforts in perpetuity. UNDP Terminal Evaluation of Project n. 00059979, 2018.

production systems and water resource management. The evaluation team observed in field visits that the construction of water fountains with pumps and water reservoirs was not successful. There was very limited water available in the reservoir built by UNDP compared to the natural water reservoirs available close by. The quantity of water coming from the water fountains built by UNDP was extremely limited compared to the others available in the villages. Successful innovations in terms of agricultural and livestock practices (i.e. Zai technique and adapted forage) were not scaled-up beyond the pilot to address knowledge gaps in different country contexts.

Starting in 2019, a new larger-scale GEF initiative for vulnerable coastal areas and communities is expected to spread technologies to strengthen climate resilience and adaptive capacity, and reinforce rural livelihoods, through the design, construction and maintenance of coastal protection measures. It will be critical to build upon the best practices and failures of the previous pilot to promote community and Government engagement and ownership and ensure sustainability. Upstream objectives on policy and institutional development for climate risk management need to be realistically reconsidered to align the level of investment to the existence of a conducive environment to achieve meaningful results.

Guinea-Bissau is facing the interrelated challenges of energy access and climate change adaptation, with heavy reliance on traditional biomass, particularly wood and charcoal. In 2018, to decrease deforestation and enhance access to clean energy, UNDP started a GEF project to promote better access to modern energy services for Guinea-Bissau's forest-dependent communities through sustainable mini-grids and low-carbon bioenergy technologies. Government interviews highlighted that the planned location of the mini-grids in isolated areas threatens the timely provision of the technical assistance required to maintain the equipment. In addition, there are no regulations, incentives or legislative framework to support renewable energy and no enabling environment at institutional level to develop such

policy and financial instruments.¹⁰² The need for significant upfront investment also challenges the potential scale-up of such initiatives, and there is no private sector interest to invest in it.¹⁰³ These limitations suggest that there are significant political, technology and market-related risks with no reasonable means of mitigation, which would require a less ambitious project more adapted to the realities of the country.

In terms of the prevention and management of natural disasters, the country office aimed to improve the quality and timing of climate information and early warning communications. In pilot villages in Gabu, UNDP developed community contingency plans which, at the time of the evaluation, were found inactive and not effective as some communities continued to suffer the effects of floods. It also introduced farmers' rain gauges and trained community focal points to collect information on rainfall parameters, to be shared with the regional agro-meteorological station in Gabu, and then the National Institute of Meteorology. During field visits, the evaluation team found that the reporting structure and information feedback loops between communities, regional and national level had not been working for a long time. Interviews in the field indicated that data had not been disseminated, there was no functioning or reliable weather forecasting system in place and the instruments available to collect meteorological information at regional level were basic and obsolete. National ownership was not attained.

Given the limited capacities and coordination of government institutions to respond to crises, the country office supported the dissemination of the National Strategy for the Prevention of Risks and Disasters and the drafting of the Decree Law establishing the National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction. The lack of enabling environment to work on institutional strengthening, and late funding for emergency response, hindered the operationalization of the National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction as a functioning system to coordinate different ministries to respond to emergencies, jointly with FAO and UNICEF. Interviews with government counterparts highlighted that late funding for emergency response

¹⁰² GEF Project Identification Form, 2016.

¹⁰³ Ibid.


had been inappropriately used to buy administrative material for the Government, to ensure timely use of funds and high delivery rates. Whilst disaster risk reduction (DRR) systems need to be strengthened, it is questionable whether the limited resources available to advance this area were strategically and efficiently invested to achieve results in a challenging institutional environment.

2.5. Cross-cutting issues

Finding 15. The corporate financial sustainability exercise that led to a reduction in the number of staff has negatively impacted human resources, leaving an inadequate country office team to effectively implement the programme and respond to the country's needs. In addition, the country office has faced significant challenges in attracting and retaining talent. This has generated risks in terms of internal control and accountability at senior management level; bottlenecks and inefficiencies in the operations team; an over-burden of work in both programmes and operations; and limited synergies across thematic areas and units with projects being implemented mostly in isolation.

The protracted instability in Guinea-Bissau has limited the physical presence and investment of donors in the country, significantly reducing the capacity of the country office for resource mobilisation and partnership. Given the RBA drive to ensure financial self-reliance of country offices, UNDP Guinea-Bissau went through a restructuring exercise at the end of 2015 to optimise the office and ensure cost efficiency, resulting in the loss of several posts. It also aimed to ensure that office expenditures did not exceed its resource envelope given a decreasing execution rate since the 2012 coup d'état and diminishing resources as a consequence of the 2015 political stalemate. Programme core resources went down drastically at this time, from \$ 2.5 million in 2014 to \$ 0.93 million in 2015, rising back to \$ 3.9 million in 2018 (see figure 8 for a comparison with UNDP Africa and UNDP globally). According to the change management implementation note, "while the CPD requires a structure that can allow the achievement of its objectives and goals in an efficient manner, the Financial Sustainability Analysis guided the Country Office to plan its structure accordingly with the available resources, as well as to respond to the corporate guidelines of full project costing." This left the country office with an inadequate workforce.

FIGURE 8: UNDP core vs non-core funding, UNDP total, RBA average and Guinea-Bissau (2016-2018)



Due to the challenging country context, attracting and maintaining qualified staff was difficult, both for national and international positions. At the time of the 2015 audit mission, seven positions were vacant. With restructuring in 2016, the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) specialist and gender specialist positions were cut, and a programme specialist has been covering the M&E role. A new gender specialist was only recruited in early 2019. The position of Head of Finance was also vacant for one year in 2018 and was only filled at the beginning of 2019. Challenges to recruit national staff and consultants with the required qualifications due to limited capacities in the country have created overburdening of staff and delayed the implementation of some projects. The country office operates using different languages (Portuguese, French and English, as well as Creole), which creates a further recruitment challenge as all staff must speak Portuguese and at least one other language. UNDP respondents claimed that creating international posts was difficult because of limited flexibility of rules and costs.

The country office also faced significant human resources challenges at senior management level. The UNDP Resident Representative, who was also the Resident Coordinator until December 2018, had been acting as the head of UNIOGBIS. This left the Deputy Resident Representative for Programmes as acting Resident Representative, as well as de facto Deputy Resident Representative for Operations.¹⁰⁴ Since September 2018, the position of Deputy Resident Representative for Operations has been vacant again and has not been filled due to the UNDP Resident Coordinator delinking and its related corporate human resources changes. As such, one senior manager has been filling the three top management positions in the country office for a long period. Despite short-term deployments to cover some of these gaps, recruitment of international staff was difficult due to the national context, language requirements, classification of the positions and the country office financial situation. Furthermore, at the time of this evaluation, the entire country office senior management team (two national and three

international staff) was changing at the same time, creating significant risks during the transition period and in terms of the UNDP internal control framework and oversight of both operations and programmes.

The country office has tried to maximise existing staff capacity to deliver the programme, encouraging staff to perform duties beyond their stated responsibilities. However, the operations team is significantly understaffed and has not grown at the same pace as the programme unit, creating bottlenecks and inefficiencies, and adding to the already challenging context of limited local markets, goods and services. Respondents highlighted concerns regarding administrative inefficiency and programmatic delays. The move from NIM projects to those working through the modality of “full support to NIM” to address low capacity of counterparts, created an additional burden on the operations team (see finding 16).

In 2016, the country office created ‘clusters’, consolidating its programme under two distinct pillars: ‘governance and justice’; and ‘inclusive sustainable development’. As shown in figure 2, the three CPD pillars are interlinked, with the achievement of outcomes 37 and 39 creating the enabling environment for outcome 38. Progress on the latter could generate resources for further advances on outcomes 37 and 39, thus creating a virtuous circle.

However, due in part to the overburden of work, there has not been a significant increase in integration, collaboration and synergy, and teams and projects continue to work in silos. Activities are designed, implemented and managed by separate teams, with different partners. No projects have been developed across issues, such as environment and justice, or across teams, such as local governance and strategic policy. In terms of economic growth, projects were implemented by different teams in isolation, with no programme coherence or strategy.

The country office has not adapted its way of working from a stand-alone project basis to a fully-fledged

¹⁰⁴ Country office Audit report, 2015: “There were weaknesses in the oversight of procurement practices, weaknesses in the management of salary advances, untimely reconciliation of bank accounts, and unclear selection of vendors. The Office further explained that it had upgraded the Deputy Resident Representative -Operations position from P3 to P4 using extra budgetary funds but was still unable to fill the position despite numerous requests to the Regional Bureau for Africa for assistance”.

programme-basis, creating a perception of several 'mini-UNDPs' working in parallel. The Strategic Policy Unit was not integrated into the programme clusters, and did not lead any work on poverty reduction or economic transformation, reducing potential synergies. The current structure has led to projects under the economic growth outcome being implemented by different teams in isolation, without programme coherence or strategy. The Global Fund team operates as a silo within UNDP, with a completely separate and parallel structure. More effective ways of working to facilitate better internal communication, knowledge sharing and coordination have yet to be considered.

Finding 16. The UNDP country office has not established an effective results-based management (RBM) system across the programme portfolio. This has led to programme activities not being underpinned by theories of change and clear results frameworks, limiting timely adaptation of the programme to respond to systematically identified risks and the achievement of results.

Overall, the country office shows inadequate practice of results-based management. The link between projects, outputs and outcomes is not clear, and some projects do not seem to contribute to any output (for example, the energy project linked to outcome 39) or outcome (for example, the peacebuilding project currently linked to outcome 38 on economic growth). Global health projects were not considered in the CPD design and were subsequently linked to an output at the end of 2018.¹⁰⁵

No evidence was found of strategic planning, with programme logic where projects build clear results chains to show how they contribute to the achievement of an identified output and how they relate to work by other partners. There was no clear

identification of causal links and interim results that would help to measure progress towards the ultimate outcome. Indicators did not allow adequate measurement of UNDP progress or contributions to the outcomes as they were impact indicators, for which changes cannot be attributed to UNDP. For example, the use of indicators such as voter turnout, the rate of growth of gross domestic product or the poverty rate cannot show any contribution or achievement of UNDP. Project cycle procedures were not systematically followed, and some projects missed key steps such as quality assessment, risk logs, baseline data and sex-disaggregated data.

The country office conducted three outcome evaluations in 2018, and evaluations of four of the 17 projects that finished in this programme cycle.¹⁰⁶ With some exceptions,¹⁰⁷ it was not clear how learning from the evaluations has been applied to programmes. Some recommendations were repeated over multiple projects and years with no clear action by the country office. For example, several evaluations identified the need to strengthen monitoring practices to make necessary adjustments in a timely manner or highlighted the need for the country office to improve its understanding of RBM, results hierarchies and theories of change.¹⁰⁸

Though risks were identified, many were consistently repeated over projects and years, without proper assessment of the effectiveness of the mitigation strategies. For example, risk logs and the CPD reported risks related to the country's volatile political context, frequent changes in Government priorities, high turnover of staff in ministries, the breakdown of constitutional order and the blockade of the national Parliament. They also reported organisational risks including lack of communication and motivation of project stakeholders, operational risks such as the weak capacity of project implementation partners to

¹⁰⁵ This was due to uncertainty around whether UNDP would continue as principal recipient of Global Fund projects at the time. RBA is accompanying the country office in reflecting changes to the results framework which will allow the addition of health projects in the CPD without requiring approval from the Executive Board.

¹⁰⁶ The quality assessment rating available in the UNDP Evaluation Resource Center indicates that two outcome evaluations were moderately satisfactory and one moderately unsatisfactory. Among the project evaluations, two were satisfactory and other two were either unsatisfactory or moderately unsatisfactory. Other decentralised evaluations rated in 2012-2013 were overall satisfactory.

¹⁰⁷ The Local Economic Development project was in line with the Public Administration Reform Project evaluation that recommended the discontinuation of investments in reforms at upstream level in favour of local level.

¹⁰⁸ Several evaluations recommended that the country office organise exchanges or training sessions on the importance of the theory of change, to ensure its ownership by all programme staff beyond a theoretical tool. However, the country office has still not articulated clear theories of change with proper systems thinking at the CPD or programme area levels.

apply RBM, M&E and financial management processes, and financial risks such as the funding decline.

Despite the magnitude of the risks identified, new projects did not incorporate major changes in approach or strategy and there was no continuous learning for strengthened risk management capacity. For example, though organisational and political risks significantly challenged South-South cooperation due to limited interest and will to embark on cooperation programmes under political uncertainty,¹⁰⁹ the country office continued work on the Pro-Palop multi-country project with no major changes in approach, limiting its results to study tours with no follow-up action.

Some UNDP interventions led to State institutions becoming dependent on UNDP funding for basic operational costs not covered by the Government's own limited resources (see finding 1). UNDP ensured that each project included a budget line to cover administration costs as a contribution to institutional functioning to enable the execution of development activities.¹¹⁰ Whilst this can be contemplated for a limited time, it has been going on for a long time and not coupled with strong support for the Government to achieve tangible results.

To mitigate the risks identified, the country office planned to strengthen its support to, and partnership with, institutions that demonstrated more resilience to political instability. In recent years no major change has been observed regarding this, and there has been no stakeholder mapping to identify potential partnerships. For example, work with the Parliament was redirected to its Special Commissions but results were not achieved given the limited government budget. Another strategy explored was the placement of senior technical experts in the government structure. This led to mixed results: in the case of the justice Chief Technical Advisor (CTA), it facilitated the negotiation of a phase out plan for the CAJ; but in the case of the planning CTA, it did not lead to increased effectiveness as expected.

Despite the operational and organisational risks identified, the country office designed its CPD with national execution (NIM) as the default modality, to be replaced by direct execution (DIM) in the event of force majeure. A change from NIM to 'full support to NIM' and some DIM to improve efficiency only took place after the Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers macro and micro assessments in mid-2016, which rated most of the implementing partners high or significant risk, with no possibility of direct cash advance for more accelerated delivery and reduction in UNDP transaction costs. A shift to DIM or at least 'full support to NIM' could have been envisaged earlier, given the systematic identification of these risks.

Finding 17. UNDP has shown low capacity and commitment to mainstream gender, youth and human rights issues in the programme and has not focused on transformative approaches to address the root causes of inequality. UNDP has made some steps with regard to including gender considerations in some projects, but results have been limited and remain only gender-targeted.

Gender equality and youth development are integral aspects of the 2030 sustainable development agenda with the aim of "leaving no one behind". Through its corporate gender equality and youth strategies,¹¹¹ UNDP has committed to integrate gender concerns into all of its programmes and practice areas and engage young people as a positive force for transformational change. UNDP adopts a human-rights based approach founded on supporting youth empowerment across all dimensions of sustainable development. In Guinea-Bissau, UNDP made limited progress in translating these corporate commitments to its work for gender and, according to the GRES methodology, is gender targeted (see figure 3). If we derive the GRES methodology to youth, we could classify the country office results as 'youth blind', meaning that the projects failed to recognise or acknowledge the different needs of young people.

¹⁰⁹ IEO Pre-mission questionnaire.

¹¹⁰ IEO Pre-mission questionnaire.

¹¹¹ This evaluation spans across two corporate gender equality strategies: one for the period 2014-2017 and another one for 2018-2021, and one Youth Strategy (2014-2017).

Country office efforts under outcome 37 were geared at strengthening women's rights and representation in public institutions. Activities included support for the gender parity law, aimed at women's participation in decision-making, which was approved by the National Assembly in August 2018, and capacity development for the Network of Women Parliamentarians on gender budgeting and integrating a gender perspective in the National Assembly's oversight role. UNDP also worked closely with UN Women on the legal basis for eliminating discrimination and accelerating women's rights in law, and to disseminate the law on domestic violence to combat sexual and gender-based violence.¹¹² The country continues to face significant challenges in relation to gender-based violence, as noted in the work of the CAJ (see finding 4).

No activities were developed to engage traditional and religious leaders on human rights and gender equality issues, despite being included in the CPD. Neither was collaboration with the private sector explored, to advance gender equality through decent work and workplace practices.

Under outcomes 38 and 39, the country office focused on ensuring women's equal participation in projects, particularly in local committees established in the local governance project in the Cacheu region and female producers in the climate change project in the Gabu region. Previous evaluations noted that reports only refer to the numbers of women participating in trainings or study trips.¹¹³ Activities have not been developed to promote economic opportunities for youth and women or improve their access to inclusive finance products and markets, as planned in the CPD. Projects have not addressed the different needs of women or youth and there has been no work to include a focus on masculinities. Despite the lack of sex-disaggregated data at country level, UNDP has not explored collaboration with academia and think-tanks to support evidence-based research on gender equality.

The country office has not effectively integrated youth as a positive force for transformational change. Although the CPD planned to mainstream youth issues across UNDP programmes, this has not been translated into effective strategies and results. Youth were targeted in one project on peacebuilding, and the specific CPD output on youth economic empowerment was not operationalised. Young people represent the majority of the country's population and face significant challenges in terms of unemployment, inequality and exclusion, sometimes leading to migration. Adequate mainstreaming of youth issues has not been explored in the work on economic empowerment, citizen participation, resilience and livelihoods. Access to finance and markets could also have helped to reduce migration risks associated with youth unemployment.

UNDP financial commitments to gender equality were very low during the last years. At the time of the evaluation, the country office had not implemented any gender-specific (GEN3) projects to address structural changes in social determinants.¹¹⁴ Overall, 73 per cent of programme expenditure was geared towards CPD outputs with limited or no expected contribution to gender equality (see figure 9). 72 per cent of programme expenditure (\$33.8 million) was directed towards outputs expected to contribute to gender equality in a limited way (GEN1 outputs), 1 per cent (\$0.8 million) were not expected to contribute to gender equality in any way (GEN0 outputs) and 27 per cent (\$12.6 million) towards outputs expected to have gender equality as a significant objective (GEN2 outputs). These standards track resources designated to gender at planning stage, but do not monitor and report on actual expenditure on gender. Financial expenditures, as shown in figures 7-8, should therefore be understood as gender-responsive commitments and plans.

¹¹² UNDP ROAR 2016.

¹¹³ UNDP Final Evaluation of the Project on Administrative Reform and Decentralisation (n.00049200), 2017.

¹¹⁴ Design of a gender-specific project around women's financial inclusion and gender justice called "Placing Women at the Center of Justice and Financial Inclusion and Women Empowerment" had started at the time of the evaluation.

FIGURE 9. UNDP programme expenditure by gender marker





FIGURE 10. UNDP gender marker by outcomes and number of outputs (2016-2018)




Inadequate gender architecture in the country office limited its progress on gender mainstreaming. The gender analyst position was put on hold for three years due to resource constraints and the staff member temporarily covering gender issues was also responsible for M&E, communications and resource mobilisation. There were no trainings on gender issues for country office staff, other than the corporate online gender awareness training. A cross-unit gender focal team was put in place after recruitment of a gender specialist in early 2019, and the country office embarked on some actions to meet the

concerns of the Gender Equality Seal.¹¹⁵ These included an online self-assessment, the development of a gender strategy and a review of gender mainstreaming in all projects.

In terms of gender parity, the office employs more men than women in all professional categories, particularly at senior management level (see figure 11), and only 38 per cent of staff were women as of May 2019. However, as noted in finding 13, the country office faced challenges to recruit staff.

FIGURE 11: UNDP country office gender distribution



¹¹⁵ Launched in 2011, the Gender Equality Seal serves as a certification programme and learning platform to support country offices to address gaps, document and share innovation and knowledge and advance organisational change for gender equality.



CHAPTER 3

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

DEVELOPMENT effectiveness COORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP
sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness COORDINATION AND DEVELOPMENT responsiveness
COORDINATION HUMAN effectiveness COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability
ATION relevance sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness
ss COORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP relevance MANAGING FOR RESULTS
RESULTS effectiveness COORDINATION efficiency COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability
AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness
sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness COORDINATION AND DEVELOPMENT responsiveness
INATION HUMAN effectiveness COORDINATION efficiency COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability
ATION relevance sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness
ss COORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP relevance MANAGING FOR RESULTS
INATION AND DEVELOPMENT responsiveness NATIONAL OWNERSHIP sustainability PARTNERSHIP

These conclusions and recommendations are based on the findings presented in chapter two and highlight the most critical strategic issues.

3.1. Conclusions

- **Conclusion 1. Programme design and risk analysis.**¹¹⁶ **The protracted crisis context in Guinea-Bissau has challenged UNDP programme design and delivery of results. UNDP has not been able to effectively reposition and adapt its programme to remain relevant to the country's challenges.**

UNDP did not sufficiently consider risk assessments or conflict analysis in the design and adaptation of initiatives and allocation of resources. Although for many years initiatives for capacity building and upstream work with government institutions have failed to produce sustainable results, UNDP did not adapt or discontinue these types of initiatives. Despite political stalemate since 2015, the UNDP strategy focused on developing draft legislation with no parliament in session, constructing buildings without securing government resources for maintenance, and providing study tours and one off trainings for civil servants who didn't have the resources to put the learning into practice.

Without due consideration for the context, lessons and evaluation recommendations, UNDP has not been able to effectively reposition and adapt its programme to remain relevant to the country's challenges. Evaluations of the previous CPD identified the need for more effective mitigation strategies for capacity development efforts, given the political risks limited the ability of UNDP to achieve results in this area. Political and operational risks were systematically monitored, but mitigation strategies were not effective and there were no changes at strategic level. RBA oversight of the country office programme proved not to be appropriate for a more effective response and adaptation of the programme to the needs of the population.

- **Conclusion 2. Silos and poverty reduction.**¹¹⁷ **UNDP did not pay adequate attention to poverty reduction and economic growth through an integrated sustainable development approach, despite the severe needs of the country and the presence of a Strategic Policy Unit in the office.**

The country office units operate in silos with very limited synergies across projects and teams and poor attention to results-based management, which further limits programme integration. The Strategic Policy Unit was not integrated into programmes and provided limited support to the development of projects on poverty reduction and economic growth. The poverty reduction area lacked a coherent strategy and there were no significant investments in integrated sustainable development, despite its importance to the country, partially due to limited donor presence and interest.

Investments in local governance and environmental protection were not sufficiently focused on economic development and livelihoods, particularly to promote women's and youth empowerment, and links between teams were not explored. The country office restructure focused on ensuring financial sustainability and brought in a cluster approach, but this has not led to more integrated ways of working. The programme has continued to be characterised by fragmented and uncoordinated activities.

- **Conclusion 3. Sustainability.**¹¹⁸ **UNDP has contributed key building blocks for improved access to justice, biodiversity protection, elections and health, with promising prospects.**

The country office is well positioned in these sectors with ample access to government institutions and other partners in the country. However, the sustainability of such initiatives is limited. For over nine years, UNDP supported the running of centres for access to justice for the most vulnerable across the country. Given the protracted political crisis, hand-over plans were

¹¹⁶ Linked to findings 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 12, 13 and 14.

¹¹⁷ Linked to findings 8, 11, 13 and 17.

¹¹⁸ Linked to findings 4, 6, 7, 14 and 16.

unsuccessful. The country office decided to move forward with an exit strategy without ensuring that the necessary conditions were in place, putting at risk many years of investment.

In the environment sector, UNDP supported the expansion of the country's protected area system and established an institutional framework for the management of these areas. However, the lack of sustainable financing for the expanded national protected area system and insufficient efforts to develop alternative sustainable livelihoods for affected communities puts in doubt the effectiveness of results.

UNDP support to Guinea-Bissau electoral processes focused on the short-term mobilisation of resources and organisational support for election implementation. Longer-term engagement to reduce the cost of elections and improve data reliability could have increased sustainability and decreased government dependence on development partners.

- **Conclusion 4. Human and financial resources.¹¹⁹**
The corporate push for financial sustainability, alongside the challenges to attract and retain staff and limited resource mobilisation options in the country, challenged the capacity of the country office to deliver on its programme.

In a context where institutional strengthening efforts were not working, this pushed the country office towards non-sustainable short-term investments to keep financial delivery high and cover government budget gaps, without adequate attention to ensuring results. This projected an image of UNDP as a donor rather than a substantive development partner.

The 2015 country office restructuring focused on improving financial sustainability and created a significant overburden of work, leading to delays and inefficiencies. The country office suffered significant staff vacancies at different levels for long periods. Senior management structures and profiles were not adequate to respond to the country's needs (mainly governance and poverty)

and particularities such as the presence of a political mission and the significant operational and political risks. This has created risks to the internal control frameworks and accountability.

- **Conclusion 5. Human rights, gender and youth.¹²⁰**
The country office lacked a systemic approach to human rights, youth and gender mainstreaming. It paid insufficient attention to mainstreaming gender and made limited contributions to women's empowerment in legislation, and none in behaviour change.

The pressing needs and issues for youth were not addressed, and the only attention to youth issues was found in a peacebuilding intervention. Overall engagement in human rights was narrow and UNDP did not engage strategically in raising awareness on human rights and gender issues or alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Initial commitments to promote economic development for women and youth were not converted into specific projects (see conclusion 2).

¹¹⁹ Linked to findings 1 and 15.

¹²⁰ Linked to findings 4 and 17.

3.2. Recommendations and management response

</

1.3 Ensure a balanced dosage of capacity building of Government and upstream work initiatives in the new programme to be formulated, as prospects of a new phase of political stability are being envisaged.	December 2020	DRR/P
1.4 Implement participatory and innovative methods during programme and projects design.	December 2020	DRR/P
1.5 Create a typology offering options for scaling up in response to covariate shocks according to each intervention area.	December 2020	DRR/P
1.6 Advocate in the UNCT for the deployment of a Peace and Development Advisor.	November 2019	RR

Recommendation 2.



Programme design – UNDP should review its approach to programming through the lens of a complex systems approach and co-evolutionary processes. This requires an adaptive management approach to build long-term capabilities, moving the focus from form to function and from imitation to effective innovation, through an iterative process of localised solutions before scale-up.

UNDP initiatives should refrain from building infrastructure without adequate consideration for its function or importing models from other countries which encourage imitation such as ambitious Government reform projects or study tours which are not adapted to the pace of progress or state capabilities in fragile settings. The country office should consider exploring pockets of effectiveness and localised solutions through an iterative process, such as in livelihood development and local economic development, before scaling up to promote incremental change.

Management Response:

Agreed



The country office agrees with this recommendation. The country office will take into account the recommendation of revising its programmatic approach by using iterative processes and focusing on localised solutions that would lead to sustainable development gains. A combined approach of long-term capacity and localised and innovative solutions to respond to the needs of the population and to adapt to the changing conditions in a fragile country context.

Key Action(s)	Completion date	Responsible Unit(s)
2.1 The country office will utilise the programme and project steering committee programme review and project management and project quality assurance processes to adapt to the changing development conditions in Guinea-Bissau. Moreover, the country office needs to create a culture of designing and implementing processes that allow for out-of-the-box solutions that focus on accelerating innovations on the ground.	March 2020	DRR/P
2.2 The country office will consider mapping innovative local solutions and supporting local actors to develop and scale them up. Cross-cluster design and implementation is needed in order to focus on tangible results in programming. A more focused geographical approach is needed to showcase advances in poverty reduction/ wealth creation efforts through innovative approaches.	June 2020	DRR/P
2.3 The country office will encourage, advise and mobilise resources for the Government to deliver services to citizens through the better use of existing infrastructure. Infrastructure projects should only be considered in order to jumpstart a process targeting specific deficiencies and showcasing a model that can be emulated by the Government.	Throughout the programme cycle	DRR/P

Recommendation 3.



Poverty reduction – UNDP should prioritise efforts for poverty reduction and employment creation through an integrated sustainable development approach to ensure that the next programme responds adequately to the most critical needs of the population in alignment with the UNDP mandate to “eradicate poverty and build resilience to crisis and shocks”.

At least until there is greater political stability in the country, UNDP should invest more strategically in localised solutions for inclusive growth, employment and sustainable livelihoods to generate scalable and transformative solutions through an iterative process of learning, with adequate consideration for women and youth. The country office should better integrate the Strategic Policy Unit into programmes to help reposition and lead the work on poverty reduction and economic growth, including a shift in approach from separate environment and poverty work towards integrated sustainable development. The country office should ensure more consistent collaborative engagement to address the immediate needs of the population, taking advantage of its access to partners in the country, particularly in its work on local planning, biodiversity protection, livelihoods and resilience.

Management Response:

Agreed



UNDP fully agrees to adopt the recommendations produced by the Independent Evaluation Office on this point. The country office will promote greater integration of the economic and strategic unit with other programme units in the country office, in matters concerning planning, design and implementation. This is already happening with new programmes that involve youth employment, innovation and acceleration, among other areas. The country office will take advantage of funding opportunities to promote poverty reduction, employment creation and sustainable livelihoods, mainly in rural areas and among youth and women, while concentrating on geographical areas where efforts can be shared among agencies and programmes.

Key Action(s)	Completion date	Responsible Unit(s)
3.1 Promote greater integration of the economic and strategic unit with other programme units, mainly the sustainable development and governance clusters, leading to improved design and implementation of initiatives and rename the unit to manifest its focus on both economic development and inclusive wealth creation.	Immediate	RR
3.2 Promote greater emphasis on inclusive wealth creation/ poverty reduction / youth employment / sustainable livelihoods, mainly among youth and women, including pilots to test new program approaches.	Immediate	DRR/P, Senior Economist

3.3 Take advantage of new GEF funded programmes to promote sustainable livelihoods while environment conservation measures are implemented.	Immediate	Head Sustainable Development Cluster
3.4 Take advantage of new initiatives in rural areas to promote local development and creation of sustainable initiatives for the benefit of the vulnerable population; focusing on pilot regions that allow for better results.	Immediate	Heads of Clusters
3.5 During the new Common Country Assessment/ UNDAF/CPD process, ensure a focus on job creation and inclusive growth in the comparative advantages exercise.	Immediate	DRR/P, Senior Economist

Recommendation 4.



Programme approach and knowledge management – Country office senior management should promote a coherent and integrated programme approach and ensure that evaluation recommendations are implemented, lessons are incorporated into the programme and projects, and concrete steps are taken to ensure sustainability before completing projects and terminating assistance.

Steps taken by the country office to move away from isolated projects have been insufficient. Country office senior management should promote more integrated efforts, explore new ways of working and ensure projects clearly contribute to planned outputs and outcomes, with a clear results chain and better focus on sustainability strategies. The country office should take serious action on previous evaluation recommendations to improve its programming and strengthen understanding of results-based management, risk assessments and theories of change with clear stakeholder mapping. UNDP should systematically reaffirm and strongly encourage the Government to move from commitments to clear concrete steps to promote continued and viable efforts. This could include advocating for a functioning professional public civil service to limit the effects of instability and turnover. Attention should always be paid to first sustainability planning and ownership, based on a committed exit strategy for when concrete results are delivered.

Management Response:**Agreed**

UNDP agrees to adopt the recommendations produced by the Independent Evaluation Office on this point. The country office has already started to move away from isolated projects to more inclusive programming and implementation. This is already happening in the implementation of new programmes such as the GEF funded Coastal Area Management and Early Warning Systems programmes. Previous programme and project evaluation recommendations will be carefully analysed, and serious actions will be taken to integrate them. Despite an almost persistent environment of political crisis, the country office will keep encouraging the Government to deliver on commitments and ensure exit strategies and scalability of actions are materialised.

Key Action(s)	Completion date	Responsible Unit(s)
4.1 Take additional steps for greater proximity and collaboration among programme units in programme /project design and implementation; common formulation of theories of change and improved methodologies applied.	Immediate	DRR/P, Heads of Clusters
4.2 Ensure management responses from project evaluations are well formulated and implemented.	Immediate	
4.3 Build staff capacity in results-based management, risk assessment and theories of change with clear stakeholder mapping with clear emphasis on mitigation of risk considering lack of ownership.	December 2020	DRR/P
4.4 Ensure programmes / projects have strong national ownership, clear exit strategies and scalability capacity.	Immediate	DRR/P
4.5 Plan training in RBM, programme/ project management and HACT for partner ministries, local authorities and all responsible parties (NGOs, associations and civil society).	December 2020	DRR/P

Recommendation 5.



Oversight, human and financial resources – RBA should help UNDP Guinea-Bissau to review its human resources and financial structures, to increase its capacity to adequately respond to the needs and challenges of the country. RBA should progressively shift its demand-driven, financial delivery-focused approach to one of continuous and systematic programmatic oversight to identify and respond to strategic guidance and support needs.

The country office should promptly increase and, in alignment with programme growth, adapt the capacity of the operations team to be more efficient, learning from the Global Fund experience. The RBA drive for high country office delivery should be balanced with country office ability to flexibly adapt its structure to respond to administrative and programmatic delays and needs, given that its funding sources cannot be much diversified due to limited donor interest in the country. Considering limited donor engagement, RBA should support the country office to develop a strong resource mobilisation strategy, complemented by appropriate RBA oversight to support the country office to acquire and retain a more permanent senior management team with adequate skills (including languages) to ensure appropriate accountability, repositioning and risk management.

Management Response:

Agreed



UNDP fully agrees to adopt the recommendations produced by the Independent Evaluation Office on this point. The country office will review its structure and staffing, both programmatic and operational, to improve its capacity to deliver as a function of its financial resources. Some of these measures are already in place, as staff from programme management units (both programme and operations) are now being integrated. The country office has started, and will finalise, its resource mobilisation strategy to improve donor diversity and develop new sustainable partnerships, including with the private sector.

The country office new senior management configuration is pushing for a new approach on both human and financial resource management. RBA will provide support to the country office to develop the resource mobilization strategy in collaboration with BERA and to review the capacity of the office to better deliver on the new country programme. RBA has supported the country office to acquire a more permanent and experienced senior management team which are now all onboard – the Resident Representative and two Deputy Resident Representatives for Operations and Programmes to assure accountability, repositioning and risk management. RBA will use the opportunity of the UN transition to provide strategic guidance and support to better position and resource the office in collaboration with BMS, BPPS and Crisis Bureau.

Key Action(s)	Completion date	Responsible Unit(s)
5.1 Adjust the structure of the country office and its programmatic and operational staffing for the new challenges to be laid out in the CPD;	Immediate	RR
5.2 Obtain support from RBA for oversight and monitoring of activities at both the programmatic and operational levels and to build local capacity;	Immediate	RR
5.3 Strengthen the capacities of the country office to promote innovative approaches for the design of new projects (labs, design thinking).	Immediate	DRR/P
5.4 Implement the new resource mobilisation and partnership strategy which has already been initiated.	Immediate	DRR/P
5.5 Systematically strengthen the capacities of staff at all levels for improved delivery capacity and performance.		DRR/O, DRR/P

Recommendation 6.



Human rights, women and youth – UNDP Guinea-Bissau should seek to systematically mainstream gender, youth and human rights into its programming. This requires designing and investing in pilots to create opportunities for women and youth to more actively and effectively participate in economic life, and identifying approaches to effectively promote behaviour change, including on masculinities and cultural norms.

UNDP work on access to justice and health should, if continued, focus on increasing awareness of gender and human rights issues, aimed at behaviour change. As initially planned, specific projects should be developed with the economic empowerment of women and youth at their core, strengthening their capacities to take advantage of market opportunities with due attention to social and cultural conventions. In addition, UNDP should build the capacity of the office to mainstream youth, gender and human rights approaches in all programmatic initiatives and not rely on one gender focal point, thus ensuring that the entire office is invested in, and capable of, promoting transformational change.

Management Response:**Agreed**

UNDP fully agrees to adopt the recommendations produced by the Independent Evaluation Office on this point. The UNDP office has made efforts to improve its approach to mainstreaming gender, youth and human rights in its programme. However, it is aware of the need to improve performance in these areas. It has elaborated the gender strategy and action plan, documents that aim to promote a change of sociocultural values, norms and power structures in order to eliminate the sources of inequalities and ensure the observance of human rights. As part of the project placing women at the centre of justice sector reforms, a gender strategy in the justice sector is under development to improve the quality of service provided to women by the Centres for Access to Justice. A gender analysis of the local economic development project was undertaken, which aims to provide for the integration of the gender component in the development plans of the Cacheu and Gabu regions. UNDP, in collaboration with the national environment institutions, is looking at strengthening the gender component in synergy with other projects being implemented by these institutions. The project "Financial Inclusion and Women's Economic Empowerment" is currently being finalised. Its main objective is to finance women and youth projects around small businesses to create employment and sustainable incomes and reduce poverty. Therefore, in the field of inclusive and sustainable development, a proposal was developed to link the local economic development and financial inclusion project with women's economic empowerment, with a view to ensuring efficiency and promoting synergies within the UNDP programme framework.

The Global Fund projects have conducted several studies aimed at obtaining new information for the design and effective intervention to reduce disease among women.

Key Action(s)	Completion date	Responsible Unit(s)
6.1 Review and learn from positive experiences within on-going projects such as: (i) the LED project, that has integrated gender and youth as part of its activities in the establishment of the Institutions of Participation and Community Consultation; and (ii) the Global Fund Programme Management Unit that has promoted gender parity at the community level.		Heads of Cluster, Gender Expert
6.2 Ensure that the country office Gender Strategy and Action Plan are in place and aligned with the next CPD cycle.		Gender Expert
6.3 Continue upstream policy support and advice, and downstream gender empowerment interventions.		Gender Expert

Annexes



Annexes to the report (listed below) are available on the website of the Independent Evaluation Office at <https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/evaluations/detail/12274>.

Annex 1. Terms of reference

Annex 2. Country at a glance

Annex 3. Country office at a glance


Annex 4. Project list

Annex 5. People consulted

Annex 6. Documents consulted

Annex 7. Summary of CPD outcome indicators and status as reported by the country office

Annex 8. Project mapping



Independent Evaluation Office
United Nations Development Programme
One UN Plaza, DC1-20th Floor,
New York, NY 10017, USA
Tel. +1(646) 781 4200, Fax. +1(646) 781 4213

Web: www.undp.org/evaluation



/ UNDP_Evaluation



/ ieundp



/ evaluationoffice