



# INDEPENDENT COUNTRY PROGRAMME EVALUATION SOMALIA



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## INDEPENDENT COUNTRY PROGRAMME EVALUATION: SOMALIA

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# Foreword

It is my pleasure to present the Independent Country Programme Evaluation of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Somalia, previously called Assessment of Development Results. The evaluation, which covered the period 2015-2019, was conducted by the Independent Evaluation Office of UNDP in close collaboration with the UNDP Somalia country office.

The first cooperation agreement between the Government of Somalia and UNDP was signed in 1977. In the last decade, the UNDP partnership with the Federal Government of Somalia has been formalized through three country programme documents. In 2012, the country saw the end of a series of transitional governments (2000-2012) with the adoption of a provisional constitution and the election of a new Parliament. After years of remote management from Nairobi and presence on the ground in Puntland and Somaliland only, UNDP started to move to Mogadishu in 2012, focusing on supporting the Federal Government of Somalia and the establishment of emerging member states.

The evaluation reviewed a period of critical changes in the country and found that UNDP operated in a highly complex, fragmented and volatile environment, supporting and helping to put in place key governance processes, in partnership with the Government and other development actors, including:

- The development of the first National Development Plan in 30 years, covering the period 2017-2019;
- The election in 2017;
- The development of the first attempt to coordinate aid flowing to the country through the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility;
- Development of the Recovery and Resilience Framework.


The evaluation also found that UNDP is centrally positioned to act as a platform, convenor and trusted

partner for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, other United Nations agencies and donors working across Somalia. Indeed, what it can achieve in the future will be dependent not only on its ability to develop a programme in line with the country's needs, but also on its ability to focus on areas where UNDP can add the most value while facilitating the work of others.

While recognizing that capacity injection has been helpful to support key processes and that it will continue to play a role in Somalia in the medium term, the evaluation highlights that there is no long-term capacity development strategy and the sustainability of interventions is at risk. The evaluation notes that there has been progress since 2015, but current implementation modalities are still not supporting a shift towards long-term creation of capacity within institutions. Building on incipient reform processes, the evaluation presents suggestions to address this complex challenge in the next programmatic cycle.

The evaluation also prepared a summary of lessons learned on the experience of joint programming in Somalia, for further discussion with partners, both in Somalia and in other countries engaging with this modality, and with relevant headquarters departments and partner agencies.

I trust that this report will be of use to the readers seeking to better understand the wide array of support provided by UNDP, including what has worked and what hasn't, as well as the factors that have influenced the performance and development contributions of UNDP in Somalia. I hope that the results and recommendations of this report provide a valuable input for the formulation of the next UNDP engagement strategy with the Federal Government of Somalia, the Federal Member States and Somaliland.



**Indran A. Naidoo**  
**Director, Independent Evaluation Office**





# Table of Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations	vii
Evaluation Brief: ICPE Somalia	1
<b>CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>3</b>
1.1 Purpose, objectives and scope of the evaluation	4
1.2 Evaluation methodology	4
1.3 Overview of the national development context	6
1.4 The UNDP programme in Somalia	11
<b>CHAPTER 2. FINDINGS</b>	<b>15</b>
2.1 Environment and resilience to climate change portfolio	16
2.2 Economic recovery and development	23
2.3 Effective institutions and inclusive politics	30
2.4 Rule of law	42
2.5 Cross-cutting issues	50
<b>CHAPTER 3. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE</b>	<b>61</b>
3.1 Conclusions	62
3.2 Recommendations and management response	64
<b>ANNEXES</b>	<b>83</b>
<b>TABLES, FIGURES AND BOXES</b>	
Table 1. Summary of environmental policies and strategies	19
Table 2. Rule of law indicators for Somalia, 2000-2017	45
Figure 1. Evolution of programme budget and expenditure	12
Figure 2. Programme expenditure by portfolio	12
Figure 3. Financial overview, environment portfolio	17
Figure 4. Financial overview, early recovery portfolio	24
Figure 5. Financial overview, effective institutions and inclusive politics portfolio	31
Figure 6. Financial overview, rule of law portfolio	43
Box 1. Main evaluation questions	4
Box 2. Key factors contributing to and/or hindering results, environment and resilience to climate change portfolio	22
Box 3. Key factors contributing to and/or hindering results, economic recovery and development portfolio	30
Box 4. Key factors contributing to and/or hindering results, effective institutions and inclusive politics portfolio	42
Box 5. Key factors contributing to and/or hindering results, rule of law portfolio	49



# Acronyms and Abbreviations

<b>ADR</b>	Assessment of Development Results
<b>AMISOM</b>	African Union Mission in Somalia
<b>CAS</b>	Comprehensive Approach to Security
<b>CPD</b>	Country programme document
<b>CRESTA/A</b>	Community Recovery and Extension of State Authority and Accountability
<b>CSP</b>	Community Security Project
<b>DfID</b>	United Kingdom Department for International Development
<b>DINA</b>	Drought Impact Needs Assessment
<b>ECC</b>	Enhancing Climate Resilience of the Vulnerable Communities and Ecosystems in Somalia project
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
<b>FGM</b>	Female genital mutilation
<b>FIMM</b>	Fragility Index and Maturity Model
<b>GDP</b>	Gross domestic product
<b>GEF</b>	Global Environment Facility
<b>ICPE</b>	Independent Country Programme Evaluation
<b>ICRIC</b>	Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission
<b>IDP</b>	Internally displaced person
<b>IEO</b>	Independent Evaluation Office
<b>IESG</b>	Integrated Election Support Group
<b>IFIs</b>	International financial institutions
<b>ILO</b>	International Labour Organization
<b>JPLG</b>	Joint Programme on Local Governance
<b>M&amp;E</b>	Monitoring and evaluation
<b>MIDNIMO II</b>	Durable Solutions for Displacement Project
<b>MOCA</b>	Ministry of Constitutional Affairs
<b>MOIFA</b>	Ministry of Interior and Federal Affairs
<b>MOLSA</b>	Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
<b>MOPIED</b>	Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development
<b>MOWFA</b>	Ministry of Women and Family Affairs
<b>MPTF</b>	Multi-Partner Trust Fund
<b>NDP</b>	National Development Plan
<b>NGOs</b>	Non-governmental organizations
<b>NIEC</b>	National Independent Election Commission
<b>OCHA</b>	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>OCVP</b>	Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention
<b>PCVE</b>	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
<b>PIPs</b>	Project initiation plans
<b>POQA</b>	Programme Oversight and Quality Assurance
<b>PREP</b>	Poverty Reduction and Environment Protection project
<b>PROSCAL</b>	Joint Programme on Sustainable Charcoal Reduction and Alternative Livelihoods
<b>PSG</b>	Peacebuilding and Stabilization Working Group
<b>PSP</b>	Parliamentary Support Project
<b>RBM</b>	Results-based management
<b>REFS</b>	Reconciliation and Federalism Support Project for Somalia
<b>RE-INTEG</b>	European Union-funded project for enhancing Somalia's responsiveness to the management and reintegration of mixed migration flows

<b>ROAR</b>	Results-oriented annual report
<b>RRF</b>	Recovery and Resilience Framework
<b>S2S</b>	Support to Stabilization project
<b>SCR</b>	Support to Constitutional Review project
<b>SDGs</b>	Sustainable Development Goals
<b>SDRF</b>	Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility
<b>SGBV</b>	Sexual and gender-based violence
<b>SIP</b>	Strengthening Institutional Performance project
<b>StEFS</b>	Support to Emerging Federal States project
<b>TPM</b>	Third-party monitoring
<b>UNCT</b>	United Nations Country Team
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNEP</b>	United Nations Environment Programme
<b>UN-Habitat</b>	United Nations Human Settlement Programme
<b>UNHCR</b>	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>UNODC</b>	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
<b>UNOPS</b>	United Nations Office for Project Services
<b>UNSOM</b>	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
<b>UN-Women</b>	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>WPP</b>	Women's Participation Project
<b>Y4C</b>	Youth for Change project
<b>YES</b>	Youth Employment Somalia project

# Evaluation Brief: ICPE Somalia

Somalia is a uniquely difficult context, characterized by a very complex and fragmented architecture of international support; a rapidly changing and contested political settlement, with tensions between the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States; complex regional politics which include rivalry among Middle Eastern powers; an enduring major insurgency and related military offensives; widespread societal, criminal violence; rock-bottom State capacity; and massive poverty and economic hardship, compounded by severe environmental challenges, including drought, illegal depletion of natural resources and vulnerability to climate change. The evaluation recognizes that most of these factors are inter-linked and mutually reinforcing, creating a highly complex environment.

UNDP is a key actor in Somalia, with a programme structured around five portfolios, three of which have been providing the core of the long-standing engagement of UNDP in the country, focusing on governance aspects (effective institutions, inclusive politics, rule of law) and two emerging portfolios (environment and resilience to climate change, economic recovery and development) that address emerging priorities as Somalia gradually moves towards stability.

## Key findings and conclusions

UNDP in Somalia is widely recognized as a strong partner to government counterparts at the level of the Federal Government and of Federal Member States. Some partnerships are long-standing and others are emerging in response to current needs

and the proactive attitude of UNDP staff. Equally, UNDP is centrally positioned to act as a platform, convenor and trusted partner for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), other United Nations agencies and donors working across Somalia, thanks to its long-standing presence and relationships, its extensive footprint on the ground, its commitment to deliver jointly with other agencies, its extensive network of local staff and advisers and the breadth of its technical portfolio. It also showed that it can, with partners, promote the need to address very complex and sensitive issues like human rights.

The evaluation highlights that capacity injection has been helpful in supporting key processes like the development of the first National Development Plan in 30 years, a peaceful election in 2017 and others. UNDP will continue to play a role in Somalia in the medium term through capacity injection. However, the evaluation notes that there is no long-term capacity development strategy and the sustainability of interventions is at risk. Current implementation modalities do not support a shift towards long-term creation of capacity within institutions. Sustainability is also at risk for interventions on the ground, due to lack of long-term capacity and commitment of local government authorities to maintain results, the short span of donor funding and lack of integration of sustainability measures from the design stage. Crucial areas like gender require attention and there is scope for improvement of monitoring, evaluation and adaptive management to ensure that UNDP better designs, implements and reports on its work.

## Recommendations

In framing its next country programme, UNDP should determine its added value in the Somali aid ecosystem, review its communication strategies with partners and donors, and explicitly articulate its contributions to overall development results through theory of change approaches. The country programme development process should ultimately strengthen the strategic focus of the programme, develop synergies across portfolios and ensure sustainability. In particular, UNDP should ensure that sustainability in relation to capacity development, financing and projects is at the centre of project design, monitoring and adaptive management efforts, in cooperation with partners in the country. A rights-based approach is central to UNDP approaches and should be a central part of the mutual accountability framework.

This evaluation finds that UNDP is centrally positioned to play a key role within the Federal Government's Recovery and Resilience Framework, which encourages a move towards long-term resilience. However, it also notes that UNDP expertise will be required in the immediate future in long-standing core areas of governance like elections, local governance and rule of law. In addition to the existing areas of UNDP

work, on which the evaluation team makes specific recommendations below, the evaluation stresses a major gap in the current country programme: work on anti-corruption. The evaluation team recognizes that addressing corruption in a context such as Somalia is incredibly difficult, but the issue is central to peacebuilding and sustainable development. The anti-corruption programme currently in development is welcome but will need to be seen as part of a wider political approach at the level of UNDP and UNSOM leadership, working collectively with all donors and Somali stakeholders.

For the next country programme, it will be crucial to find the right balance to ensure that UNDP retains focus and uses its facilitation abilities to encourage other actors to play an active role in the Somali context rather than trying to expand its two smaller portfolios, on environment and energy and early recovery, at the expense of effective institutions, inclusive politics and rule of law.

The office should strengthen its results-based systems and practices. In particular, solid evidence, systematically collected and used for adaptive management, and communications with donors and partners

are central to the success of the UNDP effort in Somalia. UNDP needs to make sure that it has the best possible systems in place to ensure efficient delivery of its programme. Specifically, UNDP needs to ensure that it is staffed and structured appropriately, with both technical and strategic capacities in place. At the same time, UNDP will need to improve how it communicates with Somali partners and donors to be clear about the role UNDP plays. The reorganization of the gender function should be supported through the establishment of incentives and measures which will embed it in the implementation of the programme to ensure that gender results move towards transformative levels.

In cooperation with the office of the Resident Coordinator and UNSOM, UNDP should clarify its own roles and responsibilities and those of other actors in the management and support of the aid coordination system, in line with roles and responsibilities of each actor under the United Nations reform, with a view to streamlining and simplifying the process, improving operational efficiency and ensuring transparent aid flows to both the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States.





# CHAPTER 1

## BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION

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## 1.1 Purpose, objectives and scope of the evaluation

The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conducted the third Independent Country Programme Evaluation (ICPE) in the Republic of Somalia in 2019.<sup>1</sup> An ICPE is carried out to capture and demonstrate evaluative evidence of the UNDP contributions to development results at the country level, as well as the effectiveness of the UNDP strategy in facilitating and leveraging national efforts for achieving development results. This evaluation had two main objectives:

1. Support the development of the next UNDP country programme, based on evaluative evidence of past performance; and
2. Strengthen the accountability of UNDP to national stakeholders and the Executive Board.

Additionally, as most of the UNDP programme in Somalia is implemented jointly with other agencies, this evaluation identifies lessons learned on joint programming which will be shared with UNDP Regional Bureaux and the Crisis Bureau for further learning and dissemination at corporate level (see annex 8). UNDP Somalia was selected for an ICPE as its country programme is due to end in 2020. This is the third country-level evaluation conducted by UNDP in Somalia, after the Assessments of Development Results (ADRs) carried out in 2010 and 2015.<sup>2</sup> This ICPE covers the period from 2015 to July 2019 in the 2018-2020 programme cycle, which spans two different country programme documents (CPDs) (2011-2015, extended to 2017 and 2018-2020) and two different UNDP Strategic Plans, for 2014-2017 and 2018-2021. It aims to provide key inputs for the development of the new country programme, to be implemented starting in 2021 by the country office.

The primary audiences for the evaluation are the UNDP Somalia country office, Regional Bureau for Arab States, Crisis Bureau and the UNDP Executive Board and the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States.

## 1.2 Evaluation methodology

The evaluation was guided by the United Nations Evaluation Group Norms & Standards<sup>3</sup> and the ethical Code of Conduct.<sup>4</sup> It was carried out within the overall provisions contained in the UNDP Evaluation Policy.<sup>5</sup> In accordance with the terms of reference (see annex 1), the evaluation was guided by three main evaluation questions, shown in box 1.

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### BOX 1. Main evaluation questions

1. What did the UNDP country programme intend to achieve during the period under review?
  2. To what extent has the programme achieved (or is likely to achieve) its intended objectives?
  3. What factors contributed to or hindered the performance of UNDP and eventually, the sustainability of results?
- 

The evaluation relied mostly on qualitative methods and tools. Data and information collected from various sources and means were triangulated to ensure the validity of findings. Primary and secondary data were collected using various methods, including:

1. A portfolio analysis and desk review of all programme documents; project progress reports; information from UNDP corporate, country office monitoring and reporting systems; self-assessment reports such as the UNDP results-oriented annual reports (ROARs); project evaluations; audit reports; financial data; gender

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<sup>1</sup> The UNDP country programme covers all of Somalia as well as Somaliland. The evaluation recognizes that Somaliland has a unique status, as presented in section 1.3. Throughout the report, where the evaluation refers to Somalia this includes all Federal Member States, along with Somaliland, except when the evaluation makes specific reference to specific aspects of the programme in a given context.

<sup>2</sup> See: <https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/evaluations/detail/7072>

<sup>3</sup> See: <http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/1914>

<sup>4</sup> See: <http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/100>

<sup>5</sup> See: UNDP Evaluation Policy: [www.undp.org/eo/documents/Evaluation-Policy.pdf](http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/Evaluation-Policy.pdf)



analytics; and other available background documents on the national context (see annex 6 for a full list of the documents consulted and annex 7 for the corporate indicator information). Evaluative judgments were made only when information derived from internal reports could be verified and triangulated.

2. Consultations with more than 400 key informants using semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions in Mogadishu, Garowe, Qhardo, Baidoa, Hargeisa, Berbera and Burao. Among the key informants were government counterparts, civil society organizations, academia, the private sector, United Nations agencies, bilateral donors, UNDP staff at the country office and Regional Bureau, and beneficiaries in Somaliland (Berbera, Burao, Hargeisa), Puntland (Qhardo, Garowe, Bosasso), Galmudug (Dhusamrebb), Lower Juba (Kismayo), Mogadishu (Garesbley and Hodan districts), South West State (Baidoa and Hudur districts) and Hirshabelle (Jowhaar). The evaluation team also made sure to participate in key events and meetings to observe discussions, for example among the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States, donors, etc., established direct contact with experts to seek external views and reached out to interested parties which have not cooperated with UNDP to compensate for very limited available data. (See annex 5 for a full list of the persons consulted.)
3. Direct observation of project activities by thematic specialists in Puntland (Garowe, Qhardo) and Somaliland regions (Hargeisa, Berbera and Burao). These projects and locations were selected through a review of project documents and in discussions with the portfolio and programme managers, ensuring coverage of interventions in diverse geographical locations and based on accessibility and security constraints.

4. One pre-mission self-assessment questionnaire completed by the country office, addressing key issues covered by the evaluation.
5. A presentation of preliminary findings at the end of the data collection mission in the country to validate initial findings with the country office staff and collect any additional information.
6. A survey on joint programming, distributed to the head of agencies and programme managers working in partnership with UNDP (see annex 8).

The effectiveness of the UNDP country programme was analysed through an assessment of progress made towards the achievement of the expected outputs over the review period and the extent to which these outputs contributed to the intended country programme outcomes. In this process, both positive and negative, direct and indirect unintended results were also considered. To better understand the UNDP performance and potential for sustainability of results, the specific factors that have influenced or hindered results were examined. In assessing the evolution of the country programme, the UNDP capacity to adapt to the changing context and respond to national development needs and priorities was also examined. The utilization of resources to deliver results (including managerial practices) and the extent to which the country office fostered partnerships and synergies with other actors (i.e., through South-South or triangular cooperation) are some of the aspects that were assessed. Given that a country-level evaluation was conducted by IEO in Somalia in 2015, the evaluation also followed up on implementation of the recommendations of the 2015 ADR. Special attention was given to integrate a gender-responsive evaluation approach to data collection methods.

The main limitations faced in the conduct of this evaluation included security<sup>6</sup> and logistical con-

<sup>6</sup> During the evaluation mission to Somalia, the team had to revise its plans several times as a consequence of three major attacks: (1) Kismayo: <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/dozens-dead-attack-somalia-s-kismayo-hotel-n1029506> (2) Mogadishu: <https://thedefensepost.com/2019/07/22/somalia-mogadishu-car-bomb/> and (3) Mogadishu: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/mogadishu-mayor-omar-osman-dies-hospital-suicide-attack-190801134839540.html>

straints and the limited availability of evaluations, with several conducted with limited physical presence in the country, most focusing on humanitarian rather than development aid and many presenting findings which quickly become irrelevant due to the fluid and constantly changing context. Availability of stakeholders and UNDP staff due to the operational situation in the country was also a limiting factor, and limited advance preparation and scheduling of interviews in Mogadishu meant that the team had to invest considerable time during the first phase of the mission to set up interviews and obtain required contact details. A further limitation is the fact that the evaluation team was presented in many situations with evidence, but was requested not to use it, even anonymously. This report makes all efforts to guarantee anonymity and confidentiality while presenting a comprehensive assessment.

The evaluation started in March 2019 with the drafting of the terms of reference. Recruitment of external consultants was finalized in June 2019. The data collection mission to Nairobi (UNDP staff, donors and partner agencies) took place between 13 and 23 May, and to Somalia (Mogadishu, Baidoa, Garowe, Qhardo, Hargeisa, Burao and Berbera) between 8 July and 1 August 2019 and included an internal debriefing with the country office staff to present preliminary findings and areas for recommendation. Additional data collection in Mogadishu, South West State, Hirshabelle, Gulmudug, Lower Juba, Puntland and Somaliland took place over the period 1 to 26 August with the support of national data collection experts. Outcome analysis papers were prepared and synthesized into a draft report in September 2019, which was submitted for IEO peer review and review by a member of the IEO Evaluation Advisory Panel members. The revised draft was shared with the country office and Regional Bureau in October 2019 and the Gov-

ernment in November for their comments. A final stakeholder debriefing was delivered in December 2019 via videoconference.

### 1.3 Overview of the national development context

**Context and economic situation.** The Federal Republic of Somalia is located in the Horn of Africa. Somalia's strategic location as well as its natural resources have made it of interest to international powers and regional actors who compete for influence and control. The United States and European Union countries have long had a strong role, with Kenya and Ethiopia being long-standing actors. In recent years, Turkey, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have become very active in supporting various allies within Somalia in pursuit of strategic advantage.<sup>7</sup> Somalia is classified as a least developed country and fragile State. With a population estimated at 14.7 million in 2017,<sup>8</sup> nearly 7 out of 10 citizens live in poverty,<sup>9</sup> and international grants and remittances are critical to maintaining even low levels of consumption. The highest incidence of poverty is found among the households located in settlements of internally displaced persons (IDPs) (75.6 percent) and the country's capital Mogadishu (73.7 percent).<sup>10</sup> Seventy percent of the Somali population is engaged in agro-pastoralism, pastoralism, subsistence agriculture and charcoal production as livelihood options, all of which are dependent on natural resources and vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (see section on environment and natural resources below).<sup>11</sup> If normal rains resume later this year, gross domestic product (GDP) growth could remain broadly unchanged at around 2.9 percent in 2019. Per capita incomes remain very low and debt at unsustainable levels (at about US\$4.7 billion or 100 percent of GDP in 2018, of which 96 percent is in arrears).<sup>12</sup>

<sup>8</sup> World Development Indicators, World Bank data 2018.

<sup>9</sup> Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment, World Bank, August 2018. Sixty-nine percent of the population live in extreme poverty, defined as living on less than \$1.90 per day, 2011 \$, purchasing power parity adjusted.

<sup>10</sup> World Bank data, Somalia Poverty and Vulnerability report 2018: <http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/3181>

<sup>11</sup> United Nations and World Bank. 2006: Somali Joint Needs Assessment: Productive Sectors and Environment Cluster Report.

<sup>12</sup> International Monetary Fund Country Report No. 19/256, August 2019.

**Political and security situation.** From 1991, the country experienced about two decades of civil war with a devastating impact on its socioeconomic infrastructure and institutions, leaving Somalia without a stable central government. This period was marked by the de facto secession of one of the country's regions<sup>13</sup> and the return to customary and religious law in most regions. Between 2000 and 2012, the country underwent a long transition period during which several transitional governments succeeded one after another in attempting to re-establish countrywide rule.

However, the absence of a central authority in the country for about a decade led to the emergence of regional elites, clans and various politico-religious groups as sources of competing authority. Over the last two decades, important factions and groups have challenged the authority of the transitional authorities and posed security threats, hindering State-building progress and regional security. Since the defeat of the Islamic Courts Union in 2007 by the Transitional Federal Government and its international backers, al-Shabaab, whose broad aim is to establish an Islamic State of Somalia, has controlled large areas of the country, particularly in South-Central Somalia.<sup>14</sup> Since 2007, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)<sup>15</sup> has been deployed to support the security, peace and State-building process. With AMISOM support, the Federal Government has gradually extended governance to areas previously dominated by al-Shabaab. The conflict however remains active; between January 2016 and October 2017, UNSOM documented a total of 2,078 civilian deaths and 2,507 injuries, with more than half the casualties (60 percent) attributed to al-Shabaab militants.<sup>16</sup> The planned drawdown of AMISOM forces in coming years may make the security context for United

Nations activities more challenging unless Somali security forces are able to take up the burden.

Although the fight between the Government and al-Shabaab is a key driver of conflict, in practice it is hard to disentangle the various drivers of violence which include land disputes, clan rivalries and economic disputes. Human security is also impacted by social marginalization, forced evictions, discrimination against vulnerable groups and minorities, gender-based violence and recruitment of youth and children by armed groups and forces.

In 2012 the country ended its transition through the approval of a provisional constitution and the election of parliament. In 2012, a Federal Government was re-established. Puntland state was joined by Jubaland, South West, Galmudug and Hirshabelle to form the Federal Member States. However, the issue of Somaliland's status remains unresolved.<sup>17</sup> In 2013, with the implementation of the New Deal Compact, a partnership framework between the Federal Government and the international community was signed, paving the way for a new State-building process. For the first time in two decades, the ninth Parliament successfully served a full term and indirect elections were held in 2016.<sup>18</sup> Agreement was reached in 2016 on a provisional constitution, the parliament was formed and a Federal Republic of Somalia constituted (comprising the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States). In December 2016, the Federal Government presented, for the first time in over 30 years (since 1986), a nationally owned, nationally led National Development Plan (NDP) covering the fiscal period 2017-2019. In 2018, the Federal Government established the Federalization Negotiation Technical Committee to accelerate state and national constitutional discussions.

<sup>13</sup> Somaliland in 1991, although it is not recognized as an independent state. Puntland has operated autonomously since 1998 but remains part of the Somali federal structure.

<sup>14</sup> It should be noted that while al-Shabaab ceded physical control of Mogadishu in 2011 following an AMISOM and Somali forces offensive, the group retains considerable influence in the form of shadow governance structures and a very active guerilla and terrorist infrastructure. <https://www.cfr.org/background/al-shabab>

<sup>15</sup> <https://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/>

<sup>16</sup> Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, Protection of Civilians: Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in Somalia, December 2017.

<sup>17</sup> <http://www.so.undp.org/content/somalia/en/home/countryinfo.html>

<sup>18</sup> <http://www.so.undp.org/content/somalia/en/home/countryinfo.html>

In June 2018, leaders of the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States met in Baidoa to continue ongoing discussions concerning the draft constitution and provisions for resource-sharing, revenue-sharing and the distribution of powers. Baidoa did represent an important milestone in the shape of an agreement over resource-sharing regarding hydrocarbons, which are critical because of evidence of very substantial mineral and oil and gas deposits in various regions of the country/countries, as well as offshore. Despite this, the country remains politically fragmented and the relations between the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States remain difficult, hampering progress on many fronts. Disputes centre around allocation of resources, sharing of power and clan rivalries and have led to prolonged discussions on several issues, for example the drafting and adopting of a constitution. While some progress is being achieved, the establishment of more “inclusive politics” is constrained by a hierarchical, male-dominated and closed, clan-based social order and a corresponding absence of opportunity for citizens to be informed on, or participate in, the political process, along with the absence of a political culture of open and inclusive dialogue and participation. This goes along with a practice of exclusionary high-level decision-making, lacking in transparency or accountability. For example, the Baidoa agreement is currently stalled and has not been embodied in federal legislation.

**Development and state of emergency.** Notwithstanding progress achieved in the area of State-building, the two decades of conflict and a continued problem with security due to the activity of al-Shabaab have had significant effects on human development.<sup>19</sup> The humanitarian crisis in Somalia is

among the most complex and long-standing emergencies. Continued conflict and subsequent displacement have continuously disrupted livelihoods and access to key sources of food and income.

Development indicators in Somalia remain among the lowest in the world. Life expectancy at birth (56 years in 2016) is below the average in sub-Saharan Africa (60 years in 2016).<sup>20</sup> The under-five mortality rate remains high (131.5 per 1,000 live births)<sup>21</sup> and malnutrition is the underlying cause of over one third of deaths of children under the age of 5 years. Over 47 percent of the population does not have access to safe drinking water and more than half of children are out of school. Inequality is also high, with the top 20 percent of the population consuming six times more than the bottom 20 percent.<sup>22</sup> Employment rates remain very low (only 26 percent of working adults are employed in urban areas and 32.7 percent in rural area),<sup>23</sup> with a significant gender disparity (only 19 percent of females aged 15 - 64 participated in the labour force in 2017 with 87.5 percent of women in vulnerable employment).<sup>24</sup> The country remains disproportionately dependent on remittances which represented five times the amount of foreign direct investment in Somalia in 2016.<sup>25</sup> The economic sector relies on agriculture and livestock, which remain underdeveloped and highly vulnerable to the persistent external shocks.

The IDP population in Somalia has doubled over the past two years, from 1.1 million in 2016 to some 2.6 million in 2018, in part due to the impact of the 2017 drought. In addition, there are 131,000 refugee returnees as well as refugees induced by conflict and climate vulnerability. About 80 percent of IDPs in Somalia are concentrated in urban and peri-urban centres often organized in formal and informal set-

<sup>19</sup> In addition to al-Shabaab, Islamic State has emerged as a small but potent Islamist terrorist organization threatening the stability of Somalia.

<sup>20</sup> World Development Indicators, World Bank Data 2018.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Consumption quintiles per capita based on total imputed consumption is 0.469 for the first quintile (bottom 20 percent) while it is 2.674 for the fifth quintile (top 20 percent) according to the World Bank data.

<sup>23</sup> Data from the National Development Plan II 2017-2020.

<sup>24</sup> World Development Indicators, World Bank data 2018. Child forced marriage is also noted to be a source of economic gain for families, depriving young girls of the opportunity to develop their potential and contribute to wider society.

<sup>25</sup> \$19.6 million for remittances and \$44.9 million for foreign direct investment. See <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/02/23/pr1866-imf-executive-board-concludes-2017-article-iv-consultation-with-somalia>

tlements. These population movements populations have put pressure on the limited urban infrastructure and services and have been, in some cases, exacerbating existing conflicts over land tenure and affecting overall social cohesion. This has led to an increase in evictions from informal settlements, with an estimated 730,000 persons evicted between 2015 and 2018, with the number of evictions almost doubling between 2015 and 2018.<sup>26</sup> Due to the numerous development challenges in Somalia, displacement has been of a protracted nature, with assessments suggesting that about half of IDPs have been displaced for more than three years.<sup>27</sup>

Built on the foundations laid by the New Deal Compact, the NDP aims at accelerating socioeconomic transformation to achieve the objectives of reducing poverty, strengthening governance and political inclusion, addressing environmental vulnerability (cyclical droughts and natural disasters) and promoting economic and societal transformation including gender equality. The NDP emphasizes reviving Somalia's traditional economic sectors, such as agriculture, livestock and fishing, utilizing the strengths of the private sector.<sup>28</sup> In parallel to the development path drawn by the NDP for the Federal Member States, Somaliland runs its own national development strategy. Each of the Federal Member States also has its own state development plan, produced independently, but synchronized with the NDP.

**Environment and natural resources.** Somalia comprises varied landforms, mainly plateaus, plains and highlands. Somalia has the longest coastline among the African countries and is endowed with a rich variety of natural resources. It is also endowed with a variety of energy and mineral resources including oil and gas, although much is still to be harnessed. Most of the economic activities in the country rely on natural resources and are vulnera-

ble to the effects of climate change (see economic section above). Land is being continually degraded, with ecosystem services under serious threat from a combination of deforestation due to charcoal production and unsustainable natural resource mismanagement, which is contributing to loss of soil fertility, vegetation and grazing land.<sup>29</sup> As highlighted by United Nations Security Council resolution 2444 (2018),<sup>30</sup> illegal use of natural resources remains a serious problem, which not only has an impact on the environment but also contributes to channelling resources to al-Shabaab. This is particularly the case for charcoal.

The country experiences routine droughts and floods. Due to the El Niño phenomenon, a prolonged drought period brought it to the brink of famine in 2017, followed by record level of rainfalls between late March and June 2018 over much of the country, all of which had a devastating humanitarian impact in most regions of the country, aggravated the needs of an already highly vulnerable population and affected their productive capacities (see above).

To respond to the economic slowdown and the humanitarian and food crisis following the 2016 drought, the Government has strengthened the implementation of national policies including fiscal policy and a large-scale famine programme with remarkable support from donors (donor grants almost doubled between 2016 and 2017, from \$55.3 million to \$103.6 million).<sup>31</sup> However, real GDP growth in Somalia decreased by 2.1 percent in 2017 following a 4.4 percent decline in 2016.<sup>32</sup> It was estimated that natural disasters caused 800,000 new displacements<sup>33</sup> in 2017. Poor rainfall in spring 2019 threatens to lead to another drought and poor agricultural performance, with possible impacts on economic growth forecasts for this year (see above, economic context).

<sup>26</sup> Data from the 2019 Humanitarian needs overview, November 2018, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> The Somalia National Development Plan 2017-2019, Federal Government of Somalia, Final version, October 2016.

<sup>29</sup> Federal Government of Somalia, "State of the Environment and Gap Analysis Report: Republic of Somalia" (forthcoming).

<sup>30</sup> The same resolution extends various elements of the Somalia sanctions regime until 15 November 2019.

<sup>31</sup> <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/somalia/overview>

<sup>32</sup> <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/somalia/overview>

<sup>33</sup> <http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/somalia>



**International assistance.** Somalia received \$2 billion in official development assistance annually in 2017 and 2018. Development aid has been steadily rising over the past decade, from \$202 million in 2009 to \$874 million in 2018. Together, the European Union and the Governments of the United Kingdom and Germany provided more than half of development aid in 2018 (\$454 million). The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany and the European Union were the largest providers of humanitarian assistance, together providing 78 per cent (\$883 million) of total humanitarian aid in 2018.<sup>34</sup> According to the last available estimates, international partners spend approximately \$1.5 billion a year on peace-keeping, counter-insurgency and support to the Somali security sector.<sup>35</sup> Aid flows are approximately 10 times higher than the central Government's budget, highlighting Somalia's dependence on foreign aid. Somalia also receives substantial support from the League of Arab States, Islamic Development Bank and the Governments of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. These contributions are not fully reported, but estimates highlight that non-traditional donors are becoming very prominent. For example, Turkey was already reported to be the fourth most important donor in 2015 and is currently ranked as the eleventh contributor of development aid over the period 2017-2018, based on amounts disclosed. Most non-traditional donors channel their funds through their own government systems as opposed to multilateral organizations.<sup>36</sup>

In line with the Somali Compact, a significant portion of humanitarian and development aid from donors that are members of the Development

Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development is managed through pass-through funds, including the Somalia Humanitarian Fund, which mostly works through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and is managed by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); the Central Emergency Response Fund, which is also managed by OCHA and has Somalia as one of the top recipients; and the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF), which comprises three windows: the Somalia Infrastructure Trust Fund administered by the African Development Bank, the Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) administered by UNDP, which includes a national funding window, and the Multi-Partner Fund administered by the World Bank. Donors increased their contributions to the SDRF funds in 2018 to \$83 million, compared with \$161 million in 2017. However, as the overall volume of development aid also increased by 20 percent, the share of aid channelled through the SDRF funds decreased from 22 percent in 2017 to 21 percent in 2018. On-treasury aid<sup>37</sup> and the use of the MPTF national window is slowly increasing, with approximately 13 percent of aid being channelled through country systems.<sup>38</sup>

**Human rights.** The Somali Government has had a Human Rights Road Map since 2013 and an action plan to implement the Road Map since 2015.<sup>39</sup> Human rights has been a theme of Somalia's NDP and Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS). The United Nations Independent Expert reported in 2018 that, compared to, 2017 "the human rights situation in Somalia is on the right track for recovery."<sup>40</sup> However, as indicated in the Independent Expert's report, Somalia's 2019 submission to the universal

<sup>34</sup> Aid Flows to Somalia, Federal Government of Somalia, Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development, 2019.

<sup>35</sup> UNSOM/World Bank (2017), Somalia Security and Justice Sector Public Expenditure Review, available at <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/644671486531571103/pdf/Somalia-SJPER-01302017-Final-Version.pdf>

<sup>36</sup> Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, Country Evaluation Brief, Somalia, 2017.

<sup>37</sup> Definition: Aid disbursed into the Government's main revenue funds and managed through the Government's systems. Aid Flows to Somalia, Federal Government of Somalia, Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development, 2019.

<sup>38</sup> Aid Flows to Somalia, Federal Government of Somalia, Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development, 2019.

<sup>39</sup> <https://unsom.unmissions.org/somalia-human-rights-road-map-ready-implementation>

<sup>40</sup> Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, Human Rights Council Thirty-ninth session, 10–28 September 2018, A/HRC/39/72. Some observers argued to us that since Somalia is seen by the Security Council as "too big to fail", such cautious optimism may be more related to the political needs of the United Nations than facts on the ground. There is however a substantive policy value in this "narrative of success."

periodic review process<sup>41</sup> and by most independent observers,<sup>42</sup> the human rights situation remains very poor. Civilians are caught up in violent conflict as well as humanitarian disasters; human rights are abused by insurgents, militias and state forces; and women continue to suffer disproportionately. Despite a commitment by donors and the Somali Government to improve the human rights situation, according to the Federal Government of Somalia, donor support for human rights and gender equality has in fact declined since 2016.<sup>43</sup>

## 1.4 The UNDP programme in Somalia

The first cooperation agreement between the Government of Somalia and UNDP was signed in 1977.<sup>44</sup> In the last decade, the UNDP partnership with the Federal Government of Somalia has been formalized through three CPDs.<sup>45</sup> In 2012, the country saw the end of a series of transitional governments (2000-2012) with the adoption of a provisional constitution and the election of a new Parliament. After years of remote management from Nairobi and presence on the ground in Puntland and Somaliland only, UNDP started to move to Mogadishu in 2012, focusing on supporting the Federal Government of Somalia and the establishment of emerging member states.<sup>46</sup> The UNDP Somalia programme has been developed within the broader framework of United Nations system-wide country plans for Somalia, which have progressively evolved to include a structurally integrated presence since

2014 and several integrated teams and joint programming among United Nations entities. In order to align to the New Deal Compact and the United Nations Somalia Integrated Strategic Framework 2014-2016, UNDP during the period 2015-2018 focused on four priorities:

**Outcome 1.** Somali women and men are better able to manage conflict.

**Outcome 2.** Somali women, men, girls and boys benefit from more inclusive, equitable and accountable governance, improved services, human security, access to justice and human rights.

**Outcome 3.** Somali men and women benefit from increased sustainable livelihood opportunities and improved natural resources management.

**Outcome 4.** Somali women and men attain greater gender equality and are empowered.

The articulation of Somalia's first NDP in 30 years led to the identification of six pillars: (1) peace, security and rule of law; (2) effective institutions; (3) economic growth; (4) infrastructure; (5) social and human development; and (6) resilience. Based on these pillars, the United Nations system in Somalia developed a strategic framework for the period 2017-2020 to guide and articulate its collective strategy in support of the Somali Government's development priorities and in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The United Nations Strategic Framework 2017-2020 is focused

<sup>41</sup> Federal Republic of Somalia, Universal Periodic Review (Second Cycle 2016), January 2019.

<sup>42</sup> <https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/somalia/report-somalia/>; <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/somalia>

<sup>43</sup> Federal Republic of Somalia, Universal Periodic Review (Second Cycle 2016), January 2019.

<sup>44</sup> Agreement between the Government of the Somali Democratic Republic and the United Nations Development Programme, 31 May 1977.

<sup>45</sup> Previous country programme documents (CPDs) covered the periods 2008-2010 and 2011-2015; the current CPD covers the period-2018-2020. Gaps between the different CPD time frames correspond to CPD extensions approved by the UNDP Executive Board.

<sup>46</sup> While the presence in Puntland and Somaliland had been stable, there was no presence in Mogadishu until 2012. Even then, just after the first round of relocations (including the UNDP Country Director), a terrorist attack on the United Nations compound led to casualties among UNDP staff and halted the process. UNDP however resumed the relocation and is currently almost entirely based in Mogadishu. This is not the case for many other agencies. This gives UNDP a strong on-the-ground presence which is not without challenges as senior managers and programme staff are entirely in Mogadishu, but some of the operational staff remain in Nairobi. At the same time, the focus on supporting the Federal Government of Somalia and emerging member states led to a reduction in the presence and work in Puntland and Somaliland. At the time of the last ADR, these offices had 55 and 40 staff respectively. They currently have 22 staff each (excluding the United Nations Clinic staff but including the five drivers and security staff). At the time of the evaluation, only one international adviser was employed in Hargeisa and no international staff were present in Garowe. Both programmes cover interventions in environment and climate change and the joint programme on local governance, and to a limited extent rule of law and inclusive politics. For details on the move to Mogadishu, please refer to the 2015 ADR.

on five interlinked and mutually reinforcing strategic priorities:


1. Deepening federalism and State-building, supporting conflict resolution and reconciliation and preparing for universal elections;
2. Supporting institutions to improve peace, security, justice, the rule of law and safety of Somalis;
3. Strengthening accountability and supporting institutions that protect;

4. Strengthening resilience of Somali institutions, society and population;
5. Supporting socioeconomic opportunities for Somalis, leading to meaningful poverty reduction, access to basic social services and sustainable, inclusive and equitable development.


UNDP is one of the United Nations agencies implementing all five strategic priorities and is expected to play a lead role in rule of law, resilience, inclusive politics and institutional strengthening, which are widely considered to be the areas where UNDP has a comparative advantage and is traditionally a key player. Accordingly, the UNDP programme for 2018-2020 is focused on three development priorities:

1. Inclusive and responsive political processes (outcome 1, corresponding to outcome 5 in Atlas);
2. Extending accountable and transparent service delivery in a secure environment (outcome 2, outcome 6 in Atlas);
3. Progress from protracted socioeconomic and environmental fragility and recurrent humanitarian crises (outcome 7 in Atlas).

**FIGURE 1. Evolution of programme budget and expenditure**



**FIGURE 2. Programme expenditure by portfolio**



Source: UNDP Atlas 2019



The UNDP programme is structured around five portfolios, which reflect the structure of the office in Mogadishu:

1. Environment and resilience to climate change, which was established in 2017 in recognition of the growing importance of this area of work and to better organize the two streams of work previously combined under a programme covering environment and energy, local economic development and private sector development. Interventions under this thematic area were captured under outcome 3 during the 2011-2015 country programme and under outcome 3 (7) during the 2018-2020 country programme.
2. Economic recovery and development, also established in 2017 for the same reasons explained above; interventions were captured under the same outcomes, with minor exceptions under outcome 2 (6) for the period 2018-2020.
3. Effective institutions is one of the core and long-standing portfolios; its interventions are mostly captured under outcome 1 (5) and 2 (6) for the period 2018-2020.
4. Inclusive politics is another core and long-standing portfolio; its interventions are mostly captured under outcome 1 (5) for the period 2018-2020. The work on effective institutions and inclusive politics forms the core of UNDP engagement in the area of governance under the two portfolios and therefore section 2.3 summarizes the context for both.
5. Rule of law is also an area of long-standing engagement for UNDP and corresponds mostly to outcome 2 (6) for the period 2018-2020, with some more recent interventions (e.g., joint programme on human rights) forming part of outcome 1 (5).

While it is clear that UNDP after 2012 intended to support the Federal Government of Somalia and the emerging member states, specific strategic frameworks for engagement in the various geographical contexts, including Somaliland and Puntland where there had been stable presence, are not available. The CPD for 2018-2020 provides generic guidance, e.g., "UNDP will strive to adequately address the needs of Somaliland with targeted programming." The evaluation presents the findings by portfolio, with a joint introductory section for portfolios 3 and 4, which form the core of the governance interventions in the country and are interlinked.





# CHAPTER 2

## FINDINGS

DEVELOPMENT effectiveness COORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP  
sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness COORDINATION AND DEVELOPMENT responsiveness  
COORDINATION HUMAN effectiveness COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability  
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COORDINATION AND DEVELOPMENT responsiveness NATIONAL OWNERSHIP sustainability PARTNERSHIP

## Assessment of the contributions of UNDP

This chapter presents the results of the outcome analysis, organized by portfolio (see section 1.4). It should be noted that financial data are not available by portfolio and the evaluation therefore provides information which gives the order of magnitude, as calculated by IEO, but is not exact. This is supplemented with data at outcome level when necessary. Also included are an assessment of the UNDP contribution to gender equality and women's empowerment, the role of partnerships, innovation and an analysis of factors contributing or hindering joint programming (see annex 8 for details).

This evaluation recognizes that Somalia is a uniquely difficult context, characterized by a very complex and fragmented architecture of international support; a rapidly changing and contested political settlement, with tensions between the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States; complex regional politics which include rivalry among Middle Eastern powers; an enduring major insurgency and related military offensives; widespread societal, criminal violence; rock-bottom State capacity; and massive poverty and economic hardship; compounded by severe environmental challenges, including drought, illegal depletion of natural resources and vulnerability to climate change. The evaluation also recognizes that most of the above-mentioned factors are interlinked and mutually reinforcing, creating a highly complex environment. Additionally, UNDP operations take place in a very restrictive security environment. The evaluation findings should be read in full recognition of this extraordinarily difficult context.

### 2.1 Environment and resilience to climate change portfolio

**Context.** Building on recommendation 2 of the 2015 ADR and in recognition of the importance and potential of this thematic area (see section 1.4.), the envi-

ronment and resilience to climate change portfolio was established in 2017. Until 2017, this area of work was part of the Poverty Reduction and Environment Protection (PREP) initiative, which was evaluated in the previous ADR<sup>47</sup> but remained active until 2018. The portfolio intends to address three key areas: (1) climate change adaptation; (2) environmental governance; and (3) sustainable energy. It is comprised of two main projects: the Joint Programme on Sustainable Charcoal Reduction and Alternative Livelihoods (PROSCAL), which is the ongoing intervention addressing the first key area; and the Enhancing Climate Resilience of the Vulnerable Communities and Ecosystems in Somalia project (ECC), addressing the third area. The second area is covered by smaller-scale interventions aiming to support the strengthening of environmental governance (Cross-Capacity Development for Global Environmental Governance) and supporting the country with the preparation of a number of reports (e.g., National Adaptation Programme of Action on Climate Change, State of the Environment and Gap Analysis Report). Additionally, interventions under the economic recovery and development portfolio address area 3. The results related to these are assessed in section 2.3.

**Relevance to national priorities.** The NDP 2017-2019, which was developed with strong UNDP support (see section 2.4), sets out the following vision: "Through sustainable management of our natural environment we will continue to promote the economic growth of all Somalis" and "effective disaster preparedness and response will be mainstreamed in public and private sector work and by individuals significantly reducing deaths, damage, economic loss and people affected by disasters". Additionally, in 2018, the Government of Somalia, with support from UNDP, the World Bank and the European Union, developed the Recovery and Resilience Framework (RRF) as a strategic document accompanying the Drought Impact Needs Assessment (DINA) developed in response to the 2017 drought. The DINA sets out a road map to progress from early drought recovery to longer-term resilience and disaster pre-

<sup>47</sup> The evaluation has requested documentation on the implementation of the PREP project after the ADR was completed, but it is not available.

paredness, and is intended to enable the country to break the cycle of vulnerability and humanitarian crisis to which it has been subject in the past.

**Relevance to the UNDP mandate.** The portfolio is in line with the UNDP Strategic Plan, 2014-2017, namely area of work 1, sustainable development pathways.<sup>48</sup> The interventions under the pillar are also aligned to the objective of the Strategic Plan, 2018-2021 of accelerating structural transformations for sustainable development and in particular, signature solutions 3, enhance national prevention and recovery capacities, and 5, close the energy gap. Finally, it is also now in line with one of the three priorities of the organization, climate change and environment, as announced by the UNDP Administrator in January 2019. It is also aligned to the objectives of SDGs 6, 7 and 13.


**Financial overview.** As well as the environmental component of the PREP project, a total of eight projects have been implemented over the period 2015 to date: two main projects (see context) and

a number of smaller interventions, including some proposal preparation. The pipeline is currently estimated at approximately \$59 million, indicating that considerable growth is expected during the implementation of the next country programme and that UNDP will increase its focus on providing support to the implementation of the RRF (see finding 2).

**Gender overview.** The interventions in the portfolio were expected to contribute to gender results to some extent; all the major projects were classified as GEN2 and four smaller-scale interventions as GEN1 (see finding 22, for an analysis of the use of the gender marker). Both PROSCAL and ECC made a concerted effort to target women beneficiaries as part of a strategy to identify and reach out to vulnerable groups. Relevant findings are presented in finding 2.

**Partners and donors.** Funding for these areas comes from two major sources, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the MPTF (see section 1.3). The GEF has been funding the largest UNDP project in this area to date (ECC), as well as several other smaller-scale interventions. These are not implemented jointly with other agencies, unlike most of the UNDP programme in Somalia. The GEF has so far financed only 16 projects in Somalia, of which only seven (including medium, full-size and enabling activities) are national for a total allocation of \$28.5 million, three under the GEF and four under the Least Developed Countries Fund, including the ECC (the second largest project in Somalia); and four others are in the pipeline for UNDP implementation.<sup>49</sup> The active projects are being implemented closely with the Directorate of Environment, Office of the Prime Minister (Federal Government of Somalia), which is the counterpart agency,<sup>50</sup> the Ministry of Environment, Agriculture and Climate Change (Puntland) and the Ministry of Environment and Rural Development (Somaliland).

**FIGURE 3. Financial overview, environment portfolio**



<sup>48</sup> Specifically with the aims of: (i) promoting effective maintenance and protection of natural capital; (ii) improving sustainable access to energy; and (iii) assessing key environmental risks to the poor and vulnerable. UNDP Strategic Plan, 2014-2017.

<sup>49</sup> For details, please see: [https://www.thegef.org/projects-faceted?ff=field\\_country:146](https://www.thegef.org/projects-faceted?ff=field_country:146) FAO and the African Development Bank manage one enabling activity and one full-size project respectively.

<sup>50</sup> This was formerly the Ministry of Fisheries, Marine Resources and Environment. Currently there is no Ministry of Environment at federal level. The Ministry was closed and replaced with a Directorate shortly after Minister Buri Mohamed Hamza was killed in an al-Shabaab attack in 2016. This is supposed to be temporary, but it is currently not clear what the timeline for transition is. "Counterpart agency" is the terminology used by UNDP; GEF uses "executing".



Other partners include the Federal Ministries of Energy and Water Resources, of Livestock, Forestry and Rangeland, of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management; the Puntland and Somaliland authorities for disaster preparedness (Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management Agency and National Disaster Management Authority respectively); and the Somaliland Ministry of Water Development and Hargeisa Water Agency. Through PROSCAL, a joint programme, UNDP works with the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

**Finding 1.** UNDP has gradually been building a portfolio of work which starts to address some key environmental challenges in Somalia, including the need to adapt to climate change and increase resilience to extreme weather events, particularly droughts and floods, to provide access to sustainable energy and to support the establishment of building blocks for a functioning environmental governance, in partnership with some of the key institutional counterparts and other United Nations agencies. UNDP has also demonstrated that it can adapt to emerging priorities and emergency situations. However, long-term support for one of the key national priorities, disaster risk reduction, is not yet in place, beyond the support provided within the framework of the ECC project as a response to the 2017 emergency.

UNDP reallocated resources in the short term to face the 2017 drought-induced crisis through a number of activities under the ECC project<sup>51</sup> and has supported the Ministry of Planning in the development of the DINA and the RRF (see section on relevance to national priorities). In so doing, UNDP has positioned itself as one of the key actors promoting a shift from emergency response to long-term development and resilience. While there is no consensus on the technical quality of the documents and

disagreements among ministries and between the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States are strong when it comes to roles, responsibilities and financing mechanisms<sup>52</sup> to implement the RRF, there is consensus among government counterparts, donors and partner agencies that a shift towards long-term resilience is needed.

The portfolio is centrally positioned to lead in the development of long-term solutions and has several projects in the pipeline, including the implementation of the newly-created GEF System for Transparent Allocation of Resources allocation for Somalia, amounting to \$13.6 million, and the development of Green Climate Fund readiness proposals. Through the implementation of PROSCAL, it is also an example of how UNDP can facilitate the programmatic engagement of non-resident agencies (i.e., UNEP) with relevant expertise but limited presence on the ground and work with other key agencies in the country (e.g., FAO). Coordination is reported to be functioning at the level of establishing clear roles and responsibilities, but falls short of harnessing the full potential of joint programming through regular exchanges and joint discussions to find solutions to key challenges (e.g., sustainability).<sup>53</sup> For example, there has been limited exchange so far on how the agencies can support each other when working with national counterparts to develop and support implementations of policies and strategies.<sup>54</sup>

Additionally, the evaluation notes that support to authorities in charge of disaster response has not led to sustainable results in all cases. For example, the Drought Operation Centre in Somaliland, housed in the National Disaster Management Authority during the drought, is no longer operational, the 15 staff have left and there is no evidence that the knowledge acquired has been passed on to any permanent staff.<sup>55</sup> Equally, the Regional Disaster

<sup>51</sup> These included the provision of emergency relief and operational support to the Puntland and Somaliland authorities in charge of disaster response.

<sup>52</sup> Evaluation interviews and observation of the discussions at the meeting on accelerating the RRF implementation: the way forward, held 17 July 2019 at the Hanger, Aden Abdulle International Airport.

<sup>53</sup> Evaluation interviews.

<sup>54</sup> Evaluation interviews.

<sup>55</sup> While the evaluation notes that there has been a complete institutional change for disaster management in Somaliland, the results of the intervention were not kept, highlighting their limited institutionalization.

Risk Management Office in Burao is not operational.<sup>56</sup> Additionally, no support has been provided at policy level, but this is being initiated now.

**Finding 2.** The portfolio supported policy processes, awareness-raising and project implementation. There is some evidence of successful technical support provided, but several policies are still pending validation/approval/implementation. There are signs of increased awareness of key environmental problems (e.g., charcoal production) and the need to move towards long-term solutions (RRF and at project scale). Project implementation, which has taken place in Somaliland and Puntland only, has seen a range of interventions with mixed results. Infrastructure rehabilitation and construction at this stage stands out as the area with the potential for providing tangible benefits, but monitoring and adaptive management were not always adequate. Overall, while the programme is growing, the response has so far only been able to address a small part of the country's needs through small-

scale interventions and sustainability of the interventions is at risk.

**Policy processes.** UNDP and its partners have supported the development of several policies and strategies, as well as some communications related to environmental conventions. These were facilitated by close cooperation with some key institutional actors at the Federal Government of Somalia (e.g., Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development (MOPIED), Directorate General of Environment), in Puntland (e.g., Ministry of Environment, Agriculture and Climate Change) and Somaliland (Ministry of Environment and Rural Development), and by a clarity of roles and responsibilities when implementation was carried out in partnership with other United Nations agencies (e.g., PROSCAL). Several are however still at some stage of the approval process and there is no evidence yet of implementation. This is not unique to environmental policies and strategies and is partially due to the complex and fragmented political

**TABLE 1. Summary of environmental policies and strategies, as of 31 August 2019**

Policy/ Strategy	Status as of September 2019	Comments
Somalia Recovery and Resilience Framework	Launched on 30 January 2018	Road map being developed by MOPIED, launched in July 2019. UNDP supported the development of the framework through this portfolio and the effective institutions portfolio (in coordination with the support provided the NDP development process), see finding 7
Environment Policy and Act	Draft completed in June 2019, pending validation	Supported by the ECC project
National Climate Change Policy and Funds Mobilization Strategy	To be submitted to the Council of Ministers during 2019, based on commitment by the Office of the Prime Minister to complete the process in 2019	Supported by the ECC project
National Charcoal Policy of Somalia	Draft prepared in 2018, validation meeting held on 10 August 2019	Supported by PROSCAL, through UNEP

<sup>56</sup> At the time of the evaluation visit, it was not connected to electricity, there were no light bulbs, the computer was not being used and the furniture was in a state of disrepair, with broken drawers, desks and missing door handles.

Table 1 (cont'd)

<b>Policy/ Strategy</b>	<b>Status as of September 2019</b>	<b>Comments</b>
Somalia Energy Policy	Draft ready in 2018, pending validation and approval	Supported by Shifting the Energy Paradigm Project, which supported the consultation process and initially created the Energy Coordination Unit
National Capacity Self-Assessment Action Plan for the implementation of the Rio Conventions	Developed in 2016	Some support for implementation expected through the project supporting cross-cutting issues related to environmental governance, which started in 2018, no evidence of results available
National Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2018	Prepared by UNDP in 2018 with funds provided by UNEP	
State of Environment and Gap Analysis Report 2018 for the Federal Republic of Somalia	Draft undergoing revisions	Supported by UNDP and UNEP
Management Policy for Disaster Risk Reduction	Drafted in 2018	The Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management is expected to produce an action plan. Evaluation interviews highlighted that no significant support was received by UNDP in the drafting of this policy, contrary to the ECC 2018 project implementation report. There is evidence that UNDP provided some input through participation in consultation stages
Land Use Policy – Puntland	Drafted and validated, pending approval (as of December 2019)	Supported by the ECC project
Land Use Policy – Somaliland	Drafted, 2018	Supported by the ECC project

environment in the country, specifically the diverging opinions of the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States, as well as among Federal Member States and the international community. While there is no estimate of the time

required to complete a policy process, with very few having been completed, Table 1 summarizes the most recent developments and the time lapses, particularly between technical development and the next steps.



**Awareness-raising.** Evidence<sup>57</sup> of increased awareness has been observed at the level of strategic discussions and government and international actors as well as at local and community levels. PROSCAL has been instrumental in raising awareness of the negative impacts of the charcoal trade through the organization of an international conference in 2018,<sup>58</sup> followed by an Ambassadorial-level meeting which included representatives from the demand countries (mostly Gulf States). While initiatives like the training of journalists by UNEP (PROSCAL) are leading to an increased number of media pieces being produced,<sup>59</sup> the charcoal trade remains a very difficult issue, as it represents a key source of income to al-Shabaab, is linked to clan power structures, is at the centre of a power struggle between the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States (particularly Jubaland) and plays an important role in regional politics, particularly due to the Kenyan interests in the trade. Charcoal trade is a key source of taxation revenue through checkpoints for al-Shabaab, the Kenyan Defence Forces and Jubaland Security Forces.<sup>60</sup>

At community level, awareness-raising by both PROSCAL and ECC are leading to increased understanding of environmental challenges and the problems related to charcoal production in particular. For example, the Qhardo district pastoralist association has set up an informal network to police the practice of illegal tree cutting and is enforcing the creation of reserve areas which can regenerate if no settlements are set up during and immediately after the rainy seasons.<sup>61</sup> However,

addressing major environmental issues remains beyond the capacity of the communities and the local district authorities (e.g., illegal charcoal production by al-Shabaab, management of hazardous waste, etc).

**Project implementation.** While relevant and increasing in volume, in line with the recommendations of the 2015 ADR, some interventions remain at a scale which is too small to lead to significant impact and their sustainability is at risk. For example, the ECC project intended to rehabilitate 520 hectares of rangelands, but as of 2017, 35,000 hectares (approx. 86,500 acres)<sup>62</sup> of land were deforested each year for charcoal production.<sup>63</sup> The evaluation also notes that at the time of the visit, it was ascertained that not all the original hectares could be planted due to a number of reasons and several issues were reported with the sustainability of the afforestation initiatives.

Infrastructure to promote resilience to droughts and floods is assessed by the evaluation as having the highest potential to lead to results at impact level, including through the introduction of new technologies (e.g., rainwater harvesting). In Puntland and Somaliland, a number of projects were implemented, including, in Puntland, 29 berkheds rehabilitated and three sand, two subsurface and five earth dams.<sup>64</sup> Some basic infrastructure, e.g., rock dams, are low-cost and are being maintained by the community.<sup>65</sup> However, the evaluation notes that while UNDP states that agreements are in place to ensure long-term maintenance and management, in practice this is not happening

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<sup>57</sup> Evaluation interviews.

<sup>58</sup> <https://unsom.unmissions.org/international-conference-illegal-charcoal-trade-opens-mogadishu>

<sup>59</sup> Evaluation interviews, media links and project reports. In particular, government authorities in Puntland report that they now routinely check the news as there is a frequent stream of information of which they are sometimes unaware.

<sup>60</sup> The Conflict Stability and Security Fund, "Charcoal Case Study", March 2019 and evaluation interviews.

<sup>61</sup> Evaluation interviews on site.

<sup>62</sup> UNDP, "National Capacity Self-Assessment Towards Implementing the Environmental Treaties of the Rio Convention Final Report and Action Plan for Somalia", 2017.

<sup>63</sup> UNDP, "National Capacity Self-Assessment Towards Implementing the Environmental Treaties of the Rio Convention Final Report and Action Plan for Somalia", 2017.

<sup>64</sup> Evaluation interviews with executing agency and GEF project implementation reports, midterm review site verifications and third-party monitoring reports.

<sup>65</sup> Rock dams are often damaged by pastoralists attempting to walk through with their cattle, but the communities rebuild the walls; awareness of the benefits is gradually improving as they note that rangeland is rehabilitating.

in all cases, or it is happening through informal arrangements which are not long-term.<sup>66</sup>

The evaluation also notes that there are structural problems with some of the sites and solutions provided. For example, the Yirowe earth dam was built with an escape route on the opposite side, which has led to a partial collapse of the structure twice since completion in October 2018. It also suffers from quick evaporation due to the absence of a tank for storage. Several sites (e.g., afforestation projects, some of the dams, etc.) have diesel pumps instead of solar pumps, leading to high maintenance costs as well as a higher carbon footprint.<sup>67</sup> Solar panels installed on the Burao hospital have been functioning at 50 percent capacity since installation, and the software had not been updated for one year. Solar panels installed on Garowe hospital are currently not working. These interventions would have benefited from closer monitoring and adaptive management based on the monitoring of results.

Attempts to promote sustainable livelihoods, promote small-scale business and favour a transfer to

sustainable technologies have also seen limited results. One of the most common interventions is the distribution of sustainable cooking stoves and the creation of small businesses around it, with a focus on vulnerable beneficiaries, including female heads of households and female IDPs. While some beneficiaries report that their individual use of charcoal/firewood has reduced as a result of receiving more sustainable cookstoves, in some cases (e.g., distribution of 300 cookstoves to IDPs in Garasbley, Mogadishu) the evaluation, confirming the findings of the third-party monitoring (TPM) reports, found that recipients were not always using the stoves due to a number of reasons or did not know how to continue using them due to unavailability of briquettes. Attempts to create women's cooperatives and set up small businesses were also a challenge. Beneficiaries reported that the distribution of cookstoves (for resale), trainings (e.g., on accounting) and the acquisitions of basic tools led to a small increase in income, in some cases temporary (e.g., at the time of sale of the stoves) or better ability to manage agricultural production and sales (e.g., as a result of the

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## BOX 2. Key factors contributing to and/or hindering results, environment and resilience to climate change portfolio

### Contributing:

- Coordination and cooperation with institutional actors
- Clarity of roles and responsibilities in case of joint programming (see also cross-cutting issues, finding 22)
- Strong relevance and alignment to emerging priorities of the country and UNDP mandate
- Ability to adapt to respond to emergencies

### Hindering:

- Limited monitoring (either direct or through third-party arrangements), limiting adaptive management for specific project interventions

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<sup>66</sup> This is also highlighted by the report prepared by Intermedia Development Consultants in 2018, "UNDP Somalia TPM, some lessons; some suggestions", which draws attention to this as one of the five key issues which require close monitoring. For example, the costs the communities would have to face to keep the trees alive are reported to amount to approximately \$500 per month. Currently, the survival of the sites is guaranteed by occasional cash-for-work interventions managed by the World Food Programme. Evaluation interviews highlighted that this is the case for all afforestation sites. Yirowe earth dam in Somaliland is currently guarded by staff provided by the contractor who built the dam, on a voluntary basis, after the District Council declined to absorb the maintenance costs. Due to the remote location of the dam, it was also not possible to set up a commercial arrangement to pay for the management costs. Salahley water catchment is managed by volunteers and there is no system in place to monitor water trucking by private companies from Garowe, which has the potential to quickly deplete the water available to pastoralists. Burao gabions were also found to be in need of maintenance, but the interviews with local authorities highlighted that this is not currently being planned due to limited resources.

<sup>67</sup> Evaluation visits.

accounting training), but there is limited evidence of uptake of new technologies (e.g., hydroponic fodder production is not currently in use, sustainable cook-stoves are being sold but briquettes are not available) or long-term significant increase in income and stability of livelihoods. The evaluation also notes that these interventions are currently not implemented within the framework of a long-term strategy for upscaling and replication.

## 2.2 Economic recovery and development

**Context.** Among the 12 projects under this portfolio, the country office implemented four projects specifically targeting youth, three of which sought to generate alternative livelihoods and social rehabilitation for youth in support of stabilization efforts in newly recovered areas<sup>68</sup> and in addressing other social phenomenon such as piracy,<sup>69</sup> all gradually phasing out during 2017-2018. Since 2015, the bulk of expenditures under the portfolio has been in the United Nations Youth Employment Somalia (YES) programme, a joint programme involving four other United Nations agencies, accounting for about 50 percent of expenditures for the entire portfolio between 2015 and 2018. Another area of work in which UNDP had been gradually engaging is the development of durable solutions for IDPs. During the period under review, the programme had three active projects in this area, including two project initiation plans (PIPs) aimed at supporting the development and launch of a United Nations strategy and joint response on durable solutions for IDPs, and a joint project with the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for durable solutions in a Mogadishu IDP settlement, initiated in 2017. In 2019, UNDP joined the second phase of the existing joint United Nations Durable Solutions for Development project

(MIDNIMO II), with UN-Habitat and the International Organization for Migration, targeting the Hirshabelle and Galmudug Federal Member States. In the area of investment promotion, a PIP was launched in 2018 to support institutional capacity-building of the MOPIED for decision-making over economic and investment policies. Finally, UNDP has been supporting institutional capacity-building of the National AIDS Commission, for HIV prevention activities, on behalf of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, which is operated in Somalia by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).<sup>70</sup>

**Relevance to national priorities.** The portfolio is relevant to the NDP 2017-2019 and seeks to provide a contribution to several of its goals. Through the youth employment lens, UNDP is contributing to the goal of the NDP to "enhance the participation of the youth to the development of the nation through effective mobilization, empowerment, training and sports to foster national cohesion, enhance peace and improve quality of life". The UNDP engagement in the reintegration of IDPs and returnees, under the durable solutions initiative, contributes to the building resilience capacity pillar and its goal "to improve resilience through reintegration of the displaced people and returnees". On the latter, the development and implementation of the durable solutions initiative operationalizes the national and regional commitment of the country to the Nairobi Comprehensive Plan of Action for Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees, recognized as the regional application of the Global Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework. Overall, the portfolio is alignment with SDG 1, ending poverty, and SDG 8, decent work and economic growth.

**Relevance to the UNDP mandate.** The portfolio is in line with the UNDP Strategic Plan, 2014-2017, specifically area of work 1, sustainable development pathways, and area of work 3, resilience-building so that countries can sustain their development gains

<sup>68</sup> Project "Community stabilization through the socio-economic integration of vulnerable youth".


<sup>69</sup> Project "Alternative livelihood to piracy".

<sup>70</sup> UNDP work in HIV prevention started back in 2006, through the Global Fund. However, support in this area of work has been discontinued, and only focused on an institutional capacity development aspect during the period of the evaluation. This work was commissioned by UNICEF as main implementing agent of the Global Fund in Somalia.

in the face of shocks and rebound stronger.<sup>71</sup> The portfolio also feeds into signature solutions 1 (keeping people out of poverty) and 3 (enhance national prevention and recovery capacities) of the current UNDP Strategic Plan, 2018-2021.

**Financial overview.** Between 2015 and 2018, the country office operated 12 projects under this portfolio, including four PIPs and the UNDP Innovation Facility, for a total of \$16.6 million in programmatic expenditures. About 40 percent of total expenditure over this period occurred in 2018. Support to youth employment and livelihood generation amounted to 69 percent of expenditures, support to internally displaced populations for livelihood generation to 14 percent, HIV prevention to 13 percent, and support to capacities for investment and trade promotion to 4 percent.

**FIGURE 4. Financial overview, early recovery portfolio**



**Gender overview.** All projects under this portfolio are reported as having gender equality as a significant objective (GEN2)<sup>72</sup>, with the exception of the work in HIV prevention, reported as having gender equality as a principal object (GEN 3), and the Innovation Facility, reported as not contributing to gender equality. Applying the Gender Results Effec-

tiveness Scale, the evaluation would characterize the work on this portfolio to generally fall under the rating of gender-targeted rather than having a specific gender contribution, as across the portfolio most programme activities focused on integrating women as part of project intervention without explicitly seeking to address gender equality or gender-responsiveness, addressing the differential needs of men and women.

**Partners and donors.** As indicated, about 50 percent of expenditures have come from the YES programme which has been funded through the United Nations Multi-Donor Trust Fund as well as through the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund for a specific programme component implement in South West and Jubaland. Other projects supporting livelihoods and social rehabilitation were funded through bilateral funding including by the Government of Japan and a consortium of private sector companies. Work under the durable solutions for IDPs has been channelled through UN-Habitat as a recipient of the European Union funding for enhancing Somalia's responsiveness to the management and reintegration of mixed migration flows (RE-INTEG). In 2019, UNDP also received funding from the Peacebuilding Fund for its coordination and participation in the joint programme MIDNIMO II. All sources of funding cited have been complemented with additional funding from UNDP regular (core) resources. Key partners include the other United Nations agencies participating in the joint programmes (see context above).

**Finding 3.** The overall approach of UNDP in promoting youth employment or livelihood creation has been oriented towards short-term job creation and self-employment with less focus on strengthening employability and on private sector development through the strengthening of existing value chains. Value chain development was the focus of the flagship United Nations programme on youth

<sup>71</sup> More specifically, the portfolio is aligned with the objective of comprehensive approaches to peacebuilding and State-building in post-conflict and transition settings of area of work 3, and development of sustainable and inclusive productive capacities of area of work 1 of the Strategic Plan, 2014-2017.

<sup>72</sup> It should be noted that the UNDP corporate application of the gender marker does not have a clear definition of what significant contribution is specifically.

employment, but the programme did not manage to promote the necessary focus, synergies and complementarity in the work of participating agencies.

Over the period reviewed by this evaluation, UNDP has supported youth employment through the lens of stabilization efforts in newly recovered areas, as a response to piracy in Puntland or more generally to address the huge problem of youth unemployment in Somalia. The bulk of UNDP support has been through the flagship YES programme<sup>73</sup> launched in 2015. UNDP and four other agencies (FAO, International Labour Organization (ILO), UN-Habitat and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization) partnered with the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA) and sought to leverage their respective comparative advantages to provide integrated support to youth employment centred around specific value chains.

The ADR conducted in 2015 noted, among other things, that UNDP interventions in this area were not in line with a strong focus on value chains, trade and the private sector presented in Peacebuilding and Stabilization Working Group (PSG) 4, but focused instead on job training and job creation through infrastructure rehabilitation programmes. It also concluded that interventions to strengthen livelihoods were too small-scale and fragmented to address challenges.<sup>74</sup> To a large extent, the same observation has remained valid in the current evaluation period. Conceptually, the YES joint programme responded to the requirement of PSG 4 through its focus on value chains but its operationalization and execution did not manage to deliver on this approach.

Across the different projects, UNDP adopted a similar model which included the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and productive assets, through cash-for-work activities promoting short-term job creation and livelihood creation; business, life-skills and vocational training; and the provision of grants with a view to promote sustainable livelihood generation through business creation.<sup>75</sup> Somalia is often recognized for its vibrant private sector<sup>76</sup> which has strived and developed during the decades of conflict. Despite this, private sector linkages were not evident in the UNDP strategy. Except for the UNDP technical and entrepreneurship skills transfer in the solar value chain, the evaluation team found no evidence of private sector linkages across the entire portfolio. UNDP sought to promote entrepreneurship in the area of solar installation and maintenance, with evidence in some cases of linkage with the private sector through the facilitation of internship opportunities for some of the beneficiaries. In the context of the YES programme, internship opportunities of six months were facilitated for 50 beneficiaries out of the 400 trained by the programme.<sup>77</sup> While this is a positive initiative, this approach was not adopted in a systematic manner and at the time of the evaluation, the internships were still ongoing and did not permit assessment of the effectiveness of the approach in promoting the employability of beneficiaries.

The YES programme did not manage to develop the required focus and coordination among its different actors in order to leverage complementarities and favour the sequencing and targeting of interventions, geographically and by group of beneficiaries. Except for the joint work between FAO and

<sup>73</sup> Along with PROSCAL, YES is the only programme of the United Nations Multi-Partner Trust Fund window for Somalia for the economic foundations pillar.

<sup>74</sup> IEO, Assessment of Development Results Somalia, 2015.

<sup>75</sup> This is not unique to UNDP and to Somalia and is part of a standard approach applied by UNDP in a post-conflict context. While it is favourable in a post-conflict context to stimulate quick economic revitalization, it tends to create short-term income generation rather than sustainable livelihoods and longer-term results. Often missing in the approach is continuity in the support and the absence of linkages to other larger employment initiatives. This was found to be a common shortcoming in UNDP engagement in the area of economic recovery and revitalization in post-conflict settings in a recent thematic evaluation of UNDP support to poverty reduction in least developed countries.

<sup>76</sup> The collapse of state infrastructure and government services since 1991 as de facto made the private sector the main provider of services. This has included banking, telecommunications, air transport, urban water and electricity. There is however a lack of available data to quantify the size and characteristic of this sector. For instance, Somalia is reported to have the most active mobile money markets in the world, outpacing most other countries in Africa with approximately 155 million transactions, worth \$2.7 billion, recorded per month. See World Bank Group, Somalia economic update, Edition August 2018.

<sup>77</sup> Evaluation interview and results reported by the project.



UNDP around dry fish processing, no interventions by all the agencies were implemented in a single location and on the same target groups. This issue was observed in the midterm evaluation of the programme in mid-2018 which established at that time that the programme was implemented in a fragmented manner and not structured around a value chain analysis, in part due to a lack of consensus on the programme strategy.<sup>78</sup> This shortcoming, which was not addressed after the midterm review in 2018, is widely recognized by all stakeholders met during interviews (Resident Coordinator's office, government, implementing agencies and partners, donors).

While the evaluation team was not able to visit all the 10 sites of dry fish processing on which UNDP and FAO operate, in Berbera the evaluation team observed detrimental results due to poor sequencing and integration between the two agencies, confirming the finding of the 2018 midterm review. Targeted youth beneficiaries had completed their trainings, dry processing facilities had been constructed and handed over, but the fishery equipment and planned training had not yet happened, leaving the infrastructure unused. The progress of the interventions stopped for several months due to internal administrative challenges,<sup>79</sup> leaving trained youth beneficiaries waiting to access the final stage of training and the startup grants, already made available in their bank account but strictly earmarked and depending on the final delivery of activities by FAO. Beyond this frustration, all Somali stakeholders met by the team expressed doubt about the market potential of dry fish on the local market because it is not part of consumption behaviour in that area.<sup>80</sup>

Another shortcoming in the overall approach of UNDP, noted by the evaluation across its projects, resides in its operationalization. The practical limitation associated with the delivery of such support through projects de facto limits the domain in which technical training can practically be delivered and may push for a supply-driven rather than demand- or market-driven offering. In addition, the desire to reach many beneficiaries does not consider market absorption capacity and the risk of saturation. Finally, similar programmes are known to require sustained continuity in support to beneficiaries to be successful. While the evaluation observed activities in the fishery value chain development which included the provision of mentoring and coaching services to ensure continuity after the end of the business and technical training, in general stakeholders met (implementing partners, beneficiaries) recognized limitations associated with the limited duration of support provided.

In terms of capacity development, the UNDP approach through the YES programme has consisted in supporting the positions of 19 technical advisers in MOLSA at federal and regional levels and in the Benadir Regional Administration, to support coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the programme. Although the programme was initially conceived to support capacity and enhance ownership through oversight, the evaluation team found limited evidence of increased capacity or of a strategy to achieve this objective. In some cases, concerns were raised about the actual input and accountability of technical advisers to the programme and to the ministries. In addition, the evaluation noted that technical advisers have been nominated in regions

<sup>78</sup> The evaluation notes a tension in the objectives of the NDP between the objectives of economic development, which include private sector development, and the objective of social and human development, where the issue of youth employment falls. This was reflected in reported disagreements between United Nations agencies as to the focus of the programme between being youth-centred and contributing to social cohesion, or an employment programme, seeking to contribute to job creation.

<sup>79</sup> The fishery activities in Berbera were slowed by administrative challenges in the release of earmarked funding from these activities by the joint programme's administrative agent. In addition, inputs in the intervention by the FAO technical staff (international consultant), covering several sites of the projects, were hindered by the requirement to have administrative contract breaks.

<sup>80</sup> Fish consumption in general, while increasing, has never formed part of Somali consumption behaviour and until recently has been limited to coastal and large urban areas. Despite its important potential in Somalia, annual per capita fish consumption appears low compared to global averages (around 2 kilograms compared to 17 kilograms globally). See Glaser SM, Roberts PM, Mazurek RH, Hurlburt KJ, and Kane-Hartnett L (2015) *Securing Somali Fisheries*. Denver, CO: One Earth Future Foundation. Dry fish is not a product consumed on the local market and constitutes a product requiring consumer education. As part of its activities in the YES programme, FAO was to include a "market campaign" to support consumer behaviour but this had not taken place in Berbera.

where no activities have been planned. However, the engagement with MOLSA has provided a foundation for further engagement, notably leading to the drafting and endorsement of a national employment policy by the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States,<sup>81</sup> scheduled for ratification by Parliament. The endorsed national employment policy is providing a policy framework, previously absent, for the development of a future joint United Nations programme which, drawing from lessons learned of the implementation of the YES programme,<sup>82</sup> puts greater emphasis on institutional capacity development, setting the enabling environment and on a shift from a youth-centred to a more employment-oriented approach.

There is however evidence that UNDP is using lessons from past implementation and adapting to change in the overall environment to devise a different model of engagement, adopting a business “ecosystems approach”.<sup>83, 84</sup> UNDP support is being designed around a set of change actions aimed at establishing an enabling environment conducive to business development with youth, IDPs and host communities as principal target groups. This strategic orientation reflects the broader contextual changes in the macro- and microeconomic situation of the country and the growing number of development actors and their investments on the ground. It is also consistent with the “whole of society approach” envisioned in the UNDP Strategic

Plan, 2018-2021. It also provides a strategic framework in which UNDP may better exercise its perceived added value as a development actor in an environment mostly composed of humanitarian actors. While this shift in approach is positive, the evaluation notes that the strategy remains for now at a conceptual stage.<sup>85</sup>

**Finding 4.** UNDP has been engaged in addressing the humanitarian and development divide on the issue of IDPs in Somalia through the lens of durable solutions. Through its participation in flagship joint United Nations programmes, UNDP is affirming its positioning as a development actor and developing a differentiated response in what has been a field dominated by humanitarian actors. However, evidence of results is not yet available.

Responses to the challenge of internal displacement in Somalia traditionally have been delivered through humanitarian intervention that is short-term in nature and delivered in a fragmented manner. However, there has been a growing recognition of the need for a multidimensional response from humanitarian and development actors to address the challenges of IDPs in a sustainable manner, including as part of the RRF discussions (see findings 1 and 3). Between 2015 and 2017, UNDP supported the development of the durable solution initiative<sup>86</sup> for Somalia with the objective to attain durable improvement of living situations and

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<sup>81</sup> March 2019.

<sup>82</sup> At the time of this evaluation, a concept note for the new United Nations employment programme had been designed but did not have funding committed yet.

<sup>83</sup> Source: Economic Recovery and Development portfolio strategy presentation provided by the country office.

<sup>84</sup> The concept was introduced by the business strategist James. F. Moore in his 1993 Harvard Business Review article, “Predators and Prey: A New Ecology of Competition.” He defined it as an economic community supported by a foundation of interacting organizations and individuals—the organisms of the business world. The economic community produces goods and services of value to customers, who are themselves members of the ecosystem. The member organisms also include suppliers, lead producers, competitors and other stakeholders. Over time, they coevolve their capabilities and roles and tend to align themselves with the directions set by one or more central companies. Those companies holding leadership roles may change over time, but the function of ecosystem leader is valued by the community because it enables members to move toward shared visions to align their investments and to find mutually supportive roles.

<sup>85</sup> The UNDP Innovation Facility has adopted this approach to try accelerating the emergence of a digital economy in Somalia, but it remains at an early stage with the initiative yet to demonstrate scaling-up and business viability or to formally evaluate the results. The same conceptual approach is envisaged at a localized level under the MIDNIMO II joint programme but this is at also at an early stage, with implementation just starting in 2019. It also not clear how this would translate at the level of the portfolio. For example, UNDP has initiated some upstream-level policy work in 2018, through a PIP, to support MOPIED capacities for research and analysis to support the newly established National Economic Council in its mandate to advise the President on macroeconomic and sectoral-level policymaking aimed at favouring economic growth but this is still at an early stage, and linkages with other project engagements are not evident.

<sup>86</sup> The durable solution initiative corresponds to the national framework of implementation of the regional application the Nairobi Comprehensive Plan of Action for Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees, which is in turn the regional application of the Global Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework.

livelihoods of displacement-affected communities and citizens through area-based, rights-driven and bottom-up approaches providing innovative multi-sectoral solutions.

UNDP, among other partners, participated and supported the advocacy and consultation effort led by the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General in framing the national response to the solution, which led to the integration of the durable solutions as a priority in key policy frameworks such as the NDP and their integration in the aid architecture of the NDP, and later on in the DINA and RRF. However, progress in rolling out a comprehensive durable solution response as intended has been hindered by a lack of clarity in terms of government responsibilities over the initiative, leading to sensitive institutional conflict at federal level, which delayed the roll-out of a comprehensive national response through a whole-of-government approach as envisaged.<sup>87</sup> In the meantime, in 2017 piloting of an implementation strategy was launched by United Nations actors through two projects in which UNDP participates.

In the first one, UNDP is partnering with UNHCR and UN-Habitat in addressing the challenge of IDPs in Benadir Regional Administration through a joint programme.<sup>88</sup> The project aims to improve living conditions of IDPs and returnee refugees through the establishment of governance systems, increased housing, land and property rights and social, economic and political inclusion to enhance conditions for local integration of IDPs in

two Mogadishu settlements. The UNDP role in the programme has been to stabilize the livelihoods of IDPs and to provide them with sustainable livelihood options. UNDP adopted a similar model previously observed<sup>89</sup> in its other project engagement but which differed in integrating the approach from the Innovation Facility for IDP beneficiaries. Applying design-thinking methods, the initiative seeks to develop platforms to ideate, prototype and test new ideas to address development challenges.<sup>90</sup>

While at an early stage with conditions for success and potential for scaling-up needing to be assessed in further detail, the introduction of social entrepreneurship, and particularly the focus on stimulating self-directed livelihood generation ideas, may be considered as a signature approach moving forward. The merit of the approach resides in empowering beneficiaries while departing from a supply-driven approach.

The second project, MIDNIMO II, launched in January 2019 in Galmudug and Hirshabelle, was at an initial stage of implementation during the evaluation, but initial progress demonstrates the added value of UNDP as a development actor in this arena. For example, in addressing institutional rivalry in Hirshabelle, the project advocated for the establishment of an interministerial committee chaired by the Office of the State President, which was formally established on April 2019 through official decree.<sup>91</sup> While the launch of other activities by UNDP was delayed, partly due to the absence of an operational presence in these Federal Member States, the establishment

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<sup>87</sup> As of July 2019, there was institutional agreement over the coordination, roles and responsibilities for the national durable solutions response including the establishment of a durable solution.

<sup>88</sup> Innovative durable solution for IDPs and refugee returnees. The project is funded through the European Union Trust Fund RE-INTEG programme: Enhancing Somalia's responsiveness to the management and reintegration of mixed migration flows. The best ideas are then selected through an innovation challenge and receive support for development and marketing. In the context of this project, UNDP applied the approach around initiating social entrepreneurship projects by IDPs. In partnership with the university, UNDP delivered a social entrepreneurship course to target beneficiaries and encouraged social start-ups. At the time of the evaluation, a social innovation challenge has been organized, and the project was moving towards the financing of about 150 social start-ups planned. In addition, for sustainability, the project supported the development of a business incubator for IDPs based with the Benadir Regional Administration to support business incubation through access to facilities, mentoring and coaching. Following extensive training and preparation for the launch of the incubator, it was to be officially launched in September 2019.

<sup>89</sup> Short-term employment through rehabilitation of basic infrastructure, and skills training in the area of solar panel installation for a selected number, to equip IDP settlement infrastructure. Source: Third-party monitoring report.

<sup>90</sup> UNDP, Design thinking, A guide for prototyping and testing solutions for the Sustainable Development Goals, 2017.

<sup>91</sup> Directive from the President of Hirshabelle State DGS/CoS/N/172/19 on the establishment of the interministerial committee for the effective implementation of the programmes of stabilization, decentralization and durable solutions of Hirshabelle State.



of such a committee constitutes both a positive advance for the roll-out of durable solutions in the region and potentially for longer-term engagement for a multisectoral response in Hirshabelle.<sup>92</sup>

**Finding 5.** Through the Innovation Facility, UNDP is proposing a differentiated and positive contribution leveraging technological solutions to address social problems and stimulating the emergence of a digital economy in Somalia. While at an early stage to observe tangible results and potential for job creation and employment, it appears particularly relevant to the Somali context in responding to the demands and aspirations of youth.

Since 2017, through the Innovation Facility, UNDP Somalia has been exploring new areas of work focused on the use of technology and social innovation to support development objectives. As mentioned, the RE-INTEG project leverages this approach to organize innovation challenges for IDPs.

Under its “future ready initiative,” the same model was adopted and piloted on mobile phone application development and business capacities. The initiative forged partnerships with existing business incubators in Mogadishu and Hargeisa to deliver training activities on mobile application development to young graduates and students. The training was delivered by Microsoft trainers, leveraging partnerships established between the company and the UNDP office in Egypt. In addition, UNDP supports the operational capacity to deliver trainings on application development.<sup>93</sup> Examples of mobile application solutions developed include a mobile application facilitating blood bank management and apps for buying fresh fruits and vegetables and for people to request a taxi to their homes. UNDP has also been supporting the emergence of this sector through networking events such as the first Mogadishu tech summit in October 2018 and first Somali Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics Conference in July 2018, and its second edition in July 2019 to engage with the ecosystems of actors in Somalia and foster

engagement. Networking resulting from these conference events has led youth beneficiaries in Mogadishu to start an association, the Somali Technology Association Center, to provide information and communication business incubation and other services.

At the time of the evaluation, activities were still ongoing, with solutions developed still in incubation and on a small scale, so it was not possible for the evaluation to assess fully the result of these pilot initiatives and their potential for upscaling and replication. Subject to the effective uploading of mobile applications on digital marketplaces, training participants had not received the expected training certification, which was seen as an important support for their employability. In addition, it is not clear at this stage what pathways have been identified to ensure the marketability of the mobile application solutions developed, and their viability as a business initiative. However, this area of work was found by several interviewees to be an innovative and relevant domain of engagement, responding to aspirations and carrying hope for educated Somali youth groups. The engagement in this area of work, as discussed under finding 4, constitutes a positive departure from a supply-driven to a more self-directed approach for beneficiaries. In addition, the focus on the digital economy is an innovative area of engagement which differentiate itself from the activities of other actors. The evaluation notes, however, the need to include continuous monitoring and evaluation of such pilots to support learning over the experience and to enhance clarity over factors of success in the development of a more coherent programmatic approach.

The country office is exploring new entry points based on the same approach around geographic information systems/remote sensing and network management, and crowdfunding as a solution to unlock new sources of financing. It is also testing ground in other areas of the UNDP programme, including testing of the existing crowdsourcing plat-

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<sup>92</sup> Based on evaluation interviews.

<sup>93</sup> Evaluation interviews and UNDP reports.

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### BOX 3. Key factors contributing to and/or hindering results, economic recovery and development portfolio

#### Contributing:

- Comparative advantage of UNDP as a development actor in a highly humanitarian context
- Innovative programmatic offer

#### Hindering:

- Lack of synergies, integration, and sequencing in joint programming
  - Pressure for financial delivery vs requirement for sequencing in joint programming
  - Quality of project design but lack of focus on implementation
- 

form for citizen participation<sup>94</sup> with the Municipality of Mogadishu and the Ministry of Constitution, in partnership with the Municipality of Madrid, Spain.

## 2.3 Effective institutions and inclusive politics

**Context.** Effective institutions and inclusive politics focuses on State- and institution-building, with inclusive politics also addressing some dimensions of social inclusion and effective institutions also addressing stabilization. UNDP governance programming in Somalia was launched in 2008, with the Joint Programme on Local Governance (JPLG). Work on State-building (capacity development) began with the Somalia Institutional Development Project in 2009 (2009-2013). The UNDP Parliamentary Support Project (PSP) was initiated in 2013, and continues, though, since 2017, with a much-reduced budget. The Constitutional Review and Implementation Support Project, stemming from the parliamentary project, began in 2015 and continues under a slightly modified title until the present. Programming in the two thematic areas overlaps, with federalism and dialogue around the constitution a concern for Support to Emerging Federal States (StEFS) 2015-2019 and its successor project, Reconciliation and Federalism Support Project (REFS)

2018-2020), as well as for Parliamentary Support and the Constitutional Review and Implementation Project.<sup>95</sup> StEFS also crossed into the territory of gender equality and women's empowerment/ Women's Participation Project (WPP) and election support by supporting workshops in the Federal Member States on engaging women in the political process prior to the 2016 elections. The JPLG is also very much concerned with reconciliation at the local level and in relations between the Federal Member States and local governments. Similarly, the WPP project crosses the boundaries between inclusive politics, where it is housed, and effective institutions, with particularly strong links to JPLG.

**Stabilization.** Since 2015, there has been an extension of State control into areas previously held by al-Shabaab and a number of international actors provide stabilization activities at the local level, notably the multi-donor Somali Stabilization Fund, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Transition Initiatives and early recovery initiatives supported by the Government of the United Kingdom. The core of UNDP stabilization work in this time period was Support to Stabilization (S2S and S2S II) but at the start of this reporting period UNDP was also undertaking two projects, the Community Security Project (CSP) and Youth for Change (Y4C). CSP had three core

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<sup>94</sup> See <http://consulproject.org/en/>. CONSUL is a free open software for citizen participation which enable users to create debates, make proposals, vote, and consult legislative text to citizens. It was developed and launched by the Madrid City Council and later adopted by over 50 institutions across the world.

<sup>95</sup> As of December 2018, REFS has been moved to the inclusive politic portfolio. The Constitutional Review project is now labelled Support to Constitutional Review.

elements: (1) building Somali capacity to undertake analysis of conflict and stability, through support to the Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP); (2) local-level peacebuilding work through a community-based reconciliation and trauma healing approach implemented by Soyden, and by supporting alternative dispute resolution mechanisms; and (3) social and economic integration of individuals and youth at risk of participating in violence.<sup>96</sup> CSP was discontinued during 2015 with elements being folded into the Joint Rule of Law Programme (e.g., Alternative Dispute Resolution in Puntland), elements folded into S2S (e.g., the Soyden community work), while the Y4C element continued as a stand-alone project into 2017.

**Relevance to national priorities.** UNDP governance programming in Somalia has been at the centre of the agency's efforts to support government in Somalia since 2012-2013. Overall, the programme portfolio was built on the New Deal Compact and the United Nations Strategic Framework for Somalia 2014-2016. The New Deal Compact had identified the building of public sector capacities as a key component of the effort to achieve its peacebuilding and State-building objectives. The term "effective institutions" is one of the six principal pillars of the NDP. Good governance is one of six values and principles identified as guiding the NDP. Inclusive politics responds to two major goals of the NDP: "To achieve a stable and peaceful federal Somalia through inclusive political processes and effective decentralization"; and "Improve how the government is organized, the way government works and to strengthen the elements that allow government to operate".


Building the capacity of the Federal Member States is recognized as one of 11 initial priorities set out in the NDP (p.11). Attention is also given to putting in place the frameworks necessary to enable federalism, along with decentralization, and the importance of building and/or strengthening the relationship between the Federal Member States and local administration. Addressing the capacity development needs of local government and

establishing elected district councils are also recognized as important areas for support. Supporting the Somali Government to extend governance, services, and reconciliation to areas newly liberated from al-Shabaab through stabilization is a crucial part of the Somali and international community strategy in Somalia. For all local interventions under the governance umbrella, notably local governance and rule of law, there is, rightly, a pressure to roll out programming in areas liberated from al-Shabaab, which may at times lead to prioritizing geographic reach over high technical quality (see finding 18).

**Relevance to the UNDP mandate.** The work of the two portfolios is aligned with area of work 3 of the Strategic Plan, 2014-2017, particularly the component on State-building to improve capacities, accountability, responsiveness and legitimacy. It is also in line with signature solution 2 of the UNDP Strategic Plan, 2018-2021, strengthen effective, inclusive and accountable governance. The portfolios are also supporting the achievement of SDGs 5 and 16.

**Financial overview.** Figure 5 provides an overview of spending during the evaluation period for the two interlinked portfolios. These two sectors amounted to a significant portion of overall UNDP spending for

**FIGURE 5. Financial overview, effective institutions and inclusive politics portfolio**



<sup>96</sup> UNDP, Annual Report, Community Security Project Q1-Q4 2015.

the period. Spending peaked in 2016 while UNDP was providing support to the preparation of the elections and has declined to a substantial degree subsequently. In part, this is the result of a decision by certain donors, including the European Union, the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DfID) and USAID, to devote a larger proportion of their resources to bilateral initiatives in the same field. In the effective institutions portfolio, it also reflects an apparent “fatigue” on the part of donors regarding the continuation of funding for core capacity development and infrastructure of the institutions of the Federal Government and the Federal Member States. Only 45 percent of the overall expenditure (\$118,570 million) for the two portfolios for the period is accounted for by effective institutions and State-building.

Two large projects, Strengthening Institutional Performance (SIP) and StEFS, came to an end early in 2019. Respectively, their overall expenditures were \$17,989,000 and \$20,161,000 (rounded). Though efforts were made to secure further donor support, SIP was not extended and has not been replaced in full. A successor project to StEFS, REFS 2018-2020, was launched at the end of 2018, but has a budget of only \$10.89 million. This latter project has been moved to the inclusive politics portfolio. The budget for JPLG has also declined from phase 1 to phase 2, to the current phase 3, despite a generally favourable response to the programme by donors and Somali partners.

**Donors and partners.** The single largest sources of funds for programming in effective institutions is the UNDP MPTF in Somalia. The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund has also been an important contributor to JPLG and has funded S2S. Among the donors identified as making specific contributions, the Governments of Sweden, Norway, Switzerland and Italy and the European Union have contributed to several projects. DfID and USAID have also made targeted contributions to projects within the portfolio. Two of the projects among those considered here are joint with other United Nations agencies and organizations. StEFS, now completed, was a partnership with UNSOM, as is its successor. The JPLG involves a broad-based partnership with

several agencies: ILO, UN-Habitat, United Nations Capital Development Fund and UNICEF. The principal partners have been as follows:

- For SIP: MOPIED, Ministry of Finance, Office of the Prime Minister, Office of the President, National Civil Service Commission, MOLSA, Ministry of Women and Family Affairs (MOWFA), and the Aid Coordination Unit, now with the Office of the Prime Minister. For the Government of Puntland: The Office of the President, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, the Civil Service Commission, the Ministry of Labor, Youth and Sports, Ministry of Women and Family Affairs and the Puntland Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Bureau.
- For StEFS: Ministry of Interior and Federal Affairs (MOIFA), the Boundaries and Federalization Commission, Office of the Prime Minister and the Governments of the newly emerging federal states.
- For JPLG: MOIFA and counterparts in Puntland, Somaliland and the newly emerging federal states, as well as the Office of the Vice-President in both Somaliland and Puntland, plus district councils and local administrations in Somaliland and all Federal Member States, including Puntland.
- For Stabilization: MOIFA at federal level and the ministries of interior at the level of the Federal Member States have been the implementing partners.

Under the inclusive politics portfolio, all the projects are joint projects with UNSOM and one is implemented with the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women). Most of the funds to the portfolio originate from the MPTF, with key donors being the Governments of Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Germany and the United Kingdom. Key Somali partners include:

- Elections support: National Independent Election Commission; MOIFA.

- Support to constitutional review: Ministry of Constitutional Affairs (MOCA); Joint Parliamentary Committee on Oversight and Constitutional Review; Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission.
- Parliamentary Support Project: National Federal Parliament (both Houses); Parliaments of Somaliland and Puntland; emerging state parliaments.
- Women's Political Participation and Gender and Women's Empowerment: Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development; Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (Somaliland); MOLSA; Ministry of Women Development and Family Affairs, Puntland and ministries dealing with women's affairs in the newly emerging federal states.
- REFS: MOIFA, the Boundaries and Federalization Commission, Office of the Prime Minister; governments of the newly emerging federal states.<sup>97</sup>

**Gender overview.** While all components addressed gender mainstreaming, gender equality was not central to any of the interventions under the effective institutions portfolio, with most interventions classified as GEN2 (please see finding 22). JPLG phase 3, which began in July 2018, is an exception as it has introduced a gender equality outcome, and has begun to cooperate closely with the UNDP Gender Adviser and WPP in work planning and developing a gender-sensitive approach.<sup>98</sup> The inclusive politics portfolio included a specific joint programme on gender issues and integrated gender into project plans. See finding 9 for details.

#### **Finding 6. Effective institutions. The three main projects within the effective institutions portfolio**

formed the core of the UNDP investment in State-building in Somalia, and together contributed substantially to the formation of State structures and governance processes at three levels of government.<sup>99</sup> All three projects made timely and effective contributions in the sphere of the production and adoption of relevant high-level policies and strategies. The portfolio also showed the ability to adapt and change course as circumstances required or as new, urgent priorities became apparent; and stakeholders confirmed that consultations took place at design and implementation stage.

The evaluation found that interventions under the portfolio enjoyed high levels of ownership, at both senior and technical levels. Government partners confirmed that they had provided vital support in building policy frameworks and core capacities at the federal government level in the Federal Member States and at local government level, within the highly fragmented and complex political context in Somalia (see section 1.3). Their support to building and rehabilitating facilities and supplying equipment has also been much appreciated. In addition, the projects have helped to shape the mechanisms to make federalism work. However, where results in the area of federalism are concerned, the effect of the UNDP contributions has been constrained by political conflict and the absence of elite consensus on many of the key issues.

SIP was the primary contributor at the Federal Government of Somalia level (along with Puntland), with its support complemented by that offered by StEFS on matters relating to federalism and reconciliation. Along with the World Bank, it helped the Federal Government of Somalia to shape its policy and strategic frameworks and key legislation, build its capacity and put in place the administrative

<sup>97</sup> The predecessor to REFS, StEFS, has been considered in detail in the effective institutions section of the report. REFS only began at the very end of the evaluation period and continues the work begun in the earlier project. It will be referred to in this section of the report, but will not be examined in detail.

<sup>98</sup> Recently, UNICEF and UNDP have been working on a concept note on gender-responsive local government in Somalia and Somaliland, while the programme has also supported the Ministry of Women's Development and Family Affairs of Puntland in producing guidelines on gender equality and responsiveness in local government.

<sup>99</sup> In a federal system, it is important to be careful, when writing of "levels of government" not to assume that the federal government is supreme in all matters. In Somalia, as in other federal jurisdictions, whatever the outcome of constitutional negotiations, powers and responsibilities will be divided between the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States.



structures and processes for several ministries and agencies, including MOPIED and the Civil Service Commission at the federal level and in Puntland. It also assisted the Office of the President and Office of the Prime Minister in establishing and organizing policy units. In Puntland, it facilitated the establishment of the Puntland Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Bureau, and supported it in preparing and securing Cabinet approval for three major policy documents.<sup>100</sup>

StEFS operated as a strong partnership between UNDP and the UNSOM Political Affairs and Mediation Group, and, with UNSOM taking the lead on substantive matters. The project delivered considerable resources to facilitate the building of federalism at both Federal Government and Federal Member States levels and the design of mechanisms for intergovernmental relations. The value of this contribution is confirmed by MOIFA, which credits it with supporting the development of the basic framework for federalism.<sup>101</sup> For the most part, these policies, structures and processes are now in abeyance, as a result of the continuing political standoff between the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States, including Puntland, over issues relating to resource- and revenue-sharing, among others. Substantial funding was devoted to construction and rehabilitation of essential facilities and organizational structures for newly formed state governments, which, at the outset, had very little to work with.<sup>102</sup> Finally, with UNSOM Political Affairs once again it is recognized for its particular contribution to reconciliation in the state formation process in Hirshabelle and Galmadug.<sup>103</sup>

JPLG, working with MOIFA and its counterparts in the Federal Member States and Somaliland, has supported the building of a legislative, policy and administrative framework for local government.

It has achieved results in terms of building local government structures and district councils. Its approach to capacity development has been systematic and the presence of technical advisers at local administration level, supported by the project, has been important in building local capacities and ensuring that the new local institutions were able to perform essential devolved governance functions. The programme also built up the local government departments of the respective ministries of interior and helped put in place decentralization policies, along with the necessary enabling legislation and regulations for local governance. The evaluation was also able to confirm that it also supported the forging of strong working relationships between local administrations and district councils on the one hand, and the local government departments of the Federal Member States on the other.<sup>104</sup>

The interventions by the effective institutions projects have taken a strategic approach in working with governments on priority-setting and in ensuring that support is directed to the most essential areas of governance policy. In some spheres, including the NDP, Federal Member States strategic planning, intergovernmental coordination and decentralization policy, the projects have also demonstrated a recognition of the need to follow through from policy development to implementation. SIP had also done this in the case of aid coordination mechanisms and policy, though with mixed results (see finding 20). JPLG has supported the preparation and adoption of local government laws in Somaliland and Puntland, as well as in South West State, Jubaland, Hirshabelle and Galmudug. The laws set out the allocation of functions and responsibilities and reduces the potential for future conflict. Among other things, StEFS contributed, with mixed results, to the establishment of governance structures and core policy frame-

<sup>100</sup> Namely the Public Service Delivery Charter, Public Complaints Mechanism and the Civil Service Code of Conduct (SIP Final Report, 2019, p.8.), and evaluation interviews.

<sup>101</sup> Interviews conducted by the evaluation team.

<sup>102</sup> Evaluation interviews: Joint Evaluation of SIP and StEFS, pp.57-58.

<sup>103</sup> Joint Evaluation of SIP and StEFS, December 2017, p.48.

<sup>104</sup> Confirmed in evaluation team meetings with Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States representatives, and national consultant interviews in Puntland and Somaliland.



works and the preparation of strategic development plans for four Federal Member States.<sup>105</sup>

In terms of adaptive management, SIP was able to respond to the request from the political leadership of the Federal Government of Somalia to support and facilitate the production of the first NDP for Somalia for 30 years. Although it was certainly consistent with the project's objective, the initiative had not been in the Government's political agenda at the time of the planning and approval of SIP. It was therefore a considerable challenge to find the funds within the project budget to provide technical consultants, inputs from international experts and national staff, along with resources to support extensive consultations, including sessions with the diaspora in Western Europe and North America. However, project management and UNDP senior managers, as well as the donors supporting the project, all determined that SIP should provide the necessary support.<sup>106</sup>

StEFS is credited by representatives of state government as responding very directly to their needs, and making space for meeting emerging needs, wherever possible. The most notable examples of rapid response are found in the area of peacebuilding and reconciliation. Where significant interclan or sub-clan conflicts flared up, the project proved capable of fielding teams of UNSOM experts very rapidly, as a result of some highly efficient logistics and technical support.

Both SIP and StEFS were supportive of government approaches to consultations, and these reportedly took place for most draft policies, strategies and laws, while JPLG built engagement with local communities.<sup>107</sup> However, one of the difficulties arising stemmed from the government preference to keep consultations private, with no reports made available on what transpired. This resulted in a state of

affairs where MOPIED organized extensive consultations on the NDP, but where some key stakeholders, most notably the Federal Member States, felt that they were not consulted and donors feel that they are not involved.

**Finding 7. Effective institutions – stabilization.** Support to stabilization has been a valuable component of the international efforts to stabilize newly liberated areas. UNDP has played a central, if low-key, role in enabling the Somali Government to progress the roll-out of local governance in liberated areas. Its added value has been the injection of management capacity into the Somali Government. UNDP adapted well during the life of S2S to changing context. However, the evaluation cannot rigorously assess the impact of UNDP programming on actual stabilization outcomes because of a lack of evaluation evidence and monitoring information.

S2S (2014-2018) and S2S II (2019- ) focused on creating the capacity within the Somali Government to design and deliver stabilization activities that would lead to the introduction of effective local government structures and peacebuilding initiatives. By injecting capacity into MOIFA at the federal and member state levels, overseeing the channeling of funds through Somali government systems and sponsoring a range of local peacebuilding, reconciliation and governance initiatives, the UNDP project has delivered some results.<sup>108</sup> The policy and operational context evolved significantly during the life of S2S and UNDP adapted well to the changing circumstances. Significant changes in the policy context included the creation of the Wadajir framework and the formation of Federal Member States, and the creation of the CAS and the Community Recovery and Extension of State Authority and Accountability (CRESTA/A) structures within the aid architecture. Operationally, UNDP adjusted to the need to shift from direct implementation to

<sup>105</sup> Joint Evaluation, pp.59-63. On the contributions and limitations of the capacity injection process in the Federal Member States, see Ibid pp.59-63, and TPM reports on StEFS in South West State and Jubaland, July 2017, and in Galmudug, September 2017.

<sup>106</sup> Interview and correspondence with Portfolio Manager; SIP 2015-2019, Final Report, Introduction.

<sup>107</sup> Interviews with senior officials in the Federal Government of Somalia and Puntland; Joint midterm evaluation of SIP and StEFS; annual reports for all three projects.

<sup>108</sup> Evaluation team interviews with Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States officials and non-United Nations donor representatives.

national implementation and successfully oversaw verification of the national window funding model.

The injection by S2S of capacity into MOIFA at national and state levels did contribute to the Somali Government's ability to develop and implement coordination frameworks and strategies. Progress has included the convening of national-level stabilization meetings, development of national and local stabilization plans and financing for state-level stabilization and community liaison personnel.<sup>109</sup> The project also succeeded in helping MOIFA to pioneer the use of the national window approach, a good example of how UNDP can help the Somali Government fix the "invisible plumbing" of the government system, and so take more ownership of the delivery agenda. In the districts, S2S assisted local aspects of stabilization including improving contextual understanding, preparations for district council formation, and conflict management through district peace and stability committees and continuation of the Soyden work and other community-level reconciliation activities.

However, it has not been possible for the evaluation team to assess the results of stabilization programming at the outcome level. In relation to the CSP and Y4C projects, which preceded S2S, the evaluation team noted no evidence of independent evaluations of these projects, and minimal institutional knowledge within UNDP of the results of this work. Reporting by the implementers and project teams noted positive results in the production of analyses, conduct of community activities<sup>110</sup> and training

provided to people at risk.<sup>111</sup> The alternative dispute resolution work was effectively sustained and transitioned into the rule of law programme, with positive impacts on the rule of law in Puntland, but no evidence that subsequent programmes had built on these previous programmes is available. For instance, S2S and also the United Nations CRESTA/A team have recently undertaken district-level analyses but these did not build on the prior investment in the analytical capacity of OCPV.<sup>112</sup> Furthermore, there is no evidence that work with communities or individuals at risk under S2S or preventing and countering violent extremism (PCVE) has built on lessons from initiatives such as Soyden or Y4C.

S2S itself was subject to a third-party evaluation commissioned by MOIFA.<sup>113</sup> The evaluation documents activities undertaken but the only judgment that it makes about outcomes is that "the project did indeed create a general environment of development between the participating stakeholders and beneficiaries" and "provision of quality services to the ultimate beneficiaries was most noticeable in cases of building confidence and trust in public institutions and empowerment of communities."<sup>114</sup> The January 2019 Peacebuilding Fund Project Progress Report, meanwhile, focused on activities, including preparation of stabilization plans, provision of funds to districts allowing conflict management activities to be funded, putting in place conflict management structures at the local level, and support to local government formation processes. UNSOM CRESTA/A, which uses a Fragility

<sup>109</sup> Evaluation team interviews with Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States officials and non-United Nations donor representatives and anecdotal observations about the benefits of such activities on local conflicts and governance but the evaluation team did not find any reporting that analysed relationships between these activities and desired stabilization outcomes.

<sup>110</sup> Somali Youth Development Network, Final Evaluation Report, June 2017.

<sup>111</sup> For example, in Y4C Phase II, which ended in 2015, the project provided support to 500 adults and 592 youths and in Phase III, which ran through 2016, the project registered 160 "delinquent" youths and provided them with training and mentoring. Youth for Change Phase II, Final Report, September 2015; Youth for Change Phase III Final Report, 1 January 2017. Evaluations and tracer studies of Youth for Change, similar projects on which Y4C was based, conducted in 2012, had indicated some positive impacts on the scheme participants but a range of implementation concerns. Evaluation of the Youth at Risk project, Final Report December 2012.

<sup>112</sup> The OCPV was regarded as a flagship investment in local analytical capacity, building an evidence base around conflict and security, so it is surprising that more recent initiatives to measure security and stability at the district level, such as the FIMM reports, did not build on this investment in any discernible manner. The result of this loss of institutional memory is that, in 2019, there is still no reliable, multi-year time-series analysis of the situation in districts targeted for stabilization.

<sup>113</sup> Somatech, End of S2S Project Evaluation Report, 24 May 2019. Note that other donors in the stabilization space claim little visibility of S2S activity. This is however perhaps a sign of success since S2S is designed to inject capacity and funds into the Somali government rather than via a United Nations-flagged mechanism.

<sup>114</sup> Somatech, End of S2S Project Evaluation Report, 24 May 2019, p.4.

Index and Maturity Model (FIMM) to assess levels of security, governance, social cohesion and community recovery, did produce an updated assessment in July 2019, but due to changes in its methodology, there is no time-series analysis allowing us to track outcome-level progress since 2015. Furthermore, as the FIMM report notes, “it would be difficult to isolate and establish causal links between the indicators of progress in the community recovery focus area and many programmes funded by donors.”<sup>115</sup>

In sum, S2S has usefully injected capacity and funds into the Somalia government system, and thus provided an enabling environment for stabilization planning, and has supported local work on governance and peacebuilding,<sup>116</sup> but it is not possible to comment on the relationship between these activities and stabilization outcomes. It should be a priority for UNDP to address this gap by putting in place effective evaluation approaches that track outcomes over time and analyse the correlative and causal relationships between these and UNDP stabilization projects.

**Finding 8. Inclusive politics.** The portfolio targeted support to institutions and political processes which are critical to the formation of a fully equipped modern State, providing timely and effective contributions in the sphere of the production and adoption of relevant high-level policies and strategies (e.g., electoral law). There was a consistent effort to ensure that consultations took place with Somali counterparts, but efforts were stymied by major political barriers and the portfolio struggled to respond to urgent needs of government counterparts and to maintain close relations with donors.

More than all the others with the exception of rule of law, the inclusive politics portfolio operated in

highly sensitive areas, where issues of representation, accountability and inclusion would frequently come to the fore. All the projects have at times hit a wall of inaction and unwillingness of partners to proceed, sometimes as a result of decisions made at the highest level, and sometimes because of inter- and intra-institutional disputes. During the first phase of the projects in the inclusive politics portfolio, ending in 2017, the focus for the Parliament, constitutional review and elections support projects was on building the relevant institutional and legal frameworks and providing support to ensure that the institutions supported could undertake the basic functions required in their various mandates.

In addition to its work to build the National Independent Election Commission (NIEC) and its network of regional offices, as well as to prepare the draft electoral law, the Elections Support Project supported the preparation of the 2016 parliamentary and presidential “elections.” The United Nations Integrated Elections Support Group (IESG) was obliged to manage a less-than-ideal process, based on a sharing of seats among clans and subclans, which was characterized by corruption, irregularities and mismanagement. The election/selection process was by no means free and fair,<sup>117</sup> but it did preserve the peace and facilitate a peaceful transition of power.<sup>118</sup>

IESG was given credit for adjusting rapidly to difficult conditions, for managing effectively and efficiently with a limited budget, ensuring that the process stayed on track, and for introducing some principles of sound electoral organization. Despite reservations about the process, the effort was regarded as a success by the international community and as legitimate by the political class and clan leaders, if not necessarily by the broader population.<sup>119</sup> Since the electoral process did not feature a

<sup>115</sup> The United Nations CRESTA/A Fragility Index and Maturity Model July 2019, p.4.

<sup>116</sup> Though it is important to note that there have been other donor advisory inputs alongside S2S into MOIFA and that the UNDP work is an integral part of a wider donor effort coordinated by the United Nations CRESTA/A architecture.

<sup>117</sup> Final Report on Somalia’s 2016-17 Electoral Process, 2017, Domestic Observer Mission, SAFERWORLD, London, PUNSA (Garowe) and SOSSENSA, Mogadishu, funded by DANIDA; In Search of a Workable 2020 Electoral Model, Op.Cit; and, for example, Jeffrey Gentleman, “Fueled by Bribes, Somalia’s Election Seen as Milestone of Corruption”, New York Times, 7 February 2017.

<sup>118</sup> See Final Report on Somalia’s 2016-17 Electoral Process, 2017, Domestic Observer Mission, SAFERWORLD, London, PUNSA (Garowe) and SOSSENSA, Mogadishu, funded by DANIDA; and In Search of a Workable 2020 Electoral Model, Op.Cit.

<sup>119</sup> Interviews conducted for evaluation with donors, Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States representatives, UNDP and United Nations staff members, including national staff.

conventional election with associated rules, regulations and procedures and respect for the principle of “one person, one vote”, it was determined that NIEC, which had been established to manage elections based on universal suffrage, would play no part in the exercise.

Subsequently, during 2017-2018, in collaboration with the NIEC, the IESG began preparations for the 2020 election with an action plan, along with nationwide consultations on requirements and challenges to be met in conducting the steps leading up to the election.<sup>120</sup> However, the Federal Government of Somalia Parliament has yet to pass the electoral law, and no action has been taken on the Government’s earlier commitment (May 2017 at the London Conference on Somalia) to hold “general universal suffrage elections” by 2021.<sup>121</sup> As a result of the absence of an electoral law and the lack of movement on the Government’s implementation of its commitment for 2020, it has not been possible for the NIEC to begin the sequence of essential work leading up to the elections, beginning with voter registration, since donors are unwilling to provide any support for preparations until the Government acts. Hence, the NIEC remains completely untested, with no opportunity to gain practical, hands-on experience. According to election experts, the time required to complete the preparatory steps prior to the election proper is at least 12 months. Voter registration, done properly, particularly in the challenging Somali context, would be expected to be a lengthy process, but also a vital opportunity for the NIEC to build its practical capabilities. Clearly, time is running out for the announcement of the election and for the lead time required to make it work.<sup>122</sup>

The PSP succeeded in working with its partners to put in place the overall policy and administrative framework<sup>123</sup> along with rules and procedures

to enable the legislative bodies to conduct normal operations. Considerable attention was given to developing detailed training plans suitable to the learning needs and capabilities of staff, senior officials and elected representatives. The project partnered with a reform-minded Speaker in the Federal Parliament, who had a vision of how the institution would play its role in governance and looked to UNDP to support him in realizing the vision. Similarly, in Somaliland, parliamentary leadership demonstrated a firm commitment to reform. This was less the case in Puntland, where political difficulties held back progress.<sup>124</sup>

All the partner institutions supported are extremely positive about the scope and quality of support provided. With strong leadership, the unicameral Ninth Federal Parliament in Mogadishu and its counterparts in Somaliland and Puntland, though less so in the latter case, were able to take decisive action in moving ahead with legislation and parliamentary operations, including the passage and adoption of government budgets. In addition, the project supported construction, facility upgrades and provision of equipment. The project has however now lost much of its funding and is now restricted in the level and form of support it is able to provide (see finding 10).

Though the Support to Constitutional Review project (SCR),<sup>125</sup> the portfolio supported the creation of MOCA in Mogadishu, along with more modest levels of support for counterparts established in the Federal Member States, and supported the Oversight Committee of the Federal Parliament and Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission (ICRIC). All facets of the establishment of ICRIC, including construction and equipping of its facilities, had been supported by UNDP. Like many other special commissions in Somalia, it had nine

<sup>120</sup> See United Nations Electoral Support Project, Annual Report 2018, p.2.

<sup>121</sup> The commitment was renewed in an agreement between the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States in November 2017, and in the Federal Government of Somalia Council of Ministers’ 2020 Political Roadmap (January 2018). See United Nations Electoral Support Project Document, December 2017, “Development Challenge”. P. 6; see also: Annual Report 2018, p.3.

<sup>122</sup> Evaluation interviews.

<sup>123</sup> Confirmed in interviews and as presented in the Final Evaluation of Parliamentary Support Project, 2013-2017.

<sup>124</sup> See Ibid for discussion of leadership factors during the period of the 9th Parliament.

<sup>125</sup> Formerly named the Constitutional Review and Implementation Support Project.



members, with its composition being determined by the “4.5 formula”.<sup>126</sup> Its role has been a technical one, to scrutinize and provide commentary on draft chapters of the constitution. Together, MOCA, the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Oversight and Constitutional Review and ICRIC formed the team responsible for preparing drafts to be considered by the political leadership and to form the basis on which national consultations could take place. The project worked to ensure the adequate functioning of the three stakeholders in draft preparation. In addition, support was extended to facilitate the creation of the Technical Expert Working Group to provide more scrutiny of draft chapters in a retreat setting. An initial draft was presented by the Parliamentary Committee to the Federal Parliament in February 2016. However, at the PSG 1 (Inclusive Politics) meeting of June 2016, it was agreed that no further work would take place until after the completion of the electoral process, and the project closed at that time.<sup>127</sup> The new government and the leadership of the tenth Parliament indicated that the earlier draft should be discarded and that work should begin again on a new version.

The project re-emerged in 2017, and a memorandum of understanding was prepared, clarifying the roles of the three partner organizations, along with a road map, prepared at the direction of the President on the process which would guide the constitutional review. The project supported the three partners, as before, and the review of the complete “zero draft” was completed during August 2019, but, given the current stalemate between the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States, no further action has been taken. However, MOCA Ministers from the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States have continued to meet in the MOCA Forum, supported by the project, as have rep-

resentatives of the Parliamentary Oversight Committees from the two levels of government.<sup>128</sup>

Government partners have commented negatively on the slowness of the UNDP response to new requests for initiating support, even where the items are covered in the annual workplan and the approved budget. One major government partner indicated that when there is an unanticipated and urgent need for support on a major issue or challenge, it has learned that it cannot rely on UNDP and therefore turns to implementors of bilateral projects to fill the gap. Understandably, PSP has also struggled to define its role in the face of severely constrained resources and the emergence of bilateral projects in the same sphere. The Upper House complains bitterly about being given little support and poor communications from the project.

Donors have also expressed concern at the failure of some projects, notably PSP and SCR, to adapt to the political circumstances which have led to a halt on core activities aimed at producing results. The projects have maintained the same or similar levels of expenditure, even though no progress can be made in pursuing results. Except for the elections support and WPP projects, which have remained close to donors and meet with them on a monthly basis and more frequently during election periods, donor representatives also express concerns over weak, activity-based reporting and a lack of responsiveness and poor communications on the part of portfolio and project management to concerns raised. There are reports that donor officials have been obliged to bring their issues to the attention of the Resident Coordinator in order to get resolution.<sup>129</sup> The result is that a number of donors have opted to support these processes through bilateral contributions.<sup>130</sup>

<sup>126</sup> On the 4.5 formula, see Somalia: In Search of a Workable 2020 Electoral Model, The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, Mogadishu, 2019, p.10. See also United Nations Somalia, The Journey to 24%: Documenting Lessons from Women’s Political Participation during Somalia’s 2016 Electoral Process, not dated. In 2000, an indirect election/selection procedure, based on the clan-based 4.5 power-sharing formula was adopted for the sharing of seats in the Transitional National Assembly. This was the occasion for the introduction of the formula.

<sup>127</sup> Constitutional Review Support Project, Annual Progress Report, 2016.

<sup>128</sup> Constitutional Review Support Project Newsletter, June-August 2019.

<sup>129</sup> Evaluation interviews and correspondence shared under confidentiality.

<sup>130</sup> For example, by supporting the Max Planck Foundation (<http://www.mpfpr.de/projects/country-based-projects/somalia/>) or other organizations through parallel initiatives.

**Finding 9.** Gender in effective institutions and inclusive politics. The interventions in the effective institutions portfolio have attempted to mainstream gender equality with dedicated activities geared to enhancing women’s capacities and their representation in decision-making positions. However, results accomplished have been limited largely to policies adopted, rather than their implementation, and to enhanced representation without an improved presence for women in decision-making, except for more recent interventions under JPLG, which is now addressing the issue.<sup>131</sup> Inclusive politics has achieved limited success in terms of integration of gender equality concerns into project plans and efforts to support gender mainstreaming with government partners, with one exception, WPP, which is the only project dedicated to gender equality and women’s empowerment and is highly valued by women’s organizations. The projects providing support to constitutional review and Parliament paid very limited attention to matters related to gender equality and women’s empowerment and demonstrated weak integration of gender equality into overall project planning. Like WPP, election support is rated highly for effort and for effective integration of gender equality and women’s empowerment into project plans and projected results.

JPLG phases I and II failed to deliver on gender equality. After the completion of the second evaluation in December 2015, programme management undertook a thorough gender audit and as a result, recognized the limitations of earlier approaches to integrate gender in programming.<sup>132</sup> For JPLG phase III (2018-2023), the programme has introduced a

gender equality outcome and begun to cooperate closely with the UNDP Gender Adviser and WPP in work planning and developing a gender-sensitive approach.<sup>133</sup> One result of the commitment to working with district councils to enhance women’s involvement in decision-making is a much higher level of participation by women in community discussions of how infrastructure fund allocations (through the Local Development Fund, supported by the project) should be spent. With stronger engagement by women, despite initial resistance, in several communities there has been a substantial increase in the number of projects supporting schools and health clinics, as compared with road building and improvements, the number one priority for men.<sup>134</sup>

StEFS made consistent efforts to ensure that the target of 30 percent participation of women in project activities was met and, by and large, succeeded.<sup>135</sup> More specifically, 30 percent of technical advisers, staff officers and interns supported were women, although men dominated as consultants. The target of 30 percent of government staff members trained through the project was also met.<sup>136</sup> Women’s participation in six “inclusive consultations” on federalism averaged 47 percent.<sup>137</sup> However, the evaluation found no evidence that increased participation led to systemic or lasting change in the position of women’s vis-à-vis access to decision-making circles.

SIP allocated resources to supporting the federal Ministry of Women and Human Rights and the Puntland Ministry of Women and Family Affairs Assistance, including the development of gen-

<sup>131</sup> While the achievement of 24 percent representation by women in the Federal Government of Somalia Parliament stands out as an important breakthrough, for now its significance is largely symbolic. There have been sustained efforts to build their capacities and an appreciation on their part of the potential role of the Women’s Caucus. Despite this, beholden to the clan elders who selected them, the women representatives are finding it difficult to work together on issues of importance to women across clan lines. Source: Interviews conducted for the evaluation, and gender equality and women’s empowerment final evaluation, 2017.

<sup>132</sup> Final Evaluation of JPLG 1, Part 1, March 2014 and midterm review of JPLG 2, December 2015.

<sup>133</sup> Recently, UNICEF and UNDP have been working on a concept note on gender-responsive local government in Somalia and Somaliland, while the programme has also supported the Ministry of Women’s Development and Family Affairs of Puntland in producing guidelines on gender equality and gender-responsiveness in local government.

<sup>134</sup> Interviews with national and local project staff, and with informants in Somaliland and Puntland.

<sup>135</sup> According to gender-disaggregated data provided in the project’s annual reports for 2017 and 2018. See also the combined midterm evaluation of SIP and StEFS, December 2017, for an assessment of the project’s performance re: gender equality, pp. 63-65.

<sup>136</sup> StEFS Annual Report 2018 and evaluation interviews.

<sup>137</sup> StEFS Annual Report 2017 and evaluation interviews.



der mainstreaming guidelines and a toolkit to support implementation for Puntland; a strategic plan for the federal Ministry, along with a gender mainstreaming approach to be deployed in the Federal Government of Somalia and support for gender focal points throughout the government;<sup>138</sup> organization of a high-level workshop to facilitate input from women's organizations to the NDP; and the provision of furnishings and equipment for the federal Ministry's new facilities.<sup>139</sup> In addition, the project supported placement of eight female interns in government ministries in the Federal Government of Somalia and Puntland.<sup>140</sup>

WPP has focused on advocacy in terms of social attitudes as well as policy and the legal framework. In conjunction with many other projects, including election support, as well with domestic NGOs and other United Nations and International organizations, WPP was successful in achieving the 24 percent women's representation in the 2016 elections.<sup>141</sup>

It has continued to support women parliamentarians, as well as women's affairs ministries in Somaliland and Puntland. It has also engaged with civil society in building awareness of critical issues including gender-based violence and female genital mutilation (FGM), and has been effective in its work at community level through utilizing the community capacity enhancement methodology.<sup>142</sup> WPP has supported women's affairs ministries and women's organizations, including the Women's Caucus of the Federal Parliament, in advocating for gender-sensitive legislative laws and policies, including the Constitution, the Electoral Act and the Law on Sexual Offences. Bills on FGM were sub-

mitted to parliament in Puntland and Somaliland, and a Sexual Offence Bill passed into law in both states.<sup>143</sup> According to the final evaluation of gender equality and women's empowerment, it was determined that in Puntland, the number of sexual violence cases taken to trial has increased following the adoption of the new law.<sup>144</sup>

Yet, while there have been successes, the project's effectiveness has been limited by its scattered approach to utilizing its resources and its failure to build links across activities.<sup>145</sup> The absence of a capacity development strategy and a focused theory of change resulted in an inability on the part of the project to follow up on many worthwhile initiatives, thus reducing the prospect of achieving potential longer-term results. In addition, evaluation interviews highlighted a separation of activities implemented by its principal United Nations agency partners, UN-Women and UNDP (see also finding 10 below). The evaluation notes that in the past year, with the guidance of the newly appointed UNDP Gender Adviser, who is also adviser to the project, WPP has begun to adopt a more systematic approach, while adopting a broader perspective on "women leaders", focusing more on community leaders and less on "elite women".

**Finding 10. Inclusive politics.** After a very positive beginning in the first part of the evaluation period, relations between UNDP and the UNSOM Political Affairs and Mediation Group have become difficult, except in the sphere of elections support. Relations with UN-Women are also challenging. This has been to the detriment of effective project implementation (see finding 9) and has affected the relations of joint programmes with Somali partners.

<sup>138</sup> One of the constraints faced by the project – and this has been the case in many other countries – is the lack of recognition, resources and authority for the designated gender focal points.

<sup>139</sup> SIP, 2015-2019 Final Report, pp.40-41 and evaluation interviews.

<sup>140</sup> One of the young women was posted to the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation in Puntland. Subsequently, she was selected as a member of permanent staff through a competition organized by the World Bank, and now serves as Director of Finance in the Ministry. Evaluation interviews.

<sup>141</sup> See Gender equality and women's empowerment, Final Evaluation Report, not dated (2017=2018?), pp.19-20 and p.42. For an internal United Nations Somalia review of the struggle to reach 24 percent, see United Nations Somalia, The Journey to 24%: Documenting Lessons from Women's Political Participation during Somalia's 2016 Electoral Process, 2017.

<sup>142</sup> Gender equality and women's empowerment final evaluation, not dated, executive summary.

<sup>143</sup> Evaluation report of Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment project, 2017.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid.

<sup>145</sup> See discussion of efficiency and effectiveness of the project in the Gender equality and women's empowerment final evaluation report.

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## BOX 4. Key factors contributing to and/or hindering results, effective institutions and inclusive politics portfolio

### Contributing:

- Relevance to priorities of Somali authorities at all levels
- Established and trusted presence across Somalia
- Adaptability to changing Somali and donor context
- Strong partnerships with government ministries and shared commitment to clear objectives
- Effective and mutually supportive linkages with other projects, programmes and organizations
- Close collaboration among United Nations agencies and with UNSOM in supporting objectives for gender equality and women's empowerment

### Hindering:

- Decrease in coordination with UNSOM and government counterparts
  - Donor relations and establishment of parallel projects
  - Limited capacity of partner government ministries
  - Lack of focus in project design and absence of a theory of change to guide priority-setting, resulting in a poor fit between the allocation of project resources and expected results
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Initially, inclusive politics was co-located with the Political Affairs and Mediation Group, as is still the case with the large Integrated Elections Support Group (11 staff members from UNDP, 39 from UNSOM and 2 UNDP staff who are cost-shared with other projects). In 2017, this ended. This and other disagreements led to a distancing of UNDP from its United Nations partners, with the exception of the Joint Programme on Elections. Whereas formerly, meetings with Somali partners would be shared with an agenda discussed in advance, this no longer happens. UN-Women and UNDP operated separately during the implementation of WPP (see finding 9), and in 2018 internal problems at UN-Women (absence of staff in both Mogadishu and Nairobi) led to delays in project implementation of several months.<sup>146</sup> While funds were eventually reprogrammed for 2019, this was noticed by the Somali partners and damaged the United Nations reputation for reliability. Additionally, there have been difficulties in the relationship between

UNDP and UNSOM on WPP. The result has been that UNDP works alone with the Ministry for Women and Human Rights Development while UNSOM and its gender adviser work with other partners.

## 2.4 Rule of law

**Context.** UNDP support for the rule of law has long been established in Somalia,<sup>147</sup> especially in Somaliland and Puntland where the security and political environments have been more stable. The conceptual model and delivery pattern for the UNDP and wider United Nations approach to policing and justice has remained relatively consistent since the previous governance and rule of law programme (2012-2015)<sup>148</sup> but was adjusted in the 2015-2018 period in response to changing political and constitutional circumstances, and to lessons learned in how to organize rule-of-law programming within the United Nations system. One of the notable developments since 2018 has been the rapid expansion

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<sup>146</sup> Evaluation interviews and project reports.

<sup>147</sup> Three rule of law and security programmes spanned the period 2002-2011, followed by the Governance and Rule of Law Programme 2011-2015.

<sup>148</sup> Evaluation, UNDP Somalia Projects 2012-2015 Access to Justice, UNDP Access to Justice Programme Civilian Policing, UNDP Somalia, July 2015.

sion of rule of law interventions beyond main cities into rural districts.

While at times organized under different headings and structures, and with different emphases, the thrust of the UNDP policing and justice approach has been consistent, was largely reflected in the 2015-2018 Joint Rule of Law Programme and has been carried through into the successor programmes that began in 2018, notably the Joint Police Programme and Joint Justice Programme. The approach has been to support legal and regulatory frameworks including revisions to the police act; to provide the formal courts, police and their oversight bodies (ministries of justice and internal security) with basic operational capabilities such as vehicles; to build management and oversight capacity in relation to strategic planning, operational management, and inspection regimes;<sup>149</sup> to deliver better services, for instance, through mobile courts in remote areas, community police stations in population centres, and specialized sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) units; to directly support the provision of legal aid and alternative dispute resolution so as to widen access to justice; to increase the capacity of the legal sector through education; and to raise awareness among citizens and justice and police service providers of legal rights and responsibilities.


**Relevance to national priorities.** The interventions grouped under the rule of law portfolio in Somalia are relevant to Somali national priorities in three ways: (1) in line with the NDP pillars on rule of law and on human rights; (2) in line with the CAS strands on internal security (2B), justice (2C) and PCVE (4); and (3) more recently, they are in line with the Federal Government of Somalia's Road Map on Security and Justice (2017-2020), coordinated by the Office of the Prime Minister. In Somaliland, the rule of law programme is in support of Somaliland's National Vision 2030 and, more specifically, Somaliland's National Development Plan II (2017-2021), pillar 3 on good governance, in particular focusing on security, rule of law, justice and human rights.

The balanced approach of frameworks adopted by UNDP and supply- and demand-side work have tried to build trust and legitimacy in formal government rule of law institutions, to compete with al-Shabaab alternatives, and to provide increased security and access to justice for Somali citizens, especially vulnerable groups such as women. Work on PCVE is an obvious necessity in Somalia and the 2017 national strategy provides a policy foundation on which to build.

**Relevance to the UNDP mandate.** The rule of law portfolio is in line with area 2 of the UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017, Citizen expectations for voice, development, the rule of law and accountability are met by stronger systems of democratic governance; and with signature solution 2 of the Strategic Plan 2018-2021, "strengthen effective, inclusive and accountable governance ... [including] rule of law, anti-corruption capacities and access to justice." In addition, the rule of law portfolio directly supports SDG 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions.

**Financial overview.** The significant gap between amounts budgeted and amounts spent from 2015-2017 came about because the initial design of the Joint Rule of Law Programme exceeded donor appetite and the programme faced execution delays.

**FIGURE 6. Financial overview, rule of law portfolio**



<sup>149</sup> Through both capacity injection at the ministerial level and by training and systems.

Overall, the gaps between amounts budgeted in annual workplans and amounts spent reflect delays in release of funds to and from the MPTF.

**Gender overview.** All the interventions were classified as GEN2, with one exception (Support to Somali Police Force, GEN1). Please see finding 22, cross-cutting sections, for an analysis of use of gender marker. In a very challenging environment for gender equality, the rule of law portfolio did a creditable job of addressing the issue. Highlights included the education and deployment of female Somali lawyers into justice and security institutions; the successful targeting of SGBV through support to legal aid and to SGBV policing and prosecutorial initiatives;<sup>150</sup> the promotion of women's voices in security and justice issues through civil society institutions; and support to the ministries of women and human rights to advocate and legislate for the rights of women. However, the fact that, for instance, women are still turning to al-Shabaab courts for justice indicates how much more needs to be done to ensure that the state and formal rule of law system caters for women's' needs.

**Finding 11.** The long duration of the rule of law programme has meant that medium-term initiatives have had time to bear fruit, particularly in Somaliland and Puntland. The Joint Rule of Law Programme delivered tangible improvements at the activity and output levels in access to justice, and judicial and police capacity. However, the absence of data means that it is not possible to rigorously assess the overall impact of rule of law programmes, despite the large sums spent on them.

Consistent support for the law schools in Hargeisa and Puntland universities has developed a generation of young lawyers who now serve as agents of change in the judiciary, police and legal professions. Legal aid and alternative dispute resolution mecha-

nisms established by UNDP in Somaliland and Puntland have also developed local credibility that bodes well for their sustainability.<sup>151</sup> After many years of stability and international assistance, the capacity of police and judicial institutions in Puntland and Somaliland have developed relatively far, compared, for instance, to the emerging Federal Member States, which are starting from a very low institutional base.

At the level of activities and outputs, the 2015-2018 Joint Rule of Law Programme and its successors, the Joint Justice and Joint Police Programmes, have contributed to tangible increases in capacity and in the delivery of justice and policing. Tangible achievements were recorded in access to justice, notably for women, development of both formal and alternative justice systems and development of police operational capability across the country. Overall, since 2015, the Joint Rule of Law Programme, Joint Police Programme and Joint Justice Programme have succeeded in strengthening the presence of government police and justice institutions across the country.<sup>152</sup> While the state police and justice presence is strongest in urban areas, it has expanded into more remote areas too. In addition, given that Somalia is likely to retain a pluralist legal system for the foreseeable future, progress was made in connecting the sharia and customary systems to the state system and addressing some of the inequities for women in the customary system.

For the justice system, numerical targets, as defined in the final results framework, were met or exceeded in the 2015-2018 period. These included preparation of laws and regulations; building judicial capability (training of personnel, setting up of a case management system, equipment); provision of mobile courts and court inspection regimes; and support to legal aid providers and alternative dispute resolution houses. For the police, achievements included refurbishment of police stations,

<sup>150</sup> Long-term support to the One Stop center for SGBV victims at Hargeisa hospital and support to legal aid providers in Somaliland and Puntland have had notable and tangible impacts on access to justice for vulnerable groups.

<sup>151</sup> Evaluation team interviews with law schools, graduates, employers, and users of legal aid services.

<sup>152</sup> Evaluation team interviews with Somali officials at federal and state level, with front-line service providers – police, judges, lawyers, and with donors and implementing partners. Administrative data from reliable Somali or third-party sources remain limited but this judgement is also based on data made available by Somali authorities (e.g., changes over time in numbers of cases taken to court across Somaliland or cases reported to police in Hargeisa).

supply of equipment, establishment of community policing forums, roll-out of training and development of national- and state-level technical coordination committees and policing plans.<sup>153</sup>

Systematically assessing the results of rule of law interventions at the outcome and impact levels is difficult due to a paucity of rigorous time-series data collected by the United Nations, Somali authorities or other donors. Despite many years work on rule of law in Somalia, and considerable research that has been undertaken on policing, justice and security, UNDP and its Somali and international partners remain unable to produce detailed evidence on the impact of rule of law interventions in building public trust and confidence in the police and justice system, shifting public support from insurgents to the Government or in reducing crime rates. Hence, it is impossible to say confidently whether rule of law has improved over this period or whether Somali citizens feel safer or better served.

According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators<sup>154</sup> published by the World Bank (see table 2

below), cited in the UNDP country plan and presented in the table, there has been little discernible progress on rule of law. There is positive data in some areas, for instance on the increased use of formal courts by citizens, and UNDP did good work in the past on supporting Somali analytical capabilities such as the OCPV.<sup>155</sup>

Within UNDP, until recently, however, there has been little effort to measure progress at this level. The 2015 review of the governance and rule of law programme focused on outputs and activities.<sup>156</sup> While the 2017 review of the Joint Rule of Law Programme nominally focused on outcomes, it noted the difficulty in doing so, observing that: “donors and national stakeholders have had difficulties in properly assessing the measure and impact of the Programme.”<sup>157</sup> The draft UNDP Joint Rule of Law Programme 2015-2018 results matrix focuses on output rather than on outcome measures.<sup>158</sup> UNDP did begin to undertake baseline studies in 2017 and in 2018, established a project on SDG 16 to collect and analyse data at the outcome level. This long overdue exercise is in its early set-up stages.<sup>159</sup>

**TABLE 2. Rule of law indicators for Somalia, 2000-2017\***

	2000	2005	2010	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
<b>Rule of law</b>	-2.28	-2.17	-2.41	-2.42	-2.4	-2.35	-2.3	-2.35	-2.31

Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank

\* Estimate of governance measured on a scale from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. Higher values correspond to better governance (in this case in relation to the rule of law indicator). Somalia is ranked 0 in terms of percentile.

<sup>153</sup> Given that the original Joint Rule of Law Programme was very ambitious and was underfunded, we understand that the targets stated in the June 2019 results framework (most of which were met or exceeded) had been revised down from the 2015 results framework. However, it is not clear whether the apparent success against the result framework was a genuine representation of overperformance or a result of a downgrading of the level of ambition.

<sup>154</sup> The World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators aggregate several dozen indicators representing different facets of rule of law to determine change over time in a country's rule of law context. <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home>  
<sup>155</sup> <https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/somalia/peacebuilding-organisations/ocvp/>

<sup>156</sup> Evaluation, UNDP Somalia Projects 2012-2015 Access to Justice, UNDP Access to Justice Programme Civilian Policing, UNDP Somalia, July 2015.

<sup>157</sup> UNDP Somalia, Joint Rule of Law Programme Evaluation, November 2017, p. 40.

<sup>158</sup> UNDP Draft Final Joint Rule of Law Programme Progress Report Results Matrix May 2015-September 2018.

<sup>159</sup> UNDP, Somalia Peace and Security Goal 16 M&E Project, Pilot Exercise: Measuring SDG 16.3.2. The Somaliland authorities provided the evaluation team with data that indicated progress. For instance, the High Judicial Council reported an increase in number of cases brought to court from 11,000 to 15,000 between 2017 and 2018. The Hargeisa police, meanwhile, stated that reported crimes fell by about half in the areas where community policing initiatives had been introduced with UNDP support.



**Finding 12.** The Joint Rule of Law Programme helped to progress political agreement over structures for policing and justice across Somalia. UNDP justice and police programmes adapted well to changing political and strategic circumstances. The New Policing Model, while still contested by some in the federal police, has provided a structure to enable cooperation supported by the Joint Police Programme.

The process of state formation and constitutional review remains contested, with policing and justice being an important topic of contestation between Mogadishu and Federal Member States. In this context, it has been valuable to find functional areas on which the federal and member state governments can cooperate. The national justice model holds the potential to perform a similar function if it can be agreed, though this may be some way off. The New Policing Model is being institutionalized by mechanisms, such as a revised police act and programme activity to deliver police reform and capacity-building, that could embed the political agreement.<sup>160</sup>

During the life of the Joint Rule of Law Programme, there were major constitutional and political changes, notably the formation of the Federal Member States and national elections. There were also major changes to the aid architecture such as the Somali Compact, the NDP and the CAS. The Joint Rule of Law Programme responded to these adjustments and adapted rapidly to support the roll-out of police and judiciary in the Federal Member States, including support to the member state ministries of interior and justice, the judiciary and the state police.

**Finding 13.** The original design and management of the Joint Rule of Law Programme proved to be

flawed. The new joint programmes in the portfolio are better designed and more manageable but further work is needed to ensure that they deliver effectively for all concerned. However, in Somaliland, engagement on rule of law has been problematic, and engagements in South-Central have sometimes been difficult. Some key areas are currently not covered. This is understandable due to the need to focus the support provided by the portfolio but they remain a priority for Somalia in the long term.

The rule of law sector is very sensitive for Somali authorities.<sup>161</sup> It is also of great interest to many donors, who often have their own, sometimes conflicting, views on how support should be provided.<sup>162</sup> This makes it a very difficult area to manage. In line with international best practice that stresses the importance of an integrated approach to rule of law, and the United Nations Global Focal Points vision, the 2015 Joint Rule of Law Programme sought to cover all aspects of the justice, corrections and policing chain. This approach was conceptually valid but the difficulties of managing such a wide-ranging programme that had to involve numerous United Nations agencies,<sup>163</sup> multiple donor interests and a fragmented set of Somali government partners, proved too ambitious in practice. This complexity led to the correct decision to rescope and reduce the ambition of the programme in 2017 and to redesign the overall approach from 2018. This process was however very time-consuming, involved very lengthy inter-agency discussions, and left a legacy of poor relations between elements of the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) and a loss of confidence from some donors. In retrospect, much time and effort would have been saved if the original Joint Rule of Law Programme had been better designed from the outset or had

<sup>160</sup> Interviews with donors and Somali federal and member state officials in police, security, and justice ministries and review of meeting notes. The Joint Police Programme Executive Board and lower-level structures such as regular meetings of federal and member state police chiefs serve as mechanisms within which the New Policing Model and country-wide police capacity-building efforts can be planned, coordinated and resourced.

<sup>161</sup> As witnessed by the temporary suspension of work supported by the Government of the United Kingdom with the Somaliland police due to human rights concerns.

<sup>162</sup> As evidenced by the sometimes uncoordinated provision of advisers to security ministries, the training of parallel military units by different international partners, or the desire of certain donors to remain apart from United Nations coordinated trust fund approaches.

<sup>163</sup> The Joint Programme on Rule of Law had nine participating United Nations organizations. The Guidance Note on Joint Programmes published by the United Nations Development Group in 2013 recommends a maximum of four, based on a review of joint programming in the United Nations system to that date.



been adapted more rapidly. Doing so would have required the delegation of authority for coordinating and approving the redesign to someone in the United Nations team.

The more focused set of rule of law programmes launched in 2018 (police, justice, corrections, human rights, security sector, PCVE, analysis) appears to be more effective since each can focus on a smaller number of partner institutions and a smaller number of United Nations agencies.<sup>164</sup> The logic of the current suite of programmes works well and their cross-cutting design addresses key issues in the security and justice sectors. Although the programmes are all badged as joint, in practice they are quite different from one another. On the one extreme are smaller programmes like human rights, PCVE and security sector which involve two or three actors in the United Nations system and a clear lead. On the other extreme is the Joint Police Programme which is much larger (\$42 million) and effectively operates like a mini-trust fund, with funding allocations determined by an executive board comprising donors, Somali authorities and the United Nations.<sup>165</sup> The current suite of separate programmes risks reinforcing fragmentation across the justice chain. Active efforts by the United Nations, donors and Somali authorities are needed to forge these links.<sup>166</sup> A second common failing in security and justice programming is to separate the sector out from wider public administration reform efforts.<sup>167</sup>

Since the previous UNDP rule of law programme in Somaliland finished in 2017,<sup>168</sup> there has been little

substantive UNDP rule of law support, to the disappointment of the government and beneficiaries. While the new programme looks set to start by the time this report is completed at the end of the year, this long hiatus was down to a complex and lengthy set of negotiations involving Somaliland authorities on the one hand and donors on the other. While not as egregious, engagements in South-Central have sometimes been difficult, with donors complaining about UNDP reporting and some Somali partners complaining about inordinate delays in disbursing funds.<sup>169</sup>

Key elements of the rule of law system have not been addressed to date, notably the commercial legal system, land law, the area of anti-corruption<sup>170</sup> and institutions such as the auditor general.<sup>171</sup> The evaluation finds that the programme was right to focus on key areas where there was an opportunity to make progress and UNDP and its partners could contribute their expertise. However, with Somalia ranked by Transparency International as the most corrupt country in the world,<sup>172</sup> these areas will be vital if Somalia is to develop economically and to build trust in the State, and it is important for UNDP to consider the extent to which it can support the country.

**Finding 14.** The Joint Human Rights Programme has successfully raised the prominence of human rights and has the potential to help Somalia fulfil its commitments. However, a lack of political will on the side of the Somali authorities, the United Nations and donors has led to slow progress.

<sup>164</sup> In this structure, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) have gained more prominent roles, with UNODC for example leading the corrections stream.

<sup>165</sup> In this structure, UNDP is expected to implement work requests in specified areas. Defined as training, support to legal and governance issues and oversight.

<sup>166</sup> Somali interlocutors at the delivery level pointed to some areas of good coordination, for instance between police investigators and prosecutors but also to plenty of examples where donor activity, such as training, reinforced stovepiping.

<sup>167</sup> The NDP-CAS separation exemplified this tendency.

<sup>168</sup> Somaliland partners credit the prior UNDP support with having assisted in service delivery through support to mobile courts and monitoring of courts; police capacity-building and roll-out of community policing; and improving legal aid provision. UNDP project documents for the new programme however note that previous rule of law interventions were “ad hoc”, “with no overall agreed strategy” and with minimal impact outside urban centres. United Nations and Somaliland Government, Somaliland Joint Rule of Law Programme 2019-21, July 2019, p. 6.

<sup>169</sup> Evaluation interviews.

<sup>170</sup> The evaluation notes that a concept note (PIP) has been developed by the effective institutions portfolio.

<sup>171</sup> As noted in the 2017 evaluation of the Joint Rule of Law Programme, “there has been an over-emphasis on capacity building the criminal justice system, at the expense of strengthening the civil law legal system.” UNDP, Joint Rule of Law Programme Evaluation, November 2017.

<sup>172</sup> <https://www.transparency.org/country/SOM>

It was to the credit of the United Nations and key donors that a Joint Human Rights Programme was established in 2018 to help the Somali Government and civil society progress their commitment to improve human rights. The advent of the joint programme was positive as it gave actors within the United Nations and in the Somali Government, such as the Ministry for Women and Human Rights Development, a degree of prominence and dedicated resources. The Joint Human Rights Programme has had initial successes in raising the profile of human rights and supporting Somalia to take steps forward on the international and domestic stage. Initial steps since mid-2018 have included: ratifying the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and enacting a law to establish a National Disability Agency; convening a Women's Peace Forum bringing together women from across the country; establishing and building the capacity of an interministerial task force to progress the human rights agenda; awareness-raising activities; and supporting the January 2019 universal periodic review process. Meanwhile, there has been progress under rule of law projects to train security forces in human rights<sup>173</sup> and to support justice and police institutions working on women's access to justice and SGBV issues.

However, the programme has underperformed compared to expectations. The process of appointing commissioners to the Human Rights Commission, a central element in the human rights architecture, was inordinately delayed;<sup>174</sup> the Ministry for Women and Human Rights Development has found it hard to gain traction with the security ministries; both the federal and the Somaliland Governments have taken a hard line on freedom of expression towards journalists; the federal Government has been reluctant to share significant resources on human rights with Federal Member States; and the Women's Peace Forum has not been built upon, in part because of

tensions between the Federal Government and civil society organizations.<sup>175</sup>

These delays are reflective of the general situation in which Somali authorities and the United Nations find themselves over the issue of human rights. Disagreements between the Federal Government and the United Nations over how to address human rights were contributing factors to the expulsion of the former Special Representative of the Secretary-General in January 2019 after UNSOM criticism of human rights abuses by Somali security forces. Moving on from these disagreements, the United Nations, donors, and federal and member state authorities should recommit to addressing human rights as a key part of Somalia's security transition and development plan.

**Finding 15.** The UNDP project on PCVE only began in September 2018, making it too early to assess its contribution to outcome-level results. However, the evaluation positively assesses the approach adopted by UNDP.

The PCVE project has injected capacity into the Federal Government and Federal Member States to plan and coordinate work on PCVE, initiated coordination activities, supported activities by women's groups and initiated action-learning pilot projects.<sup>176</sup> These are positive first steps in helping Somalia to move beyond a counter-terrorist military/law enforcement approach and to reduce future recruitment to violent extremist groups. UNDP demonstrates that it can add value to this area of work and has a comparative advantage because of its ability to convene different actors. The Somali PCVE team at the federal and member state levels lauds the technical leadership from UNDP. However, the small scale of the programme means it can only have impact if it leverages other resources across government and donor programmes. As one of the Somali PCVE advisers told the evaluation team: "we are on the defence,

<sup>173</sup> The Human Rights Due Diligence Policy is noted as a useful tool to ensure that human rights standards are addressed among security forces.

<sup>174</sup> Nine commissioners were due to be appointed but are still to be approved by the Prime Minister and Parliament.

<sup>175</sup> Evaluation team interviews.

<sup>176</sup> Evaluation team interviews at federal and member state levels. Action research pilots have included community consultations on drivers of radicalization.

while al-Shabaab are in attack mode” in terms of radicalizing potential recruits.<sup>177</sup> In addition, the major event that is hailed as an early success of the project, a November 2018 Women’s Peace Forum, has not been followed up on due to the negative political dynamics. A further complication has been the reluctance of the Somaliland government to embrace the PCVE agenda.<sup>178</sup> Effectiveness will be dependent on sustained policy and technical leadership, and intensive efforts to ensure integration with other workstreams.<sup>179</sup>

**Finding 16.** UNDP work on security sector governance seeks to take a more systematic approach to capacity-building across central and member state security ministries and has made initial progress. However, it is not yet possible to assess outcomes-level results and sustainability is a real risk.

Building the capacity of the Somali federal and member state authorities to govern the security sector is a vital part of efforts to facilitate the transition from an international to a national lead on providing a safe and secure environment. The international community has been supporting the

development of a Somali national security architecture, plans and governance structures for a number of years, often through the provision of international advisers.

In 2018, UNDP security sector governance work focused on the federal Ministry of Internal Security, building on previous work with the Ministry to strengthen internal management systems. The Security Sector Governance Programme, a joint effort between UNDP and the UNSOM Rule of Law and Security Institutions Group initiated in 2019, has moved outwards from the Ministry to establish a security sector governance team in the Office of the Prime Minister, to oversee institutional strengthening across the other ministries in the Government’s security and justice road map (i.e., defence and justice), and to build links to state-level regional security offices. In addition, the project has worked with the Defence Committee of the Somali Parliament to strengthen its ability to oversee and legislate for the security sector.

It is too early to evaluate outcomes for this intervention in terms of measurable improvements to the

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## BOX 5. Key factors contributing to and/or hindering results, rule of law portfolio

### Contributing:

- Relevance to priorities of Somali authorities at all levels
- Established and trusted presence across Somalia
- Long-term, developmental approach
- Adaptability to changing Somali and donor context

### Hindering:

- Transaction costs of working within a very complex United Nations system and donor architecture
  - Political competition between and across actors in the Somali government
  - Lack of impact evaluation and evidence base; now starting to be addressed by the SDG 16 project
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<sup>177</sup> Evaluation team interview.

<sup>178</sup> Evaluation team interviews in Somaliland.

<sup>179</sup> In practice, what this means is, first, keeping in place a highly qualified, energetic and motivated technical lead who can shape the intervention and network across donor and Somali stakeholders; and second, ensuring that the PCVE programme focuses more on mainstreaming PCVE thinking and approaches into other activities across government than setting up its own, small, initiatives that risk becoming stovepiped.

performance of the security ministries and oversight mechanisms, and the project has suffered delays caused in part by the July 2018 al-Shabaab attack on the Ministry of Internal Security in Mogadishu. Early indications of progress are positive. The draft law on security sector pensions will, if implemented, assist in the process of reforming security forces, while the interministerial conferences of security ministers and of police commissioners are a useful mechanism for structured security coordination across the federation, as are the meetings of regional security offices. However, as with other UNDP and other donors' capacity-building projects, there is a risk that the establishment of a new team staffed by advisers (in the Office of the Prime Minister in this case) may give the illusion of progress rather than contributing to the building of real long-term capacity.

## 2.5 Cross-cutting issues

**Finding 17.** Programme coherence. The programme is not structured around a coherent theory of change which highlights the causal pathways from project-level contributions to programme outcome and impact levels. In addition, and as a result of the above, there is limited coordination among interventions, compounded by a lack of systematic information-sharing, knowledge management and coordination of activities, as well analysis of trends and common risks. Additionally, the engagement in the various locations of the country is detailed only at project level without an overarching strategy and guiding framework, clearly communicated to partners, leading to misunderstanding with counterparts about what UNDP can deliver in each location.

As a result of the relocation to Mogadishu and the decision to focus on the capacity-building of the Federal Government of Somalia and new Federal

Member States, the engagement in Puntland and Somaliland has been decreasing and engagement in Mogadishu has been increasing. The current office sizes in Hargeisa and Garowe are also diminished.<sup>180</sup> This is understandable and it is also in line with the strategic decision to focus on specific aspects to ensure stronger results. However, there was no overall strategy<sup>181</sup> for engagement, based on intended overall results, clearly communicated to the relevant counterparts, which note in almost all cases (the evaluation noted exceptions only in the environmental portfolio in Puntland and Somaliland and the development of a new joint programme on rule of law in Somaliland)<sup>182</sup> that they are unclear about the current engagement of UNDP and feel that they are being sidelined, even if the political and security contexts allow for more long-term development interventions, which they see as a priority for UNDP. For example, JPLG phase III decided under pressure from donors and the Federal Government of Somalia to move away from a primary focus on Somaliland and Puntland and focus on the emerging Federal Member States, which has led to a sense among earlier partners, now with far more limited resources to support them, of being left behind. Even in the emerging Federal Member States, with more limited resources to go around from JPLG or REFS, there is a view that resources are not always an appropriate response to local needs and priorities.<sup>183</sup>

The gap in coordination among interventions was filled at strategic level by senior management. This led, for example, to the review of the structure of major joint programmes, the establishment of an environment, energy and climate change portfolio and the restructuring of the gender function. Both partners and donors reported the need to request the intervention of the former Resident Representative to resolve bottlenecks in implementation at various stages (e.g., proposal development, prior to

<sup>180</sup> Based on the IEO human resource analysis, Garowe: Between 2015-2019, the country office lost 11 posts. (48 to 37). Hargeisa: Between 2015-2018, the country lost 18 posts (58 to 40). From 2015 to 2018, Mogadishu got an additional 37 posts (102 to 139). Programme and administrative staff (including drivers and UNDP security) stand at 22 in each location.

<sup>181</sup> The evaluation notes the existence of an annual workplan for Puntland as the only regional document.

<sup>182</sup> Evaluation interviews.

<sup>183</sup> Source: Interviews conducted by the evaluation team in Garowe and Baidoa, and by national consultants on behalf of the evaluation team in Baidoa, and in several sites in Somaliland and Puntland, as well as with representatives of the emerging Federal Member States while in Mogadishu.

submission to SDRF, unavailability of reports, access to information). Additionally, the evaluation notes that there is an informal exchange among portfolio managers, but not close coordination at the level of implementation of projects. This is partially due to the absence of dedicated Deputy Country Director (now Deputy Resident Representative) for Programme for almost two years during the period being evaluated. The evaluation observed several cases in which project steering committees did not meet regularly or joint programmes had no regular coordination meetings except on an ad hoc basis (e.g., preparation of a high-level conference), leading to joint programming but isolated implementation and missed opportunities in terms of complementarity of the work. Additionally, several staff mentioned not being informed of upcoming events and project-related activities relevant to their area of work. Minutes of Local Project Advisory Committee meetings are not always available, 56 percent of annual workplans are missing and 69 percent of annual and final reports are not available,<sup>184</sup> and TPM reports (see below) were not centrally stored and not used for improving delivery.

**Finding 18.** Capacity development versus capacity injection. UNDP development programming in Somalia is mostly, though not exclusively, about capacity development. Exceptions include interventions focusing on the rehabilitation and development of infrastructure and livelihoods support (e.g., development of value chains). Yet what is notable is the absence of a coherent capacity development strategy and the reliance on capacity injection to support key governance process through the provision of external expertise. While it has not worked in all cases (see section 2.2), this approach has enabled UNDP to achieve several results under the governance programmes (see sections 2.3 and 2.4), but raises the questions of long-term sustainability and efficiency as well as value for money.

When UNDP support is withdrawn as a project ends abruptly, this leaves institutions not fully capable of exercising their mandates. Equally, pressure to expand to new geographic areas may lead to the spreading of resources too thinly at the expenses of quality in delivery.

It is recognized that there is a lack of capacity on the part of Somali institutions to deal with the complex challenges the country faces. Therefore, there has been and continues to be a need to inject capacity, in the form of consultants and advisers, to deliver results. It is also noted that this is a common practice, resulting in 415 positions at the latest available count, of which 173 are supported by UNDP.<sup>185</sup> In the case of SIP, over the period 2015-2018, UNDP supported an average of 61 positions per year with the Federal Government of Somalia and 20 with the Puntland Government.<sup>186</sup> MOCA is not a large ministry, but it has 17 advisers and seven “Young Graduates” to support it, all funded by UNDP.<sup>187</sup> MOLSA received 19 advisers at federal and regional level, including in locations where the YES programme was not active. In the Benadir Regional Administration, it was reported that about 20 teams composed of technical advisers were established for project coordination, each team engaging with different projects from international cooperation. Given the decision by the international community to assist in the construction of modern state structures and complex governance mechanisms and arrangements, there was little alternative to this approach. As is suggested in the SIP final evaluation, “the delivery by the government simply cannot wait until the civil servant machinery is strong enough to deliver. Hence, a certain dependency on advisory staff will remain the reality for years to come...”<sup>188</sup>

This modality poses the risk of setting up perverse incentives and fuelling patronage politics. The evaluation team was provided with numer-

<sup>184</sup> The evaluation team has in several cases requested such documentation, but it was not received. This data refers to the information available to the team as of 27 August 2019. Additionally, it is noted that some documents labelled as annual workplan or annual report do not actually cover the entire project. For some completed projects (e.g., PREP), no workplans or final reports are available.

<sup>185</sup> Resident Coordinator's office, “Request and Support for Government positions”, 2017.

<sup>186</sup> SIP final evaluation, p. 17.

<sup>187</sup> Information provided by senior MOCA officials in interviews with the evaluation team and documentation in SCR annual reports.

<sup>188</sup> SIP final evaluation, p. 11.



ous anecdotal examples whereby ministries were incentivized to take on a new project “in return” for the provision of a letter of agreement and associated advisers. The evaluation also collected examples which highlight that other development actors find it challenging to operate in Somalia, unless they can “compete” with the offer of more established, larger actors like UNDP. Government counterparts have in interviews provided examples of requests which are based on clan realities and perceived needs rather than sound assessments of capacity needed to deliver on priorities.

The evaluation notes that limited attention has been given to moving away from this system to build sustainability. Some examples of long-term investment show what can be done in line with recommendation 3 of the 2015 ADR, e.g., the building up of the law faculties in Puntland and Somaliland, sponsoring students and then providing internships for graduates to work in government;<sup>189</sup> the support provided to Amoud University in Somaliland to establish a Master’s degree course on climate change and environmental sustainability, which is now in its second year and is being run without UNDP support; and the training for journalists and media professionals under PROSCAL (see finding 2).<sup>190</sup> The use of the national window for implementation has also shown some promise (see finding 7).

While SIP and JPLG have supported the development of government training capabilities, and in some cases these are making a difference, overall, though, too much reliance was placed on short-term training as a solution to capacity development issues. Government partners noted that there is a continuing need for staff training, and that the gap left by the closure of SIP and StEFS has not been filled, despite efforts to build up government training capacities. Further, neither project had developed an exit strategy. Government partners, particularly those at local government level, also

commented on the fact that staff turnover and the arrival of new members of district councils led to a requirement for continuing training.

There are examples of situations where the ongoing engagement with an institution over one or two years allowed for observation of remaining capacity gaps and designing interim solutions. However, while some government ministries at Federal Government of Somalia level or in Somaliland and Puntland, in some cases with strong cadres of diaspora-sourced personnel as advisers and senior officials, can fulfil their respective mandates, many others cannot. With the ending of SIP and StEFS, several institutions were left incomplete and unsupported. This view has been expressed to the evaluation team by government representatives from Puntland and Hirshabelle, as well as from Federal Government of Somalia institutions. For a number of institutions, it is also apparent that there has been a falling off in collective capabilities once substantial support is withdrawn.

The evaluation notes that international financial institutions (IFIs) report that they are increasingly demanding that capacity be transferred to permanent staff in the civil service as a requirement for their interventions. According to the IFIs, this is matched with close oversight, through performance-based monitoring, which include visits by technical specialists to ascertain the level of knowledge transfers in specific sectors.<sup>191</sup> The World Bank is also reported to be increasingly using country systems including for oversight, for example by involving the office of the Auditor General in its operations. This approach was confirmed by key informants who have worked for both UNDP (or other United Nations agencies) and IFIs. Also, there have been cases where, after an unplanned cessation of donor funding, Somali authorities have found ways of continuing service delivery, albeit at reduced rates, and these positive examples can be built upon.<sup>192</sup>

<sup>189</sup> Evaluation interviews with Puntland State University, Hargeisa University and graduates employed in the rule of law sector.

<sup>190</sup> Evaluation interviews and see <https://www.spgsr.amouduniversity.org/programmes/climate-change-environmental-sustainability>

<sup>191</sup> Evaluation interviews with IFIs.

<sup>192</sup> For instance, the Somaliland justice ministry chose to allocate resources to continue partial provision of mobile courts and court inspections even after UNDP funding was withdrawn.



There are examples of increased performance monitoring and long-term capacity-building, for example through JPLG,<sup>193</sup> and a stronger risk mitigation approach for implementation through responsible parties, which is, as of 2019, reviewed centrally by Programme Oversight and Quality Assurance (POQA), which is also organizing the verification by TPM. However, according to TPM reports and verifications conducted by the evaluation team, over the period being assessed, often the consultants have no precise task descriptions, are gap-filling and are not effectively supervised. In some cases, the requested support seems unnecessary for the amount of work to be delivered, for example in the case of the Aid Coordination Unit, staffed with 21 advisers (recently reduced) to support the logistical aspects of aid coordination, the MOLSA advisers under YES (see finding 3), or the growing number of new advisers in the Prime Minister's Office working on security sector governance. Up to 2019, there is also no evidence of monitoring of the implementation by responsible parties, except for ad hoc spot checks by programme staff. This responsibility is again being transferred to POQA, which is overseeing the process centrally using external firms.

Increasingly there is a justified push for UNDP to expand its support to areas newly liberated from al-Shabaab, especially for the governance programmes (rule of law, JPLG, REFS) (see 2.3 and 2.4). While this is understandable, UNDP risks to spread resources too thinly in areas where it is very difficult to make progress. For example, one of the great strengths of JPLG, unmatched by any other governance project, is its network of local staff and its consistent presence on the ground. This has enabled it to develop workplans which are well adapted to priorities articulated at Federal Member States level (as well as in Somaliland), to build "local knowledge" and to make informed adjustments as conditions change at state and/or local levels. However, the expansion in the number of partners, as the project has moved into operating in the emerging Federal Member

States, is challenging its ability to be as responsive as it has been in Puntland and Somaliland. This is also the case for REFS, the successor to StEFS, which has approximately half the resources of its predecessor.

Finally, and while this is beyond the scope of UNDP responsibilities, the evaluation team noted the absence of a mechanism to ensure coordination of such support among the numerous partners in Somalia (United Nations, IFIs, bilateral) and the sharing of these resources. There is currently no formal system which allows development partners to know which agencies are financing which institutions, for what and on what terms. The risk management unit of the Resident Coordinator's office has engaged with United Nations partners to support this objective but this initiative remains at an initial stage.

**Finding 19. Management and operations.** There is appreciation by partner agencies for the key role played by UNDP operations in supporting their engagement in Somalia, with several noting that they would not be able to operate otherwise.<sup>194</sup> However, government counterparts, donors and some UNDP staff raise the problem of speed in delivery and quality of processes, including reporting and level of responsiveness.

The evaluation team notes that reform is under way and these issues are partially caused by the separate locations and relocation process from Nairobi to Mogadishu. The evaluation nonetheless notes a persistent disconnect between programme and operations staff within UNDP and has been presented with several examples related to:

- Time required to establish a letter of agreement;
- Time required for procurement of goods after a letter of agreement is approved;
- Time required to obtain answers to specific related questions, in some cases of several months (e.g., by email);

<sup>193</sup> Evaluation interviews, use of TPM and related reports, midterm reviews and evaluations (not all can be publicly disclosed).

<sup>194</sup> Partner agencies have stressed that UNDP is effectively and efficiently supporting them in procurement and logistics, emphasizing that they would often not be able to have staff or consultants operating in Somalia without UNDP support.

- Quality of submission of required documentation for operational processes (e.g., terms of reference for procurement processes);
- Delays in finalization of procurement processes (e.g., time required for evaluations of tenders);<sup>195</sup>
- Delays in the preparation of project reports, updates, communications to donors.

Based on interviews, the following causes have been identified:

- Absence of clarity on delegation of authority, compounded by prolonged absence of senior management with adequate level of clearance (due to both vacant posts and rest and recuperation leave cycles, as well as other specific leave circumstances), leading to either the inability of authorizing required steps or the need to retroactively fix or restart specific processes (e.g., issuing of letters of agreement);
- Limited knowledge of some programme personnel of applicable rules and regulations, leading to misunderstandings and delays in operational processes and inaccurate information relayed to partners;
- Time required to obtain all necessary signatures and approvals due to prolonged absence of personnel;
- Limited engagement in some cases with donors and government counterparts.

**Finding 20.** Management and operations. In all three outcome areas, the financial execution rate has been above 70 percent. Financial delivery only, especially in a complex and fragile context like Somalia, may however not necessarily lead to the delivery of results. The management efficiency ratio reached 27 percent<sup>196</sup> in 2018, but was otherwise

stable at around 10-15 percent. While these costs are higher than the average (4-6 percent), they are justified by the operational context of Somalia. Attention needs to be directed in case the 2018 situation is repeated and causes need to be identified.

Over the period under evaluation (2015-2018), the programme expenditure amounted \$219.45 million, which represented 79 percent of the financial delivery rate. Disaggregated data by outcome and year indicated that from 2016 to 2018, programme expenditure decreased slightly for the governance and rule of law and universal access to basic services outcomes, while it increased for early recovery and return to sustainable development pathways. Financial delivery is an important indicator, but this should always be read in conjunction with delivery of results, specifically in this context and given the implementation modalities used by the country office and the weaknesses in monitoring (see findings 17 and 22). A too narrow focus on financial delivery may in this context trigger the establishment of structures, for example coordination platforms like the Energy Coordination Unit, staffed for six months before project closure in 2018, with four advisers as well as support staff,<sup>197</sup> without due consideration for long-term planning and sustainability, as well as permanent creation of capacity within the institutions concerned (see finding 17).

**Finding 21.** Aid coordination. UNDP has been central to the design of the first aid coordination architecture in the country, manages one of the three trust funds (MPTF) and through the effective institutions portfolio (SIP project) supported the establishment of the Aid Coordination Unit. While the concept was valid and the need for coordination is undisputed by stakeholders, conflicts and political disputes among stakeholders have interfered with the effectiveness of the Unit and the utility of the aid architecture. The performance of the Aid Coordination Unit, which is entirely staffed by technical consultants, has

<sup>195</sup> Evaluation interviews and examples of emails shared in confidence with the team.

<sup>196</sup> UNDP IEO, "Financial analysis, Somalia", July 2019.

<sup>197</sup> Evaluation interviews; UNDP Somalia, 2018, project budget, Energy Coordination Unit and UNDP Somalia, 2017, Project document "Shifting the Energy Paradigm in Somalia". The funding of the Energy Coordination Unit was eventually taken over by the World Bank, which reportedly included compulsory training of permanent staff and performance monitoring as requirements.

not delivered the expected results. While the MPTF is meant to increase transparency and facilitate the coordination of aid flows to the country, stakeholders report several challenges with its operations.

During the period under review, the structure came to comprise the SDRF, the three associated funds, one of which, the MPTF, is managed by UNDP (see 1.2) and the technical Peacebuilding and State-building Working Groups, which progressively increased in number from five to nine. While the design of the new SDRF structure was in process, it was decided to establish a dedicated coordination arrangement for the CAS to “provide oversight and guidance on implementation of the CAS, NSA and Security Pact”, supported by UNSOM. UNDP has supported the establishment of the aid architecture in Somalia since 2014 and has played multiple roles, ranging from strategic advice on the structure of the aid coordination system (Somali Institutional Development Project, implemented prior to the period being reviewed by this evaluation) and its improvement (including ongoing reform efforts), to operational support (through the management of the MPTF) and main provider of capacity injections (in support of the Aid Coordination Unit), as well as coordinator of several joint programmes (see 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4).

Recognizing the need for coordination and logistical support, UNDP (SIP) spent significant resources in setting up and organizing the Aid Coordination Unit and has paid salaries of staff since its inception. By the close of SIP, nearly 50 percent of project expenditures had been allocated to the Unit (\$4.027 million of \$8.238 million).<sup>198</sup>

While its establishment was a logical development in the light of the overall design of the aid

coordination architecture, and its worked contributed to the organization of SDRF meetings, pillar working group meetings and the High-Level Partnership Forums (supported by the Resident Coordinator’s office), it does represent an exceptionally expensive solution to the need for a secretariat and policy unit, even considering the complete absence of such a mechanism beforehand, and it is not regarded by donors or the Federal Member States as having made the expected contribution to enhancing aid coordination.

While SIP took all the necessary steps to equip the Unit to do its work, it could not control recruitment processes, nor could it oblige government to implement the mandate assigned to the Unit. The Unit has never been able to perform a policy role, and has limited its work to logistical and secretariat support to aid coordination mechanisms. The quality of this work has been questioned repeatedly by stakeholders.<sup>199</sup> The Unit has been a “political football”, subject to a contest for control among several high-level political leaders. It has eventually been absorbed into the Office of the Prime Minister but does not seem to have acquired a clearer mandate.<sup>200</sup> Having identified the need for reform and improvement, the evaluation notes that efforts are now under way to reform the structure, and these should be aligned to the United Nations reform and its practical implications (see below and recommendation 7).<sup>201</sup>

The evaluation noted that there are both strategic and operational concerns in relation to the MPTF. These have been raised by donors and partners in other settings<sup>202</sup> and will not be repeated here. It is however important to note that the above reasons, as well as long-standing bilateral issues, have led to only 20 percent of aid flowing through the SDRF.<sup>203</sup>

<sup>198</sup> Based on expenditures reported in SIP Final Report, p.74.

<sup>199</sup> Evaluation interviews, Overseas Development Institute 2017, “The New Deal in Somalia: An independent review of the Somali Compact” and meeting notes, review of the aid architecture meeting, February 2018.

<sup>200</sup> Evaluation interviews.

<sup>201</sup> Joint UNDP-Resident Coordinator’s office programme has been developed in 2018; the evaluation also notes that a survey completed after the evaluation data collection phase was completed indicates increased satisfaction with the Unit’s work in the last year, giving early indication of a positive trajectory of reform. The number of consultants staffing the Aid Coordination Unit has also decreased from 23 to 12.

<sup>202</sup> See for example “Recommendations report MPTFO mission to the Somalia Multi Partner Trust Fund” UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, December 2018.

<sup>203</sup> Aid Flows to Somalia, Federal Government of Somalia, Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development, 2019.

The evaluation notes that the multiple roles played by UNDP are now taking place in a different management scenario, as a result of the United Nations reform and specifically the separation of the Resident Coordinator function from UNDP. In the case of Somalia, this means that the reform of the aid architecture is still being supported by UNDP, as is the Aid Coordination Unit, but the MPTF technical support is housed in the Resident Coordinator's office and no longer supported by UNDP, which is also the host of the MPTF. The strategic support to the High-Level Partnership Forums, which ultimately decide on the aid architecture structure in the country, is also provided by the Resident Coordinator's office. Additionally, UNSOM has as an integral part of its mandate to advise "the Federal Government and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on peacebuilding and State-building in the areas of [...] coordination of international donor support" (see above; the CAS is managed by UNSOM).

**Finding 22.** Joint programming and joint implementation. Approximately 75 percent<sup>204</sup> of the UNDP programme over the period 2015 to present has been jointly implemented. The type of arrangements varies and not all joint programmes have the same characteristics (see sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4). The more recent joint programmes have been designed based on lessons learned from the first generation of such programming and are assessed as fitter for the purpose (see finding 12). Results over the period vary in quality and degree of sustainability, which remains a risk for several interventions (see sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 for specific findings). Excellence in delivery is recurrently referred to as the only UNDP tool to make progress in the complex context of Somalia and the evaluation observed an effort to learn and adapt from experience in joint implementation.

Joint programming is in several cases a necessity in Somalia. It is demanded by the Government and

seen as a response to the need for coordination and to reduce fragmentation in interventions. It is also perceived to be useful to address the complex and interrelated nature of the development challenges facing the United Nations and UNCT. UNDP has been at the forefront of joint programmes by acting as the coordinator and facilitator for most of the programmes it is part of (except for some programmes under the early recovery and development portfolio, see section 2.2 and gender equality and women's empowerment/WPP). The evaluation observed the following scenarios:

- **Joint programming UNDP/UNSOM.** This type of joint programming is where the strongest partnerships were noted, especially during the first period covered by the evaluation. It includes cases of joint delivery through close coordination and teams operating almost as one (e.g., Election Programme, Joint Justice Programme, PCVE, StEFS). The evaluation has however also noted that joint implementation is decreasing in some areas (e.g. Parliament and Constitution Joint Programmes), partially due to personalities and diverging views on priorities (see finding 10).
- **Joint programming/UNCT level.** The evaluation notes varying degree of results, ranging from overall positive results (JPLG) to challenging and difficult situations with limited results (e.g., YES programme). The YES programme illustrate some key challenges and lessons from joint programming. As presented in section 2.2, the programme demonstrates challenges in implementing a common agenda across five agencies, and when it did so among a selected number of agencies (case of FAO and UNDP on fishery), its execution and results suffered from lack of integration and sequencing in the planning and implementation of activities. The later point is also seen

<sup>204</sup> When the entire programme portfolio is considered, including the security and support to United Nations coordination projects, total expenditure amounted \$219.45 million out of which joint programmes represented 73 percent. Joint programmes with UNCT represented 20 percent of the total expenditure while joint programmes with UNSOM accounted for 53 percent. When security and support to United Nations coordination are considered as part of the programme budget, total expenditure amounted \$207 million over the period 2015-2018. All joint programmes represented 77 percent of the programme expenditure. Joint programmes with UNCT accounted for 21 percent while joint programmes with UNSOM represented 56 percent.

in RE-INTEG project where the UNDP livelihood component has moved forward. A challenge posed in these situations is the need for respective agencies to respond to individual donor and corporate requirement of performance against financial delivery. Another key aspect cited that comes from this experience is the programme coordination capacity lacking authority over resources and agencies workplans against collective outcomes, as well as human resources to support it,<sup>205</sup> the latter being widely perceived to be a key factor contributing to the perceived success of JPLG. While a positive example, JPLG still highlights the scope for learning lessons, as each contributing agency has its own annual workplan and budget and manages and is accountable for its own activities and working relations with Somali partners, without effective collective oversight. For example, there have been two major episodes of fraud and corruption regarding the awarding of contracts for local infrastructure projects supported by JPLG, one in Somaliland and one in Puntland, for each of the two participating United Nations agencies managing infrastructure programming. Both cases are now undergoing formal, independent United Nations investigation. Efforts to resolve the case in Somaliland became ensnared with interclan politics and led to the expulsion from the territory of the United Nations agency involved.<sup>206</sup>

- **Joint Programming/UNCT and non-resident agencies.** UNDP is seen in some cases as facilitator for the engagement of non-resident agencies, e.g., PROSCAL, a joint programme which is set up with clear roles and responsibilities and has enabled UNEP to re-engage in Somalia and start contributing its expertise. However, the evaluation also notes limited interactions and exchanges on a regular basis among agencies, which is limiting the possibilities for closer coordination

and joint discussion on how to address major challenges like sustainability (e.g., at the level of policy adoption and implementation, sustainability of results on the ground, etc.). At the same time, key weaknesses in some programmes were felt when non-resident agencies, e.g., UN-Women, were unable to staff key roles in Somalia, highlighting the need to have clear roles and responsibilities, joint oversight and senior leadership engagement to ensure that these are followed through or alternative plans put in place.

A more detailed analysis of the factors contributing and/or hindering the achievement of results through joint programmes is presented in annex 8.

**Finding 23. Gender.** UNDP in Somalia is moving away from the implementation of interventions directed only at gender, as recommended in the 2015 ADR, to an approach which mainstreams relevant aspects in the entire programme. This was supported by a restructuring of the function but is not yet institutionalized and formalized through a dedicated strategy and buy-in by staff and counterparts. While the adoption of such a direction is vital, the difficulty of getting there should not be underestimated. It should also be noted that there remains one gender-specific project, WPP, which is greatly valued by women's organizations and should be continued (see finding 9).

In the past decade, some progress has been made to advance gender equality and women's empowerment in both the Federal Republic of Somalia and Somaliland, as presented in finding 9. Significant challenges persist, including gender-based violence, high maternal mortality, the prevalence of FGM and limited involvement of women in the economic sector. According to Atlas, the UNDP financial commitment towards gender equality and women's empowerment during the period 2015-2018 was estimated to be very high, with 76.2 per cent of programme expenditure geared towards outputs that contribute significantly to gender

<sup>205</sup> Stakeholders reported that the YES programme over its timespan of five years had four different coordinators.

<sup>206</sup> Evaluation interviews and see for example: <https://www.somtribune.com/2019/06/10/somaliland-suspends-ilo-operations-in-country/>



equity (GEN 2). At the same time, only 4.7 percent of programme expenditure was estimated to be directed to outputs which have gender equality as a principal objective (GEN3). As the gender markers were assigned by project managers, without review by either a gender expert or the quality assurance section (or equivalent function before November 2018), the evaluation therefore does not focus on this data and rather reports results of UNDP interventions under each portfolio are presented in sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4.

At office level, the evaluation notes that although the number of interventions aiming to be gender-sensitive (but not gender-transformative) is high and the restructuring of the function should lead to stronger results, the country office has not developed a gender equality and action plan aligned with the new UNDP Gender Equality Strategy, 2018-2021. In 2018, there were no specific resources allocated to support the gender focal team, and UNDP did not co-chair any inter-agency gender theme group (ROAR, 2018). There are also no mechanisms in place yet to ensure coordinated, office-wide support for the mainstreaming of gender aspects into programming.

Finding 24. Design, monitoring and evaluation. There is some evidence of learning from evaluations and reviews, specifically for strategic decision-making. However, monitoring is identified as a challenge,<sup>207</sup> with shortcomings observed both in terms of quality, frequency and accuracy of direct monitoring by UNDP and ineffective use of TPM. Quality of the involvement of partners and donors in the project design phase is mixed.

The results of several evaluations and reviews were used to trigger a reflection on the implementation of joint programmes, which allowed for a learn-

ing-by-doing approach (see finding 21). For example, the office prepared a meta-analysis of evaluation findings in 2018, which followed a prior review of all evaluations conducted over the period 2012-2017.<sup>208</sup> Based on these, programmatic changes were made, for example, to the structure of the Joint Programme on Rule of Law, and the StEFS programme started to more closely coordinate with Federal Member States about the nature of interventions. There is however room for improvement, especially at the project level. For example, this evaluation notes (see section 2.4) that there has been a failure to use and generate useful time-series data on stabilization and conflict or indeed on rule of law outcomes, making it hard to comment on the relationship between programme activities and stabilization and rule of law outcomes. Additionally, there are few evaluations of the collective results of joint programmes,<sup>209</sup> therefore limiting the opportunity for reflection on overall achievements and areas for improvement.

Monitoring has been identified as an area for improvement by several evaluations and this assessment concurs with these finding. Specific issues include:

- With a few exceptions, there is a lack of strategic approach to the use of TPM and use of findings to inform adaptive management. TPM was used on ad hoc basis, with assignments requested directly by project managers.<sup>210</sup> Its focus remained on activity-level verification and there is no evidence that the reports were used to inform project implementation. A strategic analysis developed by the TPM contractor in 2017 was not used to trigger a discussion on necessary adjustments both in terms of use of TPM and at programmatic level.<sup>211</sup> This evaluation team requested

<sup>207</sup> As highlighted by the ADR 2015 and the UNDP Audit no 1757, 2017, recommendation 7.

<sup>208</sup> UNDP Somalia "Lessons learned from evaluation 2018" and UNDP Somalia "Review of Somalia's Programme and Project Evaluations 2012-2017".

<sup>209</sup> With the exception of evaluations requested by donors looking at their own country programmes or assessments of specific aspects of joint programmes, most evaluations are not jointly conducted and do not systematically address results achieved by the entire programme.

<sup>210</sup> Assignments were also less in numbers than stipulated in the agreement with the TPM contractor. The evaluation understands that this was due to lower priority assigned to TPM and use of monitoring funds for other activities, but could not verify the reasons.

<sup>211</sup> Intermedia Development Consultants, "UNDP Somalia TPM: some lessons, some suggestions", 2018.

the TPM reports on several occasions, but they were not made available until the TPM contractor was requested to resend them all to the country office in June 2019, indicating that the reports were not even centrally stored by the office.

- As stated in sections 2.1 and 2.2, there is a lack of direct observation of quality of interventions in the field and a focus on activity-level verification. This is partially due to logistical and security constraints; however, it should also be noted that, as stated in the “UNDP Somalia Monitoring Policy – Guidance Document” (undated), monitoring remains a responsibility of the programme managers. Additionally, security and logistics are not limiting factors in Somaliland and Puntland. While TPM use should not replace direct monitoring, there is no indication that a strategy was in place to prioritize TPM monitoring to areas hard or impossible to reach by staff. Examples are presented in section 2.1. Additionally, as presented in the “UNDP Somalia TPM: some lessons, some suggestions” document presented to the country office in 2018, it is possible to use TPM for verification beyond activity.

The result of the above, combined with the challenges presented in finding 16, is that results reported (e.g., in the ROAR) are not always accurate and sustainability is at risk. For example, while solar power systems on five hospitals have initially helped with reducing energy costs and UNDP reports that “the solar power system has helped to significantly reduce the hospital’s average monthly electricity bill from \$6,000 to \$30” (ROAR and Pre-mission

questionnaire), the evaluation notes that the system in Burao has been functioning since 2017 at 50 percent capacity and the one in Garowe isn’t functioning at all (finding 2). The limitations to afforestation projects and problems with infrastructure projects were already discussed under finding 2. Women entrepreneurs were provided with cookstoves for sale, but the evaluation did not find evidence of improved accountancy and business skills. The Drought Operations Centre in Burao isn’t being used, etc. Monitoring of the implementation by responsible parties is discussed under finding 18.

Projects are mostly designed by UNDP, with varying degrees of input from partner agencies, institutional counterparts and donors. The SDRF provides a mechanism to discuss project proposals and come to an agreement. However, all actors involve report challenges with the process, including:

- Unrealistic budget expectations, based on discussions with government counterparts without donors’ participation;
- Unclear roles and responsibilities based on mandates and added value of each agency;
- Limited discussions with key counterparts, with Federal Member States often reporting not being consulted at the beginning;
- Deviation for project design without adequate consultation;
- Identification of partners later in the implementation stage;
- Lack of sustainability measures identified at design stage.





# CHAPTER 3

## CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

DEVELOPMENT effectiveness COORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP  
sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness COORDINATION AND DEVELOPMENT responsiveness  
COORDINATION HUMAN effectiveness COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability  
COORDINATION relevance sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness  
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COORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP relevance MANAGING FOR RESULTS  
COORDINATION AND DEVELOPMENT responsiveness NATIONAL OWNERSHIP sustainability PARTNERSHIP

The conclusions and recommendations are based on the findings presented in chapter 2. They are not meant to be prescriptive and are at the strategic level, highlighting only the most critical issues.

### 3.1 Conclusions

● **Conclusion 1. UNDP in Somalia is widely recognized as a strong partner to government counterparts both at federal and member states levels. Some partnerships are long-standing (e.g., MOPIED, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Ministry of Information Somaliland, police, Ministry for Women and Human Rights Development and MOWFA in Puntland), and others are emerging in response to current needs and the proactive attitude of UNDP staff (e.g., Federal Directorate General of Environment, Puntland Ministry of Environment). Through its work in the areas of environment, climate change, durable solutions and innovation, UNDP has also demonstrated that it can facilitate the shift towards long-term sustainable solutions for Somalia in line with the principles of the RRF. However, some key actors feel that they are not involved with the work of UNDP or are not being supported as they expect. This group includes some Federal Member States, some federal ministries and some actors in Somaliland.**

Over the period 2015 to present, UNDP operated in a highly complex, fragmented and volatile environment and supported and helped put in place key governance processes, in partnership with the Government and other development actors, including:

- The development of the first NDP in 30 years, covering 2017-2019;
- The election in 2017;
- The development of the first attempt to coordinate aid flowing to the country through the SDRF;
- Development of the RRF and the push for a shift towards long-term development, away

from a recurrent emergency response;

- Operationalization of functional-level coordination structures such as the New Policing Model, and support to Wajadir structures;
- Ability of Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States to function compared to 2014, for instance, in relation to delivery of local governance, policing and basic justice services.

Except for new and growing areas of work like environment and energy, which are predominantly active in Somaliland and Puntland, the following factors are the sources of misunderstanding about the role UNDP could play in each region: the shift in focus to support the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States in the aftermath of the relocation to Mogadishu and the increased possibility to work at central level; internal disagreements about roles and responsibilities among ministries, Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States; and the prolonged absence of a Deputy Resident Representative for Programme and tailored strategic documents per region, adequately communicated to stakeholders.

● **Conclusion 2. UNDP is centrally positioned to act as a platform, convenor and trusted partner for UNSOM, other United Nations agencies and donors working across Somalia. The long-standing presence and relationships of UNDP, its extensive footprint on the ground, its commitment to deliver jointly with other agencies based on comparative advantages and added values, its extensive network of local staff and advisers, as well as the breadth of its technical portfolio, mean that UNDP has been an indispensable partner for a range of United Nations agencies which have more of a niche focus, or a less extensive presence, and also an important partner for donors, most of whose NGO or private sector implementers do not have the reach of UNDP. This is in line with the UNDP intention to act as “operational backbone” for other agencies.<sup>212</sup>**

<sup>212</sup> UNDP Strategic Plan, 2018-2021.



While joint programming has not been without challenges and is not a silver bullet (see finding 21 and annex 8), UNDP has shown that it is centrally positioned not only to support the operations of other agencies in the country, but also to make sure that they are part of strategic discussions as well as field implementation, especially when they are non-resident agencies, as seen in programmes like PROSCAL and rule of law. This promotes a joint response to the complex challenges of the country, based on each agency's strength. UNDP, meanwhile, is a natural partner for those donors committed to delivering through and promoting multilateralism. In relation to both United Nations and donor partners, however, UNDP will need to do extra work to clarify its added value, ensure open and transparent communications, support a system of mutual accountability and provide reassurance about its competence to execute projects. It will also need to strengthen partnerships which have been strong in the past, but are less so at present (e.g., with UNSOM).

- **Conclusion 3. Recognizing that capacity injection has been helpful to support key processes (conclusion 1) and that it will continue to play a role in Somalia in the medium term, the evaluation highlights that there is no long-term capacity development strategy and sustainability of interventions is at risk. Current implementation modalities are not supporting a shift towards long-term creation of capacity within institutions. Sustainability is also at risk for interventions on the ground, due to lack of long-term capacity and commitment of local government authorities to maintain results, the short span of donor funding and lack of integration of sustainability measures from the design stage.**

The 2015 ADR concluded that: "UNDP contribution to strengthening national capacities has

been less than expected". This ICPE reiterates the 2015 finding. There has been progress in some areas. Management systems have been built in some institutions,<sup>213</sup> and long-term capacity-building efforts have borne fruit in some areas.<sup>214</sup> It is also important to recognize the overall lack of capacity at the federal and member state levels, outside of Somaliland, given the context of conflict, underdevelopment and emigration. The approach therefore adopted by UNDP, as well as other United Nations agencies and other donors, has been to fund advisers and consultants<sup>215</sup> in Somali institutions under letters of agreements which provide the capacity needed for Somali institutions to deliver on the development and peacebuilding agenda. In the short term, this modality in itself poses the risk of setting up perverse incentives and fuelling patronage politics, in part due to unclear accountability frameworks. In the longer term, there is little evidence that this approach is being used to build sustainable human or management capacity within Somali institutions.

Fiscal sustainability is also a major challenge in a context in which government revenues will remain meagre for a long period to come. As long as the international community perceives a value in supporting the Somali State for reasons of international security and development, then donors are likely to continue funding core State operations. However, as with human capacity, it is a core responsibility of UNDP to assist Somali and donor partners to move the country towards a more sustainable fiscal model. This will require vigorous use of the mutual accountability framework to ensure that Somali authorities are doing all they can to raise revenues and build State capacities that are affordable, and ensure that donors provide consistent funding over time that is designed to gradually shift responsibility to state budgets.<sup>216</sup>

<sup>213</sup> The successful, in fiduciary terms, use of the national window in the MOIFA for S2S is noted.

<sup>214</sup> For instance the use of the university scholarship and internship processes.

<sup>215</sup> Often expatriate Somalis.

<sup>216</sup> A more rigorous approach to joint planning in this area may help avoid situations where core service delivery initiatives suddenly stop due to changes in donor interest or priorities, and also situations where the government adopts a new initiative or builds a new governmental capability even though there is no prospect of its being affordable.

- **Conclusion 4. Project implementation and adaptive management have been weak, requiring improvement. The use of evidence, monitoring and reporting remain weak and undermine the UNDP ability to design, deliver and account for results.**

The evaluation recognizes that the operational environment in Somali is challenging, that there is a very complex aid architecture with competing donor interests, and a complex political situation across Somali stakeholders. Nonetheless, donors, Somali partners and UNDP staff express concerns about the UNDP ability to design, deliver and monitor projects, i.e., to conduct the basics of quality project and programme management. Issues include timeliness, quality of oversight and quality of reporting. As a result, the evaluation noted specific cases in which support has therefore been provided through bilateral agreements (e.g., support from DfID to policing), perceived as easier to monitor, or in parallel to main initiatives (e.g., review of the Constitution, Parliament). The 2015 ADR concluded: “UNDP monitoring and reporting of results tend to emphasize inputs and immediate outputs with less orientation on intermediate outcome results.” The ICPE reiterates this finding. Across the portfolio, the evaluation found a limited ability to analyse or report on out-

comes or impacts, a lack of efforts to build Somali or donor capacities to generate such time-series data, and a focus on reporting at the activity level. Evaluations and TPM have not been used to their potential. Donors have expressed concerns over the ability of UNDP to report on results and progress in a realistic and evidence-based manner. The evaluation acknowledges that UNDP has recently initiated some efforts to improve the situation, and these are long overdue (see for example finding 10).

- **Conclusion 5. Gender and human rights. UNDP Somalia has made a concerted effort to support gender-sensitive approaches and to initiate a much-needed dialogue on human rights. While there is evidence of improved women’s participation and, in some areas, increased sensitivity to gender issues, gender was not fully mainstreamed into programming, except for some interventions (elections and WPP).**

Both gender and human rights are critical and sensitive issues in the context of Somalia and the office has been proactive in changing its approach to the management of the gender portfolio and in raising the profile of the issue of human rights, even if much remains to be done, in cooperation with donors and partners.

## 3.2 Recommendations and management response

### Recommendation 1.



In framing its next country programme, UNDP should determine its added value in the Somali aid ecosystem, review its communication strategies with partners and donors, and explicitly articulate its contributions to overall development results through theory of change approaches. The country programme development process should ultimately strengthen the strategic focus of the programme, develop synergies across portfolios and ensure sustainability.

UNDP Somalia has many potential advantages on which it can build and has de facto moved away from certain legacy areas, such as infrastructure projects, unless they are essential for the functioning of institutions (e.g., in

Federal Member States) or in the case of environmental interventions,<sup>217</sup> if the infrastructure is built to the correct standards and can be maintained. Key UNDP roles may include providing thought leadership, in partnership with Somali counterparts, on the development and State-building agenda, a long-term developmental perspective, world-class technical expertise, a countrywide convening and operational platform, and support for the scaling-up of successful interventions through the presentation and dissemination of evidence of what works or doesn't. This evaluation finds that UNDP is centrally positioned to play a key role within the RRF, which encourages a move towards long-term resilience. However, it also notes that UNDP expertise will be required in the immediate future in long-standing core areas of governance like elections, local governance and rule of law. It will therefore be crucial for UNDP to retain focus and use its facilitation abilities to encourage other actors to play an active role in the Somali context rather than trying to expand its two smaller portfolios, environment and energy and early recovery, at the expense of effective institutions, inclusive politics and rule of law.

In order to fulfil these roles, UNDP needs to ensure it is staffed and structured appropriately, with both technical and strategic capacity in place. For programming in the governance and rule of law areas, relatively short funding cycles can stand in the way of progress. As noted in finding 11, long-term funding makes a real difference. UNDP should explore with donors how longer-term programming can be developed so that UNDP can provide the long-term support to Somali partners that is needed to bring about sustainable change. At the same time, UNDP will need to improve how it communicates with Somali partners and donors to be clear about the role UNDP plays. UNDP needs to communicate to all Somali stakeholders what its focus and added value are and what it will not do, and ensure that it is actively involved in using its expertise to shape donor interventions as well as honestly and clearly communicating results.

In addition to the existing areas of UNDP work, on which we make specific recommendations below, we would stress a major gap in the current country programme, work on anti-corruption. The evaluation team recognize that addressing corruption in a context such as Somalia is incredibly difficult, but the issue is central to peacebuilding and sustainable development. The anti-corruption programme currently in development is welcome but will need to be seen as part of a wider political approach at the level of UNDP and UNSOM leadership, working collectively with all donors and Somali stakeholders.

<sup>217</sup> Somali counterparts, who recall the period when a lot of UNDP support revolved around equipment (e.g., vehicles, uniforms) and infrastructure (e.g., police stations, courts) sometimes bemoan the fact that the weight of UNDP effort has shifted in recent years to "soft" services such as technical advice and training. In the view of the evaluation team, this shift is the right one as UNDP focuses more on its added value and allows either other agencies such as UNOPS or the Somali authorities to manage infrastructure provision. Clearer communication will however be required to ensure that strong relations are retained with counterparts.

*Specific programmatic recommendations by portfolio:*

**Environment and resilience to climate change:**

- **Define a strategy to develop the portfolio** in line with the country's federal and regional priorities, by paying particular attention to high-priority issues that have so far not been addressed or addressed to a limited extent (e.g., disaster risk reduction, biodiversity, waste management).
- **Strongly coordinate with the early recovery portfolio** to ensure that innovation is streamlined into environmental approaches and that livelihood and value chain development work are linked to the development of a green economy (e.g., sustainable manufacturing of cookstoves and materials, to replace imports, should be linked to the support provided to IDPs and to the development of value chains; the development of environment-related sectors, e.g., solar, should support long-term sustainability of the interventions of this portfolio).<sup>218</sup>
- **Facilitate the presence of other agencies** in Somalia, based on the experience of PROSCAL, thereby increasing coverage and depth. At the same time, closely coordinate with IFIs to strengthen upscaling and replicability.
- **Lead by example** and promote the greening of UNDP, and preferably United Nations, operations in Somalia, in line with the recently launched UNDP Greening the Moonshot initiative, as well as long-term work by UNEP on greening United Nations operations (Greening the Blue) as well as the greening of United Nations operations specifically in conflict environment (Greening the Blue Helmets), including systematic use of environmental technologies (e.g., solar versus diesel) and innovation (e.g., seed bombing as an alternative to traditional afforestation), also as a measure to address sustainability concerns (see below).

**Early recovery and development:**

As it seeks to operationalize its shift towards longer-term sustainable approaches, UNDP should seek to **continue piloting innovative approaches and test approaches for upscaling** with partners in the area of economic governance, promoting a human development perspective as its differentiating factor, and seeking to establish linkages between upstream- and downstream-level engagement in and across its portfolios.

UNDP should put **greater emphasis on private sector development** in key strategic sectors with a view to promoting potential for import substitution and investments to establish greater synergies between its portfolios on economic recovery and environment and resilience to climate change, with a view to supporting resilience of existing key productive sectors (livestock, and agriculture sectors).

<sup>218</sup> For example, solar installations and maintenance would benefit from presence in the same locations of skilled personnel and companies which can ensure long-term use of the facilities provided, and could be paid for their services through income generated by the selling of electricity not needed for the specific facility.

As UNDP considers its engagement with the private sector, it should consider **establishing new partnerships** with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and particularly with chambers of commerce, while pursuing engagement with MOLSA through the next phase of United Nations joint employment programme.

Given its unique positioning and mandate, UNDP should consider **establishing synergies between its engagement in the area of durable solutions and its other portfolios**, particularly in the areas of local governance and rule of law, which are conducive to ensuring the physical, material and legal safety of IDPs and returnees in line with the Durable Solutions Initiative.

#### **Effective institutions and inclusive politics:**

UNDP should continue to provide **support for building the centre of government in the Federal Government of Somalia** and the Federal Member States, including parliaments, where required. While needing less support, Somaliland should not be neglected. Further projects should be developed around an agreement with the partner government at senior level on a series of realistic performance benchmarks to be aimed for. **Where political commitment is absent, support should cease.**

Inclusive politics portfolio management should address the poor record in **reporting effectively to, and communicating with, the donor community** as a matter of urgency and ensure that both staff and management resources are devoted to improving the situation.

UNDP and UNSOM management should take steps to **resolve the current decrease in cooperation** on inclusive politics, which is undermining relations with Somali stakeholders and is detrimental to programme effectiveness.

The inclusive politics portfolio should take immediate steps to **increase its ability to respond to urgent requests by government partners** to meet emerging needs, which has contributed to donors and Somali partners turning to bilateral agreements, ultimately undermining the principle of coordinating aid flows to the country through a common system.

#### **Stabilization:**

**Better manage the national window approach.** The national window approach has been positive in terms of giving MOIFA confidence to lead, but the lack of the UNDP ability to evaluate impact raises concerns. While UNDP should not row back from the national window, methods need to be agreed with MOIFA to ensure impact is properly assessed.<sup>219</sup>

<sup>219</sup> This will be easier to do if the improvements to the aid coordination architecture and mutual accountability framework proposed above are adopted.



**Bring stabilization into the governance mainstream.** Since much of stabilization is about negotiating political settlements, building local government structures and delivering accountable services, i.e., the governance agenda, in principle it would make sense to bring the JPLG closer together with S2S. To make this work, however, would require addressing concerns at the level of the Federal Member States about centralization of control and funding in Mogadishu. JPLG has worked well because of its very close and direct partnership with the Federal Member States. MOIFA has a significant role, but the project works independently with the member states, which has significant benefits but because of its size and geographic scope, project management is already overloaded. Given the constant challenges of fraud and corruption facing all projects, for the present it would be unwise to combine the two into a mega-project. However, it would be advisable to move to a coordination structure involving the two projects to exchange information and develop a shared approach to local partners and timing of interventions.

**Step forward to a more prominent role in shaping the stabilization agenda in Somalia.** In the coming period, in case of more consistent government and military presence and an increasingly urban population, there will be a requirement to evolve and adapt the approach taken. UNDP should therefore take the opportunity to reflect on lessons and adjust the future phases of S2S accordingly. UNDP is ideally placed to provide intellectual leadership on the stabilization agenda, in partnership with UNSOM.

#### **Rule of law:**

**Ensure linkages across the criminal justice and the public sector chain.** Efforts under way, supported by UNDP, to bring security and justice development within the new NDP framework, and to finalize an updated security and justice public expenditure review, should be prioritized.

**Carefully revise the need to address gaps in the portfolio.** There is a risk of UNDP and its United Nations partners seeking to do too much. There are many pressing needs in the Somali rule of law sector but limited absorptive capacity and the sheer difficulty of getting anything done in the Somali context should make UNDP cautious about adding to its portfolio. However, there are areas like anti-corruption which are necessary for the long-term sustainability of results in the governance area.

**Define and articulate the UNDP added value.** A new country programme provides an opportunity to redefine the UNDP role. With UNOPS and UNODC having become heavily involved in the 2015-2019 period in operational delivery, UNDP can double down on its added value in areas like long-term institution-building, community security and justice and a focus on vulnerable populations. In relation to UNSOM, UNDP also needs to build on the areas where UNSOM policy and technical expertise mesh well with UNDP technical expertise and longer-term focus.

**Security sector reform:**

**Articulate a clear strategy for building long-term sustainable civil service capacity** in the security and justice ministries, and adopt a rigorous approach to measurement of the impact of capacity injection. These approaches need to be aligned with the wider civil service capacity-building efforts being undertaken in the context of the new NDP (see recommendation 2).

**Preventing and countering violent extremism:**

**Ensure sustained policy and technical leadership.** The PCVE agenda requires continued experienced leadership from UNDP both to ensure that the work is informed by global good practices and to navigate the complex federal and local politics surrounding this issue.

**Ensure integration with other related work and measure results.** For PCVE to make a tangible difference in Somalia, it will be very important for UNDP to work with the Somali Government on two aspects: (1) to ensure full integration with other areas of work;<sup>220</sup> and (2) to ensure proper measurement. It is positive that the pilot projects have been constructed on the basis of location-specific context analysis. It will be vital that UNDP operationalizes a results-based approach that rigorously uses data to figure out what works in Somalia's varied contexts.

**Management  
Response:  
Accepted**



The next CPD will articulate the programme-level theory of change and how it will achieve its results through synergistic approaches across portfolios /and role of partnerships in contributing to the achievement of results and maintaining sustainability. A comparative analysis will be undertaken as part of the development of the next CPD.

A Partnership and Communication Strategy will be developed in line with UNDP Corporate Guidelines, to ensure coherent outreach and coordinated approach to partners.

<sup>220</sup> With Somalia ranked by Transparency International as the most corrupt country in the world, these areas will be vital if Somalia is to develop economically and to build trust in the State.

Key Actions	Time frame	Responsible Unit(s)	Tracking*	
			Status	Comments
<b>1.1</b> Country office will explicitly define the theory of change of the next CPD showing the assumptions and role of partnerships, risks and the solution tree based on data from country analysis.	By end of Sept 2020	Programme, POQA	Not started	This will start once the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) process is rolled out, and UNSDCF outcomes are in place to inform the next CPD
<b>1.2</b> Partnership and Communication Strategy developed	February 2021	Programme, Communications Unit	Not started	To be developed as part of the CPD

## Recommendation 2.



**Ensure that sustainability in relation to capacity development, finances and projects is at the centre of project design, monitoring and adaptive management efforts, in cooperation with partners in the country.**

Sustainability has been more of a catch phrase than a reality in UNDP programming in the past. While Somalia will remain dependent on donor financial and human support for decades to come, a more stable political settlement and progress on debt relief provides the opportunity in the next phase for UNDP and its partners to take sustainability seriously. At the strategic level, UNDP should work with the IFIs to put in place a long-term capacity-building programme at Federal Government and Federal Member States levels by building the educational/graduate entry/career development pipeline in the civil service (and other state functions) with clear milestones for phasing out international funding and international advisers and in parallel, milestones for use of national window and building of country systems. This overall programme should cover fiscal as well as human sustainability and needs to be cross-sectoral, including the security sectors and the remainder of the public administration. The new NDP provides the ideal opportunity to agree on such a strategy.

It may be that UNDP, and its United Nations and donor partners, make the conscious decision to continue injecting capacity for at least a generation in order to ensure progress continues. This would be a rational option but even in this case, all UNDP interventions should include specific capacity-building elements and measures.<sup>221</sup> If on the other hand, the United Nations and its

<sup>221</sup> For instance, by building in benchmarks for the phased transfer of skills and responsibilities from advisers and consultants to staff on the core civil service payroll.

donor partners do not feel that they can commit to a multi-decade civil service capacity-building effort, then it would be wise now to scale down the level of ambition and focus on a smaller number of areas that can be sustained when international funding for advisers drops away. If the creation of specific units staffed by advisers is deemed necessary (as seen for the Aid Coordination Unit, Border and Federalization Commission, ICRIC, etc.), any commitment to support them should be based on a thorough contextual and political economy analysis, including political and other factors which may act as barriers to unit effectiveness and value added.

Meanwhile, at the level of individual UNDP programmes and projects, a systematic approach to sustainability needs to be included at project design stage. This should include plans for development of civil servants, transition plans for advisers and measures for long-term sustainability of infrastructure projects. Plans should be revised if deemed unsustainable (e.g., by selecting low-cost technologies, developing partnerships with other United Nations agencies or IFIs to support results, ensuring the commitment of local authorities and clear understanding of maintenance required). UNDP should also negotiate with donors a light involvement in the long term, to support monitoring and adaptive management, to avoid projects being abandoned, and should explore partnerships with other actors (e.g., IFIs) to look at upscaling and replicability options. Future projects should support partner institutions in developing capacities to monitor the effectiveness and efficiency of implementation, as well as relevance to communities and citizens.

**Management  
Response:**  
**Accepted**



There is need to have a mix of individual capacity-building, institutional strengthening and setting up of systems to ensure long-term sustainability of UNDP support/interventions given high staff turnover rate within partner organizations in Somalia.

Efforts will be made to incorporate a sustainability plan and an exit strategy in the different projects, to the extent feasible. The country office will explore possibility of adopting phased out approaches in providing support, in line with the changing country context, i.e., the government gradually and increasingly taking on some of the costs in view of the debt relief that the country will benefit from.

Key Actions	Time frame	Responsible Unit(s)	Tracking*	
			Status	Comments
<p><b>2.1</b> Capacity development efforts to focus on the systems and processes establishment in addition to individual training and capacity-building.</p> <p>(a) Incorporate systems development and institutional strengthening in programmes/projects</p> <p>(b) Support development of monitoring and evaluation (M&amp;E) system for tracking/tracing those trained</p>	Continuous	Programme	Not started	Initiatives to be ongoing

### Recommendation 3.



**A rights-based approach is fundamental to UNDP approaches and should be a central part of the mutual accountability framework.** An increased UNDP/UNSOM programmatic focus on human rights has been a positive move. However, UNSOM and UNDP leadership, working with donor partners, need to provide stronger backing to hold all partners to account to their human rights commitments. UNDP needs to build on its particular advantages by providing support and advice to Somali authorities at all levels and working with civil society to ensure rights are consistently respected.

**Management Response:**  
**Accepted**



A rights-based approach will be adopted in undertaking the country analysis and will inform the development of the new country programme documents and the programmes under it. Efforts will be made to target both rights holders and duty bearers with the UNDP interventions.



Key Actions	Time frame	Responsible Unit(s)	Tracking*	
			Status	Comments
<b>3.1 Rights-based approach adopted</b> a) Adopt the 3-step approach in undertaking the analysis to inform CPD development (b) Target both rights holders and duty bearers in defining CPD outputs	March – December 2020	Programme	Not started	

#### Recommendation 4.



**The office should strengthen its results-based systems and practices. In particular, solid evidence, systematically collected, used for adaptive management, and communication with donors and partners, are central to success of UNDP efforts in Somalia.**

Efforts have been made to improve this area since the last ADR but UNDP Somalia still underperforms. The lack of long-term outcome analysis, time-series data, quality evaluations and systematic use of monitoring all contribute to a lack of donor confidence in UNDP and an inability to determine what difference UNDP is making. Recent initiatives such as the SDG 16 research project need to be supported, along with efforts to fuse analytical capabilities across the United Nations mission and the overall effort to build monitoring, evaluation and quality assurance capacity through the establishment of POQA.

##### Quality assurance:

- Ensure timely and substantive revision of projects at design through Local Project Approval Committees prior to submission to the SDRF. This should include the identification of synergies within the programme and document consultations with partners.
- Update the risk management framework and ensure it is adequately prepared, revised and approved.

##### Monitoring:

- Building on current reform efforts, ensure that TPM is used strategically to inform adaptive management, centrally managed by POQA, with priority given to areas which cannot be reached by project staff monitoring. POQA should also ensure that long-term trends are identified and discussed regularly with the Deputy Resident Representative-Programme and senior management. In the case of joint programmes, consider use TPM for monitoring of collective results as part of the functions of the coordination mechanisms.

- Ensure regular and thorough monitoring of accessible projects, including verification of data and information provided by counterparts.
- Centralize all agreements with responsible parties (as per direct implementation modalities), which should be monitored by POQA and discussed regularly with senior management, and ensure regular spot checks by external providers of cash transfers. Ensure monitoring of results delivered through responsible parties, not just at activity level, but also in terms of quality (e.g., quality of consultations conducted towards the preparation, validation and adoption of policies).
- Maintain a central database of all advisers, including terms of reference, length of assignment, supervisor and expected transfer of skills at the end of the assignment. Develop a performance-based framework for the monitoring of results to ensure value for money and verify building of capacities and skills.
- Ensure the signed agreement for the handover of infrastructure include specific clauses for the maintenance and long-term sustainability requirements. If these are signed with communities, care should be taken to ensure that long-term requirements are realistic and well understood. If not, alternative plans should be defined at either project development stage (e.g., use of lower-cost technologies) or during implementation
- Maintain a central database of agreements signed upon completion and allocate budget to long-term monitoring. This should be the basis for the decision on whether to provide additional support.

**Evaluation:**

- Use evaluation approaches that track outcomes over time and analyse the correlative and causal relationships between outcomes and UNDP interventions and focus on contributions to results, based on added value and comparative advantages.
- Promote the use of joint evaluations as a requirement for joint programmes, to assess delivery of the programme as a whole.

**Management  
Response:**  
**Accepted**



Measures have been put in place for effective monitoring and tracking of results, collecting data and providing evidence-based results reporting. The particularly challenging nature of implementation in the Somalia context, including scarcity of data and challenges in predictability will be addressed within the country analysis and as part of the designing process for the new CPD. Additional emphasis will be put on gathering data relevant to enhancing results-based management, as well as techniques for adaptive management learned from other country offices and elsewhere as part of the CPD design process.

Recommendation 4 (cont'd)

Key Actions	Time frame	Responsible Unit(s)	Tracking*	
			Status	Comments
<b>4.1</b> Results-based management (RBM) Training for programme and project teams was conducted to orient staff on the linkage between project-level and programme-level theory of change and how results are visualized and realized through the projects.	Oct 2019	POQA	Complete	The training was provided with support from the regional hub
<b>4.2</b> RBM Training for programme and project teams – refresher training planned for Q1 in 2020	March 2020	POQA	Ongoing	
<b>4.3</b> Reform the third-party monitoring process, tools and terms of reference to ensure collection of data and lessons for adaptive management		POQA	Done	New request for proposals has been launched with revised terms of reference for TPM

## Recommendation 5.



**The reorganization of the gender function should be supported through the establishment of incentives and measures which will embed it into the implementation of the programme.** Measures should include a double reporting line to the gender adviser for monitoring and evaluation officers working on specific programmes and/or portfolios; trainings for technical staff responsible for the implementation of programmes with the potential to include gender aspects; inclusion of gender-related goals for staff development; regular strategic discussions chaired by the Resident Representative and Deputy Resident Representative, Programme; and creation of knowledge platforms. At the same time, it is recommended that UNDP Somalia formalize these arrangements in a gender equality action plan aligned with the new UNDP Gender Equality Strategy, 2018-2021 and resources allocated to gender results be tracked, monitored and verified in coordination with POQA. While there are some exceptions, gender approaches are not yet mainstreamed or transformative, therefore a more systematic approach to programme conceptualization and design and to negotiation with government partners must be adopted. It is recommended that in consultation with Somali women stakeholders as well as male decision makers, UNDP should undertake a thorough review of its current practices regarding gender equality and women's empowerment with a view to adopting a more systematic approach to facilitate gender mainstreaming in a way appropriate to the Somali context.

Further, in reconsidering its overall approach to gender equality and women's empowerment, UNDP would do well to recognize the continuing value of a dedicated project on the theme. A stand-alone project should focus on spheres of engagement where there is the greatest opportunity to build capacities of women's organizations and women's leadership by supporting them in working for achievable objectives. Beyond this, recognizing that capacity development is not about quick results, there would be continuing support for Somali partners over the life of the project, and, with positive interim results, into a second phase. As has been demonstrated by the experience of JPLG, and, in a limited way, by gender equality and women's empowerment, the most promising place to focus programming would seem to be at local level, building women's participation and knowledge and seeking male allies in the common pursuit of local democracy, from the bottom up. Supporting policy objectives, monitoring the effectiveness of government and local government programmes and advocating for meeting the needs of vulnerable communities at Federal Member States level will build a valuable link to the state level. It will also be essential to maintain a link to the Federal Government of Somalia Parliament and the Ministry for Women and Human Rights Development, but this would be done by forging a link to engagement at state and local levels via a coherent theory of change, binding together the inputs of all joint programme partners.

**Management  
Response:**  
**Accepted**



Adopt a twin-track approach to mainstreaming gender in next CPD/UNDP support/initiatives. The office established a team of gender focal points and introduced a new gender planning and M&E tool that was applied in a selection of pilot projects, to increase visibility of gender results beyond focus on parity.

Key Actions	Time frame	Responsible Unit(s)	Tracking*	
			Status	Comments
<b>5.1</b> Establish gender focal points within M&E team to pilot the gender planning tool among six pilot projects that will report on transformational gender results in 2019	March – Dec 2019	POQA, Programme	Ongoing	Results of this will be seen in the 2019 report
<b>5.2</b> New UNDP gender strategy for Somalia will be developed, informed by the new NDP, the Somalia Women's Charter and the global UNDP gender strategy	Dec 2020	Programme	Ongoing	
<b>5.3</b> Have a stand-alone output and project to promote gender equality and women's empowerment	By Dec 2020	Programme	Not started	This will be part of the new CPD drafting
<b>5.4</b> Establish a gender focal team to develop the country office gender action plan and coordinate its implementation	By March 2020	Programme & Operations	Not started	



## Recommendation 6.



**Programme management and operations.** While understanding the complexity of the context, UNDP has to make sure that it has the best possible systems in place to ensure efficient delivery of its programme.

Roles and responsibilities for project management should be clear and accountability ensured, in line with UNDP rules and regulations. At a practical level, there is a need to staff the vacant positions and to ensure that a system is in place to minimize the delays related to the complex environment (e.g., delays in procurement processes due to absences of personnel). The current move to reform results-based management in the office should be supported and used for strategic decision-making, and the incoming Deputy Resident Representative for Programme needs to ensure effective implementation and coordination. Trainings and exchanges should be promoted to increase understanding of operations and processes and staff need to be held accountable for project management, including regular monitoring, risk management and adaptive management.

**Management  
Response:  
Accepted**



The country office has initiated application of 'innovation' in business processes to increase efficiency in its operations. The office has also rolled out training of programme and project staff on the new Programme and Project Management changes, to apply the new tools that the changes provide and assist in increasing efficiency in responding to emerging needs in programme aspects.

Key Actions	Time frame	Responsible Unit(s)	Tracking*	
			Status	Comments
<b>6.1</b> The office rolled out training on the new Programme and Project Management changes to the programme and project staff from various offices and projects in Somalia	October 2019	POQA	Complete	Support was provided from the regional hub to deliver on this training.
<b>6.2</b> Programme and project staff were trained and oriented on the use of Atlas for project management, risk management and recording of results	October 2019	POQA	Complete	Support from the regional hub was provided to deliver on this training

<b>6.3</b> The innovation team will engage with each end-user unit to develop tools and SOPs that are efficient, user-friendly and avoid the bottlenecks identified during the prototype phase	Feb – Dec 2020	Operations	Ongoing	
<b>6.4</b> Reinforce dialogue on better/more effective programming options for new initiatives through the established biweekly meetings between the Programme Team and Programme Oversight Team	Jan – Dec 2020	Programme, POQA	Ongoing	

## Recommendation 7.



**Aid architecture.** UNDP in coordination with the United Nations Resident Coordinator's office and UNSOM should clarify the roles and responsibilities of UNDP and the other actors in the management and support of the aid coordination system, in line with the roles and responsibilities of each actor under the United Nations reform, with a view to streamline and simplify the process, improve operational efficiency and ensure transparent aid flows to both the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States.

In particular, the evaluation notes that role of UNDP in support of the reform efforts should be clarified, as well as the responsibility of other actors for facilitating the political discussions and strategic decision-making based on its results. The strategic and operational recommendations developed by the UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office in December 2018 should be implemented as soon as possible to improve the functioning of the MPTF, and this will require UNDP to support the Resident Coordinator's office in the process as the latter retains responsibility for the support unit of the MPTF, while UNDP has traditionally provided technical support. The structure of the Aid Coordination Unit should be reviewed by UNDP as part of the reform process, based on the decision taken at political level, to ensure that it performs both at logistical and administrative as well as strategic levels. In line with recommendation 4, UNDP should ensure performance-based monitoring of the Unit. Due consideration should be given to the merging of the CAS and SDRF structures.

**Management  
Response:  
Accepted**



While this recommendation has been addressed through the development of the Joint Project titled 'Support to Aid Management & Coordination in Somalia' which brings together under the umbrella of the United Nations Integrated Office previously fragmented support to the aid coordination function provided by UNDP, UNSOM and the World Bank, this project will need to support further work in relation to the National Development Plan 9 and the ongoing work on reforming the aid architecture. The project has been under implementation after the period covered by the evaluation. Collaboration between members of the Strategic Partnerships Unit of the United Nations Integrated Office is regularly discussed by its members and will be addressed, particularly in the process of development of the 2020 Annual Workplan.

Key Actions	Time frame	Responsible Unit(s)	Tracking*	
			Status	Comments
Development of Annual Workplan of the United Nations Integrated Office's Strategic Partnership Unit in which roles and responsibilities of members are defined	January 2020	United Nations Integrated Office's Strategic Partnerships Unit	Not started	

**Recommendation 8.**



**Joint programming. A critical weakness of the joint programmes is the absence of provision for collective oversight and for vesting authority in the Programme Management Board. It is recommended that this deficiency in the regulations and guidance provided to joint programmes be addressed as a matter of urgency. It is recognized that this may well require a formal agreement among agency heads at headquarters and that it should be supported by joint monitoring and evaluation (see recommendation 4).**

**Management  
Response:  
Accepted**



There is need to strengthen the Joint Programming Steering Committee/ Programme Board with clear terms of reference that emphasize their oversight function. To get this right, it is suggested to separate the functions that are technical from those that are management/oversight related since the latter are the ones that provide overall direction of the programme. Furthermore, the steering committee needs to receive inputs from joint field monitoring to appreciate feedback from the ground that will inform the adaptive management options to take as part of their oversight role.

Key Actions	Time frame	Responsible Unit(s)	Tracking*	
			Status	Comments
<b>8.1</b> Adopt joint planning and monitoring initiatives and make them visible in the joint workplans	Jan – Dec 2020	Programme	Not started	To be incorporated in the 2020 workplans
<b>8.2</b> Develop a checklist that outlines the minimum pre-requisite inputs required in the preparation of the Joint Programming Steering Committee meetings. These inputs will provide the committee with information to enable them perform their oversight function more effectively	Jan – Dec 2020	Programme	Not started	To be developed jointly when Joint Programming members agree to the proposal of separating technical staff from steering committees
<b>8.3</b> Develop a calendar to time the schedule of the meetings to be aligned in a cycle of joint monitoring, technical meeting followed by steering committee. This will ensure information from the field is analysed and taken into account by the technical team, adaptive measures introduced where required and brought forward to the steering committee for review and endorsement	Jan – Dec 2020	JP members	Not started	To be developed jointly with the technical staff and M&E teams

\* Implementation status is tracked in the Evaluation Resource Centre.





# Annexes



Annexes to the report (listed below) are available on the website of the Independent Evaluation Office at:  
<https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/evaluations/detail/12286>

**Annex 1.** Terms of Reference

**Annex 2.** Country at a Glance

**Annex 3.** Country Office at a Glance

**Annex 4.** List of Projects

**Annex 5.** People Consulted


**Annex 6.** Documents Consulted

**Annex 7.** CPD Outcome & Output Indicator Matrix

**Annex 8.** Lessons Learned from the Experience on Joint Programming in Somalia







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