Evaluation of the Project
“Increasing Human Security in the Face of Disaster Risks in Haiti”

Final Report
May 2020

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May 2020
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<tr>
<td>ABE/EBA</td>
<td>Adaptation basée sur les Écosystèmes (Ecosystem-based adaptation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADFE</td>
<td>Association pour le Développement de Fort-Liberté et de ses Environs (Association for the development of Fort-Liberté and its surroundings)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFASDA</td>
<td>Asosyasyon Fanm Solèy Dayiti (Haiti Sun Women Association)</td>
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<td>AFELI</td>
<td>Association des Fermiers de Limonade (Limonade Farmers Association)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFVN</td>
<td>Asosyasyon Fanm Vanyan nan Nò (Valiant Women Association of North)</td>
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<tr>
<td>APAPANNE</td>
<td>Association des Professionnels Agricoles pour l’Avancement du Nord et du North-East (Association of Agriculture Professionals for the Progress of the North and Northeast -)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>Bureau Agricole Communal (Communal Office of Agriculture)</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>Common Country Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCPC/CCCP</td>
<td>Comité Communal de Protection Civile/ Communal Committee for Civil Protection/</td>
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<tr>
<td>CESVI</td>
<td>Cooperazione e Sviluppo (Italian NGO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNIGS/NCGSI</td>
<td>Centre National d’Information Géo-Spatiale (National Center for Geo-spatial Information)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUN/NCEO</td>
<td>Centre d’Opération d’Urgence National (National Center of Emergency Operation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTD/DTC</td>
<td>Coordination / Coordonnateur Technique Départemental/e (Departmental Technical Coordinator/Coordination)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTESP/TCEPA</td>
<td>Comité Thématique d’Éducation et de Sensibilisation du Public (Thematic Committee on Education and Public Awareness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAT/DTP</td>
<td>Direction d’Aménagement du Territoire (Directorate of Territorial Planning)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPC/DCP</td>
<td>Direction de la Protection Civile (Directorate of Civil Protection)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDCFDF/DDWSWR</td>
<td>Direction départementale à la Condition Féminine et aux Droits de la Femme (Departmental Directorate for the Status of Women and Women's Rights)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDENFP/DDNEVT</td>
<td>Direction départementale de l’Education Nationale et de la Formation Professionnelle (Departmental Directorate of National Education and Vocational Training)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDPCE/DDPEC</td>
<td>Direction départementale de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe (Departmental Directorate of Planning and External Cooperation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFP/DTD</td>
<td>Direction de la Formation et du Perfectionnement (Directorate of Training and Development)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRM</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIC/CIT</td>
<td>Équipe d’Intervention communautaire (Community Intervention Team)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFPC</td>
<td>Gwoupman Fanm Pa Chita</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPGA</td>
<td>Jeunes Progressistes de la Grand’Anse (Young Progressives of Grand’Anse)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>Human Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSU</td>
<td>Human Security Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHSI/HISC</td>
<td>Institut Haïtien de Statistiques et d’Informatique (Haitian Institute of Statistics and Computer Science)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARND/MANRRD</td>
<td>Ministère de l’Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles et du Développement Rural (Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCFDF/MWSWR</td>
<td>Ministère à la Condition Féminine et aux Droits de la Femme (Ministry for Women’s Status and Women's Rights)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDE/ME</td>
<td>Ministère de l’Environnement (Ministry of Environment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances (Ministry of Economy and Finances)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENFP/MNEVT</td>
<td>Ministère de l’Éducation Nationale et de la Formation Professionnelle (Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFK</td>
<td>Mouvman Fanm Kapoti (Capotille’s Women Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICT/MITC</td>
<td>Ministère de l’Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriales (Ministry of Interior and Territorial Collectivities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOFAPNO</td>
<td>Mouvement des Organisations de Femmes pour l’Avancement et le Progrès du North-West (Women’s Movement for the Progress of the North-west)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPCE/MPEC</td>
<td>Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe (Ministry of planning and external cooperation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSPP/MPHP</td>
<td>Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population (Ministry of Public Health and Population)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTPTC/MPWTC</td>
<td>Ministère des Travaux Publics Transport et des Communications (Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communication)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODINOVGA</td>
<td>Organisation Pour Le Développement D’ intégration Pour Une Nouvelle Vie De La Grand ’Anse (Organization for the Development of Integration for a New Life of Grand ’Anse)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFALJEB</td>
<td>Oganizasyon Fanm Louvri Je Boukan (Open-eyes women organization of Boucan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFDA/CRED</td>
<td>Office of U.S for Foreign Disaster Assistance/ Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OJADGA</td>
<td>Organisation des Jeunes pour le Développement et l’Avancement de la Grand’Anse (Youth Organization for the Development and Advancement of Grand Anse)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNGRD/NPDRM</td>
<td>Plan National de Gestion des Risques et des Désastres (National Plan for Disaster Risks Management)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNH/NHP</td>
<td>Police Nationale d’Haiti (National Haitian Police)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSDH/HDSP</td>
<td>Plan Stratégique de développement d’Haiti (Haiti Development Strategic Plan) Plan d’Urgence Familial (Family Emergency Plan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PUF/FEP</td>
<td>Service d’ Appui Pédagogique (Pedagogical Support Service)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP/PSS</td>
<td>Système National de Gestion des Risques et de Désastres (National System of Disaster Risk Management)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPGRD/PSDRM</td>
<td>Secrétariat permanent de gestion des risques et des désastres (Permanent Secretariat for Disaster Risk Management)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOT</td>
<td>Training of trainers</td>
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<tr>
<td>UEP</td>
<td>Unité d’Étude et de programmation (Study and Programming Unit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN WOMEN</td>
<td>United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCT</td>
<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTFHS</td>
<td>United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security</td>
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<td>UNV</td>
<td>United Nations Volunteers</td>
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Executive Summary

1. Background and Context of the Project:
The evaluation of the project “Increasing Human Security in the Face of Disaster Risks in Haiti” was carried out by two external evaluators, between October 2019 and April 2020. The project was implemented from April 2016 until September 2019, then extended until December 2019. It was jointly implemented by UNDP, UN Women, and UNESCO in Haiti. The pilot project targeted interventions in the departments of North, Northeast, Northwest, South and Grand’Anse. The project had an envelope of USD 4,112,230.79 of which USD 1,979,068.79 was funded by the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS), the remainder USD 2,133,158.00 coming from UN implementing agencies on the ground funded through donors (Japan, DIPECHO and the EU). UNDP contributed USD 1,936,000.00, UNESCO USD 115,158.00 and UN Women put in USD 82,000.00.

2. Object, Purpose, and Methodology of the Evaluation
The project had three basic objectives: 1) To sensitize government officials to the application of the Human Security approach in the area of risk and disaster management; 2) To build capacity for natural disaster preparedness among main stakeholders at the municipal and regional levels; 3) To contribute to the empowerment of communities so that they could cope with insecurities stemming from disasters.

The evaluation of the three-year project was requested on behalf of the UNDP Country Office in Haiti as part of the office’s plans to feed into the 2017-2021 Country Program. The evaluation will serve the purposes of UNDP, even though it is expected that UNESCO and UN Women, as the other executive agencies, will also benefit from the results. The evaluation was conducted in accordance with four of the Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) criteria for evaluating development projects and programs: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability. To these were added criteria on mainstreaming the rights-based/gender approach and using the human security approach.

The evaluation was supposed to have been conducted in October 2019 by an international consultant, based on the activities of the project until September 2019. However, given the political upheaval in the country and lack of possibility to travel to Haiti for an on-site visit, it was decided to hire a national consultant for the field interviews and preliminary analysis.

3. Evaluation Findings and Performance Assessment
A) Relevance
- The project was highly relevant in structural terms to the challenges faced in disaster risk management (DRM) in Haiti. The Human Security project is also in line with the Haiti Strategic Development Plan in its four components/action areas: territorial rebuilding - social rebuilding - economic rebuilding - and institutional rebuilding.
- The project was also relevant to the target groups’ needs and priorities because it responded to the country’s vulnerable situation and the limits of inclusion of people in existing national DRM systems. It was also relevant to both on-going and planned efforts of the UNCT, especially UNDP that supports the government in disaster risk management.
- The HS approach, with its protection and empowerment framework, proved highly relevant for DRR planning in Haiti. As a preventive framework, the Human Security approach adds value in the context of planning for disasters in Haiti because it can help bridge humanitarian assistance with longer-term development goals and strategies.
- The project showed flexibility and adaptability to the volatile political situation.
While the project was relevant to the needs of communities and institutions, a number of initiatives undertaken were not completed to the end. UN agencies have to foresee proper follow-up with the concerned entities, encourage the use of the products, and complete what has yet to be completed in order to ensure the overall relevance of the project.

B) Effectiveness

The project was able to achieve most of its objectives, despite major delays:

**Objective 1: The UN in Haiti, the Government of Haiti and its partners use the Human Security approach in strategies related to disaster risk reduction.**

- A major study was published with quantitative and qualitative, objective, and subjective assessment of human insecurities related to disasters.
- The term human security appears in the government’s National Risk Management and Disaster Plan, albeit in a very generic way, alongside other concepts/frameworks such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, etc.
- Although the UNDP country staff was trained in the concept, the UNDAF does not explicitly use the Human Security approach and its methodology.

**Objective 2: The main disaster risk reduction mechanisms are strengthened at the departmental and municipal level.**

- A DRR data management architecture was prepared based on needs assessment. The Database, however, could not be completed due to insufficient funding.
- Training and workshops were organized to integrate the HS approach in departmental and municipal DRR and emergency response strategies, including departmental annual plans and contingency plans, although these were not revised to integrate HS.

**Objective 3: Targeted communities are empowered to address their insecurities and actively participate in decision-making processes for the development and implementation of DRR strategies.**

- Sensitization workshops and campaigns were organized for vulnerable populations to understand disaster-related insecurities and on ways to address them.
- The Family Emergency Plans were developed and distributed among 10,000 families.
- UN Women, in partnership with the MSWWR, the DCP, and civil society organizations, targeted 400 women heads of vulnerable households and distribution of emergency kits. Two platforms of women’s networks were created for information sharing, although support to them was abandoned when priorities went elsewhere.
- A study was published on communication practices in DRM and recommendations were provided for an effective public communication strategy to the government. They need to be followed up.
- 250 volunteers (civil defense brigadiers) from the DCP in the five targeted departments were trained on the HS approach with a focus on its operationalization in the field, awareness techniques, and the Family Emergency Plan. Participants were satisfied with the knowledge but requested concrete support. The Communal Committees for Civil Protection (CCCP) were satisfied but indicated that they cannot replicate the training for other volunteers.
- Approximately 26 CBOs were trained in HS and project management and 8 of them were financially supported to design and implement small-scale mitigation projects. Many of these projects, however, were not sustainable nor complete by the end of the project although the participation process by communities was appreciated.
- UNESCO, in partnership with the Ministry of National Education, developed a training module in DRR in French and Creole but it has not been integrated into the formal education system yet.
- About 1,800 teachers, school administrators, and students were targeted for awareness-
raising in disaster preparedness and response information campaigns.

• 100 schools were evaluated for their vulnerability and recommendations were made to the government for further investment, which they still have not received.

• These achievements were reported in difficult conditions related to force majeure and change of priorities to humanitarian needs following Hurricane Matthew, political instability, and change in government counterparts, delays, postponements, and lack of adequate personnel.

C) Efficiency

• The project implementation strategy was based on a tripartite execution by three UN agencies under the leadership of UNDP Haiti. On one hand, the advantage of tripartite management was to valorize the experience, expertise, resources and partnerships of each agency brought together. On the other hand, as this was not an integrated joint programme where one agency would act as coordinator, but a project based on three distinct set of objectives and activities led by three different agencies, the results were not necessarily efficient.

• As the lead agency, UNDP was mostly responsible to ensure joint reporting to the donor but it was not responsible for the oversight of activities. Each agency applied its own principles and followed its own rules. However, some mechanisms were put in place, such as coordination meetings, communication protocol by email, regular reporting, monitoring visits, etc.

• Coordination difficulties were noted when it came to the delivery of scheduled narrative and financial reports, given that each agency had full autonomy in scheduling its own activities. As implementation progressed, the different agencies began to get used to working together and alignments were made easier.

• Despite the requirements of the UNTFHS, the modality chosen for this project was not a joint program. UN Trust Fund resources were allocated directly to each UN agency separately. The narrative of the proposal was integrated, giving reason for the three agencies to come together with their specific skills, experiences and partners. Beyond the general objective however, the implementation modality was not an integrated approach. The three agencies cooperated and coordinated for a joint objective but they did not integrate or pool their resources.

• The level of coordination between UN agencies and their national counterparts varied. If there were challenges in the flow of information, the problem was not as much about lack of cooperation between UN agencies as it was lack of coordination between different government agencies and between entities at the central and departmental levels

• The Human Security Unit at the UNTFHS in New York provided guidance, guidelines, feedback, comments, and reference materials in addition to funding.

• The Steering Committee met only twice during the project, as opposed to every six months. Representation issues, delays, coordination problems between center and departments hampered efficiency and the role of the Steering Committee was mostly noted in asking for extensions.

• On behalf of the government, local follow up at the departmental levels was to be assumed by Departmental Technical Committees. These, however, were non-operational given political instability, lack of communication flow between center and periphery, and logistical costs. As a result, monitoring could not be assumed on the ground.

• Overall, beneficiaries and stakeholders interviewed highly regarded the outcomes of the project and were satisfied with the results. At the same time, many national stakeholders interviewed asked to increase the number of beneficiaries, the scope of the project, the geographical reach, and the involvement of more communities and departmental level institutions, etc.

• Based on data received from UNDP, approximately 85.98% of the total UNTFHS funds were disbursed and spent from April 2016 to the end of September 2019. According to our calculations, the budget consumption rate by objectives and outputs in September 2019 (i.e. 3 months before effective close-up) was as high as 98.82%. 

• Despite the socio-political challenges, delays, rising costs and changing priorities and the political emergency of the country, the financial resources were well spent.
• The project was trying to be cost-effective when it came to personnel and tried to keep a very small project implementation unit, but at the detriment of ability to follow up at the department levels. Realization of activities could have been done more effectively if the project team had been better distributed geographically.
• At the same time, higher salaries were paid for expertise, given that instead of paying consultants, the project had to hire firms to carry out some of the activities.
• A number of short-cuts and combined activities within the project as well as with other projects of UNDP added complementarity and helped make savings.

D) Sustainability
• While most of the stakeholders interviewed held showed high satisfaction with the results of the project and the relevance of objectives with priorities at the national and local levels, none of the entities interviewed indicated the possibility to continue the actions initiated by the project without further support. All of them mentioned financial difficulties which prevented them from capitalizing on the achievements.
• The worsening political situation is one of the factors that hampers the possibility for the allocation of money from national and local authorities. In a climate of uncertainties, knowledge in general takes a back seat and is not a priority. The little money that is available to national institutions would be rather spent on personnel or tangible projects, like income generation, construction, etc.
• For the moment, apart from the DRR Database, there have been no agreements to indicate that the activities will continue. The point was made in almost all interviews held by the national evaluation consultant that without further funding support, national institutions were unable to guarantee that the results will continue. The assumption made among all those interviewed was that while training, education and awareness raising was important, more concrete activities were needed in order to put the knowledge into practice.
• The project produced an impressive set of information and communication-related outputs, but it is not clear how widely they have been disseminated and how much the wider public has access to them.

E) Mainstreaming Gender and Human Rights
• With its Human Security focus, the project advocated for the rights of people regardless of their social category during training and awareness-raising activities.
• Through UN Women, the case of vulnerable women and the need for mainstreaming gender differences into studies, training modules, and pamphlets were adequately made in most interventions. A trainer was integrated into the pool of trainers specifically to tackle the gender aspect. Excellent slides on gender mainstreaming into DRR activities were developed with the help of UN Women experts and were used in trainings. The role of women in implementing the Family Emergency Plans and their networking capacities were strengthened but more targeted interventions would have been optimal in all interventions.
• Yet, in the design and development of the DRR database, CNIGS did not make any special consideration to the gender factor or the rights of vulnerable categories.
• A quota of 25 to 40% of women was set for the trainings. While those for executives at the central/national level had at least 30% women, this was not the case at the level of training for volunteers of the Civil Protection Committees at the departmental level where men were much more present.
• Trained women’s organizations in the North should be better mobilized for preparation and response to disasters.
F) Understanding and Using the Human Security Approach

- As the project being evaluated was about including the Human Security approach in DRM, the report also looked at how and whether HS was well understood and well integrated.
- The organization of training on the HS approach was the strength of this project; so the HS approach was explained very well. Excellent training modules were developed based on materials provided by the HS Unit, localized in the context of Haiti, and adapted to understanding and responding for DRR.
- Despite the training, the question remains as to whether the concept was genuinely understood by interlocutors. Interviews showed that the concept was easily understood by the staff of the UNDP office but not yet fully clear for all Haitian counterparts.
- Overall, it is possible to conclude that the people centered-view of the Human Security approach was better understood (and better explained) than the inter-sectoral principle which emphasizes the inter-connectivity between threats and risks.

4) Conclusions and Lessons Learned

Among the lessons learned from the project in Haiti:

- Insecure situations require special care and flexibility. HS is not a reactive concept that resembles the usual humanitarian approach but one that advocates for proactive, preventive, long-term measures. As such, it should be advocated among actors involved in long-term socio-economic planning in the country and not just those working for emergency response.
- The HS approach should not be about slogans, it has a specific methodology based on inclusion of people as agents of change and on tackling multiple insecurities holistically. Including the terminology in national strategies without having concrete plans to implement them is not enough. Other humanitarian actors involved in DRM should have a good understanding of the concept and adopt its principle in their strategies to be able to comply with the new National DRM plan and its implementation.
- Joint programming requires multi-dimensional interventions among fewer communities. Instead of a silos approach where each agency focuses on its own single-focused objective among different communities, integrated interventions for HS should systematically try to tackle more insecurities holistically among fewer at-risk communities.
- Awareness raising projects need to combine knowledge sharing with practical means to operationalize concepts and they should regularly refresh what has been learned.
- Knowledge should circulate, hence all studies, brochures, and training modules need to be better disseminated to the general and specialized public.

5) Recommendations

1) Continue advocating for the use of the Human Security approach in strategic and operational plans
2) Continue the flow of information and disseminate widely the products created by the project
3) Find ways to complete projects that were left incomplete and capitalize on gains made
4) Improve modalities for joint programming towards integrated projects in the future
5) Improve future training programs
6) Recommendations to the Human Security Unit to reinforce the integrated approach
1. Background and Context of the Project

Haiti, often referred to as the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, is one of the most exposed countries in the world to natural hazards that include hurricanes, cyclones, tropical storms, floods, earthquakes, landslides, and droughts. Between 1900 and 2011, according to information kept in the OFDA/CRED International Database on Disasters, the country was hit by a hundred natural and man-made disasters, 44% of which were caused by floods, 37% by storms and hurricanes, 7% by drought, 2% by earthquakes, 2% by landslides and 1% by epidemics. According to the same source, nearly 250,000 people were killed, 90% of them by the earthquake in January 2010. Haitian authorities have reported even more deaths.

During the hurricane season in 2008, Haiti was hit by four storms – Fay, Gustav, Hannah and Ike – which killed more than 800 people and devastated nearly three-quarters of the country’s agricultural land causing USD 1 billion in damage. An earthquake in 2010 close to the capital Port-au-Prince caused over 300,000 deaths, according to official figures, the displacement of more than 1.5 million people, with damages and losses estimated at an equivalent to 120 percent of Haiti’s GDP. A Cholera epidemic in the same year claimed about 10,000 lives. Category 4 Hurricane Matthew in 2016 caused losses and damages estimated at 32% of the 2015 GDP. In 2018, an earthquake of magnitude 4.7 to a few kilometers from the northwestern peninsula affected several municipalities in this department and neighboring municipalities of Artibonite and the North.

More than 96 percent of the population is at risk of two or more hazards, and 56 percent of the country’s GDP is linked to areas exposed to risk from two or more hazards. The geographical location of Haiti on the northern American Plate and in the Caribbean zone makes it a very exposed country to hydro-meteorological and seismic hazards. Additionally, the poverty level of the population makes it more vulnerable to fire and epidemics. Indeed, persistent poverty, the depletion of resources and the high exposure to natural risks constantly appear as factors of human insecurity in the country. Obviously, these calamities do not have the same impact on all social strata of the population, and the most vulnerable, namely women, young people, the elderly and people with disabilities, are often the most affected. Disasters for example have a direct impact on women’s livelihoods, increasing their workload (economic insecurity) and exposing them more to violence and sexual abuse (insecurity personal) in addition to vulnerabilities linked to natural risks (environmental insecurity). Urban and rural populations in coastal areas are also particularly vulnerable to climate and natural hazard events.

Natural disaster hazard risks are further exacerbated by man-made policies and practices which put the populations of the island at very high risk: inadequate building codes, lack of regulatory enforcement, poor infrastructure, and failure to prepare for earthquakes and storms. Staggering levels of deforestation increase exposure to floods and mudslides. Emergency services are ill equipped to cope with major disasters and populations have little knowledge about what to do. Haiti’s vulnerability to disasters and the country’s inability to cope with them is also affected by decades of political instability and unrest. The country has been continuously facing a social, economic and political crisis. Over 6 million Haitians live below the poverty line on less than USD 2.41 per day, and more than 2.5 million fall below the extreme poverty line of USD 1.23 per day. In the 2019 fiscal year, the country experienced rapid currency depreciation (close to 30%), high levels of inflation (close to 20%), and a contraction in GDP (projected at 0.5%). The unemployment rate rose to 28.9%. Despite the huge amount of aid promised in the aftermath of each disaster, very little of aid has been channeled through Haitian organizations. Post-earthquake aid, for example, was criticized for being badly targeted and doing little to help the country prepare for future catastrophes.

Since the second half of the 20th century, the Haitian state has endeavored to limit the damage by putting in place a mechanism to monitor atmospheric disturbances, coordinate and manage risks and disasters. In 1997, authorities created an institution called the Directorate of Civil Protection/Direction de la Protection Civile (henceforth referred to as DCP) under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior and Local Authorities, which became the operational arm of a National System for Disaster Risk Management/ Système National de Gestion des Risques et de Désastres (henceforth NSDRM involving not only various government ministerial entities, but also international organizations and Haitian civil society.

Following the 2010 earthquake, the government conducted a post-disaster needs assessment and, in coordination with the humanitarian sector and civil society organizations, developed and implemented a National Plan for Disaster Risk Management Plan/ Plan National de Gestion des Risques et des Désastres (henceforth NPDRM). The Plan serves as a reference document for interventions before, during and after not only for the public sector, but also for humanitarian actors intervening in targeted communities. In recent years, the Haitian government, with the help of the international community, has scaled up efforts to integrate Disaster Risk Management (DRM) into national policies and long-term development plans. In particular, it has made building a better and safer Haiti a priority in its long-term development strategy.

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Haiti, through its direct support to the DCP, has been helping make the national risk and disaster management system more functional and better able to meet the challenges of protecting the population. It is helping the Government of Haiti move from a culture of disaster response to one of prevention and reduction of vulnerabilities. Initiatives have sought to develop, manage and disseminate information and data about risks as well as support preparedness, early warning and response.

In 2016, three agencies of the United Nations, namely UNDP, UN Women and UNESCO joined efforts to implement a pilot project "Increasing Human Security in the Face of Disaster Risks in Haiti" with the support of the UN Human Security Trust Fund (UNTFHS). The overall aim of the project was to promote the application of the Human Security approach to disaster risk management (DRM) in Haiti.

The Human Security (HS) approach, as it is propagated by the UN Human Security Unit (HSU), is a people-centered approach to the reconceptualization of security by describing it as freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom from indignities. The approach is operationalized through interventions (policies and projects) that are people centered, specific to the context, holistic (touching multiple insecurities at the same time), and preventive.

With its completion, UNDP and its implementing partners hired a team of consultants, consisting of one national and one international consultant, to carry out an evaluation and measure its performance against pre-established criteria in order to learn lessons on implementing Human Security projects.

### 2. Object, Purpose and Methodology of the Evaluation

#### A) Object of the evaluation

The project "Increasing Human Security in the Face of Disaster Risks in Haiti" was designed in 2015 and was to start on January 2016 to be closed on December 2017. However, given shifting priorities and difficulties after the passage of Hurricane Matthew in October 2016 compounded by delays in starting, the timeframe was changed to three and a half years, from April 2016 until September 2019, eventually extended until December 2019 to close accounts. The project was implemented jointly by UNDP, UN Women and UNESCO, each responsible for its own area of competence. UNDP, which also commissioned
the final evaluation, acted as lead agency and was tasked with ensuring consistency in implementation and joint reporting to the UNTFHS.

National partners involved in the planning and implementation included the Directorate of Civil Protection (DCP) of the Ministry of the Interior and Territorial Collectivities/Local Authorities (MITC). Other state bodies involved included the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation/ Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe (henceforth MPEC), the Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training/ Ministère de l’Education Nationale et de la Formation Professionnelle (henceforth MNEVT), the Ministry for Women’s Status and Women’s Rights/ Ministère à la Condition Féminine et aux Droits de la Femme (henceforth MWSWR) as well as grassroots community organizations with special attention to women's and youth organizations. At the local level, the project was executed by two NGOs, a local and an international one, the Mouvement des Organisations de Femmes pour l’Avancement et le Progrès du North-West/Women’s Movement for the Progress of the North-West (henceforth MOFAPNO) and the Cooperazione e Sviluppo (henceforth CESVI) for UN Women.

The pilot project targeted interventions in the departments of North, Northeast, Northwest, South and Grand’Anse, regions which were specifically identified by the Group of Political Champions for Disaster Resilience so that the project could capitalize on the gains made in other projects and thus create synergies with local and national efforts.

Target beneficiaries included 4 groups, matching the different objectives of the project:

1) **Strategic level national institutions** targeted for improving the national system of risk and disaster management
2) **District and municipal level stakeholders** targeted for capacity building in natural disaster preparedness
3) **Community based organizations and NGOs** working in zones exposed to natural hazards, especially women’s organizations and youth groups.
4) **School communities**, including teachers and pupils, especially in the north district.

The project had an envelope of USD 4,112,230.79 USD of which 1,979,068.79 USD was funded by the UNTFHS, the remainder USD 2,133,158.00 coming from UN implementing agencies on the ground funded through donors (Japan, DIPECHO and the EU). UNDP contributed USD 1,936,000.00, UNESCO USD 115,158.00 and UN Women put in USD 82,000.00.

The main objective of the project was to empower vulnerable communities and to build sustainable capacities at the local, departmental, and national level to reduce the impact of disaster risks. The emphasis was also placed on the participation of women in the promotion of the HS approach.

The project had three basic objectives:

(i) To sensitize government officials to the application of the Human Security approach in the area of risk and disaster management, including taking into consideration the approach in developing and implementing strategic documents. Specifically, the project was supposed to ensure that the strategic development planning tools, methods, and outputs, led by the government and the UN in Haiti, integrated the disaster risk issue in line with the Human Security approach and sustainable development goals;

(ii) To build capacity for natural disaster preparedness among main stakeholders at the municipal and regional levels;

(iii) To contribute to the empowerment of communities so that they could cope with insecurities.
stemming from disasters. Specifically, women, youth, and groups of people with disabilities were to be provided with tools and resources to identify their insecurities with respect to disasters and to develop effective ways to cope with them. The project thus aimed at ensuring that the education sector developed a “culture of risk”.

The expected accomplishments of the project were as followed:

1) Capacity of national institutions dedicated to disaster risk reduction built and strengthened, including through planning and integrating the Human Security approach.
2) Increased resilience of communities at the national, regional, community and individual levels to assess their risks and cope with disasters.
3) Systematic knowledge developed and disseminated through the education system to contribute to a culture of risk.

B) Evaluation objective, purpose and scope

The evaluation of the three-year project was commissioned by the UNDP Country Office in Haiti as part of the office’s plans to feed into the 2017-2021 Country Program. The evaluation will serve the purposes of UNDP, even though it is expected that UNESCO and UN Women, as the other executive agencies, will also benefit from the results. As such, they cooperated in the evaluation process. The Human Security Unit in charge of the UN Trust Fund on Human Security will also benefit from concrete findings on successes and challenges of implementing projects from a Human Security perspective.

The key objectives of the evaluation are as follows:

(a) To assess the relevance and effectiveness of the project’s design and implementation in support of the national risk and disaster management system in Haiti (Relevance);
(b) To gauge the results achieved by the project in terms of reaching the project’s initial objectives; (Effectiveness);
(c) To analyze the efficiency of the processes adopted in pursuit of the objectives of the project in terms of adequate use of resources in relation to outputs (Efficacy);
(d) To estimate the degree to which the project’s outputs will be sustained and potentially replicated in the future (Sustainability);
(e) To obtain recommendations on how gender mainstreaming and human-rights aspects were considered and incorporated in the course of the project’s design and implementation.
(f) To analyze the added value of the Human Security approach, both in terms of understanding and application by stakeholders of the project.

The findings and recommendations of the evaluation can be used for the following purposes:

- How to improve policies and practices geared towards improved disaster risk management in Haiti.
- Showing results to the government and national implementation partners (government of Haiti, Haitian organizations) as well as to the financial partners (UN agencies and UN Human Security Trust Fund).
- Drawing lessons on implementing the Human Security approach to DRM and as such, make a contribution to the field of Human Security and efforts of the Trust Fund and Human Security Unit to mainstream the approach in the UN and advocate for its use among national partners, academia, etc.
C) Evaluation methodology

The evaluation was undertaken in four phases:

1) Phase 1: Preparation. This phase included the hiring of the international and national consultants and their briefings by UNDP staff and communication between them to plan for the questions and the fieldwork. During this stage, an inception report was prepared with questions to guide the evaluation.

2) Phase 2: Collection of primary data. During this stage, the national consultant conducted a number of interviews in the field based on questions devised together with the international consultant.

3) Phase 3 included analysis of the data, based on findings from fieldwork and documents received from UNDP Haiti and HSU.

4) Phase 4: Reporting. Preliminary observations and conclusions were presented by the national consultant in Haiti to the UN Country Team.

5) Phase 5: Finalization. A draft was prepared by the team and vetted among UN partners and HSU before finalization.

A combination of quantitative and qualitative evaluation methods and techniques were used, including:

- **Relevant documents were reviewed in-depth**, including but not limited to:
  - The project document
  - Theory of change and the results framework
  - Annual work plans
  - Reports of the trainings
  - Quarterly and annual reports prepared for the HSU and comments received in return
  - Minutes of steering committee meetings
  - Technical / financial monitoring reports
    - Haiti national documents
    - Strategic Development Plan of Haiti
    - National DRM Plan of Haiti (old and new version)
    - National Education Curriculum/ Disaster Risk School Teaching Materials
      - UN/UNDP documents
    - Specific UNDP program and Reports
    - The UNDAF
      - Research and advocacy
        - The Human Security Study commissioned by the project in Haiti
        - Materials prepared by the project for advocacy, including training slides on Human Security and on Gender Mainstreaming,
        - Promotional videos and pamphlets prepared by the project
        - Conceptual papers and other case studies related to DRM and Human Security

- **A questionnaire were prepared for UNCT members and other stakeholders at strategic and programmatic levels.**

- **Field visits and on-site validation** of results were organized. Data was collected based on fieldwork in Port-au-Prince and in 3 departments out of the 5: North, Northeast and Grand’Anse, given that visits to other departments was not possible given insecurity and logistical difficulties during the political upheaval.

- Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key stakeholders including government counterpart,
representatives of civil society organizations, UNCT members, and implementing partners, based on the following methodology:

- Development of evaluation questions based on evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, human rights and gender) and according to the various stakeholders to be interviewed
- Interviews and group discussions (focus group) with key beneficiaries and stakeholders
- Reporting of interviews without attribution in full respect for confidentiality when needed.

In Port-au-Prince, interviewed were conducted with representatives of the DCP, NCGSI, MNEVT, MWSWR and MPEC. The national consultant also met with the management of the UNDP office in Haiti, the Head of the Resilience Unit and the UNDP project team, the UN Women project team and the UNESCO project manager.

At the departmental level, the national consultant interviewed two departmental technical coordinators of DRM, two departmental directorates of national education and professional training, three departmental coordinators for the status of women and women's rights, two departmental planning and external cooperation directors. He also interviewed the head of the CESVI Foundation, a partner of UN Women, from distance.

In the municipalities affected by the assessment mission (Cap-Haitian, Limonade, Fort-Liberté, Ouanaminthe, Capotille, Jérémie, Beaumont and Corail) the national consultant met brigadiers, community-based organizations (CBOs), families from vulnerable neighborhoods, students, teachers and school administrators at the site of small mitigation projects.

- **The use of a participatory and consultative approach** during the fieldwork required close collaboration between the national evaluation consultant and officials, implementing partners and direct beneficiaries. Participatory approach required that samples of relevant stakeholders were chosen at all levels for the different activities of the project. During the interviews, the consultant allowed time and space for beneficiaries to express their opinions freely.

- Where possible, data was collected by sex. As part of the questionnaire, a section was dedicated to questions related to the integration of gender and human rights concerns. Evaluators looked at the participation and involvement of women and other categories of vulnerable populations (handicapped people, elders) in project activities and benefits. They further considered the extent to which gender and the rights based approach were mainstreamed in the design of DRM policy and plans.

- Data collected from different sources and methods were triangulated, to assure they reflected the reality as close as possible: Information was compared between the reports prepared by the project team for the UNTFHS and what beneficiaries said during interviews. Information provided by government counterparts, such as from the DCP, was compared with what was found in reports and what beneficiaries mentioned during interviews. Opinions gathered from national stakeholders were double checked with project team and vice versa. At the end of the fieldwork, and before the preparation of the report, a debriefing meeting was held in Port au Prince with project stakeholders at the national level in order to check the validity of conclusions with them.

- The national consultant prepared the following reports which were used by the international consultant for analysis of findings and preparation of the Evaluation Report:
  - Nine institutional interview reports at the level of the three departments
  - Ten reports of meetings and interviews at the central level (Port-au-Prince);
  - Eight group discussion reports (focus-group) at the municipal level and 2 school visit reports
Four reports of visits to sites of small risk mitigation projects

D) Scope of evaluation

The evaluation was supposed to have been conducted starting in October 2019 by the international consultant, based on the activities of the project until September 2019. However, given the political upheaval in the country and lack of possibility to travel to Haiti for an on-site visit, it was decided to hire a national consultant for the field interviews. By the time the data started to be analyzed, the project had already ended after its extended deadline of December 2019. This meant that the evaluators were also able to look at the final analytical and financial report that UNDP prepared on the project for the Human Security Unit (HSU). As such, the evaluation had a more complete picture of the full project that had been fully completed.

The evaluation covered all of the phases of the project cycle during its three years of implementation (2016-2019): identification, design, implementation, monitoring and review. Evaluators analysed consultation and inclusion of stakeholders, the implementation strategies, adaptation to the changing environment, communication mechanisms, achievements, the budget consumption, the timeline and, of course, the degree to which beneficiaries were reached through the interventions. It targeted all the actors and beneficiaries of the program activities and took into account all member institutions of the national system of risk and disaster management. The targeted area initially consisted of the three departments of Great North (North, Northeast and Northwest), but was then extended to two other departments (South and Grand’Anse). For a more realistic access to beneficiaries during the time frame, the evaluators selected, together with UNDP, three of the five departments where activities were most concentrated in order to conduct interviews, focus group discussions and field visits: North, Northeast and Grand’Anse.

The evaluation used the traditional indicators of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD (namely relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability) as requested by the UNDP Country Office in Haiti, in addition to the Human Security programmatic principles to evaluate the project from a Human Security perspective (namely people-centered, comprehensive, context specific and preventive). The impact could not be measured at the moment for two reasons: 1) there was not enough baseline information on the situation of targeted communities before the project started, and 2) impact is usually measurable in a longer timespan after the project has ended.

E) Key evaluation questions

The evaluation was designed to provide answers to key questions listed below in order to assess whether the project delivered the optimal outcomes in the most efficient way, and to identify key lessons learned in the process. The questions were adapted from those in the consultants’ Terms of Reference (TOR) but expanded upon in order to analyze further nuances. To the questions provided in the TOR, the consultants also added new ones to understand specifically the understanding and use of the Human Security approach, given that the overall objective of the project was to advocate for the approach in DRM, and in order to draw lessons for the UNTFHS.

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<tr>
<th>Evaluation Criteria</th>
<th>Evaluation Guidelines and Reference</th>
<th>Key evaluation questions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>Relevance of the project’s concept and design, both</td>
<td>Was the initial design of the project relevant at the time of writing and does it remain so today?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluation Criteria</td>
<td>Evaluation Guidelines and Reference Points</td>
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<td>structurally and the activities, within the context of Haiti</td>
<td>• To what extent was the project aligned with national development priorities, outputs and outcomes of the government, the UNDP strategic plan and the SDGs?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Relevance both to on-going and planned efforts of the government and the UNCT.</td>
<td>• How appropriate were the problem analysis, the intervention logic, and risk analysis?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Relevance of the Human Security approach for DRM in Haiti</td>
<td>• What were the intended and unintended aspects of the program related to the political, security and developmental dimensions? What adjustments had to be made to the project and how did the situation impact delivery?</td>
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<td>• Responsiveness to the situation on the ground then and now</td>
<td>• To what extent was the project developed in partnership with Haitian authorities, in particular at provincial and local levels</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• ToC logic and alignment with political and security reality</td>
<td>• Was the Programme’s Theory of Change correct and does it continue to remain so?</td>
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<td>• Ability of the project to adapt and respond to changes and challenges, including the political, humanitarian and administration situation</td>
<td>• To what extent have lessons learned from other relevant projects been taken into account in the development of the project?</td>
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<td>• Extent to which the immediate objectives, results and indicators of the project have been attained</td>
<td>• To what extent were the views of beneficiaries who could contribute information or other resources to the achievement of the expected results been taken into account in the process of developing the project?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• The clarity of the project objectives, the relationship between the inputs, outputs, and activities are logical</td>
<td>• To what extent has the project provided adequate responses to political, economic, institutional and legal changes in the country?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>• Assessment of the impact of external factors on the project’s work plan, schedule and the overall management arrangements; project achievements beyond the planned outputs</td>
<td>• Have each of the three objectives and the outputs under each been delivered successfully?</td>
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<td>• Degree and quality of support provided by UNDP, Other UN agencies (UNESCO and UN Women)</td>
<td>• Were the expected results achieved? Were there any unexpected results? How have these contributed to outcomes?</td>
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<td>• What were the major factors that influenced the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives? How did the project adapt?</td>
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<td>• Were the organizational structure, management, planning and implementation processes effective and efficient?</td>
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<td>• In which areas did the project achieve its most important results? Why and what were the factors that contributed to the success? How can the project build on its results or extend them?</td>
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<td>• In which areas did the project score the least? What were the constraints and why? How can or could they be overcome?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>and from the Human Security Unit at UN HQ</td>
<td>• What alternative strategies, if any, would have been more effective in achieving project results?</td>
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<td>• Structures’ role in delivering expected results. Did they contribute to or hamper their achievement?</td>
<td>• To what extent have stakeholders been involved in the implementation of the project?</td>
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<td>• To what extent is the management and implementation of the project participatory and does this participation contribute to the achievement of project objectives?</td>
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<td>• To what extent has the project adequately addressed the needs of constituents (national constituents) and changes in partner priorities?</td>
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<td>• How effective were the project’s governance arrangements? To what extent has there been collaboration and communication among UNDP, among the three UN implementation agencies, with donors, and with the government at the central and departmental level?</td>
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<td>• How effective was UNDP’s support as lead agency in each of the various areas where UNDP was involved (UNDP support at the national and local level, operational and technical level)?</td>
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<td>• Was the oversight and lead role provided by the UNDP Country Office effective?</td>
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<td>• Was proper and timely guidance provided by the Steering Committee?</td>
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<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>• The quality and timeliness of the implementation of activities</td>
<td>• Has the project been delivered in an efficient manner making the best use of the resources available?</td>
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<td>• Extend to which intended objectives, results and indicators have been achieved in a cost-efficient manner.</td>
<td>• Were the resources (financial and human) available utilized efficiently?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• International partners’ role in the implementation of activities, communication and overall coordination.</td>
<td>• Were the designed structures the most appropriate in terms of the country’s socio-political reality? What, if any, blockages emerged?</td>
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<td>• Utilization of human and financial resources. Did alternative means exist; if so, would they have been more efficient</td>
<td>• To what extent have the project implementation strategy and the implementation of this strategy been efficient and cost-effective?</td>
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<td>• To what extent have resources been used efficiently? Have the activities in support of the strategy been economic (cost-effective)?</td>
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<td>• How effective and efficient were the lines of reporting between UNDP and UNTFHS? Between UN agencies? Between UNDP and the Government?</td>
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| **Evaluation Reference Criteria** | • What factors, if any, had positive and negative effects on efficient resource utilization?  
• To what extent have the funds been made available and have the project activities been completed on time?  
• To what extent do the monitoring and evaluation systems used by UNDP enable efficient and effective project management? | |
| **Sustainability** | • Sustainability of the results achieved with a focus on capacities built and ability of the institutions to operate with reduced, or even no, international technical assistance in the future.  
• Extent to which the project has built capacity among government agencies and grassroots organizations to integrate the Human Security approach in their future initiatives.  
• Possible scope of future support and recommendations on how best the project could capitalize on its achievements. | • To what extent will financial and economic resources be available to ensure the sustainability of project results?  
• To what extent do stakeholders support the long-term objectives of the project?  
• Are there social or political risks that could jeopardize the sustainability of the project results and the project's contributions to the results and effects of the country program?  
• What is the risk that the level of ownership by stakeholders will be insufficient to sustain the benefits of the project?  
• To what extent are the lessons learned documented on an ongoing basis by the project shared with relevant stakeholders who could learn from the project?  
• What could be done to strengthen exit strategies and sustainability? |
| **Gender and human rights** | • Extend of women’s involvement and participation in activities of the project  
• Mainstreaming of gender differences in policies based on the understanding of differences.  
• Application of the rights-based approach | • To what extent has the project contributed to gender equality, women's empowerment and the promotion of human rights?  
• To what extent has the project promoted positive changes in gender equality and women's empowerment? Have there been unintended effects or consequences?  
• How did the project apply the rights-based approach? |
| **Human Security approach** | • Extend to which the value of the HS approach has been explained and understood  
• Understanding of the Human Security approach and its relevance to DRM in Haiti  
• Extend to which the Human Security programmatic | **Understanding the Human Security approach:**  
• How was knowledge about the added value of the Human Security approach implanted among national partners? Among other UN agencies and donors?  
• Was the staff trained in HS programming? |
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<td>principles have been used in the project outputs and activities</td>
<td>How was the HS approach explained to beneficiaries at the national and departmental levels?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Applying the Human Security approach:**
- Were interventions designed based on a comprehensive Human Security analysis of communities?
- Evidence of application of the approach in national DRM strategies and in the UN strategic documents.
- How did the project contribute to improving the human security of affected populations?
- Did interventions use the 4 principles of the Human Security approach as understood by the HS Unit?
  - Were DRM strategies at the national level and initiatives at the local level people centered?
  - Did the project involved beneficiaries in the design, implementation and monitoring?
  - Were strategies designed and implemented in an integrated (multi-sectoral) manner, touching on alleviating multiple insecurities?
  - Were interventions designed in ways that are preventive? Protective? Empowering?
  - Were interventions designed and implemented in a context specific manner? What a priori information and baseline on communities and initiatives have been used? 

**F) Constraints and limitations**

Given political insecurity in Haiti at the time of the evaluation, it was decided that a national consultant will conduct the fieldwork, in consultation with the international consultant who helped prepare the questionnaire and used the data to analyze the final report.

During fieldwork, the evaluation encountered a number of difficulties, which included:
- Overall difficulty to plan and conduct interviews, focus groups and field visits given the political situation, as well as the changes in the personnel of institutions which meant the loss of institutional memory, or lack of availability of the persons sought for the evaluation.
- Lack of representatives of executing agencies (namely UNDP, UNESCO and UN Women) in the field. This created difficulties in terms of identifying and conducting interviews with the stakeholders and beneficiaries that had participated in the project.
• Lack of coordination between government institutions at the departmental level, including DTC-North, DTC-Grand’Anse, DDNEVT-Northeast hampered the availability and flow of information.
• Given that the implementing partners (UNDP, UNESCO and UN-WOMEN) have no staff on the ground at the departmental level, it was difficult to find out beneficiary target groups and organize meetings with them.
• The lack of information on the communities and communes affected by UNDP activities made it difficult to target places to visit and organize meetings and focus groups.
• Evaluators could not benefit from cooperation from departmental structures of Civil Protection in the North and Grand’Anse and the Northeat for various reasons (lack of support for contracts, lack of desire to meet for interviews, frustration against the government for delay in the payment of salary etc.).

As a result of these difficulties, a number of interviews originally planned for the evaluation could not take place. These included:
• The coordinator of TCEPA – The director of the Department of Education of Northeast, The Coordinator of PSS Northeast t, The Deputy Director of education of North The DTC-DRM of Grand’Anse, the head of DDPEC of Grand’Anse.
• Target groups such as CCCP of Cap-Haïtian, CIT of Petite-Anse, women CBO in the Northeast, CIT at Fort-Liberté.
• Targeted beneficiary communities: Residents of Petite-Anse, of Blue Hill and of one neighborhood in Plaine-du-Nord. Also, directors and teachers trained about the DRR scholar manuals in Cap-Haitian.
• The UNDP project manager having been removed from his functions before the end of the project, was not too available even if he expressed his goodwill to collaborate from distance, and the means of communication were not effective, missing an opportunity to go into the details of implementation.
• A UNDP Program staff who was involved in the design of the project could not be interviewed due to their unavailability and the transmission of a questionnaire to this person went unanswered.

To circumvent these difficulties and to carry out the data collection in the best possible manner, the national consultant established contacts on the spot and used his social skills to bring volunteers on board, especially in the field.

Other limitations that hampered the full achievement of the TOR included:
• Shifting socio-political situation in Haiti and the related security implications, particularly in respect of the visits to sample of regions.
• Access to key informants in the field given the socio-economic unrests.
• Inability to comment on the effectiveness of the costs and use of resources compared with similar projects as such information was not available to the evaluators.
• The risk of lack of interest of beneficiaries to talk to representatives of the UN or about a UN project, given accusations of corruption etc. levied against foreign aid and national institutions during the time of the evaluation.
• Major delays in completing the evaluation due to the personal circumstances of the international consultant.

3. Evaluation Findings and Performance Assessment

This chapter presents an analysis of the project’s results through the prism of OECD criteria for evaluating development assistance programs, namely relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability.
A) Relevance

Relevance of the project’s concept and design, both structurally and the activities, within the context of Haiti

The project was highly relevant in structural terms to the challenges faced in disaster risk management (DRM) in Haiti. There is a very high level of interlinkage and complexity between the wide range of different types, levels, and reaches of vulnerability in Haiti and the multiple types of disasters that have been experienced and that are likely to be experienced in the future. This is clearly documented in the projection and assessment documents produced by Haitian national agencies as well as in the UN Common Country Assessment (CCA), the UNDAF and other documents of the UN. The situation in Haiti is characterized by its complexity and hybridity. A range of natural catastrophes for the most part independent of human intervention continues to form a complex constellation of threats.

As the project reminds us, the Human Security approach is particularly well suited to analyze and suggest measures that permit hybrid analysis of the interlinkage of “natural” threats to Human Security (earthquakes, hurricanes, flooding, landslides) and “human-made” threats such as poverty, injustice and inequality, health, food insecurity, etc.

The Human Security project was in line with the Haiti Strategic Development Plan/Plan Stratégique de développement d’Haiti (Henceforth HDSP) in its four components/action areas: territorial rebuilding - social rebuilding - economic rebuilding - and institutional rebuilding, both in terms of content and process. For the content, it focused on a priority need of the government of Haiti, to protect its citizens from the devastations of natural and man-made disasters. As such, the Human Security approach supported further the protection and empowerment of impacted communities in comprehensive manner. DRM in Haiti has been of firefighter nature: responding to emergencies. The project was relevant as it introduced new methods to prevent risks by educating populations.

The design of the project also took into consideration the needs and wishes of national authorities:

- The Directorate of Civil Protection was strongly involved in the design of the project, less so at the departmental and municipal structures.
- The project was first supposed to be implemented in three departments of the Great North region, but was revised to extend to the departments of South and Grand’Anse after the passage of Hurricane Matthew and per the suggestion of the Government through the DCP. In this regard, the project adapted itself easily to national priorities.
- The project also responded to a need of the Ministry of Education which consisted in developing a school manual for training in DRM. During the preparation of the project document, the MNEVT further insisted that the establishment of evacuation plans in schools be included.

Furthermore, the project was squarely aligned with the United Nations Development Assistant Framework (UNDAF) in Haiti. It contributed to the achievement of Outcome 3, namely “National, regional and local institutions as well as civil society improve the management of rural and urban areas, agriculture and the environment, and prevention and risk reduction mechanisms in order to strengthen the resilience of the population in the face of natural disasters and climate change.” As such, the project supported the indicative results of Output 3.1 “National actors have the knowledge, capacities and tools necessary to improve the management of natural resources as well as the reduction and management of risks.”

Relevance both to on-going and planned efforts of the government and the UN CT

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The point of reference for Haitian national efforts is the National System for Disaster Risk Management (NSDRM), created in 1999 as the operative component of the Nation Plan for Disaster Risk Management (NPDRM). This national system, which remains underdeveloped, is articulated according to a regional logic. It seeks to address disaster risk management as a problem of coordination, of unifying the relatively decentralized efforts at disaster risk management while at the same time preserving its ability to adapt to specific territorial challenges. Previous projects (for example, UNDP 2013-2016) have focused on strengthening the institutional ties within the national programme.

Earlier versions of Haitian national plans have essentially continued this path, emphasizing coordination between different bodies, the creation of coordination groups, and linking more directly to donor agencies. A similar approach is echoed in the Strategy of Protection (2018-2021) in which the analysis of disaster risks takes the form of a focus on streamlining institutional levels, improving communication, and clarifying and strengthening links of responsibility, accountability and governance and, to some degree social structures.

The Human Security approach that is the core of the present project is fundamentally different—though ultimately compatible with—on-going government efforts, and can be regarded as a supplement to the plans and efforts of the Haitian government. Human security is an individual-centered approach. In the context of DRR, this means a focus first and foremost on individual vulnerabilities. When the individual vulnerabilities are first conceptualized and pragmatically addressed, the solutions to collective vulnerabilities become clarified and can be addressed. To the degree the programme succeeded in redirecting attention and resources from the Haitian institutional approach to the individual-based Human Security approach, it was relevant to the on-going and planned efforts.

Relevance of the Human Security approach for DRR planning and DRM in Haiti

While the question as to whether the Human Security approach was understood and is being used adequately will be dealt further in the report, in this section we shall look at whether the concept, which formed the basis of the project, was relevant for DRR planning in Haiti in the first place.

The project was designed with the premise that the Human Security approach, with its emphasis on specific operational principles for policies and programmes, namely people-centered, comprehensive, preventive and context specificity, as well as its dual framework of protection and empowerment, would be appropriate for localizing the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The Human Security approach is relevant for the context of DRR planning in Haiti first because of its people-centered focus: As the original project document noted, communities were often not consulted when identifying risks or developing disaster risk reduction strategies. This can impede the effectiveness of strategies designed to protect them. The more information people have, the better they are able to participate as active members in the success of the government’s strategic plans. The project assumed that by training the relevant decision makers at the national, departmental levels, and by providing seed money for small-scale mitigation projects, people and communities would become stakeholders in DRR.

As natural disasters bring about problems in different areas (not just environment insecurity but also food, health, community, personal economic insecurity, etc.), a multi-pronged approach is appropriate. The Human Security approach is ideal for developing comprehensive and integrated responses that address the multidimensional impacts of disasters as well as the underlying social, economic and environmental factors that contribute to vulnerability. The emphasis on partnership between different UN agencies was also meant to reinforce the comprehensive and context specific principles. The partnership was supposed to draw
on the expertise and resources of a wide range of actors from across the UN, Government, civil society and communities.

As a preventive framework, the Human Security approach adds value in the context of planning for disasters in Haiti because it can help bridge humanitarian assistance with longer-term development goals and strategies. This promotes coherence across agendas and plans (e.g. Agenda 2030 and Sendai Framework) and ensures sustainability. Whereas typical funding by international donors in Haiti has been based on humanitarian concerns for immediate needs of national institutions and affected populations, the human security approach adds a vision for long-term solutions by addressing underlying stress factors and risks as well as people’s resilience to mitigate the impacts.

By targeting various levels, the project proved its relevance to the specific context of Haiti: the national and strategic levels were targeted for trainings in order to integrate the DRR national plan; the institutional level was supported by building capacity of state structures; and communities and municipalities were targeted at the operational level.

Finally, as the project document stated, the protection and empowerment framework of the Human Security approach was targeted through interventions designed to focus on reinforcing institutional structures that have the responsibility for protecting the Haitian population on the one hand, and on strengthening the role of individuals on the one hand.

All these points mean that the Human Security framework was very much relevant to the context of strategic planning and project implementation to mitigate risks of disasters for people and communities in Haiti. Whether the principles were understood and used will be evaluated below.

**Relevance to the target groups’ needs and priorities**

The project was relevant to the needs and priorities of populations at risk of disasters: to be protected from risks and disasters and educated and empowered so that they could be resilient to their impacts. Traditionally, the national DRM system in Haiti has not taken the needs of populations in a proactive manner or seen them as stakeholders that can help themselves and others in relief operations. The project sought to contribute to the change of mentality among policy and decision makers.

By involving communities in small mitigation micro-initiatives, the project also responded to the priorities expressed by residents of affected communities. The Human Security Study conducted through the project also showed the extent of insecurities that people feel, both objectively and subjectively. The project was relevant so far as it addressed their fears, wants and indignities.

Regarding the needs of national institutions, interviews pointed to the relevance of the project to some needs and priorities:

- 20 years ago the national system of disaster risk management identified the need for a disaster database. The project facilitated the development of such a database, at least its architecture, by the National Center of Geo-Spatial Information (NCGSI).
- The two studies conducted through the project (one on human insecurities and the other on communication and sensitization practices in disaster risk management) will facilitate a better understanding of insecurity factors and ways to address them. They will contribute to evidence based policies.
- The national education system, through this project, now has at its disposal three disaster risk reduction training manuals elaborated by government specialists and validated by the Ministry of Education and Professional Training and by the DCP. Once adopted into the national education curriculum, they will answer the needs of thousands of pupils and teachers.
Through the interventions of this project, women’s needs were better expressed and their voices heard by those in charge of the DRM system. Women organizations also became empowered to learn more about DRM and to create networks that could respond better to local needs of women.

And yet, while the project was relevant to the needs expressed, there were also some missed opportunities to make the project even more relevant:

- The lack of completion of the database (see below) means that the DCP and NCGSI have to seek additional resources to operationalize the system, unless UNDP can continue supporting them.
- While a network of women’s organization was created in the Great North region (Northwest, North and North-East departments), as a tool to facilitate better coordination between women’s organizations and liaise them with the National system of DRM through Departmental Coordination bodies, the network became dysfunctional once UN Women ended activities.
- The two major studies provided important empirical findings and made recommendations. So far, however, their findings and/or recommendations have not yet been applied, and their utility cannot be proven.
- While the school training manuals on DRR were produced and validated by the Ministry of the National Education and Vocational Training, they were not properly distributed to interested sector actors, and they have also not yet been inserted in the formal curriculum. There is a risk that they will remain as just new documents put aside.

At the end of the day, to ensure that the project was truly relevant to the needs of national constituencies and addressed changes in partners’ priorities, UN agencies have to foresee proper follow-up with the concerned entities, encourage the use of the products, and complete what has yet to be completed.

**Ability of the project to adapt and respond to changes, including the political situation**

The project faced a number of challenges that hampered its implementation process since the beginning. First it faced, one year of instability due to electoral contestation from mid-2015 until November 2016. Second, in October 2016, the category 4 Hurricane Matthew devastated parts of the country. Since July 2018, the country fell again into socio-political instability, with some violent episodes during July 2018, in February 2019, and finally the lockdown that the country experienced from September to mid-November 2019. The political situation meant long delays that impacted the start or continuation of activities for days and weeks. Changes in the government structures (new Ministers, new General Director of DCP, etc.) led to constant postponement of meetings, validation of documents, and so on. The project adapted by revising the workplan, requesting extensions, reorienting activities, etc.

To adapt to risks, the project however showed flexibility: After the passage of Hurricane Matthew for example, interventions were diverted to the regions most affected. Furthermore, by operating as a pilot project first and implementing projects in two departments of the south and then expanding, the project sought to stay relevant and adapt to circumstances. In order to mitigate risks, a Technical Committee was set up in October 2017 to follow up on decisions in the field, even though it did not stay functional.

While it is possible to assess that the project was flexible in order to adapt to changes in the national context, long term impacts cannot be assessed at this point. It is far too early to draw decisive conclusions about what results can be expected from the immediate project outcome. The strengthening (and weakening) of human security predicaments involves a myriad of factors that take place a long period.
B) Effectiveness

The extent to which the objectives of the project were achieved

The evaluation considered whether the project effectively attained its three objectives.

**Objective 1:** The UN in Haiti, the Government of Haiti and its partners use the Human Security approach in strategies related to disaster risk reduction.

To sensitize government officials to the application of the Human Security approach in risk and disaster management, including taking into consideration the approach in developing and implementing strategic documents. Specifically, the project was supposed to ensure that the strategic development planning tools, methods and outputs, led by the government and the UN in Haiti, integrated the disaster risk issue in line with the Human Security approach and sustainable development goals;

**Objective 2:** The main disaster risk reduction mechanisms are strengthened at the departmental and municipal level

To build capacity for natural disaster preparedness among main stakeholders at the municipal and regional levels;

**Objective 3:** Targeted communities are empowered to address their insecurities and actively participate in decision-making processes for the development and implementation of DRR strategies

To contribute to the empowerment of communities so that they could cope with insecurities stemming from disasters. Specifically, women, youth and groups of people with disabilities were to be provided with tools and resources to identify their insecurities concerning disasters and to develop effective ways to cope with them. The project also aimed at ensuring that the education sector developed a “culture of risk”.

The project achieved most outputs and activities by the end of December 2019, but some of the activities were left incomplete.

The project had clearly defined goals. Although the project suffered from major delays because of Hurricane Matthew and socio-political instability in the county, by December 2019 and after a number of extensions, the majority of the planned activities were completed, and expected results were achieved at a certain level as outlined in table 1 below. How these tasks and activities led to the achievement of project objectives is subsequently discussed (by project objective).

Table 1: Summary of achievements and shortcomings of project objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Planned output (outcome)</th>
<th>Achievements</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Objective 1.** The UN in Haiti, the Government of Haiti and its partners use the Human Resource approach to address disaster issues in Haiti. | **Output 1.1.** Human insecurities related to disasters in Haiti are identified and evaluated. | • A study on Human Security in 5 departments was published, which consists of both an analysis of insecurities and a subjective survey of how people feel about them. Excellent study but not readily available | + Achieved:  
• A unique HS study which can be a baseline for evidence based interventions  
• A new tool on communication practices |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Approach in strategies related to disaster risk reduction.</th>
<th>- Shortcoming • Not clear how widely disseminated and accessible the study is among policymakers and researchers.</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.2.</strong> The Human Security Approach is mainstreamed into strategic development planning.</td>
<td><strong>- Partially achieved:</strong> • The National Risk Management and Disaster Plan mention some of the principles of the Human Security approach superficially (alongside many other ones). HS language and framework are not mainstreamed into the Haiti Strategic Development Plan or other national policies and sectoral development plans. • The UNDAF does not make explicit use of the HS approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.3.</strong> The national stakeholders of Disaster Risk Reduction are aware of the benefits of the Human Security Approach.</td>
<td>+ Achieved: Participants were satisfied • One time training with no follow up has little impact. • Participants asked for more tools to put knowledge into practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objective 2.</strong> The main disaster risk reduction stakeholders are strengthened at the departmental and municipal level</td>
<td>- Shortcoming: • The DRR Database was not completed before the project closed. • Gender was not necessarily mainstreamed in database • No annual plans nor contingency plans were revised to take into account the HS approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 2.1.</strong> The cross-sector DRR coordination bodies at the departmental level have knowledge and data to address insecurities related to disasters with a gender perspective.</td>
<td>+ Achieved: • Trainings conducted • Excellent training materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 2.2.</strong> A protection approach is promoted throughout the emergency response strategies of the main municipal actors of disaster</td>
<td>- Partially achieved: • The DRR Database was not completed before the project closed. • Gender was not necessarily mainstreamed in database • No annual plans nor contingency plans were revised to take into account the HS approach.</td>
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</table>

This part of the project was abandoned given that other actors, among them UN agencies, had also committed to assess the shelters and support their adjustment to standards on behalf of the Directorate of Civil Protection.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risk reduction and emergency response.</td>
<td>Targeted vulnerable communities participate in the identification of their insecurities related to disasters and on efficient ways to address them.</td>
<td>Relevant technical capacities are acquired by civil society and community-based organizations to further their leadership in designing and implementing disaster risk management activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objective 3.</strong> Targeted vulnerable communities are empowered to address their insecurities and actively participate in decision-making processes for the development and implementation of DRR strategies.</td>
<td><strong>Output 3.1.</strong> 400 women heads of households received training. A study on communication practices in DRM was conducted and published with recommendations for improving the system. Two networks of women’s organizations (one in the North and one in the South) created by the project and specializing in disaster risk management serve as focal points for gender issues within the national mechanisms in case of disaster. A comprehensive study on DRM communication practices was released with practical recommendations. Communication study not easily accessible online. No new communication strategy by the Govt which can take into consideration recommendations of the study.</td>
<td><strong>Output 3.2.</strong> The project trained around 250 volunteers (civil defense brigadiers) from the DCP in the five targeted departments on the HS approach with a focus on its operationalization of a protection system of the most vulnerable populations in the field, awareness techniques and the Family Emergency Plan. The volunteers were able to accompany more than 30,000 families to understand the importance and to put in place the Family Emergency Plan in the most at-risk cities. Interviews showed satisfaction with knowledge.</td>
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</table>
but no means to implement action.
• 25 organizations in the north and 23 in the southern departments received training on HS, but also on project management, financial reporting, etc.
• The project partnered up with another UNDP to support 8 organizations to received funding for small mitigation projects.
• The projects, although very micro and not always sustainable, allowed for community building, needs assessment, new ideas and a bit of salary for participants
• Rudimentary understanding of the HS approach
• No follow up with families to see if the Emergency Plans have been put to use
• A number of incomplete or abandoned projects because of rising prices, difficulties in procurement, abandonment, etc.
• Micro projects require constant refreshing otherwise unsustainable.

| Output 3.3. The extended school community has a reinforced capacity to address its insecurities and implement tailored disaster prevention and management protocols. | Three theoretical and practical training manuals in DRM developed
- Development of a guide/module for integrating DRM into the school curriculum, but which has still not been integrated
- The project trained 100 teachers and school directors in the North department
- Organization of many DRR advocacy campaigns to raise awareness for schools for the benefit of 1800 students
- 100 public schools in the North and North-East were physically evaluated for their vulnerability using the UNESCO-VISUS methodology and recommendations made to the Ministry (but inability to support the schools rebuild) | + Achieved
- Guide produced for integrating DRM into the school curriculum, available in French and Creole
- Training for 100 teachers and school directors in the North and North east
- More than 2000 of pupils/students reached
- 100 schools evaluated for their vulnerability
- Partially achieved
- The textbooks need still to be integrated in the basic education curriculum.
- More trainings are needed
- Lack of support for schools that were deemed vulnerable and unsafe.
- No evidence of gender mainstreaming in guides. |
**Analysis**

The project has three broad objectives:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Objective 1: The UN in Haiti, the Government of Haiti and its partners use the Human Security approach in strategies related to disaster risk reduction</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>How?</strong> By sensitizing government officials to the application of the Human Security approach in the area of risk and disaster management, including taking into consideration the approach in developing and implementing DRR strategies.</td>
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</table>

Under this objective, the following achievements and challenges can be noted:

**Human insecurities risks related to disasters assessed**

**Achievements**

- The Study on Human Security in Haiti, in two parts, produced by the project, is a comprehensive, unique snapshot of human insecurities related to disaster in Haiti. As such, the study can be used as a baseline for interventions, policies and programmes: Knowing what people’s fears, wants and needs are today can be measured against the outcome of interventions in the future.
- The first part analyzed insecurities that most severely hamper people's lives and livelihoods. The second part consisted of perceptions of individuals of their insecurities. A sample of 20 communes in 5 geographic departments was chosen in order to bring out the diversity of human insecurities in the country. The qualitative subjective part of the study presented a unique opportunity to look at how people defined their insecurities: their fears about the threats posed by natural disasters, their needs, expectations and dignity.
- Among the interesting findings, the following can be noted:
  - In the five departments, the main threats identified by respondents concerned both man-made risks (famine, anarchic constructions, deforestation, fragile health infrastructure, post-disaster sexual assault (for women), lack of waste management, lack of leadership) and natural disasters (hurricanes, floods, drought, earthquakes that destroy lives and property).
  - A difference was noted in the expression of needs according to the sex of respondents. Women focused on small businesses, prevention of sexually transmitted diseases and caring for the elderly and children. They put their overall emphasis on activities that can generate rapid income to cope with economic and food insecurities caused by disasters. Men, on the other hand, placed more emphasis on long-term recovery actions, such as farming, fishing, and offering money to their wives, among others.
  - The perception of dignity of individuals was also different: For women, losing their dignity consisted of being raped or being cheated on by their husbands. For men, losing their dignity consisted of stealing or witnessing the rape of their daughter or their wife, watching their children die hungry, or themselves dying without the possibility of supporting and taking care of their families. For people with disabilities, lack of dignity meant being treated as children or thinking they were a burden for others in times of natural disasters.
  - The study showed how the lack of social cohesion was considered to be the main threat linked to natural disasters on community security. Mention was also made of the unequal distribution of resources (humanitarian aid) and lack of consideration for the most vulnerable (women, children, people living with disabilities, old people).

**Shortcomings:**

- While this is a comprehensive study, with a lot of excellent insights about what people themselves evaluate as their insecurities, there are some minor inconsistencies: The text mentions that there are no unanimous definitions of Human Security, while it does not make enough reference to the 2012
UN GA resolution which adopted a common definition of the concept. ³ Nor does it use the analytical framework developed by the Human Security Unit which is found in the Human Security Handbook published in 2016.⁴

- Among the original UNDP seven dimensions from the 1997 Human Development Report which are used as analytical tools, missing is the “political security” dimension, which in the context of Haiti, would have been very interesting to analyze (issues related to political instability, governance failures, corruption, etc.).
- While the study as printed in 40 copies and allegedly distributed to universities and institutions working in the field of DRM, this is not enough to disseminate this important tool. The Report is not accessible on the UNDP Haiti website as of April 2020. It is not clear where the digital version is and how accessible this report is. As such, there is a need to more proactively dissemination this excellent study and make it easily accessibly by policy makers and researchers so that they could use it as baseline.
- Given that UNDP could not find one consultant to do the entire report, it was then given to a consulting firm "Guynemer Development Group-GDG". This showed that expectations had not been realistic from the start about local capacity to conduct such an extensive survey.

**Recommendation**

- Now that this study is available, it should be widely disseminated. UNDP should also encourage UN agencies to use it for their programming purposes, and should encourage the government to use the findings for evidence based policy development.
- The findings could also be disseminated to the wide public through various through infographics, pamphlets, short summary articles, pamphlets etc

The HS approach integrated in some of the strategic documents of the government and the UN

**The Government’s National Risk Management and Disaster Plan**

**Achievements**

- The international consultant supported DCP stakeholders to take into account the HS concept in the revision of the National Risk Management and Disaster Plan (2019-2030). As a result, HS was mainstreamed into the Plan’s 4 strategic axes which were devised along with the Sendai Framework: (i) improving knowledge of disaster risks, (ii) strengthening disaster risk governance, (iii) development and use of financial mechanisms to building the resilience of communities, structures public and private and (iv) improved preparation for an effective response and rapid post-disaster recovery.
- The Plan took up some Human Security language and methodology: Notably, it mentions that the strategy focuses on the central role of individuals and communities, that it favors a participatory, inclusive approach and that it strives to be an integrated and holistic strategy, echoing some of the 4 principles of the HS Framework. It also pleads that everyone has the right to live "free from fear", "Free from want" and "with dignity". But this concept is also named alongside many other ones promoted by the international community, including the Sendai Framework, the recommendations of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, etc.
- Although it was not clear whether they made use of the Study on Human Insecurities produced through the project, both the UNDAF and the Government’s National Plan for Disaster Risk Management use the same findings, which indicate that the main insecurity caused by natural disasters is economic insecurity (losses in the agricultural sector, difficulties in accessing financial

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³ UN General Assembly, 66th Session “Follow-up to paragraph 143 on Human Security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome” (A/RES/66/290), 25 October 2012
resources, and the loss of material goods and productive assets), followed by food insecurity and health insecurity caused by expensive services and the lack of health infrastructure in municipalities and remote rural areas.

Shortcomings:

- An assessment of the plan shows that the wording “Human Security” appears in the document in a very generic way, alongside other concepts/frameworks such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, etc. There is no conceptual clarity about what these different approaches bring and how they differ. There is also no precision about what the Human Security framework is about and words are used as empty shells. The mention of the generic wording “Human Security” cannot be considered an achievement in itself as it is such a harmless expression used that no one can be against its inclusion, especially in humanitarian documents.

- From the 4 Human Security principles and the 2 framework (protection and empowering), the text mostly uses the people-centered approach, noting that Plan is based on the principle that “humans remain at the center of DRM action”. Yet, the focus on people, including vulnerable people, can simply be a humanitarian concern of the impact of disasters, hence, business as usual when it comes to DRM. Other principles of the Human Security approach are missing, and notably the inter-sectoral/holistic principle which would require designing interventions that touch upon a few insecurities at the same time (food, economic, environmental, etc.).

- There has not been a revision of Haiti’s Strategic Development Plan yet to take into account the different dimensions of Human Security. This will apparently be done within the framework of the PNA (national adaptation project) with the Ministry of the Environment.

Recommendation

- UNDP could continue lobbying decision makers to adopting the Human Security approach in strategic documents, not simply by using words about people-centered solutions without giving meaning to them, but by adopting methodology of inter-sectorality, prevention etc.

- When Action Plan(s) for the implementation of the Strategic Development Plan and the National Risk Management and Disaster Plan (2019-2030) are being developed, it would be food for UNDP to ensure that the HS approach is operationalized through them.

UN Strategic documents

Achievements

- The UN Development Framework (UNDAF) 2017-2021 was prepared to guide the UN achieve sustainable development objectives and help Haiti reach emerging country status by 2030. The UNDAF emphasizes strengthening prevention capabilities, preparedness and response to disasters centered on the individual by the introduction of an integrated information system disaggregated by age and sex; intensifying public awareness, particularly among the most vulnerable people, for behavior change in the face of hazards; and the dissemination of information management tools and tools in DRM at all levels.

- As such, it is possible to say that the goals of the project were aligned with those of Outcome 3 of UNDAF where the resilience of populations is said to be strengthened in the face of natural disasters and climate change.

Shortcomings:

- While the UNDP country staff was trained in the concept and while the consultant who was hired to prepare the trainings for the UN was also involved in advising on how to include Human Security in the UNDAF, the document does not explicitly use the Human Security approach and its methodology (the 4 principles, the 7 components, etc.). UNDP staff interviewed however, noted that it had based is programming on the Human Security approach and will continue to do so in future revisions.
The 2018 – 2021 Strategic Plan of UNDP refers twice to the Human Security but doesn’t explain anywhere how the agency intends to support national governments to emphasize the HS approach throughout the application of its four principles.

There is no indication whether and how the Study on Human Security in Haiti, which was supposed to be used as input into the preparation of the UNDAF, was actually used and how.

**Recommendation**

- In the final analysis, given that the UNDAF and other strategic documents of the UN talk about the need for education to build resilience against disasters, it would seem that the Human Security approach is being used by UNDP. However, the concept, as used by the UNTFHS and the HSU, has a specific terminology and methodology that goes beyond obvious references to resilience.
- The leadership of the UN agencies needs to continue using the terminology of Human Security in dialogues with national counterparts, not only on issues related to disaster risks but also for example in discussions on the need to counter the more recent pandemic COVID-19.

**Members of the UNCT and national DRR stakeholders trained, in the HS approach**

**Achievements**

- The project led to the development of very comprehensive training modules on Human Security approach that were then used for capacity building efforts and training of trainers.
- An international expert was hired to conduct trainings on Human Security for the UN country team and government officials at the beginning of the third year (May 2018).
- A training module and slides were developed on HS approach applied to disaster risk reduction in Haiti. Another set of slides were developed by UN Women experts on mainstreaming gender into DRR activities.
- 10 to 15 members of different UN agencies were trained on understanding the concept, its evolution, characteristics and added values. Program managers were mostly interested in discussing linkages between the HS approach and human rights and application to emergency.
- A workshop was organized for ministries involved in DRR under the direction of the DCP, where 25 representatives from the research and programming units of ministries and other public institutions participated.

**Shortcomings:**

- During interviews, most national DRR stakeholders appreciated the approach while they expressed their worry to see the principles be applied in the context of poverty in Haiti where basic needs could not be satisfied by the government.
- While the training for the UN agencies and the government was very comprehensive, it may have been too ad hoc. There should have been follow up and not just a one time meeting.
- It was not clear where these training manuals were deposited. As of April 2020, the training slides and manuals were not on the UNDP Haiti website.

**Recommendation:**

- Now that the training slides and methodology have been developed, it would be important for the UN to ensure that the trainings are duplicated.

**Objective 2: The main disaster risk reduction mechanisms are strengthened at the departmental and municipal level**

**How?** By strengthening the capacity of the main disaster risk reduction mechanisms and cross-sector coordination bodies at the departmental and municipal levels by providing them with
knowledge and data to address disaster related human insecurities including the gender perspective

Under this objective, the following achievements and challenges can be noted:

**DRR data management architecture developed based on needs assessment**

**Achievements**

- The project led to the preparation of the architecture of a DRR database, validated by all the actors interested in the DRM, which meets a need of more than 20 years of the DCP and the SNGRD in general. UNDP senior management counts on the disaster database as one of the major outcomes of the project that will be able to support DCP in making informed decisions.
- The project recruited an international company, instead of a consultant as initially planned, to work on the architecture of a DRR database. The company conducted a mission to Haiti to assess the needs and capacities of national partners such as DCP and the Centre National d’Information Géo-Spatiale (National Geo-spatial Information Center) (NCGSI) and made recommendations to strengthen the human resources dedicated to the management of databases at the DCP level.
- The company then developed a database architecture taking into account the needs expressed by the DCP and its partners as well as the various existing data collection tools.
- The NSDRM, managers from the DCP and sectoral ministries (MNEVT & MWSWR) and volunteers received training on how to collect and compile disaster data using an Excel form. The training took place in the format of training of trainers at the departmental and national levels.
- An international forum on the management of data related to the impacts of natural disasters was planned but was then downgraded to a national meeting given the political instability.

**Shortcomings:**

- The Database was initiated but was not completed due to insufficient funding, given that the requests from the DCP exceeded the availability of funds. The project came to an end before the consulting firm had time to develop all the functionalities that would make the base operational. The NCGSI will have to turn to the World Bank to seek funds to complete the database and make it operational.
- While the DRM database is highly relevant for Haiti, the evaluation team found out from the Director of NCGSI that the call for proposals was launched before the Center knew about it. However, the center had already negotiated with the World Bank to support the creation and development of a DRM database. This means that the project initiated exactly what the NCGSI had already planned to do. On the one hand this shows a high degree of relevance; on the other hand, though, it shows a lack of proper coordination on DRM among national stakeholders and their international supporters.
- While its architecture was highly praised, the data collection system requires continued input and attention. On-going training is still needed for DCP local and departmental volunteers.
- The International Forum on data management related to disaster impacts went from a planned international event to a national one and was postponed twice.
- Like for the study, the project ended up hiring a company instead of a consultant, thus adding to delays and to expenses. This shows that from the start, expectations to rely on individual consultants were unrealistic and had to be better anticipated.
- It did not become clear to the evaluation consultants how data collection was ‘gender sensitive’ as per the project document.

**Recommendation:**

- As a DRR database was one of the most visible, concrete and tangible outcomes of the project, it is important for it to become completed and operationalized.
- The data collection system requires continued input and attention, while trainings need to be continued so that UNDP and UN agencies can ensure that the database is used for DRM.
The integration of the HS approach in departmental and municipal DRR and emergency response strategies, including departmental annual plans and contingency plans

Achievements

✓ The planning/preparation of the review of emergency plans in the North and North–Est became opportunities to integrate the HS and gender-sensitive approaches. In January and March 2017, two workshops were organized to finalize discussions around the national emergency plans. The revision of the Centre d’Opération d’Urgence National (National Center of Emergency Operation) (NCEO) procedure manual also made it possible to integrate Human Security aspects into the operationalization of the NCEO in emergencies.

✓ Three training packages were developed on DRM planning which became the basis of trainings of 25 DCP departmental and municipal managers on integrating the HS approach into the planning of their DRM activities during two days in March 2018.

✓ DCP managers within ten departments also received training on integrating gender concerns into the preparation of contingency plans, conducted by a gender expert invited by UN Women.

Shortcomings:

❖ While the intentions and preparations were there, in the final analysis, no actual annual plans nor contingency plans were revised to take into account the HS approach and principles. The theory could not be tested given that the socio-political turbulence did not allow a proper review of the contingency plans at the departmental level.

❖ While at the national level, the DRR national plan was revised to take into consideration the integration of the HS approach and gender needs, none of the departmental civil protection committees changed or reviewed its contingency plan to adapt it to those concepts.

Recommendation

➢ Now that the DCP departmental managers are trained, there should be followed up so that they do integrate the HS approach and gender needs in their contingency plans and annual plans.

Evaluation of the protection standards of temporary shelters of targeted municipalities

❖ After discussions with the national counterpart, this part of the project was abandoned given that other actors, among them UN agencies, had also committed to assess the shelters and support their adjustment to standards on behalf of the Directorate of Civil Protection. Thus, the project did not pursue this activity and instead put more focus on field activities such as raising awareness of the most vulnerable and small-scale mitigation projects.

❖ The fact that it was in the project document in the first place showed a lack of proper coordination with other UN agencies during the preparation of the project so that the proposed activities would not duplicate.

Objective 3: Targeted communities are empowered to address their insecurities and actively participate in decision-making processes for the development and implementation of DRR strategies. How? By contributing to the empowerment of communities so that they could cope with insecurities stemming from disasters and actively participate in decision-making processes for the development and implementation of DRR strategies. Specifically, women, youth and groups of people with disabilities are provided with tools and resources to identify their insecurities with respect to disasters and to develop effective ways to cope with them.

Vulnerable populations sensitized about how to identify and respond to disaster related insecurities, including through the use of emergency kits

Achievements
The knowledge of 660 women and 180 men was raised following Hurricane Matthew through trainings and awareness campaign on women's rights and on the availability of safe spaces and community protection mechanisms in situations of emergency. 400 women heads of households living in most exposed and vulnerable neighborhoods were targeted for awareness sessions and distribution of emergency kits by UN Women, in partnership with the MWSWR and the DCP and civil society organizations.

Through the project, 1,154 women and 117 men from 10 communes in the Departments of South and Grand'Anse were trained to use the Family Emergency Plans (FEPs) which were developed in March 2016 by DCP as a planning tool to allow for all family members to participate, plan together and divide responsibilities to better prepare for and respond to disasters.

More than 10,000 families understood the importance of FEPs and how to put them in place.

During interviews, leaders of women’s organizations in Grand’Anse recognized having received training on DRR basic notions, FEPs, early warning system and on good farming practices. Each participant received a FEP and each organization an emergency kit.

Shortcomings:

- During interviews with women’s organizations in Cap-Haitian, AFASDA representatives of women who had undergone trainings expressed that while they had learned about DRM, they felt that they needed more trainings to understand the operational aspects of the Human Security approach, especially as it related to different ways men and women had to protect themselves. Nonetheless, having undergone training of trainers, these women felt they could share knowledge with other members of their organizations and also to help neighbors protect themselves from disaster risks.
- Targeted communities did not necessarily represent the most vulnerable families within the intervention areas. The purpose of these interventions was capacity building for women’s organizations on DRM issues and networking. Hence, members of women’s organizations were targeted from different communities and the choice was guided by community leaders and women community leaders.
- Focus-group meetings held by the national evaluation consultant with representatives of five families in Bel-Air and in Cap-Haitian revealed that while families felt they had gained new knowledge about risks and disaster and how to protect themselves, the majority of participants had forgotten or did not know the role of each family member in the Emergency Plan.

Recommendation:

- It is important to ensure that women leaders who received trainings and emergency plans share knowledge with other members. However, given that there were no obligations to duplicate the trainings in the first place, and no system to monitor it afterwards in the communities, it is hard to estimate what the results will be of such trainings.

Public communication study and tools developed on disasters-related human insecurities

Achievements:

- A study on Communication Practices in DRM was published which analyzed information needs and available channels of information for various population groups: rural and urban areas, young and elderly women and men. The study also provided a list of 20 recommendations and tools to improve the communication system.
- A set of communication tools was designed and developed by a private firm which was subsequently used and adapted to different audiences during awareness-raising activities of the project. The tools included leaflets in creole on what to do to mitigate the risks of tsunami, cyclone and earthquakes, entitled "Men sa nou dwe konnen lè gen katastròf, chanjman konpòtman".
- In both North and North-East departments, journalists of local radio stations were trained on key messages to be used in case of disasters. Specific messages were developed for the most vulnerable (youth and the elderly) as well as for women through women journalists’ network (REFRAKA) who trained other journalists.
Shortcomings:

- The study on Communication Practices was said to have been distributed at a launch event at the DCP premises at the end of November 2019 and the final report of the project claims it is online. However, the evaluation team could not find it online by April 2020. Print copies are not enough to ensure that different population groups have access to it.
- As no new strategy on public communication was developed subsequently, there is no way to gauge whether and how the recommendations made in the study were taken into consideration.

Recommendation:

- The study on Communication Practices in DRM needs to be better disseminated and the recommendations within it followed up with relevant authorities.

Platform of women’s Network established for strengthened partnership and dialogue on DRR

Achievements

- In early 2016, a Network of 30 women's organizations from 3 departments of the Great North (North, North-East, Northwest) was created and the capacities of its members raised for networking and experience sharing by MOFAPNO (local organization) through UN Women. The strength and weaknesses of the network, called "Rezonedepatmantal famn Gran No pou ransfom sekirite imen", was assessed during a workshop in December 2017.
- A similar network was created in the departments of South and Grand’Anse with the support of Cesvi Fondazione, an implementation partner recruited by UN Women. This network also received training on basics of DRM, early warning systems, good agricultural practices adapted to climate change, the use of FEPs and managing group dynamics during the distribution of emergency kits.
- The two networks of women’s organizations were trained to act as focal points for gender issues within national mechanisms in case of disaster. The DCP could take into account their knowledge and practices in DRM and include them in the development of emergency response at municipal and departmental levels.

Shortcomings:

- While connections were made between women’s organizations in the North with the departmental directorate of DPC, the sustained and institutional involvement of women in emergency response by DCP is not guaranteed.
- The Network created in the North had been no longer operational before the end of the project because UN Women ended activities one year before given changes following the passage of Hurricane Matthew. According to the women interviewed, the platform of women’s organizations set up was practically stillborn since the first meeting that helped establish it. No other meetings had taken place because of the political unrest that had shaken the country. Even a whatsapp group created as a means of communication began to lose its members since there was almost nothing to discuss and share on the group, particularly concerning DRM. Women’s organizations were expecting further capacity building initiatives and did not see the value of networking alone.
- Interviews conducted with eight members of the organization Oganizasyon Fanm Louvri Je Boukan (OFALJEB) in Coral revealed that beneficiaries were satisfied with the relevance of the trainings and had been able to replicate them to other members, but they also mentioned their dissatisfaction that after training in good agricultural practices, the project had not planned to provide seeds for the establishment of the plots. In general, a common complaint heard was that while knowledge imparted through the project was useful, relevant and adequate, material support was also necessary in order to help communities put the principles of freedom from fear, want and indignities to good use. For volunteers with emergency response, that meant materials. For farmers, it meant seed,
credit, etc. so that they could not only protect themselves in cases of disasters but take care of their every day livelihoods which was also a chronic human insecurity.

**Recommendations**

- The sustainability of trainings should be rethought for future projects. On the one hand, abstract knowledge without the means to put it in practice may not lead to much change. On the other hand, once knowledge has been gained, organizations need to be able to further disseminate it themselves and put it in practice and not expect UN organizations to continue capacity building activities.
- An incentive system needs to be implemented so that the trainings continue and knowledge is passed on beyond the project.
- Future projects need to make sure that any institutions created (like a network for example) can be self-sufficient and can also be tied institutionally with the work of DCP if they are to be taken into consideration in DRM activities.

**Volunteers, community-level structures and civil society trained on disaster preparedness and response procedures, with a focus on the protection of the most vulnerable groups**

**Achievements**

- Approximately 250 volunteer civil defense brigadiers from the DCP in the five targeted departments were trained as first responders on first aid, protocols for interventions in preparedness and response, management of emergency stocks, etc.
- The project supported the implementation of a volunteer management system at the Haitian Civil Protection and the development of a national volunteer strategy for DRR, to manage the network of 4,000 members of the civil protection committees and 2,000 members of the volunteer brigades.
- The volunteers were able to accompany more than 30,000 families to put in place the Family Emergency Plan in the most at-risk cities.

**Shortcomings:**

- The system of volunteers and supporting families during emergencies is the task of the government. In effect, the project supported the government to carry out what it is supposed to do anyway.
- According to the annual progress reports provided by UNDP, volunteers saw themselves as agents of change in their communities, but claimed that the lack of resources such as transport, communication equipment, and materials rendered it difficult to optimize their interventions. They expected more support and mentoring to implement their responsibilities within the national DRR system. They expected tailored training and a clearer carrier path so that they could capitalize on their volunteering experience in the labor market, and they expected more recognition and visibility of their contribution to the community.
- According to the interviews conducted for the evaluation, trained volunteers were satisfied with the trainings and new knowledge acquired but they felt that awareness has reached too few people in vulnerable communities.
- Fort-Liberté brigadiers interviewed were satisfied because they had acquired more knowledge and a better understanding of risk and disaster management issues. Nonetheless, they also called for more regular retraining and the provision of more material equipment, such as rowboats, helmets, chainsaws, motorcycles, beaconing tape, first aid kits. The problem, therefore, is not necessary in the knowledge as it is in the means to implement it concretely.
- The Communal Committee for Civil Protection (CCCP) of Jérémie has the human capacity to do the training, but without the adequate equipment which it does not have, it will be difficult to replicate these trainings for other volunteers.
- Interviews show that only a rudimentary understanding of the HS approach had been gained. For volunteers, HS was summarized in interviews for example as “the responders must secure themselves first before seeking to secure the others.” Members of the Communal Committee
mentioned that they were not able to apply the fundamental principles of Human Security correctly, hence could not replicate the trainings for the other members of the committee.

- No follow-up has been made to see if families have been able to put the family emergency planning tools to use.

**Recommendations**

- It is not enough to train volunteers in responding to emergencies if tools are not given to put their knowledge in practice. It is also important to empower volunteers, be it in terms of recognition or financial means.
- The work of first-responders is of humanitarian, emergency response nature. The Human Security approach advocates for a longer-term prevention model. It would be necessary to adapt trainings when talking about long-term objectives with people involved in finding short-term rapid responses to emergencies.

**Implementation of small-scale disaster risk mitigation projects**

**Achievements**

- In partnership with another UNDP project, 8 CBOs were trained on emergency preparedness and response, on the Human Security approach as well as in project management, including drafting financial report etc., in the departments of North, Northwest, South and Grand 'Anse.
- A total of 8 organizations (3 in the North and the North-East and 5 in the city of Jérémie in Grand’Anse) received funding for small-scale risk-mitigation projects. These were chosen on the basis of their contribution to strengthening community resilience among populations most exposed to risks. These included canal cleaning, construction of security walls to protect from rising tides and sea waters, draining canals to facilitate the flow of wastewater, protection of riverbanks with plantation of bamboos, forest trees and fruit trees, treating ravines, building dry stone thresholds and hedgerows to reduce the risk of floods and protecting lands against erosion, etc..
- While the section below will discuss some shortcomings of these projects, our evaluation also noted some benefits of working with the communities to understand the importance of risk mitigation projects. Case in point was a project in Jérémie run by the Youth Organization for the Development and Advancement of Grand’Anse (OJADGA) whose project consists in building a 37-meter protective wall for the inhabitants of the district of Mackandal against sea waves at Trou Lizanne. With each rise of the tide, the waves would destroy the infrastructure (houses, latrines, vehicles) but also cause the death of several people (children and adults) who come to throw garbage. The tides were named Trou Lizanne after a woman who had been carried away in the past. The organization had not originally thought about such a project and wanted to set up a microfinance mutual to support the people of the neighborhood. However, when leaders consulted the residents of the community, they realized that the priority for the more than 10,000 inhabitants of Mackandal was the protection from the tide increases. It was based on people’s identification of their priority insecurities that the idea turned into the construction of a protective wall. Yet the project met with some delays too, because the UNDP site engineers recommended the construction of a thicker stone, but materials were not only underestimated, but their procurement was also delayed by the blockages that crippled the country as a whole in the summer and fall of 2019. Nonetheless, the wall was built, providing peace of mind for the population, and around 150 people, including 100 young members and 50 non-member residents, benefited from a small temporary salary on the site, allowing them to cover certain school expenses.

**Shortcomings:**

- The projects were supposed to be for and by the youth, but the majority of participants were not young people.
- The projects were extremely small. Reporting was done on results at the very micro level: meters of construction of walls, number of small canals constructed or drained, etc. No attempts were made
to study or understand the impact of these projects on the lives of communities, not just to stop a flood but in terms of the value of working together, management of project among communities, awareness raising, participatory approach, trust building etc. The few examples quoted above need to be better highlighted.

- A mission report by UNDP conducted in July 2019 to the departments of the North and Northeast concluded that NGOs did not have enough capacity to elaborate projects and more training was needed for them in project management. Recommendations included providing more support to CBOs in the development of projects, gearing and targeting them, giving evaluation criteria, etc. before duplicating them in other parts of Haiti (namely Grand’Anse). Yet, there is no indication that project selection and management was done differently when replicated.

- By October 2019, the mid-term report from Grand’Anse showed that some projects had not been completed on time, and some had been abandoned. Some (much) of the ‘under-construction’ was due to the difficulties brought about by the socio-political unrest, including increases in the price of materials, lack of budget, difficulty in obtaining materials etc.

- Visits to project sites of the Association of Limonade Farmers (AFELI) which was a soil conservation project showed that hedges, contour canals and conservation work on soils in hillsides had almost disappeared. These types of observations in all project sites throw doubts on the sustainability and desirability of such micro-level risk mitigation projects that were not part of larger municipal or district level plans or if they were not constantly updated and renewed with adequate and continued resource allocation.

- Socio-economic turbulences that crippled the country in 2019 especially caused challenges in terms of delays in payments, which caused the cessation of work, difficulties in procurement, hike in prices. By the closing time of the project, some micro projects had been incomplete or abandoned. In such cases, UNDP had to find additional resources from its other projects. For example a dozen residents who were benefiting from the work of the Organization for Development and Integration for a New Life in Grand’Anse (ODINOVGA) on preventing the erosion of the banks at the Fond Blay Ravine were satisfied with the possibility to cross the ravine again and to use the water source in peace. They mentioned that if the organization found it difficult to complete the work, they were ready to contribute their labor force, but could not afford to contribute money.

- By the end of the project, some small-scale projects had not been completed. The micro-projects in Jérémie, for example, had not yet finished and their sustainability is in question, much like the ones in the North and North-East.

- There was no indication of the gender inclusion aspect of these projects: Were men and women involved together? Did they contribute to the empowerment of women? This information was not available.

### Recommendations

- The value of micro-projects need to be better studied, especially since their sustainability is questionable. More than the concrete outcome of the project, their role in building community cohesion, awareness raising, participatory planning and implementation, etc. should be highlighted.
- Micro-level projects should also be implemented by both men and women working together in order to contribute to the empowerment of women, gender equality etc.
- Micro-level projects, to be more sustainable beyond the support of the project, need to be linked to district level plans.

### Capacity to address insecurities in and through schools

Training and education modules on DRR elaborated and validated, waiting for integration into the formal education system
Achievements

✓ UNESCO, in partnership with the Ministry of National Education, developed a training module in DRR and risk mitigation methods (guide on the integration of Risk and Disaster Management in the school curriculum) for teachers and school inspectors. The guide was validated by DCP and the Development Department from the Ministry of National Education. Available in Creole and French, was presented at an event with the Akademi Kreyòl Asyisyen (AKA), the academic center for promotion of the creole language, to actors working in education.

Shortcomings:

✓ While the DRM training manual was created based on what the Ministry wanted to begin with, it has not been integrated into the formal education curriculum yet.

✓ For the staff of the coordination unit of the project interviewed, the area where the project yielded the least results was at the level of the school community. They noted that the DRM protocol in the schools could not be implemented due to a lack of interest of education actors during moments of socio-political crisis.

Recommendation

➢ DPC partners and UN organizations need to continue lobbying the Ministry of National Education so that it would integrate one of the key products of the project, the guide on the integration of DRM, into the school curriculum.

Knowledge about disaster preparedness and response raised among teachers, school inspectors, pupils and parents

Achievements

✓ More than 2000 of pupils as well as 100 teachers and school directors from public and private schools in risk areas in the departments of North and North-East were made aware of risks and informed of actions to adopt before, during and after an event.

✓ In coordination with the MNEVT and the Technical Committee for Education and Public Awareness (TCEPA), UNESCO raised awareness about the risk of Tsunamis for 4,500 students and teachers in Cap Haitian. Other activities included the organization of 23 theatre workshops around DRR for the benefit of 1500 people; two technical workshops for schools on DRR awareness and behavior to adopt after an earthquake and/or a Tsunami which included evacuation simulation exercises.

✓ The visit of the national evaluation consultant to a number of schools in Fort-Liberté in the North-East showed that students had retained the knowledge gained, and teachers were making periodical reminders. The management was satisfied with the new information given to students, which repeated what was said in old, damaged and torn posters displayed in the classroom. However, there had not been any refreshers of the awareness raising lessons organized by the project in the schools visited.

✓ 100 public schools in the North and North-East were physically evaluated for their vulnerability using the UNESCO-VISUS methodology and the list in addition of concerns with practical recommendations were provided to the Ministry of Education. Officials of the Ministry of Education received three training workshops on understanding and using the results of the VISUS method to improve safety levels of schools.

✓ School emergency plans were drawn with the participation of volunteers from community intervention teams (CIT) and crossing guards.

Shortcomings:

✓ Interviews with schools and administrators in schools in Fort-Liberté showed that a number of schools did not have escape plans to follow in events of an emergency.

✓ While the satisfaction was very high with the knowledge gained, students interviewed also suggested that trainings should be done in a sustained manner and be more specific. Students had also learned the basics of evacuation or running to safety but were worried when they heard about
the physical vulnerability of their schools on the radio. Most of the concerns were with the inadequacy of the infrastructure and vulnerability to risks of their schools.

- In places where a risk assessment had been carried out by the project, administrators asked for the reinforcement of the school buildings or the opportunities to rebuild in a safer place but had not received support yet.
- While targeted school communities have better knowledge on how to cope with insecurities, it is not clear if they will have enough capacity to implement tailored disaster prevention and management protocols because this involves mobilization of human resources and means which the project could not provide.
- While raising awareness is very important, the scale is too small to have a lasting impact. National authorities should ensure the duplication of these campaigns among schools nation-wide?
- The lessons/campaigns did not seem to have put much emphasis on gender differences.

**Recommendations**

- Lessons learned about working with students and educators need to be shared with DCP and MNEVT so that they continue the awareness raising initiatives beyond the project.
- The government also needs to support vulnerable schools identified through the project to reinforce their infrastructure or rebuild elsewhere. The UN could provide detailed recommendations to national authorities, and, eventually, help raise funds and support.

**Overall Challenges/obstacles to achieving the expected results**

Initially designed for two years, the project lasted three and a half years. Some, if not most, of the delay can be attributed to the following factors:

**Force major and change of priorities to humanitarian:**

- The devastating Hurricane Matthew that hit the southwest coast of Haiti in October 2016 had a direct impact on the implementation of the project. It absorbed most of the government's disaster response capabilities and also radically changed the immediate and medium-term priorities of the government and the humanitarian community. Consequently, certain activities were oriented towards the areas affected by the hurricane (Departments of South and Grand'Anse) during April 2017.
- The passage of Hurricane Matthew also preoccupied DCP and national counterparts, putting them in a more humanitarian mentality which was not always amenable to proactive and prevention modalities prescribed by the Human Security approach.

**Changes in government and government counterpart and political instability:**

- Since the start of its implementation, the project faced a number of unforeseen delays due to political instability in Haiti. While the project was designed in 2015 on the basis of consultations with the government, there was a change of direction at the executive and decision-making levels, with presidential elections in November 2016. This necessitated re-engagement with the new government and local counterparts in promoting the Human Security approach and the rationale of the project.
- Change of interlocutors within the ministries involved (MITC, MPEC, MWSWR, MNEVT) meant that the process of raising awareness of the project’s objectives had to be started again. All these constraints generated delays for the implementation of the first objective where the government of Haiti should have been directly involved. The first Steering Committee took place only in October 2017.
- The most consequential changes started when country lock downs began on February 7, 2019 with demonstrations accompanied by scenes of violence and looting for about a week, and picked up again in September 2019 when the situation degenerated. The country
remained inactive for about three months with the paralysis of many activities (closure of schools, administrative offices, private and public companies).

- The political crisis greatly reduced the availability of government leaders at national and local levels and changed the scope of the project in terms of priorities. It also hindered the completion of certain field activities where it was difficult to meet the schedule, by lack of access to materials, rising prices, etc. A number of small-scale projects were revised in terms of scope and/or postponed.
- The mitigation strategy of the project staff paid off however: While waiting for stability to have political validation of the national risk and disaster management plan at the highest level, the project organized workshops to have technical and political validation at the regional level in the meantime. This was a positive strategy.

Delays, postponements and lack of personnel:

- The project was initially designed for three departments in the North, but after the passage of cyclone Matthew, donors were asked for the possibility of extending it to the departments of South and Grand’Anse. This contributed to delays in the implementation and required an initial request for an extension from 9 months to a year. Sociopolitical unrest across the country caused repetitive postponements of scheduled activities, some of which were not completed even after a last extension until September 2019.
- Lack of qualified francophone experts in Human Security and social sciences and DRR meant that the project started to look for companies instead of individual consultants to carry out the trainings and the communications study. These changes slowed down the consultants’ selection process. The nomination of trainers by DCP was also delayed, and the Training of trainers (TOT) is also delayed the training of approved trainers from the DCP who could then train others in 2019 only, making follow up and assessment of the impact of the trainings very difficult.
- On the plus side, the international Human Security expert and the national Human and Social Sciences expert worked well to produce a number of documents of high quality, including training manuals, an impressive study on Human Insecurity from disasters, as well as a study on communication practices. UN Women provided its own expertise when it became difficult to find a gender expert for the study on human insecurities.
- The Forum on data management related to disaster impacts that was supposed to be an international event was downgraded to a national event and postponed twice because of the deterioration of the country’s security situation.

C) Efficiency

Extent to which the project implementation strategy was efficient and cost-effective

The project implementation strategy was based on a tripartite execution by three UN agencies under the leadership of UNDP Haiti. UN Women developed a partnership with an international NGO and a regional women’s organization, while UNDP and UNESCO implemented their responsible activities through partnership with public entities such as DCP (through the departmental coordination bodies of civil protection), NCGSI (national center for geospatial information) and the Directorate of Training and Improvement (from the Ministry of national education).

On the one hand, the advantage of tripartite management was to valorize the experience, expertise, resources and partnerships of each agency brought together. As it was a co-financed project, each agency contributed its share of both money and human and logistic resources. By pulling together their resources and capacities and topping them off with the Human Security Trust Fund financial support, the three agencies were able to achieve a greater result during a shorter amount of time. The added value of the agencies’ resources also had the advantage to reduce the cost of the project.
On the other hand, however, as this was not an integrated join programme where one agency would act as coordinator, but a project based on three distinct set of objectives and activities led by three different agencies, the results were not necessarily efficient. A tripartite execution created challenges so far as each agency had its own timetable, its own logistics and its own system of execution and reporting. UNDP, as lead agency, was in charge of providing a joint report to the UNTFHS, and faced difficulties in the first two years to align the timings of the agencies’ reports in order to compile a joint one. UNDP however did not have full control over the implementation of objectives of the project and could not follow up and supervise, nor could it always ensure proper information flow between the partners of the three agencies and between national and departmental level entities.

UNDP, as leading agency, set up the Project Implementation Unit which included representatives from each of the UN executing agencies. The project initially had six human resources, including three from UNDP, two from UNESCO and one from UN Women. During implementation, a technical assistant was recruited from UNDP for better monitoring of field activities. UNDP was the only agency which was able to field a full time programme officer for the project. The other agencies added the responsibility of managing the project as part of the tasks of one of their programme officers because of shortages of personnel in general. As a result of divided attention, monitoring of results were hampered.

**Efficiency of UNDP Country Office’s support to the project and relations with national agencies**

The UNDP project staff within the Project Implementation Unit coordinated adequately with other technical staff of the UNDP Country Office through weekly meetings on logistics and month exchanges with other projects. These exchanges led to experience sharing to some degree as well as to joining forces with other projects of UNDP, for example in the implementation of small-scale mitigation projects where CBOs identified through another project were targeted and their projects on risk reduction financed through the project.

The project Unit was also responsible for ensuring the project’s quality assurance as per the donor's requirements. Each agency was in charge of its own relations with its traditional partner agencies and provided reports, information, advocacy etc. directly.

UNDP worked with DCP in the trainings and community sensitization parts of the project for which it was responsible.

**Efficiency of cooperation between UNDP, UN WOMEN and UNESCO**

As the lead agency, UNDP was mostly responsible for ensure joint reporting to the donor, UNTFHS, but it was not responsible for the oversight of activities. Each executant agency applied its own principles and followed its own rules. However, some mechanisms were put in place, such as coordination meetings, work plans, communication protocol by email, regular reporting, monitoring visits, etc.

Despite exchanges between the technical teams during the planning, some coordination issues were inevitable, mainly with it came to delivery of scheduled narrative and financial report, given that each agency had full autonomy in scheduling its own activities but UNDP had the responsibility to provide a joint report to the UNTFHS. The heads of agencies had to talk to each other in order to solve late reporting issues.

In interviews conducted with the management of UN agencies, while senior managers rated the partnership as a “success”, it became clear that coordination between the agencies was not easy at the beginning, but as implementation progressed, the different agencies began to get used to working together. Adjustment issues
at the start of the project were sorted out as agencies developed the habit of working together and delays were reduced in the submission of final reports.

While the requirement of the UN Trust Fund for Human Security is for joint programming among UN agencies, it became evident that the modality chosen for this project was not a joint program. UN Trust Fund resources were allocated directly to each UN agency separately (UNDP, UNESCO, UN Women) after they submitted a coherent programme, where each had a different role. The narrative of the proposal was integrated: it made sense for the three agencies to come together with their specific skills, experiences and partners in order to help different government counterparts in integrating a people-centered approach in dealing with disaster risks.

Beyond the general objective however, the implementation modality was not an integrated approach. The three agencies cooperated and coordinated for a joint objective but they did not integrate or pool their resources. In addition to the funds provided by the UNTFHS, each agency had its own funds and used the independently in a joint effort, as defined by the project proposal developed for the UNTFHS with the national counterparts.

The fact that each agency worked independently according to its agenda created difficulties, at least initially, in the better management of the entire implementation, particularly with regard to reporting. However, at the technical level, weekly meetings were regularly held between the teams of the three agencies to look at the plans together.

One area where cooperation between the agencies proved successful was in gender mainstreaming. UN Women provided its expertise to the study on Human Insecurities as well as to the publication on communication practices for which UNDP was responsible.

**Efficiency of relations with national counterparts**

The level of coordination between UN agencies and their national counterparts varied. Because each of the three agencies had its own implementing partners, each agency summarized the project activities that concerned their partner agencies without having a good idea of the whole project.

UNDP did not have the obligation to submit reports to the government. Yet, as, the Director of Civil Protection board was a member of the Steering Committee, and through constant communication with the project team, the DCP was informed regularly of the progress realized in the implementation process. The same could not be said about the other sectoral ministries. Lack of proper allocation of adequate human resources by UNESCO and UN Women meant that the flow of information with their national counterparts was not always efficient, as the national evaluation consultant heard in the interviews.

As each agency was in charge of communication with its own counterparts, information flow was also hampered between national agencies. For example, the technical coordinators of the DCP interviewed could not tell the evaluation team anything about the projects implemented by UNESCO and UN Women, even though DCP Director was a member of the Steering Committee. Information about the project was passed around in silos, each agency reporting to its partner only, and no coordinating actor in charge of ensuring the full involvement of all partner counterparts in the project. As a result, national partners may not have had a full picture of the project.

Yet the problem was not perhaps as much about lack of cooperation between UN agencies as it was a problem of lack of coordination between different government agencies and between entities at the central and departmental levels.
Despite difficulties, UNDP rated its partnership with MICT/DCP and the National System of DRM, which it has supported since its creation in 1997, as very good. Interviews with national stakeholders at central and departmental level also revealed that UNDP played an efficient role in supporting the national system of disaster risk management. Most of the respondents appreciated that UNDP involved them at different levels in the project implementation and management, except the National Center for Geospatial Information which reproached UNDP for not having involved them at the starting point of developing the TOR for the DRR data collection system.

Efficiency of support by the UN HSU

One of the main tasks of the Project Implementation Unit was to communicate regularly with the UN Human Security Unit (HSU) in charge of the UNTFHS. UNDP, on behalf of the other UN Implementing partners, produced the consolidated reports in order to compile the technical narrative and financial reports for the Trust Fund.

The assessment of UNDP in Haiti was that the communication with the HSU in New York was optimal: They were always available to answer questions, accommodate extensions when necessary, discuss financial concerns and also to share recommendations on the visibility of the project.

HSU agreed to expand the scope of the project to also include the departments of South and Grand’Anse after Hurricane Matthew, and to revise the deadlines of the project, when sufficient explanation and additional rationale was provided.

The role of HSU (both through the Focal Point, the Financial Officer and the Director herself) was apparent in different parts of the project design and implementation, including:

- Providing a detailed Progress Reporting Template in the UNTFHS Guidelines, which facilitated greatly the compilation of materials to be sent to New York.
- Providing detailed comments on the various reports sent to New York, starting from the draft concept note and project document, to each mid-term report.
- Asking for more clarifications on financial reports and human resources.
- Sharing Human Security documents, policy notes, thematic guidelines, subject related bulletins, handbooks for programming, related UN resolutions, etc., that the HSU has gathered throughout the years, made available through their website.

The main concern of the HSU seemed to be on three aspects, one of which was realistic and showed the lack of coordination among agencies, and the other two were perhaps unrealistic, especially given the socio-political situation in Haiti:

1) First, was the concern in the variation in programme delivery by implementing partners. Given that delivery rates by implementing partners were significantly different during the first and second year of implementation, the HSU reminded concerned UN agencies in Haiti that “integrated, comprehensive and inter-agency approaches, where UN agencies work together towards shared goals and objectives to address the full spectrum of inter-related issues facing the target population, is a central principle of the Trust Fund and a principle of HS approach.”

2) Second, more reporting was requested to showcase the added value of the Human Security approach for localizing the implementation of the Sendai framework for DRR in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In reports sent to New York, however, these linkages and explanations were not explicitly made, going to show perhaps that in real terms, project implementation among communities and with national counterparts has a more tangible output than the realm of UN language and priorities such as Sendai Framework and Sustainable Development.
Agenda. While showcasing connections between the different UN supported frameworks may be important at the policy and headquarters levels, there is little evidence that these are understood at the project level or even important criteria for the impact of projects.

3) Third, in their comments, the HSU also asked to show how major lessons learned, including best practices and innovative approaches in programme management, are catalytic initiatives to be replicated and mainstreamed in other regional projects through other sources of funding by the UN system, national counterparts, bilateral and multilateral donors. Given the dire socio-economic situation in Haiti, it is hardly conceivable that a number of the initiatives of the project, especially those that rely purely on education, training and advocacy, will be sustained through other funding.

- We could not find any indication that there was a field visit to the project in Haiti by members of the HSU.
- While documents were distributed to the UNDP Haiti on the Human Security approach, the Haitian project staff was not involved in any trainings or conferences organized by the HSU. It would be good for the HSU to bring together periodically the key project staff of the offices where the Trust Fund projects are being implemented in order to support exchanges of experiences, etc.
- One area that could improve is better coordination at the level of headquarters on the publications and training manuals being developed through the project in different languages. Even though the HSU’s documents were widely disseminated, including in French, the training modules that consultants developed in Haiti for example could have been shared with other French-speaking projects so as to consolidate their conceptual discussions (and of course, localize them according to the country specificity). The 2nd Steering Committee of the project called for better coordination with HSU on the development of the concept to avoid duplication of research.

Structures’ role in delivering expected results. Did they contribute to or hamper their achievement?

Representative issues hampered efficiency:

Theoretically, the project had a well designed structure to enhance the participation and the governance of the project. This included a Steering Committee consisting of the three UN implementation agencies with their national partners. The idea involving the government at the central level in the decision making board of this project was sound. The Steering Committee was tasked with overseeing the advancement of the project, making decisions on extensions and ensuring the support of the national level to the implementation of projects at the municipal and departmental levels.

While theoretically, the governance structure was well conceived, in reality however, implementation was quite different. The problem was that representation of national counterparts in the Steering Committee was at very high level. A Steering Committee with high level officials such as a Minister and General Director (of DPC), may have difficulties to meet because of lack of interest of high political decision makers for technical affairs, and given that they are much solicited for other causes judged as priority. That’s what happened with the project. During three years and nine months, the Steering Committee should have met at least six times, but only met twice. Furthermore, the Minister of Interior and Territorial Collectivities and the Minister of Planning and External Cooperation who should have co-presided the Steering Committee were never present. When more technical staff represented those ministries in the Steering Committee, their decision-making levels were not sufficient to make quick and decisive decisions. As a result, validation and implementation of decisions took more time than expected.

In order to mitigate risks linked to the political context, a National Technical Committee was organized in December 2016, consisting of technical staff from the main ministries concerned by the project, i.e. the
 Ministry of the Interior and its DCP and the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation. The objective of this Committee was to ensure ownership of the project at the central level despite the rotation of the political staff in ministries. Yet, the National Technical Committee created to substitute the Steering Committee did not solve problems because members still did not have decision making powers.

Local follow-up at the departmental levels was to be assumed by Departmental Technical Committees, which were supposed to delegate to follow-up committees. At the regional/departmental level, the two Regional Monitoring Committees set up to facilitate the adequate execution of the activities could not function as intended for long because the project did not take into account all charges that would involve to move the Committee members from one place to another to ensure activities monitoring. As a result, the efficiency and quality of the program implementation could not be properly monitored by DRR stakeholders.

As it happens in many other projects, running any steering committee or other support committees is always challenging because the interests of the implementing partners of the project or project managers are not the same as those of the stakeholders. At the same time, the expectations of some state officials are high when it comes to working with international organizations.

Delays and few decisions:

The Steering Committee took a long time to be set up. It first met in October 2017 to discuss the work plan and budget. By then, it was asking an extension of the project. The next one was supposed to take place after 3 months, but it took place at the end of April 2018 only (6 months later), and by then, they decided to have the next meeting not in 3 but 6 months. To our knowledge the Steering Committee did not meet again. Most of the decisions of the Steering Committee, given the delays and the political instability, were related to asking for extensions or reorientation of the project. The first meeting for example asked for a reorientation of the activities towards the South and Grand’Anse departments after the passage of Hurricane Matthew as well as a new extension until the end of March 2019 and then to September 2019. During the next and only other meeting, general decisions of no consequence were taken.

Coordination problems among too many committees:

The decisions of the Steering Committee were supposed to be followed up by technical committees set up at the departmental levels, and DCP had to follow up with departmental representatives to coordinate this. However, there were major delays to set up Departmental Technical Coordination Committees. The first meeting in the North with Disaster Risk Management technical coordinators of North, Northeast and Northwest was held in September 2018 only, almost a year after the Steering Committee that had met in September 2017. During their meeting, discussed veered into concerns about their lack of involvement in the projects. Representatives wanted a stronger role in the conception, planning and implementation in order to rectify the deficit in communication and allow for better participation of cities and targeted communities. They suggested meeting in different departments on a monthly basis and lead the creation of a local follow up committee which was supposed to meet every 3rd week of the month. Needless to say, all of these different committee meetings in different departments did not materialize.

Too many promises were made about the frequency of meetings of different structures, follow-up, coordination to avoid duplication, etc. However major delays hampered the meetings to be truly meaningful, except for asking for extinctions. Coordination between the national and department level of the DCPs on the project also seemed to be sub-optimal, as information flows between center and departments and back was not smooth, at least regarding the project. All this resulted in numerous structures but lack of proper flow of information and accountability.
Extend and efficiency of involvement of national stakeholders in the implementation of the project at the central and departmental levels

If representation through the Steering Committee and the many different planned departmental committees were not optimal, the overall involvement of national stakeholders was ensured in other ways.

The change of direction in 2016 at the executive and decision-making levels in the Haitian government required a re-engagement with the new government and local counterparts in promoting the HS approach. The appointment of new interlocutors within the ministries involved in the project meant that the process of raising awareness of the project's objectives had to be restarted. While these constraints delayed implementation at the start, national stakeholders came on board and were involved in the project, especially at the central levels.

Overall, beneficiaries and stakeholders interviewed highly regarded the outcomes of the project and were satisfied with the results. At the same time, many national stakeholders interviewed asked to increase the number of beneficiaries, the scope of the project, the geographical reach, and the involvement of more communities and departmental level institutions, etc.

- **DCP**: As a member of the Steering Committee, the DCP at the central/national level was substantively involved in the implementation of the project. At the departmental level, technical coordination and municipal civil protection committees were supposed to actively participate in the planning, organization and monitoring of activities, but they were less so. Based on interviews with stakeholders and review of documentation, our evaluation notes that overall, DCP entities were much more involved at the central than at the departmental level. This was mostly due to internal weaknesses of the national system of risk and disaster management which lacks human resources at the departmental and local level, as well as problems of coordination between the center and departments.

- **Directorate Training and Development (DTD) of the Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training (MNEVT)**. The TDD at the national level, through the Service for the Development of Educational Executives, fully participated in the implementation of the activities carried out by UNESCO. According to officials interviewed at the national level, the departmental education directorate appointed representatives who participated in the various workshops and were involved in the organization of trainings. However, the executives interviewed at the Departmental Directorate of National Education and Professional Training (DDNEVT) in the North mentioned that they had no direct involvement as a decentralized entity of the MNEVT, and the ones in Grand’Anse mentioned that UNESCO in partnership with MNEVT had other projects and it was not clear to them which was the Human Security one.

- **The Ministry for Women's Status and Women's Rights (MWSWR)** at the central level was not initially involved in the design of the project, but since it is represented in the Permanent Secretariat for Risk and Disaster Management, the ministry was able to propose to reshape the project to take better account of the gender aspect, which UN Women supported. Officials interviewed noted that while UN Women leads other projects with the MWSWR, involvement in the HS project ultimately strengthened the work of the ministry. They recommended that the ministry must be involved much more from the start of project design so that decisions are made with it and not for it. They also suggested that in addition to coordinating at the central level with the MWSWR, UN Women should also involve departmental coordination in the planning, organization and implementation of activities. The Departmental Coordinators of the MWSWR in the North and Northeast were not aware of the HS project per se but knew about trainings that UN Women was carrying out for women’s organizations in the department. They lamented that there was no involvement of the
departmental coordination offices in the activities of the project, in particular with regard to supporting women's organizations. The Departmental Coordinator in Grand’Anse also did not know anything about the project.

- **The Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPEC)** was apparently only consulted at the start of the project, but there was no further communication between UNDP and MPEC about the implementation and progress of the project, and neither did this ministry seek to get involved in monitoring. The MPEC was represented only through the Regional Planning Department within the framework of the project but the it does not sit in the meetings of the Steering Committee. The departmental Director of Planning and External Cooperation in the North-East mentioned that he had never participated in any meeting where mention was made of any project on Human Security being implemented in the department. He was also not informed of the Ministry of the existence of this project.

- **The NCGSI** considered that the development of the database on natural disasters is one of the most important activities of the project since the Center was already thinking about developing such a database with the DCP and had approached donors like the World Bank. At the same time, however, the NCGSI leadership lamented of not having been consulted even at the stage of designing the questions for the DRM database. They recommended that UNDP consults more systematically all beneficiaries so that projects are designed and implemented with them instead of for them.

**Extent to which the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms were efficient and in a timely manner**

The initial proposal described a monitoring and evaluation mechanism based on specific elements: a monitoring schedule plan, a joint annual review report, an annual project review, and an appraised annual work plan for the following year.

When the project duration was extended from two to three years and nine months, these mechanisms may have been revised but the evaluation team did not receive a new schedule plan. The project sent three progress reports to the UNTFHS which were monitoring reports, in other words, documents that showed what had been achieved and what the challenges, accompanied by a budget of what had been spent and what was required for subsequent years. Based on these documents, the UNTFHS sent its comments both on the narrative of the project and on the budget expenditures, past and expected future.

The decision had been taken early on to have one evaluation (this one) instead of two for the project. During the three years and nine months duration of the project, the evaluation team noted only five field missions by representatives of UN agencies in order to survey what was going on in the field.

On behalf of the government, local follow up at the departmental levels was to be assumed by Departmental Technical Committees, which were supposed to delegate to follow up committees. These, however, were non-operational given political instability, lack of communication flow between center and periphery, and logistical costs. As a result, monitoring could not be assumed on the ground.

**On the efficient use of financial and human resources**

Based on data received from UNDP in the final report submitted to the UNTFHS, from April 2016 to end of September 2019, approximately 85.98% of the total UNTFHS funds were disbursed and spent (Table 2). According to our calculations, the budget consumption rate by objectives and outputs in September 2019 (i.e. 3 months before effective close-up) was as high as 98.82%. (Table 3).
This high level of budget delivery is reported at a time when the project closed but a few activities had not been completed: The DRR database has not been fully operationalized yet; the Human Security approach is yet to be mainstreamed into all strategic documents; some of the small-scale mitigation projects had to be abandoned or are still incomplete; and the educational DRR modules have not been integrated fully into the national curriculum system. Nonetheless, given the socio-political challenges, delays, rising costs and changing priorities, it could be estimated that the financial resources were well spent.

**Table 2**: From April 2016 to end of September 2019, approximately **85.98%** of the total UNTFHS funds were disbursed and spent, according to documentations provided by UNDP, in USD, rounded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Executing Agencies</th>
<th>Approved Budget Year 1 (in USD) (a)</th>
<th>Received Funds (in USD) Year 1 (b)</th>
<th>Approved Budget Year 2 (in USD) (c)</th>
<th>Received Funds (in USD) Year 2 (d)</th>
<th>Approved Budget Year 3 (in USD) (e)</th>
<th>Received Funds (in USD) Year 3 (f)</th>
<th>Total Received Funds to date (in USD) (g=b+d+f)</th>
<th>Expenses to date (in USD) (h)</th>
<th>Balance of Received Funds (in USD) (g-h)</th>
<th>Execution (g/h)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDP</strong></td>
<td>702,410</td>
<td>702,410</td>
<td>477,367</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>477,367</td>
<td>1,179,776</td>
<td>1,030,472</td>
<td>149,304</td>
<td>87%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UNESCO</strong></td>
<td>385,753</td>
<td>385,753</td>
<td>128,920</td>
<td>128,920</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>514,673</td>
<td>504,218</td>
<td>10,455</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN Women</strong></td>
<td>176,015</td>
<td>176,015</td>
<td>108,605</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>108,605</td>
<td>284,620</td>
<td>166,965</td>
<td>117,656</td>
<td>59%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,264,177</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,264,177</strong></td>
<td><strong>714,892</strong></td>
<td><strong>128,920</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td><strong>585,972</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,979,069</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,701,655</strong></td>
<td><strong>277,414</strong></td>
<td><strong>85.98%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Expenses rate by objective and output, from April 2016 to September 2019 (3 months before effective close-up) Budget consumption rate 98.82 %, in USD, rounded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective 1</td>
<td>200 000</td>
<td>272 376</td>
<td>222 602</td>
<td>17 000</td>
<td>239 602</td>
<td>156 100</td>
<td>83 501</td>
<td>65.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.1</td>
<td>85 000</td>
<td>155 376</td>
<td>141 721</td>
<td>17 000</td>
<td>158 721</td>
<td>78 081</td>
<td>80 640</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.2</td>
<td>40 000</td>
<td>30 200</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.3</td>
<td>75 000</td>
<td>86 800</td>
<td>80 880</td>
<td>17 000</td>
<td>80 880</td>
<td>78 019</td>
<td>2 861</td>
<td>96.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective 2</td>
<td>261 336</td>
<td>358 668</td>
<td>277 413</td>
<td>115 000</td>
<td>392 413</td>
<td>185 887</td>
<td>206 526</td>
<td>47.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 2.1</td>
<td>255 336</td>
<td>352 668</td>
<td>276 646</td>
<td>115 000</td>
<td>391 646</td>
<td>181 294,20</td>
<td>210 352</td>
<td>46.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 2.2</td>
<td>6 000</td>
<td>6 000</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>4 593</td>
<td>-3 825</td>
<td>59.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Objective 3</td>
<td>808 010</td>
<td>712 727</td>
<td>863 055</td>
<td>1 913 969</td>
<td>2 777 025</td>
<td>2 983 810</td>
<td>-206 785</td>
<td>107.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 3.1</td>
<td>231 000</td>
<td>174 092</td>
<td>197 413</td>
<td>45 000</td>
<td>242 413</td>
<td>203 246</td>
<td>39 167</td>
<td>84.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 3.2</td>
<td>293 000</td>
<td>262 597</td>
<td>389 604</td>
<td>1 801 000</td>
<td>2 190 604</td>
<td>2 521 910</td>
<td>-331 306</td>
<td>115.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 3.3</td>
<td>284 010</td>
<td>276 038</td>
<td>276 038</td>
<td>67 969</td>
<td>344 008</td>
<td>258 654</td>
<td>85 354</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personnel Cost</td>
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<td>368 353</td>
<td>349 054</td>
<td>43 630</td>
<td>392 683</td>
<td>524 957</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Operating</td>
<td>172 788</td>
<td>137 473</td>
<td>137 473</td>
<td>43 558</td>
<td>181 032</td>
<td>101 357</td>
<td>79 675</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
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<td>Indirect support Costs</td>
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<td>129 472</td>
<td>129 472</td>
<td>129 472</td>
<td>111 502</td>
<td>17 970</td>
<td>86.3%</td>
<td>86.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1 979 069</td>
<td>1 979 069</td>
<td>1 979 069</td>
<td>2 133 158</td>
<td>4 112 227</td>
<td>4 063 614</td>
<td>48 613</td>
<td>98.82%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A few observations considering the budget expenditure:

*Inefficient budget for personnel:*

The project was trying to be cost-effective when it came to personnel: The project implementation unit consisted of a small team of six persons (the UNP project manager, the UNESCO and UN Women chiefs of the project, a driver, a finance assistant and later a technical assistant), which can be considered reduced cost of human resources while aiming at good results. While they were unable to conduct effective monitoring of activities, the small staff could build on partnerships and sharing of resources in order to get much done. The reduced cost of the personnel was mostly due to the comments received from the HSU on the first submission, where they remarked that “In the project budget, please note that the personnel and general operating costs are too high. Please reduce the total amount to no more than 20% of the total project cost. Furthermore, it is unclear why a project officer/coordinator, as well as finance/admin officers, are needed for each agency. As an integrated joint project, one project coordinator should work across all agencies”. In fact, since this was not an integrated joint project as envisaged by the HSU, there was a need for each agency to be represented in the implementation unit. At the same time however, given the lack of human resources of UNESCO and UN Women in Haiti in general, their representatives on the project were
also working on other dossiers. As a result, monitoring could not be done consistently, except by UNDP, who had fielded a full time project manager.

For a USD 4 million project executed in five departments, personnel of only six staff (four technical staffs) is too small to be very effective in terms of planning, execution and monitoring, even when the project prioritizes partnerships for many of its activities. The staff may have been-over utilized and the activities may have suffered when there was not enough human resources to ensure monitoring, continuity, quality control etc. Realization of activities could have been done more effectively if the project team had been better distributed geographically. For example, if there had been one technical assistant and one finance/logistic assistant by department or by region with adequate logistics at their disposal, the project would have ensured better coordination and facilitated real time financial management of activities. This especially given that the monitoring and implementation structures foreseen by national partners at the departmental and local levels turned out to be inefficient or non-existent, at described above.

Despite short-cuts in personnel for the implementation unit, nevertheless, salary and other personnel costs reached USD 525,000 up to September 30, 2019, exceeding the budgeted amount of USD 392 683 by 33%. This had to do with the need to sub-contract companies instead of individual consultants to carry out the study, the trainings and the DRR database architecture. The project had difficulty finding Francophone expertise in Human Security and social sciences related to disaster risk reduction and had to rely on companies instead of individual consultants for the study on human insecurities. As requested by DCP, certain international consultancies were converted into national consultants (i.e. the consultant preparing the Communications Study), while other individual consultancies were changed to companies the design of the architecture of the DRR database for example). As a result, costs were more than what had been originally budged.

Short-cuts, savings and combined activities and complementarity

If the budget spent on personnel was less than efficient (too little spent on project personnel and too much on consultants), other expenditures were more cost-effective.

- A decision was made by the Steering Committee to combine the study on existing HS, good Human Security practices and perceptions of HS into one single multi-faceted study. The consultant who developed training modules and did training for UNCT and NSDRM also participated in the design of the study. The merger of studies freed up funds for field activities
- A decision was also made to have one evaluation instead of two, with funds redirected to activities.
- For targeting trainings for Volunteers, the project was able to collaborate with another UNDP joint programme with United Nations Volunteers (UNV) Haiti, called “UNV-PRDSNDRD Cooperation Initiative to strengthen the Decentralized Reinforcement Project for the National Risk and Disaster Management System (DRP-NRDMS) » funded by the government of Brazil and implemented between February 2017-2019. The Human Security project joined trainings geared towards volunteers in 4 departments, added content in terms of perceptions of human insecurity and shared logistics.
- Complementarity was also sought with other UNDP project in targeting communities for small scale mitigation projects.
- Where possible, the hiring of local consultants was favored to cut costs and valorize the work of nationals. For the preparation of the Human Security Insecurity study, the draft prepared by an international consultant was not accepted, as it was not grounded on empirical knowledge of the Haitian field. The project was transferred to a national Haitian company. Where an international consultant was used to develop the study and trainings, the project shared the costs with USAID who was using the same consultant for their work.
On the availability of funds and completion of project activities on time

Funds were transferred by the UN Trust Fund to each agency separately on time after receipt of workplan, budget request, workplan or justification if an extension was requested. The delays were not caused by a lack of funds but by changes in the political situation, additions to the project, logistical issues, and lack of human resources by some agencies hampering follow up. Even though each agency received funding separately, UNDP was in charge of joint reporting to the UNTFHS.

From the beginning of the project, the first Steering Committee meeting requested the extension of the project from the end of March 2018 to the end of September 2019. Following the signing of the financing agreement and the receipt of the first disbursement in April 2016, the launch of project activities with the government fell behind schedule. This delay was mainly due to significant changes within the Ministry of the Interior, the key institutional partner for all project activities. In 2016, the context of political insecurity around presidential and senatorial elections slowed project implementation. Change of leadership required re-engagement with the new government and local counterparts. At the same time, Hurricane Matthew which affected the southwestern coast of Haiti in Oct 2016 absorbed every one’s attention and changed immediate priorities and medium-term plans.

A number of changes were decided early on that had budgetary implications: The DCP showed interest in having training on HS for the PSDRM staff. Trainings were added to include members of the PSDRM at the national level, in addition to strengthening of departmental and municipal levels. While international consultancies were converted into national consultants (i.e. the consultant preparing the Communications Study) or when national consultants were changed to international firms (for the DRR Database), these changes slowed down the hiring of consultants’ selection process.

The HSU, in its comments to the first report submitted, noted that UNDP had underspend for the first year, creating a budget variation between the money spent by the three agencies. As there was a request for an extension of the programme period, the HSU requested a consolidated explanation, a Workplan and Results Monitoring Report reflecting the changes/realignments of the various activities and timeline of the programme implementation. HSU then invited the development of an updated and harmonized work plan which would ensure that all the implementing agencies were working together in an integrated manner.

Appropriateness of the utilization of Human Security Trust Funds to project purpose and goal and effect of the existence of parallel funding sources

The main goal of the project was to empower vulnerable communities and further enhance, in a sustainable manner, capacities at the local, departmental and national levels for reducing disaster risk; in other words, it sought to reinforce the national system for disaster risk management in Haiti. All activities realized with funds received from UNTFHS were appropriate because they were focused on reducing a type of human insecurity.

A point needs to be raised about the possibility of duplication. Other donors and other initiatives were already or were planning to conduct activities similar to some of the ones planned for the project. As highlighted in the Steering Committee meetings for example, coordination was necessary on two activities: the database and on the integration of the education modules. DCP mentioned for example that coordination was necessary with the USAID project for the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPEC) which sought to integrate the risks stemming from disasters in the data of the Models of Management of External Assistance (Models de Gestion de L’aide Externe). DCP had also engaged MNEVT on an initiative to integrate DRR in academic and educational curriculum and education of DRM. DCP mentioned the need to coordinate with UNESCO so as not to duplicate activities. Ironically, both of these activities
(database and the integration of modules) were the two initiatives left unfinished by the completion of the project.

Overall, the added value of the project was the integration of the Human Security approach, but working on disaster risks is not something that others were not doing already. In fact, UNDP senior executives interviewed for the evaluation mentioned that from their perspective, this project complements various other projects already involved in the aspect of risk and disaster management, and its added value is the multidimensional aspect of the project that will have made a difference and also the emphasis placed on the disaster database that will be able to support Civil Protection in making certain decisions.

D) Sustainability

Support of stakeholders for the long-term objectives of the project

Most of the interviews held with stakeholders showed high satisfaction with the results of the project and the relevance of objectives with priorities at the national and local levels. Where national counterparts are satisfied with results, they may be more willing to support the continuation of the results attained, either themselves or through other international support.

Direct beneficiaries, volunteers, members of communities affected by disasters, pupils, teachers and school administrators or women’s organizations, were most if not all satisfied with the achievements and all wanted to see more. They were satisfied with both the knowledge gained, and for those benefiting from small projects, from the interventions that changed a bit their lives, albeit in very small ways.

DCP counterparts indicated their full support for the long-term objectives of the project and their intention to integrate the Human Security approach into future plans, as it was done in the National Plan for Risk and Disaster Management. Human Security is such an easily attractive concept that it would be difficult for humanitarian actors to reject it.

At the same time, however, apart from the NCGSI which will be trying to find additional funds and complete the database that it would like to keep functional, none of the entities interviewed indicated the possibility to continue the actions initiated by the project. All of them mentioned financial difficulties which prevented them from capitalizing on the achievements.

The worsening political situation is one of the factors that hampers the possibility for the allocation of money from national and local authorities, but it is not the only one. Given that the project was heavily based on education, knowledge and awareness raising, there are two possibilities: One is that in a climate of uncertainties (of human insecurity), knowledge in general takes a back seat and is not a priority. The little money that is available to national institutions would be rather spent on personnel or tangible projects, like income generation, construction, etc.

But there is also another possibility why these projects per se may not be seen as a priority for extra funding: They are already part of what the institutions do in the first place. Educating the public about risks of natural disasters and how to protect themselves is already part of the portfolio of what DCP actors and donors supporting them in Haiti do. This begs the question as to whether, at the end of the day, the project brought something new or was it supporting the existing initiatives under the guise of making them more relevant to Human Security objectives.

Availability of resources to ensure the continuity of the project
As a senior level UN executive told the evaluation consultant during an interview, there is not necessarily a need for a lot of resources to continue the actions initiated within the framework of the project given that the concept of Human Security is a cross-cutting issue. But if additional resources are required, and where the opportunity arises, UNDP will seek to obtain the resources to continue supporting the DCP.

For the moment, apart from the DRR Database, there have been no agreements to indicate that the activities will continue. The point was made in almost all interviews held by the national evaluation consultant that without further funding support, national institutions were unable to guarantee that the results will continue. The assumption made among all those interviewed was that while training, education and awareness raising was important, more concrete activities were needed in order to put the knowledge into practice.

- The DCP mentioned that it did not currently have budgetary autonomy to be able to ensure that the results of the project are pursued. However, it is in the process of transforming into an autonomic GeneralDirectorate with budget that meets its needs. In the meantime, DCP can mobilize funds from its usual partners to continue exploiting the results of the project.

- The DTC mentioned it was unable to continue awareness-raising activities in the affected neighborhoods or in other neighborhoods because it did not have the necessary financial means. Nor can it replicate the training for the other crossing guards because the training sessions involve logistics, and obtaining teaching materials, resources which it does not have.

- Now that the trainings for women have been completed and materials made available, the MNEVT interlocutors indicated that they can only follow up in terms of awareness-raising to ensure that the knowledge acquired produces transformative effects in the beneficiary organizations. However, financial support from UN Women will still be needed, in particular to reactivate the platform initiated in the North. UN Women indicated that it did not have the funds for the moment to continue activities at this point.

- The DDNEVT indicated that it does not have the financial means to reproduce the trainings, but also deemed it necessary to duplicate them within the framework of another project.

- The NCGSI has an obligation to continue not only in order to finalize the Database, but above all to collect information and make it accessible to users. However, without funding from the World Bank or any other financial partner, there is a risk that it cannot finish developing the full architecture, nor continue its regular management. The Center does not have the financial means independently to support this database.

**Sustainability of the results achieved and ability to operate beyond international assistance**

As the old saying goes, the only thing that cannot be taken away from a person is knowledge. Since much of the project was based on awareness raising, it is assumed that the results will stay with beneficiaries. At the same time however, such ‘sustainability’ is based on four imperatives: First, that enough tools have been created to sustain the reproduction of knowledge. Second, that knowledge needs to have been geared towards the right institutions. Third, knowledge needs to be periodically refreshed in order to stay relevant and activated. Fourth, people who have gained knowledge also require access to means, resources and opportunities in order to put what they have learned to practice.

1) **The right tools/products left behind**
A number of the products and processes created by the project have enough shelf life and can be considered major contributions that can be of use to national counterparts and international actors beyond the termination of activities. These include:

- The Study on Human Insecurities in Haiti highlighting insecurities related to disaster risks, and people’s own perceptions of these, can continue to be useful long after the project has ended. It is a useful tool which can serve as a baseline for evidence based policymaking and activity development.
- The Study on Good Communication Practices in DRM, including gender analysis, is a solid tool which includes important long lasting recommendations.
- The DRR Database, although not yet fully completed, will help guide decision-making in DRM and is a useful tool, once fully operational. The capacity of NCGSI is strengthened thanks to the project since from now on it will be able to model a disaster situation from the history of data collected on people, places at risk, damage already caused, etc.
- The Guide/Module for the integration of DRR in schools validated by the DCP and the Ministry of National Education can be very useful for improving the practical knowledge of pupils, but it has to be fully integrated into the national curriculum system.
- The training modules and slides used for explaining the Human Security approach or gender mainstreaming are excellent tools which can be used to duplicate the trainings.

Less durable, are the following:
- The Platforms for women’s organizations created in the North and South are non-operational and risks disappearing.
- The micro mitigation projects are likely not going to be resistant to time and lack of attention: some were destroyed immediately and others may not resist the first bad weather. The case in point is the projects in Limonade and Ravine Fond Blay. As such, their lack of replicability is a pity as communities showed interest in them.

2) The right institutions targeted

- The project put emphasis on three types of actors: DCP and the volunteers in charge of first response on the ground, Women’s organizations and education actors. These beneficiaries were targeted for concrete support (such as Family Emergency Plans) and knowledge about what to do to protect vulnerable communities, etc.
- The main counterpart of UNDP, namely DCP and its network, however are mostly involved in short-term crisis response and have a humanitarian/emergency mentality. Whereas the added advantage of the Human Security approach is that it is concept geared towards the long term, strategic thinking involved in prevention and resilience building. To this end, the one actor that needed to be involved more proactively was the Ministry of planning and external cooperation (MPEC) and the departmental DDPEC. Human Security is a strategic idea that requires both downstream, practical projects but also upstream, strategic planning for the long term. DPC is not the only valid main partner in this regards and only the MPEC could ensure continuity at the more strategic level.

3) Knowledge periodically refreshed

- Beyond the project, knowledge that has been provided needs to be refreshed in order to be used. This should not necessarily mean that the trainings would continue, but that the knowledge and skills attained are installed in the institutions or beneficiaries.
- From the interviews conducted for the evaluation, it became clear that national institutions all saw the need to be supported, even for as little as logistics, in order to duplicate the trainings.
Most also mentioned the need to continue trainings so that the “complex” concept of Human Security could be better understood.

- The content of Human Security being too complex may not be a valid concern however, as it is at the end of the day, a very logical, simple concept that requires the inclusion of people as agents, objects and subjects of efforts to eradicate multiple insecurities in their lives.
- In terms of the need to support institutions to duplicate the trainings, the project must have foreseen a contract or an incentive with those that it trained in TOTs so that that they would organize other trainings or that they will share their knowledge with others. The interviews give the impression that without further support, knowledge will not be duplicated, nor will it be used.
- If the municipal and departmental structures do not manage to facilitate replicas of training, there will be no transmission of knowledge to other members. Their technical capacities will not have been reinforced in the final analysis, with the additional risk that the trained people leave the structures.

Possible scope of future support and recommendations on how best the project could capitalize on its achievements

At the end of the Report, our recommendations include areas where the project can capitalize on its achievements. In this section, a few areas can be noted:

- The advocacy and trainings should continue among both decision makers and communities at the national, departmental and community levels. Now that the training modules have been prepared, the methodology to train on the HS approach developed, the study published, materials ready, replicating the trainings should not be too costly given that the project had not used too expensive materials (banners, awareness panels).
- Now that the DCP has adopted its DRM plan with the Human Security approach, an action plan/implementation plan must be developed. It is precisely such an implementation plan which can show how the HS approach can be operationalized on the ground. The plan itself should also serve as a basis for the mobilization of more resources.
- The MNEVT DRR Guide, once integrated into the teaching curriculum, will continue to expand its reach to training generations of children and young people in risk and disaster management.
- The HS study and the publication on best communication practices, as well as the disaster database will meet the needs of the NSDRM for a long time. They need to be better publicized and used by policy makers, donors and researchers.
- Some of the small mitigation projects which are deemed more sustainable, at least in the medium term, should continue to be refreshed, and beneficiaries who will continue using them can be solicited for their maintenance.

What could be done to strengthen exit strategies and sustainability? Ensuring continuity and ownership.

- UNDP should ensure that other projects of UNDP continue to build on what has been done.
- UNDP could also work with national Haitian institutions in ensuring that the support of other international donors and agencies builds on, and completes what has been started. For example, the World Bank could be approached in order to consider supporting the completion of the database. For this UNDP could share information about the project achievement and raise awareness about gaps and needs.
- The sense of ownership must be fostered. The NCGSI, for example, no longer sees the database as a product of UNDP but rather a national property. By encouraging this feeling of ownership and fostering the leadership, they can feel responsible to carrying on the work. This is also the case of the
DCP which advocates its NPDRM with other donors while the development was funded by the project.

- Even the small mitigation projects can be hailed as community owned projects because communities identified their needs, individuals contributed their free labor. By ensuring ownership, and responsibility is the best way to strengthen the sustainability of what was achieved.

**Outreach and communication products that remain beyond the project**

The project, with its strong concentration on awareness raising and educating the public on the risks of disasters, produced a large number of advocacy and communication materials as outputs, including brochures, videos, publications, etc. All outreach materials, pictures, films, flyers have been uploaded via: https://www.dropbox.com/sh/c6z1it7awwy4j9c/AABMVJR8q-3MNoa-LOUiKL4Qa?dl=0.

Among them the following can be of note:

*Achievements:*

- A 15 minute video documentary on how to prevent natural disasters in Haiti
- A video on Human Security and the achievements of the project.
- A Study on communication practices in DSM prepared and printed in 100 copies;
- A study on Human Insecurities prepared and printed in 40 copies.
- Other communication materials organized by the project included: a flyer on the Tsunami and cyclones for awareness activities in the North Department; Approximately 30,000 flyers of family emergency plans for the country's five department; More than 20,000 cyclone Precautionary Flyers (about behaviors to have before, during and after cyclones) for outreach activities in the five targeted departments; 3 banners and 110 bags, 110 notebooks for the National Forum on Disaster Data Management and One hundred (100) jerseys for visibility during DRM awareness activities.

- Under the auspices of UN Women, a consulting firm (Mediacom) was engaged to produce communication materials on the inclusion of gender in the management of risks and disasters, including 2 documentary films, a dozen banners and 5,000 flyers for North, North East and North West, and 3 study reports and a strategic document to mainstream the gender perspective within DRR strategies to be formatted and disseminated.

- UNESCO supported the production of a number of videos and brochures on its educational activities. Their pamphlet has been downloaded here: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1AcD9Iy-L7ktJNq4c1yEbPVc8V9fERs

*Shortcoming:*

- While these are an impressive set of information and communication-related outputs, the main problem is dissemination. Flyers were distributed during events, but where were the more global outputs, such as the communication study, the Human Security study and the documentary deposited? How did the wider public have access to them? We were unable to find them on the website of UNDP Haiti even.

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5 https://www.dropbox.com/sh/e94izugmip9y8h/AABxzqHJ2zJgty8 HvAkMF7guya/Film%20documentaire%20comment%20previenir%20les%20risques%20naturels%20en%20Haïti%20Mars%202017.mov?dl=0
Mainstreaming Gender and Human Rights

How was the rights-based approach used in the project and among national partners

At the outset, it must be said that the Human Security approach is very close to the rights-based approach, which refers to the rights of all people in disaster situations. The Human Security approach ensures that people can exercise their rights by stabilizing the conditions, and making them free from fear, want and indignities. How the two approaches related conceptually were explained well in all the training modules prepared and the trainings carried out.

At the practical level, the project advocated for the rights of people regardless of their social category during trainings and awareness raising activities. By focusing on women and members of vulnerable communities during the implementation of small-scale projects, the project shed light on the conditions of some of the most vulnerable.

The extent to which poor people, people with disabilities, women and other disadvantaged and marginalized groups benefited from the project.

Through one of the main partners of the project, UN Women, the case of vulnerable women and the need for mainstreaming gender differences into studies, training modules and pamphlets was adequately made in most interventions. The special case of poor people or people with mobility was raised in the studies and training modules but no targeted interventions were designed for them specifically.

Some project activities took into account the gender aspect and the needs of vulnerable populations more than others.

Achievements:

- As much as possible, the Study on Human Insecurities targeted the situation and voices of women, the poor, the vulnerable etc. In fact, a good part of the first chapter entitled ‘Human Security and the Risk of Natural Disasters’, is devoted to an analysis of the particular vulnerability of women and girls. It mentions that the vulnerability comes from gender stereotypes and social, political and economic inequalities in society, combined with the tendency to view women as objects and preys to desire, exposing them to social violence. The study shows how women are vulnerable during and after disasters hit, and at the same time, how during the recovery period, the role of women can be changed if they are better integrated into disaster response and risk reduction measures.
- Given that in Haiti, detailed information on the situation of women in post-disaster situations is not collected on a regular basis, the Study produced is an invaluable tool for researchers, policy makers, programme developers, etc. For the Study, perceptions and information was gathered through 5 focus groups included only women and 10 were mixed.
- The National Plan of Disaster Risk Management (2019-2030) puts gender and social inclusion as an important part of its implementation strategy.
- The training themes themselves focused on the protection of the rights of each individual, particularly those most vulnerable such as the disabled, the elderly, children and pregnant women.
- Excellent slides on gender mainstreaming into DRR activities were developed with the help of UN Women experts and were used in trainings.
- The trainings focused not only on the specific needs of women, their unsafe conditions before, during and after a disaster, but also on the needs of vulnerable categories.
- A trainer specializing in protection of women was integrated into the pool of trainers specifically to tackle the gender aspect.
The establishment of women's DRM networks in the Departments of South and North supported the reinforcement of gender mainstreaming in DRM. Through these networks, women could share information, whether preventive or related to response actions during disasters, with women living in the most remote areas.

This intervention mitigates the lack of information that women are subject to according to the Study on Good Communication Practices conducted by the project. In this way, women, and especially family heads, have the capacity to strengthen their autonomy and protect themselves and their families.

In developing and explaining the Family Emergency Plans (FEPs), the roles of women and girls were explicitly defined. Awareness activities emphasized on the participation of women and girls.

The FEPs and simulation exercises in schools all emphasized the protection to be given to people living with reduced mobility (disabled, elderly, pregnant women and small children). The FEPs also emphasize on the disabled, children and the elderly during evacuations.

**Shortcomings**

- In the design and development of the DRR database, NCGSI did not make any special consideration to the gender factor or the rights of vulnerable categories.
- A quota of 25 to 40% of women was set for the Human Security trainings. The DTC had taken this into account when choosing the crossing guards where at least 30% were women. However, as the section below analyzes, the list of participants of the volunteers of the Civil Protection Committees at the departmental level showed a large bias on behalf of male participants. At the national level, trainings targeting the executive levels of line ministries and the DCP, the gender balance was much more apparent. This may have to do with the role of women in communities in local communities, where men are more active in the public as volunteers and women are more active within families and with women’s associations.
- Gender mainstreaming requires understanding the structural inequalities in society and tackling them in a holistic way. While the project produced valuable knowledge about the differences between how disasters impact men and women differently, that knowledge was not necessarily put into action when it came to interventions in schools, or for the database, etc. The role of women in implementing the Family Emergency Plans and their networking capacities were strengthened but more targeted interventions would have been optimal in all interventions.
- Trained women’s organizations in the North, because they are not connected with the Departmental Directorates of DRM, are not automatically mobilized in preparation and response to disasters. Women’s networking alone without upstream linkages to decision makers is not always effective in the long term.

**F) Understanding and Using the Human Security Approach**

As the project being evaluated was about including the Human Security approach in DRM, this part of the evaluation report proposes to also look at how and whether Human Security was well understood and well integrated. We believe that the analysis in this section may be of use to the Human Security Unit who funds projects through the UNTFHS specifically in order to advocate for the concept.

The analysis of findings is presented here by making distinctions between three indicators: 1) Extend to which (and how) the Human Security approach and its value was explained through the project, 2) extend to which beneficiaries understood the HS approach and its conceptual and operational relevance to DRM in Haiti, and; 3) Extend to which the 4 HS programmatic principles were used in the project outputs and activities, as propagated by the HS Unit at the UN and through the General Assembly Resolution A/RES/66/290 (10 September 2012).
1) Extend to which the value of the HS approach was explained

The organization of trainings on the Human Security approach was the strength of this project.

- The training modules were developed based on materials provide by the HS Unit, localized in the context of Haiti and adapted to understanding and responding for DRR.
- Trainings on the HS approach were conducted for agency project staff, for UN agencies involved with the project, for civil protection managers at central, departmental and municipal level and MNEVT/DTD and MWSWR/SPU executives.
- Human Security training took place at all levels of the national DRM system: DCP executives and crossing guards. There was training for grassroots organizations and also for executives of sectoral ministries to take this approach into account in their interventions.
- Different executives of the Directorate of Civil Protection at central and departmental levels participated in training sessions to properly understand the Human Security approach. As told to the evaluator, they understood that Human Security is more than physical security, it is multi-sectoral and is centered on the individual.
- According to officials interviewed from the MWSWR, other than the two or three people trained on Human Security, no one else is yet aware of the approach.

Here we shall provide an analysis of the trainings for trainers which were carried out for the volunteers from the DCP on HS, Family Emergency Plan and Awareness Techniques. They took place in April and May 2019 in all of the departments. Based on the reports of the trainings, the following observations are made:

- **Facilitators** were all certified by the National System of Risk and Disaster Management with extensive skills and experience in the field of Risk and Disaster Management, in addition to academics experts on the topics in question.
- **Participants** were supposed to be equally distributed among men and women as much as possible, but a list of participants at the departmental levels shows that this equality was not reached at all among the volunteers of the Civil Protection Committees. The vast majority were men (18 out of 22 in Jérémie, 41 out of 51 in a session realized in North, 19 out of 25 in another session, 46 out of 50 in the last session in North, etc. At the same time, trainings at the national level, targeting national authorities/entities were significantly more gender balanced.
- **Topics** were well chosen, based on a very comprehensive module that was prepared by a consultant. The trainings, which *grosso modo* used the same format, were divided in two parts, the first part devoted to the Human Security approach and the second one to Family Emergency Plans (FEPs).

- **Learning objectives** set out for the trainings were logical and comprehensive, and consisted of:
  - Understand the concept of Human Security
  - Know the framework for Human Security analysis
  - Explain the objectives and the importance for a family to set up a FEP.
  - Apply the steps to follow for the development of the FEPs according to the different scenarios
  - Accompany the most vulnerable families to prepare their Family Emergency Plans
  - Conduct a community awareness activity

- The **agendas** consisted of the following topics (with little variations in different locations):
  - **A - Human Security**
    - 1-Human Security, Historical concepts and foundation
    - 2- Human security analysis framework
    - 3-Human Security: Practical case and lessons learned
- 4-Methodology for operationalizing the dimension of Human Security
  - B- Family Emergency Plans
    - Introduction to key DRM concepts
    - Role of the family and the community as important actors in DRM
    - Importance of the family emergency plan
    - Key principles for developing a FEP.
  - C- Awareness techniques: Present the organization chart of the NSDRM, taking into account the communication chain, the function of public information and the role of the Public Information Officer in normal times and in emergency situations
    - Origin of animation and awareness concepts
    - Know the objectives of the animation
    - Analyze the animation process
    - Define the qualities of a facilitator
    - Know your attitudes

- As far as the HS approach was concerned, we found the training module very comprehensive and well developed. The modules go through the correct interpretations of HS (based on what the HSU promotes), the evolution of the concept, its characteristics (the 4 principles), the seven core dimensions, three freedoms, etc.
- One of the excellent additions was the case studies that were developed to show the use of HS in programming in different situations and to draw lessons: (i) Human Security and Natural Disaster Reduction in Peru; (ii) Poverty reduction and Human Security in Myanmar; (iii) Human security and emergency development transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
- Group exercises helped people understand the operationalization of the HS approach in analysis, mapping, planning, implementation and impact of projects
- Perhaps one shortcoming was missing the opportunity to adapt the HS approach not just to disasters (environmental insecurity) but also to sectors such as agriculture, health, education, etc. and show the linkages and inter-sectorality.

Based on the recommendations and evaluations that appear in the reports of the trainings, we conclude that overall, participants highly regarded the trainings. In terms of shortcomings or recommendations, most comments had to do with the need to repeat these trainings, including for various structures and senior executives and decision makers, as well as the need to provide certification and reference materials.

2) Understanding of the HS approach and its conceptual and operational relevance to DRM in Haiti

While extensive efforts went into trainings to explain the approach and how it can apply to DRM in Haiti, the question remains as to whether it was well understood by interlocutors. Based on the interviews conducted, we conclude that:
- The concept was easily understood by staff of the UNDP office. With regard to the other UN agencies, UN Women staff best understood it because they were already working transversally on human rights / women's rights.
- The concept, as simple as it may sound, was not yet fully clear for all Haitian counterparts. Its implementation remains especially hypothetical in the context of reality where interventions are often of the firefighter type. The appropriation of security and human security seems to be more apparent among DCP stakeholders than those of the other ministerial entities.
- At the sub-national (departmental) level, members of the NSDRM found the Human Security framework useful but in order to better able to integrate it in their efforts, more advocacy was needed at the decision makers’ level.
• Overall, it is possible to conclude that the people centered-view of the Human Security approach was better understood (and better explained) than the inter-sectorality principle which puts emphasis on the inter-connectivity between threats and risks.

3) Use of the HS approach

One of the overarching objectives of the project was to advocate for the use of the Human Security approach in strategic plans:

• The revision of the National Plan for Management of Risk and Disasters presented the opportunity to integrate the concept and convince the decision makers of the importance of this approach during the validation workshop of the plan.
• The Haiti Development Strategic Plan (HDSP) was not yet revised to take into account the HS approach. Such a revision was being planned as part of the new UNDP project on climate change adaptation supported by Japan.
• The UNDAF was revised but it did not systematically take into account the HS approach. In its mid-term review in 2020, it was anticipated that the UNDAF will formally take the approach into account but it remains to be seen. In the meantime, related concepts of resilience, etc. are well integrated.
• Departmental contingency plans were not revised to take into account the HS approach.
• The training modules and the Study on Human Insecurities related to DRR used the HS approach as advocated by the HSU and the UNTFHS.

But when we say that the HS approach was taken into account in this or that strategy, what do we mean exactly? Is it enough that a certain document simply uses the terminology? The query needs to better unpack what it means to integrate the HS approach in order to have meaning. To what extent did the project genuinely use (and advocate for the use of) the 4 programmatic principles (people centeredness, comprehensive, preventive and context specificity) and the dual framework (protection and empowerment) in the project outputs and activities?

Below are some of the examples of how the principles were used in the various activities:

People centeredness
The people-centered principle requires that interventions are conducted not only FOR the people but also BY them as agents of change. Did the various strategies, plans, studies, trainings and micro projects at various levels involve beneficiaries in the design, implementation and monitoring?

• The Study on Human Insecurities not only analyzed objective factors stemming from natural disaster risks, but also how people themselves assessed their own fears, wants and indignities.
• The trainings allowed for reaching out to the vulnerable populations. The mobilization of volunteers under the aegis of departmental managers enabled a proximity approach for families living in the most exposed neighborhoods, whether in cities or in remote communal sections. These families had time to assess their exposure to various threats by themselves and for themselves. To this end, the family is better able to make responsible decisions to protect themselves, starting with the implementation of their emergency plans.
• Communities, particularly young people, actively participated in the identification, design and implementation of mitigation projects for insecurities linked to their environment based on the needs they defined. The projects combined community know-how with scientific techniques for building community infrastructure to avoid or reduced the impact of floods, landslides and tidal rises.

Preventive
• The HS approach emphasizes prevention and not only emergency response, contrary to what was done before at the level of the DTC and the national system of DSM per se. By integrating the approach in
its strategic plans, the DCP and other national partners sought to build in anticipation of risks, protection of populations through knowledge, etc. As such, risks and impacts of disasters could be mitigated.

- The assumption of the project was that given that information and knowing what to do in times of disasters could save lives, it would be possible to say that the content of the trainings, the Study of Insecurities, the Communication Study, the educational brochures, the Family Emergency Plans, etc. all played a preventive function.
- The setting-up of a network of women in the South, as was done in the north, strengthened the integration of gender needs in DRM. The sharing of information, either preventive or related to response actions during disasters, could reach women living in the most remote areas. Armed with information, women and especially heads of families, have the capacity to strengthen their autonomy and protect themselves and their families.
- Children, thanks to the preparation of the guides on the integration of DRM in schools, have the necessary information on the various natural risks and the actions they had to take to mitigate risks.
- The small-scale construction projects were built in a way as to mitigate the risk of disasters and as such, were specifically preventive projects.

**Context specificity**

- The Study of Human Insecurities connected to Disaster Risks in Haiti which was prepared at the beginning of the project ensured that enough information could be drawn from the local situation in the different localities where subsequent projects, trainings and interventions were being planned. In principle, then, interventions were based on a comprehensive Human Security analysis of communities. The extent to which the actual study was used by those designing the projects and implementing them however was not clear from our interviews and analysis.
- The mitigation projects can also be called context specific projects par excellence as they were developed bearing in mind what local communities themselves deemed necessary to protect them against local disasters.
- The attempt to understand the vulnerability of school buildings and educational infrastructure to natural disasters in order to draw recommendations was an example of a context-specific intervention.

**Comprehensive**

Were interventions designed and implemented in an integrated (multi-sectoral) manner, touching on alleviating multiple insecurities?

- The fact that UNESCO, UNDP and UN Women with their respective expertise, networks, counterparts and areas of interventions worked together would be one argument for the compressive nature of the project. The biggest supposed added value of the project however turned out to be its biggest deficit: our interviews showed that each ‘sector’ and partner worked in a silos manner, concentrating on its own contingencies, without trying to make linkages between responses to different insecurities. This was also due to the problem of staffing: Apart from the UNDP project officer, there was no specific staff dedicated to the project.
- The Study on Human Insecurities highlighted the linkages between the different insecurities as they impact people’s lives in Haiti: Environmental insecurity (natural and man made disasters) lead to economic, food, health, personal, political and community insecurities. However, the project was designed in a way as to deal with issues related to environmental insecurity (mitigation, disaster relief, etc.) as separately and primarily through sectoral plans carried out under the responsibility of sectoral ministries.
- Even the small-scale mitigation projects were supposed to alleviate risks but not necessarily done in a way that provides economic security (beyond very small salaries paid through the project). Health insecurities were not tackled through the project. Political insecurities were ignored, even
though the fact that people could participate in the governance system of DRM could be billed as a trust building exercise of participation.

- The fact that the project took up a pilot approach, by trying to have small projects for different populations in different localities, also proved to be a missed opportunity. Instead of dealing with multiple insecurities of selected communities in a holistic way, the project instead spread its interventions around to tackle one insecurity of different communities.
- The way that the project would have better tackled the multi-sectorality principle of the HS approach would have been to concentrate on a fewer number of communities that were especially vulnerable to natural disasters and devised a holistic response that would tackle their multiple insecurities: health, economic, food, community, etc.

4. Conclusions and Strategic Lessons Learned

Many conclusions can be drawn from this complex project. Annex A includes a table with challenges, mitigation measures adopted and lessons learned. Here, we will highlight some of the more strategic lessons learned from the implementation of the project “Increasing Human Security in the Face of Disaster Risks in Haiti”

1) Insecure situations require special care

The Human Security approach is specifically relevant to situations of crisis and risks. As such, it is an appropriate framework to adapt to the mitigation of risks stemming from natural and man-made disasters. As this project shows, people who live in environments of insecurity need to be protected and empowered in order to mitigate the negative impact of risks in their lives. Human Security is not a reactive concept that resembles the usual humanitarian approach but one that advocates for proactive, preventive, long-term measures. As such, it should be advocated among actors involved in long-term socio-economic planning in the country and not just those working for emergency response.

The Study produced by the project showed that insecurities are not only related to physical aspects but also to fears, wants and indignities that people subjected to natural disasters feel in their lives. Interventions need to take the whole package of insecurities into account and not just a piecemeal approach to the impact of environmental insecurity only.

Having said this, however, the project also showed how difficult it is to carry out interventions among decision makers and among communities when the political situation of a country is volatile. The unrests impacted strategic decisions, caused delays, led to turnovers in governance structures, led to rising prices for construction materials which in turn made the completion of walls impossible, etc. Our interviews showed that the DRM protocol in schools could not be implemented due to a lack of interest of the education actors during moments of socio-political crisis. Like hurricanes and tsunamis, political turmoil changes priorities for everyone: From decision makers all the way to community members who have to deal with the crisis.

Each time, in this case, the project showed its ability to adapt. One lesson learned is that flexibility is key when working on Human Security projects. Alternative plans are necessary, partnerships need to be strengthened and adaptation strategies devised. These will help the sustainability of the outputs and increase the resilience of all those involved in the project design, implementation and monitoring.

2) Human Security approach should not be about slogans, it has a specific methodology

*People centered*
The project aimed to integrate the Human Security approach into strategic documents of the government and the UN. We found however that even in strategic documents that supposedly used Human Security, such as for example the DRM Strategy of Haiti, this amounted to little more than a series of words put together without indications of what they really mean and how they are related and operationalized. The Strategy for example uses Sustainable Development, Human security, Sendai Framework, resilience, leaving no one behind, etc. lined up together one after the other. The mention of the generic wording “Human Security” cannot be considered an achievement in itself as it is a harmless expression that no one can be against its inclusion, especially in humanitarian documents. Adequate integration would require the use of the HS methodology - the 4 principles (people centered, context specific, comprehensive/interrelated and preventive) and the dual framework (protection and empowerment) – in the analysis of challenges and in the solutions proposed by the strategy.

The crust of the Human Security approach involves two truisms: One that insecurities are best dealt with for people by the people. In other words, implicating communities as agents and stakeholders, objects and subjects ensures more success in interventions designed to alleviate risks. Haitian institutions working on disaster risks, already try to involve people when they have the means and resources to facilitate participation. This is what efficient and legitimate states should do. International organizations cannot perpetually support the state in fulfilling its role in consulting with people and communities. And yet, without the support of this project, the inclusion of people as agents of change and as beneficiaries in DRM strategy may not have happened, given that the government adopts the traditional humanitarian approach where populations are seen as ‘vulnerable’ and as ‘beneficiaries”.

Nonetheless, the inclusion of the Human Security approach in the national strategy remains too general. The National Plan needs to be implemented through action-oriented/community-based work plans. Beyond the completion of the project, it is necessary to support the continued integration of people into these plans at all levels: design, implementation and monitoring. This may be done through the support of other donors, such as the World Bank and others in Haiti. In this case, the project may need to have raised awareness about the HS approach not only among the three UN implementing agencies but also other donors so that the work could go one beyond the UNTFHS project.

**Multi-dimensional principle**

The second imperative of the Human Security approach is its comprehensive element. Since insecurities can bleed into each other, they have to be dealt with holistically. Environmental insecurity (like natural hazards) inevitably leads to food insecurity, economic insecurity, health insecurity, personal, political and community insecurity. In our evaluation of the project supported from the UNTFHS, we noticed that the value of holistic/comprehensive interventions was not demonstrated sufficiently. Responding to multi-dimensional insecurities related to disasters requires integrated approaches to sectoral planning and delivery of services; This element was not highlighted enough by the project.

Without this inter-sectorality approach, limiting the Human Security approach to the involvement of people and communities without putting into question the silos delivery system inherent in fragmented governance and institutions, is business as usual and does not necessarily have added value.

**3) Joint programming requires multi-dimensional interventions among fewer communities**

Related to the point above, adopting the Human Security approach requires tackling multiple insecurities at the same time. That is the purpose for which the UNTFHS requests joint programming among UN agencies in order to each bring their own expertise in an integrated way.
In this case, the project was not technically a ‘joint programme’, even though it was implemented in parallel by three different agencies. Each brought their own partnerships, skills, contacts among communities and areas of specialization. Even though synergies were sought at the level of projects by the three agencies through regular meetings and sharing of information (and in some cases sharing of expertise), each concentrated on its own single-focus objectives: emergency response, mitigation and resilience (UNDP with DCP), women’s empowerment (UN Women and women’s NGOs) and using and expanding the education sector (UNESCO and Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training).

For each insecurity area, a different community was also targeted, with little synergies between the beneficiaries of the different objectives. This meant that the project spread itself too thin by piloting different interventions around the country without the possibility to follow up. More importantly, however, from the Human Security point of view, this meant that the opportunity was missed to tackle multiple insecurities among the same community. The project could have more systematically tried to tackle more insecurities among fewer at-risk communities. For example, taking, even as pilot basis, 3-4 communities overall and targeting them for multi-faceted interventions that would help them alleviate economic, food, health, environmental, community and personal insecurity.

The small scale community-based DRR projects that UNDP targeted for micro-financing could have been seen from this angle, if they had been larger, and more systematically followed up. They had very good elements: They were all led by community members in partnership with land owners and local authorities. While they were chosen for their ability to mitigate risks from a disaster, they did in a way address multiple insecurities such as economic (i.e. prevention of landslide), food (i.e., fruit tree plantation), community (i.e. harmonized society with empowered youth and women and their dignity), health (i.e. nutrition-sensitive plantation), personal securities (i.e. reducing the risks of disasters). However, here again the different insecurities were tackled through different projects and the one constant was that they were seen as risk-mitigation projects (to alleviate environmental insecurity). They were also much too small in scale, and achievement was evaluated as to whether the micro task chosen was completed or not.

4) Awareness raising projects need to combine knowledge sharing with practical means to operationalize concepts. Regular refreshment of knowledge is also necessary

This particular project was heavily based on capacity building/raising awareness/ educating. It created tools (studies, guidelines and modules) and it organized a number of trainings. From the interviews conducted, however, two issues became clear:

First, national institutions indicated their lack of resources to duplicate the trainings beyond the project without further support. On the one hand, once knowledge has been imparted, the question is how to ensure that it is used, and not how it can continue to be given through trainings. UN organizations cannot perpetually organize trainings. The idea was that national institutions will follow up themselves and duplicate the trainings or pass on the knowledge to the communities and put it in practice in their own everyday work. When beneficiaries mention to the evaluators that their expectation is that the trainings should continue but that they cannot put the resources themselves, something has gone wrong.

At the strategic level, it is up to the national institutions to use the Human Security approach if they have been convinced of its added value. Nonetheless, the operationalization should happen when the strategies are translated into actionable plans, and the UN would need to follow that up, as a continuation of this project, even after its completion.

At the community levels, crossing guards, for example, were trained in Human Security, awareness-raising techniques and Family Emergency Plans, but the CCCP indicated that it will not be able to replicate the trainings after the project. Volunteers interviewed who had been trained mentioned that they expected more
support and mentoring to implement their responsibilities within the national DRR system. They expected tailored training and a clearer career path so that they could capitalize on their volunteering experience in the labor market, and they expected more recognition and visibility of their contribution to the community. All these point out that it is not enough to train volunteers in principles of Human Security if tools are not given to them to put their knowledge in practice and their own empowerment, be it in terms of recognition or financial means, is not put to the forth.

In general, a common complaint heard was that while knowledge imparted through the project was useful, relevant and adequate, material support was also necessary in order to help communities put the principles of freedom from fear, want and indignities to good use. For volunteers with emergency response that meant materials, rowboats, etc. For farmers, it meant seed, credit, etc. so that they could not only protect themselves in cases of disasters but take care of their everyday livelihoods which was also a chronic human insecurity.

When it came to empowering through knowledge in schools, we can confirm that based on multiple activities at several levels for example, targeted school communities have better knowledge on how to cope with insecurities. But we can’t affirm whether they have enough capacity to implement tailored disaster prevention and management protocols because this involves mobilization of human resources and means which the project could not provide. Managers from sectoral ministries are trained in Human Security. However, not being at decision-making levels may not have the desired impact in the policies and strategies of these departments.

5) Knowledge should circulate

What is the use of studies, publications, guidelines or training modules if they are not used and reused over and over again? The project led to the preparation of a number of excellent tools: Very good training slides on how to teach about the Human Security approach which is very comprehensive. Very good set of training slides on gender mainstreaming. An excellent study on perceptions and facts of human insecurities in Haiti. A study on communication practices around DRM. A guide/module on integrating DRR in schools etc... These materials need to be circulated widely. For the moment they are not even on the website of UNDP Haiti. Even though the project paid for the publication of some of these reports, too few people around the country would have access to them if they are simply distributed as booklets. They need to be available through other means (social media, etc.). Decision makers should be encouraged systematically to use the different tools prepared by the project (database architecture, studies, modules, etc.) for their evidence based policy making.

Trainings also need to be refreshed and revisited. One-time trainings for selected beneficiaries, including trainers that are supposed to pass on the information, is not enough, especially when especially when follow-up was not even planned or cannot materialize. It may be better to have less trainings but more regular ones that revisit the same beneficiaries, going further with the knowledge each time. One off intense trainings may be less useful. A sustainable exit strategy may also be necessary to start with for a project mainly focused on trainings. UN organizations should ensure from the start that those who are trained with the explicit purpose of informing others (through the Training of Trainers (ToT) model) are held accountable to duplicate the trainings beyond the project.

5. Recommendations

By the time this evaluation was conducted, the project had come to an end. Although there is no clarity about the nature of any follow up project, recommendations are included here concerning improving future
joint programming on Human Security. Recommendations are clustered in 6 areas. As the project heavily relied on knowledge, the main recommendations concern improving the flow of information, continuing advocacy etc.. Except for the recommendations specifically geared towards the HSU for considering on how to promote the Human Security approach through future projects, others are generally targeted to UNDP, the other partners in the project (UNESCO and UN Women) as well as national counterparts in Haiti.

1) **Continue advocating for the use of the Human Security approach in strategic and operational plans**
   - In its dialogues with the government and national counterparts, UN agencies, starting with UNDP, should continue to advocate for the Human Security approach without simplifying it. Human security is not a ‘project’ or some general words related to humanitarian concerns, but an approach with a specific methodology for putting it into practice. The point should be made, and demonstrated, that involving people and planning to relieve their multi-dimensional insecurities is not only a humanitarian goal for emergency situations but a long-term approach for preventing and mitigating the impacts of risks.
   - Human Security is an approach that makes sense to the full gamut of UN interventions in a country where development is constantly at risk, like in Haiti. To this end, other UN agencies should also become aware of it and use it for the revision of UNDAF.
   - The advent of COVID-19 pandemic and its impact not only on health security but also on economic, personal, food, community and political security presents an opportunity for UN agencies in Haiti to continue to advocate for the HS approach as a preventive, people centered, multi-sectoral framework for protecting people during crisis. Where UNDP will be solicited to provide support to Haiti in the context of the COVID-19 crisis, it should ideally use the Human Security terminology and tools for analysis and responding to crisis. Concretely, UNDP could for example commission a study on the Human Security implications of the pandemic and what can be done in Haiti.
   - Advocacy for the added value of adopting the HS approach should target not only the DRR actors such as DCP, but also and especially decision makers at the highest level of the government, from the Ministry of Planning all the way to the Office of the Prime Minister.

2) **Continue the flow of information and disseminate widely the products created by the project**
   - Even if the project is finished, it is important to continue to disseminate widely the products created by the project, i.e. the Study on Human Insecurities, the Study on Communication Practices, the guide/module for the education system, the promotional videos prepared for the project, the training modules and slides etc.
   - These products should be made available not only through the existing UNDP website, but perhaps also linked to the online sites of the national counterparts, research centers and universities, NGOs etc.
   - UNDP could consider creating promotional materials to explain and present, in simple words and infographics, the findings of the project. As such, it will continue to advocate for the Human Security approach in Haiti.
   - The UN should also use the study on Human Insecurities for evidence-based programming, including for the UNDAF, and also encourage the government to use it for its policy-making purposes.
   - Follow up should be made with DCP and its networks on the recommendations made through the Communication Study.
   - The leaflet, FEPs etc. produced for the project should also be disturbed through other projects of UN agencies.

3) **Find ways to complete projects that were left incomplete and capitalize on gains made**

   Even though the project is finished, much remains to be done to capitalize on gains made.
• Encourage the government to integrate the HS approach in any community-based workplans that will be eventually developed to implement the Strategic Development Plan and the National Risk Management and Disaster Plan (2019-2030).
• Use the HS Study to inform the UNDAF updates and other UN strategic documents.
• Follow up with the Ministry of Education to integrate the DRM Modules into the national education system.
• Seek further resources to complete the DRR Database. UNDP could seek funds from other donors such as the World Bank directly. The completion of the database is not enough; it should also be used. Continue working with decision makers in order for them to populate, manage and especially use the data for evidence-based policies.
• Follow up on the small-scale mitigation projects, working with local communities and local structures to mobilize in kind and other types of resources to maintain or upgrade them. Tie these activities with other UNDP or UN projects. Analyse lessons learned, not only in terms of outputs but especially process (trust building among communities, cohesion building etc.). Future micro-level projects should also be implemented by both men and women working together in order to contribute to the empowerment of women, gender equality etc. In order to be more sustainable beyond the support of future projects, such micro-level interventions also need to be linked to district level plans.
• Continue building the capacity of the two women’s networks/platforms that were created by UN Women and encourage DCP to use the resources, expertise and access of women’s organizations to communities.

4) Improve modalities for joint programming towards integrated projects in the future

• Future joint programs and integrated projects need to build on strengthened inter-agency coordination, joint baseline studies before the design of the project, joint workplan and constant dialogue and adjustment.
• Instead of scattering efforts through different target populations, agencies need to choose to target a few communities jointly, conduct a baseline assessment of the insecurities in those communities together, and develop integrated interventions which put forward their different expertise for common objectives.
• Allocate adequate human resources in order to ensure follow up and monitoring at the departmental and municipal levels.
• Each agency should identify one focal point + one alternate to follow up the activities, including beyond the completion of the project.
• Choosing one agency that can coordinate among others will facilitate the flow of information, including with national counterparts, as well as accountability.

5) Improve future training programs

• For any project designed in the future that has a large training component, ensure that adequate resources are foreseen for the duplication of trainings or incentives beyond the project.
• A sustainable exit strategy may be necessary to start with for a project mainly focused on trainings. UN organizations should ensure from the start that those who are trained with the explicit purpose of informing others (through the Training of Trainers (ToT) model) are held accountable for duplicating the trainings beyond the project.
• Make available all training tools and materials on the Human Security approach widely so that they can be duplicated, not only among government institutions but also universities, research centers etc.
6) Recommendations to the Human Security Unit to reinforce integrated approaches

- Reinforce the need for integrated approaches and joint programming in the project proposals being considered for the UNTFHS
- Favor projects where fewer targeted communities are chosen for interventions to address their multi-dimensional insecurities through different UN agencies, instead of each agency working with different communities.
- Make an inventory of tools developed through the various projects supported by the UNTFHS around the world. Deposit them on the HSU website and disseminate them.
- Once every 2 years, consider bringing together key staff and experts from the projects funded through the Trust Fund in order to exchange information, solve problems, network, share best practices and challenges, etc.
- Support baseline assessment of insecurities before projects start as well as impact assessment a few years later in order to draw lessons on how people’s lives were genuinely changed through the projects.
Annex 1
Challenges, Mitigation Measures, Lessons Learned and Recommendations

We found some of the lessons learned and recommendations highlighted in the three reports that UNDP provided to the UNTFHS extremely valuable and deserving to be repeated. Below, we have chosen some of the most relevant ones, edited them at times and added some more.

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| Dealing with delays and force major | • UNDP and the UNTFHS showed flexibility to adapt to the situation. The project was extended at no cost based on the recommendations of the Steering Committee.  
• The project budget and workplan were extended to a 3-year project with no cost extension. | • Chronic delays in the project implementation requires anticipation  
• Appointment of follow up committees at the sub-national level requires logistical support. | • Contingency planning is necessary to better mitigate the external and internal constraints and challenges. |
| | The passage of Hurricane Matthew disrupted plans and drew attention away to new priorities and new locations. | • UNDP, based on the requests of the Steering Committee was able to revise activities in order to respond efficiently to the need of the areas affected by the hurricane.  
• UNTFHS was flexible to give approval to redirection of the scope of activities to new geographical areas (south and Grand’Anse). | • Flexibility is important when working in risk-related areas, even if they are the most appropriate for Human Security interventions. | Draw lessons on the ability to reorient activities and how much the activities were appropriate, efficient for impacting the lives of those impacted by disasters. |
| Decentralization and delocalization needs | Relations between the central and the departmental levels were supposed to be assumed by the national ministries. However the flow of information and coordination proved less than optimal. | Relations between center and periphery, and lack of means at the departmental and municipality levels impact the implementation and monitoring of activities at the local level | Significant resources need to be allocated to follow up at the departmental and municipal levels, including allocation of project staff. |
No field presence by the project unit.

Monitoring of projects was left to follow up committees at the departmental level, involving the DRM stakeholders, which were put in place. But they were abandoned very early because of dissatisfaction.

Spreading too wide with too little resources amounts to too little impact everywhere. Disseminating efforts too widely without the ability to follow up do not produce long term results.

Concentrate the efforts of the project in one department to produce greater effects, particularly for activities affecting the communities.

- Engagement and coordination with state actors worked well at the central level, but not at the departmental level except for DCP.
- At the field level, the project appeared as three different projects: Each agency carries out its activities with its partners and target groups without any real interconnection. Counterparts of different agencies did not have a clear view of what other institutions were doing.

One entity needs to coordinate between different institutions and ensure that information flow to the departments is smooth.

- Concentrate the efforts of the project in a department to produce greater effects, particularly for activities affecting the communities.
- Disseminate information about the project as a whole to all institutions involved.

Lack of control over outcomes when decisions are with national authorities/others

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| Difficulty of ensuring that the Human Security framework is taken into account in state planning | - UNDP will continue working with the government’s strategic documents through various projects.  
- Revisions of UNDAF etc. give more opportunities | - Inclusion of the wording “Human Security” is not what should be aimed, but the integration of its methodology.  
- Evidence should be presented continuously to convince authorities of the added value | - Continue to use the training modules and the studies to raise awareness of government officials.  
- Include the methodology of the approach in all dialogues on development needs (and not just on managing or reducing disaster risks) |
| Lack of interest among officials at the ministerial level because of lack of priority. | Agencies was in charge of advocating and communicating with its own traditional relationships and relying on partnership created through other projects in order to create trust and interest in the project. | • The added value of the HS approach should be adequately proven to solicit interest.  
• Information dissemination is key to advocacy.  
• Need to continue to advocate for the added value of adopting the HS approach by the decision makers at the highest level of the government.  
• The point should be made, and demonstrated, that involving people and planning to relieve their multi-dimensional insecurity is not only a humanitarian goal but it also makes sense for the legitimacy and efficiency of actions undertaken.  
• As much as possible, disseminate the results of the project to all partners. |
|---|---|---|
| Difficulties in terms of timely coordination with some ministries on the implementation of the activities. | Each UN agency was responsible to report back to its own partner. | While decision making is always high officials’ prerogative, daily coordination needs to be ensured at lower levels with more technical staff able to raise the information up to relevant officials.  
Regularly inform all national counterparts together, through dissemination of bulletins, media spots, etc.  
Ensuring a system of focal point in each relevant ministry to follow up with the activities and contribute to the decision-making process. |
| Changes in the executive, both at the central level and in the departmental officers, meant changes in persons and counterparts, creating more delays, slowing down activities especially in the departments and communes. | • While working with new focal points significantly delayed the project start, having to convince a new set of officials presented opportunities to fine tune convictions, rationale, objectives, etc.  
• One Focal point at the governmental level (DCP) co-lead the project with technical support. | • Continuous advocacy is necessary through different dialogues established with stakeholders at various levels  
• An efficient and transparent system of dissemination of information across ministries and with Even if the project is finished, dissemination of the studies, guide/module, trainings, videos, etc. should be assumed through other projects and dialogues of UN agencies. |
Dissemination of information among the ministries was not optimal, neither across sectors nor with the regions. The departments/municipalities/communes is necessary.

### Relations between UN agencies

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| Harmonization of activities by different UN agencies was necessary in the planning and implementation of the project. | • As prompted by the HSU, the implementation unit run by UNDP revised and prepared a coordinated work plan.  
• The Heads of project at the three implementation agencies (UNDP, UNESCO and UNWOMEN) discussed the implementation of the planning matrix and harmonization of reporting during their weekly meetings.  
• When issues were raised, Heads of agencies talked to each other. | Interagency coordination requires concerted efforts, joint workplan and constant dialogue and adjustment. | Future joint projects need to start with joint needs assessments and better integration of the activities of different UN agencies concentrated on the same communities instead of scattered through different target populations. |

| Rotation of project staff jeopardized the continuity of the joint activities | Institutional memory was diminished as the project was passed on to different people and different units. Dropbox files gathered all the project documents together. | • Institutional memory should be better localized through depository of documents.  
• Staff should leave behind handover notes or debriefings when they move to other projects. | Each agency should identify one focal point + one alternate to follow up the activities in case of rotation or unavailability of staff.  
• Disseminate the products (studies, manuals, training slides, etc.) of the project through the existing UNDP or a new project website. |

### Working with departmental coordinators, communities and civil society actors (including volunteers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenge</th>
<th>Mitigation measure adopted by the project</th>
<th>Lessons learned</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women have not been involved at the community level in DRM</td>
<td>• The project supported the creation of women’s networks to make up for the deficit of including</td>
<td>Men and women should be working together on resolving issues</td>
<td>Use facts and studies and HS methodology to show why men and women’s capacities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


- Civil society organizations and local structures working on DRM do not include enough women in the discussion and in the decision making forums during the planning of mitigation actions to be undertaken.

- The women’s networks were meant to share information and support women in the communities but support to capacity building for them stopped when priorities shifted after the passage of Hurricane Matthew.

- It would be better not to build separate networks but put men and women together for a better understanding of the distribution of labor.

- Creation of networks without linking them up to decision making bodies is not always effective.

- Use arguments to convince civil protection actors on the necessity to include women related to insecurities, but each bringing to the table their separate needs and capacities.

- Better use of existing in-house resources

### Adjusting expectations and modalities due to limited (human and financial) resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenge</th>
<th>Mitigation measure adopted</th>
<th>Lessons learned</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Difficulty finding appropriate consultants who can carry the HS study, training on gender, database creation, etc. | - The ToR was revised to hire a company instead of a consultant (for the Study on insecurities, for the database creation, etc.);
- The project also mobilized an internal team to follow the progress of the study and ensure its quality.
- UN Women stepped in with its in-house expertise to have a consultant develop the Gender Mainstreaming training slides.
- A company was hired to put together the architecture of the DRM database (at a bigger cost). | - Flexibility in terms of delays due to personnel but adaptation in terms of better management of the process, alternatives, etc.
- Need for realistic expectations for the allocation of resources from the start.
- Better use of existing in-house resources | There is a need to prepare more experts in HS in Haiti. Hence the importance to disseminate the existing studies, training modules, etc. in order to build the capacity of local experts for future interventions. |
| Delay in establishing the database for disaster data management, resulting in downgrading to the completion of an | - The project revised its expectations downwards because the available budget was not enough: Instead of a full database, the expected output became a needs analysis | - Need for realistic expectations of what is possible from the start and allocation of adequate budget.
- Need to better coordinate with | More funding should be found in a concerted way for the completion of the database. Since UNDP initiated it, UNDP could seek funds from other donors such |
architecture instead of a full database.
• The international forum was also downgraded to a national workshop.
• Discussions started with other UNDP projects, other donors (world bank) and national partners of the strategy in order to finalize the database.

other donors and national actors in order to build on initiatives and not reinvent the wheel.

as the World Bank directly.
• The completion of the database is not enough; it should also be used. There is a need to continue working with decision makers in order for them to populate, manage and especially use the data for evidence based policies.

Difficulty to adequately monitor activities in the field

Since the coordinating technical committees that the Steering Committee recommended could not become functional, and since monitoring was needed of local projects, UNDP recruited a UN volunteer to support and supervise activities related to awareness raising and mitigation projects in the South department

• Need to ensure from the start about the availability of local entities that can monitor activities.
• If not, it would be better to pool efforts within a smaller number of geographical targets and work with fewer communities more comprehensively, and avoid the tendency to spread resources too thin.

The small-scale mitigation projects need to be followed up, communities mobilized to maintain them, and local structures empowered to manage them and draw lessons.
• Follow up with the community projects should be foreseen through other UN projects

Support from Human Security Unit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenge</th>
<th>Mitigation measure adopted by the project</th>
<th>Lessons learned</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The project relied on HSU not only for managing the fund but also for providing knowledge, updated info, training modules, experts, etc.</td>
<td>• The national and international experts preparing the training modules relied heavily on the documentation made available by the HSU in French. • Examples of other UNTFHS projects in other countries were used as case studies • HSU provided comments to annual and mid term reports, but it was not clear if they also helped them much with substantive issues</td>
<td>Sharing of information, studies, methodologies, modules regarding Human Security creates a community of knowledge and better arguments and evidence for mainstreaming the approach.</td>
<td>• HSU to make an inventory of tools developed through the various projects it is supporting around the world. Deposit them on its website. • Once every 2 years, HSU could consider bringing together key staff and experts from the projects funded through the Trust Fund in order to exchange information, solve problems, network,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beyond making the documentation available on their site.</td>
<td>share best practices and challenges, etc.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2

List of Documents Reviewed

1. TOR of the Evaluation for the Projet on Human Security
2. UNTFHS_project document _ Full proposal_final version
5. Strategic Development Plan of Haiti/Plan Stratégique de développement d’Haiti (PSDH)
6. Template 4: Evaluation Inception report content outline
7. Template 5 : Standard Evaluation Report content overview
9. UN-Women financial report _ March 2019
10. UNDP interim financial report as of 30-09-19_November 2019
11. Human Security project - Third narrative annual report_October 2019
12. Study on Human Insecurities related to Disaster Risks in in Haiti
15. Matrix of communication tools in DRM
16. Selection report for small CBO mitigation projects in Grand’Anse
17. First technical and financial reports of the CBOs of Grand’Anse
18. Family Emergency Plan leaflets
20. Report of the 4th meeting of the Technical Committee of the Project
21. Reports of the first and second sessions of the steering committee
22. Report on the first implementation meeting of the local project monitoring committee in the North
23. Basic information sheet _ Final evaluation UNTFHS_ONU-Women Project
24. List and contact of CBOs supervised by UN-Women / CESVI
25. Comments of the HSU on the progress reports of the project
Annex 3
Interviews Conducted

Semi structured interviews in Port-au-Prince

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Person or representative interviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Stéphanie Zibell, Deputy Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dorine Jn Paul, Head of Resilience Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seth Lee Daniel Cador, HS Project Financial Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maguelita Varin, HS Project Technical Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hervens Hitler Silmé, Former Head of HS project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>Panaroty Ferdinand Prophète, Head of project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>Vastie Michel, project Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wanick Charles, Responsible for Monitoring-Evaluations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MITC/DCP</td>
<td>Dr Jerry Chandler, Head of the Directorate of Civil Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNEVT/DTD</td>
<td>Mrs. Marie Zulda Dubois, Chief of the Teachers’ Initial Training Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mme Cirta Jean-François, Chief of the Continuous Training Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/MWSWR</td>
<td>Mrs. Gerty Adam, Representative of the MWCWR in the PSDRM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mrs. Eugénie Jérôme, Coordinator of Studies and Programmation Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rachelle Louissaint, Departmental Offices Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPEC/DTP</td>
<td>Péretz Ebert Peltrop, Director, Directorate of Territorial Planning (DTP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Duverna Rigaud, Director of the Regional Planning Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPEC/ NCGSI</td>
<td>Bobby Piard, Director of the National Center of Geo-Spatial Information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Semi-Structured interviews and focus groups at the departmental level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Person or representative interviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DTC-North</td>
<td>Jean Henry Petit, Departmental Technical Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guito François, Departmental Deputy Technical Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Johnny Dorméus, Brigadier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDWSWRNorth</td>
<td>Mrs. Philona Jean, Departmental Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDNEVT North</td>
<td>Curtis Eyma, Departmental Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Samuel Eugène, Coordinator of the Pedagogical Support Section (PSS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDPEC</td>
<td>Dieudonné Ramphis, Departmental Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stanley Hilaire, Deputy Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Committees or organizations</td>
<td>Persons and Function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| CCCP of Cap-Haitian              | Ilmène Saintilus, Head brigadier  
                              Rose-Lourde Tanis, Brigade Treasurer  
                              Espolène Louis, Communication’s official  
                              André Allande, Brigade’s Security Official |
| CCCP of Fort-Liberté            | Vernest Richemond, Brigade Deputy Chief  
                              Emanie Cap, Brigadier  
                              Luscon Régistin, brigadier |
| CCCP of Ouanaminthe             | Joseph Wensly, Brigadier  
                              Pierre Wanel, Brigadier  
                              Alfred Renand, brigadier  
                              Sainvil Hantz, brigadier  
                              Myrthil Victor, brigadier  
                              Lorsaint Kesnel, brigadier  
                              Jean Baptiste Angela, Brigadier  
                              Ambroise Gérald, Brigadier  
                              Charles Lange, CCCP’s Logistic Officer  
                              Milfort Durand, CCCP’s Response Officer  
                              Jovin D. Frisner, Sanitary Officer |
| CCCP of Jérémie                 | Germain Jean Alix, Town hall Director  
                              Willy Aly, CCCP member  
                              Marie Sheila Benjamin, CCCP member  
                              Gelette Pierre, member  
                              Pressiny Chevalier, member  
                              Jean Garry Joseph, member  
                              Daniel Jeudy, member  
                              Alex Legagneur, member |
<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|                                  | **Honoré Jean Espais**, member  
**Antoine Frantz**, member |
| Women CBO in Cap-Haitian         | **Astrude Muscadin**, Counselor of **AFAC**  
**Judith Pierre**, Accompanist of **AFASDA**  
**Elvire Eugène**, Executive Directress of **AFASDA**  
**Roselaure Donatien**, Coordinator of **AFVN** |