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**Government of the Republic of Kenya  
United Nations Development Programme  
International Labour Organization**


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POJ ERTI IN KEN I -1

(*"I Two-veur Pilot I ~runnie)*

K EN/97/005



*LLEVIATION*

Report of the Mission  
July 28 - **August** 25, 2000

*EVALUATION TEAM*  
*Fund Siddiqui, Tea ni Leader*  
*George Manu*  
*Gon di K. Olu.vrc*  
*Nairobi, 12 September 2000*

***EXECUTIVE SUMMARY***

The overall objective of this pilot programme was to enhance the capacity of the national, district, and division level structures of the government and community based organizations, NGOs etc. on participatory development approaches for poverty eradication. Although the pilot programme was conceived as a subprogramme of the on-going UNDP supported programme on "capacity building for enhanced public administration and participating development" it was expected to link with Government's National Eradication Plan. However, while this programme was funded and began its operations in April 1998, the work on the preparation of the National Poverty Eradication Plan (NPEP) was delayed by a year. It was a pilot programme of two-year duration funded by UNDP and implemented by the International Labour Organization. Having completed its two-year duration at the end of March 2000, at present, the pilot programme is in the process of winding down its activities.

The pilot programme, implemented in three districts (Isiolo, Narok, and Suba), had two underlying goals. First, to **demonstrate** how grassroots based participatory development approaches can be used to reduce poverty by planning, designing and implementing appropriate methodologies. Second, based on the lessons learned during the course of the implementation of the pilot programme, **document the participatory approaches** that had worked well, as well as, those that did not work so well - to facilitate the development of a national programme for poverty reduction.

The methodology used in this evaluation involved review of relevant documents, analysing information provided by UNDP, ILO, and project staff in Nairobi and members of the project teams in the three pilot districts, Government officials in Nairobi and the three pilot districts, the community organizations working with the pilot programme in the three pilot districts, and the beneficiaries of the programme in the three pilot districts.

The Evaluation Team would like to express its sincere appreciation to the government officials in Nairobi, districts and divisions, and members of the communities and project sites that it visited for their support. It also acknowledges the support provided by the UNDP Nairobi Office, ILO Area Office in Dar es Salaam, ILO EAMAT, and programme staff in Nairobi and the three districts.

Based on the analysis of the documents made available to the evaluation team, information presented at briefings on programme activities, and information obtained during discussions with UNDP, ILO/EAMAT, Government officials at the national, district, and division levels as well as the community groups and beneficiaries of the programme, the team has drawn the following conclusions and lessons that can be learned from the experiences of the implementation of this pilot programme.

## CONCLUSIONS

1. This Programme on Poverty Alleviation in Kenya has had mixed results. Although the concepts and design of the programme were sound and highly relevant to Kenya its implementation has been bogged down by an inability to mobilize the available resources effectively and efficiently to achieve the planned objectives of the programme. A programme budgeted at nearly two million dollars should have achieved much more than what is evident to the Mission.
2. Nevertheless, some successes have been achieved, most notably, the creation of awareness amongst the ultimate beneficiaries of the participatory development process as well as some capacity building and the establishment of a credit scheme in each of the pilot districts.

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3. Over its two-year implementation period, the programme has been dogged by many bureaucratic problems and consequent delays in mobilization of inputs along with disputes and in-fighting in various quarters. Decisions were made at the start of the programme that heavily skewed the use of available resources towards salaries and operations to the detriment of programming activities on the ground. Nearly three-quarter of the programme resources have gone to support "process" related tasks to "deliver" one-quarter of the programme resources to the beneficiaries.

For a pilot programme of this nature, the two-year duration was rather short. As a result, while the programme raised high expectations in the participating communities, it has delivered rather little. Among the communities that the Mission visited there was a sense that the programme was ending abruptly. Indeed, given all the things that this programme had going for it at the onset, most notably the excellent methodology and approach, plus the fact that relatively small amounts of money could have made a world of difference to the ultimate beneficiaries, this was a missed opportunity to showcase a successful attempt at poverty reduction.

5. Several factors affected the performance of the programme, which include the following:
  - The low level of donor activity in Kenya who were operating on a "low level funding scenario" that made the task of mobilizing additional resources for the programme difficult.
  - Delays in launching the Poverty Eradication Plan and subsequent difficulties in getting the Plan fully funded and operational, desynchronized attempts to provide a link with this pilot programme.
  - The high turnover of government staff (including 3 Permanent Secretaries in the life of the programme) as well as a 15 month delay in setting up the NPAC has had adverse effects on the programme.
  - The profile and approach to work of the team in Narok, including their efforts to actively involve existing local government and community structures and documenting their experiences, contributed in no small measure to their success. This was not evident in Suba or Isiolo districts.

6. The Mission believes that the following issues require urgent attention and follow-up by all concerned parties: Government, UNDP and ILO:
- There is a need for continuity with, and linkages to, on-going initiatives, in particular Poverty Eradication Programme as well as the UNDP supported programme on Good Governance and Poverty Eradication. This is especially important if the goodwill and trust placed in the UN agencies and the Government by communities involved in the programme is not to be lost completely.
  - The credit scheme in each of the districts requires, as a matter of urgency, the injection of professionalism and good governance to safeguard the funds and ensure that they reach the intended beneficiaries and are used for the right purpose.
  - This pilot programme has made some significant achievements and a number of useful lessons can be drawn from the experience. It is important to ensure that these are not lost and are made use of in the planning and implementation of the Government's on-going national poverty efforts.

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## LESSONS LEARNED

1. In poverty reduction interventions, it is important to recognize that the poor are not a homogeneous group. They include the poorest of the poor - the bottom 30 percent of the population called *hardcore* poor - and also those who constitute the rest of the 52 percent of the population classified as poor in Kenya. Relatively, small sums of money, if well targeted, can make a world of difference to the poorest of the poor individuals and communities.
2. Poverty reduction, not unlike other challenges of development, is a long-term process. This ought to  

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be reflected in the planned duration of the programmes/projects, particularly where new/different concepts, methodologies or experiments are being tried.
3. National staff recruited on programmes of this nature should not automatically be put on NPPP scales. Rather the job requirements must be carefully considered and the qualifications and experience of candidates thoroughly examined, along with the implications for the programme/project, in making such decisions.
4. Funding and executing agencies should avoid raising expectations and hopes of communities unduly, particularly when funding for activities has not been secured beforehand.
5. Baseline data collection must be integrated into programmes/projects of this nature to enable results to be measured and to assess their impact.
6. To ensure success and sustainability, there is need for initiatives of this nature to involve and work with local government officials and other existing community structures to the extent possible.
7. Frequent transfers and changes of key government personnel, both at central and local levels, do not augur well for sustainability nor even progress in development. As a condition for disbursement and further release of funds, government should be required to commit staff to programmes of this nature and guarantee that they will not be moved for a specified period of time.
8. The roles and responsibilities of various actors in a programme of this nature must be specified and agreed in writing at the onset.
9. The need for constant dialogue and good collaboration between various actors in programmes of this nature, particularly among sister agencies of the UN system, cannot be overemphasized. The establishment of proper monitoring and evaluation systems and constant monitoring/reviews can help to arrest many situations before they get out of hand. In this respect, it is important that reporting and governance mechanisms - such as the formation and meeting of steering committees, implementation arrangements, mid-term reviews, development of work plans and regular reporting are respected and enforced.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on its findings and conclusions, the evaluation mission recommends that:

1. The ILO should undertake a "management review" of its procedures for executing programmes of this nature, especially in places where the organization does not have an office. The modalities of Area Offices and MDTs, and even the role of the Regional Office and headquarters, need to be carefully examined in the light of this programme's experience, and benchmarks should be established for delivery of programme inputs and responses to requests from programme staff.
2. In view of the concerns expressed to the Mission about the use of programme resources, it is recommended that in order to clear the air and also for accountability a financial audit of the programme be carried out. The auditors could come from the ILO (provided they have not been involved in the programme, for example Geneva-based staff) and/or the Joint Inspection Unit and/or external consultants.
3. Government, UNDP and ILO should review their practices and procedures regarding appointments  
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of programme personnel in the NPPP salary scale. It is proposed that the placement of recruits on this scale should not be automatic but should be based on an assessment of the requirements and determined on a case by case basis.
4. Government and UNDP should ensure the completion of projects that were started in the districts. An important step will be to establish some mechanism to link these projects with the Poverty Eradication Commission and the UNDPs on-going programme oil "Good Governance for Poverty Eradication". This is necessary if the goodwill and trust placed in these organizations by the communities is not to be lost completely. A good starting point would be to absorb and utilize in their respective districts some of the programme staff (in particular the Narok team and the MSE/ credit coordinator in the Suba district).
5. There is also an urgent need for action to safeguard the credit scheme. It is recommended that an experienced professional be attached to each of the districts with immediate effect for between 6 to 12 months (but not at NPPP salary scales) to see the SACCOs through the initial teething problems and set up challenges.
6. UNDP Office Nairobi should also review its disbursement procedures, in light of this programme's experiences, and put in place measures to improve the delivery of disbursement.
7. It is necessary that UNDP and other executing agencies spell out and communicate clearly to all stakeholders the differences between national execution and agency execution and the roles/ responsibilities attached to the different actors.

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### *Terminal Evaluation of the Sub-Programme for Poverty Alleviation in Kenya*

**Project KEN/97/005/01/11:**

**Executing Agency: UNDP Contribution: Government Inputs: Prior Phases: Project Signed: Project Start  
Date: Project Duration:**

**Sub-Programme** for Poverty Alleviation in Kenya  
International Labour Organization (ILO) US\$ 1,904,300  
Ksh 6 million (in kind) None  
November 28, 1997 April 1, 1998  
2 Yrs (March 31, 2000) extended to August 2000



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## **1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 The**

### **Evaluation**

1. This report presents the findings of the terminal evaluation of the "Sub-Programme for Poverty Alleviation in Kenya" which was piloted in the Isiolo, Narok and Suba districts. It was funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and executed by the International Labour Organization (ILO). The administrative support to the pilot programme was to be provided by ILO Area Office in Dar es Salaam and technical backstopping by ILO/EAMAT located in Addis Ababa. The in-country ILO project teams included: one team headed by a National Programme Coordinator located in Nairobi and a team located in each of the three pilot districts.

2. The Programme Support Document for the sub-programme was formally signed by all parties in November, 1997. The programme had an initial start date of November 1997 and a planned duration of two-years. However, the pilot programme implementation, did not formally begin until April 1998. As a result, with a planned programme duration of two-years, the completion date for the programme was assumed to be the end of March 2000. It appears that the funding agency, UNDP had expected the programme to be completed by the end of 1999. However, because of problems and delays in the mobilization of programme inputs, at the TPR of the programme on 25 February 2000, a decision was made to extend the completion date by six months. This has subsequently been reversed and the programme is scheduled to complete all ongoing activities by August 2000.

3. When the Evaluation Mission began its work in Nairobi on July 23, 2000, it was informed

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that except for one individual in each pilot district, contracts of the project staff in each of the three pilot districts had been terminated at the end of June 2000. These staff members were recalled to their districts on short contracts for the duration of the visit of the Evaluation Mission to their districts.

4. The purpose of this evaluation is to assess the programme's accomplishments and document any problems encountered during its implementation through a review of programme concepts and design, programme performance relative to the criteria established at the inception of the programme, and its results and impact in enhancing the capacity for participatory development of the communities in the three pilot districts. In addition to the major findings of the evaluation, the report also presents a summary of lessons learned, and makes recommendations for future activities in this important area

5. The evaluation mission comprised a team of three independent consultants:
- an international expert nominated by UNDP as the Team Leader, Dr. Farid Siddiqui,  
a  
Partner in Tarcen International Ltd, Toronto, Ontario, Canada;
  - an international expert nominated by ILO, Dr. George Manu, of EMPRETEC  
Ghana  
Foundation, Accra, Ghana
  - a national expert nominated by Government, Mr. Gondi H.Olum, Nairobi, Kenya.

6. The Evaluation Team began its work with a briefing by UNDP and ILO staff in Nairobi on July 28, 2000. This was followed by visits to the three pilot districts (July 29 - August 10) and further consultations with UNDP, ILO and programme staff, and the Government officials in Nairobi over the August 11 - 25 period.

7. The methodology used in this evaluation involved review of relevant documents, analysing information provided by UNDP, ILO, and programme staff in Nairobi and members of the programme teams in the three pilot districts, Government officials in Nairobi and the three pilot districts, the community organizations working with the pilot programme in the three pilot districts, and the beneficiaries of the programme in the three pilot districts.

## **1.2 The National Context**

8. Kenya, situated on the eastern coast of Africa, had a total population of around 28.7 million in 1999 which had grown from 21.4 million in 1989 - representing an annual growth

rate of 2.9 percent. Its economy is relatively diversified. The service sector is the largest contributor to GDP accounting for about 55 percent of GDP. Agriculture and the industrial sectors are the next significant contributors to GDP accounting for 27 percent and 18 percent of GDP. The Kenyan economy has been in a recession for the last three years. The continued slowdown in economic activity is spread across all key sectors of the economy. The latest drought has posed further challenges for the Government. Kenya is a low income country and was ranked 138<sup>th</sup> out of 174 countries on the Human Development Index in UNDP's Human development Report for the year 2000.

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9. In 1999, under 5.5 million persons out of a total population of 28.7 million, or 17.6 percent of the total population, were estimated to be engaged in any form of economic activity in both urban and rural areas. These included: 1.67 million, representing less than 6 percent of the population, who were wage employees in the formal sector, about 65,000 who were self-employed or were unpaid family workers, and over 3.7 million who were engaged in informal sector activities.'

10. The concerns that led to the withdrawal of IMF from Kenya in mid 1997 had also adversely effected the willingness of other donors to support Kenya's development efforts to enhance its economic growth levels and to reduce poverty. In 1994, the overall poverty level in Kenya was estimated to be 40.1 percent of the population. By 1997, the proportion of Kenyans (both rural and urban) living below poverty line had climbed to 52.6 percent of the population.<sup>2</sup> In the rural areas, the hard-core poor constitute more than one-third of the population.

### **1.3 Government of Kenya's Poverty Eradication Plan and Poverty Reduction Strategy 1.**

#### **3.1 Poverty Eradication Plan**

11. Against the background of the worsening incidence of poverty, in February 1999, the Government of Kenya published its National Poverty Eradication Plan (NPEP), which was subsequently launched by the President the following month. This was a bold and major attempt by the Government to address the high and worsening incidence of poverty in Kenya. The NPEP provides a national policy and institutional framework for action against poverty in Kenya.

12. The Plan focuses on districts with the highest incidence of poverty. It has three major components, namely: (i) a charter for social integration, (ii) improved access to essential services by low income households and (iii) a strategy for broad-based economic growth. Each of these components provides a framework for further action by Government, civil society, the private sector, donors and other partners. More specifically, the Plan, which is for the 1999-2015 period, sets the following goals and targets:

- Reduction of the poor in the total population by 20% by 2004 and by a further 30% by 2010.

- 15% increase in enrolment rates over the first six years of the Plan.
- 19% increase in completion rates, especially for girls in the first six years.
- Universal primary education achieved by 2015.
- Universal access to primary health care to within 5 km of all rural households or within one hour of local transport by 2010.
- Increase by 8% each year until 2004, access to safe drinking water by poor households.
- By 2010, create universal access to safe water.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Republic of Kenya, "Economic Survey 2000", prepared by Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Nairobi, May 2000, Table 4. 1, page 48.

<sup>2</sup> The overall poverty lines for rural and rural areas in Kenya were considered to be Kshs 1238.9 & Kshs 2648.0 per month per adult equivalent, respectively.

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- Reduce time spent by women on fuelwood and water collection.
- Publish best practice guidelines for rural and urban social development by 2000.
- 20% of communities to draw up action plans by 2004.
- 40% of all extension messages to be relevant to very poor farmers.

13. A preparatory phase of 18 months, which was on-going at the time of this evaluation, is aimed at setting local poverty reduction priorities and establishing management structures and appropriate financing mechanisms, before full-scale implementation. Another important aim in the early stages of plan implementation is the enhancement of Government's capacity

in participatory planning. In these respects, it was expected that the experience and lessons of the GOK/UNDP/ILO Pilot Programme on Participatory Development for Poverty Alleviation would make an important contribution to the implementation of the Plan.

14. A Poverty Eradication Commission has been set up, under the Office of the President, to oversee the implementation of the Plan into three phases, as follows: 1999-2004 (Phase I), 2005-2010 (Phase II) and 2011-2015 (Final Phase). Funds for the programmes of the Plan are expected from three main sources: (i) a poverty eradication budget, which would come from the national budget, (ii) setting aside or 'ring fencing' at least 10% of the national budget and (iii) the establishment of an Anti-Poverty Trust Fund, which would be managed by an Independent Board of Trustees, outside the government machinery.

### **1.3.2 Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper**

15. Following the NPEP, the Government of Kenya published in June 2000 its Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) for the period 2000-2003. As the title suggests, this is a medium-term strategy for achieving the Plan. The PRSP does in fact state that this is the first phase of implementing the NPEP. However, it appears to go further by outlining measures to improve economic performance and, in the process, ties in to the Medium Term Expenditure Framework. Importantly, the PRSP has become the centrepiece of recently-renewed support of the World Bank and to some extent also IMF. This is understandable given the position taken by the Paper that the strategy outlined therein will be used by Government as a framework upon which detailed sectoral priorities, programmes and allocations will be developed.

16. The Interim PRSP contains five basic components and corresponding objectives, namely to:

- facilitate sustained and rapid economic growth;
- improve governance and security;
- increase the ability of the poor to raise their incomes;
- improve the quality of life of the poor; and
- improve equity and participation.

17. This Interim Strategy, together with the Plan launched in 1999, confirm the priority given by the Government to poverty reduction and its determination to address the issue. Over the coming months, the Government of Kenya plans to engage in a wide ranging consultation process leading to the preparation of the final PRSP.

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## **2. PROGRAMME KEN/97/005: SUB-PROGRAMME FOR POVERTY**

## ALLEVIATION IN KENYA

### 2.1 Overview

18. In November 1997, this pilot programme on participatory development for poverty eradication was signed by the UNDP and the Government of Kenya with the International Labour Organization as the executing agency. This pilot programme, with a two-year duration, was designed as a response to the Government of Kenya's recognition of the need to focus on poverty alleviation through the involvement of political and government structures through district focus for rural development. The Government had recognized that the only sure way of ensuring provision of basic social needs of the communities was through the exploitation of district endowments and investment in human resources at district level through participatory approaches, while at the same time, developing and strengthening sustainable poverty eradication strategies that can foster rural employment creation. It had also recognized that it lacked capacity, both at the centre and the local levels, to steer the bottom *up* participatory approaches to local development.

19. The pilot programme to be implemented in three districts (Isiolo, Narok, and Suba) had two underlying goals. First, to *demonstrate* how grassroots based participatory development approaches can be used to reduce poverty by planning, designing and implementing appropriate methodologies. Second, based on the lessons learned during the course of the implementation of the pilot programme, *document the participatory approaches* that had worked well, as well as, those that did not work so well - to facilitate the development of a national programme for poverty reduction.

20. The overall objective of the pilot programme, as stated in the project document, was "to contribute to poverty reduction through three major thrusts, working in complementary and mutually supportive ways; provision of increased income earnings and employment opportunities, provision of adequate levels of basic needs, such as education and training, basic health needs and training, basic health services, environmental protection; and the provision of safety nets such as loan guarantee funds and labour based work programmes"<sup>3</sup>.

21. In pursuit of the overall objective, the pilot programme focused on seven components. These components and their immediate objectives were as follows:

*Component #1: Capacity building and institutional strengthening for participatory development*

**Immediate Objectives:**

- i. Creation of awareness at national, provincial and local levels for mobilization of community participation for local development.

<sup>3</sup> ILO- EAMAT , "Programme Document for Poverty Eradication in Kenya: Pilot Programme on Participatory development in Isiolo, Narok and Suba Districts (KEN/97/009)", page 18.

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- ii. Equip government staff, CBO's and communities with knowledge, skills vital for promoting participatory approaches to development.
- iii. Building capacity and competence of the relevant Government agencies, NGOs and other service providers in poverty reduction strategies.

*Component #2: Improved and sustainable agriculture, livestock and fisheries production*

**Immediate Objective:**

- i. Improve the income of agricultural and livestock producers and fishermen through better farm and livestock management practices.

*Component #3: Rural micro enterprise development for poverty reduction*

**Immediate Objectives:**

- i. Development of income generating activities and micro and small scale enterprises in the areas where there is greatest potential in the districts.
- ii. Involvement of the communities in the choice, design and establishment of micro-enterprises.
- iii. Establishment of market centres and marketing associations.
- iv. Provision of technical and business skills using community based approaches.

- v. Establishment of suitable credit and financing schemes for micro finance.

*Component ##: Development of Education and training for poverty reduction*

**Immediate Objectives:**

- i. Establish within every district a co-ordinating agency of stakeholders and organizations involved in planning and the delivery of training for the informal sector and small-scale enterprises.
- n. Develop community based training programme.
- in. Strengthening general education and non-formal education:
  - Reduce the high drop out rates push out. *(text as written in I'RODOC)*
  - Sensitize local leaders, PTAs, school committees on education and enable them to become community mobilizers.
  - Strengthen adult education by making it functional and relevant.
  - Improve physical facilities in schools as means to improving academic performance
  - Improve teachers' skills through relevant in-service incomes. *(text as written in PRODOC)*
- iv. Identify the targets and establish their current level of involvement in education activities. Conduct sensitization workshops with them and agree on a mobilization package and the approaches to be used. Draw up a work-plan with each category. Implement the mobilization activities per plan. Conduct periodic follow up to review progress and adjust accordingly.

*Component #5: Development of sustainable community based health services*

**Immediate Objectives:**

- i. Reduce high infant mortality rate in the three districts.
- ii. Initiate and support community-based HIV/AIDS management programme.

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- iii. Build sustainable community capacity to manage tse-tse flies and trypanosomiasis.

*Component # : Community based environmental protection*

**Immediate Objectives:**

- i. Sensitization of various segments of the communities to value environment as a key resource for their survival.
- ii. Strengthening communities efforts to protect environment - soils, water catchments, wells and dams, and lake

*Component #7: Sustainable community based infrastructure development* **Immediate Objectives:**

- i. Identification and mobilization of resources for the construction of sustainable rural access roads and bridges in the three districts.
- ii. Feasibility study for sustainable use of solar power in Isiolo and rural electrification



- for Suba and Narok undertaken.
- in. Sustainable, all weather access roads benefiting selected rural communities in Narok, Suba and Isiolo districts.
  - iv. Labour based improvement and maintenance of rural roads shown to be technically and economically viable.
22. It was envisaged that at the completion of the programme, the pilot districts will have developed a critical mass of trained manpower from the top district leadership to sub-locational level (community level) able to articulate and formulate in a coherent fashion, sustainable policies and strategies for the support of interventions for community-based activities using participatory approaches that result in freely chosen gainful employment activities and poverty reduction measures. Specifically, the PSD outlined the following "end of sub-programme situation":
- Available in adequate numbers trained local community in labour based methodology and technology actively participating in the construction and maintenance of rural access roads, improved water supply through hand dug and protected wells and small irrigation schemes constructed and maintained through water management control structures by local communities, trained skilled artisans available to build schools, hospitals and other public utilities through sub-contract, and environment conservation activities at community level in afforestation, wood lot, and soil conservation.
  - Micro-economic interventions will be observed with the established for a for consultation and harmonization from sub-locational level to village level, involving leaders from districts and locations.
  - There will be a number of NGOs trained in using participatory approaches in community mobilization and support.
  - The district Development Committees will have been sensitized in participatory approaches.
  - Integrated skills and entrepreneurial development training programmes based on ILO's community-based training for employment and poverty eradication in rural areas will have been institutionalized at the district level.
  - Available income generating activities supported by credit, extension services and operated and administered by the communities.

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- There shall be improved food production in non traditional dietary areas, grains, fruits and vegetables to ensure the provision of balanced diet and food security.
- Community based health care and counseling shall be available at affordable costs.
- There will be maintenance/construction programmes on rural infrastructure to address the problems of poor infrastructure facilities in the districts.

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## **2.2 Current Status of the Programme**

23. The pilot programme formally started in April 1998 and had a planned programme duration of two-years. UNDP contributed US\$ 1,904,300 from its core TRAC resources. The PSD indicates a Government input, in kind, of Kshs 6 million. The ILO was the executing agency for the programme . According to the latest Budget Revision "F" approved in mid July 2000, total programme expenditures amounted to

US\$ 490,037 in 1998 and US\$ 540,221 for 1999 - representing a total expenditure of US\$ 1.03 million or 58 percent of the programme budget over the first 21 months out of an initially planned programme duration of 24 months.

24. At the first TPR for the programme held on 25 February 2000, because of the problems and delays in the mobilization of programme inputs, the ILO team requested an extension of the programme duration by six months along with a request for additional resources (US\$ 353,992.42) to assure the orderly completion of activities still in progress. Given that only 58 percent of the programme budget was utilized *up* to the end of 1999, the justification for this request for additional resources by the ILO team is not clear to the Mission. According to the minutes of the TPR, the extension of the programme duration by six months was agreed. The records show that at the end of May 2000, the programme US\$ 1,723,926 through budget revision "E". The budget was increased again by US\$ 100,000 to US\$ 1,823,926 in mid July 2000 through budget revision "F" with explicit direction to rephase available programme funds to focus on the following three activities which were to be completed

#### CURRENT STATUS OF PROGRAMME BUDGET

BUDGET -  
UNDP Contribution Government (in kind  
et ev                      US\$ 1,823,926 Ksh 6million

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Duty Travel Session Costs

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by August 2000:

- I. documentation of best practices and lessons learnt, to facilitate mobilization of extra resources in the future phase of the programme;
- ii. undertake a terminal evaluation of the project; and
- III. conclude activities for which financial commitment have been made.

25. Throughout the duration of this Mission the team was repeatedly informed about the lack of resources available for programme activities, although an allocation of US \$ 793, 668 had been set aside for the first half of the year 2000 - that is substantially higher than the actual amount spent in either 1998 (US\$ 490,037) or 1999 (US\$ 540,221).

26. Some decisions, most notably the classification of the national professional staff recruited for the programme to UNDP NPPP classification without examining the implications of the decision for the overall mix of programme inputs has had serious negative implications for programme impact and results. The initial programme budget had estimated the cost of these posts at a monthly rate of US\$ 750. This decision increased the salary costs of these individuals to over US\$ 2000 per month. As a result, the costs of NPC and the nine national professionals in the three districts, over the programme duration, have increased by nearly three times from the initial estimate of US\$ 210,000 to US\$ 615,856 according to Budget Revision "F" of mid July 2000.

27. For a programme of this nature the availability of transport for the project teams, specially in the three districts, is a critical programme input. Delays in registering the vehicles that had already arrived in the country and were the property of UNDP appear to have gotten tangled in secondary issues and point to an unclear policy stance on the part of Government, an ambiguous position taken by UNDP as well as an aggressive pursuit by the NPC to obtain diplomatic UN plates for the four vehicles. The withdrawal of the vehicles by UNDP from all four programme sites in March 2000 though justified - as a consequence of the modalities used by NPC to obtain temporary registration of the vehicles with UN diplomatic plates that became known after a fatal accident involving one of the vehicles - did adversely effect the implementation of programme activities in the three pilot districts.

28. As of mid August 2000 -four and a half months after the scheduled completion date for the programme - there is a sense in the target communities and stakeholders that the programme has not fully delivered on its promises and that it is being closed abruptly. The Evaluation Mission believes that while unrealistic expectations on the part of the beneficiary communities and various stakeholders may have a part to play, the major contributing factor has been the lack of adequate management of the implementation of the programme (that includes effective mobilization and disbursement of programme inputs), as well as inadequate monitoring of the programme implementation activities.

29. The status of the programme activities at the end off the programme reflects very much not only different perceptions of the about role, responsibility and authority of the NPC and the ILO/EAMAT by both parties, but more importantly a failure to develop a consensus between the NPC, the district teams and ILO/EAMAT as well as with representatives of the Government and

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UNDP on a strategy/work plan for the implementation of the programme. This failure has resulted not only in ad hoc implementation of critical programme activities but also created a situation where key programme inputs are being delivered to communities in the three pilot districts a month after the project teams have left the districts (at the end of June 2000) and for all practical purposes the pilot programme is assumed to have closed. These include:

- The delivery of equipment to the three divisions in the Narok district for road building and maintenance late in July 2000.
- The disbursement of US\$ 35,000 to Cooperative Unions in each of the three pilot districts late in July 2000. These newly created bodies, who were registered towards the end of 1999, have just begun to organize themselves. The Evaluation Mission met with representatives of the cooperatives in each of the three districts. In Isiolo and Narok districts, the cooperative has an office, and in Suba district they were in the process. The Evaluation Mission has concluded that at present these three cooperatives lack the management skills and effective financial control systems needed to manage a revolving fund and urgently require external support to build these capacities. The absence of this support is likely to result in a mismanagement of these funds. The Mission attributes the current situation to an uncoordinated and untimely delivery of programme inputs and would like to emphasize that its conclusion should not be considered a justification for the extension of the pilot programme activities beyond its intended duration.

30. Finally, the many issues surrounding the implementation of this pilot programme make

it difficult to properly assess the extent to which it has been able to complete the planned activities. Nevertheless, after its visits to the three pilot districts the Mission is left with the impression that the written progress reports may be more optimistic than the realities on the ground. Also, it has not been possible for the Evaluation Mission to get a clear picture on the utilization of programme funds, especially by pilot districts.

### 2.3 Other Related Initiatives

31. In September 1999, UNDP launched a major new initiative to support Government's NPEP and its PRSP discussed through its programme on "Good Governance for Poverty Eradication". This four-year programme has five components covering capacity building for participatory planning and poverty eradication; targeted policy implementation and legislative reforms; strengthening local governance to alleviate rural and urban poverty; civic education, justice and human rights; and communication for good governance. Cross-cutting and related interventions include gender mainstreaming and empowerment of women, HIV/AIDS and disaster management. UNDP view this programme as a continuation of its support for Government's initiatives aimed at poverty eradication that during the last programming cycle included this Pilot Programme on Participatory Development for Poverty Eradication (the Sub-Programme for Poverty Alleviation in Kenya).

32. Kenya has benefited from a number of multilateral and bilateral technical cooperation programmes aimed at poverty eradication. Some of the programmes that UNDP has supported in recent years include:

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
KEN/95/200 - Management of the Development Process - which  
aimed at strengthening Kenya's capacity to manage its  
development process.

KEN/95/300 - Small-Scale and Jua Kali Enterprise Development.

KEN/95/100 - Capacity Building for Enhanced Public  
Administration and Participatory development.

Ken/95/005 - Support to Indigenous Communities.

33. There are numerous other on-going donor-funded initiatives, including GTZ support in data collection and documentation on the incidence of poverty. Recently, following the resumption of IMF/World Bank aid to Kenya, it was announced that the World Bank is to provide Kenya with a loan of US\$ 150 million. Full details have yet to be confirmed but a substantial proportion of this amount is earmarked for poverty reduction. Also, Kenya's new poverty reduction initiatives are expected to benefit from an Africa Development Bank facility.



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### **3. FINDINGS OF THE EVALUATION**

34. The approach adopted by the evaluation team was not to attempt to pick apart each component, objective, output and activity of the Pilot Programme to establish what has or has not been done, but rather to focus on examining the programme's performance in the broader context - what has worked and what has not and the reasons why, thereby extracting lessons learned which can be applied to any future technical assistance in this important area. The thrust of our analysis is to support each finding with constructive suggestions for improvement, where appropriate.

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*Programme Concepts and Design Programme Management Framework' Programme Performance Indicators  
Impact and Results*

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#### **3.1 Programme Concepts and Design**

35. This section presents our findings on pilot programme's concepts and design, its linkages to



the National Poverty Eradication Plan, its relevance to UNDP's country programme in Kenya, the articulation of pilot programmes objectives, outputs, activities, and indicators of achievements, and finally the pilot programme's strategy.

### 3.1.1 Programme Rationale

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##### *Pr gramme's Rationale*

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36. At the time this pilot programme was being formulated it was recognized within the

Government of Kenya (GOK) that the objectives of its National development Plans have been too lofty and macro in their focus. That the Plans did not address the meso and, socially contextualized, micro problems of equity, and access to economic opportunities and social services for the poor. In response, it adopted a strategy that provided a district focus for rural development in an effort to enable communities to participate in the development process. The GOK's strategy to adopt a district focus for rural development and making the civil servants at the district level responsible for ensuring the success of district focus were important steps towards a participatory development process. The implementation of this strategy, however, was impeded because the district officials who were to play a crucial role, although familiar with top-down approaches, were relatively unfamiliar with bottom-up participatory approaches to development. Also, the community based organizations that could work towards addressing the development needs of their communities lacked capacity and were found to be struggling.

37. The rationale of the pilot programme was to test bottom-up participatory approaches to

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development in three selected districts by focusing on building the capacities of public officials at the district and divisional level, and supporting through training and financial inputs the community-based organizations in these districts to enable them to work with their communities in identifying and prioritizing their needs, mobilizing resources to address these needs, and manage the implementation of their community-based programmes and projects.

38. In an environment of worsening poverty levels, the Evaluation Mission finds the programme rationale to be sound and UNDP support for the pilot programme to be appropriate and timely.

### **3.1.2 Linkages to National Poverty Eradication Plan**

39. Although, the pilot programme was considered a sub-programme of UNDP supported programme on "capacity building for enhanced public administration and participatory development" it was expected to link with the Government's National Poverty Eradication Plan (NPEP). With the delay in the launching of the Plan, however, the linkage has as yet not been established and the sub-programme has operated more as a stand-alone pilot programme.

### **3.1.3 Relevance to UNDP Country Programme**

40. Poverty alleviation is a global priority of UNDP programming. The pilot programme, therefore, forms a core part of UNDP programming in Kenya.

### **3.1.4 Articulation of Programme's Immediate Objectives, Outputs, Activities and Indicators of Achievements**

41. The nature and scope of the participatory approach for poverty reduction proposed in the PRODOC is comprehensive. It consists of seven components. For each of these seven components, detailed information not only on immediate objectives, outputs, activities, and indicators of achievements is provided but also information on problems, constraints and issues to be addressed, target beneficiaries, and strategy. If it could be faulted for anything it is that the scope is too broad for a two-year programme.

42. The absence of an overall immediate objective for the whole pilot programme gives the impression that it was prepared as separate segments that were pulled together at the end.

43. On a more critical note, the indicators for measuring the attainment of objectives were, for the most part, not quantified, thus rendering the task of determining their attainment rather difficult. Equally, and perhaps more critically, outputs were not quantified. These were serious omissions. Neither was a document outlining the Programme Support Implementation Arrangements (PSIA) prepared later. The PRODOC also did not outline the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, including the terminal evaluation.

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### **3.1.5 Programme Strategy**

44. The programme strategy, as outlined in the programme document, was to empower vulnerable groups at the grass roots level that had not benefited through the macro-economic interventions. It called for the implementation of a "bottom-up", community-based, gender sensitive methodological approach. In the implementation of this strategy, it was envisaged that the programme activities will work through GOKs district and division level structures that were the focal point for Government's strategy promoting a district focus for rural development as well as with grass roots community-based organizations, NGOs and other development partners active in the district.

45. The pilot programme strategy had also recognized that the financial resources that will be required to implement the high priority programmes and projects that will be identified through the "bottom-up" process will be well beyond UNDP's current and any future allocations. An important element of this strategy was therefore the mobilization of additional resources to finance the implementation of the identified programmes and projects through complementarity and collaboration with other multi- and bi-lateral agencies, NGO etc. The budget of the pilot programme did provide some resources that could be utilized to finance a few "demonstration" programmes and projects in the three districts. The budget presented in the Programme Support Document that was signed by the Government, UNDP, and the Executing Agency (ILO) in November 1997, provided

US\$ 600,000 or about one-third of the total programme budget for this purpose.

46. The Mission finds the programme strategy, as outlined in the programme document, to be sound and promising. Unfortunately, the programme did not deliver on its promises because of poor programme management and a failure to mobilize available programme inputs as planned in a timely and transparent manner. In two of the three districts (Isiolo and Suba) it also failed to link effectively with the district and division level official structures and existing community-based organizations.

### 3.2 Programme Management Framework

47. The success in the implementation of any

programme to a large extent depends not only on the *h i' Conrpo, en s*

capabilities of the personnel involved in the *Pr ..,r iip,me Management Framework*

implementation of the programme and the

appropriateness of its concepts and design but also on *,Luag mcntStrvdurc*  
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the management structures that are put in place to *ing and Lvalua6on*

manage the implementation of the programme as well

as the clarity with which the role, responsibility and

authority of the various actors involved in the implementation is defined. In this section, we present our findings and observations on the overall management framework for the programme.

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#### 3.2.1 Management Structure

48. The document setting out the "Programme Support Implementation Arrangements (PSIA)" for the pilot programme *was not prepared. If* prepared, it would have set out the role, responsibility, and authority of the various actors involved in the implementation of the programme as well as a schedule for periodic monitoring of programme activities. The only reference on implementation management arrangements, that the Evaluation Mission has been able to find, is the following text under Section 2.6 of PRODOC with a heading "

Sub-programme Co-ordination Mechanism":

*'As the sub programme will be executed by the ILO, the National Sub-Programme Coordinator will be responsible to the ILO for all programme activities and the timely realization of the sub programme outputs and correct utilization of the funds. He or she will cause the Committee to meet at least twice a year in consultation with UNDP and the ILOEAMAT. ILO-EAMAT will be responsible for technical backstopping and will be members of the Advisory Committee. The programme Management will have an independent office in order to provide access to all stakeholders, and grassroots communities (Annex figure 1).*

*At the district level, the ILO District Sub-Programme Officer will similarly have an independent office. He/She will also be advised by a District Programme Implementation Committee*

49. It is worth noting that "Annex figure 1" referred to above was not included in the copy of PRODOC made available to the Evaluation Mission. The PRODOC prepared by the Executing Agency and signed by all parties (UNDP, ILO, and the Government) looks more like a working draft than a final document providing a framework for an expenditure of nearly two million US\$. The budget estimates presented in the PRODOC include simple arithmetic errors, which once corrected do not add up to US\$ 1,904,300 - the approved budget for the programme. A simple quality check of the PRODOC, before it was signed and issued, would have been useful in preventing many simple errors.

50. The coordination mechanisms, outlined in the PRODOC, had envisaged that the pilot programme would be guided by a National Programme Advisory Committee (NPAC) at the national level and by the District Programme Implementation Committees (DPIC) at the three pilot districts. While at the district level, because of the support from the District Commissioners, these coordination structures were made available to district programme teams, this did not happen at the national level. In fact, the National Programme Advisory Committee was formed only in August 1999 - some fifteen months after the start of the programme. Whether the reason for this delay was the frequent turnover of key individuals in the government or a lack of ownership of the programme by senior officials at the national level is not obvious to the Evaluation Mission.

51. From the information provided to the Mission, the in-country operations of the programme

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included a programme offices in Nairobi (headed by NPC) and offices in the three Districts (headed by a national professional), at the same time the following arms of the ILO have played some role in the implementation of this programme:

**ILO EAMAT**, located in Addis Ababa - provided orientation on work plan preparation to programme staff, approved the work plans and their associated resource requirements, approved in-country team's requests for funds for programme implementation, participated in and approved programme budget revisions, and provided technical backstopping to in-country teams.

**ILO Area Office**, Dar es Salaam - processed the request for funds from in-country programme team, after ILO/EAMAT's approval, and issued EPAs to UNDP Office in Nairobi for payment of funds to the in-country programme team.

**ILO Regional Office for Africa**, located in Abidjan - according to the correspondence that the Mission has seen, the Regional Office was kept informed on programme activities.

**ILO Headquarters**, located in Geneva - was involved in recording budget revisions after they had been approved and signed.

52. In a normal situation, when a staff member is recruited to manage a programme it is ensured that either the person is familiar or is provided orientation training on the rules and regulations of the executing and funding agency. With an understanding of the rules and regulations an effective programme manager should be able to work through this multi-layer management structure. However, if components of this structure are not working efficiently

then the resulting delays when accumulated over all the layers can become serious obstacles in programme implementation, specially in the case of a programme of short duration involving multiple activities - notwithstanding the capabilities of the programme manager.

53. In the case of this pilot programme, the management structure has not worked well. The following examples illustrate the extent of the confusion on the ground:

- i. A decision was made at the start of the programme affecting personnel costs that significantly changed the mix of programme inputs. The budgetary implications of this decision were not formalized until around October/November 1998, when budget revision "B" was approved by UNDP Nairobi and ILO Area Office in Dar es Salaam. The Mission has been unable to establish as to who was leading the process of budget revision "B".
- ii. The NPC informed the Mission that he was not involved in the decision-making process that effected the personnel costs. He also informed the Mission that he did not see budget revision "B" until October 1998 and therefore had continued to prepare work plans based on the planned budget.
- iii. The NPC also informed the Mission that an "interim" work plan was prepared by him in May 1998 which was the basis on which ILO EAMAT approved EPAs in June 1998. He also asserts that a comprehensive work plan was developed by programme staff in November 1998 and approved by EAMAT in February 1999. At the same time, the NPC

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also acknowledges that a work plan that matches an approved programme budget was approved only in December 1999- three months before the planned completion date of the pilot programme.

54. The unusual events that occurred during the last 24 hours of Mission's work in Nairobi, at least for the Team Leader of this evaluation, exemplify the state of the confusion that must have surrounded the management of this pilot programme. After a draft for discussion of the evaluation report was circulated to Government, UNDP, and ILO on August 23<sup>d</sup>, the Mission received a detailed fax from Addis Ababa (late on Thursday August 24<sup>th</sup>) from a staff member of ILO EAMAT, along with a copy of a letter that the Director of ILO EAMAT had written to the NPC on December 8, 1998. For the sake of clarifying facts, the Mission presents below some excerpts on the issues of "work plan preparation" and "budget revisions" from this very long letter from the Director of ILO EAMAT that covered a broad range of issues.

*" B. WORK PLANS*

*You will recall that we have been concerned by your lack of submission of a workplan*

*from April to December 1998. ...*

*.... Several communication has been sent to you on the work plan and again discussed with you and your team during our last mission in November. To date no work plans have been received for the **period of program implementation beginning April to December 1998.***

*We wish to reiterate that **a work plan forms a fundamental basis for programme implementation and financial expenditure thereof.** Your non submission of the programme work plan to date cannot justify the expenditures so far undertaken by you on the programme as **we are not aware of the activities supporting these expenditures.***

*As long as we do not receive your work plan for the period under reference we will not expect (should be - expect) you **to incur any expenditure** on the programme unless it is justified and supported by **an approved work plan** by EAMAT*

#### *"D. BUDGET REVISIONS*

*We have noted with concern that you unilaterally revised programme budget without our knowledge or reference to EAMAT for clearance before sending the proposed budget revisions to Dar-es-Salaam (Budget revision Band C). ... By copy of this far we request ILO Dar-es-Salaam to follow the laid down regulations and refer all EPA and Budget Revision requests to us before any action is taken by them "*

55. The above information, that became available to the Mission during its last twenty four hours of work in Nairobi, clearly demonstrates that the NPC has been telling a different story to the Mission. This had continued until the end of the Mission, as illustrated by his comments on the

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draft of the evaluation report that was circulated on August 23<sup>rd</sup> in which he continues to reassert his position re: work plans (item # 14 and # 15). Unfortunately, these comments were submitted to the Mission as the joint response of NPC and ILO EAMAT (represented by another member of ILO EAMAT). **Does this mean that the two members of the ILO EAMAT team, who have provided comments on the draft report, have opposite recollections of the events surrounding the preparation of the work plans?** On this issue the Mission has taken the views expressed by the Director of the ILO EAMAT to be the authoritative position.

56. In the absence of an agreed upon work plan, it is not clear to the Mission as to what process or information was used by the various arms of ILO - the executing agency - to authorize the flow of funds to the pilot programme in Kenya. At best, the ad hoc approval process for funding programme activities, the reported lack of involvement of ILO EAMAT, coupled with delays in issuing EPAs by ILO/Area Office in Dar es Salaam and further delays in the processing of payments against EPAs by UNDP Office in Nairobi when taken together, paint a rather dismal picture of the management of this programme.

### **3.2.2 The Programme Offices**

57. The PRODOC planned for the setting up of independent offices for its teams in Nairobi and the three pilot districts. The justification for creating independent offices was "to provide access to all stakeholders, and grassroot communities". This decision, however, did create a distance between the district teams and the local government structures - which in the final analysis have the responsibility for continuing the programme activities in the post programme era.

58. The Nairobi Office was staffed by a NPC, finance/admin assistant, secretary and a driver. The three district teams each had three national professionals and three support personnel: finance/admin assistant, secretary and a driver. Thus the programme had a total staff of 22, all of whom were Kenyan nationals.

59. As noted earlier, the decision to classify the nine national professionals in the three districts to UNDP's NPPP classification, at the start of the implementation of the programme, had increased the personnel costs by three times from the initial estimates presented in the PRODOC. This increase has not only adversely the availability of resources for other critical programme activities, but more importantly, it is the Mission's conclusion

that except for a few the nine **national professionals did not have the qualifications and experience** to have to be classified at the NPPP level.

60. The nine national professionals were recruited at salaries of around Kshs 120, 000 per month excluding allowances. These salaries increased by 25 percent in 1999. As a comparison, the salary range for the position of the Director, Fiscal and Monetary Affairs Department at the Ministry of Finance, advertised in a local newspaper on August 19, 2000, is Kshs 277,200 - 341,200 per year or Kshs 23,100 - 28,433 per month. Similarly, the Mission has been informed that the national UNVs currently employed in Kenya are paid around US\$ 600 per month.

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61. The Mission believes that this action on classification of national professionals not only contributed to a sub-optimal utilization of the scarce resources but may have also adversely effected the working relationship of the district teams with their counterpart officials in the government. The Mission was also informed that in the absence of a focal point for the disbursement of funds at the district level, funds for programme activities in a district were sent directly to the national professional in the field who accounted for the use of funds directly to the disbursing office i.e. UNDP Office Nairobi. It is not clear to the Mission what role the finance/admin assistant in the district had to play. A timely review of this issue could have saved the programme the costs of three finance/admin positions in the districts.

62. The Mission has found that the Programme Office in Nairobi did not keep accurate financial records. Significant delays were experienced in obtaining simple information on upto date actual expenditures by activity and district. Over the duration of the Mission, the team has received several updated versions of the same information which has raised concerns among the evaluation team about the reliability of these data.

### **3.2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation**

63. No mechanism for a regular monitoring of programme implementation was planned or followed. The Mission has concluded that many of the problems experienced could have been avoided if periodic monitoring had been carried out.

64. The PRODOC did not include any information on the monitoring and evaluation aspects of the programme and the budget in the PRODOC did not include any allocation for evaluation.

## **3.3 Programme Performance**

### 3.3.1 Programme Inputs

66. The single most important factor that has adversely affected the implementation of this pilot programme has been the executing agency's failure to mobilize and utilize available programme inputs in a cost effective and timely manner. A programme budgeted at nearly two million US dollars over a two-year period should have achieved much more than what is evident to the

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65. This section focuses on the programme's performance in terms of the timeliness, quantity and quality of inputs delivered by the ILO and UNDP; the quantity and quality of outputs produced, the costeffectiveness of activities undertaken, and the extent to which the programme's immediate objectives were achieved. It is not our intention to cover these topics in detail, but rather to present major findings and perhaps draw some pertinent conclusions and lessons learned.

#### Key Components

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Evaluation Mission. Some of the other factors that have adversely effected the implementation of the programme include:

- A decision at the start of the programme to classify the nine national professional staff recruited for the programme to UNDP NPPP classification, at a cost that was three times higher than what was budgeted in the PRODOC. This decision, significantly changed mix of planned programme inputs. As noted earlier, the budgetary implications of this decision were not formalized until October/November 1998.
- NPC's failure to prepare and get approval of a work plan until February 1999 that reflects his lack of understanding of a basic fact, as pointed out by the Director of ILO EAMAT, that a work plan forms a fundamental basis for programme implementation and financial expenditure. A work plan whose resource requirements reflected an approved budget was not prepared until December 1999.
- Although, the NPC was provided orientation training in Dar es Salaam on ILO financial regulations he appears to have failed to follow them
- Lack of periodic monitoring of programme activities combined with a lack of consensus as well as a failure to follow established ILO rules and regulations governing the respective roles of NPC, ILO Area Office, ILO EAMAT seem to have made it difficult to take corrective actions in a timely manner. No external mid term review of the programme was carried out. The documentation that the Mission has examined show that a review of the programme activities carried out in January 2000 - two months before the completion date of the programme is being referred to as the mid term review. It should be noted, however, that an annual progress report was prepared by the NP C. It identified many issues that were effecting the implementation of the programme and required corrective actions.
- The absence of periodic meetings of the in-country teams that the NPC should have been organized to review programme implementation.
- Conflicts between NPC and the ILO/EAMAT backstopping team that seem to range from substantive issues on the nature and scope of the programme, to lack of proper communications and inter-personal problems between NPC and the programme staff in the three districts, appear to have made it difficult to find solutions to the resource mobilization problems.

67. Throughout the duration of this programme, funds that were made available to

project teams in the districts bore little relationship to the work plans they had been providing to NPC in terms of either the amount provided or the timing of programme activities. The flow of funds appear to reflect the operation of a petty cash account than an effort to mobilize programme resources to implement a work programme. During its visits to the districts the Mission was informed by members of the project teams that the requests for resources that they submitted to the NPC as per their work plans not only had delays, but that in most cases they did not receive the amount they had requested including cases where no funds were made available. A few examples of the flow of funds on requests submitted by the Isiolo District Team are presented in Table 1 (see next page).

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**TABLE 1: EXAMPLES OF FLOW OF FUNDS: REQUESTS SUBMITTED BY ISILOLO TEAM TO NPC**

Action	Programme Activity			
	A workshop for extension staff from central, Oldonyiro and Kinna Divisions	Rehabilitation of water intakes: 2 in Burat (Ntirim & Kilimani) and one in Gambella	Sensitization/awareness creation on enviro. conservation in selected sub-locations and training on how to establish tree nursery in an enviro. invest project.	A two day training workshop for 11 CB DC members, 5 members of local technical team and 14 local leaders (chiefs and sub-chiefs) in Central division.
Scheduled implementation period as per workplan	January 1999	Jan- April 1999	Jan-March 1999	January 1999
Date funds requested	First on Nov 30, 1998. Again on March 4, 1999. Third request June 10, 1999	First on Nov 30 1998. Again on June 10, 1999	First Nov 30 1998. Again on March 4, 1999. Third request on 20 Jan 2000	First Nov 30 1998
Amount requested	Kshs 62,419.24	Kshs 538,973.44	Kshs 375,375.00	Kshs 55,200.00
Amount Received	Kshs 57,470.00	Kshs 115,100.00 and materials costing Kshs 120,825.	Kshs 305,800.00	Kshs 55,200.00
Date funds received	June 25, 1999	Sept. 23, 1999	March 13, 2000	June 25, 1999
REMARKS		Only two intakes in Burat funded.	The funds allocated to this activity were reallocated to "credit training" at Nakuru	

Source: Programme team in Isiolo.

68. Given the varying rates of success of the pilot programme in the three districts, the Mission would have liked to examine the relationship between programme expenditures and programme performance among the three districts. The data supplied by the NPC on expenditures by district, that are almost the same across the districts, appears to the Mission to be estimates which it does not consider to be reliable for such an analysis.

69. All ten national professional staff, the NPC and the three professionals in each of the three pilot districts, joined the programme on April 1, 1998 and were briefed by the ILO/EAMAT team.

The administrative staff were recruited later and began work on different dates, as follows:

August 1, 1998	Secretary -National Office
September 1, 1998	3 Finance and Admin Assistants (National Office, Narok and Suba districts); 3 Secretaries for the three pilot districts; and
	1 Driver for the National Office
October 1, 1998	Finance and Admin Asstt for the Isiolo district
October 2, 1998	Driver for Suba district
November 2, 1998	Driver for Narok district
November, 1999	Driver for Isiolo district
April 1, 1999	Driver for the National Office

70. The four vehicles procured by the programme arrived in Nairobi in July 1998 and were delivered to the programme teams in September 1998. According to information provided by the NPC, they were available for use in the three districts in October 1998.

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71. The computers and photocopiers that were also procured by the programme had arrived in Nairobi on June 30, 1998. The NPC has reported that they were available for use by the district teams in August 1998. It should be noted that because of lack of power the programme team in Suba was unable to make use of this equipment. In their case a generator was purchased in March 1999. However, no funds were made available for the operation of the generator until August 1999. Therefore, in fact, the Suba team was unable to utilize equipment for a year after its arrival.

72. The office furniture, that was procured locally, was supplied to the four operations of the programme around September 1998.

73. The terms of reference for this evaluation required the Mission to verify the inventory of equipment procured by the programme. The Mission is pleased to report that during its visits to the districts it was able to locate all items, as per the list of equipment supplied by NPC, in each of the three districts and the national office - with the exception of the generator in the Suba district and some furniture items in the national office. The generator was returned to the national office sometime ago and is currently stored in the office of the ILO/IPEC along with two office chairs and a computer table. Of the four vehicles that were procured by the programme, three have been in the possession of UNDP Nairobi since end of March 2000. The Mission was informed that the fourth vehicle, that was involved in a fatal accident, has been written off by the ILO.

### **3.3.2 Programme Outputs**

74. Based on the information that has been made available to the Mission by the NPC, the main outputs of the programme across the three districts are:

- i. , Some 47 training programmes offered to various groups aimed at capacity building in the areas of the seven components of the programme.
- ii. Support for a few projects, the most notable assistance provided by the programme directly include:
  - Loan guarantee funds in the amount of US\$ 35,000 to each of the three pilot districts.
  - Tools for road building to the Narok district only.
  - Materials (cement and pipes) for culverts and irrigation in Isiolo.
 and indirectly, through assistance provided by Africa 2000 network, support for the construction of water projects, mostly boreholes and dams in Narok and Suba districts.
- iii. A number of reports generated by external consultants that include:
  - situational assessment report for the three districts
  - participatory needs assessment for the three districts
  - institutional capacity building for integrated water and environment
  - local technical teams training course
  - modules of employable skills assignment reports

- energy assessment study for the three districts
- district credit scheme - principles and methods of operation

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### **3.3.3 Cost-effectiveness**

75. There are no absolute standards that can be utilized to judge whether or not the programme activities were delivered in a cost effective manner. To address this issue indirectly it may be insightful to examine the activities that the programme had delivered and the role that the programme teams in Nairobi and the three districts had played. Because the focus of the programme was on capacity building, providing training to various groups on different topics has been the main activity of the programme. The role that the programme team members have played was to "organize" the training programmes which were "delivered" by technical experts brought from outside. In other words, the main tasks that the team members have performed were "process" related and not "technically substantive" in nature.

76. If the expenditures incurred in maintaining these teams were to include their salaries, costs of office and equipment provided to make them functional, and the costs of the travel of the programme personnel then these expenditures add up to US\$ 1,324,568 or 72.6 percent of the total programme expenditure over the life of the programme. Put in another way, nearly threequarter of the programme resources have gone to support "process" related tasks to deliver onequarter of the programme resources to the beneficiaries.

77. Even a cursory review of the data presented in the Table 2 highlights the implications of the decision to change the classification of the national professional staff from initial cost estimates of

**TABLE 2: PLANNED AND ACTUAL EXPENDITURES FOR THE PILOT PROGRAMME**

Expenditure Category	PLANNED BUDGET as per PRODOC		ACTUAL EXPENDITURE As per Budget Revision "F"	
	US\$	percent	US\$	Percent
PERSONNEL				
• Int'l experts and Consultants	305,900	15.9%	88,375	4.8%
• <b>National Professionals</b>	<b>210,000</b>	<b>10.9%</b>	<b>615,856</b>	<b>33.8%</b>
• Admin/finance support staff	211,200	11.0%	204,434	11.2%
SUB-TOTAL	727,100	37.7%	908,665	49.8%
EQUIPMENT	140,100	7.3%	153,433	8.4%
TRAVEL & MISSION COSTS	75,000	3.9%	181,427	9.9%



OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE	0	0%	77,127	4.2%
TRAINING				
• Fellowships	45,000	2.3%	5,940	0.3%
• Group Training	267,500	13.9%	227,885	12.5%
SUB-TOTAL	312,500	16.2%	233,835	12.8%
SUBCONTRACT				
• Subcontracts	300,000	15.6%	72,148	4.0%
• Loan guarantee Fund	300,000	15.6%	105,000	5.8%
SUB-TOTAL	600,000	31.1%	177,148	9.7%
Misc.	72,500	3.8%	92,301	5.1%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,927,200</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>1,823,926</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

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US\$ 750 per month to the UNDP NPPP scale. A decision, which with hindsight, could be viewed as unjustified based either on the education and experience of the concerned individuals or the nature of the tasks/functions they performed. The Mission would like to highlight the significant variances between the planned budget and actual expenditures across all budget lines. It notes with some concern the reduction in planned activities that were to benefit the participating communities. The cost benefit of the decisions/practices that led to this distortion should have been a matter of concern to the programme implementers.

### **3.3.4 Achievement of Programme's Immediate Objectives**

78. A detailed report outlining the programme results by component, immediate objective and output provided by the National Programme Coordinator is presented in Annex E in its original form. As indicated earlier, the mission is left with the impression, following the field visits and subsequent meetings, that this and other progress reports may be more optimistic than the reality.

79. Rather than review here all the activities and outputs under each of the immediate objectives in the seven components, the Mission has opted to highlight the main findings under each immediate objective.

80. Perhaps the greatest achievement of this programme is the creation of awareness at district and sub-locational levels for the mobilization of community participation for local development. This programme has made a major contribution in empowering and enabling communities to identify their development priorities and to mobilize resources to help themselves.

81. There are indications to suggest that the income of farmers assisted by the programme in Suba and Narok has improved. The mission visited farms and spoke to horticulturalists who had participated in PRAs and benefited from training. In addition, in Suba, the mission was informed that the training of paravets had resulted in the improvement of health, productivity and a lower mortality of the animals.

82. The programme played some role in getting a livestock market started on an open patch of land in Oldonyiro division of Isiolo district. However, failure to mobilize funds, firstly, to set up water points and, secondly, to fence the market have left these communities greatly disappointed by the support provided by the programme.

83. Over a third (about 36%) of all people trained were women. Significantly, in Narok, the programme succeeded in bringing men and women together for training and the cause of participatory development generally - something that normally does not happen apparently among the Maasai community.

84. The training programmes on improve and start your business delivered by the programme have resulted in a start up of a horticulture project in Suba and in significantly improving the marketing activities of an on-going horticulture operation in Suba. Also, a restaurant owner trained in Narok has been able to improve his income significantly which he attribute to the

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training he has had received. There were no examples, however, of business start-up, the

reason often cited was lack of available funds. In Isiolo district and Oldonyiro division in particular, for example, none of the SYB trainees interviewed had managed to start an enterprise. In Narok, skills training for a promising women's group had begun just two weeks before the evaluation team arrived there. However, there was no provision for even the most basic tools to continue production and earn income, after the training.

85. Credit associations (SACCOs) had been registered (in October 1999) in all three districts. In Narok and Isiolo, they had secured offices, whilst Suba was in the process of settling into one at the time of the evaluation. Each had one full-time employee and, although some of the members of the management committees claimed to have had prior experience of SACCOs, it was not clear whether they have the necessary expertise to manage credit professionally.

86. Component 4, dealing with the development of education and training, was one of the few where quantifiable indicators were specified in the PSD. As stated elsewhere in the report, from the information available to the evaluation team, this component, particularly the MES, accounted for the largest expenditure in terms of training. Yet, the effects were not readily visible.

87. In respect of Component 5, there was no evidence to suggest that infant mortality rate had been reduced. Furthermore, with the exception of Suba where a UNV had been deployed and attached to the programme team to work on HIV/AIDS, there was no evidence of any impact, or even significant activity, by the programme. However, in respect of control of tsetseflies and trypanosomiasis, the mission was impressed with the work and achievements of ICIPE in Suba.

88. Thanks to the financial support of GEF/Africa 2000 Network, the programme managed to set up, or were in the process of completing, five water projects in Suba and Narok. These were significant projects which were much appreciated by the communities and which cut to the core of poverty.

89. Finally, in the area of Infrastructural Development (Component 7), the most notable achievements were clearance of an 18 km stretch of access road in Narok (in progress at the time of the evaluation), training of various resource persons at the Kenya Institute of Highway Building at Kisii, and the construction of culverts in Burat. For some odd reason, only Narok received tools and these arrived just two weeks before the visit of the evaluation team to the district. People trained in Suba complained and felt let down by the unkept promises to supply them with tools.

90. On the whole, it may be concluded that the project has had mixed results.

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### **3.4 Programme Impact and Results**

91. This section presents our findings on the impact and results in terms of outcomes that were expected. The implementation of a participatory approach to development for poverty eradication was expected to: enhance awareness of and participation in development of participating communities enabling them to address their critical poverty issues; strengthen the capacity of participating institutions (concerned civil servants, CBOs, NGOs etc); and bridging the gender gap. It also includes our findings on steps taken to document the lessons learned from the implementation of the pilot programme, and the sustainability of the programme.

#### **3.4.1 Awareness of Participatory Development**

92. Notwithstanding all of the problems that the implementation of this programme has faced, it has managed to make a significant contribution in mobilizing community participation to address their priority development needs. It has also demonstrated the willingness of the participating communities to contribute, both in cash and kind, resources needed to meet their high priority needs and to manage the implementation of their development projects. Few communities whose projects did manage to receive support from or through the pilot programme were ecstatic. For other communities that had participated in the participatory process, identified their needs, and had mobilized their own resources and were waiting for top up funds - there was disappointment and despair.



### *Key Components Programme Impact and Results*



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Strengthening of capacities of Participating Stakeholders

- Gender Impact

Documentation of Lessons'Learned' Programme

- Sustainability of Programme Achievements

93. The lesson to be learned from the experiences of the pilot programme is that the implementers must share with the participants the information on the exact nature of the support that they can or are there to provide and the time frames within which this support is planned to be provided. This has implications for the programme design. The pilot programme in its concepts and design went all the way in one single sweep from building capacities for participatory development, to identification of communities high needs, to setting up issue/project based committees at the grass roots (sub-location level) that began to mobilize their own inputs and had expectations that other resources will be provided to meet their identified needs. In the implementation of the pilot programme, the failure to provide the needed resources, whatever the reason, after raising their hopes may have contributed to reducing their enthusiasm to participate in any future similar effort.

94. An approach that separated these activities into the following three distinct phases and shared the information on the phasing of these activities with the stakeholders would have minimized this risk:

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- Phase I: Capacity building for participatory development. This phase goes as far as identifying the participating communities high priority needs.
- Phase II: Mobilize participating communities to set up issue/project based communities to mobilize their own inputs, both cash and kind, and began lobby for support from Government and potential donors.
- Phase III: When resources become available, the issue/project based committees begin to manage the implementation of their project.

95. Although the programme team in Narok district appeared to have worked closely with CBOs and NGOs in their districts, the Mission believes that a similar situation did

not exist in the Suba and Isiolo districts.

### 3.4.2 Strengthening Capacities of Participating Stakeholders

96. In the pilot programme, the key stakeholders included government agencies at district and division levels tasked with the implementation of the district focus for rural development; community based organizations; NGOs; and of course the participating communities representatives.

97. The data provided by the NPC on training activities carried out under the pilot programme, presented in Table 3, show that a significant amount of training has been provided. However, the distribution of training amongst the key stakeholders is not clear. Nor was the Mission able to

**TABLE3: SUMMARY F TRAINING PROGRAMMES ONDUCTED**

Programme Component	Total Number of Programmes Delivered	Number of Persons Trained			Direct Costs in US\$
		Female	Male	Total	
1. Capacity Building	7	13	93	144	46,522
2. Agri. Livestock & fisheries	5	27	111	168	27752
3a MSE	9	25	45	148	34,633 <sup>4</sup>
3b. Credit	8	15	57	149	7408
4. VOTEC	10	51	140	191	57,340
5. Health	5	57	45	102	19471
6. Environment	2	14	56	70	21,729
7. Infrastructure	1	1	18	19	10364
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>203</b>	<b>565</b>	<b>1023<sup>5</sup></b>	<b>225,219<sup>6</sup></b>

Source: National Programme Coordinator

4 Total number trained is not the sum of female + male as data disaggregated by gender was not available for some training programmes.

5 None of the SIYB training cost US \$1,000 except one Training of Trainers Programme for 18 people for 2 weeks, which cost US \$28,268.

6 Includes US \$3,499 for SPROUT training for 10 NPP Staff held in February 1999.

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ascertain whether or not all the stakeholders specified in the PSD actually participated in the capacity building interventions.

98. Analysis of the data shows that women accounted for 35.9% of total trainees. In addition, the average cost per training programme was US \$4,791.89, yielding an average cost per person trained of US \$218.45.

99. Given the time frame of this evaluation and the nature of this programme, particularly the delays in the mobilization of inputs and in implementation, it was not possible to do a proper assessment of impact amongst the participating stakeholders. Notwithstanding this, the following observations can be made from the observations of the evaluation team in the field and other findings:

- IYB - as clearly distinct from SYB - training programmes (for MSE development in Component 3) appeared to have had the most visible positive effects. It is interesting to note, in this respect, that if the cost (US \$28,268) of the SIYB training of trainers programme is excluded, then more people were trained under

this component for the least cost, of all the training conducted by this Pilot Programme. From what can be concluded from the evidence available, therefore, Component 3 was the most cost-effective in terms of training.

- Along with IYB, training of paravets (in Component 2) appeared to have had some positive results, particularly in Suba where it was reported that animal health and productivity had improved whilst the mortality rate of livestock had reduced.
- In contrast, the largest area of expenditure was for training in Modules of Employable Skills (Component 4), yet the effects were not that visible.
- Similarly, a relatively large sum was spent on capacity building (Component 1). However, high staff turnover of government officials appears to have had a negative effect. This also raises questions about sustainability.

100. The PSD emphasized the importance of mainstreaming gender concerns in the programme. In particular, the employment needs of women were mentioned along with women's access to productive resources.

101. The programme appears to have achieved much in this area. Over a third (about 36%) of all people trained were women. Significantly, in Narok, the programme succeeded in bringing men and women together for training and the cause of participatory development generally - something that normally does not happen apparently among the Mansai community. In Isiolo, women accounted for the majority of shareholders in the SACCO which suggests that, all things

### 3.4.3

#### Gender Impact

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being equal, they should have greater access to the

#### credit. 3.4.4      Documentation of Lessons

#### learned

102. Very little documentation has been prepared on lessons learned during the course of the implementation of the pilot programme to document the participatory approaches that had worked well, as well as those that did not work so well - to facilitate the development of a national programme for poverty reduction. The only exception is the programme team in Narok that did prepare a report entitled, "Process of Implementing PPEP Programme and Lessons Learnt in Narok District".



103. The NPC has informed the Evaluation Mission that as the manager of the programme he neither had the time nor the technical expertise to prepare this material. One member of the ILO/EAMAT backstopping team, that the Mission had the opportunity to discuss this issue with, believes that it was not E~MAT's role to prepare this documentation. This situation could have been avoided if a CTA, who would have been responsible for both managerial and technical functions, was recruited instead of an NPC. Indirectly, this would have also minimized many of the financial flow problems that the programme suffered from because of the level of authority vested in the position of the CTA.

104. During its visits to the districts, the Mission came across a video filming crew in the Isiolo district that was going around the three districts filming the project sites that received some funding from or through the pilot programme - incomplete dams, still in progress boreholes and what not. It is the Missions view that this expenditure of over Kshs 440,000 could have been better utilized if the pilot programme had financed the two projects in Oldonyiro that were not financed and could have been completed with a total contribution of around Kshs 400,000. The completion of these two project would have contributed to significantly improving the quality of life of the people in this division and restored their faith in the participatory process.

### **3.4.5 Sustainability of Programme Achievements**

105. The sustainability of the efforts of this programme is not obvious to the Mission. First there is the issue of how the experience and lessons of this pilot programme are going to link and be fed into the Poverty Eradication Programme as well as UNDP's Good Governance for Poverty Eradication Programme. Of particular concern is the fact that there is no plan or mechanism as yet for absorbing the staff of this sub-programme into these initiatives. The UNVs who have been recruited into the districts to ensure some continuity are not in a position to do so effectively because, firstly, there are limitations on what one person can do in such a broad, multi-faceted task and secondly, since they were not involved in the programme they are unlikely to be familiar with the participatory approach that has been tried under this programme.

106. The Mission is also concerned about the erosion of the capacity that the programme has attempted to build at the district and division level because of the high turnover of government staff At central government level, the programme saw, in two-years, three Permanent Secretaries

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in the responsible ministry. At district level, most of the District Commissioners and District Development Officers (DDO) were new, in some cases less than four months in post. In Isiolo, for example, at a meeting with government officials, half the people present had not been in post at the start of the programme. Consequently, many trained officials have since moved on and the new ones have yet to develop any capacity.

107. High staff turnover of government staff and difficulties in involving district officials in the programme, particularly in Suba and Isiolo, meant that government staff were not adequately equipped with the knowledge and skills to continue with the approach and activities of the programme. In this regard, there is no evidence to suggest that there is *a critical mass* of line ministries and district *officials* who have the capacity and competencies to formulate and implement poverty reduction strategies using participatory approaches, as a result of the programme. However, at community or CBO level, the indications are more positive.

108. The constraints on budgets and other resources, particularly transport, mean that many district extension officers and other officials will not be able to continue to do outreach provide support for the ultimate beneficiaries of the programme.

109. Finally, the credit scheme may survive given that it has been institutionalized *-provided* it is managed professionally and properly.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

110. Based on the analysis of the documents made available to the evaluation team, information presented at briefings on programme activities, and information obtained during discussions with UNDP, ILO/EAMAT, Government officials at the national, district, and division levels as well as the community groups and beneficiaries of the programme, the team has drawn the following

conclusions and lessons that can be learned from the experiences of the implementation of this pilot programme.

## CONCLUSIONS

1. This Programme on Poverty Alleviation in Kenya has had mixed results. Although the concepts and design of the programme were sound and highly relevant to Kenya its implementation has been bogged down by an inability to mobilize the available resources effectively and efficiently to achieve the planned objectives of the programme. A programme budgeted at nearly two million dollars should have achieved much more than what is evident to the Mission.
2. Nevertheless, some successes have been achieved, most notably, the creation of awareness amongst the ultimate beneficiaries of the participatory development process as well as some capacity building and the establishment of a credit scheme in each of the pilot districts.
3. Over its two-year implementation period, the programme has been dogged by many

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bureaucratic problems and consequent delays in mobilization of inputs along with disputes and in-fighting in various quarters. Decisions were made at the start of the programme that heavily skewed the use of available resources towards salaries and operations to the detriment of programming activities on the ground. Nearly three-quarter of the programme resources have gone to support "process" related tasks to "deliver" one-quarter of the programme resources to the beneficiaries.

4. For a pilot programme of this nature, the two-year duration was rather short. As a result, while the programme raised high expectations in the participating communities, it has delivered rather little. Among the communities that the Mission visited there was a sense that the programme was ending abruptly. Indeed, given all the things that this programme had going for it at the onset, most notably the excellent methodology and approach, plus the fact that relatively small amounts of money could have made a world of difference to the ultimate beneficiaries, this was a missed opportunity to showcase a successful attempt at poverty reduction.
5. Several factors affected the performance of the programme, which include the following:
  - The low level of donor activity in Kenya who were operating on a "low level. funding scenario" that made the task of mobilizing additional resources for the programme difficult.
  - Delays in launching the Poverty Eradication Plan and subsequent difficulties in getting the Plan fully funded and operational, desynchronized attempts to provide a link with this pilot programme.
  - The high turnover of government staff (including 3 Permanent Secretaries in

the life of the programme) as well as a 15 month delay in setting up the NPAC has had adverse effects on the programme.

- The profile and approach to work of the team in Narok, including their efforts to actively involve existing local government and community structures and documenting their experiences, contributed in no small measure to their success. This was not evident in Suba or Isiolo districts.

6. The Mission believes that the following issues require urgent attention and follow-up by all concerned parties: Government, UNDP and ILO:

- There is a need for continuity with, and linkages to, on-going initiatives, in particular Poverty Eradication Programme as well as the UNDP supported programme on Good Governance and Poverty Eradication. This is especially important if the goodwill and trust placed in the UN agencies and the Government by communities involved in the programme is not to be lost completely.
- The credit scheme in each of the districts requires, as a matter of urgency, the injection of professionalism and good governance to safeguard the funds and ensure that they reach the intended beneficiaries and are used for the right purpose.
- This pilot programme has made some significant achievements and a number of useful lessons can be drawn from the experience. It is important to ensure that these are not lost and are made use of in the planning and implementation of the Government's on

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going national poverty efforts.

## **LESSONS LEARNED**

1. In poverty reduction interventions, it is important to recognize that the poor are not a homogeneous group. They include the poorest of the poor - the bottom 30 percent of the population called hard-core poor - and also those who constitute the rest of the 52 percent of the population classified as poor in Kenya. Relatively, small sums of money, if well targeted, can make a world of difference to the poorest of the poor individuals and communities.
2. Poverty reduction, not unlike other challenges of development, is a long-term process. This ought to be reflected in the planned duration of the programmes/projects, particularly where new/different concepts, methodologies or experiments are being tried.
3. National staff recruited on programmes of this nature should not automatically be put on NPPP scales. Rather the job requirements must be carefully considered and the qualifications and experience of candidates thoroughly examined, along with the implications for the programme/project, in making such decisions.
4. Funding and executing agencies should avoid raising expectations and hopes of communities unduly, particularly when funding for activities has not been secured beforehand.
5. Baseline data collection must be integrated into programmes/projects of this nature to enable results to be measured and to assess their impact.
6. To ensure success and sustainability, there is need for initiatives of this nature to involve and work with local government officials and other existing community structures to the extent possible.
7. Frequent transfers and changes of key government personnel, both at central and local levels, do not augur well for sustainability nor even progress in development. As a condition for disbursement and further release of funds, government should be required to commit staff to

programmes of this nature and guarantee that they will not be moved for a specified period of time.

The roles and responsibilities of various actors in a programme of this nature must be specified and agreed in writing at the onset.

9. The need for constant dialogue and good collaboration between various actors in programmes of this nature, particularly among sister agencies of the UN system, cannot be overemphasized. The establishment of proper monitoring and evaluation systems and constant monitoring/reviews can help to arrest many situations before they get out of hand. In this respect, it is important that reporting and governance mechanisms - such as the formation and meeting of steering committees, implementation arrangements, mid-term reviews,

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development of work plans and regular reporting - are respected and

## enforced. 5. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on its findings and conclusions, the evaluation mission recommends that:

1. The ILO should undertake a "management review" of its procedures for executing programmes of this nature, especially in places where the organization does not have an office. The modalities of Area Offices and MDTs, and even the role of the Regional Office and headquarters, need to be carefully examined in the light of this programme's experience, and benchmarks should be established for delivery of programme inputs and responses to requests from programme staff.
2. In view of the concerns expressed to the Mission about the use of programme resources, it is recommended that in order to clear the air and also for accountability a financial audit of the programme be carried out. The auditors could come from the ILO (provided they have not been involved in the programme, for example Geneva-based staff) and/or the Joint Inspection Unit and/or external consultants.
3. Government, UNDP and ILO should review their practices and procedures regarding appointments of programme personnel in the NPPP salary scale. It is proposed that the placement of recruits on this scale should not be automatic but should be based on an assessment of the requirements and determined on a case by case basis.
4. Government and UNDP should ensure the completion of projects that were started in the districts. An important step will be to establish some mechanism to link these projects with the Poverty Eradication Commission and the UNDPs on-going

programme on "Good Governance for Poverty Eradication". This is necessary if the goodwill and trust placed in these organizations by the communities is not to be lost completely. A good starting point would be to absorb and utilize in their respective districts some of the programme staff (in particular the Narok team and the MSE/credit coordinator in the Suba district).

5. There is also an urgent need for action to safeguard the credit scheme. It is recommended that an experienced professional be attached to each of the districts with immediate effect for between 6 to 12 months (but not at NPPP salary scales) to see the SACCOs through the initial teething problems and set up challenges.
6. UNDP Office Nairobi should also review its disbursement procedures, in light of this programme's experiences, and put in place measures to improve the delivery of disbursement.
7. It is necessary that UNDP and other executing agencies spell out and communicate clearly to all stakeholders the differences between national execution and agency execution and the roles/responsibilities attached to the different actors.