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**End-line Evaluation for the Support to Public Administration Project –RSS/IGAD
Regional Initiative for Capacity Enhancement in South Sudan- Phase II Project**

EVALUATION REPORT

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Acknowledgements and Disclaimer

This report was prepared by an independent evaluation team comprised of Richard M Chiwara and Batali Geoffrey as commissioned by UNDP South Sudan. Contents of this report are based on research and compilation of information gathered from a cross-section of stakeholders within and external to UNDP, through a series of consultative dialogues. We thank respondents from UNDP; government, at central and state level; independent commissions; the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Juba; and other organisations and institutions for their valuable time and participation. Special thanks to Ms. Rose Joseph from the Ministry of Labour, Public Service and Human Resources Development. Without her support, it would have been difficult for the team to identify and meet with relevant key informants in the states.

Although the analysis, opinions and conclusions made in this report are based on the findings obtained directly from observation and feedback from key informants, they do not necessarily represent the opinions and views of UNDP or organisations of the respondents. All necessary efforts have been taken to make sure that information contained in this publication is accurate and not misleading. However, the possibility of human errors or unintentional omissions cannot be excluded.



Richard M Chiwara, PhD.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and United Nations Development Programme in South Sudan signed a Third-Party Cost-Sharing Agreement for implementing the project: ‘Support to Public Administration – Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) Regional Initiative for Capacity Building in South Sudan – Phase 2’. The planned implementation period was from 1 October 2013 to 31 March 2016. Implementation was delayed due to ongoing conflict in South Sudan and in May 2016, the parties agreed to extend the project’s period to December 2018;¹ and latter to 31 July 2019.² UNDP has commissioned the end line evaluation of the project to assess the project’s contributions towards capacity building/enhancement of South Sudan’s civil service for equitable, responsive, and accountable service delivery.

The overall purpose of the end line evaluation was to assess the project’s contributions towards supporting South Sudan in building its civil service capacity for equitable, responsive, and accountable service delivery. The specific objectives of the evaluation were as outlined below.

- a) To assess the relevance and strategic positioning of the project to South Sudan’s civil service capacity and public service delivery needs;
- b) To assess (a) the progress made towards project results and whether there were any unintended results and (b) what can be captured in terms of lessons learned for ongoing and future UNDP’s institutional capacity enhancement initiatives in South Sudan.
- c) To assess whether the project management arrangements, approaches and strategies were well-conceived and efficient in delivering the project.
- d) To analyse the extent to which the project enhanced application of a rights-based approach, gender equality and women’s empowerment, social and environmental standards and participation of other socially vulnerable groups such as children and the disabled.
- e) To assess the overall contribution of the project to the state of good governance and public administration in the country.

The evaluation assessed the project’s relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability during its implementation. The findings and conclusions were based on data and information collected in six (6) project locations - Juba, Rumbek, Terekeka, Torit, Wau and Yambio. The evaluation team reviewed key project documents, including project annual work plans, annual and quarterly reports. A total of 75 key informants were consulted in individual interviews and focus group discussions using a semi-structured interview guide.

¹ Addendum I to Third-Party Cost Sharing Agreement

² Addendum II to Third-Party Cost Sharing Agreement

Evaluation Findings

Relevance

Based on evaluators' observation of conditions at subnational levels, the project was highly consistent with beneficiaries' requirements and needs. CSSOs not only provided coaching and mentoring in the substantive areas of work. They also supported their counterpart twins in other tasks such as how to use computers, how to write minutes of meetings, and how to write reports. There was evidence in the states that the CSSOs were highly appreciated across all the sector Ministries to which they were deployed.

The project was consistent with triangular South-South cooperation, as well as UNDP's signature solution for **Governance for peaceful, just, and inclusive societies** as outlined in its Strategic Plan 2018 – 2021. By seeking to enhance institutional capacity at subnational levels, the IGAD initiative was therefore highly relevant and aligned to UNDP's CPD, specifically the United Nations Cooperation Framework (UNCF)/CPD Outcome 1: Strengthened peace infrastructures and accountable governance at the national, state and local levels.

The project's strategy for 'on-the-job' training through mentoring and coaching, whereby CSSOs were involved in direct service delivery within the institutions to which they were seconded directly aligned it to ten (10) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 16.

Effectiveness

Three out of five indicators were exceeded, while one of the remaining two was satisfactory, while the fifth indicator was not rated due to insufficient data.

Indicator 1. Number of institutional policies developed to enhance operations. This indicator was achieved. At central government level, a number of policies were developed, including for example, Social Protection Policy and national Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) policy and strategic framework. CSSOs deployed at state level also contributed to development of various policies, including for example the state Employment Policy in Rumbek.

However, the evaluation also noted that the individual capacities of the twins as it relates to whether or not they were now independently capable to develop and produce these institutional policies was still limited. The evaluators observed that any outputs that were initiated by the CSSOs but not completed by the time of their departure have remained incomplete. For example, in the Rumbek state Ministry of Finance, the CSSOs had started to lead the development of the state Development Plan, but left before it was completed. This was still not completed by February 2020, and the responsible twins said that they did not have the capacity to complete the exercise independently.

Indicator 2. Number of strategic plans/frameworks developed to implement established policies. This indicator was achieved. 53 strategic plans/frameworks were developed against a planned target of five strategic plans/frameworks. The evaluation independently verified that an Annual Operational Plan, Human Resources Strategy Plan, as well as Regulatory Audit Manual, Performance Audit Manual, and a Communications Audit Manual were developed at the National Audit Chamber (NAC). At state level, the evaluation verified that Annual Strategic Plans were developed with CSSO support in the following ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs): (a) state Ministry of Labour, Public Service and Human resources Development (MLPS&HRD) in Rumbek, (b) state Ministry of Agriculture and Rural development (MARD) in Torit and Yambio; (c) state Ministry of Trade in Yambio; and (d) state Ministry of Gender and Social Welfare (MOGSW) in Wau.

Indicator 3. Proportion of targeted institutions reporting improved work-related performance by the twins. This indicator was achieved. The evaluation noted that work-related performance of the 'twins' was increased and there was greater appreciation for the CSSOs in those sectors where they were also involved in direct service delivery, in particular in the hospitals. There were however two challenges that affected performance by twins. Firstly, there were cases of mismatched skills between the CSSO and twins, such that there was limited direct coaching/mentoring. Secondly, the project was undertaken during a period of austerity where the government only provided Chapter 1 budget (salaries), so there were no operational resources to carry out activities on which to base the coaching/mentoring.

Indicator 4. Proportion of twins expressing satisfaction over the twinning arrangement. This indicator was partially achieved. The evaluation noted that the indicator measured 'the proportion of twins *expressing satisfaction with twinning arrangements*' while the baseline and target measured 'proportion of twins that *gained knowledge from their coach/mentor*'. This inconsistency could potentially give rise to significant variance in measurements. Majority of the twins interviewed during the evaluation were satisfied with the twinning arrangements. At the hospital in Torit for example, the local staff did not know how to use the Complete Blood Count (CBC) machine and Oxygen machine until after the CSSOs taught them.

Indicator 5. Number of targeted institutions rated as offering improved. There was no end line survey undertaken to determine the exact number of institutions that were providing improved services. Based on key informants interviewed, public service delivery was declining due to budgetary constraints. While this is not attributable to the project, it does however make it difficult to objectively assess improvement of service delivery in targeted institutions.

On the other hand, there were also institutions that could demonstrably attribute improved service delivery to the CSSOs. In Torit for example, the evaluation noted that when the state Ministry of Gender and Social Welfare was established by separating it from the Ministry of

Youth, Culture and Social Welfare, the CSSOs helped to develop capacity of all ministry personnel as well as developing institutional policies and code of conduct.

Efficiency

Overall, the evaluation found that the project's quantitative outputs were delivered efficiently and could be directly attributable to its activities. The project delivery of available resources was high at 90.8 percent, which means management of the project by the Project Management Unit (PMU) in terms of activity implementation was commendable in spite of the hostile operating environment characterised by conflict and limited access to some areas.

Sustainability

Although the project was anchored in national institutions, some of the civil service personnel had since left government in search of 'greener pastures'. Secondly, the government has consistently lacked financial capacity to sustain the project's results and processes as exemplified in Torit where Community Action Plans (CAPs) developed in the state Cooperatives Directorate were not been implemented due to funding challenges. Furthermore, a number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) stopped actively supporting project activities when the CSSOs left, demonstrating a lack of confidence in government's capacity to deliver as well as its accountability to partners and stakeholders.

Lessons Learned

The evaluation identified seven key lessons.

Lesson 1. CSSOs can be twinned with more than one individual. The evaluators recorded numerous instances where the CSSOs mentored/coached the whole department or even the whole Ministry in basic tasks such as office procedures, work ethics and using computers. In Rumbek for example, key informants at the state MLPS&HRD said the CSSOs showed them how to keep the office environment clean and developed the filing system that they still use to this date.

Lesson 2. CSSOs cannot deliver standard comparable results if their contribution is based only on their individual initiative. Some CSSOs were considered to have been very successful and helpful by their respective twins, while others were considered not so successful indicating a need for CSSOs to have specific Terms of Reference when they are deployed.

Lesson 3. Practical level coaching/mentoring may not be enough to build effective capacity. Key informants, especially at senior level of Director and Director-General level felt that there was a need for their staff to get advanced training in order to establish a cadre of national civil service professionals who may be able to mentor their colleagues.

Lesson 4. Embedding the PMU in government enhances ownership of project processes and results. There was demonstrable institutional memory of the project within government during the evaluation as they were able to identify and track the deployment of twins in the states.

Lesson 5. Capacity involves developing the individual skills as well as retaining skilled personnel. Evidence obtained in visits to the states was that there is still a huge capacity gap across all MDAs as a number of Ministries were losing trained staff to NGOs and other organisations, largely because of low remuneration levels in the civil service. For example, the Kiir Mayardit hospital in Rumbek had one doctor, one anaesthetist and no nursing staff, down from 14 doctors when it was established.

Lesson 6. Project processes and results are more likely to be sustainable if they have synergy with other initiatives within UNDP or other organisations. Some of the initiatives that were started by CSSOs collapsed when they left. Key informants at state level said they could not continue with the initiatives due to lack of funding as government was not funding operational budget for activities. The initiatives that have continued to survive are typically those that were linked to other ongoing initiatives, as for example in Torit where some of the Cooperatives were linked to the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and World Food Programme (WFP) interventions.

Lesson 7. Effectiveness can be compromised if direct beneficiaries are not engaged and involved in project processes from the beginning. Directors of some of the hospitals that were visited said if they had been consulted, they would have recommended CSSOs with different professions from the ones that were deployed.

Recommendations

The evaluators concluded that the project was overall successful in terms of its limited objectives to improve performance of civil servants in some of the targeted institutions. However, the evaluators were cognisant of the continuing capacity gap that still exists in South Sudan's civil service and in that regard, made six specific recommendations for consideration by UNDP and its partners.

Recommendation 1. Key project partners, including in particular the Government of Norway, IGAD and UNDP should continue to support civil service capacity building in South Sudan (see Section 5.1 on relevance). This is critical for the success and consolidation of the peace process that is underway.

Recommendation 2. UNDP should consider the following adjustments to the project design and strategy:

- a) Each CSSO should coach/mentor a group of national twins rather than a single twin. This entails determining the optimum number of twins for maximum impact.
- b) Secondment of South Sudan civil service personnel to selected IGAD countries for intensive comprehensive on-the-job training of the functioning of entire departments; and on completion, use these as national trainers. This will alleviate challenges to do with language barriers as well as application of local standards and regulations.
- c) Ensure that there are clear TORs and specific deliverables for the CSSOs upon their deployment so that capacity development is uniform laterally across states, as well as horizontally between central, state and county governments.

Recommendation 3. UNDP should establish a mechanism whereby CSSOs maintain contact with their twins via email and/or social media as part of continuous mentoring/coaching. The twins had developed personal and professional relations with their respective CSSOs, and a number of them would wish to continue the relationship.

Recommendation 4. UNDP should ensure that programme staff have more involvement and oversight of the project in order to retain institutional memory after the exit of project staff.

Recommendation 5. The Government should ensure that targeted institutions have appropriate staff that will be twinned with the CSSOs. This should include ensuring that there is clarity with regards to the grade level of the respective CSSO/twin as well as ensure that the twinned personnel remain in position for the duration of the project.

Recommendation 6. The Government should honour its commitments, especially with regards to welfare of CSSOs in terms of accommodation and transport. This should also include taking appropriate measures to ensure that trained personnel are retained in their positions.

ACRONYMS

CAP(s)	Community Action Plan(s)
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPD	Country Programme Document
CSO(s)	Civil Society Organisation(s)
CSSO(s)	Civil Service Support Officer(s)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
GRSS	Government of Republic of South Sudan
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority for Development
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MEST	Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
MLPS&HRD	Ministry of Labour, Public Service and Human Resource Development
MOGSW	Ministry of Gender and Social Welfare
NAC	National Audit Chamber
NGO(s)	Non-Governmental Organisation(s)
NLA	National legislative Assembly
NOREF	Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre
PEB	Project Executive Board
PMTC	Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission (of HIV)
PMU	Project Management Unit
R-ARCSS	Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan
RSS	Republic of South Sudan
SDG(s)	Sustainable Development Goal(s)
SSC	South-South Cooperation
TGoNU	Transitional Government of National Unity
TOR(s)	terms of Reference
TrC	Triangular Cooperation
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
WFP	World Food Programme

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and United Nations Development Programme in South Sudan signed a Third-Party Cost-Sharing Agreement for implementing the project: ‘Support to Public Administration – Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) Regional Initiative for Capacity Building in South Sudan – Phase 2’. The planned implementation period was from 1 October 2013 to 31 March 2016. Implementation was delayed due to ongoing conflict in South Sudan and in May 2016, the parties agreed to extend the project’s period to December 2018;³ and latter to 31 July 2019.⁴ UNDP has commissioned the end line evaluation of the project to assess the project’s contributions towards capacity building/enhancement of South Sudan’s civil service for equitable, responsive, and accountable service delivery.

The evaluation was carried out over a period of 45 working days during the period 30 November 2019 to 31 March 2020. It was undertaken by two independent consultants. This report is the culmination of that evaluation and contains the evaluators’ findings, conclusions and recommendation based on multiple information sources, including official documents and reports as well as consultations with key informants. The report is presented in eight chapters as outlined below.

- ① Chapter 1 introduces the report.
- ② Chapter 2 contains the evaluation purpose, objectives and scope..
- ③ Chapter 3 outlines the evaluation methodology.
- ④ Chapter 4 describes the project and the context in which it was developed and implemented.
- ⑤ Chapter 5 contains the evaluators’ findings based on the evidence gathered.
- ⑥ Chapter 6 highlights some emerging lessons to inform similar programming in future.
- ⑦ Chapter 7 outlines the evaluators’ conclusions and recommendations.

2. PURPOSE, OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

2.1. Purpose

The overall purpose of the end line evaluation was “to assess the project’s contributions towards supporting South Sudan in building its civil service capacity for equitable, responsive, and accountable service delivery”.⁵

³ Addendum I to Third-Party Cost Sharing Agreement

⁴ Addendum II to Third-Party Cost Sharing Agreement

⁵ Evaluation Terms of Reference, p1

The evaluation also served to fulfil UNDPs accountability to donors, national stakeholders and partners through an impartial assessment of the results generated by the project. The key stakeholders and users of the evaluation included *inter alia*, relevant ministries, department and agencies (MDAs) of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS), Government of Norway, IGAD contributing countries – Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, UNDP, UN agencies, United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), civil society organisations (CSOs), academia and think tanks, as well as other development actors.

2.2. Objectives

The specific objectives of the evaluation were as outlined below.

- f) To assess the relevance and strategic positioning of the project to South Sudan’s civil service capacity and public service delivery needs;
- g) To assess (a) the progress made towards project results and whether there were any unintended results and (b) what can be captured in terms of lessons learned for ongoing and future UNDP’s institutional capacity enhancement initiatives in South Sudan.
- h) To assess whether the project management arrangements, approaches and strategies were well-conceived and efficient in delivering the project.
- i) To analyse the extent to which the project enhanced application of a rights-based approach, gender equality and women’s empowerment, social and environmental standards and participation of other socially vulnerable groups such as children and the disabled.
- j) To assess the overall contribution of the project to the state of good governance and public administration in the country.

2.3. Scope

The evaluation assessed the project’s relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability during its implementation. The findings and conclusions were based on data and information collected in six (6) project locations - Juba, Rumbek, Terekeka, Torit, Wau and Yambio.⁶ The assessment included the entire project cycle from its planning and design, implementation, monitoring and reporting.

Assessment of the project’s effectiveness in delivering planned results was based on comparison of performance indicators at baseline and end line as reported by UNDP. This was further triangulated by information obtained from project stakeholders, specifically with regards to (a) examining the factors that contributed to achievement or otherwise of intended results; (b) determining the extent to which the project contributed to building capacities towards public service delivery, addressing crosscutting issues of gender equality and human rights; (c) forging partnerships at different levels including with government, donors, UN

⁶ The other 4 locations – Aweil, Kapoeta, Kwajok and Yei were not visited due to flight scheduling challenges

agencies and communities; and (d) identifying lessons learned and any best practices for future programming of projects of similar nature.

3. METHODOLOGY

The overall methodology was based on a qualitative approach including review of secondary literature and official programme documents, unstructured individual and focus group interviews of key informants, including representatives of key government institutions, UNDP senior management, programme and project staff, programme staff of partner UN agencies. The list of documents reviewed is in Annex 1.

3.1. Data Collection

The evaluation team reviewed key project documents, including project annual work plans, annual and quarterly reports. A total of 75 key informants were consulted in individual interviews and focus group discussions using a semi-structured interview guide. The informants represented a cross section of the project’s stakeholders (see box). The list of individuals interviewed is in Annex 2. The evaluation team also fielded visits to six project locations to consult key informants, particularly the civil service beneficiaries at state level.

Administrative Level	# of institutions
Central government	7 (MPSL&HRD; NAC; MoA; MoH, MoGSW, MEST; SSIA).
States	Health – 5 Finance/labour – 3 Agriculture – 3 Gender – 3 Housing – 1 Education 1

3.2. Data Analysis

Evaluation findings and conclusions were based on qualitative analysis of available data and evidence, including specifically comparative analysis of baseline data with performance data as reported in the annual and quarterly reports. This included collation of key informant perceptions about the project’s performance as well as direct observation. Where specific indicators were developed with baseline data and performance targets, the assessment was based on comparison of the baseline and end line data as reported by UNDP or as observed directly during field visits⁷.

3.3. Limitations

One of the limitations was absence of end line survey to provide specific and objective data on the status of indicators at the end of the project. In addition, the project staff had dispersed in July 2019 when the project ended making it difficult to identify the key partners and beneficiaries at state level. In mitigation, the evaluators used extensive triangulation of information from multiple sources, including review of project files and reports, as well as interviews with government officials at central and state level.

⁷ The evaluation did not undertake an end line survey, this was beyond the scope of the evaluation.

Programme staff in UNDP were not adequately prepared to support the evaluation process. Some of the programme staff were either not willing or just plain incompetent to facilitate an evaluation. The evaluators struggled to get support, including with regards to accessing institutional memory such as project contact lists, or even routine administrative tasks such as flight bookings.

4. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DESCRIPTION

4.1. Country Context

Due to decades of protracted war, when South Sudan gained independence in July 2011, its public sector institutions did not have adequate capacity to provide public services to the population. The national human resource base had been decimated by the long war and displacement.

The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) provided for a six-year transition period followed by a referendum, which ultimately ushered independence on 9 July 2011. During the transitional period, South Sudan embarked on a programme to develop its public sector institutions including establishment of 23 State national and state institutions.⁸ Post-independence, 29 Ministries, 21 Independent Commissions and Chambers, 10 state governments, a national legislature and 10 state assemblies were established. However, some appointments to the civil service were done based on their role in the liberation struggle or in order to engender peace rather than merit and skill. A World Bank study at the time estimated that 50% of civil servants did not have the requisite qualifications and skills required in their positions.⁹

4.2. IGAD Regional Initiative Phase 1

UNDP and the Government of Norway signed a contribution agreement for the first phase of the IGAD Regional Initiative for Capacity Enhancement in South (ern) Sudan in 2010. The project was implemented by UNDP and the South Sudan Ministry of Labour, Public Service and Human Resource Development (MoLPS&HRD) from October 2011 to September 2013. Three IGAD member States committed to second 200 of their civil servants to South Sudan government institutions.

A total of 199 (95% of planned target) Civil Service Support Officers (CSSO)¹⁰ were seconded to 22 Republic of South Sudan (RSS) institutions – 19 Ministries, the National legislative Assembly (NLA), HIV and AIDS Commission and Council of States. Over 1,000 South Sudanese civil servants at the national and state levels benefitted from systematic on-the-job coaching

⁸ Project document, p 3

⁹ Ibid., p 4

¹⁰ The total CSSOs comprised 79 from Kenya and 60 each from Ethiopia and Uganda

and mentoring. An independent research conducted by the Danish Institute of International Studies confirmed that the CSSOs had an impact of the twins' learning and skills through, for instance, developing twins 'analytical skills and the ability to identify problems', including drafting skills which are essential for effective institutional operations.¹¹

Phase II of the IGAD initiative proposed the deployment of additional CSSOs to the State and County levels in order to provide an equitable distribution of mentoring and coaching support particularly where few professionals were available. Phase II would also respond to the demand from the States for capacity development in technical areas, including agriculture and animal resources, health and legislative functions.¹²

4.3. Phase II IGAD Project Description

Due to the success of Phase I, the GRSS with UNDP support requested the Government of Norway and participating IGAD member States¹³ to extend the project. The Third-Party Costs sharing Agreement for Phase II of the project was approved in October 2013. After the December 2013 crisis, only 35 CSSOs from Uganda were deployed in August 2015 as part of Phase II.¹⁴ The first batch of 29 Kenyan CSSOs arrived in October 2015 followed by 26 Ethiopian CSSOs in November 2015. Consequently, Phase II did not effectively start implementation until the following year, while also the July 2016 crisis further disrupted implementation as CSSO were temporarily relocated from Juba and Yei back to their home countries.

In Phase II, the project focused on: (i) deploying the CSSOs to state and county levels to enhance public service capacities at the sub-national level, and (ii) targeted deployment towards critical policy and technical areas in accordance with the government's evolving priorities. Specifically, the project design highlighted the following strategies:¹⁵

- Increased deployment of CSSOs to the states and counties to strengthen extension of state authority at the local level and provide support where it is most needed.
- Increased number of CSSOs deployed in policy and technical areas to strengthen government's core functions and support diversification of the economy.
- Retention of the 30% target for women's placement in the civil service, including (a) balanced distribution of women in all grades among CSSOs, and (b) ensuring gender balance in the identification of local civil service twins [the project strategy was for CSSOs to provide on-the-job training through coaching and mentoring of the local counterparts called 'twins'].

¹¹ IGAD Phase I: Final Report, p 5

¹² IGAD Phase II Project Document, p 15

¹³ Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda

¹⁴ Project Mid-term Evaluation, November 2017

¹⁵ Project document, p 17

Table 1 below shows the project’s results, resources, monitoring and evaluation framework.

Table 1. Project results, resources, monitoring and evaluation framework

Project output. National and state level civil service institutions strengthened.		
Indicator	Baseline and target	Planned budget
Indicator 1. Number of institutional policies developed to enhance operations	Baseline: 2 - Government Records Management Policy and Civil Service Training Policy Target: 7 Policies	A. Cost of CSSOs: Phase 1: \$4,673,592.71 Phase 2: \$15,962,692.00 GMS: \$1,117,388.44 Sub-total: \$21,753,673.15
Indicator 2. Number of strategic plans/frameworks developed to implement established policies.	Baseline: 3 strategic plans approved and 1 framework Target: 5 strategic plans and frameworks	B. Workshops, conferences and international travel costs Sub-total: \$251,450.00
Indicator 3. Proportion of targeted institutions reporting improved work-related performance by the twins.	Baseline: 80% of the supervisors reported improved skills of twins Targets: 90%	C. Management Personnel, Travel, Logistics support, and Office costs Sub-total: \$3,467,011.11
Indicator 4. Proportion of twins expressing satisfaction over the twinning arrangements.	Baseline: 95% of twins gained knowledge from their coach/mentor. Targets: 95%	Sub-total: \$3,467,011.11
Indicator 5. Number of targeted institutions rated as offering improved services.	Baseline: TBD Target: TBD	TOTAL: \$25,472,134.26

Initially Phase II was planned to end in March 2016, but due to “insecurity around South Sudan during part of the initial scheduled period,” it was extended to December 2018, and later to July 2019.

5. FINDINGS

5.1. Relevance

According to UN guidelines¹⁶, **relevance** measures the extent to which a development intervention is consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country’s needs, global priorities and partners’/donors’ policies.

Beneficiaries’ and country’s requirements and needs

The IGAD initiative Phase II involved deploying the CSSOs to state and county levels to enhance public service capacities at the sub-national level. Based on evaluators’ observation of conditions at subnational levels, the project was highly consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements and needs.

¹⁶ UNEG Handbook for Conducting Evaluations of Normative Work in the UN System

Prior to deployment of the CSSOs in Kuajok, the hospital used to refer complicated cases of deliveries to Wau. However, during the tenure of the CCSOs two local doctors were trained to undertake the surgical procedures in Kuajok and there were no further referrals to Wau.

In Terekeka the evaluators found that the project deployed one CSSO nurse from Kenya who was twinned with two nurses. The CSSOs introduced the concept of integrated testing centre where expectant mothers were provided with prenatal testing for hepatitis B, syphilis and HIV. The hospital latter got funding for another project for Prevention of Mother to Child (PMTCT) transmission of HIV, which they attributed to the presence of the CSSO. The CSSO and twins also provided training to **traditional birth attendants** in the communities. Given the distances that women travel to access hospitals as well as lack of ambulance services, this was a commendable and innovative initiative by the CSSO and the twins. By the time of the evaluation, the twins were still continuing with this community outreach initiative.

The capacity gaps within the Ministries at the time of the project implementation and to a large extent even up to the time of this evaluation was overwhelming. This was aptly described in a NOREF report¹⁷ as follows:

The South Sudanese civil service can be described as comprising (1) civilians who stayed during the civil war; (2) demobilised fighters; (3) returnees from Khartoum; (4) diaspora members from elsewhere; and (5) young South Sudanese who have recently graduated from university. While there are capable and committed staff in all these groups, there are also many with very few or no skills, including a category that can be described as “corridor sitters”, i.e. people who are on the payroll, but spend their time doing very little and at times do not even show up for work.

In this context, it was found that the CSSOs not only provided coaching and mentoring in the substantive areas of work. They also supported their counterpart twins in other tasks such as how to use computers, how to write minutes of meetings, and how to write reports. In Rumbek, twins at the State Ministry of Finance said that their CSSOs had mobilised and led the staff to clean the office and premises. This may seem very petty, but it demonstrates the extent of the problem and the relevance of the project at the time. In Wau, the Paediatrician deployed to the state hospital was also teaching at the University of Bahr el Gazal. The evaluators found overwhelming evidence in the states that the CSSOs were highly appreciated across all the sector Ministries to which they were deployed.

¹⁷ Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) 2013; Friends in need are friends indeed: triangular co-operation and twinning for capacity development in South Sudan, p 4

Global priorities

The new generation of country-level programming guidelines¹⁸ emphasise an integrated and multidimensional programming approach that addresses [core programming principles](#) in a holistic manner. One of these core programming principle is sustainability.

“Sustainability guides the focus on maintaining and building on development results. The 2030 Agenda calls for ensuring the lasting protection of the planet and its natural and cultural resources, supporting inclusive and sustained economic growth, ending poverty in all its dimensions and enhancing human well-being. **Strengthening the capacities of national and subnational institutions** and communities is essential. The Cooperation Framework will, as appropriate, help to strengthen these institutions so that they are appropriately configured, capacitated and resourced to advance the achievement of the 2030 Agenda”¹⁹.

The initiative was also consistent with triangular South-South cooperation. South-South cooperation derives from the adoption of the [Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries \(BAPA\)](#) by 138 UN Member States in Argentina, on September 18, 1978. The plan established a scheme of collaboration among least developed countries, mostly located in the south of the planet. South-South Cooperation (SSC) is at the heart of UNDP’s support to help countries achieve their development goals. UNDP is viewed as an effective interlocutor, leveraging its network of offices, policy centres and expertise at the regional and global levels to foster South-South and Triangular Cooperation (TrC).²⁰

“The concept of the initiative was that, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda seconded 199 Civil Service Support Officers (CSSOs) to nineteen South Sudanese ministries at the state and national level for two-year terms. The aim was to support capacity development in government agencies through rapid secondment of CSSOs from IGAD member states. The strategy for implementing this objective was to provide ‘coaching and mentoring’ of South Sudanese civil servants by the CSSOs. The seconding states would retain their CSSOs on payroll during the full deployment. UNDP managed the programme and Norway provided funding to cover administration and allowances for the CSSOs. The initiative was thus an example of triangular South-South cooperation for capacity development utilising long-term coaching and mentoring – or ‘twinning’ – through on-the-job training as its key operational modality. It was an attempt to address the crippling capacity gaps

¹⁸ UNDG 2019; United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework - Internal Guidance, p 10

¹⁹ Ibid., p 11

²⁰ <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/2030-agenda-for-sustainable-development/partnerships/sdg-finance--private-sector/south-south-cooperation.html> accessed 01/03/2020.

in South Sudan while accommodating calls for culturally and technically appropriate capacity, local ownership and regional cooperation”.²¹

The evaluation therefore found the project was highly relevant and consistent with global priorities.

UNDP Strategic Plan, Country Programme Document (CPD) and SDGs

To achieve the objectives outlined in its Strategic Plan in line with the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development, UNDP is implementing six cross-cutting approaches to development, known as [Signature Solutions](#).²² The achievement of these signature solutions depend largely on existence of national institutional capacity to plan, implement and monitor development programmes. The project is directly aligned with the signature solution for **Governance for peaceful, just, and inclusive societies**. In that respect, the evaluators found the project to be highly consistent with UNDP’s Strategic Plan 2018 – 2021.

In 2018, UNDP noted that “...national and subnational institutions require capacity strengthening as they are nascent and besieged by insufficiently qualified staff. The country has untapped non-oil revenue generation potential. Inefficient revenue mobilization and administration systems intensify socioeconomic deprivation of the predominantly youthful population. Service delivery in critical sectors, such as health (including provision of antiretroviral therapy and treatment of tuberculosis and other communicable diseases) is provided almost exclusively by humanitarian and development organizations”.²³ By seeking to enhance institutional capacity at subnational levels, the IGAD initiative was therefore highly relevant and aligned to UNDP’s CPD, specifically the United Nations Cooperation Framework (UNCF)/CPD Outcome 1: Strengthened peace infrastructures and accountable governance at the national, state and local levels.



Based on the project’s objectives and assessment of the activities undertaken in the project locations that were visited, the evaluators found that the project was directly aligned to, and directly contributed to the following SDGs as illustrated below.

²¹ Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 2013; Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict – a case study of OPEN, p 2

²² Signature Solutions: (1) Keeping people out of poverty; (2) Strengthen effective, inclusive and accountable governance; (3) Enhance national prevention and recovery capacities for resilient societies; (4) Promote nature-based solutions for a sustainable planet; (5) Close the energy gap; and (6) Strengthen gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls.












²³ UNDP Country Programme Document 2019 – 2021, p 3

Figure 1. SDGs directly aligned with the project

	<p>The project directly contributed to SDG 16 by strengthening institutional capacity of the civil service both at national and subnational levels.</p>
	<p>The project strengthened partnership between the Government of South Sudan and (i) the Government of Norway, and (ii) the participating IGAD member states.</p>

Due to the project’s strategy for ‘on-the-job’ training through mentoring and coaching, the CSSOs were also involved in direct service delivery within the institutions to which they were seconded. In addition, as a capacity building initiative, the project’s long term impact should result in improvement of service delivery. In that connection therefore, the project also indirectly contributed to ten (10) SDGs as per the targeted institutions.

Figure 2. SDGs to which the project indirectly contributed by location

		<p>The project targeted the Ministry of Agriculture in Juba, Torit and Yambio.</p>
	<p>60 percent of the CSSOs were deployed in the health sector, in all the project’s ten (10) locations.</p>	
	<p>The project deployed CSSOs at the University of Bahr El-Ghazal in Wau.</p>	
	<p>CSSOs were deployed in the Ministry of Gender in Juba, Torit, Wau and Yambio</p>	
	<p>The project had CSSOs deployed to the Ministries of Labour in the following locations: Aweil, Juba, Rumbek, Torit and Wau.</p>	
		 <p>In Juba and Yambio, CSSOs were also deployed to the Ministries of Trade.</p>
	<p>CSSOs were also deployed to the Ministries of Housing in Juba and Yambio.</p>	
	<p>The project deployed CSSOs to the Finance Ministries in Aweil, Juba, Rumbek and Yambio as well as the Investment Authority in Juba.</p>	

5.2. Effectiveness

UNDP evaluation guidelines assert that effectiveness measures the extent to which the initiative’s intended results (outputs or outcomes) have been achieved or the extent to which progress toward outputs or outcomes has been achieved.²⁴ The assessment of the project’s effectiveness focused on determining whether or not the project’s planned results were achieved based on the stated indicators, baselines and targets. As a qualitative evaluation, the rating scale of achieved, satisfactory and unsatisfactory was used to assign the evaluators’ assessment based on progress made against planned targets.

²⁴ Programming, Monitoring and Evaluation Handbook, p 169

Achievement of project outputs

Overall, the evaluation found that the project achieved its planned output targets. Three out of five indicators were exceeded, while one of the remaining two was satisfactory. The fifth indicator was not rated due to insufficient data. The following tables show the documented results based on annual and evaluation reports, which are further corroborated by the evidence that was independently collected during the course of this evaluation.

Table 2. Project Indicator 1: Number of institutional policies developed

Indicator	2016 Results	2017 Results	2018 Results	Assessment
Indicator 1. Number of institutional policies developed to enhance operations Baseline: 2 - Government Records Management Policy and Civil Service Training Policy Target: 7 Policies	42	6	6	Achieved

UNDP's annual reports indicate that a total of 54 institutional policies were developed during the tenure of the project.²⁵ The independent mid-term evaluation also reported that 53 institutional policies were developed by 2017.²⁶ Based on direct observations as detailed below, it was found that the project achieved its planned outputs and surpassed the planned targets.

Most of the CSSOs that were deployed in office functions did effectively contribute to development of institutional policies. For example, in Rumbek, it was noted that two CSSOs from Kenya were deployed to the MLPS&HRD. The CSSOs led in the development of the State Employment Policy as well as Training Policy for the Ministry. At central government level, a Social Protection policy was developed by the Ministry of Gender and Social Welfare (MOGSW); while also the national Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) policy and strategic framework was developed by the Ministry of Education Science and Technology (MEST); as well as development of TVET curriculum for secondary schools.

The above represents a sample of the institutional policies that were independently verified by the evaluators. However, it was also apparent that the individual capacities of the twins as it relates to whether or not they were now independently capable to develop and produce these institutional policies was still limited. The evaluators observed that any outputs that were initiated by the CSSOs but not completed by the time of their departure have remained

²⁵ 2016, 2017 and 2018 Project Annual Reports

²⁶ Final Mid-term Evaluation Report: Support to Public Administration Project - RSS/IGAD Regional Initiative for Capacity Enhancement in South Sudan, November 2017; p 14

incomplete. For example, in the Rumbek state Ministry of Finance, the CSSOs had started to lead the development of the state Development Plan, but left before it was completed. This was still not completed by February 2020, and the responsible twins said that they did not have the capacity to complete the exercise independently. Similarly in the Ministry of labour, it was expected that CSSOs would help in the development of a database of state employees. However, the CSSOs left before this could be done and so the database was not done because the trained twins felt they do not have the requisite skills.

Table 3. Project Indicator 2: Number of strategic plans developed

Indicator	2016 Results	2017 Results	2018 Results	Assessment
Indicator 2. Number of strategic plans/frameworks developed to implement established policies. Baseline: 3 strategic plans approved and 1 framework Target: 5 strategic plans/frameworks	21	11	20	Achieved

According to project annual reports, a total of 53 strategic plans/frameworks were developed. The project target was to develop five strategic plans/frameworks, which this evaluation independently verified to have been exceeded as outlined below.

Four CSSOs all from Uganda were deployed to the National Audit Chamber (NAC) and each CSSO was twinned with 4-6 audit staff. The NAC staff confirmed that with the guidance of the CSSOs, they were able for the first time to develop their Annual Strategic Plan in-house. They were also able to develop (a) Annual Operational Plan, (b) Human Resources Strategy Plan, as well as developing several manuals including (i) Regulatory Audit Manual, (ii) Performance Audit Manual, and a Communications Audit Manual. In addition to developing these physical outputs, NAC personnel had also gained knowledge enabling them to independently undertake 1 performance audit and 3 regulatory audits in 2018. For 2019, the NAC had planned to audit 34 public institutions comprising MDAs, but were only able to do nine due to budgetary constraints.

The NAC staff noted however, that Auditing standards were constantly evolving and in order to keep up, they need to have some of their personnel sponsored to gain professional qualification abroad. For example, new international standards for Financial Audit and Compliance Audit have been developed but they did not have those skills locally.

An Annual Strategic Plan was developed for the MOGSW in 2017 and the twins have been able to develop subsequent annual plans independently since then. In addition, the CSSOs

also helped to develop indicators for gender mainstreaming, which the Ministry uses to assess gender performance across other MDAs. At state level, the evaluation verified that Annual Strategic Plans were developed with CSSO support in the following MDAs: (a) state MLPS&HRD in Rumbek, (b) state MARD in Torit and Yambio; (c) state Ministry of Trade in Yambio; and (d) state MOGSW in Wau.

Table 4. Project Indicator 3: Proportion of institutions reporting improved performance of twins

Indicator	2016 Results	2017 Results	2018 Results	Assessment
Indicator 3. Proportion of targeted institutions reporting improved work-related performance by the twins Baseline: 80% of the supervisors reported improved skills of twins Targets: 90%	92%	96%	94%	Achieved

According to UNDP reports, the planned project targets were achieved as shown in Table 4 above. However, based on the non-statistical sample of institutions visited, the evaluation independently verified and confirmed that more than a third of the institutions visited did not experience improved performance by the twins (see box). The variation is attributable to the time difference between the annual reports and the evaluation. The reports were made when the CSSOs were still present, while the CSSOs and in some

Location	# of institutions visited	# reporting improved performance by twins	# reporting no improved performance by twins
Kwajok*	1	1	0
Juba	7	5	2
Rumbek	4	3	1
Terekeka	1	1	1
Torit	6	4	2
Wau	4	2	2
Yambio	1	0	1
Total %		63.5%	37.5%
*Informant was interviewed in Terekeka			

cases, some of the twins had left by the time of the evaluation. Two major challenges were identified by the group that did not report improved performance by twins. Firstly, they noted that there were mismatched skills between the CSSO and twins, such that there was limited direct coaching/mentoring. Secondly they observed that the project was undertaken during a period of austerity where the government only provided Chapter 1 budget (salaries), so there were no operational resources to carry out activities on which to base the coaching/mentoring. In Wau for example, the ‘twins’ at the state Ministry of Agriculture noted that ‘...due to insecurity in the state, the only activity that we were able to do was training, but even this was through discussions for 30 minutes to one hour on some specific subject. This was hardly enough to make any changes in capacity. Even after the CSSO left, we have not done any training and capacity is still very low’.

Overall however, the evaluators found that project performance to increase work-related performance of the ‘twins’ was satisfactory. There was also greater appreciation for the CSSOs in those sectors where they were also involved in direct service delivery, in particular in the hospitals, and the twins in this sector particularly benefitted the most.

Table 5. Project Indicator 4: Proportion of twins satisfied with twinning arrangement


Indicator	2016 Results	2017 Results	2018 Results	Assessment
Indicator 4. Proportion of twins expressing satisfaction over the twinning arrangement Baseline: 95% of twins gained knowledge from their coach/mentor. Targets: 95%	85%	93%	85.3%	Partially achieved. Satisfactory

Project annual reports show that the targets for Indicator 4 were not achieved (Table 5), implying that a substantial number of twins were not satisfied with the twinning arrangements. This evaluation noted however, that the indicator was not formulated properly and there could be some inconsistencies with the annual measurements. The indicator itself purports to measure ‘the proportion of twins **expressing satisfaction with twinning arrangements**’; while the baseline and target measure ‘proportion of twins that **gained knowledge from their coach/mentor**’. This inconsistency gives rise to different interpretations by respondents and could cause significant variance in annual measurements.

Based on the responses obtained from interviews with the ‘twins’ in this evaluation, majority of the twins were satisfied with the twinning arrangements. Most of the twins said they had benefitted immensely from their respective CSSOs. At the hospital in Torit for example, the local staff did not know how to use the Complete Blood Count (CBC) machine and Oxygen machine until after the CSSOs taught them (see picture). In the state MLPS&HRD in Torit, one of the twins said that he had done a human resources audit for the first time with the help of the CSSO. In almost all cases where the twins recommended continuation of the project, they all requested the return of the particular CSSO that they had twinned with. This was an indication that they had developed personal and professional relations with their respective CSSOs, and by proxy, were generally satisfied with the twinning arrangements. Overall therefore, since no dedicated end line survey was undertaken, the evaluation has rated this indicator as satisfactory.



Table 6. Project Indicator 5: Number of target institutions rated as offering improved services

Indicator	2016 Results	2017 Results	2018 Results	Assessment
Indicator 5. Number of targeted institutions rated as offering improved services. Baseline: TBD Targets: TBD	No data	90%	85.7%	 Unrated

There was no end line survey undertaken to determine the exact number of institutions that were providing improved services. However, based on review of the project’s annual reports for 2017 and 2018, the evaluators noted that the number of institutions offering improved services was reported to be declining from 90% in 2017 to 85.7% in 2018. This is assuming that a standard survey was conducted, with comparable samples and questions in both years.

Based on key informants interviewed as part of this evaluation, the evaluators were of the opinion that the institutions providing improved services could indeed be declining, but not in any way attributable to the project. Majority of key informants noted that public service delivery was generally declining due to budgetary constraints, with government only funding salaries for civil servants. Even then, some civil servants had not been paid for periods up to six months or more. At the government’s Kiir Mayardit hospital in Rumbek for example, the evaluators noted that there was only one medical doctor, one anaesthetist and zero nursing staff; down from ten doctors, 17 nurses and 10 midwives when the hospital was first opened in 2014.

“All the hospital staff have left due to poor salaries and remuneration”.
 Hospital Director

There were also institutions that had negative experience with their respective CSSOs, either because of mismatched skills or due to lack of skills by the CSSO. For example at the Investment Authority in Juba, the CSSO was not involved in any activities because the institution had no operational budget during the entire period of the project. In Torit, one of the CSSOs, a Kenyan deployed to the Department of Human Resources Management did not have any skills and was reported not to have contributed to anything. Some of the key informants, especially at the level of Director Generals who were responsible for managing the CSSOs also felt that they should have been more engagement and consultation with recipient institutions during selection of the CSSOs. For example, in Torit, the hospital administration felt that deployment of at least one or two Radiologists would have had bigger impact at institutional level.

On the other hand, there were also institutions that could demonstrably attribute improved service delivery to the CSSOs (see box). The evaluation found that capacity of the national gender machinery was very low at the time. The project was instrumental in the establishment and capacity building of state Ministries of Gender in Torit and Yambio, which had zero capacity at the time of their establishment. The evaluation was unable to assign an overall rating for this indicator. It is also noteworthy to point out that no baseline or target was established or updated for this indicator, thus making it difficult to measure and assess progress.

State Ministry of Gender and Social Welfare (Wau)

“For us, the project was very timely because it came when the Ministry was being established and separated from the Ministry of Youth, Culture and Social Welfare. The two CSSOs helped us to establish the Ministry and develop Gender Policy, Social Protection Policy, Code of Conduct and our first ever Strategic Plan. The CSSOs also capacitated us to work across sectors to mainstream gender, and when they left, their recommendation was not done by our Ministry alone, but was endorsed by the State Council of Ministers”.

5.3. Efficiency

In assessing the project’s efficiency, the evaluators sought to objectively determine the extent to which the project’s qualitative and/or quantitative result could be attributed to its activities.

Overall, the evaluation found that the project’s quantitative outputs were delivered efficiently and could be directly attributable to its activities. For example, for the first time, the NAC developed its annual strategic plans in-house and realised cost savings by foregoing external consultancy services.

The qualitative results, such as the institutional and individual capacity that was developed was more difficult to ascertain and would require a dedicated survey or end line capacity assessment. However, a majority of the twins that were interviewed said they had benefited immensely from the CSSOs.

Management and coordination


The overall project governance, including management decisions and approval of annual plans and revisions was exercised by the Project Executive Board (PEB), which met quarterly and co-chaired by MoLPS&HRD and UNDP. Other members of the PEB included representatives from the participating IGAD countries, i.e. Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda; the donor – Norway; as well as IGAD Secretariat and UNDP. A Technical Committee with similar membership was also established to discuss and advise the Project Management Unit (PMU) on technical issues, and it convened bi-monthly.

The PMU exercised day-to-day management of the project and was placed in MOLPS&HRD. Once the CSSOs were deployed to the field, their management fell under the MDAs to which they were seconded. The evaluation found that the project management architecture enabled government to exercise overall ownership of the project and associated activities. It was also found that splitting the operational and administrative management of CSSOs between the State Ministry to which they were deployed and the MOLPS&HRD in Juba had its own problems. For example, some CSSOs could claim leave days on the basis that this had been approved in Juba when in fact it was not (see box).

One CSSO deployed in Torit had indicated that he was staying on duty through the December holiday season, but advised his supervisor that he was approved to go on leave. He was later detained by security agents at the border area for unlawful photographing and was eventually deported from South Sudan.

Some key informants also noted that the project design included a provision whereby the twins would continue to use laptops that were allocated to the CSSOs so that they have access to relevant files and information. When the CSSOs left, they surrendered the laptops to MOLPS&HRD in Juba. However, there were instances when the laptops did not reach intended beneficiaries and the institution was not aware of the delivery of six laptops (Rumbek hospital). Two laptops were delivered to the Kiir Mayardit hospital, but they were out of order and beyond repair. The two CSSOs deployed to the state Ministry of agriculture in Torit also left their laptops behind, but they had deleted all the files. The evaluators found that this component of the project was not implemented effectively.

Figure 3. Project Organogram



Resources utilisation

This evaluation was undertaken after the project had ended and after the project manager had left the country. However, it appeared that UNDP programme staff did not exercise hands-on management of the project as they seemed to struggle to provide institutional memory of key information, including financial data and project contact lists in the project locations. The Mid-term evaluation²⁷ also made similar conclusions, when it noted that:

“It was observed that there is no central location/single source where all project documentation can easily be accessed (p 11); ...The project lost over US\$ 5 million due to exchange rate depreciation between the Norwegian Kronor and US Dollar. UNDP did not timely report the losses to the donor. Resultantly, key project activities like provision of the CSSO Innovative Grant were undermined (p 15)’.

In order to preserve institutional memory, UNDP should take a more active approach and not leave everything to the project managers whose tenure is limited to project life cycle.

Interestingly, the evaluation found that project delivery of available resources was high at 90.8 percent (Table 7). This means management of the project by the PMU in terms of activity implementation was commendable in spite of the hostile operating environment characterised by conflict and limited access to some areas. Key informants also commended the CSSOs, noting that majority of them were very humble and had settled well in their respective communities and adopted to local conditions.

Table 7. Project financial data.

	Total (US\$)	Available (US\$)	Expenditure (US\$)	Delivery rate (%)
Planned budget	25,472,134.00			
2016		5,370,263.00	5,466,435.40	101.8
2017		5,296,817.66	4,634,273.66	87.5
2018		2,224,515.03	1,604,197.61	72.1
Sub-totals		12,891,595.69	11,704,906.67	
Project delivery				90.8%

Overall therefore, the evaluation found that project efficiency was mixed. With regards to resources utilisation, the project had low budget delivery efficiency but high expenditure efficiency of available resources. With regards to management and coordination, the design had appropriate structure, although UNDP engagement was weak. For example, the delivery of laptops that were used by CSSOs to their respective twins was not efficiently coordinated, and as a result some of the computer laptops could not be accounted for.

²⁷ Support to Public Administration Project RSS/IGAD Regional Initiative for Capacity Enhancement in South Sudan: Final Mid-term Evaluation Report, November 2017

5.4. Sustainability

Sustainability measures the extent to which benefits of initiatives continue after external development assistance has come to an end.²⁸ This involves establishing the extent to which relevant social, economic, political, institutional and other conditions are present and, based on that assessment, making projections about the national capacity to maintain, manage and ensure the development results in the future.

The following case study illustrates the complexity of the issues in South Sudan and the findings that can be inferred based on the case study.

Case Study: Cooperative Directorate, Torit

Three CSSOs were deployed to the state Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development in Torit. They were attached respectively to three directorates of Extension Services, Research and Cooperatives. The two CSSOs that were attached to Extensions and Research reportedly undertook training workshops as well as community outreach activities, especially for extension services. However, none of them left behind any written reports or documented materials. They also left behind their two laptops, but all files were deleted.

On the other hand, the CSSO that was attached to the Cooperatives directorate also conducted many training workshops. Actually, senior directors in the Ministry noted that the cooperative movement in Torit was non-existent and was only revived through the efforts of the CSSO. Through his efforts, the directorate produced three manuals: (i) Formation of Cooperatives, (ii) Cooperative Budgeting, and (iii) Cooperative Leadership Skills.

The Directorate also developed eight Community Action Plans (CAP) for the eight Payams that make up the town of Torit. The projects envisaged in the CAP experienced funding challenges partly because the NGOs that were going to fund them withdrew support after the CSSO left. They also established two Cooperative Unions, two Marketing Cooperatives, one beekeeping cooperative and reactivated four dormant marketing cooperatives in the Magwi area. The cooperatives were now annexed to Food Security project implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), where they are getting further support; and through those linkages, have been registered as suppliers by the World Food Programme (WFP).

However, five of the staff of the directorate have since left and joined local and international NGOs. Furthermore, senior directors also noted that the Cooperatives Directorate falls under different ministries in different states. This made coordination and sharing of information and lessons difficult for them.

²⁸ UNDP Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results, p 170

Although the above case study pertains to one state and even one Ministry, it nonetheless gives some useful pointers about the sustainability of the project. Firstly, the notion that the project is anchored in national institutions is by itself not sufficient to assure its sustainability. As highlighted in the case study, most of the staff of the Cooperatives Directorate have left the Ministry to join NGOs in search of 'greener pastures'.

Secondly, the government lacks financial capacity to sustain these initiatives. The case study illustrates how the CAPs have not been implemented due to funding challenges. Furthermore, development partners do not have confidence in the government's accountability. As soon as the intervention reverts back to government management without an external overseer in the form of attached CSSOs, NGOs withdrew their support in part because they have no confidence in government's capacity to deliver as well as its accountability to partners and stakeholders.

Thirdly, establishing synergy across related interventions is critical for sustainability. The case study illustrates how such linkages have ensured the sustainability of the cooperatives that were established because of linkages with FAO and WFP interventions.

6. LESSONS LEARNED

There were a number of lessons that emerged over the course of the project's implementation, of which the key ones are outlined below.

Lesson 1. CSSOs can be twinned with more than one individual. Based on evidence from the states, the capacity gaps that CSSOs found in the states were not only technical, but often included almost everything from office procedures, work ethics and using computers to mention some of the most basic skills. The evaluators recorded numerous instances where the CSSOs mentored/coached the whole department or even the whole Ministry in some of these basic tasks. In Rumbek for example, key informants at the state Ministry of Finance, Labour, Public Service and Human Resource Development said the CSSOs showed them how to keep the office environment clean and developed the filing system that they still use to this date. This is an illustration that individual CSSOs, can be able to coach/mentor a group of twins, or depending on their specific terms of reference, they can coach/mentor a whole department.

Lesson 2. CSSOs cannot deliver standard comparable results if their contribution is based only on their individual initiative. As noted throughout the report, some CSSOs were considered to have been very successful and helpful by their respective twins, while others were considered not so successful. The example in the state Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development is illustrative. While the CSSO deployed to the directorate of Cooperative Development initiated many interventions, there were no results delivered by the CSSO deployed to the Research directorate. The lesson here is about the need to ensure

that CSSOs have specific Terms of Reference when they are deployed. This will ensure a minimum standard of delivery across the board, while at the same time not limiting those with higher initiative to provide extra services.

Lesson 3. Practical level coaching/mentoring may not be enough to build effective capacity.

Majority of key informants, especially at senior level of Director and Director-General level felt that there was a need for their staff to get advanced training. A particularly notable example was at the NAC. Key informants said they had received practical mentoring and coaching with respect to developing annual work plans, strategic plans and regulatory audits. However, professional auditing standards were continually evolving and this required staff to have advanced training and accreditation to regional and global audit institutions in order to keep abreast with these changes. The key lesson is that while practical coaching is essential, it should be complemented with advanced training of key civil service personnel, thereby establishing a cadre of national civil service professionals who may be able to mentor their colleagues.

Lesson 4. Embedding the PMU in government enhances ownership of project processes and results.

The evaluators observed that UNDP lacked institutional memory of the project. For example, UNDP was unable to provide the evaluators with a contact list of the twins or respective supervisors in the target institutions to which the CSSOs were deployed. It was evident that the government had complete ownership and leadership of the project processes, and that project memory exists more in government than within UNDP.

Lesson 5. Capacity involves developing the individual skills as well as retaining skilled personnel.

The one thing was very evident during the visits to the states was that there is still a huge capacity gap across all MDAs. It was noted that a number of Ministries were losing trained staff to NGOs and other organisations, largely because of low remuneration levels in the civil service. The case of the Kiir Mayardit hospital in Rumbek is a particularly glaring example where the hospital staff are down to one doctor, one anaesthetist and no nursing staff. The lesson here is that unless government delivers on its commitments, including in staff retention, there will be limited improvement in the civil service capacity situation.

Lesson 6. Project processes and results are more likely to be sustainable if they have synergy with other initiatives within UNDP or other organisations.

The evaluation noted that some of the initiatives that were started by CSSOs collapsed when they left. Many key informants gave evidence to the effect that they could not continue with the initiatives due to lack of funding, with government only intermittently providing Chapter 1 budget and no operational budget for activities. The initiatives that have continued to survive are typically those that were linked to other ongoing initiatives, as the case in the Cooperative directorate in Torit. Synergy with other projects was therefore a critical factor for the project's sustainability.

Lesson 7. Effectiveness can be compromised if direct beneficiaries are not engaged and involved in project processes from the beginning. The evaluation noted that effectiveness could have been enhanced if the direct beneficiaries were involved in selection of the CSSOs. For example, the Directors of some of the hospitals that were visited said if they had been consulted, they would have recommended CSSOs with different professions from the ones that were deployed.

7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Conclusions

The evaluators concluded that the project was overall successful in terms of its limited objectives to improve performance of civil servants in some of the targeted institutions. This should however be understood in a context of general limited capacity in South Sudan. Even at the time of this evaluation, civil servants were still facing a challenge of irregular payment of salaries. Even when the salaries were paid, the salary scale were small and insignificant as one Director-General in a state Ministry put it:

'It is very difficult to strictly enforce punctuality or work hours among staff. Everyone has alternative activities to supplement their incomes, even for me, my pay cannot even buy a single chicken'.

In that regard, the project was more successful in sectors where the CSSOs were involved in direct service provision, particularly in hospitals and to some extent in agricultural extension work and cooperative development. Firstly, there continues to be a general shortage of qualified medical staff and therefore the CSSOs were seen as additional capacity whose services were much appreciated at institutional level. Secondly, as a highly technical field, the CSSOs were twinned with national staff who had at least a basic training in the field; and therefore they could actually learn something from the CSSOs.

The performance of the CSSOs was not uniform across the states, most likely because there were no specific terms of reference (TORs) given to them prior to deployment. Individual CSSOs seemed to have developed their work plans according to their own initiative. For example, in a single institution where two or more CSSOs were deployed, one could be reported as having been very active, organising training workshops, visits to communities and resource mobilisation with donors and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). On the other hand, the other CSSO would be reported as not having done anything due to lack of operational budget or other similar challenges. If they had been deployed with specific TORs and deliverables, it would have been easier to measure their performance objectively against set criteria.

The government also appeared not to have been quite ready for the project. In the first place, there were some commitments that the government made with respect to its counterpart

contributions, including for example taking care of the welfare of the CSSOs once they were deployed to their respective locations. In most instances the government did not deliver on any of its commitments such as accommodation and transport for the CSSOs. This was due to the budget constraints that the government was experiencing, partly because of the prolonged conflict situation and attendant humanitarian crisis.

As noted above, the timing of the project was therefore not the best, under the circumstances. However, there were still some decisions within government's control which could have improved the project's operational environment. For example, the constant changes of senior management in ministries did not help the project much. The CSSOs were under the operational supervision of the Director-General within each Ministry, and therefore every time the Director-General was changed and a new one appointed, the CSSOs were affected. The new Director-General would bring their own perspectives in terms of priorities and expectations for the CSSOs.

Overall however, these challenges were insignificant compared to what the project achieved only by exposing civil servants to the CSSOs and their work ethic. Coming to work on time, taking care of the work environment, keeping record of everything, including writing minutes of meetings and filing systems. For most of the twins, this was their first time to actually see how a functional office works. One senior civil servant who is now a Director-General in Torit observed that she had joined the civil service in 2015, had not received any induction at all and was not even trained for the job she was recruited to do. Everything that she knows now, she learnt from her twin CSSO.

7.2. Recommendations

In compiling the following recommendations, the evaluators were cognisant of the continuing capacity gap that still exists in South Sudan's civil service. The recommendations were also informed by the evaluators' perceptions about ongoing political developments in South Sudan with regards to the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) in line with the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) signed in September 2018. These new developments will exacerbate the capacity challenge, as the government seeks to consolidate peace and establish its authority and legitimacy through enhanced public services while also reducing the number of states from 32 to 10.

Recommendation 1. Key project partners, including in particular the Government of Norway, IGAD and UNDP should continue to support civil service capacity building in South Sudan (see Section 5.1 on relevance). This is critical for the success and consolidation of the peace process that is underway.

Recommendation 2. UNDP should consider the following adjustments to the project design and strategy:

- d) Each CSSO should coach/mentor a group of national twins rather than a single twin. This entails determining the optimum number of twins for maximum impact.
- e) Secondment of South Sudan civil service personnel to selected IGAD countries for intensive comprehensive on-the-job training of the functioning of entire departments; and on completion, use these as national trainers. This will alleviate challenges to do with language barriers as well as application of local standards and regulations.
- f) Ensure that there are clear TORs and specific deliverables for the CSSOs upon their deployment so that capacity development is uniform laterally across states, as well as horizontally between central, state and county governments.

Recommendation 3. UNDP should establish a mechanism whereby CSSOs maintain contact with their twins via email and/or social media as part of continuous mentoring/coaching. The twins had developed personal and professional relations with their respective CSSOs, and a number of them would wish to continue the relationship.

Recommendation 4. UNDP should ensure that programme staff have more involvement and oversight of the project in order to retain institutional memory after the exit of project staff.

Recommendation 5. The Government should ensure that targeted institutions have appropriate staff that will be twinned with the CSSOs. This should include ensuring that there is clarity with regards to the grade level of the respective CSSO/twin as well as ensure that the twinned personnel remain in position for the duration of the project.

Recommendation 6. The Government should honour its commitments, especially with regards to welfare of CSSOs in terms of accommodation and transport. This should also include taking appropriate measures to ensure that trained personnel are retained in their positions.

ANNEXES:


Annex 1. Documents reviewed

1. UNDP (2015); Project Annual Report, 2015
2. UNDP (2016); Project Annual Report, 2016
3. UNDP (2017); Project Annual Report, 2017
4. UNDP (2018); Project Annual Report, 2018
5. UNDP (2019); Project Progress Report, Q2-2019
6. UNDP (2019); Addendum II – No-cost Extension 2019
7. NIIS (2013); Policy Brief: Civilian capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict
8. UNDP (2017); Mid-term Assessment Report
9. Project Document; Support to Public Administration:
IGAD Regional Initiative for Capacity Enhancement in South Sudan - Phase II
10. No-cost Extension: IGAD Phase II
11. NOREF (2013); Report: Friends in Need are Friends in Deed
12. NIIS (2013); Policy Brief: With a little help from my friends
13. UNDP (2016); Revised Work plan: Oct 2013 – Dec 2018
14. NOREF (2013); Policy Brief: Triangular Cooperation for Government Capacity Development in South Sudan

Annex 2. Individuals interviewed

#	Name	Title	Institution
	JUBA		
1	Ephraim Wolyan	Audit Manager	NAC
2	Selfador Lado Alfeo	Senior Audit Manager	NAC
3	Ayen Yai Kuol Arop	Director Public	NAC
4	Venansio J Logumu	Deputy Director Audit	NAC
5	William George	Assistant Audit Manager	NAC
6	Edmon John	Audit Manager	NAC
7	Dut Kuol De Dut	Deputy Training	NAC
8	Betty Kiden Elyzai	Senior Inspector Gender	MoG&SW
9	Jane Tumalu Erasto	Senior Inspector Gender	MoG&SW
10	James Kiden Jackson	Deputy Director	MoG&SW
11	Dr Thuou Loi	Anesthetist	
12	Juac Agok Anyan	Director Qualification Standard Development	
13	Kuc Gideon Tueny	Director General of TVET	
14	Hon.Juma Yoane Kebi	Undersecretary	MoLPS&HRD
15	Garang Kuel	Director Human Resource Development	MoLPS&HRD
16	Rose Joseph	Liaison Officer	MoLPS&HRD
17	James Tipo Kol	Director General	MoLPS&HRD
18	Kok Bol Bulabek	Director General	SS Investment Authority
19	Angelo Joseph Lemor	Planning Officer	Ministry of Agriculture
20	Santo Louis Lorori	Planning Officer	Ministry of Agriculture
21	Jackline Minda Francis	Planning Officer	Ministry of Agriculture
22	Peter Mazadi Nathan	Inspector Planning	Ministry of Agriculture
	UNDP		
22	Kamil Kamaluddeen	Country Director	UNDP
23	Eliman Jagne	Duty Country Director	UNDP
24	Andrew Shuruma	Team Leader	UNDP
	Donors		
28	Christiane Kivy	Programme Officer	Embassy of Norway
29	Ojja Bosco	Programme Officer	Embassy of Norway
	TEREKEKA		
32	Dr Augstino Hwan	Medical Director	Terekeka Hospital
33	Anna Khamisa	Nurse	Terekeka Hospital
34	Kiden Rose Yakata	Midwife	Terekeka Hospital
	TORIT		
46	Simplisio Saverio	Nurse	Torit Teaching Hospital
47	Angilo Jaden	Theater Attendant	Torit Teaching Hospital

48	Dr John Issac	Medical Director	Torit Teaching Hospital
49	Cecilia Apai	Laboratory in-charge	Torit Teaching Hospital
50	Okure Galdo Anthony	Assistant Laboratory Attendant	Torit Teaching Hospital
51	Wani Bosco Sabastin	Acting Director	MoLPS&HRD
52	Augustine Labike	Director	MoLPS&HRD
53	Issac A. Paul	Director General	Ministry of Agriculture
54	Romeo Ojunga	Director General Research	Ministry of Agriculture
55	Johnson Kenyi Simon	Director General Cooperative	Ministry of Agriculture
56	Botulis Dominic	Director Cooperative	Ministry of Agriculture
57	Leone Amure	Assistant Director Cooperative	Ministry of Agriculture
58	Idwa Dominica	Director General	MoG&SW
59	Bahket Roma	Engineer	Ministry of Housing
60	David Justin	Director General	Ministry of Housing
	YAMBIO		
61	Phillip Crespo	Director General	MoLPS&HRD
	RUMBEK		
62	Dr Simon Mangok	Medical director	Rumbek State Hospital
63	Simon Peter Manyang	Anesthetist	Rumbek State Hospital
64	John Ater Riak	Nurse	Rumbek State Hospital
65	Dr Bornada Bol	Medical Officer	Rumbek State Hospital
66	Sebit Maker Malook	Director Planning and Budget	Ministry of Finance
67	Abraham Makur	Director of Standards	Ministry of Finance
68	Joseph Lueth Weljang	Director Commerce	Ministry of Finance
69	Adok Mabeny	Director General	Ministry of Finance
70	William Luk Majak	Director Planning	Ministry of Finance
	WAU		
71	Dr Thonk Manjok	Director General	Wau Teaching Hospital
72	Dr Edman Sebit	Medical Director	Wau Teaching Hospital
73	Dr Thomas Madit	Dean College of Medicine	University of Northern Bahr- Gazal
74	Ann Daniel Ali	Director General	MoG&SW
75	Joseph Martin Khamis	Director Extension	Ministry of Agriculture



1. Consultancy Information
<p>Consultancy title: End-line Evaluation for the Support to Public Administration Project – RSS/IGAD Regional Initiative for Capacity Enhancement in South Sudan- Phase II Project</p> <p>Duration: 30 days</p> <p>Duty Station: Juba, South Sudan, with possible travel to states</p>
2. Background and Context
<p>The Support to Public Administration Project – RSS/IGAD Regional Initiative for Capacity Enhancement in South Sudan- Phase II was designed in line with the 2012-2016 South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) and the annexed Medium-Term Capacity Development Strategy (MTCDS). The project aimed to support South Sudan in building its civil service capacity for equitable, responsive, and accountable service delivery. It addressed three levels of capacity: enabling environment (policy, legal, regulatory and institutional); organizational (work procedures and operational arrangements); and individual (skills development) levels. The project was funded by the Government of Norway while three IGAD countries; Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda contributed experienced civil servants who spent two years in South Sudan’s national and subnational government institutions. The project was implemented in Aweil, Juba, Kapoeta, Kuajok, Rumbek, Terekeka, Wau, Yambio and Yei.</p> <p>The project was initially aligned to the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the UNDP Country Programme Document (January 2012 - June 2016); Outcome 1: <i>Core governance and civil service functions are established and operational</i>, then to the UN Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF)/ Country Programme Document (CPD) (2016-2018) Outcome 3: <i>Peace and governance strengthened</i>, and lastly to the current 2019-2021 UN Cooperation Framework and CPD Outcome 1 <i>Strengthened peace infrastructures and accountable governance at the national, state and local levels</i>.</p> <p>The following were some of the key achievements of the Support to Public Administration project;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 92 percent of host institutions reported improved capacity of civil servants. ● 19 gender responsive institutional policies, manuals and SOPs were developed, approved and are in use. ● Six institutional policies were developed and operationalized. ● Twenty strategic frameworks were developed and submitted for approval. ● 96 percent of targeted institutions reported improved work-related performance by the twins. ● 93 percent of twinned civil servants expressed satisfaction over the twinning arrangements. ● 90 percent of targeted institutions reported improved services delivery.
3. Purpose of the Evaluation
<p>The Support Public Administration Project ended on 31 July 2019. This evaluation is being conducted to assess the project’s contributions towards supporting South Sudan in building its civil service capacity for equitable, responsive, and accountable service delivery.</p>

UNDP commissions this final evaluation to provide UNDP, donors, national stakeholders and partners with an impartial assessment of the results generated by the project. The evaluation will assess the project's relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability contributions towards gender equality and women empowerment; identify and document lessons learned; and provide stakeholders with recommendations to inform the design and implementation of other related ongoing and future projects. Key stakeholders include relevant ministries, department and agencies of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, Government of Norway, IGAD contributing countries – Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, UNDP, UN agencies, UN Mission in South Sudan, civil society organisations, think tanks and other actors.

4. Evaluation scope and objectives

a. Scope

The end-line evaluation will cover the period of 1 October 2013 to 31 July 2019, covering all the project locations; Aweil, Juba, Kapoeta, Kuajok, Rumbek, Terekeka, Wau, Yambio and Yei. The evaluation will cover programme conceptualisation, design, implementation, monitoring, reporting and evaluation of results and will engage all project stakeholders. The evaluation will assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency of the project; explore the key factors that have contributed to the achieving or not achieving of the intended results; and determine the extent to which the project is contributing to improving public service delivery; addressing crosscutting issues of gender equality and women's empowerment and human rights; and forging partnership at different levels, including with government, donors, UN agencies, and communities.

Objectives

Specific evaluation objectives are:

- i. To assess the relevance and strategic positioning of the project to South Sudan's civil service capacity and public service delivery needs;
- ii. Assess a) the progress made towards project results and whether there were any unintended results and b) what can be captured in terms of lessons learned for ongoing and future UNDP's institutional capacity enhancement initiatives in South Sudan.
- iii. Assess whether the project management arrangements, approaches and strategies were well-conceived and efficient in delivering the project.
- iv. Analyse the extent to which the project enhanced application of a rights-based approach, gender equality and women's empowerment, social and environmental standards and participation of other socially vulnerable groups such as children and the disabled.
- v. Assess the overall contribution of the project to the state of good governance and public administration in the country.

5. Evaluation questions

The evaluation seeks to answer the following questions, focused around the evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, including cross cutting issues of human right and gender equality:

Relevance: To what extent was the project in line with the national development priorities, the country programme's outputs and outcomes, the UNDP Strategic Plan and the SDGs;

Effectiveness: To what extent were the project outputs achieved, and contribution to the country programme outcomes and outputs, the SDGs, the UNDP Strategic Plan and national development priorities;

Efficiency: To what extent was the project management structure efficient in generating the expected results;

Sustainability: Are there any risks that may jeopardize the sustainability of the project;

Human rights: To what extent have the disadvantaged and marginalized groups benefited from the work of UNDP in the country;

Gender equality: To what extent have gender equality and the empowerment of women been addressed in the design, implementation and monitoring of the project

Guiding evaluation questions will be further refined by the evaluation team and agreed with UNDP evaluation stakeholders.

6. Methodology for the evaluation

The evaluation will be carried out in accordance with UNDP evaluation guidelines and policies, United Nations Group Evaluation Norms and Ethical Standards; OECD/DAC evaluation principles and guidelines and DAC Evaluation Quality Standards.

The evaluation will employ a combination of both qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods including:

1. Document review of all relevant documentation. This would include a review of inter alia; project document (contribution agreement); theory of change and results framework; programme and project quality assurance reports; annual workplans; consolidated quarterly and annual reports; results-oriented monitoring report; highlights of project board meetings; and technical/financial monitoring reports.
2. Semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders including key government counterparts, donor community members, representatives of key civil society organizations, UNCT members and implementing partners:
 - Development of evaluation questions around relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability and designed for different stakeholders to be interviewed.
 - Key informant and focus group discussions with men and women, beneficiaries and stakeholders.
 - All interviews should be undertaken in full confidence and anonymity. The final evaluation report should not assign specific comments to individuals.
3. Surveys and questionnaires including participants in development programmes, UNCT members and/or surveys and questionnaires involving other stakeholders at strategic and programmatic levels.
4. Field visits and on-site validation of key tangible outputs and interventions. The evaluator is expected to follow a participatory and consultative approach that ensures close engagement with the evaluation managers, implementing partners and direct beneficiaries.
5. Other methods such as outcome mapping, observational visits, group discussions, etc.
6. Data review and analysis of monitoring and other data sources and methods.

The final methodological approach including interview schedules, field visits and data to be used in the evaluation will be clearly outlined in the inception report and be fully discussed and agreed between UNDP, stakeholders and the evaluators.

7. Evaluation products (Deliverables)

The evaluator will be expected to deliver the following:

- a) Evaluation inception report (10-15 pages). The inception report should be carried out following and based on preliminary discussions with UNDP after the desk review and should be produced before the evaluation starts (before any formal evaluation interviews, survey distribution or field visits) and prior to the country visit in the case of international evaluators.
- b) Evaluation debriefings. Immediately following an evaluation, UNDP may ask for a preliminary debriefing and findings.
- c) Draft evaluation report (max 40 pages). UNDP and stakeholders will review the draft evaluation report and provide an amalgamated set of comments to the evaluator within 10 days, addressing the content required (as agreed in the inception report) and quality criteria as outlined in the UNDP evaluation guidelines.
- d) Evaluation report audit trail. Comments and changes by the evaluator in response to the draft report should be retained by the evaluator to show how they have addressed comments.
- e) Final evaluation report.
- f) Presentations to stakeholders and the evaluation reference group.
- g) Evaluation brief and other knowledge products agreed in the inception report.

8. Evaluation team composition and required Competencies

The end line evaluation will be conducted by an independent consultant (an international evaluation expert). The international consultant must have extensive experience in strategic programming of development assistance in post-conflict countries within the broader areas of public administration and democratic governance in post conflict settings. Preferably, the consultant also has substantial knowledge of and experience with the monitoring and evaluation of similar initiatives in volatile environments. The required qualifications and technical competencies are listed below:

Qualifications

- Minimum Master's degree in Law, Public Policy and Management, Public Administration, Development Studies, International Development, or any other relevant educational background.

Technical competencies

- At least 7 years (and recent – latest should have been conducted within the past 2 years) professional experience in conducting evaluations of similar public administration and governance initiatives in post-conflict settings.
- At least 10 years' experience in the fields of public administration, institutional capacity building, governance, and gender mainstreaming and human rights promotion.
- Excellent writing skills with a strong background in report drafting.
- Demonstrated ability and willingness to work with people of different cultural, ethnic and religious background, different gender, and diverse political views.

9. Application Process

Interested candidates are expected to submit the following;

- Detailed technical proposal demonstrating understanding of objectives, scope of the evaluation, proposed methodology, evaluation deliverables and timeframes (not more than 4 pages)
- Updated CV demonstrating relevant academic and professional qualification, and experiences.
- Clearly outlined itemised financial proposal

Evaluation Criteria

- For evaluation and selection method, the Cumulative Analysis Method [weighted combined score method] is used in this recruitment:
 - a) Technical Qualification (100 points) weight; [70%]
 - b) Financial/Price Proposal (100 points) weight; [30%]
- A two-stage procedure is utilized in evaluating the proposals, with evaluation of the technical proposal being completed prior to any price proposal being compared. Only the price proposal of the firm who passed the minimum technical score of 70% of the obtainable score of 100 points in the technical qualification evaluation will be evaluated.

Technical Evaluation Criteria	Weighted Score
1. Education: Minimum Master's degree in Law, Public Policy and Management, Public Administration, Development Studies, International Development, or any other relevant educational background.	15
2. At least 7 years (and recent – latest should have been conducted within the past 2 years) professional experience in conducting evaluations of similar public administration and governance initiatives in post-conflict settings.	20
3. At least 10 years' experience in the fields of public administration, institutional capacity building, governance, and gender mainstreaming and human rights promotion.	10

4. Demonstrated understanding of objectives and scope of the evaluation	20
5. Concise and coherent methodology clearly articulating how the anticipated deliverables will be achieved	35
TOTAL	100

9. Implementation arrangements

The UNDP South Sudan Country Office will select a qualified and experienced evaluation consultant through UNDP procurement processes in consultation with the partners. UNDP will be responsible for the management of the consultant and will in this regard designate an evaluation manager and focal point. Project staff will assist in facilitating the process (e.g., providing relevant documentation, arranging visits/interviews with key informants).

The project manager and evaluation manager will convene an evaluation reference group comprising of technical experts from partners and UNDP to enhance the quality of the review. This reference group will review the inception report and the draft evaluation report to provide detailed comments related to the quality of methodology, evidence collected, analysis and articulation of findings and approve the final report. The reference group will also advise on the conformity of processes to UNDP and UNEG standards.

The consultant will take responsibility, with assistance from the project team, for setting up meetings and conducting the review, subject to advanced approval of the methodology submitted in the inception report. The consultant will report directly to the designated evaluation manager and focal point and work closely with the project team. The consultant will work full time, based in UNDP South Sudan and will be required to travel to the project locations as part of the evaluation. Office space and limited administrative and logistical support will be provided. The consultant will use her/his own laptop and cell phone.

UNDP will develop a management response to the evaluation within 2 weeks of report finalization.

10. Timeframe for the evaluation process

The evaluation will be carried out over a period of 30 working days broken down as follows:

Deliverables	Days
Inception report	5 days
Evaluation debriefing:	
Draft evaluation report	20 days
Final evaluation report	5 days
Evaluation report audit trail	
Power point presentation for stakeholders	30 days