Agulhas
Applied Knowledge

Impact Analysis of Projects Implemented by LHSP through a Perception Study

Baseline Report

31 July 2020

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1. Executive Summary

In April 2020 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) retained Agulhas Applied Knowledge ('Agulhas') to prepare a baseline assessment of projects implemented by the Lebanon Host Communities Support Programme ('LHSP'), through a perception study (hereafter, 'the project'). The research team launched data collection in June and provided the UNDP with initial indicator data in July 2020. This report contains our analysis of the survey results.

Our key findings are as follows.

- Respondents across our sample reported being significantly adversely affected by the current economic and political crisis in Lebanon: 17% were no longer able to afford food and 64% stated that they were buying less food. Syrians and those in South Governorate were more likely to report being unable to buy food. Only 8% of our sample reported the same level of spending on non-essential items and could be described as unaffected by the crisis.

- Nearly half, 45%, of the Lebanese respondents surveyed were not optimistic about their future in the country and were planning to leave Lebanon. Being young or unemployed strongly correlated with a desire to leave Lebanon.
    - Unemployed respondents did not believe that the 17 October protests would have a positive impact on their futures and wanted to leave the country.
    - The more educated the respondents, the more likely they were to believe the protests would positively affect the country's future.
    - Groups not part of traditional power structures, such as women, youth, Syrians and Palestinians, were also more likely to feel alienated and unable to make a difference in their communities.

- Most respondents in the sample believed that local services had deteriorated over the past year; this perception was most acute in the Bekaa Governorate. No one sampled believed that more jobs had become available. Youth activities and infrastructure (roads and bridges) consistently emerged as the least satisfactory services. Bekaa had the highest share of respondents likely to complain about the state of local services.

- There were differences between where people *thought* they would take complaints about municipal services, and where they in fact took their complaints. Although only 15% of Syrians thought they would hypothetically raise complaints with the municipality; in practice, 38% of those with a complaint turned to the municipality. Although fewer women, 47%, than men, 53%, believed they would turn to the municipality with complaints, in fact a higher proportion of women, 65%, turned to the municipality. This indicated that politically underrepresented groups also considered the municipality to be a legitimate body to complain to as well as the Lebanese (65% of Lebanese complained directly to the municipality).

- Respondents in Mount Lebanon were most likely to report that the municipality had engaged with them in setting its priorities, while those in Bekaa felt least engaged. Syrians were less likely to have been engaged by their municipality than Lebanese residents. Although respondents generally reported that the municipality understood their priorities and needs, most believed that the municipality was unable to respond, due to limited budgets and mandates.

- Our respondents perceived Syrians and youth to be the two most marginalised communities, although Lebanese residents said that youth, the elderly and women were most marginalised. We found a widespread belief amongst Lebanese that Syrians were being given aid while they were left behind.

- Most respondents attributed LHSP-funded projects to the municipality. Regardless of whether respondents attributed projects to the municipality or international donors, we found widespread agreement that projects had increased confidence in the municipality's ability to deliver services.

- Reported rates of tension between Syrians and Lebanese dropped significantly year-on-year, from 71% in 2019 to 25% in 2020. This is likely because respondents were more preoccupied with hyperinflation and the shutdown triggered by COVID-19.
  - Results showed that respondents were much more likely to believe there were tensions between communities than to experience such tensions themselves.
  - Disputes between Syrians and Lebanese were highest in the Bekaa, even though respondents in Mount Lebanon and the North believed there were more tensions in their communities.
  - Lebanese and Syrians addressed disputes differently: Lebanese were most likely to turn to local and governmental authorities (such as the municipality or the ISF), whereas Syrians were most likely to turn to family members, possibly due to concerns that their residency papers may not be available.

- While there was near universal agreement that violence was not an acceptable way to resolve disputes, respondents in the Bekaa were least likely to hold this view (at 86%) and respondents in the North were most likely to report having used violence to resolve a dispute (at 14%).

Although implementation of UNDP's integrated peacebuilding programme is embryonic, our survey tracked perceptions towards violence in schools, the municipal police and fake news. This data forms our baseline for future analysis of perceptions and programme effectiveness.

- An overwhelming majority of respondents, 93%, believed that violence was not an acceptable form of discipline in school; respondents in the South were most likely to believe that it was. A large majority, 86%, believed that violence in schools reinforced violence in the community, though a slightly smaller share, 79%, believed that reducing violence in schools would have a commensurate impact on reducing violence in the community. Views were mixed on the merits of programming on this topic; some considered the issue to be peripheral, given the country's economic crisis.

- Most interviewees found the municipal police to be credible, 67%, and trusted to resolve disputes, 66%. A large majority, 71%, also felt safe when they saw the municipal police. In practice, however, only 4% reported going to the municipal police with a dispute. The municipal police were perceived to be weak and under resourced.
- Respondents in the North were most likely to believe that there was fake news in the media. Over 50s were least likely to believe this, or to believe that fake news had increased tension in their community. 18-to-29-year olds were slightly less likely to believe there was fake news in the media (75% believed there was) but were more likely to believe that fake news has increased tensions in their community, 81%.

Through regression analysis (using a binary logistic regression), we found statistically significant causal relationships between:

- The number of UNDP interventions in a community and the optimism of residents about their future in the country. With every increase in the number of interventions in a community, residents were more likely to be optimistic about their future in Lebanon.
- Perceived intra-Lebanese tensions and the desire to stay in Lebanon. Respondents who believed that there were no tensions between Lebanese residents were more likely to be optimistic about their future in their community.
- Perceptions that services had improved and optimism about the future. Respondents who perceived that services had improved were more optimistic about their future in Lebanon and wished to remain in the country.
- Employment and optimism about an individual's future in the community: individuals who were employed were more likely to be optimistic about their future in Lebanon.

Perceptions about the municipality did not affect whether individuals wanted to stay in their communities or in Lebanon, neither did perceptions about tensions between Lebanese and Syrians. The amount of money spent on projects was also not a statistically significant factor.

The explanatory power of the model overall is not particularly strong, with a Nagelkerke R Square of 0.109. This means that there are other variables that are not part of our model which play a more significant role in determining respondents' optimism about their future in their community; factors analysed in this report explain about 10.9% of their response.

2. Introduction and methodology

2.1. Research background

Between 2016 and 2018, LHSP's annual impact analyses had focussed on understanding the link between primarily 'hard' LHSP (i.e. infrastructure) projects and the reduction of tensions between Syrian and Lebanese community members.

In recent years, UNDP's efforts have expanded to include efforts to reduce intra-Lebanese tension, support to the municipal police and the piloting of new approaches to peacebuilding within Lebanese communities and between Lebanese and displaced Syrians. These peacebuilding projects comprise 'fake news' campaigns to counter misinformation, activities to reduce violence in schools and a greater focus on community engagement activities within municipalities.

This 2020 baseline research study differed in scope and approach to research conducted in previous years. In line with the UNDP's expansion in its range of programmes and its new indicators (see Table 1, below), the Agulhas research has gathered baseline data on a broader range of programmes and matters. The Agulhas research also took place in an entirely new community cohort.

Table 1: Indicator data

Indicator	Description	Type	2019	2020
Impact	Proportion of residents in the target municipalities who perceive tensions between refugees and the host communities in the target areas.	Historic	71%	25%
	Proportion of residents who perceive that the municipality is responding to their needs.	Historic	69%	55%
Outcome	% of residents who feel the municipal support projects have a positive impact on the local community.	Historic	57%	72%
	% of residents who are aware of, or participate in, community engagement activities by the municipality.	New	Not applicable ('NA')	39%
	% of residents who believe that the municipality better understands their needs.	New	NA	72%
	% of residents who are aware of, follow, or subscribe to, a local online fake news campaign.	New	NA	22%
	% of residents who believe that fake news can contribute to increasing tensions or incidents.	New	NA	39%

	% of community members who consider that violence in school reinforces cycles of violence in the broader community.	New	NA	87%
	% of residents who believe reducing violence in schools would help decrease tension and violence in the community.	New	NA	80%
	% of residents who feel engaged in the changes that are happening in their community. (MSR)	Historic	27%	37%

2.2. Communities

The research team carried out field research in 10 communities proposed by the UNDP (see Table 2, below). Three communities were in the Bekaa region, two in the North, three in the South and two in Mount Lebanon.

Two communities, Chekka and Qob Elias, were the target of a broad range of programming, i.e. integrated programmes including traditional LHSP support, counter-disinformation, violence free schools and municipal policing programming. Two communities: Miyeh-w-Miyeh in the South and Qsarnaba in the Bekaa, had no LHSP projects at the time that the survey was conducted.

Table 2: Research communities

Community	Area	Donor(s)	Intervention Start	Budget (spent and allocated)	MSR	Media	VFS	Municipal police
Qob Elias	Bekaa	LRF-Germany, DFID, CSSF Japan	2014	$ 1,407,752	☑	☑		☑
Chtoura	Bekaa	KFW	2020 (under prep)	$ 388,500	☑			
Qsarnaba	Bekaa	Italy KFW	2017	$ 302,517	☑			
Qalamoun	North	USA-BPRM KFW	2016	$ 550,944	☑		☑	
Chekka	North	CSSF, DFID	2018	$ 450,171	☑	☑	☑	☑
Miyeh-w-Miyeh	South	DFID, KFW	2020 (under prep)	$ 488,453	☑			

Haris	South	Italy, DFID CSSF	2017	$ 560,570	☑			
Abbasiyeh	South	KFW	2020 (under prep)	$ 398,500	☑			
Jdeidet el-Chouf	Mount Lebanon	Netherlands, DFID CSSF, US-BPRM	2019	$ 957,178	☑			
Baaqline	Mount Lebanon	DFID, KFW, LRF-Germany	2015	$ 452,462	☑			

2.3. Survey structure and ToR alignment

Our data collection methodology was designed to align with the 13 UNDP research components outlined in the project's ToR. This structure also guided our key informant interviews and focus group discussions. We outline these components in Table 3, below, in the order these are addressed in this report.

Table 3: Sections of the survey questionnaire and their link to the ToR components

Title	ToR Component
Outlook	Changes in perception of residents regarding their agency (including their participation in the identification of needs and priorities) and their sense of optimism for the future.
Quality of services and livelihood opportunities	Changes in residents' assessments of the availability, quality and value of municipal services. Changes in residents' assessments of the availability and quality of livelihood opportunities.
Grievance mechanisms	Residents' awareness of grievance and accountability mechanisms related to the provision of basic services.
Relevance of services	Changes in residents' assessments of their municipality's capacity to identify and prioritise needs and capacity to provide, maintain and operate municipal services. Residents' assessments of their municipality's capacity to maintain and operate the assets used to provide the municipal services including the assets provided by LHSP.
Community engagement and resident agency	Changes in perception of residents regarding their agency (including their participation in the identification of needs and priorities).

| Project-specific questions | Impact of increased municipal services, livelihood opportunities and / or peacebuilding initiatives on residents' confidence in, or perception of the legitimacy of local government, including consideration of attribution.

Residents' assessments of their municipality's capacity to maintain and operate the assets used to provide the municipal services including the assets provided by LHSP. |
|---|---|
| Tensions and violence | Changes in the nature and levels of tension, and social stability (e.g. positive interactions, violent incidents, inclusion of different groups – including refugees - in LHSP structures and activities) more broadly, between and among host communities and Syrian refugees. |
| Integrated approach | Impact of integrated approach (municipal policing, violence free schools and local media support) on social stability in select municipalities.

Impact of municipal policing support on residents' sense of community safety and security. |

2.4.   Research approach

Our research approach focused on three data collection methods.

i)   A **quantitative survey** implemented through remote phone-based interviews in each of the 10 communities, which sampled 1,470 respondents; after excluding 60 surveys due to bias (see Section 1.6.), we included 1,407 surveys in our final analysis.

ii)   **41 Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)** supplemented the survey to aid analysis.

iii)   Finally, we ran 10 **Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)** in July to delve into survey data and aid analysis.

We underpinned our research and analysis with a short community-level political economy and conflict analysis.

2.5.   Sampling

Our data collection relied upon **snowball sampling** as we anticipated that gathering phone numbers of residents through other would be challenging due to data protection or may be a source of bias. Snowball sampling is a non-probability sampling technique where existing study subjects recruit future subjects from among their acquaintances.

Our sample size was statistically representative, with a confidence level of 95% and a confidence interval of 8. The confidence level allowed us to be 95% certain of the accuracy of the results. The confidence interval reflected the margin of error: if, for example, 48% of the sample selected a certain answer, we could be "sure" that if we had asked the question to the entire relevant population, between 40% (48-8) and 56% (48+8) would have picked that answer.

Our sampling was based on population estimates provided to us by the UNDP. As census data in Lebanon has not been made public, we were unable to verify these estimates. Where we cite population estimates in subsequent sections, we refer to the source of these estimates if these differ from UNDP estimates.

Table 4: Distribution of respondents by municipality

Area	Village	Total estimated population	Ratio Syrian to Lebanese	Sample size	Lebanese	Syrian
Bekaa	Qob Elias	31,542	1.8	149	53	96
Bekaa	Chtoura	3,988	1.6	145	56	89
Bekaa	Qsarnaba	4,285	0.3	145	113	32
North	Qalamoun	7,799	0.6	147	91	56
North	Chekka	9,988	0.2	79	67	12
South	Miyeh-w-Miyeh*	25,215	0.1	150	118	12
South	Haris	3,800	0.1	142	130	12
South	Abbasieh	13,724	0.2	149	130	19
Mount Lebanon	Jdeidet el-Chouf	69,705	0.3	146	114	32
Mount Lebanon	Baaqline	7,904	0.1	155	143	12
Total		**177,950**		**1,470**	**1015**	**372**

* The sample in Miyeh-w-Miyeh included 20 Palestinians.

2.6.   Limitations

Three factors limited our survey methodology and analysis.

1. **Research limitations**

   We had planned to boost our survey sample through additional online dissemination on local community pages in the second week of data collection. Within a few days of data collection, however, it became clear that the intelligence division of the Lebanese army had been alerted to our research and was initially alarmed by it due to heightened political tensions in the country. Our team coordinated with the UNDP, who in turn coordinated with the Lebanese army. Given the sensitive content of some of our survey questions (asking, for example, about perceptions towards 17 October protests) and the deteriorating political climate, a joint decision was taken not to proceed with online dissemination.

2. **Survey bias**

   Due to the phone-based nature of our interviews, random (curb-side) surveys were not possible. The change in sampling methodology (to snowball sampling) necessarily means that our sample was not random. A snowball sample carries the risk of not being representative of the underlying population. We mitigated this risk by increasing and diversifying the initial list of survey participants and by assessing survey results for bias across all our communities.

   Through our analysis, we identified bias in one community, Chekka. This bias was associated with a single chain of interviews with one surveyor, which showed a high degree of similarity in responses with a pro-municipality bias. During the data validation process and through our FGD with residents from Chekka, we confirmed the bias. To avoid skewing our data, we eliminated these 60 results from our analysis. We identified no other instances of bias in our data.

3. **Participation in FGDs**

   Due to restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 crisis, we held our FGDs with a skilled moderator remotely over Zoom and Whatsapp. This medium affected our analysis in two ways:

   - Intermittent internet connections and the less personal nature of online meetings led to a reduction in the rate of individuals who joined the FGDs. Whereas we had aimed for six-to-eight participants per area, we averaged between three and five (see Annex 1). Midway through our FGD in one community, for example, national electricity was cut off, which left four of five participants without a connection.

   - Due to concerns over data security and fears that the results might be taken out of context, we did not share the survey results with our interviewees to stimulate

focus group discussions. This was a change on the approach of previous years and may have affected the quality of FGDs.

2.7.   Understanding survey data

We gave all survey respondents the option not to answer a question; we have excluded most 'no answer; responses from the graphs below to avoid cluttering graphs. For ease of reading, we also rounded up all data; this means the aggregate number of responses may occasionally appear to exceed 100%.

2.8.   Respondent profile

The highest percentage of respondents were in the Bekaa and the South (31% each), and the South governorate had the highest absolute value of respondents (441). This was due to the higher number of communities sampled in each of these two areas: three communities in the Bekaa and the South governorates, compared with two communities in the North and Mount Lebanon governorates.

Table 5: Distribution of respondents by governorate

Governorate	Number of respondents	Percentage
Bekaa	439	31%
North	226	16%
South	441	31%
Mount Lebanon	301	21%
Total	**1407**	**100%**

Table 6, below, shows the distribution of respondents by the following disaggregation: age, gender, nationality, working status, and education level.

- **Age:** Overall, the highest single percentage of respondents in our survey were youth (31%) aged between 18 and 29. In the North governorate, the largest group of respondents were youth (47%), while in the Bekaa governorate, the largest group (34%) ranged between 30 to 39 years old; in Mount Lebanon most respondents (37%) were over 50 years old.
- **Gender:** Across all governorates, the ratio of females-to-males survey respondents was similar, as planned in our sampling method. The ratio of Syrian-to-Lebanese followed the population distribution in municipalities, also as we had planned.
- **Employment:** Across governorates, we recorded the highest percentage of unemployed respondents in Bekaa (28%) and North (32%) governorates. Across the board, the percentage of respondents occupied with housework was high (26%); these were overwhelmingly women.

Overall, we calculated the unemployment rate to be 37%, this was higher than the national average of 11.4 % reported by the Central Administration for Statics (CAS) based on the latest

household survey data on 2018-2019. Youth unemployment for the age category (18 – 24) reached 29.4% in our sample, a result close to the national youth unemployment rate of 23.3%.[1] Our sample included a higher share of unemployed people 30-to-39 and 40-to-49 year olds, compared to the national average.

We used the following formula to calculate the unemployment rate.

$$Unemployment\ Rate = \frac{Respondents\ who\ are\ not\ working\ and\ looking\ for\ work}{Total\ of\ respondents\ who\ not\ working\ and\ looking\ for\ work, employed, and\ self\ employed}$$

$$Unemployment\ Rate\ = \frac{320}{320 + 247 + 301} = 37\%$$

Table 6: Respondents distribution by age, gender, nationality, working status, education level across all governorates

Age	Bekaa	North	South	Mount Lebanon	Total
18 - 29	29%	47%	29%	23%	31%
30 - 39	34%	25%	23%	18%	26%
40 - 49	26%	16%	18%	22%	21%
50+	12%	12%	30%	37%	23%
Gender	Bekaa	North	South	Mount Lebanon	Total
Male	47%	43%	50%	50%	48%
Female	53%	57%	50%	51%	52%
Nationality	Bekaa	North	South	Mount Lebanon	Total
Lebanese	51%	70%	86%	85%	72%
Syrian	49%	30%	10%	15%	26%
Palestinian			5%		1%
Working status	Bekaa	North	South	Mount Lebanon	Total
Student	6%	13%	6%	4%	7%
Not working looking for work	28%	32%	14%	21%	23%
Not working not looking for work	3%	0%	3%	2%	3%
Employed	17%	16%	15%	23%	18%
Self-employed	18%	9%	29%	25%	21%
Retired	1%	0%	3%	5%	2%
Occupied with housework	25%	28%	29%	21%	26%
No answer	1%		1%		1%

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[1] 'Presidency of the Council of Ministers', Central Administration of Statistics, Updated 12 August 2020: http://cas.gov.lb/index.php/component/content/article?id=212

Attained education level	Bekaa	North	South	Mount Lebanon	Total
No formal education	10%	4%	9%	2%	7%
Elementary	25%	26%	24%	13%	22%
Intermediate	24%	21%	31%	30%	27%
Secondary	12%	10%	14%	23%	14%
University	20%	35%	20%	30%	25%
Postgraduate	9%	4%	1%	2%	4%
No answer	1%		1%	0%	0%

Figure 1: Respondents' education levels, by governorate

3.   Context and Outlook

3.1.   North Governorate

Chekka, North Lebanon, is a coastal town proximate to the regional capital, Tripoli and connected to two other regional centres: Batroun and Jbeil. Qalamoun, in the Tripoli area has a mixed urban-rural geography due to its straddling of both, the seaside and mountains. Economic activity is concentrated by the seaside.

We analysed the impact of the economic crisis on spending across governorates. Overall, the crisis affected the North less than other regions (such as the South or the Bekaa governorates). Across all communities, we found a statistically significant correlation between optimism about the future and the impact of the economic crisis on people's ability to buy food, meaning that people who are optimistic about their future in their communities were those still able to afford food.

In our Northern communities of Chekka and Qalamoun, we found that the socio-economic deterioration in Lebanon affected food purchase uniformly across the two communities: with 13% of respondents no longer able to buy food. A majority of those who reported that they could not afford food were Syrian, while all the respondents who described no change to food spend were Lebanese.

In our survey, only those who reported being able to buy food were asked to report on their purchase of medicine, education and non-essential spending.

Figure 2: Spending patterns, North Governorate

Of those who could afford food, 44% were buying less medicine, including a higher proportion in Qalamoun compared with Chekka. A majority continue to attend the same school or university, but 17% reported to have stopped spending on non-essential items. 25% of respondents continued to buy the same level of non-essentials items: these can be said to be unaffected by the crisis in Lebanon.

We provide an overview of the demographics and profile of both communities, below. Exact population data in Lebanon is unavailable as census results are not made public by the government.

Table 7: Political and economic profile of Chekka and Qalamoun, in the North Governorate

	Chekka	Qalamoun
Location attributes		
Population estimate	UNDP population estimate: 8,336 Lebanese and 1,652 Syrians.[2]	UNDP population estimate: 4,823 Lebanese and 2,976 Syrians. However, the Qalamoun municipality described itself as having 13,000 residents and 4,000 Syrian refugees.[3]
Rural/Urban	Urban: coastal town connected through the high road to regional centres.	Mixed: rural and urban.
Sectarian profile	Mixed population estimated at 27% Maronites, 20% Greek Orthodox and the remaining Sunni and Shi'a.[4]	Majority Sunni Muslim; specific breakdown unknown.
Political settlement	The residents in Chekka are divided in their political affiliations between the two leading Christian parties, the Free Patriotic Movement and the Lebanese Forces.	The town was historically secular and loyal to Arab and Syrian nationalist political parties, though this has changed.[5] Now, the (largely Sunni) Future Movement traditionally dominates, but there is growing loyalty towards Islamist political groups, such as al-Jamaa al-Islamiya.
Local economy	Relies on private sector and industry, primarily factories such as cement, sugar refining plans, paper and cardboard manufacturing and lime and gypsum quarries. Smaller agricultural sector.	Relies on low-value handcrafts and local produce (olive oil, rose essence). Heavy reliance on public sector, with 70% of the town's residents reportedly employed by the state.
Violence / Use of force (contested /	Unknown; our researchers reported low rates of violence between communities;	Contested - There were issues around 2007-2008 with few residents from town getting

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[2] Though another UNDP report estimated that Chekka has7,500 permanent residents and 1,200 Syrian residents, 400 foreign labourers from Egypt, Bangladesh, India, Philippines, and other countries; see UNDP Chekka Final Report.

[3] 'Qalamoun Administration', Municipality of Qalamoun; Updated on 4 June 2017: https://www.qalamoun.org/municipality/qlm-gov.html

[4] KII, Deputy Mayor, Chekka, July 2020.

[5] See Al Akhbar,«وزيرستان لبنان» هل تتحوّل أستاذاً جامعياً الـ 30 بلدة القلمون Updated on 18 July 2007: https://al-akhbar.com/Archive_Local_News/189263, though this data may be contested.

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uncontested space)	a curfew is imposed on Syrians by the municipality.	involved with armed Islamic groups during clashes with the Lebanese army.
Population attributes		
Education rates % literate	All surveyed Lebanese had received at least a primary school education. 33% of Syrians surveyed had not completed any formal education. 69% of Lebanese and 0% of Syrians reported having a university education.	All surveyed Lebanese had received at least a primary school education. 11% of Syrians surveyed had no formal education. 42% of Lebanese and 2% of Syrians reported having a university-level education.
Female and male education rates	Women were equally likely to have no formal education as men (both 5%). These were all Syrian. A roughly equal number of men (63%) and women (62%) surveyed had an undergraduate or postgraduate degree.	Men were slightly more likely to have no formal education than women (5% compared to 3%). All respondents with no formal education were Syrian. A higher number of women surveyed (34%) had an undergraduate or postgraduate degree, compared to men (16%).
Male employment	A total of 51% of men described themselves as employed (33%) or self-employed (18%).	A total of 29% men self-described as employed (10%) or self-employed (19%).
Female employment	A total of 23% of women described themselves as employed (18%) or self-employed (5%).	A total of 13% of women self-described as employed (12%) or self-employed (1%).
Other	Some reports of widespread use of child labour and heavy competition with refugees for industry jobs.	No serious clashes with refugees over jobs due to the town's reliance on the public sector.

3.2.   South Governorate

On paper, Miyeh-w-Miyeh is a small village east of Saida in southern Lebanon; in reality, its population far exceeds the 4,500 registered residents and its village hosts over 26,000 refugees. Most Palestinian refugees live inside the refugee camp. In comparison, Haris (close to Nabatiyeh) is a village with a relatively homogenous Shi'a population. Our third community, Abbasiyeh, is a larger city in north-east Tyre well-connected to Beirut.

30% of respondents in the South Governorate reported they could no longer afford food: this was the highest rate in our sample. A closer look at data showed that individuals were particularly affected in Miyeh-w-Miyeh. In that community, 60% of Palestinians said they could no longer afford food, and more Syrians than in other towns—92%—reported the same.

Of respondents who could still afford food, 36% were buying less medication and 71% reported they could no longer afford 'non-essential' spending. Only 6% continued to spend the same on non-essential items and could be assumed to be largely unaffected by the crisis.

Figure 3: Spending patterns, South Governorate

We provide an overview of community profiles, below. Population estimates varied between sources and exact population data was unavailable to us.

Table 8: Political and economic profile of Miyeh-w-Miyeh, Haris and Abbasiyeh, in the South Governorate

	Miyeh-w-Miyeh	Haris	Abbasiyeh
Location attributes			
Population estimate	UNDP estimated population: 900 permanent Lebanese, 24,000 Palestinians and 1,000 Syrian refugees.[6]	UNDP estimated population: 8,000 permanent residents; 4,000 seasonable residents, 900 displaced Syrians and 100 others.[7]	UNDP estimated population: 4,500 permanent Lebanese residents and 14,000 non-Lebanese residents including 9,000 Syrian refugees.
Urban / Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban
Sectarian profile	Historically Christian, but largely Sunni Muslim in	Overwhelmingly Shi'a.	Mixture of Shi'a, Sunni and Christians and about

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[6] MRR through the Mechanisms for Stablization and Resilience, March 2019
[7] Project for Updating the Maps of Risks and Resources Through the MSR, March 2019

	profile due to the refugee demographics.		200 Arab Bedouins. Palestinians concentrated in two core areas: Shabriha & Jall el-Bahr (many reportedly also Lebanese nationals). Most refugees reported to live in private accommodation.
Political settlement	Prominent families compete for power, and tension peaks during elections. Conflict between families compounded after the Mayor failed to resign after three years, in breach of an informal agreement between them.[8]	The two main political groups present at Haris are Amal and Hezbollah. The Mayor affiliates with Amal.	Hezbollah and Amal are the primary parties. Others, like Iraqi Ba'ath Party, the Communist Party, Syrian National Party and Palestinian parties also operate.
Local economy	Trade is practically non-existent and limited to certain metal industries. Agriculture is a source of temporary (and seasonal) employment, although the sector faces water shortages and lacks the equipment necessary to make it productive. High dependence on public-sector jobs, particularly in the military (around 15 Generals reportedly originate from the town). The local agriculture sector employs around 500 foreign labourers.	Construction and agriculture are the major sources of revenue; the community also relies heavily on remittances from expats in Sub-Saharan Africa.	Broad-based economy: Carpentry, agriculture, banking, accounting, furniture-making, metallurgy, aluminum and glass-making. Many Syrians work in agriculture—which is heavily affected by water shortages—construction, trade and other industries in the city.
Violence / Use of force (contested /	Contested and overlapping political power structures include the Popular	Relatively low-violence rates; power held in balance.	Tensions occur within the municipality between said parties in a power struggle

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[8] Prominent families include Bizri, Francis, Abo Saba, Al Rifai, Haddad, Saleh and Wanna.

uncontested space)	Palestinian Committee, Fatah, Hamas, Jihad, Phallanges, Lebanese Forces, and Free Patriotic Movement. Control over the camps is heavily contested. Armed organisations in the camp include Fatah, Hamas and Ansar Allah. Armed clashes occur at the camp affecting stability and security of the village.	The most prominent families are Al Ahmad, Al Ali, Nasser, Yehia, Saad, Saleh, Khawaja, Jawad and Fakih.	in town. do not lead to clashes or armed conflict. There is tension between communities over jobs.
Population attributes			
Education rates % literate	3% Lebanese, 17 % Syrians and 5% Palestinians had no formal education. 35% Lebanese no Syrians had a university education.	15% Lebanese and 8% Syrian respondents described themselves as having no formal education. 11% Lebanese no Syrians described themselves as having a university education.	8% Lebanese respondents described themselves as having no formal education; no Syrian said the same. 30% Lebanese and no Syrians described themselves as having a university education.
Female and male education rates	More women than men had no formal education (7% women compared to 3% for men). 30% men and 27% women have university / postgraduate education.	More women than men had no formal education (16% women compared to 13% men). 9% men and 11% women had a university education.	4% men; 9% women without a formal education) 26% men and 27% women were university educated. No Syrians said the same.
Male employment	55.2% men described themselves as employed (19.7%) or self-employed (35.5%).	74% men described themselves as employed (15%) or self-employed (59%).	58% men described themselves as employed (12%) or self-employed (46%).
Female employment	21.7% women described themselves as employed (14.9%) or self-employed (6.8%).	29% women described themselves as employed (11%) or self-employed (18%).	27% of women described themselves as employed (16%) or self-employed (11%).
Other	The presence of Syrian workers has negatively	A dearth of jobs and use of Syrian refugees as	

|		
affected the Palestinians as they compete with them for job opportunities.	cheap labour on farms created competition between Lebanese and Syrian citizens.	

3.3. Mount Lebanon Governorate

Jdeidet el-Chouf and Baaqline are Lebanese villages in the Chouf District of Mount Lebanon. Both are known for their role in regional trade and are heavily populated by the Druze community.

Also known as Beqaata el-Chouf, Jdeidet el-Chouf is located around 45 km from Beirut, on the northern bank of the Barouk River. It is known for having one of the largest trade markets in the Chouf district and for its regional famers' markets. Baaqline is larger and more urbanized compared to Jdeidet el-Chouf. This town has been a capital for the ruling families of Mount Lebanon and has a rich historical and cultural heritage.

Among our respondent pool, Mount Lebanon residents were least likely to be heavily affected by the economic crisis in the country. Only 7% of respondents reported being unable to afford food and those individuals hailed mostly from Jdeidet el-Chouf. That said, 88% of respondents reported buying less food, and 43% were buying less medicine. Non-essential spend was also drastically affected, however, and schooling was becoming unaffordable.

Figure 4: Spending patterns, Mount Lebanon

We provide an overview of the demographics of the area, below.

Table 9: Political and economic profile of Jdeidet el-Chouf and Baaqline, in Mount Lebanon

|	Jdeidet el-Chouf	Baaqline
Location attributes		
Population estimate	UNDP estimated population: 20,000 total.[9] The broader Jdeidet el-Chouf is estimated to total 69,705 residents. The UNDP also estimated a Syrian population of 1,308 individuals.	12,000 permanent residents and 3,000 seasonal residents. Non-Lebanese residents number approximately 2,500 people (including 730 Syrian).[10]
Urban / Rural	Urban	Urban
Sectarian profile	Majority Druze	Majority Druze
Political settlement	The Progressive Socialist Party dominates, with a small presence of civil society supporters, Wi'am Wahab followers (an opposition Druze leader) and the Lebanese Democratic Party (led by Talal Erslen).	Various political groups operate through local Druze officials. These include the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), led by Walid Jumblat. Divisions between the opposition and the municipality have increased and are still evident. The Mayor recently excluded supporters of the 17 October protests from municipal projects, and excluded opposition from the 2019 UNDP MSR process.[11]
Local economy	A regional employer. The area had a booming real estate sector which as a large source of employment; this changed in 2017 due to the country's worsening economic conditions.	Reliant on trade, real estate and remittances. Syrian refugees work in agriculture and construction.
Violence / Use of force (contested / uncontested space)	Relatively uncontested: the Fatayri family dominates and the Mayor is always a Fatayri, as are half of the Municipal Council members. The municipality steps in to resolve disputes if families cannot do so themselves.	Unknown.

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[9] Conflict Analysis Report, Awaer, April 2020

[10] Project for Updating Maps of Risks and Resources through the MSR, Nov 2018

[11] According to findings in the Conflict Analysis Report, Dawaer Foundation, April 2020. In interviews in the Mayor, he clarified that he is not against the revolution, but that he did not want the municipality's meetings to become a forum for debate, so he thought it was easiest to exclude pro-revolution activists.

Population attributes		
Education rates % literate	3% Lebanese respondents and 6% Syrian respondents described themselves has having had no formal education. 22% Lebanese compared to 5% Syrians were university educated.	8% Syrians had no formal education, compared with no Lebanese. 50% Lebanese went to university/ postgrad education.
Female and male education rates	3% men and 4% women had no formal education. 15% men with a university degree; 21% women with a university degree.	1% women had no formal education; these were all Syrian. 50% women had a university or postgraduate degree, compared with 33% of men.
Male employment	70% men self-described as employed (19%) or self-employed (51%).	65% men described themselves as employed (28%) or self-employed (38%).
Female employment	25% women self-described as employed (18%) and self-employed (7%).	33% of women self-described as employed (27%) and self-employed (7%).
Other	Syrian workers were already present in the village before the crisis, working in agriculture, construction and as car mechanics. The Syrian workforce is seen as a competitor and the municipality has prohibited Syrians from opening their own businesses.	

3.4. Bekaa Governorate

Qob Elias, in Zahle, Bekaa, is a town on the Chtoura-Nabatiyeh road. Chtoura is smaller and more affluent area that occupies a more strategic location as core transit route. Qsarnaba is located on a hill; the village's infrastructure is underdeveloped and the area experiences heavy subsidence and mudslides in winter months; the community relies on agriculture.

Our survey results showed that the Bekaa region has been heavily impacted by the socio-economic crisis in Lebanon: 25% of people in the Bekaa reported they could no longer afford food and 62% were buying less food. Most of those affected lived in Qsarnaba. Of those who reported being able to buy food, 55% were buying fewer medication, especially in Qob Elias.

Figure 5: Spending patterns, Bekaa

Respondents in the Bekaa were less likely to change their decisions on education and 52% continued to attend the same school. This was likely due to the high probability that individuals in those communities already attended public schools: the most affordable schooling option. Over half the people in Bekaa stopped non-essential spend, such as going to restaurants or recreational activities. Overall, the crisis has had a significant impact on spending habits in the Bekaa: only 4% continue to spend the same on non-essential items. In interviews, activists from Bekaa stated that job creation must be a priority in the region because the high unemployment rate will lead to violence and other social issues.

We provide an overview of location and demographic attributes, below.

Table 10: Political and economic profile of Qob Elias, Chtoura and Qsarnaba, in the Bekaa Governorate

	Qob Elias	Chtoura	Qsarnaba
	Location attributes		
Population estimate	UNDP population estimate: 50,0000 Lebanese and 30,000 Syrian.[12]	UNDP population estimate: 370 permanent Lebanese residents; 2,000 seasonal Lebanese residents and 705 Syrians in100 residential units.[13]	UNDP population estimate: 8,000 permanent residents, including 200 Syrians. The number of Syrians increased to 1,800 after the conflict began. Syrians live in a mixture of

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[12] MSR Input to the Perception Survey – All Regions.
[13] UNDP, MSR, March 2019; The Project for Updating the Maps of Resources and Risks. Syrians in Chekka are believed to from a higher socio-economic stratum. Note, 235 Chekka Lebanese voted in the 2017 municipal elections.

			camps and independent houses.[14]
Urban / Rural	Urbanised – the village of Qob Elias has grown and its outskirts are not well equipped with basic infrastructure.	Urban a transit route to Central and North Bekaa villages.	Rural
Sectarian profile	65% Sunni and 35% Christian (Christian communities including Maronite, Catholics, Orthodox, Protestant). Arab Bedouins live on the outskirts of the village.	Over 60% Maronite and Catholic. The remaining population is Shi'a, Sunni and Orthodox Christian.	Predominantly Shi'a
Political settlement	Representation in the municipality is split equally between Sunni and Christians. All political groups are active, including specifically the Future Movement, the Lebanese Forces, and the Free Patriotic Movement. The Sabaa party has also gained momentum.	Most municipal officials (six) are Christian and three are Shi'a. Political groups include the Free Patriotic Movement, Hezbollah and Amal. The current Mayor has been in that position for the last four terms (22 years).	Unknown, believed to be controlled by Hezbollah.
Local economy	The region relies on agriculture for around 80% its revenues. Industrial sector is also active, with factories working in agri-food, wine and arak-making, plastics, cardboard, packaging and products complementing agriculture. Syrians tend to work as labourers in agriculture.	Chtoura is the commercial and trading centre of the Bekaa with many restaurants, banks, stores, hotels, wineries, exchange stores and a dairy factory.	Reliant on agriculture and food factories for local employment. Agriculture is plagued by poor irrigation, high water costs and poor equipment and machinery.

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[14] Project for Updating the Maps of Resources and Risks Through the MSR, Dec 2018

Violence / Use of force (contested / uncontested space)	Family violence is common and sectarian violence increases during elections. Violence between tribes breaks out, particularly over the right to move produce (vegetables) through markets and over rents. Violent conflict is sometimes reported between villagers and the Arabs / Bedouins.[15] High rates of weapons proliferation. An increase in robbery.[16]	Shi'a families have more political ties than the rest as they are more actively engaged with Shi'a political parties. Biggest families are Sawma, Chames, Assi and Kassouf.	Unknown
Population attributes			
Education rates % literate	11% Lebanese 16% Syrians with no formal education. 49% Lebanese and 4% Syrians with a university or post-graduate degree.	0% Lebanese and 18% Syrians with no formal education. 61% Lebanese with university or postgraduate degree compared with 4% Syrians.	1% Lebanese and 19% Syrians with no formal education. 51% Lebanese respondents with a university or postgraduate degree.
Female and male education rates	18% women and 12% male respondents with no formal education. 21% of women compared with 20% of men with a university degree.	7% men and 15% women with no formal education. 22% men and 30% women with university or postgrad degree.	6% of respondents with no formal education were women, compared with 2% men. 42% men with a university or post graduate degree compared with 45% women.
Male employment	44% men described themselves as employed (19% employed, 26% self-employed).	35% men described themselves as in employment (10% employed; 25% self-employed).	74% of men compared themselves as employed (30%) or self-employed (44%).
Female employment	30% women described themselves as employed (11% employed; 18% self-employed)	22% women described themselves as employed (18% employed; 4% self-employed)	20 % women described themselves as employed (18% employed; 2% self-employed).

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[15] The largest Muslim families are Al Moallem, Hatoum, Hayek, Merhi, Kazaoun, Harati; the largest Christian families are Badr, Choueiry, Chantiri, Sayyah, Sabat and Lebbos.

[16] Reported by a former MSS committee member interviewed by our team. The individual added that the lack of street lights in the expanded parts of the town has increased instability and incidents of theft.

| Other | The Mayor has reportedly employed many of his family in the municipality and on municipal projects. | Community members from neighbouring villages and towns operate shops and businesses in Chtoura, which leaves the community largely empty when shops close. | Refugees form a core component of the labour force, particularly in agriculture and construction. Child labour is reportedly widespread amongst Syrians in the agriculture sector. |

4. Outlook in Lebanon

45% of Lebanese respondents surveyed were not optimistic about their future in the country and were planning to leave Lebanon. This compared with 50% of Lebanese respondents who stated that they were optimistic about their future and were not planning to leave the country Only 16% of Syrians were optimistic about their future in the communities they live in. A higher share of Syrians wanted to leave Lebanon.

Figure 6: Outlook by nationality

Our analysis showed optimism to be highest in Mount Lebanon and lowest in Bekaa. The Bekaa region also hosted the highest proportion of respondents who wanted to leave their towns. Wealth alone did not explain rates of optimism: although our Mount Lebanon sample was least financially affected by the crisis in Lebanon, respondents in the South were also optimistic despite hosting the highest proportion of residents no longer able to afford food.

Figure 7: Outlook by governorate

One reason for high rates of optimism in Mount Lebanon could be the community's relative wealth coupled with the high degree of homogeneity and tight-knit nature of Druze communities.

*Figure 8: Outlook in the Mount Lebanon Governorate, by nationality*

■ Optimistic   ■ Optimistic, plans to leave town   ■ Not optimistic, plans to leave Lebanon

	MOUNT LEBANON		JDEIDIT EL CHOUF		BAAQLINE	
	LEBANESE	SYRIAN	LEBANESE	SYRIAN	LEBANESE	SYRIAN
Not optimistic	32%	57%	39%	59%	27%	50%
Optimistic, leave town	2%		4%			
Optimistic	66%	43%	57%	41%	73%	50%

In the North—which had the largest share of respondents who wanted to leave the country—rates varied across the two communities. More people wanted to leave Chekka compared to Qalamoun, and Syrians were much more likely to want to leave Lebanon, particularly in Qalamoun.

Figure 9: Outlook in the North Governorate, by nationality

■ Optimistic   ■ Optimistic, plans to leave town   ■ Not optimistic, plans to leave Lebanon

	NORTH		QALAMOUN		CHEKKA	
	LEBANESE	SYRIAN	LEBANESE	SYRIAN	LEBANESE	SYRIAN
Not optimistic	65%	97%	46%	96%	91%	100%
Optimistic, leave town	5%		6%		5%	
Optimistic	30%	3%	48%	3%	5%	

Across all southern towns the South, we found a higher share of respondents optimistic about their future in their own communities compared to other regions. This held true across all Southern towns.

Figure 10: Outlook in the South Governorate, by nationality

| | Optimistic | Optimistic, plans to leave town | Not optimistic, plans to leave Lebanon |

Figure 11: Outlook in the Bekaa Governorate, by nationality

The highest share of respondents who wanted to leave their areas (presumably to Beirut or another urban area) lived in the Bekaa region. The region also showed high rates of pessimism and a desire to leave Lebanon.

Figure 11: Outlook in the Bekaa Governorate, by nationality

4.1.   Community belonging

To understand the degree to which respondents felt a sense of belonging to their community, our survey asked whether respondents felt part of their community, and whether they believed they could make a difference in their community.

We identified the highest rates of belonging in Mount Lebanon and the South, and the Lowest rates of belonging in the North. Similarly, respondents in the North were least likely to feel they could make a difference in their town, likewise in the Bekaa. Although respondents in the South felt a high degree of belonging to their community, they were more likely to disagree that they could make a difference in the town. Respondents in the South and the Bekaa were

also most likely to provide a no-answer response to these questions. This trend comes up repeatedly in our analysis.

Figure 12: Community belonging, by governorate

PART OF TOWN

■ Disagree   ■ Agree   ■ Neutral   ■ No answer

	BEKAA	NORTH	SOUTH	MOUNT LEBANON
Neutral	12%	14%	9%	9%
No answer	0%		3%	
Agree	70%	67%	79%	91%
Disagree	18%	19%	10%	6%

MAKE A DIFFERENCE HERE

■ Disagree   ■ Agree   ■ Neutral   ■ No answer

	BEKAA	NORTH	SOUTH	MOUNT LEBANON
No answer	7%		8%	
Neutral	15%	15%	22%	6%
Agree	58%	56%	49%	79%
Disagree	20%	29%	22%	15%

Figure 13: I feel that I am part of this town, by community

■ Disagree   ■ Agree   ■ Neutral   ■ No answer

	QOB ELIAS	CHTOURA	QSARNABA	QALAMOUN	CHEKKA	MIYEH W MIYEH	HARIS	ABBASIEH	JDEIDIT EL CHOUF	BAAQLINE
No answer		1%				8%			1%	
Neutral	5%	13%	18%	17%	8%	15%	8%	4%	5%	1%
Agree	77%	66%	68%	61%	77%	64%	85%	88%	87%	94%
Disagree	19%	20%	15%	22%	15%	13%	8%	8%	8%	5%

Figure 14: I feel that I can make a difference in this town, by community

A demographic breakdown of data shows that young people (18-39) year-olds were more likely to feel alienated from their community than the 40+, that women were more likely than men to feel a sense of alienation, and much more likely to feel unable to affect change in their community. Of all our respondents, Palestinians were least likely to feel able to make a difference in their community and to provide no-answer responses to both questions.

Figure 15: I feel that I am part of this town, by demographic attribute

Figure 16: I feel that I can make a difference in this town, by demographic attribute

4.2.   Impact of 17 October events on outlook

Most respondents across our sample believed that the 2019 so-called revolution, triggered by protests which started on 17 October of 2019, would make life harder for them. Only 20% of respondents believed that protests would improve their prospects in Lebanon; most of the optimistic respondents hailed from Mount Lebanon.

Figure 17: Effect of 17 October protests

Figure 18: Effect of 17 October protests within each sampled community

The South and the Bekaa regions had the highest rates of respondents who said that the 17 October events would make life harder: over 50% of respondents in the South and over 60% of those in the Bekaa believed that they would be adversely affected by protests.

25% of respondents in Miyeh-w-Miyeh believed the uprising will have a positive effect on their future in Lebanon, suggesting perhaps that the Christian and Sunni respondents in that area were more optimistic about the protests than the Shi'a respondents in Haris and Abbasiyeh.

That said, unlike in Haris, individuals in the relatively homogenous Shi'a community of Abbasiyeh also believed that the situation would improve their lives.

In the North, most respondents in both towns (86%) believed that protests did not affect them. A smaller volume of respondents believe that these events will make the situation in Lebanon harder (8% in Qalamoun and 9% in Chekka). Only 5% believed that protests would change their future in Lebanon for the better.

The highest percentage of individuals who believed 17 October events would improve their future and prospects were in Mount Lebanon. The data shows a high split between supporters and critics of the uprising. This is likely because the communities are highly politicised and split between supporters of Druze traditional political parties (Socialist Party led by Walid Jomblat) and opposing actors who support the revolution.

Results in the Northern governorate suggest a greater degree of apathy towards the protests. An overwhelming majority of respondents believed that protests would not affect their future either way.

4.2.1. How demographic attributes affected optimism

Our analysis showed a significant correlation between desire to leave the country and the state of employment and age of the respondent. Among Lebanese, there was an inverse correlation between wanting to leave the country and employment status, indicating that people who were unemployed were also those who wanted to the leave country.

We found an inverse correlation between age and the desire to leave the country: younger people wanted to leave Lebanon. There was no significant correlation between those who wanted to leave the country and education levels. These correlations only applied to Lebanese respondents; we found no such correlations among our Syrian sample.

Table 11: Correlation between desire to leave Lebanon, age, and employment status

Unemployment	Pearson Correlation	0.144**
	Significance (2 – tailed)	0.000
Age	Pearson Correlation	-0.135**
	Significance (2 – tailed)	0.000

We analysed the relationship between perceptions towards the protests of 17 October and socio-economic status among the Lebanese segment of respondents. We found:

1. A negative correlation between unemployment and the perception that 17 October events would result in positive changes in the country. Unemployed respondents did not foresee any positive impact of the protests and mostly wanted to leave Lebanon.

2. A positive correlation between education and the perception of the positive impact of 17 October events. The more educated the respondents were, the more likely they were to believe the uprising would positively affect the country's future.

3. A negative correlation between desire to leave the country and the positive perceptions of the uprising: respondents who wanted to leave Lebanon believed that 17 October protests were unlikely to have a positive impact on the future.

Table 12: Perception that 17 October events would improve individual prospects in Lebanon

Unemployment	Pearson Correlation	-0.06*
	Significance (2 – tailed)	0.023
Education	Pearson Correlation	0.131**
	Significance (2 – tailed)	0.000
Desire to leave the country	Pearson Correlation	-0.365**
	Significance (2 – tailed)	0.000

5. Quality of Services and Livelihood Opportunities

This section explores the changes in residents' overall perception in the state of service (such as water, sewerage and road quality), and the availability of job or livelihood opportunities.

Changes in residents' assessments of the availability, quality and value of municipal services.	Changes in residents' assessments of the availability and quality of livelihood opportunities.

5.1. Change in quality of services

Most respondents in the sample believed that local services had deteriorated relative to conditions a year ago. Only 11% believed these had improved, and most of those who responded positively hailed from the South.

The highest share of respondents who believed that services had deteriorated hailed from the Bekaa region. Analysis of the data shows that the rate is high in all Bekaa communities: 77% in Qob Elias, 68% in Chtoura, but 46% in Qsarnaba.

Figure 19: Change in overall quality of services compared to a year ago, by region

According to interviews with municipal authorities, civil society activists and community members in the Bekaa, municipal authorities lacked a coherent plan for services and had limited capacity, funds or authority to improve conditions. One former MSS member in Qob Elias stated that the water allocated for one town was instead being diverted to other towns, which caused frequent water shortages in summer months. Waste treatment was also highlighted as a significant issue: waste was reportedly being dumped immediately outside the town, causing health and environmental problems. Data collected from the FGD in Qob Elias demonstrated that community members appeared to have no municipal representation at all. In Chtoura, respondents believed the conditions of public services were better compared with 40-50 years ago, but that there were no improvements in recent years.

The South had the highest share of respondents (20%) who stated that there had been an improvement in services. This perception was mainly found in Abbasiyeh (27%) and Haris (25%). Interview responses and FGDs in the South conflicted. For example, interviewees hesitated to criticise local government, expressed gratitude towards their municipality for its service-provision role and emphasised that the municipality had done the best it could. Although FGD participants (in Abbasiyeh, for example) agreed that services had improved, they highlighted significant scope for improvement in water and solid-waste management.

FGD participants said that although sewerage treatment and solid-waste management emerged as the highest-quality services in our survey, Haris did not have sewerage systems and solid waste treatment was virtually non-existent. Instead, waste was being transported to landfill and other sorting plants outside the village, and water did not reach some neighbourhoods entirely.

In Mount Lebanon, a greater proportion of participants (57%) believed that services had improved (8%) or that they had not changed (49%), as opposed to getting worse (43%). But a closer look at the data shows significant variations between Jdeidet el-Chouf and Baaqline: in Baaqline 53% of respondents believed that services had deteriorated, whereas in Jdeidet el-Chouf only 33% believed the same.

The highest share of respondents who perceived no change at all in the state of services was in the North: 76% for Chekka and 54% for Qalamoun. Two municipality members interviewed in Chekka described being frustrated that they were not being allowed to improve service supply and said that they had wanted to self-fund maintenance work such as fixing the pumping facilities. They pointed out that the central government was sensitive about letting the municipalities maintain its public properties and that the government had stopped them from upgrading services on the basis that infrastructure is owned by the state water company.

Further data analysis showed differences between Syrian and Lebanese perceptions of municipal services. Syrians were more likely to believe that services to have deteriorated (65%), and Lebanese were more likely to believe that services had improved (14%). The data is unclear on why Syrians were more likely to believe that services had deteriorated, though this may be due to the fact that many Syrians live in camps outside the town where interventions are less likely to affect or reach them. Results suggested that any improvement in services was more likely to benefit Lebanese citizens than Syrians.

Figure 20: State of services, by nationality

The following table lists the top three services with which respondents were least satisfied, by governorate. We delve into this data on a community level in Section 7 of this report, where we cross reference satisfaction rates with LHSP programme areas.

Table 13: The three services that respondents are most dissatisfied with, by governorate

Governorate	Service	% dissatisfied
Bekaa	Youth activities	52%
	Roads and bridges	52%
	Water	41%
North	Street lighting	38%
	Youth activities	36%
	Roads and bridges	35%
South	Water	50%
	Youth activities	40%
	Healthcare services	35%
Mount Lebanon	Youth activities	57%
	Roads and bridges	53%
	Local markets	45%

The lack of activities for youth was a constant theme in our survey results, interviews and FGDs across all governorates. Respondents noted that there was no plan to support youth

development in municipalities or at a national level, and that youth lacked basic facilities, such as public libraries, centres with IT equipment and sports clubs. Respondents were concerned that a high rate of youth were both unemployed and without much else to occupy them.

The quality of roads and bridges were also repeatedly reported as unsatisfactory, with roads in need of maintenance. Interviewees recognised, however, that roadwork was not solely the municipality's responsibility: the municipality was only responsible for the 'internal roads' and the Ministry of Public Works was responsible for main roads.

5.1.1. North

Respondents in the North Governorate were more likely to be highly satisfied with services overall. They were most satisfied with water, sewerage and local markets, and least satisfied with street lighting, youth activities, and roads and bridges, including agricultural roads.

Figure 21: Satisfaction with services, North Governorate

According to data collected through the Chekka FGD, road conditions were poor. Interviewees stated, however, that internal roads (i.e. those within the municipality's responsibilities) had been recently rehabilitated and were wide and clean. The lack of support for the region's agriculture sector was also raised as an issue in FGDs and also featured prominently in survey data. In Qalamoun interviewees said that the maintenance of those services beyond the municipal's responsibility—such as water and electricity—was slower than expected, although water was available to all homes and waste collection was reportedly on time. According to

the Chekka Deputy Mayor, municipalities had not received funding from government since 2017,[17] and municipalities were therefore limited in their ability to offer and sustain services.

5.1.2. South

In the South, interviewees were most satisfied with school buildings, sewerage systems and waste collection and least satisfied with water, youth activities and healthcare. Overall, however, satisfaction rates in the South were high compared with our other communities.

Figure 22: Satisfaction with services, South Governorate

According to the Miyeh-w-Miyeh mayor and activists in Haris, water services were under added pressure due to the refugee populations in the community, particularly in summer months when population levels increased. In Haris and Abbasiyeh, activists said that the supply of water from the state's water company was not sufficient. The Mayor and Deputy Mayor both stated that water was being supplied to the Lebanese and Palestinian communities fairly; it is less clear, however, how adequate water distribution is and one activist interviewed in Miyeh-w-Miyeh reported disputes between the Lebanese and Palestinians over access to water outside the refugee camp.[18]

Problems with waste management were also reported, especially in Abbasiyeh. The Mayor said that the municipality had worked with UNDP on a project related to a medical waste factory, because all medical waste from the Tyre region is treated in their town, but that they

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[17] This was repeated in other KII in Baaqline and Jdeidet el-Chouf in Mount Lebanon, and Miyeh-w-Miyeh in the South.

[18] Within the refugee camp, water distribution was reportedly being handled by UNRWA (KII, member of Popular Palestinian Committee).

still needed support to find suitable places to dump this waste. Interviewees also stated they needed to increase recycling efforts.

Interviewees in Haris were satisfied with waste collection and streets conditions but described an urgent need for a medical centre as there were no hospitals or clinics in the village. In all three communities, there was a relatively high satisfaction rate with sewerage, but interview analysis shows that in Miyeh-w-Miyeh sewerage networks lack capacity.

5.1.3. Mount Lebanon

Mount Lebanon had an overall lower level of satisfaction with services compared to other regions. The three services with highest satisfaction were sewerage, waste collection and water services, while the three lowest satisfaction were youth activities, roads and bridges and local markets.

Figure 23: Satisfaction with services, Mount Lebanon

Although more residents than not were satisfied with water services, there was still a high rate of dissatisfaction with this service, which suggested a high rate of water-related inequalities.

According to the Mayor in Jdeidet el-Chouf, there is a mismatch between resident expectation and municipal purview. Residents considered the municipality to be responsible for providing all the services, even when central government was responsible. Roads are also affected by harsh weather conditions in winter, but municipalities do not have the capacity to maintain them sustainably. Although Mayors in both communities said they had plans to maintain service provision, they struggled due to a shortage of funds.

According to data from the Baaqline focus group, sewerage services were generally good despite some shortfalls in certain areas. Both communities were also satisfied with the state of healthcare provision because the community had access to three hospitals in the Jdeidet el-Chouf area. FGD participants in Baaqline and Jdeidet el-Chouf reinforced survey results and

stated that roads needed rehabilitating and that the town lacked appropriate youth facilities, such as public space for sports facilities, playgrounds and public gardens. According to one interviewee in Jdeidet el-Chouf, a basketball stadium was built last year and some sports clubs were opening, so youth services were "finally progressing".

Across the board, activists and municipal representatives interviewed shared a dim outlook of conditions in Lebanon. They described a slow deterioration in the Lebanese economy over two years, with the additional pressure of COVID-19 now exacerbating the economic challenge. According to interviews in both Jdeidet el-Chouf and Baaqline, state-level corruption was the reason why municipalities had not been receiving budget from the Independent Municipal Fund since 2017.

As in the South, our researchers understood that water shortages in Mount Lebanon were a significant regional issue especially in summer months. The region's municipalities share the same sources of water (from the Union of Municipalities in Baaqline); this is not sustainable anymore with municipalities competing for an increasingly limited water supplies.

5.1.4. Bekaa

Bekaa had an overall lower level of satisfaction with services compared to other regions. Respondents were most satisfied with waste collection, sewerage, and local markets, and least satisfied with youth activities, roads and bridges and water services. These findings were reinforced in FGDs and interviews in both communities.

Figure 24: Satisfaction with services, Bekaa

According to interviews and FGDs, waste and sewerage management is a more significant issue than was highlighted in the survey. The Qob Elias FGD data demonstrated that water networks were old and that supply shortages remained despite several attempts to maintain networks. Although respondents were relatively more likely to be satisfied with waste collection and sewerage management, local activists, the municipal police and Mayor all

stated that waste was routinely dumped in makeshift and unplanned landfills, which caused significant health problems, and that sewerage from refugee camps was also being dumped into the Litany river or agricultural plains. On waste management, one Qob Elias activist stated: "I know there are initiatives happening to improve this, but we need one coherent plan to tackle the problem properly."

Water shortage was a recurring theme throughout our data collection. In the Bekaa, water shortages specifically appeared to affect Qob Elias. Here a former MSS committee member interviewed stated that water-related shortages had been recurring for the past five years and that people were forced to buy water privately. Fixing these shortages were the responsibility of the Zahle Water Company, rather than the municipality and they hoped that the municipality could play a more constructive role on water management and could potentially help mediate with the company in Zahle as they would have more clout than individuals could.

5.2. Livelihood opportunities

In all governorates, most respondents believed that there were fewer job opportunities in their local communities than a year ago. No one believed there were more jobs available.

Figure 25: Respondents' perceptions on change in overall state of job opportunities compared to one year ago, by region

Most respondents (around 80% in each community) attributed the decrease in job opportunities to the overall economic situation in the country. Interviewees noted that the COVID-19 pandemic would only exacerbate this problem across the country.

Figure 26: Reasons for the reduction in job opportunities, by region

Mount Lebanon had the highest share of respondents who believed that not much had changed regarding job opportunities in their communities: 37% in Jdeidet el-Chouf and 23% in Baaqline. According to the focus group discussions in Jdeidet el-Chouf, unemployment had been increasing even before the Syrian crisis. There was a perception that Syrians were being hired in the agriculture sector at detriment to Lebanese as their labour was cheaper.

Although some respondents said that Lebanese labourers eschewed agricultural work, participants in the Jdeidet el-Chouf FGD stated that the situation had become so dire that Lebanese citizens would accept any jobs at all, regardless of the status associated with low-paid or labouring work. According to interviews in Baaqline, shops had closed due to the economic crisis and employees could only retain their jobs if they accepted salary cuts. Before the crisis, employment opportunities in Baaqline were already limited and the local community received support from diaspora to sustain their living.

In Abbasiyeh (South Governorate), the Mayor mentioned that 70% of businesses have shut down with huge impact on people's livelihood. Those who were renting shops had lost their income, workers were losing their jobs and the economic impact was spiralling. The Mayor of Qsarnaba said the municipality had to distribute food packages during Ramadan.

Activists in the South reinforced findings that the community was experiencing high rates of poverty and said that people were cultivating any available patch of land, however small. The impact of the Syrian crisis was perceived (in Abbasiyeh, for example) to compound pressures on services, jobs and resources. Finally, remittances—formerly a key source of income—had also slowed. With the economic slowdown being global in nature, expats previously employed abroad had been returning to Lebanon and adding pressure on family members. With a weak private sector, interviewees could not identify a way out of the crisis.

Activists in Bekaa stated that the economic impact of the COVID-19 lockdown had been drastic. Employment opportunities were now virtually non-existent, although many people managed to keep their jobs. With the region heavily reliant on agriculture, the increase in input prices (due hyperinflation affecting the Lebanese Pound) had also added pressure on farmers. State employees or regular laborers have lost their purchasing power.

Some respondents, especially in the North, cited the lack of private sector investment (Qalamoun 26%) as the reason for unemployment. Across the board, few respondents attributed the lack of jobs to a lack of municipal efforts to improve livelihood conditions. This suggested that the municipality was not expected to provide or promote local employment. The highest share of those who did attribute responsibility to the municipality were in Miyeh-w-Miyeh (14%) and they were mostly Palestinians.

6. Grievance Mechanisms

Residents' awareness of grievance and accountability mechanisms related to the provision of basic services.

Most respondents across all governorates did not report making a complaint about the state of local services in their communities over the past six months. Across our sample Bekaa had the highest share of complaints (11%); this broke down to 17% Qsarnaba, 9% Qob Elias and 8% Chtoura.

Figure 27: Share of respondents who have made a complaint about services within the past six months.

Our survey asked two key questions:

1. A general question to all respondents about whom they *would* hypothetically raise complaints to; and
2. A specific question to self-reported complainants to whom they *practically* raised complaints.

Results demonstrated a clear difference in the way that Syrians and Lebanese resolved their complaints.

Table 14 breaks down responses by nationality. Many more Syrians (43%) believed they would approach family and friends with complaints, compared to the Lebanese (12%), and much more Lebanese thought they would go to the municipality (63%) than the Syrians (15%).

In practice, over half of the Lebanese complainants (65%) raised their complaint with the municipality and 17% Lebanese turned to someone they knew who was connected to the municipality (only 4% of Syrians opted for this method, probably due to their lacking of personal or social connections with, and to, the municipality). Among Lebanese respondents there was no difference between their reported behaviour (i.e. that they would turn to the municipality with a complaint) and their practical action: 65% of Lebanese complainants made their complaints to the municipality. More Lebanese (17%) turned to someone they knew had a connection with the municipality than they thought they would (only 7%).

As mentioned above, a higher proportion believed they would complain through a family member or a friend (43%). In practice, only 8% Syrians referred their complaint to a family member or friend; rather, 38% Syrians turned towards the municipality for complaints while 42% chose 'other' (UNHCR) in the past six months.

Table 14: Raising complaints about services, by nationality

	Who did you raise your complaint to?			In general, who do you raise your complaint to?		
	Lebanese	**Syrian**	**Total**	**Lebanese**	**Syrian**	**Total**
The municipality directly	65%	38%	59%	63%	15%	50%
Someone I know connected to the municipality	17%	4%	14%	7%	8%	7%
Family / Friend	10%	8%	10%	12%	43%	20%
Mukhtar	1%		1%	2%	2%	3%
Religious leader	1%	4%	2%	0%	2%	1%
Political party representative	1%		1%	1%		1%
LAF			0%	1%	3%	2%
ISF	2%		2%	3%	2%	4%
Municipal police	1%	4%	2%	2%	4%	3%
Other (All Syrians mentioned UNHCR)	1%	42%	10%	1%	15%	5%
Do not know / No answer			100%	7%	7%	100%
	100%	*100%*	*59%*	*100%*	*100%*	*50%*

Data disaggregation showed further gender-based differences in how men and women perceived they would raise complaints and how they practically did (see Table 15). Fewer women (47%) than men (53%) believed they would turn to the municipality with complaints, but in practice, more women (65%) referred to the municipality with service-related complaints than men. More women (28%) compared to men (12%) also turned to family and friends with a complaint, while more male (19%) than female (8%) resorted to someone connected to the municipality.

Reasons for this difference are unclear and could be a line of enquiry for future studies.

Table 15: Raising complaints about services, by gender

	Who did you raise your complaint to?		In general, who do you raise your complaint to?	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
The municipality directly	55%	65%	53%	47%
Someone I know connected to the municipality	19%	8%	8%	6%
Family / Friend	8%	13%	12%	28%
Mukhtar		2%	2%	3%
Religious leader	3%		1%	0%
Political party representative	2%		1%	0%
LAF			2%	1%
ISF	2%	2%	5%	3%
Municipal police	2%	2%	3%	3%
Other (all Syrians mentioned UNHCR)	11%	8%	7%	7%
Do not know / No answer			7%	3%
	100%	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**

Most interviewees said they would contact the municipality—by phone or in person—with a problem. In general, municipalities had hotlines that locals could use to contact them with complaints and needs. However, personal connection with the municipality remained the main channel people used to ask for assistance or issue a complaint.

Social media pages, such as Facebook, were also used to make and receive complaints, as in Jdeidet el-Chouf, Baaqline and Qob Elias. In Qob Elias, people proactively used social media pages to communicate with the municipality, but they did not think the municipality was responsive to people's requests or complaints. According to an interview with a municipality engineer, Mount Lebanon municipalities had tried using social media to communicate with locals but this did not work as well as anticipated; they did not state the reason for this.

Interviewees said that the person(s) they turned to heavily depended on the nature of the problem. For example, some described resorting to the municipal police with security-related concerns (in Qalamoun and Jdeidet el-Chouf). Others interviewed, such as a local sports club owner in Qalamoun, stated that if the municipality proved unable to resolve his complaints, he would raise this with the responsible ministry itself.

In the South, communicating with municipalities was described as 'easy'. However, some interviewees stated that many people might not wish to speak to the municipality directly but to local political leaders, or via other people who were connected to the municipality. Interviewees in Abbasiyeh highlighted that people turn to political parties for help first, and then contact the municipality subsequently. In addition, many people also wished to resolve issues among themselves because of the political dynamics within the community (for example, one activist from Miyeh-w-Miyeh said that personal connections with the Mayor influenced the fairness of the response when problems were reported to the municipality).

As in other towns, community members, activists and municipal officials in Mount Lebanon all stated that they would first contact the municipality with complaints or request. In an interview in Baaqline, a former MSS committee member highlighted that individuals might also turn to religious figures for help when problems arose. According to an interview in Jdeidet el-Chouf, political parties were ready to intervene if the leading families were unable to resolve issues or complaints among themselves.

7.   Relevance of Services

Changes in resident's assessments of their municipality's capacity to identify and prioritise needs, and to provide maintain, and operate municipal services.

Most survey respondents reported that their municipality understood local priorities and needs. Respondents from the North Governorate were most likely to agree with this statement, and Bekaa respondents were least likely to agree. Results in the Bekaa were disproportionately affected by the high share of people who disagreed in Chtoura, 46%, compared with 28% in Qob Elias and 30% in Qsarnaba. Finally, a higher share of Lebanese respondents agreed that the municipality understood their needs.

Figure 28: The municipality understands the local community's priorities and needs, by governorate and nationality

Despite these positive results, across multiple communities in the North and South—including Qalamoun and Qsarnaba—interviewees and FGD participants agreed that awareness did not always translate into action. They believed that municipal effectiveness was limited by internal politicking or matters that are outside the municipality's control (such as budget and remit).

7.1.   North

Municipal authorities in the North Governorates described being aware of citizen's needs and priorities but said they lacked capacity to provide for citizens. Activists added, however, that political conflicts about the distribution of the resources of the municipality exacerbated the municipality's ineffectiveness. According to an environmental activist in Qalamoun, the municipality comprised parties pitted against each other, particularly the Future Movement and Islamist groups that had gained popularity in recent years. These groups were fighting to take advantage of their positions of relative power to settle internal and individual disputes.

Municipal authorities and activists both expressed the view that donor-led workshops helped set priorities and reduce tension over services and social issues in the town. That said, the Qalamoun municipality complained that the workshops were implemented at the level of the union of municipalities, rather than at town-level, which left insufficient time and space to delve into the issues affecting Qalamoun. Given that the UNDP had not yet started the Qalamoun MSR process, it was unclear to which meetings the municipal official had been referring.

7.1.1. Whether LHSP projects address local needs and priorities

The table below cross-references the services that community members found least satisfactory with projects known to have been implemented by the LHSP. This analysis takes low satisfaction rates to be a proxy for priority services; where needs and LHSP programmes do not overlap, there may be space for future UNDP interventions.

According to this analysis in North Lebanon the LHSP has implemented programmes in four of the six areas identified as local priorities. Key gaps are in programmes to improve street lighting in Qalamoun, and improvements to roads and bridges in Chekka.

Table 16: LHSP projects in the North and services that residents are most dissatisfied with

Town	LHSP projects	Status	Service	Reported Satisfaction with services	Most dissatisfied with
Qalamoun	Rehabilitation of Qalamoun public school for boys	completed	School buildings	65%	Youth Activities
	Provision of a water truck to Qalamoun	completed	Water	71%	Roads and bridges
	No LHSP activities				Street lighting
Chekka	Improve the solid waste management in the village and activate the sorting from source process (procurement and capacity building)	completed	Waste collection	77%	
	Support SWM sector (phase 2)	under preparation	Waste collection	As above	
	No known LHSP activities				Street lighting

No known LHSP activities	Roads and bridges
No known LHSP activities	Agricultural infrastructure

7.2. South

In Haris and Abbasiyeh, activists and FGD participants believed that the municipality understood their priorities, but they did not expect the municipality to accomplish matters beyond its remit and ability, which suggested that residents' expectations were being managed. According to an interview with the Deputy Mayor in Haris, in the absence of support from the government, individuals have stepped in to support the municipality themselves.

The Mayor and Deputy Mayor in Miyeh-w-Miyeh both believed that the MSR workshops prepared the municipalities to plan relevant projects and agree these with activists and NGOs. That said, Miyeh-w-Miyeh FGD participants described local municipal representatives as elderly and out of touch with the needs of a younger generation.

Beyond MSR meetings, activists and municipal authorities in Haris and Miyeh-w-Miyeh said that municipalities do not hold meetings with residents to listen to their needs and opinions; they were also unsure whether residents would want any such meetings. According to a local teacher and scout leader in Abbasiyeh, local leaders did not involve community members in their decisions on projects. One activist in that community described the municipality itself as sufficiently representative by virtue of its having been elected by locals.

7.2.1. Whether LHSP projects address local needs and priorities

The table overleaf cross-references the services that community members found least satisfactory with projects known to have been implemented by the LHSP. This analysis takes low satisfaction rates to be a proxy for priority services; where needs and LHSP programmes do not overlap, there may be space for future UNDP interventions.

The LHSP has implemented programmes in five of the nine priority areas highlighted in the South. The key gaps are in programmes that improve local markets in Miyeh-w-Miyeh, healthcare services in Haris, and healthcare and youth services in Abbasiyeh.

Table 17: LHSP projects in the South and services that residents are most dissatisfied with

Town	LHSP projects	Status	Service	Reported Satisfaction with services	Services Most dissatisfied with
Miyeh-w-Miyeh	Extension of the sewerage culvert in Haret Saida	under preparation	Sewerage	55%	Youth activities
	Provision and installation of LED Lights	under design	Street lighting	43%	Water
	No known LHSP activities				Local markets
Haris	Support to cooperatives	completed	Livelihoods		Water
	Establishing and equipping multi-purpose facility	under design			Youth Activities
	No known LHSP activities				Healthcare
Abbasiyeh	Rehabilitation of medical solid waste management facility and provision of equipment	Ongoing	Waste collection	72%	Water
	No known LHSP activities				Healthcare
	No known LHSP activities				Youth Activities

7.3.   Mount Lebanon

According to the Mayor of Jdeidet el-Chouf and the activists interviewed, local authorities have attempted to "change their mindset" when it comes to local priorities and continue to update programmes continuously. The Mayor perceived this adaptation and his relationship with residents as positive. He said that the Jdeidet el-Chouf municipality had previously developed a municipal plan and discussed the engagement of the local community in the decision-making procedure within the municipality. They had divided the village into five neighbourhoods and established residential neighbourhood committees in each of them. Meetings were set up between UNDP and the municipality and residents were welcomed at these meetings and participate in the discussions and provide their opinions on the services in town.

7.3.1. Whether LHSP projects address local needs and priorities

The table below cross-references the services that community members found least satisfactory with projects known to have been implemented by the LHSP. This analysis takes low satisfaction rates to be a proxy for priority services; where needs and LHSP programmes do not overlap, there may be space for future UNDP interventions.

The LHSP has implemented programmes in all the priority areas identified through our research. This suggests that the UNDP finds it easier to work in Mount Lebanon than elsewhere in Lebanon, or that the community-engagement process to design projects has been particularly effective at identifying needs in the two communities.

Table 18: LHSP projects in Mount Lebanon and services that residents are most dissatisfied with

Town	LHSP projects	Status	Service	Reported Satisfaction with services	Most dissatisfied with
Baaqline	Support the sorting from the source through the provision of waste management equipment	under preparation	Waste collection	63%	Roads and bridges
	Construction of rainwater canals in El Harabish area	under design	Sewerage	50%	Street lighting
	Rehabilitation of storm water canals	completed	Sewerage		
	Setting up the medical room of Baakline Public (Interm) School	completed	Healthcare	55%	Youth activities
	Supporting the services of Baaqline House Center Association Primary Health Care Center	completed	Healthcare		
	Supporting the services of Baaqline Social Development Center	completed	Healthcare		
	Equipment of the National Library	completed	Youth Activities	38%	Youth activities
Jdeidet el-Chouf	The rehabilitation of Jdeidet el-Chouf Market sidewalks	On-going	Local markets	51%	Local markets

Rehabilitation of Jdeidet Al Chouf Market sidewalks	completed	Local markets	As above	Local markets
Construction of a multipurpose sport playground	completed	Youth Activities	36%	Youth activities
Construction of storm water drainage channels	under design	Sewerage	81%	
No known LHSP activities				Healthcare

7.4. Bekaa

Chtoura's residents disproportionately believed that the municipality did not understand their needs or priorities. According to an interview with a municipal official, we understand that most Chtoura residents are not local to the town but rent homes there; as such, they are not routinely involved in decision making. The municipality's clerk and treasurer reported that Chtoura does not have a social media page to engage with the local community, unlike other communities in the region.

Two members of the Chtoura municipality mentioned that meetings involving the municipality, citizens and the UNDP had become repetitive and that community members had lost interest in participating in them. Our researchers observed a degree of fatigue by community members to participating in interviews, FGDs and other community activities that were perceived to be led by donors. Chtoura appeared to have been targeted by multiple surveys and programme engagements with the UNDP writ large, and residents were not able to distinguish between activities led by different parts of the UN.

According to the Qob Elias municipality, the needs of the local community far exceeded the municipality's capabilities and the local communities' expectations were too great. This was also the case in Chtoura where a municipal official stated that "people think that it is the municipality's responsibility to take care of all services but many times it is the ministries' job."

In Qsarnaba, respondents considered that the municipality did not know how to prioritise the needs of the community, despite goodwill, due to limited capacity in the municipality. According to the former Mayor of Qsarnaba, some residents were empathetic and did not make demands of the municipality, while others "blamed it for all shortfalls". An activist from Qsarnaba argued that these shortages were due to the lack planning in government, which has disproportionately affected deprived areas in the Northern Bekaa.

7.4.1. Whether LHSP projects address local needs and priorities

The table below cross-references the services that community members found least satisfactory with projects known to have been implemented by the LHSP. This analysis takes low satisfaction rates to be a proxy for priority services; where needs and LHSP programmes do not overlap, there may be space for future UNDP interventions.

According to this analysis, the LHSP has implemented programmes in three of the six priority areas highlighted in the Bekaa. This falls to three of nine priority areas when Qsarnaba is factored in (we understand that there no LHSP projects are currently being implemented in Qsarnaba). Although LHSP programmes targeted all priority areas in Qob Elias, in Chtoura key gaps included youth activities and improvement to street lighting.

Although three sewerage-related projects were implemented, survey respondents did not report high rates of dissatisfaction with this type of services, though we understand sewerage and solid-waste management to be core priorities articulated in interviews and FGD data.

Table 19: LHSP project and services that residents are most dissatisfied with

Town	LHSP projects	Status	Service	Reported satisfaction with the services	Most dissatisfied with
Qob Elias	Improve the wastewater treatment facility	completed	Sewerage	74%	Roads and Bridges
	Provision of equipment for wastewater services	completed	Sewerage	*As above*	Youth Activities
	Design and construction of 11 Km irrigation canals network	completed	Agricultural infrastructure	55%	Water
	Construction of a sports complex and a fence to the basketball court	completed	Youth Activities	34%	
	Rehabilitation and equipment of the Lebanese Red Cross and SDC healthcare centres	Under preparation	Healthcare	68%	
Chtoura	Construction of a storm water network	Under preparation	Sewerage	77%	
	No known LHSP activities				Roads and bridges

No known LHSP activities	Youth Activities
No known LHSP activities	Street lighting

7.5. How the municipality identify and prioritises needs

Interviewees reported multiple ways in which they were involved in dialogue, including coordination committees and public meetings. That said, the frequency of meetings, the openness of the forum and local interest to participate varied across governorates.

According to the Baaqline FGD, local coordination committees were selected from all the community categories and are representative. Municipal interviewees (the Mayor and another official) described hosting participatory meetings in Jdeidet el-Chouf to understand local needs and escalate these to the board of municipality; as this was reported by the Mayor and another municipal official, the extent to which it reflects public sentiment is unclear.

According to an interview with an activist in Haris, the municipality did not proactively engage residents to understand their needs. This finding was indirectly reinforced by the Deputy Mayor who described collecting information on local priorities only when individuals contacted the municipality for assistance. Interviewees in Miyeh-w-Miyeh stated that the municipality did not initiate community meetings. In Abbasiyeh, a local teacher and scout leader said that this method was unlike "the old days" when leaders used to gather community members in the town square; now, leaders made decisions on behalf of the community, rather than with them.

According to an interview with an environmental activist in Qalamoun in the North, the municipality did not set up meetings and talk directly to the community individuals because of it fears that the "procedure will be a mess". As outlined in Section 8.4. (community engagement and resident agency), respondents in Qsarnaba reported feeling most engaged in decision making.[19] Finally, in Chtoura and Qalamoun, participation in local meetings reportedly dropped, with individuals less committed to joining; reasons for this were unclear.

7.6. Skills and funding

A third of respondents in three out of four regions believed that the municipality had both, skills and funds, to provide services. Half the respondents in Mount Lebanon perceived the municipality to have skills but not funds (56% in Baaqline and 39% in Jdeidet el-Chouf).

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[19] Interviews in Chekka and Qob Elias yielded no specific information on the approach that the municipality took to identifying and prioritising needs.

Respondents believed that the lack of funding had the greatest impact on service delivery: few respondents believed that the municipality had funds but no skills to deliver.

A closer look at this data demonstrated further variations in perception. A significantly higher percentage of individuals in the Bekaa and the South chose not to answer the question.

Figure 29: Perception of municipality's skill level and availability of funds to provide services, by governorate

In Chtoura and Qob Elias, residents were most likely to either state that the municipality had both the skills and funds, or not to answer the question at all. Particularly in these two communities, individuals were much less likely to criticise the municipality's skills or state that it didn't have the funds to deliver. Respondents in the South were even more cautious; as with the Bekaa, we saw higher rates of individuals who said that the municipality had the skills and funds (particularly in Haris and Abbasiyeh), and high no-answer rates, but low criticism of municipal funding or capacity. The data suggested a degree of social pressure not to criticise authorities in these areas.

Figure 30: Perception of municipality's skill level and availability of funds to provide services, by community

MOUNT LEBANON

Jdeidit el Chouf ■   Baaqline ■

	BOTH SKILLS AND FUNDS	SKILLS BUT NOT FUNDS	FUNDS BUT NOT SKILLS	NEITHER	NO ANSWER
Jdeidit el Chouf	25%	39%	10%	19%	7%
Baaqline	16%	56%	7%	19%	3%

NORTH

Qalamoun ■   Chekka ■

	BOTH SKILLS AND FUNDS	SKILLS BUT NOT FUNDS	FUNDS BUT NOT SKILLS	NEITHER	NO ANSWER
Qalamoun	26%	19%	10%	17%	28%
Chekka	49%	3%	27%	15%	6%

Respondents in Mount Lebanon were most likely to respond that municipal authorities had skills, but not funds, to execute projects. This was likely due to the higher levels of education in the area. Chekka, in the North, was most likely to believe that municipal authorities had both the skills and funds needed to execute projects; repondents in Chekka were also likely to report that their municipality had more funds than skills. Chekka also had high education rates in that community as it hosted the highest rate of university graduates across the sample and had the highest proportion of respondents with higher education and above.

In interviews, a theme emerged that municipalities had skills but not funds to provide services. As previously mentioned, respondents in over half our communities stated that the Independent Municipal Fund had stopped funding municipalities in 2017 and that municipalities were struggling as a result (see Sections 5.1.2. and 5.1.4.).[20]

Interviewees suggested that the municipality was at times keen to step in where the state could not to provide services that were generally considered to be the purview of ministries. According to a municipal official in Chekka, the Mayor had funded some improvements through the municipality and was keen to continue to pay for repairs and maintenance, but the government would not allow him to continue doing this as some of the repairs were outside municipal jurisdiction and required line ministry approval. The Mayor of Haris reportedly also used his own money to rehabilitate roads. Municipal interviewees in Qsarnaba and Qob Elias (such as the Qob Elias Mayor) stated that "regarding water, the municipality is doing the job of the State water company."

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[20] This point was repeated in Jdeidet el-Chouf and Baaqline in Mount Lebanon, Miyeh-w-Miyeh in the South, and Chekka in the North.

8. Community Engagement and Resident Agency

Changes in perception of residents regarding their agency (including their participation in the identification of needs and priorities).

About a third of respondents said that the municipality engaged the local community to identify priorities and needs over the past year. Respondents in Mount Lebanon described being most engaged, and those in the Bekaa described being least engaged.

Syrians feel much less engaged. Overall, 53% Syrians (compared with 37% Lebanese) disagreed that the municipality has engaged the local community. Rates were highest in Haris and Miyeh-w-Miyeh, where 92% of Syrians disagreed with this statement, follow by Chekka in the North (83%).

Only Qsarnaba (22%), Qalamoun (30%) and Qob Elias (47%) had a lower disagree rate among Syrians than Lebanese (40%, 35% and 49% respectively). This may have resulted from a lack of knowledge or low expectations: if the public did not expect to be engaged, then they may have been less likely to perceive that they were not engaged. It is unclear to us why expectations were lower among Syrians,[21] and this is a hypothesis that we could test in future surveys. Overall, 13% of respondents were neutral and 11% did not provide a response; it is unclear whether this reflected lack of knowledge, apathy or a desire not to criticise.

Figure 31: In the past year, the municipality has engaged the local community to identify needs and priorities, by governorate and nationality

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
[21] We understand that many Lebanese towns impose curfews on their Syrian communities, particularly when these communities live inside camps. Syrian communities tend to be distinct from Lebanese communities, with Syrian settlements on the outskirts of towns.

The lowest rate of community engagement appeared to be in the Bekaa region: in Qsarnaba and Qob Elias 36% and 48% respectively of respondents disagreed with the statement that they have been engaged by the municipality in the past year. In Chtoura, the rate of respondents who also disagreed with this statement was particularly high (59%).

Mount Lebanon showed the highest rate of engagement, but data showed a degree of variation. 25% of individuals in Jdeidet el-Chouf reported being engaged compared to 60% in Baaqline who said the same. According to a student activist, Baaqline's coordination committees emerged form a series of workshops and represented a cross-section of the community. This student and respondents in the FGDs approved of the municipality's establishing of these committees which they took to suggest an interest by the municipality in local needs. According to the UNDP, the variation between findings in the two communities was due to the UNDP's interventions: in Jdeidet el-Chouf, the MSR process had been newly started, while in Baaqline, it had been running for two years.

8.1. Perceptions of marginalisation

When asked about whose needs were most marginalised, 79% of Syrians responded that refugees were most marginalised. Conversely, when asked the same question Lebanese respondents reported that youth were most marginalised, followed by the elderly.

Figure 32: Whose needs are least considered in your local community: results by nationality

Note: 20% of Lebanese responded 'other – none', meaning that 20% of Lebanese responded considered that all community members' needs were being considered.

Women (16%) were more likely than men (7%) to describe themselves as the most marginalised group. That said, women believed that refugees and youth were also more marginalised that them. This belief was held regardless of whether the female respondent was Syrian or Lebanese.

Figure 33: Whose needs are least considered in your local community; results by gender

Although middle-aged respondents were most likely to believe that refugees were most marginalised, 25% of youth perceived themselves to be most marginalised and 29% of the elderly believed that they were most marginalised.

Figure 34: Whose needs are least considered in your local community; results by age group

8.2. Participating in events

Although 39% of overall respondents were aware of at least one event that the municipality had organised in their town, only 39% of these residents (i.e. 15% of the total sample) had participated in events.[22]

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[22] This survey question referred to events in general rather than specific types of events, for example, MSR events.

Table 20: Knowledge and participation in events organized by the municipality, by governorate

	Total	Bekaa	North	South	Mount Lebanon
Knowledge of some event	39%	33%	42%	38%	48%
Participation in some event (share of respondents who know about an event)[23]	39%	53%	30%	40%	28%
Knowledge but no participation	61%	47%	70%	60%	72%

The link between the overall perception of the municipality and the participation in municipal events is not straightforward and other factors affect perception. Counterintuitively participation rates were highest in the Bekaa, even though respondents reported the overall lowest engagement with the municipality and low satisfaction with municipal services. Mount Lebanon, which reported higher levels of satisfaction with municipal events, saw the lowest rates of participation. Other regions which showed high levels of agreement with the idea that the municipality understood their needs and engaged the community in the prioritisation process, also reported low levels of participation.

Of those who knew about events, the highest share of respondents were aware of town hall meetings and community events. Respondents in Mount Lebanon were most likely to know about MSR meetings and those in the North were least likely to know about them. This is likely because, at the time of writing, no MSR meetings had been held in Qalamoun.

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[23] This refers to all types of events, rather than specific UNDP-funded or MSR-related activities and events.

Figure 35: Knowledge about, and participation, in events taking place in the local community, by governorate

There is a correlation between knowing about services and perceiving that the municipality was engaging the community in determining the priorities and needs of the town. There is no correlation between participating in the activities and perceptions of being engaged by the municipality. This means that perceptions of engagement are related to knowledge rather about participation. Instead, participation was driven by other factors unrelated to a sense of being engaged.

Table 21: How perception about being engaged by the municipality is affected by two other variables: knowing about activities and / or participating in events

Knowing about municipal activities	Pearson Correlation	0.92 *
	Significance (2 – tailed)	0.001
Participating in municipal activities	Pearson Correlation	0.34
	Significance (2 – tailed)	0.225

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). (N= 1407)

8.3.   Bekaa

As elsewhere in our sample, residents in Bekaa contacted the Mayor personally with requests and engaged with the municipality on the WhatsApp application. Municipalities said that they were in direct contact with minorities in the villages, considered them as residents and listened to their needs.

The largest share of respondents who did not feel engaged by the municipality were in Chtoura; Chtoura residents reported not being involved in decision making. According to the municipality's clerk and treasurer these residents this lack of involvement was "because the town does not have a social fabric." Another municipal official stated that members of the public did not have time to attend meetings, or that many residents were not native to the town and therefore "did not care about the village and its services". The official clarified that individuals in Chtoura cared about their businesses rather than the state of the village writ large.

Figure 36: The municipality has engaged the local community in identifying the priorities and needs during the past year, Bekaa Governorate

Our survey and FGD reinforced the feeling of public dissociation from their municipality in Chtoura. FGD participants mentioned that that the municipality was 'remote', separated from its people and did not engage in the public to understand the needs. And in our survey, 20% of respondents in Chtoura did not feel part of the town and a higher percentage did not feel they could make a difference in the town. Chtoura came second only to Qalamoun in having the highest number of respondents who described themselves not feeling part of the town.

As previously discussed, municipal officials believed that public meetings held in Chtoura had become repetitive after a couple of sessions, which led to a drop in participants (see Section 7.4.). The same municipality clerk and treasurer in Chtoura previously mentioned expressed being dissatisfied with MSR meetings. To him, it became clear that these meetings were for networking and public relations purposes rather than for planning or development. Other municipal officials interviewed also felt that the UNDP had hosted MSR meetings to maintain relationships with them, rather than to plan projects.

We understand from conversations with the UNDP that community members in Chtoura did not consent to forming a group to hold meetings, and that the interviewees may be mistaking the 2018 MRR updated with the 2019 MSR process. According to the UNDP, Chtoura participants attended only one MSR meeting and, despite multiple efforts to explain the difference between the MRR update process and the MSR process, community members have still confused the two.

Respondents in Qsarnaba reported being most engaged; this finding was reinforced by our interviews. In these, respondents said that the municipal council was formed from village residents and consequently understood local needs and priorities. Qsarnaba FGD participants reinforced the view that the municipality sought to respond to local needs despite limited capacity, and that the relationship between the public and the municipality was positive. The former Mayor stated that the municipality made an effort to engage directly engaged with local minorities. That said, one interviewee—a Coordinator for the Ministry of Social Affairs in Bekaa—stated that the municipality did not know how to prioritise the needs of the community.

According to an interview with an activist in Qob Elias, the MSR workshops offered them the opportunity to get involved and work with other people from their towns. Meetings improved communication: there were deep discussions and considerable disagreement, but everybody recognised that they could have these disagreements and still live together peacefully. Another Qob Elias activist stated that people regularly criticised or complained about the municipality's service provision, but local authorities did not respond to criticism, and any response was politically motivated. This respondent said that the municipality did not let the community take the initiative to address local issues (such as water supply), and charged for the services without doing the necessary work.

8.4.   North

Survey results in Qalamoun and Chekka were similar, although Chekka residents reported feeling more engaged. In Qalamoun, according to the Head of the local sports club, a small number of people were invited to participate in the municipality's meetings to discuss issues of the town. However, an environmental activist in Qalamoun and Qalamoun FGD said that the municipality did not organise public meetings, but that news and information travelled fast because the town was small.

Municipal representatives in Qalamoun stated that they took decisions regarding priorities and projects and that it was rare for them to conduct surveys or hold public meetings as this could be 'messy' (politically) and needed capacity which the municipalities did not have.

Figure 37: The municipality has engaged the local community in identifying the priorities and needs during the past year, North Governorate

■ Agree **■** Disagree

	NORTH	QALAMOUN	CHEKKA
Agree	42%	41%	44%
Disagree	-31%	-33%	-28%

The approach appeared to have changed during the COVID-19 crisis. During the crisis, Qalamoun and Chekka municipalities established crisis committees comprised mainly of experts on social and health issues. They also created a hotline for people to reach out to the municipal police and the healthcare centres of the villages in case of any such cases. Now, in general people call the municipality directly with a request. At times, municipalities deliver announcements by driving the municipality car through the town with loudspeakers.

8.5. South

Respondents in Miyeh-w-Miyeh reported feeling least engaged across our sample in the South. According to a teacher and activist in Miyeh-w-Miyeh, the municipality did not initiate meetings with the locals and, if ever they did hold meetings, these were usually conducted in the town, not in the Palestinian camps.

Respondents in Haris reported the highest levels of engagement in the South. However, FGD participants stated that not all Lebanese, and no Syrians, were involved in the decision-making process. Although interviewees said that there were few occasions to meet with municipal officials, they reported higher rates of engagement and were positive about the municipality.

When there were opportunities to engage with municipal authorities, community members reported feeling more positive. According to a teacher in Abbasiyeh, for example, when locals were involved in the process of determining priorities and discussing local issues, they feel more engaged and were better prepared for the activities and developmental work to follow in their community.

Figure 38: The municipality has engaged the local community in identifying the priorities and needs during the past year, South Governorate

Municipalities described their role as a mediator or middleman between the people and state and saw this role as an important one; they stated the community relied on the municipalities to communicate the grievance to the state and try to broker a response.

According to the Mayor of Miyeh-w-Miyeh, the municipality's various committees (such as health, agricultural committees and others) coordinated with organisations relevant to their work. A Palestinian activist in Miyeh-w-Miyeh stated that the so-called Popular Committee (al-Lajneh al-Sha'abiyeh) was the official committee responsible to receive complaints inside the camp. They would then coordinate with Palestinian relief agencies, such as UNRWA (if the issue related to water provision): "we, the Popular Committee, act as the middle party when it comes to services provided by UNRWA on water and sanitation". Where it could, the Popular Committee also directly addressed service provision shortages (such as electricity issues).

8.6.   Mount Lebanon

Respondents in Jdeidet el-Chouf reported feeling much less engaged compared with respondents in Baaqline. According to an interview with a local resident, the Jdeidet el-Chouf municipality had made an effort to organise participatory and dialogue meetings. The Mayor and a local trader both described these meetings as open to the community; FGDs participants also stated that the municipality was engaging its community through social media.

According to an interview with a local activist in Baaqline, the municipality met regularly with neighbourhood / coordination committees to discuss issues in the town.[24] However, one FGD participant believed these coordination committees were politically oriented, and that certain individuals were excluded from the process. Although this participant did not provide more detail, the Mayor had separately stated that 17 October protesters had been causing conflict

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[24] We note that only one coordination committee was established in Baaqline under the UNDP MSS process in 2017.

with party activists and, as outlined in the Baaqline community profile in Section 3.3. above, the Mayor had excluded pro-17 October activists from at least one previous meeting.

The same FGD participant who stated that the politicisation hampered the ability of the committees to perform also added that the performance of the neighbourhood committees was good and that the committee was necessary "the role of the neighbourhood committee is important because the municipality cannot be aware of every detail within the village, but these committees' decisions seem to be more political-oriented."[25]

According to a local activist, the Mayor is willing to help and has a good relationship with the local community, but that a problem exists in state-level politics: "people now are not impressed by talking, they are impressed by the actions taken." This activist believed that the municipality must satisfy residents through clear action to improve services. The Baaqline Mayor praised the MSR workshops on the basis that they engaged residents in the decision-making process but they criticised that projects agreed with the UNDP were not moving forward quickly due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Figure 39: The municipality has engaged the local community in identifying the priorities and needs during the past year, Mount Lebanon

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
[25] According to the UNDP, only one coordination committee was established in Baaqline under the 2017 MSS; the neighbourhood committees were also dissolved four years ago and differed to the coordination committees established by the UNDP.

9. Project-Specific Questions

Impact of increased municipal services, livelihood opportunities and / or peacebuilding initiatives on residents' confidence in, or perception of the legitimacy of local government, including consideration of attribution.	Residents' assessments of their municipality's capacity to maintain and operate the assets used to provide the municipal services including the assets provided by LHSP.

This section considers whether, and how, municipal services affect confidence in local government and perceptions towards municipal authorities. We also consider links between select LHSP projects (see Table 22) and residents' confidence in their municipality in service provision.

We selected projects from a list of municipal projects in each location on the basis of size, profile and date of implementation. These criteria helped increase the probability that respondents were aware of the project in question. Miyeh-w-Miyeh and Qsarnaba are not listed below as LHSP programme implementation had yet to start in these communities.

Table 22: The list of LHSP projects that respondents were asked about in their towns

Village	Project Name	Project Value?
Chtoura	Rehabilitation of stone water systems	Unknown
Qob Elias	Establishing a sports playground	$339,081
Qalamoun	Support with potable water tanks	$70,937
Chekka	Solid waste management	$197,532
Abbasiyeh	Rehabilitation of the medical waste management center	Unknown
Haris	Supporting women's cooperatives	$14,000
Jdeidet el-Chouf	Rehabilitation of sidewalks	$207,012
Baakline	Rehabilitation of stone water systems	$74,281

9.1.   Awareness of interventions

Respondents in Jdeidet el-Chouf (69%) and Abbasiyeh (67%) were most likely to know about the LHSP projects in their towns, while those in Qalamoun (18%)[26] and Chtoura (17%) were least likely. One feature that these two communities shared is that they had relatively homogenous sectarian identities; Haris and Baaqline shared that feature and ranked highly in terms of the likelihood that respondents were aware of LHSP projects in their communities.

Figure 40: % respondents aware of LHSP projects in their communities

As to whether the project had increased residents' confidence in the municipality's ability to deliver services, we found significant positive results for Haris, Abbasiyeh and Baaqline, compared with Chekka, Jdeidet el-Chouf and Qob Elias.

Figure 41: The project has increased my confidence in the ability of the municipality to deliver services

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
[26] We note that the MSR process in Qalamoun had not yet started.

9.2.   Project attribution

9.2.1. Northern Governorate

In the North, most respondents in both Qalamoun and Chekka attributed the LHSP-funded projects to the municipality (56% and 70% respectively). 30% respondents in Qalamoun also said that they did not know who was behind the project. Usually the residents thought that the municipality was responsible, and this enhanced the relationship between the locals and the municipality.

According to a municipal Environmental Committee member in Chekka, all UNDP projects had been positive and working with the UNDP had been easy; this interviewee stated that UNDP projects had created better connections among people in Chekka. According to the Deputy Mayor in Qalamoun, the projects were well planned and communicated with the locals, so they were positively impacting the community and had improved the relationship between the municipality and local communities.

Figure 42: Project attribution in North Governorate

The figure overleaf shows that over half of the respondents in Qalamoun and a vast majority of respondents in Chekka agreed with the statement that the LHSP project had increased their confidence in municipality's ability to deliver services. In Chekka, no one disagreed with the statement, and a municipal official said that stakeholders involved in the Chekka project were highly satisfied.

As stated above, interviewees in Qalamoun said that such projects injected them with a sense that the municipality was trying its best to improve the lives of the locals. 15% of respondents in Qalamoun, however, disagreed with the statement that the project had increased their confidence in the municipality. Interviewees explained that the municipality was sometimes perceived to be slow to respond and, according to the Head of the Medical Association of Qalamoun, if water issues were not solved, conflict could erupt among the public.

9.2.2. South Governorate

Most respondents in Haris and Abbasiyeh attributed the LHSP project in their community to the municipality. A higher rate of respondents than in the North attributed the work to the UNDP and / or other international donors; no one attributed projects to the Ministry of Social Affairs.

Figure 43: Project attribution in South Governorate

All those who were aware of the project agreed that it had increased their confidence in the municipality, regardless of whether they attributed the project's implementation to the municipality. Even though they might think that someone else was responsible for the project, people still believed that the municipality played a positive and key role in its implementation.

9.2.3. Mount Lebanon

In Mount Lebanon, a higher percentage of residents in Jdeidet el-Chouf (72%) attributed activities to the municipality whereas a higher percentage of those in Baaqline (51%) than attributed them to the UNDP.

Figure 44: Project attribution in Mount Lebanon

Unlike the South and North governorates, both towns in Mount Lebanon disagreed as to whether LHSP projects had increased residents' confidence in municipality's ability to provide services. More people in Baaqline, 85%, stated that the project had increased their confidence, while only 32% agreed with this statement in Jdeidet el-Chouf. The reason for this difference is unclear but is likely to be project-specific or due to the size and profile of the project.

9.2.4. Bekaa Governorate

In Bekaa, more people in Chtoura (60%) attributed the project to the municipality than those in Qob Elias (31%). Compared with the other three governorates, Bekaa had a higher share of respondents who did not know the agency behind the project. The Ministry of Social Affairs was not mentioned in both Qob Elias and Chtoura.

Despite not knowing to whom they should attribute projects, most respondents in the Bekaa—especially in Chtoura—believed that the work had increased their confidence in the municipality's ability to deliver services (though fewer people in Qob Elias agreed with this statement).

Figure 45: Project attribution in Bekaa Governorate

10. Tensions and Violence

Changes in the nature and levels of tension, and social stability (e.g. positive interactions, violent incidents, inclusion of different groups – including refugees - in LHSP structures and activities) more broadly, between and among host communities and Syrian refugees.

This section analyses respondents' perception regarding tensions between Lebanese and Syrians, and among Lebanese themselves. The second compares these perceptions with respondents' actual experience of inter- or intra-community disputes and then assesses whom residents turn to in order to resolve disputes.

Over half the respondents in each governorate did not perceive high rates of tension between Lebanese and Syrians. These results were a significant drop in those from 2019 (see Section 1 Table 1). Reasons for this change may have been methodological but were likely also contextual: although incidents between Lebanese and Syrians have reportedly continued, in the run-up to—and during—data collection, priorities had shifted and individuals were much more preoccupied with, or concerned by, hyperinflation in the economy and the shutdown triggered by COVID-19.

Most respondents disagreed that there was conflict between Lebanese community members, and this trend was similar by gender, age, and nationality.

The percentages in the graphs below refer to those who agreed with the statement; the remainder disagreed with the statement or chose to remain silent.

Figure 46: Perception of intra-community tensions

Respondents in Mount Lebanon were most likely to report tensions between communities (39% in Baaqline 39% and 31% in Jdeidet el-Chouf). Respondents perceived less intra-Lebanese tensions than tension between the Lebanese and Syrian communities.

Figure 47: % Respondents who believed that there are tensions between Lebanese residents in their community

Respondents were asked whether they had been party or witness to disputes between Lebanese and Syrians in their communities. The highest percentage of those reportedly involved in, or aware of, a dispute was in the Bekaa and the lowest share was in the South. Bekaa also had the highest no-answer rate to this question, which may suggest a higher-than-reported rate of disputes. High rates of disputes in the Bekaa may be due to the relatively higher percentages of Syrian refugees, which may have increased the likelihood of conflict.

Figure 48: Have you been part of, or a witness to, a dispute between a Lebanese and Syrian in your community?

10.1. Causes of disputes

Although individual respondents from Baaqline (such as a former MSS committee member) reported that tensions between Syrians and Lebanese were rare, participants in the Baaqline FGDs described some tensions and said that this usually related to specific individual issues, such as late rental payments and conflict over parking spots, rather than the ethnic identity of Syrians themselves.

Participants in the Baaqline FGD went to great lengths to justify incidents as due to individual grievances (rather than anti-Syrian racism or sentiment). Interviewees in Baaqline said that there was a standalone incident in the area in which a Lebanese person killed 10 individuals, five of whom were Syrians; it was clear, however, that this was not because of their nationality but the murderer's poor mental condition. As in Baaqline, so too in Jdeidet el-Chouf and in the North provinces. In Qalamoun (North), disputes between the two groups were reported to be family- or property-related, according to the Head of the Qalamoun Medical Association.

In Jdeidet el-Chouf, although an FGD participant stated that "anything can cause tension and conflict", all interviewees believed that conflict was usually due to individual disputes rather than general anti-Syrian sentiment. Interviewees said that even though individuals sometimes represented or advanced the interests of affiliated political parties—particularly in Haris and Abbasiyeh—there were no broader religious or politically-oriented conflicts.

According to our research, conflict over livelihood opportunities could have also been the cause of disputes. This was reported in the two communities of the North Governorate: Chekka and Qalamoun, as well as in Abbasiyeh. According to one interviewee in that town, Syrians were willing to accept lower salaries and rent, which made their labour more competitive. This was disputed by a local teacher / scout leader, who said that Syrians accepted jobs that Lebanese did not want to do and such competition therefore was not a source of tension.

10.1.1. Perceptions of Lebanese marginalisation

It was a common narrative that Syrians were well taken care of, and they received more support from the international agencies, while the Lebanese were being left behind. Multiple interviewees across our sample—including Qob Elias, Chekka and Abbasiyeh—stated that UNDP and other support was highly welcomed in their communities. Across the board, however, Lebanese interviewees stated that Lebanese people were suffering more than Syrian refugees and should receive more support.

In the Bekaa communities of Qob Elias and Chtoura, respondents stated that many Lebanese were unaware that services were being provided to both, Lebanese and Syrians. In Chtoura and Qob Elias, there was a widespread perception that Syrians—but not Lebanese—had received cash assistance and were queuing in front of cashpoints fuelled tensions. This perception jars with reality. Across our sample 28% of Syrians stated that they could no longer afford food, compared with a total of 12% of Lebanese who said the same.

Finally, local resource pressure was cited as another source of tension. An Abbasiyeh activist mentioned that the arrival of Syrians had increased the burden on waste management and water consumption. Syrians, he complained, did not follow the rules set by local officials, including in relation to COVID-19; he added that competition over jobs was further straining community relations. Another interviewee perceived the Lebanese to have suffered more

than Syrians in recent years and said that the UN had forgotten all about them. In Haris, the municipality's security committee helped monitor conflict between the two nationalities.

In Qob Elias interviews with activists highlighted a grievance that sewerage from Syrian camps were dumped onto agricultural lands. The focus group in Haris mentioned that although there was no direct conflict among Syrians and Lebanese, discrimination against the Syrians persisted. For example, the Lebanese declined to attend a certain workshop because of the presence of Syrians.

According to an activist in the Bekaa, the Lebanese public believed that Syrians were a heavy burden on the economy and that as long as the UN supports them, refugees would stay in Lebanon.

10.2. Resolving disputes

Overall, when the respondents had a dispute, they sought help from family (32%) and the municipality (25%). However, this percentage differed across governorates: individuals in the Bekaa (54%) and the North (52%) were most likely to turn to family, while those in the South (44%) and Mount Lebanon (32%) were most likely to turn to the municipality. This suggests that family relations had most influence in Bekaa and the North, while those in Mount Lebanon and the South sought state actors, such as the (32%) and ISF (31%).

Figure 49: When you have had a dispute with someone in your community, who have you resorted to?

Lebanese and Syrians addressed disputes differently. Lebanese community members were more likely to resort to the municipality (31%) and family (24%). Most Syrians resorted to family (53%) with their disputes. Lebanese (18%) were also more confident referring to the ISF than Syrians (5%).

This suggests that Syrians felt less safe seeking authorities' help when it came to disputes; reasons for this are unclear, though they may be due to concerns about being mistreated or arrested, particularly if Syrians did not have the relevant residency papers or permits. The likelihood that an individual would turn to formal authorities (such as the municipality of ISF/LAF) for dispute resolution increased markedly with age.

Finally, although women and men were equally likely to turn to the municipality to resolve a dispute, women were much more likely to turn to family for support, and men were much more likely to turn to the LAF/ISF for the same. Critically, about 20% of respondents in the North and South felt they could not turn to anyone. A closer look at data shows that many such respondents were Palestinian.

Figure 50: Dispute resolution by nationality

10.3. North

More respondents reported a higher rate of tension and disputes in Chekka compared to Qalamoun. This may have been due to religious differences: Chekka was predominantly Christian while Qalamoun was predominantly Sunni. Most Syrian refugees in Lebanon are Sunni, and they may have been more accepted in Sunni Qalamoun than in Christian Chekka.

There was a distinction between perceptions of conflict and actual rates of conflict: although individuals routinely perceived more tension between Lebanese and Syrian community members, they witnessed fewer disputes or incidents between two different community members.

Figure 51: Disputes between Lebanese and Syrians, North Governorate

According to interviews with municipal authorities in the North, the arrival of Syrian refugees posed an extra burden on services, particularly water, electricity and sewerage. A municipal member of the Environmental Committee said that the presence of significant numbers of Syrians in the community had increased the sense of insecurity among Lebanese residents. In Chekka, locals complained about the phenomenon of dense illegal housing associated with Syrian refugees, although according to the same municipal member of the environmental committee, the local community has also benefitted from being able to rent empty houses to Syrians.

Municipalities in the North said that Syrians had been part of their community since long before the crisis. Those who had arrived after the crisis were usually family members of the existing Syrian communities in the North. This meant lower levels of tension with refugees despite local awareness of the strain that the refugee population has placed on services.

When interviewees were asked about tension and violence, municipalities and activists in the North were relatively defensive; they described their towns as peaceful places and said that instances of conflict were low and related to interpersonal disputes rather than political or identity-based factors.

10.4. South

Respondents in the South reported fewer tensions and disputes between Lebanese and Syrians compared with other governorates. In Abbasiyeh, more Syrians than Lebanese believed that there were tensions and disputes. In Miyeh-w-Miyeh, Syrians did not report any tensions with the Lebanese, although 20% of Lebanese thought there were tensions in the community. Miyeh-w-Miyeh has a specific demographic, with far more Palestinians than Syrians living in the area. Again, it was commonly perceived that Syrians competed with Lebanese for jobs as they were willing to be paid less which threatened Lebanese livelihoods.

Figure 52: Disputes between Lebanese and Syrians, Southern Governorate

In Haris and Abbasiyeh, municipal authorities and the activists said there were no major conflicts in their towns. According to the teacher in Abbasiyeh, local communities help Syrians and do not mistreat refugees, but there is competition in the labour market over jobs, particularly because Syrians accept lower wages the Lebanese. One activist stated that, in the past, there were conflicts between families in the village due to politics, but that such conflicts no longer existed. On the surface, parties cooperated with one another even though individuals continue to advance the interest of the political parties they support.

10.5. Mount Lebanon

The highest rates of disputes with Syrians were reported in Mount Lebanon. That said, more Syrians than Lebanese reported tensions and disputes. 83% of Syrians reported tensions in Baaqline while only 35% Lebanese did.

Figure 53: Disputes between Lebanese and Syrians, Mount Lebanon

■ There are tensions between Lebanese and Syrians in this community   ■ Witnessed disputes with Syrians

Although officials stated that relations with Syrians were positive, activists said that conflict and tension between the two communities was always live in Mount Lebanon; they attributed this to interpersonal issues (as described above in Sections 10.1. and 10.3.).

10.6. Bekaa

In Bekaa, more Lebanese than Syrians reported inter-communal tensions. A higher number of Lebanese than Syrians also reported having been part of or witnessed disputes between host and refugee communities, particularly in Qob Elias (30%). The highest share of Syrians who witnessed disputes between the two groups was in Chtoura (24%).

Figure 54: Disputes between Lebanese and Syrians, Bekaa

■ There are tensions between Lebanese and Syrians in this community
■ Witnessed disputes between Lebanese and Syrians

In Qob Elias, there were more complaints towards the Syrians. Interviewees including a local activist resented that sewerage from Syrian camps was being dumped onto agricultural lands. Interviewees also described scenes of long lines of Syrians queuing up in front of cash machines to withdraw support and stated that this roused anger among the Lebanese, especially those experiencing hardship. It is unclear whether such scenes take place, but in the

context of restricted currency withdrawals for Lebanese, such scenes could be perceived to be highly incendiary.

10.7. Perceptions of violence

Our survey asked respondents whether they believed that violence was an acceptable way to resolve disputes. Later in the survey, we also asked whether respondents had themselves used violence to resolve disputes. Asking these two questions enabled us to furnish this report with additional data on the difference between perceptions and actions.

We found near-universal disagreement with the statement that violence was an acceptable form of dispute resolution. Respondents in Mount Lebanon—98%—were most likely to disagree with this statement and respondents in the Bekaa—86%—were least likely to disagree with that statement.

Figure 55: Violence is an acceptable way to resolve disputes

Despite near universal acceptance that violence was not an acceptable form of dispute resolution, we saw that more people in the Bekaa and the North were likely to report having used violence to resolve a dispute. In the North, 14% had used violence, and in the Bekaa although 3% reportedly used violence to resolve a dispute, 10% of respondents did not answer that question, which might suggest that they had resorted to violence to resolve disputes. No-answer rates in the Bekaa were 7% in Qob Elias, 7% in Chtoura and 15% in Qsarnaba. In the North, 13% of Qalamoun and 15% of Chekka residents used violence to resolve a dispute.

Figure 56: I have resorted to violence to resolve a dispute

11. Taking an Integrated Approach to Programming

Impact of integrated approach (municipal policing, violence-free schools and local media support) on social stability in select municipalities.	Impact of municipal policing support on residents' sense of community safety and security.

In Chekka, Qob Elias and Qalamoun, the UNDP has started implementing elements of an integrated programme to support municipal government. The integrated approach comprised projects to promote violence-free schools (VFS), efforts to support municipal police and projects to increase resilience against fake news (see Section 2 Table 2). At the time of writing, roll out of this integrated approach is embryonic and project plans were delayed due to COVID-19.

Our research delved into perceptions on violence in schools, the municipal police and fake news; we will track this sentiment in future years alongside measures of project effectiveness to understand how programmes have affected perception and reality on the ground.

11.1. Violence-Free Schools

A minority of survey participants, 4%, agreed with the proposition that violence was an acceptable form of discipline in schools. The highest share of those who agreed with that proposition hailed from the South, 6%. This finding was reinforced in interviews across governorates where interviewees said that violence (verbal or physical) was not an acceptable way to discipline or punish individuals for poor behaviour.

In interviewee (a former MSS committee member) in Baaqline said that a distinction needed to be made between violence between students and violence between teachers and students. She stated that teacher-student violence had decreased significantly in the region, but that bullying and violence between students remained high.

A majority of those interviewed agreed that violence in schools reinforced violence in the community. A slightly smaller percentage, but still an overwhelming majority, believed that reducing violence in schools would also contribute to reducing violence in the community. According to one interviewee in Qob Elias, while the VFS project on its own may not succeed in eradicating violence in schools, even if it made a small difference it would help reduce violence on the long term.

Figures 57: Perceptions of violence and violence in schools

■ Violence is acceptable discipline
■ Violence in schools reinforces violence in community
■ Reducing Violence in schools contributes to reducing violence in community

When our interviewers discussed violence in schools with interviewees, it was clear that many believed that this was a peripheral social issue and that efforts targeting the school did not have as broad an impact on the community as infrastructure projects could. Our interviewers also noted a degree of shame and defensiveness when it came to discussing violence; their initial reaction was to dispute the presence of any school violence occurring.

In the North Governorate, no one believed that violence was an acceptable form of discipline. Most respondents agreed that violence in schools reinforced violence in community and that reducing it would also impact the community. Interviewees stated that there have been no violent incidents in schools in their town.

Figures 58: Perceptions of violence and violence in schools, Northern Governorate

■ Violence is acceptable discipline
■ Violence in schools reinforces violence in community
■ Reducing Violence in schools contributes to reducing violence in community

A higher number of respondents in the South believed that violence was an acceptable form of discipline. Even though a high rate of individuals believed that school violence reinforced cycles of violence in the community, a lower rate compared to respondents in the North believed that reducing violence in schools would have a knock-on effect on reducing violence within the community.

Figures 59: Perceptions of violence and violence in schools, Southern Governorate

■ Violence is acceptable discipline

■ Violence in schools reinforces violence in community

■ Reducing Violence in schools contributes to reducing violence in community

	SOUTH	HARIS	ABBASIEH	MIYEH W MIYEH
Violence is acceptable discipline	6%	9%	6%	4%
Violence in schools reinforces violence in community	86%	89%	85%	85%
Reducing Violence in schools contributes to reducing violence in community	80%	80%	81%	79%

In Mount Lebanon the municipal officials and residents interviewed took the view that there was no violence in their schools. A small proportion of respondents agreed that violence was an acceptable form of discipline, but the vast majority agreed that violence in schools reinforces violence in the community and that reducing it would also benefit the community. Fewer people agreed with this statement in Baaqline. A Jdeidet el-Chouf activist said that cases of violence in schools were not documented, even though these took place; this suggested that there may be violence that the community is unaware of. The activist said that more data needed to be collected.

Figures 60: Perceptions of violence and violence in schools, Mount Lebanon

■ Violence is acceptable discipline

■ Violence in schools reinforces violence in community

■ Reducing Violence in schools contributes to reducing violence in community

	MOUNT LEBANON	CHOUF	BAAQLINE
Violence is acceptable discipline	4%	6%	2%
Violence in schools reinforces violence in community	80%	85%	75%
Reducing Violence in schools contributes to reducing violence in community	78%	82%	74%

In Bekaa, responses showed the largest difference between those who agreed that violence in schools reinforced violence in community and those who believed that reducing violence would have a commensurate effect on violence in community. This was especially the case in Qsarnaba, though reasons for this are unclear. According to an interview with a former MSS committee member in Qob Elias, although the VFS project may not erase violence completely, it will make a small difference that would help reduce violence on the long term.

Figures 61: Perceptions of violence and violence in schools, Bekaa

11.2. Municipal policing

This section explores the extent to which people perceived the municipal police to be 1) credible and organised and 2) trusted to resolve disputes. Our survey also explored whether respondents felt safe when they see municipal police.

Although most individuals resorted to the municipality to resolve disputes and only 4% resorted to the municipal police with a dispute (see Section 10.2. above), most respondents believed the municipal police to be credible and organised and trusted the municipal police to resolve disputes. Perceptions of trust and credibility were highest in Mount Lebanon and lowest in the Bekaa; reasons for this are unclear, although one factor may be the higher number of municipal police in the North. The relationship between the number of municipal police and the extent of confidence in the force may be an area for future analysis.

Figure 62: Municipal police are credible

Figure 63: I trust the municipal police to resolve disputes

■ Agree ■ Disagree

66%	55%	61%	69%	83%
-15%	-28%	-9%	-7%	-10%

TOTAL | BEKAA | NORTH | SOUTH | MOUNT LEBANON

Figure 64: I feel safe when I see the municipal police

■ Agree ■ Disagree

71%	60%	66%	73%	88%
-11%	-24%	-7%	-4%	-7%

TOTAL | BEKAA | NORTH | SOUTH | MOUNT LEBANON

11.3. North

In Chekka, the Deputy Mayor stated that activities to support municipal capacity and training were implemented with the UNDP's support. These included training on communication and coordination with Lebanese Security Forces and in community policing concepts and practices.

According to municipal officials, training was helpful because the municipal police lacked capacity compared with the security forces. Chekka, officials said, had grown into a larger town and needed better-trained police. There were also tourist attractions around the beaches in the summer which required a higher police presence (the municipality provides 20 seasonal policemen).

Figures 65: Municipal police is credible, and I trust the municipal police to resolve disputes and I feel safe when I see the municipal police, Northern Governorate

During COVID-19, municipalities worked jointly with the union of municipalities. They received instructions from the Ministry of Health and sought to apply them in their towns but did not have as much authority or capacity to impose social distancing and hygiene practices as the security forces or state ministries. People in the town reportedly knew municipal police well and did not see them as figures of authority who could implement regulations.

In Qalamoun, the municipal police was most trusted to resolve conflict. The municipal police were responsible for traffic control and public security. Their role was enhanced during the economic crisis (protecting public and private properties) and the recent COVID-19 pandemic. Interviewees said that the municipal police had responded swiftly to incidents of theft and that they were present on main roads and visible to villagers. According to interviewees, however, the municipal police required more equipment and training in interpersonal skills to resolve conflicts ("they need to be more patient and tactful"). The village also needed to recruit more policemen, as there were only around 10 to 12 police.

11.4. South

According to interviews with municipal officials in Haris, the municipalities in the South were struggling to fund the municipal police; due to the current economic crisis, municipalities had imposed limits on recruitment and any appointments needed approval from the state. One activist stated that police recruitment in the South had to be improved and that appointments needed to be made on merit rather than political interest.

Figures 66: Municipal police are credible, and I trust the municipal police to resolve disputes and I feel safe when I see the municipal police, Southern Governorate

The municipal police worked on directing traffic in the villages, especially during Souk (market) days and during cultural and religious events or gatherings.

We understand that municipal police were also active in enforcing COVID-19 measures in these communities, but their role in managing COVID-19 measures was only explicitly mentioned in Haris. According to an interview with a member of the women's cooperative of Haris, the community's two or three policemen were "very efficient" and worked hard to apply COVID-19 measures and regulations in the village.

11.5. Mount Lebanon

Activists from Mount Lebanon said that the municipal police played an effective role during the latest lockdown due to COVID-19. They worked on regulating the entrance and exit of the village's main roads and enforced the 1900hrs curfew.

Municipalities mentioned that the public image of municipal police differed from the ISF, and that they did not enjoy the same status or level of respect from people. Community members considered them less powerful than the ISF, and this was reportedly because the police were less empowered by the Lebanese government.

Figure 67: Municipal police are credible, and I trust the municipal police to resolve disputes and I feel safe when I see the municipal police, Mount Lebanon

In Jdeidet el-Chouf, there were only three policemen, a low number for an area that was reported to need 10-15 policemen. Their power was limited but locals said that police were doing the best job they could, which included resolving disputes, handling security issues, directing traffic and disseminating information from the municipality.

In Baaqline views were mixed as to whether the number of policemen in the town was sufficient: some stated the town needed more, while others thought the current number was sufficient. Overall, the village was considered safe and active. Were serious incidents to take place, the municipality would inform the ISF rather than the police.

11.6. Bekaa

Like other governorates, activists in Bekaa said that there were a lot of municipal police but that they were recruited based on political affiliation and did not do their job to a high standard. Some activists argued for increasing the numbers of municipal police and to train the existing ones, especially given recent increases in the rate of theft.

Figures 68: Municipal police are credible, and I trust the municipal police to resolve disputes and I feel safe when I see the municipal police, Bekaa Governorate

In Qob Elias, the UNDP implemented a municipal police campaign; police were trained on how to conduct their roles and were provided with essential equipment for night patrol. According to the municipality, all such support was beneficial and the training had helped municipal police become more responsible and improve their profile.

In Chtoura, police had recently been trained on their roles and duties, the legal system, interpersonal skills and other context-specific problem-solving methods. Locals believed this improved police capacity and enhanced residents' perceptions of the police. As with other communities, the municipality required state approval to boost the number of municipal police. Interviewees also stated that the municipal police were limited in terms of what they could do as they lacked the right to prosecute individuals.

In Qsarnaba, interviewees said that the community lacked any municipal police. Municipal officials said they sometimes asked locals to act as municipal police in special scenarios. Interviewees believed that Qsarnaba has been a low priority when it came to being resourced adequately by the state, possibly because the municipality was relatively new. The high service and resource needs across the municipality meant that the recruitment of municipal police had not been prioritised.

11.7. Fake News

Respondents in the North reported the highest rates of fake news in the media; those in the South reported the lowest such rates. The South also saw the highest no-answer rates compared with other communities. We found a correlation between those who perceived that there was fake news in the media, and the perception that fake news increased tension in the community. Finally, a high rate of respondents in the Bekaa and Mount Lebanon reported being aware—or part of—an online fact-checking campaign.

Older respondents in our sample were less likely to believe that there was fake news in the media or to believe that fake news had increased tension in their community; they were also less likely to be part of an online fact-checking campaign. 40-to-49-year olds were most likely to agree with both statements, and to be part of online fact-checking campaigns. Youth aged between 18 and 29 were less likely to believe there was fake news in the media, but were more likely to believe that fake news has increased tensions in their community.

Figure 69: Fake news related questions, by age

- ■ There is fake news in the media
- ■ Fake news increased tensions in this community
- ■ I am aware of / part of an online fact checking campaign

Figures 70: There is fake news in the media, and Fake news can contribute to increasing tensions and incidents in my community

THERE IS FAKE NEWS

■ Disagree ■ Neutral ■ Agree ■ No answer

FAKE NEWS HAS INCREASED TENSION

■ Neutral ■ Agree ■ No answer ■ No answer

Figures 71: I am aware, or part, of an online fact-checking campaign, by governorate

Most respondents in the North believed that fake news existed and that it affected tension levels within their community. However, the Deputy Mayor in Chekka said that the spread of rumours and fake news in the town was not a social problem, and that there is a deliberate effort to spread such news in the town. Across the board in municipalities our interviewers found a degree of apathy by respondents towards fake news and it was clear that they had regarded the matter as a peripheral issue.

According to an interview with the Head of the medical association of Qalamoun, social media applications were the main source of fake news; in Qalamoun, they try to fact-check and counter fake news through WhatsApp. A small share of respondents in that community were aware of a fact-checking campaign, but no interviewees in Qalamoun said that they had heard of any awareness campaign regarding fake news.

The Head of the Qalamoun Medical Association also stated that there had been a great deal of fake news relevant to the revolution, with many reports, accusations and counter accusations spreading about who was responsible for the economic collapse in the country.

Figures 72: Fake news and its impact, North Governorate

Perceptions regarding fake news varied among our communities in the South. Over half the people in Abbasiyeh agreed that there was fake news in their community and that such news affected tensions, while only 37% of respondents in Miyeh-w-Miyeh believed the same. In all cases, we received mixed feedback on how frequently fake news occurs. A small proportion of respondents are aware of fake news campaigns.

Fake news was not considered to be a serious concern by interviewees in the South. The Mayor of Abbasiyeh mentioned that although this matter was undoubtedly important, there were more important matters that needed to be addressed in the context of the current COVID-19 and economic crises and that addressing these matters as a priority would be to the community's greater benefit.

Figures 73: Fake news and its impact, South Governorate

Most respondents in Mount Lebanon believed that fake news existed in the media and that it had affected tensions in their community. It was a common narrative in interviews with municipal officials and activists in Jdeidet el-Chouf that fake news was widespread in the community. The Jdeidet el-Chouf Mayor described fake news as a significant problem in his community and said that such news has travelled fast and was quickly and widely believed.

Such fake news was sometimes detrimental to the health of the community. For example, during the COVID-19 crisis, fake news spread regarding the preventative effect of drinking Anis to fight the virus, which was incorrect. In addition, the Mayor said that fake news had been spread about the municipality and its work. This took place on several social media applications and sites such as WhatsApp, Facebook and Twitter.

Figures 74: Fake news and its impact, Mount Lebanon

■ There is fake news in the media   ■ Fake news increased tensions in this community
■ I am aware/ part of online fact checking campaign

	MOUNT LEBANON	CHOUF	BAAKLINE
There is fake news in the media	91%	93%	90%
Fake news increased tensions	85%	82%	88%
Aware/part of fact checking	38%	36%	40%

In the Bekaa, most respondents in all towns believed there was fake news in their community and that such fake news had increased local tensions. The coordinator for the Ministry of Social Affairs in the Bekaa and a local activist in Chtoura both described how harmful fake news had been during the COVID-19 pandemic and stated that fake news is a particular threat because individuals may quickly react and mobilise on the basis of inaccurate information.

In Qob Elias, however, activists and municipalities described the community as so tight-knit and well-connected through WhatsApp that when individuals tried to spread fake news or a rumor, this was exposed. We understand that the UNDP project to counter fake news is being implemented in Qob Elias.

Chtoura activists said that their community was prone to believing fake news, but this was not considered a serious problem. They gave the example of a rumour that someone in the town had COVID-19 which had caused alarm; municipal officials had to use their private Facebook accounts to deny this.

Figures 75: Fake news and its impact, Bekaa Governorate

■ There is fake news in the media   ■ Fake news increased tensions in this community
■ I am aware/ part of online fact checking campaign

	BEKAA	QOB ELIAS	CHTOURA	QSARNABA
There is fake news in the media	89%	92%	93%	82%
Fake news increased tensions	88%	89%	92%	85%
Aware/part of fact checking	33%	38%	30%	30%

12. Additional Statistical Analysis

Our team looked at the potential causal relationship between people's future outlook and the three pillars of the LHSP intervention, namely tensions in the community, relationship with the municipality, and quality of services, in addition to a series of socio-economic variables. We performed regression analysis using a binary logistic regression, which is usually used when the dependent variable is a binary variable, i.e. takes the value of zero or one only.

The following equation is the regression equation used

$$Optimism = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Services + \beta_2 Municipality + \beta_3 Tensions + \beta_4 Interventions + \beta_5 Employment + \varepsilon_i$$

Where, the variables are defined as follows:

- Optimism (the dependent variable): People's optimism about the future; takes the value of 1 if people are optimistic about their future in their community or in Lebanon, and take the value of 0 if people want to leave Lebanon

- Services: People's perception of whether services in their community have become better or worse during the past year; takes the value of 1 if people report that they have improved, and value of 0 if they see that they have worsened or are still the same

- Municipality: People's perception of the municipality composed of 3 variables, perceptions on municipality's understanding of priorities (Municipality 1), municipality's ability to provide services (Municipality 2), and perceptions on municipality engaging them in determining priorities and needs (Municipality 3) ; Municipality 1 takes the value of 1 if people feel that municipality understands their needs, Municipality 2 takes the value of 1 if people feel that municipality is able to provide services, and Municipality 3 takes the value of 1 if people feel engaged by the municipality, all 3 variables take the value of 0 otherwise.

- Tensions: People's perception of tensions, composed of 2 variables, between Syrians (Tensions-Syr) or among Lebanese residents (Tensions-Leb); takes the value of 1 if people do not report tensions, and value of 0 if they believe there are tensions.

- Interventions: The number of interventions in the community; this variable was calculated by summing all LHSP projects implemented so far, the municipality policy program, VFS, and media campaign for each community.

- Employment: employment status; takes value of 1 if employed and 0 if not employed.

The equation also includes a constant β_0 and an error element ε_i

The results of the regression are presented in the table below. Only the variables with (***) sign next to them are statistically significant, i.e. show a causal relationship with people's outlook for the future. Our results showed that:

- Services are significant: if a respondent believed that services had improved, they were 0.38 times more likely to be optimistic about their future in their community.
- None of the municipality related variables showed to be statistically significant, indicating that perceptions about the municipality did not affect one's outlook on whether they want to stay or leave the community.
- Tensions with Syrians were also not statistically significant, however tensions among Lebanese were. Results showed that if respondents believed that there were no tensions between Lebanese residents, they were 0.519 times more likely to be optimistic about their future in their community.
- As for variables related to UNDP interventions, while the amount of money spent in the community was not statistically significant, the number of interventions showed that for every increase in number of interventions in a community, residents were 1.189 more likely to be optimistic about their future in their community (regardless of whom they had attributed projects to).
- Regarding socio-economic variables, while education did not show a statistically significant relationship with optimism about the future, employment status did. Regression results showed that if a respondent was employed they were 0.609 times more likely to be optimistic about their future in their community.

The explanatory power of the model overall is not too strong, with a Nagelkerke R Square of 0.109. This means that there are other variables that are not part of our model which play a more significant role in determining one's optimism about their future in their community. However, the factors that we provide here explain around 10.9% of this decision.

Table 23: How perception about being engaged by the municipality is affected by two other variables: knowing about activities and / or participating in events.

EXPLANATORY VARIABLE	β VALUE	SIGNIFICANCE	STANDARD ERROR
SERVICES	0.380***	0.000	0.250
MUNICIPALITY 1	0.741	0.197	0.233
MUNICIPALITY 2	1.083	0.712	0.217
MUNICIPALITY 3	0.911	0.641	0.201
TENSIONS_SYR	0.957	0.838	0.215
TENSIONS_LEB	0.519***	0.009	0.250
INTERVENTIONS	1.189***	0.02	0.057
INTERVENTIONS_USD	1.000	0.25	0.000

EDUCATION_DEGREE	1.277	0.181	0.183
EMPLOYED	0.609***	0.003	0.166
CONSTANT	2.443	0.001	0.262

***, significant at 1%

Annex 1 – Interview List

Community	Participants profile
Chekka	Vice Mayor Two municipal members
Qalamoun	Deputy Mayor Head of Medical Association Head of Sports Club Environmental Activist
Jdeidit el Chouf	Mayor Member of municipality Local actor Trader
Baaqline	Mayor Activist Member of scout organization Member of women cooperative Teacher
Haris	Deputy Mayor Mokhtar Engineer Member of women cooperative
Abbassiyeh	Mayor Municipality's engineer Student/activist Former MSS committee member
Miyeh-w-Miyeh	Mayor Deputy Mayor High school teacher Activist

	Member of Palestinian Popular Committee
Qob Elias	Mayor
	Municipal member
	Head of municipal police
	Former MSS committee member
	Two activists
Qsarnaba	Mayor
	Former Mayor
	Member of agricultural coop
	Employee at the ministry of social affairs
Chtoura	Two members of municipality
	Municipality clerk
	Member of Arcenciel organization/ activist

Focus group discussions

Community	Participants profile
Chekka	Development practitioner and activist
	Three University professors
	High School Director
	Activist
Qalamoun	Five university professors
	Engineer
Jdeidit el Chouf	Member of women cooperative
	Two activists
	Psychologist
Baaqline	Local actor
	Trader
	School director
	National library member
	Local actor

	Baaqline environmental association member
Haris	University student
Abbasiyeh	Agricultural cooperative member
	High school director
	Teacher
	Social worker
	Teacher and social worker
Miyeh-w-Miyeh	School director
	Social Club President
	Two activists
	Scout leader
	School teacher
Qob Elias	Five activists
Qsarnaba	Mokhtar
	Two activists
Chtoura	Local doctor
	Activist/ trader

Annex 2 – List of figures and tables

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