UNDP Jordan

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT
External Independent Mid-Term Evaluation of the UNDP Jordan Country Programme 2018-2022
“Placing development back at centre stage”

Commissioned by the UNDP CO, Jordan

By: Christian Bugnion de Moreta, Subur Consulting SL
www.suburconsulting.es

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Acronyms and abbreviations

CD: Capacity Development
CO: Country Office
CPD: Country Programme Document
CT: Central Team (UNDP CO)
DAC: Development Assistance Committee
DOS: Department of Statistics (MoPIC)
ECCDRR: Environment, Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDP Pillar)
EU: European Union
GA: General Assembly
GES: Gender Equality Seal
GoJ: Government of Jordan
GP: Governance and Peacebuilding (UNDP Pillar)
IGSL: Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Livelihoods (UNDP Pillar)
IEO: Independent Evaluation Office (UNDP)
IP: Implementing Partner
JRP: Jordan Response Plan
KII: Key Informant Interview
MoDEE: Ministry of Digital Economy and Entrepreneurship
MoFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoI: Ministry of Interior
MoJ: Ministry of Justice
MoL: Ministry of Labour
MoLA: Ministry of Local Administration
MoPPA: Ministry for Political and Parliamentary Affairs
MoPIC: Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
MoY: Ministry of Youth
MSC: Most Significant Change
MTE: Mid-Term Evaluation
OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
RC (UN): Resident Coordinator
RC (JOR): Royal Court
RF: Results Framework
ROAR: Results Oriented Annual Report
RR: Resident Representative
RRF: Resource and Results Framework
SDGs: Sustainable Development Goals
ToC: Theory of Change
ToR: Terms of Reference
UNCT: United Nations Country Team
UNDG: United Nations Development Group
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNEG: United Nations Evaluation Group
UNFPA: United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF: United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIDO: United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
UNSG: United Nations Secretary General
UNRCO: United Nations Resident Coordinator Office
UN Women: United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
WFP: World Food Programme
1. Executive summary

This executive summary is structured along the points mentioned in the UNEG quality checklist for evaluation reports. It presents the object, objectives, audience and methodology of the evaluation, its main findings, conclusions and recommendations. More detailed information is contained in the body of the report.

1.1. Overview of the evaluation object

This Mid-Term Evaluation’s (MTE) object is the UNDP Jordan CPD 2018-2022 covering the period from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2020. The unit of analysis is the CPD. At the time of the evaluation, UNDP’s CO’s portfolio consisted of 39 interventions resulting in a total contribution of USD 62 million, as detailed under box 3 in the body of the report.

The CPD is structured around three outcome statements as follows:

**Outcome 1:** Enhanced opportunities for inclusive engagement of people living in Jordan in the social, economic and political spheres, through nine interventions;

**Outcome 2:** People, especially the most excluded and vulnerable, proactively claim their rights and fulfil their responsibilities for improved human security and resilience, with 22 interventions;

**Outcome 3:** Institutions in Jordan at national level and local levels are more responsive, inclusive, accountable, transparent, and resilient, through eight interventions.

The 39 interventions are slotted under three “pillars”: Governance and Peacebuilding (GP), Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Livelihoods (IGSL), Environment, Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction (ECCD). A fourth programming category applies to “Corporate” initiatives, which include the Gender Equality Seal, the Accelerator Lab the SDG Impact and Greening the Blue according to CO information.

1.2. Evaluation objectives and intended audience

This MTE is meant to capture and demonstrate evaluative evidence of UNDP’s CO’s results achieved to date and consequently, its contribution to development results at the country level with regard to policy advisory services and implemented programmes, projects and initiatives. This MTE is both summative, giving an objective judgement of the value of the CPD performance, and formative, providing a learning exercise from which UNDP management may be able to position itself in preparation of the next CPD. It is also designed to provide inputs on how the CO could more effectively achieve intended results for the remainder of the current programme cycle. The primary audience is the UNDP CO, the Regional Bureau for Arab States (RBAS) and corporate headquarters, but the MTE may also be shared more widely with the government, development partners and implementing partners, in line with UNDP evaluation policy that places all evaluation reports on the evaluation resource centre website (erc.undp.org).

1.3. Evaluation methodology

The MTE used a mixed methods approach but was essentially qualitative. It included a thorough documentary revision and analysis, 73 Key Informant Interviews (KII) representing a good sample of the different stakeholders (Government of Jordan (GoJ), development partners, implementing partners (IPs), private sector partners, UN agencies and UNDP staff itself). Each interview lasted for approximately one-hour with a total primary data collection time of 75 hours. Confidentiality was assured and the sampling strategy, including the selection of the 73 respondents, was developed, discussed and agreed on with the Evaluation Manager and the UNDP’s relevant CO Team. KIIs included semi-structured, close-ended questions, using a five-point scale, and open-ended questions. Different sets of KIIs’ guiding questions were developed.
to accommodate for the different targeted stakeholders. The MTE was undertaken under the provisions of the UNEG evaluation norms and standards and UNDP’s IEO Evaluation Guidelines of January 2019, UNDP guidance on Outcome-level evaluation; of the UNDP PME Handbook; the UNDG Result-Based Management Handbook; UNDG UNDAF Theory of Change Companion Guidance; and following the provisions of the UNDP evaluation policy. The approach of the MTE was resolutely “utilization focused” and different analytical tools were used in interpretation of the data such as contribution analysis, appreciative inquiry, adaptation of the Most Significant Change approach, amongst others.

1.4. Most important findings and conclusions
The CO is globally on track to achieving its objectives when analysing UNDP’s global indicators for the CPD, despite a challenging and complex context. Not only has the Syrian crisis’s response focused the attention of the international community on humanitarian assistance to the 1.36 million Syrians in Jordan for the past ten years, but the COVID-19 pandemic has also negatively impacted everyone, at individual and institutional levels. Furthermore, the frequent changes in cabinet and in government counterparts meant that UNDP had to spend substantial time and effort to establish solid relationships with the new office holders.

UNDP has taken a pro-active and risk-taking role in strategically positioning itself in Jordan, a repeated pattern echoed throughout the KII’s. It has rightly shifted its attention towards placing development back at centre stage, moving away from the emergency humanitarian response that has been the main focus of the international community under the Jordan Response Plan (JRP). Building on the concept of resilience, UNDP has contributed to advocating for a more sustainable approach to livelihoods and employment creation. This was achieved through support from corporate initiatives to give higher visibility to the SDGs in Jordan, which directly attended to accelerating progress towards the 2030 Agenda, but also in applying the resilience concept with institutions, especially at the local level, to improve service delivery. Its adoption and piloting of corporate initiatives and innovative approaches to partnerships is not risk exempt, but can yield substantial rewards if it is successfully developed, as early results suggest.

On another related note, although UNDP managed to secure alternative funding from non-traditional donors, further core funding is highly needed to maintain a proactive position, increase UNDP CO’s capacity to inform policymaking and ensure sustainability of key partnerships. The main findings of this report correspond to the four evaluation criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. Findings are summarized hereunder, but are detailed in the body of the report.

Relevance
The CPD remains relevant with its three outcome statements despite the changes in the context since 2018. Although the current GoJ’s, and some of the development partners’ priorities give more immediate attention to economic growth and employment, the achievement of the 2030 Agenda and the SDG Jordan’s 2025 Vision remain relevant. What has changed is the importance of the two immediate GoJ priorities of economic growth and employment, while other aspects are placed in secondary position. The composition of the UNDP portfolio under the CPD remains relevant, particularly in regard to the interventions that are supported by the environment pillar (ECCDRR) and the corporate initiatives (SDG Impact, Greening the Blue, the Accelerator Lab, the Gender Equality Seal), and the engagement with private sector, and efforts in supporting digitalisation). The Governance and Peacebuilding (GP) portfolio is also highly relevant, although the context is not enabling to engage in full depth on certain sensitive issues, given limited entry
points and receptiveness of some stakeholders. For the Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Livelihoods (IGSL), the inheritance from the JRP and the Syrian crisis means that UNDP must consolidate its steering of the portfolio towards more sustainable and integrated livelihoods/employment schemes and stronger private sector involvement. The needs are clearly there, and livelihoods/employment creation are the two top GoJ priorities. There is a good opportunity for UNDP to capitalise on this aspect provided a clear strategy is developed for this sector by the CO.

**Efficiency**

Financial efficiency is high. The delivery rate under the CPD from 2018 to 2020 has been consistently over 90% regarding cumulative expenditures under the programme budget.

Management efficiency is very high. The CO has been restructuring since 2017 in order to be more prepared to face its multiple challenge in a more efficient manner. It is moving away from the project portfolio approach towards a thematic approach. New functions have been added and staff recruited (such as for the Central Team) and the creation of the new Policy Advisory Team. Internal information flow and communication is very high, and there is a strong push towards more integrated programming strategies across the pillars. This is work in progress and requires increasing engagement and visibility at the policy level. Management is clearly concerned about enhancing CO performance to the highest possible level given the context.

Programming efficiency varies depending on the CO pillar. It is relatively high in Environment, but it could be higher across all the pillars and corporate initiatives through the construction of a Theory of Change (ToC) exercise for each pillar, that would also link better the interventions within each pillar, and in turn from the pillar level to the overall CO level – in support of the CPD outcomes. This would contribute to a more integrated, mutually supportive portfolio of interventions across the pillars and would allow a more comprehensive approach towards efficient programming. That said, implementation efficiency is generally high across the programme portfolio, with exceptions due to constraining external factors, including COVID-19.

**Effectiveness**

UNDP is on the right path to achieve key CPD results and is setting up proper building blocks for development in Jordan. Many interventions remain on-going and are not yet completed and some new ones have just started. Considering the timing of this MTE after three years, UNDP’s effectiveness across its programme is generally good, in some cases very good, but it is also uneven across the programming portfolio.

As recognised in the ROAR (Results Oriented Annual Report), a number of interventions are actually standard-setting (e.g., work in the Solid Waste Management – SWM- sector) and have received very high ratings from the different stakeholders. This is especially true of the environmental portfolio, but also applies to the work in governance (support to elections, decentralisation) and to some of the livelihood interventions that focused more on the 3x6 approach, trying to steer away from short-term humanitarian emergency response.

The corporate initiatives are widely regarded as a very interesting innovation that have a very high yield potential, particularly regarding SDG Impact and the SDG Joint Fund/ sustainable development financing and the Gender Equality Seal at which the CO has achieved a Silver certification level during the current CPD. The accelerator lab needs more support from the corporate level (coaching) to find its niche in the CO.
The CO has been relatively weak in informing policy making, although this was constrained by the operating environment, with the exception of the environment portfolio and UNDP policy notes on decentralisation in collaboration with the Economic and Social Council. A need to make greater efforts in the future on informing policy making exist and is foreseen to be delivering with the initiation of the Policy Advisory Group within the CO.

An opportunity exists to build on the support to Department of Statistics (DOS) on SDG data and statistics to use this data for policy making. UNDP is recognised as a trusted and valued partner, with clear implementation capacity; a very clear level of responsiveness that is almost unanimously recognised as a key strength; adaptive management; good national and international staff; very strategic and open management style; international experience and a commitment to the Sustainable Development Agenda.

Very good progress has been achieved on gender mainstreaming and Women Economic Empowerment (WEE) is seen as a key future area in which UNDP is bringing added value. Other area where effective approaches were identified are related to Green Economy and Local Economic Development results. Prevention of Violent Extremisms (PVE) is a sensitive and delicate issue that may have to be upscaled to become a regional programme, as through regional exchanges and peer learning it may follow a different approach based on best international practices.

A stronger vision across the programming pillars of their success through a review of the M&E system to incorporate medium-term outcomes from its programming would enhance strategic management decision making capacity, as well as strengthen visibility and communications of UNDP’s achievements in Jordan.

**Sustainability**

To increase the sustainability of the UNDP CPD all interventions should include an exit or hand-over strategy, or a sustainability plan to upscale/replicate the results. Because not all interventions have a sustainability plan, it makes sustainability very much project-driven – rather than responding to strategic programmatic considerations. Resources also play a role as long-term partnerships leading to sustainability are dependent on sufficient resource allocation, which is not an easy endeavour in Jordan as core funding and access to development funding is limited. An example of a good sustainability modality is demonstrated through the Property-Tax Project, providing tax digitalisation services and technical assistance to MoLA with a five-year Development Services agreement, which is envisioned to lead to enhanced public service delivery.

Other programming aspects, particularly the innovations and corporate initiatives such as the Accelerator Lab, need time to flourish and to demonstrate their sustainability, but they do hold great potential provided a sustainability plan is clearly established. Some interventions have proved to include sustainability measures or have been replicated (for example the Badia projects, Heart of Amman project, the SWM interventions, PVE or WEE interventions through additional phases).

**Conclusions**

UNDP CO has been able to steer its positioning back to a stronger focus on the development agenda. Some of the downstream interventions show very strong and significant results, and the global appraisal of UNDP’s performance from the four different stakeholder categories
interviewed is high. UNDP is on the right track, yet there is room for improvement. But UNDP’s position is largely strategic and represents an evolving balance of proactive and responsive positioning within the bounds of its area of influence, considering the reform process is led by larger players and International Finance Institutions (IFI). Limited results were leveraged in the policy area, with the exception of the environment portfolio (ECCDDR). Yet, it should be noted that many of the challenges hampering informing policy making are linked to the operational context, changing conditions and competing priorities, which make long-term objectives take the backseat when confronted with more pressing issues. Despite these challenges, UNDP CO managed to demonstrate its capacity to effectively and efficiently support efforts to contribute to the development results. It provided guidance on the development agenda and has a strong convening role, it took risks in line with its objectives and development mandate, it advocated for achieving the SDGs achievements, it is taking the right steps towards closer partnership with the private sector, the social entrepreneurship actors, the investment ecosystem, non-traditional donors, to further support the corporate initiatives that may yield high potential rewards.

UNDP is a minor player in terms of the amount of the funds it is implementing in the country, but it is finding the correct niche, and its efforts and innovative approach are evident in a context of complex donor relations and changing GoJ priorities. UNDP’s management was found to be transparent, respected and strategic and these efforts need to be further pursued and consolidated. UNDP CO adopts an open and transparent internal communications system that is an important enabling factor towards a common vision.

UNDP CO has been highly praised for its level of responsiveness and commitment, showing its engagement and readiness in problem solving and its concern to achieve meaningful results. All stakeholder categories recognized UNDP’s convening power and soft advocacy on a number of critical themes and issues, notably on the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, as well as on the innovation and the SDG Impact initiative.

1.5. Main recommendations

As requested by the CO, the recommendations are divided according to the timeline, immediate to short-term under the current CPD, and medium to long-term for the upcoming CPD. Under each timeline, a separated set of recommendations is made for strategic considerations and internal CO recommendations.

1.5.1. Immediate to short-term recommendations (current CPD)

a) Strategic considerations

1. Continue efforts to leverage a strong relation with the private sector, and adjust the language and communication materials accordingly
2. Review the relationship and entry points with GoJ counterparts such as MoPIC and key actors in order to engage more actively into advocacy and policy making in critical areas, including with Parliament and the Ministry of Justice
3. Develop a map (inclusive of geographical layout) of ongoing development programmes and actors to ensure UNDP is positioned strategically both thematically and geographically to avoid potential overlap and duplication with larger operators
4. Define an engagement strategy with the Royal Court, particularly on the SDG agenda.
5. Review the vision and success at the end of the CPD period and beyond, for each pillar and corporate initiatives through a ToC exercise - with a clear identification of the underlying assumptions and causal relations, and their contribution to the overall CO ToC.

6. Develop a strategy and roadmap for new partnerships with private sector, philanthropic organizations, foundations and corporate sustainability funds for SDG initiatives and continue leveraging support from non-traditional donors.

b) internal CO recommendations

7. Provide a comprehensive M&E and RBM training to programme staff, with a particular focus on the ToC and the hierarchy of results, in order to ensure a common understanding and language is used for M&E and across all interventions.

8. Use the M&E function beyond project and CPD requirement to construct the CO narrative of success in Jordan based on and including evidence and data from evaluations.

9. Review and adapt the CPD RRF indicators in line with their existing limitations, and develop a country specific intermediate UNDP outcome Results Framework with relevant indicators to communicate effectively the CPD achievements.

10. Build a narrative of the CO successes by the end of the CPD that can be shared publicly and through social networks drawing from the previous recommendation.

1.5.2. Medium to long-term recommendations (next CPD)

a) Strategic considerations

1. Consider piloting an area-based integrated programme across the different pillars over a 3-year period in one governorate (suggested to be in the South) supported by a field office with a permanent staff presence to develop local partnerships and relationships.

2. Develop/establish a high-profile regional exchange centre/hub at regional level (or a Regional Centre of Excellence for a) PVE b) SDG data and statistics c) SDG investment funds, and also considering inclusion of d) regional programme management e) applications of successful transition to private sector in the SWM sector, e) Women Economic Empowerment. This could be done at the existing regional hub or sharing specific functions between the regional hub and the CO. For PVE, it could also be envisaged to link it to the UNDP Oslo Governance Centre. The expressed need to continue regional and international exchanges for SDG data and SDG investment funds supports points b) and c) of this recommendation.

3. Hold high-profile annual awards for best practices with media coverage under the regional “centre of excellence” under the previous recommendation 2 ensuring regional participation/visibility to stress the importance and value given to peer learning (particularly on SDG data and statistics, PVE).

4. Exploring possible collaboration with the King Abdullah II Centre for Excellence for this Regional Centre of Excellence/regional knowledge exchange hub.

5. Request from the corporate headquarters support in advocating to development partners that short-term funding is counterproductive for resilience and sustainability, even in protracted crisis situations, and try to establish a benchmark of 3-years for project funding particularly on sensitive issues to ensure enough time is given for coaching and monitoring.

6. The outcome statements of the CPD should reflect the relative importance of the UNDP programming portfolio. More than half of the current CPD budget allocations rest with the ECCDRR pillar and the CPD is only addressing ECCDRR interventions through two outputs under outcome JOR 29 as it has no specific outcome statement.
b) Internal CO recommendations

7. Consider developing a partnership strategy for programmes defining the typology and added value of the different kinds of partnerships
8. Avoid as much as possible short-term project implementation as it runs against the objective of developing sustainability and advocate the need for medium-term funds amongst development partners to strengthen the quality of the results.
9. Develop a consolidated data and information management dashboard for breaking silos between the pillars and support integrated policymaking and programming approaches.

2. Object of evaluation

The CPD document was distributed on 22 November 2017 and approved at the first regular session between 22-26 January 2018 of the Executive Board of the UNDP, UNFPA and UNOPS, as per item 2 of the provisional agenda. It came at a time of a change in the Administrator, and coincided with a different perspective to development work, which is reflected in the different structure and wording of the expected results in the two different UNDP strategic plans: For the period 2013-2017, UNDP has a vision of helping countries achieve the simultaneous eradication of poverty and significant reduction of inequalities and exclusion. It was articulated through 7 outcomes.

For the period 2018-2021, the CPD is aligned to the UNDP’s strategic plan vision “to help countries achieve sustainable development by eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions, accelerating structural transformations for sustainable development and building resilience to crises and shocks”. By 2021, UNDP wants to “catalyse tangible progress on:

   a) Eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions, and keeping people out of poverty;
   b) Accelerating structural transformations for sustainable development, especially through innovative solutions that have multiplier effects across the Sustainable Development Goals;
   c) Building resilience to crises and shocks, in order to safeguard development gains”.

UNDP’s CPD 2018-2022 was developed on the basis of national priorities as identified in Jordan Vision 2025, a National Vision and Strategy, elaborated in 2015 by the Government and consistent with the 2030 Agenda. UNDP’s CPD is aligned to the United Nations Sustainable Development Framework (UNSDF 2018-2022) with which it shares the same outcomes, something which renders more difficult the analysis of contribution and attribution.

UNDP’s CPD consists of three outcomes referenced as JOR 28 for Outcome 1, JOR 29 for Outcome 2, and JOR 30 for Outcome 3. Each is in turn articulated through a series of outputs as follows:

   **Outcome 1: Enhanced opportunities for inclusive engagement of people living in Jordan in the social, economic and political spheres**
Output 1.1. Civil participation, institutions and electoral/parliamentary processes strengthened to promote inclusion, transparency and accountability.

Output 1.2. National and subnational government effectiveness levels enhanced, and accountability strengthened

Output 1.3. National and civic capacities strengthened for social cohesion and prevention of violent extremism

Outcome 2: People, especially the most excluded and vulnerable, proactively claim their rights and fulfil their responsibilities for improved human security and resilience

Output 2.1. Employment opportunities and livelihoods strengthened, for stabilization, and return to sustainable development pathways

Output 2.2. Capacities at national and sub-national levels strengthened to promote local economic development (LED) and deliver basic services

Output 2.3. Nature-based solutions developed, financed and applied for sustainable recovery, and improving communities’ resilience and living conditions

Output 2.4. Climate change adaptation and mitigation policies and measures, and DRR plans funded and implemented

Outcome 3: Institutions in Jordan at national level and local levels are more responsive, inclusive, accountable, transparent, and resilient

Output 3.1. Capacities developed across the Whole of Government to integrate the 2030 Agenda in development plans and budgets and analyse progress towards the Goals, using innovative and data-driven solutions

Output 3.2. Policies, plans and partnerships for sustainable development draw upon UNDP thought leadership, knowledge and evidence

This period coincided with a UN-realignment with the detachment of the Resident Coordinator function (2018), which had also important implications on the implementation of the CPD and the role of UNDP. This is not covered by the scope of the current MTE, but an evaluation is being conducted by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) in New York, and there will be lessons from that report that the UNRC and the UNDP CO should be aware of.

2.2. Logic model of the CPD

The CPD does not contain an explicit narrative theory of change that indicates how the outcomes are expected to be achieved. However, the CO used the problem analysis and solution pathways to construct the logic behind the CPD architecture and identifies the entry points on which transformational change must be exerted to achieve the outcomes, as shown hereunder:

Figure 1. UNDP Jordan CPD ToC – Solutions Pathways
To be fully aligned to the corporate guidance on the ToC, the above diagram should be completed with a clear identification of the underlying assumptions, the causal relations, and in particular the partnership strategy, as UNDP does not work in a vacuum but through a network of partners, some of which take a different pathway albeit contributing to the same outcomes.

The development of a ToC narrative using the “IF” and “THEN” linkages, completed by the underlying assumptions (provided) and building on the partnership strategy, would provide a more complete understanding of the logic model. A reconstructed ToC drawing on the second pathway above could read, in a narrative format, and in a condensed form, as follows:

**Box 1. Reconstruction of a ToC**

**Example of a reconstructed Theory of Change - Pathway 2 towards Empowered People**

**IF** technology utilization and innovation services are provided to targeted strategic partners,

**Provided** partners are committed to digital transformation and make human resources available,

**THEN** SDG and institutional capacities can be developed.

**IF** SDG and institutional capacities are developed,

**Provided** MoPIC commits to the application of the institutional capacities developed,

**AND** no change in GOJ priorities takes place

**AND** MoPIC staff capacitated staff remain in their position

**THEN** SDG National Frameworks can be developed

**AND IF** SDG National Frameworks are implemented,

**PROVIDED** GOJ allocates the necessary resources to their implementation,

**THEN** People in Jordan will become empowered

**THROUGH** Improved quality health services, education, human security and information

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3 UNDG, UNDAF Companion Guidance: Theory of Change, undated (June 2017)
2.3. CPD portfolio composition

The portfolio of the CPD is composed of 39 interventions slotted under the three CPD outcomes, as mentioned in the figure hereunder: Table 1. Portfolio of UNDP CPD interventions implemented under current CPD
## Outcome 1 (JOR 28): Enhanced opportunities for inclusive engagement of people living in Jordan in the social, economic and political spheres

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr</th>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Output Description</th>
<th>Counterpart</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>End date</th>
<th>Donor</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>HEWAR Community Dialogue</td>
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<td>31-Dec-2020</td>
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<td>Human Security and PVE</td>
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<td>31-Mar-2021</td>
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<td>Harnessing Gender Justice into Microfinance for an</td>
<td>Women's access to justice dgp</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice, Central bank of Jordan, tamnahay memals</td>
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<td>Office of PM (PVE Unit)</td>
<td>10-Mar-2017</td>
<td>31-Dec-2019</td>
<td>JAPAN</td>
<td>$ 1,730,320.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mitigating the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on</td>
<td>Phase II Social Cohesion Prog</td>
<td>Office of PM (PVE Unit)</td>
<td>13-Mar-2018</td>
<td>31-Dec-2020</td>
<td>JAPAN</td>
<td>$ 1,138,076.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sub-total: $ 13,395,061.39

## Outcome 2 (JOR 29): People, especially the most excluded and vulnerable, proactively claim their rights and fulfill their responsibilities for improved human security and resilience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr</th>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Outcome Description</th>
<th>Counterpart</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>End date</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Contributions US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mainstream Rio Convention into 3 areas</td>
<td>DRR mainstreaming</td>
<td>Civil defense, Ministry of Interior, National Center for Security and Crisis Management</td>
<td>1-Jun-2018</td>
<td>31-Dec-2020</td>
<td>JORDAN</td>
<td>$ 175,502.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>PVE &amp; Livelihoods through HSD</td>
<td>Self-Reliance &amp; Inclusion</td>
<td>Ministry of Local Administration PVE Unit</td>
<td>10-Aug-2020</td>
<td>31-Dec-2021</td>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>$ 1,806,750.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>PVE &amp; Livelihoods through HSD</td>
<td>Human Security and PVE</td>
<td>Office of PM (PVE Unit)</td>
<td>10-Aug-2020</td>
<td>31-Dec-2020</td>
<td>JAPAN</td>
<td>$ 3,710,359.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>PVE &amp; Livelihoods through HSD</td>
<td>PVE &amp; Livelihoods through HSD</td>
<td>Office of PM (PVE Unit), Greater Amman Municipality, MOLA</td>
<td>1-Feb-2020</td>
<td>31-Dec-2020</td>
<td>JAPAN</td>
<td>$ 4,835,331.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Women Empowerment in SWM</td>
<td>Enhance women resilience</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
<td>1-Apr-2020</td>
<td>31-Dec-2021</td>
<td>JAPAN</td>
<td>$ 202,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Women Empowerment in SWM</td>
<td>Women Empowerment in SWM</td>
<td>Office of Local Administration</td>
<td>1-Apr-2020</td>
<td>31-Dec-2020</td>
<td>CANADA</td>
<td>$ 156,623.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Women's access to justice dgp</td>
<td>Women's access to justice dgp</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>6-May-2020</td>
<td>31-Dec-2020</td>
<td>UNDP FW</td>
<td>$ 267,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Reduction &amp; Elimination of POPS</td>
<td>COVID-19 Response</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Local Administration, Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>1-Jun-2018</td>
<td>31-Dec-2022</td>
<td>JORDAN</td>
<td>$ 237,000.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Reduction &amp; Elimination of POPS</td>
<td>Reduction &amp; Elimination of POPS</td>
<td>Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>1-Jun-2018</td>
<td>31-Dec-2022</td>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>$ 5,434,344.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Improve livelihoods of Sheep Owners</td>
<td>Sheep wold</td>
<td>MOI &amp; Badia Restoration Program</td>
<td>1-Jan-2019</td>
<td>31-Dec-2022</td>
<td>JORDAN</td>
<td>$ 646,875.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Sustainable Urbanization</td>
<td>Sustainable Urbanization</td>
<td>Greater Amman Municipality</td>
<td>1-Jan-2018</td>
<td>31-Dec-2022</td>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>$ 2,739,648.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Reduction &amp; Elimination of POPS</td>
<td>Maritime Littoral</td>
<td>ASEA</td>
<td>1-Jan-2018</td>
<td>31-Dec-2022</td>
<td>SWC</td>
<td>$ 110,000.00</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>SWM Development Service</td>
<td>SWM Development Services</td>
<td>Ministry of Local Administration</td>
<td>1-Jun-2019</td>
<td>1-Jun-2022</td>
<td>JORDAN</td>
<td>$ 1,716,682.55</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>Women Empowerment in SWM</td>
<td>Women Empowerment in SWM</td>
<td>Ministry of Local Administration</td>
<td>1-Apr-2020</td>
<td>31-Dec-2022</td>
<td>CANADA</td>
<td>$ 4,808,245.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Migratory Soaring Birds</td>
<td>Migratory Soaring Birds</td>
<td>Ministry of Environment, Birdlife International</td>
<td>1-Jan-2018</td>
<td>31-Oct-2022</td>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>$ 3,676,469.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>PHASE III SOCIAL COHESION PROGRAM</td>
<td>PHASE III SOCIAL COHESION PROGRAM</td>
<td>Ministry of Local Administration</td>
<td>1-Jan-2018</td>
<td>31-Dec-2023</td>
<td>AGP FOR UN DEV</td>
<td>$ 202,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>National &amp; Local Capacity</td>
<td>National &amp; Local Capacity</td>
<td>Ministry of Water and Irrigation</td>
<td>22-May-2018</td>
<td>31-Dec-2022</td>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>$ 127,462.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>SDG Climate Facility: Climate Action for Human Sec</td>
<td>SDG Climate Facility: Climate Action for Human Sec</td>
<td>Ministry Of Water And Irrigation</td>
<td>1-Dec-2019</td>
<td>31-Dec-2022</td>
<td>UNDP SDG</td>
<td>$ 12,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sub-total: $ 43,414,402.87

## Outcome 3 (JOR 30): Institutions in Jordan at national level and local levels are more responsive, inclusive, accountable, transparent, and resilient

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr</th>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Output Description</th>
<th>Counterpart</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>End date</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Contributions US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Financing for Development SDG’s</td>
<td>Financing for Development SDG’s</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>1-Jul-2019</td>
<td>31-Dec-2018</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>$ 271,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Financing for Development SDG’s</td>
<td>Financing for Development SDG’s</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>1-Sep-2018</td>
<td>31-Dec-2018</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>$ 751,375.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Financing for Development SDG’s</td>
<td>Financing for Development SDG’s</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>1-Sep-2018</td>
<td>31-Dec-2018</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>$ 271,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Enhancing SDG Financing Ecosystem</td>
<td>SDG Financing Component I</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>15-Jan-2020</td>
<td>15-Jun-2021</td>
<td>JORDAN</td>
<td>$ 420,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Enhancing SDG Financing Ecosystem</td>
<td>SDG Accelerator_ Component II</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>15-Jun-2020</td>
<td>15-Jun-2022</td>
<td>JORDAN</td>
<td>$ 200,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Property tax knowledge transfer</td>
<td>Plan and implement the Knowled</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Local Administration</td>
<td>8-May-2020</td>
<td>31-Dec-2020</td>
<td>JORDAN</td>
<td>$ 1,585,000.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>COVID-19 Impact and policy Analysis</td>
<td>COVID-19 SURVEYS ANALYSIS</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>1-Jul-2021</td>
<td>31-Dec-2022</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>$ 1,114,992.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sub-total: $ 5.422,735.37

Total: $ 62,232,200.30
From the perspective of the different pillars of the UNDP CO (core three pillars are Governance and Peacebuilding (GP), Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Livelihoods (IGSL), and Environment, Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction (ECCDRR)) and of the corporate initiatives, the number of interventions is:

Table 2. Interventions according to the areas of practice/pillars of the UNDP CO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNDP Pillar/area of practice</th>
<th>Contributions</th>
<th>Number of interventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GP</td>
<td>$ 11.729,702,94</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGSL</td>
<td>$ 3.656,658,31</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP/IGSL</td>
<td>$ 12.146,049,98</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCDRR</td>
<td>$ 31.212,054,09</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate</td>
<td>$ 3.487,734,98</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>$ 62.232,200,30</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The portfolio is resourced mainly from the ECCDDR pillar with half of all contributions, although it is slotted under two outputs under Outcome 2 (JOR 29): Outputs 2.3 (Nature-based solutions developed, financed and applied for sustainable recovery, and improving communities’ resilience and living conditions) and 2.4 (Climate change adaptation and mitigation policies and measures, and DRR plans, funded and implemented). The slotting of interventions under the different outcomes and their allocation to the different pillars does not seem to necessarily match the relative importance given to each outcome. This raises the question of how much the interventions are strategically driven versus project driven, as no specific weighting has been allocated to the different outcomes. This is normal, to a certain extent, given that at the onset of the CPD an exact prospect of funding by outcome may not be possible, and it is logical to leave a certain breadth for the CO to position itself over the five-year time frame based on lessons learnt through implementation and policy advisory services, as well as allowing diverse types of contributions in support of the outcome. However, some sense of where the main thrust of the CPD is heading would also signal to potential donors where UNDP expects to be a main contributor. The identification and role of the stakeholders are discussed in the attached inception report.

A challenge in following the logic of the interventions to tie them to the ToC of the CPD is the fact that different titles and acronyms have been used for some projects. For example, Heart of Amman is actually a mix of two interventions funded by Japan under the programme of “PVE” while it also sits under the Italian funded work on Social Cohesion and building resilience and improvement of livelihoods for Iraqi refugees. While the programme platform (Heart of Amman) is the same, two very separate tracks are followed, and support is provided to different population groups as well. A specific diagram of how interventions relate to their respective outcomes could be useful to better understand the strategy behind each pillar/area of practice. During the presentation of the preliminary findings, a specific example was shared of how portfolios composed of different interventions could be structured to contribute to a similar ToC, taken from a previous UNDP CPD outcome evaluation.
2.4. Country context

While the government had established its 2025 vision in 2015, changes in the government also meant changing priorities over the period of the CPD. Initially the GoJ developed an Executive Development Programme (2016-2018) which was essentially the three-year Action Plan for the 2025 Vision, also aligned with the SDGs. It was then substituted by the two-year National Renaissance Plan (Al-Nahda) was presented by a new government for a two-year period (2019-2020) to achieve the “Jordanian Human State”, based on three pillars: “state of law” which aims to ensure the principle of rule of law and enhancing the rights and duties of the Jordanian citizen in real life; “productive state” which aims to unleash the Jordanian human’s potential to achieve a decent living; and the “solidarity state” which aims to safeguard the Jordanian human’s dignity by improving the quality of public services and social protection systems. While this Renaissance Plan has common aspects with three UNSDF outcomes, there are also some differences, in particular the focus on a two-year planning period to achieve objectives, versus a ten-year planning cycle as laid out in Vision 2025. The shift to short-term objectives and quick gains needs to be read together with the increasing social and economic burden of the Syrian refugee crisis, which was trying to mobilise, under the Jordan Response Plan for the Syrian Crisis 2018-2020, a total of US$ 7.1 billion, of which US$ 4.5 billion in projects and US$ 2.6 billion in direct budget support, with a 51% funding response reported by MoPIC in 2019. This protracted humanitarian crisis entails a shift in priorities as development gains, both social and economic, have eroded in the aftermath of both the 2009 economic crisis and more recently as a result of the continued crisis in Syria and the generous acceptance by the Jordanian government of 1.36 million Syrians on its territory. Within a more constraining financial and economic global context, the economic competitiveness of the country and its ability to face the additional social and economic costs of the crisis are diminishing. Another document which was also considered a benchmark was the 2017 Voluntary National Review on the implementation of the 2030 agenda, which was the first to be made in the region, but seems to have had weak monitoring with no progress report regarding its implementation.

To further complicate matters, the COVID-19 (C-19) pandemic was declared in March 2020 and affected all countries with diverse measures: including lock-down and confinement in order to contain the pandemic. The restrictions to mobility and limitations regarding physical togetherness and contact have further affected all people living in Jordan, with the most vulnerable suffering the brunt of these limitations, and particularly women. To respond as quickly as possible to the new situation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the UN system, under the pro-active technical lead of UNDP CO, developed the UN Socio-Economic Framework for COVID-19 Response (UN SEF) in July 2020, together with the Resident Coordinator and UN partners. The government has responded to the pandemic through issuance of 24 defence orders as of December 2020. The UN SEF has identified five strategic pillars for COVID-19 as described hereunder with a total budget of US$ 431.2 million:

**Pillar 1** Health first: protecting health systems during crisis
**Pillar 2** People first: social protection and basic services
**Pillar 3** Economic response and recovery: protecting jobs, small and medium-sized enterprises, and vulnerable workers in the informal economy

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4 Jordan Response Plan to the Syrian Crisis 2018-2020, p. 3
**Pillar 4** Macroeconomic response and collaboration

**Pillar 5** Social cohesion and community resilience

Five “accelerators” have been identified to recover better under the UN SEF:

i) Equity and Inclusiveness to make sure that new and pre-existing vulnerabilities are addressed;

ii) an integral Gender Focus to guide us in addressing both new and pre-existing gender gaps and structural inequities;

iii) Digital Transformation that supports innovation and progress in public and social services as well as business and economic initiatives;

iv) Environmental Sustainability that emphasizes green solutions and technology for a better future; and

v) Preparedness and Prevention to strengthen systems and processes to efficiently maintain access to health, public and basic services, education, social assistance and business during times of crisis.

It is unclear to what extent these accelerators were designed to be used as entry points by UNDP or the UN system in supporting the 2018-2021 Strategic Plan outcomes and UNSDF 2018-2022 outcomes and the updated CCA. Based on the documentary review, KII respondents and corresponding analysis, UNDP seems in fact to be very mindful of these accelerators in the way the CO is implementing its portfolio. In particular, the C-19 pandemic has brought loads of attention to the digital transformation and virtual processes (accelerator 3) and to the preparedness and prevention aspects of the health systems (accelerator 5) with specific responsive support tailor-made in both cases through the flexible and adaptive response of the UNDP CO. The other three accelerators were already mainstreamed into the corresponding CO programming portfolios, with a strong focus on gender (as shown by the Gender Silver Seal awarded to the CO) and two GEN3 projects (on Women Empowerment, funded by Canada, and Gender Justice initiative supported by UNDP Funding Window), on environmental sustainability from the ECCDRR pillar, and on equity and inclusiveness across pillars to ensure no one was left behind. The latter, however, was less strongly embedded in programming as part of a systematic search for coherent coverage, given the limited geographical reach of the UNDP interventions.

Thirdly, after having examined the different planning documents and based on the information received during the data collection process, it appears that the main GoJ priorities can be summarized over the short to medium term as bearing on two main foci: economic growth and employment generation. In the search for quick gains, the importance of the SDGs seems to be somewhat relegated to second-level priorities by some GoJ partners.

In the aftermath of the London and Brussels (2019) conferences, efforts to combine the various frameworks were undertaken. An analysis of the priority actions referenced in the various planning frameworks was made and identified no less than 1,476 priority actions under the following documents: 200 under the Renaissance Plan, 170 under the five-year Reform Matrix, 70 under the HRD plan, 203 under the Economic Growth Plan, 175 under the Social Protection Strategy and 658 under Vision 2025. The MoPIC has the lead role in coordination of all international cooperation and has also established a Reform Secretariat, in line with its own internal restructuring. The most recent development in addition to the Reform Matrix has been the elaboration of the GoJ executive programme 2021-2024, which was presented on 16th February 2021 to his Majesty King Abdullah by the Prime Minister.

The somewhat tortuous relationship between the commitment to longer-term objectives with short-term priorities (e.g., 2 to 3 years planning framework and priority plans), coupled with a

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5 GoJ Strategy Plan Mapping Matrix, excel, 15.10.2019
high turn-over in Cabinet positions and key ministries, which happen on average every year, increases the complexity in maintaining long-term, strong and strategic partnerships.

The current situation is therefore very different than the planning scenario used in the CPD 2018-2022, particularly as assumptions did not materialize with the C-19 pandemic, and the level of complexity for a proactive positioning of UNDP in the country is high. UNDP needs to find the proper balance between the short-term quick-win gains stemming from the C-19 pandemic and the UN SEF which it can help achieve, the protracted Syrian refugee crisis under the JRP, the GoJ reform matrix and its executive programme, together with its longer-term development approach to contributing to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), for which it remains both an integrator and a champion. The GoJ commitment to longer-term objectives seems to be somewhat overshadowed by the need to show quick economic and social gains in an increasingly fragile economic context severely impacted by the C-19 pandemic. The findings from this MTE indicate that the CO is currently correctly positioning itself in order to achieve a balance in its interventions.

Regarding resource allocation and mobilisation, Jordan is a middle-income country. This implies more limited resources are available from traditional donors and indeed less core funds for the UNDP CO, which in turn diminishes the capacity of the CO to proactively play a greater role for actively advocating on key issues given limited funding availability.

3. Evaluation purpose, objectives and scope

3.1. Purpose
This MTE is meant to capture and demonstrate evaluative evidence of its contribution to development results at the country level with regard to policy advisory services and implemented programmes, projects and initiatives. In line with UNDP Jordan evaluation plan, the MTE is being conducted to assess the impact of UNDP’s development assistance across the major thematic and cross cutting areas of Governance, Sustainable Development and Inclusive Growth. At the same time, the MTE’s findings and recommendations are meant to inform future CPD programming. This MTE is therefore both summative, giving an objective judgement of the value of the CPD performance, and formative, providing a learning exercise from which UNDP management may be able to position itself in preparation of the next CPD.

3.2. Objectives

The objective of this evaluation is to capture and demonstrate evaluative evidence of its contribution to development results at the country level regarding policy advisory services and implemented programmes, projects and initiatives.

The MTE focuses on the three selected UNSDF outcomes to capture evaluative evidence of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the current programmes of UNDP, which would be used to strengthen existing programmes and to set the stage for the preparation of the new CPD.

The MTE has three specific purposes combining both summative and formative elements:

1) To provide a summative evaluation of the performance and results to date;
2) To identify good practices and lessons to be carried forward into potential future interventions with similar outcomes;
3) To provide recommendations, where relevant, on aspects of policy and programming which could be improved to inform the next CPD.

3.3. Scope

The scope of this mid-term evaluation is the implementation period of the Programme Phase since its start on 1 January 2018 until 31st December 2020. The MTE unit of analysis is the CPD, which is composed of a portfolio of interventions described under section 2.3. The evaluation is carried out under the provisions of the UNDP revised evaluation policy of January 2019. It essentially assesses the strategic level to determine the value, performance, improvements and good practices that underpin the CPD implementation and looks to the future to suggest, based on the findings and lessons identified during the MTE process, possible ways to inform UNDP over its next planning and programming cycle. Since the CPD is still under implementation, the MTE has identified where the process and building blocks have been placed by the CO, even though the outcomes themselves are not yet fully reached.

3.4. Audience

This mid-term decentralised evaluation is meant to provide evidence of results and accountability to the UNDP and other interested stakeholders, but it is also a learning exercise for the CO. It is undertaken under the oversight of the UNDP Jordan Country Office. The UNDP evaluation manager is the UNDP business development support and reporting specialist, in consultation with the CO Team. Her role is to ensure that the final evaluation remains on track with its work plan and submits the required deliverables. The audience is primarily the CO, regional bureau and corporate headquarters, but the MTE may also be shared more widely with the government, donors and implementing partners. It is normally publicly available on UNDP’s Evaluation Resource Centre website (https://erc.undp.org).

4. Evaluation methodology

This MTE has been carried out in line with the UNDP Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) Evaluation Guidelines of January 2019; UNDP guidance on Outcome-level evaluation; UNDP PME Handbook; the UNDG Result-Based Management Handbook; UNDG UNDAF Theory of Change Companion Guidance and following the provisions of the UNDP evaluation policy. The MTE also adheres to the UNEG ethical guidelines for evaluation. The approach follows also a “utilization-focused evaluation” approach that is described by M. Q. Patton in his book of the same title that continues to be a good practice reference material for the conduct of

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6 UNDP, Outcome-level evaluation, a companion guide to the Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and evaluation for development results for programme units and evaluators, December 2011
7 UNDP, Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results, 2009
8 UNDG, Results-Based Management Handbook, Harmonizing RBM concepts and approaches for improved development results at country level, October 2011
evaluations. The application of these guidelines ensures that the evaluation methodology is also
gender-responsive, and more details are contained in the attached inception report.

The four criteria for undertaking the MTE are mentioned in the ToR and are the standard criteria
used for evaluations: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability. The definition of
each of the evaluation criteria has been given by the OECD/DAC glossary of key terms in
evaluation and results-based management updated in 2019 as follows:

“Relevance: The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent
with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donors’
policies.

Efficiency: A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are
converted to results.

Effectiveness: The extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or
are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.

Sustainability: The continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major
development assistance has been completed.”

Considering that 60% of the CPD timeline has passed and the fact that outcome indicators are
supposed to be reached at the end of the CPD, the MTE has focused on identifying whether a)
the processes to reach the outcomes have been put in place and b) the building blocks are sound
and supportive towards enabling the realisation of the outcomes.

The MTE also analysed the co-existence of two different approaches towards development: a)
one through the “traditional” interventions that UNDP has been undertaking for many years and
for which it has extensive experience and b) through its recent innovation lens and the
incorporation of new corporate programmes and strategies (SDG, PVE, Accelerator Lab, etc.).

Tools and methodology

The evaluation used a mixed-methods approach, but was essentially based on qualitative data.
Because of the COVID-19 limitations, all interviews took place virtually. The methodology
consisted of the following:

1) Documentary review and evaluation planning phase

This phase was based initially on the review and analysis of the documentation submitted by
UNDP CO and used to develop the inception report that was submitted on 18th January 2021
and was further complemented by additional documentation obtained during the data
collection from different key informants. An updated bibliographical annex is therefore
attached.

2) Data collection Phase

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10 Better Criteria for Better Evaluation, Revised Evaluation Criteria, Definitions and Principles for Use,
OECD/DAC Network on Development Evaluation, 2019 which completes and updates the traditional
OECD/DAC, glossary of key terms in evaluation and results-based management, Evaluation and Aid
Effectiveness series, 2002
As agreed with the UNDP evaluation manager and the CO, the main data collection was done through virtual **Key Informant Interviews (KII)**. An initial list of 75 respondents (from which 6 were no longer in-country and did not respond to the invitation to be interviewed sent four times by e-mail) was established by the CO, and reviewed and complemented by the evaluator based on further interview probing needs. As a result, a total of 73 KII were held with 42 women and 45 men from the different stakeholder groups for a total interview time of 75 hours, yielding an average of 62 minutes per interview. The different stakeholder categories interviewed are mentioned hereafter:

Figure 2. Table of Key Informants Interviewed during the CPD MTE (source: MTE notes)

The response rate compared to the original list of respondents, which did not include UNDP staff is 78.3%, which is very near the 80% target identified in the inception report. 13 government institutions or ministries were interviewed. Some noteworthy gaps were Parliament (meeting rescheduled three times and finally cancelled), MoJ and the National Crisis Management Centre. The complete list of respondents is included in the corresponding annex to this report.

**Interviews were semi-structured using a questionnaire/interview protocol with key evaluation questions to ensure consistency and comparability.** Some questions requested a rating from the respondent using a 5-point scale (from 1 lowest to 5 highest, with 3 as mathematical average). However, the MTE did not carry out a formal survey, considering that many of the respondents only had a partial knowledge of the CPD portfolio, and hence were rating different aspects of UNDP based on the incomplete knowledge. Therefore, while some perceptions have been leveraged from the KII, the in-depth interviews provided more qualitative knowledge on specific issues, prioritising depth in the interview process. This also explains the low number of specific ratings obtained on some questions, and the fact that the MTE findings do not necessarily reflect
the perception ratings presented in the report. Where there is such a discrepancy, the report addresses the reasons for providing additional qualitative information that informs the overall findings from the evaluation process.

Findings were triangulated (e.g., having confirmation from three different sources) to strengthen the credibility of the evaluation report. Probing was extensively used to obtain an in-depth understanding of the operational context, constraints and factors that influenced UNDP’s positioning and performance over the first three years of CPD implementation.

At the end of the data collection phase, the MTE held a preliminary debriefing supported by an internal PowerPoint presentation with the UNDP CO to present the tentative findings, conclusions and recommendations and to obtain an initial feedback and take into consideration the CO’s inputs for the preparation of the draft evaluation report.

3) Data analysis and preparation of the draft evaluation report

Based on the results of phases 1 and 2, the evaluator made an analysis and interpretation of the data and prepared the current draft evaluation report submitted to the UNDP evaluation manager, who has two weeks to provide the consolidated comments to the evaluator for the preparation of the final report. Data validation: A clear distinction is made between the interpretation of the data (subjective) versus the triangulated findings (objective and factual).

4) Final evaluation report

A final evaluation report will be submitted to the UNDP evaluation manager within five working days from the date of receipt of the consolidated comments but in any case, not later than fifteen working days after the receipt of the draft evaluation report. An audit trail will also indicate how the comments and suggestions made on the draft report have been addressed.

Sampling and data sources: as discussed with the CO, the primary sources of information for the data collection through KII was identified in the initial list of respondents which consisted of 75 persons excluding UNDP CO staff. This comprehensive list was the sample target for this MTE, thereby providing an inclusive analysis of the perception from the various actors regarding the work of the UNDP in Jordan. The evaluator reviewed the list and made suggestions for specific respondents to be included. The sample of 73 KII for this evaluation is considered as sufficiently representative of the key main stakeholders, despite the unavailability of three key stakeholders as identified above under point 2).

4.2. Evaluability

The UNSDF contains a Resource and Results Framework (RRF) with a set of related indicators, which had been used during years 2018-2020. The Outcome Statements (JOR 28, 29 and 30) as well as the outcome indicators are defined at the corporate level, and it is not done by the CO. The CO is responsible for the outputs statements and indicators that are mentioned under the third column of the RRF “Indicative country programme output”. As indicated in the inception report and in line with UNDP evaluation guidance, the unit of analysis for CPD evaluations is the
CPD outcomes, in this case the three outcomes, although the CO is not being responsible for them or the selection of the outcome indicators as indicated in the UNDG RBM Handbook. UNDP has recognised that there are in fact more than one level of outcomes, as shown on the figure hereunder, extracted from the same handbook (p. 116).

Figure 3. UNDP PME Handbook example

In UN and UNDP operating environments, there are normally more than one outcome hierarchies: UNDAF outcomes and UNDP country programme outcomes. In Figure 14, higher level outcomes, such as UNDAF or national outcomes, are depicted by oval shapes. The country programme outcomes are depicted by diamond shapes. They could also be conceived as sub-outcomes that lie within a higher level national or UNDAF outcome as depicted.”

This has however not been operationalised in UNDP’s RBM frameworks, and more recent additional RBM guidance from the UNDG RBM Handbook does not address the intermediate outcome level, stating that “United Nations agencies are expected to achieve the outputs for which they are responsible and thereby contribute to UNDAF outcomes aligned to national priorities.”

As a result, the CO has to work on the assumption that it only achieves outputs, which is something probably meant to simplify the results framework, but that ends up confusing those who are not RBM specialists, since UNDP does not incorporate the concept of “intermediate outcome” in its RRF nor how intermediate outcomes of its interventions support UNDAF (or in this case UNSDF) outcomes, which, as shown on the figure above are not necessarily the same.

This corporate requirement conflicts with the training materials used by UNDP for the training on Results-Based Management that is being rolled out to UNDP COs, particularly regarding the need for the CO to focus on outcomes instead of outputs. Given the CPD RRF, the indicators for the outcomes are included in this report with the updated information provided by the CO.

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11 UNDP, PME Handbook, p. 117
12 UNDG, RBM Handbook, 2012, p. 15
13 The evaluator is also a vetted RBM trainer for UNDP Panama and Istanbul hubs and has delivered various training workshops on RBM to COs using UNDP and UNDG materials in addition to training to 294 staff from UN agencies, Government officials, NGOs and private sector over the past ten years.
However, it is not reflecting the actual achievements of the CO itself, and most of the indicators are not adjusted to capture changes over a five-year timeframe. Therefore, while the CPD is supported by an RRF with outcome statements and relative indicators, these are not reflecting the achievements of the CO over the past three years (the intermediate outcome level) that contribute to the higher level UNSDF outcomes. As mentioned in the UNDP PME Handbook “Large projects may have outcomes that can be evaluated. Further, small projects may also make tangible contributions to the achievement of CPD outcomes or even project-specific outcomes. In such instances, these project evaluations may be considered to be fulfilling requirements for outcome evaluations”\textsuperscript{14}. It is critical for UNDP to develop results framework at the intermediate outcome level which speaks about the UNDP achievement in the country during the CPD timeframe, and how these contribute to the higher-level UNSDF outcomes.

In addition to the CPD RRF, and as a result of the pandemic, a specific Result Framework was designed for the UN SEF and its five pillars, which at the end of 2020 substituted the results collected by the three Results Groups under the UNDSF at the end of 2018 and 2019.

The indicators for appraising the results under each Pillar are:

Box 2. Indicators under the UN SEF

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Pillar 1 - 4 indicators:} \\
1.1. Number of people accessing non-C-19 essential health services \\
1.2. Number of health facilities that received UN support to maintain essential immunization services since C-19 disruptions \\
1.3. Is the country protecting health services and systems (binomial, Yes or No) \\
1.4. Number of community health workers receiving UN support to maintain essential services since C-19 disruptions \\
\hline
\textbf{Pillar 2 - 5 indicators:} \\
2.1. Number of people reached with critical WASH supplies \\
2.2. Number of children supported with distance/home-based learning \\
2.3. Number of primary school children receiving meals or alternatives to meals \\
2.4. Does the country have measures in place to address GBV (binomial, Yes or No) \\
2.5. Number of beneficiaries of social protection schemes and services related to C-19. \\
\hline
\textbf{Pillar 3 - 4 indicators:} \\
3.1. Is the country reinforcing UN supported employment policies and a regulatory environment conducive to economic recovery and decent work (binomial, Yes or No) \\
3.2. Number of private sector companies and formal and informal sector workers supported during and after the C-19 pandemic \\
3.3. Is the country adopting climate and environmentally sensitive fiscal, legislative and monetary stimulus packages for C-19 economic response and recovery (binomial, Yes or No) \\
3.4. Number of direct beneficiaries of food supply protection regimes that are designed to protect livelihoods by addressing food supply bottlenecks \\
\hline
\textbf{Pillar 4 - one indicator:} \\
Socio-economic impact assessments done (binomial, Yes or No) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{14} UNDP PME Handbook, p. 154
Pillar 5 - three indicators:

5.1. number of organisations benefitting from institutional capacity development,
5.2. number of CBOs capacitated to respond to and mitigate the pandemic and its effects,
5.3. number of social dialogue, advocacy and political engagement spaces.

This RF is similarly focusing on wider aspects of the work of the UN in Jordan and does not target specifically the achievements of the CO. As a result, neither CPD RRF nor UN SEF RF provide a results framework that enables UNDP to tell the story of its achievements. This aspect is further discussed under point 5.2.4. hereunder.

This MTE contains a strong formative element and analyses a CPD which has been now implemented for 60% of its life cycle, three out of its five years. While some of the expected results are yet to be achieved, the MTE analysed whether the building blocks and processes are in place to enable the CO to achieve its expected objectives (and hence consider prospective evaluation and appreciate inquiry elements for analysis).

4.3. Risks and limitations

A major limitation is that the evaluation had to be undertaken remotely and did not allow the physical presence of the evaluator in Jordan given the C-19 pandemic. This did not allow for evidence to be collected through on-site observation and from site visits. Another limitation was that a few of the KII were held in Arabic. UNDP CO provided an interpreter that allowed simultaneous interpretation to take place during the interviews.

Finally, sufficient time should have been allocated for the data collection phase during the planning phase. The data collection phase was extended twice until 4th March 2021 in order to ensure a good representativity of the respondents. This should have been reflected in the level of effort planned for the evaluation from the onset. From two exercises conducted for CPD MTEs through virtual means, it is suggested at an effort level of 40 to 45 person-days be considered for the correct fulfilment of the MTE objectives15.

5. Findings

This section is structured according to the evaluation criteria and main evaluation questions as identified in the inception report and as indicated in the UNEG Quality checklist for evaluation reports. The key questions to be addressed by the evaluation have been structured along both the main purpose of the evaluation, the ToR and the line of enquiry mentioned above into a set of 19 Key Evaluation Questions (KEQ).

5.1. Relevance

5.1.1. To what extent is the CPD still corresponding to government and donor priorities at present?

When the CPD was designed the main attempt was to bring UNDP’s focus back to its development agenda, after the shift in the response from the international community on humanitarian aid and refugee assistance in the aftermath of the Syrian crisis, through the Jordan

15 The evaluator wishes to acknowledge the CO’s adaptive management that recognised the original effort level of 25 days for this evaluation as insufficient and agreed to a much-needed extension of the workload.
Response Plan in which UNDP played a key coordination role. However, the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs remains the longer-term ambition, which was espoused by the GoJ through Jordan vision 2025, Al Nahda Renaissance Plan, the 2017 VRN, and other planning frameworks. Before the C-19 pandemic UNDP had resolutely achieved a shift of focus to more development-related efforts and programming under its CPD, and in particular with what has been viewed as very good support for the 2020 elections that were able to take place despite the C-19 related limitations. UNDP has been rolling out, with the support of its regional office, the concept of “resilience” as a main programming category across all interventions, which also serves to bridge the gap (or nexus) between the short-term humanitarian aid and the longer-term developmental needs, after a protracted crisis that is now entering its 10th year with no immediate end in sight.

Jordan has been receiving a large amount of ODA, but the response to the JRP has been the most visible in terms of programmatic assistance from the international community. Its costs are too steep to be borne by the GoJ, so international response is of paramount importance to address the response to the Syria crisis. Nonetheless, as the protracted crisis is increasingly affecting the carrying capacity of the country to both provide assistance and services to its many foreign guests as well as to all Jordanians, including the most vulnerable Jordanians, the need to address strategically the longer-term sustainability issues naturally come to the front of the agenda and require a specific positioning that UNDP is trying to adopt (notably through mainstreaming of the concept of resilience).16

The declaration of the Covid-19 (C-19) pandemic by the WHO on 14th March 2020 triggered a substantial change in the way development assistance had to be delivered worldwide. Jordan came as no exception as a three-months lockdown required development actors to re-think how to do business in the context of mobility restrictions and lack of direct physical contact amongst people. The pandemic had two consequences: a) it came as a wake-up call for the UNCT to find a common ground on the way forward in a very challenging context, constrained by movement limitations. The result was the proactive role of UNDP in the development and the coordination of the UN SEF which was released in July 2020. It also put the GoJ also on alert and the country was subject to 24 Defence Orders from March until December 2020 aiming at addressing the pandemic. At the same time, a priority MoH response plan was endorsed by the Cabinet in order to provide the immediate actions required to contain the virus and avoid widespread contamination. b) it also indicated the need to speed up the digitalisation efforts and increase efforts to develop functional platforms allowing for remote communication, thereby supporting the calls to engage on the digital transformation “accelerator”.

In this context, UNDP provided a dual support, first within the UNCT through an intensive information sharing and coordination with UN agencies on the UN SEF and how the UN should react under the UNRC leadership to the pandemic (through the 5 pillars identified in the UN SEF), and second through specific actions to response gaps that highlighted UNDP’s capacity to adapt and respond quickly to emerging needs, both in the health and digital sectors. In particular, the provision of triage tents, of PPE (personal protective equipment), of medical waste equipment, support to the mobile clinic, are a few examples of the relevance of UNDP’s action, which were confirmed through the KII. Another important aspect was the support to

16 CO comment: “UNDPs Resilience work (and mandate) goes much beyond ‘mainstreaming the resilience concept’, whereby providing UNDP leadership of JRP / 3RP processes at the strategic level, including through the facilitation of integrated (Inter-Agency) processes around the humanitarian-development nexus, and resilience tracking/ high-level advocacy”.
selected GoJ institutions in digitalisation and ensuring that services could continue to be provided through remote means. Of particular importance was the property tax project, that allowed a virtual platform to continue operating despite the lock-down and enabled the citizens to pay their taxes through virtual means.

The donors also showed willingness to have some funds repurposed given the severity of the C-19 pandemic, so that there proved to be an understanding that flexibility would be given to the extent possible to address this unforeseen situation. Despite the C-19 pandemic, the CPD remains at present a reflection of UNDP, donor and government priorities, particularly given the broad outcome statements, so there does not need to be a substantial change in the CPD as the direction of the CO remains rightly anchored on the initial vision, although it has been able to adapt to the best of its abilities to changing operating conditions.

5.1.2 Is UNDP’s UN SEF response aligned to the country’s main priorities?

As indicated above the UN SEF was released in July 2020, when the GoJ had a Health Response Plan endorsed by Cabinet, but mainly focusing on the health sector. At the time the UN SEF was released, the GoJ had not yet developed a comprehensive response plan. As such, the UN SEF came to actually complement those aspects that were not initially covered by the CPD or the multiple GoJ strategies and plans, but it was coordinated with the GoJ and was aligned to the country’s main priorities in response to the changing context.

5.1.3 What potential shifts in CPD are necessary to address current priorities?

There is no need to shift the CPD to address current priorities because UNDP has de facto already adapted its programming to the changing context. By increasing support to digitalisation and innovation, UNDP is finding new venues to continue addressing the current priorities, which are of course constrained by the mobility limitations. While no one knows for how long the pandemic will continue to limit mobility and remain a public health threat, it is obvious that some programmes will not be able to be completed over the medium-term unless mobility restrictions are relaxed. What the CO may do is a portfolio review to identify which interventions are more at-risk of not reaching their objectives and consider a contingency plan for those projects that cannot be completed as planned.

5.1.4 To what extent is the method of delivery aligned to current priorities?

The CPD mentioned under paragraph 21 that “the programme will be nationally executed and implemented through mutually agreed modalities based on the most efficient and cost-effective manner”. The information obtained from the CO shows in fact that some programmes were nationally implemented while others used direct implementation. Considering the feedback from the various GoJ counterparts regarding UNDP’s performance in Jordan, it does appear that the delivery methods used have been adapted to the priorities, as the level of satisfaction across UNDP global delivery is high.

5.2. Efficiency

5.2.1. Is the CPD providing value for money?
The CPD for UNDP Jordan is composed of a portfolio of a variety of interventions. As shown in table 3. Under section 2.3, the programming portfolio is divided across three practice areas (GP, IGSL, ECCDRR), plus the corporate initiatives (CORP). The rationale behind the interventions varies. The strongest portfolio is that of environment, that has 16 interventions and half of the CPD contributions. Many of the interventions are funded through the Global Environmental Finance (GEF) or through regional projects, targeting a range of concrete operational results. At the same time, a series of interventions deal with Jordan’s respect of its international obligations, and hence deal with different levels of results (e.g., Rio Convention on Biological Diversity – CBD-, Nagoya Protocol, 4th National Communication under UNFCCC and 2nd Biennial Update Report, etc.). So even within the specific pillars, different interventions have different objectives ranging from operational results, informing policy making, to compliance and respect of international obligations. Further support was also provided to specific areas such as the development of the Jordan National Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy (DRR) 2019-2022, although no direct feedback from GoJ was available on the support to the DRR strategy itself. The value for money of this portfolio is clearly established because it is tied to specific outputs defined in the various project documents. Feedback from KII particularly from GoJ counterparts confirmed clear value for money for the interventions in the Environment (ECCDRR) portfolio, across the majority of the sixteen interventions.

Under the IGSL pillar, with the exclusion of those interventions that are undertaken together with the GP pillar under the funding of the Government of Japan, which are covered separately, the interventions are geared towards a more sustainable approach to livelihoods and empowering women and vulnerable people in the process. Developing resilience through a more holistic approach to livelihoods, which through the 3x6 approach and similar mechanisms links the individual activities into a process that rightly seeks to align with the demand side, working on a specific value-chain approaches, and inclusive of private sector actors, is a clear value for money in the context of often unsustainable livelihoods provided on short-term basis to the large number of refugees that have been residing in Jordan over the past ten years. While more should be done to ensure the sustainability of the approach, particularly as regards to the linkages with micro-finance and financial institutions, it is an approach that seeks to empower individuals and develop their skills and capabilities to contribute to their subsistence. E-wallets seem to be a particularly effective manner to empower those women who would otherwise not have access to funds. The level to which the portfolio has mainstreamed sustainability approach in its interventions is however not clear.

The ten interventions under the GP pillar portfolio also represent a varied mix of projects. Feedback from KIIIs also confirm the high value for money provided through certain interventions, such as in supporting the electoral process in 2020, in decentralisation, through the partnership with the MoLA and through community dialogue interventions. A sizeable number of interventions are placed under the “PVE” heading and comprise different approaches with different objectives. It is less clear how much value added is being leveraged through the various “PVE” interventions, in the sense that they need to follow a strategic narrative to be mutually supportive and contribute to the overall goal of “PVE”. A separate analysis regarding the effectiveness of “PVE” as a programming category is discussed further under the effectiveness section (including the three interventions across both GP and IGSL pillars).

Under the corporate initiatives, there are six interventions which are being implemented. These are all innovative approaches that challenge traditional development interventions and entail a certain level of risk, as these innovations are navigating unchartered waters and the yield may
not be immediately evident. Yet there is a huge potential to reap high dividends for the SDGs if the initiatives are properly nurtured and coached, with adequate technical backstopping from the corporate level. For the UNDP CO these are potentially highly rewarding initiatives, but sufficient core funds, time and support must be granted to turn these investments into rewards.

Overall, the UNDP CO portfolio is definitely willing to take risks on a number of themes, approaches, and in the composition and balance of its programming. While generally the programming under each pillar appears to have shown its value for money (see details under the effectiveness section), the corporate initiatives require sufficient lead time to achieve their potential. The SDG Impact initiative are highly interesting and there appears to be a market for such services. However, UNDP needs to become more agile and change its vocabulary and terminology when engaging with the private sector as the traditional UN jargon used in some projects may not be conveying the right message to the potential partners and investors. For the purposes of this MTE, the six interventions that are labelled under the “PVE” heading also are considered as corporate initiatives, although they are implemented by the pillars, in the sense that they respond to the new approach presented by former UNSG Ban Kim Moon to the General Assembly (GA) on 24th December 2015 and based on the General Assembly resolution of 9th February 2016. While PVE does not form a part of more recent corporate initiatives *stricto sensu*, it does represent a different approach to traditional development work that raises a certain number of questions. It is not possible at this stage for the MTE to give an evidence-based appraisal of the value for money from the different PVE interventions, and this is explained in more details under the effectiveness section of this report.

5.2.3 Has the CPD been efficiently managed?
5.2.3.1. Financial efficiency

All financial information was provided by UNDP Jordan CO Operations, with figures as of 31st December 2020. In terms of programme delivery, the CO has achieved a very good performance, with a cumulative delivery rate systematically above 90% for the first three years of the CPD, including for 2020 and despite of the limitations and constraints of the C-19 pandemic. Details are provided per year and per programming category.

Table 3. Delivery rates of UNDP Jordan CO as of 31.12.2020 across programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme 2020-2018 in USD</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12,440,372.00</td>
<td>13,954,029.00</td>
<td>16,231,247.00</td>
<td>42,625,648.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11,297,825.00</td>
<td>12,721,002.00</td>
<td>15,071,950.00</td>
<td>39,090,777.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management 2020-2018 in USD</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,557,968.00</td>
<td>1,983,573.00</td>
<td>1,578,184.00</td>
<td>5,119,725.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,225,475.00</td>
<td>1,682,632.00</td>
<td>1,533,241.00</td>
<td>4,441,348.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Programme delivery per year across pillars
2018 | Budget USD | Exp | Delivery Rate
--- | --- | --- | ---
GP | 6,081,265.00 | 5,591,477.00 | 92%
ECCDRR | 7,586,597.00 | 7,296,925.00 | 96%
IG&SL | 2,098,730.00 | 1,718,894.00 | 82%
Corporate | 464,655.00 | 464,654.00 | 100%
Total | 16,231,247.00 | 15,071,950.00 | 93%

2019 | Budget USD | Exp | Delivery Rate
--- | --- | --- | ---
GP | 3,536,093.80 | 3,362,678.10 | 93%
PVE4: Act 1,3, & Act4 | 1,418,821.54 | 1,258,491.30 | 93%
Total GP pillar | 4,954,915.34 | 4,621,169.40 | 92%
ECCDRR | 5,982,863.90 | 5,509,278.60 | 92%
IGLS | 314,283.90 | 297,759.73 | 85%
PVE4: Act 2& Act4/2 | 1,931,548.41 | 1,617,224.54 | 85%
Total IG&SL Pillar | 2,245,832.31 | 1,914,984.27 | 88%
Corporate | 770,417.45 | 675,569.73 | 88%
Total | 13,954,029.00 | 12,721,002.00 | 91%

2020 | Budget USD | Exp | Delivery Rate
--- | --- | --- | ---
GP | 1,772,334.84 | 1,580,992.00 | 89%
PVE4: Act 1,3, & Act4 | 801,482.00 | 791,078.00 | 89%
PVE5: Act 1&3, & Act 4 | 1,076,912.76 | 884,630.44 | 89%
Total GP pillar | 3,650,729.60 | 3,256,700.44 | 89%
ECCDRR | 5,053,627.53 | 4,665,244.70 | 92%
IG&SL | 951,875.48 | 919,300.00 | 92%
PVE4: Act 2& Act4/2 | 683,479.21 | 651,899.36 | 92%
PVE5: Act 2 & Act 4 | 624,085.32 | 497,473.14 | 92%
Total IG&SL Pillar | 2,259,440.01 | 2,068,672.50 | 92%
Corporate | 1,476,573.21 | 1,307,207.36 | 89%
Total | 12,440,370.35 | 11,297,825.00 | 91%

5.2.3.2. Management efficiency

The CO has been restructuring from 2017 even before the start of the CPD as reflected in the different organograms shared with the evaluator from 2016 to 2019. New structures included a Central Team with functions that cut across M&E, gender, innovation (establishment of the Accelerator Lab), and more recently the creation of a Policy Advisory unit, while one pillar changed its acronym from IPIS (Inclusive Participation and Institutional Strengthening) to GP (Governance and Peacebuilding) in an attempt to reflect more clearly the thrust of its interventions and its focus area.

The CO management is showing to be very adaptive and concerned about finding the most constructive structure to achieve its goals. It is recognised for a very good effort in communication and information to all staff, with a series of Town Hall Meetings held regularly,
quarterly updates from the RR, and a recognised willingness to transparency and efficient communication and coordination across the CO. Efforts to break the traditional “silos” in which UNDP places its “units” or “pillars” have been clearly recognised by the staff, although more efforts are still warranted to improve programming efficiency. In terms of information management, the CO is recognised as a good practice example given the quantity and relevance of the information that was made available to the CPD MTE that enabled the evaluator to gain an in-depth understanding of the constraints and highlighted the commitment of the CO to finding the most adequate structure to enhance its efficiency. This is the first CPD evaluation undertaken by this evaluator\(^{17}\) that included a detailed composition of the CPD portfolio, with budgets, beginning and end dates, pillar allocation, counterpart, and all the financial information related to the delivery of the three first years of the CPD, which shows that a good information management system is being established. In terms of the CPD provision of a 3% allocation for M&E from the programme budget, the allocation for the first three years of the CPD (2018-2020) amount to 2%(or $759,074.50), on track with the 3% target by the end of the CPD.

From an external perspective, UN colleagues see UNDP’s management as very strategic. Some suggested it could be even more so in relation to specific UN partnerships that may be developed further. Within the corporate initiatives, the accelerator lab is struggling to find its niche in Jordan. In part it is due to the culture clash between traditional and experienced development practitioners who do not necessarily see the need to include innovative approaches to their work, but it is also in part given the lack of sufficient coaching and nurturing from the corporate level to equip, support and train the accelerator lab in order to enable them to fulfil their function in the country and in an integrated manner with the programmes.

The UNDP CO staff is a key asset, and it needs to be nurtured. The quality of the staff, both national and international, and including specialised consultants, was deemed to be quite high, but a high staff turn-over, particularly from the internationals in the GP (former IPIS) and IGSL pillar means that some of the institutional memory has been lost. This could be remedied through posting of a National Officer as deputy for every pillar head by an international staff.

5.2.3.3. Programmatic efficiency

The overall portfolio of CPD interventions could be further enhanced in terms of programmatic efficiency if these interventions were clustered around common objectives across the range of outcomes contained in the CPD. In fact, while many of the interventions have a strong stand-alone value, programmatic efficiency could be enhanced if, within each of the three pillars and for the Corporate initiatives’ portfolio, a theory of change was developed to show how each intervention contributed to the transformational change that is supposed to be achieved at the end of the CPD. In order to do this, each pillar and the corporate initiatives team need to review individually the essence of the projects, and link them together as they contribute to the higher-level outcomes through a ToC exercise. This requires a facilitated session for the CO in order to have a stronger programmatic efficiency, in which it becomes apparent how the different interventions are mutually supportive of the contribution to the (intermediate) outcome. At present, and as mentioned in the CPD portfolio list, it is not evident that these interventions are clustered around a strong programming approach where programme results are given even more importance than individual intervention results.

\(^{17}\) The evaluator has undertaken a mix of 109 evaluations of which some 40 for UNDP including UNDAF, CPD, ADR, Outcome, and project evaluations.
From a portfolio perspective, Environment (ECCDRR) is the best resourced and has been the strongest, with half of the CPD funding going to this pillar while only two of the four outputs under outcome 2 (JOR 29) actually relate to environmental concerns. Work on decentralisation and elections, working at local level, and establishing community dialogues, appeared as some of the strong points of the GP pillar, with lesser successes in working with Parliament, in the justice sector, in terms of accountability or transparency. For the less resourced IGSL pillar, the approach used to livelihoods (3x6) and its concern with developing resilience, coaching, including the demand side through a value-chain approach, and engagement with the private sector, has been seen as an efficient shift from the traditional cash-for-work humanitarian programmes. Nonetheless, the portfolio appears to be overall weaker than expected in supporting policy making, except for the ECCDRR pillar, and not all interventions contained elements to ensure sustainability.

5.2.3.4. Strategic efficiency

The CPD is a combination of traditional and high-value interventions that are shown to bring added value and are well rated by GOJ counterparts, donors and implementing partners, with more innovative approaches such as the accelerator lab, for which a specific niche needs to be found in the context of Jordan, and a series of interventions that have just started but may be particularly relevant to the country’s needs (e.g., DOS and SDG data). Some interventions address policy-level decisions (mostly those from the ECCDRR portfolio), but the technical assistance and support given to inform policy can be a resource intensive exercise requiring additional core funds in order to allow the CO to continue its relevant strategic positioning in the country. UNDP’s CPD is strategically determined, pro-active, and needs to be recognised as a “risk taking” portfolio of interventions, as some entail a high level of uncertainty over future results, some require a certain time to obtain a return on the investment (i.e., SDG Impact, sustainable development financing ), and others are highly sensitive and require a very clear approach (e.g., PVE) regarding what results may be achieved.

All the more so because the short-term project funding that is allocated to some interventions (such as PVE) undermine the CO’s efforts to be strategic and set the agenda.

With the UN Reform the functions of the UN Resident Coordinator became separated from those of the UNDP Resident Representative. As both current incumbents had worked before together under different titles (the current UNRC was then UNDP RR as well, while the current UNDP RR was the UNDP Country Director), they had a good working relation and had already collaborated closely before the delinking took place. The UNRC is supportive of UNDP in regard to resilience and the SDGs. However, how the de-linking of the UNRC from the UNRR is actually adding value to the UNDP programme remains to be demonstrated. KII indicate some level of confusion on roles and responsibilities, and there was no direct evidence of how the UNRC function enhances the role of the UNDP, but this aspect was outside the scope of the evaluation. An evaluation of the UN Resident Coordinator System is currently under way by OIOS (Office of Internal Oversight Services) which may bring useful findings on this question. From an external perspective (donor, UNCT and GOJ), the two persons are highly respected and work well alongside each other, so they are seen as a winning team.

5.2.4. How strong is the CO’s M&E system in providing evidence to inform decision making?
The CO has made substantial efforts compared to the past CPD and in line with the IEO Assessment of Development Results (ADR/ICPE) in 2017 has strengthened the M&E function through the creation of a Central Team, resourced by five programme and operations staff. However, more training on RBM needs to be done to fully address the ADR finding that “the inadequate attention given to results-based management in planning, monitoring and reporting on UNDP interventions hampered the design of an integrated and holistic country programme, as well as monitoring and report on results”.18 This finding applied to the previous CPD, although the need to strengthen the staff’s RBM skills and capacities is still warranted. In particular, the current MTE sees a certain internal conflict between the corporate guidance that is given to the CO when establishing the CPD RRF and the CO’s M&E needs. There are two levels at which the UNDP is providing M&E functions: 1) The Corporate Level – where the unit of analysis is the CPD RRF, and 2) Individual projects – where the unit of analysis is the projects as defined by the various donors’ requirements.

1) RRF of the CPD

The Resources and Results Framework established under the CPD lists three different outcomes that aim to be achieved at the end of the CPD five-years timeline. (JOR 28, 29, 30). They are further presented in reverse order in the CPD (Outcome 3, then 2, then 1). The outcome statements and the outcome indicators are not established by the CO, but are defined at the corporate level. These indicators have to be collected in compliance with corporate requirements, but they do not indicate the level of results that UNDP has achieved in Jordan under the CPD during its implementation, as outcomes refer to the contribution of a much wider range of partners (such as the Youth Development Index and Gender Development index, or the percentage of refugee population benefitting from United Nations supported programmes). The CO is responsible for the “indicative country programme output” under column 3 of the RRF, which summarizes how UNDP is expected to contribute to the outcomes. This follows the UNDG RBM Handbook of 2012 that states “United Nations agencies are expected to achieve the outputs for which they are responsible and thereby contribute to UNDAF outcomes aligned to national priorities.”19 The same handbook defines “Outcome” as “representing changes in the institutional and behavioural capacities for development conditions that occur between the completion of outputs and the achievement of goals” and “Output” as “changes in skills or abilities and capacities of individuals or institutions, or the availability of new products and services that result from the completion of activities within a development intervention within the control of the organization”20. Outputs can therefore be attributed because they are the result of undertaking specific activities.

2) Individual projects results framework

Each intervention is funded by donors, which each have their own reporting requirements and want to have a certain set of M&E information regarding their individual projects, in line with their objectives. Individual projects do generate a large number of outputs and are likely to generate outcomes.

The problem for the CO is to show the transformational change that the UNDP is contributing to in the country, and this cannot be done through aggregating the individual

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18 IEO, ADR Jordan, 2017
19 UNDG, RBM Handbook, October 2011, p. 15
20 Ibid, p. 6
project results into the corporate RRF framework. As indicated under section 4.2., UNDP has recognised that projects and interventions may generate outcomes. However, these are not the high-level CPD defined outcomes, but they are intermediate outcomes, e.g., the transformational change as a result of the completion of the outputs, that nonetheless are also supporting the higher-level outcomes. By lacking these, the actual pathway (or strategy) followed by the CO is lost between the immediate project outputs and the higher-level outcomes of the CPD.

UNDP has provided a definition in its Outcome Level Evaluation: a companion guide, which is itself based on the UNDP PME Handbook that remains a reference for evaluation users, and which states that “Outcomes describe the intended changes in development conditions that result from the interventions of governments and other stakeholders, including international development agencies such as UNDP. They are medium-term development results created through the delivery of outputs and the contributions of various partners and non-partners. Outcomes provide a clear vision of what has changed or will change globally or in a particular region, country or community within a period of time. They normally relate to changes in institutional performance or behaviour among individuals or groups. Outcomes cannot normally be achieved by only one agency and are not under the direct control of a project manager.”

The UNDP CO is ill-equipped to show its contribution to the transformational changes at the outcome level in the country because its various results frameworks are either too low level (e.g., project level, only speaks about the project results) or too high (e.g., CPD level, where outcomes are collective results from the UNCT and the GoJ). As a result, there is not M&E or RBM framework to collect data that informs both the contribution of UNDP as an agency to transformational changes at institutional and behavioural level as a result of its CPD implementation and informs management decision making. As this is a recurrent challenge for the CO, the case is made for the UNDP CO to develop a meso-analytical RBM M&E framework with three primary objectives:

1) Cluster and structure the interventions portfolio in a manner that highlights the contribution of individual projects to the intermediate outcome according to a specific ToC for each pillar and for the corporate projects
2) Review outside the scope of the CPD and of the individual interventions the CO management needs in terms of data and information, so that strategic decision-making is grounded on available data and evidence that supports proactive positioning.
3) Develop a country specific, UNDP specific, overall results framework that can tell the story of the various intermediate outcomes that UNDP contributed to achieving through its efforts (outputs), in order to provide greater accountability to national stakeholders and beneficiaries and that can and should be used externally to support its communication and visibility strategies to donors, GoJ, private sector, implementing partners and more generally to the media and on social networks.

5.2.5. How is UNDP balancing current short-term priorities with its longer-term CPD planning objectives?

UNDP has shown to be adaptive and responsive to changing needs, this is exemplified through the response to the C-19 pandemic both internally in the CO (through remote and virtual work home-based for UNDP staff) and externally with the UNCT and GOJ, with the lead role in supporting the preparation of the UN SEF in July 2020 but also through targeted specific support to identified gaps and funding specific outputs related to this gap coverage (purchasing of personal protective equipment, triage tents in hospitals, medical waste auto cleaners, etc.).

This implies that the longer-term CPD objectives are not altered, although the context is clearly affecting some of the implementation efficiency given mobility restrictions. Despite pressures to focus efforts on economic growth and employment creation as the key immediate GoJ priorities, UNDP is not forgetting its commitment to the longer-term objectives as defined in the 2030 agenda and the corresponding national planning frameworks. The MTE assesses the CO’s capacity to balance the short- and longer-term priorities under the CPD in the current context as good.

5.3. Effectiveness

The CO is overall on track to achieving its CPD objectives. However, there are wide differences across interventions and pillars which means that results are uneven. Furthermore, the CPD is only 60% implemented, so there remain two years to leverage the expected results. In this context, the MTE presents in this section a) the evaluation results according to the CPD RRF structure b) the response to the Key Evaluation Questions as mentioned in the inception report c) the results of the qualitative information and some survey results from the KII process which reflect the perception of the various stakeholders interviewed and d) the interpretation of data.

A.1) Evaluation results according to the RRF structure (Source of data UNDP CT): outcomes

As the unit of analysis of the CPD is the 3 CPD outcomes, the first appraisal relates to the outcome level indicators as mentioned in the CPD RRF. They are presented in reverse order which is how they appear in the RRF. These indicate the following:

Table 5: UNSDF/CPD Outcome indicators as of 31.12.2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CPD Outcome 3: Institutions in Jordan at national and local levels</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 3.1</td>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Milestone Actual</td>
<td>Milestone Actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of population satisfied with the last experience of public services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1 Proportion of population satisfied with the last experience of public services (National)</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Indicator 3.2       | Baseline | Milestone Actual | Milestone Actual | Milestone Actual |
| Existence of functional systems to track and make public allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 |
| 3.2.1 Existence of functional systems to track and make public allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment (National) | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
### Indicator 3.3: Ranking of Jordan on the corruption perception index and the open budget system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Indicator 3.4: Existence of national/local disaster risk reduction strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
<th>Actual</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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</table>

### Indicator 3.5: Number of laws and policies which are adopted and/or modified in line with international/United Nations standards and conventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
<th>Actual</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### CPD Outcome 2: People especially the most excluded and vulnerable

#### Indicator 2.1: Youth Development Index

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

#### Indicator 2.2: Gender Development Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>88</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Indicator 2.3: Percentage of refugee population (dis-aggregated according to sex and age) benefitting from UN supported programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>85%</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Indicator 2.4: Number of beneficiaries of the Jordan Compact initiatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>571,355</td>
<td>571,355</td>
<td>571,355</td>
<td>571,355</td>
<td>571,355</td>
<td>571,356</td>
<td>571,355</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Based on the above figures, the MTE makes the following assessment:

1) Most of the indicators are measuring something that UNDP is very indirectly contributing to by itself. A number of these indicators relate to high-level outcomes, whereas two indicators represent much more directly the contribution of UNDP to the outcome (e.g., 3.4.1 DRR strategy and 3.5.1 laws and policies adopted). Both these indicators refer to the work of the environment pillar (ECCDRR). Outcomes measured range from almost direct UNDP contributions (3.4.1 and 3.5.1) compared to much more minimal involvement in the contribution to the outcome (2.3.1. and 2.4).

2) Outcome 1 indicators are based under untested assumptions about factors influencing women’s participation in the political sphere. Indicators show a drop compared to the baseline, while KII data from GoJ counterparts indicates that the performance of UNDP during the elections and the support to women’s political empowerment was considered to be good. This indicates the need to review and explain the basic assumption in line with a better understanding of the gender dynamics in politics. UNDP CO has made substantial efforts in gender and has been praised by counterparts for a number of successful interventions aiming at inclusive participation and empowerment of women. It has gained the gender seal certification and now has a gender focal point in the CO. But there are some underlying causes that have not been properly identified and which cause the indicators to be below the targets. It may be useful to review Outcome 1 indicators when a detailed analysis of the factors affecting women’s political participation is made and causal factors are better understood.

3) A number of these indicators are quite old and do not have regular updates, and therefore are not so well suited to really measure progress over the five-year timeframe of the CPD. For example, for indicator 3.1.1., there has not been any survey conducted since 2018, and for indicator 2.1.1, there has not been a report since 2016. A mid-term review of the indicators at the corporate level based on the learning that has taken place in the CO during these three years could inform better suited indicators of success.

A.2) Evaluation of results according to the RRF structure (Source of data UNDP CT): outputs

The Outputs under the CPD have a total of 59 indicators to report. Each outcome is supported by a number of outputs, as shown under section 2.1. outcome 1 has three outputs, outcome 2...
had four outputs and outcome 3 has two outputs. The MTE has revised the progress to date of the indicators.

In the table 6. hereunder, the indicators are complemented by a traffic light signal where green indicates the target has been achieved or exceeded, yellow that it is in progress but not yet achieved, and red for those indicators that show underperformance. For Output 1.1 Civic participation, institutions and electoral/parliamentary processes strengthened to promote inclusion, transparency and accountability, for Output 1.2. National and subnational government effectiveness levels enhanced, and accountability strengthened, and for Output 1.3. National and civic capacities strengthened for social cohesion and prevention of violent extremism, under Outcome 1, there are 20 indicators. 8 of those are on track with expectations and this work in progress should be achieved by the end of 2022 (yellow light), 5 have already achieved or exceeded the target (green light), and 7 are underperforming (red light). It should be noted that four of the seven related to lower electoral participation, and 2 relate to the capacity development of local level representatives, which is also associated with the lack of progress on the decentralisation strategy (remaining red light).

Reminder: an indicator is a neutral measure of progress. It does not reflect the performance of the work undertaken or the level of satisfaction from the partners and beneficiaries, so it is not a sufficient source of evidence to fully appraise the results achieved from a qualitative perspective.

Table 6: update of CPD Output 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 indicators as of 31.12.2020 (source UNDP CO)
### CPD Output 1.1: Civic participation institutions and electoral/parliamentary processes strengthened

#### Indicator 1.1.1 Number of consultative sessions held by committees with civil society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Traffic light rating (MET)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2019</td>
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<td>2020</td>
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<td>2022</td>
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</table>

#### Indicator 1.1.2 Number of consultative sessions held by committees with women-led CSO (Nation-wide)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Traffic light rating (MET)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
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<td>2020</td>
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</table>

#### Indicator 1.1.3 Percentage of representatives capacitated on oversight procedures, disaggregated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Traffic light rating (MET)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2020</td>
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<td>2022</td>
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</table>

#### Indicator 1.1.4 Number of civil society, women/youth/refugee platforms (Nation-wide)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Traffic light rating (MET)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
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<td>2020</td>
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</table>

#### Indicator 1.1.5 Percentage of women/youth (below 35 yrs) candidates in local/national elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Traffic light rating (MET)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2020</td>
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<tr>
<td>2022</td>
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</table>

### CPD Output 1.2: Sub- and national government effectiveness levels enhanced and accountability strengthened

#### Indicator 1.2.1 Percent of local level representatives capacitated on enhanced services design and delivery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Traffic light rating (MET)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>20%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
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<td>2020</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### Indicator 1.2.2 The extent to which systems, procedures, capacities are in place at the Gov. and Mun. level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Traffic light rating (MET)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
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#### Indicator 1.2.3 Number of National strategies/plans updated based on consultative and evaluation sessions

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#### Indicator 1.2.4 Decentralisation strategy endorsed by the cabinet, regulatory framework revised

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#### Indicator 1.2.5 Nr of sub- and national initiatives adopted to promote integrity/strengthen anti-corruption

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### CPD Output 1.3: National and civic capacities strengthened for social cohesion and PVE

#### Indicator 1.3.1 Nr of nat/local gov't, NGO/CSO programmes that encourage inter-community dialogue

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#### Indicator 1.3.2 Number of programmes engaging refugees in arts/cultural activities for social cohesion

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#### Indicator 1.3.3 Increase government capacities to build consensus and use mediation in dispute-resolution

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#### Indicator 1.3.4 Count of government institutions and NGOs capacitated on PVE, geographically

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#### Indicator 1.3.5 Number of host communities into which access to justice services are provided

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For outcome 2, the four outputs are: Output 2.1. *Employment opportunities and livelihoods strengthened for stabilisation, and return to sustainable development pathways*, Output 2.2. *Capacities at national level and sub-national level strengthened to promote local economic development (LED) and deliver basic services*, Output 2.3. *Nature-based solutions developed, financed an applied for sustainable recovery, and improving communities’ resilience and living conditions*, Output 2.4. *Climate change adaption and mitigation policies and measures, and DRR plans funded and implemented*. A total of 26 indicators are reported upon, with nine indicators showing the programmes are on track or are expected to achieve the targets, sixteen having reached or exceeded the target, and one underperforming.

Table 7: update of CPD Output 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 indicators as of 31.12.2020 (source UNDP CO)
### CPD Output 2.1: Employment/livelihoods strengthened for stabilization and return to sustainable development

| Indicator 2.1.1 Number of sectors targeted for job creation, disaggregated by sector (National) | 11 | 13 | 14 | 17 | 15 |
| Indicator 2.1.2 Number of additional females/males benefiting from strengthened livelihoods, disaggregated | 19,000 | 31,705 | 33,007 | 40,348 | 42,000 |
| Indicator 2.1.3 Number of SMEs established, disaggregated | 710 | 754 | 795 | 831 | 1,650 |
| Indicator 2.1.4 Percentage of SMEs established that have access to finance | 0% | 0% | 100% | 100% | 10% |
| Indicator 2.2.1 Amount of LED promotion mandates/functions defined and operationalised at gov/mun. levels | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Indicator 2.2.2 Number of government introduced systems, procedures and capacities for LED promotion | 3 | 8 | 11 | 12 | 12 |
| Indicator 2.2.3 Increase % in flow of public/private investment in LED interventions at sub-national level | 0.01% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 15% |
| Indicator 2.2.4 Count of gender sensitive LED Plans adopted | 3 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| Indicator 2.2.5 Count of government/local-councils, LDU members, capacitated on LED-planning | 45 | 45 | 495 | 538 | 344 |
| Indicator 2.2.6 Count of female governorate members, capacitated on LED-planning, etc | 180 | 180 | 985 | 1,050 | 1,375 |
| Indicator 2.3.1 Nature-based solutions developed financed and applied for recovery and resilience | 0% | 3% | 54% | 100% |
| Indicator 2.3.2 Number of additional females benefiting from natural resource management livelihoods | 150 | 325 | 390 | 390 | 100% |
| Indicator 2.3.3 Percentage of national staff with enhanced capacities on waste management, disaggregated | 3% | 4% | 50% | 59% | 29% |
| Indicator 2.3.4 Percentage of female national staff with enhanced capacities on waste management | 7% | 11% | 41% | 41% | 30% |
| Indicator 2.4.1 CCA and mitigation policies and measures and DRR plans funded and implemented | 0% | 33% | 55% | 59% | 29% |
| Indicator 2.4.2 Count of preparedness plans covering response/recovery, by type of disaster | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| Indicator 2.4.3 Percentage of at-risk population covered by community-level contingency plans for disasters | 0% | 0% | 30% | 30% | 30% |
| Indicator 2.4.4 Percentage of at-risk population covered by community-level contingency plans for Floods | 0% | 0% | 30% | 30% | 30% |
| Indicator 2.4.5 Percentage of at-risk population covered by community-level contingency plans for Earthquakes | 0% | 0% | 30% | 30% | 30% |
| Indicator 2.4.6 Percentage of at-risk population covered by community-level contingency plans for Landslides | 0% | 0% | 30% | 30% | 30% |
| Indicator 2.4.7 Percentage of at-risk population covered by community-level contingency plans for Drought | 0% | 0% | 30% | 30% | 30% |

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For Outcome 3, the remaining 13 indicators are measuring the results of two specific outputs: Output 3.1. Capacities developed across the Whole of Government (WOG) to integrate the 2030 Agenda in development plans and budgets, and to analyse progress towards the Goals, using innovative and data-driven solutions, and Output 3.2. Policies plans and partnerships for sustainable development draw upon UNDP thought leadership, knowledge and evidence.

Three indicators show the progress to be on track with expectations, four indicators have reached or exceeded their targets, and five are underperforming. These are related to the capacity development in regard to SDG and national goals monitoring and reporting, something for which the lead role of the MoPIC in defining and endorsing the framework was warranted.

Table 8: update of CPD Output 3.1, 3.2 indicators as of 31.12.2020 (source UNDP CO)
B) Presentation of results according to the Key Evaluation Questions

5.3.1. What are the key results of the CPD programme to date?

The results from the CPD can be divided into two categories: a) interventions that have shown results and created positive effects (e.g., intermediate outcomes), and b) areas of emerging results and potential results. As the CPD is still under implementation, a number of interventions are still on-going (24 of 39 according to their project end date as indicated in figure 2. In section 2.3.) so in many cases results are only partially completed, or are yet to be achieved. The focus of this section is on the CPD programme itself and not on the other functions that UNDP assumes as member of the UNCT, or in support of the UNRCO.

a) Completed results and positive outcomes at country level

A number of transformational changes have already taken place in specific areas: they are mentioned in the ROAR reports from 2018 to 2020, and some have been triangulated through the KII and the documentary analysis undertaken during the MTE. The following constitute a non-extensive list of significant achievements over these three years. They are not prioritised or mentioned in any specific order of importance, since they are all important achievements:

- Resources from the private sector with a Unilever contribution towards WEE and youth in the retail and merchant value chains. This has opened the ground for more exploration for funding from the private sector and responds to a changing scenario across the development partners’ world. UNDP is rightly trying to associate itself more closely with the private sector, both as funder (such as in the case of Unilever), or as implementing partner, and also possibly as investors on SDG funds as well.
- 4th National Communication and 2nd Biennial Universal Report presented to the UNFCCC, and the 6th National Report to the CBD (Convention on Biological Diversity), by which Jordan is fulfilling its international obligations.
- Capacity development of Local Development Directorate staff at national and local levels, on public expenditure management systems and local development plans, leading to a review and update of a Decentralisation Implementation Programme Plan.
- The Badia support programme showed to be highly successful across the range of its components (wool shearing and dairy production and exhibition), with evidence that the timely support allowed hundreds of families from remote areas to access the markets in Amman. Further evidence during KII indicate that dairy products are currently being exported to Saudi Arabia and soon other international destinations.
- The support to Solid Waste Management (SWM) has leveraged a number of unexpected positive results given adaptability of the UNDP to engage on emerging opportunities: this includes the composting facility that turned an environmental threat and public health risk into an income-generating production of fertilizers. Various examples of positive effects in the SWM sector were reported through the KIIIs and indicate that substantial gains have been made for both the population and the institutions tasked with SWM. There is a current shift in GoJ to encourage more private companies to enter the waste market given the potential for turning waste management into a marketable commodity, but without creating distortions, and this appears as a priority.
- Gradually shifting the focus from emergency employment packages to more sustainable forms of livelihoods, including a coaching support and microbusiness packages through the
3x6 approach, even though the longer-term sustainability prospects failed to materialize for the Syrian refugees.

- Capacity development of the MoLA through “development services” agreement over the next five years in SWM, showing the added value of the UNDP technical services and a concern for sustainable GOJ services in the future through knowledge transfer and skills development.
- The pool funding from the private sector and financial institutions was created for livelihoods and employment interventions. Of particular importance was the development of e-wallets (with NMB) in the provision of grants to women who would arguably not have gained access to the funds without remote financial mechanisms.
- Gender has been an area of constant improvement across the various interventions, although in livelihoods it did face structural challenges that impeded effective participation of women in the labour market. However, other interventions such as the Canadian-funded Women Economic Empowerment project yielded some very good results and a constant effort to ensure gender-responsive implementation is being made across the programming portfolio.
- Jordan became a pilot of the SDG Impact initiative, one of 11 other countries globally, first country in Arab states to develop an SDG investor map, and is among the 31 countries that has recently established an Accelerator Lab.

b) Emerging and potential outcomes at country level

- The first MoU in the region with the private sector with a focus on SDGs was signed with ZAIN. This opens venues for more engagement from the private sector on SDGs.
- Formulation of the PVE National Action Plan (NAP)*
- Formulation of the DDR Strategy*
- Formulation of the National Drought Policy in the Water sector*

*While the UNDP closely supported the preparation of the above three documents as outputs, these are a potential outcome as it is up to the GoJ to commit to their application and implementation, thereby contributing to a change in institutional performance as mentioned in the corporate definition of “outcome”.

- Innovative approaches have been supported by the CO despite the associated risks. Some emerging areas of very high potential value for UNDP is the development of private sector partnerships, the SDG investment funds and corporate initiatives on the SDGs. There is evidence that sizeable social investment funds are available in-country, which tend to be placed elsewhere in the region, given the lack of a clear framework and opportunities for substantial returns on the investments. The SDG funding initiative is a high-risk but high potential pay-back endeavour which needs more funding and support to be consolidated, probably gaining increased visibility through a second regional conference on the issue, but with products already developed and concrete examples from other countries where such investments are already leveraging their reward.
- The accelerator lab that was started under this CPD is trying to find its niche, but it needs more corporate support and coaching to be able to define better its role. Interesting products have been done (such as the masculinity survey during the pandemic), while other efforts are more difficult to link to UNDP’s programming portfolio (such as payment of electricity bills through digitalisation, very useful, but not so clearly strategic).
The partnership with DOS on the SDG indicators is a highly interesting and promising one, but it needs to be closely monitored and supported given the complexities surrounding the process and the delay in moving forward given the C-19 pandemic and the support from Lebanon-based consultants that have also not been able to undertake all of the required work. There are high expectations from this collaboration, but UNDP has to be managing these expectations well to avoid potential disappointment.

5.3.2. What unexpected results (direct or indirect effects) did UNDP generate since the CPD was implemented?

In the SWM UNDP has shown that waste can actually be a productive asset if well managed, and some jobs have been created through recycling in addition to evidence of behaviour change among the population through waste segregation, with the machines supplied by UNDP (KII data).

Innovation is reflecting the proactive risk-taking of UNDP’s position in Jordan. It is included in most of its programmes, even in small-scale initiatives, in which it proved useful to develop new ways to ensure accountability, for example for Gender-Based Violence (GBV). The negative aspect is that the sustainability is not ensured, and the payback is expected to take place too quickly given the funding timeline. This undermines its positive effects as they are not continued until a critical mass is developed and the project can be handed over to the GoJ institutions or replicated and upscaled by donors as a larger initiative.

Anecdotal evidence of behaviour change was reported in the livelihoods and entrepreneurship efforts during KII, with information that the people trained became more entrepreneurial, seemed to be able to do better business, and this infused a new culture in the communities.

A key to social empowerment of women was identified as having e-money on their smartphones, theoretically avoiding the need to involve the husband in the financial transactions (note: this finding is not triangulated).

UNDP consolidated the high level of trust from all stakeholders through showing its flexibility and adaptive capacity to changing conditions when identifying gaps (such as for medical waste, IT equipment, PPE during the C-19 pandemic) or responding to GoJ or the Jordanian Royal Court (JRC) requests such as the Marine Reserve or across a range of requests from GoJ counterparts.

5.3.3. Is there evidence that national institutional capacity development has been enhanced at national and at local level?

There is clear evidence of capacity development at national level. However, this is always undertaken under a specific intervention, so it is linked to a specific objective. This means that capacity development is not equally mainstreamed across the intervention portfolio, with some projects having a very strong capacity development component, versus others that do not. The issue here is that UNDP has an overt commitment to capacity development, but it is not a programme. UNDP does not have a capacity development programme that runs over the medium to long term to enable institutions to take over after the knowledge and skills transfer is complete. In those interventions where a CD component is included, the perception of beneficiaries is indeed high (see point C) perceptions from KII), recognising both the skills, knowledge and training capacity provided through the UNDP. The downside is that because it is not a corporate long-term programme, capacity development efforts finish when the
intervention is completed. This does not necessarily correspond to the time needed to ensure
the hand-over of the skills, knowledge and capacities and transform institutional performance.

In the CPD intervention portfolio, capacity development is not only provided to national and
local level institutions: evidence of implementing partners’ capacity development was also
obtained from a number of those CSOs and NGOs that are providing services under the UNDP-
led interventions, obtaining generally high marks (except in one case) in relations to their
capacity development.

UNDP could consider a long-term capacity development programme targeting its key partners
in GoJ and Implementing Partners, but such an approach requires the corresponding funds that
are not readily available from core resources or pooled funds. It also requires a clear strategy
for capacity development beyond the intervention level that would focus on the partnership
strategy with UNDP’s key partners over the longer-term, linked to a vision of what the outcome
of that capacity development process would be.

5.3.4. How can UNDP maximise its potential to achieve CPD results?

UNDP has taken all necessary steps to adjust to the changing operational context, with the
support of its donors, especially in view of the C-19 pandemic. It has already positioned itself
accordingly. The one aspect that may increase its effectiveness would be to further seek for
mutually supportive interventions across a specific objective, through a more integrated
programme concept based on the corresponding theory of change. This would signal potential
for higher synergies across programmes, which could be more easily done through an integrated
approach in an area-based pilot programme.

5.3.5. To what extent does the CPD ensure tracking of the intervention’s coverage and
target groups?

While some KII indicated that “UNDP is the only agency that works in remote areas”, the MTE
finds that UNDP has yet to incorporate the concept of coverage in terms of its programming
strategy. While the term seems to stem from humanitarian evaluation practice it actually is
key when applying the concept of leaving no one behind. Coverage indicates the population
within a specific area that is included in the intervention. UNDP works necessarily with the
vulnerable population, albeit with a limited budget that is unable to cover all the needs, and in
only parts of the country. As a result, it is particularly important to have a visual mapping of the
various development actors, in order to understand to what extent UNDP is really targeting the
most vulnerable, and ensuring the application of the leaving no one behind concept. It is
understood that for the Jordan Response Plan focusing on the Syrian refugees a system was
established within the MoPIC (JORISS) to provide this type of information for the humanitarian
needs. However, KII data indicates that donors are loath to provide the required information
and the mapping is not updated, as each donor is differently committed to coordination efforts.

It would be useful for UNDP to have a country map down to the municipal level (if the data is
available) of the socio-economic vulnerability of the population (regardless of origin or status)
in the areas of intervention where they operate. Furthermore, it would be useful to overlap the
interventions to see if further synergies between projects can be leveraged in some specific

22 See ALNAP’s Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria, 2006, p. 38
locations. Without an updated map clearly detailing the geographical coverage of its downstream interventions (for projects seeking essentially an objective at community-level), it is difficult to see to what extent the interventions are inclusive and equitable. Particularly given the presence of other large actors, a map of development actors would be a strong asset for both targeting and coverage purposes.

5.3.6. Are the five “accelerators” mentioned in the UN SEF add value to UNDP’s contribution to development results?

The UN SEF has identified the following five “accelerators”: i) Equity and Inclusiveness to make sure that new and pre-existing vulnerabilities are addressed; ii) an integral Gender Focus to guide us in addressing both new and pre-existing gender gaps and structural inequities; iii) Digital Transformation that supports innovation and progress in public and social services as well as business and economic initiatives; iv) Environmental Sustainability that emphasizes green solutions and technology for a better future; and v) Preparedness and Prevention to strengthen systems and processes to efficiently maintain access to health, public and basic services, education, social assistance and business during times of crisis. This is an effort to bring the UN system on board in addressing key development issues to build forward better. Noteworthy that the indicators for the RF of the UN SEF across the five pillars do not seem to measure any specific accelerator’s contribution. Regarding UNDP, since one of the corporate initiatives at the UNDP CO is the “Accelerator Lab”, the use of the term “accelerator” may lead to some confusion for an external audience that expects linkages to exist between the Accelerator Lab and the five UN SEF “accelerators”.

It is unclear to what extent the other UN agencies are supportive of the “accelerator” concept, and it is also unclear whether these have been rolled out with a strategic buy-in approach to the UNCT, or whether they are merely mentioned as an aspirational approach to be included as much as possible within the UNCT programmes. One of the UN agencies interviewed did indicate benefits from some of the accelerators, and another agency specifically regarding the UNDP Accelerator Lab, while there is no clear evidence regarding the extent to which these are being used in programming outside of the UNDP. It is the view of the evaluator that improved explanation and communication on the term of “accelerator” is needed to ensure a common understanding across the various stakeholders.

For the UNDP CO, the use of accelerators for UNDP is a natural extension of its existing “six signature solutions”23 with the exception of the “digital transformation” which has proven to be particularly valuable during the C-19 pandemic given the mobility restrictions. However, no evidence of causal relation between the “accelerators” and UNDP’s contribution to development results is readily available.

C) Key stakeholders’ perception and survey results

C.1.) Survey results

75 hours of continuous interviews across 73 stakeholders yielded a wealth of qualitative information regarding the perception of UNDP in Jordan. Although the initial interview guide

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included a high number of 5-point scale ratings on different aspects of the work of the UNDP, it soon became apparent that most KII only had a limited knowledge of the entire range of UNDP activities in the country, and hence could only provide partial information on some questions, or simply were not aware of or could not rate specific issues (in these case N/A was reported). This however does not mean that no qualitative information was obtained, as all ratings given were justified. In the end, the survey is therefore not representative of all the respondents interviewed, with the exception of the question regarding UNDP’s performance that was the most frequently rated question (except among UN respondents). The current survey results are not designed to be read as a stand-alone finding. It is an indicator of perception, but one that needs to be appraised in light of the qualitative stakeholder’s perceptions included under the following section C2).

Different questions were asked according to the stakeholder category (GoJ, IP, UN, UNDP, donors) and the results from the survey are the following:

C.1.1. GoJ counterparts survey results (19 respondents across 13 institutions and ministries)

The five-point scale ranges from 1=minimum/lowest, 2= low, 3=average, 4= good/high, 5= maximum/highest, and where 3.0 is the mathematical average. N/A=Not Applicable/No Answer

Survey results indicate a high overall appraisal across the three questions regarding performance, trust, and partnership with UNDP, with averages ranging from 4,36 to 4,71.

C.1.2. Donors survey results (8 respondents, including two donors not funding UNDP)

Survey results indicate a high overall appraisal across the three questions regarding performance, trust, and partnership with UNDP, with averages ranging from 4,36 to 4,71.
Donors view UNDP’s performance as high as shown in the first graphic, and provide a partial view of high level of trust and good partnership, but this is anecdotal as it only applies to 2 and 3 donors. However, the majority provided qualitative information that align with the ratings.

C.1.3. Implementing Partners’ survey results (16 respondents, of which 5 NGOs, 5 private sector, 3 international organisations, 2 institutes, 1 public company)

IP views of UNDP’s performance overall is a high 4,0 although a majority (10) of respondents did not provide a rating. Similarly, a high rating for partnership was given from a majority of respondents, while those that rated the level of trust in UNDP did so to a very high level.
C.1.4. UN agencies survey results (11 respondents including RBAS)

While most UN agencies could not provide a rating regarding the performance of UNDP programmes in Jordan, a majority provided a high overall rating on its partnership, and similarly 40% provided a good or very good rating regarding the level of trust with UNDP.

C.1.5. UNDP staff and management perception (19 respondents)

A wider range of rating questions was asked to the UNDP CO staff and management. The results were as follows:
UNDP’s perception of its performance is related to the fact that this is a mid-term evaluation, and that therefore a number of objectives are to be achieved by the end of the CPD. The rating, above average, reflects the current level of programming performance. However, most of the respondents gave a 1-point higher rating when considering the expected achievements by the end of the CPD. Also, the impact of the C-19 pandemic constrained some interventions despite the level of adaptive management shown by the CO. The remaining ratings are only stemming from 4 or 5 respondents, but they are representative of the more general qualitative perception regarding these specific aspects: UNDP is doing well in terms of gender mainstreaming and gender responsive programming, with strong efforts to integrate this dimension that was lacking under the earlier CPD. In terms of capacity development, the self-assessment is almost a high mark (3.75) recognising that different partners have received different levels of capacity development. On partnership, UNDP gives an average rating of 3.00. This may be in part due to the fact that there is no clear definition of “partnership” in UNDP, since GoJ counterparts, CSO and NGOs funded to implement projects and services, international organisations, are all considered as “partners”, regardless of the contractual or strategic relationship that brings them to engage with UNDP. In fact, there should be a specific partnership strategy to help the CO ensure long-lasting and strategic partnerships that support their development efforts.

In regard to the capacity of UNDP to inform policy, there is a perception that the work is below average, and that more should be done (with the exception of the Environment portfolio where more evidence of informing policy has been obtained). This remains a challenge for UNDP as it does not only depend on funds and resources (including the technical assistance) to provide such a support, but it must also be feeding into the GoJ priorities at a time when the key priorities are not targeting development goals. In terms of visibility, the survey gives a slightly above average rating regarding UNDP’s visibility, and this is related to public perception. Visibility from development partners would also be 1-point higher. This speaks about the need to better communicate the achievements that UNDP is obtaining in Jordan through its CPD.

C2) Qualitative feedback from stakeholders’ perception of UNDP
While survey results are by large not representative of the entire number of respondents (given the high number of N/A answers), the qualitative information obtained during the interviews does confirm what the ratings above indicate. A few of the comments and remarks are reproduced hereafter that capture the general perception of the UNDP, by category of respondents, and identifies strengths, weaknesses and some include specific recommendations.

Box 3: Qualitative perception by stakeholder category

**GOJ perceptions**: strengths, weaknesses and suggestions *(source: MTE KII notes)*

- **Strengths**: Geographical intervention areas, responsive, committed, convening power, coordination capacity, impact of interventions on the ground, long-lasting partnership (for some), excellent staff and experts, international experience, inventive, good response to C-19 pandemic
- **Weaknesses**: Too much focus on Syrian refugees – geographical interventions, high costs of UN agencies, lack of clarity on UN RC role in the reform, advocacy on LGTB is a cultural shock for most Jordanians
- **Suggestions**:
  - additional support to capacity development and training required,
  - focus on WEE and YE as key entry points,
  - more focus on the investment side of the economy,
  - closer engagement from the Royal Court

**IP perceptions**: strengths, weaknesses and suggestions *(source: MTE KII notes)*

- **Strengths**: committed to impact of interventions, only entity capable of bringing GoJ, private sector, UN and public institutions around a table, adaptive to the country needs, only agency focusing on development, quality and nature of projects (multidisciplinary) that cover a wide range of issues, highly reliable, strong support in capacity development, good at strategic planning, working on quality and not on quantity, good staff
- **Weaknesses**: high turn-over, delays, low institutional memory, short project implementation timeframe, weak on sustainability, role of UNDP not clear to the public, no experts in Jordan in impact investment
- **Suggestions**:
  - more involvement needed with the private sector and the Royal Court,
  - be clearer on UNDP’s role to the Institutes they are dealing with,
  - Jordanians not aware of what is done in the justice sector,
  - higher visibility,
  - use WEE as key entry point

**Donor perceptions**: strengths, weaknesses and suggestions *(source: MTE KII notes)*

- **Strengths**: strong network of partners, GoJ relationship, focus on WEE, new mechanisms in innovative finance support, participatory approach to LED, very good initiatives on innovative finances, trying to influence upstream (policy/advocacy), soft but effective advocacy, well respected, technical expertise, UNPD is the brain behind the resilience debate
Weaknesses: Not a major player in terms of resources so limited leverage, how to measure progress not always clear, difficulty to report on some projects (PVE), positioning not always clearly perceived

Suggestions:
- Use the Royal Court as influencer/entry point on certain issues,
- continue focus on WEE,
- improve language to communicate with less UN jargon and more results-oriented terms (e.g., concrete results).

UNCT perceptions: strengths, weaknesses and suggestions (source: MTE KII notes)

Strengths: strategic, great initiative with private sector on SDGs, transparent, RR has the right strategy and vision, impressive quality and range of international and national staff, recognised integrator role, open to collaboration and partnerships, shift from humanitarian aid to development, work on gender mainstreaming, convening power

Weaknesses: does not know how to communicate success, need for more strategic partnerships rather than ad hoc, improve information sharing at the technical level, quality of surveys sometimes questionable, PVE is a challenge

Suggestions:
- impact investment and SDG operationalisation are UNDP’s niche.
- The Royal court has convening power and should be used as an important entry point.
- Expansion of partnerships as there remain many areas for collaboration

D) Data interpretation – the analysis of the MTE evaluator

D1) what is interpretation in an evaluation?

Previously presented evidence was based on stakeholder perceptions and ratings as obtained through KII, combined with the documentation received for review. This section represents the interpretation of the information collected and analysed by the evaluator, and is the sole responsibility of the evaluator. It does not necessarily reflect the findings as presented above, since the interpretation uses a combination of methods (in concrete an adaption of the Most Significant Change approach, contribution analysis, appreciative inquiry, outcome mapping) to turn the different sources of data and information into a perfunctory analysis.

An evaluation report is more than just a summary of collated KII information and survey ratings: interpretation stems from the analytical process of all the information and data collected, received, reviewed and analysed, that allows the evaluator to make an informed and as objective a judgement as possible based on the evidence obtained, the universe of which is defined in the inception report. The universe was also expanded as additional data became available during the data collection phase. As such, this section does not claim to represent the point of view of any specific stakeholder, nor that of the commissioning agency. It is a tentatively unbiased appraisal of the CPD.

D2) Interpretation findings

UNDP is on the right path to achieving key results and setting up proper building blocks for development in Jordan. Its portfolio reflects a risk-taking, innovative and proactive approach to placing development back on the agenda, after years of being pulled into the humanitarian crisis and the JRP response. The UNDP has identified high-value interventions across a number of sectors and specific themes.
Some of the most successful interventions include the SWM sector, where additional important gains may be leveraged, partnership with MoLA especially at the local level, in gender and more particular Women Economic Empowerment, efforts to support the decentralisation process, involvement of the private sector, advocacy for the innovative approaches which may yield high gains, but over the longer term. The balance of the CPD portfolio is a mixture of proactive positioning, vision and strategy from the CO, which also contains reactive and responsive interventions based on GOJ and donors’ requests. UNDP has basically identified the right entry points to achieve its outputs. The overall performance ranges from medium to good across the range of interventions, with generally higher marks on the environment portfolio (ECCDDR). While UNDP’s effectiveness is commendable in the current context, and particularly considering the impact of the C-19 pandemic, it does not mean that every is well and business should continue as usual. The MTE addresses hereunder a series of critical issues that the CO should address to enhance its programmatic positioning, efficiency and effectiveness in line with the completion of the CPD timeline, and possibly beyond.

The MTE finds that UNDP’s key strengths are its responsiveness, which was praised by almost all of KII except one, its staff quality, its technical skills, its convening role, its capacity to address a wide range of issues, its strategy, its resource mobilisation capacity, its engaging attitude, its commitment to development and to gender, its added value, its high level of trustworthiness, its international pool of resources, and its convening role. Its risk-taking and proactive attitude has allowed the CPD to place development back at centre stage, although it still plays an important role under the JRP and its staff supports the UNRCO in several working groups. However, it has decisively changed its focus towards a forward looking 2030 agenda that is only 9 years away.

UNDP’s major weaknesses are a limited capacity to influence the governance agenda, difficulty in achieving sustainable results with the Parliament and the justice sector, in terms of ensuring GoJ buy-in to public accountability and transparency, limited influence on the SDG agenda and in informing upstream policies particularly in GP and IGSL pillars, including an exit or sustainability strategy within each intervention, accepting short term funding, difficulty of a strategic geographical coverage of the interventions, costs and the difficulty in ensuring a common vision across all the CO programmes, despite recognised efforts from the management.

**UNDP’s critical issues**

1) Restructuring the CO

The CO is being restructured and on the right track to supplementing key essential functions of M&E, gender, policy advice. The setting up of the Central Team, the recent addition of a Policy Advisory Unit, all are steps in the right direction. UNDP should aim a for longer stay of its international staff, and the high turn-over in GP and IGSL have undermined its institutional memory. Mitigation measure: ensure all deputy pillar heads are National Officers to maintain institutional memory.

2) Common vision of the CPD results

Despite substantial efforts of senior management to convey a common vision of the CPD results, there remains a need for a CO-wide sharing of the CPD vision. This could be done with the development of a Theory of Change across the different pillars and strategic functions of the CO, to show how the individually and collectively contribute to the CPD objectives.
3) M&E needs and constraints

The M&E function has improved with the new CO structure, but there remains a need for specific internal capacity development on RBM. UNDP relies too much on external consultants for some of what should be its core skills set. M&E and RBM are essential skills across all programme managers as they provide the language and understanding needed to structure a consistent and coherent programme vision that can be shared across the CO. The M&E function of the CO should be able to support the provision of data and evidence to submit to management for strategic decision-making purposes.

4) Communication and visibility

Linked to the M&E and RBM capacity development needs, UNDP also needs to improve its communication and visibility. Improvements are noted with the internal partnership and communications action plan for the Jordan CO: 2020-2022, but there it does not fully address the key issues. UNDP needs to find the right language and message for its target audience. Project reports and CPD reports are driven by donors and HQ respectively: there is a need for a narrative to communicate key successes and achievements (i.e., positive change on institutional and behavioural levels) at the country level, hence the need to increase accountability towards national ownership. UNDP needs to be mindful of the different levels of communications skills and language required in line with its target audience, and minimize the use of UN jargon for external communications. As the private sector should be a key partner in the future, UNDP has to learn to “market” and “brand” its logo, and engage on these new aspects that are not related to traditional development work through the use of tailored messages – being mindful that the meaning of impact when referring to the private sector is obviously not that used in development work. This is something the accelerator lab could probe into.

5) Resources and core funds for proactive positioning

Proactively positioning UNDP has an opportunity cost. Setting the agenda is not akin to being able to leverage the resources to do so. As a risk-taking CO, more core funding is necessary to allow for the CO to maintain its strategic alignment and advocacy function, and strengthen its capacity to inform policy and upstream work in key areas. That said, the CO has proved to take initiatives to leverage resources with non-traditional development partners and its portfolio is above the initial expectations, a sign that the CO has been able to engage constructively in a complex donor environment to obtain the necessary resources. However, this does not obviate the need for large core funds to sustain its proactive agenda.

Another critical issue is the short-term funding received under several of the interventions in UNDP’s portfolio. Perhaps as an inheritance of the JRP’s humanitarian focus, some of the UNDP’s funding is actually allocated on short-term basis, over a 12 to 18 months execution period. This runs against key principles of sustainable development, as there is a minimum time required to create sustainable conditions. It comes as a contradiction for donors to fund UNDP on short-term basis when the objectives are aligned to sustainable development goals. UNDP should strongly advocate to donors that short-term funding runs against the objectives of its mandate. In certain programmes, short-term funding actually constraints results, by wanting to leverage quick and visible gains in a context when the groundwork has not been consolidated, something which may thwart its objectives. UNDP should hold its ground and inform donors that technically it cannot be operating under short-term funding and expect sustainable results.

6) Capacity Development (CD)
Capacity development is a key focus area of UNDP’s engagement. It is normally provided through a range of support including training, financial and technical contributions, and sometimes specific equipment, to CD beneficiaries. Those who received capacity development support gave high to very high ratings to UNDP on this question. The issue here is linked to the fact that UNDP does not have a CD corporate programme, so that CD is actually provided in line with the needs of the specific intervention that is funding the CD element, and is therefore largely limited to the intervention objectives. UNDP provides CD support to both GoJ institutions and to IPs. Data and KII indicates generally a high to very high level of satisfaction regarding CD support from both GoJ and IP. However, there are also areas and initiatives in which UNDP does not provide CD, and therefore partners do not benefit from the needed support because it is not included in the design of a specific intervention. In other cases, such as for the MoLA service provision partnership, CD is the main benefit of the agreement.

An interesting insight from the data collection is related to the educational system in Jordan. While there are plenty of highly educated people in the country, some respondents indicated that the educational sector remains largely academic and fails to bring in the technical and practical experience needed to operationalise the knowledge gained. So, while the theoretical knowledge is there, the manner in which it is translated into concrete implementation is not always known. Several respondents thus indicated the value-added of CD activities that include exchange and good practices from other countries, as a learning opportunity for Jordan, or the holding of regional exchange workshops, attended by experienced foreign experts.

In order to have a clearer view of why CD is being provided to either GOJ or IP (CSO or private sector or international institutions), UNDP could consider developing a CD strategy that identifies the key elements of what institutional performance will change as a result of the CD support for the different kinds of partners.

7) Partnership

The term of “partnership” is loosely used in UNDP and covers a range of different actors with which UNDP has some kind of relationship. It includes donors who provide funding to UNDP for specific interventions, GOJ institutions that benefit from the technical and financial support of the UNDP, CSOs that are contracted to implement specific activities with a project through grants, UN agencies that share Joint Projects with UNDP, and the private sector that can be both beneficiary and contributor to the UNDP interventions (Accelerator lab, SDG investment fund). So, the term of “partner” takes a different meaning depending on the nature of the relationship. The MTE did not find evidence that the CO has defined a partnership strategy. But it may be sensible to develop such a strategy, in order to identify and categorise the kinds of partnerships, particularly those that relate to the upstream work of influencing policy, setting the agenda, advocating for the SDGs. It is particularly telling that across the different MTE KII categories there was a feeling UNDP was not engaging enough with the Royal Court, given the influence they wield that can be used to support, inter alia, the commitment to the SDGs.

Another important aspect is that the closer relationship that was to take place with the MoPIC during the CP has not fully blossomed, as several changes in the cabinet, the reform process and competing priorities have constrained the space of UNDP’s engagement. Much of the limitations stem from the contextual and operational challenges, and should not be seen as UNDP’s lack of

\[24\] Although there has also been reports that because of UNDP’s responsiveness a certain level of support to CD was made available although it was not originally foreseen, underlining UNDP’s adaptive management capacity.
willingness to deliver on its commitments. MoPIC is one strategic partnership that needs to be further nurtured.

8) Gender

UNDP CO has subscribed to a strong commitment in gender mainstreaming. The UNDP CO has gained the Gender Equality Silver Seal (GES) allocated to those offices that incorporate certain parameters and indicators in the benchmarking matrix to be certified GES holders. There are three levels of certification: bronze, silver and gold. This underlines the progress from the CO in terms of gender. More specifically, as gender responsiveness can apply across all types of programming, UNDP is appraised to be particularly effective in Women Economic Empowerment, an area that many respondents indicated as a focus area for UNDP in the future where it should and could further develop its efforts given the positive results achieved to date.

9) Livelihoods

Livelihood’s interventions have been generally useful in shifting the attention away from the short-term assistance designed as a humanitarian response of cash for work interventions to a more comprehensive focus geared at more sustainable livelihoods. While there is no doubt that the 3x6 approach is a more holistic livelihoods approach, and that UNDP is rightly giving more thoughts of the demand side, value chain, coaching and incubators, including microfinance connections for livelihood beneficiaries, it is not yet clear that such an approach is, in practice, sufficient to establish sustainable livelihoods. An outcome evaluation report of the UNDP livelihoods interventions dated 17 September 2020 found that “the overarching activities of the livelihood’s component fall within the “emergency” lens. It is thus difficult to speak of about long-term impact”\textsuperscript{25}. It further states that “the sustainability of employment opportunities provided is mixed” and recognises the “absence of a clear framework or strategy that all projects contribute to achieving”.\textsuperscript{26} This relates to the need for the pillars to have a ToC showing how the various interventions contribute to the CPD outcome as already mentioned in this report. It further found that despite identifying barriers and challenges “there has not been advocacy and policy work to address these barriers”.\textsuperscript{27} So despite having the correct theoretical approach, there is still much work needed to set the livelihoods and employment interventions on the correct path towards sustainable intervention, mindful of the management response to the outcome evaluation findings.

The critical issue here is that by targeting the most vulnerable, UNDP is not necessarily selecting the most capable and capacitated to work or become entrepreneurs. There is only a certain level of success it can obtain through livelihoods, and a comprehensive livelihood’ strategy (missing, but to be developed) should set the stage for realistic success benchmarks in terms of sustainability, while incorporating better the demand side, and particularly engaging much more closely with the private sector, using LED approaches.

10) Accelerator lab

The accelerator lab has the support of senior management but is finding it difficult to identify its niche. It is trying to find its ground but, considering this is a new initiative with different profile of people than the traditional UNDP development practitioners, it needs better visioning and

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p. 7
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., p. 6
coaching from the corporate level to ensure it is able to serve its function. It is not yet clear whether it has the capacity to yield the expected benefits, and it may be easier to find its position if it could be focusing on a specific integrated intervention concept, rather than fishing in a wider pond of potential paybacks but without a clear strategy or defined objectives. It also needs more time to become an added value to the UNDP programme and some fine-tuning is necessary along the way.

11) Area-based integrated programming

A key concern for the MTE is the absence of a visual mapping of UNDP interventions. Knowing that UNDP is one of many actors in Jordan, and certainly not the one with the highest resources, its geographical coverage should be defined in line with the gaps that other actors have left in the country. Considering its main mandate is development, UNDP should be implementing an area-based integrated programme in one selected governorate to highlight how the different interventions can be mutually supportive of the outcome objectives and how closer coordination amongst interventions leads to higher gains. In order to do this some mapping should be undertaken at the Governorate level to inform where such a programme would be more strongly answering the needs. A perception that the UN is mostly focused on the Syrian Crisis is evident amongst GoJ counterparts. It is particularly important for the choice of the Governorate to be mindful of not only vulnerabilities but also of capabilities, so that there is sufficient local capacity (in communities and in local institutions and CBO) that can be tapped into to pursue the area-based programme after its completion. UNDP should also consider the opening of a field office in that Governorate (several Key Informants indicated the South as an underserved region) to coordinate and represent locally the area-based programme, while building local level partnerships through its field presence.

12) Entry points (WEE, YE, Green Growth, LED)

UNDP is able to do many things across a range of sectors and themes. It is both a strength and a weakness. A strength, because it can intervene simultaneously on various aspects of a critical issue from a multidisciplinary perspective (like in the SWM sector) and a weakness, because it may seem insufficiently focused from an external perspective. While one part of the solution lies in the construction of a ToC from the pillars and practice areas to show how they link and support the UNDP intermediate outcomes for Jordan, the other is related to how UNDP communicates its positioning to its external audience and how it shows where it is adding value. The MTE suggests considering Women Economic Empowerment, Youth Empowerment, Green Growth, and Local Economic Development be the “labels” under which the downstream interventions are geared, and where UNDP is well positioned to provide further support. Obviously, other key terms of social cohesion, vulnerability, can and should be woven into the WEE and YE interventions to sustain the narrative, the same as nature-based solutions, energy efficiency can be included under Green Growth. Local Economic Development (LED) could be used at the downstream level across the pillars of GP and IGSL. A more structured intervention portfolio following clearer and specific UNDP objectives for Jordan can increase UNDP’s visibility through improved communication with its external stakeholders.

13) PVE

PVE is the most challenging programme within the UNDP portfolio. While some aspects of governance are difficult to engage in given limited buy-in from the national counterparts, the PVE portfolio presents a significant risk for the UNDP in Jordan. While it started off well and UNDP supported the creation of the PVE unit, currently in the PM’s Office, and also supported
the creation of a national strategy and a national action plan on PVE, it is now reaching a critical stage as a wide range of activities are being conducted under the NAP by a large number of different actors.

PVE is an initiative that was presented by the former UN SG to the General Assembly on 24th December 2015 under the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. It clearly positions PVE at the centre of the counterterrorism and security agenda, alluding to a number of violent extremist groups, many of which have a presence in the region.

While it is meant as an instrument of peace, its starting point is driven by security concern of donor nations, and it addresses the issue from the supply side, without considering the demand side (underlying causal factors of violent extremism). It appears to the evaluator as ill-defined, as the terminology of “violent extremism” seems to exclude non-violent extremism, or violence not caused by extremists. The concept is hardly conducive to an operational bottom-up programme, in a country where many may believe that it is a Western Instrument directly targeting their faith. Instead of finding positive entry points in which social cohesion and youth empowerment as the entry points for peaceful communities, it addresses the problem from the negative security side, and is not solution oriented. Violence is pervasive in many societies, including Jordan, but it is not linked to extremism (i.e., GBV data).

Five years after the launch of this initiative, additional research has been made on the subject and a number of countries, including those in the region, have also developed a PVE strategy and a National Action Plan (for example Lebanon).

In Jordan, it is the MTE view and belief that the country context simply does not allow for a proper technical roll-out of PVE interventions that contribute to the positive case scenario mentioned above. It is simply too sensitive and political to be addressed transparently and technically. KII showed also limited understanding of the objectives from the various stakeholders, and in some cases varying expectations. It is the view of the MTE that the challenge is too big for the UNDP CO to crack.

In order to start engaging on a more transparent, research-driven, bottom-up data collection to inform positive interventions in the communities, it may be desirable to elevate the PVE to become a regional programme, with peer learning taking place across the countries. In order to do so the UNDP Regional Amman Hub or the UNDP Oslo Governance Centre could be used as a base for technical support in cross-fertilisation, and a regional Chief Technical Assistance (CTA) could be recruited to that end.

When rolling out interventions in the communities, there is an urgent need to agree on positive language (such as social cohesion, including green growth, youth and women empowerment). This would allow to highlight what the interventions’ objectives are, rather than having a large pot of funds used to undertake unrelated interventions across a range of activities (most of which are funded by other donors and not under UNDP’s direct oversight), but that still do not constitute the basis for a consistent community-based programme.

Furthermore, progress is severely constrained by the short-term funding allocated to PVE activities. Considering that establishing trust with communities is an essential factor of success, it is impossible to consolidate such a relationship without an incremental approach over three years, with regularly contacts, exchanges, coaching and monitoring. Trust building is effort and time intensive and requires a physical presence in the targeted communities.
Finally, **accountability** must be placed on the result of these PVE interventions, and a realistic M&E framework needs to be developed – rather than just implementing activities because funding is available.

14) Regional reference hub

Jordan has a good reputation in the international community as a stable and welcoming country in a region that is volatile and affected by many conflicts. It has a high geopolitical value. It has traditionally accepted a high number of foreign guests on its soil, and even recently has granted through the Jordan Compact a number of rights to refugees to alleviate their difficult situation in a protracted crisis in Syria with no immediate end in sight. It possesses good planning frameworks, although these tend to be scattered across the GOJ, and highly educated and capable staff. It has been the first country in the region to undertake the Voluntary National Review in 2017, and Jordan is seen as a key factor of stabilisation in the region. UNDP is also hosting from Jordan two regional projects from its environment portfolio. Jordan has the capacity and may have the interest to gain higher international profile through the creation of a regional reference hub on several themes, amongst which PVE (which should be renamed using positive and constructive language), regional information exchange on the collection of SDG indicators (with DOS), on the mapping of development interventions and on hosting conferences and workshops on SDG investment funding. SDG funding has high potential but requires sustained international exposure. Annual regional awards could be given at an annual conference on the best performer in each of the themes supported through the regional reference hub.

15) Data

Data collection is sensitive and difficult. Specific indicators that are seen to negatively reflect the country’s image on the international scene (such as the % of women in the labour market) cause quite a bit of resentment within certain circles in Jordan. Not all data collected is published and some of the collected data is yet to be published. As a result, there is a dearth of data to inform national decision-making, an area where through the work with DOS UNDP has the potential to bring significant value addition through technical knowledge and support. The inclusion of DOS as host of a regional SDG indicators hub (see point above) could prove to be an advantage for exchanging approaches and technical experiences across the various countries in the region.

16) Positioning based on where added-value comes in – tailor programmes to existing gaps from other donors to avoid duplication

UNDP’s resources do not allow to set the agenda when it comes to downstream implementation. It has been coordinating well with the different actors in the country, but more efforts are warranted for downstream interventions, to ensure the cover gaps left by other actors and do not constitute a duplication of existing interventions. This is generally the case, but specific evidence of deliberate lack of coordination in the coverage of certain interventions was also found to exist and some evaluation reports echo the need for closer coordination. This reflects the specific agenda of the donor but also the lack of proactiveness from UNDP to consult the major development actors with the large budgets and see how they are actually complementing each other and adding value. For example, the portfolio review of Nature, Climate and Energy in UNDP Jordan shows a wide range of potential actions and options offering different ways forward. In theory, UNDP has both the knowledge and capacity to engage into any of the areas mentioned: Green Recovery (or green growth), Nature Based solutions, Sustainable energy, and Climate Change. However, each area is sufficiently broad to require a
significant investment. UNDP should see, in each of these areas, where the major development actors are investing, and, as it has done in the C-19 response, identify the existing gaps where it can add value and complement the national efforts. It is not clear that UNDP is able to choose its niche in the environmental sector, and close consultation with its government counterparts, but more specifically the large development actors working in the same field, would provide a map of the current situation in support of sector policies and plans. In part this coordination also explains the low profile of UNDP in sectors such as water, for example.

5.4. **Sustainability**

5.4.1. **What results of UNDP’s interventions are likely to be replicated or continued by GoJ institutions or by donors?**

UNDP has several interventions that are being funded into additional phases: on decentralisation, on livelihoods interventions, on PVE, on SWM. Some are directly funded by the GoJ, such as the MoLA service delivery agreement. There are several examples where UNDP’s interventions are being replicated and/or upscaled, either on donor or with GoJ funding. This is the positive side of UNDP’s portfolio. However, when looking at sustainability, UNDP does not have a systematic inclusion of an exit or hand-over strategy in its interventions, nor does it plan how to possibly continue with the results into a next phase at the onset of an intervention, with counted exceptions. It would be desirable for all interventions to include a sustainability plan built into the intervention design across all programming.

5.4.2. **Has UNDP established any mechanism to support the GoJ sustain gains in key development areas?**

UNDP had established a good relationship with MoPIC and other line ministries, such as with MoI, MoLA, MoL, MoE, MoPPA, MoY and other government institutions (such as GAM, DOS) to create these mechanisms. Chief among these was to be the partnership with MoPIC, which was referred to in the CPD as the key partner for enabling “an effective, coherent and institutional framework for 2030 Agenda implementation”. Considering the multiple changes at MoPIC, the impact of the C-19 pandemic, the internal restructuring of MoPIC along the Reform Matrix, the shifting priorities to ensure first and foremost economic growth and employment opportunities as current immediate objectives, the context did not allow for the relationship to flourish as expected. Other partnerships were also affected either by recurrent shuffles of ministerial positions or by the C-19 related limitations. Among the most successful, the work with MoLA at the local level in service provision, the technical skills provision, the relationship with MoE and across a range of its departments and units, are all reflecting the mechanisms that UNDP has set up to sustain development gains.

5.4.3. **What are the existing opportunities for UNDP to maximise the sustainability of its programming?**

As mentioned previously, the systematic inclusion of a sustainability plan in very intervention would contribute to increasing the sustainability of its programme. Another aspect is to cluster the portfolio of interventions under the three pillars and the corporate initiatives along a specific strategic objective through a TOC exercise, which in turn supports the higher-level outcomes.

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UNDP Jordan CPD 2018-2022, para 17 p. 6
that UNDP is contributing to. A more strategic composition of interventions within each portfolio would allow early planning regarding the likelihood of sustainability of the programme (meant as the collection of interventions under each pillar and the corporate initiatives) and allow for UNDP to advocate for longer-term support to its programme rather than focusing on the interventions level. As suggested by the UNDP CO, UNDP could also develop a standard exit strategy that contains clear elements for sustainability before the end of the CPD cycle, and which could be revisited during the next cycle.

5.5. Cross-cutting themes

5.5.1. To what extent was gender mainstreamed within the CPD? Is there any evidence that 15% of the programming budget was allocated to GEN3 projects?

Jordan CO has made a substantial change in mainstreaming gender in the CPD, something that has been recognised by almost all key informants interviewed. There is no question that the CO has devoted resources to this (with a Gender Analyst position), and undergoing the Gender Equality Seal certification, in which it achieved the Silver Seal. Within the gender themes, a specific area where UNDP seems to have a recognised added value is in the field of Women Economic Empowerment (WEE), which should remain among the entry points for the future efforts of pursuing gender equality. According to figures shared by the CO, throughout the period from 2018-2020; and in terms of gender specific programming, the CO has delivered 12.2% out of its 3 years programme budget equivalent to $5,214,780.70, so it may be on track to allocate 15% by the end of the CPD.

5.5.2. To what extent was the Gender Equality Seal successfully implemented?

The CO is pursuing its efforts in this sense and wants to obtain the Gold seal in the future.

In 2020, UNDP Jordan Country office achieved the Silver Gender Equality Seal certification which is a corporate gender initiative and an innovative certification program that mainstreams gender from the inside out. The process entails 38 benchmarks covering five key elements of management systems, inhouse capacities, enabling environment, knowledge and communications, and partnerships. In 2020, Jordan Country Office achieved a silver level certification based on the final score of 71%, fulfilling 27 out of 38 benchmarks. This is a significant improvement from a baseline of 44% in 2016.

The Jordan Office management commitment combined with a solid Gender Focal Team and a full time Gender Analyst have led to great strides in all areas of work. Some examples are achieving gender parity in the Country Office, promoting open and participatory processes across all programmatic work, and contributing to knowledge production at national level through the “Gender Justice and the law” study. The office commitment is also translated into the CPD and planning processes which are paving the way to a more gender responsive portfolio. In 2020, the Country Office achieved its first GEN3 project which focuses on Women’s Economic Empowerment in Solid Waste Management. In 2021, the implementation of the Gender Justice project has now secured the office its second GEN3 project.

The Country Office has committed to achieve the Gold Gender Equality Seal during the next round of certification (expected 2021 – 2022) which will be kicked off within the first six months of 2021. To achieve the Gold Level, the Country Office will ramp up its efforts across the following areas where the Country Office has most room for improvement: Advocacy and Communication, Programmes and Projects, Partnerships, and Results and Impact.
5.5.3. To what extent was UNDP successful in the partnerships established?

As mentioned above, UNDP has been able to establish some very successful partnerships with some GoJ ministries, institutions, CSOs, private sector enterprises and financial institutions, while other partnerships were not able to follow the course that had been designed.

Results from the survey regarding the rating of the partnership with UNDP have consistently yielded high results (section C.1.1. to C.1.4. above), with an average of 4.44 from GoJ respondents, 4.05 from donors, 4.05 from implementing partners and 4.14 from UN agencies. The scale is a five-point scale from 1 to 5, where 5 is the highest rating. Survey results indicate a consistently high rating regarding the value of the respondent’s partnership with UNDP.

UNDP staff itself had lower rating on its partnership (average of 3.00 in section C.1.5. above), signalling the need to reinforce its approach towards establishing partnerships.

A partnership strategy would allow the CO to be qualify and identify the different types of partnerships, as the word is used for very different types of relationships with different actors, which does not always convey the right meaning regarding the type of relationship that UNDP has with its “partner”. It may be useful to draw on the UNDP PME handbook when designing the partnership strategy, particularly the section 2.2. relating to stakeholder engagement and the stakeholder importance and influence matrix.

5.6. Lessons learnt

- Terminology is important when communicating findings and results. UNDP should have a lexicon to define terms that are used within the UN but are not defined and may not be easily understood by external stakeholders. In particular, concepts need to be clearly spelled out to show what these imply (such as “accelerators”). UNDP should also define what “corporate initiatives”, “signature products”, and other terms mean in terms of their implementation within the broader CPD portfolio together with pillar projects and interventions.
- The importance of UNDP programming should be reflected in the structure of the CPD outcomes. Half of the programme portfolio falls under the ECCDRR pillar and it relates to two of four outputs under CPD Outcome 2 but does not have an outcome of its own.

6. Conclusions

UNDP CO has been able to steer its positioning back to a stronger focus on development. UNDP still plays a key role in support of the JRP, and is involved in nexus/resilience discussions, but it has rightly shifted the thrust of its efforts back to the development agenda. In a complex context of strong donor presence, diverging international community goals, the pre-eminence of funding through the JRP for the Syrian crisis response, a high level of change and turn-over in cabinet and ministerial positions, and the effects of the C-19 pandemic, it needs to be said that UNDP has found a strong position in Jordan to bring value to the national development priorities and the 2030 agenda. Some of the downstream interventions show significant results, and the global appraisal of UNDP’s performance from the four different stakeholder categories interviewed is high. This means that UNDP is doing the right thing, although not everything is done right and there are venues for improvement. But UNDP’s position is highly strategic and represents a balance of proactive and responsive positioning. Limited results were leveraged in the policy area, with the exception of the environment portfolio (ECCDDR), but in all fairness, many of the
challenges are linked to the operational context, changing conditions, competing priorities, which make long-term objectives take the backseat when confronted with more pressing issues. Despite of these challenges, UNDP has shown it is capable of providing guidance on the development agenda, it is willing to take risks in line with its objectives and development mandate, it is advocating for the SDG achievements. It is taking the right steps towards close partnership with the private sector, the social entrepreneurship actors, and the investment sector, to further support the corporate initiatives that may yield high potential rewards.

UNDP is a minor player in terms of the amount of the funds it is implementing in the country, but it is finding the correct niche, and its efforts and innovative approach are evident in a context of complex donor relations and competing GoJ priorities. However, there is a high potential for rewards on the innovative approaches it has engaged on, and particularly on the SDG investment funds. To consolidate its position, the private sector is set to become a key partner for UNDP. This means also adapting language and communication to private sector needs.

UNDP’s management was found to be transparent, respected and strategic – specific progress was made in the restructuring of the CO and in internal communications, in order to take the CO on board along a common vision, and working in a more integrated approach to programming, although these efforts need to be further pursued and consolidated. UNDP CO has a very open and transparent communications system that is an important enabling factor towards a common programming vision.

UNDP CO has been highly praised for its level of responsiveness and commitment, showing its engagement and readiness in problem solving and its concern to achieve good results. There is also an open and constructive relationship with UN agencies, and in some cases Joint Projects, with room for more strategic partnerships around specifically targeted themes (such as WEE). There is also a positive appraisal of all stakeholders on UNDP’s implementation and delivery capacity. It holds a particularly strong position in the Environment sector with excellent relationships with MoE, and MoLA. Other GoJ ministries and institutions were equally showing good overall appraisal of UNDP, with a certain room for improvement in the relationship with MoPIC.

All stakeholder categories recognized UNDP’s convening power and soft advocacy on a number of critical themes and issues, notably on the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, as well on the innovation and the SDG investment funds initiative, not to mention its achievements in gender mainstreaming.

UNDP may not be the largest development player in Jordan, but it is the main actor with a development mandate, that has the concern to contribute to improving the lives of Jordanians and of the population living in Jordan, building on the existing capacities, with a vision of a more resilient country in which women and youth can be empowered to contribute to the attainment of the SDGs. The CPD remains a reference point for the UNDP’s positioning in Jordan, but the evolving context should be reviewed when considering the formulation of the upcoming CPD, particularly in line with the GoJ’s evolving priorities.

Generating a higher visibility to UNDP’s action through better communication, stronger partnership with the private sector, and the setting up of a Regional Reference Hub (or Regional Centre for Excellence) on issues such as PVE, SDG statistics, SDG investment Funds, (and possibly regional project management, capacity development in SWM transformation), are all options that may contribute to further build-up the recognised value of UNDP’s contribution to development results.
7. Recommendations

1.5.1. Immediate to short-term recommendations (current CPD)

a) Strategic considerations

1. Continue efforts to leverage a strong relation with the private sector, and adjust the language and communication materials accordingly
2. Review the relationship and entry points with GoJ counterparts such as MoPIC and key actors in order to engage more actively into advocacy and policy making in critical areas, including with Parliament and the Ministry of Justice
3. Develop a map (inclusive of geographical layout) of ongoing development programmes and actors to ensure UNDP is positioned strategically both thematically and geographically to avoid potential overlap and duplication with larger operators
4. Define an engagement strategy with the Royal Court, particularly on the SDG agenda.
5. Review the vision and success at the end of the CPD period and beyond, for each pillar and corporate initiatives through a ToC exercise - with a clear identification of the underlying assumptions and causal relations, and their contribution to the overall CO ToC.
6. Develop a strategy and roadmap for new partnerships with private sector, philanthropic organizations, foundations and corporate sustainability funds for SDG initiatives and continue leveraging support from non-traditional donors.

b) internal CO recommendations

7. Provide a comprehensive M&E and RBM training to programme staff, with a particular focus on the ToC and the hierarchy of results, in order to ensure a common understanding and language is used for M&E and across all interventions.
8. Use the M&E function beyond project and CPD requirement to construct the CO narrative of success in Jordan based on and including evidence and data from evaluations
9. Review and adapt the CPD RRF indicators in line with their existing limitations, and develop a country specific intermediate UNDP outcome Results Framework with relevant indicators to communicate effectively the CPD achievements
10. Build a narrative of the CO successes by the end of the CPD that can be shared publicly and through social networks drawing from the previous recommendation

1.5.2. Medium to long-term recommendations (next CPD)

a) Strategic considerations

1. Consider piloting an area-based integrated programme across the different pillars over a 3-year period in one governorate (suggested to be in the South) supported by a field office with a permanent staff presence to develop local partnerships and relationships
2. Develop/establish a high-profile regional exchange centre/hub at regional level (or a Regional Centre of Excellence for a) PVE b) SDG data and statistics c) SDG investment funds, and also considering inclusion of d) regional programme management e) applications of successful transition to private sector in the SWM sector, e) Women Economic Empowerment. This could be done at the existing regional hub or sharing specific functions between the regional hub and the CO. For PVE, it could also be envisaged to link it to the UNDP Oslo Governance Centre. The expressed need to continue regional and international exchanges for SDG data and SDG investment funds supports points b) and c) of this recommendation.
3. Hold high-profile annual awards for best practices with media coverage under the regional “centre of excellence” under the previous recommendation 2 ensuring regional participation/visibility to stress the importance and value given to peer learning (particularly on SDG data and statistics, PVE)

4. Exploring possible collaboration with the King Abdullah II Centre for Excellence for this Regional Centre of Excellence/regional knowledge exchange hub

5. Request from the corporate headquarters support in advocating to development partners that short-term funding is counterproductive for resilience and sustainability, even in protracted crisis situations, and try to establish a benchmark of 3-years for project funding particularly on sensitive issues to ensure enough time is given for coaching and monitoring.

6. The outcome statements of the CPD should reflect the relative importance of the UNDP programming portfolio. More than half of the current CPD budget allocations rest with the ECCDRR pillar and the CPD is only addressing ECCDRR interventions through two outputs under outcome JOR 29 as it has no specific outcome statement.

b) Internal CO recommendations

7. Consider developing a partnership strategy for programmes defining the typology and added value of the different kinds of partnerships

8. Avoid as much as possible short-term project implementation as it runs against the objective of developing sustainability and advocate the need for medium-term funds amongst development partners to strengthen the quality of the results.

9. Develop a consolidated data and information management dashboard for breaking silos between the pillars and support integrated policymaking and programming approaches.