
**CPD OUTCOMES:**

**CPD Outcome I: Peace and Governance**

*People in Myanmar live in a more peaceful and inclusive society, governed by more democratic and accountable institutions, and benefit from strengthened human rights and rule of law protection,*

Articulated through four outputs

and

**CPD Outcome II: Planet and Prosperity**

*Myanmar becomes more resilient to climate and disaster risk with efficient environmental governance and sustainable use of natural resources*

Articulated through three outputs

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**Date:** 11th November 2020
Table of contents

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................. 1
2 Object of Evaluation ................................................................................................................ 5
  2.1 Object of the evaluation ........................................................................................................ 5
  2.2 The logic model of the CPD .................................................................................................. 6
  2.3 Country context ................................................................................................................... 6
3 Evaluation purpose, objectives and scope .............................................................................. 8
4 Evaluation Methodology .......................................................................................................... 10
  4.1 Constraints and limitations ................................................................................................ 12
5 Key Findings ............................................................................................................................... 12
  5.1 Relevance ................................................................................................................................ 12
  5.1.1 To what extent is the CPD still responding to GoM and donor priorities at present? .......... 12
  5.1.2 Is UNDP’s three-pronged corporate response aligned to the country’s main priorities? .. 17
  5.1.3 What potential shifts in CPD are necessary to address current priorities? ................... 18
  5.1.4 To what extent is the “integrated programming” model supporting current priorities? .. 18
  5.2 Efficiency .................................................................................................................................. 19
  5.2.1 Is the CPD programming providing value for money? ..................................................... 19
  5.2.2 Has the CPD been efficiently managed? ........................................................................... 20
  5.2.3 How strong is the CO’s M&E system in providing evidence to inform decision-making? .. 22
  5.2.4 How is UNDP incorporating short-term and longer-term CPD planning objectives? ....... 24
  5.2.5 Does UNDP’s integrated programming model maximise operational efficiency? .......... 25
  5.3 Effectiveness ............................................................................................................................. 26
  5.3.1 What are the key results of the CPD programme to date? ............................................... 26
  5.3.2 What unexpected results did UNDP generate since the CPD was implemented? .......... 31
  5.3.3 Is there evidence that national institutional capacity development has been enhanced? 31
  5.3.4 Are there any apparent gaps in CPD programming to address the current challenges? ... 32
  5.3.5 How can UNDP maximise its potential to achieve CPD results? ..................................... 35
  5.3.6 To what extent does the CPD ensure tracking of coverage and target groups? ............. 35
  5.4 Sustainability ............................................................................................................................ 36
  5.4.1 What results of UNDP’s interventions have been replicated or continued? .................... 36
  5.4.2 Have the outputs from the “flagship” projects of UNDP been used by GoM? ................. 37
5.4.3 What are the UNDP opportunities to maximise the sustainability of its programming? ... 37
5.5 Cross cutting themes .................................................................................................................................................. 38
  5.5.1 To what extent was gender mainstreamed within the CPD? ................................................................. 38
  5.5.2 To what extent were human rights addressed within the CPD? ............................................................. 38
  5.5.3 Is conflict sensitivity mainstreamed in UNDP’s programming? ............................................................... 39
6 Conclusions .......................................................................................................................................................... 40
7 Recommendations ............................................................................................................................................... 41
  7.1 Recommendations addressed to senior management (internal) ............................................................... 41
  7.2 Recommendations addressed to senior management (external) ............................................................... 42

Annexes:
1. TOR
2. Bibliography
3. Context analysis stand-alone six pager
4. interview questionnaire
5. List of key informants and mission agenda
6. CPD RRF indicators update and traffic light rating
7. (internal) power point presentation regarding preliminary findings
8. MTE Team Bio
### List of acronyms and abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CO:</td>
<td>Country Office</td>
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<td>CPD:</td>
<td>Country Programme Document</td>
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<td>CSO:</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>DAC:</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>EAO:</td>
<td>Ethnic Armed Organisations</td>
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<td>GoM:</td>
<td>Government of Myanmar</td>
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<td>GRSP:</td>
<td>Governance for Resilience and Sustainability Project</td>
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<td>ICT:</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technology</td>
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<td>IRRF:</td>
<td>Integrated Results and Resource Framework</td>
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<td>JMC:</td>
<td>Joint Monitoring Committee</td>
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<td>LEAP:</td>
<td>Leadership, Effectiveness, Adaptability and Professionalism in Myanmar’s Civil Service Project</td>
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<td>MTE:</td>
<td>Mid-Term Evaluation</td>
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<td>M&amp;E:</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>NCA:</td>
<td>Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement</td>
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<td>OECD:</td>
<td>Organisations for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PB:</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
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<tr>
<td>RABP:</td>
<td>Rakhine Area-Based Programme</td>
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<td>RBM:</td>
<td>Results-Based Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARL:</td>
<td>Strengthening Accountability and Rule of Law Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>SE:</td>
<td>Special Envoy (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERF:</td>
<td>UN framework for the immediate socio-economic response to COVID-19 in Myanmar</td>
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<td>SERIP:</td>
<td>Support to Effective &amp; Responsive Institutions Project</td>
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<td>SMU:</td>
<td>Strategic Management Unit</td>
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<td>SP:</td>
<td>Strategic Plan</td>
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</table>
TDLG: Township Democratic Local Governance Project
ToC: Theory of Change
TOR: Terms of Reference
TL: Team Leader
UN: United Nations
UNCT: United Nations Country Team
UNDG: United Nations Development Group
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNEG: United Nations Evaluation Group
UNOPS: United Nations Office for Project Services
UNRCO: United Nations Resident Coordinator’s Office
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) corporate policy states that “evaluations should focus on expected and achieved accomplishments, critically examining the presumed causal chains, processes, and attainment of results, as well as the contextual factors that may enhance or impede the achievement of results. Evaluations focus on determining the relevance, impact, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of UNDP work in order to make adjustments and improve its organizational and system-wide contributions to development.”

The current evaluation is a decentralized external mid-term evaluation (MTE) of UNDP’s Country Programme Document (CPD) (2018-2022) in Myanmar. It is commissioned by the UNDP Country Office (CO) at a time when the COVID-19 pandemic is affecting all programmes internationally and in a highly complex and sensitive national context and during an election year. The evaluation team is composed of three evaluation consultants hired independently by UNDP under the coordination of the evaluation team leader. The scope is the beginning of the CPD in January 2018 until June 2020.

The overall objective of the CPD Mid Term Evaluation (MTE) is to assess the progress in achieving the results of the country programme, its relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of strategies in light of the development priorities, and the changes in the local and international contexts including the impact of COVID-19.

The primary audience of this MTE is the UNDP, Government of Myanmar, development partners, UN Country Team (UNCT), and UNDP implementing partners.

The methodology used a mixed-methods approach but was essentially qualitative. It comprised an analysis of all relevant programme documentation shared by UNDP, data collection through 67 Key Informant Interviews (KII) of which 27 were government counterparts, 26 UNDP staff and management, 7 donors and 7 other development partners for a total of almost 73 hours of interview time. The MTE used a questionnaire protocol to ensure consistency and comparability during interviews, which included KII’s perception regarding the performance of UNDP in Myanmar and other aspects using a five-point rating scale. The CPD Integrated Results and Resource Framework was analysed with a traffic light system rating as explained in the body of this report. Finally, an internal and anonymous staff survey was undertaken using Survey Monkey which obtained 18 responses out of a total of 26 targeted respondents.

The MTE has found that the political and operational context in Myanmar at present is highly complex and sensitive, leaving a relatively small political dialogue space for UNDP to engage. The history of the UN presence in Myanmar has created certain conditions which have not always contributed to enabling environments for the work and programming of UNDP or its positioning. A stand-alone context and historical analysis is attached to this report as annex 3.

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1 UNDP, revised evaluation policy 2019, p. 2, para 4, DP/2019/29 dated 5th July 2019
In regard to the evaluation criteria, the MTE has found that the CPD was relevant to the country priority needs as identified in Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan 2018-2030, which the CPD outcomes very directly supported, in particular goals 1 and 5 of pillars 1 and 3. The CPD was fully aligned to the national priorities and the two outcome statements were broad enough for UNDP to provide flexible support and engage in emerging opportunities. However, reflecting the very optimistic context in 2016/2017, the planning assumptions were overly positive and did not materialize as planned, and UNDP did not have a risk management strategy at CPD level to address the changes in the country’s evolving situation. This constrained efficiency and influenced the capacity to mobilize resources. Furthermore, it is argued that the CPD design lacks balance regarding its targets, with a majority of outputs of the five flagship programmes (11 of 17) focusing on duty bearers and much fewer (3) on rights holders. This does not include the four vertical funded programmes and the one area-based programme.

The operational efficiency is somewhat lower than expected, as resource mobilisation up to 30 June 2020 indicates that UNDP obtained 71% of its planned budget against the envisioned 5-year budget. Nonetheless, the CO has a delivery rate of 57% against available resources for 2020, and is likely to fully reach delivery targets by the end of the CPD. UNDP also has a network of five strategically located field office and one sub-office. These play a major role in support of UNDP’s interventions, which should be further enhanced. Human resources are a key asset for UNDP and the CO mentioned difficulty in recruiting and keeping staff. The organogram shows a large number of vacant posts. To increase operational efficiency and effectiveness, UNDP should undertake a functional review of its business processes and delegation of authority.

UNDP has shown to be quite effective in the area of institutional capacity development and technical assistance. Evidence of policy and positive behaviour change across the two programme units (each corresponding to a specific outcome statement) have been found. A more detailed description is in provided in the body of the report, but UNDP has effectively contributed to policy development, informed legislative changes, supported a wide range of government partners to a significant extent not only through material support, but most importantly through its technical assistance and capacity development. In addition to documentary evidence, UNDP received a high average rating of 4.14 out of 5 from government counterparts interviewed regarding its perceived performance (on a scale of 1 minimum to 5 maximum). Similarly, it received a high average rating of 4.15 regarding its contribution to institutional capacity development, and an even higher average rating of 4.39 regarding the level of trust the government has in UNDP. Such a perception shows that UNDP is achieving effective results in a number of key areas, most of which tend to be at the upstream level, although there is also evidence of positive behaviour change across the two programming units, particularly through the introduction of community-based participatory consultative mechanism and planning tools which were not being used under the previous military government.

Another key achievement is that UNDP is in the process of mainstreaming conflict sensitivity throughout its programming. In the current context in Myanmar, conflict sensitivity across any interventions, particularly at the decentralised levels, is a critical requirement that simply cannot be ignored. A strategic
A partnership was developed in Rakhine state with RAFT and SCFG, but it needs to be fuelled, owned and rolled out to all other programmes with unwavering support and commitment of senior management. UNDP’s work in Myanmar is not about development, it is about conflict sensitive development. This makes a big difference with the way some of the programmes have been implemented up to now and it should become the standard and backbone of all UNDP programmes in the country.

A less positive aspect related to UNDP’s effectiveness is the lack of a clear roadmap for success, a weak and inadequate M&E system not well aligned with the Results-Based Management (RBM) and M&E corporate guidance and principles, and the lack of a communication strategy that supports UNDP’s positioning in the country. Reporting should be improved, as it is descriptive and narrative and fails to capture significant changes and does not provide a vision of how UNDP is putting the building blocks in place for the outcome processes. Another aspect is that UNDP is seen as very much responsive to government priorities and its strong partnership is appreciated, but it appears much less committed to the defence of the United Nations programming principles to support rights holders. As such, lack of advocacy and engagement on human rights issues coupled with a lack of clear understanding by donors and other implementing partners regarding the rules of engagement of UNDP vis-à-vis government undermines the level of effectiveness, especially for programmes outside of the capacity development and technical assistance spheres at union level. In addition, there are also questions about how UNDP is positioning itself in Myanmar and a clearer vision of success and the expected development gains should be provided. This is reflected in the ratings given by the (7) donors interviewed, which yield an average rating of 3.3 on the same 5-point scale regarding UNDP’s performance (i.e. slightly over the average of 3.0). UNDP’s internal staff survey also provides a similar self-assessment, with a combined average of 62% in terms of performance achievement (equivalent to 3.1 on the 5-point scale). There is a clear consensus that UNDP is very strong in some areas, but much weaker in others. UNDP needs to update its current strategy in light of the context. That said, UNDP was found to have shown adaptive management to the COVID-19 pandemic to the best of its capacity and with the support of its donors.

At overall programme level, the CPD pillars include sustainability by default, i.e. through the integral components that include economic, environmental and social interventions. At the project level, individual projects have been mindful to include sustainability as an integral part of their strategy. On national capacity development, there is evidence of sustainable change in the way Parliaments/Hluttaws are now working and the MTE identified the likelihood of sustainability in the area of community-based participation. Additionally, there are examples where some of the project mechanisms have been further reproduced by the government.

In conclusion UNDP has managed some substantial results in a complicated and sensitive operating context, but more efforts are needed and in particular in communicating internally and externally more clarity on the vision, its positioning and the expected results it wants to achieve in Myanmar by the end of the CPD in the current context.

The MTE key recommendations are:

A. Internal UNDP recommendations
1) Undertake a functional review of business processes and delegation of authority for the CO and its field offices,

2) Ensure a shared vision among UNDP staff on the CO implementation strategy and expected outcomes to be achieved at country level by the end of the CPD,

3) Create more spaces for cross-fertilization and exchange amongst UNDP staff to ensure a common understanding based on the evolving learning across the various programmes,

4) Make conflict sensitivity the backbone of UNDP programming: train all UNDP staff and partners not to apply but to really shift their mindsets to become conflict sensitive programming champions, and recruit local staff from ethnic regions who speak their own ethnic languages, not Burmese language necessarily to engage with the local CSOs,

5) Review and adjust the M&E system to reflect corporate guidance on RBM requirements and review the indicators for the CPD, identifying alternative ways to provide evidence of results ahead of the final CPD evaluation,

6) Train all staff on RBM and M&E particularly on the formulation of outputs and outcomes, the results hierarchy, the development of a theory of change, including a review of tools that can be used when indicators are not most useful to provide evidence of the change process,

7) Develop a risk management strategy and tool to track CPD assumptions and ensure a review of the planning assumptions is made in June 2022 before the final CPD evaluation is undertaken,

8) Develop an internal roadmap for the achievement of the CPD specific country outcomes, as defined in the corporate UNDP guidance, setting clear and meaningful benchmarks for success,

9) Develop a strategy for engaging with donors and leveraging resources,

10) Consider an alternative structure for the CO based on a different division of labour: one unit in charge of technical assistance and capacity development for duty bearers, and one unit in charge of all integrated area-based programming in Rakhine, in Kachin, as well as possibly other states/regions such as Mon, with greater focus on serving the needs of rights holders,

11) Introduce coverage data in all programming to show to what extent UNDP interventions are covering the needs, and use coverage gaps to develop strategic partnership with other actors, particularly community-based organisations for area-based programme implementation, to ensure the application of the leave no one behind principle

12) Move from activity-based reporting to outcome-based reporting

13) Prepare the CO for the Gender Equality Seal certification to ensure gender sensitivity is more strongly addressed in UNDP programmes

14) Ensure that the Strategic Management Unit (SMU) provides more strategic value of tracking, monitoring and managing the CPD risk and assumptions.

B. External recommendations to UNDP

1) Define together with the UN Special Envoy and the UN Resident Coordinator the rules of engagement for UNDP in Myanmar,

2) Engage with the government on the positioning of UNDP in Myanmar, discuss and agree on rules of engagement and identify key priority areas for the next CPD in the current context,
3) Assess with the government the political space for dialogue to have a shared understanding and agreement over UNDP’s role and mission in working in Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAO) and conflict-affected areas, and engage or re-engage in the peace process while building trust with the EAOs,

4) Develop a communications strategy that builds upon the revised M&E system and addresses the outcome level results, particularly in areas where critical processes are being implemented but under reported (e.g. community-based participatory planning).

5) Change external reporting accordingly to reflect meaningful information to donors and external audiences,

6) Commission systematically mid-term project evaluations when the evolving context is not supported by the initial planning assumptions to allow adaptive management responses,

7) Reach out to UNCT members to see where strategic partnerships around joint programmes can be further developed.

2 Object of Evaluation

2.1 Object of the evaluation

The unit of analysis for this MTE is the UNDP CPD 2018-2022. The programmatic structure of the CPD is the following:

*Figure 1 – CPD architecture*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CPD Outcome I: Peace and Governance</th>
<th>People in Myanmar live in a more peaceful and inclusive society, governed by more democratic and accountable institutions, and benefit from strengthened human rights and rule of law protection;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.1:</strong> Effective public institutions enabled to develop and implement evidence-based policies and systems that respond to the needs of the people</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.2:</strong> Institutions at union and subnational levels enabled to develop effective systems and procedures for performing their representative and oversight functions</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.3:</strong> Mechanisms, institutions and capacities strengthened to sustain peace and social cohesion</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.4:</strong> People have improved access to responsive, inclusive and accountable justice services and national human rights protection mechanisms, in compliance with rule of law and international standards</td>
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<tr>
<th>CPD Outcome II: Planet and Prosperity</th>
<th>Myanmar becomes more resilient to climate and disaster risk with efficient environmental governance and sustainable use of natural resources.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 2.1:</strong> Improved disaster and climate risk management systems for community resilience</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Output 2.2:</strong> Solutions developed at the national and subnational levels for sustainable management of natural resources and ecosystem services as a platform for inclusive economic development</td>
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At the operational level, the CPD was implemented through five “flagship” projects, four vertically funded programmes, and one area-based programme. The five flagship projects are:

**GRSP – Governance for Resilience and Sustainability Project**

**LEAP - Leadership, Effectiveness, Adaptability and Professionalism in Myanmar’s Civil Service Project**

**SERIP - Support to Effective & Responsive Institutions Project**

**SARL - Strengthening Accountability and Rule of Law Project**

**TDLG – Township Democratic Local Governance Project**

In 2018 an area-based programme was launched for Rakhine state, under the acronym of **RABP** (Rakhine Area-Based Programme), which has seen two joint projects funded under its umbrella by donors.

### 2.2 The logic model of the CPD

The UNDP CPD is built on two separate outcomes, each articulated through a number of specific outputs. The logic for the CPD architecture is found in the draft ToC (Theory of Change) 17-page narrative which states that “securing a durable peace will require efforts to build effective national and sub-national institutions to address the immediate needs of all of Myanmar’s communities, build the trust necessary to underpin an eventual political settlement to decades of conflict, and prepare institutions for increased decentralization in line with an eventual peace settlement. In so doing, governance mechanisms must mitigate conflict risks posed by inequality, exclusion, and vulnerability linked to climate change and natural resource management.”

### 2.3 Country context

*Development and Operational context*

Myanmar is a country that is striving to complete a multi-pronged transition process: from conflict to peace, from military/autocratic rule to a democratic civilian Government and from a largely closed economy to an open market economy. These processes remain ongoing but have marked the past positioning of the UNDP involvement in the country. At the time of the formulation of the CPD (in 2017),

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1 A stand-alone five-pager analysis of the historical evolution is attached
there was a generally optimistic appraisal of the situation and a number of the planning assumptions which were expressed in the 17 page draft narrative Theory of Change (ToC) which informs the logic and architecture of the CPD did not take place. The documentary data analysis shows that a number of the key planning assumptions did not materialize, thereby limiting the level to which the pathway to solutions could be achieved in the changing context. In particular, the assumption that the political space around the peace process would improve did not materialize, as there has been a resurgence of EAOs activity as the expectations from the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and the work of the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) did not fully materialize and conflict in Rakhine intensified. As most of UNDP’s interventions are based in conflict-prone areas of the country, this also affects the implementation of UNDP’s interventions and UNDP’s presence in the field is tributary to the prevailing security situation. Furthermore, the pace of commitment to policy reform has been slower than anticipated. In terms of the CPD’s two outcomes statements, both pillars are strongly influenced by and subject to the conflict dynamics. UNDP has recognised that the drivers of conflict are many but include the control, management and exploitation of natural and environmental resources, while political decentralisation and delegation of authority to local level actors is also recognised as one of the drivers of conflict. On the socioeconomic front, Myanmar had been making strong economic gains over the past two years with good key performance indicators. However, the difficulty is to ensure that these gains translate into better socioeconomic conditions for all the population and particularly the rural and vulnerable groups, in line with the concept of “leave no one behind”. The draft narrative ToC for the CPD did clearly identify the risks associated with the formulation of the ToC and the elaboration of the CPD, but it did not contain a risk management strategy to indicate how UNDP would adjust its programme if the planning assumptions did not materialize. It is a finding of this MTE that future ToC should include the risk management strategy in order to allow UNDP to adjust its position to a changing context (and review its ToC when needed) on yearly basis.

CPD implementation is based on national execution with government counterparts at all levels as the main implementing partners. In this regard, the CO has two programme units - Governance and Sustainable Peace Programme, and Sustainable Inclusive Growth Programme. The MTE noted that the majority of programme work in terms of resource volume was being undertaken under the Governance and Sustainable Peace programme with much less being done under the Sustainable Inclusive Growth programme, as mentioned under point 5.2.2.3 in the efficiency section. However, compared to the baseline at the start of the CPD, the SIG portfolio is expanding progressively.

November 2020 is the date set for the next general elections, affecting the current political and negotiation space in which the three-pronged transition is taking place. Issues related to the much-needed trust building and development of strategic partnership across the range of actors may be constrained or affected pending further developments during the post-electoral period.

Evolving Context

The COVID-19 pandemic has changed the way the UN and UNDP has been working around the globe. Given the scale of the pandemic, UNDP has developed a corporate COVID-19 response plan, as mentioned based on health systems support, inclusive and integrated crises management and response, and social
and economic impact needs assessments and response. In Myanmar UNDP has revised its overall 2020 targeted delivery rate and is transitioning all critical operations to digital and virtual platforms as much as possible. The social and economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is affecting most disproportionately poor and vulnerably households, and job loss is a direct consequence of travel and border trade restrictions in place. The World Bank estimates a drop of 6% regarding GDP growth (from 6.8% in 2018/19 to an increase in 2020/21 of only 0.5%).

The COVID crisis means that the UN system has adapted its positioning and programming in order to support the crisis management response and recovery aspects of the pandemic. In particular, in June 2020, the UN published “A UN framework for the immediate socio-economic response to COVID-19 in Myanmar” (UN-SERF), which identifies the key programmatic priorities over the short (0-6 months) and medium-long term (6 to 18 months). UNDP CO led the technical development of the UN SERF as a major contribution to the UNCT. A thorough analysis of the situation at country level and of the UN’s response is made in the 141 page-long document, which clearly spells out by focus areas the manner in which the evolving response will be addressed by the UN system and reflects a strong understanding of the context, opportunities and risks. It also analyses the nexus between humanitarian aid and development aid, as well as the complexity of the conflict dynamics. The UN-SERF is also aligned to the Government of Myanmar’s COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan (CERP) issued on 27 April 2020 and is supporting the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP), but it is logically more oriented to the COVID crisis response.

Peacebuilding and conflict resolution

Two of the most difficult transitions in the country involve the support to good governance and decentralisation and achieving a peaceful country and reaping the peace dividends. While UNDP seems to have positioned itself well in the governance area with the support to public institutions at state level using its comparative advantage, UNDP’s positioning in the peacebuilding (PB) context is not so apparent, nor is its relationship in the articulation of the PB with the humanitarian and development nexus. UNDP appears to have developed efforts to ensure at least that the “Do No Harm” is an approach used in its programme and by its implementing partners, but it must ensure that conflict sensitivity is being mainstreamed throughout the CPD programming. Since conflict dynamics permeates into the governance, capacity development, natural and environmental resource management, and other aspects of the CPD programme, it is essential for UNDP to ensure conflict sensitivity is a constant in all programming.

3 Evaluation purpose, objectives and scope

The overall objective of the CPD Mid Term Evaluation (MTE) is to assess the progress in achieving the results of the country programme, its relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of strategies in light of the development priorities, and the changes in the local and international contexts including the impact of COVID-19. Specifically, the evaluation assessed the level of achievement of both expected and unexpected

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results by examining the theory of change, relevance and coherence of its activities and results, the results chain, processes, contextual factors and causality using appropriate criteria.

The scope of the evaluation covers from the beginning of the country programme – January 2018 to June 2020.

The primary audience of this MTE is the UNDP, Government of Myanmar, development partners, UN Country Team (UNCT), and UNDP implementing partners.

This MTE is carried out in line with the UNDP Evaluation Guidelines of January 2019, UNDP guidance on Outcome-level evaluation⁴, of the UNDP PME Handbook⁵, the UNDG Result-Based Management Handbook⁶, Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility: Improving Learning for Results,⁷ UNDG UNDAF Theory of Change Companion Guidance, and following the provisions of the UNDP evaluation policy.

The evaluation applies the four standard criteria laid out in the OECD-DAC Revised Evaluation Criteria,⁸ which defines the following:

**Relevance**: The extent to which the intervention objectives and design respond to beneficiaries’, global, country, and partner/institution needs, policies, and priorities, and continue to do so if circumstances change.

In this MTE the question is **whether the CPD is still relevant to the current context and what specific measures, if any, are required to ensure full alignment and impact.**

**Effectiveness**: The extent to which the intervention achieved, or is expected to achieve, its objectives, and its results, including any differential results across groups.

In this MTE effectiveness refers to **the extent to which the current programmes generated the planned results as well as identifying effects generated beyond the planned results.** It includes ensuring that “leaving no one behind” principle has been applied, review of the capacity development of national counterparts, ensuring that gender mainstreaming was applied as well as the Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) and an assessment of the degree to which CPD programming is conflict sensitive.

**Efficiency**: The extent to which the intervention delivers, or is likely to deliver, results in an

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⁴ UNDP, Outcome-level evaluation, a companion guide to the Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and evaluation for development results for programme units and evaluators, December 2011
⁵ UNDP, Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results, 2009
⁶ UNDG, Results-Based Management Handbook, Harmonizing RBM concepts and approaches for improved development results at country level, October 2011
economic and timely way.

In this MTE the analysis will consider the timeliness of results, use of programming modalities and extent to which UNDP process contributed to the results obtained, as well as the shifting resource needs in response to the COVID pandemic and in support of the UN-SERF

**Sustainability**: The extent to which the net benefits of the intervention continue or are likely to continue.

Since this MTE is taking place 30 months after the beginning of the CPD the criterion of impact has not been applied but the evaluation tried to capture the effects, positive or negative, generated by the CPD.

The inception report details the 21 Key Evaluation Questions (KEQ) as defined and approved by the evaluation management that guide the MTE lines of inquiry.

### 4 Evaluation Methodology

The approach to this MTE is participatory and follows the recommendations of the “utilization-focused evaluation” approach that is described by M. Q. Patton in his book of the same name that continues to be a good practice reference material for the conduct of evaluations. The evaluation used a mix of methods but was essentially qualitative. It consisted of the following phases:

1) **Documentary review and evaluation planning phase (virtual).**
   
   This phase is based on the review and analysis of the documentation submitted by UNDP (listed in the enclosed annex). It is further informed by two virtual meetings with the UNDP evaluation manager (SMU Team Leader along with UNDP DRR). The result of that process was the delivery of the inception report, which provides the details regarding the evaluation approach, tools, timeframe and key questions, as well as the understanding of the evaluation team regarding the work to be performed.

2) **Remote data collection from Myanmar (virtual):**
   
   As agreed with the UNDP evaluation manager, in light of the travel restrictions linked to the COVID situation, the main method to collect in-country data was through **Key Informant Interviews (KII) and/or Focus Groups Interviews**. Interviews were semi-structured using a questionnaire/interview protocol with key evaluation questions to ensure consistency and comparability. A five-point rating-scale was also be used for some key questions in order to provide also quantitative data. However, each rating was also supported by a qualitative explanation justifying the rating. A total of 67 KII were held for a total interview time of almost 73 hours, yielding an average of 65 minutes per interview. The respondent sample was made up of 117 persons in total, of which 66 men and 51 women. 27 KII were held with government

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counterparts, both at Union and State/Region levels, 26 with UNDP, 7 with donors and 7 with other partners (UN and others). The list of interviewees is included as annex 5.

3) **Written feedback by government counterparts**
   In addition to the 27 KII with government partners, given the cancellation of some of the requested meetings because of the COVID situation, an additional four submissions regarding the questionnaire protocol were submitted by Government partners, namely from the Union Civil Service Board (UCSB) and the Dry Zone Department. This brings the total number of inputs to 31.

4) **Internal survey among UNDP staff:**
   An internal survey was undertaken with a selected list of 26 respondents that was discussed and agreed with the evaluation management. 18 responses were received (yielding a response rate of 69%). As topics relate to internal UNDP issues, it is provided as an internal document and is included as annex. Selected findings from this survey, done through Survey Monkey and hence ensuring confidentiality of the respondents, are also extracted to support some of the findings of this report.

5) **Internal presentation of the preliminary findings**
   A ninety-minute Power Point presentation was made to senior management on the preliminary findings of the MTE. The objective was to engage and inform senior management on the initial findings of the MTE. As with the survey, the presentation was made for an internal audience only and is not meant to be shared externally.

6) **Preparation of the draft evaluation report (home-based)**
   Based on the data analysis of notes and evaluative evidence gathered during data collection phases, the evaluation team has prepared a draft evaluation report. The evaluation manager provided the consolidated comments to the MTE on 2nd November 2020. Given the quantity of comments, the MTE took additional days to prepare the final report.

7) **Final evaluation report (home-based)**
   This is the final evaluation report addressing all consolidated comments. The audit trail included as annex indicates how the comments and suggestions made on the draft report have been addressed.

Data validation: A clear distinction is made between the interpretation of the data (subjective) versus the triangulated findings (objective and factual). The MTE team used the traffic light signal (green, yellow and red) to provide a visual indication of progress regarding the various CPD indicators.

Data sources and respondent sample: the primary source of information were the UNDP CO management and programme staff, the main Government counterparts (as provided in the list of government counterparts per outcome submitted by the UNDP), the main development actors and key donors, as well
as selected implementing partners. The sample was largely a convenience sample of respondents who agreed to be interviewed among donors, government counterparts and UNDP staff. Purposive sampling was applied for the other key informants. The MTE national consultant based in Myanmar facilitated the interviews with the respondents by setting up the meeting arrangements and the corresponding links. In some cases, UNDP also provided support in order to obtain confirmation from government counterparts. UNDP also allowed the MTE team to use their Zoom account platform which was the primary means of virtual communication.

4.1 Constraints and limitations

One direct limitation of the COVID pandemic is that the evaluation could not include field-based data collection, thus the exercise was conducted remotely. Another challenge is that ten of the requested meetings could not be held (see interview list annex). To compensate the inability to directly interview the key informants, four government counterparts provided written inputs based on the questionnaire interview prepared by the MTE team. Interpretation was most often necessary when interviewing government counterparts. The national consultant was instrumental in facilitating interpretation during all the meetings that could not be held in English and the MTE team wishes to acknowledge his very useful support during the data collection phase.

With the exception of the MTE Team Leader who had previous experience in conducting remotely evaluations, it was a first time experience for the rest of the MTE team and also for the government counterparts, and possibly also for some of the other relevant stakeholders interviewed. Finally, because of the difficulty of obtaining a rapid confirmation for the interviews, the MTE team agreed with the evaluation manager to extend the timeframe of the evaluation to ensure that enough time was granted to obtain a sufficiently meaningful sample of respondents. Although not all the desired interviews could take place, it is the view of the MTE team that the current sample is sufficiently representative of the key evaluation stakeholders.

5 Key Findings

This section is structured along the evaluation criteria and in line with the 21 Key Evaluation Questions defined in the inception report.

5.1 Relevance

5.1.1 To what extent is the CPD still responding to government and donor priorities at present?
The government of Myanmar has developed the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP) for the period 2018 to 2030, which determines the country’s priorities. The development of the UNDP CPD 2018-2022 was done in direct support and alignment of the MSDP, and in particular regarding pillars 1 (peace and stability) and 3 (people and planet). The UNDP CPD outcome I: peace and governance, is directly related to pillar 1 of the MSDP, while UNDP CPD outcome II: Planet and Prosperity, is supporting pillar 3 of the MSDP, more specifically goals 1 and 5 as shown hereunder.

The MSDP (2018-2030) and UNDP Country Programme (2018-2022) are firmly aligned with the 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals. The UNDP Country Programme focuses on delivery of two outcomes: (i) People in Myanmar live in a more peaceful and inclusive society, governed by more democratic and accountable institutions, and benefit from strengthened human rights and rule of law protection; and (ii) Myanmar becomes more resilient to climate and disaster risk with efficient environmental governance and sustainable use of natural resources. Through these strategic outcome areas, UNDP is contributing directly to help achieve MSDP’s Goal 1: Peace, National Reconciliation, Security and Good Governance and Goal 5: Natural Resources & the Environment for Prosperity of the Nation.

In terms of design, CPD outcomes are broad enough to address the key challenges in Myanmar while providing flexibility to UNDP to adjust in programming during implementation. However, the content and focus were based on broadly optimistic assumptions informed by the country dynamics in 2016/17 which did not materialize and thus constrained implementation and the achievement of overly ambitious targets.

The CPD lacks balance with regards to which it addresses the needs of duty bearers and rights holders equitably. The CPD is implemented through the five flagship projects, four vertically funded programmes under SIG and one area-based programme in Rakhine state. An analysis of the flagship project indicators shows that by design, the projects have strong emphasis on capacity development for duty bearers but limited empowerment for the rights holders (see Table below)\(^\text{10}\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Outputs focusing on duty bearers</th>
<th>Outputs focusing on rights holders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

\(^\text{10}\) CO comment: “It is important to make note that some of the projects documents have been revised and approved by the board to address this including RABP, SARL. Also, when projects are designed you do most often have not identified implementing partners. As referenced earlier, there has been a significant expansion in the number of implementing partners to build capacity of duty bearers.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TDLG</th>
<th>Improved capacity of township administrations to respond to people’s needs</th>
<th>Improved engagement between People and Township Administrations on public service delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved EAO engagement in Township planning and public service delivery</td>
<td>Dialogue on policy and institutional local governance reforms informed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRSP</td>
<td>Resilience and sustainability policy frameworks are strengthened and implemented</td>
<td>Increased promotion of small and large-scale green investments</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Improved organisational arrangements and capacity of targeted government offices with environment, climate change and DRR responsibilities</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local resilience and sustainability issues are addressed through inclusive subnational implementation of innovative policies and programs of action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERIP</td>
<td>Governance institutions have access to accurate, comprehensive and harmonized data needed for decision-making and monitoring.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy formulation, implementation and monitoring at Union and State/Region level is guided by strategic priorities, better coordinated and more inclusive</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parliaments are equipped to pass robust and people-centred legislation resulting from effective policy-making and legislative proposals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARL</td>
<td>Access to public services become more fair, transparent and accountable through enhanced administrative systems and anti-corruption measures.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parliaments are better able to engage with and represent the rights and interests of the public.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Justice sector strengthened to administer justice according to rule of law and human rights.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEAP</td>
<td>Ethics, meritocracy, inclusivity and responsiveness applied in Myanmar Civil Service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People centred services enhanced due to more effective and professional civil service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil service oversight, accountability, standards and capacity strengthened to support decentralisation at Union and subnational levels</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The table above shows that out of combined total 17 outputs for the five flagship projects, 11 of them (64.7%) focus exclusively on capacity building for duty bearers; three (17.6%) are focused exclusively on rights holders; while the remaining three have dual focus on both duty bearers and rights holders.

Various donors structured their support to UNDP through either directly through the CPD or through contributions to specific projects. This does not cover the vertically funded projects such as GEF. The MTE team found that the CPD at its onset was clearly aligned to government priorities and responded to the priorities of the donors providing funding to UNDP in Myanmar although its planning assumptions were neither realistic nor researched as it chose to see the glass half-full but didn’t prepare a risk management strategy in case planning assumptions did not materialise.

For the vertically funded projects, the interventions have their own rules and strategy (such as for GEF) and therefore the CO has limited sway over its contents and manner in which the project is implemented. Nonetheless it was shown that regardless of the project structure, conflict sensitivity needs to be applied throughout programme implementation, as projects such as R2R did not sufficiently consider the importance of the rights holders and its linkages to conflict sensitivity.

For the area-based programme, the RABP is structured according to a series of different projects, some of which are joint projects with other UN agencies. At the time of this MTE there has not yet been an evaluation of the RABP to identify results achieved and address the balance between duty bearers and rights holders. Currently there is an important effort towards mainstreaming conflict sensitive programming with an expansion of the IP network in Rakhine, suggesting a higher level of attention may be given to rights holders in Rakhine, but always constrained on the one hand by the limitations related to access and security on the ground, and on the other hand from the level of trust with EAOs.

These findings are important to inform the future composition of the CPD portfolio and ensure a balanced strategy for UNDP in support of both duty bearers and rights holders.

At the time of this MTE, the COVID-19 pandemic declared in March 2020 has substantially changed the way of doing business not only of UNDP, but of all governments and development actors across the world, due to the lock-down and confinement measures. To address this unforeseen situation, UNDP quickly prepared and updated a COVID-19 contingency plan, which was built on two rounds of programme criticality exercises. UNDP Myanmar showed adaptive management capacity through:

1) Shifting on-going support of current programmes to use virtual remote communication means as much as possible to avoid placing people at risk through face-to-face events. This of course means that some activities had to be rescheduled or suspended, such as training workshops.

2) Provision of key equipment and supplies in response to government requests, as UNDP procurement was stated to be more efficient for obtaining key materials on timely basis.

3) The development of a UN framework for the immediate socio-economic response to COVID-19 in Myanmar, published in June 2020 under the name of UN-SERF, which came in support to the government’s own COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan of 27 April 2020, and provides a detailed assessment and analysis of the needs and necessary responses to the COVID crisis. It details both the short-term implementation measures (0 to 6 months) and the medium-term objectives (6 to
18 months). However, the MTE does not have an update on the resourcing of this ambitious framework nor the level to which it is actually being implemented, as it falls outside of the scope of the CPD evaluation. Both UNDP and donors did report flexibility in repurposing the funds where necessary to adapt to the COVID context.

At present, the immediate focus of the national and international response has shifted towards mitigating the impact of the adverse socioeconomic effects of the pandemic. For UNDP specifically, the main concern is to focus on early to medium-term recovery. The COVID response does not however invalidate the longer-terms objectives that were identified in the CPD and that are being implemented through various projects under the current CPD.

Another question is to what extent the planning assumptions that were used to formulate the CPD and its theory of change (ToC) were valid. The MTE found that most of the planning assumptions were excessively optimistic and that the political space for a quick advance of the peace process, policy reform and decentralisation did not materialize to the extent the CPD expected. As such, the evolving context took a different path, in particular with the resurgence of armed conflict and most notably in Rakhine State, which constrained the options that could be pursued to work on certain specific projects, notably in relation to engagement with EAOs. High sensitivity on these issues means that UNDP was not able to engage as much as it had hoped.

Mid-way through its life cycle, the CPD is no longer as relevant to inform about the direction and priorities of the UNDP in the country, since it is articulated through a series of projects, each of which has a results framework with a number of indicators regarding the expected results it is set to achieve. The bulk of the CPD is implemented through five so-called “flagship” projects, four vertically funded projects and one area-based programme in Rakhine state. While the initial strategy behind the “flagship” projects was to provide an integrated vertical and horizontal approach, the actual implementation showed that the concept was interesting but difficult to achieve in practice. At the same time, the development of an area-based programme in Rakhine also allowed UNDP to test horizontal integration in a specific geographical area.

The MTE developed an internal and anonymous staff survey for UNDP. The results obtained from 18 staff indicate that there are different perceptions regarding the application of programming principles across the different interventions undertaken. This implies the need for UNDP to work internally to ensure

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11 CO comment: “The CO developed several C-19 proposals and was approved for the SG’s global C-19 Funding as the one UNCT submission”

12 CO comment: “While I agree it is difficult to achieve, this truly needs to be qualified. It is unfair to make such a statement with nothing to back it up. there were only two years (2020 a lost year) to begin implementation. It takes time to see results and different donors push their own agenda’s which also presents challenges. Please also note as mentioned that the previous CPD programme evaluations and the UNDP Strategy called for integrated approaches. The Government also request such integrated approach during CPD consultations.”
greater coherence, understanding and consistency for all the staff to have a shared perception of how the Country Office is advocating for and applying its programming principles.

5.1.2 Is UNDP’s three-pronged corporate response aligned to the country’s main priorities?

UNDP’s three-pronged corporate response is more strongly aligned on two of the three types of transition that Myanmar is experiencing, most notably in the area of governance: not only is UNDP providing support in relation to the development of the democratic process and capacity development of public institutions, but also in governance management of the natural and environmental resources. The second aspect where UNDP is supporting the country’s priorities is in the peace process. However, UNDP is not a key player in the peace process, and donors have left UNDP largely out of the peace process. UNDP is working at the field level through its projects in ensuring that it is working with a conflict sensitivity lens, and is trying to obtain some access to EAO areas. The MoU signed with the government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is an example of these efforts. However, it is not clear for the MTE whether the outcomes (e.g. results in terms of benefits for the rights holders) are being achieved as planned, since accessibility is an important but recurrent constraining factor which is decided at the central level of government. UNDP has therefore sought for complementary partnerships, including with local organisations. As the political space around the peace process remains narrow, UNDP seems to take a small-step strategy to service the needs of the population in trying to reach out beyond the government-controlled areas of the country. The third aspect in which UNDP has not so strongly engaged is Goal 3 of the MSDP: Job creation and private sector led growth.

As Myanmar is still in a multiple transition process, and in line with the available resources, UNDP has focused on two of the three dimensions of the transition, with a clear comparative advantage in the first dimension relating to good democratic and environmental governance and support to state institutions. This remains a need at present and will do so for the foreseeable future as a number of institutions have either recently been created or restructured with the change in government, or as a result of new functions or institutions being developed. Regarding the peace process, UNDP has to reflect whether it holds a comparative advantage in the activities it is undertaking at field level in conflict-affected areas, and whether there is enough political space to allow for UNDP to work in those areas according to the normative framework and principles of the United Nations. It is unclear that at present UNDP should be involved in the third aspect of economic development through job creation, although this could be considered at a future stage and pending the evolution of the contextual factors that affect the peace

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13 CO comment: “we have been working with 22 implementing partners in this CPD, and 10 government ministries, 16 Government departments, 8 central offices, independent commissions and boards, supreme court, state and regional parliaments”.

14 CO comment: “This was intended to build up this area of work in the CPD (not in previous CPD) and efforts have been made and now starting to pick up. Unfortunately, there has been little funding available in this area and the CO has not had sufficient capacities but do expect and see this changing.”
process and the government’s transition and reform process towards achieving the MSDP targets and the SDGs.

5.1.3 What potential shifts in CPD are necessary to address current priorities?

At the time of this report (October 2020), almost three years have passed since the CPD started. Given the level of efforts required to undertake a review of the CPD in line with the current constraints linked to the COVID-19 pandemic and the fact that elections are scheduled for November 2020, and considering the lead time it would take to make changes effective, it would likely not prove cost-efficient to shift the CPD at this stage. UNDP has shown adaptive management to the COVID crisis within the limits of its possibilities. The visible results of the UNDP in Myanmar are achieved through the on-going projects and programmes and not through the CPD document itself, which is initially designed to inform about UNDP’s positioning in the country for the five-year period. Therefore the MTE finds that UNDP, in response to the shifting priorities and in line with the government’s request and with the consent of its donors, has already taken actions to respond to the current challenges without substantially altering the contents and objectives of its CPD programming. However, should the restrictions linked to the COVID remain in place over the coming year, it will become increasingly difficult to ensure that the results of the various programmes remain on track. Rather than a current shift in CPD priorities, UNDP needs to have a risk management strategy to review its position in Myanmar by end of June 2021 and a contingency plan to redirect some of the results which it may not be able to achieve towards realistic objectives that could be reached by the end of the CPD (or at the end of the life of the project(s)).

More importantly, the final evaluation of the CPD should be looking at the evolution of the context over 2021-2022 to inform the development of a new CPD grounded on the current realities of the country and reflecting the strategic positioning of the UNDP for their future programme. UNDP needs to use the available guidance to develop a robust and technically-sound theory of change based on tested assumptions and inclusive of a risk management tool.

5.1.4 To what extent is the “integrated programming” model supporting current priorities?

UNDP developed an “integrated programming” model for its “flagship” projects which was meant to provide a strong mechanism to ensure horizontal and vertical integration (from union to state/region and township level) would be undertaken. Conceptually the idea makes sense, but the different flagships were only partially able to carry out integrated programming. A number of projects actually had results that blended into the results of other projects, and it was not always very clear whether and to what extent each project contributed to the results. Various projects had components that crossed over to other flagship projects, making attribution difficult. As such, given the breadth of some of the flagship projects (e.g. SERIP), it was difficult to ensure an integrated programming model because some of the projects were simply too broad in their scope. Despite some good communications across the projects and some examples of successful collaboration, overall the concept of “integrated programming” model could not
be fully undertaken and even at times proved challenging for the staff as the delegation of authority was not always clear.

Another type of project that attempted to achieve “integrated programming”, albeit with a different approach, was the Rakhine area-based programme (RABP). The logic behind an area-based programme is that all the programming undertaken in that specific geographically-defined area is coordinated and managed by a team to ensure that all the interventions are mutually supportive of the overall goal of the area-based programme. The RABP has therefore a different management structure compared to the flagship programmes, and has been undertaking different interventions in Rakhine state some under the specific funding of the donors (e.g. Japan, Canada) and through Joint Programmes with other UN organisations such as UN Women. Other interventions address the more complex work in conflict-affected areas, and an MoU with the government and UNHCR was signed to allow outreach to the Northern Rakhine region.

UNDP interventions in Rakhine are not likely to achieve the desired effects in part because of limited access to some townships. In addition, however, the RABP is not being implemented completely as an integrated programme, i.e. in those targeted areas where there is access, there should be comprehensive programme coverage. The MTE noted that the project implementation was fragmented to the extent that individual projects were implemented in separate locations, and where two or more projects were implemented in the same locality (township), there was limited evidence of a coordinated approach to the interventions.\(^{15}\) The idea of implementing an area-based programme through flagship projects is therefore somewhat counter-intuitive.

The overall integration of the flagship programmes together with the RABP and the vertically funded projects proved challenging. At the operational level, it was not possible to have a fully integrated programming model as initially devised. The recommendations section addresses possible alternative scenarios in order to facilitate a different approach towards an integrated portfolio of interventions of UNDP under the CPD.

5.2 Efficiency
5.2.1 Is the CPD programming providing value for money?

\(^{15}\) CO comment: “There is a misunderstanding here in the original design. It is not fragmented. It was designed originally in agreement with donors, government, and the team to have the local governance activities implemented in the south non-conflict areas and the livelihoods in central Rakhine where there is some conflict and ethnic challenges. The ROL/A2J work was to be statewide based on available resources. This would enable to test out designs and have broader coverage tailored to the specificity of the areas. The aim was after a few years to expand and join up. This has partially taken place in 2020, but further expansion in the future may be limited by the conflict. The integration was focused on having all project activities represented in Rakhine State, but not to have to be operating in the exact same locations and be tailored to the different context throughout the state.”
The CPD programming has obtained mixed results across the programming portfolio. Some interventions have made significant achievements which have been recognised by both the government counterparts and the partners, and therefore are showing a good return on the investment and value for money considering the significance of the achievement and the level of ownership that is being developed among institutions and partners. In both of UNDP’s programming units (Governance and Sustainable Peace - GSP, and Sustainable Inclusive Growth – SIG) there is evidence that some of the interventions have obtained good value for money. At the same time, not all the interventions were able to reach or are on track to reaching their stated objectives.

In particular, at the beginning of 2020, the COVID situation has created some barriers and altered some of the mechanisms for implementing the interventions. The fact that some interventions are not on track is therefore not linked to a lack of programming efficiency but to limitations generated by the current COVID situation. As the project portfolio shows wide variations, the MTE estimates that, overall, UNDP has been able to achieve reasonable value for money on its interventions, but with significant differences between the projects.

5.2.2 Has the CPD been efficiently managed?

5.2.2.1 Human Resources

While the CO has developed a structure to effectively implement the CPD, the organogram shows there are too many vacant positions and the recruitment process to fill them up is slow. Implementing partners and in particular government counterparts noted during key informant interviews (KII) that they felt excluded in UNDP process to fill key project positions (as per UNDP policy), and that the process was often too slow thereby affecting project implementation. On the other hand, senior project staff also felt that implementation was slowed down because they often had to undertake functions that should be done by programme personnel because some of these positions were vacant. The MTE was informed that staff recruitment was challenging for the CO, and that some key posts had been left vacant for some time (e.g. Gender Advisor, SMU Team Lead, etc.). However, the MTE team also

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16 CO comment: “The org. chart represents two levels of staffing. The many ‘frozen or vacant’ posts were there from the change management process and only to be filled if certain resource mobilization thresholds were met. Therefore, the structure in place is for the current level of annual targets. Corporate has consistently said that the CO was too large and should cut back particularly on international posts so there was also this challenge to grow. This does not mention the main challenge of having to identify the right talent and having to go through 2,3 or more rounds of recruitment and still to not find qualified staff. It was for lack of trying or prioritizing such as the Gender Adviser, SMU, etc. Sometimes people accepted the post only to withdrawal before taking up. These facts are all documented. As for resignation, there are many reasons people have left due to health, family, C-19, new opportunities, so inferring/speculation is not helpful.” MTE response: comment very defensive, last sentence not acceptable as it is neither speculative nor interpretative but fact-based.
noted that a few staff actually resigned from their positions at the CO, something which may indicate human resources management issues that UNDP will have to address internally.

5.2.2.2 Operational efficiency

The CO has five operational field offices located strategically across various states and regions, and one sub-office. Key informants, including government counterparts and project staff noted that field offices played a key role in facilitating coordination between the government and UNDP at subnational level. The MTE also noted however that there was lack of clarity with respect to the roles and responsibilities of the field offices, and often their success depended on individual personalities. For example, in some of the field offices, field office staff noted that they were not informed about some of the projects under implementation in their state; while also on the other hand, project staff admitted that they had no interaction with the field offices. In other cases, project staff observed that they did not get effective support from field offices such as IT support or office accommodation, hence they did not feel the need to share information with field office staff. In places where there is an Area Coordinating Officer, the MTE noted that they had limited role in implementation or M&E; and consequently, they were not able to provide a comprehensive synopsis of UNDP’s strategic results for their respective areas. UNDP field offices are a clear value-addition for operational efficiency, but the business processes and delegation of authority as well as their staffing should be reviewed to enhance their operational efficiency\(^\text{17}\).

5.2.2.3 Financial efficiency and delivery rate

UNDP financial data shows a five-year budget projection of US$ 172 million for the duration of the CPD from 2018 to 2022 (see figure 3 hereunder). Financial data further indicates that UNDP planned to allocate 42.2\% (US$ 72,785,726 versus US$ 172,581,622) of its overall budget for interventions on ‘planet and prosperity’ including climate resilience, disaster management, natural resources management and employment-led economic growth. However, actual resource allocation for this outcome is 39\% of the total available resources (US$48,286,455 versus US$ 122,465,039) as of 30 June 2020; while actual expenditures are lower at 31.6\% of total expenditures (US$ 22,099,534 versus US$ 69,811,109) for the same period, so it does not appear likely that the projected delivery will be fully achieved by the end of the year for this outcome.

The financial data provided by UNDP also shows that UNDP has an overall delivery of available resources of 57.0\% (US$ 69,811,109 versus US$ 122,465,039) as of 30 June 2020. However, delivery is uneven between the Programme Units. The GSP Unit has higher delivery of 64.3\% (US$ 47,711,575 versus US$ 74,178,585); while for the SIG Unit delivery was 45.7\% (US$ 22,099,534 versus US$ 48,286,455).

\(^\text{17}\) RBA comment: “The field offices, if capacitated adequately also present opportunities for area-based programming and resource mobilization (e.g. Mandalay Area office in the Dry Zone). The Dry Zone is a politically stable region and therefore less challenging in terms of implementation.” MTE response: Agree with comment
The CO indicates that the annual delivery rate was 92% in the first two years of the CPD and is expected to be on track with the revised delivery rate by the end on the year.

Nonetheless, considering the five-year CPD timeframe and the actual resources versus the planned budget (71%), as well as the COVID limitations, it is to be expected that not all the planned results may be achieved as initially foreseen in the various project and programmes. This could suggest a need to obtain additional resources to facilitate UNDP’s ability to achieve its expected outcomes or re-prioritize the outcomes to be achieved. The CO, however, indicates this is likely to relate only to the GCF and climate portfolio.

Figure 3 – UNDP delivery versus planned resources for the CPD – from January 2018 until 30 June 2020

5.2.3 How strong is the CO’s M&E system in providing evidence to inform decision-making?

UNDP has developed a system for M&E which is not reflecting the various corporate guidance documents, starting with the definition of outcomes and outputs. The M&E system does not reflect adequate understanding of Results-Based Management (RBM) principles and particularly of the hierarchy of results. Furthermore, guidance materials such as the UNDG RBM Handbook, Harmonizing RBM concepts and approaches for improvement development results at country level, October 2011, do not seem to have been used in the development of the M&E system. As it stands currently, the M&E system needs a

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18 CO comment: “This is not true. Please refer to the international consultant &E system assessment reports and M&E guideline”. MTE response: listing of documents is not enough to ensure a proper application and use of the guidance materials.
through review as it is only focused on outputs – which runs contrary to the UNDP corporate guidance on M&E.

The CPD M&E system does not enable adequate tracking and reporting of results in terms of real development change beyond incremental changes of output indicators. In particular, the use of perception surveys to track developmental changes is limited. Out of a total of 30 output indicators, only one is based on perception surveys. This means that UNDP is missing the opportunity to monitor and report on how the effects generated by its interventions are perceived to affect everyday life for its primary beneficiaries – the most vulnerable and marginalised groups.

UNDP’s corporate policy is to evaluate its development cooperation with the host government on a regular basis in order to assess whether and how UNDP interventions contribute to the achievement of agreed outcomes, i.e. changes in the development situation and ultimately in people’s lives. UNDP defines an outcome-level result as “the intended changes in development conditions that result from the interventions of governments and other stakeholders, including international development agencies. They are medium-term development results created through the delivery of outputs and the contributions of various partners and non-partners. Outcomes provide a clear vision of what has changed or will change in the country, a particular region, or community within a period of time. They normally relate to changes in institutional performance or behaviour among individuals or groups”.\(^\text{19}\)

This is the type of change that the M&E system has to be able to report on, through an RBM compliant results-framework in each of the different interventions implemented by UNDP.

The current system is essentially compliance driven towards upstream accountability and is unable to provide evidence regarding the degree of significant change towards the achievement of its outcomes, nor is it providing the evidence to allow UNDP to communicate effectively and report adequately on the key results which it is obtaining in the country. By delegating the outcome and impact level to third party monitoring, and by systematically considering that an indicator is the only measure of success in the results framework, UNDP is spending countless efforts on collecting information that does not contribute to inform decision making or support its positioning. An urgent review of the M&E system should be undertaken with the assistance of a vetted RBM expert, coupled with RBM staff training to ensure that all staff understand the basic difference between an outputs (results of a completed activity, thus can be attributed to the implementing agency) and an outcome (changes in institutional performance or individual behaviour, which the agency is contributing to, but not by itself as mentioned in the corporate definition of outcome in the previous paragraph).

The need for better communication and reporting was also echoed in the interviews with UNDP’s donors. There is a general consensus that UNDP is not communicating adequately on its results and that it is sometimes difficult to see where the interventions are leading to or what is the overall strategy (e.g. Northern Rakhine). At present, the MTE finds that UNDP is not equipped to monitor, evaluate,\(^{19}\)

\(^{19}\) UNDP (2011); Outcome-level Evaluation: A companion guide to the handbook on planning monitoring and evaluating for development results for programme units and evaluators, p 3.
communicate or report well on its performance. As the M&E system is a critical management and communication tool, it is essential that a complete review of the M&E system is undertaken with the proper level of technical assistance to ensure it is compliant with the corporate guidance and norms.

Descriptive and narrative reporting detailing the numbers of people trained, events undertaken, communities reached, townships covered, as seen in previous annual reports, is inadequate unless it is contextualised, and a sense of coverage is given. UNDP needs to be specific about the extent to which it is covering the identified needs, in line with the leave no one behind principle, to ensure it is sufficiently inclusive in the approach it is applying in its interventions. At present, none of the interventions address the issues of needs coverage comprehensively. It is difficult to understand the meaning of UNDP’s results if they are not linked to the context and the size of the needs is not being addressed.

Finally, UNDP should undertake more mid-term evaluations of its interventions. For Outcome I, only one project (TDLG) had been evaluated at the time of this MTE (although it is understood that 3 other projects are/will be externally evaluated). Outcome II has more systematically carried out mid-term evaluations, partly because it is already a requirement for GEF and other vertical funds. Given the changing context from the design phase of the CPD and of the interventions that articulate the CPD in operational terms, both from the unmet planning assumptions to the consequences of the COVID crisis, mid-term project evaluations are very useful to allow for timely corrective action and should be more systematically undertaken.

5.2.4 How is UNDP incorporating current short-term priorities with its longer-term CPD planning objectives?

In August 2020, UNDP made a Country Office Annual Business Plan review (COBP) which highlighted UNDP’s adaptive management to the COVID crisis. In this regard, UNDP has repurposed, with donor’s support, part of the resources to support ICT needs of governmental partners and allow them to maintain a functional structure (e.g. Anti-Corruption Commission). It has also responded to specific procurement needs from the government and is involved in a number of socio-economic surveys. As indicated in the COBP minutes, three of the current short-term priorities are defined as20:

1) Health System support: (1) Support state and regional governments on health supplies; support to Sittwe hospital in Rakhine for medical equipment (2) Support subnational government in awareness generation- extensive campaigns with wide reach conducted; necessary equipment such as loudspeakers provided to government (3) Supported development of C-19 Chatbot for the Ministry of Health and Sports for interactive and accurate information;

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20 UNDP, COBP, 10 August 2020, p. 4
2) Socio-economic impact assessment and recovery: (1) Three Socio-Economic assessments are underway – one national and 2 geographic (Rakhine and dry zone). This will link to making high frequency data available through a new online data dashboard which will inform GoM in recovery efforts (2) Support government in MSMEs digital transformation (3) Facilitating dialogue to ensure effective private sector involvement in recovery process; through a roundtable with private sector organized with Union of Myanmar Federal Chamber of Commerce (UMFCCI) (5) supporting development of information exchange platform to better under market demands to assist local businesses; and

3) Integrated Crisis management: (1) Support national partners in setting up e-learning platforms (civil service, training HR defenders etc) (2) Support national partners to strengthen ICT capacities (e.g. telecon equipment for HRC, ACC, Environmental Conservation Dept) and promote remote working modalities (e.g. webinars and online committee meeting support for MPs, adapting HR modules for UCB) (3) Working with government on launching a series of challenge grants around digital transformation and promoting e-commerce. (4) Promote innovation through crowdsourcing information to serve as warning system for potential outbreak and to assist in prioritizing national resources.

Despite the short-term response that is required to address the COVID pandemic, which is more a socioeconomic crisis than a health crisis for the country, the longer-term priorities remain unchanged, while the need to address unresolved conflicts remain. With the increased vulnerability of the people as a result of the COVID, it is essential that the efforts to foster sustainable peace, in which UNDP is playing a minor role, be intensified to allow more access to all affected populations regardless of their geographical location. If anything, the COVID crisis has served to show that the main pillars on which the MSDP was built and which UNDP chose to support remain relevant over the longer-term, and efforts undertaken to date to reach these longer-term development gains should not be sacrificed by an excessive focus on the immediate response to the COVID crisis. It is unclear when reviewing current levels of staffing that UNDP has the capacity to engage in additional interventions without depleting its already stretched pool of human resources.

5.2.5 Does UNDP’s integrated programming model maximise operational efficiency?

As mentioned under the relevance section, the idea behind integrated programming is conceptually to achieve greater operational efficiency. However, the devil is in the details and it depends very much how this integrated programming is translated in terms of management and business processes and delegation of authority. UNDP has followed two types of “integrated programming” models: the vertical/horizontal integration through the flagship projects, and the horizontal integration of the RABP. Early results and interviews with UNDP staff indicate that, in order to maximise operational efficiency, UNDP needs to undertake a functional review of its business processes and delegation of authority, as currently there are some bottlenecks which are not conducive to operational efficiency. UNDP also has five field offices and should be able to use these offices more strategically to support operational efficiency.
From the two different models tested, it appears to the MTE that, in the current context, it would be preferable to opt for a horizontally integrated programming modality through area-based programmes considering the changing context within the country from one state/region to another and given the variety of needs and population groups. But in any case, a functional review of its business processes and delegation of authority is needed. And a key enabling factor is to ensure that local staff speak the specific local languages to be able to communicate with the local stakeholders in each state/region/township.

5.3 Effectiveness

5.3.1 What are the key results of the CPD programme to date?

There is evidence of policy and behaviour change showing that UNDP has been effective and successful in its technical support and institutional capacity building. Some examples are:

a) The project planning model and formula-based Township development grant (outlined in the Grant manual) is being used in twenty townships in three State/Region: Mon and Rakhine State, and Bago Region and the grant is reflected in the State/Region governments budgets. The Bago Region Government (BRG) allocated MMK 56 billion (USD 38 million) to the 28 townships from its FY 2019/2020 capital budget using a formula based on the TDLG method\(^{21}\).

b) The Government completed the first National Indicator Framework for the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP). Forty-one percent out of the total 286 indicators are SDG indicators\(^{22}\).

c) The Conservation of Biodiversity and Protected Areas (CBPA) Law which enabled the establishment of Community Protected Areas (CPAs) raised the interest (and lowered the political tensions) of Indigenous and Local Communities (ILCs) to co-manage Key Biodiversity Areas (KBAs)\(^ {23}\).

d) The first five-year strategic plan was developed for the Union Attorney’s General Office and draft legislative guidelines, as pointed out during the interviews.

e) The National Environmental Policy adopted in 2019 and launched by the Union President, and the development of a national strategy and masterplan on environmental conservations, also mentioned during the interviews.

f) Review of the legislation and providing inputs to Rules for implementation of revised legislation, so as to ensure that the enabling conditions for community participation in conservation were in place, as discussed with the SIG team,

g) Policy paper on civil service governance, Code of values for Union Civil Service Board, also mentioned in the ROAR,

h) The strategic plan for the Myanmar Human Rights Commission (MHRC) was established, as confirmed during the interviews,

k) The national REDD+ strategy was endorsed at a multi-stakeholder National Validation Workshop, as indicated in the ROAR,

l) A code of conduct and risk assessment tool was developed for the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), as indicated in the ROAR.

\(^{21}\) TDLG Annual Report 2019, p53

\(^{22}\) SERIP Semi Annual Progress report 2019, p11

\(^{23}\) Terminal Evaluation Report: Strengthening Sustainability of Protected Areas Management in Myanmar, p35
Hence there are a substantial number of meaningful results at the upstream level. A number of these were discussed with the national counterparts during the interviews and were clearly identified as key achievements that are creating enabling conditions for government’s institutional performance.

Additional anecdotal evidence of meaningful outcomes was also identified in the support provided to Parliament, where significant capacity development was undertaken leading to a substantial change in the manner in which MPs and Parliamentary Committees function.

An important finding for the MTE is that with the change of government, a number of new MPs were occupying posts for which they had not received any technical preparation. The support of UNDP was considered as a key aspect of learning and maturing to the new Members of Parliament and was of critical value.

Similarly, the community-based participatory processes used both in the environmental and governance areas proved to be key in fomenting ownership, interest and commitment from the different national partners. The bottom-up participatory system which UNDP has been used in its approaches for the different interventions implemented under both units (SIG and GSP) has proved to be a strong mechanism that came to fill a gap, as previously top-down authoritarian systems had been applied with little community participation.

There are therefore various key aspects that UNDP has effectively addressed in the interventions undertaken in the CPD linked to the multiple transitions the country is experiencing.

From the 27 KII held with government and national counterparts at union and state/region level, and the four written submissions from government partners that could not be interviewed (e.g. a total of 31 KII), the MTE found a high level of satisfaction from government counterparts regarding UNDP’s performance, their levels of trust, and UNDP’s contribution to capacity development. The questionnaire protocol included a five-point scale (where 1 is minimum and 5 is maximum, 3 being average) in order to obtain KII’s rating on several questions (see annex 4). All ratings were further justified through qualitative statements explaining why such a rating had been given.

Regarding the question:

*How satisfied are you with UNDP’s performance?* 27 KII provided an average rating of 4.14, with 81.5% of the responses providing a 4 or above (4 Not Applicable – N/A – answers).

On the other question:

*How much has UNDP contributed to developing your institutional capacity?* This question received an average rating of 4.15 from 13 respondents (18 N/A answers), with 100% of the responses giving a 4 or above.
On the question about:

*How much do you trust UNDP?* The average rating from 23 respondents was 4.39, with 87% of responses 4 or above (9 N/A answers). This question actually has 32 responses despite having 31 KII, because in one case there was a clear distinction between the trust of UNDP as an organisation and the trust of UNDP in Rakhine, which received a rating of 3. This rating is based on what is perceived as insufficient communication on the operating modalities of UNDP in Rakhine.

Such findings show a high to very high overall perception of UNDP’s performance and its role as supporting institutional capacity development. It also shows that UNDP is indeed perceived as a trusted partner by government institutions.

Two aspects which could be further improved and were brought up during the interviews: 1) Historically diminishing resources for some partners (Parliament, DRR/DM), to continue with increased support in specific areas given the limited funds available to some departments (Department of Meteorology and Hydrology, Environmental Conservation department), although new partners have also emerged supporting government institutions in the post-2015 election period, 2) More work at informing the policy level could be done, which has been curtailed as a number of technical advisors that were deployed are no longer present or have not been replaced.

Looking at the effectiveness of the CPD from an analysis of its results and resource framework (RRF), and based on the indicators provided to date by the two programming units, gives a different vision of UNDP’s performance in Myanmar. The MTE used as described in the inception report a *traffic light system* by which each indicator is rated as red, yellow or green according to its level of completion.

The *traffic light system* is based on the following benchmarks:

- Green is **good/very good** and minor improvements and corrections are possible, but the results are clearly on track and do not require substantial changes (normally performance of **66% and above**)
- Yellow shows **mixed result, partially satisfactory**, and while results may be on track, certain changes are needed (normally performance of **33% to 65%**, so this is why it is partially satisfactory. Note that it can be lower or higher than 50%, so it *does not necessarily indicate failure*)
- Red corresponds to **unsatisfactory** results with urgent and immediate action required to address shortfalls and gaps (performance **less than 33% achieved**)

The indicators supplied by UNDP for the 30 output indicators of the RRF show the following status:

*Table 2 Output indicators as of September 2020 under the UNDP CPD 2018-2022 as reported by programme units*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colour</th>
<th>number</th>
<th>percentage</th>
<th>comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>One third are on track, no changes required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28
Based on this analysis therefore, the picture of UNDP’s performance is at best mixed. It may also show some disconnect between the manner in which UNDP is attempting to capture the key results through its RRF and the actual significance of the work that is being carried out at the outcome level. While it is important to be able to aggregate some data at the corporate level to have an overall view of specific results, less attention and effort is devoted to highlighting the critical stepping-stones and change processes that are being supported by UNDP at the outcome level. Again, it is necessary to undertake a review of the M&E system and adjust it to better capture the relevant results, rather than reporting against targets that in some cases are no longer valid and need to be re-defined.

An analysis of the RRF indicators, including the three outcome indicators, does not reflect the reality of UNDP’s achievements in Myanmar. UNDP needs to have a country-specific outcome mapping that captures the changes it is working to achieve over the lifecycle of the CPD, and these do not need necessarily to be measured by indicators. Other mechanisms and tool such as public perception surveys can be very useful to provide evidence of results.

As mentioned under the relevance section, UNDP’s portfolio is strongly leaning towards supporting the duty bearers and much less focus and attention is provided for the rights holders. The one aspect in which the MTE believes UNDP should review its positioning is the degree to which UNDP is able to influence and exert a positive impact on the rights holders. While there is also some evidence of results in this regard, more could be done to service the needs of the rights holders.

When considering the donors’ perception regarding UNDP satisfaction, the results are more nuanced compared to the ratings provided by the government counterparts.

Regarding the same question: How satisfied are you with UNDP’s performance? Out of 7 donors interviewed, the average rating is 3.33, slightly above the average rating of 3.0. 6 of the 7 donors interviewed provided a rating and one did not (N/A answer). Ratings are presented from lowest to highest:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>rating</th>
<th>2,5</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>3,25</th>
<th>3,5</th>
<th>3,75</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>3,33</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nr answers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>AVG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: evaluator’s analysis and rating. The rating table is included as annex 6.
The ratings do not necessarily reflect only the performance of UNDP. One donor justified the rating based on “the context and the complex UN dynamics in the country”. Another donor that provided a rating of 3.25 indicated that UNDP had obtained very mixed results, very good in some areas but poor in others. In general donors recognized UNDP’s technical assistance and capacity development of government as its main strength in the country.

Generally, what brings down UNDP’s performance rating has been identified as a) an overly ambitious CPD, b) insufficiently clear vision of UNDP’s strategy and positioning in Myanmar, seen as going more after the funding opportunities than as setting the agenda for its programming based on its principles, c) low or inadequate level of communication and information to donors on programmes (with one exception) and not necessarily providing the expected evidence of results (i.e. weak M&E and reporting systems), d) a slow bureaucracy that does not allow UNDP to seize existing opportunities in an already complex and narrow political environment.

From the analysis of the MTE the flagship projects have leveraged mixed results with notable differences across the programming portfolio:

- TDLG appears to be bringing a clear added value to improve local governance processes. Its participatory bottom-up process and approaches are filling a gap and the mid-term evaluation of the project has detailed the positive effects of the project. On the downside, the flagship did not integrate conflict sensitivity to any significant extent during its implementation.
- The support provided to Parliament was also a significant achievement – as the work was starting from scratch and required substantial nurturing to enhance the capacity of the Parliament and its committees to function adequately
- Positive results were achieved in the fight against corruption through the support of the Anti-Corruption Commission, as well as in the Rule of Law in terms of raising awareness of the rights holders. However, SARL did not include any involvement with the security sector, thereby strongly limiting its influence on only one leg of a three-legged stool (Justice, police/security forces, military).
- SERIP was a very broad and multifaceted project. While it obtained specific achievements, donors did not necessarily see SERIP as the preferred recipient for the funding to support governance efforts. The manner in which the funding was channelled between TDLG and SERIP was also a source of confusion.
- GRSP was not mentioned as a known “brand” by the government counterparts interviewed, but its activities were clearly known and also came to fill a gap, particularly all aspects relating to community participation and empowerment, in addition to supporting upstream efforts. However, under one of the environmental projects lack of conflict sensitivity in the implementation led to a negative effect on the project for UNDP which should serve as a lesson learnt for all other projects.
• RABP seems to have achieved significant project-specific results but it is less clear how they translation into outcome-level achievements (in terms of affecting people’s lives).

From the perspective of UNDP, the staff survey showed a self-evaluation combined average of 62% in regard to the question about its performance under the CPD (equivalent to 3.1 on a 5-point scale). UNDP is also aware of its strengths and weaknesses and has provided a rating which is actually somewhat lower than that received from its donors (average of 3.3) and certainly lower than the rating received by the government counterparts (average of 4.14).

5.3.2 What unexpected results (direct or indirect effects) did UNDP generate since the CPD was implemented?

As the CPD has now been implemented for more than 30 months, it is not possible to make a rigorous impact analysis. The MTE therefore attempted to identify the effects, positive or negative, of the CPD over the CPD timeline. However, this question is difficult to answer for the MTE because there is only so much depth that can be obtained from documentary analysis and virtual interviews. Without on-site observation and heading out to the field to interview the actual beneficiaries of the government services or engaging with some of the communities, it is much more difficult to identify the unexpected results of the CPD.

What is apparent is that the CPD was implemented under a range of assumptions that did not materialize, but it was not monitored and there was no risk management system in place to address the changing and evolving context. Interventions did in fact show adaptive capacity, but this was done at the project level. A CPD-specific risk management system should be informing the adaptive management across each intervention given the necessary coordination required in integrated programming rather than having each project respond on its own to similar challenges.

For the rights holders, there is some evidence of positive effects and ownership and support regarding the community-based participatory approaches used in some UNDP interventions under both programming units. The level of ownership is in part linked to the fact that UNDP with this approach is filling a gap of consultative processes at the community level that did not previously exist, given that the relationship between the government and the CSOs does not benefit from the same level of trust as the relationship between the government and UNDP.

A lesson was learnt through an environmental project which did not properly integrate conflict sensitivity in its implementation and led to a formal complaint by a community-based organisation. This has shown that conflict sensitivity for UNDP programme in Myanmar is not an option but a must.

5.3.3 Is there evidence that national institutional capacity development has been enhanced at national level? And at state/region level?
As mentioned under point 5.3.1 above there has been significant capacity development reported by 13 of the 31 KIs interviewed by the evaluation. This included government counterparts at the union, state and regional levels. The average rating given to UNDP regarding its support to institutional capacity development is a high 4.15 (on a scale of 1 minimum to 5 maximum) with 100% of respondents providing a 4 rating or above. Based on this information and the supporting statements that justified the ratings, it clearly appears that UNDP had a major role in contributing to capacity development.

Anecdotal evidence in interviews was also provided showing how decisive for their institutional capacity the support of UNDP had been. 18 KII did not provide a rating to this question. Some because their collaboration with UNDP did not include any capacity development component, or because they were not aware of the training or capacity development support provided. Therefore, it should not be assumed that the 18 KII that provided N/A as an answer did not benefit from UNDP capacity development support. Rather, only that they were not able to provide a concrete response to this question.

The sample of KII included 17 respondents from the union level and ten respondents from the state/regional levels. Therefore, the findings are also applicable to the state/regional level.

5.3.4 Are there any apparent gaps in the CPD programming to address the current challenges?

The UNDP CPD is strongly focusing on sustainable peace in the context of the multiple transitions but is only partially addressing the needs in the construction of peace in Myanmar. The role of UNDP in the peace process has been decreasing in the recent past. It has been side-lined from the Joint Monitoring Committee given what was viewed by donors as making insufficient progress although it was able to contribute to ensuring that the Technical Secretariat Centre performs its duties24, providing technical and budget assistance to ensure its functioning. It has been excluded from the Joint Peace Fund which is managed by UNOPS and includes most of the donors that support its interventions under the CPD but have chosen to use another venue for channelling their peace building funds and efforts. This indicates that UNDP may have missed past opportunities to engage more substantially on the implementation of the peace process and show its added value in this respect. Since the MTE team does not know the current political space for UNDP to engage on this sensitive and complex process with the government, it is difficult to make evidence-based statements. Certainly, what is found is that UNDP has a secondary role in addressing the transition towards peace and is not the preferred actor for the majority of donors. Notwithstanding, UNDP has engaged under the CPD with a strong commitment to ensure more conflict sensitivity across all its programming. UNDP has made great efforts to possess a more conflict sensitive programming, but it needs to pursue and consolidate its efforts in this field to ensure that all the staff across the country office and the field offices are able to change their mindsets and actually commit to, own and implement conflict sensitive programming. Specific partnerships were leveraged, for example in Rakhine state, for that purpose. It is still work in progress and the most important gap, in view of the MTE, is for UNDP to clearly position itself as the “conflict sensitive” programme implementation agency.

24 See Guy Patrick Banim, Final Independent Evaluations of the JMC Support Platform Project (SPP), June 2019
regardless of the type of intervention it is undertaking. It must also build trust among non-government actors and partners at field level, something that requires its staff to have the necessary local language skills. In the context of Myanmar and given the diversity of local contexts, social and political dynamics, it is essential that programmes are thoroughly and completely responsive to the conflict dynamics. Making a conflict assessment before implementing an intervention is not enough. All UNDP have to understand how to behave, communicate, plan and negotiate the actual implementation of any intervention that is undertaken in any of the many conflict-affected areas of the country.

Thus, it is the view of the MTE that the key to UNDP’s continued support at the field level in Myanmar is to own and use conflict sensitivity and social cohesion principles as the backbone of any intervention. This would in turn enable UNDP to carry out service provision for those larger programmes from IFI which lack the capacity to integrate conflict sensitivity in programme implementation.

Linked to this aspect is a wider political analysis of the country’s context and the efforts around the peace process. Myanmar has a long tradition of Special Envoys who have been liaising with the government on the peace process. However, Myanmar is not a UN mission country and the UNCT was not brought on board with the political process, to position the technical resources to support possible points of entry for the UN in the peace process. The consequence is a certain disconnect between the higher-level political agenda and the technical agenda of the UNCT.

The second aspect related to the political space is linked to UN reform and the de-linking of the Resident Coordinator function from that of the Resident Representative. It is the understanding of the MTE team that it is the UNRC Office which should set the rules of engagement of the UNCT vis-à-vis government in the country, and not the UNDP Resident Representative. However, it is difficult to understand if such rules exist, as different UN agencies seem to pursue different agendas and have certainly different position on a number of sensitive topics, particularly in relation to the human rights issues. UNDP is recognised as a trusted partner for government, but it is unclear to what extent it advocates for HRBA or if there is a common understanding of the modus operandi followed by UNDP in trying to engage in EAO areas and whether the government is indeed sharing UNDP’s views on its approach to working in conflict affected areas. This is a key question that needs to be answered before UNDP can position itself for the next CPD and ensure a common understanding of the rules of engagement in Myanmar as relates to its work undertaken outside of the institutional strengthening and governance areas.

At the end of the day, as mentioned in UNDP’s corporate definition of outcome, UNDP is there to bring developmental changes that will ultimately positively affect people’s lives. By working with the conflict sensitivity mindset at the local level, UNDP is able to influence positive change, as it is already doing in some interventions, through the use of participatory and bottom-up methodologies and approaches and an expanding network of RPs/IPs. But clearer understanding and communication with the government counterparts is required to have a shared approach regarding UNDP’s rules of engagements and the trade-offs of working in a conflict sensitive area-based programming approach.
UNDP’s engagement is a long-term process, and it should convince its donors, particularly in Rakhine state, to move away from short-term interventions (12 or 18 months) towards longer and more predictable funding.

Another gap in the present CPD programming is the inability of conveying a clear programmatic strategy across its intervention portfolio. While certain donors that support only specific interventions may not need a clearer strategic vision, others have some difficulty to draw out to which extent UNDP is pursuing a clear strategy or whether UNDP is using emerging entry points to develop project interventions. The internal UNDP survey undertaken by the MTE also shows that more could be done to communicate a common vision of UNDP’s achievements to its external audiences.

In terms of its partnership strategy, UNDP could do more. While a number of papers have addressed the issue of engagement with EAO signatories, it is unclear that UNDP has gained the trust of the EAOs, while it has gained the trust of the government. To be able to work in a conflict sensitive manner at field level, UNDP needs to reach out to the EAOs to see how it would be able to gain their trust in order to be a respected development actor working in favour of all the people of Myanmar down to the township and villages levels in those areas where it has gained such an access.

In terms of positioning, UNDP has not been heavily involved in the macro-economic policy and job creation sectors given resource limitations and an already complex and sensitive portfolio of interventions. It is the view of the MTE that UNDP should not engage in the short-term in the private sector led economic growth and job creation, but in terms of the strategic positioning over the longer-term it may use the third transition from a closed to an open market economy to bolster its gains in the other two reform processes. However, it is not yet the time for such efforts to be deployed. In addition, and closely linked to its positioning strategy, UNDP must do more to establish itself and communicate its role as the SDG’s integrator. It is the view of the MTE team that there was a lack of shred understanding of what that role entails, much less what should be done to fulfil it. However, the MTE found a number of clear examples where UNDP had played the role of SDG integrator, albeit without realising or communicating it as such. The following two examples are illustrative: 1) UNDP support for the development of the National Indicator Framework enables other UN agencies with sectoral mandates to focus more meaningfully on how to measure progress on their respective SDGs; 2) The deployment of Anti-Corruption teams in sector ministries also facilitates effective results achievement by other UN agencies. The MTE proposes that a specific indicator for this work should be formulated and integrated into the revised M&E framework.

Finally, as regards to the COVID response, as echoed in some of the donor’s interviews, UNDP has already undertaken a number of useful adjustments to its programme and proved responsive to government’s requests in terms of procurement of materials and equipment, carrying out socioeconomic surveys, strengthening its ICT provision to partners, etc. But it not necessarily an area that should become the main thrust of its intervention strategy, particularly keeping in mind that a stalling political dialogue process amongst the parties in conflict may be more constraining for the various reforms than the socioeconomic effects of the COVID pandemic.
5.3.5 How can UNDP maximise its potential to achieve CPD results?

In view of the MTE, based on the documentary analysis, the 67 KII, the internal UNDP survey results, the feedback from government counterparts, and the interpretation of the data collected, UNDP could:

1. Complete the change in mindset of ensuring that all its programming is supported by trained conflict sensitive staff that are able to ensure its operating principles are applied across all its interventions.

2. Develop a communications strategy that is supported by a revised M&E system that captures the outcome level results showing the importance of its achievements in the country beyond narrative and descriptive reporting. Develop for internal purposes (e.g. not for the CPD) a results matrix that allows to visualize the expected results of the current intervention portfolio by the end of the CPD and identify the tools (and not only indicators) to be able to capture such progress, inform senior management and communicate it to external audiences.

3. Review its vision for the expected results at the end of the CPD based on the learning and results to date and mindful of the evolving context. Engage UNDP’s donors accordingly to adjust the vision for the next CPD and its future intervention portfolio.

4. Ensure a more balanced approach between the support to duty bearers and that of rights holders by strengthening its outreach capacity at state/region and township levels.

5. Use of coverage in any intervention as a key criterion to appraise the extent to which needs are being covered, hence creating venues for partnership and complementary efforts with partners, working towards a common vision of success.

6. Consider a shift to more area-based integrated programming approaches rather than pursuing the integration of flagship projects that are somewhat conceptually opposed to vertically funded projects integration and ABP and that have shown to have operational integration challenges.


8. Develop a shared understanding of what it means for UNDP to be the SDG integrator. Key informants all have different ideas about the role, while some key informants also noted that an emphasis and focus on SDGs had somehow been side lined due to donors’ shift towards the COVID response. The results of a UNDP staff perception survey shows that majority of staff believe that availability of donor funding and responsiveness to government request are likely to have greater influence on UNDP programming than UN normative frameworks such as human rights based approaches (HRBA) and leave no one behind.

9. Advocate for longer funding periods to its donors particularly for conflict-affected areas where trust and confidence building take time.

5.3.6 To what extent does the CPD ensure tracking of the interventions’ coverage and target groups?

As mentioned under point 5. above, UNDP could do more to serve the needs of the constituencies it is supporting particularly at field level in conflict affected areas. All decision-making in government is strongly centralised at union level, which decides where and when UNDP may obtain access to specific
areas. It is therefore crucial for UNDP to pursue good advocacy and engagement with central authorities to obtain expanded access to conflict-affected areas.

Determining and reporting on coverage becomes a priority when operating in a complex and sensitive geographical area where many uncovered needs exist, and UNDP is only bringing a small contribution to address these needs. There is hardly any mention of the denominator in the interventions undertaken by UNDP (e.g. what is the reference group that is being covered by the intervention). Unlike humanitarian assistance which has clearly defined quantitative targets, UNDP does not apply the concept of coverage in its programming. Yet it is not the same to graduate 2nd from a class promotion of 200 students than from a classroom of 3. More sensitivity and attention should be brought to the issue of coverage, and this should be better defined across the various projects (although some projects are specifically targeted and identified the target group, but not the remaining uncovered needs), particularly for the sake of the coherence and consistency of area-based programmes. This requires a sustained and active engagement of the government authorities to understand and share the approach used by UNDP and authorize UNDP to operate without access constraints unless they be linked to security conditions or armed activity.

Ensuring the tracking of the coverage versus uncovered needs would also allow UNDP to report on exclusion factors more adequately and would provide more evidence of the leave no one behind operating principle.

5.4 Sustainability

At project level, sustainability is addressed in the design. A review of the project documents shows that each has a section on Sustainability and Scaling Up, which outlines the project’s sustainability plan (GRSP – p.35; LEAP – p.18; SARL – p.29; SERIP – p.39; and TDLG – p.19). Institutional capacity development is also integral to all the projects and is an enabling factor towards achieving sustainability.

At overall programme level, the CPD pillars include sustainability by default, i.e. through the integral components that include economic, environmental and social interventions. At the project level, individual projects have been mindful to include sustainability as an integral part of their strategy. On national capacity development, there is evidence of sustainable change in the way Parliaments/Hluttaws are now working and likelihood of sustainability in the area of community-based participation. Additionally, there are examples where some of the project mechanisms have been further reproduced by the government as mentioned hereunder under point 5.4.1.

5.4.1 What results of UNDP’s interventions have been replicated or continued by GoM institutions? Or by donors?

The MTE team had difficulties in obtaining evidence regarding the replication or continuation of the interventions. Among the evidence obtained an example of ownership was the Bago Region Government (BRG) allocation of MMK 56 billion (USD 38 million) to the 28 townships from its FY 2019/2020 capital budget using a formula based on the TDLG method. Also, various donors showed their interest in
continuing to fund those interventions that are providing positive results through the CPD or on specific interventions. It is expected that projects such as TDLG which have shown substantial results will be replicated and possibly upscaled with a similar approach. Also, the implementation of the REDD+ strategy contains empowering approaches that will likely obtain some level of support.

It proved difficult, during the interviews, to address this dimension with government partners. Many counterparts indicated and requested further support from UNDP given their own limited government budgets, so the sustainability of some benefits may be questionable. After the 2015 change in government, other actors are also providing support to governmental institutions, but the MTE does have a full information to respond to this question.

5.4.2 Have the outputs from the “flagship” projects of UNDP been used by GoM and if so how?

As indicated under the effectiveness section 5.3.1. UNDP projects have generated a number of critical outputs at the upstream level in terms of policy, strategy, laws and by-laws. These are in turn contributing to the reform and transition process in government and the MTE found they are being used government partners. The shift from autocratic to democratic rule means that under the previous decision-making structure the system followed the chain of command and did not necessarily have the supporting framework to facilitate the implementation. By working upstream in the policy/law making/strategy development and plans for partner institutions, UNDP projects are decisively contributing to the democratic transition and improved governance structures. One example is the review of the legislation to ensure community participation in conservation, that gives local communities a voice where they previously had none.

5.4.3 What are the existing opportunities for UNDP to maximise the sustainability of its programming?

GEF (Global Environmental Facility) projects indicate various dimensions regarding sustainability: financial resources, socio-political conditions, institutional framework and governance, environmental concerns. It is difficult to make a prospective judgement to maximise the sustainability of UNDP’s programming, but it can basically be linked to:

a) Those interventions that contributed to developing or strengthening the institutional framework and governance, where the adoption of key policy documents and passing of laws ensure a higher likelihood of sustainability;

b) Those interventions for which the government or donors are willing to provide continuing resources because of the benefits that are being achieved; and

c) Those processes that contribute to empowering the local communities through participatory methodologies and which should be maintained provided local empowerment remains a political priority of the government (hence allocating specific resources to these processes).
In some cases, for example in support to the Parliament, additional support is coming from more recent development actors that are now channelling resources to Parliament at a time when UNDP’s resource allocation is decreasing.

5.5 Cross cutting themes

5.5.1 To what extent was gender mainstreamed within the CPD?

The UNDP CO has not yet undertaken the Gender Equality Seal certification, indicating that it has not yet reached the stage where it can comfortably consider that it has the necessary resources and technical expertise to ensure gender mainstreaming in its CPD.

Interviews indicated that staffing issues also led to a prolonged vacancy for the post of gender advisor. Despite identifying the need for a gender sensitive programming approach, not all of the UNDP interventions have been able to incorporate gender sensitivity in its intervention design and implementation. However, some interventions, particularly in Rakhine in the Joint Project with UN Women, had a specific focus on gender and targeted women as the main intervention beneficiaries. UNDP has made some efforts to integrate gender in programming, but more efforts are warranted and it would also be an encouraging sign if the CO was to undertake the Gender Equality Seal certification as a commitment to stronger gender mainstreaming.

5.5.2 To what extent were human rights addressed within the CPD?

The human rights-based approach (HRB) is a programming principle which figures among the normative frameworks of United Nations Agencies, including UNDP. In Myanmar, the issue of human rights is particularly sensitive for various reasons:

1) Because of peace process is not yet consolidated and human rights violations are being reported by the various parties in conflict, including Tatmadaw, the government and EAOs. There appears to be limited political space to engage with the government on this issue.

2) Because the UNCT does not speak with one voice regarding human rights issues. Some agencies are more outspoken and communicate more openly about human rights violation, which builds up government resistance to engage on the issue and contributes to limiting access to conflict-affected areas.

3) Because the government is democratically elected and unlike the previous military government, it represents the people’s votes and is the expression of the popular sovereignty that resulted from the 2015 elections. In this view, human rights are an internal issue, and the current confrontational situation with the government through the International Court of Justice ruling of January 2020 does not contribute to open further political space for negotiation on this issue.

4) Because of the complexity of the civil-military relationship, where Tatmadaw retains a clear authority on aspects related to what is perceived as national security issues.
UNDP’s position in regard to HRBA advocacy is unclear to the MTE team. It appears from the documentary review and interviews that UNDP is certainly not an open and vocal critic of the government regarding the respect of human rights. It is the perception of the MTE team that UNDP has taken the rights-based approach in terms of how it implements its programming, even though it must be noted that the programming is strongly focused on the duty bearers and much less on rights holders. UNDP is taking a cautious approach and does not seem to be advocating actively for the HRBA to be used by government partners. Given that some entry points are simply not existing (for example UNDP has no access to the military or Tatmadaw) to engage on negotiations and given the recent past, it is unlikely that the government will turn an open ear to discuss with UNDP issues that they have repeatedly denied engaging on in higher level fora.

It is however the MTE view that such an issue should be taken up at a higher level as it affects the entire UN system in Myanmar and is not within UNDP’s remit to influence. It is also recognised that different UN agencies have different views regarding Human Rights issues in Myanmar and how to engage with the government. There are complicated dynamics of trust versus pressure to ensure progress is made and apparently not a common vision across the UN.

At the higher level, an Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (IIFFMM) was established from 2017 until September 2019. Its report was endorsed by the Human Rights Council but was not recognized by the GoM; its impacts on UN operations in Myanmar in general.

5.5.3 Is conflict sensitivity mainstreamed in UNDP’s programming?

UNDP has been developing its conflict sensitivity capacity since the beginning of the CPD. It remains work in progress as there is still quite a lot to be done, but it is on the right track. In Myanmar conflict sensitivity programming is not an option, it is a must. The first three paragraphs of the CPD evidence that conflict is an integral part of the operating context and must be addressed to make sustainable development gains. UNDP has understood that not only those programmes that deal with Rakhine need to be conflict sensitive. It must now ensure that all its staff is actually applying conflict sensitivity in all programmes implemented. This requires the support of senior management and the continued training and practical demonstration of how conflict sensitivity is applied to the on-going programme. Strategic partnerships with RAFT and SCFG have been developed in Rakhine and should be strengthened and expanded to other conflict affected areas, such as Kachin or Mon states. Further strategic partnership with local level organisations should also be envisaged, particularly given the recurrent access limitation to conflict affected areas. At the same time, UNDP should win the trust of the EAO signatories of the NCA to be perceived as bringing useful support to the communities under the control of the EAOs. Noteworthy that EAOs are asking political rights such as self-determination and civil liberty rights related as a priority, not necessarily general development works which they understand should follow after the political rights are recognized. UNDP support to decentralisation and local governance in this context should be better advocated to engage with EAOs and gain their trust, provided there is a political space to do so.

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It is therefore the view of the MTE that conflict sensitivity has to become the essence behind all UNDP programming in Myanmar and it has to be done with a proper risk management systems in place to limit potential reputational damage for the organisation. However, UNDP seems to be risk adverse in Myanmar and when working in conflict environments, there is always a level of risk that must be assumed. UNDP has to determine what level of acceptable risk it is willing to take.

The currently vacant post of Social Cohesion and Conflict Prevention Specialist should be urgently filled to continue providing the necessary oversight of the conflict sensitivity development efforts.

6 Conclusions

UNDP’s CPD was developed at a time of widespread optimism. The evolution of the context shows that the planning assumptions did not materialise. In particular, resurgence of conflict in Rakhine also showed the limitation of the progress regarding the peace process. In this challenging environment, and with a limited political space for negotiation and advocacy, UNDP has been able to maintain and consolidate a good relationship with its government counterparts. Evidence of significant results, particularly at the upstream level, are described in this report. The level of satisfaction from government counterparts regarding UNDP’s performance and contribution to capacity development is high. It is also considered as a trusted partner of the government. It is less clear however whether sufficient efforts have been developed downstream, or whether the expected results of the interventions will be fully achieved. There is a general recognition by donors and UNDP staff itself that it does not have a balanced position. It is very strong on specific aspects, most notably in technical assistance and capacity development to government institutions, but much weaker on other critical issues such as engaging in the peace process, from which the UN has been left out, and other programming principles which it must strengthen in the future. First and foremost, conflict sensitivity has to become UNDP’s main focus when designing and implementing any programme in the country. It is a finding that the CPD was not necessarily balanced in providing support to duty bearers and rights holders, something that should be reviewed for the next planning period.

In the current context in Myanmar, with the COVID limitations and the upcoming elections in November of this year, UNDP would not benefit from a substantial shift in the CPD implementation strategy followed to date. Interventions have adjusted to the changing conditions even if there has been no CPD risk management strategy to steer the global approach to achieving development results. As not all the anticipated resources have been received, it is important for UNDP to define which are the key outcomes it will achieve by the end of the CPD.

The operating environment is highly politicised and very complex in Myanmar at present. The upcoming elections also suggest that major changes to the CPD should not be contemplated at this moment. The most cautious approach would be to focus efforts and resources in securing the emerging development gains (or those in the process of being achieved) that have been identified until after the elections. There
is limited room to manoeuvre and UNDP could take advantage of the change in its leadership to undertake a round of prospective meeting with the authorities to discuss their current expectations as regards to the future support to be provided by UNDP.

At the higher level, UNDP also needs to discuss with the UNRCO and the UN Special Envoy, what are the UN rules of engagement vis-à-vis government in Myanmar in order to know under which premises it operates in conflict-affected areas. From government, it needs to obtain access to EAO controlled areas but it also needs to gain the trust of EAOs to be able to provide support to the population that has been, up to now, left out of the development gains because they are outside of the geographical area of intervention. Not a single EAO was included in the list of suggested evaluation respondents shared by the CO.

UNDP has managed some substantial results in a complicated operating context, but more efforts are needed and in particular more clarity on the vision, its positioning and the expected results it wants to achieve. It is hoped that the contents of this report will support UNDP to review its position and adjust its current interventions to maximize the development gains for the country and its people.

7 Recommendations

The recommendations section is structured according to the actionable and prioritized recommendations that stem from the findings mentioned in the body of the report.

7.1 Recommendations addressed to senior management (internal)

1. Undertake a functional review of business processes and delegation of authority for all the CO and its field offices,
2. Ensure a shared vision among UNDP staff on the CO implementation strategy and expected outcomes to be achieved at country level by the end of the CPD,
3. Create more spaces for cross-fertilization and exchange amongst UNDP staff to ensure a common understanding based on the evolving learning across the various programmes,
4. Make conflict sensitivity the backbone of UNDP programming: train all UNDP staff and partners not to apply but to really shift their mindsets to become conflict sensitive programming champions, and recruit local staff from ethnic regions who speak their own ethnic languages, not Burmese language necessarily to engage with the local CSOs,
5. Review and adjust the M&E system to reflect corporate guidance on RBM requirements and review the indicators for the CPD, identifying alternative manners to provide evidence of results ahead of the final CPD evaluation,
6. Train all staff on RBM and M&E particularly on the formulation of outputs and outcomes, the results hierarchy, the development of a theory of change, a review of tools that can be used when indicators are not most useful to provide evidence of the change process,
7. Develop a risk management strategy and tool to track CPD assumptions and ensure a review of the planning assumptions is made in June 2022 before the final CPD evaluation is undertaken,
8. Develop an internal roadmap for the achievement of the CPD specific country outcomes, as defined in the corporate UNDP guidance, setting clear and meaningful benchmarks for success for internal use,
9. Develop a strategy for engaging with donors and leveraging resources,
10. Consider an alternative structure for the CO based on a different division of labour: one unit in charge of technical assistance and capacity development for duty bearers, and one unit in charge of all integrated area-based programming in Rakhine, in Kachin, as well as possibly other states/regions such as Mon, focusing on serving the needs of rights holders,
11. Introduce coverage data in all programming to show to what extent UNDP intervention is covering the needs, and use coverage gaps to develop strategic partnership with other actors, particularly community-based organisations for area-based programme implementation, and ensure the application of the leave no one behind principle
12. Move from activity-based reporting to outcome-based reporting
13. Prepare the CO for the Gender Equality Seal certification to ensure gender sensitivity is more strongly addressed in UNDP programmes
14. Ensure that the Strategic Management Unit (SMU) provides more strategic value of tracking, monitoring and managing the CPD risk and assumptions.

7.2 Recommendations addressed to senior management (external)

1. Define together with the UN Special Envoy and the UN Resident Coordinator the rules of engagement for UNDP in Myanmar,
2. Engage with the government on the positioning of UNDP in Myanmar, discuss and agree on rules of engagement and identify key priority areas for the next CPD in the current context,
3. Assess with the government the political space for dialogue to have a shared understanding and agreement over UNDP’s role and mission in working in EAO and conflict-affected areas, and engage or re-engage in the peace process while building trust with the EAOs,
4. Develop a communications strategy that builds upon the revised M&E system and addresses the outcome level results, particularly in areas where critical processes are being implemented (e.g. community-based participatory planning),
5. Change external reporting accordingly to reflect meaningful information to donors and external audiences,
6. Commission systematically mid-term project evaluations when the evolving context is not supported by the initial planning assumptions to allow adaptive management responses,
7. Reach out to UNCT members to see where strategic partnerships around joint programmes can be further developed.
Annexes:

1. TOR
2. Bibliography
3. Context analysis stand-alone six pager
4. interview questionnaire
5. List of key informants and mission agenda
6. CPD RRF indicators update and traffic light rating
7. (internal) power point presentation regarding preliminary findings
8. MTE Team Bio
1. Background

The UNDP Country Programme (CPD 2018-2022) supports the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals within the framework of addressing the challenges of multiple transitions in Myanmar. The current Country Programme is built on the achievements of the previous programme but represents a shift towards more integrated programming at the national and sub-national levels and support to United Nations-wide initiatives to better address the interlinkages between peacebuilding and social cohesion, governance, environment and natural resources management, resilience, urbanization and balanced and inclusive growth. This integrated approach is designed to break silos and strengthen horizontal linkages across state and non-state actors as well as vertical linkages across administrations at district, township, state and union level through area based programmes.

The UNDP Country Programme is firmly aligned with UNDAF 2018-2022 and the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP) and it focuses on delivery of the following two outcomes with 7 key intended outputs:

**CPD Outcome I: Peace and Governance** - People in Myanmar live in a more peaceful and inclusive society, governed by more democratic and accountable institutions, and benefit from strengthened human rights and rule of law protection; and

- **Output 1.1**: Effective public institutions enabled to develop and implement evidence-based policies and systems that respond to the needs of the people
- **Output 1.2**: Institutions at union and subnational levels enabled to develop effective systems and procedures for performing their representative and oversight functions
- **Output 1.3**: Mechanisms, institutions and capacities strengthened to sustain peace and social cohesion
- **Output 1.4**: People have improved access to responsive, inclusive and accountable justice services and national human rights protection mechanisms, in compliance with rule of law and international standards

**CPD Outcome II: Planet and Prosperity** - Myanmar becomes more resilient to climate and disaster risk with efficient environmental governance and sustainable use of natural resources.

- **Output 2.1**: Improved disaster and climate risk management systems for community resilience
Output 2.2: Solutions developed at the national and subnational levels for sustainable management of natural resources and ecosystem services as a platform for inclusive economic development

Output 2.3: Evidence-based policies and programmes developed to promote inclusive economic growth and employment creation with particular focus on women and vulnerable groups

As June 2020 marks the mid-point of the Country Programme, UNDP Myanmar plan to assess the continuing relevance of the CPD including a review the changing context and original assumptions on which the CPD was developed, to undertake a review of progress made, to explore and adjust direction if needed that may benefit the programme and recommendations for the next country programme cycle in response to the likely context during the remainder of the CPD programme cycle.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY PROGRAMME SUMMARY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title:</strong> UNDP Myanmar Country Programme Document (2018-2022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Atlas ID:</strong> MMR10</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CPD document signed:</strong> 20 November 2017</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Duration:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Start</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>01.01.2018</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Corporate outcome and output:</strong> CPD outcome 1 and 2</td>
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<td><strong>MSDP Alignment:</strong> Aligned with MSDP Goal 2, 3 and 5</td>
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<td><strong>CPD budget:</strong> USD 172 million</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Resource mobilized:</strong> (as of Mar 2020) USD 102 million</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Funding source</strong> Regular resources (TRAC); Programme cost sharing (Donor contribution including MPTF, private sector); Vertical trust fund (GEF); Funding window; EC Cost sharing</td>
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<td><strong>Key Donors:</strong> Japan, DFID, SDC, SIDA, DFAT, Canada, Germany, Norway, EU, Luxemburg, Netherlands, PBF, Italy, Austria, Private sectors</td>
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<td><strong>Office locations:</strong> 8 office locations (Naypyidaw, Yangon, Sitwee and Maundaw- Rakhine, Shan, Kachin, Mon, Mandalay)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Projects:</strong> 5 Flagship projects, Vertical fund projects, Area Based Programmes (Rakhine, Kachin)</td>
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<td><strong>Joint Programmes:</strong> 7 Joint programmes with UN agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UNDP interventions:</strong> 56 townships, 10 States/Regions</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Partnerships:</strong> 10 Government ministries, 16 government departments, Commissions, parliaments, private sectors</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Implementing party</strong> UNDP Myanmar</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Responsible Party</strong> Work with more than 20 local implementing partners including CSOs/NGOs/INGOs and government entities</td>
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2. Current Context

As COVID-19 spreads globally, it is a massive health, humanitarian, and development crisis. Due to the pandemic, Myanmar, especially the border regions: Kachin, Mon, Shan, Kayin States and in Yangon have terrible negative impact. A large number of Myanmar migrants have continued to return to Myanmar received the from China and. According to MOHS data, more than 23,000 people returned to Myanmar from Thailand via Myawaddy from March 19 to 28 2020.

While concerns have been raised about Myanmar’s capacity to manage the coronavirus given its poor healthcare infrastructure, migrants and the country’s displaced populations face even greater risks. Most are trapped in dangerously overcrowded camps or quarantine centers with severely substandard health care and inadequate access to clean water, sanitation, and other essential services. Many displaced people have underlying medical conditions and chronic diseases, putting them at high risk of suffering serious effects from the virus.

The impact of economic fluctuations related to the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to disproportionately harm poor and vulnerable households. With travel and border trade restrictions in place, the impact is in Myanmar’s tourism-related services, agricultural exports to China, and in supply-chain disruptions to the manufacturing sector. Every day, people are losing jobs and income, with no way of knowing when normality will return. Myanmar’s GDP growth is projected to slow to between 2 and 3 percent, from 6 percent in 2019, in the current fiscal year due to the COVID-19 pandemic, with the brunt of the outbreak’s economic impact likely to be borne by poor and vulnerable households across the country according to recent world bank report.

Given the current Covid-19 pandemic there is an expectation that this will also impact and delays in UNDP programme and project implementation as a result UNDP has reduced its overall 2020 targeted delivery. However, UNDP Myanmar remains fully operational and is adapting the way it works and focused on COVID-19 response. UNDP is mobilizing all assets to respond to this unprecedented challenge. UNDP Myanmar have transitioned all critical operations to digital and virtual platforms, enabling teams to continue delivering effectively despite restrictions on movement and physical interaction. With the changing context, emerging needs and priorities UNDP Myanmar is also revisiting the Programme strategy and business processes to be more relevant to this crisis. UNDP Myanmar had conducted Programme and operational criticality exercise to review and identification of critical programme areas and activities that will continue and activities that will be postponed or canceled. Some activities are paused or downscaled and looking for opportunities to be redirected to new priorities.

UNDP globally has developed a COVID-19 response focused on three immediate priorities including health systems support, inclusive and integrated crises management and response, and social and economic impact needs assessments and response. The Myanmar Country Office is preparing its response plan building on these three priority areas and in line with the current requests and priorities of the Government of Myanmar, current Programme areas and in response to broader UN Country Team collaboration across a range of development areas. Rapid response funds are new core funds being made available by UNDP headquarters to respond to this crisis, while flexibility have also been provided to the county offices to
repurpose existing core funds towards this response, if necessary. In this context, UNDP have also been advised by cost-sharing donor partners that funds can also be repurposed towards COVID response if required.

UNDP intends to fully leverage its existing programme, staff and technical capacities and most importantly partnerships at the union, state and regional levels and with the communities to roll out the response in terms of community engagement and awareness raising, strengthening local government’s capacity plan, coordinate, budget and deliver essential services including to migrants and IDPs, and bolstering public health systems. With many of our partners, particularly in the local government, capacities are being enhanced to be able to work and manage remotely through online systems. UNDP is working closely with local partners that allows local solutions to COVID-19 humanitarian and development needs, to be designed together with local partners, and in coordination with the host government.

Some activities that have been identified include community and anti-stigmatization awareness, expansion of use of digital technologies, private sector engagement and corporate social responsibility, volunteerism and social cohesion, resilience and recovery, support to MSMEs as well as health systems support and socio-economic impact assessments at the sub-national levels.

UNDP Myanmar is also streamlining policies and procedures for greater agility, increasing our flexibility to receive and deliver private sector and other financing, and taking steps to initiate innovative approaches like next generation network of innovation and digital solutions across the country — a crucial institutional asset in responding to this complex, fast-moving crisis. Accelerator Lab will be sensing on-the-ground changes and sourcing local solutions for this crisis response.

Midterm CPD Evaluations is expected to assess UNDP performance in areas that are critical to ensuring sustained contribution to development results and the context of emerging development issues and changing priorities at the national levels. To this end, this evaluation also needs to cover, for example, UNDP policies, focus areas, partnerships, programmatic approaches, cooperation modalities, or business models considering current crisis scenario.

3. **Evaluation Purpose, Scope and Objectives**

The overall objective of the CPD Mid Term Evaluation (MTE) is to assess the progress in achieving the results of the country programme, its relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of strategies in light of the development priorities, and the changes in the local and international contexts including the impact of COVID-19 and with a view to 2020 elections. The evaluation timeframe will cover from the beginning of the country programme- January 2018- to June 2020. Specifically, the evaluation will access the level of achievement of both expected and unexpected results by examining the theory of change, relevance and coherence of its activities and results, the results chain, processes, contextual factors, original assumptions and how they have or have not manifested, and causality using appropriate criteria. The primary audience for the MTR will be the UNDP, Government of Myanmar, development partners, UN Country Team (UNCT), and UNDP implementing partners.
The first stage of the CPD MTE will be to conduct a review of the current context, building on relevant context analysis and taking into account the latest socio-economic and political developments locally as well as relevant developments at a global level since the inception of the CPD in 2018.

The second stage is to assess the relevance of the CPD to the current context, by identifying challenges and ways to overcome or mitigate them, and to provide lessons learnt considering the emerging national and global development priorities. The final stage will be the provision of key recommendations including improvements in performance and results, proposed adjustments to the design of the current country programme including programmatic focus (structurally and through a revised Results and Resource Framework) and the development of elements that can be considered to inform the planning of the next country programme. It will also help fleshing out some key aspects such as what does it mean for UNDP to be the SDG integrator, how innovation can support our processes, how does the COVID-19 recovery require projects in results area to adapt (if at all) and other new questions such as these.

4. Evaluation criteria and Key guiding questions

The CPD MTE will be conducted in line with the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria and UNDP Evaluation Guideline 2019: (a) relevance; (b) effectiveness; (c) efficiency; and (d) sustainability of development results.

**Relevance:** This essentially looks into and deep dives into the question of whether the CPD is still relevant to current context and what specific measures, if any, that will require to be undertaken to ensure full alignment and impact. In doing do, reviewing the theory of change, UNDP’s comparative advantage and strategic positioning etc will be considered. Considering the emerging crisis, it would be useful to assess the extent that this CPD is appropriately responsive to the needs of the national constituents and changing partner priorities.

**Effectiveness:** This considers to what extent the current programme generated the requisite results in line with what was planned and what has been achieved beyond the planned results. In doing so, the review will also look into whether principles of leaving no one behind were applied, the requisite capacity enhancement of the national counterparts took place, whether conflict sensitivity assessment, gender mainstreaming etc were adequately considered.

**Efficiency:** This criteria considers to what extent the programme results obtained justifies the economic use of resources and if there is alignment between what has been expended (resource wise) and what has been achieved. Other considerations such as timeliness of the results, conducive use of programming modalities, extent to which UNDP processes and decision making have contributed/affected the results etc.
**Sustainability of development results:** This criteria looks into what extent did UNDP establish mechanisms to ensure the sustainability of the results attained in terms of capacities of national partners and whether other institutional mechanisms have been put in place to sustain the programme results. It also assesses, among others, to what extent do partnerships exist with other national institutions, NGOs, United Nations agencies, the private sector and development partners to sustain the attained results and to what extent have partners committed to providing continuing support.

*Note: Guiding evaluation questions is provided to the consultants in the annex as guidance. Please make sure that gender, conflict and Human rights aspects are well integrated in the evaluation questions. Consultants will need to be further refined by the evaluation team and agreed with UNDP.*

5. **Methodology**

The evaluation will be conducted primarily to assess the progress, and changes in the context and how this should inform the remaining CPD cycle in terms of programming and operations. This evaluation will include mixed method design. The MTE must provide evidence-based information that is credible, reliable and useful. The MTE team will review all relevant sources of information including documents prepared during the preparation phase. The MTE team is expected to follow a collaborative and participatory approach ensuring close engagement with the evaluation managers, implementing partners and direct beneficiaries.

The overall MTE will be divided into three phases:

**Phase I: Evaluation Planning Phase (Virtual)**

With the Covid-19 crisis, ensuring the safety of evaluation teams, Phase 1 of the CPD MTE will be to conducted virtually by the evaluator which include remote arrangements to conduct four key tasks (1) desk reviews of key documents (2) review of the current situation – context analysis (3) development and finalize inception report (4) design of evaluation tools and questionnaires.

1. **Desk review of all relevant documentation.** Following the introductory meetings and briefings, the evaluation team will undertake a desk review of all relevant reports and data. This should be supplied by the strategic management unit in a timely manner and all efforts made to access missing reports and data prior to the development of the inception report and the data-collection mission. This would include a review of inter alia

   - UNDP Strategic Plan (2018-2021) and other new UNDP corporate priorities since 2018 that are relevant for the Myanmar context including the new COVID related programmatic offers;
   - Myanmar UNDAF
COVID impact on UNDP Governance and Climate programming

Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (2018-2030) and key government strategies in areas of cooperation with UNDP

Donor contribution agreements

Theory of change and results framework

Result Oriented Annual Report (ROAR)

All evaluations of projects that were conducted during the period

Programme/project annual, semi-annual reports.

Donor reports

Minutes of programme board meetings.

Other documents

2. Context Analysis

- **Development and Operational Context (2 pager):** First part of context analysis will analyze the environment in which a CPD has been operating since its inception in 2018. Context analysis mainly focuses on scanning both internal and external environment, analyzing operating environments like political, economic, social, technological developments and demographic trends related to CPD implementation. Context analysis will analyze how key departures due to contextual changes had impacted organization, team, strategy, program or project.

- **Evolving Context (2 pager):** Second part of context analysis will assess the relevance of the CPD vis a vis the current evolving context (e.g. Covid crisis, conflicts, displacement and migration, elections etc.). This will enable an understanding of contextual changes and the ways in which the CPD may need to pivot to respond to these evolving changes; and thereby useful for any proposed adjustments that can be considered.

3. Evaluation Inception Report (max 10 pages) to be developed. Evaluators will commence the evaluation process with a desk review and preliminary analysis of the available information supplied by the implementing agency. Based on the TOR, initial meetings with the UNDP programme unit/evaluation manager and the desk review, evaluators should develop an inception report. The description of what is being evaluated illustrates the evaluators’ understanding of the logic or theory of how the initiative is supposed to work, including strategies, activities, outputs and expected outcomes and their interrelationships. It will detail how each evaluation question will be answered by way of proposed methods; proposed sources of data; and data collection and analysis procedures taking into consideration the options available during COVID-19 restrictions. The inception report should include contextual analyses as mentioned above, a proposed schedule of tasks, activities and deliverables.
The inception report provides an opportunity to clarify issues and understanding of the objective and scope of an evaluation, such as resource requirements and delivery schedules.

4. Development of evaluation questions, remote interview questionnaire focus groups guidelines and online surveys
   - Development of evaluation questions around relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability and designed for different stakeholders to be interviewed.
   - Surveys interview questionnaires focus group discussions guidelines and online survey tools to be designed and pretested.

Phase II: Validation Phase (virtually or on site/ face to face)

Option 1: Virtual validation

With international and internal travel restrictions in place, it is very likely that there may or may not be able to conduct field visits and/or lack of local evaluation team members data could be collected remotely.

   - For validation, skype or telephone interviews, online/mobile questionnaires, online surveys, collaboration platforms (slack or yammer) and satellite imagery could be used to gather data.
     - Remote telephone interviews with key government counterparts, representatives of key civil society organizations and implementing partners is recommended.
     - Online survey tool or one to one Zoom meetings can be organized for donor community members and UN partners.
     - Programme specific group zoom meetings can be organized for thematic programmatic and operational areas.
   - Use of Partners Survey contact information: UNDP Myanmar had already collected list of all the partners contact details during 2019 partners survey. These information’s can be used for virtual interviews.
   - Stakeholder engagement ensures the effective communication of an evaluation and its uptake, so it is very important to do a test run and factor in emergency settings and time zone differences.
   - Stakeholders that are dealing with existing emergencies should be given advance notice and an adjustment of evaluation timelines can be expected.
   - UNDP Field office colleagues will assist national consultant in logistic arrangement of the virtual meetings with partners and beneficiaries.
Option 2: Onsite or face to face validation

- If situation permits, national consultant or international consultant will visit to selected field sites (if feasible)
- Undertake key informant interviews with beneficiaries, government officials, communities and other stakeholders who have been involved in implementing activities under the program and/or participated in various program activities.
- Focus Group Discussions to be held whenever appropriate (specially recommended for beneficiaries). All interviews should be undertaken in full confidence and anonymity.

Ensuring the security of consultants, stakeholders and accompanying UNDP staff, particularly in crisis situations. The evaluation team members should have passed relevant United Nations security exams and be aware of and comply with related security protocols, including passing the United Nations Department of Safety and Security training courses on basic security in field II29 and advanced security in the field.

Phase III: Analysis, Debriefing and Report Writing Phase (in country or virtually)

Following field missions or data validation phase, data review and analysis of evaluation questions, surveys and questionnaires. Evaluation teams are required to ensure maximum validity, reliability of data (quality) through triangulation of the various data sources.

Prior to the drafting of the evaluation report, the evaluation team should debrief the UNDP project/programme and management teams with preliminary findings. Debriefings with key stakeholders and the evaluation reference group may also be organized virtually or face to face where possible. This gives an opportunity to discuss preliminary findings and address any factual errors or misunderstandings, prior to writing the evaluation report.

At a time of social distancing, social media can help bridge the gap. Social platforms like yammer, teams etc can be formed to enable connecting, networking and engaging with target audiences such as donors, partners, and decision makers. This will be valuable to drive discussions, increase accessibility and amplify reach to key evaluation stakeholders.

A quality evaluation report should:

- Have a concise executive summary (maximum four pages).
- Be well structured and complete.
- Describe what is being evaluated and why.
- Identify the evaluation questions of concern to users.
- Identify target groups covered by the evaluation and whether the needs of the target groups were addressed through the intervention, and if not, why.
• Explain the steps and the procedures used to answer those questions.
• Present findings supported by credible evidence in response to the questions.
• Acknowledge limitations and constraints in undertaking the evaluation.
• Draw conclusions about findings based on of the evidence.
• Propose concrete and usable recommendations derived from conclusions.
• Be written with the report users and how they will use the evaluation in mind.

6. Evaluation products (deliverables)

The evaluation team will be accountable for producing following Deliverables/Expected outputs. These products include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliverables</th>
<th>Payments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation Inception report (max 10 pages).</strong> The inception report to be submitted following and based on preliminary discussions with UNDP after the desk review and prior to any formal evaluation interviews, survey distribution or field visits (and country visit in the case of international evaluators). It will detail the evaluators’ understanding of what is being evaluated and why, include the context analyses that overarches the CPD review, showing how evaluation questions will be answered by way of: proposed methods; proposed sources of data; and data collection and analysis procedures taking into consideration the options available during COVID-19 restrictions. The inception report should include a proposed schedule of tasks, activities and deliverables.</td>
<td>25 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Debrief on initial findings:</strong> A debrief meeting will be held after collecting primary data/information on the initial findings and observations at the validation phase.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>**Draft Midterm evaluation report.**¹ A Draft Mid-Term Evaluation report with all major findings and recommendations will be submitted to the UNDP DRR and Strategic Management Unit (SMU) for review. SMU will share the draft with relevant internal stakeholders, collate all the comments and provide the feedback to the evaluator within an agreed period of time.</td>
<td>25 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Final Mid-Term Evaluation report</strong> incorporating comments received from internal stakeholders and including a clear succinct Executive Summary. The evaluator will maintain an evaluation report audit trail to ensure that comments and changes by the evaluator in response to the draft report have been addressed.</td>
<td>50 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ A length of 30 to 40 pages including executive summary is suggested.
7. Evaluation Team Profiles and Key tasks

The MTE team is expected to consist of two International Consultants (Team lead and specific expert on results, alignment and SDG) and a National consultant to ensure contextual alignment and evaluation logistics management. A conflict sensitivity expert will also be recruited to assess the extent to which the CPD implementation has taken a conflict informed approach to implementation and adapted programming approaches as needed to ensure conflict sensitivity.

7.1 Team Leader - International Consultant Profile:

**Key expertise area:** Evaluation management with organizational skills (Team leader with lots of experience with evaluations and review); Experience in conducting programme evaluations with various UN organizations in humanitarian and development sectors, Expertise in gender focused evaluation; Experience in policy evaluation (MDG/SDG, Thematic, Strategic plan etc)

Overall task of the team leader is to provide strategic direction to the evaluation reviewing the CPD context, rationale, priorities, implementation and impact and recommended course correction as and if needed. The team leader will also be responsible for ensuring continued alignment with UNDAF and the UNCT priorities.

**Required qualifications:**

Master’s Degree or equivalent in International Relations, Political Science, Economics, Sociology, or any other related field; knowledge of current development issues, evaluation discipline is a must.

**Technical competencies:**

- Minimum 10-15 years relevant experience
- Proven recent experience with Country Programme assessment or UN Development Framework assessment is mandatory.
- Proven experience in conducting Evaluations/assessments in transitional and conflict countries required
- Strong analytical capacities (quantitative and qualitative) and strong ability to communicate and summarize this analysis in writing.
- Proven ability to produce high quality analytical reports
- Proven experience of having worked in south/southeast Asia. Prior experience in Myanmar would be significant asset.

**Language skills required.**

- Excellent communication (oral and written) skills; fluency in English required.
Team leader Tasks:

- Fulfil the contractual arrangements under the terms of reference as appropriate;
- Coordinate, mobilize and evaluate the evaluation team;
- Desk review of all relevant documents;
- Prepare Context analysis papers
- Develop the evaluation inception report, including an evaluation matrix, detail evaluation plan and evaluation tools as per TOR;
- Keep to standards and ethical principles in line with UNEG Norms and Standards and Ethical Guidelines;
- Consultation with key stakeholders including key government counterparts, donor community members, representatives of key civil society organizations and implementing partners
- Field visit to Programme/project sites for validation if conditions are approved and conductive
- Take a lead in collecting primary and secondary information, analysis and report writing
- Ensure to incorporate analysis on cross cutting issues
- Take a lead in sharing information and making presentations/debriefings
- Draft reports and brief the UNDP RR/DRR, evaluation manager, programme managers and stakeholders on the progress and key findings and recommendations;
- Ensure comments are sufficiently addressed in the MTR report
- Finalize the evaluation, taking into consideration comments and questions on the evaluation report. Evaluators’ feedback should be recorded in the audit trail;
- Deliver the products agreed to the right standard and quality; Account for what the team has done (and spent).

7.2 Technical expert in Results and Strategic alignment of programmes and SDG integration - International Consultant Profile:

**Key Expertise area:** Result management (Poverty Reduction, Governance, Environment and Climate Change, Peace, Crisis Prevention and Recovery, Youth, Gender); experience in conducting UNDAF/Joint programme evaluations and understanding of the UN development and reform agenda, understanding of UNDP programming standards and business process; experience working in Asia

Overall task of second international consultant will entail providing deep dive into the thematic and technical result areas (under the guidance of the team leader) and help assess relevance, continued alignment with country priorities of these areas, while also fleshing out some key aspects such as what does it mean for UNDP to be the SDG
integrator, how innovation can support our processes, how does the COVID-19 recovery require projects in results area to adapt (if at all) and other new questions such as these.

**Required qualifications:**

Master’s Degree or equivalent in International Relations, Political Science, Economics, Sociology, or any other related field; knowledge of current development issues, evaluation discipline is a must.

**Technical competencies:**

- Minimum 10-15 years relevant experience
- Proven recent experience with Country Programme assessment or UN Development Framework assessment is mandatory.
- Proven experience in conducting Evaluations/assessments in transitional and conflict countries required
- Strong analytical capacities (quantitative and qualitative) and strong ability to communicate and summarize this analysis in writing.
- Proven ability to produce high quality analytical reports
- Proven experience of having worked in south/southeast Asia. Prior experience in Myanmar would be significant asset.

**Language skills required.**

- Excellent communication (oral and written) skills; fluency in English required.

**Technical expert Tasks:**

- Fulfil the contractual arrangements under the terms of reference as appropriate;
- Support team leader in desk review of relevant documents and prepare Context analysis papers from lens of issues/priorities identified in CCA/UNDAF, UNDP strategic plan and MSDP.
- Support team leader in development of the evaluation inception report, including an evaluation matrix, detail evaluation plan and evaluation tools as per TOR;
- Review CPD alignment with UNP SP, UNDAP and MSDP;
- Review and explore UNDP’s role and contribution as SDG integrator in UNCT and provide recommendations for deepening/expanding;
- Reviewing the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact of the CPD
- Review of CPD programme quality standards and explore how innovation can support our processes
- Identifying whether UNDP has achieved or in process of achieving its intended results (based on strategic outcomes and workplans)
- Consultation with key stakeholders including key government counterparts, donor community members, representatives of key civil society organizations and implementing partners
- Field visit to Programme/project sites for validation if permits
- Support team lead in collecting primary and secondary information, analysis and report writing
- Ensure to incorporate analysis on cross cutting issues
- Support in drafting report, sharing information and making presentations/debriefings
- Support in finalizing the evaluation, taking into consideration comments and questions on the evaluation report.

7.3 In addition, a conflict sensitivity expert will provide inputs to the work of the consultants is to review and assess the extent to which the conflict sensitivity considerations been integrated into project design, implementation and M&E to ensure intervention do No Harm; to assess whether the engagement with partners is improving prospects for non-discrimination, human rights and principles of equality and inclusion; and how the organization is addressing any grievances that are arising from our programming. Also assess the actions, including mitigation measures to limit escalating tensions between project stakeholders unintentionally contribute to conflict.

7.3 National Consultant Profile:

**Required qualifications:**

Master’s Degree or equivalent in International Relations, Public Administration, Political Science, Economics, Sociology, or any other related field;

**Technical competencies:**

- Minimum 3-5 years relevant experience
- Thorough understanding of overall socio-political and development context of Myanmar including that for regions/states.
- Knowledge and experience of working with national and sub national government structures
- Experience in undertaking reviews or assessments
- Prior experience in Gender related work or working with the UN will be an asset
- Strong analytical capacities (quantitative and qualitative) and strong ability to communicate and summarize analysis in writing.
- Proven ability to produce reports in English

**Language skills required.**
- Excellent command of Myanmar and English languages in speaking and writing and should be interpret in both languages (National consultant)

**National Consultants Tasks:**
- Fulfil the contractual arrangements under the terms of reference as appropriate;
- Desk review of all relevant documents;
- Support team leader in development of the evaluation inception report, including an evaluation matrix, detail evaluation plan and evaluation tools as per TOR and translation of tools in Myanmar if needed;
- Keep to standards and ethical principles in line with UNEG Norms and Standards and Ethical Guidelines;
- Take lead in logistic management of evaluations like organizing meetings, setting appointments, interview in Myanmar languages if needed.
- Take lead in consultation with key stakeholders including key government counterparts, representatives of key civil society organizations and implementing partners
- Take lead in the field visit to Programme/project sites for validation
- Support team leader in interpretation, context analysis and report writing
- Support team leader in sharing information and making presentations/debriefings
- Support in drafting reports and brief the evaluation manager, programme managers and stakeholders on the progress and key findings and recommendations;
- Support in finalization of the evaluation report, taking into consideration comments and questions on the evaluation report. Evaluators’ feedback should be recorded in the audit trail;
- Deliver the products agreed to the right standard and quality; Account for what the team has done (and spent).
8. Institutional arrangements

The UNDP Evaluation Owner is the Resident Representative (RR) who is accountable for the quality and approval of final terms of reference, final evaluation reports and management responses before final submission to the Evaluation Resource Centre (ERC).

The Evaluation Manager is Team Leader of the UNDP Strategic Management Unit (SMU). The SMU is responsible for coordinating the evaluation process and providing needed administrative support.

The MTE Team Leader will report to the UNDP Myanmar Deputy Country Director, as Officer in Charge, and work on a day to day basis with the Team Leader of the SMU as Evaluation Manager. The members of the evaluation team shall report to the MTE team leader.

Note: The institutional arrangement and role of evaluation partners in evaluation is provided in the annex for consultant review.

9. Time frame for the evaluation process approx. 45 Days over a period a 90 Days (July - September 2020)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>ESTIMATED # OF DAYS</th>
<th>PLACE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase One: Evaluation Planning Phase</strong></td>
<td>15 Days</td>
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<tr>
<td>Briefing with UNDP (Senior Managers, SMU, Programme units)</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>Home based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desk review of all relevant documentation</td>
<td>6 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context analysis: Development context and evolving context</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drafting of inception report</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>Home- based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development and testing of evaluation tools</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Comments and approval of inception report</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Note: Within one week of submission of the inception report</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Phase Two: Validation Phase</strong></td>
<td>20 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>Option 1: Virtual validation. Use of skype or telephone interviews for government counterparts and local implementing partners; online surveys/Zoom meetings/telephone interview with donor partners, UN counterparts and programme teams</td>
<td>10 days</td>
<td>Home- based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option 2: On the ground validation - Consultations and field visits, in-depth interviews and focus groups</td>
<td>10 days</td>
<td>With field visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase Three: Analysis, Debriefing and Report Writing Phase</strong></td>
<td>10 days</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Preliminarily debriefing (via zoom meetings if travel restrictions exists)</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>Home- based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation of draft report including executive summary</td>
<td>6 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>Draft report submission</td>
<td>Feedback from UNDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Note: Within two weeks of submission of the draft report</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finalization of the evaluation report incorporating comments</th>
<th>Presentation of final report (vis zoom meeting (via zoom meetings if travel restrictions exists)</th>
<th>2 days</th>
<th>1 days</th>
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</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated total days for the evaluation</th>
<th>45 Days</th>
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</table>

** This flexibility is being built in given the current COVID crisis and the uncertainties around travel etc.

### 10. Evaluation Ethics

“This evaluation will be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG ‘Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation’. The consultant must safeguard the rights and confidentiality of information providers, interviewees and stakeholders through measures to ensure compliance with legal and other relevant codes governing collection of data and reporting on data. The consultant must also ensure security of collected information before and after the evaluation and protocols to ensure anonymity and confidentiality of sources of information where that is expected. The information knowledge and data gathered in the evaluation process must also be solely used for the evaluation and not for other uses with the express authorization of UNDP and partners.”
MID TERM EVALUATION
UNDP Myanmar Country Programme (2018-2022)
Terms of Reference (International Consultants)

ASSIGNMENT TITLE:
1. Team Leader for Mid Term Evaluation of CPD
2. Technical expert in Results and Strategic alignment of programmes and SDG integration

DURATION: July- September 2020 (45 fee days)

REPORTING LINE: Strategic Management Unit, UNDP Myanmar

DUTY STATION:
Option 1: Virtual evaluation- home based considering Covid crisis
Option 2: Home based and Yangon with field travel (if situation permits)

1. Background

The UNDP Country Programme (CPD 2018-2022) supports the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals within the framework of addressing the challenges of multiple transitions in Myanmar. The current Country Programme is built on the achievements of the previous programme but represents a shift towards more integrated programming at the national and sub-national levels and support to United Nations-wide initiatives to better address the interlinkages between peacebuilding and social cohesion, governance, environment and natural resources management, resilience, urbanization and balanced and inclusive growth. This integrated approach is designed to break silos and strengthen horizontal linkages across state and non-state actors as well as vertical linkages across administrations at district, township, state and union level through area based programmes.

The UNDP Country Programme is firmly aligned with UNDAF 2018-2022 and the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP) and it focuses on delivery of the following two outcomes with 7 key intended outputs:

**CPD Outcome I: Peace and Governance** - People in Myanmar live in a more peaceful and inclusive society, governed by more democratic and accountable institutions, and benefit from strengthened human rights and rule of law protection; and

- **Output 1.1**: Effective public institutions enabled to develop and implement evidence-based policies and systems that respond to the needs of the people
- **Output 1.2**: Institutions at union and subnational levels enabled to develop effective systems and procedures for performing their representative and oversight functions
❑ **Output 1.3:** Mechanisms, institutions and capacities strengthened to sustain peace and social cohesion

❑ **Output 1.4:** People have improved access to responsive, inclusive and accountable justice services and national human rights protection mechanisms, in compliance with rule of law and international standards

**CPD Outcome II: Planet and Prosperity** - Myanmar becomes more resilient to climate and disaster risk with efficient environmental governance and sustainable use of natural resources.

❑ **Output 2.1:** Improved disaster and climate risk management systems for community resilience

❑ **Output 2.2:** Solutions developed at the national and subnational levels for sustainable management of natural resources and ecosystem services as a platform for inclusive economic development

❑ **Output 2.3:** Evidence-based policies and programmes developed to promote inclusive economic growth and employment creation with particular focus on women and vulnerable groups

As June 2020 marks the mid-point of the Country Programme, UNDP Myanmar plan to assess the continuing relevance of the CPD including a review the changing context and original assumptions on which the CPD was developed, to undertake a review of progress made, to explore and adjust direction if needed that may benefit the programme and recommendations for the next country programme cycle in response to the likely context during the remainder of the CPD programme cycle.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY PROGRAMME SUMMARY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Atlas ID:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CPD document signed:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duration:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Start</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Planned end</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Corporate outcome and output:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MSDP Alignment:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CPD budget:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Resource mobilized:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funding source:</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Key Donors: Japan, DFID, SDC, SIDA, DFAT, Canada, Germany, Norway, EU, Luxemburg, Netherlands, PBF, Italy, Austria, Private sectors

Office locations: 8 office locations (Naypyidaw, Yangon, Sitwe and Maundaw- Rakhine, Shan, Kachin, Mon, Mandalay)

Projects: 5 Flagship projects, Vertical fund projects, Area Based Programmes (Rakhine, Kachin)

Joint Programmes: 7 Joint programmes with UN agencies

UNDP interventions: 56 townships, 10 States/Regions

Partnerships: 10 Government ministries, 16 government departments, Commissions, parliaments, private sectors

Implementing party UNDP Myanmar

Responsible Party Work with more than 20 local implementing partners including CSOs/NGOs/INGOs and government entities

2. Current Context

As COVID-19 spreads globally, it is a massive health, humanitarian, and development crisis. Due to the pandemic, Myanmar, especially the border regions: Kachin, Mon, Shan, and Kayin States and in Yangon have terrible negative impact. A large number of Myanmar migrants have continued to return to Myanmar received the from China and. According to MOHS data, more than 23,000 people returned to Myanmar from Thailand via Myawaddy from March 19 to 28.

While concerns have been raised about Myanmar’s capacity to manage the coronavirus given its poor healthcare infrastructure, migrants and the country’s displaced populations face even greater risks. Most are trapped in dangerously overcrowded camps or quarantine centers with severely substandard health care and inadequate access to clean water, sanitation, and other essential services. Many displaced people have underlying medical conditions and chronic diseases, putting them at high risk of suffering serious effects from the virus.

The impact of economic fluctuations related to the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to disproportionately harm poor and vulnerable households. With travel and border trade restrictions in place, the impact is in Myanmar’s tourism-related services, agricultural exports to China, and in supply-chain disruptions to the manufacturing sector. Every day, people are losing jobs and income, with no way of knowing when normality will return. Myanmar’s GDP growth is projected to slow to between 2 and 3 percent, from 6 percent in 2019, in the current fiscal year due to the COVID-19 pandemic, with the brunt of the outbreak’s economic impact likely to be borne by poor and vulnerable households across the country according to recent world bank report.

Given the current Covid-19 pandemic there is an expectation that this will also impact and delays in UNDP programme and project implementation as a result UNDP has reduced its overall 2020 targeted delivery. However, UNDP Myanmar remains fully operational and is adapting the way it works and focused on COVID-19 response. UNDP is mobilizing all assets to respond to this unprecedented challenge. UNDP Myanmar have transitioned all critical operations to digital and virtual platforms, enabling teams to continue delivering effectively
Despite restrictions on movement and physical interaction. With the changing context, emerging needs and priorities UNDP Myanmar is also revisiting the Programme strategy and business processes to be more relevant to this crisis. UNDP Myanmar had conducted Programme and operational criticality exercise to review and identification of critical programme areas and activities that will continue and activities that will be postponed or canceled. Some activities are paused or downscaled and looking for opportunities to be redirected to new priorities.

UNDP globally has developed a COVID-19 response focused on three immediate priorities including health systems support, inclusive and integrated crises management and response, and social and economic impact needs assessments and response. The Myanmar Country Office is preparing its response plan building on these three priority areas and in line with the current requests and priorities of the Government of Myanmar, current Programme areas and in response to broader UN Country Team collaboration across a range of development areas. Rapid response funds are new core funds being made available by UNDP headquarters to respond to this crisis, while flexibility have also been provided to the county offices to repurpose existing core funds towards this response, if necessary. In this context, UNDP have also been advised by cost-sharing donor partners that funds can also be repurposed towards COVID response if required.

UNDP intends to fully leverage its existing programme, staff and technical capacities and most importantly partnerships at the union, state and regional levels and with the communities to roll out the response in terms of community engagement and awareness raising, strengthening local government’s capacity plan, coordinate, budget and deliver essential services including to migrants and IDPs, and bolstering public health systems. With many of our partners, particularly in the local government, capacities are being enhanced to be able to work and manage remotely through online systems. UNDP is working closely with local partners that allows local solutions to COVID-19 humanitarian and development needs, to be designed together with local partners, and in coordination with the host government.

Some activities that have been identified include community and anti-stigmatization awareness, expansion of use of digital technologies, private sector engagement and corporate social responsibility, volunteerism and social cohesion, resilience and recovery, support to MSMEs as well as health systems support and socio-economic impact assessments at the sub-national levels.

UNDP Myanmar is also streamlining policies and procedures for greater agility, increasing our flexibility to receive and deliver private sector and other financing, and taking steps to initiate innovative approaches like next generation network of innovation and digital solutions across the country — a crucial institutional asset in responding to this complex, fast-moving crisis. Accelerator Lab will be sensing on-the-ground changes and sourcing local solutions for this crisis response.

Midterm CPD Evaluations is expected to assess UNDP performance in areas that are critical to ensuring sustained contribution to development results and the context of emerging development issues and changing priorities at the national levels. To this end, this evaluation also needs to cover, for example, UNDP policies, focus areas, partnerships, programmatic approaches, cooperation modalities, or business models considering current crisis scenario.
3. Evaluation Purpose, Scope and Objectives

The overall objective of the CPD Mid Term Evaluation (MTE) is to assess the progress in achieving the results of the country programme, its relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of strategies in light of the development priorities, and the changes in the local and international contexts including the impact of COVID-19 and with a view to 2020 elections. The evaluation timeframe will cover from the beginning of the country programme - January 2018 to June 2020. Specifically, the evaluation will access the level of achievement of both expected and unexpected results by examining the theory of change, relevance and coherence of its activities and results, the results chain, processes, contextual factors, original assumptions and how they have or have not manifested, and causality using appropriate criteria. The primary audience for the MTR will be the UNDP, Government of Myanmar, development partners, UN Country Team (UNCT), and UNDP implementing partners.

The first stage of the CPD MTE will be to conduct a review of the current context, building on relevant context analysis and taking into account the latest socio-economic and political developments locally as well as relevant developments at a global level since the inception of the CPD in 2018.

The second stage is to assess the relevance of the CPD to the current context, by identifying challenges and ways to overcome or mitigate them, and to provide lessons learnt considering the emerging national and global development priorities. The final stage will be the provision of key recommendations including improvements in performance and results, proposed adjustments to the design of the current country programme including programmatic focus (structurally and through a revised Results and Resource Framework) and the development of elements that can be considered to inform the planning of the next country programme. It will also help fleshing out some key aspects such as what does it mean for UNDP to be the SDG integrator, how innovation can support our processes, how does the COVID-19 recovery require projects in results area to adapt (if at all) and other new questions such as these.

4. Evaluation criteria and Key guiding questions

The CPD MTE will be conducted in line with the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria and UNDP Evaluation Guideline 2019: (a) relevance; (b) effectiveness; (c) efficiency; and (d) sustainability of development results.

**Relevance:** This essentially looks into and deep dives into the question of whether the CPD is still relevant to current context and what specific measures, if any, that will require to be undertaken to ensure full alignment and impact. In doing do, reviewing the theory of change, UNDP’s comparative advantage and strategic positioning etc will be considered. Considering the emerging crisis, it would be useful to assess the extent that this CPD is appropriately responsive to the needs of the national constituents and changing partner priorities.
Effectiveness: This considers to what extent the current programme generated the requisite results in line with what was planned and what has been achieved beyond the planned results. In doing so, the review will also review whether principles of leaving no one behind were applied, the requisite capacity enhancement of the national counterparts took place, whether conflict sensitivity assessment, gender mainstreaming etc were adequately considered.

Efficiency: This criterion considers to what extent the programme results obtained justifies the economic use of resources and if there is alignment between what has been expended (resource wise) and what has been achieved. Other considerations such as timeliness of the results, conducive use of programming modalities, extent to which UNDP processes and decision making have contributed/affected the results etc.

Sustainability of development results: This criterion looks into what extent did UNDP establish mechanisms to ensure the sustainability of the results attained in terms of capacities of national partners and whether other institutional mechanisms have been put in place to sustain the programme results. It also assesses, among others, to what extent do partnerships exist with other national institutions, NGOs, United Nations agencies, the private sector and development partners to sustain the attained results and to what extent have partners committed to providing continuing support.

Note: Guiding evaluation questions is provided to the consultants in the annex as guidance. Please make sure that gender, conflict and Human rights aspects are well integrated in the evaluation questions. Consultants will need to be further refined by the evaluation team and agreed with UNDP.

5. Methodology

The evaluation will be conducted primarily to assess the progress, and changes in the context and how this should inform the remaining CPD cycle in terms of programming and operations. This evaluation will include mixed method design. The MTE must provide evidence-based information that is credible, reliable and useful. The MTE team will review all relevant sources of information including documents prepared during the preparation phase. The MTE team is expected to follow a collaborative and participatory approach ensuring close engagement with the evaluation managers, implementing partners and direct beneficiaries.

The overall MTE will be divided into three phases:

Phase I: Evaluation Planning Phase (Virtual)

With the Covid -19 crisis, ensuring the safety of evaluation teams, Phase 1 of the CPD MTE will be to conducted virtually by the evaluator which include remote arrangements to conduct four key tasks (1) desk reviews of key documents (2) review of the current situation
– context analysis (3) development and finalize inception report (4) design of evaluation tools and questionnaires.

1. **Desk review of all relevant documentation.** Following the introductory meetings and briefings, the evaluation team will undertake a desk review of all relevant reports and data. This should be supplied by the strategic management unit in a timely manner and all efforts made to access missing reports and data prior to the development of the inception report and the data-collection mission. This would include a review of inter alia

   - UNDP Strategic Plan (2018-2021) and other new UNDP corporate priorities since 2018 that are relevant for the Myanmar context including the new COVID related programmatic offers;
   - Myanmar UNDAF
   - COVID impact on UNDP Governance and Climate programming
   - Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (2018-2030) and key government strategies in areas of cooperation with UNDP
   - Donor contribution agreements
   - Theory of change and results framework
   - Result Oriented Annual Report (ROAR)
   - All evaluations of projects that were conducted during the period
   - Programme/project annual, semi-annual reports.
   - Donor reports
   - Minutes of programme board meetings.
   - Other documents

2. **Context Analysis**

   - **Development and Operational Context (2 pager):** First part of context analysis will analyze the environment in which a CPD has been operating since its inception in 2018. Context analysis mainly focuses on scanning both internal and external environment, analyzing operating environments like political, economic, social, technological developments and demographic trends related to CPD implementation. Context analysis will analyze how key departures due to contextual changes had impacted organization, team, strategy, program or project.

   - **Evolving Context (2 pager):** Second part of context analysis will assess the relevance of the CPD vis a vis the current evolving context (e.g. Covid crisis, conflicts, displacement and migration, elections etc.). This will to enable an
understanding of contextual changes and the ways in which the CPD may need to pivot to respond to these evolving changes; and thereby useful for any proposed adjustments that can be considered.

3. **Evaluation Inception Report** (max 10 pages) to be developed. Evaluators will commence the evaluation process with a desk review and preliminary analysis of the available information supplied by the implementing agency. Based on the TOR, initial meetings with the UNDP programme unit/evaluation manager and the desk review, evaluators should develop an inception report. The description of what is being evaluated illustrates the evaluators’ understanding of the logic or theory of how the initiative is supposed to work, including strategies, activities, outputs and expected outcomes and their interrelationships. It will detail how each evaluation question will be answered by way of proposed methods; proposed sources of data; and data collection and analysis procedures taking into consideration the options available during COVID-19 restrictions. The inception report should include contextual analyses as mentioned above, a proposed schedule of tasks, activities and deliverables.

The inception report provides an opportunity to clarify issues and understanding of the objective and scope of an evaluation, such as resource requirements and delivery schedules.

4. **Development of evaluation questions, remote interview questionnaire focus groups guidelines and online surveys**
   
   - Development of evaluation questions around relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability and designed for different stakeholders to be interviewed.
   - Surveys interview questionnaires focus group discussions guidelines and online survey tools to be designed and pretested.

**Phase II: Validation Phase** (virtually or on site/ face to face)

**Option 1: Virtual validation**

With international and internal travel and border trade restrictions in place, it is very likely that there may or may not be able to conduct field visits and/or lack of local evaluation team members data could be collected remotely.

- For validation, skype or telephone interviews, online/mobile questionnaires, online surveys, collaboration platforms (slack or yammer) and satellite imagery could be used to gather data.
- Remote telephone interviews with key government counterparts, representatives of key civil society organizations and implementing partners is recommended.
Online survey tool or one to one Zoom meetings can be organized for donor community members and UN partners.

Programme specific group zoom meetings can be organized for thematic programmatic and operational areas.

- Use of Partners Survey contact information: UNDP Myanmar had already collected list of all the partners contact details during 2019 partners survey. These information’s can be used for virtual interviews.

- Stakeholder engagement ensures the effective communication of an evaluation and its uptake, so it is very important to do a test run and factor in emergency settings and time zone differences.

- Stakeholders that are dealing with existing emergencies should be given advance notice and an adjustment of evaluation timelines can be expected.

- UNDP Field office colleagues will assist national consultant in logistic arrangement of the virtual meetings with partners and beneficiaries.

**Option 2: Onsite or face to face validation**

- If situation permits, national consultant or international consultant will visit to selected field sites (if feasible)

- Undertake key informant interviews with beneficiaries, government officials, communities and other stakeholders who have been involved in implementing activities under the program and/or participated in various program activities.

- Focus Group Discussions to be held whenever appropriate (specially recommended for beneficiaries). All interviews should be undertaken in full confidence and anonymity.

Ensuring the security of consultants, stakeholders and accompanying UNDP staff, particularly in crisis situations. The evaluation team members should have passed relevant United Nations security exams and be aware of and compliant with related security protocols, including passing the United Nations Department of Safety and Security training courses on basic security in field II and advanced security in the field.

**Phase III: Analysis, Debriefing and Report Writing Phase (in country or virtually)**

Following field missions or data validation phase, data review and analysis of evaluation questions, surveys and questionnaires. Evaluation teams are required to ensure maximum validity, reliability of data (quality) through triangulation of the various data sources.

Prior to the drafting of the evaluation report, the evaluation team should debrief the UNDP project/programme and management teams with preliminary findings. Debriefings with key stakeholders and the evaluation reference group may also be organized virtually or face to face where possible. This gives an opportunity to discuss preliminary findings and address any factual errors or misunderstandings, prior to writing the evaluation report.
At a time of social distancing, social media can help bridge the gap. Social platforms like yammer, teams etc can be formed to enable connecting, networking and engaging with target audiences such as donors, partners, and decision makers. This will be valuable to drive discussions, increase accessibility and amplify reach to key evaluation stakeholders.

A quality evaluation report should:

- Have a concise executive summary (maximum four pages).
- Be well structured and complete.
- Describe what is being evaluated and why.
- Identify the evaluation questions of concern to users.
- Identify target groups covered by the evaluation and whether the needs of the target groups were addressed through the intervention, and if not, why.
- Explain the steps and the procedures used to answer those questions.
- Present findings supported by credible evidence in response to the questions.
- Acknowledge limitations and constraints in undertaking the evaluation.
- Draw conclusions about findings based on of the evidence.
- Propose concrete and usable recommendations derived from conclusions.
- Be written with the report users and how they will use the evaluation in mind.

6. Evaluation products (deliverables)

The evaluation team will be accountable for producing following Deliverables/Expected outputs. These products include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliverables</th>
<th>Payments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation Inception report (max 10 pages)</strong>. The inception report to be submitted following and based on preliminary discussions with UNDP after the desk review and prior to any formal evaluation interviews, survey distribution or field visits (and country visit in the case of international evaluators). It will detail the evaluators’ understanding of what is being evaluated and why, include the context analyses that overarches the CPD review, showing how evaluation questions will be answered by way of: proposed methods; proposed sources of data; and data collection and analysis procedures taking into consideration the options available during COVID-19 restrictions. The inception report should include a proposed schedule of tasks, activities and deliverables.</td>
<td>25 percent</td>
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Debrief on initial findings: A debrief meeting will be held after collecting primary data/information on the initial findings and observations at the validation phase.

Draft Midterm evaluation report.¹ A Draft Mid-Term Evaluation report with all major findings and recommendations will be submitted to the UNDP DRR and Strategic Management Unit (SMU) for review. SMU will share the draft with relevant internal stakeholders, collate all the comments and provide the feedback to the evaluator within an agreed period of time.

Final Mid-Term Evaluation report incorporating comments received from internal stakeholders and including a clear succinct Executive Summary. The evaluator will maintain an evaluation report audit trail to ensure that comments and changes by the evaluator in response to the draft report have been addressed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Draft Midterm evaluation report</th>
<th>25 percent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Final Mid-Term Evaluation report</td>
<td>50 percent</td>
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7. MTE Team leader Profiles and Key tasks

The MTE team is expected to consist of two International Consultants (Team lead and specific expert on results, alignment and SDG) and a National consultant to ensure contextual alignment and evaluation logistics management. A conflict sensitivity expert will also be recruited to assess the extent to which the CPD implementation has taken a conflict informed approach to implementation and adapted programming approaches as needed to ensure conflict sensitivity.

7.1 Team Leader - International Consultant Profile:

**Key expertise area:** Evaluation management with organizational skills (Team leader with lots of experience with evaluations and review); Experience in conducting programme evaluations with various UN organizations in humanitarian and development sectors, Expertise in gender focused evaluation; Experience in policy evaluation (MDG/SDG, Thematic, Strategic plan etc)

Overall task of the team leader is to provide strategic direction to the evaluation reviewing the CPD context, rationale, priorities, implementation and impact and recommended course correction as and if needed. The team leader will also be responsible for ensuring continued alignment with UNDAF and the UNCT priorities.

**Required qualifications:**

Master’s Degree or equivalent in International Relations, Political Science, Economics, Sociology, or any other related field; knowledge of current development issues, evaluation discipline is a must.

¹ A length of 30 to 40 pages including executive summary is suggested.
Technical competencies:

- Minimum 10-15 years relevant experience
- Proven recent experience with Country Programme assessment or UN Development Framework assessment is mandatory.
- Proven experience in conducting Evaluations/assessments in transitional and conflict countries required
- Strong analytical capacities (quantitative and qualitative) and strong ability to communicate and summarize this analysis in writing.
- Proven ability to produce high quality analytical reports
- Proven experience of having worked in south/southeast Asia. Prior experience in Myanmar would be significant asset.

Language skills required.

- Excellent communication (oral and written) skills; fluency in English required.

Team leader Tasks:

- Fulfil the contractual arrangements under the terms of reference as appropriate;
- Coordinate, mobilize and evaluate the evaluation team;
- Desk review of all relevant documents;
- Prepare Context analysis papers
- Develop the evaluation inception report, including an evaluation matrix, detail evaluation plan and evaluation tools as per TOR;
- Keep to standards and ethical principles in line with UNEG Norms and Standards and Ethical Guidelines;
- Consultation with key stakeholders including key government counterparts, donor community members, representatives of key civil society organizations and implementing partners
- Field visit to Programme/project sites for validation if conditions are approved and conductive
- Take a lead in collecting primary and secondary information, analysis and report writing
- Ensure to incorporate analysis on cross cutting issues
- Take a lead in sharing information and making presentations/debriefings
- Draft reports and brief the UNDP RR/DRR, evaluation manager, programme managers and stakeholders on the progress and key findings and recommendations;
- Ensure comments are sufficiently addressed in the MTR report
- Finalize the evaluation, taking into consideration comments and questions on the evaluation report. Evaluators’ feedback should be recorded in the audit trail;
- Deliver the products agreed to the right standard and quality; Account for what the team has done (and spent).

7.2 Technical expert in Results and Strategic alignment of programmes and SDG integration - International Consultant Profile:

**Key Expertise area:** Result management (Poverty Reduction, Governance, Environment and Climate Change, Peace, Crisis Prevention and Recovery, Youth, Gender); experience in conducting UNDAF/Joint programme evaluations and understanding of the UN development and reform agenda, understanding of UNDP programming standards and business process; experience working in Asia

Overall task of second international consultant will entail providing deep dive into the thematic and technical result areas (under the guidance of the team leader) and help assess relevance, continued alignment with country priorities of these areas, while also fleshing out some key aspects such as what does it mean for UNDP to be the SDG integrator, how innovation can support our processes, how does the COVID-19 recovery require projects in results area to adapt (if at all) and other new questions such as these.

**Required qualifications:**

Master’s Degree or equivalent in International Relations, Political Science, Economics, Sociology, or any other related field; knowledge of current development issues, evaluation discipline is a must.

**Technical competencies:**

- Minimum 10-15 years relevant experience
- Proven recent experience with Country Programme assessment or UN Development Framework assessment is mandatory.
- Proven experience in conducting Evaluations/assessments in transitional and conflict countries required
- Strong analytical capacities (quantitative and qualitative) and strong ability to communicate and summarize this analysis in writing.
- Proven ability to produce high quality analytical reports
- Proven experience of having worked in south/southeast Asia. Prior experience in Myanmar would be significant asset.
Language skills required.

- Excellent communication (oral and written) skills; fluency in English required.

Technical expert Tasks:

- Fulfil the contractual arrangements under the terms of reference as appropriate;
- Support team leader in desk review of relevant documents and prepare Context analysis papers from lens of issues/priorities identified in CCA/UNDAF, UNDP strategic plan and MSDP.
- Support team leader in development of the evaluation inception report, including an evaluation matrix, detail evaluation plan and evaluation tools as per TOR;
- Review CPD alignment with UNP SP, UNDAP and MSDP;
- Review and explore UNDP’s role and contribution as SDG integrator in UNCT and provide recommendations for deepening/expanding;
- Reviewing the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact of the CPD
- Review of CPD programme quality standards and explore how innovation can support our processes
- Identifying whether UNDP has achieved or in process of achieving its intended results (based on strategic outcomes and workplans)
- Consultation with key stakeholders including key government counterparts, donor community members, representatives of key civil society organizations and implementing partners
- Field visit to Programme/project sites for validation if permits
- Support team lead in collecting primary and secondary information, analysis and report writing
- Ensure to incorporate analysis on cross cutting issues
- Support in drafting report, sharing information and making presentations/debriefings
- Support in finalizing the evaluation, taking into consideration comments and questions on the evaluation report.

In addition, a conflict sensitivity expert will provide inputs to the work of the consultants is to review and assess the extent to which the conflict sensitivity considerations been integrated into project design, implementation and M&E to ensure intervention do No Harm; to assess whether the engagement with partners is improving prospects for non-discrimination, human rights and principles of equality and inclusion; and how the
organization is addressing any grievances that are arising from our programming. Also assess the actions, including mitigation measures to limit escalating tensions between project stakeholders unintentionally contribute to conflict.

8. **Institutional arrangements**

The UNDP Evaluation Owner is the Resident Representative (RR) who is accountable for the quality and approval of final terms of reference, final evaluation reports and management responses before final submission to the Evaluation Resource Centre (ERC).

The Evaluation Manager is Team Leader of the UNDP Strategic Management Unit (SMU). The SMU is responsible for coordinating the evaluation process and providing needed administrative support.

The MTE Team Leader will report to the UNDP Myanmar Deputy Country Director, as Officer in Charge, and work on a day to day basis with the Team Leader of the SMU as Evaluation Manager. The members of the evaluation team shall report to the MTE team leader.

Note: The institutional arrangement and role of evaluation partners in evaluation is provided in the annex for consultant review.

8.1 **Reporting line:**

The MTE Team Leader will report to the SMU team leader whereas other international consultant and national consultant will report to MTE Team leader.

8.2 **Logistical arrangements:**

- For all international travel (if situation permits for travel):
  - Candidates are requested to include international travel costs from probable point of departure in the financial proposal and arrange the flight. The travel cost should be based on the most economical class fare, with most direct routes.
  - UNDP will provide support for the visa process and reimburse the visa fee, based on the actual receipt.
  - UNDP will provide terminal charges at the applicable UN rate.
  - UNDP does not consider travel days as working days.

- For all in-country travels (if situation permits for travel):
  - For in-country missions, UNDP will arrange, and cover costs related to all domestic travels – such as transportation(s) between the agreed in-county duty stations and living allowances - in accordance with UNDP’s regulations and policies.
  - UNDP will facilitate security clearances required to travel in-country (if applicable).
• Other logistical matters:
  ❑ The Contractor is expected to use their own computer.

9. **Time frame for the evaluation process approx. 45 Days over a period a 90 Days (July – September 2020)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>ESTIMATED # OF DAYS</th>
<th>PLACE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase One: Evaluation Planning Phase</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Briefing with UNDP (Senior Managers, SMU, Programme units)</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>Home based</td>
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<tr>
<td>Desk review of all relevant documentation</td>
<td>6 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>Context analysis: Development context and evolving context</td>
<td>2 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>Drafting of inception report</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>Home-based</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development and testing of evaluation tools</td>
<td>2 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comments and approval of inception report</td>
<td>2 days</td>
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*Note: Within one week of submission of the inception report*

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<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>ESTIMATED # OF DAYS</th>
<th>PLACE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase Two: Validation Phase</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Option 1:</strong> Virtual validation. Use of skype or telephone interviews for government counterparts and local implementing partners; online surveys/Zoom meetings/telephone interview with donor partners, UN counterparts and programme teams</td>
<td>10 days</td>
<td>Home-based</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Option 2:</strong> On the ground validation - Consultations and field visits, in-depth interviews and focus groups</td>
<td>10 days</td>
<td>With field visits</td>
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<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>ESTIMATED # OF DAYS</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Phase Three: Analysis, Debriefing and Report Writing Phase</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Preliminary debriefing (via zoom meetings if travel restrictions exists)</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>Home-based</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preparation of draft report including executive summary</td>
<td>6 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>Draft report submission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feedback from UNDP</td>
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*Note: Within two weeks of submission of the draft report*

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>ESTIMATED # OF DAYS</th>
<th>PLACE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finalization of the evaluation report incorporating comments</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>Home-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of final report (vis zoom meeting (via zoom meetings if travel restrictions exists)</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>Home-based</td>
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**Estimated total days for the evaluation** 45 Days

**This flexibility is being built in given the current COVID crisis and the uncertainties around travel etc.**
10. Evaluation Ethics

“This evaluation will be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG ‘Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation’. The consultant must safeguard the rights and confidentiality of information providers, interviewees and stakeholders through measures to ensure compliance with legal and other relevant codes governing collection of data and reporting on data. The consultant must also ensure security of collected information before and after the evaluation and protocols to ensure anonymity and confidentiality of sources of information where that is expected. The information knowledge and data gathered in the evaluation process must also be solely used for the evaluation and not for other uses with the express authorization of UNDP and partners.”

11. Application submission process and criteria for selection

Criteria for selecting the best offer

Upon the advertisement of the Procurement Notice, qualified individuals are expected to submit both the Technical and Financial Proposals. Accordingly, the individuals will be evaluated based on Cumulative Analysis as per the following conditions:

- Responsive/compliant/acceptable as per the Instruction to Bidders (ITB) of the Standard Bid Document (SBD), and
- Having received the highest score out of a pre-determined set of weighted technical and financial criteria specific to the solicitation. In this regard, the respective weight of the proposals are:
  a. Technical Criteria weight is 70%
  b. Financial Criteria weight is 30%

Recommended presentation of technical proposal

For purposes of generating proposals whose contents are uniformly presented and to facilitate their comparative review, the individuals are advised to use a proposed Table of Contents.

Confidentiality and proprietary interests

The consultants shall not either during the term or after termination of the assignment, disclose any proprietary or confidential information related to the consultancy or the Government without prior written consent. Proprietary interests on all materials and documents prepared by the consultants under the assignment shall become and remain properties of the UNDP. This assignment will be administrated by UNDP hence UNDP rules, policies and procedures will apply.
Proposed standard technical proposal evaluation criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technical Proposal Evaluation: Education and qualifications</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Master’s Degree or equivalent in International Relations, Political Science, Economics, Sociology, or any other related field; knowledge of current development issues, evaluation discipline is a must</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minimum 10-15 years relevant experience a minimum of 15 years of demonstrated experience in leading evaluation of development programmes and projects</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proven recent experience with Country Programme assessment or UN Development Framework assessment is mandatory</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proven experience in conducting Evaluations/assessments in transitional and conflict countries required</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong analytical capacities (quantitative and qualitative) and strong ability to communicate and summarize this analysis in writing</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proven ability to produce high quality analytical reports</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proven experience of having worked in south/southeast Asia. Prior experience in Myanmar would be significant asset</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>70</strong></td>
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MID TERM EVALUATION
UNDP Myanmar Country Programme (2018-2022)
Terms of Reference

ASSIGNMENT TITLE: National Consultant for Mid Term Evaluation of CPD

DURATION: July- September 2020 (45 fee days)

REPORTING LINE: Team leader MTE

DUTY STATION: Option 1: Virtual evaluation- home based considering covid crisis
Option 2: Home based and Yangon with field travel (if situation permits)

1. Background

The UNDP Country Programme (CPD 2018-2022) supports the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals within the framework of addressing the challenges of multiple transitions in Myanmar. The current Country Programme is built on the achievements of the previous programme but represents a shift towards more integrated programming at the national and sub-national levels and support to United Nations-wide initiatives to better address the interlinkages between peacebuilding and social cohesion, governance, environment and natural resources management, resilience, urbanization and balanced and inclusive growth. This integrated approach is designed to break silos and strengthen horizontal linkages across state and non-state actors as well as vertical linkages across administrations at district, township, state and union level through area based programmes.

The UNDP Country Programme is firmly aligned with UNDAF 2018-2022 and the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP) and it focuses on delivery of the following two outcomes with 7 key intended outputs:

**CPD Outcome I: Peace and Governance** - People in Myanmar live in a more peaceful and inclusive society, governed by more democratic and accountable institutions, and benefit from strengthened human rights and rule of law protection; and

- **Output 1.1**: Effective public institutions enabled to develop and implement evidence-based policies and systems that respond to the needs of the people
- **Output 1.2**: Institutions at union and subnational levels enabled to develop effective systems and procedures for performing their representative and oversight functions
- **Output 1.3**: Mechanisms, institutions and capacities strengthened to sustain peace and social cohesion
Output 1.4: People have improved access to responsive, inclusive and accountable justice services and national human rights protection mechanisms, in compliance with rule of law and international standards

CPD Outcome II: Planet and Prosperity - Myanmar becomes more resilient to climate and disaster risk with efficient environmental governance and sustainable use of natural resources.

Output 2.1: Improved disaster and climate risk management systems for community resilience

Output 2.2: Solutions developed at the national and subnational levels for sustainable management of natural resources and ecosystem services as a platform for inclusive economic development

Output 2.3: Evidence-based policies and programmes developed to promote inclusive economic growth and employment creation with particular focus on women and vulnerable groups

As June 2020 marks the mid-point of the Country Programme, UNDP Myanmar plan to assess the continuing relevance of the CPD including a review the changing context and original assumptions on which the CPD was developed, to undertake a review of progress made, to explore and adjust direction if needed that may benefit the programme and recommendations for the next country programme cycle in response to the likely context during the remainder of the CPD programme cycle.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY PROGRAMME SUMMARY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Atlas ID:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CPD document signed:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Duration:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Corporate outcome and output:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MSDP Alignment:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CPD budget:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Resource mobilized:</strong> (as of March 2020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funding source</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Donors:</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Office locations:** 8 office locations (Naypyidaw, Yangon, Sitwee and Maundaw-Rakhine, Shan, Kachin, Mon, Mandalay)

**Projects:** 5 Flagship projects, Vertical fund projects, Area Based Programmes (Rakhine, Kachin)

**Joint Programmes:** 7 Joint programmes with UN agencies

**UNDP interventions:** 56 townships, 10 States/Regions

**Partnerships:** 10 Government ministries, 16 government departments, Commissions, parliaments, private sectors

**Implementing party** UNDP Myanmar

**Responsible Party** Work with more than 20 local implementing partners including CSOs/NGOs/INGOs and government entities

### 2. Current Context

As COVID-19 spreads globally, it is a massive health, humanitarian, and development crisis. Due to the pandemic, Myanmar, especially the border regions: Kachin, Mon, Shan, Kayin States and in Yangon have terrible negative impact. A large number of Myanmar migrants have continued to return to Myanmar received the from China and. According to MOHS data, more than 23,000 people returned to Myanmar from Thailand via Myawaddy from March 19 to 28.

While concerns have been raised about Myanmar’s capacity to manage the coronavirus given its poor healthcare infrastructure, migrants and the country’s displaced populations face even greater risks. Most are trapped in dangerously overcrowded camps or quarantine centers with severely substandard health care and inadequate access to clean water, sanitation, and other essential services. Many displaced people have underlying medical conditions and chronic diseases, putting them at high risk of suffering serious effects from the virus.

The impact of economic fluctuations related to the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to disproportionately harm poor and vulnerable households. With travel and border trade restrictions in place, the impact is in Myanmar’s tourism-related services, agricultural exports to China, and in supply-chain disruptions to the manufacturing sector. Every day, people are losing jobs and income, with no way of knowing when normality will return. Myanmar’s GDP growth is projected to slow to between 2 and 3 percent, from 6 percent in 2019, in the current fiscal year due to the COVID-19 pandemic, with the brunt of the outbreak’s economic impact likely to be borne by poor and vulnerable households across the country according to recent world bank report.

Given the current Covid-19 pandemic there is an expectation that this will also impact and delays in UNDP programme and project implementation as a result UNDP has reduced its overall 2020 targeted delivery. However, UNDP Myanmar remains fully operational and is adapting the way it works and focused on COVID-19 response. UNDP is mobilizing all assets to respond to this unprecedented challenge. UNDP Myanmar have transitioned all critical operations to digital and virtual platforms, enabling teams to continue delivering effectively despite restrictions on movement and physical interaction. With the changing context,
emerging needs and priorities UNDP Myanmar is also revisiting the Programme strategy and business processes to be more relevant to this crisis. UNDP Myanmar had conducted Programme and operational criticality exercise to review and identification of critical programme areas and activities that will continue and activities that will be postponed or canceled. Some activities are paused or downscaled and looking for opportunities to be redirected to new priorities.

UNDP globally has developed a COVID-19 response focused on three immediate priorities including health systems support, inclusive and integrated crises management and response, and social and economic impact needs assessments and response. The Myanmar Country Office is preparing its response plan building on these three priority areas and in line with the current requests and priorities of the Government of Myanmar, current Programme areas and in response to broader UN Country Team collaboration across a range of development areas. Rapid response funds are new core funds being made available by UNDP headquarters to respond to this crisis, while flexibility have also been provided to the county offices to repurpose existing core funds towards this response, if necessary. In this context, UNDP have also been advised by cost-sharing donor partners that funds can also be repurposed towards COVID response if required.

UNDP intends to fully leverage its existing programme, staff and technical capacities and most importantly partnerships at the union, state and regional levels and with the communities to roll out the response in terms of community engagement and awareness raising, strengthening local government’s capacity plan, coordinate, budget and deliver essential services including to migrants and IDPs, and bolstering public health systems. With many of our partners, particularly in the local government, capacities are being enhanced to be able to work and manage remotely through online systems. UNDP is working closely with local partners that allows local solutions to COVID-19 humanitarian and development needs, to be designed together with local partners, and in coordination with the host government.

Some activities that have been identified include community and anti-stigmatization awareness, expansion of use of digital technologies, private sector engagement and corporate social responsibility, volunteerism and social cohesion, resilience and recovery, support to MSMEs as well as health systems support and socio-economic impact assessments at the sub-national levels.

UNDP Myanmar is also streamlining policies and procedures for greater agility, increasing our flexibility to receive and deliver private sector and other financing, and taking steps to initiate innovative approaches like next generation network of innovation and digital solutions across the country — a crucial institutional asset in responding to this complex, fast-moving crisis. Accelerator Lab will be sensing on-the-ground changes and sourcing local solutions for this crisis response.

Midterm CPD Evaluations is expected to assess UNDP performance in areas that are critical to ensuring sustained contribution to development results and the context of emerging development issues and changing priorities at the national levels. To this end, this evaluation also needs to cover, for example, UNDP policies, focus areas, partnerships, programmatic approaches, cooperation modalities, or business models considering current crisis scenario.
3. Evaluation Purpose, Scope and Objectives

The overall objective of the CPD Mid Term Evaluation (MTE) is to assess the progress in achieving the results of the country programme, its relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of strategies in light of the development priorities, and the changes in the local and international contexts including the impact of COVID-19 and with a view to 2020 elections. The evaluation timeframe will cover from the beginning of the country programme - January 2018 - to June 2020. Specifically, the evaluation will access the level of achievement of both expected and unexpected results by examining the theory of change, relevance and coherence of its activities and results, the results chain, processes, contextual factors, original assumptions and how they have or have not manifested, and causality using appropriate criteria. The primary audience for the MTR will be the UNDP, Government of Myanmar, development partners, UN Country Team (UNCT), and UNDP implementing partners.

The first stage of the CPD MTE will be to conduct a review of the current context, building on relevant context analysis and taking into account the latest socio-economic and political developments locally as well as relevant developments at a global level since the inception of the CPD in 2018.

The second stage is to assess the relevance of the CPD to the current context, by identifying challenges and ways to overcome or mitigate them, and to provide lessons learnt considering the emerging national and global development priorities. The final stage will be the provision of key recommendations including improvements in performance and results, proposed adjustments to the design of the current country programme including programmatic focus (structurally and through a revised Results and Resource Framework) and the development of elements that can be considered to inform the planning of the next country programme. It will also help fleshing out some key aspects such as what does it mean for UNDP to be the SDG integrator, how innovation can support our processes, how does the COVID-19 recovery require projects in results area to adapt (if at all) and other new questions such as these.

4. Evaluation criteria and Key guiding questions

The CPD MTE will be conducted in line with the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria and UNDP Evaluation Guideline 2019: (a) relevance; (b) effectiveness; (c) efficiency; and (d) sustainability of development results.

**Relevance:** This essentially looks into and deep dives into the question of whether the CPD is still relevant to current context and what specific measures, if any, that will require to be undertaken to ensure full alignment and impact. In doing so, reviewing the theory of change, UNDP’s comparative advantage and strategic positioning etc will be considered. Considering the emerging crisis, it would be useful to assess the extent that this CPD is appropriately responsive to the needs of the national constituents and changing partner priorities.
Effectiveness: This considers to what extent the current programme generated the requisite results in line with what was planned and what has been achieved beyond the planned results. In doing so, the review will also review whether principles of leaving no one behind were applied, the requisite capacity enhancement of the national counterparts took place, whether conflict sensitivity assessment, gender mainstreaming etc were adequately considered.

Efficiency: This criterion considers to what extent the programme results obtained justifies the economic use of resources and if there is alignment between what has been expended (resource wise) and what has been achieved. Other considerations such as timeliness of the results, conducive use of programming modalities, extent to which UNDP processes and decision making have contributed/affected the results etc.

Sustainability of development results: This criterion looks into what extent did UNDP establish mechanisms to ensure the sustainability of the results attained in terms of capacities of national partners and whether other institutional mechanisms have been put in place to sustain the programme results. It also assesses, among others, to what extent do partnerships exist with other national institutions, NGOs, United Nations agencies, the private sector and development partners to sustain the attained results and to what extent have partners committed to providing continuing support.

Note: Guiding evaluation questions is provided to the consultants in the annex as guidance. Please make sure that gender, conflict and Human rights aspects are well integrated in the evaluation questions. Consultants will need to be further refined by the evaluation team and agreed with UNDP.

5. Methodology

The evaluation will be conducted primarily to assess the progress, and changes in the context and how this should inform the remaining CPD cycle in terms of programming and operations. This evaluation will include mixed method design. The MTE must provide evidence-based information that is credible, reliable and useful. The MTE team will review all relevant sources of information including documents prepared during the preparation phase. The MTE team is expected to follow a collaborative and participatory approach ensuring close engagement with the evaluation managers, implementing partners and direct beneficiaries.

The overall MTE will be divided into three phases:

Phase I: Evaluation Planning Phase (Virtual)

With the Covid-19 crisis, ensuring the safety of evaluation teams, Phase 1 of the CPD MTE will be conducted virtually by the evaluator which include remote arrangements to conduct four key tasks (1) desk reviews of key documents (2) review of the current situation
– context analysis (3) development and finalize inception report (4) design of evaluation tools and questionnaires.

1. **Desk review of all relevant documentation.** Following the introductory meetings and briefings, the evaluation team will undertake a desk review of all relevant reports and data. This should be supplied by the strategic management unit in a timely manner and all efforts made to access missing reports and data prior to the development of the inception report and the data-collection mission. This would include a review of inter alia

   - UNDP Strategic Plan (2018-2021) and other new UNDP corporate priorities since 2018 that are relevant for the Myanmar context including the new COVID related programmatic offers;
   - Myanmar UNDAF
   - COVID impact on UNDP Governance and Climate programming
   - Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (2018-2030) and key government strategies in areas of cooperation with UNDP
   - Donor contribution agreements
   - Theory of change and results framework
   - Result Oriented Annual Report (ROAR)
   - All evaluations of projects that were conducted during the period
   - Programme/project annual, semi-annual reports.
   - Donor reports
   - Minutes of programme board meetings.
   - Other documents

2. **Context Analysis**

   - **Development and Operational Context (2 pager):** First part of context analysis will analyze the environment in which a CPD has been operating since its inception in 2018. Context analysis mainly focuses on scanning both internal and external environment, analyzing operating environments like political, economic, social, technological developments and demographic trends related to CPD implementation. Context analysis will analyze how key departures due to contextual changes had impacted organization, team, strategy, program or project.

   - **Evolving Context (2 pager):** Second part of context analysis will assess the relevance of the CPD vis a vis the current evolving context (e.g. Covid crisis, conflicts, displacement and migration, elections etc.). This will to enable an understanding of contextual changes and the ways in which the CPD may need to pivot to respond to
these evolving changes; and thereby useful for any proposed adjustments that can be considered.

3. **Evaluation Inception Report** (max 10 pages) to be developed. Evaluators will commence the evaluation process with a desk review and preliminary analysis of the available information supplied by the implementing agency. Based on the TOR, initial meetings with the UNDP programme unit/evaluation manager and the desk review, evaluators should develop an inception report. The description of what is being evaluated illustrates the evaluators’ understanding of the logic or theory of how the initiative is supposed to work, including strategies, activities, outputs and expected outcomes and their interrelationships. It will detail how each evaluation question will be answered by way of: proposed methods; proposed sources of data; and data collection and analysis procedures taking into consideration the options available during COVID-19 restrictions. The inception report should include contextual analyses as mentioned above, a proposed schedule of tasks, activities and deliverables.

The inception report provides an opportunity to clarify issues and understanding of the objective and scope of an evaluation, such as resource requirements and delivery schedules.

4. **Development of evaluation questions, remote interview questionnaire focus groups guidelines and online surveys**
   - Development of evaluation questions around relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability and designed for different stakeholders to be interviewed.
   - Surveys interview questionnaires focus group discussions guidelines and online survey tools to be designed and pretested.

**Phase II: Validation Phase** *(virtually or on site/ face to face)*

**Option 1: Virtual validation**

With international and internal travel and border trade restrictions in place, it is very likely that there may or may not be able to conduct field visits and/or lack of local evaluation team members data could be collected remotely.

- For validation, skype or telephone interviews, online/mobile questionnaires, online surveys, collaboration platforms (slack or yammer) and satellite imagery could be used to gather data.
  - Remote telephone interviews with key government counterparts, representatives of key civil society organizations and implementing partners is recommended.
- Online survey tool or one to one Zoom meetings can be organized for donor community members and UN partners.
- Programme specific group zoom meetings can be organized for thematic programmatic and operational areas.
  - Use of Partners Survey contact information: UNDP Myanmar had already collected list of all the partners contact details during 2019 partners survey. These information’s can be used for virtual interviews.
  - Stakeholder engagement ensures the effective communication of an evaluation and its uptake, so it is very important to do a test run and factor in emergency settings and time zone differences.
  - Stakeholders that are dealing with existing emergencies should be given advance notice and an adjustment of evaluation timelines can be expected.
  - UNDP Field office colleagues will assist national consultant in logistic arrangement of the virtual meetings with partners and beneficiaries.

**Option 2: Onsite or face to face validation**

- If situation permits, national consultant or international consultant will visit to selected field sites (if feasible)
- Undertake key informant interviews with beneficiaries, government officials, communities and other stakeholders who have been involved in implementing activities under the program and/or participated in various program activities.
- Focus Group Discussions to be held whenever appropriate (specially recommended for beneficiaries). All interviews should be undertaken in full confidence and anonymity.

Ensuring the security of consultants, stakeholders and accompanying UNDP staff, particularly in crisis situations. The evaluation team members should have passed relevant United Nations security exams and be aware of and compliant with related security protocols, including passing the United Nations Department of Safety and Security training courses on basic security in field II29 and advanced security in the field.

**Phase III: Analysis, Debriefing and Report Writing Phase** (in country or virtually)

Following field missions or data validation phase, data review and analysis of evaluation questions, surveys and questionnaires. Evaluation teams are required to ensure maximum validity, reliability of data (quality) through triangulation of the various data sources.

Prior to the drafting of the evaluation report, the evaluation team should debrief the UNDP project/programme and management teams with preliminary findings. Debriefings with key stakeholders and the evaluation reference group may also be organized virtually or face to face where possible. This gives an opportunity to discuss preliminary findings and address any factual errors or misunderstandings, prior to writing the evaluation report.
At a time of social distancing, social media can help bridge the gap. Social platforms like yammer, teams etc can be formed to enable connecting, networking and engaging with target audiences such as donors, partners, and decision makers. This will be valuable to drive discussions, increase accessibility and amplify reach to key evaluation stakeholders.

A quality evaluation report should:

- Have a concise executive summary (maximum four pages).
- Be well structured and complete.
- Describe what is being evaluated and why.
- Identify the evaluation questions of concern to users.
- Identify target groups covered by the evaluation and whether the needs of the target groups were addressed through the intervention, and if not, why.
- Explain the steps and the procedures used to answer those questions.
- Present findings supported by credible evidence in response to the questions.
- Acknowledge limitations and constraints in undertaking the evaluation.
- Draw conclusions about findings based on of the evidence.
- Propose concrete and usable recommendations derived from conclusions.
- Be written with the report users and how they will use the evaluation in mind.

6. Evaluation Products (deliverables)

The evaluation team will be accountable for producing following Deliverables/Expected outputs. These products include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliverables</th>
<th>Payments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation Inception report (max 10 pages). The inception report to be submitted following and based on preliminary discussions with UNDP after the desk review and prior to any formal evaluation interviews, survey distribution or field visits (and country visit in the case of international evaluators). It will detail the evaluators’ understanding of what is being evaluated and why, include the context analyses that overarches the CPD review, showing how evaluation questions will be answered by way of: proposed methods; proposed sources of data; and data collection and analysis procedures taking into consideration the options available during COVID-19 restrictions. The inception report should include a proposed schedule of tasks, activities and deliverables.</td>
<td>25 percent</td>
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Debrief on initial findings: A debrief meeting will be held after collecting primary data/information on the initial findings and observations at the validation phase.

Draft Midterm evaluation report.¹ A Draft Mid-Term Evaluation report with all major findings and recommendations will be submitted to the UNDP DRR and Strategic Management Unit (SMU) for review. SMU will share the draft with relevant internal stakeholders, collate all the comments and provide the feedback to the evaluator within an agreed period of time.

Final Mid-Term Evaluation report incorporating comments received from internal stakeholders and including a clear succinct Executive Summary. The evaluator will maintain an evaluation report audit trail to ensure that comments and changes by the evaluator in response to the draft report have been addressed.

| Draft Midterm evaluation report | 25 percent |
| Final Mid-Term Evaluation report | 50 percent |

7. MTE Team Profiles and Key tasks

The MTE team is expected to consist of two International Consultants (Team lead and specific expert on results, alignment and SDG) and a National consultant to ensure contextual alignment and evaluation logistics management.

7.1 National Consultant Profile:

Required qualifications:

- Master’s Degree or equivalent in International Relations, Political Science, Economics, Sociology, or any other related field;

Technical competencies:

- Minimum 3-5 years relevant experience
- Thorough understanding of overall socio-political and development context of Myanmar including that for regions/states.
- Knowledge and experience of working with national and sub national government structures
- Experience in undertaking reviews or assessments
- Prior experience in Gender related work or working with the UN will be an asset
- Strong analytical capacities (quantitative and qualitative) and strong ability to communicate and summarize analysis in writing.
- Proven ability to produce reports in English

¹ A length of 30 to 40 pages including executive summary is suggested.
Language skills required.

- Excellent command of Myanmar and English languages in speaking and writing and should be interpret in both languages (National consultant)

National Consultants Tasks:

- Fulfil the contractual arrangements under the terms of reference as appropriate;
- Desk review of all relevant documents;
- Support team leader in development of the evaluation inception report, including an evaluation matrix, detail evaluation plan and evaluation tools as per TOR and translation of tools in Myanmar if needed;
- Keep to standards and ethical principles in line with UNEG Norms and Standards and Ethical Guidelines;
- Take lead in logistic management of evaluations like organizing meetings, setting appointments, interview in Myanmar languages if needed.
- Take lead in consultation with key stakeholders including key government counterparts, representatives of key civil society organizations and implementing partners
- Take lead in the field visit to Programme/project sites for validation
- Support team leader in interpretation, context analysis and report writing
- Support team leader in sharing information and making presentations/ debriefings
- Support in drafting reports and brief the evaluation manager, programme managers and stakeholders on the progress and key findings and recommendations;
- Support in finalization of the evaluation report, taking into consideration comments and questions on the evaluation report. Evaluators’ feedback should be recorded in the audit trail;
- Deliver the products agreed to the right standard and quality; Account for what the team has done (and spent).

8. Institutional arrangements

The Strategic Management Unit (SMU), UNDP Myanmar will be overall responsible for coordinating the evaluation process. The team will work independently under guidance of SMU team leader to ensure quality and timeliness of the deliverables.

8.1 Reporting line:
The national consultant will to the MTE team leader.

8.2 Logistical arrangements:
• For all in-country travels (if situation permits for travel):
  
   For in-country missions, UNDP will arrange, and cover costs related to all domestic travels – such as transportation(s) between the agreed in-county duty stations and living allowances - in accordance with UNDP's regulations and policies.
  
   UNDP will facilitate security clearances required to travel in-country (if applicable).

• Other logistical matters:
  
   The Contractor is expected to use their own computer.

9. **Time frame for the evaluation process approx. 45 Days over a period a 90 Days (July – September 2020)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>ESTIMATED # OF DAYS</th>
<th>PLACE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase One: Evaluation Planning Phase</td>
<td>15 Days</td>
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<tr>
<td>Briefing with UNDP (Senior Managers, SMU, Programme units)</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>Home based</td>
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<tr>
<td>Desk review of all relevant documentation</td>
<td>6 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>Context analysis: Development context and evolving context</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>Home based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drafting of inception report</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>Home based</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development and testing of evaluation tools</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>Home based</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comments and approval of inception report</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>Home based</td>
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<tr>
<td>Note: Within one week of submission of the inception report</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase Two: Validation Phase</td>
<td>20 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>Option 1: Virtual validation. Use of skype or telephone interviews for government counterparts and local implementing partners; online surveys/Zoom meetings/telephone interview with donor partners, UN counterparts and programme teams</td>
<td>10 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>Option 2: On the ground validation - Consultations and field visits, in-depth interviews and focus groups</td>
<td>10 days</td>
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</table>

| Phase Three: Analysis, Debriefing and Report Writing Phase | 10 days |
| | |
| Preliminarily debriefing (via zoom meetings if travel restrictions exists) | 1 day | Home- based |
| Preparation of draft report including executive summary | 6 days | |
| Draft report submission | - | |
| Feedback from UNDP | |
| Note: Within two weeks of submission of the draft report |
| Finalization of the evaluation report incorporating comments Presentation of final report (vis zoom meeting (via zoom meetings if travel restrictions exists) | 2 days | Home- based |
| | 1 day | Home- based |

**Estimated total days for the evaluation**

45 Days

** This flexibility is being built in given the current COVID crisis and the uncertainties around travel etc.
10. **Evaluation Ethics**

“This evaluation will be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG ‘Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation’. The consultant must safeguard the rights and confidentiality of information providers, interviewees and stakeholders through measures to ensure compliance with legal and other relevant codes governing collection of data and reporting on data. The consultant must also ensure security of collected information before and after the evaluation and protocols to ensure anonymity and confidentiality of sources of information where that is expected. The information knowledge and data gathered in the evaluation process must also be solely used for the evaluation and not for other uses with the express authorization of UNDP and partners.”

11. **Application submission process and criteria for selection**

**Criteria for selecting the best offer**

Upon the advertisement of the Procurement Notice, qualified individuals are expected to submit both the Technical and Financial Proposals. Accordingly, the individuals will be evaluated based on Cumulative Analysis as per the following conditions:

- Responsive/compliant/acceptable as per the Instruction to Bidders (ITB) of the Standard Bid Document (SBD), and
- Having received the highest score out of a pre-determined set of weighted technical and financial criteria specific to the solicitation. In this regard, the respective weight of the proposals are:
  - a. Technical Criteria weight is 70%
  - b. Financial Criteria weight is 30%

**Confidentiality and proprietary interests**

The consultants shall not either during the term or after termination of the assignment, disclose any proprietary or confidential information related to the consultancy or the Government without prior written consent. Proprietary interests on all materials and documents prepared by the consultants under the assignment shall become and remain properties of the UNDP. This assignment will be administrated by UNDP hence UNDP rules, policies and procedures will apply.

**Technical proposal evaluation criteria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education, Experience and qualifications</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Master’s Degree or equivalent in International Relations, Political Science, Economics, Sociology, or any other related field</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minimum 3-5 years demonstrated experience in evaluation, reviews or assessments of development programmes and projects</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Minimum 3-5 years relevant experience</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
- Experience in programme and project evaluation/review/assessment (5)
- Experience in UNDP/UN related evaluation (5)

| Thorough understanding of overall socio-political and development context of Myanmar including that for regions/states | 7 |
| Experience of working in various state and region (7) |

| Knowledge and experience of working with national and sub national government structures | 12 |
| - Take lead in consultation with key stakeholders including key government counterparts, representatives of key civil society organizations and implementing partners (6) |
| - Take lead in the field visit to Programme/project sites for validation (6) |

| Prior experience in Gender related work or working with the UN will be an asset | 6 |
| Strong analytical capacities (quantitative and qualitative) and strong ability to communicate and summarize analysis in writing | 12 |
| - Support in drafting reports and brief on the progress and key findings and recommendations (6) |
| - Support team leader in sharing information and making presentations/debriefings (6) |

| Proven ability to produce reports in English | 10 |
| - Support team leader in interpretation, context analysis and report writing (5) |
| - Sample of work submitted – quality of report (5) |

| Total | 70 |
Annex 2: List of documents reviewed:

2. Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan, 2018-2030
4. Overcoming as One: COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan (CERP) 27 April 2020
5. UNDP Myanmar Theory of Change Document
6. UNDP Myanmar CO Report 2018
7. UNDP Strategic Planning, 2018-2021
8. Integrated Results and Resources Framework of the UNDP Strategic Planning, 2018-2021
10. National Strategy on Resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Closure of IDP Camps, October 2019
11. Revised Concept Note, Memo on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Kachin State, September 2019
12. UNDP COVID-19 Response: Policy and Programme Offer, 19 March 2020
13. Socioeconomic Response Plans (SERPs) Review, UNDP 2020
15. Health Sector Contingency Plan & Outbreak Response on COVID-19 and other Emerging Respiratory Disease in Myanmar, April 2020
16. UND’s Integrated Response to COVID-19, 2020
17. UNDP: Beyond Recovery 2030, 2020
18. Result Oriented Annual Report (ROAR), Myanmar, UNDP, 2018
19. Result Oriented Annual Report (ROAR), Myanmar, UNDP, 2019
20. UNDP, ROAR IRRF Indicators (data set document), 2019
21. UNDP, ROAR CPD Outcome Indicators (data set document), 2019
22. UNDP, ROAR CPD Output Indicators (data set document), 2019
23. Final Evaluation Report, Strengthening Sustainability of Protected Areas Management in Myanmar, March 2020
25. Mid-Term Evaluation Report, Addressing Climate Change Risks on Water Resources and Food Security in the Dry Zone of Myanmar, January 2018
26. Mid-Term Evaluation Report, Strengthening Sustainability of Protected Areas Management in Myanmar, June 2018
27. Mid-Term Evaluation Report, Township Democratic Local Governance (TDLG), February 2020
29. Mid-Term Review, UN-REDD National Programme, November 2018
30. Semi- Annual Progress Report; Governance for Resilience and Sustainability Project (GRSP), 2019
31. Annual Progress Report; Governance for Resilience and Sustainability Project (GRSP), 2018
32. GRSP Project Document (full package signed), March 2018
33. GRSP M&E framework, structure and (related data set)/methodology/related
34. Semi- Annual Progress Report; Leadership, Effectiveness, Adaptability and Professionalism in Myanmar’s Civil Service Project (LEAP), July 2018
35. Semi- Annual Progress Report; Leadership, Effectiveness, Adaptability and Professionalism in Myanmar’s Civil Service Project (LEAP), June 2019
36. Annual Progress Report; Leadership, Effectiveness, Adaptability and Professionalism in Myanmar’s Civil Service Project (LEAP), January 2019
37. Annual Progress Report; Leadership, Effectiveness, Adaptability and Professionalism in Myanmar’s Civil Service Project (LEAP), December 2019
38. LEAP Project Document (full package signed), March 2018
39. LEAP M&E framework, structure and (related data set)/methodology/related
40. LEAP Project, Synopsis for the Annual Board Meeting, December 2019
41. LEAP, Board Meeting minutes, August 2019
42. LEAP Annual Workplan 2020
43. Semi-Annual Progress Report; Strengthening Accountability and Rule of Law (SARL), August 2019
44. Annual Progress Report; Strengthening Accountability and Rule of Law (SARL), March 2020
45. Annual Progress Report; Strengthening Accountability and Rule of Law (SARL), February 2019
46. SARL Project Document (Full package signed), April 2018
47. LEAP M&E framework, structure and (related data set)/methodology/related
48. SARL Project, Presentation (PowerPoint), Board Meeting, December 2019
49. SARL Project, Board Meeting Minutes, December 2019
50. SARL Project, Presentation (PowerPoint), Board Meeting, July 2019
51. SARL Project, Board Meeting Minutes, July 2019
52. SARL Project, Presentation (PowerPoint), Board Meeting, February 2019
53. SARL Annual Workplan 2020
54. Semi-Annual Progress Report; Support to Effective & Responsive Institutions Project (SERIP), July 2019
55. Annual Progress Report; Support to Effective & Responsive Institutions Project (SERIP), December 2018
56. Semi-Annual Progress Report; Support to Effective & Responsive Institutions Project (SERIP), August 2019
57. Annual Progress Report; Support to Effective & Responsive Institutions Project (SERIP), January 2020
58. SERIP Project Document (full Package signed), December 2017
59. SERIP M&E framework, structure and (related data set)/methodology/related
60. SERIP Project, Board Meeting Minutes, July 2019
61. SERIP Project, Presentation (PowerPoint), Board Meeting, December 2019
62. SERIP Project, Board Meeting Minutes, December 2019
63. SERIP Annual Workplan 2020
64. Semi-Annual Progress Report; Township Democratic Local Governance (TDLG), June 2018
65. Annual Progress Report; Township Democratic Local Governance (TDLG), December 2018
66. Semi-Annual Progress Report; Township Democratic Local Governance (TDLG), July 2019
67. Annual Progress Report; Township Democratic Local Governance (TDLG), April 2020
68. Annual Progress Report; Township Democratic Local Governance (TDLG) (draft for CO review), July 2019
69. TDLG Project Document, (full package signed), October 2017
70. TDLG M&E framework, structure and (related data set)/methodology/related
71. TDLG Project, Presentation (PowerPoint), Board Meeting, August 2019
72. TDLG Project, Board Meeting Minutes, August 2019
73. TDLG Project, Presentation (PowerPoint), Board Meeting, March 2020
74. TDLG Board Meeting Minutes, March 2020
75. TDLG Annual Workplan 2020
76. UNDP, Evaluation Guideline, and related Guideline During COVID-19, June 2020
77. EC Decisions on Myanmar of 10 December 2019 (matric document for UN agencies)
78. SG Decisions Memo: Durable Solutions – follow up to the Secretary General’s 2009 report on Peacebuilding, 2011
79. Semi-Annual Report, RABP (Japan/donor), October 2018
80. Semi-Annual Report, RABP (Canada/donor), September 2019
81. Final Report, RABP, UNDP/UN Women, July 2019
83. Conflict Sensitivity and Gender Responsiveness Review Report, 30 June 2018
84. Engaging with Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) in Myanmar, Final Draft, April 2019
86. Final Evaluation of the PBF project "Overcoming barriers to strengthen the voices of all women in Rakhine State for social cohesion and peace, March 2020
87. Revised Conflict Sensitivity Assessment, Synthesis Report, UNDP Rakhine Livelihood Project, March 2020
88. Engagement Strategy with EAOs UNDP’s TDLG Project in Mon State, (no date)
89. Final Report Conflict Sensitivity Capacity Strengthening Support to UNDP Myanmar November 2018 – March 2019
90. Conflict Sensitivity Mainstreaming Strategy, February 2019
Annex 3: Context, Governance/Administrative structure, and the Peace Process

- **Country’s political history and existing directions.** Myanmar is the country with the longest ongoing civil war in the world. The conflict started soon after the country gained independence in 1948. The conflict is complex and diverse, with tension and conflict events across the country between the Tatmadaw (Myanmar armed forces) and a large number of Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) as well as inter-EAO conflict in more recent years. Conflict exists with old rivals (i.e. Karen, Kachin and various groups in Shan state), as well as increasingly during the last years with new and upcoming insurgent groups such as the Arakan Army in western Myanmar’s Rakhine state. The causes of civil wars or conflicts have been myriad: ideology, identity, territory, resource claims, foreign investment, mercenaries, drug trafficking, and interventions by foreign countries. Taking over 70 years of the conflict has accompanied along with vested interests of the several militias\(^1\) too, in particular to drug trade across border with countries and other international.

- **Historically and politically, the war also referred back to Burma’s 1948 constitution based in part on the provisions of the 1947 Panglong Agreement negotiated between General Aung San (Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s father) and leaders of Frontiers areas - Chin, Kachin, and Shan. The reasons why the country having specific states and regions (S/R) had originated from the British colonial administration over frontier areas and Burma majority. That constitution in fact established the Union of Burma as a federated nation in which the predominately ethnic minority states retained a fair amount of autonomy and the right to secede from the Union after 10 years. The Panglong Agreement\(^2\) was accepted in principle the “full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas” in exchange for the ethnic minority communities joining the Bamar majority, who generally live in central Burma, to form a federated nation. In the view of most of the EAOs, Burma’s central government and the Tatmadaw have never lived up to the agreement’s promises. To the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) and Burma’s past military juntas, the EAOs are insurgents threatening the nation’s territorial integrity.

- **Ethnic areas are located in extended areas along the borderlands, which means that conflict is mostly present in areas bordering China, Thailand, India and Bangladesh. Given the long-lasting nature of the conflict, it has deep humanitarian as well as economic consequences. Many civilians have been among the casualties of the armed conflict and whole communities have been temporarily and/or permanently displaced from their homelands, with hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons. In terms of conflict dynamics, the key point of the last decade is the emerging peace process. In parallel, major inter-ethnic violence and military-led offensives against the Rohingya in Rakhine state is normally treated as separate to the peace process, albeit the situation shares many common factors with the other ethnic conflicts.

- **NCA and the current political and peace process.** As part of the peace process, the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), introduced by the Government of Myanmar, has been signed by a group of EAOs, but not all; most notably not by key Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) members in Kachin, Shan and Rakhine states, which together command an estimated 65-70 percent of EAO troops. There are 10 signatories\(^3\) including key EAOs – Karen National Union (KNU), Restoration Council of

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\(^1\) Militias are armed groups that are smaller in size, have their own economic and political agenda and may be affiliated with mainly the Tatmadaw or in some cases EAOs. This group is not generally present in the peace process.


Shan State (RCSS). Non-signatories include key EAOs in the areas covered by the projects, including the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Karen National Progressive Party (KNPP) - with TNLA jointly with allies such as the Kachin Independence organization/Kachin independence Army (KIO/KIA) regularly engaged in armed confrontations with the Tatmadaw, as well as occasional skirmishes with the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army-South (RCSS/SSA-S).

- The current peace negotiation process, as envisioned since 2011, was to be anchored in a nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) that was expected to lead to a national political dialogue. This was to allow for an extra-parliamentary\(^4\) discussion of large-scale political reform among, at minimum, the government, military, political parties and leaders of armed anti-state groups. In fact, Myanmar’s current peace process is complex in nature; however, the agreed path ahead is clear: building a democratic federal state through political rather than military means. NCA is designed to do that. To monitor the ceasefires, the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) was set up with liaison offices at state/region and local levels, while the political dialogue takes place at the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC). Political dialogues have been conducted based on three premises: ethnic, region and issue based, under the five thematic areas: political, economic, social, security and environment. Despite many challenges, there have been 51 points agreed on federal principles to date through three Union Peace Conferences (UPCs)/the 21st century Panglong Conference.

- The upcoming UPC is being prepared and expected to take place on August 19-22, 2020 to add “more points” agreed on federal principles. Yet as a key demand of both EAOs, political parties and civil society is the amendment of the 2008 Constitution, showing that the peace process is intrinsically linked to the process of democratization and the upcoming elections, for which the 2020 general election is scheduled to take place on November 8, 2020.

- UNDP/JMC/TDLG etc., Myanmar’s peace process is the opportunity for every development agency and the international community at large. They cannot afford to wait until the peace process completes – in fact no one is sure for when. That associates with the Chapter-6 of the NCA - specifies what to do during interim period.\(^5\) Chapter 6 of the NCA recognizes the roles of EAOs (NMSP and KNU in relation to UNDP/TDLG etc.,) in the fields of health, education, development, environmental conservation and natural resource management, preservation and promotion of ethnic cultures and languages, security and the rule of law, and illicit drug eradication. However, there are no clear mechanisms for operationalizing this recognition and interim arrangements to do so have not emerged.

- Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) set up under the Chapter-4 of the NCA is to do with maintaining and strengthening ceasefires. This is all about compliance of the military code of conduct, ceasefire related rules and regulations. It is composed of members of the Union Peace Making Work Committee, reps from EAOs, and respected individuals. Currently the Tatmadaw representative chairs the JMC. The latest 19th JMC meeting was held in early July 2020\(^6\), after over one-year break for different reasons – a key reason of them being about trust issue between the NLD government, EAOs and the Tatmadaw. It is believed that UNDP provides ‘technical support’ for JMC – its related works at different levels. In fact, this is a very important area to work for peace building, bringing international practices, technical and experiences to take steps transforming from “ceasefire to peace”.

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\(^4\) The extra-parliamentary strategy was based on negotiators’ perceptions of two barriers to meaningful political solutions via parliamentary means: first, under the Unlawful Associations Act, armed group leaders could not legally enter the Union Parliament to discuss the peace process; and second, the political dialogue would produce constitutional amendments after considerable input by many stakeholders, thereby gaining higher probability of adoption by the Union Parliament.


\(^6\) 19th JMC meeting: [https://www.moi.gov.mm/moi/eng/?q=news/8/07/2020/id-22105](https://www.moi.gov.mm/moi/eng/?q=news/8/07/2020/id-22105)
o **UNDP programmes vs. mapping conflict zones.** Most of UNDP project works in association with EAOs like TDLG are being implemented in most areas controlled by both the government and EAOs—known as ‘mix control areas.” For instance, KNU, a major signatory EAO, control most parts of Karen/Kayin states and also a part of Mon state (Thaton district), Bago region (eastern Bago region, KNU Brigade 3), for the latter two where TDLG works now. The New Mon State Party (NMSP) controls several parts of Mon state (TDLG) and also have some control over some remote areas based in Karen state and Tanintharyi region, for most parts where UNDP biodiversity project works. UNDP also operates in many parts of Rakhine where Arakan Army (AA) and the Tatmadaw has been fighting.

o **Power dynamics and NLD/Tatmadaw after 2015 elections**, NLD taking power from 2015 elections result and civil-military relations and power dynamics out of that relation matter most. Following the overwhelmingly victory of the 2015 elections, National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi took power and then civil-military relationship has been a critical, dedicate moment for all the transitions we have seen today. Legal and policy frameworks continue to guarantee the autonomy of the Defence Services on matters related to “national security.” Pointing to a history of violent armed conflict, past misconduct by political parties and politicians, and interference in domestic affairs by foreign powers, military leaders believe that the military must continue to play a “leading role” in governance. There is no formal legal mechanism or informal basis for civilian control over the military or accountability to the citizenry.

o In addition, the Defence Services do not need to comply with civilian authority; rather, according to the constitution, they have autonomy from elected civilian oversight. Additionally, the Defence Services Chief has the power to appoint the Minister of Defence, Minister of Border Affairs, and Minister of Home Affairs. Meanwhile, NLD took up political steps challenging the military including creating State Counsellor law for its leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and latest effort to amend the 2008 constitution in the Union parliament to reduce the power of the military.

o **Structure by Constitution matters and limitations within NLD-led government: decentralization, and de-concentration Vs. Centralization:** Myanmar’s current constitution enacted in 2008 divides legislative powers between the union and the states/regions via two legislative lists: the ‘Union List’ (Schedule 1) and the ‘State List’ (Schedule 2). That means, State/Region (S/R) governments have a constitutional mandate to run on the Schedule-2 only, while Schedule-1 is run by Union government directly. The case is that the Schedule-2 has few important areas to run in terms of public finance, taxation, natural resources management, and related planning, and budgeting. The Schedule-1 has many dominating areas of such areas etc. to run, thus becoming a “centralized Myanmar”. The Schedule-3 is all about constitutional rights for six Self-Administered Zones across Myanmar. Unfortunate is the residual power (those areas not explicitly mentioned on either list) also belongs to the Union’s control, thus formally enforcing a more “centralization. Accordingly, the administrative structure is set up by those schedules to govern.

o In accordance with such a constitutionally centralized nature, institutional structures (forms of S/R governments) at S/R becomes centralized. For instance, S/R governments do not

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1 Article 232 (b, ii) of the 2008 Constitution.
2 Daw Aung Suu Kyi is constitutionally or politically barred from becoming a president due to her marriage to a foreign/British citizen. To counter that, NLD created ‘state counselor post’ in 2016, equivalent to “prime minister” in other countries; she once claimed she is “above president”. The military views this state counselor law as “democratic bullying by majority”. More details: https://www.burma.floaters.com/article/2016/04/07/id-6237
3 The latest effort by NLD to change the constitution has failed due to the military block and more details: https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/unlawful-articles-myanmars-constitution.html
4 Article 96, the Union Legislative List, and Article 188, State and Region Legislative List, Constitution 2008
5 Article 196, the SAZ legislative List, Constitution 2008
6 Article 96, the legislative power is vested in the Union, not mentioning anything on both Schedules.
necessarily have their own staff or resources/related line departments to run but rather to supervise line departments directly controlled under the Union. This situation could be called like “ministers without ministries.” As a result, S/R governments’ responsiveness generally becomes much slower than expected. In a general term, this condition could be best named “deconcentration.” Many of UNDP project works (S/R Hluttaw support, Rakhine etc..) with this reality, pushing responsiveness, encouraging public participation/public hearings, probably featuring ‘oversight of policies’ and impacting ‘policies reform’. It is important to point out, however, that there are very few departments/organizations run by S/R government directly on its own resources—that’s municipal affairs or Development Affairs Organizations (DAO). Technically speaking, DAOs should be reformed faster –low hanging fruits— if S/R capability/capacity is good enough.

- Overall, it doesn’t necessarily say that S/R governments do not have any actual power but rather indicates limited accountability in terms of actual power they have in practice. For instance, road planning and budgeting for a certain fiscal year, Union controls highways, most inter-state roads, and S/R control roads only within its S/R, while DAOs focus on metro area or municipal area. However, the way each implement differs at their respective levels/areas. Union proposes and do actual implementation by its own resources (construction works), but S/R proposes and Union’s line departments in fact implement while DAO proposes and implements itself.

- **GAD roles.** Within centralized administrative measures in accordance with centralized constitutional mandates, general administrative department (GAD) plays a key role in overall governance/administrative operations – day to day functions. Since the government took power on 31 March 2011, following the 10 November 2010 election, the institutional arrangements in Myanmar have transformed considerably, with the military and civilian institutions technically separated from each other. However, The General Administration Department (GAD), which carries out the day-to-day administrative functions of the government at most levels, was used to be controlled by the active-duty, military-appointed Minister of Home Affairs. Therefore, there were very delicate relations between the civilian executive institutions, members of all Union and subnational parliaments, and the GAD, with regard to separation of their powers and authority, as well as the scope of their work in daily public management, including budget allocation matters. The shift of the GAD from the Ministry of Home Affairs (in military gift under the 2008 Constitution) to the Ministry of Union Government in late 2018, is a major contextual development, and opens opportunities for continued reform support at all levels of administration. This is a major structural shift under NLD-led government to take important administrative measures run by the civilian-led government, not the military. However, NLD-led government does not produce any documents with regards to actual decentralization policies or related, let alone actual implementations.

- **The Rakhine case and political dynamics.** Rakhine state is a special case and understanding of power/political dynamics – among NLD, Rakhine parties, armed groups, and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) matters most to operate any project including UNDP. Meanwhile, Rakhine is the issue that makes losing faces for both the military and NLD at the international front. There are many complicated issues in Rakhine’s conflict-setting contexts. The most dynamic one is all about politics – the tensions between the ruling party NLD and a

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16 Giles Dickenson-Jones, S Kanay De, and Andrea Smura. 2015. State and Region Public Finances in Myanmar, Yangon: The Asia Foundation.
strongest Rakhine nationalities party, Arakan National Party (ANP), who won a majority in the 2015 elections for the local parliament. However, ANP did not have a chance to nominate the Chief Minister for Rakhine State according to the 2008 constitution, thereby prompting a bitter political fight. Among other pressing issues like ICJ case, the ongoing fighting between the Tatmadaw, and Arakan Army (AA) as well as ARSA or vice versa, that political dynamics largely shapes many humanitarian/development works especially for international aid agencies in there. During even the Chief Minister nomination, the lawmakers from ANP staged a walkout in protest against the appointment of Chief Minister by NLD. ANP ended up in electing the Speaker for the local parliament. Consequently, the Speaker have often outspoken against the NLD-led government and even arguing, “the government does not respect the voice of the parliament and questioned whether the country’s democracy has already begun to fade.”

- At a higher level politics, the ANP already opposed the NLD-led Union Government’s new Advisory Commission on Rakhine led by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, due to over foreign involvement and a lack of consultation. The clash between NLD and prominent Rakhine politicians has continued, and as of this writing, the Union Election Commission has annulled the former ANP Chair, Dr. Aye Maung’s status as a MP and banned him from running in future elections due to his “treason conviction”. A bitter political fight still continues.

- Meanwhile, the Arakan Rohingya Solidarity Army attacked several police posts just hours after the Advisory commission submitted its final report to the government in August 2017. The military has undertaken ‘clearance operations’ in the area, forcing 120,000 people – mainly Rohingya Muslims to be displaced. What it all meant is that it is too hard for NLD-led government to implement the actual recommendations of the Commission. In fact, NLD-led government has faced the unprecedented international lawsuit at ICJ and the State Counsellor herself made the case before the court. The Rakhine solutions remain elusive.

- Government and civil society organizations. There were very high expectations from civil society when NLD took power. Unfortunate is that NLD doesn’t pay attention to CSOs in terms of advocacy space and understanding their roles in different settings including CSO roles in oversights. This is mainly because the NLD-led government is different from the previous quasi military government led by U Thein Sein in terms of ‘political legitimacy’; in fact, NLD views that they are fully elected so they are fully legitimate to decide something important without necessary cooperation with CSOs, whereas the quasi military one still needed to pay attention to CSOs for their inputs in terms of securing something ‘legitimate’ to decide. Now until CSOs are not happy with NLD and freedom of expressions and civil liberties rights seems to be reduced following several lawsuits against those who have used social media attacking the government’s performance.

- 2020 elections and potential power dynamics in a post-election era. It is expected that NLD will take majority seats in the upcoming elections scheduled to take place on Nov 8, 2020. A popular question still however is: can NLD take overwhelming seats and form the government like 2015? It is most possible for NLD to form the Union (federal) level government, but would lose several contested seats in ethnic regions – state parliaments like Rakhine, Shan, Chin, Kachin and Kayin etc. However, the constitution centralization still on and similar Rakhine cases would be most likely to be in those ethnic areas. Therefore, political tensions or

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17 According to article 261 (b), the president has right to appoint chief minister directly, not a majority vote by the local parliament.
18 More details on ANP protest over NLD: https://armx.asianews.network/content/ang-protests-fihan-kyaws-pick-rakhine-state-chief-13008
22 According to article 261 (b), the president has right to appoint chief minister directly, not a majority vote by the local parliament.
instability would be expected in state/ethnic administration areas, for which the Union government would take too much time and energy/effort to manage, rather than managing overall development works like COVID recovery, development, social economic development and so forth. The civil-military relationship, a critical determinant for Myanmar’s overall democratic transition and peace process, remains the same as ‘a dedicate, decisive, elusive moment' for Myanmar’s political life.
Annex 4: MTE interview guide

Name: 
Organisation: 
Title: 
Date 

Questions for government counterparts – UNDP MTE CPD

1) Please indicate what is UNDP doing well?

2) What has UNDP achieved through its interventions? (most significant change, not activities, but major institutional change)

3) What are UNDP’s strengths?

4) How satisfied are you with UNDP’s performance? Using a scale of 1 (minimum) to 5 (maximum) – please explain the rating

5) What can UNDP do better/should be doing in Myanmar?

6) Is UNDP a trusted partner for the government? Use 1 to 5 scale – why?

7) Is the geographical coverage of UNDP’s interventions adequate? Including its work in conflict-affected areas? Why?

8) Is UNDP showing good flexibility and adaptability in support of the COVID response? Why or why not?

9) To what extent has UNDP contributed to institutional capacity development (1 to 5 scale) – please justify your answer and provide concrete examples

10) Compared to other partners, how satisfied are you with your collaboration, communication and coordination with UNDP? 1 to 5 – please explain why

11) What else should UNDP be doing that they are not currently doing in order to satisfy your expectations and to achieve a more sustainable impact in Myanmar?

12) Are you aware of the Country Programme Document? (Y or N) If so, are you using it?

13) Is UNDP’s Country Programme still relevant to the current context in Myanmar? If not, what needs to be changed?

Thank you very much for your time and efforts, very much appreciated!

With kind regards – The MTE CPD team
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annex: RRF CPD indicator progress matrix based on the inputs from the programme units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDAF/CPD Outcome 1</strong>: People in Myanmar live in a more peaceful and inclusive society, governed by more democratic and accountable institutions, and benefit from strengthened human rights and rule of law protection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline and Target</th>
<th>Progress on planned target</th>
<th>MTE Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of seats held by women in: (a) national Parliament and (b) local governments</td>
<td>Baseline: National Parliament 9.7%; Local government 9.5% (2016) Target: TBD</td>
<td>Union Parliament: 11.3% Local government: no data</td>
<td>There is no target specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict related deaths per 100,000 population</td>
<td>Baseline: 0.16 (2014) Target: TBD</td>
<td>151 conflict-related civilian deaths in 2019 Source: Myanmar Institute of Peace and Security, 2020</td>
<td>Shows positive progress but no target was specified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Output 1.1: | Effective public institutions enabled to develop and implement evidence-based policies and systems that respond to the needs of the people |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 1.1.1:</th>
<th>Baseline (2017): Union – 0/0 Region/State – 0/1 Township – 0/0 Target: Union – 1 Region/State – 4 Township – 64</th>
<th>15 Township Development Plans were prepared for FY 2019/20. 50 priority projects selected for inclusion in 15 township development plans for 2020/21.</th>
<th>More effort required in order to achieve the planned target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1.1.2: # of female village tract administrators</td>
<td>Baseline (2017): 88 Target: 500</td>
<td>113 female Ward/Village Tract Administrators</td>
<td>Satisfactory progress given the context of Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1.1.3: Formula-based allocation for participatory local development planning adopted by Government</td>
<td>Baseline (2017): No such formula exists Target: Formula-based allocation mechanism operational by 2020.</td>
<td>The formula is operational in 22 townships in Mon, Bago and Rakhine states</td>
<td>Good progress, but also ideal to indicate out of how many total townships in those states</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Indicator 1.1.4**: # of townships using formula-based allocation mechanism in participatory planning | **Baseline (2017)**: 2  
**Target**: 15 | # of townships using the formula is 5 for Bago Region, 10 for Mon state and 7 for Rakhine state  
**Target was exceeded.** |
|---|---|---|
| **Indicator 1.1.5**: % of government bills in line with established government policy processes | **Baseline (2017)**: 0  
**Target**: 75% | 0  
**The planned policy management mapping was delayed due to Covid-19 pandemic** |
| **Indicator 1.1.6**: # of Goal-related operational targets of the National Strategy for the Development of Statistics (NSDS) under implementation with support of UNDP. | **Baseline (2017)**: 2 of 27 operational targets of the NSDS  
**Target**: 10 | Contribute to 7 NSDS action plans:  
- NSDS 5.3 (Conduct specific trainings)  
- NSDS 7.3 (Improve Household surveys at CSO)  
- NSDS 3.2 (Enhance Dissemination Procedures),  
- NSDS 5.2 (Develop the CSO Statistical Training Center)  
- NSDS 1.2 (Improve Coordination and Advocacy),  
- NSDS 3.1 (Improve User Consultation)  
- NSDS 2.1 (Improve Classifications, Standards, and Protocols)  
**The 27 operational targets are clear and specific; they are not the same as NSDS Action Plans that have been reported on.** |
| **Indicator 1.1.7**: % women, as proportion of deputy directors and above. | **Baseline (2017)**: 39%  
**Target**: 50% | 44.8% women held positions above Director in 2018.  
**Data for 2020 not available. Also inconsistency of data, since the indicator measure deputy director level** |
| **Indicator 1.1.8**: % women and men civil servants witnessing gender/race/ethnic discrimination at work. | **Baseline (2016)**: Gender discrimination: 17% women, 19% men; racial discrimination: 15% women, 16% men  
**Target**: Gender discrimination: 14% women, 15% men; racial discrimination: 13% women, 13% men | Planned survey delayed/postponed due to COVID 19  
**Data not available** |

**Output 1.2:**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 1.2.1: Systems for ongoing revision of rules of procedures in place (national and states/regions)</th>
<th>Baseline (2017): 0</th>
<th>Advocacy and engagement for establishment of this function with an existing Committee is ongoing. Concrete change stalled due to COVID disruptions and impending elections.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target</strong>: 7 (Union level + 6 at State/Region level)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1.2.2: % of parliamentary committees reports recommendations accepted by government (national and states/region levels)</td>
<td>Baseline (2017): 0</td>
<td>Policy inquiries are being finalised in the reporting period and it is expected that Government will respond after a period of some months consideration. In all cases, Government is cooperating with the inquiry and has expressed support for the Committee’s work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target</strong>: 60%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1.2.3: # of proposals adopted to mitigate corruption risks</td>
<td>Baseline (2017): 0</td>
<td>- Corruption Prevention Unit (CPUs) in the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is operational (mandate + roles and responsibilities, strategic planning etc.); - 72 CPUs have been established across 22 Union ministries and institutions, and Corruption Risk Assessments (CRA) included in their mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target</strong>: 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1.2.4: % of men and women civil servants feeling recruitment, promotions and postings are based on connections or bribes.</td>
<td>Baseline (2016): - 22% (both genders): recruitment based on connections - 31% (both genders): promotions based on social connections - 27% women, 28% men: postings based on connections - 24% women, 27% men: promotions and postings based on bribes</td>
<td>Planned survey postponed due to COVID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target</strong>: - 20% (both genders): recruitment based on connections - 25% (both genders): promotions based on social connections</td>
<td></td>
<td>No relevant data for assessment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Output 1.3:
**Mechanisms, institutions and capacities strengthened to sustain peace and social cohesion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 1.3.1: # of Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement violations addressed effectively against established criteria (criteria to be developed)</th>
<th>Baseline (2017): 0</th>
<th>Target: 50</th>
<th>Data available but without quality criteria Total since Apr 2017: 422/ 601 or 70% complaints received resolved/closed</th>
<th>Target exceeded.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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<tr>
<th>Indicator 1.3.2: % of trained government participants who successfully apply the knowledge and skills on social cohesion and conflict sensitivity gained from training initiatives into their work.</th>
<th>Baseline (2017): 0%</th>
<th>Target: 80%</th>
<th>Pending JMC Member and Staff Survey baseline.</th>
<th>No relevant data for assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Output 1.4:
**People have improved access to responsive, inclusive and accountable justice services and national human rights protection mechanisms, in compliance with rule of law and international standards**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 1.4.1: % of UNDP monitored trials in compliance with fair trial standards in selected areas</th>
<th>Baseline (2018): 0</th>
<th>Target: 25%</th>
<th>Manual on Fair Trial Standards was produced but the capacity building training for duty bearers was postponed due to COVID</th>
<th>No relevant data for assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 1.4.2: % of survey respondents in selected areas who describe outcomes of justice sector and judicial processes as fair, disaggregated by gender.</th>
<th>Baseline (year): 33%</th>
<th>Target: 50%</th>
<th>Interventions launched in Northern Shan. Since January 2020, over 102 beneficiaries received legal representation in courts of Rakhine and Kachin State.</th>
<th>No evidence that targeted survey was undertaken to measure progress on the indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 1.4.3: Extent to which National Human Rights Commission has the capacity to fulfil human rights obligations</th>
<th>Baseline (2017): 1 – Not Adequately</th>
<th>Target: 3 – Partially</th>
<th>- IT needs assessment undertaken and equipment for videoconferencing provided to the MNHRC office. - Reputational risk assessment completed and mitigation measures identified - Support provided to Universal Periodic Review, Special Rapporteurs and HRC Working Group.</th>
<th>For capacity building initiatives, prudent to establish baseline through a capacity needs assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Indicator 1.4.4: Number of criminal case information forms populated by justice sector institutions that contain data fields related to sexual and gender-based violence

| Baseline (year): None | Target: 5 | Planned interventions postponed due to COVID 19. Roll out of Case Data System to courts in Mandalay Region affected by funding constraints. |

Indicator is off-track.

Analysis:

Out of total 18 Output indicators, 6 (33.3%) are completely off-track, two (11%) are partially satisfactory while four (22.2%) have achieved very good performance and progress. However, another 33.3% do not have relevant data for analysis, in part due to postponed surveys following the COVID pandemic but also partly due to inefficacy of the indicators.

UNDAF/CPD Outcome 2: By 2022, Myanmar becomes more resilient to climate and disaster risk with efficient environmental governance and sustainable use of natural resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline and Target</th>
<th>Progress on planned target</th>
<th>MTE Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Forest area as a proportion of total land area | **Baseline:** Overall forest area 44.0% (2015) Permanent forest estate (PFE) 31% of total land area (2015) **Target:** Annual rate of increase of PFE by 1.67% over 2016-2030; PFE 40% of total land area by 2030 | Forest cover area 41.30% (2018) Permanent forest estate (PFE) 31.243% of total land area (2018)\(^1\) *PFE Baseline (2015) was 30.755% and was rounded up to 31%.

Source:
Central Statistics Organization Statistical Yearbook 2019 / Forest Department *Same source (CSO/FD) used for baseline forest area and PFE in 2015

The data shows 0.49% increment over 5 years from 2015 – 2020. This is positive trend but is below the planned target of 1.67% increment annually.

\(^1\) As per FRA 2020, the 2015 forest cover is 44.17% of the country total land area and it has 43.71% in 2020. Forest Cover might include RF, PPF, PA and other areas where there are forests. The forest cover is still decreasing. However, if we look at the historical trends, the decreasing rate is gradually slow down (6.61% from 1990 to 2000, 2.36% from 2000 to 2005, and 0.46% from 2015 to 2020). This is the achievement we can see. PFE (RF+PPF+PA) is 30.755% of the country area by 2015 and 31.243% by 2020. We can see 0.49% increment within 5 years. There is conflicting issues with ethnic community on customary tenure, it is very challenging issues to expand the PFE and impossible to reach to the 2030 targets without changing the management model of FD. The model should set space for ethnic community to have management rights of conservation and management of forest. With this reason, the newly formulate Forest Law 2018 and Conservation of Biodiversity and Protected Area Law 2018 set space for that. But still need to have improvement of those issues and reflect on the ground. One most feasible option is to recognize the customary tenure and community conserved areas.
### Proportion of biomass energy generated from natural forests (Myanmar Energy Master Plan 2015)

**Baseline:** 71.4% (2002)  
**Target:** 45.8% by 2030  
**55% (2015)**  
The data provided is not relevant. That 2015 data should have been the baseline.

### Output 2.1: Improved disaster and climate risk management systems for community resilience

#### Indicator 2.1.1: # of climate vulnerable people with access to fresh water, resilient agriculture and livestock practices and risk information (disaggregated by sex)

**Baseline (2016):** 58,878 with access to fresh water  
- 0 with access to resilient agriculture and livestock practices  
- 74,785 with access to risk information  
**Target:** 100,000 additional people with access to fresh water (of which 50 per cent women)  
- 75,000 with additional access to resilient agriculture and livestock practices (of which 50 per cent women)  
- 250,000 with additional access to risk information (of which 50 per cent women)  
**Source:** AF Project reports  
- 147,740 additional people with access to fresh water; 53.33% women (2019)  
- 37,332 people with additional access to resilient agriculture and livestock practices; 25.03% women (2019)  
- 25000 people with additional access to risk information; 44.50% women (2019)

#### Indicator 2.1.2: # of national/subnational development and key sectoral plans that explicitly address disaster and climate risk management

**Baseline (2017):** 1  
**Target:** 5  
- National Environmental Policy of Myanmar (2019);  
- Inle Lake Conservation 5 Year Action Plan (2015/16-2019/20)  
**Source:** UNDP publications for additional # of national/subnational plans; Previous evaluation reports for baseline  
Satisfactory. Not clear if the Inle Lake Conservation Action Plan was completed within this CPD

#### Indicator 2.1.3: # of disaster risk reduction frameworks that incorporate disaster and climate-induced risk

**Baseline (2017):** 3  
**Target:** 5  
- National Earthquake Preparedness & Response Plan (2019);  
While there is positive progress, some of the reported
management, and which address the particular needs of women and other vulnerable groups.

**Target**: 6 (cumulative – Disaster Management Policy, Disaster Recovery Framework, National Earthquake Preparedness Plan)

Yangon Earthquake Preparedness & Response Plan (2019);
Myanmar Action Plan on Disaster Risk Reduction (2017)
Disaster Management Rules (2015)

Source: UNDP publications for additional # of DRR frameworks; Previous evaluation reports for baseline

### Output 2.2:
Solutions developed at the national and subnational levels for sustainable management of natural resources and ecosystem services as a platform for inclusive economic development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 2.2.1</th>
<th># of hectares of forest and protected areas/conservation areas increased/protected with UNDP support</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baseline (2015)</strong>: 0</td>
<td><strong>Target</strong>: 2.6 million hectares protected; 304,500 hectares expanded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target</strong></td>
<td>- 3,964,784 hectares protected; - 176,087 hectares expanded</td>
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<tr>
<td>Source:</td>
<td>AF Project and SSPAM Project reports</td>
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**Target exceeded.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 2.2.2</th>
<th># of park management plans developed with UNDP support</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baseline (2017)</strong>: 0</td>
<td><strong>Target</strong>: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target</strong></td>
<td>1 plan (2020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source:</td>
<td>SSPAM Project report and WCS</td>
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</table>

**More effort required to get back on track.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 2.2.3</th>
<th># of jobs and livelihoods created through management of natural resources, ecosystem services, disaggregated by sex</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baseline (2017)</strong>: 0</td>
<td><strong>Target</strong>: 100,000 (50% women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target</strong></td>
<td>152,983; 50.83% women (2020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source:</td>
<td>AF Project and SSPAM Project reports</td>
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</table>

**Very good progress, On track.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 2.2.4</th>
<th># of mechanisms for stakeholder consultations on natural resources and environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baseline (2017)</strong>: 1</td>
<td><strong>Target</strong>: 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target</strong></td>
<td>6 mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 3 Technical Working Groups and Task Force under REDD + Community and stakeholders’ participation systems (at demonstration protected areas);</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Target exceeded.**
### Indicator 2.2.5: # of townships/district/state/region/sectors for which environmental risk assessments are conducted and recommendations and solutions provided to strengthen environmental safeguards

| Indicator 2.2.5: # of townships/district/state/region/sectors for which environmental risk assessments are conducted and recommendations and solutions provided to strengthen environmental safeguards | Baseline (year): 0 | Target: 5 | 5 Townships (2019) | Source: AF Project reports | Target achieved. However, there should more clarity as to what is being measured by the indicator. [e.g. is it one each for township, district, state, etc.?]

### Output 2.3:
Evidence-based policies and programmes developed to promote inclusive economic growth and employment creation with particular focus on women and vulnerable groups

| Indicator 2.3.1: # of policies, plans or strategies developed which promote inclusive economic growth and/or employment creation, in particular for women and vulnerable groups | Baseline (2017): 1 | Target: 6 | 0 | No interventions for this indicator.

| Indicator 2.3.2: # of women and vulnerable groups benefiting from collaboration with private sector entities leading to economic empowerment | Baseline (2017): 0 | Target: 50,000 | 25,000 | Source: SEAD Project | Very good progress. On track.

| Indicator 2.3.3: # of women with access to improved financial services | Baseline (2017): 150,000 | Target: 300,000 | 0 | No interventions for this indicator.

| Indicator 2.3.4: % of affected people having recovered their livelihoods through UNDP interventions in post-conflict/disaster areas having | Baseline (2017): 0% | Target: 30% | 90,910 | Source: Rakhine Area Based Programme Project Reports | Data inconsistency.

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FPIC-mainstreamed stakeholder consultation; Stakeholder Response Mechanism
Source: UN REDD Project reports
recovered employment/livelihoods in selected areas

Analysis

- It is noteworthy that Output 2.3 on employment creation has the most off-track indicators. This is also reflected in the expenditure trends as this output has the lowest delivery rate of 41.8% of available resources compared to the overall CPD delivery rate of 57%.
- The contributory effect of UNDP outputs to UNDAF outcomes is adequately reflected in Output 2.2 which shows 4 out of 5 indicators (80%) to be on track while also the outcome indicator on forest cover area is responsive albeit at much slower rate.
- The need to strengthen RBM capacity is apparent in some of the indicators where various types of data inconsistencies are reflected.
Annex 5 – list of Key Informants Interviewed – Mission agenda from 24.08.20 to 30.09.2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting Nr</th>
<th>Surname</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Sex</th>
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<th>Time (min)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Stahlhut</td>
<td>Joerg</td>
<td>Chief, Peace &amp; Governance Programme Unit</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>24.8.20</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Aryal</td>
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<td>Programme Specialist</td>
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<td>Win</td>
<td>Programme Support Specialist</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Programme Analyst</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Odolot</td>
<td>Sammy Odolot</td>
<td>Former Conflict Advisor</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Batchelor</td>
<td>Peter Batchelor</td>
<td>former UNDP RR</td>
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<td>Gregory</td>
<td>San</td>
<td>Chief Technical Advisor</td>
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<td>Htike</td>
<td>Min Htike</td>
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<td>Aung</td>
<td>Thein Tun Aung</td>
<td>Project Mgmt Officer</td>
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<td>Myint</td>
<td>Su Wai</td>
<td>Project Analyst</td>
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<td>Ali</td>
<td>Liaqat</td>
<td>M&amp;E Officer</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Crick</td>
<td>Thomas</td>
<td>SARL Project Manager</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Abudho</td>
<td>Jane</td>
<td>Project Officer, Housing, Land and Property (Kachin State)</td>
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<td>Htun</td>
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<td>Abudho</td>
<td>Jane Abudho</td>
<td>Kachin Office manager</td>
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<td>11.</td>
<td>Navin Bajracharya</td>
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<td>Sujeeta Le Le Mon</td>
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<td>Director, Dept of Disaster Managmt, Min. of Social Welfare, Relief Resettlement</td>
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<td>Chief, Sustainable Inclusive Unit National Coordinator Project Manager Programme Specialist COVID Recovery Analyst</td>
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*Meetings requested that could not be held/confirmed*
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Total interview time: almost 73 hours – 65 minutes average interview time

117 persons interviewed in total – 66 men and 51 women

4 written feedback forms from Government counterparts (UCSB, DZ)
UNDP CPD 2018-2022
The challenge of conflict sensitive development
Mid-term Evaluation
Preliminary Findings
9 October 2020

MTE TEAM: CHRISTIAN BUGNON, TEAM LEADER
RICHARD CHIWARA, INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANT
AUNG TUN, NATIONAL CONSULTANT

Objective: assess the progress in achieving the results of the country programme, its relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of strategies in light of the development priorities, and the changes in the local and international contexts including the impact of COVID-19.

Scope: January 2018 to September 2020

Evaluation criteria:
Relevance, Effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability


Methodology: documentary analysis, home-based due to COVID-19, no travel to Myanmar, KII, UNDP survey

Total of 67 KII, of which 27 with GoM counterparts, 26 with UNDP staff, 7 with donors and 7 other partners (UNRCO, UN Women, RAFT, SCFG, Special Envoy’s Office, former RCO advisor, consultant)

Total interview time: 72.7 hours
average KII time: 65 minutes

117 persons in total
66 men and 51 women
+ 4 GoM written feedback (USCD, DZ)

Survey of 26 UNDP staff with 18 answers (RR 69%) and only 2 positioning responses

LIMITATIONS: availability of respondents due to COVID (9 meetings not confirmed, 2 cancelled), interpretation

Acknowledgements: SMU for evaluation management and support, NPT Office for support with union level meetings, all UNDP staff interviewed as well as all other KII
FINDINGS PER EVALUATION CRITERION

RELEVANCE:
- CPD design with the programme pillars broad enough to address key challenges in Myanmar
- Clear alignment with government priorities and MSDP 2018-2030 (also optimistic) but timeframe up to 2022

RELEVANCE (cont.):
- Very necessary support to institutions in technical assistance and capacity development - recognized by GoM (UCSB, Parliament, Central Statistics Office, Forest Department, etc.)
- Importance of addressing union AND state/region levels and townships

RELEVANCE (cont.):
- CPD designed in 2017 with a very optimistic and overly ambitious vision regarding the pace of three-pronged transition in the country. “Flagship” project designed to convince and bring together large donor support on strategic value of the projects

RELEVANCE (cont.):
- Issues: various donors indicated problems with flagship approach
- CPD didn’t obtain expected resources
- 17 p.ToC for CPD: risks identified but no risk management strategy - untested assumptions
- RABP not in CPD
- Inadequate balance between focus on needs of duty bearers and rights holders

EFFICIENCY:
Delivery as of 30.6.20 57% but uneven between programme units

EFFICIENCY: 5 FO are highly useful for programme delivery – but R&R needs to be streamlined

Efficiency constrained by internal procedures - insufficient delegation of responsibilities and need to undertake functional review of business processes and delegation of authority
EFFICIENCY (cont.)
- Resource constraints including staffing

EFFECTIVENESS:
- Evidence of policy and behaviour change through TA and institutional CB:
  - Union AG Off.: First 5-year strategic plan
  - Draft legislative guidelines
  - TDLG grants framework
  - National environmental policy, National strategy and master plan
  - Review of legislation to ensure community participation in conversation

EFFECTIVENESS: (cont.) ROAR reports
- Conservation of Biodiversity and Protected areas Law (ROAR)
- Policy paper on civil service governance
- Code of values for Union Civil Service Board
- National indicator framework for MSDP
- National REDD+ strategy
- MNHRC Strategic Plan
- Anti-corruption commission: Code of conduct and risk assessment tool

EFFECTIVENESS (cont.) GoM perception
- Question: How satisfied are you with UNDP’s performance? (5-point scale)
  - Average rating from 27 respondent 4,14
  - 81,5% of 27 responses (4 N/A) 4 or above (high or highest)

EFFECTIVENESS (cont.) GoM perception
- Question: How much has UNDP contributed to developing your institutional capacity (5-point scale)
  - Average rating from 13 respondent 4,15
  - 100% of 13 responses (18 N/A) 4 or above (high or very high)

EFFECTIVENESS (cont.) GoM perception
- Question: How much do you trust UNDP? (5-point scale)
  - Average rating from 23 respondents 4,39
  - 87% of 23 responses (9 N/A) 4 or above (high or very high)
  - Note: Rakhine specific rating 3
EFFECTIVENESS: (cont.)

• CPD effectiveness:
  - Mixed progress on CPD indicators: 1/3 on track, 1/3 totally off-track. 6 indicators under governance struggling to generate data
  - CPD Output Indicators status (30) at the time of the evaluation:
  Green 10 (33.3%)
  Yellow 4 (13.3%)
  Red 9 (30%)
  N/A 7 (23.3% COVID related)

EFFECTIVENESS: (cont.)

• CPD effectiveness:
  - CPD M&E system not adequate – focused on compliance but unable to track and report on meaningful changes – needs overhaul and link to communication strategy
  - Use of UNDP and UNDG guidance in formulation of proper RBM RF mindful of the hierarchy of results: show the important changes, not descriptive/narrative lists

EFFECTIVENESS: (cont.)

• CPD effectiveness:
  - No adjustment or risk management for unrealistic planning assumptions
  - Donors confused between flagships and area-based programmes – coherence and consistency
  - Vision based on outcomes too broad to give a clear sense where UNDP is heading (survey) no clear vision of success

EFFECTIVENESS: (cont.)

• CPD effectiveness:
  - Conflict sensitivity/social cohesion not sufficiently owned by all UNDP programme staff
  - Perception (donors, other partners, other UN) UNDP responsive to government, but no clear rules of engagement/red lines (balance duty bearers/rights holders)
  - Unclear results in Rakhine and access limitations including Mon and others

EFFECTIVENESS: (cont.)

• CPD effectiveness:
  - No shared understanding of what it means for UNDP to be SDG integrator
  - Staff is key asset for UNDP – both international and national
  - Staff survey shows very fragmented views on key questions – need to come around to a joint and shared CO vision of UNPD’s role

EFFECTIVENESS: (cont.)

• CPD effectiveness:
  - UNDP staff perceptions on application of programming principles:
    - Policies: good
    - UNDP mainstreaming gender & all identities: average
    - UNDP applies conflict sensitivity in all projects: average
    - UNDP provides clear vision of expected outcomes: average

19 20 21 22 23 24
Annex 7

EFECTIVENESS (cont.)

- CPD effectiveness:
  - TDLG participatory bottom-up processes and approaches
  - Parliament – starting from scratch
  - SARL – no Security Sector Involvement
  - SERIP/TDLG donor confusion
  - Environment: insufficient conflict sensitivity
  - COVID – adaptive management in ICT

UNDP performance: donor perception (n=7) scale of 1 to 5

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SUSTAINABILITY

CPD sustainability addressed at design stage of individual projects. Institutional capacity development is also integral to all the projects. Some evidence of sustainability (TDLG Bago budget allocation of US$ 38 million to townships)

KII indicate limited level of government resources as a major constraint to sustainability for a number of departments/ministries

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS:

- Flagship concept no longer relevant in current environment
- Area-based approaches – indicating needs coverage much more adapted to needs of rights holders and varied contexts
- Insufficiently clear vision of where UNDP is going, both internal and external

Staff perception regarding UNDP’s position

NB: widely varying responses from the only two forms received (average presented here)
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS:

- Weak communications and inadequate M&E
- Functional review of business processes and delegation of authority required
- Integrated area-based programmes better suited for upcoming challenges
- Negotiation with government to access EAO areas across ABPs
- Gain trust of EAOs – already out of JMC/PF

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

- Provided UNDP becomes a conflict sensitivity champion in Myanmar then it should channel IFI programmes such as WB and ADB
- Review with UNRC and Special Envoy UNCT’s position in Myanmar and rules of engagement with GoM including access
- Consider alternative management structures in line with programme strategy

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

- Consider a dual management structure based on expected results: a) institutional support and capacity building b) Area-based integrated approach programming instead of the usual pillars
- Adjust technical capacity to capture evidence of results and report and communicate accordingly

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

- UNDP minor player but should be major player in Myanmar – review positioning strategy, define better the big picture you’re after
- Build stronger partnership strategies with complementary UNCT actors
- Invest in training and capacity development of CBOs and local partners

CONCLUSIONS:

- Challenging operating environment with CPD insufficiently based on reality on the ground
- No risk management strategy means the CPD was implemented without adaptive management to the changing context
- A number of positive results with duty bearers across GoM institutions, TA and CD

CONCLUSIONS:

- Relevance of UNDP’s positioning at present questionable
- UNDP is trying to hold the fort but obtaining mixed results if judged by CPD RF indicators
- Donors supportive of UNDP but need to communicate better and clarify its vision and scope
- Need to motivate and invest in staff to have an efficient and streamlined management
Annex 7

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Redefine the vision and success for the end of the CPD period and beyond
- Consider a functional review of the business process and delegation of authority
- Reinforce internal communication/knowledge sharing among staff to build consensus on UNDP’s position and identity in Myanmar
- More support to inform policy making

**THANK YOU FOR YOUR COMMENTS, QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS!**

THE CPD MTE TEAM
Annex 8: MTE team profile

Bio profile for Christian Bugnion

Chris is a trained economist and possesses twenty-five years of evaluation experience, having completed 108 evaluations for donors, UN agencies, INGOs, and private sector organisations, most often as evaluation team leader. He has worked in over one hundred countries and is a vetted RBM trainer and M&E expert for UNDP’s regional hubs (Panama, Istanbul) having trained 294 UN, government and NGO staff over the past ten years. Chris has undertaken corporate (IEO), regional, decentralised and Joint Programme evaluations, as well as CPD and UNDAF evaluations, on behalf of the UNDP and UNRCO. He has previously carried out programme evaluations in Myanmar in 2006, 2015 (pre-election) and more generally in the region. Chris is a former board member of the Spanish Evaluation Association, and of the Swiss Evaluation Society (SEVAL) and the European Evaluation Society, having coached development country’s junior evaluators in the peer support working group.

Bio profile for Richard M Chiwara

Richard has over 20 years of development experience, including in programme development and evaluation. He has undertaken programme evaluations in a diverse range of practice areas, including UNDAFs; Governance; Energy, Environment and climate change; and MDGs. Particularly noteworthy, he led the evaluation of UNDAF and Delivering as One in Ethiopia, Maldives, Mongolia, Yemen and Zambia. He has also led in MTE and final evaluation of UNDP CPDs in Malawi, Jordan, Nigeria, Sudan and Swaziland.

Richard brings a rich global perspective and has experience in most regions. He has undertaken evaluation assignments in Africa (16 countries); in Asia (6 countries); in the Arab states (3 countries); Latin America and the Caribbean (6 countries); eastern Europe (3 countries). He has also done some work with the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), and produced General Assembly report.

Bio profile for Aung Tun

Aung Tun (Mr.) has over 13 years of professional experience in working in various policy and governance & economic governance area on Myanmar. He is a governance specialist. He’s taken technical advisory roles for various development agencies. His background is all about Myanmar political dynamics, economic development and economic governance issues on Myanmar. Through his professional experiences, he has been in collaboration with different key stakeholders including the government counterparts, CSOs, and others. He works with various international experts on key policy and legal areas. He has also participated in several important evaluations including USAID/OTI’s Kann Let program and on UNDP programmes. He was previously with the Asia Development Bank (ADB) on governance, and related risks assignments as well as public private partnership projects across Myanmar.