JOINT FINAL EVALUATION

of

The Foundational and Short-Term (FaST) Activities of the United Nations Fund for Recovery, Reconstruction and Development in Darfur (UNDF)

January 2016 - June 2019

SUDAN

April 2021

Prepared by:
Omer Egemi (PhD, Geography)
Musa Adam Abdul Jalil (PhD, Social Anthropology)
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# Acronyms

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBOs</td>
<td>Community-Based Organizations</td>
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<td>DCB</td>
<td>Darfur Coordination Board</td>
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<td>DCP</td>
<td>Drought Contingency Plans</td>
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<td>DDPD</td>
<td>Doha Document for Peace in Darfur</td>
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<td>DDS</td>
<td>Darfur Development Strategy</td>
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<td>DJAM</td>
<td>Darfur Joint Assessment Mission</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DRA</td>
<td>Darfur Regional Authority</td>
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<td>DRDF</td>
<td>Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund</td>
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<td>DLC</td>
<td>Darfur Land Commission</td>
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<td>FaST</td>
<td>Foundational and Short-Term Activities</td>
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<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
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<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
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<td>HAC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Aid Commission</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>INGOs</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>IWRM</td>
<td>Integrated Water Resource Management</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>QFFD</td>
<td>Qatar Fund for Development</td>
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<td>QIPs</td>
<td>Quick Impact Projects</td>
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<td>ROL</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<td>SDDRC</td>
<td>Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission</td>
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<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Gender-Based Violence</td>
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<td>STDM</td>
<td>Social Tenure Domain Model</td>
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<td>JTRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<td>TS</td>
<td>Technical Secretariat</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations African Mission in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNCT</td>
<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
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<td>UNDF</td>
<td>United Nations Fund for Recovery Reconstruction and Development in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Organization</td>
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<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
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<td>VGGET</td>
<td>Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Governance of Land Tenure</td>
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<td>VRRRC</td>
<td>Voluntary Return and Reintegration Commission</td>
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<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water and Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) was signed in July 2011. A key theme of the DDPD was the transition from relief to recovery and development, as an essential aspect for sustaining peace in Darfur. To that end, the Darfur Development Strategy (DDS) 2013-2019 was developed. The DDS was envisioned as a sequenced, coordinated and holistic plan which is vital to move Darfur out of the cycle of conflict and poverty, towards a stable and prosperous future.

The DDS was articulated into three inter-connected programmatic ‘pillars’, namely (i) Governance, Justice and Reconciliation; (ii) Reconstruction; and (iii) Economic Recovery. Within each of these three pillars, ‘Foundational and Short-Term Activities’ (FaST), needed to provide tangible peace dividends and the building blocks for long-term recovery and development programs were specified. The FaST activities were also conceived to complement and coordinate with ongoing projects being implemented by UN agencies, GoS and other development partners.

Under the FaST, a total of 12 FaST activities were implemented under Pillar 1 (3 activities), Pillar 2 (7 activities) and Pillar 3 (2 activities). The activities were implemented by 13 UN partners throughout the five states of Darfur during 2016-2019. Ten of these activities involved joint projects with 2 partners or more implementing the activity. The total funding available to the 12 activities was $ 85.5 million.

The funding was through the United Nations Fund for Recovery Reconstruction and Development in Darfur (UNDF), a multi donor trust fund established in 2015 to support the key components of the Darfur Development Strategy DDS 2013-2019 in pursuit of the overall objective of the DDPD. The UNDF has been supported by a single donor, the State of Qatar through the Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD). The UNDF was established under the overall leadership of the former Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), and with participation of the Government of Sudan (GoS). As stipulated in its founding agreement, all programmes/projects funded by the UNDF should be in support of, and strictly aligned with the priorities of the GoS and the former DRA to ensuring full national ownership and therefore, contribute to developing capacity and promoting sustainability.

Within the above framework came this final evaluation of the 12 FaST projects implemented under the UNDF. The overall objective of the evaluation is to assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, inclusiveness, and sustainability of the 12 FaST Activities implemented in the Five States of Darfur. The scope of the evaluation, as stipulated in the TOR, involves: (a) UNDF achievements through projects funded under the FaST activities; (b) the modality and methods used for defining priority areas, selection of projects and disbursement of funds; (c) The organizational structure of the UNDF and the Technical Secretariat and its ability in monitoring projects, providing technical support, collating lessons learned; and (d) the synergism and complementarity between UNDF and other similar programs and funding mechanism.

Recognizing the enormous limitations imposed by Covid-19 pandemic and the associated restrictions on direct field work, the evaluation was grounded in a remote undertaking process using the following data collection tools: (a) Rigorous desk review and analysis of available relevant data. Major documents reviewed and consulted included; DDS Review Report; UNDF Project Document; UNDF ToR, Results Framework; UNDF Projects Progress Reports; Final UNDF Report; FaST projects Final Report; UNDF annual reports 2016, 2017 and 2018 and UNDF Field Monitoring Reports. (b) Consultation meetings with implementing agencies/partners: This involved virtual and face-to-face meetings with the relevant staff and focal points of the 13 implementing agencies, except UNHCR where the arranged meetings didn’t materialize. (c) Comprehensive interviews with the Coordinator of UNDF Secretariat. (d) Joint consultation with UNDF immediate partners, namely the focal
points of the DRA Commissions (DLC, VRRC, JTRC and DRDF); and (e) In-depth focusing on selected 8 projects that provide for variety of activities and different budgets. The evaluation was challenged by several issues including: (i) The second wave of Covid-19 that restricted direct field work and collection of primary data from the direct stakeholders therefore, compromising collection of concrete field-based evidence while restricted full grasping of the contextual internal socioeconomic, political and environmental dynamics affecting the implementation of the projects; (ii) the evident change in the project implementation staff as at the time of the evaluation, the overwhelmed senior staff, especially project managers and focal points were not in place; (iii) data inconsistency as the data availed was replete with inconsistency and sometimes contradictions; and reports quality as the overwhelming reporting on the projects was against the activities, with few exceptions of reporting on the outcomes and high level objectives.

The geographical distribution of the projects in the Five Darfur States shows that the projects were implemented in 514 sites. However, the number of implementation sites varies considerably between the States, from 126 sites in West Darfur to 79 sites in East Darfur. The distribution also reflects apparent variations between the different projects in terms of implementation sites. While the Strengthening Land Management for Peaceful Coexistence in Darfur and the Accelerated Learning Project and Access to Employment Opportunities were implemented in 81 and 80 sites, respectively, the Darfur Community Based Reintegration and Stabilization Project and Promotion of Sustainable Return and Reintegration of IDPs and Refugees were implemented in 9 and 13 sites, respectively. The uneven distribution by localities in the same State is also conspicuous. While localities like El Geneina in West Darfur hosted 47 intervention sites others like Kulbus Locality in the same State hosted only one site.

Many national and international stakeholders highlighted the usefulness and the continued relevance and salience of the overall FaST activities and specific priorities as originally formulated. The effectiveness of the implementation was also described as high, fluctuating around 80-85%. However, the level of effectiveness tends to vary considerably between the implementing agencies, from as high as 100% among many to around 50% among few. However, it should be alluded that the prevailing political context in Darfur and Sudan as a whole during the implantation of the FaST Projects has severely constraint the process of effectiveness as demonstrated by restrictions of mobility for some staff and the very slow process of approving some projects such as the Land Project. For the DDR project dealing with the police institutions was also not an easy task.

The FaST Projects demonstrated tangible positive impacts on the livelihoods of the targeted communities. The 15 Peace, Justice and Reconciliation Centres constructed and operationalized and the investment in the capacities of 1,264 (423F/ 841M) actors of the justice sector are essential investments in the future. 3,150 ex-combatants (630F/2520M) haven provided with support to economic reintegration. The DDR project in particular should be commended for availing economic opportunities for more than 5,000 unemployed youth, vulnerable women and others while indirectly benefitting over 200,000 households. This is in addition to technical support to UNAMID and Sudan Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (SDDRC) in demobilizing 10,250 former fighters aligned to different armed factions that signed the DDPD. The two (2) vocational training centres/schools constructed, in Zalinge (CD) and El Daein (ED) benefited over 30,000 ex-combatants, unemployed youth and other groups through training and development/upgrading of productive skills. The water quality laboratories that have been established and equipped in all five state capitals will provide a good platform for monitoring water quality, optimizing treatment processes, and supporting accelerated response to water borne disease outbreaks by rapid detection of pathogens in the water, and reducing dependence on the national laboratory and thus; transportation cost.

The FaST Projects also reflect conspicuous positive impacts on women including improvement of women economic situation; enhanced role of women in managing family resources, improved productive skills and knowledge, their organization and access to political and economic resources and other gender related
roles/rights. Women and girls’ dignity and safety have been significantly served through availing of household latrines in an Open Defecation Free environment. The active participation of women and their wide engagement in the projects indicate that they have acquired them power, self-confidence and improvement in agency (individual and collective capacities, knowledge and skills, attitudes, assets, actions, and access to services). In the process, the historically constituted gender gap in public life participation and decision making appears narrowing and a new social contract is emerging. However, the road to release and realize the huge potential of women participation and gender equity remains long.

Participatory community land mapping founded on the Social Tenure Domain Model STDM technique, in 52 villages, holds the strong potential of securing access rights to land and natural resources; this intervention also holds the huge potential of contributing to local peace and should therefore, be scaled up. The sensitization of more than 3,000 people from State Government officials, locality representatives from the farmers and nomads, women and youth groups, returnees and host communities in land issues provides for enhanced awareness of the people, including decision makers, about the critical gaps in land governance while setting the grounds for reform in the future. The consultative draft for land legislation policy reforms provides an important entry point for reform.

Investment in community infrastructure based on provision of water supply in villages, restoring social infrastructure such as schools, and linking communities to markets by constructing vital road links, remain important for the war-affected populations to resume normal life and to engage in productive economic activities. Under these intervention 232,217 (114,995F/117,217M) vulnerable rural population and returnees have access to improved water; 125,000 beneficiaries have improved all-weather access to basic services through construction of road drainage structures; 13 administrative building sites benefitting around 500,000 people; 50 communities declared as open defecation free (ODF) communities; 70 villages have benefited from solar PV systems; 30 health facilities rehabilitated and handed over to the State Ministry of Health and 4 police posts completed contributing to the safety and security of 113,500 people. The investment in the training of 172 youth from the villages and selected by the communities to serve as new health staff through institutional training (by WHO) is to be particularly commended as it holds the potential of securing the health cadre in areas that have historically suffered lack of medical staff. This an innovative approach to local level development that should be expanded and consolidated. The provision of water for 350,000 head of livestock is anticipated to reduce conflict and frictions over water sources.

The training of 2,529 school drop-outs on entrepreneurial skills; the development of 5 Business Development Centres supporting 6,235 youth with entrepreneurship and self-employment services together with the establishment of Greater Dar Fur Microfinance Apex (GDMC) and the appreciated investment in the training of 8,865 people in public awareness activities on microfinance and products and the 269 Village Savings and Loans Associations established provided for women and employability and the revitalization of rural economy.

Investigations demonstrated that the UNDF modality holds strong potential for promoting recovery and for leading the transition to humanitarian-peace nexus and the move towards long term development in Darfur and possibly the other war-affected regions of Sudan. The UNDF could also be described as the best organizational structure for accessibility of funds. However, and as provided by the experience of the implementation of FaST projects, the Fund suffered certain weaknesses that have their implications on the outcomes of the implementation process. Important among these were: (a) Reliance on one donor and who was concerned with hard ware rather than the soft resulting in a very slim baseline activity; (b) the UNDF structure that didn’t take into consideration the Technical Secretariat from the early beginning; (c) the TS structure that suffered for nearly one year from the lack of M&E officer; this is besides the limited resources available for the TS and the overstretching of its staff; M&E was generally described as possibly the weakest element in the TS. (d) The distribution of UNDF resources between the 13 UN agencies was also widely criticised. The unfair allocation of resources between the
agencies, the capture of resources by the powerful agencies and the allocation of resources for some UN agencies that have no or very limited presence in Darfur were major concerns raised. According to some commentators “the Qatari resources were the opportunity for many UN agencies to bridge some of their critical funding gaps”. (e) Weak coordination among the different partners and limited synergy among the different projects. (f) The slow flow of resources, in 6 instalments, resulting in implementation delays, and necessitated lot of budget revisions. (g) FaST approach based on project principles and village-based interventions holds the shortcoming of limiting coherence, sequencing, synergy and coordination of the intervention while restricting the development of area-based integrated and sequenced programme that allows for longer periods of implementation.

Interagency programming is possibly the best way to go and holds the strong potential for genuine and articulated implementation of humanitarian-peace nexus. Recognizing the complexity of this nexus, no single agency has the capacity to do that individually. The different UN agencies bring different skills and capacities. The comparative advantages of the different agencies provide a huge potential to capitalize on. However, the practicability, as demonstrated by the FaST projects, was a problem as demonstrated by the very limited culture of working together among the implementing UN agencies resulting in ad hoc coordination rather than institutionally founded coordination.

The UNDF agreement stipulated the DRA as the main partner to the Fund. In 2016, the Government of Sudan dissolved the DRA. The DRA ministries also disappeared. The remaining DRA structures, the commissions, faced uncertainty in their structure and functioning and most halted their activities resulting in the absence of the main partners for several of the FaST Activity projects. Partnership with the Government was also problematic owing to the immaturity of the country’s federal system and the resultant distorted coordination relationship between the different levels of governance, especially between the Centre in Khartoum and the States. Sometimes projects in the field needed to coordinate with Khartoum. This is in addition to the administrative restrictions imposed by the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) on certain projects to reach some targeted communities. Engagement with certain Government institutions such as the police was also challenging. Because most of the UN agencies had restricted presence and/or geographical outreach, there was heavy dependence on implementing national NGOs. Partner national NGOs had the advantage of grass roots presence and outreach, but the capacity of these NGOs was very challenging as the majority of these organizations were established, nurtured and capacitated within humanitarian rather than recovery culture. This had in turn negatively impacted the timely and quality implementation of the contracted activities. Added to this, the weak capacities of government and the limited investment in the institutional capacities of Government by the projects to lead, own and sustain the outcome.

Lessons learned:
• In spite of the overwhelming odds working against them, Darfur communities on the ground reflected strong preparedness and participation in the implementation of the projects indicating the active agent of those communities to rebuild and change their lives, if even small amount of hope is offered to them.
• Darfur Women, both adults and youth, indicate strong readiness and commitment to engage and participate in the implementation of interventions that target them and address their livelihoods priorities and needs.
• UNDF has huge potentialities to lead and promote Darfur transition from humanitarian to recovery, peace and long-term development. It just requires programmatically informed structure, better coordination, funding, robust secretariat and strong monitoring and evaluation.
• Darfur people are inherently very resilient (adaptation to natural environment and related livelihood options, accumulated indigenous knowledge, vibrant indigenous social protection safety net, community organization and community governance institutions…. etc). National and international actors need to build on that. But
for that there is a need for wider lens where aspects of inherent resilience are rigorously studied and the possible changes created by the conflict and other structural factors of change are fully understood.

- Darfur has huge agricultural potentialities. There is an urgent need to make these potentials attractive to the youth. There is also room for improvement. This needs good narrative about the potential jobs and how to invest in job creation.
- Most of the youth in the camps have for nearly two decades been raised and nurtured in the IDPs camps and do not want to return back. This is a challenge that needs to be addressed within the frame of a comprehensive approach focusing on urban planning and development.
- Partner UN agencies need to invest more time in understanding each other organizational culture and perspective.
- Recovery in Darfur should not be business as usual. Should be about establishing strong baseline activity including investment in research and an integrated approach based on innovative solutions.
- FaST Projects implemented activities that were previously humanitarian. This shows that Darfur is currently ripe for recovery interventions and that this shift from humanitarian to recovery is not as difficult as used to be usually perceived.
- Many of the FaST interventions had proved there are great potentials for major impacts and to guiding long term development and therefore need scaling up and consolidation. However, there is a need for the shift from project premise to programmatic premise founded on cluster, area-based approach with longer duration (minimum 5 years).
- There is always a pressing need for institutionalized coordination and cooperation among implementing agencies (joint meetings, joint field missions, knowledge sharing……etc).
- There is a huge demand for investment in capacity building at the various levels, from the communities and their respective organizations up to the three levels of governance.
- The integrated water management approach introduced to Darfur by UNEP has demonstrated its huge potential for the integration of the interventions and in promoting environmental conditions.
- Participatory land use mapping founded on STDM technique has demonstrated its value as an entry point for securing access rights to land and natural resources. The approach should be up-scaled and consolidated. Capacity building in STDM and investment in the technology related to it deserve special attention.
- There is an urgent need for mainstreaming solar energy into formal education through technical colleges. This essentially involves institutional investment in the capacities of the Government as well as availing the enabling environment for the private sector for more active engagement in innovative solutions and job creations. This could also be linked to the huge potentialities of Darfur and how to be effectively managed to sustain social peace and promote resilient development in Darfur.
- Darfur communities widely accepted and engaged in discussions focusing on women rights of access to land. This falsified the widely propagated stereotype that public discussion of women land rights is culturally restricted. This provides valuable opportunity for rigorous activity, including advocacy work, to promote and constitute women rights of access to land.
- The strong link between health and nutrition has great potential as a foundation to maintain the synergy between projects and for promoting projects coordination and cooperation.
- The inseparable link between natural resource management, livelihoods and peacebuilding in Darfur that recognizes natural resources as the platform on which the diverse, competing and vaguely organized communities can be integrated and brought together into cooperative, collaborative and constructive negotiation processes around shared interests and collective rights while addressing priority peacebuilding and livelihood issues and concerns.
• The centrality of water in dry lands, such as Darfur, and its use as catalyst/dividend for implementation of other interventions targeting women empowerment, community organization and investment in social capital development.
• Sustainability requires heavy and articulated investment in government capacities.
• The initiative of scholarships for eligible candidates for Academy of Health Sciences selected by communities from within communities constitutes an innovative approach that is anticipated to impact Darfur positively in the near future. The initiative deserves compliment and should be expanded to other deprived, underserved communities and for other staff categories such as medical doctors and assistants.
1. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
The protracted conflict in Darfur, started in 2003, has created a tragic social crisis that has its most conspicuous manifestations in the large size of IDPs and refugees, apparent human insecurities, targeted and widespread gender-based violence, collapse of rural economy, destruction of the infrastructure of community services; erosion of governance and ROL systems, poverty and unemployment particularly among the youth, proliferation of community-based conflicts and a general disintegration of the social fabric.

The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) was signed on 14 July 2011. A key theme of the DDPD is the transition from relief to recovery and development, as an essential aspect for sustaining peace in Darfur. To that end, the Darfur Development Strategy (DDS) 2013-2019 was developed. The DDS, reviewed in 2019, was envisioned as a sequenced, coordinated and holistic plan which is vital to move Darfur out of the cycle of conflict and poverty, towards a stable and prosperous future.

The DDS was articulated into three inter-connected programmatic ‘pillars’, namely (i) Governance, Justice and Reconciliation; (ii) Reconstruction; and (iii) Economic Recovery. Within each of these three pillars, ‘Foundational and Short-Term Activities’ (FaST) needed to provide tangible peace dividends and the building blocks for long-term recovery and development programs were specified. The FaST Activities were also conceived to complement and coordinate with ongoing projects being implemented by UN agencies, GoS and other development partners.

Under the FaST, a total of 12 FaST Activities were implemented: under Pillar 1 (3 activities), Pillar 2 (7 activities) and Pillar 3 (2 activities). The activities were implemented by 13 UN partners throughout the five states of Darfur during 2016-2019. Ten of these activities involved joint projects with 2 partners or more implementing the activity. Total funding to the 12 activities was $ 89.978 million (Table 1)

The funding was through the United Nations Fund for Recovery Reconstruction and Development in Darfur (UNDF), a multi donor trust fund established in 2015 to support the key components of the Darfur Development Strategy (DDS) in pursuit of the overall objective of the DDPD. The UNDF had been supported by a single donor, Qatar through the Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD), while other donors provided their support through bi-lateral funding, aligning however, their support to the DDS Pillars. The UNDF was established under the overall leadership of the former Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), and with participation of the Government of Sudan (GoS). As stipulated in its founding agreement, all programmes/projects funded by UNDF should be in support of, and strictly aligned with the priorities of the GoS and the former DRA to ensuring full national ownership. In addition, the UNDF was intended to complement other support for recovery and development in Darfur by Sudan’s partners and therefore, contribute to developing capacity and promoting sustainability.

2. FINAL EVALUATION
2.1 Objective and Purpose of the Evaluation
The overall objective of the evaluation, as specified in the evaluation TOR (Annex 1), is to assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, inclusiveness, and sustainability of the UNDF-funded 12 FaST Activities implemented in the Five States of Darfur. The main purpose of the evaluation is:

- To establish and document the positive impact and any unintended consequences of UNDF funded activities;
- To validate UNDF FaST activities results in terms of achievements toward the fund goal and outputs;
- To assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, economy, impact and sustainability of UNDF interventions and its contribution to early recovery and development of Darfur;

• To document lessons learned, best practices, success stories and challenges to inform future initiatives;
• And to formulate informed recommendations on future programmatic vision for UNDF, including the processes and governance mechanisms of the Fund.

2.2 Scope of the Evaluation
The scope of the final evaluation will involve the following components:
• UNDF achievements through projects funded under the Foundational and Short-Term Activities (FaST) between January 2016 – June 2019;
• The modality and methods used for defining priority areas, selection of projects and disbursement of funds and the advantage and disadvantage of each fund disbursement mechanism;
• The organizational structure of UNDF and the Technical Secretariat and its ability in monitoring projects, providing technical support, collating lessons learned and sharing them with UNDF partners and other actors, and coordination of exerted efforts;
• And the synergism and complementarity between UNDF and other similar programs and funding mechanism e.g., SHF, DCPSF.

2.3 Evaluation Criteria
As informed by the TOR, the evaluation was based on a multi-layered perspective specifically involving:
  i. Criteria at the level of the 12 implemented activities. Main criteria employed included: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, inclusiveness (including gender and youth), lessons learned, and sustainability of UNDF-funded 12 FaST Activities implemented and impacts.
  ii. At the level of UNDF as a funding mechanism. The main criteria to be used will include: UNDF as funding modality involving methods used for defining priority targeted areas, selection of projects and disbursement of funds; organizational structure of UNDF and the Technical Secretariat and its ability in monitoring projects, coordinating, providing technical support, collating lessons and knowledge sharing. UNDF synergism and complementarity with other similar programs and funding mechanism e.g., SHF, DCPSF involving issues of coordination, communication and exchange of information; and knowledge sharing was also investigated.

2.4 Evaluability analysis: Recognizing the nature and objectives of the FaST Activities, the analysis was intended to focus primarily on the level of outcomes. However, assessment of the physical performance at the projects (output level) was considered essential as it significantly influences the resultant outcomes.

2.5 Cross-cutting issues: Gender, youth, environment, climate change and capacity development had been explicitly integrated as cross-cutting issues from the outset of the evaluation. Specific evaluation questions were designed for that purpose.

2.6 Evaluation Approach and Methodology
Evaluation is a formal, evidence-based procedure that inherently involves establishing a “theory of change” or “intervention logic” that provides a description of the cascade of cause and effect leading from an intervention to its desired effects. According to UNDP\(^1\), evaluation analyses the level of achievement of both expected and unexpected results by examining the results chain, processes, contextual factors and causality while providing credible, useful, evidence-based information that enables the timely incorporation of its findings, recommendations and lessons into the decision-making processes of organizations and stakeholders. From this perspective the 12 FaST Activities under consideration and their funding mechanism (UNDF) were placed within

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\(^1\) UNDP, 2019, UNDP Evaluation Guidelines
the broad framework of the Darfur Development Strategy DDS objectives and priorities for recovery and development in Darfur. The study approach was effectively designed and engineered as gender-sensitive approach geared to effectively addressing issues of gender participation, equality, vulnerability, and social inclusion. To that end a wide range of questions intended to serve this objective were included in the evaluation key questions checklist that guided the consultation process.

The identified evaluation criteria reflect enormous demands for data. To satisfy these demands the evaluation will opt to an eclectic approach that recognizes the interconnectedness among the 12 FasST Activities and the linkages to the dynamics of Darfur context.

Recognizing the enormous limitations imposed by Covid-19 pandemic and the associated restrictions on direct field work, the evaluation will be grounded in a remote undertaking process using the following data collection tools:

a. **Desk review**: Rigorous review and analysis of available relevant data was undertaken. Major documents reviewed and consulted included: DDS, DDS Review Report, UNDF Project Document, UNDF ToR and Results Framework, UNDF Projects Progress Reports, Final UNDF Report, Field Monitoring Reports, Project Completion Reports, Projects Physical Achievements data, and Back to Office Reports.

b. **Consultation meetings** with implementing agencies/partners: This involved virtual and face-to face meetings with the relevant staff and focal points of the implementing agencies including; UNICEF, UNDP, FAO, UNIDO, UN-Women, UN Environment, UN-Habitat, ILO, UNOPS, IOM, and WHO. Meeting with UNHCR was organized twice but not realized due to reasons pertaining to UNHCR itself. The discussion and consultation meetings were guided by the main questions of the evaluation already prepared during the inception phase and approved by UNDP. The consultation meetings were strictly guided by a checklist containing the key evaluation questions (Annex 1) and which was already shared and approved by the UNDP in the evaluation inception report.

c. **Interviews of UNDF Secretariat**: A comprehensive interview was undertaken with the coordinator of the UNDF Secretariat. The discussion, which proved very valuable for this evaluation, focused on the substantive issues related to the UNDF as funding modality; selection of projects and disbursement of funds; organizational structure of UNDF and the Technical Secretariat and its ability in monitoring projects, coordinating, providing technical support, collating lessons and knowledge sharing; and UNDF synergism and complementarity with other similar programs involving issues of coordination, communication and exchange of information and knowledge sharing.

d. **Consultation with UNDF partners**: A joint consultation meeting was held with UNDF primary partners, namely the focal points of the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) Commissions. The meeting was held at the office of Darfur Land Commission (DLC) and attended by representatives of DLC, Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission (VRRC); the Justice, Truth and Reconciliation Commission (JTRC); and the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund (DRDF). The nature of partnership and its effectiveness, coordination and communication, the contribution of the 12 FaST Projects to the overall recovery environment in Darfur, the relevance of FaST Projects approach as stipulated in the DDS, lessons learned, and sustainability issues were thoroughly discussed and assessed.

e. **In-depth focusing** on selected projects: Recognizing the limitation of time and the difficulty of accessing the field, eight sampled projects had purposefully been selected for more in-depth analysis. The sampling process was guided by coverage of the three DDS Pillars; representation of all implementing agencies, representation of individually and jointly implemented projects and project cost where high and medium costs were considered. The possibility of learning from projects addressing major drivers of conflict in Darfur such as land issue was also considered. Table 1 below provides a summary of the sampling projects.
Table 1: Sampling projects and implementing agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Sample Project</th>
<th>Implementers</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Darfur Community Based Reintegration and Stabilization Programme</td>
<td>UNDP, UN-Women, UNFPA</td>
<td>11,794,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Strengthening Land Management for Peaceful Coexistence in Darfur</td>
<td>UNDP, UN-Habitat, FAO</td>
<td>6,079,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Rehabilitation/Construction of Access Roads and Crossing Points</td>
<td>UNOPS, ILO</td>
<td>11,618,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Construction of Public Facilities and Housing in Return Sites and Urban Settings</td>
<td>UN-Habitat</td>
<td>5,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Increased Access to and Use of Sustainable Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Services in Darfur</td>
<td>UNICEF, WHO, UNEP, IOM</td>
<td>10,807,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Upgrading and Rehabilitating of Health Facilities and Public Health Services in Return Sites</td>
<td>WHO, UNFPA, UN-Habitat, UNICEF</td>
<td>13,076,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Promotion of Sustainable Return and Reintegration of IDPs and Refugees</td>
<td>UNDP, UNHCR</td>
<td>5,050,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Recovery of Livelihoods of Vulnerable Farming and Pastoral Communities</td>
<td>FAO, UNOPS, ILO</td>
<td>4,930,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.7 Methodological limitations:
The evaluation process was negatively impacted by four major problems, namely:

a. The evaluation was undertaken in the midst of the second wave of Covid-19 that restricted direct field work and collection of primary data from the direct stakeholders of the implemented activities. In the process, the concrete field-based evidence had been compromised. In addition, the contextual internal socioeconomic, political and environmental dynamics affecting the implementation of the project have not been fully grasped. The Covid-19 pandemic had also restricted most of the consultation meetings to virtual processes, therefore, denying the consultants the privilege of face-to-face discussions which are usually more effective and informative.

b. The evident change in the project implementation staff: At the time of the evaluation, the overwhelmed senior staff, specifically project managers and focal points, commissioned by the different agencies to implement the projects were not in place. Because of that, some of the consultations were held with staff members who were not directly or fully engaged with the projects;

c. Data inconsistency: A huge body of secondary data pertaining to the FaST projects was availed to the consultants. However, the data was replete with inconsistent and sometimes contradictory data, for example the number of projects, the cost of projects and sometimes the implementation sites. This had created the task of the consultants as an extremely difficult task. This could be attributed to two major factors: (a) the coordinator of the UNDF Technical Secretariat and who was the manager and custodian of FaST data and information had already left the UNDP, and by definition the position; (b) the evident weakness of the monitoring and evaluation process of FaST projects.

d. Reporting quality: The overwhelming reporting on the projects was against the activities, with few exceptions of reporting on the outcomes making it extremely difficult from the reports to assess or to evaluate the outcomes of the projects while forcing the consultants to focus principally on the consultation meeting results.
The absence of standardized reporting system had also restricted full adherence to standardized presentation of the FaST Projects in Section 5 of this report.

3. MAPPING THE CONTEXT AND FaST PROJECTS

3.1 Darfur context
The conflict in Darfur has created a tragic and complicated crisis. Virtually, the entire population of Darfur, an estimated eight to nine million, is arguably affected by the conflict and face enormous risks to their safety. The IDPs (around two million) are still in the camps and continue to live in appalling human conditions. Livelihoods options remain extremely limited after long years of conflict and strategies pursued and adopted remain insufficient to meet basic needs or alternatively are based on coercive or exploitative relationships.

The spread of armed groups, targeted violence and vibrant war economy have combined to create an environment conducive to social disasters and widespread insecurities that make the possibilities for massive and sustained voluntary retain a remote possibility. Government services – especially health, education and water services to the rural communities have been overloaded or stopped. The conflict damaged and destroyed infrastructure, seriously curtailed markets and disrupted trade, and employment opportunities. The delivery of services has been severely constrained by insecurities, limited human resources and the apparent systemic weaknesses of service institutions to perform their mandate and responsibilities. Tribal confrontations associated with competition over land and power, has turned to be a defining feature of Darfur social landscape, adding to the polarization of Darfur society along ethnic, tribal and geographical lines. Women and children remain the main victims of the conflict and the subject to a wide range of social violence. Climate change and environmental degradation add to the intensification of the crisis and its social impacts.

3.2. The DDS 2013-2019
A key theme of the DDPD (2011) is the transition from relief to recovery and development, as a prerequisite for constituting peace in Darfur. To that end, the Darfur Development Strategy (DDS) was developed. The DDS, reviewed in 2019, was envisioned as a sequenced, coordinated and holistic plan which is vital to move Darfur out of the cycle of conflict and poverty, towards a stable and prosperous future. Informed by the needs and priorities of communities, identified through comprehensive, consultative workshops in all five Darfur states and the refugee communities in Chad, the Darfur Development Strategy (DDS) 2013-2019 evolved. The DDS represents a sequenced transitional programme along with the delivery of tangible immediate peace dividends that lays the foundational groundwork necessary to move Darfur out of the cycle of conflict and poverty, towards a stable and prosperous future.

The programmatic component of the DDS is articulated in the form of three inter-connected ‘pillars’, namely (i) Governance, Justice and Reconciliation; (ii) Reconstruction; and (iii) Economic Recovery. Within each of these three pillars, the DDS foresaw a sequenced approach based on ‘Foundational and Short-Term Activities’ (FaST), needed to provide tangible peace dividends while providing essential pre-cursors and pre-requisites for recovery and longer-term development in Darfur. As immediate initiatives, the FaST interventions, according to the DDS can, and should, be either completed within 12 months or largely established and executed during this timeframe.

Most importantly, they identified those activities. The FaST Activities were also conceived to complement and coordinate with ongoing projects being implemented by UN agencies, GoS and other development partners. They should also ensure coherence and adherence to the priorities identified through the DDS and close coordination and complementarity amongst the participating humanitarian and development actors.
3.3 The DDS FaST Projects Implemented

Under the FaST, a total of 12 FaST Projects were implemented: under Pillar 1 (3 activities), Pillar 2 (7 activities) and Pillar 3 (2 activities). The activities were implemented by 13 UN partners throughout the five states of Darfur during 2016-2018. Ten of these activities involved joint projects with 2 partners or more implementing the activity. The total funding available to the 12 activities was $ 89.978 million (Table 2).

The funding was through the United Nations Fund for Recovery Reconstruction and Development in Darfur (UNDF), a multi donor trust fund established in 2015 to support the key components of the Darfur Development Strategy (DDS) in pursuit of the overall objective of the DDPD. The UNDF was established under the overall leadership of the former Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), and with participation of the Government of Sudan (GoS). As stipulated in its founding agreement, all programmes/projects funded by UNDF should be in support of, and strictly aligned with the priorities of the GoS and the former DRA to ensuring full national ownership. In addition, the UNDF was intended to complement other support for recovery and development in Darfur by Sudan’s partners and therefore, contribute to developing capacity and promoting sustainability. To that end the UNDF Technical Secretariat was established and mandated with the overall management of the project.

Table 2: FaST Projects implemented in Darfur 2016-2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>implementers</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Pillar 1: Governance, Justice and Reconciliation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Promote Reconciliation and Coexistence for Sustainable Peace</td>
<td>UNDP, UN-Women</td>
<td>5,550,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Darfur Community Based Reintegration and Stabilization Programme</td>
<td>UNDP, UN-Women, UNFPA, UNAMID</td>
<td>11,794,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Strengthening Land Management for Peaceful Coexistence in Darfur</td>
<td>UNDP, UN-Habitat, FAO</td>
<td>6,079,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Pillar 2: Reconstruction</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Rehabilitation/Construction of Access Roads and Crossing Points</td>
<td>UNOPS, ILO</td>
<td>11,618,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Construction of Public Facilities and Housing in Return Sites</td>
<td>UN-Habitat</td>
<td>5,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Increased Access to and Use of Sustainable Water, Sanitation and</td>
<td>UNICEF, WHO, UNEP, IOM</td>
<td>10,807,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hygiene (WASH) Services Underpinned by Improved Integrated Water</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resources Management (IWRM) in Darfur</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Darfur Solar Electrification Project</td>
<td>UNDP, UNIDO</td>
<td>5,689,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Upgrading and Rehabilitating Health Facilities and Public Health</td>
<td>WHO, UNFPA, UN-Habitat</td>
<td>13,076,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Services in Return Sites</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Promotion of Sustainable Return and Reintegration of IDPs and</td>
<td>UNDP, UNHCR</td>
<td>5,050,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Accelerated Learning Programme and Access to Employment Opportunities</td>
<td>UNICEF, UNDP</td>
<td>6,105,955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to out of School Children and Youth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Pillar 3: Economic recovery</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Microfinance for Young and Poor Producers in Rural Areas of Darfur</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Recovery of Livelihoods of Vulnerable Farming and Pastoral Communities</td>
<td>FAO, UNOPS, ILO</td>
<td>4,930,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The geographical distribution of the projects in the Five Darfur States (Table 3) shows that the projects were implemented in 514 sites in the Five States. However, the number of implementation sites varies considerably between the States, from 126 sites in West Darfur to 79 sites in East Darfur.

Table 3: Distribution of projects by State, Localities and No of sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Pillar 1</th>
<th>Pillar 2</th>
<th>Pillar 3</th>
<th>Localities and Sites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PR C</td>
<td>SLM</td>
<td>RA R</td>
<td>CP R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Darfur</td>
<td>4 3 6</td>
<td>3 2 6</td>
<td>4 3 5</td>
<td>2 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of Localities</td>
<td>7 3 15</td>
<td>17 2</td>
<td>14 7 5</td>
<td>17 5 24 126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and sites</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Darfur</td>
<td>3 1 5</td>
<td>4 1 4</td>
<td>6 2 7</td>
<td>5 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of Localities</td>
<td>3 1 19</td>
<td>9 2 10</td>
<td>16 22 10</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and sites</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Darfur</td>
<td>3 1 4</td>
<td>2 3 5</td>
<td>9 4 0.0</td>
<td>5 2 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of Localities</td>
<td>3 1 9</td>
<td>8 4 10</td>
<td>19 7 0.0</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and sites</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Darfur</td>
<td>2 1 9</td>
<td>2 3 5</td>
<td>9 4 0.0</td>
<td>4 2 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of Localities</td>
<td>2 1 26</td>
<td>8 6 10</td>
<td>16 6 6</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and sites</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Darfur</td>
<td>4 2 7</td>
<td>1 3 6</td>
<td>12 5 2</td>
<td>5 2 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of Localities</td>
<td>4 3 12</td>
<td>5 3 10</td>
<td>14 5 4</td>
<td>12 2 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and sites</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Sites</td>
<td>19 9</td>
<td>81 47</td>
<td>50 27</td>
<td>80 42 64 514</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The distribution also reflects apparent variations between the different projects in terms of implementation sites. While Strengthening Land Management for Peaceful Coexistence in Darfur and the Accelerated Learning Project and Access to Employment Opportunities were implemented in 81 and 80 sites, respectively, the Darfur Community Based Reintegration and Stabilization Project and Promotion of Sustainable Return and Reintegration of IDPs and Refugees were implemented in 9 and 13 sites, respectively. The uneven distribution by localities in the same State is also conspicuous (Fig 1). While localities like El Geneina in West Darfur hosted 47 intervention sites others like Kulbus Locality in the same State hosted only one implementation sites.

Fig 1: No of implementation Sites by State

Fig 2: FaST Activities Sites by State and Locality

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2 Based on data presented in Table 3 and extracted from UNDF Final Report, UNDP, 2019
4. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

4.1 Brief Overview of DDS Objectives, Scope and Strategic Approach

The DDS was developed in 2012 and reflected the outputs of the *Darfur Joint Assessment Mission* (DJAM) which was foreseen in Article 32 of the DDPD as the vehicle through which the recovery and development priorities outlined in Article 31 would be assessed, identified and costed. The DJAM and development of the DDS were large-scale exercises involving a range of national and international stakeholders, and extensive consultations at both Khartoum and Darfur levels. As stated in the DDS document, a key overall strategic objective of the DDS was to provide a “sequenced, coordinated and holistic plan for equitable, sustainable and participatory development, vital to move Darfur out of a cycle of conflict and poverty, towards a stable and prosperous future” (DDS document, p. xvi). Underlying this objective there were several strategic prerogatives which underscored the rationale, relevance and strategic importance of the DDS, namely:

- The need to capitalize on the window of peace and opportunity offered by the DDPD, even if imperfect, in order to address core conflict drivers, address recovery needs and enable sustainable development;
• The necessity of responding to the demands of Darfuri citizens for support in addressing key needs and enabling a return to stability and normalcy;
• A recognition that in 2013, conditions were more conducive for a shift to development, while recognizing that there would never be a ‘perfect’ time to initiate recovery;
• The urgency and importance of addressing long-standing economic, social and governance grievances in Darfur through developmental approaches in order to break the cycle of conflict;
• The need to better calibrate humanitarian and development assistance and limit the socioeconomic distortions created by the dominant focus on humanitarian assistance alone.

Based on this strategic objective and the priorities for recovery and development outlined in Article 31 of the DDPD, the DDS document provides a comprehensive strategy and approach comprising a detailed analysis of the situation and needs across relevant sectors; corresponding priorities and related financial requirements; and a governance, coordination and financing architecture to ensure implementation and alignment of national and international efforts within the DDS framework. At the core of this strategy and approach were several fundamental principles which were intended to shape national and international efforts, namely:

• A transformational approach to recovery and development (not return to status quo ante);
• A comprehensive, holistic and integrated approach to programming in order to address the complex and multi-sectoral nature of conflict drivers and recovery needs;
• A sequenced and prioritized approach to implementation that focused both on tangible immediate peace dividends while laying the groundwork for sustainable development;
• A focus on supporting a transition from humanitarian to development efforts;
• Establishment of a sustainable framework for recovery and development planning and financial management.

The programmatic component of the DDS, which outlined the specific strategies for addressing the priorities identified in Article 31 of the DDPD and assessed through the 2012 DJAM, was articulated in the form of three inter-connected ‘pillars’, namely Governance, Justice and Reconciliation; Reconstruction; and Economic Recovery. These pillars regrouped the results of the work of the ten DJAM thematic working groups and extensive consultations at Darfur level, with each comprising of several objectives and expected outcomes as illustrated in Table 4 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: DDS Pillar Objectives and Outcomes</th>
<th>Sub-Objectives and Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governance, Justice and Reconciliation</td>
<td>• Strengthened Local Governance Systems, Structures and Processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall objective:</td>
<td>• Public delivery system that is appropriately staffed and managed at State and Locality level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To support State governments in more effectively executing their mandate, especially at local level, and oversee recovery of the region and initiate revival of basic infrastructure and support to conflict-affected populations.</td>
<td>• Enhanced Citizen Participation in Governance and Service Delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Improved budgeting and increased own source revenue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Intergovernmental transfers more transparent, efficient and equitable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Improved access to justice (Gender balanced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Successful social and economic reintegration of demobilized armed forces (including special groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Security Sector Reform implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reconciliation and conflict management process and mechanisms established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Improved land registration/property system and related conflict resolution mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• People having access to a compensation system and compensation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reconstruction

**Overall objective:**
To support the recovery and stabilization of war-affected populations, whose economic and social life has been severely disrupted.

- Improved physical access to goods, markets and administrative and social services
- Increase access to improved water sources and sanitation
- Increase access to electricity services
- Enhance access to and utilization of comprehensive health and nutrition services
- Improved access to and quality of education
- Successful social and economic reintegration of returnees (including special groups)
- Improved quality of urban environment and access to planned land for residents in major towns of Darfur
- Improved access to quality urban housing and services

Economic Recovery

**Overall objective:**
To contribute positively towards poverty alleviation and transitioning Darfur to development in an equitable and environmentally sustainable manner.

- Improved agricultural and livestock policies, regulatory instruments and institutional arrangements
- Improved crop and livestock production and productivity
- Improved value chains in livestock, agriculture and livelihoods development
- Improved business enabling environment and institutional capacity
- Increased access to employment opportunities
- Increase access to financial services
- Sustainable management of water, land and forest resources


For each of these Pillars, the DDS document provided a brief narrative strategy, a matrix outlining key outputs and indicators associated with each of the above objectives, and indicative financial requirements. The latter is broken down into ‘Foundational and Short-Term Activities’ (FaST), which comprised those interventions needed to provide the building blocks for long-term recovery and development programs; and the longer-term interventions and programs themselves.

### 4.2 Overall Impact and Effectiveness of the DDS

In 2013 when the DDS was launched there was considerable optimism that the DDPD could herald the start of transition to peace and development in Darfur. The DDS reflected this optimism in the ambitiousness of its objectives and approach, which were predicated on a comprehensive strategy for addressing root causes of conflict, inequality and underdevelopment. Unfortunately, the DDPD did not live up to expectations of serving as an all-encompassing framework for peace, and 2013-2019 period was marked by continued conflict, violence and insecurity and an environment that was not conducive for large-scale governance, institutional and economic reforms and programmes. Although numerous development-oriented interventions were implemented in Darfur during this period, the DDS was not totally successful to serve as a programmatic framework to guide and monitor efforts.

Developing an accurate assessment of the overall impact and effectiveness of the DDS in relation to its original vision and strategic objectives is extremely challenging. Many national and international stakeholders highlighted the usefulness of the DDS sectoral assessments and the pillar strategies in informing some of their efforts, as well as the continued relevance and salience of the overall DDS strategy and specific priorities as originally formulated. At the same time, the prevailing political context in Darfur and Sudan as a whole constrained its role and effectiveness in achieving meaningful results and impacts on peacebuilding, recovery and development trajectories, or in facilitating more coherent international and national efforts. Many of the contextual and sectoral challenges, priorities and needs identified during the DJAM and reflected in the DDS remain. Accordingly, for the most part, efforts across the three pillars have been significantly fragmented, uncoordinated and highly
In addition, overall financing and the scope of interventions was not sufficient to achieve meaningful impact at scale in relation to pillar objectives. Available data (Table 5) shows that the overall financing requirement for the DDS was estimated at US$ 7.25 billion, including US$ 177.4 required for FaST Activities. Between 2013-2019, US$ 711.3 million was committed by international partners and US$ 350 million allocated by the GoS resulting in total DDS funding of $1.61 billion accounting for 14.4% of the total fund requirements reflecting the gross underfunding of the DDS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DDS Pillar</th>
<th>Total Financial Requirements</th>
<th>FaST (included in total requirements)</th>
<th>International funding commitment 2013-02019</th>
<th>GoS Funding Allocations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pillar I: Governance, Justice &amp; Reconciliation</td>
<td>$854 million</td>
<td>$25.5 million</td>
<td>$146.1 million</td>
<td>$350 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar II: Reconstruction</td>
<td>$5.0 billion</td>
<td>$132.9 million</td>
<td>$392.8 million</td>
<td>$350 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar III: Economic Recovery</td>
<td>$1.4 billion</td>
<td>$19.0 million</td>
<td>$ 172.4 million</td>
<td>$350 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$7.245 billion</td>
<td>$177.4 million</td>
<td>$711.3 million</td>
<td>$350 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DDS Review Report, Vol. 1, UNDP

The DDS Review Report 2019 attributed the problem of DDS underfunding to the followings:

a. The absence of a mechanism to align government, bilateral and other sources of financing against DDS priorities has resulted in a fragmentation of development efforts, contributing to the overall weak alignment of development interventions against the DDS overall.

b. Little effective coordination of national and international financing against DDS objectives and priorities.

c. The general reluctance and absence of willingness among international actors to formally allocate financing against the DDS or through dedicated financing structures. This possibly explains why the UNDF only received financing through one donor – Qatar – while most donors continued to provide financing through established bilateral channels or through facilities and funds that pre-dated the DDS (for instance the DCSPF).

d. GoS allocation and channelling of its own resources through a parallel plan to the DDS and through the DRDF, as opposed to the proposed Darfur Facility as originally intended.

4.3 Pillar 1: Governance, Justice and Reconciliation

The overall goal of DDS Pillar 1 is to improve governance by building representative, responsive and effective government institutions accountable to communities wishing to transition from conflict and displacement towards rehabilitation and recovery. DDS objectives focused on governance reform, improved access to justice, land reform, and reconciliation at community and higher levels. Pillar 1 contains eleven strategic objectives which have been grouped into four thematic areas for the purposes of the review.

Pillar 1 addresses issues considered to be among the root causes of conflict in Darfur. The pillar strategy is broad and ambitious. Alongside development measures focused on institutional reform, it envisaged activities considered part of the early stages of recovery from conflict (peacebuilding, DDR and compensation for loss of assets and harm). The priorities addressed under Pillar 1 are politically complex and linked to questions of access to power and resources. As such, progress in Pillar 1 was dependent on core DDS assumptions, namely a political climate conducive to the implementation of the DDPD, and an enabling institutional environment at Federal level conducive to state-level reforms.

Pillar 1 thematic areas are interlinked. For example, institution-building and better governance is required to address conflict root causes. Pillar 1 has links to DDS Pillars 2 and 3. Governance processes and institutional
capacities are needed to ensure that infrastructure and public services are equitably provided, appropriate to community needs, and can be maintained. Economic recovery requires appropriate regulatory and tax provision, and insecurity and land occupation are critical barriers to return.

**Overall Findings**

Generally, programming and achievements in Pillar 1 sectors have been modest relative to DDS objectives. Recovery and development needs remain critical, as highlighted in the key developments section. International financing aligned with Pillar 1 objectives amounted to a small proportion of needs identified in the DDS (US$ 146.1 million out of a total of US$ 845 million). While the DDS articulated relevant strategic priorities, it did not succeed in galvanizing coherent efforts or strengthening sectoral coordination.

In the governance sector, progress in improving institutional systems and capacities across public delivery, local governance and public financial management systems was extremely limited, although some good practice was developed in individual basic services sectors. In the rule of law sector, while political and contextual constraints limited impacts, UN assistance led to progress including increased numbers of rural courts and cases resolved, development of responses to SGBV, and legal reform. In the peacebuilding sector, no progress occurred on compensation. An effective locality and state level peace architecture, and processes to address root causes of conflict and critical issues such as land occupation were generally not developed.

Progress at community level was secured through integrated models which combined governance and dispute resolution mechanisms and capacities with tangible inputs such as infrastructure and livelihoods, designed to meet community needs and address local drivers of conflict. Results in areas of operation included effective processes for resolution of local disputes, which supported a fragile social peace. Interaction between groups, trust and social cohesion appears to have increased. Community governance mechanisms supported management of natural resources and collective capacities for participatory planning. Civil society skills and networks were developed, and new community-based organisations set up. There are examples of inclusive participation and increased roles and voice for women and youth. Instances of women accessing justice through human rights based and paralegal support in the community emerged.

Limitations in programming and results reflected both the ambitious nature of DDS objectives, and the lack of an enabling environment. Key DDS assumptions proved to be unrealistic. For example, the strong assumption in the DDS that there would be rapid, large-scale returns to areas of origin following the signing of the DDPD did not occur. Similarly, much of Pillar 2’s proposed programming was centred on a massive public works campaign to deliver dramatically improved transport, energy and WASH infrastructure across the five states. Only a very small fraction of international and government financing needed for this work was ever mobilized. Moreover, and as maintained by the DDS Review Report, even if the billions of dollars in funding required for these works would have materialized, the ability of communities and local and state government to absorb, appropriate and sustainably manage these investments in such a short time is questionable.

Critical constraints to DDS implementation included the political context, lack of an inclusive peace agreement between GoS and armed opposition and a governance model which prioritized control from the Centre and regime survival. Lack of a clear framework for decentralization and for institutional mandates at different levels curtailed governance reform. Limitations in donor coherence, and shared root causes analysis and strategic planning was a further factor, with support in some areas projectized and fragmented. Operational constraints included the economic crisis, limited implementing partner capacity and difficulties in access to remote areas. Pillar 1 concerns emerged as key barriers to return. These include lack of political and technical solutions to land occupation, limitations in security and justice provision, and in capacities to coordinate and plan across basic services sectors.

The state remained unable to meet human needs and to ensure equitable access to resources, and responsive and accountable governance. Such capacity is necessary if impacts of environmental and demographic change are to
be managed. These are governance challenges which need to be addressed by effective institutions. Systematic holistic reform of public delivery, local governance and community bodies, calibrated according to political conditions, to develop streamlined clear institutional frameworks and capacities is needed. This requires political will and a strategic sequenced approach from the centre, implemented at locality and state level; and harmonized development partner efforts, with transition to support through GoS systems. Improved capacity at locality level is critical, along with coordination across basic service sectors.

The new political dispensation under the Constitutional Declaration mandates an increased focus on accountability processes, community engagement and empowering people to claim entitlements. Harmonized support to civil society and community governance would support this.

Building on results and lessons of integrated community models, and the knowledge of key I/NGO implementing partners could lead to harmonized integrated approaches to sustainable development at community level, incorporating consensus and peacebuilding over natural resources and basic services. Inclusive work with all groups, on an area, possibly eco-systems basis is suggested.

In line with Chapter 15 of the Constitutional Declaration, issues of land occupation and compensation need to be addressed through dialogue and negotiation processes above community level. Needs for protection, access to justice and responsive police and justice sector institutions remain critical. In the rule of law sector, Constitutional Declaration commitments endorse the centrality of human rights, the fight against impunity and accountability principles. Legal and institutional reform is needed to deliver impartial, independent institutions. An increased focus on access to justice in the community, and ensuring service provision is driven by community needs is suggested.

Underlying causes of gender inequality and lack of access for women to political and economic resources and decision-making roles need to be understood and addressed, and women’s organisations and networks empowered to work strategically together. Youth representatives stressed to the review team not their needs, but their wish to be agents of change and implementers of future DDS activities. Top-down approaches, and lack of understanding of the growing influence of youth structures in some contexts prevent this important potential being realized.

**4.4 Pillar 2: Reconstruction**

**Overall Findings**

Most of the goals for Pillar 2 presented in the current DDS were wholly or partially unrealized. This is partly due to the fact that international financing for Pillar 2 objectives amounted to only a fraction of the total needs identified in the current DDS budget (8% of the total required). It also reflects the lack of a conducive environment for many of the investments and reforms that would have been necessary for significant progress in the Pillar 2 sectors. As a result, humanitarian funding (which has not been accounted for in the following analysis) continued to play a predominant role in meeting needs related to Pillar 2—particularly with respect to basic services. This helped to address short-term requirements of Darfur populations, but insufficiently laid the groundwork for sustainable development in the sectors. As a result, the recovery and long-term development needs in each of Pillar 2’s thematic areas remain critical.

The ambitious and—in hindsight—overly optimistic planning that characterized the DDS is particularly apparent in several prominent areas of Pillar 2. For example, the strong assumption in the DDS that there would be rapid, large-scale returns to areas of origin following the signing of the DDPD did not occur. The number of IDPs in protracted displacement is nearly the same as in 2013, owing largely to the fact that key pre-conditions for returns (primarily security, access to land and basic services) have not been met in many areas. In addition, current trends highlight that the number of IDPs who will choose to stay in the current areas of urban displacement will be significant, a fact which was recognized but underemphasized in the current DDS. Similarly, much of Pillar 2’s
proposed programming was centred on a massive public works campaign to deliver dramatically improved transport, energy and WASH infrastructure across the five states. Only a very small fraction of international and government financing needed for this work was ever mobilized. Moreover, even if the billions of dollars in funding required for these works would have materialized, the ability of communities and local and state government to absorb, appropriate and sustainably manage these investments in such a short time is questionable.

The division of the DDS into short-term FaST programming and longer-term priorities make good sense in theory, particularly for Pillar 2’s infrastructure-related sectors. However, while the DDS envisioned these short-term projects taking place within one year to 18 months, many took multiple years to launch and then complete, given the complexities of working in Darfur. This is another example of the more realistic approach to planning that needs to be taken into account for future programming.

Despite the challenges noted above, a handful of innovative development projects in several sectors under Pillar 2, including WASH infrastructure, road repair, health, and education provide a template for how high-impact and cost-effective development-oriented programming in infrastructure and basic services could be carried out at scale. Looking forward, programming for Pillar 2 in a future DDS should also be more realistic about the quantity of near-term funds that would be available for development programming in Darfur, prioritizing more modestly scaled, integrated interventions.

As opposed to the large, stand-alone public works campaign envisioned in the current DDS, infrastructure investments should be closely integrated into area-based and community-driven programmes linked to other sectors across all three Pillars. This will both ensure that given infrastructure outlays contribute to broader development goals and that there is a greater likelihood of being sustainably managed. This applies to infrastructure related to basic services (WASH, education and health), as well as transport and energy-related infrastructure.

For returns programming, a future DDS should recognize that holistic, multi-sectoral programming over longer periods of time will likely be necessary to address the root causes currently impeding large-scale returns. Progress on the displacement issue will require significant increases in multi-year, multi-sectoral funding. Lessons from the few successful projects in the sphere highlight that achieving durable solutions takes time and resources, and funding needs to be adjusted to meet these realities on the ground. To do so effectively, returns programming should be integrated as a transversal theme throughout peacebuilding, livelihoods and natural resources management initiatives. This will facilitate a shift away from viewing returns as a one-off assistance package, and instead recognize returns as a longer-term development outcome that needs to be carefully fostered through a multi-sectoral approach, and as a part of the political economy realities, if it is to be durable. A future DDS should also anticipate and plan for a significant percentage of IDP households preferring to integrate within the urban areas in which they have been living for the past decade or more. Proactive, pro-poor investments in urban infrastructure and urban planning can ensure that cities and towns in Darfur are able to not just manage this integration but improve lives for IDPs and host communities alike.

Finally, a strengthened knowledge base for Pillar 2 sectors is also critical. An updated census is badly needed to inform basic services programming, as mentioned by a number of informants across sectors during the Review. Similarly, improved displacement programming needs to be based on accurate intentions data, and a scaling up of the Durable Solutions Working Group’s experiences with IDP profiling should thus be explored.

4.5 Pillar 3: Economic Recovery
The main objective of Pillar 3 is described as contributing positively towards poverty alleviation and a transition to development through a three-pronged approach that includes support to rural and urban livelihoods; enhancing the business environment, including through access to financing and private sector development; and improving sustainability of productive sectors through better natural resource management. The main objective of Pillar 3
is described as contributing positively towards poverty alleviation and transitioning Darfur to development through a three-pronged approach:

- Support to key livelihoods, centred on crop and livestock production, and enhanced agricultural and livestock policies, regulatory instruments and institutional arrangements.
- Increasing access to key livelihoods and financial services, centred on facilitating a conducive business enabling environment, institutional capacity and private sector development.
- Sustainability of productive sectors through natural resource management, with a focus on land, forest resources and water.

This is translated into seven objectives (each with a number of sub-objectives and outputs), as follows:

1. Improved agricultural and livestock policies, regulatory instruments and institutional arrangements.
2. Improved crop and livestock production and productivity.
3. Improved value chains in livestock, agriculture and livelihoods development.
4. Improved business enabling environment and institutional capacity.
5. Increased access to employment opportunities.
6. Increased access to financial services.
7. Sustainable management of water, land and forest resources.

Overall Findings

Generally, the programming and achievements in the last six years that relate to Pillar 3 have been modest compared with the DDS objectives. This is due both to the overly ambitious scope of Pillar 3 objectives, and the lack of a broader enabling environment due to the inability of the DDPD to deliver peace and stability in Darfur. While the DDS framework and structure identified priorities for economic recovery, it did not contribute to a collective vision and strategy, nor significantly strengthen the coordination architecture. Moreover, the depth and seriousness of the Sudanese economic crisis has had a major impact on all sectors of the economy and on the prospects for economic growth in Darfur. This has impacted and constrained the success of many development interventions. Furthermore, poverty reduction and the process of social change and transformation require longer time horizon and conducive environment and commitment from the Government side.

The learning from each different component of Pillar 3 underlines the importance of a systemic approach, whether natural resource management and catchment-based management systems, a market systems approach to developing trade, or a holistic and market-driven approach youth employment. One-year ‘humanitarian-type’ grants are much too short for such work, and inappropriate for community-based development programming, although this has been the funding model of some donors. It also requires more focus on strengthening institutions, working more closely in partnership with Government, and building relations with and supporting communities over time. This change in mindset and change in approach can be challenging for agencies steeped in over a decade of humanitarian programming and principles in a highly politicized conflict environment.

Yet despite these constraints and challenges there are areas of economic growth in Darfur that deserve attention and warrant investment. Many of these relate to the agricultural economy, while others relate to the service economy in urban areas. Rebuilding and supporting markets and trade is critical to economic recovery in Darfur, at the macro, meso and micro levels. However, the shortage of capital for Darfuri businesses and entrepreneurs is a major constraint. At the same time, well-planned and executed public-private partnerships offer considerable potential for boosting the livelihoods of rural producers as well as urban-based agro-processors. There is a small but growing body of experience to draw upon in this respect.

3 Ibid.
Natural resources – land especially – are key to all livelihood strategies in Darfur. The rate of recovery is directly related to access to natural resources and power relations. Understanding differential access to natural resources and power imbalances, and then finding ways of addressing them at local level, identifying and understanding mutual interests, are fundamental to interventions associated with natural resource management4. There are opportunities to learn from good practice examples as well as from the challenges some projects have faced.

A future DDS, and the projects it spawns, should draw upon the insights into rural livelihoods and how they have adapted and changed/are continuing to change in the dynamic context of Darfur. The Tufts and Taadoud learning offer much in this respect. It highlights the merging of production systems within households, for example as ‘traditional’ pastoralists engage more in agricultural production. And it warns against ‘the unhelpful labelling of communities or groups as either “sedentary farmers” or “nomads” (which) has enforced dividing lines associated with wider conflicts. This language continues to put people in opposition to one another’, rather than exploring how their livelihood systems are integrated5. ‘Much remains to be done in relation to promoting policy and program approaches that support the continuity and integration between livelihood specializations6. There is also an urgent need to rebalance rural development programs to be more inclusive of livelihood production systems.

There is a huge unmet need for working with youth, especially in urban areas. Current vocational training and youth employment projects are operating on a small-scale compared with the overall need. In rural areas the improved provision of services and employment opportunities are necessary for youth to remain. Fundamental change is needed, economically and politically, for youth to see a more vibrant and optimistic future, in which they can politically engage, and can earn a livelihood.

4.6 Overall Challenges and Constraints

Six years following the launch of the DDS, it is difficult to obtain an assessment of the overall impact and effectiveness of the strategy in relation to its original vision and strategic objectives. Many national and international stakeholders highlighted the usefulness of the situation and sectoral analyses and the pillar strategies in informing some of their efforts, as well as the continued relevance and salience of the overall DDS strategy and specific priorities as originally formulated. At the same time, there is little evidence that the DDS has made a significant impact on peacebuilding, recovery and development trajectories in Darfur. As the team’s assessment of the current situation in the various areas covered by the DDS demonstrates, many of the challenges, priorities and needs identified in 2013 still remain. While a number of development interventions aligned directly and indirectly to the DDS have been implemented during the 2013-2019 period, these have not been sufficient to achieve meaningful and transformational outcomes at scale as originally intended. For the most part, efforts across the three-pillar scan be characterized as highly fragmented, uncoordinated and projectized, with little evidence of strategic alignment, prioritization and linkage with an overall pillar or sectoral strategy. While some projects have achieved important results, including from a learning perspective, overall financing and the scope of interventions was not sufficient to achieve meaningful impact at scale in relation to pillar objectives.

From the review of implementation, three fundamental sets of constraints and challenges have impeded implementation of the DDS as originally foreseen and explain this less than perfect progress and impact. These include constraints related to the evolution of the context in Sudan and Darfur; issues related to the way in which the DDS was designed which posed challenges for implementation; and challenges related to the governance and

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6 Ibid.
coordination of DDS implementation. This section provides an overview of how these and related constraints and challenges affected key aspects of the DDS, notably stakeholder engagement, programmatic alignment and overall implementation. Chapter V provides further details on these issues for each pillar, while specific challenges related to the governance, coordination and financing of the DDS are addressed in Chapter VI.

**Stakeholder engagement and commitment in the DDS**

As the experience of comprehensive and multi-stakeholder peacebuilding and recovery assessments and plans in other countries demonstrates, stakeholder engagement and commitment are essential to ensure that these plans serve as a basis for effectively aligning national and international policies, programs and financing against a common set of priorities. In the case of the DDS, informant interviews and the review of data clearly indicates that there were significant deficiencies in the extent and nature of stakeholder buy in, engagement and commitment to use the DDS as a primary reference for peacebuilding and recovery efforts. Four main factors explain this:

**The absence of a conducive political environment.** The DDS assumed that Darfur had ‘turned the page’ with respect to the political and conflict situation with the DDPD following 2011, and a high level of willingness and interest by national and international stakeholders in engaging on peace and development issues. This did not turn out to be the case. The DDPD did not provide the comprehensive settlement to the Darfur conflict as expected, with key parties remaining outside the framework and conflict between the GoS and OAGs continuing. Second, the GoS did not demonstrate a willingness and intention to implement the DDS in good faith in its entirety, resulting in a lack of engagement where its leadership was critical, particularly with respect to the governance reforms foreseen in Pillar one, the engagement of line ministries, and the provision of financing. Third, many international partners, given the continued sanctions in place against the GoS, were hesitant to engage in significant development programming, let alone directly coordinate with government counterparts or channel financing through national systems, resulting in most donor financing being channelled through humanitarian channels.

**Absence of effective national leadership.** Within the framework of the DDPD and the DDS, the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) was supposed to have the primary responsibility at national level for the implementation of the DDS in accordance with Article 31 of the DDPD. In practice, the DRA was severely constrained by inadequate capacity to undertake the various coordination, planning and other functions required of this role. Its relationship to federal and state level Government bodies, including ministries, was also not clear, leading to confusion and ambiguity with respect to responsibilities and accountabilities for the DDS within government. The abolishment of the DRA in 2016 further undermined national leadership of the DDS, and while the various DDPD commissions were engaged in different aspects and sectors of the DDS, a single strong counterpart to drive implementation and facilitate coordinated international responses did not exist.

**Alignment of DDS with national and international policies and strategies.** Partly as a consequence of the above factors, many national and international stakeholders did not feel compelled or incentivized to utilize the DDS as a basis for policy making, strategy development and programme formulation, with some notable exceptions. Rather, priorities and strategies were developed by individual agencies on the basis of their own interests or bilateral exchanges with specific Sudanese and Darfuri counterparts. Furthermore, while some of the FaST Activities were intended to inform the development of enabling policy, legislation and other regulations for specific priorities to be addressed, the DDS strategy lacked an explicit strategy or mechanism to integrate these as part of broader interventions. FaST Activities, which were primarily financed through the UNDF, were also subject to significant delays, further constraining their potential to inform broader development efforts.

**Absence of communication and engagement on the DDS.** A further factor that undermined stakeholder engagement and commitment was a widespread lack of awareness and information on the DDS, particular at the
level of the Darfur states. The DDS was simply not known by many key stakeholders, both within state and local level government bodies, civil society and the population at large. This is due to the absence of an effective communications and outreach strategy around the DDS, as well as the lack of stakeholder engagement and willingness to use the DDS as an actual instrument of policy and program development. It also highlights a more fundamental issue concerning the extent to which the process of designing and implementing the DDS was truly inclusive and participatory.

**Programmatic Alignment**

During the 2013-2019 period significant amounts of development financing were allocated to Darfur, despite the overall political and other contextual challenges. The extent to which this financing and corresponding interventions aligned directly with DDS pillar priorities varied significantly, with little evidence of a coordinated approach to ensuring a strategic or coherent approach with corresponding objectives. Several factors account for this approach, which stem broadly from issues related to how the DDS pillars were developed and reflected in the actual implementation of development programming.

**Lack of enabling conditions.** All three pillars included core assumptions on the evolution of the context in Darfur which did not always materialize, rendering the feasibility or implementability of certain pillar objectives impossible. Strengthening of governance frameworks and capacities as envisioned in pillar 1, for instance, was not feasible in the absence of reforms at Federal level (which during the 2013-2019 period actually worked against decentralization objectives); likewise, continuing insecurity led to situations of prolonged displacement, rendering the returns and reintegration strategy in pillar 2 unworkable. The lack of a dynamic risk management and monitoring system in the DDS precluded flexibility within the pillars to mitigate, manage or adjust approaches in these contexts.

**Absence of pillar-level theories of change.** The DDS pillar strategies as articulated in the DDS document are limited for the most part to a results matrix of objectives, outputs, indicators and costs, without a full explanation or description of the underlying logic or theory of change that connects the various elements of the result framework. This presentation precluded a deeper presentation and understanding of the causal logic of linkages, preconditions/prerequisites, causes and impacts which are essential to properly identify critical pathways and to define, prioritize and sequence interventions accordingly. The reports produced by the ten thematic working groups during the DJAM also fail to provide this clarity, and in some sectors contradict the priorities and elements which are contained in the DDS published report. Without this clarity, the pillar strategies offered little guidance to national and international partners on how to most effectively approach and prioritize interventions at pillar and sectoral levels. While the presentation of FaST activities did articulate some elements of a critical pathway at pillar and sectoral level, these were incomplete and did not extend to the broader sets of interventions.

**Absence of cross-pillar and cross-sectoral linkages.** The description of the overall approach in the DDS report strongly emphasizes the importance of integrated, holistic and comprehensive interventions across pillars and sectors in order to address the complex requirements of peacebuilding and recovery. At the same time, the formulation and presentation of the DDS Pillars are very much stove-piped, and are notable for the absence of any cross referencing or programmatic linkages between them or individual sectors. This is particularly evident in the disconnects between Pillar 1 priorities on public service delivery capacities and the focus in pillar 2 on basic services, as well as in disconnects between pillars 2 and 3 on transportation and energy infrastructure and livelihoods and economic recovery. Despite the absence of these linkages, many interventions in practice were developed in integrated fashion across the pillars, offering important lessons for how this can be addressed in the future DDS. Moreover, the stove-piped development of the DDS precluded specific focus on core transversal and

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7 In practice, the Review team’s consultations in Darfur found that most stakeholders conflated the overall DDS with FaST programs, not seeing the DDS as anything beyond the $88.5 million in State of Qatar funded projects.
cross-cutting issues such as gender, youth, and the environment. Many of the pillar objectives and sub-objectives were articulated in technical terms, without adequate attention to power dynamics that are critical to address in a post-conflict context, for example in Pillar 3 on economic recovery. They lacked conflict sensitivity. Beyond the design of the DDS, systemic cross-linkages and integrated strategy and program development was also inhibited by the absence of effective technical coordination fora directly linked to the DDS.

**Absence of a strategy linking humanitarian and development efforts.** Although the transition from humanitarian assistance to development was identified as a key over-arching priority and objective for the DDS, there is no explanation in the DDS document for how this would be managed and achieved in practice. As the experience in other countries demonstrates, this is not simply a matter of substituting one framework or set of activities for another, but entails a complex understanding of how humanitarian and development needs relate, and how assistance can be calibrated between them over time to ensure a comprehensive, dynamic and flexible approach to addressing both urgent needs while building resilience and initiating a transition to recovery efforts. This is particularly the case in Darfur given the continued scale of humanitarian needs, the volatility of the situation, and the complexities of initiating development processes. Beyond the design of the DDS, the absence of a meaningful coordination architecture around the DDS at pillar level meant that there were no opportunities created for dialogue between humanitarian, development and peace practitioners. As a result, humanitarian efforts in Darfur have continued through a highly active humanitarian cluster system, while development efforts have remained highly fragmented and not meaningfully connected to humanitarian strategies and interventions. The agencies implementing both humanitarian and development programming are mostly one and the same and have faced challenges in shifting skillsets and mindsets from humanitarian to developmental approaches.

**Absence of programme-level planning and prioritization.** As the above has alluded to, the absence of effective alignment between development interventions and the DDS is not an issue of the design of the DDS alone. In the absence of DDS-specific technical or sectoral level fora or mechanisms to bring partners around pillar specific priorities and strategies, no collective priority-setting, targeting, coordination and information-sharing was possible. Had these platforms existed, there would have been a much higher possibility of more strategically focused, coordinated and aligned programmatic interventions, despite the limitations of the original DDS pillar strategies. A good example, albeit imperfect, of what could have been achieved is the development of the interventions financed by Qatar under the UNDF, which were developed through a coordinated and organized process directly linked to DDS pillar and sectoral objectives.

**Implementation approach**

As highlighted above, contextual factors, inadequate stakeholder engagement and lack of alignment were key factors constraining the implementation of the DDS as originally foreseen. Another major constraint was the absence of a dedicated operational strategy and associated mechanisms to manage and oversee the implementation of the DDS itself. As the experience of other countries clearly highlights, such strategies do not implement themselves; they need active management and investment to ensure that they can serve as effective frameworks to facilitate and channel coordinated and collective efforts against common goals. A key function of a dedicated implementation strategy and approach is to ensure sufficient flexibility to allow for adjustments in strategy, objectives and priorities in response to changes in the broader political and operating environment. The absence of an active approach to supporting the implementation of the DDS in practice had several important consequences.

**Management of risks and assumptions.** The implementation and achievement of DDS objectives (both strategic and pillar-level) were predicated on a number of core assumptions including a conducive political environment; continued progress in peace negotiations; enhanced data availability; improved security and absence of conflict; and long-term donor engagement and commitment to the DDS. In practice, very few of these assumptions have held, and many of the related risks identified in the DDS document have posed significant challenges and
obstacles to implementation of the strategy as originally defined. This has led a number of national and international stakeholders to state in hindsight that conditions were not conducive for a long-term strategy such as the DDS, and to prefer other modalities for channelling their assistance. In reality, as stated before, a lot of development programming has proceeded despite these risks and challenges. This underscores the importance of a dynamic strategy for managing risks and assumptions that is directly tied to decision-making at strategy-wide and pillar levels on possible compensatory adjustments to both approaches, priorities, activities and intervention. Such an approach would have provided the DDS with much greater flexibility to calibrate the scope of peacebuilding and development efforts to conditions and circumstances as they evolved.

**Monitoring and oversight.** The above points to a broader limitation in the design and implementation of the DDS. Very little attention was paid to a strategic and management level monitoring and oversight function, beyond the description of the Darfur Coordination Board (DCB). References to monitoring are limited to progress and financial monitoring. As experience from other countries shows, the scope of monitoring needs to be expanded to include a broader overview of progress, challenges and needs to enable a more dynamic and real-time assessment and adjustment of pillar and sectoral strategies to ensure both that needs are being addressed in the most effective manner, and that challenges to implementation can be addressed. The absence of such a mechanism in the DDS, both in its design and during its implementation, is a factor contributing to the ineffectiveness of the framework in creating a centre of gravity for development efforts.

**Implementation management and approach.** As in other countries, an assumption appears to have been made that the DRA, as the official national lead for the DDS, and the DCB, as the collective policy-level oversight mechanism, would manage and supervise the implementation of the DDS. Both assumptions have partially materialized, with the DRA being dissolved in 2016 and the DCB functioning intermittently. Regardless of whether they had functioned effectively, experience from other countries underscores the importance of a clear mechanism and approach to translate the DDS strategy as a document into an active framework for the coordination and management of collective efforts. This is particularly important in the context of complex strategies such as the DDS, which regroups a wide variety of stakeholders across numerous sectors. In the absence of such a mechanism, the DDS remained a reference document, with the exception of the portfolio of activities financed through the Qatari contribution to the UNDF which addressed a number of cross-pillar FaST priorities.

**Absence of an underlying knowledge base.** The DDS called for a number of “studies, surveys, and assessments” that would “create a knowledge base that grounds DDS initiatives in a broader context with regard to service delivery, human resources, fiscal management and concomitant infrastructure”. (DDS, p. 103). This laudable goal does not appear to have been carried out in practice, however, at least not in a centralized or standardized way.

**5 ASSESSMENT OF SAMPLED PROJECTS PILLAR 1:**

**5.1 Darfur Community Based Reintegration and Stabilization**

The project was implemented by UNDP, UN-Women, and UNFPA. The overall objective of the project was to achieve successful social and economic reintegration of 3,000 male and female demobilised armed forces (including special needs groups). It also addressed local insecurities through voluntary small-arms registration and control, building trust of communities in security sector institutions and building capacity of Government institutions to plan, implement and monitor DDR and small arms related projects. It provided livelihoods support for income generation and employment creation, targeting unemployed youth with high conflict potential and vulnerable women. The beneficiaries of the project included:

- 3,000 male and female combatants (2,900 male/100 female, including special needs groups) and their dependents, as direct beneficiaries, provided with livelihood support for income generation and employment creation.
• 15,000 community members (10,000 women/youth) through Quick Impact Projects (QIP),
• 590,000 community members through weapon registration process.

The project was implemented in 8 Localities and 9 implementation sites in the five Darfur States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6 DDR Project Outcomes and Achieved Results</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 1:</strong> Capacities developed within Governments to manage small arms and light weapons and promote community safety through civilian arms control and social cohesion</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Results Achieved</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Three (3) Capacity Development plans prepared and implemented for Gov officials, traditional leaders, community members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Development and community safety plan including small arms and safety prepared and implemented in 5 target communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Draft National Action Plan on SCR 1325 prepared</td>
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The main achievements of the project, measured against its outcomes, could be summarized as follows:

1. Contribution to change in attitudes and understanding on the causes and dangers of small arms to peace and security within Government and local communities. It enhanced institutional capacities in the contribution of women in peace building and security, as well as small arms control, natural resource management and conflict resolution. The project contributed to improved rule of law and reduction in small arms proliferation which led to enhanced community security and safety in selected communities.

2. Contribution to enhanced security and peace in selected communities by creating an enabling security for peace building and development activities to take place. It helped communities, armed groups and Government to have a better understanding of benefits of a peace dividend that resulted in new factions which were not originally part of the peace agreement to join the DDPD and other Government led initiatives.
3. At risk youth and marginalized women benefited from improved incomes and access to basic services that contributed to enhanced community stability and violence reduction in target communities. Joint project planning and implementation of labor-intensive community projects y ex-combatants and civilians fostered social cohesion, peace, reconciliation and social change in the target communities. Capacity building of security sector institutions such as prison and police contributed to a reduction in crime, gender-based violence against women and other forms of insecurity.

The project should also be commended for availing economic opportunities for more than 5,000 unemployed youth, vulnerable women and others employed indirectly benefiting over 200,000 households’ indirect beneficiaries. This is in addition to the investment in the capacities of large number of government officials and traditional leaders (over 500 individuals). Technical support to UNAMID and Sudan Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (SDDRC) in demobilizing 10,250 former fighters aligned to different armed factions that signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) was provided. This is in addition to the Two (2) vocational training centres/schools constructed, in Zalinge (CD) and El Deain (ED), benefiting over 30,000 ex-combatants, unemployed youth and other groups through training and development/upgrading of productive skills.

The project was faced by a wide range of challenges that restricted the full realization of its objectives. Prominent among these were:

- Limited political support and commitment that restricted implementation of policy and legislative issues and the realization of weapon registration targets.
- Limited capacity of NGOs and Government partners affected the delivery of high-quality reintegration services. In spite of the training provided a critical capacity gap remains conspicuous.
- Inaccessibility to far remote areas made it difficult to undertake effective monitoring activities, provision of extension and advisory services by Government extension staff and NGOs to ex-combatants and targeted civilians.
- Limited access to micro credit and business advisory services disrupted the development of small business activities undertaken by ex-combatants.
- Limited access to arable land and improved farming practices affected the productivity thus minimizing the impact of the assistance to the ex-combatants.
- High inflation reduced the value and quantity of the reintegration packages provided to ex-combatants, ultimately minimizing impact and sustainability of the livelihoods’ assistance.
- Delays in the timely release of funds and procurement processes contributed to the low delivery, thus attainment of results targets.
- Provision of targeted livelihoods assistance exclusive to ex-combatants created resentment among the civilians in host communities. This was mitigated by provision community infrastructure such as schools that benefitted all community members.

5.2 Project: Strengthening Land Management for Peaceful Coexistence

This project aimed to bring tangible results for peace on the ground through reaching consensus among communities and competent authorities on necessary changes and reforms to people-centred land title system including the restoration of land rights to their owners and rights to initiating land rights disputes systems and
mechanisms. Secondly, by demarcating nomadic corridors and revitalizing and/or establishing fully functioning, real time, monitoring mechanism for nomadic corridors, engaging the native administration at the various levels of the hierarchy. Also, by addressing land concerns at return sites through mapping return village sites in a conflict sensitive manner to ensure returns and reintegration processes are sustainable and conflict free. The main Government partner was the Darfur Land Commission (DLC).

As specified in the Project Final Report 2019, the project has one main outcome and six outputs, namely
1. Drafting 4 legislative reforms for the Darfur State legislation Councils;
2. Policies for adjudicating land claims cases drafted and endorsed;
3. Monitoring mechanism for nomadic corridors established and fully functioning;
4. Communities informed on their role and sensitized in land administration;
5. Land title system is improved, made more gender-equal, and land concerns at return site addressed (Support to Land Commission and State authorities to become more gender sensitive);
6. Sketch mapping for 50 return villages and livelihoods support for returned women.

The project managed to achieve tangible results. Under the first output, 58 consultation workshops that brought together a wide range of stakeholders, 3,014 men and women in consultative processes around land issues, were held, exceeding the planned target by 6%. 75% of women participants were rural based. However, targeted consultation process with the IDPs was not held. In addition, 16 visits to 16 return sites were made during the implementation of return village sites mapping.

Under output 2 Training in arbitration for land disputes settlement was availed for 900 persons out of whom 40% were females. The participants, mainly members of civil administration, reconciliation committees and community leaders, land employees and administrative officers and lawyers were informed by land legal frameworks, and equipped with relevant procedures and arbitration practice using a wide range of relevant methodologies. Following the process 63 arbitration committees, one in each locality, have been established and officially registered in the Five Darfur States. However, the capacities of these arbitration committees to be fully functional remain a major challenge.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consultation level</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Planned</th>
<th>% achieved</th>
<th>Female %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State (5)</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Localities (54)</td>
<td>1,866</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>2,494</td>
<td>2,480</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,207</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>3,014</td>
<td>2,840</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Under Output 3:** Out of the total of 12 livestock routes studied, 9 routes (seven in South Darfur and 2 in West Darfur), have been mapped, demarcated and hot points identified with the participation of tribal leaders, farmers and pastoralists; 35 monitoring groups were established or strengthened. Gender issues were raised while forming the monitoring systems. Water supply was also provided in two locations along two routes in Central and West Darfur. A big haffir was also rehabilitated by FAO under the FaST Livelihood Project at Wad Elmairam village of El Salam Locality of South Darfur, reflecting an apparent synergy between the two projects.

**Output 4:** The project exerted enormous efforts to disseminate land related information at different levels, using different approach and tools such as radio messages, local theatre performance, interactive consultations and training and awareness raising tools. Issues of gender rights and access to land and the impacts of climate change were also addressed. Global and regional frameworks to promote good governance and equitable access to land such as Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Governance of Land Tenure (VGGT) intended for informing reform in land and natural resources management were also disseminated. 11,406 persons including 45% women and children were approached through open theatre performance focusing on land related issues, including the disastrous social impacts of conflict over land.

**Under Output 5:** Capacity building in land management information was provided to relevant Government staff and Darfur Land Commission through focused training on GIS, GPS, community land mapping and, Urban Observatory and computerized data management. 225 institution staff (100F/125M) were trained on Social Tenure Domain Model (STDM) and community village mapping.

**Output 6:** On the basis of community active participatory process of ground and photo-mapping 52 return villages boundaries including village land uses were demarcated and mapped and a village profiles developed, accordingly.

**Assessment remarks**
Recognizing the complexity and socio-political sensitivity of land issues in Darfur and the short duration of the project, the project should be commended for laying the grounds for future work on land in Darfur. The wide range of consultations and the large number of stakeholders participated in the project together with active dissemination of land-related information are important investments in the future. This particularly applies to the articulated investment in the institutional capacities, and community land mapping that provides an important potential base for community land registration and secured access to land in the future. The improved awareness among communities about their role in resolving land issues was an important contribution of the project. The advocacy for women rights in accessing land has opened up a new chapter in land related discussion in Darfur and Sudan at large. However, it should be noted that the demarcation of livestock route is essentially a negotiated process involving both farmers and pastoralists. Accordingly, the mapping and demarcation process at a time where the overwhelming majority of the farmers are in the IDPs camps and not effectively participating in the process raises lot of questions about the viability of the intervention and the sustainability of its outcomes. Ample evidence from previous experiences by Sudan Government and the international actors in Darfur illustrate that. In addition, the main problem with livestock routes is not only the demarcation process but more importantly the management process of the route, which is always the absent aspect in the intervention.
PILLAR II:

5.3 Project: Rehabilitation/Construction of Access Roads and Crossing Points

This project addressed the critical issue of physical access to rural locations, goods, markets and administrative and social services. This was not a road building programme but rather aimed to construct and/or rehabilitate road drainage structures allowing better access to social services and economic recovery activities for the targeted communities.

The Project was implemented by UNOPS as the lead agency and ILO as the partner. The main Government partner was the Ministry of Physical Planning. The project targeted 2 million beneficiaries distributed unevenly between the Five Darfur States (Table 8). The implementation of the project had achieved the following results:

- A total of 105,000 beneficiaries, accounting for 5.1% of the target have improved all-weather access to basic services through construction of road drainage structures.
- Completion of quick assessment of (50) choke points in feeder roads to returnee sites throughout the Five States of Darfur.
- Construction of 23 road drainage structures on feeder roads in the Five States of Darfur.
- 22 Public facilities buildings completed in 13 administrative sites.
- 535 unemployed youth (230F / 305M) trained in Stabilized Soil Block (SSB) production and construction trades and 12 enterprises have been established to assure the sustainability of the self-help housing concept.
- 165 families have benefited from durable and affordable self-help housing construction with each household having security of tenure and certificate for their houses.
- Technical training on roads maintenance for two registered community maintenance groups (22 people).
- Establishment of six Community Development Committees in West and South Darfur States.

Although the project reflects strong relevance to the very poor infrastructure of road transport in Darfur, the effectiveness of the project implementation could be safely judged as unsatisfactory. This is evident in the fact that only 46% of the project total budget (USD 11.6 million) was spent till the end of December 2018, which is practically the end of project life time. The unsatisfactory implementation could be attributed to the followings:

a) The difficulty of road rehabilitation in Sudan in general and in Darfur in particular considering the limited technical experience;
b) The lengthy and complicated procurement procedures which was further complicated by the rapid and steep devaluation of national currency;
c) The flow of financial resources which took place in 6 tranches for all FaST projects, irrespective of the particular needs of each project, especially road rehabilitation which is essentially a seasonal intervention;
d) The late joining of ILO as a project partner as it effectively joined after the first quarter of 2018. As explicitly specified in the project final narrative report (in the period from April to the end of June 2018, ILO team introduced project outputs and ILO components to the project stakeholder (at national level, States, localities and community). The Technical Agreement with HAC in West Darfur and South Darfur were signed in the first week of July 2018.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Localities</th>
<th>Targeted beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Darfur</td>
<td>North and South of Nyala</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Darfur</td>
<td>Anjemi, Habila &amp; EL Geneina</td>
<td>128,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Darfur</td>
<td>Garsilla</td>
<td>230,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Darfur</td>
<td>El Fasher</td>
<td>102,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Darfur</td>
<td>El Daein</td>
<td>1,290,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.4 Project: Construction of Public Facilities and Housing in Return Sites and Urban Settings
The project was planned and implemented to respond to the urgent requirements for consistent and standardized package of environmentally friendly public building/facilities, designs for provision of public and basic services needed for village cluster centres at return sites, such as schools, police stations, prosecutor offices, markets, community buildings, and staff housing to ensure unified and standardized design and package to be followed and applied throughout the return sites. The project aimed to benefit at least 14,300 people from SSB technology (directly); 13,700 in return villages and 600 in relocation sites in urban areas. 15,000 persons benefiting from administrative building facilities and SSB technology (IDPs 69,000 and hosting communities 81,000. The project was led by UN-Habitat.

Project outputs and key physical achievements
Output 1. Appropriate architectural designs for public/administrative buildings/facilities, fulfilling environmental sustainability criteria: The package composition as well as the designs, drawings and documents for the public facilities as agreed and endorsed by the local authorities were the basis for the bidding process. Output achieved by 100%.

Output 1.2 Capacity building programme to key stakeholders in the construction sector on alternative, environmentally sustainable and cost-effective construction technologies conducted: Capacity building in SSB and self-help housing was provided for 528 women and 960 youth exceeding the planned target (150) by 540%. This was the result of the project response to the high demand for training by the youth. 120 local government staff and community leaders trained on basic service delivery monitoring and settlement development planning and management.

Output 1.3. Construction/Rehabilitation of administrative, public services buildings and support to self-help housing in 5 localities in the 5 States of Darfur, using environmental-friendly technology: Under this output 22 buildings including service hubs have been constructed in the Five States (Table 9)

Table: Public and service provision facilities constructed under the project by State and locality

<p>| Table 9: Buildings, Service Institutions and Service Hubs constructed in the 5 States |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>Public and service facilities constructed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Darfur</td>
<td>Dimsu</td>
<td>Police station, prosecutor office, education office, guest houses for medical staff and prosecutor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sunta</td>
<td>Secondary school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shattaya</td>
<td>Secondary school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Donki Deressa</td>
<td>Police station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nyla</td>
<td>Urban Observatory building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Darfur</td>
<td>Milliet</td>
<td>Prosecutor office, education and health office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shangili Tobai</td>
<td>Administrative Unit building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>El Fasher</td>
<td>Urban Observatory building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Darfur</td>
<td>Ed Deaien</td>
<td>Two schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yassin</td>
<td>Police station, Prosecutor office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Darfur</td>
<td>Sulu</td>
<td>Prosecutor office, Admin. Unit and prosecutor guest house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Darfur</td>
<td>Habila</td>
<td>Admin Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Geneina Rural</td>
<td>Houses for medical and education staff, El Faio police station</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Output 1.4. Enterprises/Cooperatives established with capacity to produce and apply appropriate and affordable building materials, such as non-timber techniques and stabilized sand blocks SSB: 12 enterprises in 6 self-help housing locations in the States composed of 15 persons each have been established with enterprises trained on business management and business oriented. Mechanisms for the SSB machines right of use have been put in place by the beneficiary groups to support enterprises functionality and sustainability. In the process employability for 182 persons (50 women and 132 youth) had been availed exceeding the planned target by 21.3%.

Output 1.5. Small-scale funds and grants accessed by low-income households for self-help housing upgrading: Under this output 165 durable and affordable houses, 18.9% lower than the set target, and including 125 in return sites and 40 in urban setting, have been availed through direct and small grants and self-help housing construction.

Assessment Remarks
The project has largely achieved its planned targets. The efficient use and utilization of resources is also remarkably high with 100% expenditure of the total budget. In addition, the project had also managed to achieve its specified aim besides providing for productive skills upgrading, besides providing a replicable model for investment in durable and affordable houses. This is besides the employment opportunities availed, though on a very limited scale and the long term positive environmental impacts associated with the reduced resilience on wood as a building material. Gender issues have also been acceptable in all project aspects, from the planning to the implementation phase. However, it should be noted that the project suffered the critical gap of concretely linking its beneficiary communities to financial institutions, especially the microfinance institutions to ensure the availability of resources for enterprises created, their scaling up horizontally and vertically and eventually their sustainability. In addition, the project failed to include the required measures essential for ensuring the functionality and sustainability of the established service hubs and institutions. Ample evidence suggests that many parts of Sudan as well as Sub Saharan Africa are littered with unattended schools and abandoned clinics both simply because of bad construction but more importantly because these service institutions have not been placed within abroad framework of economic interventions and livelihoods resilience.

5.5 Project: Increased Access to and Use of Sustainable Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Services in Darfur
This FaST Project was planned and implemented by UNICEF (Lead Agency), IOM, UN Environment and WHO. The aim of the project was to increase coverage and access to safe water and sanitation services and to improve hygiene practices in order to reduce incidence of water-borne diseases in return, rural and nomadic areas, and to contribute to improving severely disrupted, socio-economic life and peaceful co-existence for 150,000 conflict-affected population in Darfur.

Table 10: WASH Project Physical Achievements Against Planned Targets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planned target</th>
<th>Physical achievement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome: 150,000 conflict-affected people benefit from sustainable use of water and sanitation services, improved hygiene practices and integrated water resources management enabling improvements in their severely disrupted socio-economic life</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output I: By Dec 2018, 125,000 people living in 50 conflict-affected communities in return, rural and nomadic areas in Darfur are using improved and sustainable water and sanitation services and practicing proper hygiene</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125,000 people (men, women, boys and girls) using improved drinking water source</td>
<td>232,217 population (men: 117,217 / women: 114,995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 Defecation Free (ODF) communities reached</td>
<td>50 (UNICEF: 45, IOM: 5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
125,000 people (men, women, boys and girls) using improved latrines & 218,017 people (110,351 men and 107,666 women)  
125,000 people (men, women, boys and girls) reached with messages on proper hygiene & 218,017 people (110,351 men and 107,666 women)  
30 health centres provided with improved water sources & 34 health centers serving around 139,589 population (men: 70,704 / women: 68,885)  

**Output II:** By Dec 2018, 25,000 students in 50 basic schools in return, rural and nomadic areas use improved and sustainable water and sanitation services and practicing proper hygiene  
25,000 students (boys and girls) in 50 schools using improved drinking water source & 25,936 children (boys: 12,684 / girls: 13,253) representing 59 basic schools  
Planned Target: 25,000 students (boys and girls) in 50 schools using sanitary latrine & 24,715 children (boys: 12,493 / girls: 12,222) in 63 basic schools  
25,000 students (boys and girls) in 50 schools reached by hygiene promotion & 24,715 children (boys: 12,493 / girls: 12,222) in 63 basic schools  

**Output III:** By Dec 2018, WASH sector institutions of 5 Darfur States and localities have improved strategic, managerial and technical capacity for effective leadership, coordination and delivery of sustainable gender sensitive and cost-effective WASH services and integrated water resources management in Darfur communities  
12 monitoring report produced at state and locality level & 13 reports (10 quarterly, 2 annual and 1 final)  
100 Sector partners trained on strategic planning & 339 state level WASH Sector partners (men: 201, women: 138)  
100 WASH partners trained on gender mainstreaming & 140 State level partners (men: 64 / women: 76)  
12 of sector coordination meetings held at state and locality levels & 72 state level biweekly sector coordination meetings  
100 Locality staffs (male and female) trained on technical aspects of WASH & 1,349 partners (men: 770 / women: 579) (UNICEF)  

**Output IV:** By Dec 2018, catchment management system is established for holistic management of water resources to reduce the gender gap, conflict over water resources and to enhance grassroots peacebuilding  
2 catchments identified and mapped & Four catchments with population served 87,086 persons (men: 42,673 / women: 44,413)  
800 people (male and female) reached with IWRM messages & 734 individuals (men: 524 / women: 210) reached with IWRM related information  
60 well sites monitored & 28 groundwater level, rainfall and stream sites were monitored (UN Environment)  
18 Drought Contingency Plans (DCP) updated and developed & 18 DCPs developed & updated with the total 400,160 population served (men: 192,077 / women: 208,083) (UN Environment).  
Water resources database is operational and report generating & Data from four catchments collected and entered into the database and related reports generated serving 87,086 persons (men: 42,673 / women: 44,413) (UN Environment).  
Establishment of gender-inclusive WR training centre & Training centre rehabilitated and functional. 41 persons trained on database operation and ecosystem management using the training centre (UN Environment)  

**Output V:** By Dec 2018, improved monitoring and evaluation of safe water use, including water quality surveillance, sanitary monitoring, and mitigation and prevention framework in selected localities in five Darfur states  
Drinking water safety framework established & WASH sector Drinking Water Safety Strategic Framework for Sudan (including the Five States of Darfur) was developed and signed by Minister of Health and Minister of Water Resources (WHO)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Water quality monitoring and surveillance policies, guidelines and plan for shared information management endorsed and disseminated in Five Darfur States</th>
<th>Water chlorination guidelines developed and technically endorsed (WHO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Assessment remarks**

- The project had been very effectively and efficiently implemented and managed. Above 99% of the physical targets had been achieved and in most of the interventions the achievement exceeded the planned target. Expenditure on the project total cost was 99% reflecting efficient utilization and management of the allocated financial resources;
- Remarkable increase in the targeted communities’ access to improved, clean and safe drinking water; household sanitation facilities that are situated in an Open Defecation Free (ODF) environment provided for improved hygienic practices.
- Remarkable increase in the targeted communities’ access to improved, clean and safe drinking water. The household sanitation facilities that are situated in an Open Defecation Free (ODF) environment provided for improved hygienic practices.
- The Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) approach proved its added value in promoting sustainable and balanced water resources utilisation.
- The project reflects strong synergy and coordination with other key FaST projects, especially, the “Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP)”, the “Upgrading and Rehabilitating Health Facilities” and the “Promotion of Sustainable Return and Reintegration” projects.
- The expertise and the comparative advantage of each of the project partners and the complementary skills that support the various components of the interventions added significantly to the success of the project.
- The project invested remarkably in the capacities of local partners, including Government institutions and communities as well. The capacity of 1,828 state and locality levels WASH sector partners (1,035 men and 793 women) was built on the core WASH-programme strategic planning, M&E, gender equality mainstreaming and WASH technical aspects.
- The established and equipped water laboratory infrastructure in the Five States of Darfur together with the investment in staff required capacities added significantly to the capacity of Government institutions while provide for the development of socially responsive government institutions.
- The National Drinking Water Safety Strategic Framework developed under the project provides for bridging a critical gap in national water governance where national policy for water safety is lacking but only a draft policy framework established in 2006; this deserves compliment.
- The project planning, implementation and results reflected very good level of gender equality mainstreaming in terms of:
  - Gender-segregated data collection and presentation.
  - Women and girls’ friendly water supply technology.
  - Women and girls’ dignity and safety by having household latrines in an Open Defecation Free environment.
  - Water facilities nearby the residential area hence less fetching time and efforts for women and girls;
  - Gender-segregated and separated school toilets to enhance school girl’s safety and privacy;
  - Women and girls’ empowerment through packaged WASH capacity building programmes;
  - Women and girls involvement in the management of WASH services.
5.6 Project: Upgrading and Rehabilitating Health Facilities and Public Health Services in Return Sites

This project focused on both the infrastructure rehabilitation and/or extension using environmental-friendly technologies, and on the functional upgrading of health facilities, through filling in the identified gaps in terms of service delivery package, medical equipment and supplies, and human resources availability and skills. The project was implemented by WHO as lead agency, in partnership with UNFPA and UN-Habitat. Federal Ministry and state Ministries of Health were the main government partners. The project was implemented in 27 sites in 23 localities in the 5 Darfur States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planned target</th>
<th>Physical achievement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Designs for 30 health facilities HF endorsed by local authorities</td>
<td>30 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation, upgrading and expansion of 42 HFs</td>
<td>25 (59.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New health staff developed through institutional training</td>
<td>196 in addition to 172 students from local, communities enrolled through scholarships provided by Qatar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>820 (35% females) staff (different categories) participated in refresher trainings</td>
<td>2,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 HFs having the right mixture of skilled staff as per MOH standards</td>
<td>28 (93.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 HF having functional equipment according to the MOH standards and facility categorization</td>
<td>30 (100%) and installed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 targeted rural hospitals providing CEOC services</td>
<td>10 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The project implementation could be described as moderately satisfactory. Although most of the soft activities have been implemented by 100%, the rehabilitation/upgrading of health facilities, the main objective of the project, was achieved by 59.5%. However, the project is to be commended for the rigorous investment in building the capacities of health staff and for the provision of equipment necessary for the functionality of health institutions and improved health services for local communities. The installation of solar power panels in 18 health facilities, in addition to Um Kadada, Karnoi and Kutum rural hospitals, in coordination with UNDP FaST Darfur Solar Electrification Project is to be appreciated. The investment in the training of 172 students from local communities in different health specialities deficient in Darfur is to be particularly praised.

Fig 4: Success Story from Um Labasa Health Facility, South Darfur State:

“Um Labasa Rural Hospital is functional after been rehabilitated. Currently, there is a good number of medical staff assigned by the SMoH including one medical doctor and this helped us and saved many lives. We suffered a lot during the time when the hospital was closed, even for simple illnesses; we used to travel either to Nyala or to Kubum. Travelling to Nyala was not easy, especially during the rainy season when the roads are blocked. Now the hospital has an ambulance service to transport the complicated cases to Nyala without much suffering. As a citizen, I’m very thankful to all the partners who helped in reactivating the hospital including WHO, UN-Habitat, SMoH and the Medical Insurance Fund.” Adam Abdel-Rahman, a youth farmer from Um Labasa community, SD State, talking in the market

The project was faced by a wide range of challenges that restricted the full realization of its targets. Important among these were:

- Constraint access during the rainy season and intermittent periods of active conflict;
• Price increase of procured materials associated with the macro economic crisis and high inflation rates;
• Shortages of qualified local contractors created some delay in the implementation;
• Fluctuations of market prices and currency exchange made potential contractors reluctant to sign the contracts, or withdrew from the sites after signing the contracts;
• Delays in getting construction materials from Khartoum due to governmental disarmament campaign in Darfur States and patrolling of commercial trucks;
• Inter-tribal conflicts and insecurity had challenged the project implementation in certain locations in East Darfur (Asalaya, Yasin, Abu Dowimat) and Central Darfur (Nirtiti, Bendisi and Garsila);
• During the rainy season many beneficiaries are occupied by farming hence in most areas it was not a suitable period to mobilize people for training and production of SSB;
• The high expectations of the State Ministries of Health to the scale of construction/rehabilitation, which are sometimes beyond the available resources and scope of planned work (the case of El Wohda Hospital in South Darfur and Beida in West Darfur) resulting in implementation delays;
• Poorly motivated medical staff to work in remote rural areas, resulted in delays in securing the necessary staff for upgraded health facilities.

5.7 Project: Promotion of Sustainable Return and Reintegration of IDPs and Refugees
This project aimed to realize many of the crucial elements necessary to meet the conditions for return, working in complete coordination with all parties with responsibilities in this task. The project targeted selected return sites in the West, Central and North Darfur States to pilot a model of sustainable returns and reintegration that could eventually be scaled up. The project targeted 1.200,000 beneficiaries including 206,000 returnees. The project implemented by UNDP, as lead agency, in partnership with UNHCR and in close partnership with the Voluntary Returns and Reintegration Commission (VRRC), and relevant DRA Ministries and Commissions and the appropriate technical institutions of the Federal and Darfur State Governments.

Outputs and key physical achievements
Output 1. Safety and Security Provided at the areas of return:
Under this output 3 Police stations were constructed and equipped serving over 60,000 people; 140 police officers including 20% females (total planned target) were trained in areas of human rights, investigation techniques, family and child protection, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and community policing; 3 Community Policing Safety Centres and 3 Local Safety Working Groups (LSWGs) were established; 3 safety profiles and plans developed in return clusters in 3 localities; One UXO assessment was conducted by Ordinance Disposal Office (ODO) resulting in ODO sharing 31 safe villages in North, West and Central Darfur.

Output 2. Information provided to IDPs and refugees on conditions of the areas of origin:
Under this output 146 return villages in Al Tina, Kornoi and Umburu localities of North Darfur State have been monitored and verified. An estimated 37,000 refugee returnees were recorded with some type of refugee documentation from Chad; however, only 7,000 returnees agreed to be registered as returnees; Household level surveys have been completed in Abushok and Al Salam IDP camps and a final report launched jointly with Government authorities. The project also contributed to support the RC and UNHCT to develop a Durable Solutions strategy with the Government of Sudan.

Output 3. Short-term assistance provided to returnees on arrival: Under this output a total of 360 transitional shelters with latrine’s completed throughout the project and all target met.

Output 4. Community-based basic services for education are provided at return sites: Here 4 basic schools had been constructed in West Darfur and handed over to the MoE and communities.
Output 5. Livelihoods and income-generation activities are promoted in return areas: Six villages in West Darfur and Central Darfur were supported to complete their CEAP plans and that’s now the source of all livelihood assets for these villages; Constraints to livelihood strategies identified during the CEAP process had been addressed; Sixteen (16) community assets (livelihoods centres, grinding mills, hand-pump and irrigation pumps) had been constructed and or rehabilitated in West, Central and North Darfur; 80% of community assets had been linked with markets and value chains; 12 Saving and loans associations (SLAs) were formed in 9 villages with total members of 260 persons out of whom 72% were women; Total of 30 community-based organization (CBOs) including 6 farmers’ groups were established/reactivated composed of 424 members (214F/210M).

Output 6. Capacity building for the Government of Sudan in Return, Reintegration and Urbanisation concerns: Achievements involved provision of technical support and on the job training to VRRC staff and support in the streamlining of organization coordination, communication and human resource structures and processes. In addition, enormous efforts were exerted in Profiling and Information Management to strengthen the process of registration and verification of returnees, including collection of information on available services, livelihoods, conditions in return areas as well as identifying needs and vulnerabilities specific to displacement.

Assessment remarks:
The project was effectively and efficiently implemented and managed. Out of the total project activities (29) 21 activities (72.4%) had been fully (100%) achieved; Three (3) activities by 80%-90%; Two (2) activities by 60%-69%; Two (2) activities related to village profiles created for a few camps and information campaigns in IDP camps on conditions in return areas lagged far behind as they were achieved by only 15%. The activity that was supposed to look at the extent to which security concerns at return sites are factored into the VRRC Returns Strategy was delayed and finally cancelled. Project expenditure amounted to 100% of the project total cost.

The project is key under the DDS FaST projects where it looked after the crucial sector of the IDPs and their objective to return and resume sustainable livelihoods. In spite of the complexity of the return issue and the overwhelming odds that faced the project, it managed to build successful coordination mechanisms for tackling the issues of IDPs and Return. The project, apart from providing humanitarian and relief service at the IDPs camps including shelter and food, it has extended its contributions to enhance the sustainable livelihoods of the affected communities through short- and medium-term recovery programmes that looks after repair of the community assets and productive infrastructure and basic services. The project had also managed to build the capacity of the local institutions of IDPs, Refugees and Returnees and had effectively engaged these institutions in the different assessments, surveys and implementation of the project. Data base for the movement of IDPs, Refugees and Returnees has been established and updated on regular basis. A VRRC Returns Strategy had been developed to guide short and long term required interventions.

The challenges faced by the project were enormous, important among which were:

- Access to most locations was affected by insecurity and administrative restrictions imposed by the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC). This in addition to the constant security risks which included military movements of Government of Sudan (GoS) troops and militias, targeted ambush of UNAMID
troops on patrol, inter-tribal clashes, banditry, and presence of unknown armed groups, especially in Central Darfur, resulting in the cancelation of several planned field missions;

- The partner national NGOs, whose grass roots presence and outreach is advantageous, the capacity of these NGOs remains challenging and therefore had a negative impact on the timely implementation and the quality of implementation;
- The very high cost of material inputs in Darfur, which was further complicated by the sharp rise in inflation rates;
- The seasonality of project implementation as many of the project sites became inaccessible during the rainy season (June – October) due to poor road conditions;
- HAC, particularly in North Darfur, proved to be a major stumbling block for any data collection that may be required from the communities;
- The DRA was officially dissolved in September 2016. This caused a delay for output 6 to proceed with the capacity building activities planned for the VRRC;
- There were some delays associated with the delivery of third instalment from the donor and this delay cascaded to implementing partners causing delays in project completion. This also has rippling effect on project implementation due to the growing inflation, causing hike in construction material costs, therefore the implementing partners’ budget had to be adjusted several times which delayed the implementation of construction;
- Low participation of community members in transitional shelter project activities during harvest season (November and December);
- The difficulty of engaging with GoS police;
- The frequent changes in Government authorities;
- The weak institutional capacities of State Government structures, especially the Federal VRRC and State VRRC that lack shared working approach and suffer problems of communication and timely sharing of information.

5.8 Project: Recovery of Livelihoods of Vulnerable Farming and Pastoral Communities

This project involved the rehabilitation of 15 small water reservoirs, 20 shallow wells and construction of 20 sub-surface dams. In addition, the project intended to improving agricultural and livestock productivity through promotion of farmer and pastoral field schools, community-based seed multiplication and pasture rehabilitation and enhancing animal health delivery system. There was also a focus on improving the entrepreneurial and technical skills to contribute to value chain development and income generation activities. The ultimate result was to improve household income and nutrition among the targeted vulnerable segments of the rural population in Darfur, with a special focus on women. The project was implemented by FAO, lead agency, in partnership with UNOPS and ILO. The main Government partners were the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Animal Resources and State Level Water Institutions.

Outputs and Key Achievements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planned target</th>
<th>Physical achievement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation of 15 hafirs for humans and animals, in return and nomadic areas</td>
<td>9 hafirs (60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150,000 head of livestock having access to improved water</td>
<td>125,000 head (83%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75,000 persons reached by water provision</td>
<td>71,790 persons (95.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation of 20 shallow wells to enhance vegetable and legume production</td>
<td>20 wells (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36,000 people having improved access to water for winter farming</td>
<td>36,000 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 surface dams constructed</td>
<td>11 dams (55%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 water users’ committees established, trained and functional</td>
<td>9 (60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1050 farmers trained to become certified seed producers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,850 metric tons of certified seeds produced</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108,000 head of animals vaccinated and treated against endemic and epidemic diseases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 private veterinary service providers supported</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>240 persons (men and women) trained in improved milk production and fattening</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>700 beneficiaries with enhanced entrepreneurial potential and skills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperatives, agribusinesses established</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People provided with agribusiness skills in horticulture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assessment remarks:**

The effectiveness of the project could be described as moderately satisfactory as the implementation of three major activities, namely construction/rehabilitation of hafirs, construction of surface dams, and community organization lagged far behind the planned targets. With expenditure of 90% of the total cost the project, efficiency is also questionable. In addition, although the project was essentially a livelihood recovery project looks more as water supply focused project rather than being concretely grounded in an articulated livelihood approach. Complete neglect of East Darfur State in the project is another limitation in the project design and implementation. The failure to link entrepreneurs and small businesses created to financial institutions is another gap. However, the project could be praised for the wide range of beneficiaries (58,650 women, 56,350 men, 37,133 boys and 37,133 girls) of pastoralists, agro-pastoralists, IDPs, returnees and farmers with improved water supplies. This is besides the investment in upgrading production and entrepreneurship skills, support to small businesses and environmental rehabilitation. The main implementation challenges faced by the project were:

- High rocketing inflation rates causing hike in maintenance and construction material costs; the implementing partners and service providers budget had to be adjusted several times which delayed the implementation of construction works, especially the rehabilitation of water sources and the demarcation of livestock routes;
- The late/delayed release of funds creating project implementation as a difficult and expensive task;
- Insecurity and limited accessibility to some target areas

**6: UNDF MODALITY**

UNDF modality holds strong potential for promoting recovery and the move towards long term development in Darfur and possibly the other war-affected regions of Sudan. UNDF could also be described as the best organizational structure for accessibility of funds. However, and as provided by the experience of the DDS FaST projects implementation in Darfur, the Fund suffered certain weaknesses that have their implications on the outcomes of the implementation process. Important among these were:

**Reliance on one donor:** UNDF relied on one donor (State of Qatar) and because of that was not effectively able to perform in the sense of a Fund. The one donor also dictated its terms, at least in the sense that the State of Qatar was pushing for the hard outcomes rather than the soft ones resulting in a very slim baseline activity (studies, training,..., etc) and the least deployment of advisors and consultants. This had in turn created the projects as fast rather than foundational projects, as envisaged by the DDS

**UNDF Structure:** When UNDF started it didn’t take into consideration the Technical Secretariat and the focus was on the projects rather than on how to implement these projects. Because of that and for long time there was no one fully responsible for overseeing the projects. When the Technical Secretariat was formed the money had already been distributed among the various projects, a situation that necessitated projects budget revision to get resources for the running of the Technical Secretariat. As described by one commentator: “It was a messy start;
people didn’t expect the Qatari money to come and when it came people were not well prepared”. Because of the rush, there was also limited time to look for the right calibre of staff in some projects; besides not giving enough time for training and investment in the capacities and orientation of the projects’ implementing and managing staff.

**Technical Secretariat Structure:** Although the TS included a structure, there were very limited resources to support that structure. Because of that the TS suffered serious technical gaps, especially M&E which was established not from the beginning but late in the life time of the projects (after one year), creating M&E as one of the weakest aspects in UNDF projects management and reporting. This explains the fact that reporting did not look at the high-level objective or outcomes but focused on the activities. It should also be noted that the TS should not be left to go or dissolved after the end of the FaST projects; it could have been kept running for fundraising and as a gatekeeper for the UNDF. In addition, the TS was not full time dedicated to the management of the FaST projects but was overstretched by other responsibilities outside the domain of the FaST projects.

**Distribution of resources:** The distribution of UNDF resources between the 13 UN agencies was severely criticised by the overwhelming majority of those consulted. The unfair allocation of resources between the agencies, the capture of resources by the powerful agencies and the allocation of resources for some UN agencies that have no or very limited presence in Darfur were major concerns raised. According to some commentators “the Qatari resources were the opportunity for many UN agencies to bridge some of their critical funding gaps”. The unfair distribution of resources among partner agencies was also stressed with the small agencies being in weak position to compete with the powerful ones. All this had resulted in the portrayal of UN agencies as competing agencies rather than cooperating ones.

**UN Agencies vs INGOs:** Related to the above, there is a wide consensus that unlike UN agencies that are mostly superstructures, the INGOs have wider presence and geographical outreach in Darfur with direct contact with the communities on the ground, an accumulated knowledge of the context and rich experience of working directly with the communities. Accordingly, the outcomes of the project would had been highly much greater if the projects were implemented by the INGOs or at least a mix of UN agencies and INGOs supported or an NGO window was created.

**Coordination:** Although a variety of coordination structures had been created by the Fund, the coherent coordination process at the higher level of the UNDF was not matched by close coordination at the lower level of working partner agencies where each agency committed itself to its own approach and failed to work closely together resulting in poor communication and synergies between the different projects. For example, in some projects each partner agency had a project manager resulting in weakly synchronized and sequenced activities instead of working closely together in a coherent sequence. In addition, not all implementing agencies were in the picture from the beginning. For example, UNIDO joined the project very late, just 6 months before the end of the project and therefore it was not part of the project design, and therefore minimal consultation and coordination with the lead agency existed.

**Flow of resources:** The slow flow of resources, in 6 instalments/tranches, and which not only resulted in implementation delays, but it also necessitated lot of budget revisions. With the high inflation rate and the dual exchange rate, most of the capital-intensive project faced significant difficulties to adapt with the situation and constantly increased market prices.

**FaST Approach:** The approach based on project principles and village-based interventions also had its limitation as it provided for the limited synergy and synchronization between the projects on the ground besides contributed
to poor coordination between the implementing and partner agencies. In the process the spatial socioeconomic and environmental dynamics of Darfur made imperative by the aridity of the region, its ecological variations and the continuous mobility of its population has been compromised. The cluster, area-based or regional planning approach that had proved its viability throughout the world could have been more appropriate.

**Project vs programme approach:** Linked to the above, the project approach, silos approach adopted in the FaST has demonstrated limited appropriateness compared to programmatic approaches. While limiting coherence, sequencing, synergy and coordination of the intervention, the project approach had also contributed to the scattering of the interventions, and therefore limited their outcomes. In addition, a programme spearheaded by one agency, could have provided for stronger management and better control of supervision over the projects. Similarly, recovery is more complex than humanitarian processes. It takes time and efforts and, by definition, planning and implementation should be for longer time. The programmatic approach allows for that synergy and coherence.

7. INTERAGENCY PROGRAMMING

Interagency programming is possibly the best way to go and holds the strong potential for genuine and articulated implementation of Humanitarian-Peace Nexus. Recognizing the complexity of this nexus, no single agency has the capacity to do that individually. The different UN agencies bring different skills and capacities. The comparative advantages of the different agencies provide a huge potential to capitalize on. Although the premise of joint programming or at least joined-up programming was great but the practicability, as demonstrated by the FaST projects, was a problem. This is substantiated by the followings:

- The very limited culture of working together among the implementing UN agencies where each agency was working alone, and coordination was minimal. Accordingly, and in spite of the coordination mechanisms created, synergy between projects was largely ad hoc depending on individual initiatives rather than being a systematic and planned process. Pre-implementation institutional processes of understanding each other, how to work together, and how to coordinate were not in place. This extends to issues of information and knowledge sharing.
- Most of the projects were done in hurry with minimal communication and consultation among partners. This also applies to the preparation of the projects proposals.
- The organizational capacities of the different UN agencies differ and that matters a lot. Some are much faster and others are slow. Reporting capacities among the partners were also not the same. Many of the participating agencies have no offices in Darfur or have few staff or restricted presence to certain States reflecting the limited capacities of these agencies to undertake informed recovery interventions in Darfur. Because of that most of the agencies relied on local partners who have limited capacities of implementation and therefore, compromised the effectiveness and efficiency of implementation.
- Not all agencies have the required competent staff. The staff was also overloaded (double or triple hatted) and very few agencies had staff members fully dedicated to the project.
- The prevailing political environment at the time of FaST implementation very much influenced the implementation and its outcomes as demonstrated by restrictions on staff movement, apparent lack of commitment to certain projects “what government described as sensitive projects” and the distorted decision-making process between the Centre and the States.

8. PARTNERSHIPS

- The UNDF agreement identified Darfur Regional Authority but in 2016, the Government of Sudan, following the results of the Darfur Referendum (11th – 13th April 2016), dissolved the Darfur Regional Authority
The DRA ministries also disappeared. The remaining DRA structures, the commissions, faced uncertainty in their structure and functioning and most halted their activities. This resulted in the absence of the main partners for several of the FaST Projects.

- Partnership with the Government was also problematic owing to the immaturity of the country’s federal system and the resultant distorted coordination relationship between the different levels of governance, especially between the Centre in Khartoum and the States. Sometimes projects in the field needed to coordinate with Khartoum.

- The erroneous assumption by the UNDF that the Government of the time is committed to facilitate the implementation of each project. That has turned false as it took some projects (e.g., Land Project) almost 8 months (33% of project life time) to get, after lengthy discussion between Khartoum and the five Darfur States, the full approval of the Government, and to practically start the project on the ground. This is in addition to the administrative restrictions imposed by HAC on certain projects to reach some targeted communities as it was the case of the Return Project. Engagement with certain Government institutions such as the police was also challenging.

- Problem of expectation management. Government institutions were very demanding with very high expectations from the projects providing for a lot of communication disturbances and in some instances perceived belligerency on the side of some institutions and staff.

- Although partner national NGOs had the advantage of grassroots presence and outreach, the capacity of these NGOs was very challenging as the majority of these organizations were established, nurtured and capacitated within the humanitarian rather than recovery culture. This had in turn negatively impacted the timely and quality implementation of the contracted activities.

- Limited investment in the institutional capacities of Government to lead and own the process while at the same time eaters for the sustainability of the interventions. This makes institutional support to Government capacities an important area of future intervention for the UNDF and UN agencies.

### 9. LESSONS LEARNED

- In spite of the overwhelming odds working against them, Darfur communities on the ground reflected strong preparedness and participation in the implementation of the projects, indicating the active agent of those communities to rebuild and change their lives, if even small amount of hope is offered to them;

- Darfur Women, both adults and youth, indicate strong readiness and commitment to engage and participate in the implementation of interventions that target them and address their livelihoods priorities and needs;

- The UNDF has huge potentialities to lead and promote Darfur transition from humanitarian to recovery, peace and long-term development. It just requires programmatically informed structure, better coordination, funding, a robust Secretariat and strong monitoring and evaluation;

- Darfur people are inherently very resilient (adaptation to natural environment and related livelihood options, accumulated indigenous knowledge, vibrant indigenous social protection safety nets, community organization and community governance institutions…. etc). National and international actors need to build on that. But for that, there is a need for wider lens where aspects of inherent resilience are rigorously studied and the possible changes created by the conflict and other structural factors of change are fully understood.

- Darfur has huge agricultural potentialities. There is an urgent need to make these potentials attractive to the youth. There is also room for improvement. It is mainly about the process. This needs good narrative about the potential jobs and how to invest in job creation.

- Most of the youth in the camps have for nearly two decades been raised and nurtured in the IDPs camps and do not want to return back. This is a real challenge that needs to be addressed within the frame of a comprehensive approach focusing on urban planning and development and integration into the urban economies;
• Partner UN agencies need to invest more time in understanding each other organizational culture and perspective. Seconded staff, working together, joint training programmes, and knowledge sharing, among others, could be the pillars of a feasible and value-added approach;
• FaST Projects should not be business as usual. They should be about establishing strong baseline activities including investment in research and an integrated approach based on innovative solutions. How to create diversity as a source of strength is a challenging undertaking that deserves patience, innovative programming and smart implementation;
• FaST Projects implemented activities that were previously humanitarian This shows that Darfur is currently ripe for recovery interventions and that this shift from humanitarian to recovery is not as difficult as used to be usually perceived. Many of the FaST interventions had also proved there are great potentials for major impacts and to guiding long term development and therefore need scaling up and consolidation. However, there is a need for the shift from project premise to programmatic premise founded on cluster, area-based approach with longer duration (minimum 5 years). However, the large number of implementing agencies may restrict the realization of a sequenced integrated programme;
• There is always a pressing need for institutionalized coordination and cooperation among implementing agencies (joint meetings, joint field missions, knowledge sharing…, etc).
• There is a huge demand for investment in capacity building at the various levels, from the communities and their respective organizations up to the three levels of governance;
• The integrated water management approach introduced to Darfur by UNEP has demonstrated its huge potential for the integration of the interventions and in promoting environmental conditions;
• Participatory land use mapping founded on STDM technique has demonstrated its value as an entry point for securing access rights to land and natural resources. The approach should be up-scaled and consolidated. Capacity building in STDM and investment in the technology related to it deserve special attention;
• There is an urgent need for mainstreaming solar energy into formal education through technical colleges. This essentially involves institutional investment in the capacities of government as well as availing the enabling environment for the private sector for more active engagement in innovative solutions and job creations. This could also be linked to the huge potentialities of Darfur and how to be effectively managed to sustain social peace and promote resilient development in Darfur;
• Darfur communities widely accepted and engaged in discussions focusing on women rights of access to land. This falsified the widely propagated stereotype that public discussion of women land rights as culturally restricted. This provided valuable opportunity for rigorous activity, including advocacy work, to promote and constitute women rights of access to land. Many women had also projected their voices demanding representation in customary institution to secure their right of access to land providing an entry point for reforming customary institutions, not only in Darfur but in Sudan at large;
• The strong linked between health and nutrition has strong potential as a foundation to maintain the synergy between projects and for promoting projects coordination and cooperation;
• The inseparable link between natural resource management, livelihoods and peacebuilding in Darfur that recognizes natural resources as the platform on which the diverse, competing and vaguely organized communities can be integrated and brought together into cooperative, collaborative and constructive negotiation processes around shared interests and collective rights while addressing priority peacebuilding and livelihood issues and concerns;
• The centrality of water in dry lands, such as Darfur, and its use as catalyst/dividend for implementation of other interventions targeting women empowerment, community organization and social capital development;
• There is always the need to consider the rainy season in the planning process;
• Sustainability requires heavy and articulated investment in government capacities;
And the initiative of scholarships for eligible candidates for Academy of Health Sciences selected by communities from within communities constitutes an innovative approach that is anticipated to impact Darfur positively in the near future. The initiative deserves compliment and should be expanded to other deprived, underserved communities and for other staff categories such as medical doctors and assistants.

**10. CONCLUDING REMARKS**

- There is ample empirical evidence that communities of Darfur on the ground, farmers as well as pastoralists, IDP, returnees and refugees reflect strong level of preparedness to participate in recovery projects targeting them, as reflected by the large number of people participated in the implementation of the projects as well as in the consultation workshop, the sensitization processes and capacity building sessions organized under the projects. Recognizing and legitimizing the huge potential of the poor and marginalized is an important social asset to capitalize on;
- Darfur women, both adults and youth, indicate strong readiness and commitment to engage and participate in the implementation of interventions that target them and address their livelihoods priorities and needs;
- The FaST Projects reflect important positive impacts on women including improvement of women economic situation; enhanced role of women in managing family resources, improved productive skills and knowledge, their organization and access to political and economic resources and other gender related roles/rights. The contribution to women and girls’ dignity and safety through provision of water supply, based on friendly technology, and constituting household latrines in an Open Defecation Free environment deserves compliment;
- The active participation of women and girls and their wide engagement in the projects have offered them power, self-confidence and improvement in agency (individual and collective capacities, knowledge and skills, attitudes, assets, actions, and access to services). In the process, the historically constituted gender gap in public life participation and decision making appears narrowing and a new social contract is emerging. However, the road to release and realize the huge potential of women participation and gender equity remains long;
- In post-conflict situations, there is always a need for peace dividends as a measure that mobilizes support for peace building. In this respect, and recognizing the scale of damage caused by the long years of the conflict, the implemented FaST projects reflect enormous relevance to the context of Darfur and to lead smart transitions to recovery and long-term development if the perceived programmatic weaknesses of the projects are addressed;
- The geographical distribution of the projects in the Five Darfur States as well as within the single State shows some injustices. Of the total 514 FaST implementation sites, 239 were in the two States of West and Central Darfur, compared to 79 in East Darfur, this applies to the distribution within the same State. In West Darfur 47 implementation sites were located in El Geneina Locality while no single activity was implemented in Kulbus Locality which is inhabited by population who is ethnically and culturally different from the surrounding cultural groups. This could be potentially a source of grievances and future social tension;
- Effectiveness of project implementation is generally high, over 85%. However, effectiveness tends to vary significantly between the UN agencies. While some are strong at delivering (100% achievement of physical targets), others were largely lagging behind not exceeding 50%-60% of the targets;
- The UNDF shows great relevance and huge potentials to lead a genuine post conflict recovery and to lead the transition from humanitarian to long term development. However, it just requires a programmatically informed structure, better coordination, controlled oversight, funding, a robust Secretariat and a strong monitoring and evaluation system.
• The UNDF TS reflected certain weaknesses for the purposes of monitoring, coordinating, and providing technical support to implementing agencies. Lack of sufficient funds and lack of M&E officers for almost one year contributed to that while creating M&E and reporting as apparent critical gaps;

• Some projects reflected enormous potentials for great impacts. Certain activities such as community participatory land use mapping founded on STDM technique, IWRM and investment in sand stabilized blocks technology require scaling up and consolidation;

• Paramedics selected by the communities and trained under the FaST Projects indicates an important investment in the future and for availing health cadre in areas previously not attractive for outsiders. This is an activity that deserves rigorous investment and scaling up;

• Investment and mainstreaming of solar energy technology into formal education through technical colleges including institutional investment in the capacities of the Government as well as availing the enabling environment for the private sector for more active engagement in innovative solutions and job creations is a promising technology for Darfur. This could also be linked to the huge natural resources’ potentialities of Darfur and how to be effectively managed to sustain social peace and promote resilient development in Darfur;

• The FaST Projects focused on the hardware while with limited attention given to the software interventions. Because of that, the FaST were founded on slim baseline activity;

• Although communities reflected strong commitment to the projects and their ownership, weak capacities of the Government together with the very short duration of the project, the limited time invested in capacity building, including community organization and the continued insecurities reflect potential sustainability challenges. The poorly perceived link of the projects to the ongoing project of the INGOs that work directly with the communities and their wide geographical outreach could have contributed positively to sustainability issues;

• The new political dispensation under the Constitutional Declaration mandates an increased focus on accountability processes, community engagement and empowering people to claim entitlements together with the signed Juba Peace Agreement that provides harmonized support to civil society and community governance, hold the potential of opening new horizons for recovery in Darfur and for sustaining what had already been achieved;

• Conclusions from Darfur previous peace agreements (Abuja 2006 and DDPD 2011) as well as from Sudan’s other peace agreements (the CPA 2005 and Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement 2006) demonstrate three important lessons: (i) That elite-brokered, transactional and piecemeal high-level agreements have not only failed to bring peace but have in most instances intensified conflict while adding to social polarization and fragmentation of communities on the ground. In the current fragile Transitional Context localizing the outcomes of the peace processes through institutionalizing and scaling up of community peace building is top priority; (ii) The agreements failed to effectively include women and youth groups or to address their political and social exclusion and marginalisation. Therefore, the agreements lacked ownership, recognition and accountability among these stakeholders; And (iii), a major pitfall of the previous agreements was their weak implementation and eventually the failure to translate into peace dividends that positively impact the livelihoods of the peace direct stakeholders, namely the victims of the conflict. For this to be realized, security remains a key issue.
Annexes

Annex 1: TOR for the evaluation

FINAL EVALUATION
of
The Foundational and Short-Term (FaST) Activities of the United Nations Fund for Recovery Reconstruction and Development in Darfur (UNDF)
January 2016 - June 2019
Terms of Reference (TOR)

BACKGROUND

After a decade of conflict and displacement, the 2011 Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) strengthened the peace process and laid the groundwork for recovery and reconstruction. The Darfur Regional Authority (DRA), Government of Sudan (GoS) and the international community agreed on the need to have a coordinated and comprehensive strategy for supporting peace and development in the region. In accordance with the provisions of the DDPD, the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission (DJAM) was conducted in the latter part of 2012. Informed by the needs and priorities of communities, identified through comprehensive consultative workshops in all five Darfur states and the refugee communities in Chad, the Darfur Development Strategy (DDS) was developed. The DDS offers a sequenced, coordinated and holistic plan for equitable, sustainable and participatory development, which is vital to move Darfur out of a cycle of conflict and poverty, towards a stable and prosperous future.

The six-year strategy to meet both social and infrastructural needs, totals US$7,245,000,000, with the Foundational and Short-Term (FaST) activities amounting to US$177,400,000. There are four distinct channels to direct the various sources of funding and embed these in the coordination mandate of the Darfur Coordination Board, as follows:

- Coordinated bilateral funding; Government funding through the national budget and the Darfur Recovery and Development Fund (DRDF);
- Private investor funding; and,
- a ‘Darfur Facility’ trust fund established by the United Nations.

United Nations Fund for Recovery Reconstruction and Development in Darfur (UNDF)

The UNDF was established under the overall leadership of the former Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), represented by the UN Resident Coordinator, and with participation of the Government of Sudan (GoS). All programmes/projects funded by the UNDF are in support of, and strictly aligned with the priorities of the GoS and the former DRA, as described in the DDS, ensuring full national ownership. The UNDF complements other support that will be provided for recovery and development in Darfur by Sudan’s partners and that will bring strategic value in developing capacity and promoting sustainability. The UNDF enhances coherence, transparency and accountability in the implementation of key components of the DDS.

UNDF is overseen and guided by a Steering Committee (SC), co-chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator. The day-to-day management of the fund is performed by a Technical Secretariat overseen by UNDP.

The Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTF Office) is the UNDF’s Administrative Agent.
The UNDF was established to support the efficient implementation of key components of the Darfur Development Strategy. Specifically, it seeks to:

- Restore peace, security, and social stability.
- Improve government functionality at all levels.
- Strengthen the civil administration.
- Rehabilitate, reconstruct and construct physical, institutional and social infrastructure in post conflict Darfur; and
- Implement a comprehensive structural reform of health and educational institutions, especially Universities, in order to transform Darfur into a developed society in terms of technology, industry agriculture and trade.

To this end, the Darfur Development Strategy is supported by 3 interlinked pillars. The Governance, Justice and Reconciliation pillar aims to contribute policy support, technical assistance and capacity enhancement to State governments to enable them to more effectively execute their mandate, especially at the local (decentralised) level, and thus oversee recovery of the region and initiate the revival, staffing, equipping and maintenance of basic services, and support to conflict-affected populations through the provision of security, community policing and access to justice, compensation and land settlement. The main objective of the Reconstruction pillar is to support the recovery and stabilisation of war-affected populations, whose economic and social life have been severely disrupted. Fundamental to any recovery programme is the return and/or resettlement of displaced people, the construction and restoration of physical infrastructure and basic service recovery, such as water supply in villages and for agricultural usage and livestock, schools, health posts and police stations, as well as linking communities and markets by constructing and improving vital road, rail and air links, promoting resource-efficient housing and restoring productive systems. The main objective of the Economic Recovery pillar is to contribute positively towards poverty alleviation and transitioning Darfur to development in an equitable and environmentally sustainable manner. This will be achieved by technical and material support to key livelihoods, the promotion of the private sector, especially the creation of employment opportunities and access to financial services and ensuring the sustainability of productive sectors through appropriate natural resource management.

The Foundational and Short-Term (FaST) activities
The FaST activities are funded through the UNDF and demonstrate the benefits of peaceful cooperation and bringing people together to sustain the aspirations of a better future for all achieved through the DDPD and the DDS. Together they ensure that people invest in their future, have a say in the running of their communities, and are equipped with the right tools and skills to make a living. Whether IDPs, refugees or returnees, ex-combatants or host communities, farmers or nomads, young men or women, they are all key actors and decision-makers in the creation of a future Darfur guided by peace, not war, and are invaluable partners as the FaST activities are implemented.

The FaST activities are the initial and immediate actions that have kick started the longer-term objectives of the DDS, providing durable development solutions and peace dividends in the five Darfur states. Whilst laying the foundations for longer-term development, the FaST activities bring tangible results ranging from providing out-of-school children with a new chance at education and gainful employment, water and health facilities, market

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8 UNDP, UN Women, UNICEF, UNHABITAT, UN-ILO, UNEP, UNIDO, UNFPA, UNHCR, IOM, UNOPS

9 All the activities under the Foundational and Short-Term Activities are linked to the five outcomes of the current UNDAF (2018-2021) and SDGs relevant targets to these outcomes accordingly.
rehabilitation and microfinance to support local entrepreneurship and trade, to building environmentally sustainable shelters and power supplies to facilitate the safe return and reintegration for IDPs, refugees and ex-combatants. These FaST activities complement and coordinate with ongoing projects being implemented by UN agencies, GoS and other development partners. They ensure coherence and adherence to the priorities identified through the DDS and close coordination and complementarity amongst the participating humanitarian and development actors.

A total of 12 FaST activities have been implemented by 13 UN partners throughout the five states of Darfur. Ten of these activities involved joint projects with 2 partners or more implementing the activity. The total funding available to the 12 activities was $88.5 million.¹⁰

**PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION**

The main purpose of the evaluation is:

- To establish and document the positive impact & any unintended consequences of UNDF funded activities; to validate UNDF FaST activities results in terms of achievements toward the fund goal and outputs.
- To assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, economy, impact and sustainability of UNDF interventions and its contribution to early recovery and development of Darfur.
- To document lessons learned, best practices, success stories and challenges to inform future initiatives.
- To formulate informed recommendations on future programmatic vision for UNDF, including the processes and governance mechanisms of the Fund.

**SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION**

The scope of the final evaluation will involve the following components:

- UNDF achievements through projects funded under the Foundational and Short-Term Activities (FaST) between January 2016 – December 2018, therefore evaluators will be required to seek feedback and interact with the direct beneficiaries and communities in Darfur.
- The modality and methods used for defining priority areas, selection of projects and disbursement of funds and the advantage and disadvantage of each fund disbursement mechanism; hence the evaluator will have to obtain feedback from UNDF implementing partners, donors, local actors, and other stakeholders.
- The organizational structure of UNDF and the Technical Secretariat and its ability in monitoring projects, providing technical support, collating lessons learned and sharing them with UNDF partners and other actors, and coordination of exerted efforts.
- The synergism and complementarity between UNDF and other similar programs and funding mechanism e.g. SHF, DCPSF.

**EVALUATION OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS**

The evaluation will assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, inclusiveness, and sustainability of UNDF interventions and achievements so far. The evaluation questions will follow the OECD DAC Criteria. More specifically, the evaluation will address:

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¹⁰ Please find the list of the project partners, stakeholders and donors annexed to this ToR.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>• What is the relevance and contribution of the FaST activities to overall early recovery and development in Darfur and restoring confidence and social cohesion? (utilization of objective methods/approach is highly desired).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Effectiveness | • Assess the scope of achievement of the activities against the defined outputs and targets:  
• To what extent were the originally designed objectives of FaST activities realistic?  
• What factors were crucial for the achievement or failure to achieve the activities objectives so far? |
| Efficiency | • Assess adequacy and efficiency in planning, monitoring and reporting systems and use of both material and financial resources.  
• Assess the cost effectiveness of disbursing and utilizing the fund at the level of the secretariat and implementing partners and ensure that principles of value for money are taken into consideration. |
| Impact | • Assess the impact of project interventions on the beneficiaries’, both direct/indirect beneficiaries.  
• Capture and describe the direct and indirect, intended and unintended, positive and negative effects of FaST activities interventions.  
• At least one evaluation question to address gender related projects’ impact |
| Inclusiveness | • Establish the level of community participation of beneficiaries particularly women and youth and other vulnerable groups  
• Assess how FaST activities interventions contributed to women active participation in early recovery and development.  
• Assess the extent to which FaST interventions empowered women and improve their control of resources and access to basic services.  
• Assess and confirm the ability of the program implementers to maintain impartiality and respect the UN programming principles including the do no harm principles.  
• How has partnerships used to promote GEWE (Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women) at the national level  
• What evidence is there to show UNDF projects interventions contribution to GEWE (Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women) in each of the project outcomes |
| Sustainability | • Assess the overall project, focusing on the potential for the project to be owned by the beneficiaries and for the benefits to continue after project closure.  
• Assess the extent to which UNDF supported process, capacities and systems that will likely support the continued stabilization, early recovery and development at community and state level. |
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY/APPROACH

The evaluation methodology should employ a participatory results-oriented approach that involves project implementers, targeted beneficiaries and other community members, UNDF-TS, UNDF donors and other relevant stakeholders and will provide evidence of achievement of expected outputs through the use of quantitative and qualitative methods. The consultative element of the evaluation is crucial for building up a consensus about the project’s overall rationale and desired outcomes. Field visits will be organized to facilitate the process of evaluation. The process steps of the evaluation will include:

- **Internal consultations**: Ensure common objectives and set clear expectations of process and results.
- **Desk review of UNDF relevant document e.g. UNDF-TS reports and implementing partners, IP meeting documents, monitoring visits reports, monitoring tools, UNDF-TOR and other related documents.**
- **Develop the detailed evaluation framework, design and methodology and the evaluation instruments and tools; (the matrix should include clear information about the data collection tools and data analysis methods (including quantitative, qualitative methods and triangulation) and major limitations of the methodology including steps taken to mitigate them**
- **Develop the evaluation work plan and the instrument that will be used during the exercise.**
- **Ensure gender equality and women’s empowerment are included in the methodology for addressing gender-specific issues.**
- **Draft Inception Report not more than 10 pages in addition to annexes and present to UNDF Stakeholders.**
- **Field and project sites visit for collection of quantitative & qualitative data from beneficiaries and community members, partners, implementing partners, government, beneficiary institutions etc. through case study, key informants’ interviews, in-depth interview, focus group discussion, cross-sectional survey, meeting, etc;**
- **Draft a report with the evaluation findings: (Evaluation report length is expected to be about 50 pages plus annexes with an executive summary of not more than 3 pages describing key findings and recommendations).**
- **Present the evaluation findings to relevant stakeholders and facilitate discussion to draw out the way forward.**
- **Evaluation report audit trail: Comments and changes by the evaluator in response to the draft report should be retained by the evaluator to how the evaluator has addressed comments**
- **Final evaluation report. The evaluator will ensure that the report, to the extent possible, complies with the UNEG Quality Checklist for Evaluation Reports and follows the required report format (format is in Annex)**

The proposed approach and methodology should be considered as flexible guidelines rather than final requirements. The evaluators will have an opportunity to make their inputs and propose changes in the evaluation design. The consultant will be required to confirm the reliability and the quality of collected data through triangulation and diversification of sources and methods/approaches of collection.

EVALUATION STAKEHOLDERS: UNDF donors, UNCT members, UNDF projects’ beneficiaries, implementing partner, government bodies and other development actors working in Darfur Region.11

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11 See the annex list of evaluation stakeholders
EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION AND REQUIREMENTS
A small oversight team will be established from UNDP and UNDF Partners to ensure the quality of the process and the product.

The evaluation team will consist of a team leader (First National Consultant), with proven experience in evaluation of development projects and one international consultant to administratively support the evaluation, and two national independent consultants.

Experiences requirements for the first national consultant who is the Team leader for the evaluation:

The team leader should have the following skills and expertise, at a minimum:
- Master’s degree in a relevant area including political science, international development or evaluation with at least 10 years’ experience.
- Knowledge of UNDP’s Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) platform preferred; experience of evaluations completed with the guidance of a multi-stakeholder reference group.
- Significant experience conducting evaluations in complex, insecure and conflict-affected environments; including data management and analysis skills.
- Demonstrated experience applying different types of applied research, evaluations, impact assessments, and other relevant methodologies in conflict-affected environments.
- Experience in working with government officials, UN system, international development community, civil society actors, and populations affected by violence and insecurity;
- Experience working in Sudan and Darfur preferred;
- Strong analytical skills, including qualitative and quantitative research and knowledge on gender analysis.
- Excellent communication skills, written and oral, including in cross-cultural contexts.
- Ability to plan effectively, prioritize, complete tasks quickly, adapt to changing context and demonstrated leadership in challenging environments.

The evaluation team leader must also have solid experience in the evaluation of program effectiveness in a volatile and conflict context. The evaluation is guided by the UN principles of equity, justice, gender equality and respect for diversity; they should exhibit the following skills and experience:

- Knowledge and experience of implementing various types of evaluation methodologies.
- A strong record in designing and leading reviews and evaluations, in Darfur or similar context.
- Should have an academic background and/or training and/or work experience in development.
- Extensive knowledge of and proven successful application of qualitative and quantitative research and evaluation methods.
- Experience of evaluations completed with the guidance of a multi-stakeholder reference group.
- Data management and analysis skills.
- Process management skills including communications and facilitation skills.
- Demonstrated excellent presentation and report writing skills in Arabic and English.
- Good understanding and knowledge of Darfur traditional customs, socio-economic and political economy contexts and complications to support quality data collection and extraction. At least one of the members must have specific experience in gender mainstreaming.
EXPECTED OUTPUTS AND DELIVERABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliverables/ Outputs</th>
<th>Estimated Duration to Complete</th>
<th>Target Due Dates</th>
<th>Review/quality assurance and Approvals Required</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data collection, desk review and Summary of reviewed documents</td>
<td>3 days</td>
<td>15-18 Nov</td>
<td>UNDP Deputy Resident Representative (RR/P) for Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation Framework and work plan</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>20-22 Nov</td>
<td>UNDP Deputy Resident Representative (RR/P) for Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meetings with stakeholders</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>23-25 Nov</td>
<td>UNDP Deputy Resident Representative (RR/P) for Programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Timeframe for the evaluation/ duration of the contract:
The duration of the consultancy is for 22 working days over the course of three months Nov-Dec 2020. The remuneration will be paid as a lump sum after the final draft is reviewed and accepted by UNDF-TS.

Institutional Arrangement:
The contractor will be directly supervised by the UNDP Deputy RR for Programmes.

Responsibilities of the evaluator:

Responsibilities of UNDP: The duration of the consultancy is for 22 working days over the course of three months (Nov-Dec 2020).

BUDGET AND SCHEDULE
Distribution of funding will be carried out as follows: The payments to the Consultant will be made in three tranches as set out below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Milestone</th>
<th>Fees payable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Inception report presented to relevant stakeholders</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Draft report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Final Report*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evaluation Ethics:
Evaluation consultants will be held to the highest ethical standards and are required to sign a code of conduct upon acceptance of the assignment. UN evaluations are conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) 'Ethical Guidelines for Evaluations'.

Annexes:
- Annexes to be provided will include:
- UNDF ToR and Results Framework
- UNDF Projects Progress Reports
- Field Monitoring Reports
- List of key stakeholders and partners
- UNDF (Project Document) Result framework.
- List of projects supported
- Evaluation matrix
- Key documents for desk review

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12 Project document of the: Foundational and Short-Term (FaST) activities of the United Nations Fund for Recovery Reconstruction and Development in Darfur (UNDF)

13 Access at: [http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/100](http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/100)
- Required format for the evaluation report
- Code of conduct

**Expertise of the Evaluation Team Leader (National Consultant)**

1. Specialized Knowledge in evaluations and research especially in a volatile context.
2. Experience in evaluations and research, data management and analysis of development programmes
3. Experience on working on evaluating of development projects in the Region; similar experience in Sudan and Darfur is desirable.
4. Work for UNDP/ major multilateral/ or bilateral programmes
5. Experience in Evaluation of MPTF funds.
6. Quality assurance procedure by the applicant.
7. Reputation of the organization and staff (competence/ reliability)

**Duty Station:**

The duty station will be Khartoum with virtual meetings with UNDF projects stockholders.
# Annex 2:
## Evaluation Key Questions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Key questions</th>
<th>Source of information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Relevance** | • How relevant are the implemented FaST activities to the context of early recovery and development in Darfur?  
• How relevant are the implemented FaST activities to government recovery priorities in Darfur  
• To what extent have the implemented FaST activities addressed the priorities of different groups and stakeholders  
• To what extent have the implemented FaST activities addressed the priorities of women and youth in Darfur | UNDF Projects Progress Reports; Field Monitoring Reports; Project Completion Reports; Projects Physical Achievements data; Back to Office Reports; interviews and consultation meetings |
| **Effectiveness** | • What are the achievement of the activities against the defined outputs and targets:  
• To what extent were the originally designed objectives of FaST activities realistic?  
• How do you assess the effectiveness of implementation; coordination, and M&E of the interventions?  
• What were the crucial factors that influenced success or failure to achieve the planned activities | UNDF Projects Progress Reports; Field Monitoring Reports; Project Completion Reports; Back to Office Reports; interviews and consultation meetings |
| **Efficiency** | • How do you Assess adequacy and efficiency in planning, monitoring and reporting systems?  
• How do you Assess adequacy and efficiency in use of both material and financial resources?  
• How do you assess the cost effectiveness of disbursing and utilizing the fund at the project level? How do you assess the planning, adequacy and efficiency in addressing women and youth priorities?  
• To what extent do you think issues of environment, climate change and capacity development of stakeholders have been embedded in project planning? | UNDF ToR and Results; Framework UNDF Projects Progress Reports; Field Monitoring Reports; Project Completion Reports; Back to Office Reports; interviews and consultation meetings |
| **Inclusiveness (including gender and youth)** | • To what extent the principles of inclusivity have been adhered to in planning and implementation?  
• Any specific groups who have been left behind in the planning and implementation of the activities  
• Any particular groups who benefited more than the others from FaST projects? If yes qualify  
• Describe the benefits gained by women and youth from the projects  
• To what extent have FaST interventions contributed to women and youth active participation in early recovery and development? What evidence confirms that?  
• To what extent have FaST interventions empowered women and youth, improve their role in society, their control of resources and access to basic services? Any evidence to confirm that?  
• Assess and confirm the ability of the program implementers to maintain impartiality and respect the UN programming principles iincluding the do no harm principles14? | UNDF ToR and Results Framework; UNDF Projects Progress Reports; Field Monitoring Reports; Project Completion Reports; Back to Office Reports; interviews and consultation meetings |
| **Lessons learned** | • What are the main lessons to be learned from the experience of FaST projects experience (planning, implementation, impacts...etc)? | UNDF Projects Progress Reports; Field Monitoring Reports; Project Completion Reports; Back to Office Reports; interviews and consultation meetings |
| **Impacts** | • Capture and describe the direct and indirect, intended and unintended, positive and negative effects of FaST interventions on the recovery situation in Darfur | Field Monitoring Reports; Project Completion Reports; Back to Office Reports; |

14 UN Programming principles refer to the: Result Based Management (RBM), Gender Equality, Environmental Sustainability, Human Rights Bases Approached and Do No Harm Principles.
| Sustainability of impacts | • What are main impacts of FaST interventions on both direct and indirect beneficiaries  
• Capture and describe the direct and indirect, intended and unintended, positive and negative effects of FaST interventions on women and youth in Darfur  
• To what extent FaST activities contributed to:  
  - Overall security in Darfur  
  - Minimization of conflicts  
  - Restoring confidence and social cohesion  
  - Reduced livelihoods vulnerabilities and enhanced resilience to  
  - Empowerment of Darfur CSOs  
  - Improved capacities of government institutions  
• To what extent FaST projects have achieved their designed objectives | interviews and consultation meetings; documentation of successful stories and best practices |
| UNDF as funding modality | • What is the potential for the implemented interventions to be owned by the stakeholders and for the benefits to continue after project closure? What evidence are there to substantiate that?  
• Assess the extent to which UNDF supported process, capacities and systems that will likely support continued stabilization, early recovery and development at community and state level | Field Monitoring Reports; Project Completion Reports; Back to Office Reports; interviews and consultation meetings |
| UNDF structure and management | • Assess viability/relevance of UNDF as funding mechanism  
• Main strengths and weaknesses of UNDF as funding mechanism  
• Assess UNDF methods used for defining priority targeted areas, selection of projects  
• Assess viability, control measures and efficiency for disbursement of funds  
• The main lessons to be learned from UNDF as funding mechanism? | UNDF ToR and Results Framework; UNDF Projects Progress Reports; Field Monitoring Reports; Project Completion Reports; Back to Office Reports; interviews and consultation meetings |
| UNDF structure and management | • Assess the cost effectiveness of disbursing and utilizing the fund at the level of the UNDF Secretariat and implementing partners  
• To what extent the principles of value for money were taken into consideration and ensured | UNDF ToR and Results Framework; UNDF Projects Progress Reports; Field Monitoring Reports; Project Completion Reports; Back to Office Reports; interviews and consultation meetings |
| UNDF Technical Secretariat Capacities | • Assess capacities of UNDF Technical Secretariat for monitoring, coordinating, providing technical support, collating lessons and best practices | UNDF ToR and Results Framework; UNDF Projects Progress Reports; Field Monitoring Reports; Project Completion Reports; Back to Office Reports; interviews and consultation meetings |
| Synergy and Complementarity | • What synergism and complementarity between UNDF FaST interventions and other recovery interventions in Darfur, including those executed by implementing partners and other actors? | UNDF ToR and Results Framework; UNDF Projects Progress Reports; Field Monitoring Reports; Project Completion Reports; Back to Office Reports; interviews and consultation meetings |
| Coordination and Knowledge sharing | • How good is the level of coordination between UNDF and other actors in Darfur  
• Assess knowledge production and management by UNDF and the mechanisms in place  
• How adequate is the degree of knowledge production by UNDF? How adequate are levels of knowledge sharing and mechanisms set for that purpose? | UNDF ToR and Results Framework; UNDF Projects Progress Reports; Field Monitoring Reports; Project Completion Reports; Back to Office Reports; interviews and consultation meetings |
Annex 3:
List of individuals met and consulted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>E-mail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eltaj Tajalassfia</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td><a href="mailto:eltaj.tajalassfia@undp.org">eltaj.tajalassfia@undp.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansermet, Lorence</td>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td><a href="mailto:l.ansermet@unido.org">l.ansermet@unido.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Adam Ibrahim</td>
<td>Darfur Land Commission</td>
<td>0912157054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ElMardi Ibrahim</td>
<td>FAO</td>
<td><a href="mailto:elmardi.ibrahim@fao.org">elmardi.ibrahim@fao.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martina CARRIERI</td>
<td>IOM</td>
<td><a href="mailto:mcarrieri@iom.int">mcarrieri@iom.int</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imaledin ISMAIL</td>
<td>WHO</td>
<td><a href="mailto:ismail@who.int">ismail@who.int</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elmonshawe Mohammed</td>
<td>WHO</td>
<td><a href="mailto:monshawy@hotmail.com">monshawy@hotmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismail Mohamed Abbas</td>
<td>UNOPS</td>
<td><a href="mailto:ismailma@unops.org">ismailma@unops.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah Elimam Ibrahim</td>
<td>UNOPS</td>
<td><a href="mailto:salah@unops.org">salah@unops.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maha Alamir</td>
<td>UN-Women</td>
<td><a href="mailto:mahaamir.1@hotmail.com">mahaamir.1@hotmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdel Rahman Mustafa</td>
<td>UN-Habitat</td>
<td><a href="mailto:abdelrahman.mustafa@un.org">abdelrahman.mustafa@un.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wala Abdelmuati</td>
<td>UN-Habitat</td>
<td><a href="mailto:wala.abdelmuati@un.org">wala.abdelmuati@un.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Anodam</td>
<td>UNDP, El Fashir</td>
<td><a href="mailto:john.anodam@undp.org">john.anodam@undp.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomokazu Serizawa</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td><a href="mailto:tomo.serizawa@undp.org">tomo.serizawa@undp.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faisal Sabir</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td><a href="mailto:faisal.sabir@undp.org">faisal.sabir@undp.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fouad Yassa</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td><a href="mailto:fyassa@unicef.org">fyassa@unicef.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suzan Abdelslam</td>
<td>ILO</td>
<td><a href="mailto:abdelslam@ilo.org">abdelslam@ilo.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kahatir Haroun Nahar</td>
<td>ILO</td>
<td><a href="mailto:nahar@ilo.org">nahar@ilo.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abeer Salam</td>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td><a href="mailto:salam@unfpa.org">salam@unfpa.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seebawih Mustafa</td>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td><a href="mailto:semustafa@unfpa.org">semustafa@unfpa.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Ahmed</td>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td><a href="mailto:mohaahmed@unfpa.org">mohaahmed@unfpa.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natalie Groom</td>
<td>Former coordinator of TS</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Natalie.groom@redcross.se">Natalie.groom@redcross.se</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flemming Nilesen</td>
<td>UN Environment</td>
<td><a href="mailto:flemming.nielsen@un.org">flemming.nielsen@un.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansour Ameer Nail</td>
<td>Reconciliation and Truth C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mubara Zariug A. Alla</td>
<td>Voluntary Return Comm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Mohamed Adam</td>
<td>DLC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mohamed Ali Abbakar</td>
<td>DLC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 4:
List of supporting documents reviewed

Darfur Regional Authority, 2013-2019 Developing Darfur: A recovery and reconstruction Strategy DDS, 2019


Peace Research Institute PRI, 2020, Lessons learned from Sudan’s previous peace agreements, Report to the British Council, Khartoum.

UN Country Team Sudan, (n.d), UNDF Rules of Procedure


UN Darfur Fund UNDF, Final Report 2016-2019

UN Darfur Fund UNDF, Annual Report 2018

UN Darfur Fund UNDF, Annual Report 2017

UN Darfur Fund UNDF, Annual Report 2016

UN Darfur Fund UNDF, Field Monitoring Reports

United Nations Fund for Recovery Reconstruction and Development in Darfur (UNDF) Terms of Reference, 2014

UN Darfur Fund UNDF, Strengthening land management for peaceful coexistence in Darfur, Final Programme Narrative Report, Dec 2018

UN Darfur Fund UNDF, Darfur Community Based Reintegration and Stabilisation Programme (DCBRSP), Final Programme Narrative Report, 2019

UN Darfur Fund UNDF, Rehabilitation and Construction of Feeder Roads and Crossing Points in Darfur, Sudan, Final Narrative Report, June 2020

UN Darfur Fund UNDF, Construction of Public Buildings/Facilities and Housing in Return Sites and Urban Settings, Final Narrative Reporting Format

UN Darfur Fund UNDF, Increased Access to and Use of Sustainable Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Services Underpinned by Improved Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) in Darfur, Final Narrative Reporting Format,

UN Darfur Fund UNDF, Commence Upgrading and Rehabilitation of the Existing Health Facilities and Basic Health Services in selected return sites in the five states of Darfur, Final Programme Narrative Report, 2019

UN Darfur Fund UNDF, Promotion of Sustainable Return and Reintegration of IDPs and Refugees in Darfur, Final Programme Narrative Report, 2019

UN Darfur Fund UNDF, Recovery of Livelihoods


Annex 5: Code of Conduct

UNEG Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System
UNEG, March 2008

United Nations Evaluation Group – Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System

Evaluation Staff Agreement Form
To be signed by all staff engaged full or part time in evaluation at the start of their contract.

Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System
Name of Staff Member: Omer Abdalla Moh Egemi
I confirm that I have received and understood, and will abide by the United Nations Evaluation Group Code of Conduct for Evaluation. Signed at (place) on (date)

Signed at (place) on (date)  

Khartoum, 03 May 2021
UNEG Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System
UNEG, March 2008

United Nations Evaluation Group – Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System

Evaluation Staff Agreement Form
To be signed by all staff engaged full or part time in evaluation at the start of their contract.

Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System

Name of Staff Member: Musa Adam Abdul Jalil
I confirm that I have received and understood, and will abide by the United Nations Evaluation Group Code of Conduct for Evaluation. Signed at (place) on (date)

Signed at (place) on (date)  

Khartoum, 03 May 2021